Islamist Violent Extremism and the Fragile African State: The Case in Kenya

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DECLARATION

I, 2017562824, Benjamin Mokoena, declare that the thesis that I herewith submit for the qualification of Philosophiae Doctor (PhD) in Political Science, in the Department of Political Studies and Governance, Faculty of Humanities, University of the Free State, is my own independent work, and that I have not previously submitted it for a qualification at another institution of higher education.

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ABSTRACT

What we know, and how we know about state fragility, Islamist violent extremism (IVE), and countering Islamist violent extremism (CIVE), is fiercely contested. It is no different in the case of state fragility, IVE, and CIVE, in the context of Kenya. The research aim was therefore to critically examine the relationship between state fragility, IVE, and CIVE (the case), in Kenya (the context). The Fragile States Index (FSI) was used as an analytical measuring instrument of state fragility. The research design is an explanatory, single-embedded, longitudinal, and contextualised case study, enabling a theory-based, empirical, retroductive, and deductive-inductive analysis. Three purposeful and snowball sampling-based research methods (elite interviews, field research, and a literature and data study) enabled triangulation within and between data sources. Kenya, as a veritable setting, was purposefully selected for being representative of the case.

State fragility is defined by underperformance, misperformance, insecurity, violence (structural, direct, and cultural), fault-lines, and institutional failure at macro, meso, and micro levels of the state. The properties of state fragility, inclusive of the social structures that subsist in the fragile state, have causal capacity and tendency, providing not only the context and opportunity for, but actively generating Islamist violent extremism and impediments to CIVE, hence the failure of CIVE. The conduct of IVE and CIVE, in turn, help to compound state fragility. The combined observable outcome in Kenya are the persistent insecurity dilemma, the fragility trap, and the conflict trap. True to the new-wars paradigm and entangling a congeries of state and non-state actors, IVE and CIVE are a mixture of ‘war, crime, and human rights abuses’, which both add division and deepen division in an already divided society. True to its intractable nature, the long-war in Kenya will not be won by hard power. Much rather, it may be resolved by a negotiated social contract founded on inclusive social structures, institutions, norms, and values.

In placing the fragile African state, in this case Kenya, at the centre of the discourse on state fragility, IVE and CIVE, the study makes a significant and original scientific contribution. It reveals the debilitating and conflict-generating properties of state fragility that initiate the causal chain that yield both IVE and impediments to CIVE. CIVE must therefore first account for and weigh the conditions and constraints created by state fragility. The study has also exposed the dangers of ineffective and counterproductive CIVE that privilege regime survival and bolstering state institutions over social cohesion and state legitimacy. Kenya reveals causal sequences (with causal patterns and causal mechanisms) that shed light on similar contexts in sub-Saharan Africa. This is greatly significant given the growing levels of state fragility and Islamist violent extremism, and the persistent challenges of CIVE in this subregion.

KEY WORDS

State fragility, Islamism, Islamist violent extremism, countering Islamist violent extremism, Kenya, radicalisation, deradicalisation, terrorism, counter-terrorism, the long-war, resilience, state-building, Critical Realism, single-embedded-longitudinal case study.

OPSOMMING

Beide wát ons weet, en hóé ons weet van staatskwesbaarheid, gewelddadige Islamitiese ekstremisme (GIE) en bestryding van gewelddadige Islamitiese ekstremisme (BGIE), word steeds vurig in akademisese sirkels gedebatteer. Dit is geensins anders met staatskwesbaarheid, GIE en BGIE in die konteks van Kenia nie. Die navorsingsdoel was gevolglik om die verwantskap tussen staatskwesbaarheid, GIE en BGIE (die geval) in Kenia (die konteks) krities te ondersoek. Die Kwesbare Staatsindeks (KSI) is as analitiese meetinstrument van staatskwesbaarheid aangewend. Die navorsingsontwerp is 'n verhelderende, enkel-ingebedde, logitudinale en gekontekstualiseerde gevallestudie, wat ruimte laat vir 'n teoriegebaseerde, empiriese, retroduktiewe en deduktief-induktiewe analise. Drie doelmatige en sneeubalsteekproef-gebaseerde navorsingsmetodes (elite onderhoude, veldwerk, en 'n literatuur- en datastudie) het ruimte geskep vir triangulering binne en tussen inligtingsbronne. Kenia, as 'n outentieke geval, is doelmatig as verteenwoordigende gevallestudie geselekteer.

Staatskwesbaarheid word gedefinieer deur onderprestasie, wanprestasie, onveiligheid en gewelddadigheid (struktureel, direk, kultureel) se breuklyne, en institusionele mislukking op makro-, meso- en mikrovlakke van die staat. Eienskappe van staatskwesbaarheid, die sosiale strukture wat heers in die kwesbare staat ingesluit, openbaar kousale vermoë en geneigdheid, wat nie alleen die konteks en geleenthede vir GIE skep nie, maar ook aktief beide GIE en belemmernisse teen BGIE genereer, en sodoende die mislukking van BGIE tot gevolg het. Die gedrag van GIE en BGIE, op hul beurt, dra merkbaar by tot staatskwesbaarheid. Die gesamentlike waarneembare uitkoms hiervan in Kenia is die voortslepende onveiligheidsdilemma en die kwesbaarheids- en konflikslokvalle. Getrou aan die neo-oorlogsvoeringsparadigma en verwikkeling van 'n warboel van staats- en nie-staatsakteurs, manifesteer GIE en BGIE in 'n ongesonde mengsel van "oorlogs-, misdaads- en menseregtemisdrywe" ('war, crime, and human rights abuses') wat samelewingsverdeeldheid beide aanwakker en verdiep. Die komplekse aard van lang-oorlog (long-war) in Kenia beteken dat 'n oplossing nie met absolutêre mag bereik sal word nie, maar veel eerder deur 'n onderhandelde ooreenkoms gebaseer op inklusiewe sosiale strukture, instellings, norme en waardes.

Deur die kwesbare staat, in hierdie geval, Kenia, sentraal tot die diskoers oor staatskwesbaarheid, GIE en BGIE te plaas, maak hierdie studie 'n betekenisvolle en oorspronklike bydrae tot die wetenskap. Dit openbaar die verlammende en konflikskeppende eienskappe van staatskwesbaarheid wat die kousale ketting van gebeure aktiveer wat beide GIE en belemmernisse tot BGIE aan die gang sit. In BGIE moet die voorwaardes vir, en beperkinge teen staatskwesbaarheid oorweeg word. Hierdie studie het ook die blootlegging van oneffektiewe en teenproduktiewe BGIE, wat regimeoorlewing en versterking van staatsinstellings voorop stel ten koste van samelewingskohesie en staatslegitimiteit. Kenia as gevallestudie openbaar ‘n kousale orde van gebeure (met kousale patrone en meganismes) wat lig werp op vergelykbare kontekste in sub-Sahara Afrika. Dit is hoogs betekenisvol in die lig van groeiende vlakke van beide staatskwesbaarheid en gewelddadige Islamitiese ekstremisme, en die voortslepende uitdagings met BGIE in hierdie substreek.

SLEUTELBEGRIPPE

Staatskwesbaarheid, Islamisme, gewelddadige Islamitiese ekstremisme, bekamping van gewelddadige Islamitiese ekstremisme, Kenia, radikalisering, deradikalisering, terrorisme, anti-terrorisme, die voortslepende oorlog/langoorlog, weerstandigheid, staatsopbou, Kritiese Realisme, enkel-ingebedde-longitudinale gevallestudie.

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The study was developed with the supervision of Professor Hussein Solomon. I am foremost indebted to Professor Solomon for his invaluable insights and the little nudge now and then. I, nonetheless, take full onus for the study, including any errors, shortcomings, or omissions the study may contain.

I must pay homage to my discipline. As Aristotle argues in *The Nicomachean Ethics* (350 BCE), Political Science is the master-science. In studying interacting and multi-layered phenomena, as this study does, Political Science (as the master-science and a juncture discipline) enables us to synthesise conceptual-analytical-theoretical frameworks, instruments, and perspectives, beyond the confines of individual disciplines, enabling us to draw from International Relations, and History, Sociology, Geography, Economics, Psychology, and other disciplines (including Astrophysics). I further pulled from the cumulative body of knowledge in several fields of study, linking political thought, political-economy, geopolitics, social psychology, security studies, development studies, policy and planning, conflict resolution, and (critical) terrorism studies. I also extracted from the two developing study fields of violent extremism and CVE, whose focus is identity-based (mostly religious, racial, and ethnic) movements and organisations that often espouse violent means in seeking to fashion the state and society in accordance with the imperatives of their political-ideology. Within the ambit of violent extremism (VE), the focus of this study is the political-religion-based Islamist violent extremism (IVE).

I must also acknowledge methodologists involved in case study designs and methods, including Robert Yin, John Gerring, Alexander George, Michael Gibbert, and others, whose body of work continues to ensure the scientific rigour of case study research designs and methods. In the same breath, I must acknowledge Critical Realism, the philosophy of science, as identified with philosophy of science scholars such as Roy Bhaskar, Andrew Sayer, Margaret Archer, and others. Critical Realism provides the philosophical validation and rationale for this study's case study research design and methodology.

Lastly, I must also acknowledge the support during the course of this study from my first *alma mater*, Stellenbosch University (SU), and my second *alma mater*, the University of the Free State (UFS).

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ACRONYMS[1]

7/7	The 7 July 2005 London bombings
9/11	The 11 September 2001 attacks in the US
ACLED	The Armed Conflict Location and Event Data project
ACSS	Africa Center for Strategic Studies
ADF	Allied Democratic Front[2]
AMISOM	African Union Mission in Somalia
ASALs	Arid and Semi-Arid Lands
ATMIS	African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (replaced AMISOM in April 2022)
ATPU	Anti-Terrorism Police Unit
AQAP	*al-Qaeda* in the Arabian Peninsula (AQC affiliate)
AQC	*al-Qaeda* Central (popularly known as *al-Qaeda*)
AQI	*al-Qaeda* in Iraq (the precursor of IS)
AQY	*al-Qaeda* in Yemen (merged with *al-Qaeda* in Saudi Arabia in 2009 to form AQAP)
AU	African Union
CAPs	(CVE) County Action Plans
CDI	County Development Index
CEDMAC	Consortium for the Empowerment and Development of Marginalised Communities
CEFs	(CVE) County Engagement Forums
CI	Counter-Insurgency
CIPEV	Commission of Inquiry on Post-Election Violence
CIPK	Council of Imams and Preachers of Kenya
CORD	Coalition for Reforms and Democracy
CPI	Corruption Perceptions Index
CR	Counter-Radicalisation
CRA	Commission on Revenue Allocation
CSM	Citizen Support Mechanism
CT	Counter-Terrorism
CVE	Countering (Islamist) violent extremism (CIVE)
DDRR	Deradicalisation, Disengagement, Rehabilitation, and Reintegration[3]

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[1] Contained herein are the most significant acronyms that are referenced in the study.

[2] An insurgent-terrorist group from Uganda that is based in the DRC, and together with *Ansar al-Sunnah* from Mozambique, reportedly constitute Islamic State in Central Africa Province (ISCAP).

[3] A CVE process akin to the Disarmament, Demobilisation, and Reintegration (DDR) process in peace operations.

EAAQ	East Africa *al-Qaeda* (one of the precursors of *al-Shabaab*)
EDI	Ethnic Diversity Index
FFP	Fund for Peace
FHI	Freedom House Index
FSI	Fragile States Index
G7+	The group of 7+ (an organisation representing a group of states that self-classify as fragile and conflict-affected. Initially seven, currently 20, member states)
GCP	Gross County Product
GEM	Global Extremism Monitor
GSAVE	Global Struggle Against Violent Extremism (formally replaced GWOT in 2005)
GWAC	Global War Against Crusaders
GWOT	Global War On Terror
GTD	Global Terrorism Database
GTI	Global Terrorism Index
HDI	Human Development Index
ICC	International Criminal Court
ICJ	International Court of Justice
IDI	Inclusive Development Index
IDPs	Internally Displaced Persons
IEP	Institute for Economics and Peace
IGAD	Inter-Governmental Authority on Development
IHDI	Inequality-adjusted Human Development Index
IIAG	Ibrahim Index of African Governance (popularly known as the Ibrahim Index)
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IPK	Islamic Party of Kenya
IS	Islamic State (formerly known as ISIS, i.e., Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, or ISIL, i.e., Islamic State in Iraq and the Levante)
ISCAP	Islamic State in Central Africa Province (IS affiliate, includes *Ansar al-Sunnah* from Mozambique, and elements from the DRC)
ISKP	Islamic State in Khorasan Province (IS affiliate)
ISS	Islamic State in Somalia (IS affiliate)
ISSP	IGAD Security Sector Programme
ISWAP	Islamic State in West Africa Province (IS affiliate, and a faction of *Boko Haram*)
ISW	Index of State Weakness

JMC	*Jamia* Mosque Committee
KADU	Kenya African Democratic Union
KANU	Kenya African National Union
KDF	Kenya Defence Forces
KLFA	Kenya Land and Freedom Army (pejoratively known as 'Mau-Mau')
KIPPRA	Kenya Institute for Public Policy Research and Analysis
KNBS	Kenya National Bureau of Statistics
KNCHR	Kenya National Commission on Human Rights
KPU	Kenya People's Union
KSh	Kenyan Shilling
MENA	Middle East and North Africa
MPI	Multidimensional Poverty Index
MRC	Mombasa Republican Council
MYC	Muslim Youth Centre (changed the name to *al-Hijra* in 2012)
NAMLEF	National Muslim Leadership Forum
NARC	National Rainbow Coalition
NCIC	National Cohesion and Integration Commission
NCTC	National Counter Terrorism Center
NFD	Northern Frontier District
NFDLA	Northern Frontier District Liberation Army (NPPPP's military wing)
NIS	National Intelligence Service
NPPPP	Northern Province Progressive People's Party
NPS	National Police Service
NSCVE	National Strategy to Counter Violent Extremism
NUKEM	National Union of Kenyan Muslims
OAU	Organisation of African Unity
OPHI	Oxford Poverty and Human-Development Initiative
PCVE	Preventing and countering (Islamist) violent extremism (PCIVE)
PHDI	Planetary-pressures-adjusted Human Development Index
POCA	Proceeds against Organised Crime Act
POCAMLA	Proceeds of Crime and Anti-Money Laundering (Amendment) Act
PREG Index	Politically Relevant Ethnic Groups Index
PTA	Prevention of Terrorism Act
PTS	Political Terror Scale

PVE	Preventing (Islamist) violent extremism (PIVE)
RAI	Resource Allocation Index
RRT	Rapid Response Team
RVE	Radicalisation into (Islamist) violent extremism (RIVE)
SCI	Social Cohesion Index
SDGI	Sustainable Development Goals Index
SFI	States of Fragility Index
SLAA	Security Laws Amendment Act
SPI	Social Progress Index
START	The National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism
SUPKEM	Supreme Council of Kenyan Muslims
TJRC	Truth, Justice, and Reconciliation Commission
The West	The set of countries found in Western Europe, North America, and Oceania regions[4]
UN	United Nations
UNDESA	UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs
UNDP	UN Development Programme
UNHCR Kenya	UN High Commissioner for Refugees in Kenya
UNSDSN	UN Sustainable Development Solutions Network
VE	(Islamist) violent extremism (IVE)
WHI	World Happiness Index
WG	Whole-of-Government (the dominant approach in CVE and in building resilience [state-building] in fragile states. The WG approach is comparable to the 'integrated approach' of the United Nations in peace operations)
WS	Whole-of-Society (a civil society-based approach in CVE. The WS approach is ancillary to the WG approach)

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[4] The West is a contested conception that is employed, among other contexts, in the context of the exploitation and dominance of fragile states (and historically colonial states), in associations with Christianity as a religion, and in the context of the foreign support of what are deemed as 'apostate' and/or 'unaccountable' 'non-Western' governments. These 'non-Western' governments are classified as 'Western puppets', 'Western proxies', or similar conceptions. Within Islamist violent extremism, as an ideology and a movement, 'the West', as symbolised by the US and its allies, is often equated with *al-adou al-baeed* (the far enemy) and *dar al-harb* (the house of war and injustice). 'Non-Western', 'apostate', and/or 'unaccountable' governments are classified as *al-adou al-qareeb* (the near enemy). *Jihad* ('armed struggle') is waged against these far and near enemies. See *Translated Words* below. The Global Terrorism Index categorises 'the West' (in the context of right-wing extremism and terrorism) in Western Europe as referring to Andorra, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, The United Kingdom, Vatican City, and historically West Germany (1970-1990). In North America, the West refers to Canada and the US, and in Oceania, it refers to Australia and New Zealand (IEP, 2020a:61).

TRANSLATED WORDS[5]

Ahlu Sunnah Waljama'a (ASWJ)	people of the *Sunnah* and community[6]
al-Adou al-Baeed	the far enemy
al-Adou al-Qareeb	the near enemy
al-Hijra	the Emigration. *Al-Shabaab's* branch in Kenya (known as the Muslim Youth Centre, i.e., MYC, before 2012)
al-Hakimiyya	the sovereignty of God (Allah), (at the age of enlightenment), hence the Islamist view that God (Allah) is the highest political-governmental and legal authority (not only the religious or spiritual authority)
al-Jahiliyya	the age of ignorance. The opposite of *al-hakimiyya*, i.e., the period before the revelation of Islam (i.e., at the age of enlightenment), or a period defined by the rejection of the divinity and authority of God (Allah). Islamism often equates *al-jahiliyya* with secularism.
al-Jama'a al-Islamiyya	the Islamic Group
Allah Subhanahu Wa Ta'ala	God (Allah), Glory to Him, the Most High. Abbreviated as Allah SWT.
al-Ittihad al-Islamiyya (AIAI)	the Islamic Union (another precursor of *al-Shabaab*)
al-Ittihad Mahakem al-Islamiyya	Islamic Courts Union, ICU (another precursor of *al-Shabaab*)
al-Qaeda	the Base (or the Foundation). Formal name is *The World Islamic Front for Jihad against Jews and Crusaders*. Also known as *al-Qaeda* Central (AQC)
Amir	commander
Ansar al-Sunnah	supporters or protectors of tradition. Also known as *Ahlu Sunnah Wa-Jamo* (ASWJ). Pledged allegiance to IS in 2019

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[5] There is variation in the spelling of some of these translated words. I use the most common spelling. These translated words are referenced at respective sections of the study.

[6] A Somalia-based Sunni-Sufi group that supports moderate Islam and is opposed to Wahhabism and Salafi-Islamist organisations such as *al-Shabaab*. The group was aligned with the Somalia Federal Government (SFG) but has since clashed with both federal government forces and *al-Shabaab*. The group is not to be confused with *Ahlu Sunnah Wa-Jamo* (ASWJ) of Mozambique. ASWJ of Mozambique itself is not to be confused with *al-Shabaab* of Somalia, as ASWJ (a.k.a. *Ansar al-Sunnah*) is sometimes referred to as *al-Shabaab* in Mozambique.

Caliphate	a transnational Islamic polity, as initially established by Prophet Muhammad (the Medina model), or as established after his death in 632 by his Caliphs
Caliph	successor or deputy, as in 'successor to Prophet Muhammad' or (contentiously) 'deputy to God (Allah) on earth'
dar al-Harb	the house of war and injustice, where Islam does not prevail and/or Muslims are oppressed
dar al-Islam	the house of Islam and peace, i.e., 'the Islamic world'. Where Islam prevails and/or there is an Islamic government or an Islamic state
dar al-Sulh	the house of conciliation and truce. Where, although the state is not under an Islamic government and it is not an Islamic state, Islam is freely practised
Fitrah	primordial faith, denoting an innate submission to God (Allah). Islamism often equates *fitrah* with Islam itself, sees Islam as 'the original and only true religion'.
Gaidi Mtaani	On Terrorism Street (an *al-Shabaab* publication)
Harakat al-Muqawamah al-Islamiyya	the Islamic Resistance Movement (popularly known by the acronym, Hamas)
Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen	the *Mujahideen* Youth Movement (popularly known as *al-Shabaab*, i.e., the Youth). *Al-Shabaab* is an AQC affiliate
Harambee	all pull together (the state motto of Kenya)
Islam	the religion
Islamic	having the features of Islam, or being adherent(s) of Islam, i.e., Muslim(s)
Islamism	the ideology or the movement-organisation. Islamism seeks to return to *al-hakimiyya*, to establish Islamic states (or the Caliphate), and to enforce the *Sharia* in such states[7]

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[7] Whereas there is a distinction between Islamist groups that espouse violent means and those that espouse peaceful means in achieving the shared intention and objectives of Islamism as a movement and ideology, this study focuses on the violent strand of Islamism. With the focus on the violent strand of Islamism, 'Islamism' and 'Islamist violent extremism' are then used as equivalents, and therefore used interchangeably in this study. Furthermore, although having distinct denotation, but interacting, and acting in complementary manner, Salafis, Islamists, jihadis, *mujahideen*, and *takfiris*, are also used collectively in this study. By illustration, Salafi-takfiri-mujahid-jihadi attributes coexist in *al-Shabaab* as a single Islamist organisation that seeks to establish an Islamic state in Somalia and East Africa, based on (perceived) Islamic values and the *Sharia* (see Chapters 4 and 6).

Islamist	having the features of Islamism, or being adherent(s) of Islamism
Jama'at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin	Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims (AQC affiliate, known by the acronym JNIM)
Jamhuri	republic (*Jamhuri* Day or Republic Day is 12 December. A national holiday marking independence in Kenya)
Jihad	struggle (spiritual or armed). Islamism mostly equates *jihad* with an external 'armed struggle' or 'holy war', i.e., *jihad Asgar* ('the lesser *jihad*'), as opposed to an internal spiritual struggle, i.e., *jihad Akbar* ('the greater *jihad*')
Jihadi(s)	lslamist (radical, militant) activist(s). At times used interchangeably with *Mujahid*/*Mujahideen*
Jihadism	an Islamist doctrine based on the belief that *jihad*, in the sense of 'armed struggle' or 'holy war', is a personal duty of every Muslim to defend Islam or Muslims, or to fight foreign occupation, apostate rulers, and injustice. Islamism perceive/proclaim *jihad* as the only way to create Islamic states (or the Caliphate). *Jihadism* is based on the writings of Islamist ideologues such as Sayyid Qutb (1906-1966) and Muhammad Abd al-Salam Faraj (1954-1982)
Jimbo/Majimbo	administrative district(s) or region(s)
Kafir/Kuffar	unbeliever/unbelievers
Linda Boni	Protect Boni (i.e., Boni Reserve. Part of Boni Forest in Kenya)
Linda Nchi	Protect the Nation
Madaraka	power (*Madaraka* Day or [political] Power Day is 1 June. A national holiday marking internal self-rule in Kenya)
Madrassa	Islamic school
Manyatta	village or settlement
Muhadharas	public inter-and-intra-religious preaching-debates
Mujahid/Mujahideen	Islamist fighter/fighters
Mungiki	A (Kikuyu) militia in Kenya
Qutbi(s)	adherent(s) of the Islamist doctrine called *Qutbism*. Based on the teachings of Sayyid Qutb (1906-1966)

Qutbism	an Islamist doctrine. Among other things, advocate for 'perpetual *jihad*' as a 'personal duty' for every Muslim. Qutbism is often equated with Jihadism
Quran	the central religious text in Islam
Salaf	ancestors or predecessors. The first three generations of Muslims, starting with the generation of Prophet Muhammad (the *Salaf* and the Caliphate are seen as embodying the Golden Era of Islam, i.e., the epitome of Islam)
Salafi(s)	adherent(s) of the Islamic doctrine and movement called *Salafism*
Salafism	an Islamic doctrine and movement. Exalts the *Salaf* view and practise of Islam, and their way of life, and calls for an Islamic renaissance and for all Muslims to emulate the *Salaf*
Shahada	an Islamic creed: *I bear witness that there is no god but Allah, Muhammad is the Messenger of Allah*
Sharia	canonical law in Islam
Shifta	bandit (pejorative name for the NFDLA and NPPPP)
Sunnah	traditions and practices (as established by Prophet Muhammad). The *Sunnah* is a model for Muslims to follow
Takfir	excommunication. *Takfir* is declared against apostates of the Muslim faith, values, and *Sharia* rule, or unbelievers who live in *al-jahiliyya* (the age of ignorance), justifying the use of violence against both
Takfiri(s)	adherent(s) of the Islamist doctrine based on the view that it is a duty to excommunicate apostates and unbelievers
Takfirism	the Islamist doctrine based on the practise of *takfir*
Talib/Taliban	student/students. Formal name is *Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan*[8]
Ummah	(global) Muslim community
Usalama	security

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[8] The Afghan *Taliban* should not be confused with Kenya's *Taliban*. The Kenyan *Taliban* is a Luo militia that has been involved in political violence and criminal activity, including their participating, with *Mungiki* (a Kikuyu militia) and others, in the 2007/2008 post-elections violence that brought Kenya to the precipice of a civil-war.

Wahhabi(s)	adherent(s) of the Islamic doctrine and movement called *Wahhabism*. *Wahhabism* is based on the teachings of Mohammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab (1703-1792)
Wahhabism	an Islamic doctrine and movement. Among other things, advocating for religious orthodoxy, traditional Islamic values, and a return to the way of life of the *Salaf*, *Wahhabism* is at times equated with *Salafism*, or originating from Saudi Arabia, *Wahhabism* is often seen as a subset of *Salafism*

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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

1.1 BACKGROUND

This study is an examination of the relationship between state fragility, Islamist violent extremism, and countering Islamist violent extremism (CVE) in Kenya. Whereas the time order in this relationship is initiated by the generative powers of the 'Big Bang' of independence in 1963, which released a causal pathway of secession and violence (structural, cultural, and direct) in the former Northern Frontier District (NFD) and Coast Region, and pitted state fragility against ethnic-Somalis and other Muslims in Kenya, the temporal demarcation is contemporary Kenya, encompassing the third wave of Islamist violent extremism since the 1990s. The temporal demarcation is the end of 2019. The timeline in explanation-building nonetheless covers relevant developments after 2019 and beyond.[9] The research design is an explanatory, single-embedded, longitudinal case study. The case is the relationship between state fragility, Islamist violent extremism and CVE. Kenya is a representative laboratory, containing and demarcating the controlled conditions under which the case is studied.[10]

The first reflection in conducting this study is that Islamist violent extremism and CVE are inseparably linked. The latter is contingent upon the former, and both feed off each other. Arguably, Islamist violent extremism is the leading challenge to secularism, to the coexistence of diverse societies, to peace and security, and to law enforcement. Islamist violent extremism, an ideology and a movement, manifests in extremist narratives, and ultimately political violence, most notably Islamist terrorism, all of which are evidenced in Kenya. Islamist violent extremism also finds expression in wider violent campaigns, including Islamist insurgencies and Islamist proto-states, most notably in sub-Saharan Africa in central and southern Somalia, northern Nigeria, and northern Mali, and in other parts of the world, including parts of Yemen, Iraq, Syria, and Afghanistan. CVE, consequently, remains one of the most vexing policy and strategy challenges facing governments and the community of states.

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[9] The colonial NFD includes the post-independence North-Eastern Region, i.e., Mandera, Garissa, and Wajir counties, and the northern part of Eastern Region, i.e., Marsabit and Isiolo counties, and what used to be Moyale district. Moyale district has since been partitioned between Marsabit and Wajir counties. Partitioned from Somalia by British colonialism, the NFD was dominated by ethnic-Somalis and had hoped to be reincorporated into post-independence Somalia. Coast Region incorporates six counties, viz., Tana River, Lamu, Kilifi, Taita Taveta, Kwale, and Mombasa, and is dominated by Muslims. It was governed separately from Kenya by British colonial powers. Similar to the former NFD that wished to be reincorporated into Somalia, Coast Region had hoped for its own independence after 1963. The Kenyan state has denied both aspirations of secession since 1963. Instead of receiving independence or local autonomy, both regions were subsequently marginalised and securitised, and dissent was repressed by the centralised government system of the newly independent state. The Kenyan government then reduced Kenya to a one-party state until 1991. Between 1964 and 1982 Kenya was a *de facto* one-party state, and between 1982 and 1991 Kenya became a *de jure* one-party state. The current third wave of Islamist violent extremism since the 1990s, seeking to create an Islamic state in East Africa, including in Kenya, incorporates the continued insecurity and frustrated aspirations of ethnic-Somalis and other Muslims in Kenya since independence in 1963 (see Chapters 6 to 8). Regarding the waves of Islamist violent extremism, Otenyo (2004:77-78) identifies three waves of Islamist terrorism in the modern era: the first wave starting after the 1967 Arab-Israeli war; the second wave starting after the 1979 Iranian revolution; the third wave started in 1991 and is mainly associated with *al-Qaeda* and its affiliates (and the Palestinian *Intifada*). I reference these waves in various and relevant parts of the study. The temporal demarcation being set at the end of 2019 aims largely to enable the uniform coverage of multiple, parallel, and interacting longitudinal data sources used in the study. This demarcation does not limit explanation-building, which is valid beyond 2019.

[10] A case may be either a physical entity or a conceptual phenomenon. In this study, the case is the latter. State fragility, Islamist violent extremism, and CVE are aspects of security not unique to Kenya. Yet, examining their relationship in the context of Kenya generates a particular causal logic, i.e., causal pathway or causal sequences (with causal patterns and causal mechanisms), and therefore analytic generalisation, that may be applied in similar contexts, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa (see Chapter 2).

There are fierce scholarly contestations about what we know, and how we know what we know, concerning state fragility, Islamist violent extremism, and CVE. Which political, economic, and social conditions, whether generated by state fragility or otherwise, spawn Islamist violent extremism? To which CVE approaches and programming does Islamist violent extremism respond? Which CVE approaches and programming are effective, or conversely, ineffective, or counterproductive? How do you evaluate the effectiveness of CVE? Why are some fragile states incubators of Islamist violent extremism and others not? Is state fragility a driver and an enabler of Islamist violent extremism, an impediment to CVE, or are these spurious relationships? What are the indicators of state fragility? How is state fragility measured? Are all states not fragile in some form or degree, therefore nullifying the very notion of state fragility, or at least significantly devaluing state fragility as a conceptual-analytical framework and a theoretical perspective? The answers to many of these and other related questions are subject to conjecture, open to contestation, and often not demonstrable.

A caveat before proceeding. The concepts *violent extremism* (VE) and *countering violent extremism* (CVE) apply to varied identity-based ideological categories, including ethnic, right-wing (racial), and religious, categories. Furthermore, the concepts VE and CVE are often used without distinction between what they represent. When these concepts or their abbreviations are used in this study, they refer exclusively to the context of Islamism, unless stated otherwise. It is also critical to make the distinction between Islam (or Islamic) and Islamism (or Islamist). These concepts are closely related, yet not equivalent. In fact, extremely few adherents of Islam are Islamists, but by definition all Islamists are adherents of Islam (i.e., are Muslims), even though they espouse a very particular and not broadly shared view of Islam within the global *Ummah* (i.e., Muslim community). Mozaffari (2007:17, 21-23) and Borum (2011a:10-11) point out that whereas Islam refers to the religion, Islamism refers to a (regressive) totalitarian religious-political ideology, a movement-organisation, and/or a form of government. Islamism, drawing from a specific view and interpretation of Islam that is not shared by most Muslims, has come to be associated with terrorism, insurgency, and proto-states.[11]

With the surge in Islamist violent extremism (IVE) or Islamism since 9/11, scholarly discourse positions religion and politics central to this phenomenon. Borum (2011a:9) maintains that this is because Islamist violent extremism, as an ideology and a movement that is closely associated with political violence, including terrorism and insurgency, is "what many believe to be the most serious contemporary threat to global security". There are, however, alternative views. In *Chasing ghosts: the policing of terrorism,* Mueller and Stewart (2016) contend that the threat of terrorism has been grossly overstated. Mueller and Stewart (2016:3-7) compare post-9/11 counter-terrorism to the hysteria accompanying the witch hunts during the Middle Ages in Europe (circa AD 476-1453), and the hysteria of the 'communist craze' in the US during the Cold War (1947-1991). Mueller and Stewart (2016:2) likens most counter-terrorism efforts to chasing ghosts and maintain that post-9/11 counter-terrorism has been unnecessarily "expensive, exhaustive, bewildering, chaotic, and … paranoia inducing".

From the traditional state security perspective as well as the human security perspective, the literature and empirical evidence on terrorism as an exaggerated security threat abound. In this regard Wilson and Thomson (2005:332-333) found that in the 29 member countries of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), annual deaths from road accidents were 390 times more than the average annual deaths from terrorism in those countries. In the US alone, the number of deaths in 2001 from road accidents was equal to 9/11 deaths for every 26 days of 2001. That is almost 3, 000 deaths every 26 days. The *Global Burden of Disease Study 2019* and data from the World Health Organisation (WHO) show that almost 800, 000 people die from suicide every year. This translates to one person dying from suicide every 40 seconds, more than the global annual deaths from conflict, terrorism, and homicide combined (IHME, 2019; WHO, 2019).[12] In addition to terrorism as an exaggerated security threat, the linked danger and fear of terrorism itself has also been misused to justify questionable government conduct in what has been termed *the economy of danger*.

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[11] Applying violent extremism (and CVE) to varied identity-based ideological categories, Zariski (1989) looks at ethnic extremism in Western Europe among ethnic minorities, including Ulster Catholics, Spanish Basques, and Corsicans in France, that have used terrorism in the fight for, mostly, ethnic separatism. Ellis (2015) looks at right-wing (racial) extremism in Canada, focusing on three right-wing groups that use terrorism in pursuit of racial supremacy, viz., *Klu Klux Klan* (KKK), Church of the Creator (COTC), and Skinheads. Religion-based violent extremism includes Christian, Hindu, Buddhist, and Islamist extremism. Pratt (2010) focuses on Christian extremism as typified by the Christian right in the US, New Zealand, and Australia. An example of the Christian right is the group called Phineas Priesthood that have used terrorism, including the bombing of government buildings and abortion clinics, in pursuit of upholding their brand of Christian values. Pratt (2010: 442, 449) finds that Christian extremists are passive, assertive, or impositional, and concludes that impositional extremists such as Phineas Priesthood are the most likely to engage in violence and terrorism. Marshall (2004) and Denoeux (2013) look at Hindu extremism in Nepal and India. Groups such as *Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh* (RSS) in India and Nepal Defence Army (NDA) in Nepal, have engaged in state-sponsored terrorism against Christian and Muslim minorities in their bid to establish Hindu states in India and Nepal. Gunasingham (2019) looks at Buddhist extremism in Sri Lanka and Myanmar. Groups such as *Bodu Bolu Sena* (BBS) in Sri Lanka and *Ma Ba Tha* in Myanmar have been involved in state-sponsored terrorism against Christian and Muslim minorities in their bid to establish Buddhist states in Sri Lanka and Myanmar. Within these categories (as intimated above), the focus of this study is identity-and-religion-based violent extremism. The particular focus is *Islamist* violent extremism (IVE) as represented by Islamist-Salafi-takfiri-jihadi groups that engage in terrorism, such as *al-Shabaab*, *al-Qaeda* Central, Islamic State, and others, whose objectives are the creation of Islamic states (or the Caliphate), and the enforcement of the *Sharia*, i.e., Islam's canonical law, in such states (see Chapter 4).

Salter (2003:116, 121, 125) defines the economy of danger as the political employment of the danger of terrorism, or perceptions of such danger, as a commodity or resource, to justify questionable government policies and actions, and to supress dissent against such policies and actions. The case in Kenya also presents evidence of terrorism, by *al-Shabaab* in particular, as an exaggerated security threat, as well as the employment of the economy of danger. To illustrate, in a study of the origins of insecurity in Kenya, Atta-Asamoah (2015:7, 9) found that between 2008 and 2014 *al-Shabaab* accounted for only nine percent of all incidents and fatalities linked to insecurity in Kenya. A massive 91 percent of these incidents and fatalities were credited to other actors, including Kenya's own security forces and organised militias. Related actions like detention without trial, disappearances, renditions, and refoulment, all in violation of international law and Kenyan law, including Kenya's Constitution, are linked to the employment of economy of danger in Kenya (see Chapters 6 to 8).

Given the foregoing, Islamism, and its expression terrorism, do remain vexing security challenges. The Institute for Economics and Peace maintains that since 9/11 "the number of Salafi-jihadist groups has more than doubled, their membership has tripled, and they are present in more countries than ever before" (IEP, 2019:82). Based on Global Extremism Monitor (GEM) data, in January 2016 there were 16 Islamist terror groups active in 21 countries. Between July and September 2016, there were at least 39 religious extremist groups in 41 countries, responsible for 662 terrorist incidents. In 2016 more than 70 countries either 'expended efforts in battling extremism or suffered violence from it' (Ahmed *et al*, 2016:11; CRG, 2016:2). The Global Terrorism Index (GTI) also records similar levels of terrorist violence. Based on GTI data, at least one death from terrorism was recorded in each of 69 countries in 2017, down from 79 countries in 2016. In 2017 there were 19 countries that each recorded over 100 deaths from terrorism, and five had more than 1, 000 terrorism deaths per country. Driving much of the world's present terrorist activity are Islamist groups. In 2017, four of these groups, viz.: *Boko Haram*, based in Nigeria; Islamic State (IS), at the time based in Iraq and Syria; *al-Shabaab*, based in

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[12] The literature on terrorism as an exaggerated security threat includes Downs (2017), Mueller (2005, 2006), and Byman and Shapiro (2014).

Somalia; *Taliban*, based in Afghanistan, were responsible for 10, 632 fatalities, i.e., 56.5 percent of all terrorism deaths in 2017. *Al-Shabaab* were credited with the deadliest attack in 2017, killing 588 people in a bomb attack in Mogadishu, Somalia (IEP, 2018:2, 10, 14-15).

At least one death from terrorism was recorded in each of 72 countries in 2018, and 103 countries had at least one terrorist incident in the respective countries, but only three countries recorded more than 1, 000 terrorism related deaths per country. As in 2017, four Islamist groups were credited with most terrorist activities in 2018. *Taliban*, Islamic State (IS), Islamic State in Khorasan Province (ISKP), an IS affiliate that operates mainly in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and *Boko Haram*, were credited with 9, 223 deaths, i.e., 57.8 percent of all terrorism deaths in 2018. *Taliban* were responsible for most of the twenty deadliest terrorist attacks of 2018. The worst attack killed 466 people in Ghazini, Afghanistan, and the second worst attack killed 330 people in Farah, Afghanistan (IEP, 2019:2-3, 10-11, 14, 15, 17). Eighty-nine terrorist groups carried out attacks in 63 countries in 2019, recording at least one terrorism death in each of these countries. Still in 2019, at least one terrorist incident was recorded in each of 90 countries, and in 16 countries between 100 and 1, 000 terrorism deaths were recorded. As in 2017 and 2018, four Islamist groups were responsible for most terrorist activities in 2019. *Taliban*, IS, *Boko Haram*, and *al-Shabaab* were responsible for 7, 578 deaths, equating to 55 percent of all deaths by terrorism in 2019. Islamic State was responsible for the deadliest attack of 2019. In multiple locations in Sri Lanka, on Easter Sunday, in eight coordinated suicide attacks, IS killed 266 people, and injured more than 500 others (IEP, 2020a:4, 10, 12, 14-15, 41, 52, 94).

Terrorism related deaths have steadily increased over time, yet there is some decline in the recent past. In the period between 2002 and 2019, from less than 5, 000 terrorism deaths in 2002, there were over 10, 000 deaths in 2007, and almost 30, 000 deaths in 2015. From 2015 figures, in 2017 these figures had declined to 18, 814 deaths, and in 2018 there were 15, 964 deaths, down from a record 33, 555 terrorism related deaths in 2014. In 2019 the numbers have continued to decline, with 13, 826 terrorism related deaths recorded. Most deaths by terrorism since 2011 were reported from Iraq, Afghanistan, and Nigeria. These three countries account for 61 percent, i.e., 106, 228 (out of 174, 286), of deaths by terrorism between 2011 and 2019. Since 2004 Iraq was the country globally most impacted by terrorism as reflected on the Global Terrorism Index. The number of terrorist related deaths in Afghanistan exceeded those from Iraq for the first time in 2018. In 2019, Afghanistan held the first position on the Global Terrorism Index. Since 2015, Nigeria has occupied the third position on the index. In 2018, Afghanistan alone accounted for 7, 379 similar fatalities, i.e., 46 percent of all terrorism related deaths. In 2019, Afghanistan again recorded the most deaths at 5, 725, i.e., 41 percent of all terrorism related deaths (IEP, 2019:12, 35, 2020a:4, 12-13, 40, 2020b:The Internet).[13]

Global terrorism has also had immense economic costs. According to Frey *et al* (2007:2), there are four economic impacts of terrorism. Terror attacks: (1) "derogate a country's capital stock, both human and physical capital"; (2) "divert foreign resources away from the affected countries to other destinations … [including] the tourism industry and foreign direct investment"; (3) "induce a higher level of uncertainty and, thereby, distort the resource allocation within a country through changes in individuals' savings, investment and consumption behaviour"; (4) cause "heightened security measures [which] increase transaction costs and draw away resources from more productive use". The criteria for calculating the economic impact of terrorism are based on direct financial cost from terrorist attacks. The cost is linked to four resultant factors, viz.: (1) deaths; (2) Gross Domestic Product (GDP) losses; (3) property destruction; (4) injuries (IEP, 2019:30, 2020a:32, 39).[14]

Based on the forgoing criteria, in the period between 2000 and 2019, the economic impact of terrorism ranged from US$9.3 billion in 2000, to 81.4 billion in 2001 (mostly attributed to 9/11), and 13.7 billion in 2002 (all in constant 2019 US$). In 2004 this figure was US$20.6 billion, and by 2013 it was 80.4 billion, peaking at 115.8 billion in 2014, and decreasing to 99.6 billion in 2015. In 2016, this figure dropped again to US$97.9 billion, 55.8 billion in 2017, and 35.1 billion in 2018. In 2019, the figure was US$26.4 billion (IEP, 2020a:30-31). Like terrorism deaths, peaking at a record 33, 555 in 2014, the economic impact of terrorism, as may be expected, also peaked in 2014 at US$115.8 billion. There are also indirect costs associated with terrorism as Frey *et al* (2007) intimate above. These indirect costs, some incalculable, are linked to terrorism's impact on, for example, economic growth, trade, financial markets, tourism, business investment, informal economic activity, security spending, insurance costs, counter-terrorism, and spending on refugees or internally displaced persons (IDPs). Unlike the immediate and direct economic cost indicated above, the indirect economic cost of terrorism has longer-lasting, further-reaching, and much higher impact. The Institute for Economics and Peace estimates that the long-term indirect economic cost may be as much high as 10 to 20 times higher than the original and immediate direct cost (IEP, 2014: 45-46, 2019:32-33, 2020a:30, 34).

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[13] Where there are discrepancies in the data, I deferred to the latest data on the 2020 Global Terrorism Index report (IEP, 2020a) as well as the 2020 Global Terrorism Index interactive map (IEP, 2020b).

[14] To illustrate, of the US$26.4 billion economic impact in 2019, deaths accounted for 61.2, GDP losses 35.2, property destruction 2.5, and injuries 1.1 percent (IEP, 2020a:31-32). The 9/11 attack is the single terrorist attack in history with the largest economic impact, at US$67 billion, in constant 2018 US$ (IEP, 2019:19).

While it is popularly perceived that there is a general increase in global terrorist activity, the real increase is highly variable, and mostly particularised and geospatially concentrated. To illustrate, of the 20 countries most impacted by terrorism in 2015, not one was from either Western Europe or North America. In 2016 the same status was reported. In 2017 the ten countries that accounted for 84 percent of all deaths from terrorism were located in the Middle East, South Asia, and Africa. In 2018, the ten countries that represented 87 percent of all deaths from terrorism were again located in the Middle East, Africa, and South Asia. The ten countries that account for 80 percent of all deaths from terrorism in 2019 are also located in Africa, South Asia, and the Middle East (IEP, 2016:10; 2017:10; 2018:13, 2019:13, 2020a:13). Yet, research, funding, scholarly discourse, news coverage, and CVE efforts, have not reflected this reality. Instead, the West remains the focus and locus of scholarly interest in and concern about terrorism.

In an opinion piece aptly titled *Are some terrorism deaths more equal than others*?, Sullivan (2016:The Internet) poses the following two relevant questions: "ISIS kills 30+ in Brussels: Big story, page 1. ISIS kills 30+ in Baghdad, small story, page 6, below the fold. What does this tell us about newsroom biases?", and "Western terrorism victims get humanised with individual profiles but not victims from Asia/Africa events? What gives? Resource allocation?". The observable reality is that terrorism is concentrated in the fragile states that are mostly found in sub-Saharan Africa and some isolated parts of the world, including South Asia, and the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). See Chapter 3 and below. As shown below, terrorism occurs in MENA, South Asia, sub-Saharan Africa, and then Asia Pacific, Eurasia, Europe, South America, North America, and Central America and the Caribbean:

Terrorist attacks and terrorism deaths, 2002-2019: the most impacted regions



Created from Global Terrorism Index data (IEP, 2020a:43-44)

MENA, South Asia, and sub-Saharan Africa therefore account for 93 percent of terrorism deaths globally between 2002 and 2019. Between 2002 and 2019, sub-Saharan Africa had comparably more deaths from terrorist attacks than all other regions impacted by terrorism. This suggests that the main objective of these attacks in sub-Saharan Africa are people, not infrastructure. These terrorism deaths in sub-Saharan Africa, 49, 791 in total, translate to an average of four deaths for every attack, compared to an average of 2.6 deaths for every attack in MENA and two deaths for every attack in South Asia. In contrast, in the same period, Asia-Pacific, Europe, South America, and North America, had more terrorist attacks than terrorist deaths. This suggests that the main targets in these four regions are infrastructure, not people. Russia and Eurasia, and Central America and the Caribbean do not have significant differences in the number of attacks versus the number of deaths.

Sub-Saharan Africa has recorded almost 50, 000 terrorism deaths since 2002, with 4, 996 deaths in 2017, a further 4, 523 in 2018, and another 4, 635 in 2019. In 2018 MENA, South Asia, and sub-Saharan Africa accounted for 91 percent, i.e., US$29.94 (out of US$33) billion, of the world economic impact of terrorism, with sub-Saharan Africa alone accounting for 37 percent, i.e., US$12.17 billion (in constant 2018 US$). In 2019, MENA, South Asia, and sub-Saharan Africa accounted for 86 percent, i.e., US$22.8 (out of US$26.4) billion, of the world economic impact of terrorism, with sub-Saharan Africa alone accounting for 47.1 percent, i.e., US$12.5 billion (in constant 2019 US$). This is a developing trend. Terrorist activity is shifting away from MENA since 2018, with South Asia and sub-Saharan Africa accounting for more than 80 percent of all terrorism deaths in 2019. With the growing levels of state fragility in sub-Saharan Africa (see Chapter 3), and the related growing levels of Islamist terrorism, seven of the ten countries with the biggest increase in terrorism deaths in 2019 are in sub-Saharan Africa. Six of the ten countries responsible for 80 percent of terrorism deaths in 2019, are also in sub-Saharan Africa. In 2019, Islamic State (IS) also shifted their focus to sub-Saharan Africa. The deaths attributed to Islamic State in 2019 increased by 67 percent in the subregion, with 49 percent of all IS attacks also occurring in the subregion (IEP, 2018:37, 2019:31, 37, 2020a:4-5, 13-14, 33, 50).[15]

The foregoing places sub-Saharan Africa right at the centre of Islamist violent extremism and CVE. This centrality, is induced by the prevalent drivers and enablers of Islamist violent extremism and impediments to CVE in the subregion, including the "burgeoning youth population, persistent lack of educational, housing and vocational opportunities, long-simmering grievances among marginalised populations, and location on heavily trafficked routes" (Aldrich, 2014:524). Islamist violent extremism, finding expression through terrorism, has accordingly taken root on the subcontinent. With Nigeria topping the list on the subcontinent and placing third on the Global Terrorism Index since 2015 (see pp. 3-5 above), Islamist violent extremism has also taken root in Kenya since the 1990s. Aronson (2013:24) contends that Kenya is "a hub for terrorism, violent extremism, and factionalism".

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[15] Most terrorist activity credited to Islamic State (IS) in Africa is perpetrated by IS 'provinces' and affiliates in Africa. The most active of these 'provinces' in sub-Saharan Africa are Islamic State Central Africa Province (ISCAP). ISCAP includes *Ansar al-Sunnah* from Mozambique and other elements from the DRC (the Allied Democratic Front, i.e., ADF, though these linkages are contested), and Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP), a faction of *Boko Haram*. Another major 'province' is Islamic State Sinai Province (ISSP) which mainly operates in Egypt. Affiliates include Islamic State Somalia (ISS), Islamic State Greater Sahara (ISGS) which mainly operates in Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso, Islamic State Algeria (IS Algeria), and Islamic State Libya (IS Libya). See: Zenn, 2020:The Internet; IEP, 2020a:5, 17, 27, 29, 47, 50, 53-59; ICG, 2021:21-22).

Kenya has an average *medium* impact score of 5.04 (out of 10.00) on the Global Terrorism Index between 2001 and 2019. Reflecting the world trend of a peak in terrorism in 2014, Kenya also records an all-time high score of terrorist activity at 6.60 (*high* impact) in 2014 on the Global Terrorism Index (IEP, 2020b:The Internet). Terrorism has also had a tremendous economic impact in Kenya, estimated at US$1.27 billion in constant 2019 US$ between 2007 and 2019, with an estimated loss of 8.9 percent of GDP as contributed by the informal economy between 2007 and 2015. In response to the threat of terrorism, securitisation spending between 2007 and 2016 in Kenya is estimated at US$20.95 billion in constant 2017 US$, divided between: internal security (11.727); military expenditure (7.730); private security (1.211); security agencies (0.279). Kenya's securitisation expenditure in 2019 alone is estimated at US$1.5 billion in constant 2019 US$ (IEP, 2020a:35, 37; UNDP, 2020a:5-6, 24). Whilst the nature and extent of terrorism have varied and progressively involved various actors in Kenya since the 1970s, including terrorism by ethnic militias and terrorism by Kenya's own state agents, the focus of this study is on Islamist terrorism and responses to Islamist terrorism since the 1990s in Kenya.

The study appropriates the definition and measurement of terrorist activity, by varied non-state actors, as employed in the Global Terrorism Index. Terrorist activity consequently refers to (1) attacks, (2) fatalities, (3) injuries, (4) damage to property, and (5) impact. The first four elements are calculated annually, and the fifth element, impact, is calculated over a five-year period (IEP, 2019:90-91, 2020a:96-97).[16] Regarding *Islamist* terrorist activity as such, Otenyo (2004:77-78) identifies three waves of Islamist terrorism in the modern era, starting (1) after the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, (2) after the 1979 Iranian revolution, and (3) since 1991, mainly associated with *al-Qaeda* and its affiliates and the Palestinian Intifada. In the third wave, the seven cases of major Islamist terrorist activity in Kenya are: the 1998 US Embassy attack, the 2002 Mombasa attacks, the 2013 Westgate attack, the 2014 Mpeketoni attack, the 2014 Mandera attacks, the 2015 Garissa attack, and the 14 Riverside complex attack in 2019 (see Chapter 6, section 6.7 *Major Islamist terrorist activity in Kenya since the 1990s*).

Islamist violent extremism is linked to various accounts, including state fragility. Gaining currency since the 1990s, the properties of state fragility are said to have generative capacities and tendencies, breeding and incubating varied development and security challenges, including Islamist violent extremism (see Rice, 2001; Williams, 2007; Devlin-Foltz, 2010; Carter, 2012; Plummer, 2012; Solomon, 2013, 2016; Aldrich, 2014; ACSS, 2016). The central proposition of this study is that, in Africa, state fragility (1) provides the context (setting), (2) offers the opportunity (enablers or permissive causes), and (3) generates (causes or drives) Islamism and impediments to CVE, and hence the failure of CVE. It is also common currency that the African state, on average, offers and generates varied levels of fragility and insecurity. Africa is seen as the part of the world where state fragility is most prevalent and most embedded, most persistent, with far-reaching outcomes. Patrick (2006b:29) affirms that fragile states "do often incubate global threats, but this correlation is far from universal". Not all fragile states in Africa, accordingly, incubate Islamist violent extremism. In the 49 states in sub-Saharan Africa, Islamist violent extremism has taken root markedly in Nigeria, Somalia, Mali, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Mozambique, the Central African Republic, Kenya, Niger, Chad, and the Ivory Coast.[17]

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[16] In 2022 the Index changed its main data source from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) to TerrorismTracker, and changed its methodology, now measuring terrorism in terms of annual attacks, fatalities, injuries, and hostages (not damage to property anymore), weighted over five years (IEP, 2022:2, 88-90). The Index was not issued in 2021. I use the dataset, methodology, and definition of terrorism, as used on the Index up to 2019.

1.2 PROBLEM FORMULATION

Given the extent and persistence of Islamist violent extremism and the challenges of CVE in Kenya, the pertinent question to ask is: *Which factors explain Islamist violent extremism and impediments to CVE in Kenya?* There is expanding, yet piecemeal and often conflicting literature on Islamist violent extremism and CVE in Kenya. Said divergent literature underlines the contention in this study that what we know and how we know in regard to the question of *which factors explain Islamist violent extremism and impediments to CVE in Kenya?* has thus far mimicked the fable of the six blind men and the elephant. There are varied versions of the fable. As the story is told, a group of blind men touch an elephant in a bid to learn what it is. They all touch different parts of the elephant, and each come to different conclusions about what an elephant is like and therefore what it is. Variedly and variously, the elephant is described as a wall, snake, spear, tree, fan, or rope. The result thus is total disagreement and misrepresentation about the single, indivisible, factual reality of the elephant.

Denzin (2009) applies the tale of the blind men and the elephant in the context of the discourse on evidence-based research, an approach advocated and followed in this study. Shabtai (2016) employs the fable in an analysis of future wars. Shabtai (2016:316-317) concludes that the struggle by Islamist violent extremism represents one aspect of what future wars will look like, long confrontations that will be defined by strategic attrition, and hence the characterisation of Islamist violent extremism as 'the long-war' or 'the forever-war'. True to the analogy of the six blind men and the elephant, accounts of Islamism in Kenya are divergent, piecemeal, and in many respects, presented in problematic ways.

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[17] I use a geographical classification of countries south of the Sahara Desert and thus also include Mauritania and Sudan on the list of the 49 states in sub-Saharan Africa. This classification is also used on the Corruption Perceptions Index (see Transparency International, 2020a:11). There are, however, differences in classification. The IMF and the World Bank list only 45 countries in sub-Saharan Africa, classifying Somalia, Djibouti, Sudan, and Mauritania as part of MENA (Middle East and North Africa). In contrast, the Comoros, although a member of the Arab League like other MENA countries, is classified as part of sub-Saharan Africa. The IMF uses this 45-states classification on their World Economic Outlook Database (see IMF, 2019:The Internet).

One account frames Islamism in the context of the 'global struggle' between the Christian West and the Islamic world, viz., Otiso's (2009) *Kenya in the crosshairs of global terrorism*. This account features in various literature, including Otiso (2009), Blanchard (2013), Gaidi Mtaani (2012a, 2012b, 2014a, 2014b), Amble and Meleagrou-Hitchens (2014), Ali-Koor (2016), and Mabera (2016). Another account links the local context to the development of Islamism in Kenya, stressing aspects of state fragility, but not linking those aspects to state fragility as such. Stressing the local context, Botha (2014c:125) maintains that "most militant groups among these Muslim communities fight for their local interests - political and cultural autonomy and economic justice". Allan *et al* (2015:36) link Islamist terrorist activity in Kenya to some indicators of state fragility, including the failure to modernise security agencies, the lack of investment in intelligence and policing capabilities, corruption in security forces, and relative poverty. Looking at the 1998 US Embassy attack in Nairobi, Williams (2007:4) highlights the role of a failing state (former Sudan), and a collapsed state (Somalia at the time).

Various authors link Islamist terrorism to the alienation and marginalisation of Muslims in Kenya, most being ethnic-Somalis (Prestholdt, 2011; Linborg, 2016; Ahaya and Onyango, 2018). Similarly, Burbidge (2015) lists various factors of contention raised by Muslims in Kenya. In North-eastern Region, these factors include land for cattle grazing, access to water points and markets, cattle rustling, and a poorly regulated border with Somalia. In Coast Region, the factors include the manipulation of title deeds for political ends, not recognising Muslim customary courts, and youth unemployment. Imitating the fable of the six blind men and the elephant, Van Metre (2016) identifies six accounts in Kenya: (1) youth recruitment based on unemployment, financial incentives, and victimisation; (2) radicalisation by Imams and preachers, and divisive *muhadharas* (i.e., public inter-and-intra-religious preaching-debates); (3) the presence of *al-Shabaab* sleeper cells; (4) tensions and communal violence between Muslim and Christian communities; (5) the insularity of ethnic-Somalis and Somalia's refugees, who are often viewed with suspicion; (6) intra-Muslim factionalism, characterised by moderates versus extremists. Botha's (2014b, 2014c, 2015) account highlights the radicalisation of individuals in Kenya through political socialisation by Islamist leaders and Islamist organisations such as *al-Shabaab*.

The foregoing accounts illustrate the varying and often divergent explanations, which have until now, at best, revealed only partial glimpses of Islamist violent extremism in Kenya. The account in this study links Islamist violent extremism and impediments to CVE to state fragility. State fragility promises to reveal the elephant (i.e., Islamist violent extremism and impediments to CVE) for what it is, in all its complexities, in a coherent, systematic, comprehensive, manner. It is only with the true identification of the elephant that Kenya may deal productively and effectively with the challenges of Islamist violent extremism and CVE, as well as the conditions, constraints, and consequences of state fragility. It is critical to have such a realistic understanding of Islamist violent extremism. Failure to do so has led to the ineffective and counter-productive CVE that is observable in Kenya and elsewhere to date.

1.3 THE CENTRAL PROPOSITION

While regarded as more stable than many African countries, an economic and political hub in East Africa, Kenya has shown distinct signs of state fragility over an extended period. Since its inception in 2005, the Fragile States Index is key as an analytical tool and measure of such state fragility. The index uses a Conflict Assessment System Tool (CAST) method, triangulating qualitative data, quantitative data, and expert validation. This method, developed in the 1990s, was first intended to measure conflict risk. Since 2004 it is used to also measure state fragility. Since 2006 Kenya has received *alert* (90.0 - 99.0) and *high alert* (100.0 - 109.9) scores on the Fragile States Index (FFP, 2017a:24, 2017b:3-5, 2018:28, 2020c:39-40). State fragility in Kenya reached a record high in the post-election crisis of 2007/2008 after the disputed results of the December 2007 presidential race between Mwai Kibaki and Raila Odinga. Starting at the end of 2007, the height of the crisis was at the beginning of 2008.

Kenya received a score of 93.4 in 2007, jumping to 101.4 in 2008 and to 100.7 in 2009 on the Fragile States Index (FFP, 2020b:The Internet). Blanchard (2013:7-8) and Mabera (2016:368-369) contend that the post-election crisis brought Kenya to the brink of a civil war, leaving more than 1, 300 people dead and more than 700, 000 internally displaced. This bloodletting was followed by a constitutional crisis when the International Criminal Court (ICC) indicted several Kenyan leaders in 2011 for crimes against humanity, for their alleged involvement in the violence. The indicted leaders included, since 2013, the sitting President Uhuru Kenyatta and Deputy President William Ruto. In 2011 they were Minister of Finance and Minister of Education respectively. In 2015 the ICC dropped the charges against Uhuru Kenyatta and in 2016 against William Ruto, largely on the basis of insufficient evidence to support their alleged involvement in the post-election crisis of 2007/2008.

The evident state fragility in Kenya is reflected in the aggregated and disaggregated scores that Kenya annually receives on the Fragile States Index. On a scale of below 20.0 to a maximum of 120.0 on the Fragile States Index, Kenya has the best aggregated fragility score of *high warning* at 88.6 in 2005, the worst score of *high alert* at 101.4 in 2008 and at 100.7 in 2009, and an average *alert* score of 96.2 between 2005 and 2019. Alert (90.0 - 99.0) is the third highest fragility range on the Fragile States Index, indicating heightened state fragility and heightened conflict risk. The annual aggregate fragility scores and ranking between 2005 and 2019 on the Fragile States Index in Kenya are shown below:[18]



Created from Fragile States Index data (FFP, 2020b:The Internet)

Whereas the aggregate fragility scores above paint an overall bleak picture, it is in the disaggregated indicators where the most salient conflict-generating and debilitating properties of state fragility in Kenya are uncovered. For the period 2005 and 2019, out of 12 main indicators on the index, Kenya scores the worst in the following nine indicators on average (each scored out of 10.00): demographic pressures (8.8); factionalised elites (8.7); group grievances (8.4); state legitimacy (8.2); refugees and internally displaced persons, i.e., IDPs (8.1); uneven economic development (8.0); external intervention (7.9); security apparatus (7.8); public services (7.8). The latter two share the eighth position. Significantly, Kenya scores worse with uneven economic development (8.0) as opposed to economic decline (7.1) in the period under review (FFP, 2020b:The Internet). Later, in the contexts of Chapters 3 and 6 to 8, I return to these indicators, the Fragile States Index, and Kenya's fragility scores.

Given the foregoing, the central proposition of this study is that state fragility (X-construct or *explanans*), does not only provide the context (setting) and opportunity (enablers or permissive causes), but also generates (drives or causes) Islamist violent extremism and impediments to CVE (the binary Y-construct or *explanandum*). The state fragility indicators define not only the social, economic, and political pressures faced by Kenya, but also the Kenyan state's (in)capacity to deal with these pressures. The Kenyan state is both agent and structure, and in this sense agency and structure are real entities that have causal capacity and tendency. This is the essence of the agency-structure relationship or debate in social theory. This debate is often framed around dichotomies like free will versus socialisation or individual choice versus social context. Wendt (1987:337-339) explains that agency relates to human agents, and structure relates to organisations or social structures created by human agents. Agents and structures act and interact, and the properties of both are relevant in explanation-building. Wendt (1987:339) further maintains that the state is conceptualised as both agent and structure, or otherwise the state is conceptualised as "a structure of political authority in which government agents are in turn embedded". Critical Realism maintains that social structures such as government institutions and other organisations, have and develop emergent properties, i.e., "they exercise their own causal powers, independently of the agency which produced them" (Bakewell, 2010:1696). In this study, it is not the state but the *nature* of the state (i.e., state fragility) that is the unit of analysis. It is thus both agency and structure (as contained within the nature of the state, i.e., state fragility), that explain Islamist violent extremism as well as impediments to CVE.[19]

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[18] See Chapter 3, section 3.6.1 *Indicators and measurement*, for the complete 11 fragility ranges and the measuring scale as used on the Fragile States Index.

Th central proposition of the study is that the properties of state fragility generate popular discontent (i.e., grievance or injustice) that is carried along a pathway (i.e., causal sequence) that is encapsulated and fuelled by Islamist and Islamised dissent and violence. These properties of state fragility that have causal capacity and tendency also create impediments to CVE. Gurr (2011b:ix) therefore contends that to explain political violence (of which Islamist terrorism is one form) or to seek ways of building peace, one needs to understand: (1) popular discontent, and the justifiability and utility of political action flowing from such discontent; (2) group organisation, and the group's capacity to act; (3) the regime's ability to repress or channel popular discontent; (4) international support, for both the regime and the group. These four factors that Gurr (2011b) highlights, and other related factors, including the agency-structure relationship, provide the foundation for explanation-building in this study.

1.4 RESEARCH QUESTION

In the problem formulation, the following central question is posed: Which factors explain Islamist violent extremism and impediments to CVE in Kenya? The central proposition ascribes these factors to the properties of state fragility. These properties of state fragility, deriving from internal socio-economic and political environments, as well as the external environment, have causal capacity and causal tendency. Given the central proposition, the study seeks to answer the following questions: (1) What is state fragility?, as linked to varied permutations of underdevelopment and insecurity, particularly Islamist violent extremism and impediments to CVE, (2) What is Islamist violent extremism?, (3) What is CVE?, (4) How are Islamist violent extremism and CVE evidenced in the fragile state in Kenya as an explanatory setting?, (5) What is the relationship between state fragility and Islamist violent extremism?, (6) What is the relationship between state fragility and CVE? The central research question, based on the context of Kenya, is formulated as: *What is the relationship between state fragility, Islamist violent extremism, and countering Islamist violent extremism in Kenya?*

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[19] I further address the conceptualisation of the agency-structure relationship in the context of Chapters 2 to 5, and the agency-structure relationship as empirical reality in Kenya in the context of Chapters 6 to 8.

1.5 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES

Given the above questions, as well as the central research question, the study presents related research objectives. The first research objective of the study is to analyse state fragility as a conceptual-analytical framework, as a theoretical perspective, as well as the cause, the *explanans* (the X-construct) to the *explanandum* (the binary Y-construct). The *explanandum*, the observed outcome or effect, is the development and sustainment of both Islamist violent extremism and the impediments to CVE. The second objective is to outline Islamist violent extremism as well as its linked analytical frameworks and theoretical perspectives. The third objective is to sketch the state-of-the-art pertaining to CVE. The fourth objective is to outline and analyse the manifestations of Islamist violent extremism and CVE in the fragile state in Kenya as an explanatory context and a unit of analysis. The fifth research objective is to probe the relationship between state fragility and Islamist violent extremism in Kenya. The sixth research objective is to examine the relationship between state fragility and CVE in Kenya. The seventh and final research objective is to reach findings or conclusions pertaining to the relationship between state fragility, Islamist violent extremism, and CVE, in the context of Kenya (and other applicable contexts, especially in sub-Saharan Africa).

1.6 RESEARCH AIM AND SIGNIFICANCE

Given the research question, the aim of the study is to *critically examine the relationship between state fragility, Islamist violent extremism, and countering Islamist violent extremism, in Kenya*. Recent studies have focused on pull factors and push factors explaining the radicalisation of individuals towards Islamist violent extremism. Factors in this context referring to varied micro level drivers of radicalisation, and the process of micro level radicalisation. Said recent studies include, among others, Hassan (2012), Amble and Meleagrou-Hitchens (2014), Botha (2014c, 2015), Allan *et al* (2015), Rink and Sharma (2018). In contrast, as outlined in section 1.3 *The central proposition*, this study employs the construct of state fragility in explaining the factors that make groups and communities amenable to Islamist violent extremism. These factors, emanating from internal political, economic, and social environments, and from the external environment (as defined on the Fragile States Index), predate the formation of any Islamist organisation and relevant related pull factors, including the influence of Islamist ideologues and recruitment, or micro radicalisation as such. These factors that are embedded in state fragility are also shared and constant, whereas radicalisation is a highly personal and variable matter. It is collective agency, found in social structures, that account for Islamist violent extremism.

The submission of this study therefore is that Islamist violent extremism is a group pursuit, based on collective discontent, mobilisation, and action. Even the so-called lone-wolf terrorist acts on behalf or believes to be acting on behalf of a collective, a shared idea, ideology, or grievance. Micro radicalisation can only find logic and meaning in meso radicalisation and macro radicalisation as offered by the social structures that subsist in the fragile state. It is consequently artificial to abstract the individual from the context of group and community discontent. It is also artificial to abstract the Islamist ideology and the terror group from the context of the state that generates the political, economic, and social conditions that give rise and impetus to Islamist violent extremism, and from the context of the state from where the conditions and constraints in CVE are found and generated.

Based on the premise that the study must be analytically sound and evidence-based, the veritable setting in Kenya promises to reveal invaluable insights about state fragility, Islamist violent extremism, and CVE. Glazzard and Zeuthen (2016:1) point out that "[m]ost … work [in the field] is on [violent extremism and] terrorism in or threatening the West. Less work has been done on violent extremists in the countries where they do most damage - most violent extremism affects countries in Asia and Africa". This is true. Whereas most terrorist activity occurs in MENA, South Asia, and sub-Saharan Africa, the West remains the focus and locus of research, news-coverage, interest, and concern (see section 1.1 *Background*). The Africa Center for Strategic Studies finds that Islamism results from "a combination of drivers working in a specific local context" (ACSS, 2016:8). Similarly, Denoeux and Carter (2009a:2) conclude that "any given VE movement or set of manifestations of VE must be viewed as the product of a particular combination of variables and dynamics, at work at a certain historical juncture, in a specific setting". It is this context and this setting that the current study seeks to examine, thus placing the marginalised and fragile African state, Kenya in this case, at the centre of the discourse on state fragility, Islamist violent extremism, and CVE. The setting in Kenya adds to the real-life understanding of the abovementioned phenomena and their relationship. As Otiso (2009) contends, *Kenya is in the crosshairs of terrorism*, and Kagwanja (2014b) affirms, *Kenya is in the vortex of new-wars*. The long-war, waged by Islamist violent extremism, is one mutation of these new-wars.

Since the 1990s, research and policy have grappled with new-wars and other new security challenges. The long-war has added to this complexity. The Africa Center for Strategic Studies concludes that Islamist violent extremism, “remains under-studied and poorly understood, [and] … the conceptual and empirical foundation for … countering [Islamist] violent extremism remains nascent and underdeveloped” (ACSS, 2016:4, 6). The study therefore intends to not only add to the body of knowledge, but to propose new ways of examining the challenge of state fragility, Islamist violent extremism, and CVE by pushing through the current boundaries of knowledge in this field. Further, the link between state fragility, Islamist violent extremism, and CVE, is often assumed, but never fully demonstrated. State fragility is often referenced, but rarely defined and rarely measured. This study overcomes these limitations in analysis. The Fragile States Index is particularly illuminating in that it defines and measures state fragility and highlights not only the pressures faced by the state, but also the (in)capacity of the state to deal with such pressures, thus exposing the state to various mutations of insecurity, including Islamist violent extremism. This study seeks to demonstrate systematically and comprehensively the theoretical case, i.e., why and how the conflict-generating and debilitating properties of state fragility explain Islamist violent extremism and impediments to CVE.

The substance of case studies, such as in this current study, is in their value and utility as exemplars for conducting research in a specific discipline. In this regard, the design of this study contributes to four areas of methodological significance. The current study demonstrates: (1) how to frame a case study around a conceptual phenomenon, i.e. a theoretical case, as opposed to a physical entity; (2) how to conduct a single case study in an explanatory mode, as opposed to an exploratory, descriptive, or evaluative mode; (3) how to build explanation in a single-embedded, longitudinal, case study, enabling both spatial and temporal variation and analysis, and therefore creating multiple points of observation; (4) how to make analytic generalisations from a single representative case, by establishing a logic or conditions, with patterns of covariation, causal patterns, and mechanisms-based causal sequences, which may be applied to similar contexts. Given the above, this study will be of great interest and benefit to academia, to CVE practitioners and policymakers, as well as anyone interested in security studies or terrorism studies in general, or anyone interested in state fragility, Islamist violent extremism, and CVE in general, or all of the above in the specific context of Kenya.

1.7 RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY

The study has a contextualised, explanatory, single-embedded, longitudinal, case study research design. The research design enables an in-depth, theory-based, empirical, retroductive, deductive-inductive analysis of the relationship between state fragility, Islamist violent extremism, and CVE (*the case*) in a natural setting (*the context*, in *Kenya*). The research methodology employs three data collection methods and sources of evidence, viz.: semi-structured elite interviews, field research (non-participant observation), and a literature and data study. The three research methods, employing purposeful and snowball sampling, enable triangulation within and between data sources, the use of secondary data and primary data, as well as the employment of qualitative and quantitative data. The research design and the research methodology, including the conceptualisation of the study, are further detailed in the next chapter, Chapter 2: *Research design and methodology*.

1.8 LITERATURE REVIEW

The literature review contains a survey of existing knowledge, substantive findings, conceptual, theoretical, and methodological contributions related to state fragility, Islamist violent extremism, CVE, and Kenya. Three themes subsume the literature review: (1) key concepts; (2) theories and methodologies on state fragility, Islamist violent extremism and CVE; (3) the relationship between state fragility, Islamist violent extremism, and CVE. The literature review is further outlined in Chapter 3: *State fragility: theory and application*, Chapter 4: *Islamist violent extremism: analysis and theoretical perspectives*, and Chapter 5: *Countering Islamist violent extremism: the state-of-the-art*.

1.8.1 Key Concepts

The concepts in this study are invariably contested, starting with state fragility. The notion of state fragility is based on the contention that states are expected to have specific capacities, functions, or responsibilities, and that many are weak or failing in such regard. Englebert and Dunn (2014:42-43) identify four state functions: (1) to offer *civilised existence*, mainly by providing peace, safety, and rights, (2) to organise *collective action* (linked to the idea of state capacity), such as collecting taxes, making and enforcing laws, and maintaining an effective administration, (3) to provide *collective goods* (also called political or public goods), including education, healthcare, infrastructure, and security, (4) to reduce *transaction costs* (i.e. the costs of doing business), including creating the physical infrastructure for business, and effectively dealing with corruption. Englebert and Dunn (2014:47-48) finds that given all the indicators of statehood, the African state is most challenged by state functions. Williams (2007:1) also finds that “Africa is commonly viewed as a particular cause for concern because it is here that the phenomenon of state … [fragility] is most widespread and deeply entrenched”.

The next concept is Islamist violent extremism or Islamism (used interchangeably in this study). The concept is (1) often equated with terrorism; (2) seen as a generic concept for politically motivated violence, of which terrorism is only one form; (3) mostly viewed as an ideology and a movement that informs terrorist activity (ACSS, 2016:4). This study appropriates the third view. The concept of Islamist violent extremism dates to 2005. On 26 July 2005, Schmitt and Shanker (2005:The Internet) reported in *The New York Times* that the George Bush Administration had exchanged the catchphrase *global war on terror* (GWOT) for *global struggle against violent extremism* (GSAVE), in recognition of the extremist ideology that informs terrorism. As then Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Richard B. Myers, put it at the time, “the threat is violent extremists …, terror is the method they use” (in Schmitt and Shanker, 2005:The Internet). At the 2015 Summit on Countering Violent Extremism, former US President Barack Obama (2015a:The Internet) asserted that Islamist violent extremism encompasses not just “the terrorists who are killing innocent people. We also mean the ideologies, the infrastructure of extremists - the propagandists, the recruiters, the funders who radicalise and recruit or incite people to violence”. In its policy document on the subject, USAID (2011:12) defines Islamist violent extremism as “advocating, engaging in, preparing, or otherwise supporting ideologically motivated or justified violence to further social, economic or political objectives”.[20]

CVE is another contested concept that is central to the study. According to Schmid (2013:1) and Frazer and Nünlist (2015:2), CVE was introduced by European policymakers in 2005 following the bomb attacks in Madrid (2004) and London (2005). Frazer and Nünlist (2015:1) point out that “[t]he idea underpinning CVE is that violent extremists should not be fought exclusively with intelligence, police, and military means. The structural causes of violent extremism must also be tackled, including intolerance, government failure, and political, economic, and social marginalisation”. The concepts that are related to CVE include disengagement, deradicalisation, resilience, and state-building. Denoeux and Carter (2009a:2) define disengagement as “leaving a violent extremist organisation or group”, and deradicalisation as “abandoning previously held violent extremist beliefs or convictions”.

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[20] In the current chapter in section 1.1 *Background*, I outline how violent extremism and CVE apply to varied identity-based ideological categories. However, more often than not, these concepts are used in the context of Islamism, even though the designate Islamism (or Islamist) is not always pertinently expressed. Thus, whilst the above references speak simply of violent extremism, they use the concept within the specific context of Islamism (not right-wing or Christian violent extremism, for example). This is the case with references to CVE as well, and therefore the designation should be countering Islamist violent extremism (CIVE) instead.

Van Metre (2016:13) defines resilience as “the capacity and actions of a community to regulate violent extremist activities in that community”. Resilience would then explain why some communities can resist all forms of violent extremism, opt out of political violence, and find peaceful ways for collective action, whilst other communities cannot. Furthermore, resilience is reliant on both societal competence and societal capacity. Societal competence incorporates collective efficacy, community activism, peace or religious engagement, and security. Societal capacity encompasses social capital, leadership, information, economic resources, and place attachment (Van Metre, 2016:14-17).

‘Place attachment’ refers to an emotional connection and loyalty to a place, including the state. This is why the insularity and ‘place detachment’ (i.e., the opposite of ‘place attachment’) of ethnic-Somalis and other Muslims in Kenya, are cited in explaining Islamist violent extremism and impediments to CVE in Kenya. Another cited and related reason is ‘disengagement from the state’ (Van Metre, 2016:16, 18; ICG, 2018:ii; Thomson,2016:219-222). The related insularity, ‘place detachment’, and ‘disengagement from the state’ of ethnic-Somalis and other Muslims, all three revealing depreciated resilience, have historical context and impetus found in state fragility in Kenya, starting from the 1962 referendum, the ‘Big Bang’ of independence in 1963, the *Shifta* war (1963-1968), and evolving over time thereafter (see Chapters 6 to 8). Significantly, resilience is employed in the context of both CVE and state-building, to address Islamist violent extremism and state fragility. State-building involves capacitating the state, state-society relations, and groups within the state, to manage various shocks and stresses, including Islamist violent extremism. The African Development Bank Group (AfDB, 2014:8), in its strategy document, *Addressing fragility and building resilience in Africa*, lists varied focus areas in Africa’s fragile states, including two main focus areas: (1) strengthening state capacity and creating effective institutions; (2) promoting resilient societies through inclusive and equitable access to public goods such as employment, basic services, and natural resources (see Chapter 3).[21]

The fourth concept is terrorism. *Islamist* terrorism, as terrorism defined by actor, is one of the varied forms of terrorism that have evolved over time. It is currently in its third wave since the 1990s, and the most dominant form of terrorism today. Most definitions of terrorism have four constitutive elements, viz.: (1) action, (2) actor, (3) target, and (4) purpose (ACSS, 2016:4). Terrorism may therefore be defined as an act of violence, by a non-state actor, mainly targeting civilians and other soft targets, for political ends (ACSS, 2016:4). Likewise, the Global Terrorism Index defines terrorism as “the threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence by a non-state actor to attain a political, economic, religious, or social goal through fear, coercion, or intimidation" (IEP, 2019:6, 2020a:6). Adding state actors, Botha (2008:30) defines terrorism as "violent acts against a civilian population by state and non-state actors". Citing only state actors, Botha (2008:31) defines state terrorism as the "[s]trengthening of government control by the complete intimidation of a population". The Political Terror Scale defines such terrorism as acts and violations against 'the physical integrity of the person' by agents of the state. These acts of violence and violations of human rights include extrajudicial killings, disappearances, torture, and detention without trial (Wood and Gibney, 2010:370). Despite the long history of terrorism, as antiquated as violent conflict itself, what we know and how we know about terrorism remain highly contested. The Institute for Economics and Peace points out that "[t]here is no single internationally accepted definition of what constitutes terrorism, and the terrorism literature abounds with competing definitions and typologies" (IEP, 2020a:6, 2022:6). Pratt (2010:438) finds that "[t]here are many root causes [of terrorism] as well as differing frameworks of self-understanding". Furthermore, terrorism scholar Walter Laqueur asserts that "[m]any terrorisms exist, and their character has changed over time and from country to country" (in Borum, 2015:67). Another terrorism scholar, Brian Jenkins, also concludes that "[t]errorism is like beauty, it is in the eye of the beholder" (in Otenyo, 2004:75). In illustrating this fiercely contested terrain that is terrorism, Schmid (2011b:39, 99-148) identifies and outlines over 250 different definitions of terrorism.

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[21] Resilience as such is beyond the scope of this study. Van Metre (2016) is a good scholarly place to start in unearthing this concept. A more detailed outline of CVE in the context of this study is contained in Chapter 5.

Defining terrorism has been even more problematic in Africa, having to reflect the widely justified conflicting imperatives of the liberation struggle against colonial occupation, and the imperatives of post-independence African governance since the 1960s. Highlighting this complicated history that Africa has had with terrorism, both the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and the African Union (AU) have taken the position that "the struggle waged by peoples in accordance with the principles of international law for their liberation or self-determination, including armed struggle against colonialism, occupation, aggression and domination by foreign forces shall not be considered as terrorist acts" (OAU, 1999:article 3; AU, 2014:article 28G). Where and when such conditions as outlined above would prevail, is a matter of conjecture, contestation, and persistent ambivalence. To illustrate, what would be the answers to these questions: Is *al-Shabaab* waging a struggle of national liberation and self-determination, including armed struggle against occupation, aggression, and domination by Kenya, on behalf of ethnic-Somalis and other Muslims in Kenya and Somalia? Or rather, is *al-Shabaab* in fact an illegitimate-criminal-terrorist organisation? Do states, Kenya included, engage in terrorism as the Political Terror Scale (PTS) demonstrates? Or rather, is terrorism the exclusive preserve of non-state actors such as *al-Shabaab* as the Global Terrorism Index (GTI) maintains?

Another key concept in this study is radicalisation. Schmid (2013:1) and Frazer and Nünlist (2015:2) maintain that radicalisation, as is the case with CVE, was introduced by European policymakers in 2005 following the bomb attacks in Madrid (2004) and London (2005). Radicalisation is conceptualised as both a cause of, and a process towards, Islamist violent extremism. There is great divergence about radicalisation as a cause. Different conceptions of this are contained in Schmid (2013), Frazer and Nünlist (2015), and Allan *et al* (2015), all of whom maintain that the causes of radicalisation are found at distinct levels of analysis, viz.: micro (individual), meso (groups) and macro (society) levels of radicalisation. Some agreement on radicalisation as a process exists. However, as Schmid (2013:1) and Frazer and Nünlist (2015:2) point out, the stages in this process are contested. Borum (2011b) is a good start in probing the different conceptions of these stages. Borum (2011b:39) himself proposes a four-stage model, viz.: (1) grievance; (2) injustice; (3) target attribution; (4) distancing/devaluation. The four stages serve to trigger political violence. Borum (2011a:9) defines radicalisation as "the process of developing extremist ideologies and beliefs". Okeyo and Abdisamad (2016:27) define radicalisation as the straightforward act of 'adopting an extremist belief system'.

New-wars is yet another concept. The new-wars paradigm defines contemporary political violence and conflict as being mostly intra-state, more pernicious, more intractable, involving more non-state actors, and more dominated by identity, than other types of violent political conflicts before (see Kaldor, 2012, 2013; Williams, 2014). Williams (2014:85) contends that the value and utility of the new-wars paradigm lie in its ability to offer an alternative analytical framework (from state-centric approaches) to analysing violent conflicts and privatised violence. It is this value and utility that I find attractive and particularly suited for contextualising and explaining Islamist violent extremism and impediments to CVE in Kenya. Kagwanja (2014b:The Internet) has correctly observed that "Kenya is in the vortex of these 'new-wars' waged by terrorist networks, religious extremists, heavily armed ethnic or clan militias, bandits and criminal gangs operating within and across national borders".

The new-wars paradigm does have its critics. One point of criticism is that this paradigm merely describes conflict that is typical in fragile states or in contexts where there is weak institutionalised governance. A related criticism is that the new-wars paradigm simply describes unconventional warfare or intra-state conflict and what may therefore be easily classified under older rubrics of such wars or conflicts such as insurgency, asymmetrical war, irregular war, or low intensity conflict. One key misinterpretation of the new-wars paradigm is that this paradigm seemingly proposes a new nature of war. This is not the case. The new-wars paradigm agree that the nature of war is enduring, i.e., that invariably war has a political end. What is variable in time and space, is the character of war.

The new-wars paradigm then outlines the dominant character of war since the 1990s. The new-wars paradigm does not claim that this character of war has no historical precedence, merely that this character of war has become dominant and defining since the 1990s (see Chapters 4 to 6).[22]

Notwithstanding the criticism against new-wars as a concept and as a conceptual paradigm of war, the new-wars paradigm retains its value and utility in outlining the features of the dominant character of war since the 1990s, including the long-war that is waged by the Islamist movement. The new-wars paradigm embraces state fragility as a framework and perspective, i.e., the *explanans* in this study. The new-wars-paradigm also calls for an analysis that considers state actors as well as non-state actors. This paradigm contemplates traditional security considerations such as porous borders, controlling geographical areas, intelligence, and capacitating the state and security forces. The paradigm further reflects on non-traditional security considerations such as distributive justice, democratic values, development, identity, police actions, and law enforcement. Lastly, the long-war that is waged by the Islamist movement is included as one of the categories of new-wars since the 1990s. The long-war should therefore be understood first within the ambit of new-wars or what Rupert Smith has conceptualised as ‘war among the people’ in *The utility of force* (2005). Later in this study I elaborate on ‘new-wars’, ‘war among the people’, and the ‘long-war’ (see Chapters 4 to 6).

1.8.2 Theories and methodologies on state fragility, Islamist violent extremism, and countering Islamist violent extremism

Added to the contested concepts, the theories and methodologies linked to state fragility, Islamist violent extremism, and CVE, are also fraught with challenges. Denoeux and Carter (2009a), Borum (2011a), Day (2015), and Glazzard and Zeuthen (2016) highlight many of these challenges, including (1) the malleability and nebulousness of concepts such as state fragility, Islamist violent extremism, CVE, radicalisation, and terrorism, and the linked difficulties with definitions; (2) the lack of reliable empirical data, related unknowns, and the linked challenges with theory development; (3) the lack of reliable measuring and evaluation methodological tools; (4) the absence of general theories. Decker and Pyrooz (2015:108) hence lament that “[t]he fact that terrorist acts are rare events in most countries, as are radicalisation processes and extremist beliefs, violent extremist researchers are hard pressed to have access to readily available data sources, let alone data capable to testing theories".

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[22] The literature on the critique of the new-wars paradigm includes Newman (2004), Fleming (2009), De Waal (2009), Mello (2010), and Smith (2018). I address the new-wars paradigm in various contexts throughout this study, but specifically in Chapter 5, section 5.2 *The origins of CVE: counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism*, section 5.4.1 *CVE conceptualised*, and Chapter 6, section 6.5 *New-wars and the long-war*, where I further outline the central features of new-wars and the defence against the criticism of new-wars as a paradigm.

Be that as it may, Crenshaw (1988) and McCormick (2003) advance three theoretical perspectives or approaches linked to Islamist violent extremism, viz.: instrumentalist, organisational, and psychological. Psychological approaches link individual psychology to Islamist violent extremism. Radicalisation theory is an example of these approaches (see Hassan, 2012; Amble and Meleagrou-Hitchens, 2014; Botha, 2014c, 2015; Allan *et al*, 2015). Instrumentalist approaches on the other hand postulate that Islamist violent extremism and terrorism are intentional and instrumental, i.e., a means to a political end. These approaches include the relative deprivation theory (see Gurr, 1970, 2011a, 2011b; Pettigrew, 2015), and the rational choice theory (see Anderton and Carter, 2005; Crenshaw, 1981, 2000, 2014a; Lake, 2002; Schmid, 2013). Organisational approaches stress the internal dynamics and life cycle of the Islamist terrorist organisation, as exemplified by the natural systems model (see Abrahms, 2008; McCormick, 2003). I elaborate on these approaches or theoretical perspectives in Chapter 4, section 4.3.2.2 *Theoretical perspectives*. Whilst considering and evaluating these perspectives, the current study finds state fragility to have unmatched value and utility in unearthing and approximating reality as a conceptual-analytical framework and theoretical perspective.

Islamist violent extremism and CVE are mutually inclusive. The theories and methodologies linked to CVE are consequently in the same state of flux as is the case with Islamist violent extremism. CVE has its roots in counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism, and therefore (1) involves 'hard power' security measures such as the use of force and military means, intelligence, and law-enforcement, and (2) incorporates 'soft power' and development measures in seeking to address structural, political, economic, and social factors linked to Islamist violent extremism. Romaniuk (2015:3) points out that recently there has been a concerted effort to distance CVE from its counter-insurgency and its counter-terrorism roots. However, Schomerus *et al* (2017:3, 18) argue that 'smart CVE' includes both 'hard power' and 'soft power' measures. I address the state-of-the-art in CVE in Chapter 5.

The UN has for some time identified the need to balance 'hard power' and 'soft power'. The 2006 Global Counter-terrorism Strategy of the UN incorporates "[m]easures to address the conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism" (UNGA, 2006:4). The identified conditions include the "lack of the rule of law and violations of human rights, ethnic, national and religious discrimination, political exclusion, socio-economic marginalisation and lack of good governance". The UN reiterates these conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism in the 2015 Plan of Action to Prevent Violent

Extremism (UNGA, 2015a:7), and in the 2016 Global Counter-terrorism Strategy Review (UNGA, 2016:4). Despite such pronouncements, fierce contestations remain about which specific conditions spawn Islamist violent extremism and impediments to CVE, as well as the generalisability of these conditions. What is nonetheless patently clear is that what the UN identifies as 'conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism' are in fact prevailing and pervasive conditions in fragile states. These conditions contain and outline the properties or attributes of state fragility and their causal capacity and causal tendency to generate both Islamist violent extremism and impediment to CVE, rendering CVE ineffective and counterproductive, hence causing CVE to fail. That is the central contention of this study, which leads me to the theoretical case that this study critically examines, viz.: *The relationship between state fragility, Islamist violent extremism, and countering Islamist violent extremism*.

1.8.3 The relationship between state fragility, Islamist violent extremism, and countering Islamist violent extremism

State fragility is linked to various permutations of underdevelopment and insecurity, not just Islamist violent extremism. Williams (2007:3) observes that "[f]ailed states can spawn a variety of transnational security problems with terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), crime, disease, energy insecurity, and regional instability chief among them". Similarly, the Africa Center for Strategic Studies finds that "[p]olitical drivers are at the heart not just of … [Islamist] violent extremism and terrorism, but of insecurity and instability *writ large* on the [African] continent" (ACSS, 2016:12). I also highlight in Chapter 3 that the state fragility-security-development nexus uncovers varied security and development challenges linked to state fragility, not Islamist violent extremism alone. I further briefly demonstrate in Chapter 6 that state fragility has generated a myriad of new-wars in Kenya, not only the long-war that is waged by Islamism through *al-Shabaab*.

Literature that links state fragility directly to Islamist violent extremism abounds, including Rice (2001), Piazza (2008), Hanlon *et al* (2012), Carter (2012), Plummer (2012), Solomon (2013), Gaidi Mtaani (2013b), Ombaka (2015), Obama (2015a), and Clarke and Serena (2016). But why are not all fragile states incubators of Islamist violent extremism? According to Crenshaw (2014a), the answer lies in *the nature* of state fragility. Crenshaw (2014a:41) asserts that Islamist violent extremism and terror occur when "states are strong enough to exert repression that creates grievances, but not strong enough to eradicate opposition". Another necessary condition in generating Islamist violent extremism is the existence of a politically significant but marginalised or repressed Muslim minority, or otherwise, the existence of intra-Muslim factionalism or sectarianism, in such a fragile state. In the case in Kenya, Muslims form a marginalised yet politically significant 11 percent of the population. Fifty-four percent of Muslims in Kenya are ethnic-Somalis (see Chapters 3 and 6 to 8). Furthermore, other literature point to the link between shared state fragility and the internationalisation of Islamism. Carter (2012) and Blanchard (2013) maintain that shared fragility has encouraged the formation of ties, across the Gulf of Aden, between *al-Shabaab* in Somalia and *al-Qaeda* in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in Yemen, both affiliates of *al-Qaeda* Central. Carter (2012:75) finds that state fragility in these two countries has enabled Somalia and Yemen to become gateways for Islamist violent extremism, and to link terror (and criminal) networks between and beyond the Arabian Peninsula and the Horn of Africa.

There is also literature that highlights state fragility as an impediment to CVE approaches and programming. This literature includes Solomon (2013, 2016) and the Africa Center for Strategic Studies (2016). To illustrate, the Africa Center for Strategic Studies (2016:8, 10) bemoan the fact that most "African states do not command the official budgets necessary to overcome the socio-economic drivers of violent extremism …, [and] civil society, arguably the ideal sector for acting against cultural, [and group] drivers [of violent extremism], is often weak and curtailed in Africa". Solomon (2013:428) points to "the fundamental contradiction [in CVE] in using the mechanism of the [fragile African] state, an entity that often created the problem in the first place, as the locus of the solution". There is other literature that proposes mixed evidence, and even spurious correlation, in the link between state fragility, Islamist violent extremism, and impediments to CVE. This literature includes Patrick (2006a, 2006b), Simons and Tucker (2007), Denoeux and Carter (2009a), and Allan *et al* (2015). What we know and how we know about state fragility, Islamist violent extremism, and CVE, including in the context of Kenya, remain contested. It is this state of flux that has given impetus to the need to conduct this study. Given the aim of the study, which is to critically examine the relationship between state fragility, Islamist violent extremism, and CVE, in Kenya, the study has the structure presented next.

1.9 THE STRUCTURE OF THE STUDY

The study is divided into nine chapters. Chapter 1: *Introduction*, introduces the study, and lays out the background, problem formulation, the central proposition, research question, research objectives, research aim and significance, research design and methodology, literature review, and the structure of the study. Chapter 2: *Research design and methodology*, details the design and methodology. The study has a contextualised, explanatory, single-embedded, longitudinal, case study, research design. The research methodology triangulates three sources of evidence or methods, viz.: a literature and data study, field research (non-participatory observation), and semi-structured elite interviews. The second chapter is divided into three main parts, viz.: conceptualising the study, research design, and research methodology.

Chapter 3: *State fragility: theory and application*, is the first of three chapters under literature review. Throughout the three literature review chapters, including Chapter 2: *Research design and methodology*, I contemplate the relationship between state fragility, Islamist violent extremism, and impediments to CVE, and the context of Kenya. Chapter 3 seeks to answer two related questions, viz.: (1) What is state fragility?; (2) What is the relationship between state fragility, (in)security, and (under)development, i.e., the state fragility-security-development nexus? The chapter links state fragility to varied mutations of incapacity and insecurity, and to Islamist violent extremism in particular. The chapter also looks at the criticism against state fragility, and the utility of state fragility as a conceptual-analytical framework and a theoretical perspective. Lastly, the chapter outlines the Fragile States Index as an analytical measuring instrument in the application of state fragility.

Chapter 4: *Islamist violent extremism: analysis and theoretical perspectives*, considers Islamist violent extremism as a concept, ideology and movement, and the intention and objectives thereof. The chapter also explores the major inconsistencies and irreconcilables within Islamist violent extremism. The chapter then evaluates the analytical frameworks and theoretical perspectives linked to Islamist violent extremism. The three frameworks are (1) the clash of civilisations, (2) globalisation and uncertainty, and (3) local conditions. The three perspectives or approaches are (1) psychological, (2) instrumentalist, and (3) organisational, approaches. The three perspectives are considered in the context of alternative theoretical frameworks to state fragility as the *explanans* in this study.

Chapter 5: *Countering Islamist violent extremism: the state-of-the-art*, is the last of the three literature review chapters. The chapter outlines CVE by tracing the origins of CVE to counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism and looking at various pathways to ending violent Islamist campaigns, one of which being CVE. The chapter then considers CVE as a concept and highlights the CVE-security-development nexus. The CVE-security-development nexus, highlighting the role of connectedness and therefore the need for integration, informs not only the dominant whole-of-government and whole-of-society approaches to CVE programming, but also offensive and defensive, ideological and communicative, as well as political and social-policy, approaches and programming. Lastly, the chapter considers the challenges related to evaluating the success or failure of CVE, including the ethics of CVE.

Chapter 6: *Islamist violent extremism, countering Islamist violent extremism, and the fragile state in Kenya*, is the first of three chapters under discussion and analysis. The chapter seeks to answer the question: How are Islamist violent extremism and CVE evidenced in the fragile state in Kenya? The first part of the chapter covers the purported myth of Kenya as a victim of external terror attacks and then examines the Kenyan state as the explanatory setting of Islamist violent extremism by employing two themes: (1) authoritarianism and centralisation; (2) constitutional reforms and devolution. The chapter then looks at the origins of Islamist violent extremism in Kenya, new-wars and the long-war in Kenya, Islamist terror groups and combat units in Kenya, and major Islamist terrorist activity in Kenya since the 1990s. The second part of the chapter focuses on CVE, examining the Kenyan state as the explanatory setting for impediments to CVE by employing two themes: (1) the securitisation of the state; (2) renewed authoritarianism and centralisation. The chapter then considers key aspects of the CVE architecture, including key aspects of CVE approaches and programming, in Kenya.

State fragility and Islamist violent extremism in Kenya is the seventh chapter, and probes the question: What is the relationship between state fragility and Islamist violent extremism? The research design enables both spatial and temporal variation and analysis in the explanation of this relationship. The single-embedded lens employs the theoretical instrument of the arc of insecurity, enabling within-case spatial variation and analysis. The longitudinal lens, employing the theoretical instrument of a causal sequence, with causal patterns and causal mechanisms, enables within-case temporal variation and analysis. The single-embedded and longitudinal lenses combine to demonstrate (1) trace, (2) accounts, (3) patterns, and (4) sequences, evidence, in this causal relationship in Kenya.

In Chapter 8: *State fragility and countering Islamist violent extremism in Kenya*, the relationship between state fragility and impediments to CVE is examined. Chapter 8 is also designed to enable both spatial and temporal variation and analysis, in this case, in the explanation of the relationship between state fragility and impediments to CVE. As is the case in Chapter 7, in Chapter 8 the single-embedded design lens employs the theoretical instrument of the arc of insecurity, and the longitudinal design lens employs the theoretical instrument of a causal sequence. In Chapter 8 the single-embedded and longitudinal lenses demonstrate (1) trace, (2) accounts, (3) patterns, and (4) sequences, evidence, in the causal relationship between state fragility and impediments to CVE. The chapter ends with an exploration of the extent to which Islamist violent extremism and CVE, in turn, may have contributed to further state fragility in Kenya. Chapter 9: *Conclusion*, contains the summary and conclusions.

1.10 CONCLUDING REMARKS

This study examines the relationship between state fragility, Islamist violent extremism, and impediments to CVE in Kenya. The central proposition is that the factors that explain the incentive structure of Islamist violent extremism, and impediments to CVE, stemming from internal socio-economic and political settings, and the external context, as well as the psychological processes that explain the mobilisation of identity groups, are all linked to, and generated by, state fragility. Such fragility is defined by endemic insecurity, underperformance, misperformance, violence (structural, physical, and cultural), institutional failure, and fault-lines, at the macro (state institutions), meso (state-society relations), and the micro (relations between groups in society) levels of the state.

The study will, accordingly, demonstrate that the conflict-generating and debilitating properties or attributes of state fragility have causal capacity and causal tendency, providing not only the context, but the opportunity (enablers or permissive causes), as well as generating (driving or causing) Islamist violent extremism and impediments to CVE, rendering CVE approaches and CVE programming ineffective and counterproductive, and hence the failure of CVE. Islamist violent extremism and CVE, in turn, help to increase the fragility of the state. The combined results are the cyclical and self-reinforcing insecurity dilemma, fragility trap, and conflict trap found in Kenya. The study appropriates the Fragile States Index as an analytical measuring instrument in the application of state fragility.

This introductory chapter has set the scene and context for the study by outlining the background, problem formulation, the central proposition, research question, research objectives, research aim and significance, research design and methodology, literature review, and the structure of the study. The next chapter details the study’s contextualised, explanatory, single-embedded, longitudinal, case study research design, and its methodology. The chapter covers a conceptualisation of the study and details the research design as well as the research methodology of the study.

CHAPTER 2: RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY

2.1 INTRODUCTION

The study has a contextualised, explanatory, single-embedded, longitudinal, case study, research design. This chapter outlines the research design and research methodology in three parts: conceptualising and designing the study; the research design; the research methodology. The research design covers (1) the case study design, (2) the explanatory case study, (3) the philosophical validation and rationale for the case study design, and (4) spatial and temporal variation and analysis in explanatory case studies. The research methodology covers (1) case selection, (2) data collection, and (3) data analysis. The research design and methodology are particularly suited for this type of study, as the study encompasses a systematic, contextualised, explanatory, critical enquiry into the relationship between state fragility, Islamist violent extremism, and CVE, in a natural setting.

2.2 CONCEPTUALISING AND DESIGNING THE STUDY

I indicated in Chapter 1, section 1.3 *The central proposition*, that this study links Islamist violent extremism and CVE to state fragility, in Kenya. State fragility, it is proposed, provides the context and opportunity, and generates, Islamist violent extremism and impediments to CVE. Islamist violent extremism and CVE, in turn, contribute to the increased fragility of the state. With the research question and research objectives in mind (as outlined in the foregoing chapter), the study is structurally conceptualised and designed as outlined below:


State fragility: theory and application
Islamist violent extremism: analysis and theoretical perspectives
CVE: the state-of-the-art
Introduction
Research design and methodology
Conclusion
Islamist violent extremism, CVE, and the fragile state in Kenya
State fragility and Islamist violent extremism in Kenya
State fragility and CVE in Kenya

The above nine constituent parts of the study are dedicated to nine separate chapters. The first is the preceding introductory chapter of this thesis. The research design and methodology are contained in the current second chapter of this thesis. The literature review is divided into three chapters: Chapter 3, *State fragility: theory and application*; Chapter 4, *Islamist violent extremism: analysis and theoretical perspectives*; Chapter 5, *CVE: the state-of-the-art*. The discussion and analysis are also divided into three chapters (Chapters 6 to 8). Chapter 6 considers how Islamist violent extremism and CVE are evidenced in the fragile state in Kenya as a natural setting and explanatory context. The relationship between state fragility and Islamist violent extremism in Kenya is covered in Chapter 7. Chapter 8 contains the relationship between state fragility and CVE in Kenya. Chapter 9 is the concluding chapter.

2.3 RESEARCH DESIGN

The study has a contextualised, explanatory, single-embedded, longitudinal, case study, research design and methodology, what Baškarada (2014:5) calls 'a blueprint for a research project'. The first part of this blueprint is the research design, and the second part is the research methodology. Within the research design, the following four factors of the design are outlined: (1) the case study design; (2) the explanatory case study; (3) the philosophical validation and rationale for the case study design; (4) spatial and temporal variation and analysis in explanatory case studies.

2.3.1 The Case Study Design

Gerring (2004:341, 342) defines the case study as "an in-depth study of a single unit (a relatively bounded phenomenon) where the scholar's aim is to elucidate features of a larger class of similar phenomena", or alternatively, "an intense study of a single unit for the purpose of understanding a larger class of (similar) units". Similarly, George and Bennett (2005:5) define the case study approach as "the detailed examination of an aspect of a historical episode to develop or test historical explanations that may be generalisable to other events". Yin (1981:59; 2013:321; 2018:15) defines this approach as "an in-depth inquiry into a specific and complex [contemporary] phenomenon (the 'case'), set within its real-world context". Hamel *et al* (1993:1) link case studies to 'case history', a concept and framework that is employed typically in the fields of Psychology and Medicine, and they define a case study as "an in-depth study of the cases under consideration".

A *case*, George and Bennett (2005:17, 18) explain, is "an instance [or a historical episode] of a class of events", and *a class of events* is "a phenomenon of scientific interest, such as revolutions, types of government regimes, [and] kinds of economic systems". George and Bennett (2005) define 'a class of events' similar to what Gerring (2004) calls 'a relatively bounded phenomenon', and Yin (1981) 'a contemporary phenomenon', and 'a bounded entity' (Yin, 2012). Like George and Bennett's (2005) examples of 'a class of events', Gerring (2004:342) provides these examples of what he calls 'bounded phenomenon': revolution, political party, elections, or person. Similarly, Yin (2012:145) lists the following examples of what he calls 'a bounded entity': a person, organisation, behavioural condition, event, or other social phenomenon. A *case* thus is a physical entity *or* a conceptual phenomenon.

Gerring (2004:345) contends that the utility of the case study design is in two inherent functions, viz.: (1) when "[o]ne wishes to know both what is particular to that unit *and* what is general about it", and (2) when one wishes to "tackle subjects about which little is previously known or about which existing knowledge is fundamentally flawed". In this study, the class of events, bounded entities, or the units, both particular and general, are state fragility, Islamist violent extremism, CVE, and their relationship. Gerring (2004:347-350) maintains that the case study design has comparative advantage in various areas. Case studies offer unmatched richness and completeness in analysis when depth, rather than breadth, is the scope of the proposition. Secondly, when unpacking the black box of causality in the relationship between X and Y, in employing causal mechanisms as causal insight, case studies enable the close examination of empirical evidence by establishing patterns of covariation. Thirdly, case studies offer unmatched value when pursuing theory generation as strategy for research. This serves the quest for new theories or theory modification, especially when existing knowledge is flawed or there are great contestations (as is the existing case, which necessitates this study). Critically, as the philosophy of science scholar Thomas Samuel Kuhn maintains, "a discipline without a large number of thoroughly executed case studies is a discipline without systematic production of exemplars, and a discipline without exemplars is an ineffective one" (in Flyvbjerg, 2006:242).

The case study approach, however, is not without its critics. Hamel *et al* (1993:19, 23) point out that the case study, relying on sources such as field data, is often "deemed to lack rigour and to be subject to personal impressions, … [and by relying on] a single observation point", may lack representativeness or generalisability.[23] This study has controls for such criticism, i.e., measures to either dispel, defend against, or mitigate, such claims. Regarding the claim about the possible lack of rigour, this study (1) is theory-based; (2) is evidence-based; (3) relies on multiple sources of evidence that enable triangulation within and between data sources; (4) combines deductive and inductive analysis. It does not only relying on the initial theoretical proposition, but also considers alternative accounts, with theoretical propositions demonstrated by empirical evidence; (5) uses the single-embedded-longitudinal design, which enables within-case spatial and temporal variation and analysis, thus multiple points of observation; (6) case selection is purposefully representative, with rigorous case selection criteria and clear case boundaries; (7) does not merely describe, but retroductively traces and details state fragility as *explanans* for Islamist violent extremism and impediments to CVE.

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[23] Flyvbjerg (2006:221) addresses five 'misunderstandings' (what I call *myths*) about case study designs, that form the basis for making claims that case studies are 'unsuitable' or 'of lesser value' as methods of scientific enquiry. These 'misunderstandings' are: (1) "[g]eneral, theoretical (context-independent) knowledge is more valuable than concrete, practical (context-dependent) knowledge"; (2) "[o]ne cannot generalise on the basis of an individual case; therefore, the case study cannot contribute to scientific development"; (3) "[t]he case study is most useful for generating hypotheses; that is, in the first stage of a total research process, whereas other methods are more suitable for hypotheses testing and theory building"; (4) "[t]he case study contains a bias toward verification, that is, a tendency to confirm the researcher's preconceived notions"; (5) "[i]t is often difficult to summarise and develop general propositions and theories on the basis of specific case studies". Flyvbjerg (2006:241) concludes and demonstrates that these 'misunderstandings' are wrong and misleading.

Regarding the claim about possible bias, the study (1) privileges evidence-based and verifiable facts over impressions and opinions; (2) maintains a data collection database; (3) maintains a data collection chain of evidence; (4) the transcripts of the interviews are subjected to respondent validation, and as in claims of a lack of methodological rigour; (5) in addition to the initial theoretical proposition, also considers alternative accounts; (6) relies on multiple, triangulated, between and within, discrete sources of evidence, in the form of elite interviews, field research, and a literature and data study. These control measures are augmented by a healthy dose of scepticism and self-reflection. Galdas (2017:2) points out that although the researcher is “an integral part of the process and final product, and separation from this is neither possible nor desirable ..., [the researcher must be] transparent and reflexive ... about the processes by which data have been collected, analysed, and presented”. The above measures ensure transparency, objectivity, and enhanced confidence in the research process.

Furthermore, regarding the claim about the possible lack of generalisability, case selection is neither arbitrary nor is a deviant or outlier case selected. On the contrary, Kenya is purposefully selected because it fits the criteria regarding the object of the study. The object of the study, i.e., *the case*, is the relationship between state fragility, Islamist violent extremism, and CVE. Kenya, being typical, ordinary, average, is purposefully selected because it is *representative* of this relationship, i.e., representative of *the case* (see later in section 2.4.1 *Case Selection*, about Kenya being typical or representative of the case). Hamel *et al* (1993:23) assert that “representativeness … is always defined in terms of the object of the study”.[24] A representative case enables contextual generalisations to be made about similar cases. Yin (2012:148, 2018:27) contends that *analytic* generalisation may be made based on a study’s theoretical proposition, as opposed to statistical generalisation. George and

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[24] See Lynd and Lynd’s study, *Middletown: a study in contemporary American culture* (1929), and the sequel, *Middletown in transition: a study in cultural conflicts* (1937), for a descriptive, single-case study research design, based on a typical, ordinary, or representative case. The two studies are based on a middle-sized, average, American city, hence ‘Middletown’. The actual town was Muncie, Indiana. The two studies also have clear criteria for case selection. Seawright and Gerring (2008) identify and outline seven case study types that are involved in case selection: (1) typical (the basis for the current study); (2) diverse; (3) extreme; (4) deviant; (5) influential; (6) most similar; (7) most different. I draw from the foregoing studies and similar studies, in creating clear case selection criteria and case boundaries for the current study. See section 2.4.1 *Case selection*.

Bennett (2005:31, 32) call analytic generalisations, *contingent* generalisations, explaining that these are generalisations about “the conditions under which specified outcomes occur, rather than ... the frequency [statistical generalisation] within which those conditions and their outcomes arise”. Yin (2012:148) accordingly maintains that analytic generalisations are based on a study’s theoretical framework. This framework must establish a logic that may be applied in similar contexts.[25]

Making a case for analytic generalisation, with a single-embedded (spatial) and longitudinal (temporal) case design, this study is not a snapshot of a single space and time or a single point in time. Gerring (2004:344) points out that “[a] single unit observed at a single point in time without the addition of within-unit cases [or temporal variation] offers no evidence whatsoever of a causal proposition”. Yin (1981:61) also asserts that “a case study is not a data point [a discrete unit of information] that represents only a single observation”. Correctly understood, a single case study then relies not on a single but on multiple points of observation, based on within-case spatial or temporal variation and analysis, or both. The current study relies on both. Yin (2018:6-7) maintains that another perceived limitation of case study designs (and qualitative research in general) is the idea that case studies are either exploratory or descriptive but have a limited explanatory foothold. This study’s design, being explanatory, has control measures against such claims. Yin (2012:143-144) contends and shows that case study designs have utility in all four modes, viz., exploratory, descriptive, explanatory, and evaluative. In the current study the case study design is employed in its explanatory mode.

2.3.2 The Explanatory Case Study

This study has an explanatory, single-embedded, longitudinal, case study design, which enables within-case spatial and temporal variation and analysis. The design, relying on the initial theoretical proposition of state fragility, considers and evaluates alternative propositions, viz.: psychological approaches, instrumentalist approaches, and organisational approaches (see the section on *data analysis*). In addition, the study adheres to the criteria for an explanatory case study design laid out by Robert Yin. Yin (1981:61) contends that an explanatory case study must have: (1) “an accurate rendition of the facts of the case”; (2) “some consideration of alternative explanations of these facts”;

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[25] Statistical generalisation follows a sample-to-population logic, generalising about a population based on the empirical data collected from a representative sample of that population or universe (Yin, 2012:148; 2013:325). Tsang (2014:371-372) distinguishes between *empirical* (statistical) generalisation and *theoretical* (analytic) generalisation and argues and demonstrates that one can *theoretically* generalise from a single case study. See Allison’s *Essence of decision: explaining the Cuban missile crisis* (1971), the second edition by Allison and Zelikow (1999), and Putnam’s *Making democracy work: civic traditions in modern Italy* (1993), for explanatory single-case studies that generalise based on contextual generalisation, what Tsang (2014) and Yin (2012; 2018) call *analytic* or *theoretical* generalisation, and what George and Bennett (2005) call *contingent* generalisation.

(3) “a conclusion based on the single explanation that appears most congruent with the facts”. Yin (2018:9-11) also maintains that explanatory case studies are best conducted under specific conditions. These conditions prevail in this present study, and they are the following: (1) “when seeking to answer ‘how’, ‘why’, or ‘what’ questions [particularly when these questions seek to ‘trace processes over time’]”; (2) “when the researcher has no control over the behavioural events being studied”; (3) “when the focus of the study is on a contemporary event [i.e., a case]”.

In view of the foregoing, there is an acceptance that to examine the relationship between state fragility, Islamist violent extremism, and CVE, is to examine social phenomena that cannot be examined under controlled conditions, in the same way as laboratory experiments. It is also to study a social reality that is inhabited by self-regulating and self-interpreting social structures (i.e., institutions, organisations, associations, communities, and groups) and human agency. Because of these two factors, causal explanations, by definition, are *inferred*, based on theoretical propositions and congruent empirical evidence. Yin (2018:179) thus contends that “[t]o ‘explain’ a phenomenon is to stipulate a presumed set of causal sequences about it, or ‘how’ or ‘why’ some outcome has occurred”. Simeonova (2014:342) define causality as “the relationship between an event [the cause] and a second event [the effect], where the second event is understood as a consequence of the first”. Similarly, Gerring (2004:350) contends that “[t]he analysis of any causal relationship hinges on the counterfactual assumption - that without X [or with more or less of X], Y would be different”.

Gerring (2005:169, 170) contends that ‘causes’ are “events or conditions that *raise the probability* of some outcome occurring .... To be causal, the cause in question must *generate*, *create,* or *produce* the supposed effect”. Gerring (2010:1502) also contends that “[o]ne would like to know not only whether X causes Y but also *how* it does so”. I outline later in the chapter, when addressing Critical Realism as a philosophy of science, that the foregoing is one understanding of causality, what Mingers and Standing (2017:173) call ‘generative causality’, i.e., the linking of causes and outcomes through *generative* causal mechanism, explaining why and how X produces Y. Mingers and Standing (2017:172) explain that “the events we observe, and experience are generated through the complex interactions of generative mechanisms [or systems] that have causal powers or tendencies”. That is what this study seeks to do, to trace and detail *why* and *how* state fragility explains Islamist violent extremism and impediments to CVE. Understanding this process is more important in explanation-building than detailing the outcome. Seawright and Gerring (2008:299) clarify that “the researcher wants to find a typical case of some phenomenon so that he or she can better explore the causal mechanisms at work in a general, cross-case relationship”. In this study the phenomenon, *the case*, is the relationship between state fragility, Islamist violent extremism, and CVE. George and Bennett (2005:136) and Yin (1981:59, 2018:15, 193-194) further maintain that unlike experiments conducted under controlled conditions, which purposefully separate phenomenon from its context, case study explanations are *always* contextualised. I therefore employ Kenya as the representative context in analysing *the case*.

This study has clear attributes for a causal explanation: (1) reveals the empirical relationship between state fragility, Islamist violent extremism and CVE (*correlation*); (2) shows that state fragility predates the formation of Islamist organisations and any pull factors, meaning that state fragility predates Islamist violent extremism and CVE (*time order*); (3) based on (a) the initial theoretical proposition and alternative accounts, and (b) emergent causal patterns, mechanisms, and sequences from data mining, achieved by deductive-inductive and retroductive analysis, empirical evidence suggests that the link between state fragility, Islamist violent extremism and CVE, is not spurious (*non-spuriousness*). Moreover, (4) the study retroductively traces and explains why and how state fragility account for Islamist violent extremism, and it offer barriers to CVE (utilising *causal mechanisms*, with pattern matching, process-tracing, and time series analysis); (5) establishes the political, socio-economic and historical context through which state fragility accounts for Islamist violent extremism and barriers to CVE (*contextual explanation*); (6) demonstrates variance in state fragility and the dependent variance in Islamist violent extremism and in impediments to CVE (*variance*). These six attributes for a causal explanation find expression in explanation-building that is contained throughout the study.[26]

Michael Gibbert and his colleagues have created criteria, based on 24 coded dimensions, for gauging the scientific rigour of case studies (Gibbert *et al*, 2008, Gibbert and Ruigrok, 2010). This study adheres to these criteria. The criteria are referenced by Robert Yin (2018:42) as "logical tests ... to establish the quality of most empirical social research ..., [including] case study research". The criteria, based on these 24 dimensions, are subsumed under what Gibbert and Ruigrok (2010) call ‘primary and secondary reports on validity and reliability’. Under ‘primary reports’, Gibbert and Ruigrok (2010) list construct validity, internal validity, external validity, and reliability. I report on these four dimensions below. The other 20 dimensions, i.e., ‘secondary reports’, include case selection, case study database, chain of evidence, theory and data triangulation, *et cetera*. I report on these dimensions at respective and relevant sections of the first chapter, this chapter, and throughout the current study.

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[26] Simeonova (2014:343-344) addresses attributes for causal explanations: (1) correlation; (2) time order; (3) non-spuriousness; (4) causal mechanisms; (5) context. I add another attribute, viz.: (6) variance, enabling within-case spatial and temporal variation and analysis (see the conceptualisation of the research design at the end of this part of the chapter). Importantly, although there is some agreement, in general, of what *a cause* is, in the social sciences, there is a plurality of methodological approaches to causal arguments and/or models of explanation. By illustration, in contrast but with some overlapping to Simeonova (2014), Gerring (2005:170-182) addresses 16 attributes by which a causal argument may be measured: (1) specification; (2) precision; (3) breadth; (4) boundedness; (5) completeness; (6) parsimony; (7) differentiation; (8) priority; (9) independence; (10) contingency; (11) mechanism; (12) analytic utility; (13) intelligibility; (14) relevance; (15) innovation; (16) comparison. These attributes are not incongruent with the causal argument as contained in this study. In fact, these 16 attributes are embedded in the six attributes that this study establishes, as well as in other principles and instruments that this study adheres to, including: analytic generalisation, scepticism, strict definition of concepts, and in-depth-analysis. These methodological differences are beyond the scope of this study. Gerring (2005), however, is a good scholarly place to start. Variance, pattern matching, process-tracing (of causal mechanisms), and time series analysis, are addressed in respective sections of this chapter hereafter.

Reverting to ‘primary reports’, as Gibbert *et al* (2008:1461) outline, construct validity concerns “the quality of the conceptualisation or operationalisation of the relevant concept”, or otherwise, Gibbert and Ruigrok (2010:712) maintains, construct validity is the extent to which developed concepts lead to “an accurate observation of reality”. The central question with internal validity, is whether the study demonstrates ‘a plausible causal argument’ or ‘logical reasoning’ that is commanding and compelling enough to defend the findings of the study (Gibbert *et al*, 2008:1461). External validity is based on the belief that explanations and theories should not be limited to a specific setting but should apply in other settings as well in order to be considered to be valid (Gibbert and Ruigrok, 2010:714). Reliability refers to “the absence of random error, enabling subsequent researchers to arrive at the same insights if they conduct the study along the same steps again” (Gibbert and Ruigrok,2010:715). Similarly, Baškarada (2014:9) maintains that reliability is “concerned with demonstrating that the same results can be obtained by repeating the data collection procedure”. Gibbert *et al* (2008:1468) and Golafshani (2003:601-602) find that there is a hierarchical relationship between the validity types and reliability, i.e., reliability presupposes validity. Golafshani (2003:601-602) accordingly concludes that as one cannot have validity without reliability, it follows that once validity had been demonstrated one would have sufficiently established reliability as well.

While this study adheres to the principles of construct validity, internal validity, external validity, and reliability, what Gibbert and Ruigrok (2010:712) call ‘the natural sciences model’, these concepts are coupled to Positivism as a philosophy of science. Instead, this study refers to the principles of accuracy, confidence, generalisability, and consistency (see the section on Critical Realism below). With its accuracy of concepts (i.e., construct validity), this study has clear definitions and operationalisation of concepts and constructs. To illustrate, state fragility is clearly defined and operationalised with measurable indicators through the Fragile States Index. Islamist violent extremism is clearly defined, operationalised, and measured by the indicator *terrorist activity*, through the Global Terrorism Index. Furthermore, this study presents empirical evidence, based on data triangulation, of concepts and constructs (see the section on *data collection*). These measures link theoretical frameworks with observable reality, ensuring that the study examines that which it is designed to examine.

With the notion of confidence (internal validity), the study has an initial theoretical proposition, but also examines and evaluates alternative explanations (theory triangulation). The study also conforms to clear and rigorous attributes for causal explanation (as described above). Furthermore, the study employs pattern matching, process-tracing causal mechanisms, and time-series analysis in unpacking the causal relationship between state fragility, Islamist violent extremism and CVE. The foregoing enhances confidence or trustworthiness about the cogency, logic, and credibility of the causal explanation (see the section on Critical Realism below and later the section on data analysis). With generalisability or transferability (external validity), case selection is purposefully representative (with clear case selection criteria and case boundaries). I rely on analytic generalisation, by generating causal sequences with causal patterns and causal mechanisms, a logic that may be applied to similar contexts in explaining the relationship between state fragility, Islamist violent extremism and CVE.

Regarding consistency (reliability), based on the principles of transparency and replication, one must acknowledge that the requirement for replication does not carry the same absolute terms in the social sciences. There is an acceptance (as outlined above) that the social sciences are confronted with the complexity of a social reality where controlled conditions that enable replication are very limited, if at all achievable. The social sciences also deal with self-regulating and self-interpreting structure and agency. These variable conditions, structure and agency, mean that the social sciences are consequently confronted with variable possible outcome conditions, actions, and reactions, and variable perceived meaning and significance of those outcome conditions, actions, and reactions. Causal explanation and generalisability are, accordingly, always contingent and contextualised.[27]

Whereas contingent and contextualised explanations and generalisability are created, this is offset by offering transparency, objectivity, and trustworthiness through maintaining a data collection database, maintaining a chain of evidence, triangulating data collection methods and theories, and creating and maintaining an interview protocol and an interview guide. All these principles and measures are adhered to in this study (see the section on data collection). These principles and measures enable independent verification and validation, i.e., consistency or reliability based on transparency, and thus enhanced confidence in the research process and research results. Absolute consistency or reliability, based on replication as understood in the natural sciences, is an unachievable aspiration in the social world as stressed above. I shall return to aspects of the foregoing controls (relating to case study rigour, bias, generalisability, causality, and explanation) in appropriate sections later in the chapter and later in the study. First, the philosophical underpinnings and rationale of the explanatory case study design, as contained within the philosophy of science, are addressed.

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[27] While social reality does not lend itself to replication and controlled conditions as is the case with laboratory experiments, these controlled conditions may be functionally emulated (as shown in section 2.3.4 *Spatial and temporal variation and analysis in explanatory case studies*). In this regard, Kenya is the veritable context that contains and demarcates the conditions under which the relationship between state fragility, Islamist violent extremism and CVE exist, and can thus be examined. Furthermore, this study has a single-embedded-longitudinal design that enables within-case spatial and temporal variation and analysis. The study has clear attributes for causal explanation, clear case selection criteria and case boundaries, and has an interview protocol and an interview guide. These measures help to functionally reproduce controlled conditions, mitigating against extraneous factors, and enhancing accuracy and confidence in the research process and the research results.

2.3.3 The Philosophical Validation and Rationale for the Case Study Design

The philosophical keystones of the explanatory case study design, as adopted in this study, including views concerning society, social reality and social phenomena, social structure and agency, and the foundations for causality and social explanation, are encapsulated within the philosophy of science called Critical Realism.[28] Archer *et al* (2016:4) contends that "[c]ritical realism is a series of philosophical positions on a range of matters including ontology, causation, structure, persons, and forms of explanation .... Critical realism is not an empirical programme; it is not a methodology .... It is ... a meta-theoretical position: a reflexive philosophical stance concerned with providing a philosophically informed account of science and social science which can in turn inform our empirical investigations". According to Archer *et al* (2016:4-7), Critical Realism is distinguished by four tenets, viz., ontological realism, epistemic relativism, judgmental rationality, and cautious ethical naturalism.

Ontological realism is based on the belief that reality and social facts exist whether there is awareness or knowledge or not, of that reality or social facts (Easton, 2010a:120; Archer *et al*, 2016:4-5). Based on what we know, George and Bennett (2005:131) argue that his reality and these social facts "can be the subject of defensible causal inferences". To make causal inferences requires a critical and reflexive understanding of what we know about reality, including what we know and how we know about the nature of the social world, social structures, human agency, processes, relations, and causation (Archer *et al*, 2016:5-6). Little (2015:468) advances that "there are real underlying causes, structures, processes, and entities that give rise to the observations we make of the world .... [T]hese structures can be studied empirically, and ... it is scientifically appropriate to form theories and ... [propositions] about these underlying causes to arrive at explanations of what we observe".

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[28] Critical Realism, or Scientific Realism, as the philosophy of science appropriated in this study, is contrasted with other philosophies, including positivist/empiricist and relativist/interpretivist/constructivist philosophies. These philosophies represent the different approaches within the social sciences. The logic for this study is drawn from Critical Realism. Hence, although I adhere to the principles of construct validity, internal validity, external validity, reliability, X and Y variables, hypothesis, and so forth, I deliberately avoid using these concepts as they are associated with Positivism. Instead, I speak of accuracy, confidence, analytic generalisation, consistency, X and Y constructs, theoretical proposition, and so forth. Also, although I present Critical Realism as a singular, coherent, philosophy as associated with Roy Bhaskar, Andrew Sayer, Margaret Archer, and others, as Margaret Archer *et al* (2016:4) point out, "there is not one unitary framework, set of beliefs, methodology, or dogma that unites critical realists as a whole". George and Bennett (2005:136) also warn that "there are almost as many versions of scientific realism as there are philosophers calling themselves realists". A particular version of Critical Realism is therefore presented in this study.

Epistemic relativism is based on the belief that although what we know objectively exists, how we know is always located in a specific historical, social, and cultural context (Archer *et al*, 2016:6). Causal explanations are thus always context-specific and context-dependent. Pawson and Tilley (1997:58) establishes that the formula: cause + causal mechanisms + context = outcome, is the 'axiomatic base' of explanation-building within Critical Realism. Falleti and Lynch (2009:1152) accordingly conclude that "[o]utcomes of causal mechanisms are not fixed but dependent on the contexts within which they occur". To grasp the operations of causal mechanisms, it is critical to know the social and cultural contexts of what one is studying. How we know is thus always constructed through, and interpreted by, our own conceptual frameworks (Maxwell, 2004:6). Archer *et al* (2016:6) therefore insist that our representation and explanation of reality must be differentiated from the independence of that reality. Fletcher (2017:182) in turn thus points out that social reality is "theory-laden, but not theory-determined". James March further makes the assertion that theory and scientific knowledge contribute only to a fraction of what we know, rather than encompassing all knowledge (in George and Bennett, 2005:279). The goal of science, therefore, is to approximate reality as far as possible.

Taking stock of the above, Fletcher (2017:182) advances that how we know is based on a small fraction of a much 'deeper and vaster reality'. To illustrate this, Gross (2009:361), Easton (2010a:123), and Fletcher (2017:183) employ an analogy of an iceberg, identifying a three-level reality or what they call three ontological domains, viz.: (1) at the apex is the *empirical* level, containing 'experiences and observed events'; (2) the *actual* level is where 'events occur whether they are observed or not'; (3), the *real* level contains 'causal structures' or 'causal mechanisms'. All three levels, Easton (2010a:123) and Fletcher (2017:182-183) point out, are components of a single reality. However, since only the empirical level is often observed, reality cannot be reduced to human knowledge. Our models of reality are therefore contingent upon discovering the "causal mechanisms and the effects they can have throughout the three-layered 'iceberg' of reality" (Fletcher, 2017:183).

Judgmental rationality holds that although how we know is based on epistemic relativism, there are clear criteria to distinguish between plausible models of reality. Some models are more accurate than others. Archer *et al* (2016:6, 7) explain that in upholding one model over another, there must be relatively objective reasons or criteria to be followed, enabling cumulative scientific knowledge, even if this knowledge may be 'historical, contingent, and changing'. The resultant plausible models of reality may then be unlocked by employing causal mechanisms. Little (2015:468) argues that "events and outcomes are caused by specific happenings and powers, and ... a good approach to a scientific explanation of an outcome or pattern is to discover the real causal mechanisms that typically bring it about". Little (2015:468) further argues that "the mechanisms that are brought forward in social explanations are concretely instantiated in the social world through the actions of individuals situated within institutions and norms". Causal mechanisms-based explanations are contrasted with explanations as advocated by Positivism. Positivism bases explanations on the discovery of statistical regularity and repeatability (Little, 2015:465). By contrast, Critical Realism devalue statistical regularities as "inherently limited representations of causal processes" (Mayntz, 2004:238). In fact, Archer *et al* (2016:4) point out that despite it being "a heterogeneous series of positions", Critical Realism is united by "a commitment to formulating a properly post-positivist philosophy".

The fourth tenet of Critical Realism, cautious ethical naturalism, is based on the belief that contrary to the positivist view of a value-neutral science, and although facts may be empirically separated from values, in reality, Archer *et al* (2016:7) maintain, facts are often 'value-laden', and values are often 'fact-laden'. Archer *et al* (2016:7) conclude that there is therefore a "cautious normative dimension to our knowledge. [Accepting that] (f)acts and values are not [completely] insulated from one another". Easton (2010a:122-123) also posits that "social phenomena are intrinsically meaningful .... Meaning has to be understood, it cannot be measured or counted, and hence there is always an interpretative or hermeneutic element in social science". In this study, consequently, while I maintain a healthy dose of objectivity, I am also aware of the limitations that may be posed by my conceptual frameworks.

I stated earlier that Critical Realism employs process-tracing of causal mechanisms to build causal explanations. Process-tracing was first used in cognitive studies to analyse individual decision-making processes and is now applied beyond individual level analysis in other disciplines (Trampusch and Palier, 2016:437, 442). Beach (2017:2-3) defines process-tracing as "a research method for tracing causal mechanisms by using detailed, within-case empirical analysis of how a causal process plays out in an actual case .... [P]rocess-tracing research probes the theoretical causal mechanisms *linking* causes and outcomes together". Likewise, Beach (2016:463) states that process-tracing is a "distinct case-study methodology … [that] involves tracing causal mechanisms that link causes (X) with their effects (i.e., outcomes) (Y)". George and Bennett (2005:6, 138, 153) define process-tracing as "an operational procedure for attempting to identify and verify the observable within-case implications of causal mechanisms ..., [tracing the causal chain] between possible causes and observed outcomes".

Yin (2018:179-181) views process-tracing as a data analysis technique that he calls 'explanation-building' (see 2.4.5.3 *Data analysis techniques*). Beach (2016:464, 471) contends that the 'process' in process-tracing encourages the flawed linkage with a descriptive narrative, and consequently it is better to speak of 'mechanism-tracing'. Mayntz (2004:238) instead speaks of 'causal reconstruction'. The correct conception, whether referring to process-tracing, mechanism-tracing, causal reconstruction, or explanation-building, is the following: theorising and demonstrating the causal sequence, or the causal chain, through tracing causal mechanisms.[29] Employing causal mechanisms to theorise and illustrate this causal sequence involves "a thick and robust account of causation" (Archer *et al*, 2016:6). A 'thick and robust' contextual explanation of the relationship between state fragility, Islamist violent extremism, and CVE, is what this study seeks to achieve. If process-tracing is about tracing (i.e., discovering and detailing evidence of) causal mechanisms, what are causal mechanisms?

Easton (2010a:122) calls causal mechanisms 'deep generative processes and structures' and Bygstad *et al* (2016:84) refer to causal mechanisms as 'a causal structure that explains a phenomenon'. In the field of Psychology, mechanisms refer to "the means or manner in which something is accomplished" (McCauley and Moskalenko, 2008:415). Consequently, causal mechanisms link causes to outcomes (Beach, 2017:3), and they outline "the pathway(s) through which X might affect Y" (Gerring, 2010:1500). George and Bennett (2005:137) define causal mechanisms as "physical, social, or psychological processes through which agents with causal capacities operate, but only in specific contexts or conditions, to transfer energy, information, or matter to other entities". Beach (2017:5) define causal mechanisms as "systems of interlocking parts that transmit causal powers or forces between a cause (or a set of causes) to an outcome", whereas Mayntz (2004:241) says they are "sequences of causally linked events that occur repeatedly in reality if certain conditions are given". Gross (2009:364) defines causal mechanisms as "a more or less general sequence or set of social events or processes analysed at a lower order of complexity or aggregation [vis-à-vis X and Y] by which - in certain circumstances - some cause X tends to bring about some effect Y". Alternatively, Falleti and Lynch (2009:1143) define causal mechanisms as “portable concepts that explain how and why a hypothesised cause, in a given context, contributes to a particular outcome”.

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[29] Although a particular understanding of process-tracing is presented in this study, it is important to note that there are disagreements about what process-tracing is, and what it entails. Trampusch and Palier (2016:438) point out that "[d]efinitions of process-tracing have multiplied rather than simplified over time. The process-tracing method has been 'stretched' and applied to nearly every analysis of processes".

At the centre of causal mechanisms is the idea that “proper explanations should detail the cogs and wheels of the causal process through which the outcome to be explained was brought about” (Hedström and Ylikoski, 2010:50). Similarly, George and Bennett (2005:141) assert that causal mechanisms open the black box of causality between X and Y, laying bare the nuts and bolts of the causal chain. Little (2015:468) asserts that “[m]echanisms are not merely hypothetical models; they are ... real [concrete] underlying processes whose properties can be discovered through a variety of empirical methods”. Hedström and Ylikoski (2010:54) explain that “[t]he knowledge that there is a mechanism through which X influences Y supports the inference that X is a cause of Y. In addition, the absence of a plausible mechanism linking X to Y gives us a good reason to be suspicious of the relation being a causal one …. The knowledge of mechanisms also has an important role in extrapolation of causal findings from one setting to another”. Moreover, the utility of causal mechanism lies in helping us to avoid ‘spurious causal arguments’ and to deepen our ‘theoretical knowledge of the world’ (Gerring, 2010:1500). Similarly, Beach (2016:465; 2017:6) asserts that the value of unpacking causal mechanisms lies in subjecting a causal claim to not only causal evidence but a causal logic as well. Hedström and Ylikoski’s (2010:54) contend that a causal mechanism’s explanation expands and enhances our understanding of reality. Fletcher (2017:182) maintains that in analysing social problems or proposing solutions for social change, it is better to engage in explanation and causal analysis, rather than embarking on a ‘thick empirical description’ that is only applicable in a given setting.

George and Bennett (2005:131-137) contrast explanations via causal mechanisms with explanations via three other models, viz.: the deductive-nomological (D-N), the inductive-statistical (I-S), and the statistical-relevance (S-R) models. The D-N model creates laws or ‘statements of regularity and expectability’ i.e., ‘if A then B’. Accordingly, if the initial conditions of A exist then B is to be expected. The I-S model establishes explanation by considering ‘high likelihood’, i.e., if A exist then there is a high likelihood or high probability of B occurring. The S-R model is another probabilistic explanation. Unlike the I-S model, George and Bennett (2005:134, 146) opines, the S-R model implies that factors are ‘causal’ as long as they raise the probability of the occurrence of the expected outcome, whether the probability is high or low. George and Bennett (2005) evaluate these three models and find them deficient, opting instead for explanations via causal mechanisms. George and Bennett (2005:140, 141) find that “[m]echanism-based explanations are committed to realism and to continuousness and contiguity in causal processes ..., [providing] more detailed and in a sense more fundamental explanations than general laws do". Consequently, whereas nomological thinking establishes general and invariable propositions, the alternative to nomological thinking is not 'a mere description or narrative ideographic method'. Instead, between the two extremes, lie mechanisms-based explanations (George and Bennett, 2005:140-141).[30]

With the application of process-tracing, I trace causal mechanisms from the data to explain the relationship between state fragility, Islamist violence extremism, and CVE. With the application of causal mechanisms, I demonstrate that the fragile state has inherent properties that have what George and Bennet (2005:137) call *causal capacities*, explaining both Islamist violent extremism and barriers to CVE. These attributes or capacities, find expression in the indicators of state fragility as contained in the Fragile States Index. I seek to establish that it is the social structures or entities (governments, institutions, organisations, associations, society, communities, and groups, found in meso and macro radicalisation) that subsist in the fragile state, that have agency and causal capacity. Micro (individual) radicalisation finds meaning and logic only within these social structures.[31]

Causal mechanisms are explained by 'entities' that engage in 'activities'. Mechanisms are not theoretical, but rather, ontological entities (Beach, 2017:6). Being ontological, mechanisms are not always physical. Causal mechanisms may also be social, psychological, or conceptual (George and Bennett, 2005:144; Mingers and Standing, 2017:175). In this study, these ontological entities include the social structures that have causal capacity, engaging in actions (activities), explaining both Islamist violent extremism and impediments to CVE. I outline in Chapters 6 to 8 that the study builds causal sequences, sketching out why and how particular generative causal mechanisms release causal powers in the relationship between state fragility, Islamist violent extremism, and impediments to CVE. These causal capacity, powers, or tendencies may be deterministic, random, or probabilistic. Dupré and Cartwright (1988:522) explain that "[a] deterministic capacity is one which, under specifiable circumstances, always produces its effect. A random capacity sometimes produces its effect and sometimes does not, but nature does not determine how often or how regularly it does so. A probabilistic capacity also operates only sometimes, but the strength of the tendency to produce the effect is nomologically fixed". I show in Chapters 6 to 8 that state fragility has both deterministic and probabilistic powers, capacity, and tendency, rather than random power, capacity, or tendency.

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[30] This study appropriates a particular understanding of causal mechanisms, but as George and Bennett (2005:135) caution, "there is no agreement on an exact definition of causal mechanisms". In a survey of the literature on the concept, Gerring (2010:1500-1501) outlines that causal mechanisms may refer to: "[a] the pathway or process by which an effect is produced, (b) a micro-level (micro foundational) explanation for a causal phenomenon, (c) a difficult-to-observe causal factor, (d) an easy-to-observe causal factor, (e) a context dependent (tightly bound or middle-range) explanation, (f) a universal (i.e., highly general) explanation, (g) an explanation that presumes probabilistic, and perhaps highly contingent, causal relations, (h) an explanation built on phenomena that exhibit law-like regularities, (i) a technique of analysis based on qualitative or case study evidence, and/or (j) a theory couched in formal mathematical models". Whereas some of these characterisations of causal mechanisms are compatible, others are, as Gerring (2010:1501) correctly observes, clearly contradictory. Consequently, Mayntz (2004:239) speaks of the 'semantic noise', and Beach (2016:463) speaks of the 'considerable ambiguity and discord', around causal mechanisms.

[31] Radicalisation is introduced in Chapter 1, section 1.8.1 *Key concepts*, elaborated on in Chapter 4, section 4.2.1 *Conceptualising Islamist violent extremism*, and addressed in various contexts throughout the study.

In building causal explanations, process-tracing of causal mechanisms rely on four types of empirical evidence, viz., trace, accounts, patterns, and sequences (Beach, 2016:469, 2017:14-15). A *trace* is a piece of evidence about the existence of phenomena, and *accounts* are the content of that evidence (Beach, 2017:15). *Trace* and *accounts* may be equated with what is often referred to as *indicators* in social theory and social research. To illustrate, in the current study, the 12 main indicators of the Fragile States Index are not only measures of state fragility but are used to provide *trace evidence* of the existence of state fragility, and the content or substance (*accounts evidence*) of that fragility. The Global Terrorism Index is employed not only to measure Islamist terrorist activity, but to provide trace evidence and accounts evidence of such Islamist terrorist activity. Likewise, the Global Extremism Monitor also provide trace evidence and accounts evidence of Islamist terrorist activity. Islamist terrorist activity being the empirical substantiation or indicator of Islamist violent extremism.

In the context of the current study, one pattern-based evidence relates to the expectation that Islamist violent extremism will be most virulent, and impediments to CVE will be most defined, in areas where state fragility is most evidenced. Patterns are also statistical. There is hence an expectation of demonstrable statistical patterns such as higher poverty levels and unemployment rates, lower access to public goods and services, and higher terrorist activity, in the areas where state fragility is most evidenced in Kenya. With *sequences evidence*, both temporal and spatial chronology, what George and Bennett (2005:212) call *a path-dependent causal process* and Yin (2018:181-185) calls *time-series analysis*, I identify historical markers in the origins and evolution of both Islamist violent extremism and CVE in Kenya, from the *Shifta* war (1963-1968) to Kenya's CVE Operation *Linda Boni* since 2015. All four types of empirical evidence, viz., trace, accounts, patterns, and sequences, leave "empirical fingerprints [or the 'smoking gun'] of underlying causal processes" (Beach, 2016:469, 470).

There are three stages or modes of scientific reasoning in building a causal explanation as informed by Critical Realism, viz.: deduction, retroduction, and induction. These modes of reasoning are also linked with data analysis (see the research methodology section). I will not spend much time now on the familiar deduction, i.e., the movement from a theoretical premise to specific observations, or induction, i.e., the movement from specific observations to building a theoretical premise. Deduction-induction are also addressed later in the chapter. Deductive and inductive coding is addressed in section 2.4.3.1 *Stages in data analysis*, and deductive and inductive data analysis strategies are address in section 2.4.3.2 *Data analysis strategies*. Let me address retroduction. Easton (2010a:123) defines retroduction as "a mode of inference in which events are explained by postulating (and identifying) mechanisms which are capable of producing ... [other events]". Fletcher (2017:189) asserts that retroduction is a mode of drawing logical inferences from data by moving from the concrete to the theoretical, and back again, extending existing knowledge. These logical inferences, Fletcher (2017:189) further asserts, rely on identifying casual mechanisms and contextual conditions, in building explanation. Fletcher (2017:190) concludes that the key outcome of retroduction "is to modify, support, or reject existing theories to provide the most accurate explanation of reality".

After establishing the central proposition of the study, i.e., that the development of Islamist violent extremism and impediments to CVE are explained by state fragility, I highlight the *state fragility-security-development nexus* (Chapter 3) and the *CVE-security-development nexus* (Chapter 5). In both instances I outline the theoretical premise that state fragility is linked with both underdevelopment and various permutations of insecurity, and that state fragility explains both the development of Islamist violent extremism and impediments to CVE, and that this is evidenced in Kenya (deduction). Furthermore, I develop theoretical causal sequences in the relationship between state fragility, Islamist violent extremism, and CVE. I outline the causal mechanisms explaining the relationship between state fragility and Islamist violent extremism (Chapter 7), as well as the relationship between state fragility and CVE in Chapter 8 (retroduction). Lastly, having examined the empirical evidence outlining causal sequences (with causal patterns and causal mechanisms) in the relationship between state fragility, Islamist violent extremism, and CVE, in Kenya, I propose (induce) that these causal sequences or causal pathways may shed light on similar context in sub-Saharan Africa.

In addition to the above stages or modes of scientific reasoning, both Critical Realism and the case study design employ a range of methods. Pursuant to this attribute of Critical Realism and case study research, the current study employs three triangulated methods as outlined later in the research methodology section, viz.: semi-structured interviews, field research (non-participatory observation), and a literature and data study. Easton (2010a:123-124) also finds congruences between Critical Realism and case study research. Easton (2010a:127, 128) concludes that Critical Realism is especially well suited as a philosophy of science in case study designs as it provides the "philosophical validation, i.e., ontological and epistemological underpinnings ... ideally matched to case research .... Critical realism ... provides not only a basis for justification but also guidelines as to how case research might be done and how theory can be fashioned”. In a later study, Easton (2010b:9) reaffirms that Critical Realism “offers a defensible rationale for the use of case study research”.

2.3.4 Spatial and Temporal Variation and Analysis in Explanatory Case Studies

Moving away from the philosophical validation and rationale of the case study design to the nuts-and-bolts of the design, as such. I pointed out in Chapter 1, section 1.2 *Problem formulation* that the undertaking of this study is informed by the following nagging curiosity: *Which factors explain Islamist violent extremism and impediments to CVE, in Kenya?* The study ascribes these factors to the conflict-generating and debilitating properties of state fragility. The research design is therefore intended to address the stated outcomes of this study, i.e., (1) to examine the relationship between state fragility, Islamist violent extremism, and CVE, and (2) to analyse the fragile state in Kenya as an explanatory context of Islamist violent extremism and impediments to CVE (and hence the failure of CVE).

Two key constructs are employed in modelling the research design. X (*explanans*) is state fragility, and the binary Y (*explanandum*) is the development and sustainment of Islamist violent extremism and impediments to CVE. Earlier in the current chapter, and in Chapter 1, section 1.3 *The central proposition*, I outline that the theoretical proposition of the study is that state fragility does not only provide the context and opportunity, but also generates Islamist violent extremism and impediments to CVE. Attendant to this theoretical proposition, is the expectation that in areas and dimensions where state fragility is most evidenced, Islamist violent extremism will be most virulent, and impediments to CVE will be most pronounced. The areas or dimensions will be in the arc of insecurity.

The arc of insecurity is employed within the research design as a theoretical, analytical, and explanatory instrument. Conceived as geographical construct, Kagwanja (2014a, 2014b) and Ombaka (2015) refer to those areas in Kenya that are typified by underdevelopment and insecurity, which experience elevated levels of terrorist activity, communal violence, and criminal activity, as the *arc of insecurity*. Mwangi (2006) calls these physical spaces forgotten *badlands*, and later he calls them *stateless, ungoverned spaces* (Mwangi, 2017a). Ombaka (2015:12, 13) contends these are geographical areas in Kenya that are “only nominally under the control of the central government”, where insecurity has become “a normal burden of citizenship”. In the arc of insecurity, Kenya faces what Mary Kaldor (2012, 2013) has conceptualised as new-wars. New-wars blur the distinction between state and non-state actors, war and peace, and between political violence and criminal violence. The long-war, waged by Islamist violent extremism, is a subset of these new-wars.[32]

The arc of insecurity is not viewed solely as a geographical construct in this study. The construct embraces other dimensions, including cohesive, legal, political, economic, and social spaces. The arc of insecurity in Kenya represents the areas and dimensions of the state that are outside the meaningful and effective control and management of the state, which are reflecting areas and dimensions of state fragility. The fragility of the state and the resulting endemic insecurity and new-wars in Kenya's arc of insecurity, show consistency with the *Conflict Assessment System Tool* (CAST) methodology employed by the Fragile States Index. The CAST methodology measures not only state fragility, but also conflict risk (see Chapter 3). The arc of insecurity therefore accentuates the conflict-generating and debilitating properties of state fragility in Kenya. These properties, I will demonstrate, explain both Islamist violent extremism and impediments to CVE in Kenya. I reveal in this study that the arc of insecurity in Kenya is not only the locus of new-wars, but it is also the epicentre of the long-war.[33]

It is not by accident that Islamist violent extremism is most prevalent in regions where the indicators of state fragility are most evidenced, i.e., in the arc of insecurity. According to Kagwanja (2014b:The Internet) and Ombaka (2015:12), "[t]his arc straddles 12 out of Kenya's 47 counties namely, West Pokot, Elgeyo-Marakwet, Baringo, Turkana, Samburu, Isiolo, Marsabit, Mandera, Wajir, Garissa, Lamu and Tana River". The arc of insecurity therefore encompasses Kenya's regions that are dominated by ethnic-Somalis and other Muslim communities, viz., Coast, North-eastern, and Eastern regions. Of the 12 counties identified by Kagwanja (2014b) and Ombaka (2015), the World Bank (2018c) excludes Baringo and Elgeyo-Marakwet counties, in their North and North-Eastern Development Initiative (NEDI) development projects, estimated to cost US$6.9 billion. The projects are designed to increase economic investment, improve equity, and reduce extreme poverty. According to the World Bank (2018c:1), "[t]he North and North Eastern region of Kenya is historically underserved and is performing below national average on development indicators. Poverty levels are extremely high at 70%, compared to 45% national average. The road networks are poor to non-existent, electricity access is at 7%, only 45% of households have access to safe water, and only 26% have access to improved sanitation”. Similarly, the UNDP (2017:55) reports that youth unemployment in Coast and North-eastern counties in Kenya is between 40 and 50 percent higher than the national average. The arc of insecurity, as envisioned by Kagwanja (2014b) and Ombaka (2015), is indicated on the left (created from GeoCurrents Maps, 2018:The Internet).[34]

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[32] Whilst the long-war is waged by *al-Shabaab*, acts of terrorism (as reflected on the Global Terrorism Index for example) are also committed by militias that are maintained by various ethnic groups such as the Sabaot Land Defense Forces (SLDF), *Mungiki*, and *Taliban*. Communal violence centres around land ownership and usage, and electoral competition. Criminal activity ranges from poaching, cattle-rustling, armed robbery, illicit trafficking, and the widespread killing of security forces. These spaces of endemic violence (may they be Islamist, 'ethnic', communal, or criminal) are not always discrete. These spaces show pervasive insecurity, an oligopoly of violence, and varied points where the political and the criminal intersect in Kenya. See Chapter 6, section 6.5 *New-wars and the long-war*, and Chapter 8, section 8.2 *The arc of insecurity and impediments to CVE*.

[33] See Chapter 7, section 7.2 *The arc of insecurity and Islamist violent extremism*, in particular.



Mwangi (2006:82) finds that in the arc of insecurity in Kenya “the state has failed in its responsibility of providing security and development in these regions. These are the ‘forgotten badlands’ of Kenya the country since the state’s presence is almost negligible”. Islamist terrorist activity is concentrated in 12 counties in this arc of insecurity, including Nairobi County as the political and socio-economic hub of Kenya. In this regard, Buhaug *et al* (2011:814) have observed that in internal conflicts, the “locations where conflicts emerge are rarely typical or representative for states at large”. Buhaug *et al* (2011) point to the discrepancy between local economies and national economies, finding that instead of national economies, in fact, it is local economies, ‘with large deviations from national averages’, that are better at explaining the location of the outbreak of civil conflict. The discrepancy highlighted by Buhaug *et al* (2011) is also revealed in the 12 counties in the arc of insecurity in Kenya, where state fragility and state fragility indicators are most evidenced and most pronounced, explaining the location, eruption, and concentration of Islamist violent extremism and the pronounced impediments to CVE in Kenya (see Chapters 6 to 8).

I indicated earlier that the arc of insecurity, or its equivalents, being ungoverned spaces, stateless spaces, or badlands, is more than a geographical construct. It includes geographical, legal, political, economic, and social public spaces that are defined by underdevelopment and insecurity. In terms of ungoverned space as a geographical construct, one such space in Kenya, within the generalised arc of insecurity, is Boni National Reserve in Garissa County on the border with Lamu County, covering 1 339 square kilometres. The reserve is part of Boni Forest that stretches from Tana River County to the coast. It is from this area where *al-Shabaab* seems to operate with impunity and present a springboard for various terrorist attacks in Kenya, including the 2014 Mpeketoni attack. I demonstrate in Chapter 8, section 8.2 *The arc of insecurity and impediments to CVE*, that since the launch of Operation *Linda Boni* ('Protect Boni') in 2015, the Kenyan state continues in its struggle to dislodge *al-Shabaab* from Boni and other areas on the periphery of the centre of power in Nairobi. One is reminded of another ungoverned geographical space, viz., Sambisa Forest in Borno state, Nigeria. As is the case with the three regions in Kenya, viz.: Coast, North-eastern, and Eastern regions, Borno state in north-east Nigeria is the epicentre of Islamist violent extremism, where *Boko Haram* seems to operate at liberty. Solomon (2015a:1-2) points out that Sambisa Forest, 60 000 square kilometres of forest only nominally under the control of the Nigerian state, is where *Boko Haram* initially took the 230 girls that were abducted in Chibok in April 2014. Various attempts by Nigerian security forces to rescue the girls ended in failure. The case of the Chibok girls demonstrates the levels of insecurity, the lack of state penetration, and the lack of state monopoly over the use of violence, in Nigeria. The state simply does not exist in Boni Forest, Sambisa Forest, or any of the peripheral regions or areas outside of the capital cities or centres of these fragile states. On the margins of society, abandoned by the state, the people in these regions are left at the mercy of any group that wields power and influence in these areas.

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[34] The arc of insecurity in the context of new-wars as the 12 counties identified by Kagwanja (2014b) and Ombaka (2015), or in the context of the NEDI projects as the ten counties identified by the World Bank (2018c), does not fit squarely with the arc of insecurity in the context of Islamist violent extremism as identified in this study, although the three overlap (with 7 counties). I show in Chapter 7, section 7.2 *The arc of insecurity and Islamist violent extremism*, that the arc of insecurity in this study refers to 12 counties: (1) Nairobi County, and in Coast Region it is (2) Mombasa (3) Lamu, (4) Kwale, (5) Tana River, and (6) Kilifi. In North-eastern Region it refers to (7) Mandera, (8) Garissa, and (9) Wajir. In Eastern Region it is (10) Isiolo, (11) Marsabit, and (12) Machakos.

The arc of insecurity also represents political, social, and economic spaces. See Chapter 7, section 7.3 *State fragility and the development of Islamist violent extremism*, in this regard. In addition, the arc of insecurity or the ungoverned space, may be a legal space. To demonstrate, Kenya for a long time did not have terrorism legislation, making Kenya an ungoverned terrorism legal space. In fact, Khamala (2019:97-98) points out, the Anti-Terrorism Police Unit (ATPU), created after the 1998 US Embassy attack, operated in a legal vacuum for many years in Kenya. The first pieces of legislation in the attempt to create a legal framework to deal with terrorism in the history of independent Kenya is the 2012 Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA) and the 2014 Security Laws Amendment Act (SLAA). This is despite, as illustrated in Chapter 6, section 6.7 *Major lslamist terrorist activity in Kenya since the 1990s*, Kenya having the earliest recorded terrorist attack since independence back in 1975. Kagwanja (2015:The Internet) and Khamala (2019:96-98) explain that Kenya's civil society and judiciary resisted earlier attempts at enacting anti-terrorism legislation, including the 2003 Suppression of Terrorism Bill, and the 2006 Anti-Terrorism Bill, mainly fearing the potential for violations of human rights, and given the politics of Kenya, fearing that such legislation will be used to target specific communities in Kenya. The lack of counter-terrorism legislation incapacitated Kenya for many years. After all, among other things, terrorism is a criminalised act. Khamala (2019:85-86) explains further that terrorism is a crime under Kenyan law, as well as under international law. Terrorism may also escalate and transform into acts of genocide or ethnic cleansing when there is large-scale targeting of ethnic or religious minorities (often associated with political minorities or politically disempowered designations). Terrorism may further be a crime against humanity if it is widespread and systematic, or a war crime if conducted in a conflict scenario. Kagwanja (2015:The Internet) accordingly finds that despite being 'in the vortex of terrorism' for years, Kenya has 'the most underdeveloped counter-terrorism architecture' in East Africa. Such ungoverned spaces, simultaneously neglected and abused, are both safe havens and incubators of Islamist violent extremism. Furthermore, these spaces both enable and generate impediments to CVE, thus the failure of CVE. These spaces therefore also reinforce the conditions that not only ignite but also sustain Islamism and its manifestations, including terrorism.

A case in point is North-eastern Region of Kenya. The middle of the epicentre of Islamist violent extremism and impediments to CVE in Kenya, Mwangi (2017a:121) contends that "[i]t is the most marginalised region in the country. The region is characterised by a history of insurgency, misrule and repression, chronic poverty, massive youth unemployment, high population growth, insecurity, poor infrastructure, and lack of basic services". Mwangi (2017a:117) further contends that "Kenyan Somalis and Somali refugees who live or reside in Kenya's ungoverned spaces [like North-eastern Region] are stateless persons given the adverse violent structural and physical conditions under which they live". In this region and in the general arc of insecurity, the state security apparatus is unable to deal with terrorist activity, communal violence, and criminal activity, including poaching, cattle-rustling, armed robbery, and the widespread killing of security forces. This level of insecurity has further undermined the legitimacy of the state and the ability of the security apparatus to uphold the rule of law, including the successful prosecution of terror suspects (Ombaka, 2015:13-15). The message is clear, Ombaka (2015:14) concludes, the arc of insecurity "no longer recognises the laws of the state that is Kenya".

Added, critical infrastructure such as roads, water supply, electricity, and business networks, all linked with the state's obligation to reduce transaction costs and provide political goods, are inadequate or otherwise absent in the arc of insecurity. Given this lack of economic governance, these areas have very little formal economic activity. Instead, they have promoted the rise of illicit economies and crime. Ombaka (2015:16) finds that in these regions "the money economy is not particularly strong; apart from facilitating the buying of weapons and the paying of bribes, cash may not hold much value". Given the lack of infrastructure, the arc of insecurity is also difficult, even impossible, to police as in the stated case of Boni in Garissa County. In another illustration, Ombaka (2015:16) blames the 2014

Mandera bus attack on the lack of road infrastructure, which forces buses to travel along the Kenya-Somalia border, instead of directly from Mandera to Nairobi, thus exposing them to cross-border terror attacks. I show in Chapter 8, section 8.2 *The arc of insecurity and impediments to CVE*, that this lack of infrastructure has impeded the response of security forces to terrorist activity in these areas.

Given the foregoing, the research design is conceptualised in this manner: *the case* is the relationship between state fragility, Islamist violent extremism, and CVE. Kenya is *the context*. Kenya is a controlled, veritable laboratory, if you will, employed to critically examine and explain this relationship since the 1990s, as ignited by the 'Big Bang' of independence in 1963. Within the case are two embedded theoretical units of analysis. The A unit represent areas and dimensions that are relatively outside of the arc of insecurity in Kenya. The B unit encompasses the construct of the arc of insecurity, which include geographical, legal, political, economic, and social, spaces. The construction of the design with spatial variation (and temporal variation as indicated a little later) enables within-case variance and analysis. The conceptualisation of the research design is illustrated as follows:



Created from Yin (2018:48)

Earlier in the chapter I held that social phenomena such as state fragility, Islamist violent extremism, and CVE, and social subjects such as social structures (i.e., institutions, organisations, associations, communities, and groups) do not lend themselves to being examined under controlled conditions as would be the case with objects and subjects in laboratory experiments. However, as George and Bennett (2005:24) note, the utility of within-case variation, as illustrated above, lies in emulating the "*functional* equivalent of a controlled experiment". The attributes for causal explanation, correlation, time order, non-spuriousness, causal mechanisms, context, and variance, which were addressed earlier in the chapter, and the case selection criteria and case boundaries (addressed hereafter in section 2.4.1 *Case selection*), and the interview protocol and interview guide (appendices A and B), help to reproduce these controlled conditions. These reproduced controlled conditions mitigate against the intrusion of extraneous factors, and thereby enhance confidence in the study. George and Bennett (2005:153) conclude that "[t]hese tools do not seek to replicate the logic of scientific experimentation. Instead, they seek to increase our confidence [i.e., internal validity] in a theory".

Regarding the explanatory, single-embedded, longitudinal, case design, I take my cue from Putnam's celebrated *Making democracy work: civic traditions in modern Italy* (1993). Putnam's (1993) work is a single-embedded case study that sought to explain variation in government performance in Italy. The study compares two units of analysis in the form of six core regions (out of 20 regions) in Italy, three in the north and three in the south. As is the case in Kenya, in Putnam's study there is discernible and significant variation in the two sets of regions in Italy, viz., variation in prevailing regional conditions and consequently variation in regional government performance. As Putnam (1993:15) maintains, in "[e]xplaning these differences in institutional performance ..., [s]ome regions [in the north] of Italy, we discover, are blessed with vibrant networks and norms of civic engagement, while others [in the south] are cursed with vertically structured politics, a social life of fragmentation and isolation, and a culture of distrust. These differences in civic life turn out to play a key role in explaining institutional success". Based on the findings of this single case study, Putnam (1993) then analytically generalises that social capital and civic engagement have a great effect on government performance.

Putnam's (1993) case study is also longitudinal, with a 'before-and-after' design, i.e., before and after the creation of regional governments in Italy. The creation of these regional governments in 1970, the 'Big Bang', changed the structure of political governance in Italy. As Putnam (1993:6) explains, "[b]y the beginning of the 1990s, the new [20 regional] governments, barely two decades old, were spending nearly a tenth of Italy's gross domestic product. All regional governments had gained responsibility for such fields as urban affairs, agriculture, housing, hospitals and health services, public works, vocational education, and economic development". A 'before-and-after' design requires two distinct but sequential time periods. These time periods must be separated by the introduction of X, the 'Big Bang', the creation of regional governments in 1970 in Putnam's (1993) study. Whereas the single-embedded design enables within-case spatial variation, the longitudinal design enables within-case temporal variation. As is the case in Putman's (1993) study, this current study's design is also longitudinal, with a 'before-and-after' design, viz., before and after Kenya's independence.[35]

The 'Big Bang' in Kenya, releasing generative causal powers, was the independence of the colonial Kenyan state from Britain in 1963. With independence, the Northern Frontier District (NFD), which covered the post-independence North-eastern Region and the northern parts of Eastern Region, and was dominated by ethnic-Somalis, had hoped to be reincorporated into Somalia. This, after British colonialism carved out precolonial Somalia and dispersed ethnic-Somalis between present-day

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[35] Two days are linked to independence. On 1 June 1963, *Madaraka* Day, Kenya achieved internal self-rule. On 12 December 1963 Kenya attained independence, and the same day a year thereafter in 1964, Kenya became a republic, hence *Jamhuri* Day (see Chapter 6, section 6.3 *Islamist violent extremism and the fragile state in Kenya*).

Somalia, Kenya, Ethiopia, and Djibouti. Likewise, Coast Region, dominated by Muslims, with Portuguese and Arab heritages preceding British colonialism, had hoped for its own independence. Coast Region was also governed separately from the rest of Kenya until independence, when it was ceded to the new Kenyan state. Instead of allowing the secession of these two regions, or local autonomy, the new Kenyan state was centralised, and the democratic space was gravely constricted, which stifled peaceful forms of popular dissent. This unleashed the secessionist attempt of the NFD, which was brutally suppressed in the *Shifta* war (1963-1968). Also unleashed, were calls at secession in Coast Region, intermittent since 1963, which remains denied to this day by the Kenyan government. Since the 1990s the constricted democratic space in Kenya is contested by Islamism through the long-war that was initiated by *al-Qaeda*. Since 2006 the long-war is waged by *al-Shabaab* and its affiliate in Kenya since 2012, *al-Hijra*, merging the historical secessionist aspirations in the former NFD and Coast Region, with the current Islamist agenda of agitating for an Islamic state in East Africa. The long-war thus represents the continued contestation of the constricted democratic space in Kenya since independence in 1963 by marginalised, yet politically significant ethnic-Somalis and other Muslims.[36]

There are therefore two distinct periods of state fragility in Kenya i.e., starting in the 1960s, and starting in the 1990s. Albeit distinct in the nature of their fragility, both periods are characterised by a crisis in state-building and a crisis in nation-building (see Chapter 3). As indicated above, the main responses to the limitations and excesses of state fragility by ethnic-Somalis and other Muslims, in the first period, was through the secessionist attempts in the former NFD and Coast Region. In the second period, the main response is the current wave of Islamist violent extremism. In the first period, the key historical markers range from the *Shifta* war (1963-1968) to Wagalla massacre in 1984 (see Chapter 6). In the second period, the key historical markers range from Kenya's participation in the global war on terror after 9/11 to Operation *Linda Boni* since 2015 (see Chapters 7 and 8).

The two periods display both change and continuity in state fragility and conflict risk, and critically, a consistent history of violence between the fragile state and ethnic-Somalis and other Muslims. This fragile state, conceived and birthed by Britain based on weak foundations for statehood and nationhood, was affirmed upon independence by the post-colonial state, thus reinforcing a history of state fragility and conflict risk (see Chapters 3 and 6). The origins of the relationship between state fragility, Islamist violent extremism, and CVE in Kenya, is therefore traced to the 'Big Bang' of independence in 1963. With a longitudinal lens, I employ theorised causal sequences and the above indicated key historical markers, in explaining the state fragility-induced origins and evolution of Islamist violent extremism and impediments to CVE in Kenya.[37]

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[36] See Chapter 6, section 6.3 *Islamist violent extremism and the fragile state in Kenya*, and Chapter 7, section 7.2 *The arc of insecurity and lslamist violent extremism*.

With Putnam's (1993) study in mind, in this current study, the expectation is that Islamist violent extremism will be most lethal, and barriers to CVE will be most pronounced, in areas where state fragility is most evidenced. This will be in the embedded B unit of analysis, i.e., the arc of insecurity, as indicated above. Another expectation, as noted earlier in this chapter, is statistical patterns such as higher poverty levels and unemployment rates, lower access to public services and public goods, and higher terrorist activity, in the arc of insecurity. This study also aims to unearth (1) trace, (2) accounts, (3) patterns, and (4) sequences, evidence, of events initiated by the causal powers of the 'Big Bang' of independence in 1963. The study aims to reveal the origins and evolution of state fragility, and its resulting, since the 1990s, in Islamist violent extremism and consequently impediments to CVE. The aggregate expectation is that empirical evidence will reveal a causal sequence with causal patterns and causal mechanisms between state fragility, Islamist violent extremism, and impediments to CVE, which may be applied to similar contexts in sub-Saharan Africa. Having dealt with the logic of the blueprint of the study, I now turn to the second part of the blueprint, the research methodology.

2.4 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The case study design incorporates multiple research methods. The methodology of the study is hence structured around three triangulated methods: semi-structured elite interviews, field research, and a literature and data study.[38] These three methods are covered in the study under data collection and data analysis. But before addressing data collection and data analysis, I first consider case selection.

2.4.1 Case Selection

Kenya is purposefully selected as the veritable setting to examine *the case* that is the object of this study. Kenya is a representative laboratory, i.e., a state with marked state fragility, experiencing relatively high levels of Islamist violent extremism, and struggling exceedingly with CVE, and therefore relevant to the case under examination. Kenya, containing and demarcating the controlled conditions under which the case is studied, fits the criteria for the object of the study, which is: *The relationship between state fragility, Islamist violent extremism, and CVE*. Significant for a representative case, although Kenya has been among 20 of the most fragile states on the Fragile States Index since 2008 (except for 2014, 2016, 2018 and 2019), it is not the most fragile state in the world. Since the founding of South Sudan in 2011, Kenya's neighbours, South Sudan and Somalia, have consistently and alternately occupied the position of the most fragile state in the world on the index, with *very high alert* scores. In 2018 and 2019 this position was occupied by Yemen, with Somalia and South Sudan in the second and third positions respectively. Kenya does however have marked state fragility. With the lowest fragility score of *high warning* at 88.6 in 2005, the worst score of *high alert* at 101.4 in 2008 and 100.7 in 2009, Kenya has an average *alert* score of 96.2 (out of 120) between 2005 and 2019.[39]

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[37] See later in the chapter in section 2.4.3.3 *Data analysis techniques* for a further outline of the causal sequence or causal pathway, or what Beach (2016, 2017) calls sequences evidence, what George and Bennett (2005) call a path-dependent causal process, and Yin (2018:) calls a time-series analysis.

[38] Yin (2012:149) points out that "[t]he principle of *triangulation* comes from navigation, where the intersection of three different reference points is used to calculate the precise location of an object .... In research, the principle pertains to the goal of seeking at least three [different types of sources or] ways to verify or corroborate a particular event, description, or fact being reported by a study. Such corroboration is another way to strengthen the validity [i.e., accuracy] of a study".

Secondly, Islamist violent extremism, indicated by terrorist activity and measured by the Global Terrorism Index, is rated *medium* level in Kenya. Kenya is not the country most impacted by Islamist terrorism in the world. Between 2004 and 2017 it was Iraq, and in 2018 and 2019 Afghanistan occupied this position. Kenya does not have *very high* and *high* impact scores such as Nigeria, or Somalia, or Syria, and India. Out of 163 countries assessed on the Global Terrorism Index in 2015, Iraq ranked number one with a 9.94 score, followed by Afghanistan (9.40), Nigeria (9.28), Pakistan (8.59), Syria (8.56), Yemen (8.05), Somalia (7.53), and India (7.45). By 2018 Afghanistan surpassed Iraq for the first time since 2004, with a score of 9.60. Iraq was second (9.24), followed by Nigeria (8.60), Syria (8.01), Pakistan (7.89), Somalia (7.80), India (7.52), and Yemen (7.26). In 2019 Afghanistan still occupied the first position with a 9.59 terrorism score, followed by Iraq (8.68), Nigeria (8.31), Syria (7.78), Somalia (7.65), Yemen (7.58), Pakistan (7.54), and India (7.35). Between 2015 and 2017 Kenya had *high* impact scores of 6.56, 6.15, and 6.11, ranking 19, 22, and 19, respectively. In 2018 and 2019 Kenya had *medium* impact scores of 5.76 and 5.64, ranking 21 and 23, respectively. Critically, with the lowest score of 2.50 (*low* impact) in 2004, the worst score of 6.60 (*high* impact) in 2014, Kenya has an average *medium* impact score of 5.04 between 2001 and 2019.[40] Likewise, in a three-cluster category of countries affected by Islamist violent extremism in Africa, in its policy document *Preventing and responding to violent extremism in Africa: a development approach*, the UNDP categorises Kenya as a middle ranking ‘spill-over country’, as opposed to the two endpoint categories, which is ‘at risk’ as the least affected category and the ‘epicentre’ category at the extreme (UNDP, 2015:14-15).

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[39] Elaborated and referenced in Chapter 1, section 1.3 *The central proposition*, Chapter 3, section 3.6.1 *Indicators and measurement*, and Chapter 7, section 7.3 *State fragility and the development of Islamist violent extremism*.

[40] The Global Terrorism Index (GTI) ranks terrorist activity on a scale of 0.00 to 10.00, with 10.00 being the *highest* impact of terrorism, 0.00 as *no* impact. The GTI is based on data from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) of the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START). The first edition of the index came out in 2013, and with the eighth edition (2020), the data covers 2001 up to 2019. The above is elaborated and referenced in Chapter 3, section 3.6.1 *Indicators and measurement*, Chapter 4, section 4.2 *Islamist violent extremism*, and Chapter 6, section 6.7 *Major Islamist terrorist activity in Kenya since the 1990s*.

Thirdly, CVE in Kenya is about countering Islamist extremist narratives and terrorism, not wider violent campaigns such as Islamist insurgencies or proto-states as experienced in cases such as in Mali, Somalia, and Nigeria. While Islamist violent extremism finds expression in Islamist extremist narratives and terrorism in Kenya, the Kenyan government and the Kenya Defence Forces (KDF) have faced an *al-Shabaab* Islamist insurgency and proto-state in central and southern Somalia with Operation *Linda Nchi* (2011-2012) and as part of AMISOM since 2012.[41] The case *in* Kenya however remains the focus of the study. More so, extremist narratives and terrorism are more characteristic of current Islamist violent extremism. Islamist insurgencies and proto-states, whether in Somalia, Iraq or Syria, Afghanistan, Mali, or Nigeria, or any other state, have thus far been inconsistent and/or short-lived. In summation, on all three counts of case selection criteria, i.e., (1) state fragility, (2) Islamist violent extremism, and (3) CVE, Kenya remains typical, average, ordinary, and thus *representative* of the case.

Lastly, the study has clear conceptual, spatial, and temporal case boundaries. I outlined in Chapter 1, section 1.1 *Background*, and section 1.3 *The central proposition*, that the current study is conceptually a theory-based empirical inquiry into the relationship between state fragility, Islamist violent extremism, and CVE in Kenya, with analytic generalisation in sub-Saharan Africa. Spatial demarcation is geospatially limited to Kenya, except for instances where Kenya’s neighbours such as Somalia and Ethiopia play a pronounced role, or where Kenya’s neighbourhood, East Africa, or the Arabian Peninsula and the Middle-East, have relevance. Therefore, although the case is not unique to Kenya, Kenya is employed as the representative laboratory, containing, and demarcating, the controlled conditions under which the case is studied. Temporal demarcation is contemporary Kenya, comprising the third wave of Islamism since the 1990s. There are however references to the period before and from independence in 1963, with the time order and chronology in the relationship between state fragility, Islamist violent extremism and CVE traced to the ‘Big Bang’ of independence in 1963. The temporal demarcation is the end of 2019. Explanation-building however extends beyond 2019.[42]

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[41] In April 2022 the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) was replaced by the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS). Throughout this study, between the authorisation of AMISOM in January 2007 and the end of the mandate of AMISOM in April 2022, I therefore refer to the hybrid peacekeeping mission in Somalia as AMISOM. See Chapter 8, section 8.3.5 *Cross-cutting indicator and impediments to CVE*.

[42] Identified at the end of 2019, COVID-19, with its far-reaching socio-economic and political effects starting to be experienced since the start of 2020, is excluded in this study. The study therefore does not consider any impact of COVID-19 (an exogenous-extraneous factor), in the relationship between state fragility, Islamist violent extremism, and barriers to CVE, in the setting in Kenya. In fact, all states, the Islamist movement as well, are facing a ‘fragile moment’ stemming from the impact of COVID-19. Regarding the terrorism campaign by the

2.4.2 Data Collection

Data collection was at the level of the research question. I stated in Chapter 1, section 1.4 *Research question*, that the research question is formulated as: *What is the relationship between state fragility, Islamist violent extremism, and countering Islamist violent extremism, in Kenya?* Data was collected to answer this specific question. In addition to the level of data collection, the data sources employed in this study were chosen because they enable the answering of the research question. The data search parameters were defined by the temporal demarcation (see above under *case selection*), the research question, and related research objectives. In Chapter 1, section 1.5 *Research objectives*, I outline these objectives as: to analyse state fragility; to outline Islamist violent extremism; to sketch CVE; to analyse the manifestations of Islamist violent extremism and CVE in Kenya; to probe the relationship between state fragility and Islamist violent extremism in Kenya; to examine the relationship between state fragility and CVE in Kenya. This study also adheres to Robert Yin's (2018: 126-135) principles of data collection in case studies, viz.: the use of multiples sources of evidence; the creation and maintenance of a case study database; the maintenance of a case study chain of evidence.[43]

2.4.2.1 *Multiple sources of evidence*

I employ varied qualitative and quantitative data. These sources of evidence are drawn from the three triangulated data collection methods, viz.: semi-structured elite interviews, field research, and a literature and data study. These three methods enabled the collection and use of secondary and primary data and sources, and enabled triangulation within and between data sources, thus providing deeper insight and increased accuracy and confidence. In this regard the researcher, and therefore autoethnography as a research and narrative approach and method, are central.[44] I entered the field in Kenya with the theoretical proposition of state fragility as the *explanans*, based on an extensive

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Islamist movement, the 2020 Global Terrorism Index indicates that "[s]ince COVID-19 was declared a global pandemic … preliminary data suggests a decline in both incidents and deaths from terrorism across most regions in the world" (IEP, 2020a:12). Regarding states, despite the shared 'fragile moment', not all states are 'structurally fragile'. Resilient states will recover quicker and have less-lasting effects, whilst fragile states such as Somalia and Kenya may sink deeper into fragility, and will be more impacted, for a longer period, by the coronavirus pandemic. Fragility is also a relative-variable-ranging condition, in space and time, that affects institutions of the state, relations within the state, geographical regions of the state, and other areas and dimensions of the state. As it was before the coronavirus pandemic, during and after the pandemic, resilient states will have pockets of fragility, and similarly, fragile states will have pockets of resilience, and some states remain objectively more fragile than others, or otherwise objectively more resilient than others (see Chapter 3).

[43] Yin (2018:136-137) has a fourth principle, *exercising care when using data from social media sources*. I do not apply this principle, inherent in any type of research, as a separate principle of data collection in case studies.

[44] Regarding autoethnography, see: Ellis, Adams and Bochner (2011), and Adams, Ellis and Jones (2017).

literature and data study, with the idea of gathering, probing, and interpreting empirical evidence to support this proposition, otherwise, empirical evidence supporting alternative propositions.

I relied on Political Science as a juncture discipline. In studying multi-layered phenomena, as this study does, Political Science enables us to synthesise analytical tools and theoretical perspectives beyond the conventional knowledge silos in specific disciplines and fields of study. I drew from the body of knowledge derived from varied disciplines and fields of study, including History, Sociology, Geography, political thought, political-economy, geopolitics, social psychology, terrorism studies, development studies, policy and planning, and security studies. In addition, I drew insight from *violent extremism* and *countering violent extremism* as fields of study. Derived from these disciplines and fields of study, I drew insight about various aspects of this study, including: notions of the state, society, human nature, identity, power and the distribution of resources, socio-economic and political interactions (within and across borders), violent political conflict *writ large* and terrorism in particular, knowledge and evidence, theory and application, social reality and social phenomena, social structure and agency, the basis for causality and social explanation, and the specifics of state fragility, Islamist violent extremism, CVE, all in the context of Kenya. Relying on the cumulative knowledge in varied disciplines and fields of study enables me to reveal the elephant for what it is, and not a wall, snake, spear, tree, fan, or rope, and enables the accomplishment of the aspiration and attributes of doctorateness.[45]

Entering the field in Kenya for the purpose of this study, was neither the first time I was exposed to Kenyan politics, nor was it the first time I had visited Kenya. My interest and study of Kenyan politics stem from a course that I teach on African Politics. As the Westgate attack was taking place in Nairobi in September 2013, I was just across the border in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, at a research conference on maritime security, organised by the Royal Danish Defence College, Stellenbosch University, and the University of Dar es Salaam, titled *Maritime security off eastern Africa: beyond piracy*. It is after

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[45] See Trafford and Leshem (2009), Wellington (2013), Bitzer (2014) and Yazdani and Shokooh (2018) for an outline and an analysis of doctorateness. Yazdani and Shokooh (2018:42) define doctorateness as "[a] personal quality … [acquired] following a developmental and transformative apprenticeship process, [that] results in the formation of an independent scholar with a certain identity and level of competence and creation of an original contribution, which extends knowledge through scholarship and receipt of the highest academic degree and culminates [in] stewardship of the discipline". Regarding the fable of the six blind men and the elephant, see Chapter 1, section 1.2 *Problem formulation*. I indicated then that I use the analogy of the elephant and the blind men to illustrate that so far accounts of Islamist violent extremism in Kenya are varied, divergent, piecemeal, and in many respects, presented in problematic ways. I point out that state fragility promises to reveal the elephant (i.e., Islamist violent extremism and impediments to CVE) in Kenya for what it in fact is, in all its complexities, in a coherent, systematic, comprehensive, manner. Kenya therefore enables me to make a comprehensive, significant, and original contribution to the body of knowledge and to the broad discourse on state fragility, Islamist violent extremism, and CVE. In addition, the case in Kenya enables me to establish a logic, a causal sequence (with causal patterns and causal mechanisms), that may be applied to similar contexts.

Westgate that I started following Islamist violent extremism and CVE in Kenya with keen interest. After 2013 I visited Kenya on separate occasions for work related to my position at Stellenbosch University. In June 2016 I was invited to a research workshop on CVE in Nairobi, organised by the Africa Center for Strategic Studies, titled *Countering violent extremism (CVE) in Africa: lessons learned and way forward*. It is after this research workshop that I made the decision to pursue this study.[46]

About the employed data collection methods, direct perspectives from *al-Shabaab* are based on primary data such as *al-Shabaab*'s statements and publications like *Gaidi Mtaani* (On Terrorism Street), and existing studies. In addition to existing studies, I also draw from primary sources such as statements and publications, for perspectives from other actors such as the Kenyan government (regarding the consulted primary sources, see below under *literature and data study*). There is to some extent a wealth of data in existing studies, albeit this wealth is often challenged by a lack of clear conceptualisation and sound analysis. In addition to the direct perspectives from relevant actors, such as *al-Shabaab* and the Kenyan government, I used three data collection methods: semi-structured elite interviews, field research, and a literature and data study. Starting with semi-structured elite interviews, these were conducted with selected key informants. Data from the interviews provided new insights and was also used to corroborate data from the literature and data sources, and field research. I created an interview protocol and an interview guide for the interviews (see appendix A and B of the study). The protocol laid out principles guiding the management of the entire interview process, i.e., before, during, and after the interviews. The interview guide contains core questions, with provision for clarification and follow-up questions. The interviews were recorded.

The interviews, based on selected key informants, did not constitute a representative sample. Instead, I employed purposeful and snowball sampling, based on access, and based on the participants' knowledge, lived experiences, and their opinions, regarding state fragility, Islamist violent extremism, CVE, and the Kenyan context. I use 'informant' and 'participant' interchangeably. My understanding is derived from Yin (2018:287) who defines an informant as "[a] case study participant who is a subject of study but who also provides critical information or interpretations about the case and who may suggest other sources of evidence for the researcher to check". By 'knowledge' I refer to evidence-based, verifiable, facts. With 'lived experiences' I refer to the notion that a person develops insight and a unique perspective from having been actively part of a particular experience, or by having gained a particular experience. By 'opinions' I refer to personal views held by individuals which may or may not be subjective. I privileged knowledge over lived experiences, and lived experiences over opinions, and opinions were subjected to scrutiny based on verifiable facts. The value of having semi-structured interviews is that they, together with an existing list of core questions, offer the flexibility for follow-up questions and further clarification, benefits which would otherwise be lost in other types of interviews or data collection methods, such as structured interviews or surveys.

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[46] The Orlando, Florida, attack (2016), billed as "the worst terrorist attack on American soil since 9/11" (Lindell, 2016:The Internet), happened a day before the start of the research workshop. I remember the gathering in Nairobi, Kenya, the next day on Monday 13 June 2016, holding a moment of silence, and later contemplating this attack and its significance. The attack very much set the tone for the entire research workshop.

Outside of the general ethical requirements, ethical considerations in this study relate specifically to the interviews. The participants were required to provide written informed consent or recorded verbal assent. Although only open sources were consulted, and only non-classified data was sought, given the sensitivity and politicised nature of the topic, the researcher foresaw a limited contextual risk for the participants in that attribution would be by name and/or organisational affiliation. In this regard, the study adheres to the ethical requirements of the University of the Free State (UFS). The study has been approved by the Research Ethics Committee of the University (approval number: UFS-HSD2018/0745, dated 12 November 2018), valid for the research period 12 November 2018 to 12 November 2021. The Research Ethics Committee extended this approval (approval number: UFS-HSD2018/0745/21, dated 25 October 2021), valid for the research period 25 October 2021 to 24 October 2022. See appendix C and D of the study for the researcher's letter of request to conduct interviews, and the research study information leaflet and informed consent form, respectively. The attributed interviews are listed as part of the references section of the study.

This introduces the second data collection method, viz., field research, which took the form of non-participant observation. Entering the field in Kenya, non-participant observation was designed and intended to gather background and confirmatory data. Non-participant observation, however, proved insightful and invaluable, providing data texture that would otherwise be impossible to conceptualise and appreciate without the lived experience thereof. By illustration, one cannot fully grasp the notion of the securitisation of the state without the lived experience of the ubiquitous and restrictive security measures in public spaces in Kenya. With *al-Shabaab* apparently lurking at every corner, one is constantly reminded that not all is well in Kenya. I explore the securitisation of the Kenyan state in the context of Islamist violent extremism and impediments to CVE in Chapter 6, section 6.8.1 *The securitisation of the state*, and Chapter 8, section 8.2 *The arc of insecurity and impediment to CVE*.[47]

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[47] There were also safety considerations during travels to Kenya. Some areas in Kenya's arc of insecurity were deemed too unsafe. Furthermore, from 2020, COVID-19 safety regulations posed travelling restrictions, curtailing all travel to Kenya, face-to-face interviews, as well as further field research. Safety considerations and travelling restrictions, however, did not impede the achievement of either the aim or the objectives of the study.

The third data collection method that I employed was the literature and data study. This method included secondary sources such as peer-reviewed scholarly articles and books, and the integration of various datasets, including the following: the Fragile States Index (FSI), the Global Terrorism Index (GTI), derived from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD), the Global Extremism Monitor (GEM), the Freedom House Index (FHI), the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), the Human Development Index (HDI), the Inequality-adjusted Human Development Index (IHDI), the Planetary-pressures-adjusted Human Development Index (PHDI), the Inclusive Development Index (IDI), the Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI), the Sustainable Development Goals Index (SDGI), the World Happiness Index (WHI), the Social Progress Index (SPI), the County Development Index (CDI), the States of Fragility Index (SFI), the Ibrahim Index of African Governance (IIAG), the Index of State Weakness (ISW), the Political Terror Scale (PTS), and the Social Cohesion Index (SCI). The study employs both quantitative and qualitative data as sources of evidence, as well as secondary and primary sources. The primary sources include *al-Shabaab*'s *Gaidi Mtaani*, the UN General Assembly's *Global Counter-terrorism Strategy*, *Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism*, and the *Global Counter-terrorism Strategy Review*, the OAU *Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism*, the AU *Plan of Action on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism*, and Kenya's *Constitution*, *Prevention of Terrorism Act*, *Security Laws Amendment Act*, the *National Strategy to Counter Violent Extremism*, *Proceeds against Organised Crime Act*, and *Proceeds of Crime and Anti-Money Laundering (Amendment) Act*.

The literature and data study was particularly useful at the initial stages, helping in the formulation of the research question, the research objectives, the research aim, data coding, as well as the choice of the research design and methodology. George and Bennett (2005:89) contend that "[t]his preliminary step ... [involves] immersing oneself in the case". Immersing oneself in the case, or 'soaking and poking' in the case, proved to be an invaluable foundation for later stages in the study. The literature and data study also corroborated data from later semi-structured interviews and non-participant observation. As is the case with the latter two data collection methods, different sources within the literature and data study were also used to corroborate data as contained within the data collection method, thus adhering to the principle of between and within data sources triangulation.

2.4.2.2 *The case study database*

The case study design also requires the creation and maintenance of a case study database. The database employed archival recording by organising and documenting collected data and data sources. This collected data and data sources are listed in the reference section of the study. The reference list accounts for all consulted and cited data sources. The transcripts of the interviews and respondent validation are locked in a secured environment. The files of the recordings of the interviews and the recorded verbal assent are stored in a password protected facility. The completed consent forms are serialised in a register and kept in a locked facility.

With the literature and data study, I did not keep a database of all the published literature and data sources, as these are publicly and easily available. I do, however, maintain a database of The Internet sources in the event that the hyperlinks to uniform resource locators (URLs) become inactive. Maintaining the case study database, together with maintaining the chain of evidence, enables transparency and enhances confidence in the research process. I now turn to the chain of evidence.

2.4.2.3 *The chain of evidence*

Maintaining a clear chain of evidence, a term derived from forensics, what Yin (2012:145) calls an audit trail, is another requirement of the case study research design. I maintained the chain of evidence by recording all the references and sources of evidence in a central database, and archived them on an electronic folder, preserving these sources of evidence in their original form, thus ensuring data quality. These sources of evidence are listed in the reference section of the study. I ensured that these sources are accurately, completely, and consistently, referenced, including the accurate and complete recording of uniform resource locators (URLs) for The Internet sources. The hyperlinks to Internet sources, as contained in the reference section, are all active at the time of publication. I maintain a database (as outlined above) of these Internet sources in the event that the hyperlinks become inactive. Interview recordings were transcribed after the interviews, as well as the transcripts of the interviews being sent to participants for respondent validation. The recordings were serialised, filed, and stored in a password-protected environment. A register was kept of all the recordings and the transcript thereof, as well as respondent validation of transcripts.

All the sources of evidence employed in the study are therefore in the possession of the author, or are easily and publicly available, for verification and validation. The chain of evidence, most importantly, involves establishing direct linkages between the research aim, research objectives, research proposition, research question, explanatory analysis, conclusions, and the sources of evidence. In this regard, (1) all sources of evidence were collected and analysed because they provide answers to the research question and research objectives, and add to the achievement of the research aim, (2) the various sections of the study, including the literature review, and the discussion and analysis, are directly linked to specific sources of evidence, (3) the conclusions are derived from and linked to specific sources of evidence, and (4) the sources of evidence are accurately recorded and referenced, thus enabling easy retrieval and verification. Yin (2018:134) points out that "[t]he principle is to allow the reader of the case study to follow the derivation of any evidence from initial research questions to ultimate case study findings .... Moreover, the reader should be able to trace the steps in either direction ... from findings back to initial research questions or from questions to findings".

2.4.3 Data Analysis

Based on the data gathered through the three data collection methods, viz., a literature and data study, field research, and semi-structured elite interviews, data analysis followed the stages or processes of evaluation, transcription, coding, analysis, and interpretation. Although data collection and data analysis are two separate processes, often data analysis led to further data collection, and further data collection required further data analysis, revealing the interactive and iterative cycles between data collection and data analysis. I made this interface between data collection and data analysis until data saturation was reached, i.e., there was no longer any significantly or substantially new or relevant data emerging anymore, related either to the study's aim, or the conceptual, spatial, or temporal demarcations, answering the research question, and/or achieving the research objectives.

2.4.3.1 *Stages in Data Analysis*

As aforementioned, data analysis followed the following five stages: evaluation, transcription, coding, analysis, and interpretation. The evaluation stage was based on evaluating the relevance and significance of the collected data to the research question and the research objectives. The stage of transcribing data involved converting non-textual data into text. The non-textual data comprised recordings from interviews. After following multiple stages and cycles of data mining and data evaluation, the coding process involved organising and categorising collected data by (1) developing and applying codes relevant to the research question and research objectives, (2) identifying emerging themes, patterns, and relationships, (3) summarising the data, (4) compiling statistics and generating graphical representations of the data, and thereafter, (5) analysing and interpreting the data.

I employed manual data coding. Manual data coding is a laborious enterprise. However, the time spent coding enabled self-reflection, and for ideas and formulations to simmer, marinate, and mature, benefits not catered for by less involved forms of coding, such as computer-based data coding. Furthermore, I applied both pre-set coding (deductive) and emergent coding (inductive). Pre-set coding was based on the initial theoretical proposition of the study, achieved through the following keywords: state fragility, Islamist violent extremism, CVE, radicalisation, terrorism, Kenya, Critical Realism, and single-embedded-longitudinal case study. Through further data collection and analysis, and in following further stages and cycles of data mining and evaluation, new codes emerged as new concepts, themes, and patterns, emerged. After these stages and iterative cycles of data mining and evaluation, I formulated the final coding scheme, or the conceptual map of the data, as follows:


Kenya **(In)security, (Under)development**
Constricted democratic space, authoritarianism, centralisation, reforms, devolution, securitisation
Islamist violent extremism
Ideology, movement, organisations/groups
Terror attacks
Insurgency
Proto-states
Sharia
Islamic state
Caliphate
Terrorism
Radicalisation
New-wars
The long-war
War among the people
Arc of insecurity - self-help, survival
Distance decay, badlands, safe-havens, stateless-ungoverned spaces
GWAC, GWOT, GSAVE, Linda Nchi, Usalama Watch, Linda Boni, AMISOM/ATMIS
Coreligionists, coethnics
Shifta, Isiolo, Garissa, Wagalla
Politically significant identity, kin-country syndrome, blame system
Fault-lines, (ontological) insecurity, marginalisation, exclusion
Countering Islamist violent extremism
Approaches, programming, evaluation, ethics
Ending Islamist violent extremist campaigns
Counter-insurgency
Counter-terrorism
Risk reduction
Deradicalisation
Disengagement
Counter-radicalisation
Preventing Islamist violent extremism
Analytical Frameworks
The clash of civilisations
Globalisation and
Local conditions
Psychological approaches
Radicalisation theory
Instrumentalist approaches
Relative deprivation theory
Rational choice/strategic model
Organisational approaches
Natural systems model
State fragility – the **Fragile States Index**
Cohesion indicators
Political indicators
Economic indicators
Social indicators
Cross-cutting indicator
Criticism, Value, Utility
Single-embedded-longitudinal case study
Critical Realism – *process-tracing, causal mechanisms*
Patterns of covariation, causal patterns, causal sequences
Causal capacity, tendency
Context *Enabler*
Driver *Barriers*
Insecurity dilemma, fragility trap, conflict trap
State-building, resilience, social cohesion, nation-building
Hegemonial exchange, disengagement (from the state), wormholes
Monopoly of violence, oligopoly of (terrorist) political violence, the geography of (Islamist) terrorism

I used the above coding scheme for data analysis, and in designing the structure and the different chapters of the study as indicated earlier in the current chapter in section 2.2 *Conceptualising and designing the study*. After initial coding, I analysed and interpreted the data based on the research question and research objectives. I used the analysed data as the basis for explanation-building and for reaching conclusions. I followed an inductive analysis as the patterns and causal sequences, observable in Kenya, were examined not only to make conclusions about Kenya, but also for analytic generalisation. The inductive analysis comes with the offer that, given the context, the case in Kenya reveals themes, patterns, and relationships, comparable to similar contexts in sub-Saharan Africa. A basis for analytic generalisation (not a cross-case comparative analysis) is therefore established.

I outlined earlier in the current chapter in section 2.3 *Research design*, that there is also an inherent retroductive element in data analysis. Retroduction involved the development of a theoretical causal sequence between state fragility and Islamism, and another theoretical causal sequence between state fragility and CVE. I outline the causal mechanisms explaining the relationship between (1) state fragility and Islamism, and (2) state fragility and CVE. In unpacking the causal chain, I adhere to the formulation: cause (X) + causal mechanisms + context = outcome (Y). This retroductive analysis enables the tracing and detailing of the activities of entities (social structures) in Kenya, to explain Islamist violent extremism or Islamism, as well as impediments to CVE. The retroductive analysis accordingly enables me to subject my causal claims not only to causal evidence, but to a causal logic, and to prevailing contextual conditions. The deductive elements in data analysis are addressed in section 2.4.3.2 *Data analysis strategies*. Before addressing data analysis strategies, an outline is provided of how I conceptualised the casual relationship between state fragility, Islamism, and impediments to CVE, within the contextual explanatory setting provided by the Kenyan state. Based on a retroductive (and deductive-inductive) data analysis, I conceptualised and formulated the causal relationship between state fragility and Islamist violent extremism as visually portrayed below:



State fragility

Key factors:

Fragility at three levels of the state:
- Macro - state institutions
- Meso - state-society relations
- Micro - society-society relations (groups in society)

Underperformance and misperformance
Fault-lines, Institutional failure, and insecurity
Structural, direct, and cultural violence

Kenya

Causal mechanisms

Key theories and key factors:

Relative deprivation theory
Rational choice theory
Constricted democratic space,
Marginalisation/Exclusion
Insecurity, self-help, survival
The blame system, Disengagement
(from the state)
Politically significant identity
The kin-country syndrome
(coreligionists and coethnics)

Islamist violent extremism

Ideology and movement

Finds expression in three
Islamist campaigns:
Islamist terrorism/extremist narratives
Islamist insurgency
Islamist proto-states

Intention: *al-hakimiyya*
Creating Islamic states/the Caliphate,
based on the *Sharia*

In the specific contexts of Chapters 3, 4, 6, and 7, I provide an outline of the relationship between state fragility and Islamist violent extremism, and demonstrate and elaborate on the correlation, the causal logic, and the empirical evidence in said relationship. I highlight how and why state fragility provides the context and permissive causes for, and drives, Islamist violent extremism. Again, based on a retroductive (and deductive-inductive) data analysis, I also conceptualised the causal relationship between state fragility and impediments to CVE as follows:



State fragility

Key factors:

Fragility at three levels of the state:
- Macro - state institutions
- Meso - state-society relations
- Micro - society-society relations (groups in society)

Underperformance and misperformance
Fault-lines, Institutional failure, and insecurity
Structural, direct, and cultural violence

Kenya
Causal mechanisms

Key factors:

Institutional weakness, incapacity, and abuse
Preoccupation with regime survival over political and socio-economic imperatives
The securitisation of the state
Constricted democratic space,
Hegemonial exchange
Indiscriminate repression and victimisation, wormholes

Impediments to CVE

Ineffective and counter-productive CVE -

Islamist violent extremism is not eradicated or mediated
State-building privilege strong state institutions over nation-building
Eroded democratic principles, social cohesion, and state legitimacy
Increased radicalisation
Insecurity dilemma, fragility trap, and conflict trap

In the specific contexts of Chapters 3, 5, 6, and 8, I provide an outline of the relationship between state fragility and impediments to CVE, and demonstrate and elaborate on the correlation, the causal logic, and the empirical evidence in said relationship. Having outlined the data coding scheme, and having conceptualised the relationship between state fragility, Islamist violent extremism, and impediments to CVE, as indicated above, I now turn to data analysis strategies.

2.4.3.2 *Data Analysis Strategies*

I outlined in Chapter 1, section 1.6 *Research aim and significance*, that the study seeks *to critically examine the relationship between state fragility, Islamist violent extremism, and CVE, in Kenya*. In addressing this aim, and added to the retroductive analysis as described above, I follow three data analysis strategies, viz.: (1) employing an initial theoretical proposition (deductive); (2) considering alternative theoretical propositions (deductive); (3) tracing patterns and causal sequences from collected data (inductive).[48] Similar to deductive coding, the first strategy in data analysis prioritised the initial theoretical proposition, which was summed up as: *The factors that explain Islamist violent extremism and impediments to CVE, are directly linked to, and generated by, state fragility, in Kenya*. The second strategy, that of considering alternative theoretical propositions, or examining rival explanations, was then followed. Considering these alternative theoretical propositions, i.e., psychological, instrumentalist, and organisational approaches, enabled theory triangulation.

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[48] Yin (2018:168-174) identifies four data analysis strategies: (1) relying on theoretical propositions (deduction); (2) examining rival explanations (deduction); (3) working your data from the 'ground up' (induction); (4) developing a case description. I employ the first, second, and third strategies. The fourth strategy is limited to descriptive case studies and thus has no relevance for this study (the present study being explanatory).

After I evaluated the three propositions, I discounted psychological approaches because, among other things, they artificially abstract the individual, the Islamist ideology, and the terror group, from the context of the fragile state that generates the factors that cause Islamist violent extremism, as well as from the context of the fragile state that generates the constraints in CVE. I did not, however, dispose of the baby with the bathwater. For instance, by employing radicalisation theory as representative of psychological approaches, I deemed the overemphasis on micro radicalisation (individual psychology) to be unfounded and misleading. However, within radicalisation theory I did find the utility of meso and macro radicalisation to be certainly demonstrable and defendable. Meso and macro radicalisation account for the social structures (entities) that subsist in the fragile state that have agency and causal capacity, explaining Islamist violent extremism and barriers to CVE. Added, I found instrumentalist and organisational approaches to be either piecemeal or devoid of context, and/or addressing only the symptoms, not the causes, of Islamism (see Chapter 4, section 4.3.2 *Theoretical perspectives*).

With the foregoing considered, there are elements of these three approaches, viz., psychological, instrumentalist, and organisational approaches, that have congruency with state fragility. However, these elements, both individually, and collectively, fail to reveal the proverbial elephant for what it is, i.e., fail to explain Islamist violent extremism and impediments to CVE in any accurate and coherent manner that approximates reality. This is where state fragility as a theoretical perspective and a conceptual-analytical framework has unmatched value. The study accordingly adopted an integrated approach, incorporating the congruent elements of these three approaches in the evolving theoretical and analytical framework of state fragility. The foregoing first and second data analysis strategies, (1) employing an initial theoretical proposition (state fragility), and (2) considering alternative propositions, are thus deductive approaches, with data analysis designed to find evidence in Kenya supporting the initial theoretical proposition or supporting alternative theoretical propositions.

The third strategy entailed inductively teasing-out patterns of covariation and causal mechanisms from empirical data in Kenya, what Yin (2018) says is ‘working your data from the ground up’. I outlined above in section 2.4.3.1 *Stages in data analysis* (pre-set and emergent coding), that while busy with data mining and analysis, new codes, different from pre-set coding, emerged, as other concepts, patterns, and themes developed. Again, as indicated in the stages in data analysis, the inductive analysis comes with the proposition that, given the relevant context, the case in Kenya reveals causal sequences with attendant causal patterns and causal mechanisms that may be applied to other similarly fragile states in sub-Saharan Africa where Islamist violent extremism and the struggle against

Islamist violent extremism are evidenced. As evidenced by deductive (pre-set) and inductive (emergent) coding in data collection, similarly, the three employed data analysis strategies reveal the inherent interplay between deductive and inductive data analysis.

2.4.3.3 *Data Analysis Techniques*

In conjunction with the preceding three strategies, I employed three data analysis techniques, viz.: pattern matching, explanation-building, and time-series analysis.[49] Pattern matching involves tallying patterns emerging from empirical evidence to patterns that were predicted by the initial theoretical proposition, otherwise, those that were predicted by rival propositions. Pattern matching therefore includes comparing theoretically predicted patterns with those emerging from empirical evidence, and vice-versa, thus a deductive-inductive process (Yin, 2018:175). George and Bennett (2005) identify a similar process as pattern matching, what they call the congruence method. George and Bennett (2005:181) explain that "[t]he essential characteristic of the congruence method is that the investigator begins with a theory and then attempts to assess its ability to explain or predict the outcome of a particular case. The theory posits a relation between variance in the independent variable [X construct] and variance in the dependent variable [Y construct] .... If the outcome of the case is consistent with the theory's prediction, the analyst can entertain the possibility that a causal relationship may exist". I indicated earlier in the current chapter under section 2.3 *Research design*, that one predicted pattern is that in areas where state fragility is most evidenced, Islamist violent extremism will be most virulent and impediments to CVE will be most defined. Finally, the predicted pattern and proposition, is that of empirical evidence validating the theorised causal sequences between (1) state fragility and Islamist violent extremism, and between (2) state fragility and impediments to CVE. The theoretical proposition is therefore expected to be reflected in the evidence. Conversely, the evidence is expected to demonstrate the theoretical proposition.

The second data analysis technique, which adds onto pattern matching, was explanation-building. Yin (2018:179) maintains that explanation-building "is in fact a special type of pattern matching" that seeks to analyse data "by building an explanation [or causal sequence] about the case". As with pattern matching, Yin (2018:181) contends that explanation-building is also a partly deductive and a partly inductive data analysis technique. In this study, after inductively discovering patterns of covariation through pattern matching, based on collected data, I built an explanation of these correlated patterns through the deductive conception of the causal sequence, based on the initial theoretical proposition of state fragility. I also employed the inverted movement in data analysis from the deductive theoretical preposition to inductive empirical evidence. The study accordingly has an inductive-deductive analysis in explanation-building, based on emergent patterns of covariation from empirical data, and based on predicted patterns of covariation from theoretical propositions. I indicate in section 2.4.3.2 *Data Analysis Strategies*, and elaborate in Chapter 4, that I incorporate relevant and congruent elements of the three alternative theoretical approaches, viz., psychological, instrumentalist, and organisational approaches, into the theoretical-analytical framework of state fragility. I employ this integrated theoretical-analytical framework in explanation-building, even though I discount some elements of the three alternative theoretical approaches.

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[49] Yin (2018:175-199) identifies five data analysis techniques: (1) pattern matching, (2) explanation-building, (3) time-series analysis, (4) logic models, and (5) cross-case synthesis. I employ the first three techniques.

Added to deductive-inductive analysis, retroductive analysis was also inherent to explanation-building. George and Bennett (2005) refer to explanation-building as process-tracing. I elaborated on process-tracing (also called ‘mechanism-tracing’ or ‘causal reconstruction’) earlier in the current chapter, section 2.3.3 *The philosophical validation and rationale for the case study design*. I indicated then that the philosophy of science, Critical Realism, propagates that in outlining causality, one must employ the process-tracing of causal mechanisms. With retroductive analysis, I consequently employ process-tracing to unearth causal mechanisms, in building the causal sequence between state fragility and Islamist violent extremism, and between state fragility and barriers to CVE. Yin (2018) is in concert with George and Bennett (2005) regarding explanation-building, process-tracing, or building the causal sequence. George and Bennett (2005:182) maintain that the congruence method and process-tracing may be combined to achieve what Yin (2018:179, 181) sees as combining pattern matching and explanation-building. The agreement between Yin (2018) and George and Bennett (2005) is the following: after establishing patterns of covariation using the congruence method, the method of process-tracing may thereafter be used to build a causal explanation from these identified patterns.

The third data analysis technique is time series analysis, what Beach (2016:469; 2017:14) calls sequences evidence, and George and Bennett (2005:212) call it a path-dependent causal process. Time-series analysis entails the precise tracing and detailing (i.e., discovering and outlining evidence), of events over time (Yin, 2018:181-185). In section 2.4.1 *Case selection*, I outlined how this current study, in addition to being single-embedded, is also longitudinal. The current study therefore traces and details the relationship between state fragility, Islamist violent extremism, and CVE in Kenya since the 1990s. This included tracing and detailing, among other things, state fragility, new-wars and the long-war, Islamist terror groups, Islamist terrorist activity, and CVE approaches and programming, in

Kenya. I also traced and detailed evidence of the origins and evolution of this relationship from independence in 1963 by employing four analytical themes: (1) authoritarianism and centralisation; (2) reforms and devolution; (3) securitisation; (4) renewed authoritarianism and centralisation. I demonstrate in the current chapter in section 2.3. *Research design*, that whilst the long-war has been raging only since the 1990s, the time order in the relationship between state fragility, Islamist violent extremism, and CVE in Kenya, was in fact initiated by the 'Big Bang' of independence in 1963.

The single point of independence in 1963 released generative causal powers, which mushroomed the secessionist attempt of the former NFD in the 1960s, and intermittent calls for secession in Coast Region since the 1960s. The Kenyan state frustrated secessionism in the former NFD during the *Shifta* war (1963-1968) and continues to frustrate secession in Coast Region to this day. The long-war, raging since the 1990s, and the contingent CVE, reflect the continued frustrated aspirations of ethnic-Somalis and other Muslims, and their chequered relationship with the Kenyan state. This relationship is historically defined by insecurity and violence (structural, cultural, and direct). The time series analysis consequently included tracing and detailing the origins and evolution of the relationship between state fragility, Islamist violent extremism, and CVE in Kenya, through key historical markers.

For the 27 years of the first period of state fragility (1963-1990), these historical markers are: the *Shifta* war (1963-1968), and the Isiolo (1968), Garissa (1980), and Wagalla (1984) massacres. For the 28 years of the second period of state fragility (1991-2019), the historical markers are: Kenya's participation in the global war on terror since 9/11, Operation *Linda Nchi* (2011-2012), Operation *Usalama* Watch (2014), AMISOM (since 2012) and Operation *Linda Boni* (since 2015). These historical markers, spanning 56 years (1963-2019) and counting, and being acutely alive still in the collective memory of ethnic-Somalis and other Muslims inside and outside Kenya, denote specific periods and events in the evolving history of structural, cultural, and direct violence between the fragile state, and ethnic-Somalis and other Muslims, since independence in 1963. This history of violence (structural, cultural, and direct) currently plays out in the third wave of Islamist violent extremism since the 1990s.

2.5 CONCLUDING REMARKS

The chapter presented the design and methodology of the study. Yin (2018:26) maintains that the research design is the logic for research, and the research methodology is the logistics of the research. The logic of the study is a contextualised, explanatory, single-embedded, longitudinal, case study design, relying on Critical Realism as a philosophy of science. The methodology or logistics of the study rely on three triangulated data collection methods or sources of evidence, viz.: semi-structured elite interviews, field research (non-participant observation), and a literature and data study. In outlining the logistics of the study, this chapter has also detailed the criteria for case selection and outlined case boundaries, indicating Kenya as a representative, veritable, contextual, and explanatory setting in the study of the relationship between state fragility, Islamist violent extremism, and CVE. Although acutely observable since the 1990s, the time order in this relationship is initiated much earlier, that is, by the generative powers of the 'Big Bang' of independence in 1963. The chapter also detailed the employed data collection procedures, adhering to the principles of (1) the use of multiples sources of evidence, (2) the creation and maintenance of a case study database, and (3) the maintenance of a case study chain of evidence. Lastly, this chapter sketched how data analysis was employed, by explaining (1) the stages in data analysis, (2) data analysis strategies, and (3) data analysis techniques.

The central utility of case studies, such as this study, lies in serving as exemplars for conducting research in a specific discipline. The value and utility of this study's design lie in demonstrating how to conduct a single case study in an explanatory mode, as opposed to an exploratory, descriptive, or evaluative mode. The design illustrates how to build explanation in a single-embedded, longitudinal, case study by showing how within-case temporal and spatial variation in X generate the contingent variation in Y. This study thus demonstrates that an explanatory case study relies on multiple points of observation, and not on a single data-point that is based on a single point of observation, as erroneously perceived in some contexts. A case is either a physical entity or a conceptual phenomenon. The case in this study is a conceptual phenomenon, viz., the relationship between state fragility, Islamist violent extremism, and CVE. Kenya is not the case. Kenya is the explanatory setting.

Kenya is a controlled, veritable, laboratory that is representative of this relationship between state fragility, Islamist violent extremism, and CVE. It is a state which: (1) portrays distinct fragility, with an average *alert* score of 96.2 (out of 120.0) between 2005 and 2019 on the Fragile States Index, yet not extreme fragility, neither *high alert* or *very high alert*: (2) experiences levels of Islamist violent extremism, as indicated by Islamist terrorist activity, and measured by the Global Terrorism Index, at an average *medium* impact score of 5.04 (out of 10.00) between 2001 and 2019; (3) is struggling cutely with CVE, yet dealing with Islamist terrorism and not more violent and more expansive campaigns such as an Islamist insurgency or an Islamist proto-state. Kenya, as this representative, veritable, laboratory, contains and demarcates the controlled conditions under which the relationship between state fragility, Islamist violent extremism, and CVE, is examined. These controlled conditions mitigate against extraneous factors, therefore enhancing accuracy and confidence in the research process.

The research design also demonstrates how analytic generalisation may be made from a single representative case by establishing a logic that may be applied to similar contexts. I therefore establish a logic, a theoretical proposition, a causal sequence or causal pathway, with causal patterns and causal mechanisms which, given the context, may be applied to similar contexts in sub-Saharan Africa to explain the relationship between state fragility, Islamist violent extremism, and CVE. The central theoretical proposition of the study is that the incapacitating and conflict-generating properties or attributes of state fragility do not only provide the context (setting) and opportunity (enablers or permissive causes) but generates (drives or causes) Islamist violent extremism and impediments to CVE, resulting in ineffective and counterproductive CVE, and therefore the failure of CVE.

In conducting research, Political Science scholars are frequently confronted with two extremes, viz., the choice between the deductive, nomological, explanatory approach (associated with Positivism/Empiricism) and the inductive, descriptive, narrative, ideographic approach (associated with Interpretivism/Constructivism). Critical Realism, as appropriated in this study, presents a third alternative. Critical Realism employs process-tracing of causal mechanisms (with causal patterns) to build a causal sequence or a causal pathway between X and Y. This approach enables the answering of not only the why, but also the how, of the causal process in explaining the observed phenomena. Islamist violent extremism and its manifestation Islamist terrorism (but also Islamist insurgency and proto-states), and impediments to CVE, therefore the failure of CVE, are the observed phenomena. The observed phenomena constitute the empirical level of our three-level reality, or three ontological domains, as outlined by Critical Realism. Explanation-building is then formulated as: cause (X) + *causal mechanisms* + *context* = outcome (Y). Such an explanation goes beyond merely outlining the relationship between X and Y. Tracing (i.e., discovering and detailing evidence of) causal mechanisms in contrast explain the process of how X generates Y by unpacking the black box of causality between X and Y, and thus providing deeper, thicker, more robust, explanation. The causal process is accordingly subjected not only to causal evidence, but to the demonstration of a causal logic as well.

The next chapter is the first of three literature review chapters, viz.: *State fragility: theory and application* (Chapter 3), *Islamist violent extremism: analysis and theoretical perspectives* (Chapter 4), and *CVE: the state-of-the-art* (Chapter 5). The upcoming chapter outlines state fragility as the theoretical proposition of the study, explaining both the development and sustainment of Islamist violent extremism, and impediments to CVE approaches and programming. The chapter deals with the notion of state fragility as a phenomenon, a conceptual-analytical framework, and a theoretical perspective, and the attendant and varied perspectives regarding this notion, including the state fragility-security-development nexus, the criticism against state fragility, the value and utility of state fragility, and the Fragile States Index as an analytical measuring instrument of state fragility.

CHAPTER 3: STATE FRAGILITY: THEORY AND APPLICATION

3.1 INTRODUCTION

This study couples state fragility to the development of Islamist violent extremism and impediments to CVE. State fragility, as a concept and phenomenon, is highly contested. In examining the pathology of state fragility, I pose and answer the following questions: What is state fragility? What is the nature and attributes of state fragility? What are the indicators of state fragility? What are the causes, symptoms, and consequences of state fragility? What is the relationship between state fragility, (under)development and (in)security, and violent conflict in particular? What is the criticism against state fragility? How is state fragility analysed and measured? What is the utility of state fragility? Critically, what is the relationship between state fragility, Islamist violent extremism, and CVE?

In engaging with the theory and application of state fragility and the related questions above, the second section of the chapter starts out by examining the notion of state fragility, including the attributes, indicators, causes, symptoms, and consequences of state fragility. The third section investigates the state fragility-security-development nexus, linking state fragility to underdevelopment and various permutations of insecurity, specifically, Islamist violent extremism and the contingent impediments to CVE. The fourth section focusses on the criticism against the theory and application of state fragility. The fifth section examines the utility of state fragility as a conceptual-analytical framework and a theoretical perspective, and the last section outlines the application of state fragility through the Fragile States Index. The Fragile States Index is employed as the analytical measuring instrument of state fragility. Throughout the chapter, I consider the relationship between state fragility, Islamist violent extremism, impediments to CVE, and the context of Kenya.

3.2 WHAT IS STATE FRAGILITY?

What we know and how we know about state fragility remain open to conjecture and contestation. To illustrate, the OECD (2013:15) presents a binary classification, distinguishing only between the dichotomous *fragile* states and *resilient* states. In contrast, the G7+ (2013:4) outlines a fragility spectrum that is based on five stages of fragility, viz.: crisis, rebuild and reform, transition, transformation, and resilience. These five stages of fragility are linked to five peace-building and state-building goal areas (PSGs) that these states are guided to pursue and achieve. The five PSGs are: inclusive (legitimate) politics, security, justice, economic foundations, and revenues and services. A single country may thus be in different stages of fragility, based on each of these five PSGs, until it reaches the stage of resilience in all five PSGs, what the G7+ calls ‘pathways toward resilience’.[50]

This study appropriates the most comprehensive view on state fragility. The view is that all states in the world occupy a space on a continuum that ranges from strong (resilient), weak, to failing, failed, or collapsed, depending on how the state fulfils its responsibilities or how the state measures up to the qualities of statehood, how the state relates to its society, and the nature of relations between groups in society. Rotberg (2003:2) explains that “it is according to their performance - according to the levels of their effective delivery of the most crucial political goods - that strong [resilient] states may be distinguished from weak ones, and weak states from … [failing, failed] or collapsed ones”. Nay (2013:337) has pointed out that instead of being ‘an all-encompassing notion’, state fragility should be “disaggregated and replaced by more nuanced and discriminating analytical categories”. This is the comprehensive and nuanced view arrogated in this study. Strong states have authority and can project power, they effectively control their total geographical area (even the most remote periphery) and are able to effectively deliver political goods and services to their citizens, including security, law and order, and infrastructure (Rotberg, 2002a:131-132, 2004:3). Consequently, as Rotberg (2002a:132) asserts, strong states are “places of peace and order”. Strong or resilient states can therefore effectively withstand, manage, and even resolve, internal and external pressures levelled against the state and its society, pressures between the state and society, and pressures within society. Next to strong states, Rotberg (2002a, 2002b, 2003, 2004) places categories of states that are distinguished by different levels of weakness. This is a problematic proposition, as will be illustrated next.

Concerning weak states, Rotberg (2004:7) contends that these states may otherwise be strong but are temporarily or situationally weak because of ‘internal antagonisms, management flaws, greed, despotism, or external attacks’. Similarly, Kaplan (2014:49, 52) points out that there must be a distinction between states that are ‘structurally fragile’ and those that are experiencing ‘a fragile moment’. The key to distinguishing between the two, is the length of time the state takes to recover from a fragile encounter. A structurally fragile state will take longer to recover and may remain in fragility for extended periods. Rotberg (2004:7) accordingly maintains that state weakness may also result from inherent geographical, physical, or economic constraints (i.e., structural fragility).

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[50] The G7+ was formed in April 2010 by a group of countries that self-classify as ‘affected by fragility and conflict’. There were seven founding member states, and presently 20 member states: Afghanistan, Burundi, CAR, Chad, Comoros, Ivory Coast, DRC, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Liberia, Papua New Guinea, Sao Tome and Principe, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, Somalia, South Sudan, East Timor, Togo, and Yemen. Nepal and Ethiopia were part of the G7+ but they left the group in 2011. Kenya is not a member state (Da Costa, 2012:98-99; De Siqueira, 2014:276; Nay, 2014:223-224; G7+, 2016:i, iv, 18, 2017:1-2; Kaplan, 2016:71; Pospisil, 2017:1422, 1430).

Furthermore, weak states often have fragmented societies that are defined by latent or overt communal violence. Collier *et al* (2018:50) consequently distinguish between 'latent fragility', and 'open fragility'. The latter is associated with overt violent conflict, and the former with latent conflict. Rotberg (2002a:131, 2004:7) concludes that state weakness is 'the halfway house' between strength and failure, and extreme weakness may result in the state spiralling into a failing or failed state.

Failing states, according to Rotberg (2004:12, 2), are 'weak states that are likely to fail', and they fail because they are either unwilling or unable to deliver political goods to their societies or offer only limited political goods. At the end of the spectrum are failed and collapsed states. Rotberg (2004:4) defines a failed state as "a polity that is no longer able or willing to perform the fundamental tasks of a nation-state in the modern world". These tasks, Rotberg (2002b:87) explains, include the effective delivery of the most fundamental political goods to society. Zartman (1995:5) also explains that states fail or collapse "[b]ecause they can no longer perform the functions required for them to pass as states". Rotberg (2003:9) consequently characterises collapsed states as 'the most extreme versions of failed states'. According to Call (2008:1492, 1501), state collapse is where there is no longer delivery of political goods, but also, for a sustained period, there is no longer a central government, as was the case in Somalia between 1991 and 2004. In such a scenario, sub-state actors often take over the role of governance. These actors claim regions and subregions within what was once a state (Rotberg, 2003:10). Rotberg (2003:9) concludes that in a collapsed state the concept 'state' becomes "a mere geographical expression, a black hole into which a failed polity has fallen".

Patrick (2006a:6-9, 2006b:29-30, 2007:649-652) differentiates fragile states by state capacity and political will, concluding that fragile states often lack the capacity to (1) provide safety, security and order (security domain), (2) maintain legitimate-accountable state institutions (political domain), (3) maintain and manage effective, open and equitable economies (economic domain), and (4) perform state functions and deliver political goods (social domain), or otherwise lack the political will to achieve satisfactory and expected performance in these four domains. Fragile states may therefore be classified as: (1) *high capacity-strong will*; (2) *high capacity-low will*; (3) *low capacity-strong will*; (4) *low capacity-low will*. From these permutations, the goal is to get fragile states to the first category, i.e., high capacity and strong will, in their transition towards resilience. Susan Rice and Steward Patrick developed the above conceptualisation of state fragility at the Brookings Institution through creating the Index of State Weakness (ISW). Rice and Patrick (2008:3-4, 7-10) explain that this is a descriptive index that assesses 'developing countries', based on capacity and political will in 'four core areas of state functions', viz., economic, political, security, and social welfare. Using 20 indicators, the index's measuring scale is 0.00 to 10.00, with 10.00 being the best performance. The assessed states are then ranked from (1) failed, (2) critically weak, (3) weak, and (4) states to watch (i.e., warning or at risk). Like Rotberg's (2002a, 2002b, 2003, 2004) binary category of strong or resilient, as opposed to: weak, failing, failed, and collapsed, this index treats resilience as 'an all-encompassing other', and fragility as 'the variable other'. I revert to this index in section 3.4 *The criticism against the theory and application of state fragility*, when I address the different measuring instruments of state performance.

The foregoing categorisations tend to emphasise the (in)capacity of state institutions to deliver political goods and perform state functions, and/or the political will to do so. This, however, is one perspective. Another perspective is based on weaknesses in state-society relations through examining of internal legitimacy and socio-political cohesion. The perspective is that the relationship between the state and society must be based on social legitimacy, i.e., the extent to which society is willing to recognise and abide by the authority of the state. Fragility, thus, can occur not only because of (1) poor state capacity, performance, and political will, but also because of (2) the breakdown in state-society relations. The two often occur in tandem, the latter contingent on the former. Kaplan (2014:50) adds that this breakdown is not only in vertical state-society relations but can also occur in horizontal society-society relations, i.e., between groups in society. Carment (2003:410) consequently distinguishes between three levels of fragility within the state: the macro state level (in state institutions), the intermediate level (in state-society relations), and the micro level (in society-society relations). I address the two perspectives, (1) the institutional approach (encompass the macro state level), and (2) the social legitimacy approach (encompass both the intermediate level and the micro level), in the context of state-building in section 3.3 *The state fragility-security-development nexus*. State-building is presented as a countermeasure to both state fragility and Islamist violent extremism.

Although fragility is understood to be a variable condition, what is problematic, as discernible from Rotberg's (2002a, 2002b, 2003, 2004) and Rice and Patrick's (2008) classifications above, is that the fragility continuum places resilience on the one extreme end, and then immediately the various levels of fragility (weak, failing, failed, or collapsed) on the other end, but does not categorise various levels of resilience. Surely, resilience is also variable? States that are classified as resilient have different levels, nature, context, and history of resilience. To illustrate, is resilience in the US, UK, and France not significantly different from resilience in Finland, Denmark, and Norway? These distinctions are never made, instead resilience is treated as 'all-encompassing'. The focus also tends to be at the one end of the spectrum, i.e., failure and collapse, and not on the comprehensive breadth of state fragility. Baker (2017b:4, 7) has thus proposed a new fragility-resilience model, with every state 'encompassing both sides of the equation'. Baker (2017b:7) maintains that the resilient-fragile divide is a false duality. No country is entirely resilient or entirely fragile. Based on this model, Baker (2017b:4-5) contends that most fragile states pivot in an unstable equilibrium between fragility and resilience, with the pivot movable in either direction, i.e., a state may show improvement and stability or decline and instability.

However conceived, and despite the nature of fragility, there is hope for fragile states. Rotberg (2003:10) contends that "[n]one of these designations is terminal …, [f]ailure is a fluid halting place". Rotberg (2003:10-14) demonstrates with countries as varied as Lebanon, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Afghanistan, and Somalia that recovered from collapse or failure, graduating upward on the fragility ladder. But Rotberg (2003:10) warns that the opposite is true, success is also 'a fluid halting place'. Over time, strength can deteriorate to weakness, failure, and even collapse. Consequently, the most resilient states on the Fragile States Index are classified as 'very sustainable' (see this chapter's last section). Resilience must be sustained, notably, by equitably shared political goods, and efficient-accountable state institutions. Yet again, as Baker (2017b:8) points out, some states such as North Korea and the DRC can sustain a 'fragility equilibrium' for years, neither imploding nor improving.

Having defined the decidedly incomplete continuum of state fragility, where is the threshold between strong-weak-failing-failed or collapsed? Zartman (1995:5) points out that it is difficult to establish an absolute threshold, as the diverse functions of the state are intertwined. A weakening of one function impacts on others. One may also add that determining the degree of the breakdown in state-society or society-society relations would also carry some level of subjectivity, and accordingly, contestation. Consequently, although there is a comprehensive view of state fragility, there is no agreement about the thresholds and thus no clear-cut distinction between the different categories of state fragility. Some quantitative indexes do however have, albeit contested, clear-cut distinctions with more comprehensive categorisation. This study appropriates the categorisation of the Fragile States Index, which classifies 178 states based on 11 quantitative ranges, from (1) *very high alert*, with a 110.0 - 120.0 score, the highest level of fragility, to (11) *very sustainable*, with a below 20.0 score, the highest level of resilience (see section 3.6 *The application of state fragility: the Fragile States Index*). Added to disparities about the categories of state fragility, are disparities about the definition or indicators of state fragility (see section 3.4 *The criticism against the theory and application of state fragility*).

First, I address two related questions: (1) What causes state fragility? (2) Are there intrinsically weak states that are destined to failure and collapse? Grimm (2014:254) contends that state fragility may be caused by (1) internal malfunctions within a state, (2) the structure of the global political economy that marginalises some states, or (3) external interference and various transnational forces. Nay (2013:334) affirms the view that "fragile states are embedded in global structures and transnational exchanges that have a significant impact, positive or negative, on the strength, vulnerability and resilience of state institutions". Rotberg (2002a:131) hence concedes that all "[s]tates are not created equal. Their sizes and shapes, their human endowments, their capacity for delivering services, and their leadership capabilities vary enormously". Rotberg (2003:10) however is adamant that it is neither structural flaws nor institutional deficiencies that are at the root of state fragility, but rather human agency. Acemoglu and Robinson (2012:48, 56, 63) also argue that it is neither geography and climate, nor culture, nor ignorance, that explain the performance of nations or world inequality. Like Rotberg (2003:10) and Grimm's (2014:254) 'internal malfunctions within a state', Acemoglu and Robinson (2012:429-430) find that it is human agency (inclusive institutions) that explain the success of nations.

In *Why nations fail* (2012), Acemoglu and Robinson (2012:73-76, 79-82, 372, 430, 453) contrast *inclusive* versus *extractive* political and economic institutions, linking fragile states with *extractive* institutions. Extractive political institutions are defined by predation and repression, including concentrating power in the hands of a few, lack of government constraints, abusive structures of governance and authority, and the absence of the rule of law. Extractive economic institutions are identified by the lack of law and order, insecure property rights, poor economic performance, and limited access to economic opportunity. Acemoglu and Robinson (2012:83) conclude that "[n]ations fail when they have extractive economic institutions, supported by extractive political institutions that impede and even block economic growth". In a study of the determinants of state fragility in sub-Saharan Africa, Bertocchi and Guerzoni (2012:780) also find that it is neither history nor geography, rather it is the nature and quality of state institutions, that are 'the central drivers of fragility'.

In Kenya, Rotberg (2003:18) contends that the Kenyan state was largely weakened by, among other things, the authoritarian rule of the Daniel arap Moi Administration (1978-2002). Rotberg (2003:18) explains that "[a]lthough Kenya is intrinsically wealthy, its fortunes have been badly managed, corruption is rampant, and for 24 years a gang of ethnically specific thugs distorted the rule of law, limited the supply of political goods, battered civil society and human rights, and privileged a congeries of related ethnic minorities against larger and more central, but now marginalised, ethnicities". The history of high levels of corruption in Kenya is corroborated in Chapter 7, section 7.3.4 *Social indicators*, in which I highlight the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) and the social impact of corruption in Kenya. It includes: diverting state resources away from the needs of society into the hands of the few, social exclusion, horizontal inequality, social fragmentation, and popular discontent.

All these factors are reflected on the Fragile States Index. As in Kenya, a case of mismanaged fortunes occurs in South Africa's recent past since the attainment of electoral democracy in 1994. The South African state has been steadily hollowed out by neo-patrimonial clientelism, largely achieved through 'cadre deployment' since 1997, and the attendant width and depth of massive corruption and mismanagement at various levels of governance. With the inception of the Fragile States Index in 2005, South Africa was classified as *stable*, with a score of 55.7 (out of 120.0). In 2019 South Africa's fragility score stood at 70.1 (71.1 in 2018), indicating *elevated warning* (FFP, 2020d:The Internet). With an economy of US$139.804 billion nominal GDP in 1994, South Africa was the largest economy in sub-Saharan Africa. South Africa occupied this position until 2011 with the economy at US$416.879 billion at that time. At US$396.332 billion in 2012, from 2012 the economy steadily declined. By 2019, the economy of South Africa had contracted to US$358.839 billion nominal GDP (IMF, 2019:The Internet).

Rotberg (2003:10) thus concludes that state fragility is neither inevitable nor unavoidable. Rather, state fragility is actively enabled and actively generated. Collier *et al* (2018:8) advance that "[a]ll countries were once fragile. No society started off with the institutions and norms needed for peace and security [and prosperity]". By illustration, in 1870 the world average life expectancy was 30 years, and currently it is 73, and projected to be 77 by 2050 (Scott, 2020:11; Bloom, 2020:6-7). In *The rise and fall of American growth* (2017), Gordon (2017:1) points out that in the US life expectancy rose from 45 years in 1870 to 72 by 1970.[51] Whereas the US has recorded this high standard of living since 1970, and has had the largest economy in the world since 1890 at almost US$350 billion in GDP-PPP at the time, as Cox (2015:The Internet) shows, the US had to create resilient and inclusive political and economic institutions to succeed as a state and as a nation. It is these institutions that are being undermined in recent times, suggestive of the growing decline of the US (see Kristof, 2020:The Internet). In Kenya, reflecting delayed and stunted development in the quality of life, life expectancy was 48.4 at independence in 1963, and still only 57.4 by 1990. In fact, life expectancy in Kenya declined between 1984 and 2003. From an average 58.8 life expectancy in 1984, life expectancy was reduced to 51.8 years by 2003. In fact, thirty-eight of the 47 counties in Kenya had a decline in life expectancy from 1990 to 2006. In 2019, the average life expectancy in Kenya was 66.4 years, well below the world average of 73 years (Achoki, Miller-Petrie, Glenn *et al*, 2019:88; UNDESA, 2019:The Internet).[52]

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[51] The US started out as a fragile state with rural and agricultural societies and a long period of little to no economic growth before 1870. The period 1870 to 1970, what Gordon (2017:1) calls the US's 'special century', spurred on by unprecedented technological innovations and economic growth of the Second Industrial Revolution, resulted in levels of development that freed US society from "an unremitting daily grind of painful manual labour, household drudgery, darkness, isolation, and early death".

[52] The 2020 HDI calculates life expectancy in 2019 in Kenya at 66.7 (UNDP, 2020b:2-3).

In contrast to the mismanagement of Kenya and South Africa's fortunes, Rotberg (2003:20) points to the example of Botswana and Mauritius. According to Rotberg (2003:20), "Botswana, dirt poor at independence, and a forlorn excuse for a state, created under determined and visionary leadership a nation-state strong enough to take full advantage of a subsequent, and much unexpected, resource bonanza [in the discovery of diamonds]. So did a sugar monoculture like Mauritius become transformed by determined visionary leadership into a thriving plural society based on manufacturing for export". In their study, *Inside African politics* (2014), Englebert and Dunn (2014:113, 181-182, 217, 234) also reference Botswana and Mauritius as examples of African states that have created and maintained, since independence, what Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) would call 'inclusive institutions', based on the levels of resilience and stability in these two countries.

Whilst parallels may be drawn between Kenya and South Africa, and Botswana and Mauritius (or any other case that is identified later in this study), these parallels are not equated with a comparative analysis. The nature, levels, and history of fragility are neither equivalent in Kenya and South Africa, nor is there equivalence in the nature, levels, and history of strength in Botswana and Mauritius. Kenya and South Africa serve as an example, a case, of how human agency can mismanage a country's fortunes, leading to hollowing-out the state, and then cause citizens to question and even challenge the legitimacy and authority of the state. Likewise, Botswana and Mauritius serve as an example, a case, of how human agency can create a state that inspires the loyalty of its citizens, with inclusive, responsive, and accountable institutions. Similar to Kenya and South Africa, the case in Botswana and Mauritius is also reflected on the Fragile States Index. Since 2005 Botswana received *warning* scores (range: 60.0 - 69.9) on the index, i.e., 66.9 in 2005, steadily improving to reach 62.0 in 2017. In 2019 Botswana's score was *stable* at 57.1 (FFP, 2020e:The Internet). Mauritius has received a sustained score of *more stable* (range: 40.0 - 49.9) since 2005, i.e., 41.9 in 2005, improving to 40.5 by 2017. In 2019 Mauritius scored *very stable* at 37.2. Mauritius is the first and only African nation to rank in this category on the Fragile States Index (FFP, 2019:12, 27, 2020f:The Internet).

In Kenya the causes of state fragility are less about the lack of state capacity, which may be partially explained by geography, history, the impact of colonialism, the related structure of the global political economy that marginalises the African state, and other external factors. The history of exploitation and marginalisation, colonial and neo-colonial, is shared by all sub-Saharan African countries, including Liberia and Ethiopia that did not experience colonial occupation. Despite this history, the causes of state fragility in Kenya emanate more from internal malfunctions and structural flaws within the state since independence. Poor state performance in Kenya emanates from post-colonial institutional flaws, state-society relations, and society-society relations, all impacting on how state institutions perform and are perceived. By illustration, if economic indicators are disaggregated in the period under review (between 2005 and 2019), Kenya scores the worst with the indicator *uneven economic development*, averaged at 8.0, as opposed to *economic decline*, averaged at 7.1 (out of 10.00), on the Fragile States Index. In fact, Kenya has one of the fastest growing economies with an average GDP growth rate of 5.45 percent between 2004 and 2019 (Trading Economics, 2020c:The Internet). Kenya is East Africa's largest economy and has been the fourth largest economy in sub-Saharan Africa, becoming the third largest in 2019. Kenya's economy in 2018 was US$87.928 billion, behind Nigeria, South Africa, and Angola's economies, at US$398.186 billion, US$368.135 billion, and US$105.902 billion respectively. All in US$ nominal GDP. In 2019 Kenya's economy was US$98.607 billion, behind Nigeria and South Africa's economies, at US$446.543 billion and US$358.839 billion respectively. Angola's economy in 2019 was US$91.527 billion, fourth behind Kenya (IMF, 2019:The Internet). All in US$ nominal GDP. Despite the size and the growth of the economy, empirical evidence of sustained and extensive horizontal-regional inequality is demonstrable in Kenya (see Chapter 7).

Derived from cohesion, political, and social indicators on the Fragile States Index, Kenya has the worst average scores in the following indicators: demographic pressures (8.8), factionalised elites (8.7), group grievances (8.4), state legitimacy (8.2) and refugees and internally displaced persons (8.1), between 2005 and 2019, each scored out of 10.00. Poor performance in these indicators is a function of what Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) call *extractive*, as opposed to *inclusive*, institutions. These indicators are linked with the repression and marginalisation of ethnic-Somalis and the Muslim minority in the arc of insecurity in Kenya, and more narrowly in the former NFD. Kenya does recognise the impact of these state fragility conditions in these highly neglected and highly securitised regions. By illustration, in 2018 the World Bank and the Kenyan government launched the North and North-Eastern Development Initiative (NEDI) development projects, estimated to cost US$6.9 billion, to deal with some of these conditions (World Bank, 2018c). I revert to these issues briefly at relevant sections later in the current chapter, and in more detail in the context of Chapters 7 and 8.[53]

Having dealt with the causes, what are the symptoms and consequences of fragility? State fragility has an assortment of outcomes ranging from the incapacity of the state to provide state functions and political goods, to fulfil the development needs of society, and to provide security for society or become a threat to the security of society and to international security. All calling into question the authority and legitimacy of the state. This study links state fragility to socio-economic and political underdevelopment and various permutations of insecurity, specifically, Islamist violent extremism. The study intends to advance and demonstrate that the properties or attributes of state fragility do not only provide the context and opportunity but also generate Islamist violent extremism and impediments to CVE. In outlining the outcomes of state fragility, USAID (2005:1-2) observes and maintains that when development and governance fail, as they in fact do in fragile states, the outcomes impact not only immediate neighbours, but also impact far-flung regions. Kaplan (2008:1) consequently found that "[f]ragile states are a menace unlike any other, endangering international security, while ruining the lives of hundreds of millions across the globe". Similarly, Albertson and Moran (2016:2) pointed out that "[f]rom the collapse of Syria and the rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), to the Ebola outbreak in West Africa, to the terrors of *Boko Haram* in Nigeria, the consequences of state fragility are confronting … [the world] today in dramatic new ways". I expound on the outcomes of state fragility in the state fragility-security-development nexus below.

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[53] The arc of insecurity represents the epicentre of state fragility and Islamist terrorist activity, encompassing 12 of the 47 Kenyan counties. The Northern Frontier District (NFD) included North-Eastern Region, i.e., Mandera, Garissa and Wajir, and the northern part of Eastern Region, i.e., Moyale, Marsabit and Isiolo (Moyale district has since been partitioned between Marsabit and Wajir counties). See Chapter 7, section 7.2 *The arc of insecurity and Islamist violent extremism* and Chapter 8, section 8.2 *The arc of insecurity and impediments to CVE*.

3.3 THE STATE FRAGILITY-SECURITY-DEVELOPMENT NEXUS

Since the 1990s the previously state-centric and military-force focused concept of security has been broadened to encompass non-military issues plus issues below and above the state. Security now comprises new security threats such as terrorism, crime, migration, disease, and the environment. Security also includes the human experiences of underdevelopment, poverty, and insecurity (Shah, 2014:120). Shah (2014:120) therefore maintains that fragile states are viewed as (1) incubators of insecurity and underdevelopment, and (2) sources of security threats. Fragile states today are accordingly the confluence of humanitarian-development concerns as well as security concerns. Robert Zoellick (2008:68), former president of the World Bank, also contends that "[f]ragile states are the toughest development challenge of our era". Ken Menkhaus (2010:171) has further observed a consensus since the 1990s that 'fragile states pose security threats' to their citizens, neighbours, and the international community. Shah (2014:122) consequently defines the state fragility-security-development nexus as "the linking of poverty, underdevelopment and insecurity as a constellation - a constellation that is primarily conceptualised in reference to states categorised as 'fragile' [states]".

There are varied and divergent views about the indicators of state fragility. What is in agreement, as intimated above, is that the properties, indicators, or attributes of fragile states (1) have causal capacity and tendency, and (2) are linked to insecurity and underdevelopment. According to the IMF (2008:7), the characteristics of fragile states constrain the economic and social performance of these states in significant ways, resulting largely in weak governance, limited administrative capacity, chronic humanitarian crises, persistent social tensions, and endemic violence, including armed conflict and civil war. The IMF (2008:7) further points out that fragile states perform poorly on political indicators linked to the quality of policies, institutions, and governance. Poor political performance, in turn, impairs economic performance, resulting in negative outcomes such as reduced delivery of basic social services and the reduced effectiveness of donor assistance. Poor political and economic performance has negative effects on the economic growth of these countries and their neighbours. These countries, the IMF asserts, are also least likely to achieve global imperatives such as the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), or now, the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).

The 17 SDGs are intended to build on the eight MDGs. The MDGs were initiated in 2000 and were intended to be achieved by 2015. The SDGs were initiated in 2016, to be achieved by 2030, hence the UN *2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development* (UNGA, 2015b). I participated in ACUNS 2019: *The UN and Africa: progress towards achieving the SDGs*. Consistently featuring in the plenary sessions and the workshops, was the view that institutional failure was an enduring reason for the persistent development and security challenges in Africa. When public institutions fail, as the IMF (2008) points out above, global development and security imperatives such as the MDGs and SDGs are either not achieved or there is marginal and unsatisfactory progress. Another outcome of such institutional failure is instability and violent political conflict. This study focuses on one form of violent political conflict, viz., terrorism, as informed by, and as a manifestation of, Islamist violent extremism.[54]

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[54] The eight MDGs were: (1) eradicate extreme poverty and hunger; (2) achieve universal primary education; (3) promote gender equality and empower women; (4) reduce child mortality; (5) improve maternal health; (6) combat HIV/Aids, Malaria, and other diseases; (7) ensure environmental stability; (8) global partnership for development. By 2015 many of the targets in these goals were not achieved in sub-Saharan Africa. In Kenya, in the 15-year period of implementing the MDGs, there are mixed results, as attested by the government of Kenya’s final status report, *Progress in achievement of Millennium Development Goals in Kenya* (2016b). For example, although the target of universal primary education was achieved by introducing universal free primary education in 2003, achievement in many of the other MDGs was below target or recorded slow progress. And, as Ndeda (2019:The Internet) qualifies, despite the introduction of universal free primary education, 1.2 million children of school-going age are out of school in Kenya, there is a 27 percent primary school dropout rate, and only 50 percent of primary school children proceed to secondary school. The reasons for this include the underfunded schooling system, and high poverty rates that do not allow for the actual cost and opportunity cost of going to school, i.e., costs other than school fees and learning materials. The challenges in achieving the MDGs are thus linked to state fragility. Furthermore, Kenya’s status report lists the following challenges: the prevailing inequality between communities and regions, and the lack of inclusive growth; a range of conflicts, including communal, cross-border, and elections-related conflicts; environmental degradation; poor infrastructural development, including poor road and rail, water, sanitation, and energy networks; the capacity deficit in state institutions (Republic of Kenya, 2016b:118-119). The Academic Council on the United Nations System (ACUNS) 2019 was held at Stellenbosch University, South Africa, on 19-21 June 2019.

The 2019 and 2020 Sustainable Development Goals Index (SDGs Index) clearly indicate that Kenya (like many other African countries) is lagging behind. In 2018, Kenya ranked 125 (out of 162 countries assessed) with a score of 57.0 (out of 100), and in 2019 Kenya ranked 123 (out of 166 countries assessed) with a score of 60.2 (out of 100). The 2019 and 2020 SDGs Indexes tell us that despite some progress, fragile states such as Kenya are unlikely to achieve the SDGs targets by 2030 (UNSDSN, 2019b:21, 254, 2019c:1, 2020b:27, 2020c:1). I revert briefly to the SDGs Index when addressing the related Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI) in Chapter 7 to demonstrate why and how the regions where Islamist terrorism is concentrated, are the most deprived regions in Kenya, as a function of absolute and relative multidimensional poverty (and other indicators).[55] This finding supports the central proposition of the study that state fragility provides the context and opportunity for, and generates, Islamist violent extremism and impediments to CVE. Consequently, this study is able to demonstrate that where state fragility is most evidenced, Islamist violent extremism is most prevalent, and impediments to CVE are most pronounced, and that is in the arc of insecurity in Kenya.

From the forgoing it is quite clear that state fragility has multiple dimensions, properties, attributes, and outcomes. Consequently, similar to but in addition to the above, Shah (2014:120-121) lists the following attributes and outcomes of fragile states: weak, failing, and abusive structures of governance and authority; human rights abuses; endemic corruption and extraction of rents from the population; extreme levels of poverty; low levels of economic development; lack of capacity and willingness to provide basic services; low life expectancy and high infant mortality; susceptibility to civil wars, civil strife, and humanitarian disasters; massive waves of migration and internally displaced people; and, these states pose security threats to their neighbours and the international community. The foregoing properties or attributes and outcomes describe everyday conditions in these fragile states. These are areas and regions that the world’s ‘bottom billion’ are doomed to call home.

In *The bottom billion* (2007), Collier (2007:3, 4) describes the bottom billion as, “a group of countries at the bottom that are falling behind, and often falling apart. The countries at the bottom coexist with the twenty-first century, but their reality is the fourteenth century: civil war, plague, ignorance. They are concentrated in Africa and Central Asia, with a scattering elsewhere”. Collier (2007:20) finds that in such an environment of hopeless scarcity and frustrated expectations, not only is recruitment for rebel armies (or violent extremist groups) cheap, but life itself is also cheap. Similarly, Rotberg (2004:6) finds that these fragile states “provide no safety nets, … [societies] become fodder for anyone who can offer food and a cause”. Whereas being part of the ‘bottom billion’ is declining elsewhere, it is not the case in fragile states, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa. The World Bank (2018d:The Internet) points out that compared to 1990 when 1.85 billion people in the world lived on less than US$1.90 a day, in 2015 this figure was down to 736 million. By contrast, the OECD (2018:17, 53, 95) estimates that by 2030 more than 80 percent of the world’s poorest will live in fragile states. Likewise, the World Bank (2018d:The Internet) contends, sub-Saharan Africa is home to more than half the of the world’s extreme poor, with estimates indicating that by 2030 nine in ten people living on less than US$1.90 a day will live in this subregion. Baker (2017b:3) points out that the ‘bottom billion’, estimated at 1.4 billion, is projected to grow to 1.9 billion people by 2030. All this undermining the 2030 Agenda.

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[55] The MPI measures the incidence and intensity of poverty, based on three dimensions: education, health, and living standard. The three MPI dimensions are linked to seven SDGs, i.e., 1-4, 6-7, and 11: (1) no poverty; (2) zero hunger; (3) good health and well-being; (4) quality education; (6) clean water and sanitation; (7) affordable and clean energy; (11) sustainable cities and communities. See Chapter 7, section 7.3.2 *Economic indicators*.

Kenya has its own ‘bottom billion’. I indicated in section 3.2 *What is state fragility?* and show in Chapter 7 that despite the size of Kenya’s economy, and marked improvements in economic growth, the Fragile State Index’s indicator E2: *Uneven economic development*, the inequality adjusted HDI, the MPI, the SDGs Index, the World Happiness Index, and the Social Progress Index, all record the rising socio-economic horizontal inequality that induce popular discontent in Kenya. Inequality, and the resultant discontent and violence, are linked to various indicators of state fragility, including demographic pressures, unequal economic development, and group grievances. Linked to the impending reality of this further and increased state fragility and the growing ‘bottom billion’, is the trend of new converts to Islam that increasingly join Islamist violent groups in sub-Saharan Africa. This is an area former UN Secretary-General (UNSG), Ban Ki-moon, characterised as ‘an arc of upheaval and distress’ (UNDP, 2015:6). This trend is evidenced in Kenya. There has been, however, an attempt to downplay homegrown terrorism in Kenya, and an attempt at what Mwangi (2018a) calls the ‘Somalinisation’ of Islamist violent extremism and CVE. The perpetuated myth is that Islamism is an external Somali problem, and Kenya a mere victim of terror attacks by *al-Shabaab*. The reality is that Islamism increasingly appeals to non-ethnic-Somalis and non-Muslims alike in Kenya. This appeal, Warner (2015:The Internet) explains, is based on the ability of *al-Shabaab* and *al-Hijra* to exploit popular discontent in Kenya by “offering money, weapons training and a quick conversion to Islam”.[56]

The UNDP (2017:6) in its study on extremism in Africa, also warns that “there is a very real prospect of an even greater spread of violent extremism in Africa than has been witnessed in recent years, with further associated devastation and backsliding in development terms". The UNDP (2017) report then examines several state fragility-induced conditions that risk the further expansion of Islamist violent extremism in Africa. The UNDP (2017:6, 50) asserts that the regions in Africa that are most associated with Islamist violent extremism are regions that have also experienced 'generations of socio-economic and political marginalisation', including 'low levels of education'. Because of such marginalisation and low levels of education, the people in these regions often rely on intermediaries to interpret the Muslim religion, which is mostly in Arabic text. The UNDP (2017:6) contends that this has enabled a 'largely imported' Islamist ideology to serve as a 'lightning conductor' for local frustrations and anger. The UNDP (2017:5, 55, 58) further points out that 'economic factors' score very high as the reason why people join extremist groups. This is to be expected given the higher-than-the-national-average local multidimensional poverty levels in these areas, and the local lived experiences of unemployment and underemployment. Consequently, employment becomes an 'immediate need', making an extremist group a viable option, if not the only option, for 'employment'. The UNDP (2017:5) reveals that employment was 'the single most frequently cited reason for joining an extremist group' as provided by respondents in its study. These are the consequences of the hopeless scarcity and extreme deprivation as experienced by the growing bottom billion on the subcontinent.

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[56] See Chapter 6, section 6.2 *Kenya as a victim of external terror attacks*, and section 6.4 *The origins of Islamist violent extremism in Kenya*.

The above properties of state fragility have causal capacity, they inextricably link state fragility with underdevelopment, insecurity, and violent conflict, as Collier (2007), the IMF (2008), Shah (2014), and the UNDP (2017) also highlight. One may therefore refer to the *crisis of the African state* as a theory of conflict. The theory is that Africa is prone to conflicts because of the conditions that prevail within African states, i.e., *the African state itself is the source of insecurity and conflict*. In illustration of this theory, Englebert and Dunn (2014:47-48, 294-298) point out that the African state is highly dependent on external actors, does not afford economic opportunities for its citizens, does not adequately provide political goods, fails at collective action and reducing transaction costs, does not have monopoly over the use of force, has porous borders, has ungoverned spaces, has high unemployment and low literacy rates, and the rule of law is often undermined by citizens and the government alike.

One outcome of the above conditions and attributes, as noted earlier, is violent conflict. USAID (2005:1, 2) contends that conflict is not confined to fragile states, but violent conflict is significantly much more endemic in fragile states. Rotberg (2004:2) points out that fragile states are also defined by social fragmentation and disharmony that are correlated with, and interact with, violence. He (*ibid*) contends that "[i]t is not the absolute intensity of violence that identifies a … [fragile] state. Rather, it is the enduring character and consuming quality of that violence, the fact that much of the violence is directed against the existing government or [political system]". Such enduring and consuming structural, cultural, and direct violence is also directed against identity groups in society as well as regions within the state, as evidenced in Kenya. I demonstrate in Chapters 6 to 8 that ethnic-Somalis and other Muslims have borne the brunt of structural, cultural, and direct violence in Kenya since 1963. Muslims make up 11 percent of the population, 54 percent of whom being ethnic-Somalis.

Added to state weakness and the propensity for violent conflict, resilience is also included in the state fragility-security-development nexus. I outlined in Chapter 1, section 1.8.1 *Key concepts*, that resilience is central not only in CVE but also in addressing state fragility. The African Development Bank Group (AfDB, 2014:8), in the strategy document, *Addressing fragility and building resilience in Africa*, lists three focus areas in building resilience: (1) strengthening state capacity and establishing effective institutions; (2) promoting resilient societies through inclusive and equitable access to employment, basic services and shared benefits from natural resource endowments; (3) enhancing the Bank's leadership role in policy dialogue, partnerships and advocacy around issues of fragility. The World Bank (2005:3) lists four principles on building resilience: (1) long-term focus on building capacity and accountability; (2) the importance of the political-security-development nexus; (3) partnership with international actors; (4) the calibration of responses to the specific needs of the fragile state.

Resilience, framed around the notion of state-building, is key to addressing underdevelopment and insecurity, and the crisis of governance and legitimacy, in fragile states. According to the OECD (2013:15), a resilient state has the capacity and legitimacy to govern its society and geographical area, to manage and adapt to changing social needs and expectations, shifts in elite and other political agreements, and growing institutional complexity. The AfDB (2014:15) defines resilience as the capacity of the state to effectively manage stresses in ways that foster legitimacy and societal cohesion. Likewise, the G7+ (2013:2) defines resilience as the capacity of social institutions to absorb and adjust to internal and external shocks and setbacks. The G7+ (2013:2) explains that if fragility implies the risk of a crisis or violent conflict because the nationhood, safety, security, and well-being of citizens are endangered, then this risk is progressively reduced as institutions develop the capacity to moderate exposure to these threats. Similarly, Gelbard *et al* (2015:7) define resilience as a condition whereby state institutions have enough strength and capacity, and there is enough social cohesion, to promote security and development and to respond effectively to shocks. Baker (2017b:9) defines resilience as the ability of the state to serve its citizens and fulfil its obligations.

The OECD (2015:101) warns however that fragile states, being diverse, also face diverse economic, social, and institutional challenges, and therefore the speed with which resilience is built across fragile states vary markedly. There is therefore a need to distinguish between distinct conceptions of state fragility, and distinct conceptions of state-building. I highlighted under section 3.2 *What is state fragility?* that state fragility may result from state underperformance, or from the breakdown in state-society relations, or the breakdown in society-society relations. Likewise, state-building may also focus on state performance, or on state-society relations, or society-society relations. Lemay-Hébert and Mathieu (2014:232-233) consequently point to the two approaches to state-building that both emphasises state legitimacy, viz.: (1) the institutional approach, focusing on institutional reconstruction; (2) the social legitimacy approach, focusing on building socio-political cohesion. Of the two approaches, the institutional approach tends to dominate the discourse on state-building.

From an institutional approach, Lemay-Hébert and Mathieu (2014:235-236) assert that state-building is defined by strengthening existing government institutions and creating new institutions, all of which are designed to increase state capacity. This is because the institutional approach equates state fragility with ‘the lack of institutional capacity to implement and enforce policies’. The recommended antidote accordingly is ‘more capacity’, including more coercive capacity to enforce security. State-building is therefore seen as separate from nation-building. By contrast, the social legitimacy approach sees nation-building as central to state-building. From a social legitimacy approach therefore state fragility is equated with ‘the lack of capacity by the state to command loyalty in a political marketplace defined by political bargaining’. Consequently, according to Lemay-Hébert and Mathieu (2014:237), the social legitimacy perspective prescribes the creation of state institutions that can “define, create and solidify a viable collective identity”. Social cohesion is thus seen as the glue which binds society to the state, enhancing the legitimacy of the state, and therefore the desired end-state of state-building.

In view of these two divergent perspectives, Lemay-Hébert and Mathieu (2014:238) call for a more balanced view, thus a meeting place for both institutional and social legitimacy approaches. Kaplan (2014:52, 2016:72) agree by pointing out that for a state to navigate through fragility, it requires both state capacity and social cohesion: “[s]tate capacity matters, but the functioning of the state is strongly influenced by the dynamics of the society in which it is embedded”. Lemay-Hébert and Mathieu (2014:239) also conclude that strengthening state institutions, without strengthening state society-relations and without considering the ‘the political and social fabric of society’, is inadequate and may even result in the unintended consequence of reproducing ineffective and illegitimate institutions. Likewise, the OECD (2018:24) concludes that state institutions in fragile contexts have the propensity to instrumentalise authority and capacity in undemocratic ways, thus diverting resources to the state at the expense of society, which then creates more illegitimacy and fragility. The UNDP (2017:6) similarly warns of the dangers of state-building that privilege state institutions over social cohesion, pointing out that "[i]n the absence of 'state legitimacy', in the eyes of citizens living in high-risk areas, initiatives that focus exclusively on state capacity-building run the risk of perpetuating malign power structures, which are overt drivers of violent extremist recruitment in Africa".

Uganda serves as an example to illustrate the dangers linked with conflating state fragility, security, and development, and the risks linked with state-building that privilege bolstering state institutions over social cohesion. Fisher (2014:321-322) provides evidence of how Uganda, since Yoweri Museveni's military takeover in 1986, has instrumentalised its 'fragile status' and insecurity in the north of the country to gain influence and support, including development, counter-insurgency, and counter-terrorism aid. Aid institutions and foreign governments continue to provide aid to Uganda despite the lack of improvement on various governance indicators, including continued insecurity, and the lack of democratisation and broadly shared political goods (thus reinforcing state fragility). Fisher (2014:328-329) observes that state fragility may be used to condone governance transgressions and to justify support for governments that do not serve much of their population, as Uganda shows. Collier *et al* (2018:5) also point out that many of these aid-dependent fragile states, after decades of inviting and receiving aid, are as poor as they have always been, and some even poorer.

The Ugandan case is corroborated by Jean-François Bayart's *The state in Africa: the politics of the belly* (1993), Patrick Chabal and Jean-Pascal Daloz's *Africa works: disorder as political instrument* (1999), and Michela Wrong's *It's our turn to it* (2009), providing empirical evidence of how the state may instrumentalise disorder, corruption, poverty, and need, for the benefit of the few, largely with the complicity of foreign governments, including aid institutions. This is demonstrated in Kenya too. It is therefore foolhardy to strengthen state institutions in Kenya without, simultaneously, mending the deep divisions within Kenyan society, or mending state-society relations, or mending structural flaws and malfunctions within state institutions. To do so carries the risk of further locking Kenya in the fragility and conflict traps that have characterised the state since independence (see Chapters 6 to 8).

The state fragility-security-development nexus has helped to illuminate the challenges of fragile states, and those presented by state fragility, as well as pointing the way in which these challenges could be addressed. This nexus, however, has been criticised because in linking the three factors, (1) development is prone to be subordinated to the dictates of security, and (2) there is the risk of increased interventionism in fragile states. Nay (2013:330) contends that these linkages have been put to good use against regional conflicts, transnational terrorism, and international organised crime. However, Nay (2013:330) proclaims, linking the three factors, this nexus has promoted undemocratic forms of meddling in fragile states, and justified support for governments that do not serve their societies, but are useful partners in the agenda of foreign powers. In fact, Nay (2013:330) references Noam Chomsky's *Failed states* (2006), which deplored state fragility as "an 'ideological invention' used to legitimise intrusive US foreign interventions and strengthen American supremacy in the world order". Nay (2013:330) finds that the discourse on state fragility has not served the people in fragile states but has served the concerns of a limited number of dominant Western governments. Jones (2008:197) agrees and argues that the discourse on state fragility has served to legitimise Western imperialism in non-European countries. Jones (2008:197-198) expounds that during colonialism the distinction was between 'civilised states' and 'uncivilised states', during the Cold War it was 'evil communist states' versus 'good democratic states', and in the contemporary period the distinction is between 'strong states' and 'fragile states'. Osaghae (2007:697) hence concludes that Western governments neither intervene in fragile states nor frame the fragility discourse for altruistic reasons, but rather they intervene solely for the purpose of ensuring that "fragile states take their 'rightful' places in the hegemonic global order". This introduces the criticism against state fragility.

3.4 THE CRITICISM AGAINST THE THEORY AND APPLICATION OF STATE FRAGILITY

State fragility faces a litany of criticism. State fragility is often seen as a nebulous, malleable, concept. Fragile states are variedly referred to as 'lame Leviathan', 'shadow', 'quasi', 'decaying', 'stressed', 'insecure', 'at risk', 'troubled', 'soft', 'phantom', 'mirage', 'captured', and so forth, often without any distinction between different levels, nature, context, and history of their said fragility.[57] There are consequently issues with conceptualisation and definition. In illustration of this variation, state fragility is variedly conceptualised and defined as the level of inability of the fragile state to (1) adequately 'perform state functions' (Zartman, 1995), (2) adequately 'deliver political goods' (Rotberg, 2003), (3) adequately 'manage social, economic and political pressures' that are otherwise managed by other states (FFP, 2016b, 2017b), (4) 'achieve its developmental needs' (Kaplan, 2008), and/or (5) avoid a condition where the state is 'at risk of failure and loss of welfare' (Mueller, 2018).

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[57] See Osaghae (2007), Call (2008), Eriksen (2011), Nay (2013, 2014), Grimm *et al* (2014), and Coggins (2015), for an analysis of the origins and evolution of the concepts of the state, state failure, and state fragility, as well as the semantic ambiguities related to these concepts.

There are also a variety of definitions of state fragility. Kaplan (2008:5) observes that because of this lack of an agreed-upon definition, there is also no agreement on which states should be classified as fragile, and which ones not. Kaplan (2008:6) further observes that "[t]here are as many lists of fragile states as there are definitions". Hence Mueller (2018:3) defines state failure as "when a state does not manage to prevent a crisis, economic or political, which has the potential to harm the welfare of its population". Mueller (2018:3) measures such failure using data on economic decline, institutional changes, political turmoil, and armed violence. Kaplan (2008:11) defines fragile states as "any state highly unlikely in its current form ..., to be able to cultivate the kind of state bodies that can manage an effective process of development", or alternatively, "any country highly unlikely to become prosperous and stable without first undergoing some form of institutional reengineering".

On the other hand, Nay (2013:327) defines fragile states as "countries where the legitimacy, authority and capacity of state institutions are dramatically declining, weak or broken". The World Bank captures the security-development nexus in their definition of state fragility. The World Bank (2005:1) defines fragile states through two key and shared characteristics: (1) weak state policies and institutions; (2) the propensity for conflict and political instability. Fragile states are consequently considered least likely to 'deliver services to their citizens, to control corruption, or to provide for sufficient voice and accountability'. The World Bank (2005:2) points out that those two characteristics are linked. When state capacity and accountability are eroded, economic growth and public services cannot be generated and provided in any inclusive way. This creates grievances and ultimately political instability and conflict. In a vicious cycle, conflict reproduces its own causes, viz.: weak state capacity and weak accountability, which leads to further societal hardships, and even more conflict.

USAID (2005:1) distinguishes between states that are 'vulnerable' and those in 'crisis'. Vulnerable states are defined as unable or unwilling to adequately deliver political goods and provide basic services to most of their populations. Hence their legitimacy is in question. Crisis states are defined as states that have ungoverned spaces, and their governments are unable or unwilling to provide the most vital services to most of their populations. Hence their legitimacy is weak or non-existent, and there is either the imminent danger or actual incidence of violent conflict. The G7+ (2013:1) defines state fragility not as a finite condition but as 'a period' in the history of a state. This period, according to the G7+, often follows armed conflict. It requires greater efforts at peace building and state-building, including 'building inclusive political settlements, security, justice, jobs, good management of resources, accountable and fair service delivery', to transition a fragile state towards 'sustainable socio-economic development'. The EU Commission (in Grimm, 2014:258) defines state fragility as 'a situation where the social contract between the state and society is broken'. This breakdown occurs when the state is either unable or unwilling to fulfil its basic functions and/or obligations.

From the foregoing one may discern that there is an evolving understanding of state fragility as a concept and phenomenon. This evolution is also illustrated in the case of the OECD. The OECD (2006:13) defined a fragile state as a state that does not have the capacity and/or political will to implement pro-poor policies, that has poor governance, and is inclined to violent conflict. Recently, the OECD (2013:15) defined fragility as a 'a region or state that has weak capacity'. This weakness is linked to the functions of the state, state-society relations, and internal or external shocks such as economic crises or natural disasters. More recently, the OECD (2016:21, 2018:82) defined fragility as 'a gap between exposure to risk and the coping capacity to manage such risk'. This incapacity may apply to a state, a system, or a community. According to the OECD (2016:21, 2018:82), when these three entities fail to 'manage, absorb or mitigate' these risks, fragility may lead to negative societal outcomes, including 'violence, the breakdown of institutions, displacement, and humanitarian crises'.

Comparable to the latter OECD (2016) definition, the AfDB (2014:15) defines fragility as a 'condition of elevated risk'. This risk is linked with 'institutional breakdown, societal collapse, or violent conflict'. The AfDB explains that fragility results from the risk created by an imbalance between the internal and external strains, the challenges experienced by a state and its society, and the capacity to manage these strains and challenges. In accord with the AfDB (2014), and as the basis for the Fragile States Index, the Fund for Peace (2017b:4) asserts that state fragility occurs when the social, economic, and political pressures (experienced by all states at varying levels) outweigh the state's capacity to manage these pressures. The pressures include challenges related to government authority and legitimacy, the social contract, political competition, group grievances, economic development, the distribution of resources, the provision of public services, corruption, the rule of law, and demographic stresses.

Given the above, is fragility a period? A situation? A condition? A context? Characteristic of a state or region? Reflective of the internal and external pressures on a state? Or highlighting the behaviour of a state as predatory, unresponsive, or repressive? All the above? How do we know state fragility when we see it? Different indicators are used to define what state fragility is or is not! Zartman (1995:5) includes: a decision-making centre of government, a symbol of identity, a security providing sovereign territory, authoritative political institutions, and a system of socio-economic organisation. Osaghae (1999:184-185) includes: legitimacy, national integration, governance and management, state penetration, the extent of economic weakness and poverty, and the level of dependency on industrialised countries. Rotberg (2002b:87, 2003:3-4) identifies: security, education, health services, economic opportunity, environmental surveillance, a legal framework of order and a judicial system to administer it, and fundamental infrastructure such as roads and communications facilities. Nafziger and Auvinen (2002:161) identify: authority and legitimacy, making laws, preserving order, and providing basic social services. The Fund for Peace (2016b:The Internet) lists these indicators: the loss of physical control of a geographical area or monopoly on the legitimate use of force, the erosion of legitimate authority to make collective decisions, an inability to provide reasonable public services, and the inability to interact with other states as a full member of the international community. Hanlon *et al* (2012:32) list three indicators: territorial control, performance of core functions, and legitimacy. USAID (2005:3) narrows the indicators down to 'ineffective and illegitimate governance'.

Although many of the indicators overlap and/or are compatible, the above lists both include and exclude. Consequently, as in the maxim: *the answers you get depend on the questions you ask*, if state fragility is looked at through divergent lenses, there will always be divergent views and perspectives regarding the nature and outcomes of state fragility. Grimm *et al* (2014:205) therefore concludes that the concept of state fragility "is far from stable …. The term is used by various actors with different agendas to describe dissimilar national contexts of political disruption, institutional weakness and economic collapse". With the variable indicators and the lack of a consensus definition, plus the lack of agreement about the fragility categories and the threshold between these categories, is yet another point of criticism, viz.: How do you in fact measure state fragility? State fragility is rarely measured! That is, except for indexes such as the Resource Allocation Index (RAI) of the International Development Association (IDA) of the World Bank, the States of Fragility Index (SFI) of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the OECD, and the Fragile States Index (FSI) of the Fund for Peace. The RAI and the SFI however cover only states that are eligible for development assistance.[58] To illustrate, the 2018 SFI identifies and covers only 58 states in the world, what the OECD (2018:83-85) refers to as 'fragile contexts'. In fact, Kenya receives development assistance from both the IDA of the World Bank and the DAC of the OECD. Kenya is among the top 20 development assistance recipients in the world. The OECD (2018:26) classifies Kenya as *chronically* fragile.

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[58] The Resource Allocation Index (RAI) uses a Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) criteria to assess countries that are eligible for development assistance. The index employs a six-point scale, 1 (low) to 6 (high), to assess countries based on a set of 16 criterion. States scoring 3.2 and below are classified as 'low-income countries under stress (LICUS)', i.e., 'fragile'. The 16 criteria for assessment are grouped under four themes: (1) economic management; (2) structural policies; (3) policies for social inclusion and equity; (4) public sector management and institutions. The CPIA "measures the quality of the country's present policy and institutional framework to support sustainable growth and poverty reduction and, consequently, the effective use of development assistance" (World Bank, 2018a:1). The International Development Association (IDA) is intended to help the poorest countries reduce poverty by providing concessional loans and grants for programmes aimed at boosting economic growth and improving living conditions (see World Bank, 2005, 2018a). The States of Fragility Index (SFI) measures state fragility based on (1) political, (2) environmental, (3) societal, (4) economic, and (5) security, indicators, on a six-level scale: (1) severe fragility; (2) high fragility; (3) moderate fragility; (4) low fragility; (5) minor fragility; (6) non-fragile (see OECD, 2018:265-279).

There is also the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) of the World Bank. Whilst it covers over 200 countries and territories, the WGI focus on assessing the quality of governance. The Ibrahim Index of African Governance (IIAG) also focuses on the quality of governance, but only of the 54 states of Africa. The Ibrahim Index defines governance as “the provision of political, social, economic and environmental public goods and services that every citizen has the right to expect from their government, and that a government has the responsibility to deliver to its citizens” (MIF, 2020:8). Such governance is largely lacking in fragile states.[59] Be that as it may, focusing on governance, or governance in Africa, or countries that require development assistance, or developing countries, and having limited or no consideration of security matters, the Worldwide Governance Indicators, the Ibrahim Index, the Resources Allocation Index, the States of Fragility Index, and the Index of State Weakness, do not measure the comprehensive range of state performance of all states as the Fragile States Index in fact does.[60] Accordingly, I arrogate the Fragile States Index for the full breadth of state underperformance and misperformance. Critically, the index enables one to identify not only different dimensions of state fragility, but to identify when a state is at risk. The index is thus, comparatively, a particularly illuminating instrument for the aim and objectives of the current study. The holy grail of uncovering state fragility is, however, yet to be discovered. The Fund for Peace (2017b:13) also concedes that the index is ‘an entry point for further interpretive analysis’. Accordingly, I supplement the index with other resources, including: the Multidimensional Poverty Index, the Social Progress Index, field research, and elite interviews (see Chapter 2, section 2.4.2.1 *Multiple sources of evidence*).

Another criticism is the use of the concept *failure* versus *fragility*. Does failure indicate a condition that a state is unlikely to escape, and does fragility indicate elements of weakness which can show degradation or improvement, or as Verbakel and Pavageau (2016:1) contemplate, is fragility relative or absolute? This was the criticism against the Failed States Index, as it was known before 2014. The index was accused of simplistically fitting very diverse states into the absolute binary categories,

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[59] The WGI of the World Bank assess governance based on six dimensions: (1) voice and accountability; (2) political stability and lack of violence; (3) government effectiveness; (4) regulatory quality; (5) rule of law; (6) control of corruption (Kaufmann *et al*, 2010). The Ibrahim Index measures African governance based on four categories: (1) security and the rule of law; (2) participation, rights, and inclusion; (3) foundations for economic opportunity; (4) human development. Measured on an aggregate scale of 0.0 to 100.0, African countries are ranked according to five ranges of performance: (1) high (71.0-100.0); (2) medium-high (54.0-70.9); (3) medium (41.0-53.9); (4) medium-low (23.0-40.9); (5) low (below 23.0) (MIF, 2018:7-10, 128-135, 137, 2020: 10, 140).

[60] I addressed the Index of State Weakness earlier in the current chapter, in section 3.2. *What is state fragility*? I indicated then that although the index measures ‘state weakness’, it deals only with ‘developing’ countries.

‘failed’ and ‘not failed’. Claire Leigh’s *Failed States Index belongs in the policy dustbin* (2012) was thus scathingly critical. Leigh’s (2012:The Internet) descriptors for the index included: ‘illogical’, ‘notorious’, and ‘subjective’. Leigh (2012:The Internet) asserted that a ‘failed state’ “implies no degree of success or failure, no sense of decline or progress”. Because of such criticism, the index was renamed the Fragile States Index in 2014. Hendry and Messner (2014:The Internet), then occupying the respective positions of Director and Executive Director at the Fund for Peace, explained that ‘failed’ did not capture ‘the essential message’ of the index, that ‘failed’ was used as a distraction to criticise the index, thus diminishing the central message of the index. The central message, Hendry and Messner (2014:The Internet) pointed out, was ‘to highlight the broad spectrum of underlying causes of fragility and instability’. Hendry and Messner (2014:The Internet) concluded that ‘fragile’ better encapsulates the central message of the index, and that fragility occurs on a continuum, and affects regions and dimensions of the state in variable ways. Fragility, they also pointed out, is variable over time.

The case in Kenya also reveals this variation in fragility in time and space. Just as the OECD (2013:19) speaks of ‘pockets of fragility’ in strong states, there are ‘pockets of strength’ in Kenya. Over time, fragility has been variable in Kenya. I outlined in Chapter 1, section 1.3 *The central proposition*, that since 2005 the highest level of fragility in Kenya was in the aftermath of the post-election crisis of 2007/2008. The crisis started at the end of 2007 and reached its height in 2008. The height of the crisis brought Kenya to the brink of a civil war. Despite continued elevated levels of fragility, with an average *alert* score of 96.2 between 2005 and 2019 on the Fragile States Index, this fragility continues to fluctuate annually, and Kenya has not had *high alert* scores since 2008/2009 when it received 101.4 and 100.7 *high alert* fragility scores, respectively. In 2019 Kenya had a 90.3 *alert* score. There is also spatial variation of fragility in Kenya. In Chapter 2, section 2.3 *Research design*, in the current chapter, section 3.2 *What is state fragility*?, and in Chapters 6 to 8, this spatial variation is highlighted with the notion of the ‘arc of insecurity’, demonstrating that in the arc of insecurity, where state fragility is most evidenced, Islamism is most virulent, and impediments to CVE are most defined.

The Fragile States Index is also criticised for lacking ‘predictive power’. Verbakel and Pavageau (2016:1) find the index to be “excessively biased and politicised, overly simplistic, and lacking analytical precision and predictive utility”. Buterbaugh *et al* (2017) contend that the Fragile States Index (and other similar indexes) fails to predict violent protests and hostile regime changes, and particularly failed in predicting the 2011 Arab Spring.[61] Buterbaugh *et al* (2017:494, 496) point out that the 2011 edition of the Fragile States Index (with 2010 data) scored Bahrain as *stable*, issued a *warning* for Egypt, Syria, Tunisia, and Libya, and an *alert* score for Yemen. Intelligence services also failed to predict the Arab Spring. At the time the then US Director of National Intelligence, James Clapper, conceded: “We are not clairvoyant” (in Hounshell, 2011:50). Within months of the publication of what was a mostly a favourable 2011 Fragile States Index assessment of these countries, there were unforeseen regime overthrows in Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, and Yemen, as well as militarised violent civilian uprisings in Bahrain and Syria. Buterbaugh *et al* (2017:495) point out that the 2011 Fragile States Index accurately identified only Yemen as being at risk. Verbakel and Pavageau (2016) and Buterbaugh *et al* (2017) present a compelling and empirically grounded argument and criticism. Nonetheless, is it fair? How many social science theories and analytical tools are known for their consistently accurate predictive power? In the case of Tunisia, although simmering tensions were noted, indicators were positive and did not point to any clear and present danger.[62]

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[61] The Arab Spring was a revolutionary wave that swept throughout much of the Arab world, toppled four dictatorships in Tunisia, Libya, Yemen, and Egypt, respectively, and led to socio-political unrest in other parts of the Arab world. Heywood (2019:87) contends that the common underlying factors in the Arab Spring were “poor

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living standards, widening inequality, rampant unemployment (particularly affecting the youth), police violence and lack of human rights, [including] (e)thnic and religious tensions”. All these underlying factors are characteristic of fragile states and can be discerned in Kenya as well, as is demonstrated later in the study.

[62] The case in Tunisia is significant, with parallels that may be made with the case in Kenya. Until the Arab Spring, Tunisia was considered an economic success story with high GDP growth rates (similar to Kenya, a regional political and economic hub). Stampini and Verdier-Chouchane (2011:6) and Bouoiyour *et al* (2017:2) point out that between 1999 and 2008 Tunisia’s GDP growth rate was an average of 5 percent a year, with a record high of 6.3 percent in 2007, and was projected to exceed 5 percent in 2011, far exceeding other lower-middle-income countries in the period under review. Bouoiyour *et al* (2017:2) however maintain that “despite a marked economic and educational progress, the social conditions of the Tunisian people … deteriorated, and the corruption and inequalities … reached a very high level”. The World Bank (2015:1, 7) reports that in 2011 the unemployment rate was 18.9 percent, with the poverty rate at 15.5 percent. However, among the poorest 10 percent, unemployment was 30 percent. The World Bank (2015:ix) also reports that “[t]he events of 2011 revealed what had been festering for years: growing inequity”. Years after the Arab Spring, Tunisia still struggles with inequality. The World Bank (2015:ix) reports that Tunisia “represents a paradox: despite political progress since its 2011 revolution, wide economic and social disparities persist”. Similar to Kenya, Tunisia remains susceptible to Islamist violent extremism. Added to domestic terrorism, Trofimov (2016:The Internet) and Wright *et al* (2016:9) report that at the height of Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), with between 6000 and 7000 fighters, Tunisia was the largest source of foreign fighters for ISIS. I return briefly to the parallels between Kenya and Tunisia in Chapter 7, section 7.3.4 *Social indicators*, showing that GDP-measured economic growth alone, does not promote social progress and well-being. In fact, the progress and well-being of sections of society may be impeded amidst economic growth (chiefly by inequality-inducing corruption and constraining government policies), fermenting inequality, discontent, and political violence. Tunisia, similar to Kenya, is a case in point. Another case in point is the economic and political hub in West Africa, and yet ironically also classified as a fragile state, Nigeria. Since the inception of the Fragile States Index Nigeria has received *alert* (90.0-99.9) and *high alert* (100.0-109.9) scores on the index (FFP, 2020g:The Internet). Analysing three decades of poverty mobility in Nigeria (1980-2010), based on national surveys, Dapel (2018a:11), finds that “about 91 percent of the poor [in Nigeria] can expect to spend their lives in poverty”. Dapel (2018b:2) also finds that “the incidence of poverty in Nigeria between 1980 and 2010 rose from 27.2 percent to 69.0 percent”. Dapel (2018b:28) further finds that poverty has a regional dimension in Nigeria. Chronic poverty is more prevalent in the north-east region of Nigeria. Dapel (2019:The Internet) concludes that “the widely accepted theory that holds that ‘growth is good for the poor’ simply does not apply in the case of Nigeria, where impressive growth numbers alone failed to reduce rampant poverty. Indeed, growth, in some cases, had no impact on poverty whatsoever”.

However, as noted in Chapter 2, section 2.3 *Research design*, in dealing with causality and explanation, and prediction in this instance, there is an acceptance that the social world is populated by self-regulating and self-interpreting structures and agency. George and Bennett (2005:129) correctly observe that "human agents are *reflective* ..., they contemplate, anticipate, and can work to change their social and material environments [,or not,] and they have long-term intentions as well as immediate desires or wants". Gorski (2013:662) also notes that "human beings are … open systems capable of communication and creativity and resistance". The reality of agency and free-will simply trounces predictive models in the social sciences. George and Bennett (2005:130) hence conclude that there must be a distinction between "theories that can explain and predict both processes and outcomes", which are commonly found in the natural sciences, and "theories that can explain processes and outcomes but not predict them", which are commonly found in the social sciences. Menkhaus (2015:6, 7) asserts that what we know and how we know, at present, about the causes and drivers of conflict is much more developed than before, and currently we have a much better sense of the factors and conditions that make states susceptible to armed conflict and civic violence, consequently more adept at identifying vulnerability, "[b]ut the ability to identify vulnerability is not the same as the ability to predict conflict. Our capacity to predict armed conflict remains modest".

The social world does not have the equivalent of the universal laws of physics. These laws relate to what Hedström and Ylikoski (2010:54-55) call the (largely debunked) covering-law account of explanation in the social sciences, that equate explanation with prediction and regularity, what George and Bennett (2005:131) have called the deductive-nomological model. Mingers and Standing (2017:172) explain that this view, based on Positivism as a philosophy of science, is founded on the logic of "the hypothetico-deductive model …, [resting on a] philosophical understanding of causation …, namely a constant conjunction of events". In contrast to this regularity and predictability, as just noted, human beings are open systems that routinely defy the expected 'constant conjunction of events'. One of the tenets of Critical Realism, e*pistemic relativism*, also warns that our conceptual frameworks do no always approximate reality. Hence Critical Realism is committed to the aspiration of science and knowledge approximating reality (see Chapter 2, section 2.3 *Research design*).

The reality is that in the social world the same set of conditions may result in different processes and outcomes, given the context, time, and space. Beach (2017:10) contends "[c]ontext is important because formally similar inputs, mediated by the same mechanisms, may lead to different outcomes if the contexts are not analytically equivalent". Hounshell (2011:50) accordingly makes the point that the Fragile States Index is not 'a crystal ball'. It is rather an annual representation and ranking of state fragility in the world, examining the causes and consequences of such fragility. What the detractors of the Fragile States Index also do not consider in their criticism, particularly relating to the Arab Spring, is the ‘demonstration effect’ of these uprisings. Such demonstration effect could not have been foreseen. These detractors of the Fragile States Index therefore do not appreciate that human nature is such that human beings learn and adjust, act, and react, and just as they shape the world around them, they are also equally shaped by the world around them. Initiated by the uprising in Tunisia, and although predicated on long-simmering conditions, the local demand for social justice and regime change soon grew into the emulative cross-border revolutionary wave that became the Arab Spring.[63]

I noted in Chapter 1, section 1.3 *The central proposition*, and Chapter 2, section 2.4.1 *Case selection*, that since 2005 Kenya has received *high warning* (80.0 - 89.9) *alert* (90.0 - 99.9), and *high alert* (100.0 - 109.9) scores on the Fragile States Index. Kenya is thus *at risk*, a higher risk than many of the Arab Spring countries in 2011. The Fragile States Index has highlighted this risk since the inception of the index in 2005. But Kenya has not experienced events comparable to the Arab Spring. This was precisely the focus of Kimenyi and Ndung’u (2005) in their study *Sporadic ethnic violence: why has Kenya not experienced a full-blown civil war?* Kimenyi and Ndung’u (2005:154) outline ‘many of the risk factors that can lead to civil war’ in Kenya. Why then has Kenya not experienced civil war? That is, since the specific context of the *Shifta* war (1963-1968). The answer: *It’s the context, stupid!* Kimenyi and Ndung’u (2005) provide a contextual explanation of why civil war has not occurred in Kenya.[64]

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[63] Idris (2016) finds evidence of the ‘demonstration effect’ in the Arab Spring. Idris (2016:10) contends that, triggered by the self-immolation of Muhammed Bouazizi on 17 December 2010, the Tunisia uprising soon led to the sudden departure of Tunisian President Ben Ali on 14 January 2011. In Egypt, starting on 25 January 2011, the uprising led to the sudden resignation of Egyptian President Mubarak less than a month later on 11 February 2011. Idris (2016:10) finds that Tunisia and Egypt had shown that change was possible, and in retrospect, provided lessons and inspired subsequent uprisings in Libya, Morocco, Jordan, Yemen, Syria, and others.

[64] Kimenyi and Ndung’u (2005) based their study on a Collier-Hoeffler statistical model that was designed to predict civil war. Collier *et al* (2005:2-3, 6) note that this model predicts civil war based on motive (or grievance) and opportunity, but focusing on opportunity, employing varied variables, including: the share of primary commodity exports in gross domestic product (GDP); levels of education; the size of the population; per capita income growth; the level of ethnic and religious fragmentation; diaspora support; hostile foreign governments; income and land inequality; the country’s geography, population distribution, and population density. The wordplay, *it’s the context, stupid!*, is in reference to one of the three campaign slogans of the 1992 Bill Clinton presidential campaign in the US, *it’s the economy, stupid!*, which highlighted the importance of economic issues. The slogan and the meaning behind it have since become part of popular and political phraseology. Buhaug *et al* (2011) use the wordplay, *it’s the local economy, stupid,* and note the discrepancy between national economies and local economies, finding that local economies (rather than national economies) are better at explaining the location of the outbreak of civil conflict. The discrepancy that Buhaug *et al* (2011) highlight in the context of the link between the nature of the economy and the outbreak of civil war, is also revealed in the case of the arc of insecurity in Kenya. The arc of insecurity in Kenya explains the location and concentration of Islamist violent extremism and the pronounced impediments to CVE in Kenya (see Chapter 2, section 2.3.4 *Spatial and temporal variation and analysis in explanatory case studies*, Chapter 7, section 7.2 *The arc of insecurity and Islamist violent extremism*, and Chapter 8, section 8.2 *The arc of insecurity and impediments to CVE*).

This study provides a contextual explanation of the relationship between state fragility, Islamist violent extremism and CVE in Kenya. Relying on the logic of Critical Realism, this study builds this explanation by employing the formula: cause (X) + causal mechanisms + context = outcome (Y). The notion of a contextual explanation, however, does not reduce social sciences to completely relativity. Maxwell (1992:282-283) thus contends that “not all possible accounts … are equally useful, credible, or legitimate”. One of the tenets of Critical Realism, *judgmental rationality*, also contends that one may provide realistic and consistent conditions under which specific processes and outcomes are likely to occur. This study does demonstrate these conditions. In Kenya these conditions include state fragility-induced conditions (necessary conditions), a politically significant but marginalised Muslim minority (necessary condition), and Kenya’s fragile and volatile neighbourhood (contextual condition).

The state fragility-induced conditions in Kenya include: the inability to accommodate diverse interests (including the interests of the Muslim and ethnic-Somali minority), structural-horizontal inequality, and the failure to adequately provide political goods and public services. In turn, Islamised dissent, and a politically significant Muslim minority in Kenya, have ensured that the response to these state fragility conditions is a political-religious response as informed by Islamism. The contextual condition of Kenya’s neighbourhood includes being surrounded by other fragile states, the volatile politics of Somalia, the Horn of Africa as a highly militarised region and an epicentre of the fight against Islamist terrorism, and the volatile politics of the neighbouring Middle-East (see Chapters 6 to 8). Reverting to the initial point about the States Fragility Index and the (in)ability to predict the onset of political violence, the index is perhaps then reflective of the general limitations in the current social sciences, as George and Bennett (2005), Gorski (2013), and Menkhaus (2015) have pointed out above.

The State Fragility Index is also criticised for being ahistorical. Evers (2014:The Internet) contends that it is not by coincidence that most fragile states are either former colonies, the site of Cold War superpower rivalries, or the site of foreign interference, mostly by the West. Jones (2008:183) concludes that “[t]he current condition of structural crisis in so many of Africa's neo-colonial states must be situated historically in the imperial history of global capitalism”. The European Communities (2009:50-51) highlight four colonial legacies linked to the character of state structures and to state fragility in sub-Saharan Africa. State structures were: (1) imposed and arbitrary importations, detached from society; (2) not geared towards the development of society, but to serve colonial political and economic interests; (3) oriented towards, and highly dependent on, colonial powers; (4) highly authoritarian, as state structures were also not accountable to society, but to colonial powers.

The above and other impacts of colonialism are also captured in Walter Rodney's classic, *How Europe underdeveloped Africa* (2012/1972). Rodney (2012:224) maintains and shows that with colonisation, Africa's development (economic, political, social, and institutional), "was blunted, halted, and turned back. In place of that interruption and blockade, nothing of compensatory value was introduced". Englebert and Dunn (2014:27) consequently finds that the African state was created "on the cheap ..., weak and ... [lacking] empirical effectiveness". Walter Rodney (2012:224) and the European Communities (2009:52) conclude that decolonisation, in turn, did not present any substantial changes in the development of state institutions. State institutions in Africa therefore largely continue to display the underdeveloped, debilitating, and oppressive characteristics of their colonial origins. Evers (2014:The Internet) finds that the Fragile States Index does not reflect such historical factors, instead, the index conceals "the painful lessons of the past in a stale, numerical ranking of present circumstance". Evers (2014) does make a valid point. However, as an annual ranking of state fragility, the index is bound to focus on the present and immediate future. It is thus important for the user of the index to contextualise the index and to contextualise state fragility as such. This study views state fragility in Kenya in a historical context. The study highlights the colonial origins of state fragility, and account for state fragility over time, starting from independence in 1963. However, importantly, the study is neither a definitive chronicle of state fragility, nor is it an exhaustive account of the origins and reasons for state fragility, in Kenya. I return to the Fragile States Index later in the current chapter.

Reverting state fragility as such, another criticism is the view that 'fragility' is a concept that is reserved for African states. The Fund for Peace (2019:11-12) points out that the Fragile States Index has been accused for many years of having an 'anti Africa bias'. In fact, as Williams (2007:1) has intimated, the assertion is that Africa is where state fragility is 'most widespread and deeply entrenched'. According to the 2020 Fragile States Index, 21 of the 30 most fragile states in the world in 2019 were in Africa (FFP, 2020c:7). Not all African states however have the same nature and level of fragility. Englebert and Dunn (2014:48) accept that on average the African state performs poorly, but they point out that with this average performance, there is also the interplay of strength and fragility across time and space on the continent, i.e., "[f]or every Chad, there is a Botswana; for every Congo, a Gabon". Williams (2007:5) also points to this variation even within the same state and contends that there is always some form of governance, if not by the state, then by non-state actors or supra-state actors. There is never a case of complete and utter anarchy devoid of any form of governance whatsoever. The OECD (2013:19) consequently warns that the concept of state fragility has the unhelpful inherent ability to conceal pockets of strength in fragile states, and to mask pockets of fragility in strong states.

Related to the above, is the criticism about the mainstream (read: ‘Western’) understanding of the state and state-society relations. Verbakel and Pavageau (2016:1) contends that the notion of state fragility erroneously assumes “a neat, linear, ideal-type state”, and erroneously regards “the complex interface and interplay between state and society”, to be simple and straightforward. Grimm (2014:254) explains that the state, as an ideal type, is perceived to be “a hierarchical structure of authoritative decision-making” that is accepted by society and other states. At its core, Osaghae (2007:692) points out, a state is expected to “establish strong and effective institutions; control and defend its territory; have a stable, loyal, and cohesive population; exercise sovereign and legitimate power within its territory and possess the resources to ensure the well-being of its citizens; and, finally, enjoy the recognition and respect of other states as a credible member of the global community”. Osaghae (2007:692) asserts that in contrast to the above expectation of the state, since the 1990s the roles and functions assigned to the state have been extended to include a varied and elaborate mix of roles and functions such as poverty alleviation, economic growth and development, and good governance factors such as conflict management, accountability, transparency, and the rule of law.

In *Leviathan* (1651) Thomas Hobbes captured this construct of an all-powerful ideal state that he calls ‘a commonwealth’, as opposed to ‘a state of nature’. A state of nature describes an imagined stateless society that Hobbes (1651:60-63) calls ‘the natural condition of mankind’, viz., a condition without a ‘common power’ or ‘a commonwealth’ to moderate the excesses of human nature. Hobbes (1651:62) describes life in a state of nature as ‘every man, against every man’, where life is ‘solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short’. To escape the state of nature, society creates the commonwealth and a sovereign. This sovereign, i.e., ‘common power’ or government, Hobbes (1651:85, 87) contends, is owed obedience by society, and must have the power and the means to enforce such obedience. Hobbes (1651:87) exalts the commonwealth as “that great Leviathan, … that mortal god to which we owe, … our peace and defence”. Max Weber’s *Politics as a vocation* (1946) also captures this view of the state. Weber (1946:3, 4) defines the state as ‘a political association’, “a human community that [successfully] claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory”. Approximating Thomas Hobbes’ (1651:85, 87) notion of ‘obedience to the sovereign’, Max Weber (1946:4) explains that “[i]f the state is to exist … [society] must obey the authority claimed by the powers that be”.

With obedience, however, comes state responsibilities and obligations, including the mandatory capacity and will to serve society. Francis Fukuyama demonstrates in *The origins of political order* (2011) that throughout history the most stable states have been: (1) strong and modern; (2) adhering to the rule of law; (3) accountable. Like in Acemoglu and Robinson’s (2012) ‘inclusive political and economic institutions’, Fukuyama (2011:14) sketches how fragile states can ‘get to Denmark’, a state he equates with “good political and economic institutions: … stable, democratic, peaceful, prosperous, inclusive, and … [have] extremely low levels of political corruption”. Fukuyama (2013:6) later maintains that while democracy is ‘an intrinsic good’, the health of democracies is predicated on the quality and performance of state institutions. Fukuyama (2013:5-6) therefore argues that legitimacy is built on ‘shared growth’ and ‘broadly available political goods’, meaning: performance legitimation.

The foregoing characterisations of the state as an ideal-type, Rotberg (2003:27) reflects, may be ‘misplaced notions of what constitutes sovereignty’. Nay (2013:332) also maintains that the notion of state fragility is based on a western-centric acceptance of the Westphalian state system that dictates that all modern states must have similar institutions, perform similar functions, and have similar norms and rules. Williams (2007:2) thus concludes that “the issue of ‘failed states’ in Africa is largely about the extent to which the Westphalian ideal of statehood has taken root in the rather different and in many ways inhospitable conditions found on the continent”. But, as Kaplan (2014:51) points out, ‘good enough governance’ comes in many forms. A state can be stable and sufficiently inclusive without adhering to Westphalian notions of the state. Strength is always relative, never absolute, even in the so-called strong states. Newman (2007:465-466) also points out that it is unhelpful to hanker on a historical ideal-state when contemporary globalisation has reduced the power and role of all states. Hameiri (2007:123, 140-141) concludes that instead of referring to ‘deviant fragile states’, reference must rather be made to a failed paradigm that does not account for evolving state dynamics, including the rise and fall of power relations within and outside the state. Di John (2010:16) also maintains that state-formation is a never-ending process that is subject to recurrent contestations. It is therefore disingenuous to speak of fragile states if state-formation and consolidation, in the sense of building stable, effective, accountable institutions, was never allowed to take root in the first place.

In many respects the African state challenges the notion of an ideal-state. Englebert and Dunn (2014:294) maintain that since the 1990s, albeit varied and geographically uneven, the model of the sovereign state and the state-building project experienced severe crisis across the African continent. That was the second crisis. The first crisis in state-building and nation-building in Africa was immediately after independence in the 1960s. Since juridical independence, the African state, unable to provide many state functions or deliver the most fundamental political goods, comprising ‘nations’ that challenge notions of social cohesion, their authority and legitimacy challenged by their own societies and undermined by other states, and marginalised by the international political economy, largely falls short of the ideal-state. Kenya, which has also faced crises of statehood and nationhood in the period around independence in the 1960s and after the 1990s, also does not fit the bill when it comes to the ideal-state. With an average happiness score of 4.461 on the World Happiness Index (WHI), Kenya is far removed from Francis Fukuyama's Denmark as outlined in *The origins of political order* (2011). Kenya is closer to Dystopia, an imagined country with the least happy people. Dystopia is used as a baseline on the WHI. The index is scored on a scale of 0.00 to 10.00, with 0.00 representing the lowest level of happiness, i.e., 'the worst possible life'. The index employs the indicator 'happiness' as a measure of cognitive evaluation of social progress and life satisfaction. Compared to Kenya's average score of 4.461 between 2012 and 2019, Dystopia has an average score of 2.004 in this period under review, thus only two points lower than Kenya (see Chapter 7, section 7.3.4 *Social indicators*).

Much has been written about the colonial origins of the marginalised and fragile African state that was conceived and birthed based on artificial borders and other weak foundations for statehood and nationhood. One case in point is the border between Kenya and Tanzania. At the time, Kenya was part of British East Africa (1895-1920), and Tanzania, part of German East Africa (1885-1919). Thomson (2016:23) recounts how the Kenyan-Tanzania border was irreversibly changed at the whim of the British Crown, Queen Victoria, who wished to make a gift of Mount Kilimanjaro to her grandson, the future Kaiser Wilhelm II of Germany. Thus, today Mount Kilimanjaro is in Tanzania, not Kenya. Critically, these colonial borders also irreversibly divided Somalis and incorporated them into four countries in East Africa. I demonstrate in Chapters 6 to 8 that the inclusion of ethnic-Somalis in Kenya irrevocably tied the (mis)fortunes of Somalia and Kenya, inclusive of transforming cross-border coethnic and coreligionist grievances and kinships into intractable mediums for collective discontent and violent conflict, and resulting in the secessionist attempts in the former NFD (during the *Shifta* war: 1963-1968) and in Coast Region (intermittent since 1963), up to the current Islamist violent extremism (since the 1990s). *Al-Shabaab* has consequently vowed to Kenya: "Do not dream of security in your lands until security becomes a reality in Muslim lands, including the North Eastern province and the coast …. We will, by the permission of Allah, stop at nothing to avenge the deaths of our Muslim brothers until your government ceases its oppression and until all Muslim lands are liberated from Kenyan occupation. And until then, Kenyan cities will run red with blood" (ICG, 2018:5).

René Lemarchand (1997, 2001) calls these cross-border affinities and solidarities the 'kin-country syndrome' in his analysis of cross-border ethnic-identity conflicts between Hutus and Tutsis in central Africa's Great Lakes Region. Samuel P. Huntington's (1996) application of the kin-country syndrome is more expansive, looking at global identity fault-line conflicts that range from clan-kin and ethnic-kin to the more expansive religion-kin and civilisation-kin. In identity fault-line conflicts, kith and kin often support and participate in the local conflict, with the tendency to escalate the conflict. But, as Huntington (1996:272) points out, kith and kin have the capacity to also constrain and mediate conflict. Huntington's identity fault-line conflicts include 'the clash of civilisations' as propagated in some quarters in the discourse on Islamist violent extremism.[65] The kin-country syndrome (minus the deterministic notion of 'the clash of civilisations') and the impact of colonial borders, help to explain the why and how of domestic and cross-border Islamist violent extremism in Kenya, linking ethnic-Somali and Muslim coethnics and coreligionists across national borders, serving as conduits for shared discontent and collective action. Given the impact of these colonial borders, Thomson (2016:13) finds that African borders and African states continue to reflect past short-term strategic and economic colonial interests, not present African physical, historical, economic, social, or political realities.

The forgoing, and other weak foundations for statehood and nationhood, and later post-colonial poor governance, reveal state fragility as the context and source of many of the development and security challenges on the continent today, including Islamist violent extremism and impediments to CVE, as Kenya also demonstrates. I highlight in Chapter 8 that state fragility largely serves as a straitjacket in the case of CVE. In *Killing a mosquito with a hammer* (2017), Jeremy Lind *et al* highlight that CVE in Kenya has been heavy-handed and indiscriminate, and therefore ineffective and counterproductive. Such CVE approaches and programming as one finds in Kenya erode democratic principles and social cohesion, increase radicalisation, and incite more conflict and violence. I develop the case in Kenya further later in the current chapter and the study. I will now revert to state fragility as such.

Some African leaders have questioned the very notion of 'a fragile African state'. At the *World Economic Forum on Africa 2017*, Zimbabwe's late-former President, Robert Mugabe (2017:The Internet), responded in this manner to the question of whether Zimbabwe is a fragile state:

> Well of course you know that is not true. I want to know which country has that level of development that you see in Zimbabwe? We have 14 universities. Our literacy rate is over 90 [percent]. They don't talk of us as a fragile state from an economic point of view. We have resources. Perhaps more resources than the average country in the world. We are not a poor country, and we can't be a fragile country when we have these resources. But if someone wants to call us fragile, they are free to do so. I can call America fragile. They went on their knees at one time to China. They were assisted. They were able to save some of their companies.

One may have varied views about this response and the respondent. The response does, however, indicate the prevailing state of flux about the phenomenon of state fragility and its indicators. Another

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[65] I address 'the clash of civilisations' thesis in Chapter 4, section 4.3.1 *Analytical frameworks*.

African leader also questioned the idea of a fragile African state. Addressing the UN General Assembly in 2009, Pierre Nkurunziza (2009:1), the late-former President of Burundi, made the point that

> the terminology around 'fragile states' should only be used with caution. I am aware of the semantic debate among development practitioners, such as: 'we will only speak of countries in a fragile situation'. But that does not take away the feeling of paternalism that is attached to these words. I strongly feel that it is not a neutral terminology. Apart from the emotional implications, it has financial and political implications. Moreover, it gives us a bad image in the eyes of foreign investors we so badly need. My first proposition therefore is to replace the terminology around 'fragile states' by words of hope and partnership, of constructive relationships where we treat each other with respect.

The above statements are to be expected. Burundi and Zimbabwe are on the list of the 20 most fragile states in the world on the Fragile States Index (see later in this chapter, in section 3.6.1 *Indicators and measurement*). The AfDB (2014:15) points to the stigma attached to a state that is classified as 'fragile', and asserts that fragility is not a descriptor for a group of states, instead, it is a condition that impacts on regions of the world, on states, or on areas of a state. The OECD (2016:76) also finds that all states have some level of fragility, as fragility happens over 'a spectrum of intensity'. Although cautious of linking fragility with a specific set of states, the AfDB (2014:16) does nevertheless acknowledge that "Africa has more states affected by this condition than any other … [part of] the world". Moreover, other African leaders have acknowledged the notion of state fragility and its prevalence on the continent. In his first speech to the UN General Assembly as President of Kenya, Uhuru Kenyatta (2014) addressed various security and developmental challenges, but focused on Islamist violent extremism and terrorism, and on the 2014 Ebola crisis. President Kenyatta (2014:2, 3) acknowledged

> the imperative to build strong States that can withstand crises and respond to emergencies. State weakness in many African countries comes from a history of development paradigms and practises that have weakened the state. We must commit to build strong, resilient and accountable states that can effectively respond to shocks, adversities and emergencies .... In Kenya, we are particularly concerned by the perennial fragility that has come to characterise the Greater Horn of Africa.

Another criticism relates to the doubts that have been cast about the time order between state fragility and violent conflict. Both are seen as sharing indicators. One postulation is that state fragility is an outcome and not a cause of violent conflict. I indicated in Chapter 1, section 1.3 *The central proposition*, that the Fragile States Index employs a Conflict Assessment System Tool (CAST) methodology. Developed in the 1990s to measure conflict risk, since 2004 the CAST methodology is also used to measure state fragility. Similar indicators are thus used, further (unfairly) fuelling this criticism. Verbakel and Pavageau (2016:2) speak of the "tautological trap in presenting violence as an indicator to predict violence", i.e., violence being both an indicator and an outcome of state fragility. Englebert and Dunn (2014:296) disagree, and maintain that fragility is 'a long-term degenerative disease', with violent conflict diagnosed as a symptom, and therefore an outcome and not a cause of this disease. Baker (2017b:8) maintains that this 'communicable disease' and its symptoms, such as mass migration and political violence, are carried across the borders of the state, into other states.

In classifying state fragility as a 'syndrome', Collier *et al* (2018:16) present a list of symptoms of state fragility, including violent conflict. According to Collier *et al* (2018:50-54), the six symptoms of state fragility are: (1) 'the state faces security threats from organised non-state violence'; (2) 'the government lacks legitimacy in the eyes of many citizens'; (3) 'the state has weak capacity for essential functions'; (4) 'the environment for private investment is unattractive'; (5) 'the economy is exposed to shocks with little resilience'; (6) 'there are deep divisions in society'. Collier *et al* (2018) are more accurate because a 'syndrome', unlike a 'disease', presupposes multiple interacting causes and symptoms, as is the case with state fragility. Many of the symptoms of this syndrome reflect internal flaws and malfunctions within the state. These flaws and malfunctions, however, may also emanate external to the state and state institutions. Englebert and Dunn (2014:296) consequently concede that actors within and outside the state, such as armed insurgents, dissident groups, and neighbouring states, may accelerate state fragility. Although this study proposes and demonstrates that state fragility generates both Islamist violent extremism and impediments to CVE, I also accept that Islamist violent extremism and CVE in turn contribute to the increase in the fragility of the state, thus resulting in the insecurity dilemma, fragility trap, and conflict trap in Kenya as addressed in Chapters 6 to 8.

In establishing causality, *time order* between state fragility and violent conflict is critical. In Kenya, this time order is initiated by the generative causal powers of the 'Big Bang' of independence in 1963. Time order establishes that the cause must precede the outcome, otherwise a relationship is not 'causal', hence the maxim: *correlation is not causation*. This is what Verbakel and Pavageau (2016) and others do not consider in their tautology claim regarding the causes and outcomes of state fragility. I demonstrate in this study that state fragility in Kenya precedes the formation of Islamist organisations, the influence of Islamist ideologues, and radicalisation. In other words, state fragility predates Islamist violent extremism and the contingent CVE. It is the properties of state fragility and the attendant social structures that persist in the fragile state in Kenya that have causal capacity and causal tendency. Islamist violent extremism is contingent, and so are impediments to CVE. Whereas this chapter establishes correlation in the relationship between state fragility, Islamist violent extremism, and impediments to CVE, Chapters 6 to 8 revert to this time order, explaining the incentive structure of Islamist violent extremism in Kenya, and building a causal explanation of the relationship between state fragility, Islamist violent extremism, and impediments to CVE, in Kenya.[66]

Islamism is a group pursuit. Islamism occurs in the context of collective discontent, mobilisation, and action. Even the lone-wolf terrorist acts on behalf, or believes to be acting on behalf, of a collective. Micro-level radicalisation accounts for neither Islamist violent extremism (or Islamism), nor for the formation of Islamist organisations. Rather, it is Islamism as an ideology and a movement that not only account not for micro-level (individual) radicalisation, but also meso-level (communities/groups) radicalisation, and macro-level (society) radicalisation.[67] At relevant places in the context of Chapters 4 to 8, I also demonstrate that Islamism challenges the authority and legitimacy of the state, and competes with the state, in a struggle defined by competing political ideas and (violent) political bargaining, for the support and loyalty of society. There is empirical evidence that the Kenyan state is failing to appeal to, and command, the loyalty of sections of society, in the political contest between itself and Islamism. Islamism thus cannot be examined outside of the context of the state that creates and shapes the conditions from where Islamism finds its origins and impetus. A state that is defined by insecurity, misperformance, underperformance, institutional failure, and violence (structural, cultural, and direct), all impacting on state institutions, on the relationship between the state and society, and on relations between groups in society. To examine Islamism at any other level is to adopt an unsuitable level of analysis. The properties of state fragility, the time order initiated by the 'Big Bang' of the affirmation of state fragility at independence in 1963, and the causal sequence developing thereafter, are indivisible from the explanation of Islamism and the associated impediments to CVE.

Let me revert to the theory on state fragility. Some observers have noted mixed evidence, and others spurious correlation, in the relationship between state fragility and Islamist violent extremism, and its expression in Islamist terrorism. Newman (2007:464) and Denoeux and Carter (2009a:vi) assert that Islamist organisations have proven that they can equally operate in fragile states as well as in resilient states. Allan *et al* (2015:3, 6) also affirm that fragile states, failing to provide security and justice, do have the unprecedented tendency to incubate extremist activity, but stable states with effective security and justice sectors have shown that they can also incubate extremist activity and house extremist groups. Newman (2007:464-465) further maintains that state fragility may provide an enabling environment for the operations of a terrorist organisation, but the condition of fragility itself, is insufficient in explaining the presence of such an organisation. In a study of 153 countries between 1999 to 2008, Coggins (2015:476) finds mixed evidence in the relationship between state fragility and terrorism. One is correctly reminded of a number of major terror attacks in what are categorised as more resilient states, including 9/11, Madrid (2004), London or 7/7 (2005), Paris (2015), Brussels (2016), Orlando (2016), Nice (2016), Manchester (2017), and London (2017) attacks. But perhaps these attacks reflect the observation and assertion that even in states that are generally considered to be resilient, there are always elements of fragility in them, what the OECD (2013:19) calls 'pockets of fragility'. The AfDB (2014:15) also contends that fragility is not confined to specific countries, it is a condition that encroaches on regions of the world, on states, or on areas and dimensions of a state.

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[66] See Chapter 2, section 2.3.2 *The explanatory case study*, about the attributes for causal explanations, including *time order* as initiated by the introduction of the 'Big Bang' or the X construct, viz., state fragility in this case.

[67] See Chapter 4, section 4.2.1 *Conceptualising Islamist violent extremism*, and section 4.3.2.1 *Psychological approaches*.

Other studies, including Patrick (2006a, 2006b) and Simons and Tucker (2007), show that there is spurious correlation, or at the most marginal and local-context specific correlation, between state fragility and Islamist violent extremism. The contention is that fragile states are a logistical nightmare and too chaotic to promote Islamist violent extremism. Ken Menkhaus points out that Islamist extremists need resources that a fragile state simply cannot provide. These resources include access to communication and information facilities, skilled manpower, and financial institutions (in Denoeux and Carter, 2009a:42). Simons and Tucker (2007:388) also point out that of all the 9/11 hijackers, only one came from a failed state at the time (Lebanon), and that out of all 312 foreign fighters arrested in Iraq between April and October 2005, only four came from failed states at the time, viz., one from Somalia and three from Lebanon. Patrick (2006a:14-16, 2006b:34-36, 2007:652-653) contends that despite the growing consensus linking state fragility with varied security threats, not all fragile states spawn Islamist terrorism, or provide conducive conditions for the operations of Islamist organisations.

All other factors considered, state fragility remains a constant. In illustration, Plummer (2012:418) and Subramanyam (2018:303) maintain that extremists from the West, typically highly educated and from middle-class and well-off backgrounds, are often motivated by poor socio-political conditions in their countries of origin and the conditions of people from fragile states, i.e., "the plight of the world's poor population" (Subramanyam, 2018:303). In this regard, as Evers (2014:The Internet) points out, most fragile states are either former colonies, the site of Cold War superpower rivalries, or the site of foreign interference, mostly by the West. Cottee (2015:The Internet) therefore contends that, in joining Islamist organisations, jihadis from the West are not rejecting Western norms and ideals, but are in fact alienated from a West that 'excludes, demeans, and harass' their Muslim-kin in their countries of origin, i.e., in states that are classified as being fragile. Cottee's (2015) finding is consistent with the conception of kin-country syndrome that connects Muslim affinities and solidarities between affluent societies and less affluent societies, cutting across both physical borders and economic divides.

While state fragility is a constant, a lingering question remains: If state fragility spawns Islamist violent extremism, then why are all fragile states not incubators of Islamist violent extremism? In Chapter 1, section 1.8.3 *The relationship between state fragility, Islamist violent extremism, and CVE*, I noted that Crenshaw (2014a) alludes to the *nature* of state fragility in explaining this discrepancy. Crenshaw (2014a:41) explains that Islamist violent extremism is likely to occur when "states are strong enough to exert repression that creates grievances, but not strong enough to eradicate opposition". Denoeux and Carter (2009a:42) agree that Islamist organisations are more likely to be attracted to states such as Mali and Kenya, i.e., states of 'intermediate strength', what Rotberg (2002a:131) calls 'the halfway house between strength and failure', rather than be attracted to failing or collapsed states. A fragile but functional state such as Mali or Kenya is thus the first necessary condition in this causal chain.

Denoeux and Carter (2009a:42) assert that Mali and Kenya provide the infrastructure necessary for the operations of Islamist organisations, but do not have the strength to moderate or eradicate such organisations. Ken Menkhaus (2010:187) also notes that in the early 1990s, the *al-Qaeda* affiliate, East Africa *al-Qaeda* (EAAQ), also known as *al-Qaeda* in East Africa, found the levels of fragility in Somalia, which was a collapsed state at the time, not to be conducive to their operations. Instead, Kenya as a fragile but functional state provided the necessary conditions and resources for EAAQ to plan and launch terror attacks such as the two 1998 US Embassy attacks in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam, and the two 2002 Mombasa attacks. Similarly, unlike EAAQ and *al-Ittihad al-Islamiyya* (AIAI), i.e., Islamic Union, before, *al-Shabaab* found more traction in Somalia after some order was restored, first by *al-Ittihad Mahakem al-Islamiyya*, i.e., Islamic Courts Union (ICU), and after the defeat of the ICU at the end of 2006 by Ethiopia's military intervention, by the transitional government of Somalia.[68]

The second necessary condition is the political significance of religion (coinciding with ethnicity) in such a fragile state. An Islamist organisation, whether of domestic or foreign origin, does need to latch on to local Muslim or Muslim-kin grievances to take root and maintain support. I illustrate in Chapter

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[68] EAAQ, Islamic Union, and Islamic Courts Union, are precursors of *al-Shabaab* (see Chapter 6, section 6.6 *Islamist violent extremist groups and combat units in Kenya*). Between 1991 and 2004, Somalia was a collapsed state with no central government. Between 2004 and 2012, Somalia had a Transition Federal Government (TFG). From 2004 the TFG governed from Nairobi, Kenya, relocating to Baidoa, Somalia, in 2006, and to Mogadishu in 2007. In 2012 the mandate of the TFG ended and the Somalia Federal Government (SFG) was formed, thus instituting federalism in Somalia (see Chapter 7, section 7.3.5 *Cross-cutting indicator*).

6, section 6.3 *Islamist violent extremism and the fragile state in Kenya*, that not all forms of identity have political significance, or act as a collective political coalition, in Kenya. Like the rest of Africa, class (as a function of socio-economic status that transcends ethnicity) has no political significance in Kenya. Christianity and Islam are the only religions that have political significance in Kenya, with Islam as a (perceived) marginalised minority (this is also the case in most of sub-Saharan Africa). Despite having more than 40 ethnic groups, only a few ethnic groups have political significance. These include Kikuyu, Luo, Kalenjin, and ethnic-Somalis. All jostle for position in the constricted democratic space in Kenya.

In the case of ethnic-Somalis, they are a marginalised yet politically significant multiple minority. Ethic-Somalis are a social minority as an ethnic minority and Muslim minority, but also an economic and political minority, on the margins of socio-economic and political power and influence. Concurrently to being marginalised, ethnic-Somalis (together with other Muslims) are also a politically significant identity that is contesting the constricted democratic space in Kenya. The political significance of Muslims, and Islamised dissent as such, plays out in the context of a repressed and marginalised Muslim minority, as well as intra-Muslim factionalism that either opposes reformist Muslims looking for a space within the secular state, or opposes Muslims that support the creation of an Islamist state. Ndzovu (2014a:8) asserts that while Kenya’s Muslims have the shared experience of marginalisation and discrimination as a minority (54 percent being ethnic-Somalis), they are not homogeneous. Kenya’s Muslims come from Sunni and Shia sects (each has their own internal differences), and from diverse clan, cultural, ethnic, and racial, origins. These dynamics within the Muslim community play out in the context of both Islamist violent extremism and impediments to CVE (see Chapters 6 to 8).

Given the foregoing criticism of state fragility, should we throw the baby out with the bathwater? Call (2008:1492) is certainly of the view that we must totally abandon the very notion of state fragility. Call (2008:1494) maintains that state fragility is now used in widely divergent and even problematic ways. Call (2008:1494) finds that state fragility “now clouds, even misleads, clear analysis”. Call (2008:1492, 1501) does concede that the end of the fragility spectrum (i.e., state collapse) continues to have utility. He explains that state collapse is where there is no central government for a sustained period, as was the case in Somalia between 1991 and 2004. Despite the controversies related to state fragility and opposing views by observers such as Call (2008), the complete breadth of state fragility, not just ‘state collapse’, does have undeniable and continued value and utility, addressing the causes, nature and outcomes of the different facets and levels of widespread underdevelopment and insecurity.

3.5 THE VALUE AND UTILITY OF STATE FRAGILITY AS A CONCEPTUAL-ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK AND A THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE

The value and utility of state fragility as a conceptual-analytical framework and a theoretical perspective is demonstrated in policy considerations as evidenced by policy documents from various government agencies and organisations. These agencies and organisations range from the UN, UNDP, World Bank, IMF, EU, OECD, USAID, AfDB, G7+ and others, as shown throughout this study. Though conflicted about state fragility, Call (2008) accepts the impact of state fragility on policy considerations and policy choices. Call (2008:1494) concedes that state fragility has helped to

> direct research, resources and policy attention to states which are not serving their populations. It has also enhanced the linkage not just between international security and internal stability among poor, peripheral societies, but also that between basic freedoms and service delivery within small, powerless societies and the interests of Western powers and regional powers.

In a later study titled *The lingering problem of fragile states*, Call (2016) acknowledges the ongoing security-humanitarian concerns occasioned by fragile states, and the ongoing need to address such concerns. The utility of state fragility is also demonstrated by the positive correlation between state fragility and Islamist violent extremism. This correlation is established by empirical evidence. By illustration, the UNDP (2017:5, 63), in its study on extremism in Africa, found that the regions of Africa where Islamist violent extremism is most evidenced, are also regions that exhibit high levels of grievances towards their governments, as well as limited confidence in such governments. In the study, 78 percent of the respondents indicated low levels of trust in institutions of the state such as the police, politicians, and the military, and 83 percent believed that their governments 'only looked after the interests of the few' (UNDP, 2017:5, 82). The UNDP (2017:5, 73, 83) points out that 71 percent of their respondents pointed to 'government action', including the 'killing of a family member or friend' and 'arrest of a family member or friend', as the tipping point in joining an Islamist violent organisation. All of the aforesaid point to empirical evidence of the indicators of state fragility.

Further indicating this empirical evidence, is Dunlap (2004), Piazza (2008), and Allen *et al* (2015). Allen *et al* (2015:22) point out that various quantitative studies affirm that 'state instability' is the most consistent predictor of home-grown terror attacks. Piazza (2008:470, 481-482), in a quantitative study of 197 countries between 1973 and 2003, finds that states with elevated levels of fragility, irrespective of the nature of that fragility, are statistically more likely to be targets for terrorist attacks, to have their citizens commit terrorist attacks at home and abroad, and to house active terrorist groups.

Dunlap (2004:453, 457, 459) finds evidence of a causal relationship between state fragility and Islamist terrorism in countries such as Somalia, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Philippines, and Indonesia. Graff (2010) finds empirical evidence in the relationship between state fragility in Yemen and Somalia and the rise of *al-Shabaab* and *al-Qaeda* in Yemen (AQY) respectively. AQY was dissolved in 2009 and merged, together with *al-Qaeda* in Saudi Arabia, into *al-Qaeda* in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP).

Graff (2010:43, 65-68, 71-75) highlights extreme levels of relative poverty, low quality education, unemployment, a deficit of human rights and civil liberties, a constricted democratic space, ungoverned spaces, the lack of effective regulation, weak rule of law, and a general lack of state capacity, as major indicators of state fragility linked with the rise of *al-Shabaab* and AQY in Somalia and Yemen respectively. Consequently, Somalia, and Yemen, "the poorest [countries] in their regions, have become gateways for extremism and radical insurgencies …, [linking terror networks between and beyond] the Arabian Peninsula and the Horn of Africa" (Carter, 2012:75). Ibrahimi (2018) also provides empirical evidence in the relationship between state fragility in post-Saddam Hussein Iraq and the rise of Islamic State (IS). Ibrahimi (2018:16-17) finds that poor legitimacy and lack of authority in Iraq are two major indicators of state fragility that account for the advent of Islamic State in Iraq. One may equally link state fragility in Syria with the rise of Islamic State, hence the expansion of Islamic State from Iraq into Syria. In the preceding section of this chapter, 3.4 *The criticism against the theory and application of state fragility*, I indicated this fragility in Syria in the period leading to and following the Arab Spring of 2011. Such fragility persists in Syria to this day.

There is also evidence of a causal relationship between state fragility and the rise of *Boko Haram* in Nigeria. In 2015, a faction of *Boko Haram* adopted the name Islamic State in West Africa Province (ISWAP), pledging allegiance to Islamic State. Oviasogie (2013:25-27) and Duruji and Oviasogie (2014: 423, 425-426) highlight unemployment, poverty, corruption, inequity in power and wealth, and limited political goods, as the indicators involved in the relationship between state fragility and the rise of *Boko Haram*. Onah (2014:63, 72, 76-77) and Okoro (2014:103-104, 108, 116-118) identity the following indicators of the said relationship in Nigeria: underdevelopment, corruption, poverty, and youth unemployment, at the epicentre of Islamist violent extremism in Nigeria, viz., the north-east. There is also evidence of the causal relationship between state fragility and the rise of *Ansar al-Sunnah* in Mozambique. Pledging allegiance to Islamic State in 2019, *Ansar al-Sunnah* has been waging the long-war in the northern province of Cabo Delgado since 2017. Though underdeveloped, marginalised, and securitised by the government since independence in 1975, this region is rich in natural resources, including vast natural gas reserves. Swart (2019:2-3, 10-12), Burke (2020:The Internet), and Matsinhe

(2020:The Internet) identify youth unemployment, the lack of economic opportunities, poverty, horizontal inequalities, corruption, forced removals, external intervention, and indiscriminate counter-terrorism, as indicators involved in the relationship between state fragility and the rise of *Ansar al-Sunnah* in Mozambique. In 2019 Mozambique received an *alert* score of 91.7 on the Fragile States Index, having received *elevated warning* (70 - 79.9) and *high warning* (80 - 89.9) scores since 2005 (FFP*,* 2020h:The Internet). Like the foregoing contexts, the relationship between state fragility and Islamist violent extremism is also evidenced in Kenya. In the aftermath of the 2013 Westgate attack, *al-Shabaab* declared that Westgate was "[a] clear demonstration to the Kenyan Muslims that *Jihad* in Kenya is not impossible but, on the contrary, practical as [Kenya] … is merely a fragile third world country struggling for recognition in the continent" (Gaidi Mtaani, 2013b:15). Clearly then, *al-Shabaab* recognises, reacts to, and exploits state fragility in Kenya.

The utility of state fragility is also demonstrated in the analysis and explanation of Islamist violent extremism in and outside of academia. At the the 2015 Summit on Countering Violent Extremism, former US President Barack Obama (2015a:The Internet) pointed out that "[t]errorist groups are all too happy to step into a void. They offer salaries to their foot soldiers so they can support their families. Sometimes they offer social services - schools, health clinics - to do what local governments cannot or will not do". Likewise, researchers at the RAND Corporation, Colin Clarke and Chad Serena (2016:The Internet), came to the conclusion that "the blueprint for success is … now widely known: Gain a foothold in a failed state or ungoverned regions, latch on to a marginalised ethnic or religious group, exploit local grievances, and lend guidance, resources, expertise and manpower to the fight". Following 9/11, then US assistant secretary of state for African affairs, Susan Rice (2001:The Internet), also directly linked Africa's fragile states with international Islamist terrorism:

> Africa is the world's soft underbelly for global terrorism …. Al Qaeda and other terrorist cells are active throughout Africa …. Terrorist organisations take advantage of Africa's porous borders, and weak law enforcement, judicial institutions and security services to move men, weapons and money around the globe. They manipulate poor, disillusioned populations, often with religious or ethnic grievances, to recruit for their *jihad*.

The above identifies the drivers, permissive causes, and contextual conditions of state fragility, that explain why and how Islamist violent extremism takes root in Africa. Susan Rice (2001:The Internet) also highlights the state fragility-induced hopeless deprivation and frustrated expectations that are so endemic in Africa, that also explain the drivers of Islamist violent extremism on the continent:

> Africa is an incubator for the foot soldiers of terrorism. Its poor, young, disaffected, unhealthy and undereducated populations often have no stake in government nor faith in the future. They harbour an easily exploitable discontent with the status quo. For such people, in such places, nihilism is as natural a response to their circumstances as self-help.

In their analysis of the link between state fragility and Islamist violent extremism, Simons and Tucker (2007:387), Newman (2007:467), and Baker (2017b:3) contend that this link acquired a new impetus after Osama bin Laden took refuge in (former) Sudan, and thereafter Afghanistan, from where he is believed to have directed the 9/11 attacks. In the aftermath of 9/11, a prevailing view developed that fragile states facilitate and support terrorism. Call (2008:1493) asserts that after 9/11 'failed states' began to occupy the top tier of US security interests. Afghanistan, as a fragile state, and its apparent lack of capacity to locate, moderate, and eradicate *al-Qaeda*, and its vastly ungoverned spaces, put a spotlight on state fragility. Hanlon *et al* (2012:29) point out that the 2002 and 2010 editions of the US National Security Strategy accordingly identified fragile states as 'the number one security threat'. Rotberg (2003:1) thus contends that "[i]n a time of terror awareness …, [h]ow best to understand the nature of weak states, to strengthen those poised on the abyss of failure, and to restore the functionality of failed states, are among the urgent policy questions of the twenty-first century".

Plummer (2012:418) finds that state fragility promotes Islamist violent extremism as it "fosters a large pool of economically disadvantaged and disenfranchised youth from which to pull potential recruits". Plummer (2012:418) also points out that it is easy for terrorist groups to gain popular support in such a fragile state because they can 'plug into' the long-standing grievances and legacies of persecution or repression, of local communities. Carter's (2012) central thesis is that weak economies and fragile political infrastructures are pre-incidence indicators of terror attacks. In this regard, Carter (2012:66) points out that if the objective of terrorists is to weaken the government by targeting such infrastructures, then the terrorist's work is half-done as fragile states already have weak governments and infrastructure. It is therefore quite evident why a fragile state would be attractive to an Islamist organisation. The fragile state, if it does not generate the conditions in which terrorism takes root and flourishes, it enables such conditions. Solomon (2013:427) also finds that "the [fragile] African state lies at the core of the emergence of terrorism on the continent". Likewise, Crenshaw (2018:The Internet) has observed that governance failures in Africa are 'a gold mine for terrorist groups', with these groups taking advantage of deep-rooted grievances and already existing civil conflicts, aligning themselves with local communities and rebel movements "who may be attracted as much to the terrorists' resources as they are to their religious principles". In demonstration, Crenshaw (2018:The

Internet) points out that *al-Qaeda* in the Islamic Maghreb have ingrained themselves in the long-standing conflict between the local Tuareg separatist insurgency and the Malian government.

Based on the forgoing, one may rationally make the summation that it is the local state fragility-induced conditions that best explain Islamist violent extremism and impediments to CVE in sub-Saharan Africa. Not contextual conditions such as the influence of the international Islamist ideology, transnational Islamist organisations, or the global order and the position of Muslims in that pecking order. In these fragile states, failing to provide security, justice, and opportunity, Islamism becomes the vessel and outlet through which the hopeless scarcity, acute deprivation, frustrated expectations, and insecurity (including ontological insecurity), that bubble up from below in society, find expression. The utility of state fragility as a conceptual-analytical framework and a theoretical perspective is also demonstrated in this study. In applying state fragility through the Fragile States Index as an analytical measuring instrument of state fragility, I can demonstrate why and how state fragility provides the context (setting), opportunity (as an enabler or permissive cause), and generates (drives or causes) Islamist violent extremism and impediments to CVE. I will address the Fragile States Index next.

3.6 THE APPLICATION OF STATE FRAGILITY: THE FRAGILE STATES INDEX

I outlined in the introductory chapter in section 1.3 *The central proposition* that the Fragile States Index (FSI) employs a Conflict Assessment System Tool (CAST) framework, based on the triangulation of qualitative data, quantitative data, and expert validation. The CAST methodology was initially designed in the 1990s to measure conflict risk. Since 2004 the methodology is used to measure state fragility (FFP, 2017a:24, 2017b:3-5, 2018:28, 2020c:39-40). There is therefore a relationship between state fragility and conflict risk. This study corroborates this link between state fragility and conflict risk in the specific case of the relationship between state fragility and Islamist terrorism. Islamist terrorism is employed as an expression and an empirical substantiation of Islamist violent extremism (the ideology and movement). The next section outlines the indicators, fragility ranges, and the measuring scale, on the Fragile States Index. The next section also outlines how the index is employed and reflected in the case in Kenya and in the context of Kenya's fragile and volatile neighbourhood.

3.6.1 Indicators and Measurement

The Fragile States Index is an annual assessment of 178 countries employing 12 main indicators and over a hundred sub-indicators. The disaggregated 12 indicators are each scored on a scale of 0.00 to

10.00, with 10.00 indicating the highest level of fragility. With 12 indicators, each scored out of 10.00, the total aggregate score of the index is 120.0. The aggregate country scores are allocated by employing four broad ranges: a red *alert*, a yellow *warning*, a green *stable*, and a blue *sustainable*, status. The four broad ranges are subdivided into 11 ranges, viz.: from (1) *very high alert* (above 110.0) to (11) *very sustainable* (below 20.0). The fragility ranges and the measuring scale follow below:

1	**Alert**	1	**Very high alert**	110.0 - 120.0
		2	**High alert**	100.0 - 109.9
		3	**Alert**	90.0 - 99.9
2	**Warning**	4	**High warning**	80.0 - 89.9
		5	**Elevated warning**	70.0 - 79.9
		6	**Warning**	60.0 - 69.9
3	**Stable**	7	**Stable**	50.0 - 59.9
		8	**More stable**	40.0 - 49.9
		9	**Very stable**	30.0 - 39.9
4	**Sustainable**	10	**Sustainable**	20.0 - 29.9
		11	**Very sustainable**	less than 20.00

Created from Fragile States Index data (FFP, 2018:4-7, 2019:4-7, 2020c:4-7)

Between 2015 and 2017, 14 of the indexed 20 most fragile states in the world, receiving *alert*, *high alert*, and *very high alert* scores, were in sub-Saharan Africa. Among them was Kenya. These states are: South Sudan, Somalia, Yemen, Syria, Central African Republic (CAR), Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Sudan, Chad, Afghanistan, Zimbabwe, Iraq, Haiti, Guinea, Nigeria, Ethiopia, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Burundi, Eritrea, and Pakistan (FFP, 2015:6-7, 2016a:6-7, 2017a:6-7, 2018:6-7, 2019:6-7, 2020b:The Internet). Significantly, all the 14 sub-Saharan Africa countries encapsulate a cocktail of Islamist violent extremism, civil war, insurgency, communal violence, and/or political instability. Significant too, with Haiti as an outlier (being challenged by state fragility-generated political instability and violence instead), the other five countries outside of sub-Saharan Africa on the list (Yemen, Syria, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Pakistan) are all grappling with the challenge of Islamist violent extremism.

Bar 2014 and 2016, 2018 and 2019, Kenya has been among 20 of the most fragile states in the world since 2008. In 2014, Ethiopia replaced Kenya that moved to 21st position on the list. Significantly, Ethiopia is also plagued by civil war, political instability, and Islamist violent extremism. In 2016, Niger replaced Kenya in 20th position on the list, with Ivory Coast in 21st position, and Kenya moving to 22nd position. Both Niger and Ivory Coast are also challenged by Islamist violent extremism and political instability. In 2017 Kenya was back on the list, in 17th position. In 2018 and 2019, Kenya is again classified outside of the list, ranking 25th and 29th respectively. New on the list in 2018 were Cameroon and Uganda, respectively at 16th and 20th positions. Like the other cases, Cameroon and Uganda are challenged by Islamist violent extremism and political instability. New on the list in 2019 are Mali and Libya, respectively in 16th and 20th positions. Mali and Libya are also regarded as epicentres of Islamist violent extremism and political instability (FFP, 2015:6-7, 2016a:6-7, 2017a:6-7, 2018:6-7, 2019:6-7, 2020b:The Internet, 2020c:6-7; IEP, 2016:10, 2017:10, 2018:8, 2019:8, 2020a:8). I stated earlier that this study employs Islamist terrorist activity as the empirical substantiation (i.e., indicator) of Islamist violent extremism, and that I employ the Global Terrorism Index as one of the measures of terrorism. Furthermore, empirical evidence of the causal link between state fragility and terrorism (and other forms of political violence) is also offered above. The following further demonstrates this relationship:

State Fragility and Terrorism: 2015-2019[69]

Year and Score		Iraq	Afghanistan	Nigeria	Pakistan	Syria	Yemen	Somalia	India	Kenya
2015	Fragility score	104.7	107.9	103.5	101.7	110.8	111.5	114.4	79.6	98.3
	(ranking)	(11)	(9)	(13)	(14)	(6)	(4)	(1)	(70)	(20)
	Terrorism score	9.94	9.40	9.28	8.59	8.56	8.05	7.53	7.45	6.56
	(ranking)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(19)
2016	Fragility score	105.4	107.3	101.6	98.9	110.6	111.1	113.4	77.9	96.4
	(ranking)	(10)	(9)	(13)	(18)	(5)	(4)	(2)	(72)	(22)
	Terrorism score	10.00	9.40	8.97	8.37	8.60	7.85	7.65	7.51	6.15
	(ranking)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(5)	(4)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(22)
2017	Fragility score	102.2	106.6	99.9	96.3	114.4	112.7	113.2	76.3	97.4
	(ranking)	(11)	(9)	(14)	(20)	(4)	(3)	(2)	(72)	(17)
	Terrorism score	9.75	9.39	8.66	8.18	8.32	7.53	8.02	7.57	6.11
	(ranking)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(5)	(4)	(8)	(6)	(7)	(19)
2018	Fragility score	99.1	105.0	98.5	94.2	111.5	113.5	112.3	74.4	93.5
	(ranking)	(13)	(9)	(14)	(23)	(4)	(1)	(2)	(74)	(25)
	Terrorism score	9.24	9.60	8.60	7.89	8.01	7.26	7.80	7.52	5.76
	(ranking)	(2)	(1)	(3)	(5)	(4)	(8)	(6)	(7)	(21)
2019	Fragility score	95.9	102.9	97.3	92.1	110.7	112.4	110.9	75.3	90.3
	(ranking)	(17)	(9)	(14)	(25)	(4)	(1)	(2)	(68)	(29)
	Terrorism score	8.68	9.59	8.31	7.54	7.78	7.58	7.65	7.35	5.64
	(ranking)	(2)	(1)	(3)	(7)	(4)	(6)	(5)	(8)	(23)

The table above demonstrates that the seven countries (Iraq to Somalia) most impacted by terrorism are among the 20 most fragile states in the world, receiving *high* (6.00 - 7.99) and *very high* (8.00 - 10.00) impact scores on the Global Terrorism Index, based on an assessment of 163 countries. Since 2004, the country most impacted by terrorism was Iraq, surpassed for the first time in 2018 by Afghanistan. In 2019, Afghanistan still held this position.[70] Although India receives *high* impact terrorism scores, ranking seventh in 2017 and 2018 on the Global Terrorism Index, India does not feature on the list of the 20 most fragile states. However, India has consistently received *elevated warning* scores (70.0 - 79.9) since the inception of the Fragile States Index in 2005 (FFP, 2020a:The Internet). Islamist terrorism in India thus further corroborates the relationship between state fragility and Islamist violent extremism. Conversely, Kenya has received *high* impact scores on the Global Terrorism Index, yet Kenya has an average *medium* impact score of 5.04 between 2001 and 2019. The *medium* impact range is 4.00 - 5.99. Reflected in the nine contexts on the table above, one form of terrorist activity, viz., Islamist terrorism, dominates and leads contemporary terrorism. I also outlined in Chapter 1, section 1.1 *Background* that four Islamist groups, viz., *Taliban*, IS, ISKP, and *Boko Haram*, were responsible for 57.8 percent of all terrorism related deaths in 2018. In 2019, yet again four Islamist groups, viz., *Taliban*, IS, *Boko Haram*, and *al-Shabaab*, were responsible for 55 percent of all terrorism related deaths in 2019. I further develop and demonstrate evidence of the causal relationship between state fragility and Islamist violent extremism in the next chapters. First, the Fragile States Index and the impact of shared fragility in Kenya and in Kenya's fragile and volatile neighbourhood will be considered. The fragility scores for Kenya are as follows:

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[69] Created from Fragile States Index and Global Terrorism Index data (FFP, 2016a:7, 2020a:7, 2018:7, 2019:7, 2020c:9); IEP, 2016:10, 2017:10, 2018:8, 2019:8, 18, 2020a:8, 18, 92, 2020b:The Internet).

[70] With the eighth edition of the Global Terrorism Index (2020), the terrorism data covers the period 2001-2019. The Global Terrorism Index and the case in Kenya are elaborated and referenced in Chapter 4, section 4.2 *Islamist violent extremism*, and Chapter 6, section 6.7 *Major Islamist terrorist activity in Kenya since the 1990s*.

Fragile States Index, Kenya indicators and scores: 2005-2019			**Security Apparatus**	**Factionalised Elites**	**Group Grievances**	**Economic Decline**	**Uneven Economic Development**	**Human Flight and Brain Drain**	**State Legitimacy**	**Public Services**	**Human Rights and Rule of Law**	**Demographic Pressures**	**Refugees and IDPs**	**External Intervention**
Year	*Rank*	*Total*	**C1**	**C2**	**C3**	**E1**	**E2**	**E3**	**P1**	**P2**	**P3**	**S1**	**S2**	**X1**
2019	29	90.3	7.7	8.6	8.3	6.5	7.3	6.9	7.9	7.7	6.5	8.3	7.4	7.2
2018	25	93.5	7.9	9.1	8.6	6.6	7.4	7.2	8.2	8.0	6.8	8.6	7.7	7.5
2017	17	97.4	8.4	9.6	8.9	7.0	7.6	7.5	8.1	8.3	7.3	8.9	8.0	7.8
2016	22	96.4	8.3	8.9	8.9	6.9	7.9	7.6	7.6	8.0	7.0	8.9	8.3	8.1
2015	20	98.3	8.5	8.9	9.1	7.4	8.0	7.8	7.8	8.2	7.2	9.1	8.0	8.3
2014	21	97.3	8.4	8.9	9.0	7.5	8.3	7.5	8.1	7.9	6.5	9.0	8.3	8.0
2013	18	99.0	8.2	9.3	9.3	7.9	8.0	7.8	8.4	8.2	6.8	8.7	8.2	8.2
2012	17	99.6	8.1	9.0	9.0	7.6	8.3	7.8	8.3	8.1	7.1	9.1	8.7	8.5
2011	16	98.4	7.6	9.0	8.9	7.3	8.2	7.7	8.6	8.1	7.4	8.9	8.4	8.4
2010	16	98.7	7.9	8.8	8.7	7.0	8.5	7.6	8.9	7.8	7.7	8.8	8.5	8.5
2009	13	100.7	7.5	8.7	8.9	7.4	8.7	7.9	9.3	8.1	8.0	9.1	8.7	8.4
2008	14	101.4	8.0	8.8	8.6	7.5	8.8	8.3	9.0	8.0	8.2	9.0	9.0	8.2
2007	26	93.4	7.1	8.4	7.6	6.9	8.1	8.0	8.2	7.4	7.2	8.7	8.5	7.3
2006	31	91.3	7.1	8.2	6.9	7.0	8.1	8.0	8.0	7.4	7.0	8.4	8.0	7.2
2005	33	88.6	7.0	7.6	6.7	6.8	8.0	8.0	7.3	7.2	6.9	9.0	7.1	7.0
Average Score		**96.2**	**7.8**	**8.7**	**8.4**	**7.1**	**8.0**	**7.7**	**8.2**	**7.8**	**7.1**	**8.8**	**8.1**	**7.9**

Created from Fragile States Index data (FFP, 2020b:The Internet)

The fragility ranking above is based on an assessment of 178 countries. The worst ranking for Kenya was in 2008 and 2009 with *high alert* (100.0 - 109.9) scores, directly following the 2007/2008 post-elections crisis. There has been some progress since then. In 2019, Kenya ranked 29th with a 90.3 *alert* score. The last time Kenya had a score comparable to 2019 was in 2006, with a 91.3 score and a ranking of 31. Kenya is therefore not the most fragile state in the world. In 2015 it was Somalia (at 114.0), and in 2016 and 2017 it was South Sudan (at 113.9 and 113.4 respectively). In 2018 and 2019 Yemen was the most fragile state, with 113.5 and 112.4 fragility scores, respectively. In fact, except for 2018 and 2019 with Yemen, and in 2005 when Côte d'Ivoire took the number one spot, since the founding of South Sudan in 2011, the most fragile state has been Kenya's neighbours, South Sudan and Somalia, interchangeably (FFP, 2016a:7, 2017a:7, 2018:7, 2019:7,17, 2020c:7). South Sudan and Somalia, out of 54 states, are also classified on the 2018 and 2020 Ibrahim Index as the lowest and second lowest performers on governance in Africa (MIF, 2018:16, 2020:130, 132). With the fluctuation in state fragility, and some recent improvement, Kenya's average score over time indicates a country at risk, with an average *alert* score of 96.2 between 2005 and 2019. This trend is reflected in sub-Saharan Africa, with much of the subcontinent remaining at risk. Between 2015 and 2017 and in 2019, 14 of the 20 most fragile states in the world are in sub-Saharan Africa. This figure was 15 (out of 20), in 2018 (FFP, 2015:6-7, 2016a:6-7, 2017a:6-7, 2018:6-7, 2019:6-7, 2020b:The Internet, 2020c:7). The most fragile states on the Fragile States Index also appear on the States of Fragility Index of the OECD. The OECD (2018:26) classifies these countries, including Kenya, as *chronically fragile*.



Among 20 of the most fragile states in the world are Kenya's immediate neighbours. On the left is a map of Kenya's fragile and volatile neighbourhood (created from D-Maps, 2018:The Internet). Kenya therefore finds itself in a fragile and consequently volatile neighbourhood. In 2016 Kenya's four neighbours, South Sudan, Somalia, Yemen, and Sudan, received the highest score of *very high alert* on the Fragile State Index. South Sudan and Somalia were the worst cases on the index in 2016, occupying the first and second positions respectively, with South Sudan receiving a fragility score of 113.9, and Somalia scored 113.4. Directly across the Gulf of Aden is Yemen. Yemen was in the fourth place on the index, with a score of 111.1, and Sudan was in the sixth place, with a fragility score of 110.6. Ethiopia followed these four neighbours, with a *high alert* of 101.1. On *alert* were Eritrea (98.1), Kenya itself (96.4), and Uganda (96.0). Performing better but still indexed on *high warning* were Djibouti and Tanzania, receiving scores of 88.9 and 80.3 respectively (FFP, 2017a:7).

This shared fragility and volatility persist. In 2018, Kenya's neighbours again received *very high alert* scores. Yemen was the most fragile state, with a score of 113.5, followed by Somalia (112.30) and South Sudan (112.2). Sudan was on *high alert* at 108.0 (ranking 8th). Receiving *alert* scores are Eritrea (96.4), Uganda (95.3), Ethiopia (94.2), and Kenya itself (93.5). On *high warning* are Djibouti at 85.1, and Tanzania with a score of 80.1 (FFP, 2019:7). In 2019, Yemen was the most fragile state yet again, with a fragility score of 112.4, followed by Somalia (110.9) and South Sudan (110.8). Sudan was on *high alert* with a score of 104.8 (ranking 9th). Receiving *alert* scores were Eritrea (95.8), Ethiopia (94.6), Uganda (92.8), and Kenya itself (90.3). Djibouti was on *high warning*, scored at 82.7, and Tanzania improved to *elevated warning*, with a score of 78.1 (FFP, 2020c:7). This shared fragility has enabled and generated the internationalisation of Islamist violent extremism in Kenya's neighbourhood.

Carter (2012:67) maintains that shared state fragility has enabled Islamist groups to congregate and consolidate "networks in regions that are plagued with porous borders, lax border control, fragile economies, fragmented political and social culture, corrupt political officials, and subpar law enforcement". Shared state fragility has also enabled the formation of ties, across the Gulf of Aden, between *al-Shabaab* in Somalia (and the Horn of Africa), with AQAP in Yemen (and the Arabian Peninsula). *Al-Shabaab* and AQAP are affiliates of *al-Qaeda* Central. Yemen and Somalia share poverty, famine, corruption, porous borders, and intense political and social fragmentation (Carter, 2012:75; Blanchard, 2013:2). Shared state fragility has further enabled and generated the communicability of Islamist terrorism, maritime piracy, and civil war across both countries. In turn, Kenya stands accused by *al-Shabaab* (and other actors) of undue interference in Somali politics by: (1) supporting an 'apostate' government in Somalia; (2) destabilising Somalia; (3) exploiting Somalia. Shared state fragility has also made CVE in Kenya especially intractable. The cross-cutting indicator X1: *external intervention* therefore serves not only as a permissive cause and a driver, but also as a contextual-exogenous condition, in explaining Islamist violent extremism and impediments to CVE, in Kenya.[71]

Having considered the apex of the world's state fragility and the notion of shared fragility, let me return to the the Fragile States Index as such. The disaggregated 12 indicators on the index are: three cohesion indicators, three economic, three political, two social, and one cross-cutting indicator. These 12 main indicators of the Fragile States Index are represented below:

Cohesion Indicators	***Economic Indicators***	***Political Indicators***	***Social Indicators***	***Cross-cutting Indicator***
Security Apparatus **(C1)**	Economic Decline **(E1)**	State Legitimacy **(P1)**	Demographic Pressures **(S1)**	External Intervention **(X1)**
Factionalised Elites **(C2)**	Uneven Economic Development **(E2)**	Public Services **(P2)**	Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) **(S2)**	
Group Grievance **(C3)**	Human Flight and Brain Drain **(E3)**	Human Rights and Rule of Law **(P3)**		

Created from Fragile States Index data (FFP, 2017b:6-13, 2019:33, 2020c:41)

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[71] See Chapter 7, section 7.3.5 *Cross-cutting indicator*, and Chapter 8, section 8.3.5 *Cross-cutting indicator and impediments to CVE*, for further referencing and expansion on the above explanation-building.

A caveat. The Fund for Peace (2017b:3) contends that “a country’s overall score (and indeed, its indicator scores) are a far more important and accurate barometer of a country’s performance, and that as much as countries should be compared against other countries, it is more useful to compare a country against itself, over time”. The Fund for Peace (2017b:3) also asserts that “the CAST framework and the FSI are entry points into deeper interpretive analysis ... to understand more about a state's capacities and pressures which contribute to levels of fragility and resilience”. The Fragile State Index has immense utility as an analytical measuring instrument of state fragility. The Fund for Peace (2017b:4) asserts that the index “is a critical tool in highlighting not only the normal pressures that all states experience, but also in identifying when those pressures are outweighing a states’ capacity to manage those pressures”. The intension therefore is not to compare scores or levels of state fragility. Kenya is viewed in terms of its own performance, over time, measured against itself. I outlined in Chapter 2, section 2.3 *Research design* that the goal is to see how, over time, specific state fragility related historical markers, from the *Shifta* war (1963-1968) to the CVE Operation *Linda Boni* (since 2015), have generated Islamist violent extremism and impediments to CVE (*sequences* evidence).[72]

Furthermore, the four analytical themes, i.e.: (1) authoritarianism and centralisation; (2) reforms and devolution; (3) securitisation; (4) renewed authoritarianism and centralisation (*trace* and *accounts* evidence), are employed to outline how and why the origins and evolution of the Kenyan state have generated Islamism and impediments to CVE. The intension is also to see how variance in state fragility (based on the construct of *the arc of insecurity*) has created variance in both Islamism and impediments to CVE (*patterns* evidence). The expectation is that Islamism will be most virulent, and impediments to CVE will be most defined, in the areas where state fragility is most evidenced. Ultimately, the intention is to trace, detail, and explain, the link between state fragility, Islamism, and impediments to CVE. I develop this argument further in the next chapters.

Having briefly introduced the 12 indicators on the Fragile States Index, I now elaborate on these indicators. But first, another caveat. The Fund for Peace (2017b:13) warns that the explanation and description of the indicators, as contained below, are not exhaustive, they are entry points for further scrutiny. Important to also consider, I highlight in Chapters 7 and 8 that the individual indicators should not be seen in isolation. Much rather, the indicators interact and are mutually reinforcing, albeit some more salient than others. The 12 main indicators on the Fragile States Index are grouped under: cohesion, economic, political, and social indicators, with a cross-cutting indicator.

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[72] I outline in Chapter 6, section 6.3 *Islamist violent extremism and the fragile state in Kenya*, that the generative powers of the ‘Big Bang’ of independence in 1963 released a causal pathway of secession and violence (structural, cultural, and direct) in the former Northern Frontier District (NFD) and Coast Region, pitting state fragility against ethnic-Somalis and other Muslims in Kenya. One outcome was the secessionist and insurgent *Shifta* war in the former NFD that was violently repressed by the Kenyan state. Since then, both the former NFD and Coast Region, dominated by ethnic-Somalis and other Muslims, have been marginalised and securitised, generating varied historical markers in the relationship between state fragility, Islamism, and CVE in Kenya.

3.6.2 Cohesion Indicators

Governing society rests on central pillars, which includes security, representation, accountability, and leadership. This is at the core of the cohesion indicators of the Fragile States Index. The cohesion indicators assert that when society gets fragmented or the state stops being relevant to its society, whether through omission or commission by the government that runs the state, it becomes easy for that society to undermine government authority and to challenge the state. The state may lose its centre and consequently the state itself may come undone. This is because the state is central to the cohesion of its society, responsible for managing the pressures on both the state and its society. Likewise, if the state and its government become the exclusive preserve of the few, they lose what Rotberg (2004:6) calls ‘the mandate of heaven’ (i.e., legitimacy) in the eyes of society. The outcome is often distinct types of socio-political instability, including violent protests, insurgencies, civil wars, and violent extremism. As the Institute for Global Change (2018a:The Internet) contends in their governance programme, “[t]he single most important determinate of a country’s success [or failure] is the quality of its government”. The cohesion indicators may be represented as follows:

Security Apparatus

Considers pressures related to armed resistance to a governing authority, including terrorism, coups, insurgency, organised crime, as well as the perceived trust of citizens in the ability of the state to provide security, and the existence of a *deep state* that does not represent society. *Considerations include:*

- Monopoly on the use of force
- Relationship between security and citizenry
- Military/police force utilisation
- Arms proliferation

Factionalised Elites

Considers pressures related to the fragmentation of the state along various fault-lines, including religious, ethnic, clan, and class, fault-lines, as well as brinksmanship and gridlock between ruling elites. Measures power struggles, political competition, political transitions, and the credibility of the electoral process. *Considerations include*:

- Legitimate, representative leadership
- The strength of national identity
- Equitable resource distribution
- Equality and equity; laws and the political system

Group Grievance

Considers pressures related to divisions and tensions between groups in society, particularly related to access to resources and inclusion in the political process, including histories of past injustices related to discrimination, marginalisation, repression, and persecution. *Considerations include*:

- Amenable post-conflict reconciliation and responses
- Equality among groups
- Divisions in society
- Communal violence

Adapted from Fragile States Index data (FFP, 2017b:6-7, 2019:34-35, 2020c:42-43)

W.B. Yeats underline the central message of the cohesion indicators in *The second coming* (1921), famously reimagined by Chinua Achebe in *Things fall apart* (1994). Yeats (1921) contends, and Achebe

(1994) illustrates, that things fall apart when the centre does not hold.[73] In *Things fall apart* (1994) the lesson is that it is not the pressures of colonialism that result in the demise and displacement of the African political system, but the weaknesses and fault-lines of the African political system itself that inadvertently results in its own demise and displacement. The pressures presented by Islamist violent extremism do not explain the levels of fragility and resilience in Kenya. Rather, it is the weaknesses and fault-lines of the Kenyan state itself, at the macro, meso, and micro levels of the state, which explain the levels of fragility and resilience (or lack thereof) in Kenya, as well as the reasons why Islamist violent extremism has been able to take root and has become impervious to eradication. The centre in Kenya is teetering, desperately struggling to hold. This has been the reality of Kenyan politics since independence in 1963. Said fragility is also reflected in the inequitable structure of the economy, which is marginalising and excluding not only individuals but specific identity groups and regions.

3.6.3 Economic Indicators

The economic indicators show pressures resulting from the (in)ability of the state to provide sources of economic opportunity and livelihood, access to resources, and the actual and perceived structural-horizontal inequality (FFP, 2017b:8). The following are the economic indicators:

Economic Decline
Considers pressures related to patterns of progressive economic decline as measured by per capita income, unemployment rates, and poverty levels, as well as responses to economic conditions and their consequences, including the perceived increasing group inequalities. Measures the formal economy, but also considers the informal economy. *Considerations include*:
• The nature of public finances • Economic conditions • Economic climate • Economic diversification
Uneven Economic Development
Considers pressures related to actual and perceived inequality within the national economy, based on group identity, the level of education, economic status, or region, as well as opportunities for groups to improve their economic status. *Considerations include*:
• Economic equality • Economic opportunity • Socio-economic dynamics
Human Flight and Brain Drain
Considers pressures related to the impact of productive and skilled professional human displacement, due to economic decline or fears of political persecution or repression, and the effects on the development of the state. *Considerations include*:
• Retention of technical and intellectual capital • Impact on the economy • The influence of a diaspora

Adapted from Fragile States Index data (FFP, 2017b:8-9, 2019:36-37, 2020c:44-45)

Reflective of the above, the AfDB (2014:16) asserts that the major economic drivers at the core of fragility in Africa are “[l]arge and growing economic inequalities, economic capture of the state by a small group, or the inability of the society to provide jobs, particularly for youth”. I noted earlier in the chapter that regardless of the annual growth and size of the economy, there is evidence of widespread and rising group and regional inequality in Kenya. Such conditions generate relative deprivation, popular discontent, and finally violent conflict. If this proverbial saying is considered: *a hungry man is an angry man* (i.e., a deprived community is an aggrieved community), the causal relationship between relative deprivation and violent conflict, occasioned by state fragility, becomes self-evident.

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[73] *The second coming* (1921) warns of an impending crisis (in world affairs). *Things fall apart* (1994) is about impending British colonialism that undermines and eventually displaces African culture, traditions, practises, and political systems (that of the Igbos of Nigeria in this case).

3.6.4 Political Indicators

Related to cohesion indicators, political indicators are also at the heart of governance. Like cohesion indicators, the failure to address the pressures on political indicators may account not only for Islamist violent extremism but also for political violence *writ large*, including secessionist attempts, coup attempts, elections related violence, communal conflict, and civil war, all of which are evidenced in Kenya. I outline in Chapter 6, section 6.3 *Islamist violent extremism and the fragile state in Kenya*, that Kenya has experienced a secessionist attempt in the former NFD that turned into a civil war, the *Shifta* war (1963-1968). Kenya has also experienced intermittent calls for secession in Coast Region since independence in 1963. There have been two attempted military coups, in April 1971 and August 1982, against Jomo Kenyatta's and Daniel arap Moi's governments, respectively. Since the reintroduction of multiparty politics in the 1990s, Kenya's elections remain consistently marred by protest and violence. The most severe was the post-election crisis of 2007/2008 that brought Kenya to the brink of civil war.

Furthermore, since the 1990s Kenya has been grappling with Islamist terror attacks on Kenyan soil. Kenya's government and the Kenya Defence Forces (KDF) have also faced an *al-Shabaab* Islamist insurgency and proto-state in central and southern Somalia with Operation *Linda Nchi* (2011-2012), and as part of AMISOM since 2012. Kenya has also faced varying permutations of new-wars, which manages to blur the distinction between war and peace, political violence, and criminal violence. These new-wars are endemic in the arc of insecurity of Kenya. Added to Islamist violent extremism, these new-wars include communal violence involving various ethnic groups and organised militias, widespread banditry, and criminal activity. The political indicators are summarised as follows:

State Legitimacy

Considers the ability of the state to exercise basic functions and the population's confidence in its government and institutions, including whether the government is representative of, and open to, the population that it governs. *Considerations include*:

- Confidence in the political process
- Political opposition and transparency
- Openness and fairness of the political process
- Political violence

Public Services

Considers the presence of basic state functions that serve the people. Are there portions of the population who do not have adequate access to these services? *Considerations include*:

- General provision of public services
- Access to health and education
- Security/policing
- Shelter and infrastructure

Human Rights and Rule of Law

Considers the relationship between the state and its population, including whether there is widespread abuse of legal, political, and social rights, including those of individuals, groups, and institutions. *Considerations include*:

- Political rights and civil liberties
- Violation of rights/liberties
- Openness
- Justice and equality

Adapted from Fragile States Index data (FFP, 2017b:10-11, 2019:38-39, 2020c:46-47)

3.6.5 Social Indicators

The demographic characteristics of a society, including social fragmentation (i.e., the lack of social cohesion), identity-based political marginalisation and socio-economic exclusion, and the corruption that ferment structural-horizontal inequality and discontent, may result in a myriad of demographic pressures and implosions. This is the crux of the social indicators. Reflective of the foregoing, according to the AfDB (2014:15), at the heart of the social drivers of fragility in Africa are "demand[s] by individuals or groups in a society for inclusion and access to services, resources, opportunities, rights or identity that lead to grievances, social tensions, rebellions and violence".

Out of the 12 indicators on the Fragile States Index, demographic pressures score the worst in Kenya, receiving an average of 8.8. (out of 10.00) between 2005 and 2019. I stated earlier in the current chapter, and I outline later in the study (Chapters 6 to 8), that the origins of demographic pressures (and group grievances) in Kenya are to be found in the colonial state. The colonial incorporation of ethnic-Somalis in Kenya irrevocably tied the (mis)fortunes of Somalia and Kenya. In post-independence Kenya, the marginalisation of the Muslim minority and the ethnic-Somali minority has exacerbated these demographic pressures and group grievances even further. State fragility related conflicts and violence in Somalia and in Kenya have also caused mass migration, resulting in refugees and IDPs in Kenya. State fragility has further worsened the plight of these refugees and IDPs. Linked to these social conundrums that are linked to Islamist violent extremism and impediments to CVE, the two social indicators on the Fragile States Index may be embodied as follows:

Demographic Pressures

Considers pressures on the state stemming from the population itself or the environment, demographic characteristics, and their socio-economic and political effects, as well as pressures on the population from natural disasters and environmental hazards. *Considerations include*:

- Population dynamics
- The public health system
- Food and nutrition security
- Environmental threats
- Resource allocation and competition

Refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs)

Considers pressures on the state caused by forced displacement of large communities because of social, political, environmental, or other causes, including conflict; these pressures can affect public services, and create humanitarian and security challenges. *Considerations include*:

- The origins and impact of refugees
- IDPs and impact on resources
- Responses to displacement

Adapted from Fragile States Index data (FFP, 2017b:12, 2019:40, 2020c:48)

Having addressed the cohesion, economic, political, and social indicators, I now turn to the one cross-cutting indicator, external intervention. But first, I must reiterate that although these 12 indicators are addressed separately, they interact and may reinforce one another. I illustrate in Chapters 7 and 8 that some of these indicators are more salient than others. In the period under review, i.e., 2005-2019, Kenya scores the worst in the following indicators, chronologically presented with their fragility scores: demographic pressures (8.8), factionalised elites (8.7), group grievances (8.4), state legitimacy (8.2) refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) (8.1), uneven economic development (8.0), external intervention (7.9), security apparatus (7.8), and public services (7.8). However, one may assume that these most salient indicators do not contribute equally to state fragility and conflict risk. The question is which of these indicators should carry more weight, and related, what would be the basis for the weighting? Notably, the Fund for Peace assign equal weight to each of the 12 indicators.

Pauline Baker (2017a:4-5, 10, 2017b:6, 10, 18), former president of the Fund for Peace, through regression analysis with a sample of 91 countries (which included Kenya) between 2006 and 2012, finds that of the 12 indicators, eight indicators are the most correlated with increased fragility and increased conflict risk. The eight indicators are, in the order listed, with their coefficients: state legitimacy (7.13), demographic pressures (6.81), uneven economic development (6.58), security apparatus (6.29), human rights and the rule of law (5.93), public services (5.72), group grievance (5.18), and economic decline (4.42). Based on her study, Baker (2017a:5, 10, 2017b:10,) concludes that the lack of state legitimacy is the leading driver of fragility and conflict risk. With a coefficient of 7.13, every increase in the state legitimacy indicator contributed to a 71.3 percent increase in fragility and conflict risk. But when measured collectively, three indicators, viz., state legitimacy, demographic pressures, and uneven economic development, ‘created the slippery slope for fragility and violence’.

It is significant that six of the eight indicators that are the ‘most correlated’ with increased fragility and conflict risk, as identified by Baker (2017a, 2017b), overlap with six of the nine ‘most salient’ indicators in Kenya, as identified in this study. The indicators are demographic pressures, state legitimacy, uneven economic development, group grievances, security apparatus, and public services (although there are nine ‘most salient’ indicators, the latter two indicators share the number eight spot in Kenya, both with an average score of 7.8). The three ‘most salient’ indicators in Kenya that Baker (2017a, 2017b) does not identify as ‘most correlated’, viz., factionalised elites, refugees and IDPs, and external intervention, I argue, reflect the specific context in Kenya (see Chapters 6 to 8 for evidence supporting this argument). The other two indictors that Baker (2017a, 2017b) identify as ‘most correlated’, viz., economic decline, and human rights and the rule of law, indicators which are not the ‘most salient’ in

Kenya (both have the lowest score, both an average of 7.1), I argue, reflect the sample in her study. Baker (2017b:10) also warns that these indicators occur in different combinations in any given context. These indicators also interact in complex and inseparable ways. The weighting of these indicators therefore remains of equal weighting as that assigned by the Fund for Peace.

Reflective of the foregoing indicators on the Fragile States Index, and as I argued earlier in the current chapter and demonstrate in Chapters 6 to 8, the fault-lines in Kenya that generated Islamist violent extremism include the inability to accommodate diverse interests (including the interests of the Muslim and ethnic-Somali minorities), structural-horizontal inequalities, and the failure to adequately provide political goods and public services. Linked to these indicators and fault-lines are two necessary conditions, viz., (1) Kenya, as a functional but fragile state, has generated grievances that have given rise and impetus to Islamist violent extremism and impediments to CVE, and thus Kenya is unable to moderate and eradicate Islamist violent extremism, and (2) religion, coinciding with ethnicity, has political significance in Kenya, Muslim coreligionists and ethnic-Somali coethnics do act as a collective political coalition. The political significance of religion, specifically Islam, or more accurately Islamic identity, explains this ‘religious-political’ response to the grievances caused by state fragility in Kenya.

The contextual conditions explaining Islamist violent extremism in Kenya include the fragile and volatile neighbourhood of Kenya as indicated above in section 3.6.1 *Indicators and measurement*. Kenya’s neighbourhood is characterised by the porous border with Somalia and the politics of Somalia, being surrounded by other fragile states and the security challenges emanating from these states, and proximity to the Arabian Peninsula and the wider Middle East and the influence of the politics of these regions just across the Gulf of Aden. This is also a highly militarised neighbourhood at the crossroads of political, economic, and security competition among a myriad of foreign powers. This fragile and volatile neighbourhood is awash with small arms and is considered an epicentre of the fight against Islamist terrorism (see Chapters 6 to 8). This brings the current argument to the 12th and last main indicator on the Fragile States Index, the cross-cutting indicator, *external intervention*.

3.6.6 Cross-cutting indicator

External intervention highlights the impact of external actors in the execution and management of state functions, the role of external actors in the pressures faced by the state, and the impact of the rivalries between these external actors on the recipient state. When the state is unwilling or unable to perform state functions, to deliver political goods and public services, or manage the pressures faced by the state, pressures which include the maintenance of security, economic opportunity, and welfare, the invariable consequence is that the role of external actors (and sub-state actors) gets amplified, even displacing the role of the state. Moreover, external actors are also able to transplant their own politics onto the recipient state. These external actors may be state actors or non-state actors, including coreligionists and coethnics, as is the case in Kenya. These actors may embroil the recipient state in the affairs of other states as shown by Kenya's involvement in the US-led global war on terror since 9/11, and its involvement in Somalia since Operation *Linda Nchi* (2011-2012) and AMISOM (since 2012).[74] The cross-cutting indicator, external intervention, may be captured as such:

External Intervention

Considers the influence and impact of external actors, primarily on security matters, and their level of involvement in the internal affairs of a state at risk. *Considerations include*:

- Political intervention
- Economic intervention
- Military (force) intervention

Adapted from Fragile States Index data (FFP, 2017b:13, 2019:41, 2020c:49)

To reiterate the warning by the Fund for Peace (2017b:13), the foregoing 12 indicators of the Fragile Sates Index are indicative and not exhaustive descriptors and explanations of state fragility. These indicators and their descriptors are continually being refined and developed as we continue to improve our understanding of state fragility. Given our current understanding, these interacting and mutually reinforcing indicators are deemed to have, in George and Bennett's (2005:137) conception, *causal capacity*. They are accordingly employed in this study to trace, detail, and explain, the process by which Islamist violent extremism develops and is sustained, and why and how Islamist violent extremism becomes resistant to CVE approaches and programming. Dupré and Cartwright (1988:521) underline this point by stating that some "things and events have causal capacities: in virtue of the properties they possess, they have the [generative] power to bring about other events or states".

3.7 CONCLUDING REMARKS

This study is informed by the following nagging curiosity: *Which factors explain Islamist violent extremism and impediments to CVE, in Kenya?* The study attributes these factors to the properties or attributes of state fragility that have causal capacity and tendency. State fragility and the Fragile States Index are therefore central to the study. This chapter has outlined state fragility as the basis for the study, viz., the X-construct. The chapter has also established the correlation between state fragility,

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[74] External intervention (as an indicator of state fragility) therefore serves not only as an enabler (permissive cause) and a reason (driver), but also as an external contextual condition, in explaining Islamist violent extremism and impediments to CVE in Kenya. See Chapter 7, section 7.3.5 *Cross-cutting indicator*, and Chapter 8, section 8.3.5 *Cross-cutting indicator and impediments to CVE*.

Islamist violent extremism, and CVE, as well as the context of Kenya. In unpacking the pathology of state fragility, this chapter has outlined the concept and theory of state fragility, including the nature, attributes, indicators, causes, symptoms and consequences of state fragility, the state fragility-security-development nexus, the criticism against the theory and application of state fragility, the utility of state fragility as a conceptual-analytical framework and a theory, and the application of state fragility through the Fragile States Index as an analytical measuring instrument of state fragility.

Fragile states are variously referred to as ‘captured’, ‘hollowed-out’, ‘phantom’, ‘mirage’, ‘shadow’, ‘soft’, ‘quasi’, ‘lame Leviathan’, ‘decaying’, ‘stressed’, ‘insecure’, ‘at risk’, and ‘troubled’, the list goes on, to identify different origins, nature, and extent of state fragility. Some of these conceptions are more helpful than others. For example, are ‘phantom’ states and ‘mirage’ states figments of the imagination? Do they exist or don’t they exist? What does ‘soft’ mean? As opposed to ‘hard’? Other conceptions denote very specific or narrow elements of fragility. For example, a ‘hollowed-out’ state suggests deliberately incapacitating state institutions, often for the purpose of facilitating the looting of the state and to enable escaping accountability. A ‘captured’ state suggests a state that has been taken over by criminal gangs and/or specific political/business interests. Only a few fragile states will fit the bill of the hollowed-out state or the captured state. In the case of South Africa both state capture and the hollowing-out of the state in the period of the Jacob Zuma Administration (2009-2018) are a matter of public record. But the breadth of the ‘captured’ and ‘hollowed-out’ state neither included the whole state, nor did it encompass all institutions of the state. More so, to speak of the ‘captured-hollowed-out’ state in isolation is to conceal rather than clarify the nature and extent of state fragility in South Africa.[75] What about the case of the ‘lame Leviathan’? Does society aspire to live under a ‘strong’ or ‘able’ Leviathan?, i.e., *that mortal god to which we owe our peace and defence*, as Thomas Hobbes (1651:87) has maintained. Is either absolutism or a state of nature the only choice for people in fragile states? If only for normative reasons, a state may never have unfettered powers. But a state must have the capacity and political will to serve its society. A middle ground is therefore appropriate here, viz., a strong state that is still accountable, legitimate, and serves its society.

The notion of the state itself is also contested, and so are the roles and functions assigned to the state. Without agreement about the notion of the state, and what roles and functions the state has or should have, there is also no accord about the notion and phenomenon of state fragility. Consequently, there is no accord about the definition, indicators, measurement, properties, causes, symptoms, and outcomes, of state fragility. The theory of state fragility and the application thereof thus face varied criticism. Despite this criticism, state fragility, as a conceptual-analytical framework and a theoretical perspective, retains its patent value and utility. So does the Fragile States Index. The Fragile States Index, as an analytical measuring instrument employed in the application of state fragility, highlights the pressures on the state and state institutions, on state-society relations, as well as society-society relations. Critically, the index identifies when these pressures outweigh the capacity of the state, thus exposing the state to the risk of various permutations of insecurity, including political violence and conflict. The Fragile States Index, however, is not the holy grail of uncovering state fragility. Said holy grail is yet to be discovered. Adding to and complementing the Fragile States Index, I therefore fuse other resources and instruments in uncovering and applying state fragility. These resources and instruments include field research, elite interviews, and other congruent indexes, such as the Social Progress Index, the Freedom House Index, the Global Terrorism Index, the Political Terror Scale, and the Corruption Perceptions Index. All of these reveal various facets and outcomes of state fragility and add to an understanding of the phenomenon of state fragility and the application of state fragility as a conceptual-analytical framework and theoretical perspective (see Chapters 6 to 8).

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[75] See the *Judicial commission of inquiry into allegations of state capture, corruption and fraud in the public sector including organs of state report: part 1, volume 1-3*, (Zondo, 2022a), and the five subsequent reports, viz., part 2 through to part 6 (Zondo, 2022b, 2022c, 2022d, 2022e, 2022f).

As is the case with instruments such as the Fragile States Index, reality does not always fit squarely within the box of our theoretical frameworks. Consequently, there are blind spots in the macro theory of state fragility. Accordingly, I fuse state fragility with two congruent middle-range theories, i.e., relative deprivation and rational choice theories, and congruent factors such as politically significant identity, the kin-country syndrome, constricted democratic space, insecurity, the blame-system, disengagement, and self-help and survival motives, in formulating and demonstrating the case. I outlined in Chapter 2, section 2.3 *Research design*, how Critical Realism dictates that in our depiction and explanation of reality, epistemic relativism must be moderated by judgmental rationality. It is accordingly the duty of theory to approximate reality. The foregoing congruent middle range theories and these congruent factors deepen our understanding of the causal capacity and tendency of the properties of state fragility, thus aiding in building the causal sequence in the relationship between state fragility (X) and Islamist violent extremism, and impediments to CVE (Y), in Kenya (the setting).

Although fragile states have pockets of resilience, and resilient states have pockets of fragility, some states are objectively more resilient, and others objectively more fragile, than others. While there is an interplay of strength and fragility across time and space on the continent, on average, the African state is objectively fragile across a range of development and security indicators. Aside from human-made disasters such as terrorism and extreme inequality and poverty, the fragility of the African state is also revealed through the crippling impact of natural disasters such as droughts and floods, the locust outbreak in East Africa, and diseases such as HIV-Aids, Malaria, and Ebola, and recently, the coronavirus. The African state at large does not have the requisite resilience to deal with such pressures. Many African states are also electoral democracies, but do not have the attributes of liberal democracies. Falling short of liberal democracy, electoral democracy has not delivered on the dividends of democracy such as inclusive, responsive, and accountable institutions, increased welfare and opportunity, shared growth, social justice, and broadly available and shared political goods. Kenya reflects all articulated fragilities of the African state. In addition, although state fragility may be 'latent', 'a halting place', be 'a fragile moment', this study is primarily concerned with 'open fragility', 'structural fragility', 'chronic fragility', 'states locked in a fragility trap', or 'states in a fragility equilibrium', as is the case in Kenya. As intimated above, the concern is with all three levels of fragility in Kenya: (1) at the macro state level, focusing on state institutions; (2) at the intermediate level, focusing on state-society relations; (3) at the micro level, focusing on groups within society.

The theory on state fragility contends that state fragility is generated by two forms of poor state performance: (1) a capacity deficit and/or a political will deficit (i.e., underperformance); (2) fault-lines, malfunctions, and breakdowns in state institutions, in state-society-relations, and in group relations, all of which demonstrate institutional failure (i.e., misperformance). One must concede that there is a level of capacity deficit in Kenya. Kenya, as a lower middle-income country, does not have the economy of Nigeria or South Africa, calculated at US$446.543 billion and US$358.839 billion respectively, in nominal GDP, based on 2019 figures. Kenya does, though, have the third largest economy in sub-Saharan Africa since 2019, at US$98.607 billion nominal GDP in 2019 (IMF, 2019:The Internet). One must also concede that the Kenyan state has been hollowed out by historical factors such as colonialism and the inequitable global political-economy. State fragility in Kenya is however defined by post-colonial (mis)governance, including neopatrimonialism and corruption, as Rotberg (2003) and others have found. A fact also stressed in this current study. With the third largest economy in sub-Saharan Africa, Kenya is not at the apex of state fragility as a function of a capacity deficit.

Evidence suggests that whatever underperformance exists in key indicators such as delivering political goods, performing state functions, or enhancing social cohesion, emanate less from a capacity deficit such as economic weakness and more from misperformance and institutional failure. Between 2005 and 2019 Kenya's average scores on the Fragile States Index reflect the following areas of fragility, chronologically descending, matched with their severity indicators: demographic pressures (8.8), factionalised elites (8.7), group grievances (8.4), state legitimacy (8.2), refugees and IDPs (8.1), uneven economic development (8.0), external intervention (7.9), public services (7.8), security apparatus (7.8), and human rights and rule of law (7.1). These indicators combine to reveal misperformance and malfunctions in state institutions, state-society relations, and society-society (group) relations. The misperformance and malfunctions that are demonstrated by these indicators contrast with what the indicators human flight and brain drain (7.7), and economic decline (7.1) show. Higher scores on human flight and brain drain, and on economic decline, would have suggested a capacity deficit, i.e., underperformance based on economic weakness and lack of requisite human capital. Instead of being unable to ‘act right’, Kenya simply and actively choose not to ‘act right’ as an accountable and responsive state, particularly regarding marginalised sections of its society (see Chapters 6 to 8).

There also needs to be a distinction between *government* capacity, *societal* capacity, and *state* capacity. The institutional approach to state-building (focusing on the macro institutional state level), as well as current ineffective and counterproductive CVE, have tended to put emphasis on building *government* capacity, thus separating state-building from nation-building. The social legitimacy approach to state-building, which includes both the intermediate and micro level state-society and society-society relations, tends to put emphasis on building *societal* capacity. Capacity and resilience, however, must balance government capacity and societal capacity by: (1) capacitating the government that runs the state; (2) capacitating the relationship between the state and society; (3) capacitating groups in society, within the state. State-building cannot be pursued separately from the nation-building that is designed to achieve social cohesion. Only then can state-building and CVE be effective and productive, ameliorating the state fragility conditions that have generated Islamist violent extremism and impediments to CVE in the first place. In the case in Kenya, it is foolhardy and counterproductive to capacitate the government institutions that run the state, without mending the structural flaws and malfunctions within state institutions, without mending state-society relations, and without mending the deep divisions within Kenyan society. To do so, would reproduce state ineffectiveness, misperformance, and illegitimacy, keeping the state locked in an insecurity dilemma, a fragility trap, and a conflict trap, all scenarios observable in Kenya today (see Chapters 6 to 8).

Notwithstanding the lack of consensus about the concept of the state, as well as the concept, indicators, causes and consequences, of state fragility, in the final analysis state fragility may be understood to be a variable condition. Variable in time and space, affecting states, institutions, regions, and societies. Said variable condition is defined by structural flaws, institutional failure, and varying levels of weakness, across some, most, or all, institutions of the state and dimensions of the state. These weaknesses notably relate to the performance of state functions, the sharing of political goods in an equitable manner, adherence to the rule of law, and accountability to society. These weaknesses are therefore not only about the lack of capacity or political will. Weaknesses also result when such capacity and political will, when it exists, is abused, or misused by the government that runs the state. Accordingly, both underperformance and misperformance create weaknesses. Because it results from underperformance and misperformance in state institutions, state fragility also finds expression as weaknesses, and finally breakdowns, in the relationship between the state and society, and relations between groups in society. A Fragile state is therefore weak across various indicators. These indicators are contested, so too is their weighting. A fragile state also, at variable levels, does not serve its society or sections of its society, and sows divisions in society.

Consequently, state fragility generates popular discontent. Society or groups in society start questioning and even challenging the authority and legitimacy of the state. Ultimately, state fragility generates insecurity, conflict, and various permutations of violence. Fragile states are therefore defined by incapacitating and conflict-generating properties, including weak and abusive structures of governance and authority, human rights abuses, poor policies and limited administrative capacity, endemic corruption, and extraction of rents from the population, unequal economic development, social tensions and lack of social cohesion, and political and socio-economic instability. Collier *et al* (2018:16) conclude that state fragility is “a syndrome of interlocking characteristics”. This fragility syndrome must be understood not only based on current socio-economic and political conditions, but also in a historical and geopolitical context, as the case in Kenya demonstrates.

The central proposition of the study is that the properties of state fragility do not only provide the context (setting) and opportunity (permissive causes), but generates (drives, causes) Islamist violent extremism and impediments to CVE, ultimately resulting in failure of CVE. The Kenyan state is seen as both agent and structure, and in this sense agency and structure are seen as real entities that have causal capacity and tendency. In building the causal explanation, and in employing the construct of the *arc of insecurity*, the study develops a within-case causal explanation, with spatial variation and analysis in a single-embedded design, by demonstrating that variation in state fragility (X or *explanans*), generates the contingent variation in Islamist violent extremism and barriers to CVE (Y or *explanandum*). I can consequently demonstrate that Islamist violent extremism is more virulent, and barriers to CVE are more obstinate, in areas where the indicators of state fragility are most evidenced.

I further demonstrate, through employing theorised causal sequences, with temporal variation and analysis in a longitudinal design, how particular generative causal mechanisms, based on the indicators of state fragility which are related to historical markers in Kenya, release causal powers in the relationship between state fragility, Islamist violent extremism, and barriers to CVE. The fragility indicators are based on the Fragile States Index, and the historical markers span from the *Shifta* war (1963-1968) to Operation *Linda Boni* (since 2015). The sequenced evidence shows how the time order, from the ‘Big Bang’ of independence in 1963, was initiated in this causal process, thus explaining, since the 1990s, the origins and evolution of the relationship between state fragility, Islamist violent extremism, and barriers to CVE. I build a mechanisms-based explanation that involves social structures (entities) that have attributes or properties (with causal capacities and causal tendencies), that engage in actions (activities), generating (causing): (1) Islamist violent extremism; (2) barriers to CVE.

The next chapter deals with Islamist violent extremism by conceptualising Islamist violent extremism, outlining Islamist violent extremism as an ideology and a movement, the objectives thereof, and the major inconsistencies and irreconcilables within Islamism or Islamist violent extremism. The chapter further outlines three analytical frameworks and three theoretical perspectives that are associated with Islamist violent extremism. The analytical frameworks are the clash of civilisations, globalisation and uncertainty, and local conditions. The theoretical perspectives are psychological, instrumentalist, and organisational, approaches. These three approaches or perspectives are presented as alternative theoretical propositions to state fragility, in explaining Islamist violent extremism, in Kenya.

CHAPTER 4: ISLAMIST VIOLENT EXTREMISM: ANALYSIS AND THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES

4.1 INTRODUCTION

Since 2005, violent extremism (VE), the global struggle against violent extremism (GSAVE), and CVE, are part of the discourse on state fragility and state-building, and on security and development in general. The study of these concepts and phenomena is now an integral part of the curriculum of various academic programmes, including programmes in terrorism studies. But what is violent extremism? I illustrated in Chapter 1, section 1.1 *Background* how violent extremism applies to varied identity-based ideological traditions, including racial, ethnic, and religious ideological categories. The focus of this study is violent extremism as it applies to one identity-based religious-political ideology, viz., *Islamism*. Therefore, the question to ask is: What is *Islamist* violent extremism (IVE)?

Linked to the above, are other related questions: Is Islamist violent extremism equated with terrorism? Is Islamism an ideology that informs terrorism? What is the intention and objectives of Islamism? What is Islamism (as opposed to Islam)? What is extremism, as opposed to what, the mainstream? If the yardstick is the mainstream, then what is and should be the mainstream or the centre? Is extremism equated with radicalism and fundamentalism? Is extremism equated with political violence? Does non-violent extremism exist? What are the linkages between state fragility and Islamist violent extremism or Islamism? Which analytical frameworks and theoretical perspectives are linked with Islamist violent extremism? In answering these and other questions related to the theory and analysis of, and perspectives on Islamist violent extremism, this chapter is divided into three broad parts.

The first part deals with the varied notions of Islamist violent extremism or Islamism. As such it includes definitions, linkages with terrorism, radicalisation, and fundamentalism, the drivers of Islamism, and Islamism as an ideology and a movement, the intention and objectives of Islamism, and the major inconsistencies and irreconcilables within Islamism. The second part addresses three analytical frameworks linked to Islamism, viz., the clash of civilisations, globalisation and uncertainty, and local conditions. The third part of the chapter covers three theoretical approaches inked to Islamism, viz., psychological, instrumentalist, and organisational, approaches. These three approaches are presented as alternative theoretical propositions to state fragility, offered in explaining Islamist violent extremism. In all three parts of the chapter, I address the context of Kenya as an explanatory setting and context in the relationship between state fragility and Islamist violent extremism.

4.2 ISLAMIST VIOLENT EXTREMISM

In Chapter 1, section 1.1 *Background*, I outline that Islamism or Islamist violent extremism finds expression in extremist narratives, and finally in political violence, most notably in three violent campaigns, viz., terrorism, insurgency, and proto-states. Islamist violent extremists range from cell-based terror groups, revolutionaries, popular militias, to insurgents (Glazzard *et al* (2017:1). I show later that with this classification, *al-Shabaab* is primarily cell-based, albeit with insurgent elements at the height of its military strength between 2006 and 2012. In Chapter 2, section 2.4.1 *Case selection*, I noted that in Kenya Islamism manifests primarily through terrorist activity. With Islamist terrorist activity employed as an indicator of Islamism, I utilise, among other measures, the Global Terrorism Index as an analytical measuring instrument of Islamist terrorist activity. I also utilise other sources of evidence to provide (1) trace, (2) accounts, (3) patterns, and (4) sequences, evidence, of Islamism.

The Global Terrorism Index defines and measures terrorist activity according to the following criteria: (1) attacks, (2) fatalities, (3) injuries, (4) damage to property, and (5) impact. The first four elements are calculated annually, and the fifth element, i.e., impact, is calculated over a five-year period. The index ranks terrorist activity on a scale of 0.00 to 10.00, with 10.00 indicating the highest impact of terrorism and 0.00 indicating no impact of terrorism (IEP, 2018:6, 83-84, 2019:6, 90-91, 2020a:6, 96-97). The measuring scale of the index, which employs six terrorism impact ranges, is indicated on the left (IEP, 2020a:8-9, 2022:8-9).[76] In the period under review, 2001 to 2019, Kenya has the lowest score (*low* impact) of 2.50 in 2004, the worst score of 6.60 (*high* impact) in 2014, *high* impact scores (6.00 - 7.99) between 2013 and 2017, *medium* impact scores of 5.76 in 2018 and 5.64 in 2019, and an average *medium* impact score of 5.04 between 2001 and 2019 (IEP, 2020b:The Internet).

1	**Very high impact**	8.00 - 10.00
2	**High impact**	6.00 - 7.99
3	**Medium impact**	4.00 - 5.99
4	**Low impact**	2.00 - 3.99
5	**Very low impact**	0.01 - 1.99
6	**No impact**	0.00

I also introduced the contested landscape of terrorism in Chapter 1, section 1.8.1 *Key concepts*. By illustration, Kenya's National Strategy to Counter Violent Extremism characterises terrorist organisations and the employment of terrorism as "typically structured as revolutionary vanguard organisations whose employ of violence is intended to broaden their ideological appeal to a larger religious/racial/ethnic/social grouping. They utilise violence without legal or moral restraints and use front groups and a disguised command-and-control hierarchy for propaganda, ideological indoctrination, and mass mobilisation" (Republic of Kenya, 2016a:7). Such emotive definitions, which abound in terrorism discourse and terrorism studies, may obscure more than they clarify.

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[76] The Global Terrorism Index was not published in 2021. In the 2022 edition the Global Terrorism Index changed its main data source from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) to TerrorismTracker, and changed its methodology, now measuring terrorism in terms of (1) attacks, (2) fatalities, (3) injuries, and (4) hostages per annum (not damage to property anymore), weighted over five years. With the latest 2022 edition of the index, the measuring scale and ranges on the index remain unchanged (IEP, 2022:2, 8-9, 88-90).

Loza's (2007) definition of terrorism is perhaps more useful. Loza (2007:142) defines terrorism as "the calculated use of unexpected, shocking, and unlawful violence against combatants in order to intimidate or coerce a government or civilian population to accept demands on behalf of an underlying ideology or cause". Carter (2012:66) similarly defines terrorism as "a tactical method used to invoke fear among different governments to promote political change". The 2022 Global Terrorism Index defines terrorism as "the systematic threat or use of violence whether for or in opposition to established authority, with the intention of communicating a political, religious or ideological message to a group larger than the victim group, by generating fear and so altering (or attempting to alter) the behaviour of the larger group" (IEP, 2022:6). Although three definitions by different sources, all three represent one view, viz., stressing the instrumental purpose and utility of terrorism. I elaborate later in this chapter in section 4.3.2 *Theoretical perspectives*, on the opposing views regarding the purpose and utility of terrorism as represented by instrumentalist approaches versus organisational approaches. Whereas instrumentalist approaches view terrorism as instrumental and effective, organisational approaches view terrorism as irrational (an end it itself) and ineffective.

The contested terrain of terrorism also includes the actors involved. A dominant view asserts that only non-state actors may be classified as terrorists. This view is reflected through the Global Terrorism Index. An alternative view maintains that the state, through state agents, also engages in terrorism. This view is reflected through the Political Terror Scale. By illustration, for an incident to be included in the Global Terrorism Index as a terrorist act, it must be "an intentional act of violence or threat of violence by a non-state actor". The act must be: (1) intentional; (2) defined by violence or the threat of violence; (3) committed by a non-state actor; (4) "aimed at attaining a political, economic, religious or social goal"; (5) providing "evidence of an intention to coerce, intimidate or convey some other message to a larger audience other than to the immediate victims"; (6) "outside the precepts of international humanitarian law" (IEP, 2019:6, 2020a:6).[77] The Global Terrorism Index reflects traditional terrorism studies by excluding any other violent acts, including those by state and supra-state actors, from being defined as terrorism.[78] Schmid (2004a:384-385, 2011b:39, 42-44, 2013:11) contends that the state claims and pursues exclusive definition power on terrorism. The state therefore becomes the final defining agency and authority regarding what is terrorism and what is not, who is a terrorist and who is not. Terrorism consequently defies objective definition and consensus definition. Schmid (2004a:397, 2013:11) maintains that terrorism therefore, as criminalised and delegitimised violence and method, becomes either 'violence that you don't like', 'violence I don't support', 'unacceptable violent behaviour', or 'anti-state political violence'.

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[77] With the change in the main data source from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) to TerrorismTracker in 2022, the definition of terrorism has also changed on the Global Terrorism Index. The index no longer emphasises violence 'by a non-state actor' but refers to violence 'for or in opposition to established authority' instead, suggesting that terrorism can be committed by both state and non-state actors. The Global Terrorism Index, however, continues to record only terrorism by non-state actors (IEP, 2020a:6, 2022:6, 8-9, 88-90).

I elaborate on this contested terrain of terrorism in the context of Kenya in Chapter 6, section 6.5.2 *The long-war in Kenya*, in which I highlight the departure of critical terrorism studies from traditional terrorism studies about the nature and intentions of terrorism and the actors involved. In Chapter 5, section 5.3 *Ending violent Islamist extremist campaigns*, I also deal with this contested landscape, noting that terrorism has historically rarely succeeded in attaining its strategic objectives such as regime change, as opposed to its symbolic, tactical, and organisational objectives (see also section 4.2. *Conceptualising Islamist violent extremism*, regarding the differentiated objectives of terrorism). In the fifth chapter I also highlight various pathways, CVE among them, of ending Islamist extremist campaigns. These Islamist campaigns relate to terrorism, insurgency, and proto-states.

'New terrorism' (since the 1990s) is motivated by religious and ethnic identity, as opposed to 'old terrorism' (1970s and 1980s), which was motivated by political, ideological, and geopolitical interests (Choi and Piazza, 2016:42). This trend is evidenced in Kenya. Islamist terrorism in Kenya is associated with ethnic-Somalis and other Muslims, and their coethnics and coreligionists outside Kenya, particularly from Somalia. Whilst Islamism is largely associated with ethnic-Somalis and other Muslims, there is a growing trend of Islamism finding fertile ground with other marginalised ethnic groups and new converts to Islam in Kenya (see Chapters 6 to 8). Having identified terrorism as *the* violent campaign of Islamism in Kenya, the question remains: What is Islamist violent extremism?

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[78] In Chapter 8, section 8.3.1 *Cohesion indicators and impediments to CVE*, I detail the Political Terror Scale (PTS), through which I demonstrate high levels of state terrorism between 1990 and 2019 in Kenya. Reflective of critical terrorism studies, the PTS records human rights violations such as torture, extra-judicial killings, and clandestine imprisonment, by agents of the state, and classifies these acts as state terrorism or state (political) terror. Consistently since 2012, Kenya's score on the Political Terror Scale is recorded at level four (out of five levels), indicating that state terrorism in Kenya has 'expanded to large sections of society' that 'engage in politics or political ideas'. I show in Chapter 8, section 8.3 *State fragility and the development of impediments to CVE*, that state terrorism is often carried out in CVE operations such as Operation *Usalama* Watch (2014), targeting ethnic-Somalis and other Muslims as an identity group that is identified with Islamist terrorism, thus contributing to ineffective and counterproductive CVE, and the increased radicalisation that is observable in Kenya.

Below I address: (1) a conceptualisation of Islamist violent extremism; (2) Islamism as an ideology and a movement; (3) the intention and objectives of Islamism; (4) contradictions with Islamism.

4.2.1 Conceptualising Islamist Violent Extremism

I outlined in Chapter 1 that the construct *violent extremism* was introduced in 2005. This concept is either (1) equated with terrorism, or (2) seen as a generic concept for politically motivated violence, of which terrorism is only one form, or (3) mostly seen as an ideology and a movement that informs terrorist activity (ACSS, 2016:4). This study adopts the third understanding of violent extremism and defines violent extremism as *identity-based ideologies and movements, constituted by linked but at times competing organisations, that often espouse violence, including terrorism*. In concert, Striegher (2015:79) defines violent extremism as “ideologies that oppose societal principles and values and justify the use of violence in order to advocate particular beliefs - including racial, [ethnic], religious, or political”. Violent extremism may therefore be applied to a range of identity-based categories, but as Glazzard and Zeuthen (2016:1) point out, violent extremism is predominantly applied to Islamism.[79]

Whilst I take cognisance of these varied categories, the focus of the study is *Islamist* violent extremism (used interchangeably with *Islamism* in this study). What we know and how we know about Islamist violent extremism is fiercely contested. Consequently, one of the objectives of this study is to add to a realistic understanding of Islamist violent extremism. A caveat before I proceed. Although I cover various themes and tenets of this ideology and movement, and its dominant expression, which is terrorism, this study is not designed to be an exhaustive account of these themes and tenets. I therefore cover only those aspects that are pertinent to the aim and objectives of the study.

To proceed, ‘Islamist’ and ‘violent’ are descriptors of extremism. I pointed out in Chapter 1, section 1.1. *Background* that there is a distinction between Islam or Islamic, as opposed to Islamism or Islamist. Islam refers to the religion, and Islamic refers to features of the religion or adherents of the religion. Islamism on the other hand refers to a movement-organisation, a form of government, and/or a totalitarian religious-political ideology (Mozaffari, 2007:17, 21-23; Borum, 2011a:10-11). The descriptor 'Islamist' thus refers to features or adherents of such a movement, organisation, ideology, or government. Very few adherents of Islam are Islamists, but all Islamists follow Islam, even though they espouse a very particular and not broadly shared view of Islam. Mozaffari (2007:21) accordingly defines Islamism as, "a religious ideology with a holistic interpretation of Islam whose final aim is the conquest of the world by all means". However, this 'conquest of the world', i.e., the creation of a 'global Caliphate', is not shared by all Islamists as indicated below, and elaborated later in the chapter.

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[79] Added to ethnic, racial, and religious categories, violent extremism can also be applied to gender. The Canadian government recognises ‘violent political misogyny’ as a shared ideology and a form of violent extremism. Canada has also classified several attacks and acts of violence against females, by males that have ‘a history of hatred and violence against women’, as ‘violent extremism’ and ‘terrorism’ (notably, not as ‘hate crimes’). Forming a relatively narrow and nascent extremist category, violent political misogyny groups, broadly seeking a society where females are subordinated, are associated mostly with the ‘involuntary celibate’ (INCEL) and ‘men going their own way’ (MGTOW) movements (see Duriesmith *et al*, 2018; Orr, 2019; Bell, 2020).

Islamism has come to be associated with violent campaigns (i.e., terrorism, insurgency, and proto-states) that are intended to (1) create theocracies in the form of Islamic states, and (2) enforce the canonical law of Islam, the *Sharia*. These two objectives are to be achieved, expansively, all over the world (creating the global Caliphate), or more narrowly, in Muslim lands (creating Islamic states).[80] I outlined in Chapter 1, section 1.1 *Background*, that Islamist insurgencies and proto-states have been found in sub-Saharan Africa most notably in central and southern Somalia, northern Nigeria, and northern Mali, and in other parts of the world, including parts of Yemen, Iraq, Syria and Afghanistan. In Kenya, Islamism has not developed into these wider campaigns. I also outlined in Chapter 2, section 2.4.1 *Case Selection*, that while Islamism manifests in terrorism in Kenya, the Kenyan government and the KDF have battled an *al-Shabaab* insurgency and proto-state in central and southern Somalia with Operation *Linda Nchi* (2011-2012) and as part of AMISOM since 2012. The future development of Islamist violent extremism into these wider campaigns in Kenya therefore cannot be discounted.

The definitions provided in the introductory chapter identify Islamism as an ideology that is linked with political violence, in pursuit of socio-economic, religious, and political objectives. Adding to these definitions, the Africa Center for Strategic Studies defines Islamist violent extremism as "the ideas and conditions that encourage or facilitate [and justifies] the emergence and persistence of terrorism" (ACSS, 2016:4). In describing their campaign of seeking to establish an Islamic state in Somalia and East Africa, *al-Shabaab* also speaks of "a war of ideology that is deeply rooted in Islamic doctrine …. The *Mujahideen*'s CoG [centre of gravity], their source of strength, is intangible; it is an ideological strength" (Gaidi Mtaani, 2012b:10, 11). This political-religious ideology and its objectives therefore distinguishes Islamism as an international thought system and a trans-national movement. The manifestation of this ideology, Islamist terrorism, dominate latter-day terrorism. I outlined in the introductory chapter in section 1.1 *Background*, that four Islamist groups, viz., *Taliban*, IS, ISKP, and *Boko Haram*, were responsible for 57.8 percent (9, 223) of all terrorism related deaths in 2018. In

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[80] Given the distinction between Islamic and Islamist, it is perhaps more accurate to refer to 'Islamist' states. This study however defers to the common usage of 'Islamic' states, rather than what would be more accurately called 'Islamist' states. See section 4.2.3 *The intention and objectives of Islamist violent extremism*.

2019, yet again four Islamist groups, viz., *Taliban*, IS, *Boko Haram*, and *al-Shabaab*, were responsible for 55 percent (7, 578) of all terrorism related deaths in 2019. This pattern continues. In 2021 another four Islamist groups, viz., IS, *Taliban*, *al-Shabaab*, and JNIM, were responsible for almost half of all terrorism related deaths, i.e., 47 percent (3, 364 deaths).[81] ISKP (the IS affiliate in Afghanistan) was responsible for the deadliest terrorist attack in 2021, killing 170 people and injuring over 200 in a suicide bomb attack on 26 August at the Kabul International Airport during the US evacuation, following the fall of the Afghanistan government on 15 August (IEP, 2022:4, 10, 15, 86).

Having defined Islamism, the concepts 'violent' and 'extremism' may be explained by the notions of 'extremism of method' and 'extremism of thought'. Extremism of method and extremism of thought relate to behavioural radicalisation and cognitive radicalisation respectively, as noted later in section 4.2.2.3 *Extremism of thought and extremism of method*. Extremism and radicalisation, therefore, are not always violent or 'behavioural', thus may be exclusively conceptual and cognitive. Extremism of method and behavioural radicalisation, on the other hand, are defined by violence, which is the focus of this study. The conception of violence as a descriptor of, and as involved in, extremism and radicalisation, is wider than overt, intentional, direct, physical, kinetic force. In this regard, I appropriate Johan Galtung's (1969, 1990) classic definition of violence, and its opposite, peace.

Johan Galtung (1969:168-169) explains that violence occurs when persons, groups, and communities, experience deliberate and avoidable social orders that they find to be highly unacceptable. The understanding of these social orders extends to all aspects of public life, within, and between, states. Galtung (1990:292) maintains that these intentional and avoidable social orders, resulting from physical violence and structural violence, undermine the 'ecological balance' of human beings. This ecological balance relates to, and is dependent on achieving, four basic human needs, viz., survival, well-being, identity, and freedom. Johan Galtung (1990:291) further explains that whereas physical violence and structural violence are about the *use* of violence, cultural violence is about the *legitimation* of the use of violence. Johan Galtung (1969:169-177, 1990:291-292, 294, 296-300) consequently outlines three related forms of violence, what he calls 'a vicious violence triangle'.

The first is physical or direct violence. This relates to actions leading to damage, destruction, harm, injury, or death, linked to specific events such as protests, riots, terrorist activity, insurgencies, and wars. Such violence includes government actions linked to the suppression of these events, including counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency as such. The second form is structural or indirect violence. Such violence relates to damage and harm resulting from conditions and processes by social, political, religious, and economic structures, leading to social injustice. These conditions and processes include the denial of human rights and sources of economic opportunity and livelihood, the denial of economic opportunity and political representation, the denial of access to public goods and social services, social exclusion, and the suppression of religious or political beliefs and freedoms. The third form of violence, viz., cultural violence, is the justification for both physical and structural violence, expressed through religion, ideology, language, art, *et cetera*. Cultural violence is based on invariant beliefs of racial, ethnic, class, political and religious supremacy, or otherwise it is based on the defence of racial, ethnic, class, political and religious identities, or retaliation for perceived past and/or present injustices. Galtung (1969, 1990) concludes that this ‘violence triangle’, in its undermining of the ‘ecological balance’ of human beings, results in ‘deliberate and avoidable social orders’ that are found to be highly unacceptable.[82] Hence the development of popular discontent and political violence.

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[81] *Jama'at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin* (JNIM) is an *al-Qaeda* affiliate that operates in the Maghreb Region, and is most active in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger (IEP, 2022:17-18, 46).

In this study I employ Islamist terrorist activity as the empirical substantiation (i.e., indicator) of Islamist violent extremism. Terrorist activity however records and measures physical violence alone. Physical violence in this context refers to personal-somatic harm, injury or death, and damage or destruction of property, and the impact thereof, because of Islamist terrorism. However, Islamist violent extremism is linked with all three forms of violence as identified by Johan Galtung. To illustrate, acts of physical violence like kidnappings, beheadings, mass-shootings, and bombings, defines Islamist terrorism. Structural and cultural violence on the other hand are often attributed to those governments and societies that are the target and source of the blame system of Islamist violent extremism. The ‘blame system’ is used here to refer to the beliefs of Islamists, based on their histories and lived experiences, about who is to blame, or who or what is responsible, for their plight, conditions, grievances, or the lot of Muslims.[83] Cultural violence by Islamists is often in the context of justifying the use of physical violence in defence of Islam or Muslims, or in retaliation against injustices meted out against Islam or Muslims (see section 4.2.2.2 *Existential threats to Islam and Muslims*).

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[82] Peace is the opposite of violence. Galtung (1969) distinguishes between ‘negative peace’ and ‘positive peace’. Galtung (1969:183) explains that the absence of physical violence is equated with negative peace, whereas positive peace requires the absence of both physical and structural violence. Later Galtung (1990) extends these two notions of peace to include ‘cultural peace’, meaning ‘the absence of cultural violence’. Galtung (1990:291, 302) concludes that a ‘peace culture’ engenders cultural, structural, as well as physical, peace, meaning: the absence of all three forms of violence. The Institute for Economics and Peace (2021b:74) defines negative peace as “the absence of violence or [the absence of] the fear of violence”, and positive peace as “the attitudes, institutions and structures that create and sustain peaceful societies”. Eight pillars/measures of positive peace are listed: a well-functioning government; equitable distribution of resources; sound business environment; free flow of information; low levels of corruption; good relations with neighbours (sub-state and state levels); acceptance of the rights of others; high levels of human capital (IEP, 2021b:61-62, 2022:57-58).

[83] Homer-Dixon (1994:26) use the concept of the blame system, what he calls the ‘subjective blame system’, in the context of the causal relationship between environmental scarcity and violent conflict.

Added to these three forms of violence, the intention and utility of violence is often instrumental, i.e., a means to an end, in pursuit of social, economic, religious, and political objectives. This intention and utility of terrorism also includes the notion of terrorism as a communication strategy. Max Abrahms (2005:529) however argues that organisations such as *al-Qaeda* have been ineffective in using terrorism to convince their target states of their motivation, objectives, capabilities, and resolve. Abrahms (2005:531) concludes that if *al-Qaeda*'s intention is to eject the US and its influence out of the Middle-East and the Muslim world, then *al-Qaeda* has failed to convince the US that the US foreign policy injustices are the reason for being the target of terror attacks. Instead, the US believes that Islamist organisations such as *al-Qaeda* have an uncompromising hatred and discontent for liberal democracies and Christianity, and thus formulate the terrorist threat as existential and not policy induced, and therefor non-negotiable. The apparent failure of the instrumental use of terrorism as a communication strategy may also be evident in Kenya. It appears *al-Shabaab* has not effectively used terrorism to convince Kenya of their intention and objectives, and their ability, will, and resolve.[84]

With the notion of instrumental violence (see section 4.3.2.2 *Instrumentalist approaches*), there is an alternative organisational view. This view is that terrorism may be pursued as an end in itself or at least the notion that terrorist violence is often contradictory or undermines terrorism's stated objectives, and therefore does not often achieve these objectives. Terrorism, consequently, is deemed to be neither rational nor effective (see section 4.3.2.3 *Organisational approaches*). In contrast, Robert

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[84] Whilst being ineffective in convincing an adversary about your resolve and capability is one thing, being 'ineffective' in convincing an adversary about your motivation and objectives is another. However clearly and consistently you communicate, the content of your communication and the purpose of your actions (intention) may be inconvenient and/or unacceptable to your adversary and accordingly deliberately ignored, misinterpreted, or rejected, and therefore rendered ineffective. Islamist intentions include the US foregoing its interests in the Muslim world, the breaking-up of the Kenyan state, and the Islamisation of parts of Kenya. Max Abrahms (2005:532-533) very briefly explores this reality (deliberately misinterpreting or rejecting clear communication) but opts to disregard it. Abrahms (2005:533) concludes that the US "does not agree in the first place with the claim that terrorism directed against America derives from its unpopular Middle East policies". In contrast to *al-Qaeda*'s 'miscommunication' (as Abrahms (2005) puts it), after 18 years (in 2019) of the long-war in Afghanistan, it appears the US, having decided to negotiate an exit strategy from Afghanistan and not to interfere in the domestic politics of Afghanistan any more, has clearly received and accepted the *Taliban*'s communication, and has been coerced by it, making terrorism in this instance 'effective' (see later in section 4.3.1.1 *The Clash of Civilisations*). In Chapter 6, section 6.5.2 *The long-war in Kenya*, I probe the question whether *al-Shabaab* has been ineffective in communicating its intent and objectives in Kenya, or whether the Kenyan state, in interpreting the threat as existential, and dismissing *al-Shabaab* as 'extremist-terrorists-criminals', deliberately chooses this interpretation because it is convenient. Meaning, if the threat is existential and not policy induced, and if *al-Shabaab* are terrorist criminals, then the threat and *al-Shabaab* are accordingly non-negotiable and illegitimate, and their violent suppression is consequently justifiable and obligated.

Pape (2003:343, 345), in a study of terrorist attacks between 1980 and 2001, shows that terrorism not only has an instrumentalist and strategic logic, i.e., aimed at coercing changes in the policy of the target government, but has strategic success as well. The debate between these approaches, about the utility and purpose of terrorism, constitutes one of the great debates in terrorism studies.[85]

Cased on various factors, including purpose or intention, Marsden and Schmid (2011) outline typologies of terrorism. Marsden and Schmid (2011:171) assert that the purpose and types of terrorism range from instrumentalist, to symbolic, to communicative. Based on purpose, the different types of terrorism include: (1) coercive bargaining, i.e., instrumentalist, (2) for advertising and recruitment, i.e., symbolic violence, (3) to induce social paralysis, i.e., instrumentalist, and (4) to raise social conscience, i.e., communicative. Also based on purpose, Pape (2003:245) identifies two types of terrorism, viz., (1) demonstrative terrorism, i.e., aimed at attracting support to the organisation and to draw attention to the political cause, and (2) destructive terrorism, i.e., designed to inflict harm and induce fear, coercing an opponent into policy changes.[86] Likewise, Krause (2018:48, 51-52, 58) situates the objectives of terrorism at three levels, viz., tactical, organisational, and strategic. The tactical objective is designed to create fear, impose costs, or increase awareness. The organisational objective, what Abrahms (2012:367-368) calls ‘process goal’, is intended to maximise the strength of the organisation and to ensure its survival through ensuring increased recruits, funding, support, and status. The strategic objective, what Abrahms (2012:367-368) calls ‘outcome goal’, is to achieve political ends. These political ends are as varied as ending foreign occupation, creating an Islamic state, polarising society, and ‘killing an idea or spreading an idea’. Krause (2018:51) concludes that ‘success’ or ‘failure’ in terrorism may only be measured against the intent or objectives of terrorism. The defining agency must be the terrorist organisation itself (*al-Shabaab* in this instance).

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[85] The debate about the purpose and utility of terrorism is often based on methodological differences, not objective facts. Max Abrahms (2006b), reflective of organisational approaches, finds that terrorism is ineffective in ‘achieving its stated objectives’ and in ‘coercing the target state’. Abrahms’ (2006b:46-47) assessment of effectiveness is however limited to the ‘strategic’ objective of terrorism, what Abrahms (2012:367-368) later calls the ‘outcome goal’ of terrorism, and excludes what he calls the ‘operational’ and ‘tactical’ objectives. Max Abrahms and his colleagues also concede that there are other factors that determine success or failure, other than the terrorist organisation’s ‘effectiveness’, including: (1) *target selection*. Attacking civilians, rather than military targets or state infrastructure, often hardens the position of the state and gravely reduces chances of concessions; (2) *the type of objective*. Maximalist objectives, rather than limited objectives, make it less likely that the state will make concessions; (3) *the capability of the state*. More capable states are less susceptible to coercion and are therefore more effective in resisting terrorism (in Abrahms, 2006b:52-56, 2012:367, 373-374; Abrahams and Gottfried, 2016:83-84; Abrahms *et al*, 2017:899, 901-902; Abrahms and Conrad, 2017:281-282).

[86] Added to demonstrative and destructive terrorism, Robert Pape (2003:345) also identifies suicide terrorism, characterising it as ‘the most aggressive form of coercive terrorism’ that is defined by: “the attacker … not expect[ing] to survive a mission and often employ[ing] a method of attack that requires the attacker’s death in order to succeed (such as planting a car bomb, wearing a suicide vest, or ramming an airplane into a building)”.

The purposes of terrorism often converge, and a single terrorist attack may achieve more than one objective, by design or by accident. By illustration, Krause (2018:52, 57) finds that 9/11 was ‘a total tactical success’ as it ‘inspired significant fear’ and ‘caused more human and economic costs than any terrorist attack in history’. 9/11 was ‘a moderate organisational success’ as it contributed to *al-Qaeda* becoming ‘the centre of the jihadi movement’ and ‘one of longest lasting terrorist groups in history’. 9/11 was however ‘a strategic failure’, because the attack ‘neither coerced the US to leave the Middle East’, nor did it help *al-Qaeda* to ‘set up a new Islamic state’. But, 9/11 was also ‘a limited strategic success’ because it inspired ‘the highest rate of increase in the number of Salafi jihadis’.[87] In addition to the purpose and utility of terrorism, other debates within terrorism studies are centred around the definition of terrorism, the actors involved in terrorism, the causes of terrorism, the distinctions between ‘old’ and ‘new’ terrorism, and terrorism as ‘crime’ versus terrorism as legitimate political bargaining in the context of pressure politics and violent politics. Many of these debates often reflect the departure of critical terrorism studies from traditional or orthodox terrorism studies.[88]

In moving away from the purpose and utility of terrorist violence, as I note above, extremism does not always denote violence. There is therefore the notion of extremism of thought or cognitive radicalism. Disaggregated from violence, Islamism is believed to embrace beliefs, norms, and goals that are at the extreme of the political spectrum, far removed from the centre. However, to be ‘far removed from the centre’ is relative and contextual. Schmid (2014:11) makes the point that in 2014 Ayman al-Zawahiri, the leader of *al-Qaeda* Central, an ‘extremist’ organisation, renounced Islamic State for being ‘extremist’. Be that as it may, as Lake (2002:19) explains, what makes Islamists ‘extremist’ is (1) their beliefs and objectives that are not widely shared even within Muslim societies, and (2) they currently lack the means to obtain these objectives. I also highlight later in the chapter that among the ‘extremist’ notions of Islamism are the fundamentalist belief that Islam is the original and only true religion, opposed to other ‘false’ religions such as what Islamism pejoratively calls ‘worshippers of the cross’ (Christians). Another ‘extremist’ belief is the notion that a ‘global’ Caliphate is achievable.

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[87] I outlined in Chapter 1, section 1.1 *Background*, that the 2019 Global Terrorism Index correctly points out that since 9/11 “the number of Salafi-jihadist groups has more than doubled, their membership has tripled, and they are present in more countries than ever before” (IEP, 2019:82).

[88] In Chapter 2, section 2.4.2.1 *Multiple sources of evidence*, I indicated my reliance for this study on the body of knowledge in multiple disciplines and fields of study, including Political Science, Sociology, security studies, and terrorism studies. However, I draw only on those themes that are relevant to the aim and objectives of this study. I thus do not provide a detailed account of the debates in terrorism studies or a comparative analysis of traditional and critical terrorism studies. McCormick (2003), Schmid (2004a, 2004b, 2013), Burke (2008), Jackson (2007, 2008, 2010), Stohl (2008), Joseph (2009), Porpora (2011), Marsden and Schmid (2011), Spencer (2011), Crenshaw (2014b), Jarvis and Lister (2014), and Jarvis (2016) are good scholarly places to start for the debates in terrorism studies and the departure of critical terrorism studies from traditional terrorism studies.

The Islamist movement is divided about some of these beliefs and objectives. Within the Islamist movement Gerges (2009:1-2) sets apart (1) mainstream Islamists, and (2) jihadis. He further classifies jihadis as (1) transnationalist jihadis, (2) religious nationalists, and (3) irredentist jihadis. Mainstream Islamists such as the Egypt-based transnationalist Muslim Brotherhood and the religious nationalist *al-Jama'a al-Islamiyya*, i.e., Islamic Group, espouse peaceful means in achieving their objectives. Jihadis such as the transnationalist *al-Qaeda* and the Palestinian irredentist Hamas and the irredentist Afghan *Mujahideen*, espouse violent means to achieve their objectives. While these groups may be differentiated, it is important to note that these divisions are not invariable, but fluid.[89]

With differences in strategy and tactics, centred around violent versus non-violent means, what ties mainstream Islamists and jihadis, is their shared opposition to secularism, and their shared aspiration to Islamise the state by establishing Islamic states, or expansively the Caliphate, and the enforcement of the *Sharia*. Both mainstream Islamists and jihadis may be transnationalist, nationalist, or irredentist. Mainstream Islamists form the majority within the Islamist movement, whereas jihadis, since the 1990s, form a prominent minority (Gerges, 2009:1-2, 15; Schmid, 2014:9). This study focusses exclusively on the strand of Islamism that espouse political violence. Hence, the reference to Islamist *violent* extremism. Thus, unlike Gerges (2009), this study does not distinguish between 'mainstream Islamists' and 'jihadis'. The interest in this study is accordingly the three categories of Islamists, what Fawaz Gerges (2009) calls jihadis, viz., (1) transnationalist, (2) nationalist, and (3) irredentist. This study employs the concepts jihadis, Islamists, and *mujahideen* as equivalents, unless stated otherwise.

While Islamists share a singular religious-political ideology, they have varying interpretations of this ideology, and have varied aspirations in achieving the aims and objectives of this ideology, i.e., have either transnationalist, nationalist, or irredentist aspirations. According to Gerges (2009:1-2, 11-12, 15), transnationalist jihadis, in their opposition to the secular status quo and what is perceived as 'Western subversion of the Islamic way of life', see *al-adou al-baeed*, i.e., the far enemy, as the real enemy. The far enemy is defined as the Christian West, particularly the US and its allies, who are patrons of what are deemed to be apostate Muslim governments. Religious-nationalist jihadis on the other hand have the view that *al-adou al-qareeb*, i.e., the near enemy, is the real enemy. The near enemy is identified as apostate Muslim governments. Irredentist jihadis seek to liberate Muslim lands from foreign occupation and influence. Irredentist jihadis thus seek to reincorporate historically Muslim lands, currently under non-Muslim rule or occupation, back under Muslim rule.

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[89] The Muslim Brotherhood and *al-Jama'a al-Islamiyya* used to be jihadi movements. Founded in 1928, elements of the Muslim Brotherhood initially espoused violence, but since the 1970s the Muslim Brotherhood has pursued peaceful means, with social, political, and cultural institutions and branches in many parts of the Muslim world, making the Muslim Brotherhood a transnationalist mainstream Islamist organisation. *Al-Jama'a al-Islamiyya* was founded in the 1990s as a nationalist jihadi organisation based in Egypt, and since the 2000s *al-Jama'a al-Islamiyya* has transformed into a nationalist mainstream Islamist organisation, pursuing peaceful means. Some mainstream Islamists may support electoral democracy, even abandon the objective of Islamising the state, opting instead to represent Muslim interests in a secular state. Hamas is the acronym for the Palestinian-based *Harakat al-Muqawamah al-Islamiyya*, i.e., Islamic Resistance Movement. The Afghan *mujahideen* were the irredentist jihadis that resisted the 1979-1989 Soviet Union's occupation of Afghanistan (Sivan, 2003:25, 27; Gerges, 2009:1-2, 30, 40).

In view of Gerges' (2009) classification, is *al-Shabaab* an irredentist, nationalist, or transnationalist organisation? In Chapter 6, section 6.5.2 *The long-war in Kenya*, I show that from its founding in 2006, *al-Shabaab* has had a religious-nationalist orientation, with the objective of establishing an Islamic state in Somalia, and ridding Somalia of foreign influences. *Al-Shabaab*, however, also has irredentist aspirations, reigniting the objectives of the irredentist movement of the 1960s and 1970s, which sought to reincorporate all Somalis and Somali-lands, divided by colonialism, back into a 'Greater Somalia'. In 2012 *al-Shabaab* became a formal *al-Qaeda* Central affiliate in East Africa. This affiliation has transformed *al-Shabaab* into a transnationalist jihadi organisation in the mould of its patron, *al-Qaeda* Central. In this regard, *al-Shabaab* seeks to unite all Muslims and liberate Muslim lands (from secular or Christian rule and influence) in East Africa, and further afield. This transnationalist orientation has attracted a significant number of foreign jihadis into the ranks of *al-Shabaab*, including Kenyan nationals, enabling *al-Shabaab* to recruit Somali coethnics and Muslim coreligionists, and seeking to convert non-Muslims into Islam and Islamism, inside and outside of Somalia and Kenya.

Al-Shabaab thus espouses all three configurations, making *al-Shabaab* (1) transnational jihadis, (2) religious nationalists, and (3) irredentist jihadis, all at the same time. In Chapters 6 and 8, in the context of CVE, I demonstrate that while these three configurations may converge, coexist, and even be complementary, they most often diverge and clash. These three configurations may even be mutually exclusive, therefore leading to internal factionalism and fragmentation, as *al-Shabaab* and the 'global' Islamist movement often demonstrate. Given these three configurations, what kind of threat does *al-Shabaab* pose in Kenya? In Chapter 6, section 6.5.2, *The long-war in Kenya*, I outline that although *al-Shabaab* may not have articulated and pursued its objectives in Kenya in a clear, systematic, and coherent manner, one may discern short-term and long-term political objectives of Islamism in Kenya. These objectives include the ejection of Kenya and its influence in Somalia, the liberation of Muslim lands (and land belonging to ethnic-Somalis) in Kenya, as well as pursuing the achievement of equality and rights of Muslim coreligionists (and Somali coethnics) in Kenya. I come back to these issues in Chapter 6. Next, I revert to the conceptualisation of Islamist violent extremism as such.

Islamist violent extremism is generated by specific drivers or causes. The Africa Center for Strategic Studies (ACSS, 2016:8, 10, 12, 14) use extremism and radicalism interchangeably, and lists four types of drivers in this regard. The first type, *cultural* drivers, include (1) real or perceived attacks or threats to local cultural values, way of life, traditions, or beliefs, and (2) real or perceived inroads of other religious, political, or ideological systems in the local population. Second are *socio-economic* drivers. These drivers include (1) socio-economic disparities, (2) socio-economic exclusion and discrimination, (3) relative deprivation and frustrated expectations, all developing into grievances, and (4) financial gain and economic opportunity. Third are *political* drivers, which include (1) complicity, such as when governments or elites sponsor Islamist violent extremism, (2) government abuse, including the denial or violations of rights and liberties, and the repression of citizens, (3) disharmony and alienation, resulting from factors such as endemic corruption, impunity for elites, weak rule of law, government illegitimacy, unequal distribution of power and resources, and (4) structural factors, including a history of violent conflict, weak state institutions, and ungoverned spaces, which either feed grievances or provide opportunity or safe havens for Islamists. The fourth and last type of drivers are *group* and *individual* drivers. These drivers occur through but are not limited to (1) the normalisation of violence and the dehumanisation of 'the other', and (2) the role of the media and other non-state actors, such as the role of religious or ethnic based organisations in the radicalisation process.[90]

The above drivers are linked to so-called pull factors and push factors. Push factors such as unemployment, marginalisation, lack of opportunity, and government repression, 'push' or 'drive' an individual towards Islamist violent extremism. Pull factors such as attraction to violence, monetary incentives, or seeking protection, a sense of belonging, and religious rewards, 'pull' or 'draw' an individual towards Islamist violent extremism (Zeiger and Aly, 2015:3-4; Allan *et al*, 2015:11). Allen *et al* (2015:11) prefer 'factors' to 'drivers', explaining that "[f]actors, [a term derived from mathematics], usefully suggests that more than one is required to produce a given result". Khalil and Zeuthen (2016), on the other hand, are of the view that the binary category push factors and pull factors is overly simplistic. Instead, they offer three categories: structural motivators, individual incentives, and enabling factors. Khalil and Zeuthen (2016:9) maintain that structural motivators are broadly equivalent to push factors and individual incentives are broadly equivalent to pull factors. Whereas enabling factors may include pull factors, they *enable* rather than *motivate* or incentivise Islamist violent extremism. Schomerus *et al* (2017) reject the very notions of pull factors and push factors, and instead propose individual factors and community factors. Under individual factors, Schomerus *et al*

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[90] Denoeux and Carter (2009b:11-31) identify similar drivers, grouping them under three categories: socio-economic, political, and cultural.

(2017:2) include: personal relationships; beliefs, values, and convictions; manipulation; trauma, and humiliation. Under community factors, Schomerus *et al* (2017:2) include: history and narratives; the rejection of an external system; governance; business and crime; marginalisation, and lack of choices.

Whether one speaks of causes, drivers, factors, motivators, or incentives, or any other permutation (however conceived), from the foregoing one may discern the agreement that Islamist violent extremism is generated by a combination of multi-level factors and conditions. What is not in agreement is which of these factors and conditions are more defining than others. The UNDP (2017:xvii) report on violent extremism in Africa elaborates that, "[w]e know the drivers and enablers of violent extremism are multiple, complex and context specific, while having religious, ideological, political, economic and historical dimensions. They defy easy analysis, and [the] understanding of the phenomenon remains incomplete". This study, consequently, seeks to generate a comprehensive and realistic understanding of these factors or drivers, as embedded in the construct of state fragility and its indicators. Likewise, although Islamist violent extremism is multi-layered, it is often narrowed down to the notion of radicalisation. Borum (2011a, 2011b) consequently speaks of *radicalisation into violent extremism* (RVE), or what may be more accurately called *radicalisation into Islamist violent extremism* (RIVE). In Chapter 1, section 1.8.1 *Key concepts*, I outlined how radicalisation is often employed as both a cause of, and a process towards, Islamist violent extremism.[91] Kenya's National Strategy to Counter Violent Extremism (NSCVE) defines radicalisation as (Republic of Kenya, 2016a:6):

> a gradual or phased process that employs the ideological conditioning of individuals and groups to socialise them into violent extremism, and recruitment into terrorist groups or campaigns. It is dependent on a fanatical ideology that rejects dialogue and compromise in favour of a ends-justifies-ends approach, particularly in the willingness to utilise mass violence to advance political aims - defined in racial, ethnic, sectarian and religious terms - opposed to the democratic principles enshrined in Kenya's Constitution.

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[91] I need to highlight a dissenting view. Whilst extremism and radicalism are generally used as equivalents and therefore interchangeably, Schmid (2013, 2014) disagrees. Schmid (2014:14, 12) maintains that although both denote, 'removed from the centre', there is a nuanced difference. Extremists are 'closed-minded supremacists', and radicals are 'open-minded egalitarians'. Schmid (2013: 54-55, 7) further explains that 19th and 20th century radicals were 'liberal, anti-clerical, pro-democratic, and progressive non-violent activists', whereas 'radical Islam' points to 'an anti-liberal, fundamentalist, anti-democratic and regressive agenda'. The UNDP (2016b:17) also maintains that although in recent times radicalisation has come to be associated with 'an anti-liberal, anti-democratic, and religiously fundamentalist' agenda and violence, it is more accurate to speak of 'violent extremism' rather than 'radicalisation', as historically, 'radical movements' have tended to bring about 'positive societal change'. Based on Schmid (2013, 2014) and the UNDP (2016b), Islamists would then be extremists (i.e., right-wing, reactionary), and not radicals (i.e., left-wing, progressive). Be that as it may, as it is common currency in the context of Islamism or Islamist terrorism, I use 'extremism' and 'radicalism' interchangeably in this study.

There are, however, different kinds and levels of radicalisation as well as diverse actors involved in radicalisation. Radicalisation into Islamist violent extremism, or Islamist violent extremism as such, pertaining to primarily cell-based organisations such as *al-Shabaab*, may be conceived as follows:


TYPES AND LEVELS OF RADICALISATION
Behavioural radicalisation
Cognitive radicalisation
Macro (Society)
Meso (Community)
Micro (Individual)
CONCENTRIC RINGS OF RADICALISATION
The terror group
Sympathisers
Social movement radicals
Moderates
THE TERROR GROUP
Socially frustrated youths
Drifters & followers
Ideological activists

Created from Schmid (2013), Lake (2002), and Bjørgo (2011)

Although *al-Shabaab* is mainly cell-based, as demonstrated in Chapter 6, section 6.6 *Islamist violent extremist groups and combat units in Kenya*, *al-Shabaab* is also an insurgent organisation. The classification of *al-Shabaab* as an insurgent group is a particularly true description of the period prior to 2012. Cilliers (2015a:21, 23) maintains that between 2006 and 2012 is the period that *al-Shabaab* established a proto-state in central and southern Somalia. This period also represents the height of *al-Shabaab*'s military strength. Herein lies a key difference between terrorism and insurgency. Whereas terrorism does not seek to 'occupy ground', the hallmarks of insurgency are 'occupying ground' and 'liberated areas', as would be constituted in the creation of an Islamic proto-state. *Al-Shabaab* is therefore best defined as a terrorist-insurgency, albeit after 2012 they may lack the military means, contrary to their intent, to 'liberate' Muslims from local 'apostates' and foreign *kuffar* ('unbelievers'). From its founding in 2006, *al-Shabaab*'s military strength was gradually eroded by Ethiopia's military intervention in the same year, the deployment of AMISOM a year after (since 2007), and Kenya's military intervention with Operation *Linda Nchi* (2011-2012), all in support of Somalia's transitional government, and since 2012, by the federal government. *Al-Shabaab* is now kept in check by, among others, AMISOM, US forces, and Somalia's federal government forces (see Chapters 6 to 8).

Reverting to the conceptualisation of Islamist violent extremism as such, Okeyo and Abdisamad (2016:27) define radicalisation simply as the adoption of an extremist belief system. From this definition, one may deduce the notion of cognitive radicalisation (beliefs and ideas). But, what about behavioural radicalisation (methods and actions)? The UK's Home Office defines radicalisation as "[t]he processes by which people come to support terrorism and violent extremism and, in some cases, then join terrorist groups" (in Borum, 2011a:12). This definition extends cognitive radicalisation and introduces behavioural radicalisation (methods and actions). See the graphic above. Indicated earlier in the current chapter as well, cognitive radicalisation and behavioural radicalisation refer to extremism of thought and extremism of method respectively. To prevent unnecessary repetition, later in the chapter in section 4.2.2.3 *Extremism of thought and extremism of method*, I elaborate on these two types of radicalisation, viz., cognitive radicalisation and behavioural radicalisation. First, I consider the macro, meso, and micro levels of radicalisation, and other attributes of Islamist violent extremism.

The causes of radicalisation into Islamist violent extremism are found at different but interacting levels of analysis, viz., micro, meso, and macro levels. At the micro (individual) level, radicalisation refers to the psychological and ideological socialisation of individuals by Islamist propaganda, ideologues, recruiters, and organisations. At the meso (communities/groups) level, radicalisation results from supportive and complicit communities and groups, in the context of collective grievances, mobilisation, and action. The macro (society) level ascribe radicalisation to individual and group reactions to the actions of states, their governments, and societies, both at home and abroad. Push factors, as outlined earlier in the current section of the chapter, account for radicalisation at the macro level, and pull factors account for radicalisation at the micro and meso levels (Schmid, 2013:3-4; Frazer and Nünlist, 2015:2; Allen *et al*, 2015:11-12). Okeyo and Abdisamad (2016:28) link radicalisation to 'recruitment', which they define as "identifying, attracting, and indoctrinating new members into a terrorist organisation". Borum (2011a:14) speaks of 'enlistment', pointing out that contrary to the notion of recruitment, people want to join and volunteer to join Islamist organisations, "the majority 'join the *jihad*' through friendship and kinship". Botha (2014b:901-902) also observes that in the case in Kenya, collective religious and ethnic identity, and kinship, play important roles in the radicalisation process. Identity and kinship enhance a sense of belonging, solidarity, and pride, defining the *self* and the *other*, in this contest between *al-Shabaab* and the Kenyan state. However, it is important to note, as I elaborate later in the study (Chapters 6 to 8), that identity and kinship, just like Islam (the religion) itself, or the *madrassa* and the mosque, are all vectors or mediums of Islamist violent extremism, they are not the cause. The cause remains the debilitating and conflict generating properties of state fragility. It is these very same properties that have also generated impediments to CVE in Kenya.

Let me revert to radicalisation as such. The levels of radicalisation interact and should never be considered separate from one another (Denoeux and Carter, 2009a:4-5). However, as shown in the current chapter in section 4.3.2.1 *Psychological approaches*, radicalisation theory tends to stress micro radicalisation over meso and macro radicalisation. Contrastingly, I argue and demonstrate that it is state fragility, inclusive of the social structures that persist in the fragile state, that have causal capacity and tendency, that explains Islamist violent extremism and resistance to CVE. An individual is radicalised when her or his developing worldview and blame system lines up with that of an existing Islamist ideology and movement. This ideology and movement, in turn, is created in reaction to the conditions of state fragility. True to the Clausewitzian dictum: *War has its own grammar but not its own logic*; *war finds logic only in political intercourse* (von Clausewitz, 1984:605). Likewise, micro radicalisation only finds logic and meaning in the context of Islamist collective grievances, mobilisation, and action, as afforded by social structures found in meso and macro radicalisation.

Any relevant lone-wolf attack may be chosen in illustration, but let me take the 2016 Orlando, Florida, attack. The attacker was Omar Mateen, US-born, parents, Afghan emigrants. Mateen may or may not have been bisexual, homosexual, or homophobic, there are conflicting reports. Omar Mateen was reportedly self-radicalised and sympathetic to the cause of Islamic State (IS). Acting alone, he opened fire on patrons of a nightclub frequented by the LGBTQ+ community, killing 49 people and wounding 53 others. This attack was billed as "the worst terrorist attack on American soil since 9/11" (Lindell, 2016:The Internet). What logic, meaning, or significance does this event have outside of the specific context of the third wave of Islamist terrorism since the 1990s? Outside of this context such an event, narrowly represents a random criminal act, and broadly a hate-crime at the most. Micro radicalisation consequently loses any logic or meaning when it is artificially extricated from its context.[92]

The meso level explain how some communities would be more radicalised than others in the same society. These communities are more on the margins of society than others, forming discontented social, political, and economic, minorities. Accordingly, the insularity of Muslims and ethnic-Somalis in Kenya, unlike in other cases such as Uganda where they are more integrated in society, is one of the reasons why Islamist violent extremism has been able to gain more traction in Kenya (Van Metre, 2016:18; ICG, 2018:ii). Highlighting the interaction in the levels of radicalisation, Lake (2002:18) speaks of concentric rings of radicalisation that include: (1) moderates (the public); (2) social-movement radicals (who share goals); (3) sympathisers (they provide active support); (4) actual terrorists or the terror group (they direct, plan, and carry out the violence), as indicated on the foregoing graphic. The process of radicalisation is therefore defined by the movement and interaction of people across these concentric rings that support or are amenable to Islamist violent extremism.

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[92] In Chapter 2, section 2.4.2.1 *Multiple sources of evidence*, I outlined that on the day this attack occurred I was travelling from O.R. Tambo International, Johannesburg, South Africa, to Jomo Kenyatta International, Nairobi, Kenya, to participate in a research workshop organised by the Africa Center for Strategic Studies, titled *Countering violent extremism (CVE) in Africa: lessons learned and way forward*. The Orlando, Florida, attack and its meaning, became an unintended but illustrative case and part of the proceedings of the workshop.

Lake's (2002) inner circle of 'actual terrorists', i.e., the terror group, is itself hardly homogeneous. Bjørgo (2011:280-284) asserts that most terror groups merge varied membership that direct, plan, and carry out terrorist campaigns, encapsulating: (1) ideological activists (driven by ideology and political issues); (2) drifters and followers (seeking friendship, identity, and protection); (3) socially frustrated youths (driven by personal experiences of discrimination or other grievances). Since ideological activists largely represent the *raison d'être* of the Islamist organisation, it is these activists who would most likely rise up the ranks, occupy leadership positions, and plan and lead operations. Drifters, followers, and socially frustrated youths will constitute the bulk of the rank-and-file. Likewise, Abrahms and Gottfried (2016:77) identify 'free-riders' in the terror group, who may have dubious loyalty to the 'cause' or may not even take part in violence. Equally, Ingiriis (2018:518) identifies three groups within *al-Shabaab*: (1) ideological activists; (2) uneducated and impoverished youth who are driven by personal gain such as salary and financial reward; (3) those driven by grievances such as the political-economic marginalisation of their kinships. Whereas ideological activists form the leadership group, the second and third groups are the rank-and-file of *al-Shabaab*. Ingiriis (2018:518) finds that most *al-Shabaab* defectors tend to be from the second group that is driven by personal gain.[93]

Mark Juergensmeyer (2018) has similar findings in the case of Islamic State (IS). Islamic State, Mark Juergensmeyer (2018:22-23) finds, is made up of (1) 'true believers' (especially the leadership circle), what Bjørgo (2011) calls 'ideological activists'.[94] Islamic State also includes (2) Sunni Arab pragmatists, who fear Sunni disempowerment (given the rise of Shia Muslims post Saddam Hussein's rule in Iraq), (3) foreign soldiers of fortune, mostly motivated by economic factors, and (4) individuals in search of identity and community. Schmid (2016:43) further identifies ‘professional jihadis’ or ‘wandering terrorists’ within IS and other Islamist groups, who migrate from one jihadi theatre to another. Professional jihadis, like foreign soldiers of fortune, may have little to do with local conditions or grievances, or even the Islamist ideology itself. For ‘professional jihadis’ or ‘wandering terrorists’, *jihad* has become a way of life, and returning home is no longer an option as they would either be refused entry or arrested in their home countries. Furthermore, as Gerges (2009) has intimated, terror groups may also represent transnationalist, nationalist, or irredentist, configurations.

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[93] Max Abrahms and his colleagues differentiate between the leaders and the rank-and-file of Islamist groups regarding target selection and credit claiming. The indiscriminate targeting of civilians is largely ascribed to leadership deficits within Islamist organisations. Whereas higher ranking leaders are more sensitive to the political costs of target selection and will generally not claim indiscriminate attacks, the lower ranking leaders, and the rank-and-file, do not always consider these costs. The lower ranking leaders and the rank-and-file may also have poor commitment to the aims of the group, and may even select targets based on personal reasons, such as seeking revenge or seeking to gain status within the group (Abrahms *et al*, 2017:900-901, 902-903; Abrahms and Conrad, 2017:281-282, 284-285). Max Abrahms and his colleagues conclude that the decentralised nature of Islamist terrorist groups, and security concerns over government countermeasures, increase the tactical autonomy of the lower-ranking leaders and therefore increases the chances of 'unstrategic' target selection and indiscriminate violence (Abrahms *et al*, 2017:901; Abrahms and Conrad, 2017:287, 298).

[94] 'True believers' are also not homogenous. Within 'true believers' McCormick (2003:495) separates 'base builders', who seek to construct a broad base of popular support, from 'advocates of violence', who see themselves as a vanguard driven by the need for action. There are also 'pragmatists', who would settle for incremental gains and even compromise, and 'purists', who would settle for nothing less than absolute victory.

Lake (2002) asserts that outside of the terror group, the Islamist organisation has three outer concentric rings made up of sympathisers, social-movement radicals, and moderates. In these three outer rings, you will find sleeper cells, people who provide intelligence and logistics, recruiters, ideologues, clerics, political leaders, financiers, religious scholars, religious organisations, NGOs, passive supporters, and so forth. As Gerges (2009) intimated, these outer rings may include not only what are classified as jihadis (espousing violence), but also mainstream Islamists (espousing peaceful means), connected by a shared ideology (Islamism), and the shared objectives of liberating Muslims from foreign influences, creating Islamic states, and the enforcement of the *Sharia*. Moreover, these three outer rings may include people, Islamic or not, that may be converted to Islamism, or may be radicalised into Islamist violent extremism, as motivated by reasons as varied as religion, experiences of injustice, the need for belonging, pragmatism, economic benefit, or even a need for adventure.

The above highlights the fact that the support and membership of Islamist groups such as *al-Shabaab* are differentiated by disparate roles, types and levels of motivation and objectives, and dissimilar levels of commitment and involvement, even when the Islamist group itself may have coherent, and even stable, grievances and objectives. It is utterly important to understand this sociology of Islamism. The observed terror group is a tip of a much larger, networked, both clandestine and overt, iceberg which consists of varied individuals who may or may not be directly involved with violence, and are influenced by varied factors, other than religion or unjust social orders. Borum (2011a:8) finds that “[m]ost people who hold radical ideas do not engage in terrorism, and many terrorists - even those who lay claim to a ‘cause’ - are not deeply ideological and may not ‘radicalise’ in any traditional sense”. Islamist violent extremism is therefore correctly understood as a multi-layered phenomenon. It is a phenomenon, nonetheless, which entails a collective pursuit, in the context of collective deprivation, discontent, mobilisation, and action. In the case of *al-Shabaab*, as outlined in Chapter 6, section 6.6 *Islamist violent extremist groups and combat units in Kenya*, a single Islamist organisation may contain within itself a congeries of transnationalist, nationalist, and irredentist elements, with the potential for conflicting interests and objectives, and consequently, fragmentation. The foregoing are critical issues to consider in the framework of CVE in Kenya as elaborated in the context of Chapters 6 and 8.

Additional to the differentiated membership and support of Islamist organisations, is the issue of the differentiated purpose, utility, and objectives of terrorism itself, as highlighted at the beginning of this section of the chapter. Despite this differentiation, terrorist violence is always political, even when such violence is symbolic, or seemingly 'counter-productive', and not instrumental in the sense of achieving clear, rational, attainable, immediate, goals. As is the case with micro-radicalisation, the Clausewitzian dictum: *War has its own grammar but not its own logic*; *war finds logic only in political intercourse*, applies in the case of terrorism as well. Albeit criminalised and delegitimised, terrorism is political violence with political intent, objectives, and utility. The enduring logic of terrorism is found in its political properties, not in its grammar. This logic is also found in the long-term strategic objectives of terrorism, as opposed to its more short-term organisational or tactical objectives. The grammar of terrorism, such as the tactical behaviour of a terrorist organisation, changes from one context to another, within a particular space and time. Terrorism, mostly occurring in internal conflicts (not between states), may then only find logic and meaning in its enduring political substance. Clausewitz (1984:75, 87) contends that the purpose of war as a political instrument is to compel your will on your enemy. In the current case, the purpose of an Islamist terrorist campaign and CVE, as two opposed political tools, is to compel your will on your adversary, viz., the Kenyan state or *al-Shabaab*.

The logic or motivation for joining Islamist organisations, and establishing Islamist organisations in the first place, is found in the enduring conditions created by unjust socio-economic and political orders, as represented and defined by state fragility. Disparate, varied, immediate, individual conditions and organisational actions, may explain the grammar and sociology of terrorism, including the imperatives of the terrorist organisation, but not the meaning and significance, and certainly not the logic, of terrorism itself. It is thus critical to conceptualise Islamist violent extremism comprehensively and realistically as this study seeks to do. Failure to do so, this study submits, has led to ineffective and counter-productive CVE that is observable in Kenya and elsewhere today. CVE must appreciate the realities of Islamist violent extremism, including the intention, objectives, historical context, religious underpinnings, and the economics, politics, and the sociology of this ideology and movement. An objective and realistic understanding of Islamist violent extremism in Kenya requires the appreciation that (1) there are unjust conditions and legitimate grievances that have been created by state fragility in Kenya, (2) Islamist violent extremism present social, economic, political, and religious challenges, it is not just a mere security challenge, (3) Islamist terrorism is a form of political violence, with political (collective or public) objectives, not criminal violence for personal gain, (4) Islamist terrorism is pursued in the context of (coercive) political bargaining, however morally abhorrent the act of terrorism itself may be perceived, and (5) dismissing *al-Shabaab* as ‘extremist-terrorist-criminals’ is neither going to make them go away, nor is it going to make them less appealing and less legitimate to groups and individuals that find themselves at the margins of society. I come back to these issues in the context of Chapters 6 to 8. Having developed the foregoing conception of Islamism, what are the core beliefs, views, intention, and objectives of Islamism? In answering this question, I examine (1) Islamism as an ideology and a movement, and (2) the intention and objectives of Islamism.

4.2.2 Islamist Violent Extremism as Ideology and Movement

Ideologies have always been at the heart of political change and political movements. Ideologies serve as the basis to agitate for, and bring about, political change, or otherwise as the basis for maintaining and defending the status quo. Heywood (2019:27) explains that an ideology is understood as “a more or less coherent set of ideas [philosophies or belief system] that provide a basis for organised political action [through movements and organisations], whether this is intended to preserve, modify or overthrow the existing system of power relationships. All ideologies therefore (1) offer an account of the existing order, usually in the form of a ‘worldview’, (2) provide a model of a desired future, a vision of the Good Society, and (3) outline how political change [or preservation] can and should be brought about”. Islamism is therefore a set of ideas that form the basis for organised political action intended, in this case, to overthrow the existing system of power relations that is based on liberal secularism.

Islamism offers an account of the existing order (secular or Christian), advance a vision of a good society, and account for how change should and may be brought about (violent or peaceful means). Islamism calls its adherents to action in pursuit of its vision of a good society, i.e., the return to *al-hakimiyya* (the sovereignty of God [Allah]), as achieved at the age of enlightenment. The good society is a theocracy (‘rule by God [Allah]’), established in an Islamic state (or the Caliphate), founded on Islamic canonical law, the *Sharia*. Islamism consequently finds itself far removed from, and gravely at odds with, the prevailing centre which is defined by liberal secularism. Because of this opposition and distance from the centre, and repression by the centre, Islamism is incentivised to employ violent means in pursuit of its intent and objectives. Islamist violent extremism, as an ideology and a movement, is addressed herein under three themes: (1) religion as central to the human condition; (2) existential threats to Islam and Muslims; (3) extremism of thought and extremism of method.

4.2.2.1 *Religion as Central to the Human Condition*

Islamism views secular states as separating human beings from the central authority of God (Allah). Mozaffari (2007:23) contends that Islamism, as an all-encompassing ideology, is centred on the holistic belief in "the absolute indivisibility of the trinity *Dîn* [Religion], *Dunya* [Way of life] and *Dawla* [Government]". Secularism is thus seen as a denial of the central authority of religion and its central divinity, God (Allah), in both public and private life. There are two worldviews in this regard, viz., *al-jahiliyya* and *al-hakimiyya*. These worldviews contain some of the central tenets of Islamism. *Al-jahiliyya*, i.e., the age of ignorance, is the period before the revelation of Islam to Prophet Muhammad, or a period defined by the rejection of God's divinity and authority. *Al-jahiliyya* is often equated with secularism and the secular state. *Al-hakimiyya*, i.e., the sovereignty of God (Allah) at the age of enlightenment, is a worldview held by Islamism. Hence God (Allah) is seen as the highest political and legal authority (added to religious or spiritual authority). To return to *al-hakimiyya*, Islamism prescribes the creation of Islamic states, based on the *Sharia* (Moussalli, 2009:5; Gerges, 2009:254).

Islamist ideologues are pivotal in shaping the tenets of Islamism. One such ideologue was the Egyptian, Sayyid Qutb (1906-1966), then a member of the Muslim Brotherhood who was sentenced to death in 1966 for his connection to the attempted assassination of President Nasser Gamal Abdel. Sayyid Qutb's writings spawned the Islamist ideology known as Qutbism. Hence, adherents of this ideology are pejoratively called Qutbi/Qutbis by their detractors. Sayyid Qutb is deemed to be the 'founding father' of the modern jihadi movement (Gerges, 2009:7, 323; Chome, 2019a:5). Qutb advocated for 'perpetual *jihad*', a permanent revolution, against both *al-adou al-baeed*, the far enemy, and *al-adou al-qareeb*, the near enemy. Sayyid Qutb maintained that *jihad* is a personal duty, 'a path to self-realisation and purification', against injustice, foreign occupation, *al-jahiliyya*, and apostate rulers, i.e., against both the near enemy and the far enemy. Sayyid Qutb also held that it is a duty for every Muslim to return to *al-hakimiyya*. In the quest to return to *al-hakimiyya*, and in waging *jihad*, Qutb held that such a war is always offensive and total, 'neither defensive nor limited'. This war, the *jihad*, is to be led by an Islamist vanguard, on behalf of the rest of the *Ummah* (Gerges, 2009:4-6).[95]

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[95] *Jihad* (struggle) means (1) an internal struggle (i.e., *jihad Akbar*, the greater *jihad*) or (2) an external struggle (i.e., *jihad Asgar*, the lesser *jihad*). *Jihad Akbar* is linked with an individual religious, spiritual, or moral struggle for 'purity' or piety. *Jihad Asgar* is linked with a political struggle, armed struggle, or 'holy war', which may be offensive or defensive. In Islamism *jihad* is mainly interpreted as *jihad Asgar*. In its offensive posture, *jihad* may be waged in establishing an Islamic state, and in its defensive posture *jihad* may be waged against foreign occupation and domination, or in defense of Islam or Muslims (Mamdani, 2002:768; Moussalli, 2009:17-19). This variable conception of *jihad* (*Akbar* versus *Asgar*) represents one of the debates and disagreements within the Islamist movement. See section 4.2.4 *Inconsistencies and irreconcilables within Islamist violent extremism*.

Another influential Islamist ideologue within the lslamist movement was another Egyptian, Muhammad Abd al-Salam Faraj (1954-1982), then a member of Islamic *Jihad* who, like Sayyid Qutb, was sentenced to death in 1982 for his involvement, this time, in the assassination of another Egyptian President, Anwar Sadat. Like Qutb, Faraj held that *jihad* is a personal duty, but also the only feasible way to create Islamic states. Faraj maintained that Muslim countries are governed by apostate rulers, historically brought to power by colonialism and the West, having turned their backs on Islam. Faraj also held that *al-adou al-qareeb*, the near enemy, was the main enemy and therefore the priority (Gerges, 2009:9-11). Before Faraj and Qutb, there was the Saudi, Mohammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab (1703-1792), whose writings spawned the Islamic doctrine and movement known as Wahhabism.

Like Faraj and Qutb, al-Wahhab agitated for a return to *al-hakimiyya*. Al-Wahhab also advocated for a return to the way of life of the *Salaf*, i.e., 'ancestors' or 'predecessors', viz., the first three generations of Muslims, starting with the generation of Prophet Mohammad. These first three generations of Muslims and the Caliphate period are deemed to be the Golden Era of Islam, when Islam was 'pure'. Hence, adherents of this worldview call themselves Salafi/Salafis. Because al-Wahhab exalted the *Sunnah*, i.e., Muslim traditions and practices that were initiated by Prophet Muhammad, and the *Salaf*, and encouraged Muslims to seek the way of the *Salaf*, Wahhabism is often equated with Salafism. Salafism is the Islamic doctrine and movement that exalt the *Salaf* view and practise of Islam and way of life. Wahhabism, as an Islamic doctrine and movement like Salafism, advocates in particular for strict adherence to traditional Islamic values, religious orthodoxy, correct ritualistic practices, and moral values (Gerges, 2009:131-132; Moussalli, 2009:4-5, 11-12; Borárosová *et al*, 2017:74-75; Alvi, 2019:114). Based on the foregoing one may discern the ideal central tenets of Islamist violent extremism as a combination of Jihadism and Salafism, and/or Wahhabism, in a quest to return to *al-hakimiyya* and to emulate the *Salaf* way of life and practice of Islam, and the time of the Caliphate.[96]

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[96] Although Wahhabism is at times equated with Salafism, both being Islamic doctrines and movements with similar views, Wahhabism is often considered a subset of Salafism (Borárosová *et al*, 2017:75). Moussalli (2009:3) also conclude that "all Wahhabis are Salafists, but not all Salafists are Wahhabis". Salafis may be divided into the following categories: (1) non-political, restricting religion to the private sphere; (2) political-religious reformist, exemplified by Wahhabis; (3) jihadis, (violent) political-religious militants (Schmid, 2014:7, 15). I pointed out earlier in the current chapter in section 4.2.1 *Conceptualising Islamist violent extremism*, that while various themes and tenets of Islam and Islamism are covered in this study, there is no intention to be exhaustive in outlining these themes and tenets, including Islamic doctrines and movements such as Salafism or Wahhabism. Islamist ideologues and their contribution to Islamism, is also a theme that is not designed to be exhaustive. That will require separate studies altogether. In addressing these tenets and themes, the intention is solely to serve the aim and objectives of the study. In Chapter 6, section 6.4 *The origins of Islamist violent extremism in Kenya*, I briefly highlight the role and influence of Kenya's Islamist ideologues in the lslamist movement in Kenya, and the linkages between transnationalist Islamist ideas and the context in Kenya.

There are two distinct periods within the modern Islamist movement. In the first period between the 1970s to the mid-1990s, 'the near enemy' was the focus of the movement. At this time Islamism was dominated by irredentist jihadis and religious nationalists. This explains why Islamists such as the Afghan *Mujahedeen* were in alliance with the US during the Soviet Union's occupation of Afghanistan (1979-1989) in support of the Afghan communist government. During the Afghanistan war, jihadis from all over the world congregated in Afghanistan, motivated by the need to free Muslim lands from foreign occupation, to find a base to train and organise against the near enemy, and to establish an Islamic state. Afghanistan, however, was also a turning point. Afghanistan also introduced a new generation of jihadis. Emboldened by the Soviet defeat in 1989, these jihadis called for *jihad* against 'the far enemy'. The notion of *jihad*, as espoused by ideologues such as Qutb and Faraj, remained the same, but the enemy had changed. Furthermore, whereas the first Islamic state in history was created by Shia Islam in Iran in 1979, in the second period since the 1990s, the Islamist movement is dominated by Sunni Islam as demonstrated by Sunni Islamist organisations such as *al-Qaeda* and Islamic State. These latter-day Islamist organisations have shown a marriage between transnationalist Islamism as well as Salafism and/or Wahhabism. Since the 1990s, these transnationalist Sunni jihadis are a prominent minority within the Islamist movement (Gerges, 2009:12-14, 133).

The Islamist geopolitical worldview conceptualises the world as three worlds or 'houses'/homes, viz., *dar al-Islam*, *dar al-sulh*, and *dar al-harb*. *Dar al-Islam*, i.e., the house of Islam/peace, is where Islam prevails and/or there is an Islamic government or an Islamic state. In *dar al-sulh*, i.e., the house of conciliation/truce, although not an Islamic state under an Islamic government, Islam is freely practised. Conversely, in *dar al-harb*, i.e., the house of war/injustice, Islam does not prevail and/or Muslims are oppressed (Gerges, 2009:43-44, 179, 203, 354; Borárosová *et al*, 2017:20).[97] It follows then that *al-Shabaab* has designated Kenya as the house of war and a proxy of the far enemy, in their quest to liberate Muslim lands and deliver Muslims to *al-hakimiyya*, i.e. the sovereignty of God (Allah). Moreover, with the return to *al-hakimiyya*, not only religion as such, but particularly Islam, is central to the human condition. According to Islamism the sovereignty of God (Allah) and the centrality of religion can only be realised in an Islamic state, under the canonical law of Islam, the *Sharia*.

Whereas a narrower goal of Islamism is to create Islamic states in Muslim countries, its most expansive goal is to create a global Caliphate (Mozaffari, 2007:21). This goal is deemed possible because of the belief that "all people are born Muslim but may practice other religions before 'reverting' to the one true faith" (ISSP, 2016:25). The conviction therefore is that people 'revert', and do not 'convert', to Islam. The belief, Mohamed (1995:2) explains, is that "one is born in a state of *fitrah*, of primordial faith - and hence as a Muslim - and is then made to adhere to another religion … through the process of socialisation". The state of *fitrah* accounts for the innate sense of submission to God (Allah) that many people loose at the 'age of discretion' (Mohamed, 1995:2, 13). Another notion is *takfir*. *Takfir*, i.e., excommunication, is the act of declaring a Muslim to be an apostate for having 'insufficient dedication to their faith and *Sharia* rule', or a declaration against unbelievers (i.e., *kuffar*, singular: *kafir*) who live in *al-jahiliyya*. To declare *takfir* against someone has grave consequences, including death, and punishment in the afterlife. *Takfiri* groups are then Islamists that practise *takfir* and engage in acts of violence against 'apostates' and 'unbelievers'. Takfirism is the Islamist doctrine based on the practise of *takfir* (Schmid, 2015:1; Badar *et al*, 2017:1-2, 7; Hassan, 2017:3-4; Chome, 2019a:5).

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[97] The interpretation of these three worlds varies, and the concepts used also vary. By illustration, Borárosová *et al* (2017:20) refer to concepts that may be equivalent to *dar al-Sulh*, such as (1) *dar al-Hudna* (house of calm), (2) *dar al-Ahd* (house of truce), and (3) *dar al-Amn* (house of safety).

Highlighting this centrality of religion, at the 2015 Summit on Countering Violent Extremism, former US President Barack Obama (2015a:The Internet) observed that Islamists "portray themselves as religious leaders - holy warriors in defence of Islam …. And they propagate the notion that America, - and the West, generally - is at war with Islam". In 1998 Osama bin Laden similarly highlighted that "there are two sides in this struggle: one side is the global Crusade alliance with the Zionist Jews, led by America, Britain, and Israel, and the other side is the Islamic world" (in Amble and Meleagrou-Hitchens, 2014:523). Moïsi (2007:10) also speaks of this perceived dialectic between the Christian West and the Muslim world, noting two countervailing worldviews: (1) the growing secularism in the West with religion consigned to private life, whereas (2) the Muslim world is becoming more religious, making religion an integral part of public life. Like Moïsi's observations about the Muslim world, Abbink (2014) also notes the growing importance of religion in Africa, particularly since the 1990s. Abbink (2014:87) concludes that in Africa religion has become a prominent form of identity for many, if not the primary identity, because African national identity is historically (since independence) very unstable. This fickle national identity also explains the kin-country syndrome where ethnic-Somalis and other Muslims in Kenya identify with their coethnics and coreligionists outside of Kenya, rather than their fellow citizens (see Chapter 6, section 6.4 *The origins of Islamist violent extremism in Kenya*).

Abbink's (2014) observations are not surprising given the persistent crisis of the fragile African state. An environment defined by palpable and hopeless scarcity, denied opportunity, and frustrated expectations, as outlined in Chapter 3. In these debilitating conditions, religion provides for the human need for fellowship, comfort, hope, and purpose. The 2017 World Happiness Index underscores the point and asserts that whilst Africa expectedly has the lowest levels of happiness on the index, the importance of religion is simultaneously higher on the continent. Africans, boosted by religious participation, have more optimistic future life evaluation, contrary to what the objective abject conditions on the continent would suggest (UNSDSN, 2017:108, 110-111). The 2018 Global Attitudes Survey finds that sub-Saharan Africa has a higher approval rate for the increased role of religion in the public sphere. In Kenya, this approval rate is 74 percent. The world average approval rate is 39 percent. In Kenya 60 percent believe religion has a more important role in public life compared to 20 years ago. The world average that embraces this belief is 27 percent (Pew Research Center, 2019:23, 25). Given the link between religion and happiness, the World Happiness Index concludes that in Africa "[t]he relationship between religiosity and happiness … lends support to the idea that faith might assuage Africa's unhappiness" (UNSDSN, 2017:110). Responding to the abject conditions in the fragile state, Islamism promises and offers life satisfaction in Islamic states (and in the after-life) for Muslims.[98]

Abbink (2014:87, 90-91) asserts that Christianity and Islam claim the public space in the African state, thus politicising religion. Claiming a constricted and contested public space, in the absence of a negotiated co-existence and the presence of inequity, religion becomes politicised, divisive, and conflict-generating. As a necessary condition, the growth of Islamist violent extremism is dependent on the political significance of religion, viz., Islam in this case, finding expression in Islamism as a political-religious ideology. In Chapter 6, section 6.4 *The origins of Islamist violent extremism in Kenya*, I note that the political significance of Islam often plays out in the context of a marginalised or repressed Muslim minority, or in the context of intra-Muslim factionalism or sectarianism. In view of the foregoing observations by Abbink (2014), with the instability of national identity in Africa's fragile states, the resultant growth in the importance of religious identity should be added as a necessary contextual condition in the development of Islamist violent extremism. This growing attraction to religion as an alternative form of identity has critical relevance when one considers the increasing number of new converts to Islam that swell the ranks of Islamist organisations in sub-Saharan Africa.

South Africa, it would appear, presents a burgeoning case of the growth of religious identity. The human need for fellowship, comfort, hope, and purpose that religion promises, is increasingly observable in South Africa. This need results from the conditions created by the captured and hollowed-out state, amplified by the uncertainty that is associated with the current economic-political crisis, most notably the energy crisis (see Chapter 3, section 3.2 *What is state fragility?*). Such crises have the tendency to crystalise and amplify latent fault-lines in society, or even create fault-lines when none existed before. The increased religiosity, induced by these state fragility related crises, is illustrated by the nascent growth of religious identity in South Africa. The 2018 Global Attitudes Survey points out that 68 percent of the population in South Africa favour an increased role for religion in the public sphere, compared to the world average of 39 percent (Pew Research Center, 2019:25). Since 1994 there has been a growing number of Christian-based political parties such as the African Christian Democratic Party (ACDP), with representation in the national legislature and in the nine provincial legislatures. In 2007, *al-Jama-ah*, an Islamic (as opposed to Islamist) political party, was founded. For the first time since its founding, in the 2019 national elections, *al-Jama-ah* has made some inroads, winning one seat each in the national legislature and in the provincial Western Cape legislature.

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[98] See Chapter 7, section 7.3.4 *Social indicators*, where I address the World Happiness Index and Kenya's lagging position on the world happiness ladder. The index employs 'happiness', defined as 'the cognitive evaluation of life satisfaction', as a measure of social progress and well-being. Religion (Islam in the context of this study) plays a central role in this evaluation of current and future life satisfaction, in this life and in the afterlife.

Al-Jama-ah declare in their 2019 elections manifesto that "South Africa currently finds itself in the grip of poverty, violence, economic instability, unemployment, and corruption. The very moral fibre of our society is being eroded. Our people are crying out for fundamental change, but those pleas are falling on deaf ears …. [W]e are proudly Muslim. In this democracy, it is something we will not be apologetic for …. [T]here needs to be a party with the political will and Islamic ethos to take up the concerns of our members and our communities at the highest level" (al-Jama-ah, 2019:The Internet). At this stage it appears *al-Jama-ah* does not aspire to Islamise the state or society. The party reveals on their website that "*Al-Jama-ah* wants to promote a better understanding of our community's culture and practices in a multicultural and pluralistic society" (al-Jama-ah, 2019:The Internet).[99] Unlike such mainstream Islamic ideas in South Africa, in Kenya Muslims do act as a political coalition, and the role of religion in politics is much more manifest. Critically, Islamist violent extremism does in fact challenge secularism in Kenya and does challenge the authority and legitimacy of the Kenyan state.[100]

The centrality of religion to the human condition as a solution for challenges of the world, as intimated by *al-Jama-ah*, is also revealed in the case of *al-Shabaab*. However, *al-Shabaab* also espouse a particular Islamist ideology. This Islamist ideology is characterised by opposition to liberal and electoral democracy and secularism, counselling a return to *al-hakimiyya*, as well as being a transnationalist and regressive ideology. Regressive in the sense of hankering on a 'glorious' past of the Golden Era of Islam and period of the Caliphate. *Al-Shabaab* asserts (in Gaidi Mtaani, 2013a:18):

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[99] Similar to *al-Jama-ah*, the same may be said of Christian parties in South Africa. There has not been a call for a Christian state, or the imposition of Christian values on the state and society in South Africa. The status of the secular state in South Africa therefore remains unchallenged by religious organisations and movements. Based on the South African Constitution (Republic of South Africa, 1996: preamble, article 1), the principles and values that underpin the secular state, and therefore represent the 'norm' or the 'centre' in South Africa, include the following tenets: 'South Africa belongs to all who live in it'; 'united in diversity'; 'one sovereign democratic state'; a state founded on: human dignity; equality; human rights and freedoms; non-racialism and non-sexism; supremacy of the constitution and the rule of law; accountability, responsiveness and openness; no discrimination on the basis of race, religion, ethnicity, sexual orientation, belief, and conscience.

[100] I demonstrate in Chapter 3, section 3.2 *What is state fragility*? that whilst there are objective means of measuring state fragility, such fragility is always relative. This study therefore does not compare levels of fragility, for example, between Kenya and South Africa. The nature, levels, causes, consequences, and context of fragility, vary from state to state, even though shared patterns and parallels may be discernible among fragile states.

> Nationalism, secularism, and democracy contradicts the religion of *Aqeeda* that Muslims embrace …. Nationalism has come to give them big mouthfuls of the wine of egoism, pride, arrogation, and disrespect for others …. Secularism has liberated the people from worshipping Allah (SWT), obeying Him, fearing Him …. Finally, democracy has come to make this man - after granting him freedom and making a prisoner of the desires of the self, and obsessed by the pleasure of egoism - sit on the throne of Godhead. Thus, it has bestowed on him the full authority of legislating and making laws, and has made the ruling system, with all its capacities, at his services in order to fulfil everything that he requests …. Wherever this system is present, Islam does not exist, and wherever Islam is present there is no place for this system.

Al-Shabaab continues this theme, adamant, in the vein of Sayyid Qutb and Muhammad Abd al-Salam Faraj, that *jihad* is the only way to create Islamic states and the Caliphate, and "restore the honour, strength and land of Muslims" (Gaidi Mtaani, 2017b:22). Electoral democracy is again denounced as a failed political system that has been used to oppress Muslims and marginalise Islam. *Al-Shabaab* is unwavering that "[y]esterdays failed democratic transition in Algeria, and more recently the ousting of democratically elected leader Mohamed Morsi in Egypt, should be an example that the system of democracy is not a viable solution for Muslims, and that the booth and the ballot have failed" (in Gaidi Mtaani, 2017b:24). Accordingly, it is evident that *al-Shabaab* considers a return to *al-hakimiyya* in the Islamic state as an all-inclusive solution for the lot of Muslims in the world today.

Gerges (2009:273) asserts that Islamism offers both 'moral salvation and political deliverance'. Gerges (2009:219) further maintains that Islamism seeks to create an Islamic renaissance "rooted in an idea, a belief in the grandeur of Muslim civilisation", motivated by "a deepening developmental and governance crisis in Arab and Muslim societies". The status of Muslims and Islam in the world, a world dominated by secularism in theory but Christian states in fact, therefore serves as a reference point for the collective discontent and aspirations of Muslims. Such aspirations are not only religious, but also political, and socio-economic. The lot of Muslims in the world today is simply untenable and intolerable for Islamism. Inherent to this discontent and aspirations, and to the call for a Muslim renaissance and the return to *al-hakimiyya*, are notions of existential threats to Islam and Muslims.

4.2.2.2 *Existential Threats to Islam and Muslims*

Islamism accordingly encapsulates beliefs and fears about existential threats to both Islam and Muslims, histories of victimisation, and notions of humiliation. These notions, histories, and fears within Islamism, are also found among many moderate Muslims, not just Islamists. Denoeux and Carter (2009a:16) contends that

> [a]cross the Islamic world … there is a widely shared perception, at both the elite and grassroots levels, that Muslims have been consistent victims of sustained Western attacks, from the crusades and the colonial era through more recent events in Palestine, Bosnia, and Chechnya. Millions of people believe that the West remains bent on occupying their land, controlling their resources, subjugating them, and manipulating their leaders and countries to serve Western interests. The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq are viewed as only the most recent manifestations of such longstanding schemes. Many Muslims feel very strongly not only that the West never made serious amends for the past suffering and oppression it inflicted on them, but that it is currently engaged in a renewed effort to victimise and oppress them, as well as to denigrate and demonise their most cherished values and beliefs.

Moïsi (2007:8-9) maintains that in this perceived dialectic between the Christian West and the Muslim world, the West is consumed by a culture of fear that includes the fear of Islamism, African emigrants to the West, and the fear of a loss of identity, driven by globalisation and the resultant demographic changes in the West. Moïsi (2007:10) further maintains that, in turn, the Muslim world is trapped in a culture of humiliation, which results in a culture of hatred, driven by years of economic and political decay, the perception of being left behind by globalisation, and the singular outrage over the creation of the state of Israel. In response, and in concert with Moïsi (2007), Mozaffari (2007:23) asserts that, consequently:

> To Islamists, the existing world is both wrong and repressive. It is wrong because the existing world does not correspond to Islamic principles. Islam as a political power is no longer as predominant as it used to be in the past. The world is also considered repressive because non-Muslims occupy what the Islamists consider to be Muslim territory (e.g., Palestine, Kashmir, Chechnya) or because Muslims live under severe repression from their own (anti-Islamic) governments.

Because of these foregoing beliefs and fears, histories of victimisation, and notions of humiliation, there is a "single narrative of *al-Qaeda* and its affiliates which claim that Islam is under attack and defensive *Jihad* against the West is the obligation of every Muslim" (Schmid, 2013:59). Such existential threats to Islam and Muslims, whether real or perceived, explain the lslamist call for an Islamic renaissance, and provide the contextual explanation of Islamism, both in thought and in method.

4.2.2.3 *Extremism of Thought and Extremism of Method*

Inherent in the concept of extremism is the notion of beliefs and ideas that deviate from the norm or the mainstream, i.e., extremism of thought. But what is the norm, the mainstream? Borum (2011a:10) suggests that this could mean the core values and principles of a society. But what are these core values and principles? Is it democratic values and principles such as tolerance, secularism, respect for human rights and civil liberties, lifestyle choices? Are these values and principles universal, or specific to some societies? Most importantly, and of profound relevance for CVE, does the very existence of extremist thoughts, i.e., cognitive radicalisation, in themselves, the reason why people become violent radicals? Consequently, must CVE challenge extremist ideas, attack and destroy these ideas, or offer alternatives to these ideas, i.e., engage in 'a war of ideas'? Or should CVE concern itself only with violent methods and actions, i.e., behavioural radicalisation? In Pratt's (2010) conceptualisation, should CVE concern itself with passive extremists, or much rather focus on assertive and/or impositional extremists? Pratt (2010:442, 449) points out that, in fact, it is impositional extremists who are most likely to engage in violence. Can behavioural radicalisation be separated from cognitive radicalisation? Inversely, can cognitive radicalisation be separated from behavioural radicalisation? I come back to these and related issues in Chapters 5 and 8 in the context of CVE.

Reverting to the idea of extremism of thought, as shown in Chapter 6, section 6.5.2 *The long-war in Kenya*, it may be deduced that the 'centre' or 'norm' in Kenya is believed to be, in essence, secular, liberal, and democratic, goals and ideals, and the dividends of such goals and ideals. *Al-Shabaab*, thus, in their aspiration to establish an Islamic state and enforce the *Sharia*, would be seen as cognitively radical. More precisely, seeking to recreate the 'Golden Era of Islam', *al-Shabaab* is cognitively regressive or reactionary. With this extremism of thought, terrorism scholar, Alex Schmid contends that "[s]upporters of extremist movements tend to be fanatical, intolerant, non-compromising, and single-minded, believing that only they are in possession of 'the truth' and that they alone have the solution to pressing social problems" (in Van Metre, 2016:7). This notion of 'one invariable fundamental truth' is what makes extremism and radicalism also 'fundamentalist'. Fundamentalism presupposes a belief in 'one religion', 'one set of values and norms', and similar presuppositions. Anyone who does not believe in the 'one fundamental truth' is therefore an apostate or unbeliever.

In addition to extremist beliefs and ideas (cognitive radicalisation), extremism also refers to methods and actions (behavioural radicalisation), that deviate from the norm or mainstream. These methods and actions "show disregard for the life, liberty, and human rights of others" (Borum, 2011a:10). The 'deviant' methods and actions, which include attacks on the civilian population, mass shootings and bombings, kidnappings and ransom-seeking, sexual enslavement and beheadings, link Islamism directly to terrorist methods, crime, and human rights violations as such, which blur the distinction political violence and criminal violence.[101] Added to being cognitively reactionary or regressive, *al-Shabaab*, through applying such methods and actions, may be deemed behaviourally radical. More precisely, ignoring international humanitarian law that governs modern warfare and precludes such methods and actions, *al-Shabaab* would be behaviourally regressive or reactionary.

Linked to both the notions of extremism of thought and extremism of method and action, is the concept of violence that I addressed earlier in the current chapter in section 4.2.1 *Conceptualising Islamist violent extremism*. I highlighted the triangle of violence (physical, structural, and cultural), as identified by Galtung (1969, 1990), that is at play in the long-war. At the one end of this triangle, viz., violence legitimation (i.e., cultural violence), is the linked extremist narratives inherent to Islamism. These narratives portray followers of this ideology as victims of injustice, and hence justify the use of violence against such injustice. Allen *et al* (2015:6) maintain that "the use of a narrative of oppression to justify violence and recruit and motivate supporters is near-universal among violent extremist groups". Whether real or perceived, injustice or alienation is therefore at the core of Islamism.

Noting this sense of alienation and injustice at the 2015 Summit on Countering Violent Extremism, former US President Barack Obama (2015b:The Internet) found that "[i]f entire communities feel they can never become a full part of the society in which they reside, it feeds a cycle of fear and resentment and a sense of injustice upon which extremists prey". This sense of alienation and injustice has spawned a 'global' narrative that 'the West and Islam are in conflict' (Obama, 2015a:The Internet). A more localised narrative is the idea that is prevalent among both moderate and extremist elements of Muslim communities in East Africa, that Muslims are deliberately denied economic, educational, and other opportunities relative to non-Muslims (Ali-Koor, 2016:6). These two related narratives, linked to the concept of structural and cultural violence, are used to justify and to promote Islamism, and the use of extremist violence as such. This brings me to the intention and objectives of Islamism.

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[101] These 'deviant' methods and actions characterise what Mary Kaldor (2012, 2013) has called new-wars. These new-wars have been prominent since the 1990s. See Chapter 6, section 6.5 *New-wars and the long-war in Kenya*.

4.2.3 The Intention and Objectives of Islamist Violent Extremism

The Institute for Global Change (2018b:16-17), in their Global Extremism Monitor, identifies six key themes in the ideology of Islamism: the restoration of Islamic governance as a religious obligation; the violent opposition to 'enemies' of Islam; violent *jihad* as every Muslim's duty; identification with a global struggle; the 'narrow' interpretation of who is 'Muslim'; support for expansion of Muslim lands. Out of these six key themes, as pointed out earlier in the current chapter in section 4.2.1 *Conceptualising Islamist violent extremism*, and section 4.2.2 *Islamist violent extremism as ideology and movement*, the overarching aim of Islamist movements and organisations may be narrowed down to one intent and desire: the return to *al-hakimiyya*, the sovereignty of God (Allah), and two objectives: (1) the creation of Islamic states (or Caliphate), and (2) the enforcement of the *Sharia*.

4.2.3.1 *The Creation of Islamic States/Caliphate*

The final aim of Islamism is to 'restore' the authority of God (Allah) over human existence in Islamic states, within the existing state system. The most extensive goal is a global Caliphate, or intermediately, Caliphates in Muslim countries. The ideal of restoring the 7th century Caliphate of the Golden Era of Islam occupies a special place among many Muslims. The Golden Era of Islam, i.e., the 'classical era of the Caliphate', is viewed as either (1) the 'Medina model', i.e., society as it was shaped by Prophet Muhammad himself in Medina, or (2) the period after his death, i.e., the Caliphate as led by his immediate Caliphs, i.e., successors (Mozaffari, 2007:21, 23). The Caliphate refers to a centralised transnationalist Islamic authority, often conceived as something akin to an empire, and much broader than the understanding of a state as understood in the current state system. By contrast, the understanding of Caliph is more contested. This understanding oscillates between 'successor' or 'deputy', as in 'the successor to Prophet Muhammad' or more contentiously 'the deputy of God (Allah) on earth'. Among Islamist, and even many moderate Muslims, the Caliphate provokes a sense of pride and nostalgia (Mozaffari, 2007:23; Kennedy, 2016:xiv, 1-2). Kennedy (2016:xiv) consequently asserts that "the history of the Caliphate points to a time when Muslims were God-fearing and devout, puritanical, and self-disciplined, and always willing to sacrifice their lives in the path of Allah".[102]

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[102] After Prophet Muhammad's death in 632, his immediate Caliphs were: Abu Bakr (632-634), Umar (634-644), Uthman (644-656), and Ali (656-661) (Kennedy, 2016:xxi). Although the current study touches on various major themes in the history of Islam, its interest is not the history of Islam or the history of Islamism as such. That will warrant separate, independent studies. However, much has been written in this regard. Mozaffari (2007), Moussalli (2009), Solomon (2015b), Kennedy (2016), and Quraishi-Landes (2017) are good starting points.

There are at least three views regarding the notion and reality of the Caliphate among Islamists. The first view sees the Caliphate as ‘a vehicle for imposing their particular and often very narrow view of Islam on the *Ummah*, i.e., Muslim community’. The second view deems the Caliphate as ‘a justification for aiming at world conquest’. The third view sees the Caliphate as ‘simply providing a framework in which Muslims can strive to live a Godly life and make up their own minds about the best way to do this’ (Kennedy, 2016:xvii). With the different conceptualisations of a Caliphate, Kennedy (2016:xiii) contends that at the centre of the understanding of the Caliphate is “an idea of leadership which is about the just ordering of Muslim society according to the will of God [Allah]”. Despite occupying a special place among many Muslims, the Caliphate has an extraordinarily complex history.

Kennedy (2016:xvi) points out that, “there have been caliphs of many different sorts, warrior caliphs, pious caliphs, intellectual caliphs, pleasure-loving caliphs, incompetent caliphs, cruel and tyrannical caliphs”. Mozaffari (2007:23) thus concludes that, “[t]he Caliphate was sometimes unified, strong, and glorious, whereas at other times it was divided, in conflict, in crisis and weak”. Be that as it may, the Caliphate remains a worthy aspiration among some Islamists. Crenshaw (2018:The Internet) points out that Islamic State’s “declaration of the Caliphate, however ill-fated …, inspired terrorism and drew in foreign fighters [from] around the globe …; its audacity showed that jihadi victory was possible”. Islamic State declared a Caliphate in 2014 in north-eastern Iraq and north-western Syria, and declared its leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, as the Caliph, ‘leader of all Muslims everywhere’. The Caliphate-controlled areas were ‘liberated’ by a US-led alliance in March 2019, and Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi killed in a later operation in October 2019 (BBC News, 2019:The Internet; IEP, 2020a:16, 20).

In addition to the expansive goal of creating a Caliphate, the narrower goal is to create Islamic states in historically Muslim lands, within the existing state system (Mozaffari, 2007:20). Accordingly, the objective of Islamist violent extremism is to create an Islamic state that is ruled according to the *Sharia* (Solomon, 2015b:177). Solomon (2015b:177) contends that “[t]he key ideological components of … [Islamism’s] political … programme are: taking the Qur’an as the source of political, legal and social systems; and claiming to return to the example of the Prophet Muhammed”. Solomon (2015b:177) further contends that “violence is part of [the] creed [of this ideology and movement]”. Earlier in this chapter in section 4.2.1 *Conceptualising Islamist violent extremism*, I illustrated how Islamist violent extremism has come to be linked with political violence in its pursuit of establishing Islamic states and enforcing the *Sharia*, primarily its use of terrorism, insurgency, and actions related to creating proto-states. This brings me to the objective of enforcing the *Sharia* in the Islamic state or in the Caliphate.

4.2.3.2 *The Enforcement of the Sharia*

Mozaffari (2007:20) defines an Islamic state as "a state in which all law is based on the *Sharia*". The *Sharia*, thus, is central to the creation of Islamic states. Why is the creation of Islamic states and the implementation of the *Sharia* appealing in sub-Saharan Africa? Alternatively, why is Islamism gaining traction in sub-Saharan Africa, a region dominated by Christian-majority countries? The answer lies in the fragile African state. In the current chapter in section 4.2.2 *Islamist violent extremism as ideology and movement* (and in Chapter 3), I stress that the African state is comparatively defined by palpable-hopeless-scarcity, denied opportunity, and frustrated expectations. In such fragile states, failing to provide security, justice, and opportunity, Islamist violent extremism becomes the outlet through which the scarcity, deprivation, and insecurity, that bubble up from below in society, find expression. In these debilitating and conflict generating conditions, religion provides for the human need for fellowship, comfort, hope, and purpose. Added, the African state suffers from a crisis of nationhood. The instability of national identity has thus resulted in the search for alternative identities. Religion has filled this void resulting from the human need for fellowship, hope, identity, and belonging.

Cilliers (2015b:1) finds that "[t]he central challenge for sub-Saharan Africa is to build accountable, capable governments that can deliver security and inclusive growth". Cilliers (2015a:27) maintains that sub-Saharan Africa is plagued by weaknesses and failures, inclusive of the lack of good governance, undermining the rule of law, the lack of economic opportunity, and the lack of capable and functioning institutions. All these factors identified by Cilliers (2015a) are directly linked to, and define, state fragility in Africa, as established in Chapter 3. Consequently, within Islamists there is "a growing belief that the current secular regimes are unable to deal with [the challenges facing the fragile African state, including] poverty and corruption" (Cilliers, 2015a:24). These local conditions and challenges, and the resultant discontent, are then linked with the transnational jihadi movement.

What links the transnational jihadi movement to sub-Saharan jihadi groups such as *al-Shabaab*, is a shared history of underdevelopment, insecurity, exploitation, and marginalisation (in the Muslim world and in Africa), a shared religion (Islam), and a shared political-religious ideology (Islamism). Cilliers (2015a:20) points out that jihadis in sub-Saharan Africa do not share the 'common Arab culture and socialisation' of jihadis from North Africa, or Arab jihadis from the Middle-East, or jihadis from South Asia. Yet, like their coreligionists elsewhere in the world, they are equally influenced by the same transnational Salafi-takfiri-jihadi ideology. Cilliers (2015b:20) finds that these linkages may be instrumental, with local movements aligning themselves with the transnational jihadi movement, and with transnationalist groups such as Islamic State or *al-Qaeda*, to expand their local reach, support, and influence. Critically, these regions (Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia), share the conditions of state fragility, characterised by governments that barely serve their societies.

The Global Terrorism Index demonstrates that the Middle-East and North Africa (MENA), South Asia, and sub-Saharan Africa, account for 93 percent of all terrorism deaths between 2002 and 2019. In 2018, the ten countries that represent 87 percent of all deaths from terrorism were in the Middle East, Africa, and South Asia. The ten countries that account for 80 percent of all deaths from terrorism in 2019 are also in Africa, South Asia, and the Middle East. In 2018, MENA, South Asia, and sub-Saharan Africa accounted for 91 percent of the world economic impact of terrorism i.e., US$29.94 (out of US$33) billion. Sub-Saharan Africa alone account for 37 percent, i.e., US$12.17 billion (all in constant 2018 US$). In 2019, MENA, South Asia, and sub-Saharan Africa accounted for 86 percent of the world economic impact of terrorism i.e., US$22.8 (out of US$26.4) billion. Sub-Saharan Africa alone account for 47.1 percent, i.e., US$12.5 billion (all in constant 2019 US$). Seven of the ten countries with the greatest increase in terrorism deaths in 2019, were in sub-Saharan Africa. Six of the ten countries responsible for 80 percent of terrorism deaths in 2019, were in sub-Saharan Africa.[103]

The above occurrence, incidence, and impact of terrorism are to be expected. The Fragile States Index reveals that between 2015 and 2019, the 20 most fragile states in the world were in Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia, all scoring above 90.0 (out of 120.0) on the index. The outlier is Haiti in the Caribbean. Most of these 20 most fragile states are affected not simply by terrorism in general, but by *Islamist* terrorism in particular. In sub-Saharan Africa, these states include Nigeria, Niger, Mali, Cameroon, Somalia, Kenya, Uganda, and Ethiopia. In the Middle East, these states include Iraq, Syria, and Yemen. In South Asia these states include Pakistan, Afghanistan, and India. A qualification in the case in India. Although plagued by Islamist terrorism, India does not feature on the 20 most fragile states. India, however, has always received *elevated warning* scores (70.0 - 79.9) since the inception of the Fragile States Index in 2005 (see Chapter 3, section 3.6.1 *Indicators and measurement*).

The Islamist solution of *al-hakimiyya* comes with the promise of an alternative future to the failures and excesses of state fragility. This alternative future, i.e., the Islamic state and the application of the *Sharia*, have their challenges. By illustration, do groups such as *al-Shabaab*, *Boko Haram*, *al-Qaeda*, *Taliban*, or Islamic State have the capacity to be more effective in governance, security, and development, than the secular governments they oppose? Will Islamic states be more viable socio-economic and political entities than the fragile states they seek to replace? Available references and comparable cases, including the Iranian state (since 1979), and the proto-states in Afghanistan (1996-2001), Somalia (2006-2012), and Islamic State's Caliphate (2014-2019), suggest that these groups and such states are no more effective and no more viable than the secular governments and fragile states they oppose. Below in section 4.2.4 *Inconsistencies and irreconcilables within Islamist violent extremism*, I highlight the major contradictions and controversies within Islamism, linked to questions around the creation of Islamic states. Among these controversies, is the enforcement of the *Sharia*.

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[103] Elaborated on and referenced in Chapter 1, section 1.1. *Background*.

Quraishi-Landes (2017) separates the *Sharia, Ijtihad*, and *Siyasa*. Quraishi-Landes (2017:The Internet) maintains that the *Sharia* means 'way', referring to "the way God advises Muslims to live, documented in the Qur'an and the Prophet Muhammad's practices". The *Sharia* therefore is not 'state law', it is rather 'a religious canonical law'. *Ijtihad* are Muslim sources with legal analysis, which Muslim scholars have written into rules called *fiqh*, meaning 'understanding'. There are consequently 'multiple *fiqh* versions of *Sharia*'. *Fiqh*, according to Quraishi-Landes (2017:The Internet), includes topics as varied as "legal [grounds for divorce, charitable trust requirements], but also ethics and morality [the duty to rescue those in need], manners [hygiene, controlling anger] and ritual worship [fasting and prayer]". *Siyasa* are state laws, designed to serve the public good, which, unlike the *Sharia* and *fiqh*, apply and are enforceable to all within the state. Quraishi-Landes (2017:The Internet) therefore concludes that the movement to enforce the *Sharia* undermines "an important separation between state [*siyasa*] authority and religious [*fiqh*] authority" and may even be based on a complete misunderstanding of Muslim jurisprudence. Such are the contradictions that may be observed within Islamism.

4.2.4 Inconsistencies and irreconcilables within Islamist Violent Extremism

The forgoing show that despite the shared objectives of creating Islamic states (or the Caliphate) and the enforcement of the *Sharia*, Islamism is plagued by varied inconsistencies and irreconcilables, even within the same shared objectives. Islamism is also bedevilled by a lack of centre. A pan-Islamist consensus and leadership does not exist. Gerges (2009:24) asserts that the struggle for the soul of Islamism is waged between jihadis (espousing violent means) and mainstream Islamists (espousing peaceful means), and between nationalist jihadis (focused on the near enemy) and transnationalist jihadis (focused on the far enemy). Within this struggle exists specific contradictions and irreconcilables. By illustration, how does Islamism reconcile purporting to fight for all Muslims amidst the continuing history of racial discrimination against black Muslims in Arab and other Muslim-majority countries? This history of racial discrimination one finds within the Islamist movement and

Islamist organisations as well. Such history may be traced as far back as the Arab/Islamic slave trade (circa 800-1450).[104] And how does Islamism purport to fight on behalf of Muslims against Christians and other religions, yet, in doing so, kill, harm, and adversely affect more Muslims than Christians or followers of other religions? I highlighted earlier in the study that, in fact, most Islamist terrorist attacks and Islamist terrorism-related deaths occur in countries comprising Muslim-majorities, such as Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia, and Syria.[105] Herrera's (2019) *Most terrorist victims are Muslim*, and Daily Sabah's (2019) *80% of global terror attacks' victims are Muslims*, affirm that Islamist terrorism kills, harms, and adversely affect more Muslims than followers of other religions.

The above trend is reflected in the context of *al-Shabaab* in Somalia and Kenya. Somalia is monoethnic, with an over 99 percent Muslim population, of whom most are Sunni. *Al-Shabaab* attacks in Somalia therefore kill and affect more Muslims and ethnic-Somalis than other religions and ethnic groups. These attacks, affecting coreligionists and coethnics, are in part intended to force those targeted and neutral to choose sides between *al-Shabaab* and those opposed to it. *Al-Shabaab* is opposed to the Somalia Federal Government (SFG), which they deem to be an apostate Western puppet. *Al-Shabaab* is also opposed to other groups in Somalia, including *Ahlu Sunnah Waljama'a* (ASWJ), a Sunni-Sufi paramilitary group that is dominated by Hawiye sub-clans, supports moderate Islam, and is opposed to Wahhabism and Salafi-Islamists such as *al-Shabaab*. ASWJ, formed in 1992 and at times backed by Ethiopia, was aligned with the SFG in a formal agreement from 2009 but has since clashed with both SFG forces and *al-Shabaab* (Sheriff *et al*, 2015:51-53; Di Domenicantonio, 2016:64-66; Stern, 2021:12-13). By contrast, Kenya is a multi-ethnic, 85.5 percent Christian-majority country, with an 11 percent (5.2 million) Muslim minority. Yet, just as is the case in Somalia, despite attempts to identify and spare Muslims in *al-Shabaab* attacks such as Westgate (2013), Mpeketoni (2014), Mandera (2014), and Garissa (2015), of all 430 Islamist terrorist incidents (all linked to *al-Shabaab*) that occurred between 2010 and 2019 in Kenya, almost two-thirds (61.16 percent) were in North-eastern Region alone, covering three counties (Mandera, Wajir, and Garissa), home to almost half (47.34 percent) of Kenya's Muslims. In fact, all 430 incidents occurred in 12 counties (out of 47) that are home to 92 percent of Kenya's Muslims. Furthermore, 54 percent (2.8 million) of Kenya's Muslims, making up six percent of Kenya's total population, are ethnic-Somalis, of whom mostly live in North-eastern Region.[106]

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[104] See Abulhawa's (2013) *Confronting anti-black racism in the Arab world*, El-Geressi's (2020) *Racism in the Arab world: an open secret*, and Shehab and Baird's (2020) *Islamists appropriate Black Lives Matter movement, despite history of anti-black bigotry*.

[105] See Chapter 1, section 1.1 *Background*, and Chapter 3, section 3.6.1 *Indicators and measurement*.

[106] See Chapter 6, section 6.7 *Major Islamist terrorist activity in Kenya since the 1990s*, and Chapter 7, section 7.2 *The arc of insecurity and Islamist violent extremism*.

Furthermore, how does Islamism reconcile intra-Muslim and intra-Islamist factionalism and infighting defined by divisions such as those between Salafi and Sufi Islam, Sunni and Shia Islam, or between *al-Qaeda* and Islamic State? The question of *jihad*? Is *jihad* an individual or collective obligation? Who may call for *jihad* or declare *takfir*? Any Islamist leader, a judicial authority, or only recognised and legitimate representatives of the *Ummah*? Who is the enemy? Apostate rulers in Muslim countries (the near enemy) or the Christian West and their proxies (the far enemy)? Yet further, what is the intention? A Caliphate or Islamic states in Muslim-majority countries? Is Islam the original and only true religion? Are all people born in a state of *fitrah*, and therefore all Muslim? Can Muslims live in a secular state without undermining Islam? Is *hijra* from secular states to Islamic states an obligation for every Muslim? In the case of *al-Shabaab*, are nationalist, irredentist, and transnationalist objectives compatible? Is it feasible to pursue all three objectives at once or should they be pursued sequentially? These and other questions about Islamism are open to contestation and subject to conjecture within and outside of Islamism, revealing Islamism as an ideology and a movement that is in a state of flux.

Gerges (2009) has determined that the Islamist movement is divided between mainstream Islamists and jihadis. This is the first battle line illustrating the lack of centre within Islamism. Aside from its core views and objectives, Islamism is thus deeply divided as also shown by the contradictions outlined above within this movement. Mozaffari (2007:24) points out that "[d]espite the global aspirations of their ideologues, Islamists have no centre; there is no overall pan-Islamic radical leadership". Unlike other ideologies such as Pan-Africanism and the post-Second World War consensus regarding Africa's independence from colonial rule, Islamism does not have consensus, even within Islam or among Muslims, about the institution of Islamic states and the implementation of the *Sharia*. Zelin's (2014) *The war between ISIS and al-Qaeda for supremacy of the global jihadist movement*, and Hafez's (2017) *The curse of Cain: why fratricidal jihadis fail to learn from their mistakes*, speak to these divisions. Of significance to the case in Kenya, this lack of centre is also revealed in the struggle between *al-Shabaab* and Islamic State in Somalia (ISS), each affiliated to *al-Qaeda* and Islamic State respectively.

Since its founding in 1988, *al-Qaeda* has sought to position itself as the leader of the Islamist movement. Formed in 2010 as an offshoot of *al-Qaeda* in Iraq (AQI), Islamic State contested this position when it declared a Caliphate in north-western Iraq and north-eastern Syria in 2014, and its leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the Caliph, 'the leader of all Muslims everywhere'. In illustration of this global Islamist leadership aspiration, although *al-Qaeda*-Central is popularly known as *al-Qaeda*, i.e., 'the Base' or 'the Foundation', the official name of *al-Qaeda* is *The World Islamic Front for Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders*. *Al-Qaeda* also purports to pursue a *global war against crusaders* (GWAC), with crusaders represented as ‘the West’ or *al-adou al-baeed* (i.e., the far enemy), and symbolised by the US and its allies (Katumanga, 2008:412-413; Borárosová *et al*, 2017:71; Gerges, 2009:317; IEP, 2020a:16, 54). Gerges (2009:283) points out that despite *al-Qaeda*’s ‘World Islamic Front’ designation, “there exists no viable Islamist front united in armed struggle, or *jihad*, against the Christian West. In fact, *al-Qaeda* … [, as transnationalist jihadis, are] a small minority within the jihadi movement”.

In contrast to this purported transnationalist leadership, within the Islamist movement, most jihadis and most mainstream Islamists are religious nationalists, less concerned with ‘the far enemy’ and the global Caliphate, and more concerned with changing the conditions in their own individual home countries in the Muslim world (Gerges, 2009:287). In addition, and although based on Islamic eschatology (i.e., views and writings on ‘the end of days’), the ‘apocalyptic dream’, by *al-Qaeda* and later Islamic State, of a final confrontation between the Christian West and the Muslim world, is shared by only a few within the Islamist movement (Sivan, 2003:26; Turner, 2019:569-570, 574).[107] These observed real-life divisions and contradictions within Islamism have spawned equally divergent scholarly analytical frameworks and theoretical perspectives, to which I now turn.

4.3 ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORKS AND THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES

The foregoing illustrates that what we know and how we know about Islamism, is still open to contestation and subject to conjecture. These contestations and conjectures are reflected in the analytical frameworks and theoretical perspectives linked to this ideology and movement. This study considers three of these analytical frameworks, viz., the clash of civilisations, globalisation and uncertainty, and local conditions, and three of these theoretical perspectives, viz., instrumentalist, organisational, and psychological, approaches. Let me first consider the analytical frameworks.

4.3.1 Analytical Frameworks

The difference between the analytical frameworks, in essence, is based on whether international or local factors, or whether contextual or driving factors, in relation to Islamism, are emphasised. The clash of civilisations, as well as globalisation and uncertainty, emphasise exogenous, contextual, international factors such as the status of Islam and Muslims in the world. Local conditions emphasise endogenous, driving, local factors, including grievances such as relative deprivation, marginalisation, and repression. These theoretical and analytical differences reflect the divisions within the Islamist violent extremism itself. Crenshaw (2018:The Internet) asserts that Islamist violent extremism is divided over key questions, including the question of whether the struggle should focus on the near enemy (local conditions) or the far enemy (international factors). Given such divisions within the Islamist movement, we must also acknowledge that not all scholarly analytical frameworks and theoretical perspectives on Islamism, to use Joseph Maxwell's (1992:282-283) words, are "equally useful, credible, or legitimate". In Chapter 2, section 2.3.3 *The philosophical validation and rationale for the case study design*, I also outlined how one of the tenets of Critical Realism, viz., judgmental rationality, also corroborates that some models of reality are more accurate than others. These analytical frameworks and theoretical perspectives on Islamism are consequently subjected to both verifiable empirical evidence and analytical logic, starting with the clash of civilisations.

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[107] Islamic eschatology is comparable to Christian eschatology in the Book of Revelations in the Christian bible.

4.3.1.1 *The Clash of Civilisations*

The first analytical framework is the notion of the clash of civilisations. The clash of civilisations thesis links the development of Islamist violent extremism to a primordialist dialectic between two opposed (and imagined) worldviews, viz.: the Christian West and the Muslim world. This proposition suggests that religious difference in itself explains Islamist violent extremism and the struggle against Islamist violent extremism. In *The clash of civilisations and the remaking of world order* (1996), Samuel P. Huntington predicts conflict along fault-lines between the Christian West and the Muslim world. These fissures are said to include fault-lines between secularism and religious fundamentalism (or Islamism), republicanism and theocracy, liberal democracy and authoritarianism or totalitarianism.

According to the clash of civilisations, religious and cultural differences, in themselves, cause conflict. Conflict is therefore inevitable if these differences exist. This primordialist, deterministic, and even biological 'explanation' of conflict is also contained in Robert Kaplan's *The coming anarchy* (1994). Citing Martin van Creveld's *The transformation of war* (1991), Kaplan (1994:The Internet) asserts that "just as it makes no sense to ask 'why people eat,' or 'what they sleep for', … so fighting in many ways is not a means but an end". Since 9/11 the discourse on terrorism and Islamist violent extremism has been dominated by this notion of the clash of civilisations. See Fish (2002) and Abrahamian (2003) for a chronicle of these linkages and the dissenting views against such linkages. Gerges (2009:280-281) points out that following 9/11, 'Why do Muslims hate us so much?', dominated the media and public debate in the US. US citizens were told: 'Muslims hate America's freedoms and way of life'; 'Muslims are jealous of America's economic success, political influence, and international prestige'; 'Muslims hate Americans because of who they are, not because of what they have done'; 'America's actions and foreign policy had nothing to do with 9/11'. Gerges (2009:280, 281) and Katumanga (2008:406-407, 410) contend that the myth of 'the clash of civilisations' was given credence when *al-Qaeda*'s propaganda also peddled this mirror image and perceived dialectic between the Christian West and the Muslim world (ironically, in fact, claiming an imagined dialectic between what are two geopolitical imaginations themselves, viz., the Christian West and the Muslim world). *Al-Qaeda* pitched their own *global war against crusaders* (GWAC) against the *global war on terror* (GWOT) of the US.

The first criticism of the clash of civilisations is that this view is both primordialist and deterministic, assuming that human behaviour is both predictable and predetermined, as dictated and controlled by factors external to the human being, such as cultural and religious differences. The clash of civilisations disregards the self-regulating and self-interpreting social structures and human agency that inhabit the social world. Contrary to the claim by the clash of civilisations, George and Bennett (2005:129) and Gorski (2013:662) have correctly observed that human beings are, in fact, 'reflective open systems'. The clash of civilisations simply flies in the face of the cumulative knowledge of history and human nature. The reality of human agency and free-will, self-interest, and self-preservation, demonstrable by empirical evidence, simply trounces deterministic and even fanciful theoretical frameworks such as the clash of civilisations. As Edward Said pointed out in the case of erstwhile notions such as the 'Arab mind' and 'Islamic resistance to modernity', the clash of civilisations, in fact, represents one of the many 'false universals' linked to terrorism. 'False universals' being untrue yet widely held beliefs and views that are not based on empirical evidence (see Fish, 2002:29; Abraham, 2004:114-115).

Harald Müller also finds that Huntington's "notion of civilisation is neither supported by history nor by most of the work on civilisation and culture. His description of Islam as a disproportionally violent culture ignores that majority Muslim countries are sandwiched between all sorts of other 'civilisations' and thus have much more opportunity to clash than the rest - a simple case for 'controlling for borders' in statistical language …. Rather than the convergence of two civilisationally defined blocks, we see more diversity and shifting coalitions than before" (in Legatis, 2013:The Internet).[108] Gerges (2009:202) points to historical empirical evidence that undermines the notion of a clash of civilisations, including: the US financial and military assistance to the Afghan *mujahideen* against the Soviet Union(1980s); the US role in the defeat of Iraq and the liberation of Kuwait (1990-1991); the US intervention in Bosnia that ended the massacre of Bosnian Muslims by Serbs (1995); the US-led NATO intervention in Kosovo that ended Muslim ethnic cleansing by Serbs (1999). Clearly then, as Gerges

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[108] From an interview based on Harald Müller's study, *Coexistence of Civilisations: An Antipode to Huntington* (1998). Harald Müller's study is an assessment of, and a response to, Huntington's clash of civilisations.

(2009) demonstrates, Western and Muslim interests can and do meet, based not only on self-interest and self-preservation, but also common-interests, and even altruistic ideals.

Empirical evidence against the clash of civilisations has remained consistent. Take the negotiations between the US and the Afghan *Taliban*. What was on the table were concrete political issues, not fluffy notions of 'clashing values' or 'hatred and dislike' between the Christian West and the Muslim world. After 18 years of the long-war between the US and the *Taliban* (2001-2019), the talking points included: (1) the *Taliban*'s undertaking to stop supporting 'terrorism' and 'terrorist organisations' such as *al-Qaeda* and Islamic State; (2) the withdrawal of the US and other foreign military forces from Afghanistan; (3) allowing the future of Afghanistan to be negotiated by Afghans themselves, which would include the *Taliban* and the (then) Afghan government; (4) a ceasefire (Blanc, 2019:The Internet; Constable, 2019:The Internet). The signed *Taliban*-US agreement (2020:1-4), codified these four symbiotic political factors. Nowhere in the four-page agreement is there any mention of religion, culture, values, ideology, 'hatred', 'jealousy', or any 'clash of civilisations'.[109] Furthermore, the vast majority of Islamist terrorist activities occur in Muslim-majority countries and affect Muslims much more than members of any religion, least 'the Christian West'.[110] It is much rather right-wing terrorism that is most widespread in the West. The 2020 Global Terrorism Index shows that "[i]n North America, Western Europe, and Oceania, far-right attacks have increased by 250 percent since 2014, with deaths increasing by 709 per cent over the same period. There were 89 deaths [out of 108 terrorism deaths] attributed to far-right terrorists in 2019 …. There have been over 35 far-right terrorist incidents in the West every year for the past five years" (IEP, 2020a:3, 60). Empirical evidence thus demonstrates that the clash of civilisations simply does not proximate observable and demonstrable reality.

Another point of criticism against the clash of civilisations is the misplaced emphasises on the role of religion and identity. Egger and Magni-Berton (2019:20), in their study of attitudes towards political violence among Muslims in Europe, find that Muslims in Europe do not justify political violence and terrorism based on religion, but based on their political and economic experiences, with a Muslim identity mobilised only contingently. Cottee (2015:The Internet) also maintains that “the roots of jihadist terrorism lie not in Islam but in the myriad historical crimes and injustices of Western, and specifically U.S.-driven, imperialism”. Mark Juergensmeyer (2015:853) also finds that “very few religiously-related activists frame their motivations in scriptural or theological terms. Most are woefully ignorant about the textual and intellectual aspects of their traditions …. Religious beliefs and traditions are a part of their worldview, but only a part of it, even though it may be the vocabulary through which other social and political issues are enunciated”. Critically, as Mellon (2001:75, 76-80) points out, Islamism does not represent Islam (the religion) or the *Ummah* (the global Muslim community). The *Ummah* itself is hardly homogenous, with different traditions (such as Shia and Sunni, or Salafi and Sufi), different languages (Arabic and other languages), and different nationalities.

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[109] *Taliban* (Students) was founded in 1994 by Afghans who studied in *madrassas* (Islamic schools) and Islamic universities in Pakistan, hence the name. The formal name of *Taliban* is Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. This is the formal name *Taliban* used between 1996 and 2001 when they ruled most of Afghanistan (Juergensmeyer, 2019a:5; Borárosová *et al*, 2017:42). Titled: *Agreement for bringing peace to Afghanistan between the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan which is not recognized by the United States as a state and is known as the Taliban and the United States of America*, the 29 February 2020 four-page *Taliban*-US agreement makes provision for other related factors, including: the release of prisoners by both sides, the review of sanction against *Taliban*, and the undertaking by the US and its allies not to use force against the territorial integrity of Afghanistan, and not to interfere in the political independence or domestic affairs of Afghanistan.

[110] See this chapter, section 4.2.4 *Inconsistencies and irreconcilables within Islamist violent extremism*, Chapter 1, section 1.1 *Background*, and Chapter 3, section 3.6.1 *Indicators and measurement*).

Very recently, Juergensmeyer (2019b:109) finds that ideas, ideologies, or religious ideas, originate out of socio-political contexts and realities, not the other way around. Gerges (2009:292) also concludes that, “[o]bsessing over culture and the religious uniqueness of Arabs and Muslims obscures powerful sociopolitical and economic forces competing for influence and dominance … [in the Muslim world]”. Mellon (2001:74) correctly points out that ‘civilisations’ are simply not actors in world politics. Instead of a clash of ‘civilisations’, the clash is about real and concrete socio-economic and political factors. Religious and racial identity is merely a character of the clash, not the cause, motivation, or the logic, of this clash. The clash is policy-induced, i.e., what Mostafa and al-Hamdi (2007) show in a study of Arab support for the 9/11 attacks as ‘an anti-dominance reaction to perceived American hegemony and policies’ in the Middle-East, including the US support for Israel and for authoritarian Muslim governments. The clash is neither existential, nor about religious differences, nor cultural differences. The clash is about unjust, unacceptable, deliberate, and avoidable, social orders, as Johan Galtung (1969, 1990) would say, as experienced or perceived in the fragile states that Islamists call home, or in their adoptive countries. The clash is about the West sustaining state fragility in non-Western countries, as well as supporting ‘apostate’ and unaccountable governments in the Muslim world.

4.3.1.2 *Globalisation and Uncertainty*

The second analytical framework is globalisation and uncertainty. Globalisation and uncertainty accentuate political and socio-economic challenges faced by the Muslim world, as well as efforts to deal with these challenges. Mellon (2001:75) maintains that these challenges are ascribed to the incompetence and/or corruption of Islamic regimes themselves. Particularly, globalisation and uncertainty, as an analytical framework, highlights Islamist responses to these challenges. Kfir

(2017:773) contends that this uncertainty is linked with "social instability, radical political change, economic insecurity, and cultural changes". The political and socio-economic challenges in the Muslim world are compared to the advances made elsewhere in the world, highlighting the status of Muslims and Islam in a world dominated by Christian-majority countries. The challenges of globalisation and uncertainty, and the Islamist responses to these challenges, explain the contextual factors that have given rise to Islamism in individual countries, and the rise of Islamism as an international phenomenon.

Linking globalisation and uncertainty with the perception of existential threats to Islam and Muslims, Moïsi (2007:10) maintains that the Muslim world is trapped in a culture of humiliation that is driven by years of economic and political decay and the perception of being left behind by globalisation, resulting in a culture of hatred. In what she calls 'Islamic rage' in the development of Islamist violent extremism, Plummer (2012:418) contends that such rage emanates partially from the failure of Muslim states to achieve economic success that is comparable to Western countries. Gerges (2009:274) also observes that the Muslim world has a shared "sense of victimhood, marginality and helplessness". *Al-Shabaab* also picks up on this theme, stating that "[w]e advise the Muslims in different parts of the world who are suffering under the heel of the global Crusade against their Islam to heed the call of Allah and then the call of the *Mujahideen* leaders and pick up arms to defend their religion, honour, and properties. Patience O' Muslim *ummah*, the dark clouds of humiliation glowering above us will soon pass and the light of Islam will radiate the world" (Gaidi Mtaani, 2014a:2).

Mark Juergensmeyer (2019a:1-2) finds that since the 1979 Iranian Islamic revolution, religious nationalism emerged as a countervailing force to (Western) globalisation and secularism. Since the 1990s, Juergensmeyer (2019a:6-7) maintains, religious nationalism has been displaced by religious transnationalism as the dominant force against secular globalisation. Religious transnationalism may be equated to what Gerges (2009) called transnationalist *jihad*. Juergensmeyer (2019a:3) further finds that since the 1970s this pushback against secular globalisation is most observable in regions that are marginalised by the global political economy, meaning: in the fragile states of this world. The 2020 Global Terrorism Index also finds that "[t]errorism in sub-Saharan Africa is therefore part of a double discursive posture of combating … [domestic] socio-economic injustices and institutional dysfunctions such as corruption … and crusading against globalisation, an avatar of the West" (IEP, 2020a:81).

The return to *al-hakimiyya*, i.e., the sovereignty of God (Allah), is the answer by Islamists to the challenges facing the Muslim world, which include the negative impact of Western-driven globalisation and foreign influences on political, social, and economic conditions in the Muslim world.

The return to *al-hakimiyya*, Islamists contend, can only be achieved through *jihad* and by creating Islamic states and enforcing the *Sharia*. The globalisation and uncertainty framework provide the global context to the local conditions that have spawned Islamist violent extremism. This global context therefore includes the (perceived) subordinate socio-economic, religious, and political status of Islam and Muslims in the world today. Not only is this context and these conditions deemed deliberate and avoidable, but they are also seen as unjust and unacceptable, and therefore sources of popular discontent and the subjects of collective mobilisation and action. Exogenous globalisation and uncertainty, without local conditions such as 'apostate' Muslim governments, abusive and unresponsive structures of government, and domestic insecurity (all induced by state fragility), do not, on their own, explain the development of Islamist violent extremism, or impediments to CVE. Instead, globalisation and uncertainty, including the lot of Muslims in the world today, account for the contextual factors in the development of Islamist violent extremism and impediments to CVE.[111]

4.3.1.3 *Local Conditions*

The third analytical framework is local conditions. This framework highlights varied local conditions in the development of Islamist violent extremism. This study ascribes these varied local conditions directly to state fragility, including: (1) the suppression, marginalisation, and victimisation of local ethno-religious identities; (2) structural, direct, and cultural violence against ethno-religious identities; (3) the subjection of ethno-religious identities to 'unjust, deliberate, and avoidable social orders', 'historical injustices', and endemic insecurity (including ontological insecurity). Botha (2014c:125) finds in her study of radicalisation in Kenya and Uganda that "most militant groups among these Muslim communities fight for their local interests - political and cultural autonomy and economic justice - and not for some abstract notion of a global Islamist Caliphate". Gerges (2009:287) corroborates this finding in the context of the global Islamist movement, concluding that most jihadis and mainstream Islamists are religious nationalists who are less concerned with notions of 'the far enemy' or 'the global *jihad*' than they are with improving conditions in their own countries. Cilliers (2003:95) also finds and maintains that "[a]ll terrorism, including international terrorism, has domestic roots and is originally fuelled and driven by domestic injustices in a particular country or region".

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[111] Globalisation and uncertainty, as contextual factors, are linked to the insecurity dilemma and the search for ontological security as local state fragility induced factors. See Chapter 6, section 6.3.1.4 *The third wave of Islamist violent extremism in Kenya*, section 6.5.2 *The long-war in Kenya*, and Chapter 8, section 8.3 *State fragility and the development of impediments to CVE*, for an elaboration of the insecurity dilemma that is created by state fragility and the resultant search for ontological security by ethnic-Somalis and other Muslims in Kenya.

In its study on extremism in Africa, the UNDP (2017:5) also maintains that local conditions, rather than other factors such as transnational religion, are the driving force behind Islamist violent extremism. In this regard, the UNDP (2017:5) finds that "[f]ifty-one percent of respondents selected religion as a reason for joining. However, as many as 57 percent of the respondents also admitted to limited or no understanding of religious texts. Indeed, higher than average years of religious schooling appears to have been a source of resilience". Discounting the overemphasised and misrepresented role of religion, the UNDP (2017:6) points out that "[w]here there is injustice, deprivation and desperation, violent extremist ideologies present themselves as a challenge to the *status quo* and a form of escape". In its policy document on preventing and responding to extremism in Africa, the UNDP (2015:6) finds that Islamist violent extremism "feeds upon existing ethnic divisions, unequal distribution of resources, and the failure of the State to build an inclusive national identity". It is this local 'injustice, deprivation, and desperation' and local 'divisions and inequality', ignited, driven, and sustained by state fragility, which explain Islamist violent extremism in sub-Saharan Africa. USAID (2005:3) also looks at these local conditions that are generated by state fragility, concluding that "[w]here *both* effectiveness and legitimacy are weak, conflict or state failure is likely to result".

This current study is consequently based on this analytical framework. It contends that it is local conditions, created by the state fragility that is defined by incapacitating and conflict-generating properties or attributes, or what George and Bennet (2005:137) call causal capacities, that account for Islamist violent extremism, and impediments to CVE. These properties that have causal capacity and causal tendency, include weak and abusive structures of governance and authority, human rights abuses, poor policies and limited administrative capacity, endemic corruption, extraction of rents from the population, unequal economic development, social tensions, lack of social cohesion, violence (structural, cultural, and direct), and political and socio-economic instability. Ethno-religious identities are particularised and subjected to these properties. Finally, through illegitimacy and inefficiencies at the macro, meso and micro levels of the state, state fragility generates insecurity, conflict, and various permutations of violence, including Islamist violent extremism, and its particular expression, viz., terrorism. Islamist violent extremism is therefore the outlet and vector through which, in this case, ethnic-Somalis and other Muslims, marginalised, abandoned, persecuted, and securitised, seek to maximize their security within the state or through secession. State fragility also generates the contingent impediments to CVE approaches and programming, and hence the failure of CVE. The foregoing is the theoretical proposition and central contention of this study. This introduces the theoretical perspectives, which I subject also to both verifiable empirical evidence and analytical logic.

4.3.2 Theoretical Perspectives

Like the above analytical frameworks, what we know and how we know about Islamist violent extremism, is framed around different theoretical perspectives or approaches. This study examines and evaluates three approaches as alternative explanations to the theoretical proposition of this study, i.e., state fragility. These are (1) psychological, (2) instrumentalist, and (3) organisational, approaches. Maxwell (1992:282-283) reminds us that not all theoretical perspectives are “equally useful, credible, or legitimate”. I thus subject these perspectives/approaches to empirical evidence and a verifiable analytical logic, i.e., judgmental rationality. I start with psychological approaches.

4.3.2.1 *Psychological Approaches*

These approaches link individual psychology to Islamism. This individual psychology may include the role of the following in shaping the radicalisation process of the individual: (1) psychological traits; (2) frustration and aggression; (3) narcissism and aggression; (4) the interactions and dynamics between the state, the terrorist organisation, and the aggrieved community (McCormick, 2003:473, 490-495). I employ radicalisation theory as an example of psychological approaches to illustrate the main tenets of these approaches, starting with the following fundamental question: Why do people radicalise? As McCormick (2003:473, 490-495) pose the question: Do people, including new converts to Islam and ‘born-again’ Muslims, radicalise because of psychological traits such as alienation, a need for religious salvation, redemption, affirmation, and/or belonging, or traits such as a (an over-)developed sense of grievance or injustice, thus the *frustration-aggression* model? Or do people radicalise to restore damaged esteem (that of the self, and their linked group, religion, or nation), thus the *narcissism-aggression* model? Or do people radicalise because of the individual’s reaction to the developing interactions and dynamics between the state, the terrorist organisation, and the aggrieved community, to which the individual belongs, thus the *interactive-development* model?[112]

Allen *et al* (2015:18) assert that people radicalise because of “[t]he search for personal and group identities among those who feel this has been undermined by rapid social change”. Radicalisation is both an ideological process and a social process. Terrorists get socialised into the extremist ideology, but also join the extremist organisation to fulfil the need to belong as necessitated by the search for meaning and identity (Allen *et al*, 2015:19). But why does the search for identity and meaning lead to radicalisation in only a limited number of people? Allen *et al* (2015:18) opines that "[a] young man in search of identity who has a strong propensity to sense grievance and external threat may be at a much higher risk than one whose identity has formed and who lacks those propensities". Abrahms (2008:96) also asserts that Islamism "appeals disproportionately to certain psychological types of people, namely, the socially alienated". Botha (2014c:145) finds that "[t]he term 'alienation' most commonly refers to the feelings of powerlessness, meaninglessness, normlessness, isolation, self-estrangement, inefficacy, cynicism and a lack of social rootedness or feeling of being estranged from the mainstream". Alienation leads to apathy, or it may lead to activism as is the case with Islamism.

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[112] The interactive-development explanation is represented by models that view radicalisation as a process. In Chapter 1, section 1.8.1 *Key concepts*, I outlined the disputes about the stages in the process of radicalisation. There are also disputes about the role and impact of individual psychological traits, the state, the terrorist organisation, the aggrieved community, and the related push and pull factors, in the radicalisation process. Borum (2011b) offers a good point of departure in probing the different conceptions of the stages in the radicalisation process. Borum (2011b:39) himself proposes a four-stage model: (1) grievance, (2) injustice (3) target attribution, and (4) distancing/devaluation. Each stage triggers and leads to radicalised violence.

Radicalisation theory however faces a litany of criticism. Said criticism is often centred on the notion that micro radicalisation is nebulous and malleable, a dynamic process that has infinite causes, influences, and triggers, therefore a highly personal and variable process. At the 2015 Summit on Countering Violent Extremism, former US President Barack Obama (2015a:The Internet) maintained that "[w]e all know there is no one profile of a violent extremist or terrorist, so there's no way to predict who will become radicalised". Allen *et al* (2015:28) also maintain that the "individuals involved in extremist behaviour have varied widely in age, socioeconomic status, literacy levels, occupation and past criminal records". Although the 2017 UNDP study is predicated on explaining the socialisation of individuals into extremist organisations, the UNDP (2017:47, 17) also concedes that "individuals who join violent extremist groups have a range of priorities, perspectives and needs that motivate them, in which religion may or may not play a considerable part …. [There is] no way to determine whether an individual in certain circumstances, with a certain disposition, with certain relationships, and exposed to certain ideas will end up engaged in violence". Borum (2011a:8) consequently cautions all of us that "[r]adicalisation by developing or adopting extremist beliefs that justify violence is one possible pathway into terrorism involvement, but it is certainly not the only one …. Most people who hold radical ideas do not engage in terrorism, and many terrorists - even those who lay claim to a 'cause' - are not deeply ideological and may not 'radicalise' in any traditional sense".

The key, in accounting for collective phenomena such as Islamism and terrorism, is to seek conceptual frameworks at the appropriate level of analysis. A level of analysis that account for collective deprivation, discontent, mobilisation, and action. One should therefore not miss the forest for the trees. Cottee (2015:The Internet) also contends that studies have shown that jihadis "do not act in a social vacuum, and that what they think, feel, and do is powerfully shaped by the broader historical circumstances in which they are compelled to live and act". Hedström and Ylikoski (2010:58) have pointed out that in building causal explanations in social sciences, the "key challenge is to account for collective phenomena that are not definable by reference to any single member of the collectivity". Therefore, accounting for collective phenomena, i.e., Islamist violent extremism and CVE, at a suitable level of analysis, is where this study's state fragility proposition finds unmatched value and utility.

Having evaluated psychological approaches, as embodied by radicalisation theory, this study discounts these approaches based on the above criticism, and on a number of other related reasons. The reasons include the fact that that these approaches, firstly, misrepresent Islamism and CVE as collective phenomena by overemphasising individual psychology and agency (found in micro-radicalisation) over the role of social structures, i.e., institutions, organisations, communities, and groups (found in meso and macro radicalisation). Islamism and CVE are simply not micro-level phenomena. Islamism is a collective pursuit, with collective goals, and collective outcomes. Micro radicalisation lose any meaning and significance outside of the context of meso and macro radicalisation. In the current chapter in section 4.2.1 *Conceptualising Islamist violent extremism*, the case of the 2016 lone-wolf attack in Orlando, Florida, illustrates that outside of the context of the third wave of Islamism, Omar Mateen's actions are reduced to a random individual criminal event, a hate-crime at best. Micro-level radicalisation therefore explains neither Islamism, nor the formation of Islamist organisations.

A second reason for this study discounting psychological approaches is that these approaches do not account for the context of group/community and society discontent and mobilisation from where Islamism finds its roots, incentive, and sustainment. These approaches artificially abstract the individual, the Islamist ideology, and the terrorist organisation, from the context of the structural, political, economic, social, and external drivers of Islamism and terrorism (these varied drivers are contained within state fragility). A third reason is that psychological approaches disregard the time order in the explanation of Islamism. Time order, of course, is a necessary condition without which a causal explanation is incomplete and may even be impossible. By over emphasising subsequent pull factors, including the influence of Islamist ideologues and terror groups, these approaches do not duly consider the initial structural conditions and push factors (generated by state fragility) that shape and propel Islamism in the first place. These structural conditions and push factors predate any pull factor, including the formation of the terror group, and the influence of Islamist ideologues. An individual can only be radicalised when their developing worldview and blame system align with that of an already existing Islamist ideology and movement. The Islamist ideology and movement are, in turn, a response to the fragile state that has denied, repressed, or failed to accommodate Muslim interests.

Lastly, psychological approaches disregard the contextual explanation of Islamism and related barriers to CVE. Such explanation includes the fact that, at its core, Islamism is a political movement and campaign that challenges the authority and legitimacy of the secular state or a state that is not based on Islamic values. Islamism also competes with the state, in a struggle defined by persuasive and coercive political bargaining, for the loyalty of society. In fact, Islamism is a counter-revolution to the secular state that is the basis of the current state system. The state is not merely the locus of Islamist *jihad*, the state is an actor in the conflict. The state, its government, institutions, and society, are deemed to be legitimate targets for *jihad* in the struggle for the creation of Islamic states.[113] Moreover, in the case in Kenya, the formation of the fragile state at independence initiated the time order in the causal process between state fragility and Islamism, and it is itself the explanatory context from where the generation of Islamism and subsequent impediments to CVE are found. The fragile state of Kenya was affirmed by the 'Big Bang' of independence in 1963 and by the nature of post-colonial rule since, pitting the state against an ethno-religious identity, viz., ethnic-Somalis and other Muslims.

Having discounted psychological approaches, this study does not discount human agency. Human agency interacts with social structures in instrumentalist approaches, in organisational approaches, and in state fragility, as conceptual and theoretical perspectives. Gorski (2013:668-669) submits that "[h]uman agents are bio-psycho-social structures with emergent powers of intentionality. Conversely, social structures have agency, an agency that transcends and influences the intentions of the individual agents that co-constitute them". Bygstad *et al* (2016:84) consequently concludes that "[s]tructure enables and constrains action, while human action reproduces or transforms structure". In seeking to explain group behaviour and collective phenomena such as Islamism and CVE, the level of one's analysis must be the social structures found in meso and macro radicalisation. I stressed in the preceding chapters that it is the properties of state fragility, inclusive of these social structures that subsist in the fragile state, that have agency and thus the causal capacity and tendency capable of explaining Islamism and resistance to CVE. Human agency alone, in the sense of individual micro radicalisation, has neither logic nor meaning outside of these social structures. Micro radicalisation, to reword Carl von Clausewitz, can only account for the grammar and sociology of Islamism, but neither its causes, nor its logic, nor its (strategic) intent. I now turn to instrumentalist approaches.

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[113] The modern state system resulted from the rejection of religious authority. The 1648 Peace of Westphalia that ended the sovereign authority of the Catholic Church and the Papacy, created a secular state system based on the principle of 'the separation of the church from the state' as one of its main pillars. As a retrogressive ideology and movement, Islamism seeks to replace the secular state with an Islamic state, therefore resubjecting both private and public life (not just spiritual life) to religious principles (Heywood, 2019:52, 71-72).

4.3.2.2 *Instrumentalist Approaches*

Instrumentalist approaches, i.e., strategic theories, assert that Islamist violent extremism and Islamist terrorism are intentional and instrumental, a means to an intended political end (Crenshaw, 1988:13-16, 27; McCormick, 2003:473, 481-486). In outlining the main tenets encapsulating instrumentalist approaches, I examine two theories, viz., relative deprivation theory and rational choice theory. Marginalisation-alienation-injustice (or similar exhortations) is a common refrain in the development of Islamist violent extremism. In an essay written in a different context in 1847, titled *Wage, Labour and Capital*, Karl Marx (1902:42) succinctly captures this marginalisation-alienation-injustice refrain:

> A house may be large or small; as long as the neighbouring houses are likewise small, it satisfies all social requirement for a residence. But let there arise next to the little house a palace, and the little house shrinks to a hut. The little house now makes it clear that its inmate has no social position at all to maintain, or but a very insignificant one; and however high … [the little house] may shoot up …, if the neighbouring palace rises in equal or even in greater measure, the occupant of the relatively little house will always find himself more uncomfortable, more dissatisfied, more cramped within his four walls.

The marginalisation-alienation-injustice refrain is discernible in relative deprivation theory. Collier (2007:3) contends in a different but relevant context that the world's 'bottom billion' (the bottom billion is equated to fragile states in this study), is made up of "a group of countries at the bottom that are falling behind, and often falling apart…. [They] coexist with the twenty-first century, but their reality is the fourteenth century". This differentiated co-existence generates relative deprivation. Such deprivation occurs when there is an unbearable gap between (1) what people get, and (2) what they expect. Alternatively, Botha (2014b:908-909) speaks of (1) perceived inequality, and (2) the perceived intensity or degree of that inequality. Relative deprivation leads to frustration, grievance, and collective mobilisation and action. This is the contention of Ted Gurr's *Why Men Rebel* (1970), in which he outlines the causal relationship between relative deprivation and political violence.[114]

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[114] Davis (1959) points out that the origins of the theory of relative deprivation dates to a study made on US soldiers by Stouffer *et al* during the Second World War (1939-1945), published with the subtitle *The American Soldier* (1949), which was part of a four-volumes series called *Studies in Social Psychology in World War II*. Davies (1959:280) contends that although *The American Soldier* (1949) neither defined relative deprivation, nor codified the theory of relative deprivation, it laid the foundation of what is called relative deprivation theory today. *The*

Ted Gurr (1970:24) defines relative deprivation as an "actor's perception of discrepancy between their value expectations and their value capabilities. Value expectations are the goods and conditions of life to which people believe they are rightfully entitled. Value capabilities are the goods and conditions they think they are capable of getting and keeping". The unbearable gap occurs in terms of both relative poverty and relative wealth, or similar permutations, including relative privilege or relative power, as opposed to other permutations such as relative marginalisation or relative injustice. Davies (1959:283) thus speaks of the distinction between relative deprivation and relative gratification, and relative subordination versus relative superiority. Pettigrew (2015:12) defines relative deprivation as "a judgment that one or one's ingroup is disadvantaged compared to a relevant referent …, [invoking] feelings of anger, resentment, and entitlement". Such deprivation, and its often-violent outcomes, is the everyday reality for the lot that are doomed to call fragile states home. The *Human development report 2019*, focusing on human-made inequality in human capacities, finds that "many people have little prospect for a better future. They are without hope, purpose or dignity, watching from society's sidelines as they see others pulling ahead to ever greater prosperity …. [E]ven more have neither the opportunities nor the resources to control their lives" (UNDP, 2019b:352). In Chapter 7, I present the empirical evidence demonstrating that these conditions in fact exist in the arc of insecurity in Kenya.

Relative deprivation theory, however, has its detractors. Piazza (2006:162) points out that the literature that investigates the relationship between poverty, material deprivation, unequal distribution of resources, and mass political violence, has mixed findings, with support both for and against the relationship. Piazza (2006:171) concludes, in his study of 96 countries between 1986 and 2002, that "the results are unable to validate the 'relative deprivation' approach". Taking stock of relative deprivation theory 40 years on since *Why Men Rebel* (1970), Ted Gurr (2011a:The Internet, 2011b:x-xiv) forwards eight areas in the development of collective violence that serve to reaffirm, but also re-examine, the theory of relative deprivation. Firstly, there is the issue of grievance, and an

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American Soldier (1949) studied the attitudes of US servicemen on a range of issues regarding military life, including attitudes towards service conditions such as promotions and mobility, within and between Arms of Service, based on a range of factors, including: age, race, marital status, levels of education, rank, combat experience, overseas service, and their region of origin. Pettigrew (2015:11) elaborates that among the counterintuitive findings of *The American Soldier* (1949), was that the military police servicemen were more satisfied with their slow promotions, because they compared themselves with other military police servicemen, and not the army air corpsmen who had more rapid promotions but were less satisfied. Another finding was that of black servicemen from the South that were more satisfied than black servicemen from the North who had better conditions but were less satisfied. This was because black servicemen from the South compared themselves to the conditions of black civilians in the South, and not black servicemen from the North. Based on these findings, the conclusion made was that satisfaction is relative to available comparisons. Deprivation is therefore always relative, never absolute, and not always objective. *The American Soldier* (1949), Pettigrew (2015:15) maintains, introduced the concept of relative deprivation from which the theory was later developed.

analysis of its sources. This, Ted Gurr argues, remains an essential first step in accounting for collective action. Accordingly, the prism of popular discontent (i.e., deprivation or a sense of injustice) remains valid. The second area in analysing collective violence is the people's justifications for, or beliefs about the justifiability and utility of, political action. This is a window into the 'inner-workings' of the aggrieved group. The third area to consider is the people's clan, ethnic, religious, and political identities. One needs to examine the networks of social interaction and communication, including the dynamics related to the development of a sense of collective injustice and amenability to calls for political action. This collective identity was not adequately addressed in *Why Men Rebel* (1970).

The fourth area, given the fact of popular discontent and beliefs about the justifiability and utility of political action, is the examination of the processes of group mobilisation, including the organisation and ability of the discontented group to act in a collective manner. Yet again, group mobilisation was not adequately addressed in *Why Men Rebel* (1970). The fifth area to examine is how the communication of ideas and personal mobility inform modern-day political action, such as examining how the web, media, social networking, and air travel, enable the trans-nationalisation of ideology and political action. *Why Men Rebel* (1970), conversely, was state-centric in approach and did not adequately consider these factors. The sixth area is the acknowledgement and consideration that political violence is an outcome of rational calculation, and therefore requires and demands rational-choice analysis. Such a rational-choice analysis contrasts with the original assumption of *Why Men Rebel* (1970), which was, 'political violence originates as a non-rational reaction to frustration'.

The seventh area is about the government's capacity and response. The ability and willingness of the government being opposed by its citizens to either repress or reform, can create or suppress the opportunity for collective violence. In the final analysis, one needs to consider the nature and levels of international support for the government or the political movement or group. In this regard, globalisation has ensured that in an interconnected world, international influences both constrain and encourage specific behaviours and actions of the government and the group that challenges or opposes said government. Gurr (2011a:The Internet) consequently concludes that "governments sustain or create the conditions for conflict at every step" and expounds that "[g]overnment-imposed inequalities are a major source of grievances; repressive policies increase anger and resistance; denial of the right to use conventional politics and protest pushes activists underground and spawns terrorist and revolutionary resistance". The case in Kenya, as shown in Chapters 6 to 7, clearly corroborates and illustrates these tenets of relative deprivation as outlined by Ted Gurr (1970, 2011a, 2011b). These conditions of relative deprivations are induced by state fragility, leading to conflict development, with *al-Shabaab* challenging the authority and legitimacy of the Kenyan state and its government.

In concert with relative deprivation theory, another theory at play in accounting for Islamist violent extremism is rational choice theory, otherwise referred to as the strategic model. In illustration of this theory, Schmid (2013:3) maintains that there is a rational motive to Islamist violent extremism, and there are clear political goals that are actively pursued by this movement. After all, Schmid (2011a:3, 2011b:40-41) contends, terror, viz., 'intense fear', is both a natural phenomenon and a state of mind. Terrorism on the other hand is the conscious exploitation of this intense fear. Terrorism is employed to induce desired goals. Terrorism is ultimately designed to influence the behaviour and decision-making of the target state, government, or population. Abrahms and Conrad (2017:301) accordingly defines terrorism as "a political communication strategy for groups to convey their grievances and the costs of ignoring them". Schmid (2013:3) sees the following as a rational explanation for 9/11:

> *Al-Qaeda* has, and always had, a specific aim: to arouse the sleeping body of the Islamic Nation - a billion Muslims worldwide - to fight against Western power and the contaminations of Western culture. In support of this aim, the 9/11 attacks were designed to force the Western snake to bite the sleeping body, and wake it up.

From the above account one may deduce three modes of terrorism, viz.: instrumentalist, communicative, and symbolic (see earlier in the current chapter, section 4.2.1 *Conceptualising Islamist violent extremism*). Mozaffari (2007:24) also asserts that the use of violence is "the consequence of a strategic and deliberate choice by the leadership [of Islamist organisations], as is the case for *al-Qaeda* …. Terrorism, and diffusion of fear in the civil population, is therefore the instrument of choice in the hands of Islamist groups". Lake (2002) speaks of 'rational extremism', contending that unlike military action between states, terrorism is not always intended to yield immediate or even medium-term results. Much rather, "[t]he terrorist act itself is designed to shift the balance of power between the parties and to produce a better bargain at some point in the distant future. Bargaining over particular issues now is subordinated to a broader strategy of using violence to change the relative capabilities of the two sides" (Lake, 2002:17). Lake (2002:18-19) expounds that the political goals of *al-Qaeda* include: 'creating fundamentalist regimes throughout the Islamic world'; to 'stop the West from polluting Islamic culture'; to 'force the US to withdraw from the Middle East'; and to 'destroy Israel'.

Lake (2002:19) contends that all the foregoing are rational goals, consistent with Islamist ideology. What makes them 'extremist' is that (1) the 'political beliefs and goals are not widely shared even within Muslim societies', and (2) 'currently *al-Qaeda* lacks the means or power to obtain these goals'. Lake (2002:26) finds that the "purpose of extremist violence is to provoke the target into a disproportionate response, radicalise moderates, and build support for its ambitious goals over the long term". Accordingly, rational choice theory, in a state-centric context, must be modified when applied in the context of Islamist violent extremism. What may appear to be 'irrational', 'unclear and inconsistent political goals', becomes rational and consistent when one considers the logic of the long-war, and the differentiated objectives of Islamists. Fish (2002:30) correctly and profoundly concludes that "[t]hese men are not irrational; rather they act from within a rationality we rightly reject, if only because its goal is our destruction". Relative deprivation theory and the rational choice model account for *why* Islamist violent extremism develops, and both theories are congruent with the macro theory of state fragility in explaining the growth and sustainment of Islamist violent extremism in Kenya.

Like relative deprivation theory, the rational choice model also face criticism. Abrahms (2008) holds instrumentalist approaches, the rational choice model in particular (what he calls the strategic model), against empirical evidence based on the behaviour of terrorist organisations since the 1960s and finds the approach 'fundamentally flawed in explaining terrorist behaviour'. Abrahms (2008:79) asserts that the strategic model is based on what he deems to be three inaccurate assumptions, viz.: "(1) terrorists are motivated by relatively stable and consistent political preferences; (2) terrorists evaluate the expected political payoffs of their available options, or at least the most obvious ones; (3) terrorism is adopted when the expected political return is superior to those of alternative options". The strategic model thus proposes that terrorists are rational actors who deliberately and rationally maximise the political utility of terrorism by attacking soft targets, including civilians, to achieve political goals, with the least amount of costs involved. In response, counter-terrorism has designed strategies to neutralise or defeat terrorism by either withholding, or otherwise, yielding political concessions or allowing peaceful political changes, i.e., weakening the political utility of terrorism (Abrahms, 2008:80-81). Discounting the strategic model, Abrahms (2008) offers the natural systems model instead.

4.3.2.3 *Organisational Approaches*

Organisational approaches highlight the internal dynamics and life cycle of Islamist organisations in explaining Islamist violent extremism (Crenshaw, 1988:19-24, 27; McCormick, 2003:473, 486-490). I examine the natural systems model as an example of organisational approaches. In outlining the natural systems model, Abrahms (2008:82) offers seven common behavioural tendencies of terrorist groups that refute instrumentalist approaches. The first is that terrorist groups rarely achieve their stated political objectives by attacking civilians. The selection of terrorism as a coercive measure against civilians is therefore ineffective. Secondly, terrorism is rarely used as a last resort, and consequently terrorist groups rarely transform, even when presented the opportunity, to be nonviolent political parties. Thirdly, terrorist groups often reject political compromises or significant policy concessions by the governments that they oppose. Fourthly, these groups have variable and mutating political platforms, undermining their stated primary goals and by extension the basis of negotiations with the target government. Fifthly, these groups sometimes conduct 'anonymous terrorism', thus impeding any policy concessions that may be made. Sixthly, these groups, even those with identical political platforms, often spend more time attacking each other than their common enemy. Lastly, these groups often engage in 'never-ending terrorism', even after their stated political grievances have been resolved, or when they consistently fail to achieve their stated objectives.

Abrahms (2008:94) concludes that the rational choice model, what he calls the strategic model, incorrectly identifies the incentive structure of terrorism. Abrahms (2008:94) contends that although terrorists are rational, the primary objective of terrorism is not to achieve a terrorist group's political platform. Abrahms (2008) offers instead the natural systems model, which confirms the seven common behavioural tendencies of terrorist groups as outlined above, and concludes that theoretical and empirical evidence suggest that the incentive structure of terrorism is *social solidarity and the continued survival of the social unit*, and not what the rational choice model suggests, that is, *maximising the political utility of terrorism by attacking soft targets to achieve political goals with the least amount of costs involved*. According to Abrahms (2008:95), "[t]he natural systems model stresses that there is often a disconnect between the official goals of an organisation and the latent social goals governing its behaviour". Abrahms (2008:96) therefore maintains that there is compelling: (1) "evidence at the individual level that people are mainly attracted to terrorist organisations not to achieve their official political platforms, but to develop strong affective ties with other terrorist members"; (2) "evidence at the organisational level that terrorist groups consistently engage in actions to preserve the social unit, even when these impede their official political agendas". Abrahms (2008:98) consequently concludes that most terrorists participate in terrorism "to improve their relationships with other terrorists or to reduce their sense of alienation from society, usually both".

This study discounts the natural systems model and instead proposes and accepts that terrorist political platforms will vary given the limitations of terrorist organisations and the constraints they face. The study also accepts that some actions will appear to undermine these platforms because the ideology (i.e., the coherent set of Islamist ideas) is obedient to the dictates of identity (these dictates inform ‘new terrorism’ since the 1990s). These dictates of identity could be as ‘unstrategic’ as retribution, to inspire supporters, or simply to demonstrate courage or strength. Other ‘unstrategic’ dictates may be symbolic violence such as actions that are designed to demonstrate that the opponent is not invincible, rather than instrumental violence that would be expected of a ‘rational’ actor. In this regard, I pointed out earlier in the current chapter in section 4.2.2.1 *Religion as central to the human condition* that the ‘founding father’ of the modern jihadi movement, the Egyptian Islamist ideologue Sayyid Qutb, has successfully advocated for *jihad*, including symbolic violence, as ‘a path to self-realisation and purification’, a war that is offensive and total, thus ‘neither defensive nor limited’.

Parallels may be found in Africa’s national liberation struggles. In *The wretched of the earth* (2017/1963), Franz Fanon presented what was to be a dominant perspective within the liberation movement. Fanon (2017:65) argued that in the struggle between the colonised and the colonist, success could be achieved “only after a murderous and decisive confrontation between the two protagonists”. Fanon (2017:113, 106) further argued that violence in itself is cleansing, liberating, and empowering, “[i]t rids the colonised of their … passive and despairing attitude. It emboldens them, and restores their self-confidence …. The colonised man liberates himself in and through violence”. In such conditions as also found within Islamism, however ‘unstrategic’ and even ‘counterproductive’, ‘irrational’ and symbolic violence in fact becomes rational and instrumental, reflecting individual, tactical, and organisational dynamics, and short-term goals, of the Islamist group and its membership.

Earlier in this chapter in section 4.3.2.2 *Instrumentalist approaches*, I noted that what appears to be ‘irrational’ or ‘unclear and inconsistent political goals’, in a state-centric context of a ‘rational actor’, becomes rational and consistent when one considers the logic and objectives of the Islamist movement and the long-war. To speak of ‘unstable or variable objectives’ is to miss the utilitarian nature of the objectives of Islamist organisations and of terrorism itself, and the hostile environment these organisations occupy, including their inherent limitations. Take *al-Shabaab*. Is the objective of *al-Shabaab* to create an Islamic state in Somalia, in ‘Greater Somalia’, or in East Africa and even further afield? The answer would be a pragmatic one. The answer is most likely: *Whichever objective is achievable in the short, medium, or long run*. Does this constitute a ‘variable and mutating political platform’? No. The three objectives are not contradictory, variable, mutating, or unstable. In all three objectives the inherent intent of returning to *al-hakimiyya* and creating a polity based on Islamic law and Islamic values, remains stable and consistent. The Islamic state, however configured and whatever its extent, is then a means to an end, as utilitarian and as instrumental as terrorism itself.[115]

Whilst Abrahms (2008) does present an engaging argument, *why* terrorist organisations are formed in the first place, is glaringly omitted in the natural systems model. Surely, Islamist organisations are not social clubs? Surely, the incentive structure of terrorism is not the preservation of the terror group, as a social unit, as an intrinsic good, and consequently an end in itself? The natural systems model accounts for *how* these organisations are sustained, their sociology, and the behavioural dynamics in the lifecycle of these organisations, but not *why* they are formed. Like radicalisation theory as indicated in section 4.3.2.1 *Psychological approaches*, Abrahams' model also disregards the time order in the explanation of Islamism, and fails to acknowledge that the why and how of organisational formation need not always align with subsequent organisational behaviour. Said later organisational behaviour is often dictated by context-specific factors, such as the hostile security environment inhabited by these organisations, and the limitations of these organisations, including their leadership and resource deficits, and short-term goals. The natural systems model is silent in explaining the logic, motivation, and causes of Islamist violent extremism and its manifestation, viz., Islamist terrorism.[116]

In summation of the three theoretical perspectives or approaches, viz.: psychological, instrumentalist, and organisational, one must consequently revert to the instrumentalist approaches in explaining the logic, motivation, and causes, of Islamist violent extremism and its manifestation, Islamist terrorism. McCormick (2003:474) stresses that terrorism is always "a purposeful activity, carried out in the name of a larger political objective, regardless of the individual motives or group dynamics". This is true even when terrorism is demonstrated at the end to have been a misguided instrument in achieving the said political objective. The same is true of conventional war (between states), itself often a misguided instrument of achieving political objectives. Having considering the three theoretical perspectives, it is evident that these perspectives are not, in totality, mutually exclusive. The middle-range theories in the instrumentalist approaches, i.e., relative deprivation and rational choice theories, as contextualised to account for the logic and objectives of the Islamist movement and organisations (and not state actors) and the logic of the long-war, are congruent with the tenets of state fragility. Instrumentalist approaches are also congruent with the tenets of Critical Realism and critical terrorism studies as appropriated in this study. In the psychological approaches, radicalisation theory, in terms of meso (groups) and macro (society) radicalisation, rather than micro (individual) radicalisation, is also congruent with the tenets of state fragility in explaining the causes, logic, and incentive structure of Islamist violent extremism. Consequently, a contextualised and an integrated analytical-theoretical approach in explaining Islamist violent extremism and impediments to CVE is required. In Chapter 7, I demonstrate that relative deprivation theory, and rational choice theory, together with the following factors: the blame system, disengagement (from the state), politically significant identity, constricted democratic space, marginalisation and exclusion, insecurity, self-help and survival motives, and the kin-country syndrome, aid in building and outlining the causal mechanisms that unpack the black box of causality between state fragility (X) and Islamist violent extremism (Y), in Kenya (context).

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[115] These utilitarian and pragmatic considerations are also revealed regarding gender roles and illicit trade networks. Despite the subservient role women are supposed to have within Islamism as an ideology and a movement, Islamist organisations do find it necessary to employ women in key roles, and despite whatever pious norms and values these organisations are supposed to hold, in raising much needed organisational and operational funding, these organisations also find it necessary to engage with what would otherwise be 'impious' revenue streams. In two studies that are based on extensive field research in Somalia, Orly Stern (2019, 2021) finds that despite the Salafi-Wahhabi ideology that *al-Shabaab* holds, there is an 'invisible layer' of women that play key roles in *al-Shabaab*, including roles in logistics, intelligence, combat, fundraising, money laundering, recruitment, and running *al-Shabaab*'s legitimate businesses. *Al-Shabaab* specifically runs a 'Mata Hari network' in Kenya, using sex workers for intelligence gathering. Stern (2021) also finds that, despite banning substances such as khat and drugs, *al-Shabaab* benefits from extensive taxation, extortion, and smuggling networks that include trade in khat, drugs, charcoal, sugar, and human trafficking. *Al-Shabaab*, a self-proclaimed 'pious' Salafi-Wahhabi-takfiri organisation, is therefore not only adaptable and resilient, but also utilitarian and pragmatic.

[116] Why these discrepancies in a single reality? Krause (2018) examines studies by Robert Pape (instrumentalist approaches) and Max Abrahms (organisational approaches) and finds that the differences between them are not about substance, but about methodology. Krause (2018:47) observes that upon close examination, "the gap between them disappears when differences in their standards of measurement and case selection are considered". Krause (2018:46-48) contends that their 'seemingly irreconcilable arguments' results from their choice of different case studies and reference points, differences in how they view the purpose (levels) of terrorism (i.e., strategic, organisational, or tactical), the varied objectives of terrorism, and differences in how they measure the success and failure of terrorism. See section 4.2.1 *Conceptualising Islamist violent extremism*.

4.5 CONCLUDING REMARKS

A qualification first. Although this chapter and this study touch on various themes and tenets of Islamism as an ideology and a movement, they are not designed to be exhaustive accounts of these themes and tenets. Only those aspects that serve the aim and objectives of the study are consequently addressed. These aspects include key features of Islam as a religion, conversely, Islamism or Islamist violent extremism as an ideology and a movement, and its manifestation, viz., Islamist terrorism. Accordingly, the chapter is divided into three parts. The first part dealt with Islamism by illuminating definitions, linkages with terrorism and radicalisation, the drivers of Islamism, Islamism as an ideology and a movement, the intention and objectives of Islamism, as well as the major inconsistencies and irreconcilables within Islamism. The second part addressed three analytical frameworks that are related to Islamism, viz., the clash of civilisations, globalisation and uncertainty, and local conditions. The last part of the chapter covered three theoretical perspectives or approaches that are inked to

Islamism, viz., psychological, instrumentalist, and organisational. These three perspectives are presented as alternative accounts to state fragility, in explaining Islamist violent extremism, in Kenya.

Based on this chapter, and consistent with Islamist ideology, it may be concluded that Kenya, as a self-purported secular state, is seen as living in *al-jahiliyya* (i.e., the age of ignorance), as defined by ‘the rejection of the divinity and authority of God (Allah)’. Also consistent with Islamist ideology, it may further be concluded that Kenya is in the crosshairs of *al-Shabaab* because the country’s 5.2 million Muslims (i.e., 11 percent of the population) are ruled by a (theoretically) secular government, with a Christian heritage. Kenya is aligned with both *al-adou al-baeed*, i.e., the far enemy (i.e., the US and its allies), and *al-adou al-qareeb*, i.e., the near enemy (i.e., the Somali government, which is perceived to be an apostate government and a Western puppet by *al-Shabaab*). Kenya is also conceived as *dar al-harb* (i.e., the house of war and injustice), i.e., where Islam does not prevail and where Muslims are oppressed. Furthermore, Kenya is accused of occupying historically ethnic-Somali and Muslim lands (i.e., the former NFD and Coast Region). Moreover, Kenya itself is perceived as a Western ‘puppet’ that supports an ‘apostate’ government in Somalia and exploits Somalia. Linked to this, Kenya, and its patrons such as the US, the UK, and Israel, including other AMISOM-contributing countries, are perceived as standing in the way of the Islamist objective to create an Islamic state in either Somalia, in Greater Somalia, or in East Africa. Within this context, Kenya is perceived by the lslamist movement and by *al-Shabaab* in particular as a legitimate target for *jihad*, in pursuit of Islamist objectives, in defence and in promotion of Islam and Muslims, as well as in pursuing ontological security for both ethnic-Somalis and other Muslims in Kenya, in Somalia, and in other East African countries.

What was also established in Chapter 3, section 3.4 *The criticism against the theory and application of state fragility*, is that most fragile states are either former Western colonies, the locus of Cold War superpower rivalries, or the location of Western interference and influence. It is these very same fragile states, including those in Africa such as Kenya and Somalia, that Islamists call home. Islamist violent extremism, as a result, has distinct post-colonial (i.e., anti-imperialist) and anti-Western features. These two features are discernible in the case of *al-Qaeda* and *al-Shabaab*, as may be ascertained through key indicators such as their public statements, their stated objectives, and their target selection. The foregoing is the contextual explanation of Islamist violent extremism in Kenya. I provide further (1) trace, (2) accounts, (3) patterns, and (4) sequences, evidence, of this contextual explanation between state fragility and Islamist violent extremism in Kenya in chapters 6 and 7, based on the following formulation: cause (X) + causal mechanisms + context = outcome (Y).

I demonstrate in Chapters 6 and 7, and in the context of the current chapter, that it is in fact state fragility that explains Islamist violent extremism. The theories of relative deprivation and rational choice, and the following factors: the blame system, marginalisation and exclusion, insecurity, self-help and survival motives, disengagement (from the state), constricted democratic space, politically significant identity, and the kin-country syndrome (based on coreligionists and coethnics), aid in building the causal mechanisms in this causal relationship between state fragility (X) and the development and sustainment of Islamist violent extremism (Y) in Kenya (the context). Ted Gurr (2011b:ix) came to the conclusion that to build a secure world, or to explain collective violence, “we need to begin by analysing the minds of men - and women - who oppose bad governments and unpopular policies. But equally we need to know about the societies in which they live, their beliefs and cultural traditions, and the governments they oppose”. This is what this chapter sought to achieve, i.e., to contribute to a realistic understanding of Islamist violent extremism, and its expression, viz., Islamist terrorism, the factors that explain this ideology and movement, and the formation of this ideology and movement in response to the conflict-generating and debilitating conditions that are generated by state fragility. Thomson (2016:61) underpins such a critical-realist perspective to conflict formation, pointing out that “[c]onflict, after all, is not an unprompted phenomenon”.

The next chapter: *CVE: the state-of-the-art*, completes the three literature review chapters, and focuses on CVE. The chapter considers firstly counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism as the precursors and the locus of the origins of CVE. Secondly, the chapter reflects on the different pathways that are available, individually and in combination, in ending violent Islamist campaigns. CVE is among these pathways. Lastly, the chapter examines CVE as such, including the following: conceptualising CVE, the CVE-security-development nexus, the varied CVE approaches and CVE programming (with the whole-of-government [WG] approach and programming chief among them), and lastly, the challenge of evaluating CVE approaches and programming, including the ethics of CVE.

CHAPTER 5: COUNTERING ISLAMIST VIOLENT EXTREMISM: THE STATE-OF-THE-ART

5.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter is designed to offer the state-of-the-art, i.e., a synopsis of what we know and how we know, regarding countering Islamist violent extremism (CVE), with an application to the case in Kenya. The chapter is divided into three parts. The first part traces the origins of CVE to counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism as precursors and contributors to CVE. The second part of the chapter reflects on the different pathways to ending violent Islamist campaigns. These pathways include repression, decapitation, failure, reorientation, as well as success, and negotiations. CVE, the common and default response, is only one pathway among these pathways. Thirdly, and lastly, the chapter examines CVE as such, focusing on: (1) conceptualising CVE; (2) the CVE-security-development nexus; (3) CVE approaches and programming; (4) the challenge of evaluating CVE, including the ethics of CVE. CVE comprises the whole-of-government and whole-of-society, offensive and defensive, ideological and communicative, as well as political and social-policy, approaches and programming.

In the introductory chapter in section 1.1 *Background*, I highlighted that there must be an appreciation from the onset that what we know and how we know about CVE, similar to what we know and how we know about state fragility and Islamist violent extremism, remain equally open to conjecture and equally subject to contestation. This chapter is designed to trace and detail the state-of-the-art regarding CVE, and thus add to a realistic understanding of CVE. Such a synopsis is not exhaustive. Only those aspect of CVE that contribute to achieving the aim and objectives of the study are covered. Unlike the study of Islamist violent extremism, which is defined by varied and divergent theoretical perspectives and analytical frameworks, CVE is a field of public policy and practise. CVE, however, still suffers from conceptual and analytical challenges such as those faced by Islamist violent extremism. Before contemplating all the foregoing, the origins of CVE will be considered firstly.

5.2 THE ORIGINS OF CVE: COUNTER-INSURGENCY AND COUNTER-TERRORISM

I noted in Chapter 1, section 1.8.1 *Key concept*, that CVE has its roots in its precursors, viz., counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism. CVE therefore involves hard power, i.e., kinetic and coercive security measures, which have defined both counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism. These hard power measures include the use of military means, intelligence, legislation, and law-enforcement. CVE, however, also includes soft power, that is, persuasive and development measures, that seek to address structural political, economic, and social factors linked to the generation of Islamist violent extremism and terrorism as such. Frazer and Nünlist (2015:1) accordingly point out that the central idea behind CVE is that counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism are necessary but insufficient measures to counter Islamist violent extremism. In addition, Frazer and Nünlist (2015:1) contend that "[t]he structural causes of violent extremism must also be tackled, including intolerance, government failure, and political, economic, and social marginalisation". According to Romaniuk (2015:3), there has recently been a concerted effort to distance CVE from its counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism roots. But Schomerus *et al* (2017:3, 18) argue that 'smart' CVE incorporates both hard power and soft power measures. Aggregating soft power and hard power, Zeigler and Aly (2015:1) define CVE as "the programmes and policies for countering and preventing radicalisation and recruitment into violent extremism and terrorism as part of an overall counter-terrorism strategy and framework".

The UN has also identified the need to marry hard power with soft power in responding to Islamist violent extremism. The Global Counter-terrorism Strategy (UNGA, 2006:4) incorporates "[m]easures to address the conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism". These conditions, the UN asserts, include the "lack of the rule of law and violations of human rights, ethnic, national and religious discrimination, political exclusion, socio-economic marginalisation and lack of good governance" (UNGA, 2006:4). These conditions are reiterated in the Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism (UNGA, 2015a:7), and in the Global Counter-terrorism Strategy Review (UNGA, 2016:4). António Guterres, the UN Secretary General, has also emphasised soft power elements of CVE, concluding that "the creation of open, equitable, inclusive and pluralist societies, based on the full respect of human rights and with economic opportunities for all, represents the most tangible and meaningful alternative to violent extremism" (UNDP, 2017:iii). Before I delve deeper into CVE as such, counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism as precursors and contributors to CVE will first be elaborated.

Counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism have contributed to the theory and practise of CVE as responses to different forms of armed conflict within the state. Such armed conflict is often between the government and sections of society and/or among groups in society, what Rupert Smith calls 'war among the people' in *The utility of force* (2005). Like the conceptions of new-wars and the long-war, war among the people, such as civil wars, insurgency, and terrorism, involves state and non-state actors, and is often a mixture of war, crime, and human rights abuses. The war among the people paradigm maintains that armed conflict since the 1990s does not follow the traditional linear pathway of 'peace-crisis-war-resolution-peace'. Instead, armed conflict has become patently 'timeless' (with no end), 'more political' (the objective often to capture the will of the people), and 'fought by and among the people' rather than by 'armies on the battlefield'. In such wars, military force has limited utility for conflict resolution or achieving a political outcome, hence the notion of 'the futility of force' in such wars. With the military acting only in a supportive role, the solution to such conflicts is political, often based on a negotiated settlement (Smith, 2005:3, 17, 182; Pfanner, 2007:719-727).[117]

War among the people therefore elicits the age-old questions of how do you fight a war without a front, without a rear, without flanks? A war with no clear distinction between the enemy and a friend, combatant and civilian? A war that has very few, clear, tangible, and achievable military objectives, and even fewer and less clear military targets? A war where military power and superior military force have limited utility? How do you win a war when even success metrics are fluid and contestable? These and related questions have perplexed not only counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism for decades but continue to challenge CVE today. With the legitimacy of the state in question, and social cohesion depreciated, the struggle being about 'hearts and minds', conventional counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism have rarely been successful. The outcome in the context of counter-insurgency is that, to date, bar the two outlier cases in the Philippines (1899-1902) and Malaysia (1945-1963), there are no other examples of state success in such wars.[118] Because of the intractable nature of a war among the people and the nature of issues often involved, counter-insurgency, counter-terrorism, and CVE, have oscillated between hard power and soft power in probing and navigating the complexities contained in a war among the people. However, compared to the dominant view on CVE, which prescribes soft power and development measures, counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism tend to slant towards hard power and coercive measures. Counter-insurgency will be unpacked first.

Baker and O'Neill (2010:3) define insurgency as "an organised, violent and politically motivated activity conducted by non-state actors and sustained over a protracted period that typically utilises a number of methods, such as subversion, guerrilla warfare and terrorism, in an attempt to achieve change within a state". Similarly, Friis (2010:51) defines insurgency as "an organised movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through the use of subversion and armed conflict". Counter-insurgency, Baker and O'Neill (2010:3) and Gossmann (2010:33) contend, is the government's response to counter and eliminate such insurgency. Baker and O'Neill (2010:5-6) assert that insurgency, like terrorism, is both a form or act of war and a criminalised activity. Because of these two attributes of insurgency, counter-insurgency often involves the use of military and police forces. Counter-insurgency is therefore the use of force to suppress insurgency. Counter-insurgency also involves 'hearts and minds', i.e., the deployment of measures designed to regain the support of the population and re-establish state legitimacy and state authority. Legitimacy and authority are often derived from performance legitimation. Such legitimation, which includes expanding the democratic space and the provision of political goods in society, is mostly achieved through state-building.[119]

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[117] The categorisation of 'intra-state' armed conflict is captured under varied rubrics, highlighting the variable portrayals of these armed conflicts and the methods they use. These varied rubrics include low intensity conflict, asymmetrical war, irregular war, insurgency, guerilla war, small wars, war lite, people's war, war among the people, post-modern war, new-wars, the long-war, terrorism, and so forth. The non-state actors that wage these wars are also variedly classified. *Al-Shabaab*, adaptive and resistant, is classified as terrorist and insurgent, yet *al-Shabaab* atypically also employs urban warfare and guerrilla warfare. This study is not designed to elucidate these differences in conceptualisation and categorisation, except where this is necessary for the aim and objectives of the study. Although many of these categories have historically existed, the contemporary analysis of such categorisation is mainly contained in the literature dealing with the 'transformation of war' and the 'revolution in military affairs' (RMA) since the 1990s. See Smith (2005), Pernin *et al* (2008), McKenzie (2011), Kaldor (2012, 2013), Shabtai (2016), and ACSS (2018). Opposite this literature and body of knowledge, is Colin Gray's *Another bloody century: future warfare* (2005), which argues that there is relative continuity in the *nature* of war and warfare (compared to variety in the *character* or *context* of war and warfare).

[118] Deady (2005), Watts *et al* (2014:Chapter 4), and Hannon and Robert (2016) outline these two outlier cases.

Counter-insurgency is linked with counter-terrorism as well as peace operations, as all three are responses to 'war among the people', and all three oscillate between the employment and deployment of coercion and persuasion. While counter-insurgency is designed to suppress ongoing insurgency, and is thus coupled with hard power, peace operations are measures designed to prevent war and to restore or enforce peace. Peace operations are, accordingly, linked with soft power. Friis (2010:49) defines peacekeeping (one form of peace operations) as involving "an impartial lightly armed force overseeing a peace agreement with the consent of the warring parties".[120] Despite the distinctions between the use of hard and soft power, according to Friis (2010:50) counter-insurgency is similar to peace operations in at least six areas, viz.: (1) 'a focus on civilian rather than military solutions'; (2) 'a stress on the need for protection of civilians'; (3) 'a need for international coherence (unity of effort and an integrated approach)'; (4) 'the importance of host-nation ownership'; (5) 'the use of intelligence in support of operations'; (6) 'acceptance of the limitations of the use of force'.

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[119] I address state-building hereafter in separate but related contexts at three sections of this chapter: 5.4.1 *CVE conceptualised*, 5.4. *The CVE-security-development nexus*, and 5.4.3 *CVE approaches and programming*.

[120] Within the rubric of UN peace operations, peacekeeping is differentiated from other peace operations such as conflict prevention and peacemaking, and peace enforcement. Conflict prevention and peacemaking are persuasive and enabling measures that are designed to prevent the initiation of conflict (to prevent the initiation of conflict) or the escalation of conflict (peacemaking), whereas peace enforcement are coercive measures that are designed to suppress conflict. Friis (2010:56-57) points out that although there are grey areas, peacemaking and peace enforcement usually take place when latent conflict or overt conflict is in progress, whereas peacekeeping takes place after some form of peace has been established. Peace building, which is designed to prevent relapse to conflict, by definition also occurs after the establishment of peace. However, typical of 'new-wars' since the 1990s (see the note above), the lines between war/conflict and peace, are, themselves, also often blurred, thus undermining notions of war and peace as discrete conceptions and phenomena. Peace operations *per se* have evolved. From classical peacekeeping (see the definition by Friis [2010] above), peace operations have evolved into five generations (see the note below: Kenkel [2013] and Neethling [2019]).

In addition to being linked with counter-insurgency, peace operations are also linked with counter-terrorism. Hybrid missions, the fifth generation of peace operations since the mid-1990s, accordingly combine peace-making and peacekeeping (i.e., conflict resolution) with stabilisation and counter-terrorism (i.e., conflict suppression), through partnering the UN with regional organisations, alliances of states, or individual states (Kenkel, 2013:135-137; Neethling, 2019:62-63).[121] The UNDP (2017:19) defines counter-terrorism as involving "military operations as well as the adoption of legislative and policing frameworks to control, repress and track terrorist activities; training, equipping and reorganising national security forces and intelligence services; and enhancing border surveillance and checkpoints". Counter-terrorism may also be defined as "military or police activities that are undertaken to neutralise terrorists and extremists, their organisations, and networks in order to render them incapable of using violence to instil fear and coerce governments or societies to achieve their goals" (Van Zyl and Mahdi, 2019:4). Counter-terrorism thus emphasises the use of kinetic force.

Kenya's fight against *al-Shabaab* and participation in AMISOM combine peace operations, counter-terrorism, and counter-insurgency. Typical of hybrid missions, AMISOM itself is a marriage between peace operations, counter-terrorism, and counter-insurgency, and involves the UN, the AU, and individual state contingent forces such as the US. Neethling (2019:71, 73) points out that AMISOM, deployed in active support of Somalia's government (and therefore not a neutral party), is mandated to conduct, notably, 'offensive operations against *al-Shabaab* and other armed opposition groups', and 'reclaim areas occupied by *al-Shabaab*'. Deputy Special Representative of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission (DSRCC) for Somalia, Simon Mulongo, contends that "[a]lthough AMISOM is often called a peacekeeping or peace enforcement mission, in fact, AMISOM is a combat mission fighting a terrorist insurgency in Somalia …. AMISOM's gains in the field could never have been realised if it had continued to rely on the traditional peacekeeping template" (ACSS, 2018:The Internet).

Having considered counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism as precursors and contributors to CVE, and before contemplating CVE as such, I first reflect on the options available in ending violent Islamist campaigns such as terrorism. I established earlier in the study that insurgencies, and the establishment of proto-states, are the other two wider violent Islamist campaigns pursued by Islamists. However, since in the case in Kenya Islamist violent extremism finds expression through terrorism, I focus my discussion on ending terrorism as an Islamist campaign (not the other two wider campaigns).

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[121] Peace operations have contextually evolved into five generations since the first peace operation in 1948: (1) classical or traditional peacekeeping (starting in 1948); (2) wider or multidimensional peacekeeping (after the Cold War); (3) peace enforcement (from 1999), (4) robust peacebuilding (from the early 1990s); (5) hybrid missions (since the mid-1990s). Examples of hybrid missions include the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), 2013 to date, and the United Nations Organisation Stabilisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO), 1999(2010) to date. Between 1999 and 2010 MONUSCO was known as MONUC, i.e., the United Nations Organisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Among other things, MONUSCO is mandated to 'neutralise and disarm', and MINUSMA is mandated to 'extend state authority and stabilise' (Kenkel, 2013:125-137; Neethling, 2019:60-63, 65).

5.3 ENDING VIOLENT ISLAMIST CAMPAIGNS

Given the fact that what we know and how we know about both Islamist violent extremism and CVE are contested, how to end violent Islamist campaigns is also contested. By illustration, is CVE as the common response to Islamist violent extremism always the best response? What does empirical evidence tell us about how violent Islamist campaigns end? There are various pathways leading to the decline and the end of violent Islamist campaigns. Every individual Islamist movement or organisation, in its life cycle, goes through various stages leading to a logical end, which is either success or failure in Islamising the state and society as a central goal. The ultimate reason for the existence of Islamist organisations, like political parties, is to gain and exercise political power. However, unlike most political parties who seek political power through elections and constitutional means, Islamist organisations seek to gain such power through violent means.[122] In this regard, in the foreword to Kenya's 2016 National Strategy to Counter Violent Extremism (NSCVE), President Kenyatta defines Islamist violent extremism as "a fanatical religious-political movement that seeks to divide and terrorise communities and to collapse states in pursuit of political and economic power" (Republic of Kenya, 2016a:9). Incumbent governments respond by countering violent Islamist campaigns through the employment and deployment of hard power measures and resources that compel and coerce, but also soft power measures and resources aimed at influencing and persuading 'hearts and minds'.

Hard power measures such as those used in counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism strategies and campaigns are often costly, unsuccessful, and may even be counterproductive. Martha Crenshaw (2018:The Internet) observes that "[g]iven jihadis' adaptability and diffusion, options to combat them with force are limited". Available empirical evidence also establishes that hard power alone rarely ends terrorist campaigns. A study of 648 terrorist groups that existed between 1968 and 2006 is demonstrative. Out of these 648 groups, 268 at some time ended their terrorist campaigns. These 268 campaigns ended on the following basis: in 114 of the cases (43 percent), the terrorist group joined the political process after political engagement. In 107 other cases (40 percent), the terrorist campaign was ended by policing and intelligence actions. In 27 cases (10 percent), the terrorist campaign ended because the terrorist organisation achieved its goals. It was only in 20 cases (seven percent) that the terrorist campaign was ended because of military force (Jones and Libicki, 2008:18-19). Soft power measures and pathways on the other hand have the promise of lasting solutions. Crenshaw (2018:The Internet) asserts that with soft power, "[o]ne alternative is to try to solve the root causes of the problem by removing the conditions that make *jihad* attractive". But Crenshaw (2018:The Internet) finds that "even if the multiple political, economic, and social causes of violence could be identified, addressing them is a costly endeavour requiring a good deal of patience and persistence". Sadly, Crenshaw (2018:The Internet) points out, governments have patience and persistence in short supply.

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[122] A qualification. In Chapter 4, section 4.2.1 *Conceptualising Islamist violent extremism*, I outline how, within Islamism, groups such as the Egypt-based Muslim Brotherhood and *al-Jama'a al-Islamiyya* seek political power through elections and constitutional means. This is notwithstanding the fact that Islamism is often associated with its jihadi or 'violent' brand. Thus, similar to political parties, Islamism uses both violent and constitutional means. The Muslim Brotherhood and *al-Jama'a al-Islamiyya* have also espoused violence before in their history.

Be that as it may, the success or failure of hard power or soft power may not even be a factor in ending violent Islamist campaigns. Inhabiting an inhospitable environment, in their life cycle, the Islamist ideology and organisation may decline for reasons other than the success of any countermeasures, including any impact of CVE. These reasons, what Schmid (2011a:13) calls 'indicators of de-escalation', may include: the drying up of funding sources for reasons other than any countermeasures; the natural death of leaders; implosion resulting from internal strife; disillusionment with the ideology or organisation by leaders, the rank-and-file, or a complicit community; the lack of international support or a disapproving international environment. Notably, the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) also indicates that between 1970 and 1997 only 1.26 percent of these organisations lasted more than twenty years, 4.62 percent lasted 11-20 years, 4.62 percent lasted 6-10 years, 14.77 percent lasted 1-5 years, and 74.72 percent did not survive their first year of existence. This trend is again recorded between 2002 and 2019. In 2002 there was a total of 104 active terrorist groups identified in the world. A year later in 2003, only 47 (45.19 percent) of these groups were active. By 2019 only 19 (18.26 percent) of these terrorist groups were active. *Al-Qaeda* Central, founded in 1988 and still existing, would therefore be an anomaly, the exception rather than the rule (Schmid, 2013:48; IEP, 2020a:76).

According to Cronin (2009), the history of terrorism reveals six pathways leading to the decline and ending of terrorist campaigns, viz., (1) decapitation, (2) negotiation, (3) success, (4) failure, (5) repression, and (6) reorientation. These pathways often intermingle. In this regard Cronin (2009:8) points out that a single terrorist campaign may follow multiple pathways towards decline. Each of these pathways may then succeed in some cases or lead to failure in other cases. I demonstrate in the current study that these pathways may also be pursued as part of a comprehensive CVE approach and programming, or they may be pursued as separate, tailored counter-terrorism measures or counter-insurgency measures. I address these varied pathways next.

5.3.1 Repression and Decapitation

Whereas repression is about the use of force to defeat the Islamist campaign, decapitation involves the arrest and targeted killing of Islamist leaders. Repression and decapitation are often the default position in counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism, and very prominent in CVE. Nevertheless, "[t]he physical elimination of terrorist fighters remains front and centre in many counterterror strategies, despite the poor track record of military action in bringing conflicts and violent movements to an end" (Street and Ackman, 2018:The Internet). In addition, the cost of repression and decapitation often outweigh the gains. Let me consider the Massive Ordnance Air Blast (MOAB) bomb, colloquially called the 'mother of all bombs'. Deployed in April 2017 in Afghanistan's Nangarhar province against a complex of tunnels, caves, and bunkers, the 'mother of all bombs' cost US$170, 000 a unit, according to the US Air Force, and killed only 36 Islamic State in Khorasan Province (ISKP) militants, according to the Afghan Ministry of Defence. Initial reports put the cost of the MOAB at US$16 million a unit, and later reports put the number killed at 95 ISKP militants (Lockie, 2017:The Internet; Cooper and Mashal, 2017:The Internet; Ackerman and Rasmussen, 2017:The Internet; Ohl, 2019:1, 8; Sylvester, 2020:21, 27). These statistics beg the question: What were the gains of deploying "the largest non-nuclear bomb ever used in combat" and "the most powerful conventional bomb in the American arsenal?" (Sylvester, 2020:23, 25). According to Ohl (2019:10), "[w]eeks and months following the attack, little evidence existed that the MOAB pacified hostilities in Afghanistan". A study cheekily titled *President Trump and the mother of all bombs: quickly forgotten*, concludes that the MOAB attack was "a loud blast, followed by a loud silence …. [Y]et another bomb to fall on Afghan soil" (Sylvester, 2020:25).

Besides the fact that the cost of repression and decapitation often outweigh the gains, no other context perhaps illustrates the failure of counter-terrorism and CVE, better than the 20-years long-war in Afghanistan (2001-2021). This long-war also demonstrates the relationship between state fragility and the failure of counter-terrorism and CVE. Between 9/11 and the spectacular fall of the Afghan government and military on 15 August 2021, coinciding and precipitated by the withdrawal of their patrons, viz., the US and NATO forces, the US spent copious amounts of money in their 'global war on terror'. As of 1 September 2021, the estimated cost of the 'global war on terror', spent and committed for the financial years 2001-2022, were US$5.8 trillion. The total cost excludes US$2.2 trillion obligations for veteran's care over the ensuing 30 years. The combined cost amounts to US$8 trillion. The cost between 2001 and 2021 for Afghanistan alone is estimated at US$2.261 trillion (Brown University, 2021:1; Crawford, 2021:1-2, 6-7; IEP, 2021b:1). Despite these copious amounts of money spent on the 'global war on terror', one can safely show that the world (and Afghanistan) is less safe than it was before 9/11 in 2001. The Institute for Economics and Peace finds that "[t]his massive expenditure, [more than $300 million a day or $50, 000 for each Afghan citizen currently living in the country], has not resulted in stability nor security in Afghanistan" (IEP, 2021b:1). The Institute also finds that since 9/11 "the number of Salafi-jihadist groups has more than doubled, their membership has tripled, and they are present in more countries than ever before" (IEP, 2019:82).[123] Added, the *Taliban* now have sophisticated military equipment they did not have in 2001, courtesy of the US. When the US withdrew from Afghanistan in August 2021, they left over US$7 billion worth of military hardware, which includes aircraft, military vehicles, weapons, air-to-ground armaments, and communications equipment, which the *Taliban* now own (Kaufman, 2022:The Internet).[124]

Besides having negligible gains, repression and decapitation seldom lead to success. The long-war in Afghanistan is a case in point. The history of the targeted killings of Islamist leaders also demonstrates that decapitation has failed to end violent Islamist campaigns. From the decapitation of *al-Qaeda*'s Osama bin Laden (2011), Islamic State's Abu Musab al-Zarqawi (2006) and Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi (2019), to *al-Shabaab*'s Aden Hashi Ayro (2008) and Ahmed Abdi Godane (2014), the decapitation of Islamist leadership has not ended Islamist campaigns. Decapitation may even be counterproductive, it may "backfire, resulting in increased publicity for the group's cause, and the creation of a martyr who attracts many new members to the organisation" (Cronin, 2009:32). The case of the Afghan *Taliban* since the intensification of drone attacks from 2008 is also illustrative. In this case, decapitation eliminated older, more moderate, and more experienced leaders, who were then replaced by more radical, more indiscriminate, and more brutal, younger leaders (Abrahms and Conrad, 2017:297-298). Like decapitation, repression itself may also backfire. Following the April 2017 MOAB attack in Afghanistan's Nangarhar province, Islamic State claimed that "hundreds of youths [were] preparing to join the Islamic State's ranks, thanks to the dropping of the bomb" (Ohl, 2019:8).

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[123] The 'war on terror' focused on major theatres such as Afghanistan, Pakistan, Syria, and Iraq, but has involved more than 85 countries in counter-terrorism operations, training, and assistance. The calculation of the cost of the 'war on terror' since 9/11 includes only the US Department of Defence (DoD) and the State Department's 'overseas contingency operations' budgets, increases to the DoD's base budget, homeland security, veteran's care, and interest accrued. In Afghanistan, the figure of US$2.261 trillion includes future costs related to accrued interest and veterans' care. When future costs are excluded, the figure is US$1 trillion. Both calculations exclude the cost incurred by alliance partners such as Germany, Britain, France, and Canada, and other costs such as death benefits to survivors of the soldiers killed, compensation to civilians that were injured or killed, humanitarian assistance and economic aid as part of the war effort, and other covert costs (IEP, 2021b:1; Brown University, 2021:1; Crawford, 2021:1-2, 14-15). The foregoing therefore represents, at best, very conservative estimates of the actual cost. Crawford (2021:18) maintains that "post-9/11 spending occurs in multiple departments, each of which may provide incomplete or obscure reporting of the costs. The U.S. government has also, at times, classified or removed information about operations and their associated budgets".

[124] The 'over US$7 billion' figure is part of more than US$18 billion worth of military hardware that the US reportedly gave to the Afghan government between 2005 to August 2021. The 'over US$7 billion' figure excludes the military hardware that was reportedly retrograded to the US or sent to the Ukraine (in contribution to the impending war against Russia that started in February 2022) and excludes the military hardware the US left behind in Afghanistan and reportedly 'demilitarised' and 'rendered inoperable' (Kaufman 2022:The Internet).

5.3.2 Failure and Reorientation

Islamist campaigns also end based on failure and reorientation. Failure may result from either implosion or loss of popular support by the Islamist organisation. Reorientation on the other hand involves the transition by the Islamist organisation from terrorism into other forms of violence, including organised crime, insurgency, or civil war. Failure and reorientation are based on the view that terrorism is rarely successful. Abrahms (2008:82) finds that "although terrorism is by definition destructive and scary, [terrorist] organisations rarely if ever attain their policy demands by targeting civilians", and "terrorists have been unable to translate the consequences of terrorism into concrete political gains". Likewise, Cronin (2009:11) maintains that "terrorist groups typically neither enjoy longevity nor achieve their desired outcome". Cronin (2009:11) further asserts that terrorist groups may "implode, lose popular support, provoke a widespread backlash, or simply burn out". Crenshaw (1988:15) also finds that terrorist organisations rarely achieve their 'long-term ideological objectives'.[125] Despite such failure, Crenshaw (1988:15) contends that terrorism persist because these organisations do often achieve short-term 'tactical objectives' such as publicity and recognition.

In Chapter 4, section 4.2.1 *Conceptualising Islamist violent extremism*, I illustrated how terrorism, and Islamism as such, have varied objectives that are found at different levels. Krause (2018:51) finds that the 'success' or 'failure' of either terrorism or Islamism may only be measured against the intention or objectives of either terrorism or Islamism. The defining agency for such success or failure must be the terrorist or Islamist organisation itself. It becomes therefore important to determine either failure or success, not as all-encompassing, but as differentiated in terms of a specific objective and/or level. The objectives of both terrorism, and Islamism as such, range from symbolic, tactical, operational, and organisational objectives such as: increasing awareness of the cause and the organisation; demonstrating capabilities; attracting support, recruits, and funding; revenge and retaliation; to strategic and political objectives such as creating an Islamic state or changing government policy. Failure may then be found at different levels and within different objectives of the Islamist organisation, including the strategic failure to create an Islamic state or acquire local autonomy, or failure at lower levels, such as the loss of popular support, disillusionment with the Islamist ideology, and the failure to weaken state power or polarise society. Reorientation then again denotes the acceptance, even in the interim, of failure or setback, which may result in other forms of violence, including organised crime. Reorientation may also result in the acceptance of peaceful means, including the transformation of the terrorist organisation into a political party or interest group.

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[125] In Chapter 4, section 4.2.1 *Conceptualising Islamist violent extremism*, and section 4.3.2 *Theoretical perspectives*, I demonstrate that by emphasising the failure to achieve the strategic intention of terrorism, what Crenshaw (1988) calls the 'long-term ideological objective' (as opposed to symbolic, tactical, operational, or organisational objectives), Abrahms (2008) and Cronin (2009) reflect one view within terrorism studies, reflecting only the organisational approaches, as represented by the natural systems model in this current study.

5.3.3 Success and Negotiation

Terrorism and other violent lslamist campaigns may also end through success and negotiations. Success is when the Islamist organisation achieves its intention and objectives. Like failure, success may be found at different levels and within different objectives of the Islamist organisation. Success does not necessarily mean the creation of an Islamic state or the change in government policy. Success may also mean coercing the government to negotiate, achieving local autonomy, negotiating a new social contract, the reorganisation of power relations and social relations, and the granting of equal rights and freedoms. Success may also mean the further weakening of state power, polarising society, and gaining more popular support, recruits, and funding. All these factors are designed to offer advantages to the Islamist organisation for future confrontations, hence the notion of the long-war within Islamism. Success is therefore not only differentiated by separate levels and objectives but is also tied to time. Short-term successes at times take priority over long-term successes.

Negotiations infers that the lslamist organisation enter a legitimate political process. But negotiating with Islamist-terrorist groups has not been a popular option. Abrahms (2008:88, 93) asserts that "[s]ome of the most important terrorist organisations in modern history have pursued goals that are not only unattainable but also contradictory", and "[w]hen their political rationale is losing relevance, terrorist organisations commonly invent one …, [contriving] … a new political *raison d'etre*". This makes it difficult, if not impossible, to negotiate. Crenshaw (2018:The Internet) also purports a prevailing view that "today's terrorists do not want a seat at the table; they want to destroy the table". Negotiations may also be tricky as they may involve bargaining over indivisibles or existential threats, both of which may be deemed to be non-negotiable.[126] Despite misgivings and misapprehensions about ‘negotiating with terrorists’, negotiations may in fact be the only viable and lasting solution to ending violent Islamist campaigns. Crenshaw (2018:The Internet) agrees that “[s]ince the short term is what we have to work with, negotiation might be a viable option under the right circumstances”.

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[126] See Chapter 8, section 8.3.3 *Political indicators and impediments to CVE*, where I introduce and elaborate on the concept of indivisibles in the context of the relationship between state fragility and impediments to CVE.

But how does one negotiate peace with Islamists? Huntington (1996:298) observes that whereas “[f]ault line wars bubble up from below, fault line peace trickles down from above”. Again, Afghanistan is a case in point. The negotiations in Doha, Qatar, between the US and *Taliban* show that negotiations may be a viable option. In Chapter 4, section 4.3.1 *Analytical frameworks*, I outlined how the *Taliban*-US agreement (2020:1-4) mainly makes provision for four interdependent factors, viz., (1) the state of Afghanistan will not be used against the security of the US and its allies, or in support of any individual or organisation that threaten the security of the US and its allies, including *al-Qaeda*; (2) the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Afghanistan; (3) intra-Afghan negotiations concerning a ceasefire and the future of Afghanistan; (4) a permanent and comprehensive ceasefire. The agreement also makes provision for the release of prisoners of both sides, and the review of sanctions against *Taliban*. Furthermore, the US and its allies, although committing to maintain and pursue economic relations with Afghanistan, they undertake not to use force against the territorial integrity of Afghanistan, and not to interfere in the political independence and domestic affairs of Afghanistan. The forgoing are clear and negotiable political issues, which may be reduced to (1) the security of the US and its allies, and (2) the territorial integrity and political independence of Afghanistan. Although the agreement does not end the intra-Islamist fight between *Taliban* and ISKP, thus ensure peace in Afghanistan, it did pave the way to end the long-war between the *Taliban* and the US.[127]

Whether negotiations are a viable option in ending the long-war in Kenya and Somalia was one of the questions at the December 2021 Africa Center for Strategic Studies (ACSS) webinar on *al-Shabaab*. The general agreement was that *al-Shabaab* has shown both innovation and resilience, and that the war in Somalia and Kenya is no closer to a resolution, with clear indicators of fatigue on both sides of the conflict. Negotiating with *al-Shabaab*, however, seems not to be an option in the short or medium term for both Kenya and Somalia.[128] While there is this fixed commitment and dominant view not to negotiate with 'terrorist-criminals', another view proposes negotiations and track-two diplomacy. Track-one diplomacy employs official government channels or official agents or representatives of the parties to the conflict, while track-two diplomacy involves third parties such as academics, religious leaders, business, or NGOs who have the gravitas to be able to bring the two sides together. Track-two diplomacy has been shown to be effective in cases where there is little trust between the parties to the conflict or in cases where the positions of the parties to the conflict appear or are in fact diametrically opposed (Ingiriis, 2018:514; Murithi, 2022:interview; Ombaka, 2022a:interview).[129]

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[127] Despite this agreement, the war in Afghanistan continued. The 2020 mid-year report by the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) on the protection of civilians in the armed conflict in Afghanistan is emblematic. The report records civilian casualties between 2009 and the first half of 2020, with 3, 458 civilian casualties in the first half of 2020 alone, caused by the varied forces in Afghanistan, such as Afghan security forces, *Taliban*, ISKP, and the myriad of local and international forces (UNAMA, 2020a). In a press release about the report, the UN reiterated the call for negotiations in Afghanistan, finding that “Afghanistan remains one of the deadliest conflicts in the world for civilians” (UNAMA, 2020b:1). In the current chapter in section 5.3.1 *Repression and decapitation*, I outline how since 2020, in August 2021, the Afghan government fell to the *Taliban* advance as the US and NATO forces withdrew from Afghanistan, thereby officially ending the *Taliban*-US war.

Aside from negotiating political and socio-economic grievances as envisaged above, another negotiated solution, albeit controversial and arguably counter-productive, is the non-aggression pact. The non-aggression pact, as part of the rubric of CVE, was one of the subjects of debate at the March 2021 ACSS webinar on CVE in Africa.[130] The case in Mauritania is illustrative. Koné (2019:The Internet) and Boukhars (2020:The Internet) maintain that one way in which Mauritania has been able to keep Islamist violent extremism at bay may have been by entering into a mutual non-aggression pact with the Islamist movement. Mauritania has intensely denied the existence of such a pact. What is clear is that from the first terrorist attacks of 2005 in Mauritania, unlike in other member states of the G5 Sahel, since 2011 Mauritania has not had terrorist attacks, and its military has avoided attacking Islamist groups outside of Mauritania. In addition, since the formation of the G5 Sahel Joint Task Force, Mauritania has not fulfilled its commitment to provide a battalion to the task force, thus undermining the regional counter-terrorism effort and further fuelling the claims about the non-aggression pact.[131]

The foregoing six pathways, viz., repression, decapitation, failure, reorientation, success, and negotiation, constitute varying pathways to ending Islamist violent extremism. CVE, accordingly, is not the only pathway and may not be the best pathway in ending Islamist campaigns such as terrorism (or insurgencies, or proto-states). CVE, though, has been the common and default response to Islamist violent extremism. A caveat before proceeding. I noted at the beginning of this section of the chapter, and I demonstrate below in section 5.4.3 *CVE approaches and programming*, that these pathways may be pursued separately, or as parts of counter-terrorism or counter-insurgency measures, or as parts of CVE. Accordingly, although conceptually distinct, in reality the lines that separate these pathways, counter-terrorism, counter-insurgency, as well as CVE, often blur. Let me now turn to CVE as such.

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[128] The webinar was titled *Why al-Shabaab persists in Somalia* (ACSS, 2021b:The Internet).

[129] Track-two diplomacy is designed to facilitate a bridge to track-one diplomacy. Otherwise track-two diplomacy is conducted in parallel to track-one diplomacy. Within the study field of conflict resolution, track-one diplomacy and track-two diplomacy have been expanded to encompass 'multi-track diplomacy'. The details are beyond the scope of this study. See Davidson and Montville (1981) and McDonald (2002, 2012).

[130] The webinar was titled *Innovations and challenges in countering violent extremism in Africa* and drew on (at the time) recent lessons from Mauritania, Nigeria, and Kenya (ACSS, 2021a:The Internet).

[131] Created in 2014, the Group of Five of the Sahel (G5 Sahel) coordinates development and security policies, including counter-terrorism strategies, for the five member states, i.e.: Mauritania, Niger, Mali, Burkina Faso, and Chad. In 2017 the G5 Sahel created the G5 Sahel Joint Task Force, which is responsible for executing the G5 Sahel counter-terrorism strategy and operations (Rupesinghe, 2018:11-12; Boukhars, 2020:The Internet).

5.4 COUNTERING ISLAMIST VIOLENT EXTREMISM

The state of flux in CVE prompts varied questions. For example: What is CVE? What is effective and productive CVE, or otherwise ineffective and counterproductive CVE? Which factors lead to the failure of CVE, or cause impediments to CVE? How is the success, failure, or ethical considerations of CVE measured? The answers remain subject to conjecture and open to contestation. Related to these questions are the various challenges facing CVE either as a field of study or an area of public policy and practise. The first challenge is the nebulous and malleable concept of CVE and the related challenge of defining and pinning-down this concept and phenomenon. The second challenge, related to conceptualisation, is that the Islamist violent extremism that CVE must respond to is both a security and a development question, which stresses the vexing challenge of the CVE-security-development nexus, i.e., the challenge of determining what is 'CVE-specific' as opposed to what is 'CVE-relevant'. Another related challenge is that of balancing hard power and soft power in CVE. Therefore, the proverbial tension between hard and soft power also exists within CVE. This hard power-soft power tension is translated to tensions between security measures emphasised by counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency (as precursors of CVE) and development measures emphasised by CVE. CVE is therefore trapped between its hard power origins and its current embrace of soft power.

CVE is linked with four inherent challenges that are each found in each of the four stages of the CVE policy cycle. The four challenges are not only correlated, but they, in fact, induce each other. The stages in the CVE policy cycle are assessment, policy development, policy implementation, and policy evaluation.[132] The first stage of *assessment* presents the challenge of conceptualising CVE. I highlighted before that CVE is a nebulous and malleable concept that is variedly understood and defined. The second challenge is found in the second stage of *policy development*, and involves choosing and developing, among a number of choices, a CVE approach and programming. This, in turn, induces a third related CVE challenge. This challenge, found in the stage of *policy implementation*, is which policy to implement, given the varied and often conflicting CVE approaches and programming. This third challenge provokes the fourth challenge that is found in the fourth stage of *policy evaluation*, which is, how are CVE approaches and programming evaluated. This challenge begs the question of how to measure the failure, success, or ethical imperatives of CVE? Alternatively, how does one measure (in)effective and (counter)productive CVE? I address these four challenges in the context of separate sections of this part of the chapter, starting with the first challenge of conceptualising CVE.

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[132] See the next sub-section, 5.4.1 *CVE conceptualised*, where the CVE policy cycle is referenced and elaborated.

5.4.1 CVE Conceptualised

As with Islamist violent extremism, CVE also presents the challenge of conceptualisation. Assessment, the first stage in the CVE policy cycle, therefore, involves a concerted effort to understand and elucidate the incentive structure, origins, nature, and dynamics of Islamist violent extremism. Such an effort was the main focus of the preceding Chapter 4. Candace Karp's *You can't fight what you don't understand* (2015), also speaks to this critical challenge of conceptualisation. In Chapter 1, section 1.1 *Background*, I argued that the first consideration in conceptualising CVE is that Islamist violent extremism and CVE are inseparably linked. The latter is contingent upon the former, and both often feed off each other. It is therefore only with a careful and accurate understanding of Islamist violent extremism, that CVE may be realistically understood, conceptualised, and illuminated. Moreover, informed, productive, and effective, policy prescripts of CVE may consequently be developed only when there exists a realistic conceptualisation and understanding of Islamist violent extremism.

Islamist violent extremism must first be understood in the context of new-wars. Kaldor (2012:7, 2013:1) maintains that new-wars defy the separation of war from peace, and of political violence from criminal violence. New-wars also occur in states and regions that are defined by fragility properties, which include: widespread criminality, corruption, inefficiency, economic decline, privatised violence, and challenged state legitimacy. Kaldor (2013:2, 6) further contends that new-wars are a mix of war, crime, and human rights violations. War refers to 'organised violence for political ends'. Crime refers to 'organised violence for private ends'. Human rights violations are primarily concerned with 'violence against civilians'. New-wars may be further characterised by four factors, viz.: (1) actors; (2) goals; (3) methods; (4) modes of financing. These factors discriminate new-wars from old-wars. Unlike old-wars which were dominated by state actors and regular armed forces, new-wars are dominated by non-state actors such as para-military forces, private military contractors, mercenaries, criminals, militias, and jihadis. With regards to goals, old-wars used to be fought for geopolitical interests and/or ideology. New-wars (like new-terrorism) is about identity (i.e., ethnic, or religious), with the goal of accessing the state in the name of the group. In terms of methods, old-wars were fought through battle and by seeking control of geographical spaces by military means. In contrast, new-wars are about seizing territory through political means, and through controlling the population psychologically (by means of fear and terror). Regarding modes of financing, old-wars were financed by states largely through public taxation. New-wars are financed through predatory private financing, including looting, kidnappings, and illicit dealing in oil, diamonds, human trafficking, and drugs (Kaldor, 2013:2).[133]

All foregoing characteristics of new-wars are evidenced in the long-war in Kenya as waged by *al-Shabaab*. In Chapter 1, section 1.8.1 *Key concepts*, I indicated that the new-wars paradigm calls for an analysis that considers state actors as well as non-state actors. The new-wars paradigm further contemplates traditional security considerations such as porous borders, controlling geographical areas, intelligence, and capacitating the state and security forces. The paradigm also reflects on non-traditional security considerations such as distributive justice, democratic values, education and countering extremist narratives, development, identity, police actions, and law enforcement. I attend to new-wars and the long-war Kenya in Chapter 6, section 6.5. *New-wars and the long-war*. For now, other key aspects of Islamism will be highlighted briefly, as a basis for conceptualising CVE.[134]

In Chapter 4, section 4.2.1 *Conceptualising Islamist violent extremism* I outlined Islamist violent extremism as a multi-layered phenomenon. This is also demonstrated with the new-wars paradigm (outlined above). Islamist violent extremism is rooted as a political-religious ideology and movement that interweaves a congeries of both peaceful means and violent means, in pursuit of Islamising the state and society. The interest in this study is, of course, the violent strand of Islamism. This violent strand of Islamists, what Gerges (2009) calls jihadis, is divided between trans-nationalists, nationalists, and irredentists, whose interests and objectives converge, but also vastly diverge.[135] The support and membership of Islamist organisations are also differentiated by disparate roles and motivations, and dissimilar levels of commitment and involvement, ranging from ‘true’ believers, ‘professional’ jihadis, and pragmatists, to political leaders, financiers, and passive supporters. Islamist terrorism consequently has variable sociology and grammar, from one setting to another, in space and time.

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[133] Mary Kaldor (2012, 2013) does not argue that new-wars have no historical precedence. This argument is also true of what Rupert Smith characterises as ‘war among the people’ in *The utility of force* (2005), as illustrated earlier in the chapter. This is critical to keep in mind. I outlined earlier in the chapter, in section 5.2 *The origins of CVE: counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism*, that there is a distinction between the nature of war and the character of war. Colin Gray argues in *Another bloody century: future warfare* (2005) that there is relative continuity in the *nature* of war and warfare, as compared to the varying *character* and *context* of war and warfare. This enduring nature of war is corroborated by Carl von Clausewitz in the classic, *On war* (1984).

[134] For the sake of brevity and avoiding unnecessary repetition, I will not deal with the conceptual and theoretical aspects of Islamist violent extremism in any detail again, this has already been covered in Chapter 4. In this section I focus on those key aspects of Islamist violent extremism that are most relevant to conceptualising CVE.

[135] Given that the interest of this study is solely those Islamists that espouse the use of violence, I employ Islamists, jihadis, and *mujahideen* as equivalents, and therefore use these concepts interchangeably.

The logic (i.e., nature) of Islamist terrorism, however, embedded in Islamist violent extremism as an ideology and a movement, is enduring. This logic is underpinned by collective discontent, mobilisation, and action. In turn, this collective discontent is underpinned by the incapacitating and conflict-generating properties of state fragility that have causal capacity and tendency, generating Islamist violent extremism and barriers to CVE. CVE must reflect and respond to these realities presented by Islamist violent extremism. In turn, both Islamist violent extremism and CVE respond to the conditions and constraints presented by state fragility. Informed by and contingent upon Islamist violent extremism (as understood in this study), CVE is conceptualised in the following manner:



Created from Romaniuk (2015) and Schomerus *et al* (2017)

As illustrated above, 'smart' CVE employs both hard power and soft power. The CVE policy cycle has four stages, viz: (1) assessment; (2) development; (3) implementation; (4) evaluation. I address these four stages in the context of separate parts of this current chapter. CVE evaluation, viz., the fourth stage in the CVE policy cycle, is plagued by various challenges, including the distinction between CVE-specific and CVE-relevant measures. Given the specific challenge of determining what is CVE-specific as opposed to what is CVE-relevant, I address the related challenge of measuring the success or failure of CVE in the last part of the current chapter in section 5.4.4 *The evaluation of CVE approaches and programming*. Let me revert to the first stage of the CVE-policy cycle, i.e., assessment, or conceptualising CVE, based on and in response to an understanding of Islamist violent extremism.

I noted at the beginning of this section of the current chapter that the first challenge of CVE is to generate an accurate and realistic understanding of Islamist violent extremism, which constitutes the first stage in the policy cycle (i.e., assessment). Critically, this first stage is mostly omitted in the 2016 National Strategy to Counter Violent Extremism (NSCVE) of Kenya. I revert to the CVE architecture of Kenya in Chapter 6, section 6.9 *Countering Islamist violent extremism in Kenya*. Another challenge that is linked to assessment, is the elasticity of CVE. The result is that CVE as a field of study is conceptually challenged, with unclear boundaries. CVE has become linked to varied and divergent fields of study and practise. These divergent fields include: economic development and poverty alleviation; governance and democratisation; strategic communication and education; conflict prevention or mitigation and peace-building; criminal justice and law enforcement; civil society initiatives; youth or women engagement (Heydemann, 2014:3). Heydemann (2014:3) finds that the field of CVE has evolved into “an amorphous category, lacking theoretical or applied focus; encompasses a confusing and occasionally contradictory array of approaches”. Fink (2014:6) also finds that it is often impossible to distinguish between activities and projects that are directly focused on CVE, and those that may not be focused on CVE but have attendant benefits for CVE, i.e., what Romaniuk (2015:9) calls CVE-specific, and CVE-relevant, programming. I elaborate on the consequences of the elasticity of CVE in the last part of this chapter, section 5.4.4 *The evaluation of CVE approaches and programming*.

Despite the elasticity of the concept of CVE, there is some agreement about CVE and the various concepts that are contained within the rubric of CVE. Let me start with CVE as such. In its policy document, *Strategy for countering violent extremism*, the US Department of Homeland Security (DHS) defines CVE as “proactive actions to counter efforts by extremists to radicalise, recruit, and mobilise followers to violence” (DHS, 2016:1). Kenya’s NSCVE defines CVE as “the employment of non-coercive means to delegitimise violent extremist ideologies and thus reduce the number of terrorist group supporters and recruits” (Republic of Kenya, 2016a:6). Within the rubric of CVE are two other concepts, viz., disengagement and deradicalisation. Disengagement is defined as “leaving a violent extremist organisation or group” (Denoeux and Carter, 2009a:2). Similarly, Kenya’s NSCVE defines disengagement as “individuals deserting, defecting or demobilising from terrorist groups and activities. This is a behavioural or declarative act and does not necessarily include the psychological and social dimensions of deradicalisation” (Republic of Kenya, 2016a:6). Schmid (2013:29; 45) also contends that disengagement often occurs without deradicalisation. It is thus highly likely that recidivism, i.e., ‘the re-engagement of former terrorists in violent activities’, will be high. Therefore, the goal for CVE is for disengagement to lead to deradicalisation. Deradicalisation is “abandoning previously held violent extremist beliefs or convictions” (Denoeux and Carter, 2009a:2). Kenya’s NSCVE defines deradicalisation as “concerted efforts directed at radicalised individuals to cause them to change their views to reject violent extremist ideologies and to seek to act within Kenya’s legal and constitutional bounds. It is often aimed at prisoners convicted of terrorist or violent extremist crimes, or voluntary returnees from active participation in terrorist groups” (Republic of Kenya, 2016a:6).

Within deradicalisation, Schmid (2013:41) differentiates between (1) the employment of education and psychological and religious counselling that is designed to achieve detachment from the Islamist ideology, and (2) what may be termed 'enablers' of deradicalisation, which is the employment of political instruments such as negotiations, ceasefires, and decommissioning of arms, to aid the deradicalisation process. One may view these 'enablers' of deradicalisation as having elements such as a DDR process (i.e., disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration) in a post-conflict or peacekeeping context. Hence, disengagement and deradicalisation are associated with two other concepts, viz., rehabilitation and reintegration. Kenya's NSCVE defines rehabilitation as "a process that aims to ensure that disengaged and deradicalised violent extremists and terrorists, particularly returnees from *Al Shabaab* and like groups, are given the counselling, critical reasoning tools, and knowledge to shift their mind-sets and enable them to be peaceful and law-abiding citizens". Reintegration is defined as "actions that support the social, ideological, psychological, and economic wellbeing of rehabilitated individuals as they return to live with their families and communities, and that ensure that they remain peaceful and law-abiding in the long run" (Republic of Kenya, 2016a:6).[136]

The field of CVE has been expanded by the notion that Islamist violent extremism can be avoided and prevented. This notion is encapsulated in the concept and field of study, *preventing Islamist violent extremism* (PVE).[137] PVE includes identification and intervention concerning 'at risk' individuals and communities, building resilience, offering alternatives to violent extremist beliefs and behaviour, and so forth (see UNGA, 2015a, Finn *et al*, 2016; Ucko, 2018). PVE may therefore be defined as the "systematic preventive measures which directly address the drivers of violent extremism. This includes confronting conditions conducive to terrorism while protecting human rights and the rule of law while countering terrorism" (Van Zyl and Mahdi, 2019:4). Sometimes CVE and PVE are collapsed into one concept, i.e., preventing and countering Islamist violent extremism (PCVE or PCIVE).

Although overlapping with CVE, the next three concepts are linked more with PVE and the notion that Islamist violent extremism can be avoided and prevented, viz.: risk reduction, counter-radicalisation, and resilience. Khalil and Zeuthen (2016) speak of risk reduction (RR). RR are efforts aimed not just at disengagement and deradicalisation, but at preventing the re-engagement and re-radicalisation of individuals and communities who were exposed to, or engaged in, Islamist violent extremism. According to Schmid (2013:49), risk reduction is a better approach to CVE than deradicalisation. Schmid (2013:49) contends that unlike deradicalisation, risk reduction is less value-laden, and more proactive and context specific, in seeking specific answers to “what are the risk factors that make individuals and groups more likely to engage in acts of political terrorism?”. These risk factors are not only ascribed to the Islamist ideology, but to the whole spectrum of risk, including government action, and unjust socio-economic and political orders. Within the context of PVE, Schmid (2013:50) speaks of counter-radicalisation, which “seeks to prevent members from non-radicalised populations from being radicalised”. Schmid (2013:50) finds that “[t]he main focus of counter-radicalisation efforts is ... not the terrorists themselves but rather the strengthening and empowering of the community from which they might emerge, and which might, if neglected, be deemed potentially supportive of them”. Similarly, Kenya’s NSCVE defines counter-radicalisation as “efforts to delegitimise violent extremist ideologies, and to deter recruitment into specific terrorist groups or campaigns. It involves targeted efforts to reduce the access to citizens by influential individuals” (Republic of Kenya, 2016a:6).

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[136] Emphasising the influencing and persuasive elements of the ideological and communicative approach to CVE (rather than hard power compellence and coercion), Kenya's NSCVE envisages and outlines a DDRR process of deradicalisation, disengagement, rehabilitation, and reintegration (Republic of Kenya, 2016a:6, 16-17).

[137] Similar to the abbreviations VE and CVE, as pointed out in Chapter 1, section 1.1 *Background*, PVE is used to refer to preventing violent extremism often without distinction between the different identity-based ideological categories that are associated with violent extremism, viz.: racial, ethnic, religious, and recently gender, categories. However, when PVE is used in this study, it refers specifically to preventing religion-based violent extremism, i.e., preventing *Islamist* violent extremism (PIVE), in particular, unless stated otherwise.

Within counter-radicalisation is the idea of counter-narratives. In Chapter 4, section 4.2.2.3 *Extremism of thought and extremism of method*, I make a distinction between behavioural radicalisation and cognitive radicalisation. Then, I posed the following questions: Does the very existence of extremist thoughts, i.e., cognitive radicalisation, in itself, present the reason why people become violent radicals? Should CVE thus challenge extremist ideas, and attack, and destroy these ideas, or rather offer alternatives to these ideas? Should CVE concern itself only with violent methods and actions, i.e., behavioural radicalisation? If CVE is to concern itself with cognitive radicalisation or extremism of thought, are the dangers not clear? If the conflict is about ‘a war of ideas’, then what would stop repressive and predatory governments from censoring freedom of expression, stifling dissent, and suppressing political opposition or any contestation of the status quo, whether violent or peaceful?

Be that as it may, Schmid (2014:2) contends that cognitive radicalisation is inseparable from behavioural radicalisation in that “the distinction between acceptable ‘non-violent extremists’ and unacceptable ‘violent extremists’ is a false and illusionary one”. Schmid (2014:2) explains that religious extremism, as opposed to secularism and pluralism, is ‘inherently violent’. Abbink (2014:91) also points out that “an exclusivist discourse fuelled by absolutist notions of right and wrong”, as held by religious extremism, is conflict generating. Schmid (2014:2, 10, 16) contends that what Gerges (2009:1-2) calls mainstream Islamists such as the Muslim Brotherhood and *al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya*, are gateways to jihadism and terrorism. Schmid (2014:2) concludes that "Islamist extremism needs to be challenged and confronted rather than accommodated and tolerated by liberal democracies".[138]

The foregoing is more critical and worrisome in the context of Africa's diverse societies and teetering democracies. It is self-evident that religious pluralism can only flourish in a secular state. Abbink (2014:96) contends the purpose of secularisation is to fill the need for coexistence as occasioned by diversity and pluralism. Abbink (2014:92, 94) and Ali-Koor (2016:7) also assert that the secular model, i.e., 'the differentiation of religious institutions and norms from statecraft and governance', has been pursued and upheld as a political ideal in Africa since the first state gained independence. As such, a long history of religious diversity and tolerance that predates Islamist violent extremism already exists in East Africa, Kenya included. Secularism is thus a prerequisite for peaceful co-existence and for any productive CVE policy. Should secularism challenge the narrative of the creation of Islamic states?

Schmid (2015:14-15) is resolute that CVE must foster not only counter-narratives, but also alternative narratives, against the ideological and religious tenets and claims of Islamism. Former US President Barack Obama (2015a:The Internet), at the 2015 Summit on Countering Violent Extremism, was also adamant about the "need to reject the terrorist narrative that the West and Islam are in conflict, or modern life and Islam are in conflict". President Obama (2015a:The Internet) advised that "when all of us, together, are doing our part to reject the narratives of violent extremists, when all of us are doing our part to be very clear about the fact that there are certain universal precepts and values that need to be respected in this interconnected world, that's the beginnings of a partnership". Secularism is one of such 'universal precepts and values'. The idea with counter-narratives then, is to present and promote alternative views and alternative shared futures, much different from those presented by Islamism. This is also what the ideological and communicative approach to CVE emphasises.

The last concept under review is resilience. Resilience is used in the context of CVE and state-building, to address both Islamist violent extremism and state fragility. In Chapter 3, section 3.3 *The state fragility-security-development nexus*, I outlined how fragile states are contrasted with resilient states. Societies affected by Islamist violent extremism are said to lack resilience. In the context of state-building, Gelbard *et al* (2015:7) define resilience as a condition whereby state institutions have enough strength and capacity, and there is enough social cohesion, to promote security and development and to respond effectively to shocks. In this context, the G7+ (2013:2) defines resilience as the capacity of public institutions to absorb and adjust to internal and external shocks and setbacks. Baker (2017b:9) defines resilience simply as the ability of the state to serve its citizens and fulfil its obligations.

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[138] Mahmood Mamdani warns against the dangers of such 'counter-extremism' and 'culture talk' in *Good Muslim, Bad Muslim* (2002). See Chapter 8, section 8.3 *State fragility and the development of impediments to CVE*, and in particular section 8.3.4 *Social indicators and impediments to CVE*.

In Chapter 1, section 1.8.1 *Key concepts*, I noted that in the context of CVE resilience may be defined as "the capacity and actions of a community to regulate violent extremist activities in that community" (Van Metre, 2016:13). Van Metre (2016:14-17) maintains that resilience rests on society's capacity and competence to resist and opt out of political violence such as Islamist terrorism and find peaceful ways of reaching collective goals. Like PVE, resilience brings into the fold of CVE the notion that Islamist violent extremism may be avoided and prevented by empowering the state, its institutions, and its society, and by reducing the risk factors associated with the development of Islamist violent extremism. Kenya, however, is struggling with building resilience in state institutions and in society. This struggle in building resilience undermines CVE efforts. In Chapter 8, section 8.4 *Increased state fragility in Kenya?*, I elaborate that there are also indications that the conduct of both Islamism and ineffective and counter-productive CVE contribute to more state fragility in Kenya, threatening to lock Kenya in an insecurity dilemma, a fragility trap, and a conflict trap, thus further eroding resilience.[139]

State-building and resilience are prescribed to deal not only with CVE, but with state fragility as well. Lemay-Hébert and Mathieu (2014:235-236) contend that in response to state fragility, state-building is designed: (1) to strengthen existing government institutions and create new institutions, thus increase state capacity; (2) to strengthen social cohesion and nation-building, thus enhance state legitimacy. In the context of CVE, state-building would then be designed to resist and manage Islamist violent extremism by mitigating the the risk factors associated with the development of Islamist violent extremism and the related weaknesses and abuse of the state. Such actions occur at three levels of the state, viz., macro, meso, and micro, and are aimed at capacitating state institutions, state-society relations, and relations among groups in society. I elaborate on the notion of state-building in the context of CVE in section 5.4.3 *CVE approaches and programming*. In summation of the foregoing, one may ask when and how may one know and validate that all these elements of CVE are successful, and which ones are more effective than others, or transferable from one context to another? Conjecture and contestation bedevil answers to these questions. I revert to these questions in the last part of the current chapter in section 5.4.4 *The evaluation of CVE approaches and programming*. Another challenge of CVE, viz., the CVE security-development nexus, will first be addressed.

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[139] See 8.3 *State fragility and the development of impediments to CVE* for an outline of the insecurity dilemma and the fragility and conflict traps in the link between state fragility, Islamist violent extremism, and CVE.

5.4.2 The CVE-Security-Development Nexus

The CVE-security-development nexus is characterised by the oscillation, or otherwise, the combination, of hard power and soft power in CVE approaches and programming, thus linking development measures to what were traditionally exclusive security considerations. There is hence a view that hard power security measures are necessary but insufficient in countering Islamist violent extremism in any productive, efficient, and sustainable manner. The prevailing view is that “while removing terrorists from the battlefield and disrupting terrorist plots are, and should be, high priority objectives, they are insufficient to neutralise the global threat of violent extremism” (Borum (2011a:8). Furthermore, there is a prevailing view that soft power and development measures are requisite to CVE. Development measures, however, are expensive and have indeterminably enduring timeframes, two factors that are prohibitive for many African states. The Africa Center for Strategic Studies (2016:10) laments that most “African states do not command the official budgets necessary to overcome the socio-economic drivers of violent extremism”. In its policy document on counter-terrorism, the African Union also admits that “[f]ew African governments are in a position, on their own, to marshal the requisite resources to combat the threat [of terrorism]” (AU, 2002:preamble).

The UNDP also advocates for a constellation of security and development. In its policy document, *Preventing and responding to violent extremism in Africa: a development approach*, the UNDP (2015:6) asserts that a security response on its own, which is short-term and often counter-productive, is insufficient, and must be accompanied by a development response, which is more long-term and self-sustaining. This development response must address the very conditions that enabled and generated Islamist violent extremism in the first place. Street and Ackman (2018:The Internet) also contends that to reduce the threat of terrorism, “strategies should focus on resolving conflict by addressing its causes. Successful counterterror strategies would focus on preventing abuses by security forces, challenging and improving weak or corrupt governance, supporting equitable access to services, protecting and empowering civil society, and investing in peace and reconstruction processes”.

There is patent interaction between (under)development and (in)security in the relationship between state fragility, Islamist violent extremism, and CVE. (Under)development and (in)security have an inverse relationship, i.e., underdevelopment generates insecurity and encourages conflict, and development generates security and encourages cooperation. Given that the solution to Islamist violent extremism lies in deconstructing the challenge itself, i.e., Islamist violent extremism being a challenge of both security and development, CVE must thus address the challenge of both security and development. Collier *et al* (2018:8) contends that "[a]ll countries were once fragile. No society started off with the institutions and norms needed for peace and security". State-building and state legitimacy are key in creating such institutions and norms and in generating security and development. In this regard, legitimacy and state-building are indivisible as "[l]egitimacy aids the process of state-building and is reinforced as state-building delivers benefits for people. As such, legitimacy is both a means and an end for successful state-building" (Lemay-Hébert and Mathieu, 2014:240). However, it is undesirable for state-building to capacitate state institutions and privilege regime survival at the expense of social cohesion and state legitimacy. That kind of state-building can only reinforce conflict.

Nay (2013:333) warns that "[b]y strengthening order and stability, even when the prevailing political order rested on repression, corruption and discrimination, … [state-building] may have contributed to reinforcing abusive authority and predatory state activities". Devlin-Foltz (2010:1) is adamant that "Africa's fragile states create political and security environments that enhance the leverage of Islamist extremists in their ongoing struggle with moderates for influence. Countering extremism in Africa, therefore, cannot be separated from building stronger, more legitimate states". The UNDP (2017:7) concludes that "improved public policy and delivery of good governance by African governments confronted with violent extremism will ultimately represent a far more effective source of counter-terrorism and PVE than continued overconcentration on security-focused interventions". Accountability, responsiveness, development, and the equitable sharing of public goods, are then the lasting solution, not the use of force and the suppression of political and socio-economic grievances.

The foregoing may be reduced to the notion of good governance and the need for good governance. The Ibrahim Index defines governance as "the provision of political, social and economic public goods and services that every citizen has the right to expect from their government, and that a government has the responsibility to deliver to its citizens" (MIF, 2020:8). Alas, such governance is in short supply in fragile states. This kind of governance is specifically absent in the case of ethno-religious identities that have been subjected to 'unjust social orders' and 'historical injustices' in current fragile states like Kenya. The CVE-security-development nexus therefore poses one of the major impediments to CVE in fragile contexts. Security without development, addresses the physical threat of Islamist violent extremism, but not the underlying factors of Islamist violent extremism *per se*. These linkages between CVE, security, and development, inform not only the dominant whole-of-government (WG) and the whole-of-society (WS) approaches and programming in CVE, but also offensive and defensive, ideological and communicative, as well as political and social-policy, approaches and programming.

5.4.3 CVE Approaches and Programming

Regarding the question of how you fix fragile states, Kaplan (2008:1) responds that “nobody seems to be able to explain how to fix them - and why decades spent pumping money, peacekeepers, and advise into fragile states have been unable to reform them”. Likewise, the question of how you counter Islamist violent extremism remain open to conjecture and contestation. While state-building is often offered as a solution in the context of both state fragility and CVE, many questions remain, including the following: Which CVE approach and programming works? Which CVE approach and programming is transferrable from one context to another? Islamist violent extremism and its violent manifestation, i.e., terrorism, may consequently be defined as ‘wicked problems’, viz., complex, intractable, long-term, with no easy solutions. Below, I highlight the different CVE approaches and programming, including the dominant *whole-of-government* and *whole-of-society* approaches and programming.

5.4.3.1 *Whole-of-Government and Whole-of-Society Approaches and Programming*

The CVE-security-development nexus, highlighting the role of connectedness and therefore the need for integration, informs the dominant whole-of-government and whole-of-society approaches to CVE programming. Within the study of Public Administration, the field of policy and planning has produced three related concepts that are of particular interest in this study. The first concept is ‘wicked issues’ or ‘wicked problems’, the second is the ‘whole-of-government’ approach, and the third is the ‘whole-of-society’ approach. Both approaches are designed to deal with ‘wicked’ (i.e., rooted, complex, and intractable) public policy challenges.[140] The concept of ‘wicked problems’ was developed in the 1970s to characterise public policy challenges that were defined as: (1) emergent (new and/or prominent); (2) with complex internal dynamics; (3) having multiple causes and involving multiple actors; (4) of which there is *ex ante* (i.e., before the fact) very little knowledge on appropriate and adequate solutions or the consequences of intervention; (5) seen as posing long-term challenges (Peters, 2017:385, 389, 392). ‘Wicked problems’ may be defined as “issues straddling the boundaries of public sector organisations, administrative levels, and policy areas” (Christensen and Laegreid, 2007:1060).

‘Wicked problems’ include terrorism, crime, climate change, poverty, inequality, and economic underdevelopment (Peters, 2017:386-387; Christensen and Laegreid, 2007:1060-1061). In this mix one may include natural disasters such as draughts and floods, and diseases such as Malaria, HIV-Aids, and Ebola (and recently, the Coronavirus). These ‘wicked problems’ pose intractable challenges to the modern state, challenges beyond the capacity of fragile states. ‘Wicked problems’ include all of the individual symptoms of state fragility, for example: weak, failing, and abusive structures of governance and authority; economic underdevelopment; political violence *writ large* and terrorism in particular; a lack of capacity and willingness to provide adequate and even elementary public goods. Added to these individual symptoms, one may conceive of state fragility itself as a grand ‘wicked problem’.[141]

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[140] The ‘whole-of-government approach’ is referred to as the ‘integrated approach’, formerly called ‘integrated missions’, in the context of UN peace operations (Friis, 2010:53, 58-59).

Speaking in the context of the linkages between Africa’s fragile state and terrorism, the African Union (2002) recognises the challenges posed by ‘wicked problems’. In its policy document, *African Union plan of action on the prevention and combating of terrorism*, the African Union acknowledges that “[s]evere conditions of poverty and deprivation experienced by large sections of the African population provide a fertile breeding ground for terrorist extremism. Few African governments are in a position, on their own, to marshal the requisite resources to combat the threat” (AU, 2002:preamble). Multifaceted, enduring, with no easy solutions, the threat of ‘wicked problems’ poses particularly intractable challenges to the fragile state that is defined by underperformance, misperformance, and institutional failure. These challenges have historical precedence.

To deal with the emergent ‘wicked problems’ in the 1970s, a call was made for more integration and coordination, and increased capacity, rather than ‘departmentalism’, ‘tunnel vision’, and ‘vertical silos’ that typified policy and planning at the time. In 1997 the UK government introduced the concept of ‘joined-up government’ to deal with wicked problems. Joined-up government and related concepts such as ‘vertical collaborations’ and ‘horizontal collaborations’ were dominant in the mid-1990s. Surpassing these concepts as dominant approaches, by the 2000s the concept of the whole-of-government had become pervasive. The whole-of-government approach may involve any sector and level of government, but also private-public sector partnerships, involving groups inside and outside of government. This approach may also focus on policy development, programme management, or service delivery (Christensen and Laegreid, 2007:1060-1061, 1064). Or CVE in the context of this study.

The whole-of-government approach is defined by “public services agencies working across portfolio boundaries to achieve a shared goal and an integrated government response to particular issues”

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[141] The concept ‘wicked problems’, similar to other concepts employed in this study, also suffers from conceptual elasticity and ambiguity, and consequently, contestation. Is ‘wicked’ to be equated with ‘difficult’ or ‘complex’? Are many of the policy challenges facing the modern state today not all difficult and complex? Therefore, which public policy challenge is ‘wicked’, and which one is merely ‘bad’? The elasticity of the concept of ‘wicked’ problems is beyond the scope of this study. Peters (2017) and Christensen and Laegreid (2007) are good scholarly places to start in exploring this concept and the implications for conceptual clarity, analysis, and evaluation.

(Christensen and Laegreid, 2007:1060). Speaking in the specific context of 'fragile environments', i.e., state fragility, the OECD (2006:7, 13) and the IMF (2008:12, 53) describe the whole-of government approach as an 'integrated', 'well sequenced and coherent' framework or guidelines, for security and development, involving departments in charge of security, political, social, and economic affairs, and those in charge of development aid and humanitarian assistance. In its policy document on the matter, *Whole of government approaches to fragile states*, the OECD (2006:14) defines the whole-of-government approach as instances "where a government actively uses formal and/or informal networks across the different agencies within that government to coordinate the design and implementation of the range of interventions that the government's agencies will be making in order to increase the effectiveness of those interventions in achieving the desired objectives".

The whole-of-government approach has its pros and cons. The OECD (2006:7) points out that the approach is informed by the recognition that "the political, security, economic and social spheres are interdependent: failure in one risks failure in all others". Therefore, this approach, with principles such as integration, centralisation, and coordination, is designed and curated to achieve more efficiency and effectiveness. However, the approach often undermines the intended outcomes, which leads to complex and cumbersome organisations, little autonomy and flexibility, time-consuming coordination, and inhibiting centralisation, and thus, less efficiency and effectiveness. An example of a whole-of-government approach is the US Department of Homeland Security (DHS). The DHS was created post 9/11 for a more integrated and coordinated response to homeland security, specifically relating to the threat of terrorism on US soil (Christensen and Laegreid, 2007:1061, 1063).[142]

Whereas the whole-of-government approach is driven by government, the second approach, the whole-of-society approach, is driven by civil-society. The whole-of-society approach, mostly framed around building resilience in society, is ancillary to the whole-of-government approach. Both approaches are linked with public sector reforms. In response to the many public policy challenges, including the challenge of Islamist violent extremism, public sector reforms are often characterised by the oscillation between devolution and centralisation. In the case in Kenya, I demonstrate that, although democratisation, devolution, and the 2010 constitutional framework, which created the 47 counties from the centralised eight regions, have brought services and decision-making closer to the people at the local level, these reforms have also deepened local communal interests and fault-lines. The 47 counties are now the new administrative units where the allocation of resources and political bargaining takes place. These 47 counties therefore represent new units where new battle lines have been drawn in Kenya, between the state and society, between communities, and specifically between the state and Muslim communities, and between Muslim communities and their fellow citizens, all of whom are jostling for position in the constricted democratic space in Kenya. A country contested by factionalised elites and politically significant ethno-religious identity alliances.[143]

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[142] Reflective of the whole-of-government approach that involves public-private partnerships in CVE programming, the US federal Department of Homeland Security leads and coordinates all domestic US CVE efforts, working with, but not limited to, "Federal, State, local, tribal, and territorial governments and law enforcement; communities; non-governmental organisations; philanthropic organisations; academia; educators; social service providers; metal health providers; and the private sector" (DHS, 2016:2). The whole-of-government approach is also evidenced in Kenya. This approach is called the 'all-government' approach in Kenya. The NSCVE of Kenya maintains that the NCTC is "the lead agency to coordinate actors (state, non-state, and bilateral and multilateral partners) involved in the implementation process [of the NSCVE]" (Republic of Kenya, 2016a:15). See Chapter 6, section 6.9. *Countering Islamist violent extremism in Kenya*.

Responding to the 'wicked problem' of Islamist violent extremism, public sector reforms have included the adoption of these whole-of-government and the whole-of-society approaches, which have become dominant approaches to CVE programming since 2005. An equivalent 'all-government' approach to CVE programming has also been adopted to underpin the CVE architecture of Kenya. This approach is directed and coordinated by the National Counter Terrorism Centre (NCTC) in Nairobi. An equivalent approach to the whole-of-society approach is the 'all-society' approach in Kenya. This partnering civil-society driven approach is directed by the Citizen Support Mechanism (CSM), an organisation created by the NCTC to 'to counter and prevent violent extremism in Kenya'. I elaborate on these two approaches in Kenya in Chapter 6.[144] The two dominant approaches in CVE, incorporating security and development considerations, may include all or any combination of the other approaches and programming. Offensive and defensive approaches and programming will be explained next.

5.4.3.2 *Offensive and Defensive Approaches and Programming*

These approaches and programming include the *repression and decapitation* measures dealt with in earlier in the current chapter in section 5.3 *Ending violent Islamist campaigns*. Offensive and defensive approaches and programming therefore involve hard power strategies that are associated with the counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency origins of CVE. These hard power strategies include the offensive use of the military, policing, and legislation, and the defensive use of measures such as intelligence, infrastructure protection, crisis planning, and border security, all directed against the physical threat of Islamist violent extremism. Nasser-Eddine *et al* (2011:41-46) contend that these offensive and defensive approaches are chiefly designed to 'disrupt the operational capacity of the terrorist organisation', by denying them 'sources of recruits, supplies, finance, and targets', 'deterring and reducing terrorist attacks', and 'responding to and containing terrorist attacks' once they occur.

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[143] See Chapter 6, section 6.3. *Islamist violent extremism and the fragile state in Kenya*.
[144] See Chapter 6, section 6.9 *Countering Islamist violent extremism in Kenya*.

Offensive measures would then encompass passing and enforcing anti-terror legislation and policy. Policing and law enforcement will include investigations, prosecutions, and imprisonment of terror suspects within a legal framework and justice system. This will include legislation, policy, and policing, capable of dealing with Islamist violent extremism as a criminal enterprise. Military actions will involve varied related actions, including 'cordon-and-search' and 'search-and-destroy' operations, and decapitation or targeted killings. Defensive measures will include intelligence gathering and surveillance, and varied physical security measures, including patrols, and maintaining security zones, barricades, and security checkpoints. Whilst the above are overt offensive and defensive measures, states also engage in covert offensive and defensive measures. Covert offensive and defensive measures include renditions, covert imprisonment, torture, and extrajudicial killings, by state agents. The Political Terror Scale and the Freedom House Index capture a proportion of these covert measures in Kenya.[145] Expensive and long-drawn out, and often unproductive and counter-productive, offensive and defensive measures can only address the physical threat of Islamist violent extremism.

Another vexing question in CVE related to the above, is who is amenable to CVE measures, and who is not. In the preceding Chapter 4, section 4.2.1 *Conceptualising Islamist violent extremism*, I outlined how the support and membership of Islamist organisations is differentiated by disparate roles and motivations, and dissimilar levels of commitment and involvement. Said support and membership stem from ideological activists, pragmatists, drifters and followers, socially frustrated individuals, 'professional' jihadis, recruiters, ideologues, political leaders, financiers, passive supporters, and others. To be effective and successful, CVE must mirror lslamist violent extremism by being similarly differentiated. Clearly, some ideological activists, even 'professional' jihadis, will not be amenable to deradicalisation, disengagement, rehabilitation, and reintegration. Some communities will be equally averse to risk reduction, counter-radicalisation, and resilience. In these instances, offensive and defensive measures may then be the only viable CVE option for states. Indiscriminate CVE, however, in employing offensive and defensive hard power measures, can only serve to increase radicalisation.

CVE must therefore be differentiated to deal with (1) the differentiated support and membership of Islamist organisations as indicated above, and (2) the differentiated objectives of Islamist organisations, which I address below. Hansen and Kainz (2007:55) corroborate stated differentiated objectives of lslamist organisations, and conclude that terrorist attacks are not an objective, but merely a symptom, the real threat being the drive to promote the appeal of Islamist violent extremism as the underlying ideology and movement. CVE must therefore go beyond hard power measures in the offensive and defensive approaches aimed at only addressing the physical threat of Islamist violent extremism. States also have soft power options, which should aim to address the appeal of Islamist violent extremism as an ideology and movement, by purposefully undermining and denying the intent and objectives of the Islamist violent extremism ideology and movement. These soft power options include ideological and communicative approaches and programming.

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[145] See Chapter 8, section 8.3 *State fragility and the development of impediments to CVE*.

5.4.3.3 *Ideological and Communicative Approaches and Programming*

These approaches and programming include *failure and reorientation* aspects that I dealt with in this chapter in section 5.3 *Ending violent Islamist campaigns*. These approaches also include many of the CVE concepts and measures that I dealt with in section 5.4.1 *CVE conceptualised*, including: (1) those based on the management of Islamist violent extremism, viz., CVE, deradicalisation, disengagement, rehabilitation, and reintegration; (2) those that deal with the notion that Islamist violent extremism can be avoided and prevented, viz., PVE, risk reduction, counter-radicalisation, and resilience. Ideological and communicative approaches and programming would then encompass soft power strategies that are more aligned with CVE than with counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency. Based on the Ideological and communicative approaches and programming, the National Strategy to Counter Violent Extremism (NSCVE) of Kenya envisages and outlines a DDRR process of deradicalisation, disengagement, rehabilitation, and reintegration in CVE (Republic of Kenya, 2016a:6, 16-17).

Nasser-Eddine *et al* (2011:47-50) maintain that ideological and communicative approaches and programming are designed to offer and promote counter-narratives and alternative shared futures, counselling, education, and mentoring, as joint efforts to counter lslamist violent extremism as an ideology and a movement. Aimed at waging ‘a war of ideas’ to influence and persuade, these measures are also designed to promote ‘moderate’ Islam, rather than ‘radical’ Islam, the latter deemed to be fuelling lslamist violent extremism. I addition, secularism, and values and norms such as religious tolerance and inclusion, are purposefully promoted. The difficulty with these approaches is that, even more so than with the offensive and defensive approaches, it is much more difficult to assess success or failure, or to determine the metrics for success or failure. Earlier in the chapter in section 5.3 *Ending violent Islamist campaigns*, I highlighted that these approaches will be dependent on the terrorist organisation or individuals accepting failure or setback, and consequently renouncing violence. In addition to the ideological and communicative approaches and programming, states also have political and social-policy approaches and programming as soft power measures. These soft power measures include persuasive and development measures that seek to address structural, political, and socio-economic factors linked to the development of Islamist violent extremism.

5.4.3.4 *Political and Social-Policy Approaches and Programming*

These approaches and programming include *success and negotiation* aspects that I dealt with in section 5.3 *Ending violent Islamist campaigns*. Like ideological and communicative approaches and programming, political and social-policy approaches and programming encompass soft power strategies. Unlike offensive and defensive approaches, these approaches are more aligned with CVE than they are with counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency. Nasser-Eddine *et al* (2011:53-55) maintain that these approaches are largely designed to address political and socio-economic grievances, to encourage the terrorist organisation to engage in a democratic political process, state-building, and PVE programmes such as risk reduction, counter-radicalisation, and resilience.

State-building in particular is a key measure undertaken within political and social-policy approaches. Earlier in the current chapter in section 5.4.1 *CVE Conceptualised*, I outlined how resilience and state-building are prescribed as antidotes not only for Islamist violent extremism, but for state fragility as well. Whereas resilience is an outcome of state-building and an attribute of a strong state, state-building rests on two pillars, viz., good governance and socio-economic development. In this regard. at the 2015 Summit on Countering Violent Extremism, former US President Barack Obama (2015a:The Internet) asserted that the world needs to step up efforts “against corruption, because the culture of the bribe has to be replaced by good governance that doesn’t favour certain groups over others”, and the world needs to “keep promoting development and growth that is broadly shared, so more people can provide for their families”. The UN Global Counter-terrorism Strategy also speaks to good governance by stressing the role of community security, economic security, and political security. Community security includes religious tolerance, human development, and education programmes. Economic security encompasses issues such as development goals and youth employment. Political security includes imperatives such as human rights and the rule of law (UNGA, 2006:4, 9).

Kaplan (2008:8) contends that socio-economic development is the ‘cure’ for state fragility. Development, however, is about much more than just economic growth. In Chapter 7, section 7.3.2 *Economic indicators*, I demonstrate that economic growth can exclude vast sections of society, benefitting only the few. Kenya is a case in point. Kenya has one of the fastest growing economies. The annual GDP growth rate averaged 5.45 percent between 2004 and 2019. From an economy of US$40 billion in 2010, Kenya's economy had more than doubled by 2018. In 2018, Kenya's economy was US$87.928 billion, making Kenya the fourth largest economy in sub-Saharan Africa. In 2019, Kenya's economy was US$98.607 billion, the third largest economy in sub-Saharan Africa. Despite this economic growth and the size of the economy, acute horizontal and regional inequalities persist in Kenya, disproportionately impacting ethnic-Somalis and other Muslims and the regions they reside in.

While in 2019 Kenya had a multidimensional poverty index of 17.8 percent, the picture is different in regions dominated by ethnic-Somalis and other Muslims. In North-eastern Region, the poverty index is 50.3 percent, 22.2 percent in Coast Region, and 19.0 in Eastern Region. With ethnic-Somalis, most subsisting on less than US$1.90 a day, 79.27 percent are multidimensionally poor, compared to 16.13 percent for ethnic-Kikuyu. There is therefore a 63.14 percentage difference in the incidence of multidimensional poverty between ethnic-Somalis and ethnic-Kikuyu. These horizontal and regional disparities result from both commission and omission by the state, having marginalised and securitised these regions and communities since independence.[146] Rotberg's *Good governance means performance and results* (2014) speaks to this reality. The dividends of state-building, Rotberg (2014) maintains, must encompass good governance. Such governance can only be measured by tangible and equitably shared public goods. This is the duty of every state, including Kenya.

Just as economic growth does not often lead to development for large sections of society, state-building also does not often lead to security for large sections of society. Solomon (2015a:13, 14) contends that "[s]ecuring the state, however, does not mean security for its citizens. This is especially true in Africa, where state [or regime] security is often purchased at the expense of the human security of the citizens …. [T]hreats to the security of citizens are often not external but internal - citizens are more afraid of their own governments than the military forces of a foreign enemy". In Kenya this is clearly demonstrable with the levels of state terrorism and violations of human rights and civil liberties as captured on indexes such as the annual Political Terror Scale and the Freedom House Index. Such violations are typical of CVE operations as demonstrated by the 2014 Operation *Usalama* Watch that targeted ethnic-Somalis and other Muslims. The levels of privatised security also reflect such insecurity for large sections of society. In Kenya private security companies employ more than five times the number of both the police and the military personnel. In the case of the police, whilst the UN recommends a police-to-civilian ratio of 1:450, in Kenya the ratio is 1:1, 250. Security, a shared public good provided by the state, has become the preserve of only the privileged few in Kenya.[147]

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[146] See Chapter 6, section 6.3 *Islamist violent extremism and the fragile state in Kenya*.

The foregoing approaches and programming to CVE are evolving, so is their evaluation. Earlier in the current chapter in section 5.3 *Ending violent Islamist campaigns*, I also demonstrated that violent Islamist campaigns naturally end for reasons other than any CVE measures, including disillusionment with the Islamist ideology, the natural death of leaders, or the loss of popular support. Moreover, given the adverse security environment they inhabit, the life-expectancy of terrorist organisations is relatively short. With the foregoing in mind, a pertinent question to ask in the case in Kenya is: Will Kenya (and Somalia) be able to compel and coerce or otherwise influence and pursued *al-Shabaab* to abandon the objective of establishing an Islamic state in East Africa, and accept, within the current state system and the prevailing governance principle of secularism, 'lesser successes' yet broader-based and more inclusive objectives such as improved socio-economic conditions for all Muslims, more equitable political representation, and respect for religious autonomy? Who fails and who succeeds in imposing their will in this duel between Kenya (and Somalia) and *al-Shabaab*, is the core question. How such success or failure is measured, and what are the success or failure metrics, is the core challenge in evaluating CVE approaches and programming in Kenya (and Somalia). This leads the current discussion to the challenges associated with evaluating CVE approaches and programming.

5.4.4 The Evaluation of CVE Approaches and Programming

Evaluation is the fourth and last stage in the CVE policy cycle. The importance and current shortcomings of evaluation warrants that evaluation must be addressed separately. To fill the gaps in the current inadequacies of evaluating CVE, one must place CVE within the context of the field of public policy and planning, considering CVE performance against the cumulative knowledge about policy analysis and policy evaluation. Therefore, evaluation, i.e., performance assessment, involves an analysis and judgement of CVE in terms of the consequences and the desirability of CVE approaches and programming. Such evaluation is an empirical assessment of the success or failure of CVE, i.e., the consequences of CVE, and a normative assessment of the ethics of CVE, i.e., the desirability of CVE.

Neither success nor failure are absolute. Consequently, the question should be to what extent has either success or failure been achieved? In Chapter 6, section 6.5.2 *The long-war in Kenya,* I elaborate on the stated objective of *al-Shabaab* to create an Islamic state in East Africa and enforce the *Sharia* in such a state. Is this objective to be achieved incrementally? Will *al-Shabaab* 'liberate' Somalia first and then other Muslim lands in East Africa, including in Kenya, Ethiopia, Djibouti, and others? After the 2015 Garissa attack in Kenya, *al-Shabaab* issued the statement: "Do not dream of security in your lands until security becomes a reality in the Muslim lands, including the North Eastern province and the coast and until all your forces withdraw from all Muslim lands" (ICG, 2018:5). It begs the following related questions: What about the ethnic dimension? Are 'Muslim lands' limited to 'Greater Somalia', i.e., areas inhabited by ethnic-Somalis? As an *al-Qaeda* affiliate, does *al-Shabaab* seek a 'global' Caliphate, with East Africa as a stringboard? How does *al-Shabaab* reconcile their nationalist-irredentist jihadi outlook, versus their patron *al-Qaeda*'s internationalist jihadi outlook?

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[147] See Chapter 7, section 7.3 *State fragility and the development of Islamist violent extremism*, and Chapter 8, section 8.3 *State fragility and the development of impediments to CVE*, and section 8.4 *Increased state fragility in Kenya?*

Another widely held belief is that *al-Shabaab* has an unlimited and uncompromising 'hatred' and 'discontent' for the very existence of Kenya and therefore presents an existential threat to the state of Kenya. Is this perceived 'hatred' and 'discontent' not mistaken for a calculated objective of systematically dismantling the Kenyan state as part of the long-term plan to establish an Islamic state in East Africa? In Chapter 6, section 6.5.2 *The long-war in Kenya*, I elaborate that despite their stated objective as an organisation (as indicated above), *al-Shabaab* has not publicly articulated their intent and objectives in Kenya in any coherent and consistent manner. Instead, *al-Shabaab* has a long list of grievances and reasons for terrorist attacks in Kenya. Is this blurredness of *de facto* reasons deliberate? The foregoing has not been publicly clarified in any reasoned manner by *al-Shabaab*. Be that as it may, Krause (2018:51) demonstrates and rightly maintains that the 'success' or 'failure' (of CVE in Kenya) may only be measured against the 'intention' and 'objectives' (of *al-Shabaab* in Kenya).

The success of CVE cannot be measured by merely disrupting the operational capacity of *al-Shabaab* by denying them sources of recruits, supplies, finance, and targets, as prescribed by offensive and defensive CVE approaches and programming. Such disruption and denial will only address the physical threat of Islamist violent extremism, and very little beyond that. The success of CVE in Kenya must be measured by the extent to which CVE undermines and denies the intent and objectives of *al-Shabaab*. Noted in the current chapter in section 5.4.3 *CVE approaches and programming*, in Chapter 4, section 4.2.1 *Conceptualising Islamist violent extremism*, I elaborated on how the objectives of Islamist organisations such as *al-Shabaab* are found at different levels, some long-term and others short-term. The ultimate objective is to establish Islamic states (or the Caliphate). At other levels the objectives may mean the state making concessions that it otherwise would not have made, such as conceding to local autonomy or federalism, negotiating a new social contract and reorganisation power relations and social relations within the state, and attaining equal rights and freedoms. Yet on another level the objectives may mean the weakening of state power, damaging the economy or a key sector of the economy, such as Kenya's tourism industry, the polarisation and radicalisation of society, the Islamist organisation gaining more support, funding, and recruits, or simply continuing to survive and to undermine the legitimacy and authority of the state as a necessary part of waging the long-war. Sivan (2003:26) has correctly observed that "[t]he greatest feat of radical Islam is its sheer survival".

Just as Islamism may succeed at one level and fail at other levels, CVE may accordingly succeed at one level but fail at other levels, based on the given intention and objectives of the Islamist organisation. The question then is: When is CVE 'successful' and when does it 'fail'? More importantly, what are the metrics for 'success' or 'failure'? Furthermore, a critical appraisal of CVE must also encompass ethical considerations. The desirability of CVE, i.e., ethical considerations, relates to the moral and legal parameters of CVE policy, and is measured by whether CVE conforms to norms and principles of moral conduct, the rule of law, and constitutionalism. Evidence from the Political Terror Scale and the Freedom House Index indicate that CVE in Kenya, involving state terrorism and violations of human rights and civil liberties, falls short of such ethical imperatives.[148] Can CVE be considered successful, i.e., desirable, if it succeeds in other areas but falls short of such ethical imperatives? In the current chapter in section 5.4.2 *The CVE-security-development nexus*, I highlighted that CVE overlaps security and development. Can CVE be considered successful if it achieves its security imperatives as envisaged under offensive and defensive approaches and programming, but fails in its development imperatives as envisaged under political and social-policy approaches and programming? Answers to the above questions are key to many of the barriers to the success of CVE, as well as barriers to CVE evaluation.

There are four specific barriers to CVE evaluation. The first barrier is the challenge of the elasticity of CVE as a concept and a field of study, i.e., how to assess through fixed criteria a liquid process. Like the differentiated conceptualisation of Islamist violent extremism and terrorism, CVE has no consensual definition. At the beginning of the current chapter in section 5.4.1 *CVE conceptualised*, I maintained that the result is that CVE conceptually defies clear demarcation and focus as a field of study and as an area of public policy and practise. Heydemann (2014:3) elaborates that CVE straddles varied and divergent fields of study, including, economic development and poverty alleviation, governance and democratisation, strategic communication and education, conflict prevention or mitigation and peace-building, criminal justice and law enforcement, and civil society initiatives and youth or women engagement. CVE evaluation, therefore, is dependent on the differentiated meaning of CVE itself, which in practise is often undefined or imprecisely defined.

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[148] See Chapter 8, section 8.3 *State fragility and the development of impediments to CVE*.

The second barrier to CVE evaluation is measurement. Against which objective of Islamist violent extremism do you consider the success, failure, or ethical evaluation of CVE? Is the intent of CVE to 'disrupt and deny the operational capacity' or to 'undermine and deny the intention and objectives' of the Islamist organisation? The answer you get depends on the question you ask and the metrics you use. Consequently, the different answers to how you measure the success, failure, or ethics of CVE, would then reflect methodological differences, and not differences in fact or substance. CVE evaluation is plagued by a third barrier, viz., measuring the negative. The subfield of CVE, viz., PVE, has made CVE not only more divergent and expansive but has locked CVE in what Fink (2014:6) and Schomerus *et al* (2017:4) call 'measuring the negative'. Horgan (2014:10) finds that "we do not know precisely what we are preventing, let alone knowing how or whether we might have prevented it".

The fourth barrier to CVE evaluation is the recurrent inability to distinguish between what Romaniuk (2015:9) refers to 'CVE-specific' as opposed to 'CVE-relevant'. In the current chapter in section 5.4.1 *CVE conceptualised*, I pointed out that whereas it is possible to conceptually distinguish between activities and projects that are directly focused on CVE, i.e., CVE-specific, and those that may not be focused on CVE but have benefits for CVE, i.e., CVE-relevant, in practise it not always possible to do so. Because CVE has no consensual definition, and CVE overlaps security and development, that which is CVE-specific as opposed to CVE-relevant, becomes a matter of opinion and conjecture rather than an empirical and demonstrable fact. Aldrich (2014:526) therefore concludes that "measuring and evaluating … [CVE] policies remains an understudied topic … and the majority of the literature in the field comprises commentary and critique and lacks an empirical research basis".

5.5 CONCLUDING REMARKS

A qualification before the concluding remarks. Although this chapter touches on major themes in CVE as a field of public policy and practise, and on some aspects of counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency, the intention is not to provide an exhaustive account of these aspects, or of CVE as a field of study. Also, the study is not about CVE, counter-terrorism, or counter-insurgency, as such. Only those aspects that serve the aim and objectives of the study in the context of this chapter are addressed, primarily aspects relating to the link between state fragility and impediments to CVE.

This chapter is divided into three parts. The first part traced the origins of CVE to counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism, as precursors and contributors to CVE. The second part reflected on the different pathways to ending violent Islamist campaigns, including repression, decapitation, failure, reorientation, success, and negotiations, as well as CVE as such. The third part of the chapter focused on CVE by outlining: (1) the conceptualisation of CVE; (2) the CVE-security-development nexus; (3) CVE approaches and programming; (4) the challenge of evaluating CVE approaches and programming.

CVE in Kenya is highly criticised. Largely for being heavy-handed and indiscriminate, undermining democratic principles and increasing radicalisation, encouraging the centralisation of the state, authoritarianism, and the securitisation of the state, involving and increasing state terrorism, and being generally unproductive and counter-productive. All these factors are directly linked with state fragility and are symptoms and outcomes of state fragility. But they also represent barriers to CVE in Kenya. In addition to these symptoms and outcomes, state fragility generally limits the options available for the state to deal with Islamist violent extremism. Fragile states, the hammer often being the only tool in their CVE toolbox, tend to see a nail in every challenge to CVE. State fragility in Kenya has therefore generated particularly intractable impediments to CVE. I provide (1) trace, (2) accounts, (3) patterns, and (4) sequences, evidence, in this relationship between state fragility and impediments to CVE in Chapters 6 and 8, based on the following formulation: cause (X) + causal mechanisms + context = outcome (Y). This link between state fragility and impediments to CVE is also understood as involving social structures (entities) that have attributes or properties (with causal capacities and causal tendencies), that engage in actions (activities), generating (causing) impediments to CVE.

In the context of this chapter, and in Chapters 6 and 8, I demonstrate that it is state fragility that explains impediments to CVE, and therefore the failure of CVE, in Kenya. With explanation-building, and in creating the causal sequence between X (state fragility) and Y (impediments to CVE) in a natural setting and context (Kenya), the following factors aid in building the causal mechanisms that lay bare the black box of causality between X and Y: institutional weakness, incapacity, and abuse; preoccupation with regime survival over political and socio-economic imperatives; the securitisation of the state; the constricted democratic space; hegemonial exchange; indiscriminate repression and victimisation; wormholes. Whereas the cause is state fragility (X), the outcome or effect that is observed is impediments to CVE (Y). Given these impediments, CVE is ineffective and counter-productive. Consequently, CVE fails. Reflective of this failure is that, notably, Islamist violent extremism is not eradicated or mediated, democratic principles, social cohesion, and state legitimacy are eroded, there is increased radicalisation, and the insecurity dilemma, fragility trap and conflict trap persist. CVE in Kenya is therefore confronted with intractable challenges, including specific impediments, as well as the challenge of evaluating the success, failure, and desirability of CVE approaches and programming. This is what this chapter sought to achieve, to provide a synopsis of what and how we know about CVE, i.e., the state-of-the-art in CVE, as well as the key challenges associated with CVE and CVE evaluation, and therefore contributing to a realistic understanding of CVE. This understanding involves impediments to CVE in particular.

I elaborate on impediments to CVE in Kenya in Chapter 8. I outline then that the specific impediment to CVE in Kenya include: marginalising and conflict-generating hegemonial exchange; differentiated development regionally and horizontally; endemic insecurity and an oligopoly of political and terrorism violence; depreciated social cohesion; depreciated resilience; disengagement (from the state); state terrorism and the violation of human rights and civil liberties; heavy-handed and indiscriminate CVE; the misplaced preoccupation with religion and 'at risk' individuals in specific communities (i.e. Islam and ethnic-Somalis and other Muslims as an ethno-religious identity); the misplaced emphasis on counter-narratives and 'a war of ideas' (rather than the concrete political and socio-economic grievances that drive Islamist violent extremism); the dismissal of *al-Shabaab* as 'terrorist-extremist-criminals' (rather than political actors that engage in pressure politics and violent politics on behalf of a specific constituency); a fragile and volatile neighbourhood; shared state fragility, demographics, and grievances with Somalia; a war with no destined end in Somalia.

Having outlined the state-of-the-art of CVE in this last of the literature review chapters, the next chapter: *Islamist violent extremism, CVE, and the Kenyan state*, is the first of the three discussion and analysis chapters. The next chapter is informed by the question: How are Islamist violent extremism and CVE evidenced in Kenya? The first part of the chapter focuses on Islamist violent extremism and opens with an analysis of the myth of Kenya as a victim of external terror attacks. The chapter then examines the Kenyan state as the explanatory setting in the development of Islamist violent extremism by employing two themes: (1) authoritarianism and centralisation; (2) constitutional reforms and devolution. This first part of the chapter then looks at the origins of Islamist violent extremism in Kenya, new-wars and the long-war in Kenya, Islamist terror groups and combat units in Kenya, and lastly, major Islamist terrorist activity in Kenya since the 1990s. The second part of the chapter focuses on CVE and examines the Kenyan state as the explanatory setting for the barriers to CVE by employing two themes: (1) the securitisation of the state; (2) renewed authoritarianism and centralisation. The chapter then considers key aspects of the security architecture of Kenya, and key aspects of the all-government and the all-society CVE approaches and programming in Kenya.

CHAPTER 6: ISLAMIST VIOLENT EXTREMISM, COUNTERING ISLAMIST VIOLENT EXTREMISM, AND THE FRAGILE STATE IN KENYA

6.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter seeks to examine key elements of the fragile state in Kenya as a veritable and explanatory setting in which Islamist violent extremism and CVE are evidenced. Given this design, the first part of the chapter focuses on Islamist violent extremism or Islamism and starts out by examining the notion of Kenya as a victim of external terror attacks. Contrary to this popular myth, enabled and generated by state fragility, Kenya is in fact an active incubator of Islamism and Islamist terrorism. With state fragility as a unit of analysis, this first part of the chapter explains the relationship between state fragility and Islamist violent extremism by employing two analytical themes: (1) authoritarianism and centralisation; (2) constitutional reforms and devolution. This chapter then considers the origins of lslamist violent extremism in Kenya. Although the rise of Islamism in Kenya is linked to the third wave of Islamist terrorist activity since the 1990s, the roots of Islamism in Kenya are traceable to the ‘Big Bang’ of independence in 1963, which released generative causal powers that ignited the secessionist *Shifta* war (1963-1968), attempts and aspirations of secession in Coast Region since 1963 (and continuing to date), and other confrontations pitting state fragility in Kenya against ethnic-Somalis and other Muslims. After considering the origins of Islamism in Kenya, this chapter examines the linked notions and phenomena of new-wars and the long-war in Kenya, and then considers Islamist terror groups and combat units as well as major Islamist terrorist activity in Kenya since the 1990s.

The second part of the chapter focuses on CVE. It explains the relationship between state fragility and CVE in Kenya by utilising two analytical themes: (1) the securitisation of the state; (2) renewed authoritarianism and centralisation. In chapter 5, section 5.2 *The origins of CVE: counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism*, I elaborated on counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism, which I trace from independence in 1963, as the origins and precursors of CVE in Kenya. The securitisation of the Kenyan state has taken place in two periods of state fragility, i.e., starting in the 1960s, and starting again in the 1990s. These two periods indicate both change and continuity. From the 1960s, linked with authoritarianism and centralisation, securitisation (counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism) was in response to secession in the former NFD and Coast Region. Since the 1990s, linked with renewed authoritarianism and centralisation, securitisation (CVE) is in response to the third wave of Islamism. In both periods, the targeted group for securitisation is ethnic-Somalis and other Muslims. Lastly, the chapter outlines key aspects of the CVE architecture of Kenya, including key aspects of the all-government and the all-society approaches and programming. This dual approach and programming in Kenya are comparable to the dominant *whole-of-government* and the *whole-of-society* approaches and programming as outlined in Chapter 5, section 5.4.3 *CVE approaches and programming*. As a point of departure, the notion of Kenya as a victim of external terror attacks, will be addressed.

6.2 KENYA AS A VICTIM OF EXTERNAL TERROR ATTACKS

Empirical evidence demonstrates that the Kenyan state is an incubator of Islamist violent extremism. However, the narrative has been selective, with Kenya portrayed as an innocent bystander, rather than a participant. Bachmann (2012:46) notes that "[i]n public opinion, terrorism has been regarded as an 'external' issue in which, however, Kenyans bear the brunt of what are in fact foreign agendas". Mabera (2016:367) also asserts that Kenya is "a victim of terror acts on its own soil". Following the 2002 Mombasa attacks, on an Israeli hotel and an Israeli airline aircraft, the then Kenyan ambassador to Israel, John Sawe, claimed: "We have no domestic problems, no terrorism in our country, and we have no problem with our neighbours, no problem whatsoever" (in Botha, 2014a:3). Curiously, Atta-Asamoah (2015:15) also claims that before Kenya's incursion in Somalia with Operation *Linda Nchi* (2011-2012), "Kenya's open and accommodative nature was the only reason why it suffered".

Empirical evidence demonstrates otherwise. By illustration, unlike the 1998 US Embassy attack, all involved in the planning and execution of the 2002 Mombasa attacks were Kenyan citizens, except for one Sudanese national. With the 1998 US Embassy attack in Nairobi, although the attack was conducted by two Saudi Arabia nationals, and the planning involved foreign nationals, Kenyan nationals were also involved in the planning of the attack (Blanchard, 2013:3; Botha, 2013:33, 25-26, 2014a:3). Furthermore, the 2013 Westgate attack in Nairobi required support from a local Kenyan network (McConnell, 2013:The Internet; Amble and Meleagrou-Hitchens, 2014:524; Ali-Koor, 2016:1). Following the Westgate attack, a Kenyan Joint Parliamentary Committee report also concluded that "[t]hough Somalia provides a safe haven, training camps and opportunities for extremists to fight the 'enemies of Islam', *al-Qaeda* and *al-Shabaab* have executed attacks in the region by relying on Kenyan youth assistance and support" (in Lind *et al*, 2017:127). Although Westgate was carried out by four Somalian citizens, the other four ethnic-Somalis that were charged with planning the operation had Kenyan citizenship. The 2015 Garissa attack was conducted by four members of *al-Shabaab* who were respectively Somalian and Kenyan citizens (Patterson, 2015:16; Ali-Koor, 2016:1). Of the five members of *al-Shabaab* that carried out the 14 Riverside complex attack in 2019, four were Kenyan citizens, and of the five, only three were ethnic-Somalis. Moreover, Ahmad Iman Ali, the leader of *al-Hijra*, and *al-*

Shabaab's *Amir* for Kenyan Affairs, is of Meru-Kamba parentage from Nairobi, not ethnic-Somali (Chome, 2019b:The Internet). Islamism thus appeals to communities beyond the ethnic-Somali section of Kenya's population, including non-Muslims who are rapidly converted to Islam and radicalised into Islamic violent extremism. In section 6.5.2 *The long-war in Kenya*, I elaborate on how Islamist violent extremism, as a disenfranchised ideology and movement, finds resonance with communities and regions that have been at the receiving end of the failures and excesses of state fragility in Kenya.

Contrary to the popular myth, Kenya is not just a victim of foreign Islamist violent extremism, and definitely not a mere innocent bystander in 'the war on terror'. Speaking on the internal and external stresses that are linked to the development of Islamist terrorism within nations, Lind *et al* (2017:120) maintains that "states are not only overwhelmed by these transnational dynamics; rather, they actively shape these, as well". This is certainly the case in Kenya. Botha (2013:28) points out that since the early 1990s *al-Qaeda* embedded itself in Kenyan society. It started at least in 1993 in Nairobi, and in 1994 in Mombasa. Members of *al-Qaeda* have married locals and ran businesses in Kenya since the 1990s. Based on Global Extremism Monitor (GEM) data, Ahmed *et al* (2016:16) show that a quarter of the members of *al-Shabaab* are foreign fighters, many of whom are Kenyan of non-ethnic-Somali descent. McConnell (2014:The Internet) also maintains that "the few arrests and fewer convictions in connection with Kenya's terrorist attacks point to a domestic threat, not a foreign one". The notion of Kenya as a mere victim of external terror attacks therefore is found wanting when it is considered against empirical evidence. The roots of Islamist violent extremism in Kenya, although having an external impetus, originate from state fragility in Kenya itself. Let me demonstrate further.

6.3 ISLAMIST VIOLENT EXTREMISM AND THE FRAGILE STATE IN KENYA

To explain the incentive structure of Islamist violent extremism in Kenya, one needs to know the origins, evolution, and nature of state fragility in Kenya. Kenya is not merely the context in which Islamist violent extremism plays out. Kenya is a central agent. The state, through its agents, is itself the source of insecurity and conflict. In turn, its government, institutions, and society are the object of the blame system of Islamism and targets for *jihad*. The narrative starts with Kenya achieving internal self-rule on 1 June 1963, *Madaraka* Day ('Power' Day), and independence on 12 December 1963, with the British crown, Queen Elisabeth II, as the head of state, and Jomo Kenyatta as prime minister. A year thereafter on 12 December 1964, *Jamhuri* Day ('Republic' Day), Kenya became a republic with Jomo Kenyatta as President and Oginga Odinga as vice-President. Ngau (1987:523-525, 536) notes that *Harambee*, i.e., 'all pull together', became the state motto and a rallying call for inclusive national planning, economic development, and social change. On 12 December 1963, Ngau (1987: 536) recalls, Jomo Kenyatta declared: “But you must know that Kenyatta alone cannot give you everything. All things we must do together to develop our country, to get education for our children, to have doctors, to build roads, to improve or provide all day-to-day essentials .... *Harambee*!”.

Harambee, however, has proven to be particularly elusive in Kenya. Instead, since independence Kenya has been characterised by a very constricted democratic space, social fragmentation, a factionalised elite, authoritarian and predatory politics, uneven economic development, horizontal inequalities, and therefore, the misperformance and underperformance of the state. I elaborated in Chapter 3 that Kenya has consequently been defined by three levels of state fragility: (1) the macro level, in state institutions; (2) the intermediate meso level, in state-society relations; (3) the micro level, between groups within society. Resulting from all three levels of state fragility, Kenya’s reality is unremittingly defined by violence (viz., structural, cultural, and direct) and endemic insecurity. Ethnic-Somalis and other Muslims have had to bear the brunt of this insecurity and violence. This relationship between state fragility and resultant Islamist violent extremism in Kenya may be explained based on two central themes: (1) authoritarianism and centralisation; (2) constitutional reforms and devolution.

6.3.1 Authoritarianism and Centralisation

Kenya has had only four changes in power since independence, the governments of: (1) Jomo Kenyatta, 1964-1978 (15 years, died in office); (2) Daniel arap Moi, 1978-2002 (24 years, constitutionally barred from further running for office); (3) Mwai Kibaki, 2002-2013 (10 years, constitutionally restricted to two terms); (4) Uhuru Kenyatta, since 2013 (second term as of November 2017, term ends in August 2022). A *de facto* one-party state since 1964, from 1969 Kenya officially became a *de facto* one-party state under the ruling Kenya African National Union (KANU). This, after the dissolution of the opposition Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU) in 1964, the suppression and ultimate banning of the Kenya Peoples Union (KPU) in 1969, Kenya’s only opposition party at the time, and government clamping down on what was viewed as recalcitrant politicians. Between 1982 and 1991, Kenya was a *de jure* one party state. This period was defined by the brutal suppression of political opposition, and as elaborated later in this chapter in section 6.4 *The origins of Islamist violent extremism in Kenya*, the suppression of the Islamic Party of Kenya (IPK) and what the Daniel arap Moi Administration branded as ‘the rise of Islamic fundamentalism’. Multi-party electoral democracy was restored in 1991. Atta-Asamoah (2015:9) contends that since 1964 Kenya has an ‘imperial presidency’, which is defined by the “excessive abuse [of power], deep-rooted patronage in the allocation of national resources, misuse of state security apparatus to silence dissent, extra-judicial killings and human rights abuses, large-scale corruption, and the overall systematic abuse of public office".[149]

The constricted democratic space that has definably characterised the Kenyan fragile polity to date has resulted in a long history of endemic political violence in Kenya. The formation of the state itself was an outcome of excessive British colonial state violence, and a consequent brutal war of independence. Fought by the Kenya Land and Freedom Army (KLFA), the British pejoratively branded this group and the war itself as the 'Mau-Mau rebellion'. Both sides employed terrorism extensively. The war of independence was immediately followed by the 1963-1968 *Shifta* war between the Northern Province Progressive People's Party (NPPPP) and its military wing, the Northern Frontier District Liberation Army (NFDLA), and the Kenyan government in the former Northern Frontier District (NFD). Straight from the British script, the Kenyan government pejoratively branded this group '*shifta*', i.e., bandit. The constricted democratic space also resulted in two attempted military coups in April 1971 and August 1982, against the governments of Jomo Kenyatta and Daniel arap Moi, respectively. Since the 1990s Kenya has also experienced sporadic, mostly elections-related, 'ethnic' violence. The most violent episode being the post-election violence of 2007/2008, which brought Kenya to the brink of a civil war, leaving more than 1 300 people dead and more than 700 000 internally displaced.[150]

The constricted democratic space and this history of political violence persists with the current Islamist violent extremism as indicated by Islamist terrorist activity since the 1990s. The three historical waves of Islamist terrorism in the modern era were introduced in the introductory chapter of this study. Otenyo (2004:77-78) reveals the three waves as: (1) after the 1967 Arab-Israeli war; (2) after the 1979 Iranian revolution; (3) since 1991, mainly associated with *al-Qaeda* Central and its affiliates and the Palestinian Intifada. In the third wave since the 1990s, Islamist terrorist activity in Kenya was initiated by the 1998 US Embassy attack.[151] The current third wave of Islamist violent extremism represents the latest (violent) contestation of the constricted democratic space by Muslims as a marginalised, yet politically significant identity group, in Kenya. I should, however, qualify that Muslims in Kenya, even Islamists, are not a homogeneous identity group, as will be illustrated later in the current chapter.

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[149] The details of this summation are beyond the scope of this study. See Nyong'o (1989), Ajulu (2000), Branch and Cheeseman (2006), Murunga and Nasong'o (2006), Aronson (2013), and Mabera (2016).

[150] Again, refer to the following for further reading: Global Security (nd:a) Ringquist (2011), Whittaker (2012a, 2012b, 2015a, 2015b), Khalif and Oba (2013), Branch (2014), Njeri (2015), Mutunga (2012), The Standard (2017), Mueller (2008, 2014), Branch and Cheeseman (2009), Willis and Chome (2014), Otieno (2016).

[151] See later in this chapter in section 6.7 *Major Islamist terrorist activity in Kenya since the 1990s*, for an outline of the major Islamist terrorist activity in Kenya since the start of the third wave of Islamist violent extremism.

6.3.1.1 *Contesting the Constricted Democratic Space in Kenya*

The constricted democratic space in Kenya is contested by factionalised elites and politically significant identity alliances. Englebert and Dunn (2014:77-78) contend that not all forms of social identity, whether class, ethnicity, or religion, have political significance or function as a political coalition. This explains why, despite multiple ethnic groups in African states, only a minority of politically significant ethnic groups participate in African conflicts. Equally, Christianity and Islam are reflected in Africa's 'religious' conflicts because it is only these two religions that have political significance on the continent. This trend is reflected in Kenya. In Kenya, as is the case with the rest of Africa, class as social identity has negligible political significance. It is ethnicity and religion that have political significance. There are more than 40 ethnic groups in Kenya.[152] Nonetheless, as Posner (2004:856) and Englebert and Dunn (2014:66) point out, despite an 86 percent score on the Ethnic Diversity Index (EDI), Kenya scores only 57 percent on the Politically Relevant Ethnic Groups (PREG) Index. This means that despite the level of ethnic diversity, only a few ethnic groups have political significance and act as a collective political alliance. These include Kikuyu, Luo, Kalenjin, and ethnic-Somalis. In the case of religion, only Christianity and Islam have political significance, with Islam viewed as a marginalised minority religion. Therefore, differed ethnic and religious identities jostle for position in this constricted space in Kenya.

Englebert and Dunn (2014:92-106, 167) remind us that because of state fragility, which includes the inability and/or unwillingness to provide state functions, religion has a patent political role in Africa. The political role, however, is largely restricted to the provision of public goods that are otherwise to be provided by the state. These public goods include healthcare, education, infrastructure reconstruction, and security (during conflicts). A more direct political role includes being critical of opposed governments, instrumental in political mobilisation, lobbying for preferred public policies, and being part of the democratisation process. Religion, however, may be used and often is used to contest politics, and to compete for political power like any other political group (including political parties) or other actors (including the military). Religion has played all these roles in Kenya. Englebert and Dunn (2014:92) point out that since the 1990s, religious identity in Africa has become a motivating factor for political mobilisation and collective action. This trend is reflected in Kenya too. Occupying a marginal public space, whether real or perceived, Islam has become politicised, linking Muslim communities to Islamism. Religion often coincides with ethnicity. Hence, Islamism is linked not only with Muslims, but also ethnic-Somalis, making ethnic-Somalis a politically significant but marginalised, ethnic, religious, socio-economic, and political, minority. However, as indicated in section 6.2 *Kenya as a victim of external terror attacks*, Islamism also appeals to non-ethnic-Somalis and non-Muslims (who are rapidly converted to Islam), who find themselves on the margins of society in Kenya.

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[152] Different classifications of the ethnic groups exist. The 1969 census recorded 42 ethnic groups. The 2019 population census records more than 120 ethnic groups (see Balaton-Chrimes, 2021; KNBS, 2019a).

The constricted democratic space, defined by zero-sum politics and abusive structures of authority, is also contested by factionalised elites. Factionalised elitism in Kenya is perhaps best illustrated by the factional politics represented by the Kenyatta and Odinga families, and by extension their coethnics, the Kikuyu and Luo. In evidence, Raila Odinga has been accused of fermenting ethnic and religious tensions in Kenya, and he has repeatedly and opportunistically called for the withdrawal of Kenyan forces in Somalia.[153] Added, following the 1982 coup attempt against the government of Daniel arap Moi, Raila Odinga was arrested three times between 1982 and 1991 for his involvement in the coup, spending almost ten years in prison (Sawlani, 2018:The Internet). Later in the current chapter, section 6.7 *Major Islamist terrorist activity in Kenya since the 1990s*, I outline how following the 2014 Mpeketoni attack, while *al-Shabaab* claimed the attack, President Uhuru Kenyatta promptly blamed the attack on 'local political networks', which is widely believed to be directed at opposition leader Raila Odinga, his party the Coalition for Reforms and Democracy (CORD), and his coethnics, the Luo.

The generational Kenyatta-Odinga (Kikuyu-Luo) spat may be traced to the period immediately after independence in 1963. Muhula (2009:99-100) points out that it all started when "[t]he fallout between President Jomo Kenyatta and Vice-President Oginga Odinga in 1966, the assassination of prominent Luo politician Tom Mboya [in 1969] and the banning of [Oginga] Odinga's KPU [Kenya Peoples Union] and his detention [in 1969] consigned Nyanza province into a conflict with the Kenyatta regime …. The Kenyatta-Odinga hostility has continued to inform the political mistrust between the Nyanza provinces [Luo] and the Central province [Kikuyu]".[154] Recently, this generational spat was dramatically revealed with high levels of brinkmanship and gridlock in the six months following the 2017 presidential race between Jomo Kenyatta's and Oginga Odinga's sons, Uhuru Kenyatta and Raila Odinga.

In August 2017 Uhuru Kenyatta was declared the winner of the presidential race. Following Raila Odinga's approach of the Supreme Court, in an unprecedented judgment, not only in Kenya but in Africa, in September 2017, the court nullified the elections, forcing a rerun. With Raila Odinga boycotting the elections, citing remaining 'illegalities and irregularities' in the election process, Uhuru

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[153] Regarding factionalised leadership involving Muslims, see hereafter in this section, the 2007 memorandum of understanding between Raila Odinga and the National Muslim Leadership Forum (NAMLEF).

[154] The provinces have since been replaced by a county system, through which 47 counties were created from the eight provinces. See section 6.3.2 *Constitutional reforms and devolution*.

Kenyatta won the October rerun elections. In November 2017 Uhuru Kenyatta was inaugurated in his second term. Raila Odinga refused to recognise the October 2017 election results and in January 2018 held his own ‘inauguration’ in Nairobi as ‘the people’s President’, an act of high treason according to Githu Muigai, Kenya’s Attorney General. The resultant six months post elections communal violence between the supporters of Uhuru Kenyatta and Raila Odinga resulted in mass protests and according to the Kenya National Commission on Human Rights (KNCHR), 92 deaths. By March 2018, the two had made up following what is known as ‘the handshake’ in Kenya, and issued a joint communique in which they, notably, promised to work towards national reconciliation (Sawlani, 2018:The Internet; Ndiso, 2017:The Internet; Kenyatta and Odinga, 2018:1-8; Gathara, 2018:The Internet).

In the joint communique following ‘the handshake’, Kenyatta and Odinga (2018:1) acknowledge that ethnic hostility and divisive political competition between factionalised elites ‘have become a way of life’ in Kenya. Factionalised politics are also evidenced in relations with Kenyan Muslims. Before the 2018 ‘handshake’, just before the 2007 presidential race between Mwai Kibaki and Raila Odinga, on 29 August 2007, Raila Odinga signed the much-debated and controversial secret memorandum of understanding (MOU) with the National Muslim Leadership Forum (NAMLEF). At the time NAMLEF represented more than 50 Muslim organisations in Kenya. In return for mobilising Muslim support on his behalf, Raila Odinga promised NAMLEF that Kenya will be (MOU, 2007:1):

> a just, harmonious, peaceful and a prosperous nation based on good governance, constitutionalism and the rule of law, pro-poor policies, enhanced democratic space and where Kenyans effectively participate in shaping their destiny and the positive upliftment of the status and welfare of Muslims in Kenya and the correction of historical and structural injustices and marginalisation meted on the Muslim through deliberate policies and programmes.

In the MOU (2007:2) Raila Odinga further agreed to (1) ‘embrace NAMLEF as a partner of choice and advisor in government and on Muslim affairs’; (2) ‘set up the devolution of government’; (3) ‘initiate policies and programmes to redress the historical, current and structural marginalisation and injustices on Muslims in Kenya’; (4) ‘stop the renditioning of Kenyans to Somalia, Ethiopia and Guantanamo Bay’; (5) ‘accord northern Kenya, Coast Region, and other neglected areas budgetary priority for infrastructural development’; (6) ‘ensure equitable representation of Muslims in all public appointments’. In turn, NAMLEF agreed to mobilise the Muslim community against Mwai Kibaki, pointing out that “NAMLEF and the Muslim community in Kenya recognise the fact that President Mwai Kibaki’s government has meted out calculated, deliberate, unprecedented discrimination, intimidation, and harassment of sections of Kenyans, including the Muslims. NAMLEF and the Muslim community in Kenya desire to see an end to this" (MOU, 2007:1).

At the time another MOU, purported to be the authentic MOU, circulated in Kenya. Among other things, this second MOU reads: "WHEREAS The Candidate - who recognises Islam as the only true religion - is seeking to become the next President of the Republic of Kenya …. WHEREAS The Leaders recognise The Candidate as the only presidential candidate who has the interest of the Kenyan Muslim community at heart" (Second MOU, 2007:1). This Second MOU (2007:2) also makes provision for, among other things: (1) 'the political autonomy, apart from national defence and international accreditation, of Coast and North-eastern regions'; (2) 'the implementation of *Sharia* in Muslim declared regions'; (3) 'disbanding the anti-terror police unit (ATPU) and stopping the rendition of terror suspects'; (4) 'granting all Muslim residing in Kenya national identity cards'; (5) 'the popularisation of Islam, the only true religion, in Coast and North-eastern regions, by imposing *madrassa* classes in every primary school'; (6) 'imposing a total ban on open-air gospel crusades by worshippers of the cross in Coast and North-eastern regions'. Both Raila Odinga and NAMLEF denied this second MOU, denouncing it as a fake designed to sow divisions within Kenyan society.

Nevertheless, after Mwai Kibaki won the 2007 presidential race, and after the subsequent 2007/2008 post-elections violence, in the National Accord peace agreement based on power-sharing, the post of prime minister was created for Raila Odinga. In the 2013 presidential race, Raila Odinga lost to Uhuru Kenyatta. Ndzovu (2014a:139-140, 144-145) explains that throughout the time that Raila Odinga was prime minister, disillusioned with the Kenyan government, largely for their involvement in the war on terror, for Operation *Linda Nchi*, receiving support from Israel, and what was termed 'the continued victimisation and marginalisation of the Muslim community', NAMLEF decided to withdraw their support of Raila Odinga, vowing not to support any presidential candidate in future.

Muslims in Kenya are largely divided between (1) those that support reforms within the secular state, the constituency of organisations such as NAMLEF; and (2) those that support the creation of an Islamic state, who are linked to the Islamist movement and organisations such as *al-Shabaab*. This translates into intra-Muslim elite factionalism, with the Muslim elite divided between (1) 'moderates', seeking to represent Muslim interests within the secular state, and (2) 'extremists', seeking the creation on an Islamic state. 'Extremists' are divided between what Gerges (2009) calls (1) mainstream Islamists (espousing peaceful means), and (2) jihadis (espousing violent means), both connected by the desire and objective to create an Islamic state and enforce the *Sharia*. Within Islamist-jihadis, the observed terror group (*al-Shabaab* in this case), is a tip of a much larger, networked iceberg, both clandestine and overt. In fact, an inner core of what Lake (2002) calls concentric rings of radicalisation. These concentric rings of radicalisation, or in my conception, iceberg of radicalisation, include not only the terror group, but also sympathisers, moderates, and the public, whether Islamic or not, who may be converted to Islam, or radicalised into Islamism. 'Moderates' may then be converted to 'extremists'. Conversely, 'extremists' may be converted to 'moderates'. What all these groups have in common is the collective lived experience of state fragility, collective discontent with state fragility, collective mobilisation and action, and Islamism as a vector or medium against state fragility.[155]

In a preamble to a 2019 position paper by leaders of a consortium of 'moderate' Muslim organisations, including *Jamia* Mosque Committee (JMC), NAMLEF, and the Supreme Council of Kenyan Muslims (SUPKEM), titled *Kenya Muslim proposals on constitutional reform 2019: learning to consolidate and reconstruct our nation*, the challenges posed by the constricted democratic space as it affects the Muslim community in Kenya, are outlined as follows (Kenyan Muslim Leaders, 2019:6):

> We single out the daunting challenges facing majority of Kenyans including the Muslim community in governance, particularly low levels of integrity in leadership, systemic corruption, inequality, inequity, discrimination, marginalisation, and exclusion. The Muslim Community has borne disproportionate suffering from the ills of this misgovernance. The structural challenges facing the Muslim Community as citizens of this country, are those that are borne by other marginalised communities in Kenya, the challenges of inherent and inbuilt discriminatory policies and practices, deliberate post-independence marginalisation in development, deliberate colonial and post-colonial systems against Muslims and their institutions, deliberate policies to profile Muslim majority areas and Muslims as security risks and the challenge of exclusion from opportunities in government employment and appointments. These challenges remain over-arching for Muslims and need to inform any process of constitutional design, reforms, and implementation.

These historical grievances remain unmediated in Kenya, and the state continues in its failure to accommodate Muslim interests, as also reflected on the Fragile States Index. The index indicator C2: *factionalised elite*, with an average of 8.7 (out of 10.00) between 2005 and 2019, received the second worst score in Kenya. On the other hand, the indicator S1: *demographic pressures*, represented the worst fragility score in Kenya, with an average score of 8.8 (out of 10.00) in the period under review.[156]

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[155] The foregoing, including the divisions within Muslims in Kenya, are elaborated on and referenced in Chapter 4, section 4.2.1 *Conceptualising Islamist violent extremism*, and later in the current chapter in section 6.4 *The origins of Islamist violent extremism in Kenya*, and section 6.5.2 *The long-war in Kenya*.

[156] See Chapter 7, section 7.3 *State fragility and the development of Islamist violent extremism*.

Given the levels of brinkmanship and gridlock among the elite, religion and ethnic based identity alliances and counter-alliances, and the levels of group marginalisation and horizontal inequalities, as indicated above, these fragility scores are not surprising. A factionalised elite, and politically significant identities, indicate the low social cohesion that has fuelled Islamist violent extremism and other political conflicts, and has undermined nation-building, state-building, and CVE in Kenya.

In Chapter 3, section 3.4 *The criticism against the theory of state fragility*, I elaborate that after colonialism Africa faced a crisis in state-building and nation-building in two separate periods. The first period was directly after independence starting in the 1960s, and the second period occurred directly following the end of the Cold War period in the 1990s. These 1960s and 1990s crises in state-building and nation-building are also reflected in Kenya, demarcating two distinct periods of state fragility and conflict risk in Kenya. In the joint communique following 'the handshake' of 2018, Uhuru Kenyatta and Raila Odinga (2018:2) also lament that: "Kenya has come full circle [since the 1990s] and appears to be reliving the same divisive experiences the country underwent after 1963". The first period of state fragility (from the 1960s) produced the secessionist attempt in North-eastern and Eastern regions (during the *Shifta* war: 1963-1968) and calls for secession in Coast Region (intermittent since independence in 1963). The second period of state fragility (from the 1990s) produced new-wars, of which the long-war waged by Islamism, is one element. The two secessionist attempts and calls for secession, and current Islamist violent extremism, represent the three major contestations of the constricted democratic space by ethnic-Somalis and other Muslims in Kenya since independence in 1963. The 'Big Bang' of independence in 1963 released generative causal powers, explaining not only the roots of Islamist violent extremism in Kenya, but also the origins of the barriers to CVE in Kenya.

6.3.1.2 *Secession in North-Eastern and Eastern Regions*

After independence, North-eastern and Eastern regions of Kenya sought to secede from Kenya and be reincorporated into Somalia. The secessionist attempt, which turned into a civil war, later known as the *Shifta* war, included the three counties in North-eastern Region, viz.: Garissa, Wajir, and Mandera, and two counties in Eastern Region, viz.: Isiolo and Marsabit.[157] Whittaker (2015b:3-4) notes and I elaborate in Chapter 7, section 7.2.2 *Explaining Islamist terrorist activity in the arc of insecurity*, and Chapter 8, section 8.2.1 *Impediments to CVE in the arc of insecurity*, that these five counties, and a district called Moyale that has since been subsumed into Marsabit and Wajir counties, made up what used to be the six districts of the colonial Northern Frontier District (NDF). The former NFD in Kenya, together with the Ogaden in Ethiopia, were originally parts of Somalia's Jubaland. All were carved out by British colonialism. Following the violent repression of the secessionist attempt in the *Shifta* war, the Kenyan government securitised these regions and made no concerted effort to develop them. It is in this context of the underdevelopment and securitisation of the region that the Isiolo, Garissa, and Wagalla massacres, and later Operation *Usalama* Watch, targeting ethnic-Somalis and other Muslims, took place. The origins of the marginalisation of ethnic-Somalis may therefore be traced to the *Shifta* war in 1963. It is instructive in this regard to note how the Kenyan government and its security apparatus have historically dealt with ethnic-Somali and Muslim communities, starting in this region.

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[157] In addition to Marsabit and Isiolo, the post-1963 Eastern Region also includes modern-day Meru, Tharaka-Nithi, Embu, Kitui, Machakos, and Makueni, counties. The county system was introduced through the 2010 constitutional reforms and process of devolution. See section 6.3.2 *Constitutional reforms and devolution*.

To illustrate, the *manyatta* strategy, pursued during the *Shifta* war, was the forced settlement of ethnic-Somalis (and other frontier populations) into government villages that have been compared to 'concentration camps' and 'detention centres'. This strategy included the confiscation and killing of livestock to force ethnic-Somalis to relocate to *manyatta*, but this also enabled looting, both irreversibly decimated pastoral life and ushered in largescale destitution in these areas. *Manyatta* refers to a settlement or village. *Manyatta* was therefore a counter-insurgency villagisation, designed to separate frontier populations from '*shifta*'(i.e., the bandits), a pejorative reference to the NPPPP and its military wing the NFDLA. With a population of only 200, 000 in the NFD in 1963, between 2, 000 and 7, 000 people were killed during the course of the *Shifta* war, and more were internally displaced. It is during the war that the Isiolo massacre occurred, initiating the first of the massacres of ethnic-Somalis by state agents in Kenya. In 1968 in Isiolo, more than 2, 700 ethnic-Somalis were shot and killed in the course of enforcing the counter-insurgency *manyatta* strategy. In the 1980 Garissa massacre and the 1984 Wagalla massacre, over 3, 000 and 5, 000 ethnic-Somalis were respectively killed. In Garissa, Kenyan security forces were conducting a search and arrest criminal operation in a village called Bulla Kartasi. They detained the villagers in a local school, reportedly without food and water, leading to more than 3, 000 dead. In Wagalla, Wajir County, the security forces were there to quell communal conflict. Like Garissa, the security forces, also reportedly without food and water, detained over 5, 000 ethnic-Somalis at an airstrip just outside Wagalla, then shot and killed them.[158]

Classified as 'collective punishment' by Whittaker (2015:a), such indiscriminate repression and victimisation of ethnic-Somalis and other Muslims continue in Kenya with current CVE efforts as exemplified by the 2014 Operation *Usalama* Watch, which targeted over 4, 000 ethnic-Somalis and other Muslims. It is these histories and lived experiences of marginalisation, victimisation, and indiscriminate repression, imprinted in the collective memory of Muslims and ethic Somalis and their coethnics and coreligionists in East Africa and elsewhere, that fuel Islamism and Islamist terrorism in Kenya today. The so-called *Shifta* war that initiated these histories of violence between ethnic-Somalis and other Muslims, and their government in Kenya, was fought in the context of the 1960s and 1970s Somali irredentist movement that sought to create a 'Greater Somalia', i.e., reincorporating those regions that colonial boundaries had partitioned off to Somalia's neighbours, Kenya, Ethiopia, and Djibouti. The Greater Somalia movement led to: Somalia's strained relations with Kenya, Ethiopia, and Djibouti; the 1960s *Shifta* war in Kenya; the 1970s Ogaden war between Somalia and Ethiopia; strained relations between secessionist ethnic-Somalis in Eastern Ethiopia and North-eastern and Eastern Kenya, with their governments in Ethiopia and Kenya. In 1963 Kenya signed a mutual defence pact with Ethiopia in response to this irredentist movement. This mutual defence pact remains today.[159]

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[158] The details of the *Shifta* war and the Isiolo, Garissa, and Wagalla massacres, are beyond the scope of the study. The following are good scholarly works to consult: Global Security (nd:a), Ringquist (2011), Whittaker (2012a, 2012b, 2015a, 2015b), Anderson (2014a), Khalif and Oba (2013), Branch (2014), and Njeri (2015).

It is because of this 1963 Ethiopia-Kenya mutual defence pact, and Ethiopia's and Kenya's military incursions in Somalia, between 2006 and 2009 and between 2011 and 2012 respectively, and their participation in AMISOM (launched in 2007) in support of Somalia's government, which is considered an apostate government and Western puppet by *al-Shabaab*, that *al-Shabaab* accuses both Kenya and Ethiopia of interfering in internal Somalian politics, and of destabilising and exploiting Somalia. *Al-Shabaab* has consequently declared Kenya and Ethiopia as "the two governments which are the worst enemies of Somalia" (in Gaidi Mtaani (2012b:23). I revert to Kenya and Ethiopia's involvement in Somalia in the next chapter in section 7.3.5 *Cross cutting indicator*, to demonstrate how and why the state fragility indicator, X1: *external intervention*, serves as not only a permissive cause, but also as a driver, and as a contextual-exogenous condition, in explaining Islamist violent extremism, in Kenya.

6.3.1.3 *Secession in Coast Region*

The calls for secession in Coast Region, intermittent since 1963, represent the second major contestation of the constricted democratic space by Muslims in Kenya. Unlike the secessionist attempt of the NFD, this contestation has also encompassed Muslims, other than ethnic-Somalis. Let me qualify. Although secession in the former NFD is associated with ethnic-Somalis in Kenya and irredentism by the 'Greater Somalia' movement in Somalia, participation in the *Shifta* war was not limited to ethnic-Somalis. Whittaker (2015b:8) points out that, for example, between 10 and 20 percent of '*shifta*' were ethnic Boran and Rendille who had adopted Islam. In frontier communities such as those in the former NFD, and in the context of unequal competition for resources and unequal distribution of power and resources in the newly independent fragile state in Kenya, ethnicity and religion that went beyond just Somali identity, motivated aspirations and mobilisation for secession.

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[159] Again, the details are beyond the aim and objectives of the study. The following are relevant sources regarding the Greater Somalia movement, including the resultant *Shifta* and Ogaden wars: Global Security (nd:a), Ringquist (2011), Whittaker (2012a, 2012b, 2015a, 2015b), Anderson (2014a), Khalif and Oba (2013), Branch (2014), Njeri (2015), and Onyango-Obbo (2019). See also Chapter 7, section 7.3.5 *Cross-cutting indicator*.

Coast Region encompasses six counties in Kenya, viz.: Tana River, Lamu, Kilifi, Taita Taveta, Kwale and Mombasa. The region, dominated by Muslims, was not part of Kenya until independence in 1963 when the British ceded the region to the new Kenyan state. Unlike the rest of Kenya, the region has Portuguese and Arab heritage and was formerly ruled by the sultan of Zanzibar, all before British colonialism. Ngala Chome (2015:The Internet), a native of Mombasa, maintains that "[s]ince Kenyan independence, the Coast, as a cultural, religious and political entity, has been the Other, constructed as different from the rest of Kenya". Coast Region has more in common with the Middle East than with Kenya. This region, however, is also contested from within. It is contested between Muslims and Christians, and between Arabs, the native ethnic Mijikenda (mostly from Kwale and Kilifi counties) and ethnic-WaSwahili, as well as Luo and Kikuyu who migrated to the region since colonialism. The contestations in Coast Region also exist between Arab Muslims and non-Arab Muslims. British colonialism accorded Arab Muslims the status of 'overlords' of this region, leading African Muslims to seek common cause with African Christians post-independence. Muslims in this region are thus divided by both race and ethnicity (Ndzovu, 2010:5-6, 9-10, 13; Chome, 2015:The Internet).

Immediately after independence, a movement called the *Mwambao* United Front (MUF) demanded the independence of Coast Region. In recent times the original call for secession in the region by the *Mwambao* (the coastal strip) movement has been mostly taken up by the Mombasa Republican Council (MRC). Formed in 1999, the MRC, as was the case with the MUF, agitates for the region to be an independent state. The slogan of the MRC is *Pwani Si Kenya*, i.e., 'the Coast is not part of Kenya' (Ndzovu, 2010:9; Chome, 2015:The Internet; Patterson, 2015:18; Aluoka, 2016:35).[160] The MRC has thus far not been proven to use terrorism but has been subjected to various government banning orders and having its banking accounts frozen. Given these secessionist aspirations, Coast Region itself, like the former NFD, has been marginalised and securitised since independence (Blanchard, 2013:11; Botha, 2015:4). Furthermore, the Kenyan government accuses the MRC of having links with *al-Shabaab* and its Kenyan affiliate, *al-Hijra*. Formal links between these organisations remain unproven. But there are indications that *al-Shabaab* and *al-Hijra* have tried to infiltrate the MRC, and that with the lack of proven formal organisational collaboration, there are proven cases of individual members of the MRC that have trained in Somalia with *al-Shabaab* (ISSP, 2016:33-34). *Al-Shabaab* has also aligned itself with the objectives of the MRC. *Al-Shabaab*, for example, draws parallels with pre-2011 Sudan, stating that the US supported the secession of the Republic of South Sudan from Sudan, and asks the rhetorical question whether: "America [is] ready to finance MRC of Mombasa with cash and weapons so that they can be independent from Kenya?" (Gaidi Mtaani, 2012b:22).

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[160] In the current chapter in section 6.3.2 *Constitutional reforms and devolution*, I outline how the initial secessionist aspirations of Coast Region were abandoned based on the promise of local autonomy. At the third Lancaster conference in 1963 (one of the three conferences where Kenya's independence and constitutional framework was negotiated), it was decided that Kenya will have a federal system based on eight *majimbo*, i.e., administrative districts. The *majimbo* system was established with the Kenyan 1963 Constitution. Post-independence, however, the Kenyan government reversed the *majimbo* system, replacing federalism with a highly centralised unitary system. The post-independence constitutional framework also reversed safeguards for ethno-regional minorities. Ethnic and Muslim marginalisation became one of the hallmarks of the new administration. It is in this context that the calls for the secession of Coast Region were reignited. See also Chapter 7, section 7.2.2 *Explaining Islamist terrorist activity in the arc of insecurity*, outlining how the second Lancaster House conference in 1962 decided the issue of a referendum to determine the fate of the former NFD.

The former NFD and Coast Region are not only underrepresented, marginalised, and securitised, both regions being historically neglected by the central government in Nairobi, but as shown in Chapter 7, section 7.3.2 *Economic indicators*, and section 7.3.4 *Social indicators*, both regions also underperform disproportionately on a variety of socio-economic indicators. It is in these marginalised and securitised regions where, as a consequence, the indicators of state fragility are most evidenced and Islamist violent extremism is most virulent, thus explaining both the locus and focus of Islamist terrorism in Kenya. In fact, as shown in Chapter 7, section 7.2.1 *Islamist terrorist activity in the arc of insecurity*, of the total 47 counties in Kenya, except for Nairobi County as the centre of power, all Islamist terrorist incidents occur in only 11 counties in Kenya. All 11 of these counties are located in the former NFD and Coast Region. Besides Nairobi County, 92 percent of Kenya's Muslims are also concentrated in these 11 counties. The former NFD and Coast Region are therefore not only the locus of secessionism, but these two regions are also the locus of the third wave of Islamist violent extremism in Kenya.

6.3.1.4 *The Third Wave of Islamist Violent Extremism in Kenya*

Islamism represents the third and latest major contestations of the constricted democratic space by Muslims, and ethnic-Somalis, in Kenya. This contestation is largely waged through the long-war that

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In that referendum, 80 percent of the NFD voted to be reunited with Somalia. Both the British government and the new Kenyan state ignored the results of the referendum and the wishes of ethnic-Somalis in this region, igniting the *Shifta* war. These events, linked to the 'Big Bang' of independence in 1963, mark the origins of the relationship between state fragility, Islamist violent extremism, and CVE in Kenya, as outlined in this study.

is currently led by *al-Shabaab* since 2006.[161] In their goal of creating an Islamic state/emirate in Somalia and East Africa, *al-Shabaab* has sought to link their current struggle with two old conflicts which have pitted ethnic-Somalis and other Muslims against their government in Kenya, i.e., based on secession in the former NFD and Coast Region, as outlined above. According to the 2019 census, the total population of Kenya is 47.6 million, with Muslims being 5.2 million, they are 11 percent of the total population. Christians represent 85.5 percent of the population. The rest of the population are recorded as being either Hindu or, Traditionalists, or 'other religions', or being 'not religious', or their religion is 'not stated'. Ethnic-Somalis, being 2.8 million, represent 6 percent of the population and 54 percent of all Muslims. In addition to ethnic-Somalis, the ethnic makeup of other Muslims in Kenya includes ethnic-WaSwahili, Digo, Bajuni, Boran, and Rendille. It also includes Arabs and Asians (mostly from India and Pakistan). Muslims in Kenya are also divided between Shia and Sunni traditions, and between Sunni-Salafi and Sunni-Sufi traditions (KNBS, 2019a:1, 12, 422-423; Patterson, 2015:17; Ndzovu, 2014a:7, 90). In fact, according to Ndzovu (2012:46), the failure of Muslim formations in Kenya to form a united front and launch a sustained political opposition since independence is because of these divisions, including the resultant Muslim leadership squabbles. These divisions also include the wide schism between reformist Muslims who want to pursue Muslim interests within the secular state, and Islamist-jihadis who want to create an Islamic state and institute the *Sharia* in said state.[162]

In Chapter 3, section 3.3 *The state fragility-security-development nexus*, I elaborated on how the social legitimacy perspective regards the state as 'a political marketplace' that is defined by competing political ideas and political bargaining. From this perspective, Lemay-Hébert and Mathieu (2014:236) contend that if a state lacks the capacity to appeal to, and command, the loyalty of sections of society in such a marketplace, that state is fragile. Kenya, evidently, is failing to appeal to, and command, the loyalty of sections of its society in the political contest between itself and *al-Shabaab*, including *al-Shabaab*'s patron, *al-Qaeda* Central. It is in this context, defined by a crisis in state legitimacy, that Islamism is contesting the political space in Kenya. Although delegitimised because of its linkages with terrorism, and despite close linkages with religion, Islamism comprises of political organisations that compete for the 'hearts and minds' of society. Whatever the view that discourages the role of religion in politics, as represented by the secular state, religion can and often does contest politics and compete for popular support and political power, similar to any political organisation or other actors.

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[161] See section 6.6 *Islamist violent extremist groups and combat units in Kenya*, for a summation of the known Islamist violent extremist groups and combat units that have waged the long-war in Kenya since the 1990s.

[162] See also section 6.4 *The origins of Islamist violent extremism in Kenya*, regarding these divisions within the Muslim community in Kenya.

Because of the foregoing, including the constricted democratic space in Kenya, Islamism has gained traction, not only with Kenya's Muslims and ethnic-Somalis, but with other communities that find themselves on the peripheries of society in the fragile state. Given this constricted democratic space, with peaceful forms of dissent being stifled, and given the nature and extent of ethno-politics in Kenya and its related demographics, the electoral route is not a viable pathway in the search for security for ethnic-Somalis and Muslims, being only 6 and 11 percent of the population respectively. Added to this minority status, Mwakimako and Willis (2016:20) point out that there is the general belief among members of the Muslim community in Kenya that secularism and electoral democracy are 'un-Islamic'. As in politics in general, identity-politics plays a major role in elections in Kenya. Since independence, the state has been dominated and influenced by major ethnic groups, including Kikuyu, Luo, and Kalenjin. There is, however, no ethnic majority in Kenya, therefore election results do not reflect an ethnic census, but rather an ethnic-alliance census. While government performance does influence voter patterns, Kenyans predominantly vote for their coethnic or close ethnic-kin candidates and are more likely to rate government performance positively if the incumbent is their coethnic or close ethnic-kin. Electoral candidates also purposefully seek ethnic alliances. These ethnic or identity alliances are often instrumental, and not culturally determined. In fact, the alliances are often based on hegemonial exchange. This hegemonial exchange is also reflected with Muslim leaders in Kenya.[163]

Kenyan politics of patronage revolves around the ability of individual leaders "to act as interlocutors with government - delivering the support of 'their' community to the government in return for the ability to plead their case, and to channel resources to them" (Mwakimako and Willis, 2016:28). Falling short of liberal democracy, electoral democracy in Kenya facilitates patronage and dominance and has the unintended consequence of marginalising minorities, as is the case with Muslims. This electoral democracy has also not delivered on the dividends of democracy such as: inclusive, responsive, and accountable institutions; increased welfare and opportunity; shared growth; social justice; and broadly available and shared political goods. In Chapter 7, section 7.3 *State fragility and the development of Islamist violent extremism*, I demonstrate that the regions in Kenya that are dominated by ethnic-Somalis and other Muslims perform disproportionately poorly on a variety of development indexes, including on the Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI). For example, the MPI records a 63.14 percentage difference in the incidence of multidimensional poverty between ethnic-

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[163] See Englebert and Dunn (2014:207-211), Long and Gibson (2015), and Mwakimako and Willis (2016). Hegemonial exchange is a form of political representation and co-optation where the fragile state, otherwise unable to assert its hegemony, distributes patronage, goods, and services, in exchange for support, neutrality, or some form of compliance, from specific identity groups because of their political significance. See Donald Rothchild (1985, 1986) for an outline of hegemonial exchange. See Chapter 8, section 8.3.2 *Economic indicators and impediments to CVE*, for the dangers of hegemonial exchange in the context of the barriers to CVE in Kenya.

Somalis and ethnic-Kikuyu in Kenya. Whilst 79.27 percent of ethnic-Somalis in are multidimensionally poor, only 16.13 percent of ethnic-Kikuyu are multidimensionally poor.

The role of identity politics and patronage politics may also be revealed by the 2007 presidential elections. Ninety-four percent Kikuyu voted for their coethnic-candidate, Mwai Kibaki, and 87 percent Meru voted in support of their close ethnic-kin, Kikuyu. Ninety-eight percent Luo voted for their coethnic-candidate, Raila Odinga, and 88 percent Kalenjin voted in support of their close ethnic-kin, Luo. Furthermore, despite the rhetoric of cross-ethnic 'issue voting' in electoral campaigns, presidential candidates actively sought the 'Muslim vote', and promised to address 'historical Muslim grievances' (Houreld, 2008:The Internet; Long and Gibson, 2015:836; Mwakimako and Willis, 2016:28). In section 6.3.1.1 *Contesting the constricted democratic space in Kenya*, I elaborated on how NAMLEF, acting as Muslim intermediaries, endorsed Raila Odinga in the 2007 elections, pledging to mobilise the 'Muslim vote' in the promise of hegemonial exchange for this community. Because of the nature of Kenyan politics, both the MRC and *al-Shabaab* have discouraged Kenya's Muslims from participating in the electoral process. In the 2013 elections *al-Shabaab* called "upon the Muslims in Kenya to fully boycott the coming elections and not to be repeatedly deluded by the illusory promises of the government. Not only is the participation in the elections prohibited in Islam but … the current government has terribly failed to protect the rights of Muslims in Kenya" (Gaidi Mtaani, 2013a:5).

With the non-viability of the electoral route and other challenges, given the state fragility-induced insecurity dilemma, and the adoption of the Salafi-Wahhabi-jihadi ideology as a response (as outlined in Chapter 4), *jihad* has become a viable political option for ethnic-Somalis and Muslims as a marginalised ethno-religious identity in their search for ontological security, either in Kenya or through secession.[164] With this Islamist foothold since the 1990s, Kenya has been compelled to re-examine itself. Faced with various forms of recurrent violent political conflict and following the post-election violence of 2007/2008 that brought Kenya to the brink of a civil war, the Kenya National Dialogue and Reconciliation Committee (KNDRC) was created in 2008. This committee established varied institutions to deal with Kenya's past, including the 2008 Commission of Inquiry on Post-Election Violence (CIPEV), the 2008 National Accord that created a Government of National Unity (GNU) based on power-sharing, and the 2013 Truth, Justice, and Reconciliation Commission (TJRC). Kenya was finally forced to address the constricted democratic space and the continued brewing and eruption of diverse types of political conflict and violence, including new-wars and Islamist terrorism. These efforts to address Kenya's conflict dynamics and chequered past also include the process of constitutional review and reforms starting in 2008 (Asaala, 2010:380-382, 384-385, 396, 405).[165]

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[164] See section 6.5.2 *The long-war in Kenya*, and Chapter 8, section 8.3 *State fragility and the development of impediments to CVE*, for an outline of the insecurity dilemma and the search for ontological security by ethnic-Somalis and other Muslims. Added, with the adoption of the jihadi ideology, in the Muslim community in Kenya there are also reformists who believe that Muslim interests and security can be achieved within the secular state, as exemplified by NAMLEF's constituency. Mwakimako and Willis (2016:30) captures the sentiment of these reformists: "Muslim participation in the political process is a *dharura* (necessity). It is a case of the *maslaha* (benefits) overriding the *mafsada* (harm) …. Our participation aims at safeguarding the interests of Muslims".

Many of these efforts at addressing the constricted democratic space, conflict dynamics, and the constitutional framework in Kenya, have been undertaken in a haphazard and half-hearted manner and have consequently not yielded intended and lasting results. For example, Kenya is yet to repeal the Indemnity Act No. 5 of 1970 that inoculates the Kenyan government from legal proceeding and claims for compensation for gross violations of human rights committed during the *Shifta* war. The Act covers Garissa, Wajir, Mandera, Isiolo, Marsabit, Tana-River, and Lamu counties. The 2013 TJRC recommended that this Act be repealed, but this and other recommendations of the TJRC remain to be implemented. Such haphazard and half-hearted efforts have not only impacted on national reconciliation and social cohesion but have also generated impediments to CVE in Kenya.[166] Faced with challenges to state power and legitimacy, and consequently forced to finally re-examine itself, Kenya eventually made efforts to restructure the state through constitutional reforms and devolution.

6.3.2 Constitutional Reforms and Devolution

The constitutional framework that Kenya had at independence was gradually rolled back, leading to the constricted democratic space, the stifling of peaceful dissent, and various forms of violent political conflict, including attempted coups, electoral violence, and secessionist attempts, as outlined above. The 1963 Constitution established a federal system based on eight *majimbo* (administrative districts or regions), each with a regional assembly, president and vice-president, and a regional police force, as well as safeguards for ethno-regional minorities, including ethnic-Somalis and other Muslims as minorities. Acceded at the third Lancaster House conference in 1963, which negotiated Kenya's constitutional framework and independence, it is this *majimbo* system that led Coast Region to abandon their initial secessionist aspirations with the promise of local autonomy in the coastal

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[165] Conflict dynamics since 1963, and conflict between the post-election violence of 2007/2008 and the constitutional reforms of 2010 and beyond, are covered in various sections of this chapter in the context of this study. Many of these dynamics are however beyond the scope of this study. One place to start in unravelling these conflict dynamics, including the levels of conflict risk in the 47 counties, is the study by The Constitution and Reform Education Consortium (CRECO), titled *Building a culture of peace in Kenya* (2012). See Chapter 7, section 7.3.1 *Cohesion indicators*, regarding conflict risk in the 12 counties in the arc of insecurity in Kenya.

[166] See Chapter 8. In particular see section 8.2.1 *Impediments to CVE in the arc of insecurity*.

majimbo (see section 6.3.1.3 *Secession in Coast Region*). But the *majimbo* was to be short-lived. The 1964 Constitution replaced the federal system and *majimbo* with a unitary system, replaced the bicameral parliament with a unitary parliament, replaced the parliamentary system (with a president and a prime minister) with a presidential system that had an executive president who was the head of state and the head of government, and replaced the safeguards for human rights and civil liberties with a weak bill of rights. Furthermore, exclusion and marginalisation, including that of ethnic-Somalis and other Muslims, and thus greater insecurity, became the hallmark of post-independence Kenya (Chitere *et al*, 2006: 2, 12, 45; Ndzovu, 2010:13-14; Katumanga, 2013a:137-138, 140-141, 145-146).

The 1969 Constitution removed more safeguards for ethno-regional minorities and further centralised government. Key functions such as education and health were transferred from the eight regions to central government. Furthermore, whereas in 1969 Kenya officially became a *de facto* one-party state, the 1982 Constitutional amendment formally abolished multiparty electoral democracy, introducing a *de jure* one party state in Kenya that was to last until 1991. The ruling Kenya African National Union (KANU) resisted growing calls for constitutional reforms, and instead, violently repressed peaceful dissent. With the introduction of multiparty electoral democracy in 1991, the dominance of KANU ensured a win in the 1992 elections as well as the 1997 elections. This dominance ended when KANU finally lost in 2002 to the National Rainbow Coalition (NARC), ending almost four decades (since 1964), of *de facto* and *de jure* KANU-one-party-rule in Kenya. The end of KANU rule has, however, not ended authoritarian tendencies in Kenya (Chitere *et al*, 2006: 2-3; Asaala, 2010:380; Ndzovu, 2012:26).

The continued history of authoritarianism, centralisation, and insecurity in Kenya is indicated by the low levels of freedom and elevated levels of state terror within Kenyan society. In Chapter 8, section 8.3.3 *Political indicators and impediments to CVE*, I outline the Freedom House Index (FHI), with Kenya receiving an invariable score of *partly free* (3.0 - 5.0) since 2002. *Partly free* means that, although there is some respect and protection in major ways, human rights and civil liberties are *not* respected and protected in Kenya. In Chapter 8, section 8.3.1 *Cohesion indicators and impediments to CVE*, I also outline the Political Terror Scale (PTS), with Kenya receiving level three and level four scores since 1990. Level three indicates that state terrorism is ‘extensive’, and level four indicates state terrorism has ‘expanded to large sections of society that engage in politics’. Linked to the repression and control of society, both the FHI and the PTS offer a window into the history of violence (structural, direct, and cultural) between the state, and ethnic-Somalis and other Muslims. In Chapters 7 and 8, I demonstrate that these indexes aid in explaining the relationship between state fragility, Islamist violent extremism, and the failure of CVE. With the history of a highly constricted democratic space since independence, concrete actions to reform the state finally started after the 2007/2008 post-elections violence, leading up to the drafting and adoption of the 2010 Constitution, with devolution as a central principle.

6.3.2.1 *Devolution and the 2010 Constitutional Framework*

The principle of devolution that is intended to redress the historical regional marginalisation and inequitable development of ethno-regional minorities, is a centrepiece of the 2010 Constitution (Abdille, 2017:The Internet). The status of minorities and that of marginalised groups in Kenya are recognised in various parts of Kenya’s 2010 Constitution. The Constitution makes provision for equitable development, restitution, and affirmative action. It further includes ensuring participation and representation at the national and 47-counties levels, as well as ensuring special opportunities for, and access to education, employment, and other public goods. Articles 260 and 27(4) of the Constitution define a marginalised group as “a group of people who, because of laws or practices before, on, or after the effective date, were or are disadvantaged by discrimination … on any ground, including race …, ethnic or social origin …, religion, conscience, belief …, or birth”.[167] Before devolution Kenya was divided into eight regions, viz.: Central, Coast, Eastern, Nairobi, North-eastern, Nyanza, Rift Valley, and Western, regions. The 2010 constitutional framework replaced the eight regions with the 47 counties found in Kenya today. The county system came into effect in 2013.

Devolution, as encapsulated in the 2010 constitutional framework, is evidenced when one examines the Kenyan Constitution. Article 174 of the 2010 Constitution lists the following objectives of devolution: (1) ‘to promote democratic and accountable exercise of power’; (2) ‘to foster national unity by recognising diversity’; (3) ‘to give powers of self-governance to the people and enhance the participation of the people in the exercise of the powers of the State and in making decisions affecting them’; (4) ‘to recognise the right of communities to manage their own affairs and to further their development’; (5) ‘to protect and promote the interests and rights of minorities and marginalised communities’; (6) ‘to promote social and economic development and the provision of proximate, easily accessible services throughout Kenya'; (7) 'to ensure equitable sharing of national and local resources throughout Kenya'; (8) 'to facilitate the decentralisation of State organs, their functions and services, from the capital of Kenya'; (9) 'to enhance checks and balances and the separation of powers'. In its policy document on the matter, *Devolution without disruption: pathways to a successful new Kenya*, the World Bank (2012:iii, 4) also indicates that the 2010 constitutional framework was designed to achieve a "fair, efficient, transparent, and accountable [Kenya]", with devolution expected to ensure: (1) that previously centralised government spending will reach the local level; (2) a more equitable distribution of resources as well as social and economic opportunities between regions; (3) a more open, accountable, participatory, responsive, and less corrupt, government.

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[167] The provisions that deal with marginalised groups such as Muslims in Kenya are contained in various Articles of the 2010 Constitution, including: 10, 56, 100, 174, 204, and 260. Article 204 deals specifically with the Equalisation Fund that is designed to provide ‘equitable sharing of revenue’ within the 47-counties system of government, and importantly to provide for increased public services in Kenya’s marginalised regions such as North-eastern, Eastern, and Coast regions. The Constitution: Article 215, also makes provision for the establishment of the Commission on Revenue Allocation (CRA) which notably makes recommendations on matters of restitution, as part of national reconciliation, for marginalised communities, including recommendations on the allocation and disbursement of the Equalisation Fund in Kenya. See Chapter 7, section 7.3.4 *Social indicators*, for an outline of the social impact of the state-fragility generated marginalisation in Kenya, as well as an outline of the County Development Index (CDI) that was created by the CRA to measure development and marginalisation in Kenya.

To bring into effect the objectives of devolution, Article 176 of the 2010 Constitution establishes the 47 county governments, each with a governor with executive powers, and a county assembly with legislative powers. Furthermore, although Article 131 keeps the executive president, Article 142 restricts the president to two terms, and Article 93 reintroduces the national bicameral parliament, with a National Assembly and a Senate. The 2010 Constitution, therefore, represents a concerted effort to reverse the negative effects of the centralisation of the Kenyan state. This centralisation of the state was brought into effective starting with the provisions of the 1964 Constitution. The World Bank (2012:v, 5) points out that centralisation in Kenya produced the opposite of an inclusive state, resulting in spatially uneven and unfair distribution of resources, unequal access to public goods and services, and "large disparities of wealth and social outcomes between regions and communities". Despite these efforts at decentralisation, at more equitable distribution of resources, at the recognition of past injustices, and efforts at restitution and reparations, persistent challenges remain.

6.3.2.2 *Devolution and Persistent Challenges*

After the 2010 constitutional reforms, there are still challenges with democratisation and devolution, thus marginalisation and inequality. Whilst devolution brought services closer to the people, it also had the unintended consequence of deepening ethnic fault-lines and communal interests in the 47 counties, spurring communities to vote along ethnic lines, and exacerbating border disputes between counties, as well as community claims over land. Moreover, despite devolution, the state is still absent in many parts of peripheral Kenya (Abdille, 2017:The Internet). In the joint communique following 'the handshake' of 2018, Kenyatta and Odinga (2018:4-5) also highlight that

> [d]evolution has so far been the most successful story in the recent process of building a strong nation. Yet a lot remains to be done in enhancing its political viability and economic sustainability.

> Politically, devolution has led to exclusivity in counties where some local communities have found themselves isolated and excluded by the more populous ones creating marginalisation. Economically, the viability of counties is a matter of concern. It is imperative that the recent efforts by counties to coordinate their development plans in clusters defined by geography and economic sectors should be strongly encouraged both politically and practically.

Devolution, ultimately, has not resolved the insecurity dilemma, the fragility trap, and the conflict trap that persist in Kenya. In fact, devolution has led to the redrawing of battlelines in Kenya. The 47 counties, as the new administrative units, are now the new battlefields where communities jostle for power, where the struggle for access to public resources is waged, and where state fragility, insecurity, and political conflict, find expression. The World Bank (2012:5) notes that devolution advocates have always stressed the need for local rights, equity, participation, and accountability, all of which are seen as lacking in Kenya. I come back to these persistent challenges in Chapter 8, highlighting their linkages to impediments to CVE in Kenya. Next, I will address the origins of Islamist violent extremism in Kenya.

6.4 THE ORIGINS OF ISLAMIST VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN KENYA

Earlier in section 6.3.1 *Authoritarianism and centralisation*, I indicated that since independence the fragile state in Kenya has been largely defined by a restricted democratic space, patronage politics, hegemonial exchange, and ethno-politics. One of the outcomes is the marginalisation of ethno-religious minorities, including that of ethnic-Somalis and other Muslims. It is in this context of ontological insecurity that Islamism emerged in the 1990s. The origins of Islamism may be traced to the formation of the Islamic Party of Kenya (IPK) in 1992 (the IPK was dissolved in 1998). The formation of the IPK was influence by democratisation and the restoration of multi-party rule after more than three decades of *de facto* (1964-1982) and *de jure* (1982-1991) one-party rule. In fact, given the levels of government repression in the 1980s and early 1990s, religion (Christian and Muslim), was the only civil society sector that was tolerated in being critical of Kenya's government. Democratisation opened the space for renewed political bargaining, including that of the Islamist-jihadi ideology. Within formations that bargain for Muslims interests in Kenya are civil society organisations such as the National Union of Kenyan Muslims (NUKEM), established in 1968, the Supreme Council of Kenyan Muslims (SUPKEM), formed in 1973, the Council of Imams and Preachers of Kenya (CIPK), formed in 1997, and the National Muslim Leadership Forum (NAMLEF), founded in 2003. Before the 1990s SUPKEM was the only formation that was recognised by Kenya's government as representing Muslim interests. Less critical of government and very critical of Islamists, SUPKEM was accused by other Muslim formations in Kenya of being co-opted, and thus lost much legitimacy as an intermediary between Muslims and Kenya's government (Otenyo, 2004:78; Aronson, 2013:26; Ndzovu, 2012:26-27, 33-36, 43-46, 2014a:80-82, 84-86, 100-103, 2014b:10; Botha, 2014a:8; Chome, 2019a:10-13).

Unlike the foregoing civil society organisations, the IPK was organised as a political party that sought to win public office in Kenya. Then President Daniel arap Moi, accused the IPK of 'promoting Islamic fundamentalism'. The Kenyan government refused their registration. Denied of political participation and confronted with repressive government policies, the IPK went from a reformist political alliance, engaging in persuasion politics and seeking to represent Muslims interests in a secular state, to being more critical of government, engaging in pressure politics. With this constricted democratic space, there was a growing influence of Islamists within Muslim communities in Kenya, and within the IPK. It is these Islamist elements in the IPK that were supported by (then) Sudanese government under the National Islamic Front (NIF) (Otenyo, 2004:78; Aronson, 2013:26; Schmid, 2013:13-14; Ndzovu, 2012:26-28, 36-38, 2014a:86-88, 92, 2018a:360). After NIF took power in Sudan in 1989, they Islamised Sudan, and providing support and safe haven for varied organisations within the Islamist movement, the IPK and *al-Qaeda* included. Whereas *al-Qaeda* was formed in 1988 in Afghanistan, it is in Sudan where, Osama bin Laden, protected by the NIF government between 1991 and 1996, created the groundwork for *al-Qaeda* before resettling in Afghanistan in the middle of 1996. The 'Arabisation' and Islamisation of Sudan after 1989 led to a civil war with the southern 'Christian-African' region. With the end of the civil war and following a referendum, this region seceded in 2011 as the Republic of South Sudan (Otenyo, 2004:78; Carter, 2012:68-69; Salomon, 2014:447-448, 458).

Reverting to the case of the IPK, denied of political participation and peaceful dissent and not allowed to register as a political party, the IPK transformed from pressure politics to engaging in violent politics. The politicisation of Islam in Kenya intensified hereafter, and so was the ascendency of Islamists within Muslim opposition formations in Kenya, including within the IPK. The IPK increasingly established links with the transnational Islamist movement. It was IPK activists that helped *al-Qaeda* set up its East Africa cell in Kenya and Somalia, viz., East Africa *al-Qaeda* (EAAQ), during the 1990s, leading to the 1998 US Embassy attack in Nairobi and the 2002 Mombasa attacks (Otenyo, 2004:78; Ndzovu, 2012:36-42; Schmid, 2013:13-14; Patterson, 2015:18; Van Metre, 2016:6). Members of *al-Qaeda* have been embedded in Kenyan society since the early 1990s. Since then, Islamism, and to some extent Islam itself, has been framed as a threat in Kenyan politics (Botha, 2013:28; Aronson, 2013:26).

Reflecting on the Kenyan state's stance against Islamism, and supposedly against Islam, *al-Shabaab* asserts that "Kenya has been at the frontline in fighting against Islam and Muslims for decades. Islam is the ONLY Religion that has faced every kind of Persecution from the Government and its agents simply because of its Faith" (Gaidi Mtaani, 2012b:21). Following 9/11, Kenya's participation in the 'global war on terror' (GWOT) as an 'anchor state', also brought the government in direct conflict with its Muslim population. When Muslims demonstrated against GWOT for targeting Muslims, the Moi government in turn accused Kenya's Muslims of being unsympathetic to Islamist terror victims, and perhaps being unpatriotic as well. President Moi asked Kenya's Muslims: "Why didn't the Kenya Muslims march when Nairobi was bombed by terrorists in August 1998?" (Katumanga, 2008:414).

Besides reactions by actors such as the IPK and the Islamist movement to the fragile state's policies and actions, the origins of Islamist violent extremism in Kenya may also be traced to the influence of specific factors and specific Islamist ideologues. Ndzovu (2017a:163, 2018a:362) identifies three of these factors: (1) the emergence of the Salafi *Ansari Sunnah* community in Kenya (addressed below); (2) Kenyan Muslims that studied in the Middle East (particularly in Saudi Arabia), who embraced and imported the Salafi-Wahhabi doctrine to Kenya; (3) the influence of the war in neighbouring Somalia, including the influence of *al-Shabaab*. In the case of Islamist ideologues, as noted in Chapter 4, section 4.2.2 *Islamist violent extremism as ideology and movement*, Islamist ideologues such as Mohammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab (1703-1792), Sayyid Qutb (1906-1966), and Muhammad Abd al-Salam Faraj (1954-1982), played pivotal roles in the development and influence of Islamist violent extremism and in many of the central tenets of this ideology and movement. Islamist violent extremism in Kenya may also be traced to the influence of specific ideologues in Kenya. Said Islamist ideologues include Abdul Aziz Rimo, Aboud Rogo, and Abubaker Shariff Ahmed. These Kenyan Islamist ideologues have had a big impact on the linkages between the transnational lslamist movement and transnational Islamist ideas, including the Salafi-Wahhabi-jihadi ideology, and the Islamist context in Kenya and East Africa.

The Salafi-Wahhabi-jihadi ideology emerged in the 1980s in Kenya, and was associated with various Islamist ideologues, mostly Abdul Aziz Rimo (1949-2015). Abdul Aziz Rimo studied at the Islamic University of Medina in Saudi Arabia in the 1970s, which formed many of his Salafi-Wahhabi ideas. Abdul Aziz Rimo, critical of the Daniel arap-Moi Administration, in the late 1980s and early 1990s he was imprisoned for six years for his political activism and opposition to the leadership and government of arap-Moi. Abdul Aziz Rimo and his *Ansari Sunnah* movement advocated for a return to 'pure' Islam, framed Muslim grievances along religious lines, and proposed Islam as the solution to the political challenges faced by Muslims in Kenya. Abdul Aziz Rimo also advocated for Muslims in Kenya to 'withdraw from the infidel state', denounced 'apostates' who had 'deviated from the true faith', and called for Muslims to support the IPK. By the time of Abdul Aziz Rimo's death in 2015, he had for years withdrawn from public life, forming the *Ansari Sunnah* community in Kwale County, secluded and insulated from the wider Kenyan 'un-Islamic' society. Like Abdul Aziz Rimo, who hailed from Kwale County in Coast Region, the next leading Islamist ideologues in Kenya, Aboud Rogo (1968-2012), and Abubaker Shariff Ahmed (1961-2014), also came from Coast Region, viz., from Lamu and Mombasa counties respectively (Ndzovu, 2018a:360-364, 2018b:The Internet; Chome 2019a:9-10, 18, 20-21).

An IPK activist and a student of Abdul Aziz Rimo, Aboud Rogo advocated for the creation of an Islamic state in Kenya, and counselled *jihad* (i.e., armed struggle) as the way to achieve this. Aboud Rogo argued that *jihad* was the collective responsibility and obligation of every Muslim. Aboud Rogo dissuaded Kenya's Muslims from participating in the political process, including elections, or even seeking government employment, arguing that this was 'un-Islamic' and hindered the objective of creating a global Caliphate. Aboud Rogo also defended attacks against Christians and non-Muslims as justified because of the history of marginalisation and oppression of Kenyan Muslims. In his sermons, Aboud Rogo also preached against Western dominance, 'Western education', infidels, apostates, and those supporting the 'war on terror'. He expressed support for the killing of Muslim government officials, whom he deemed to have 'betrayed' the Muslim faith. Aboud Rogo also called for Kenya's Muslims to either fight to topple the Kenyan state, or to make *hijra*, that is, to 'immigrate' to Muslim states, and to support *al-Shabaab* and their mission of 'liberating Muslim lands occupied by infidels'. Rogo was charged, and because of lack of evidence, was acquitted, for the 2002 Mombasa attacks (Ndzovu, 2014b:7-10, 2017b:9-10, 2018a:364-365, 368, 2018b:The Internet; Chome 2019a:18).[168]

After Aboud Rogo, Abubaker Shariff Ahmed, popularly known as Makaburi (i.e., 'graveyard'), was another influential Islamist ideologue in Kenya. Long-time friends with Aboud Rogo, Makaburi reportedly recruited for *al-Shabaab*, including recruiting British nationals such as Samantha Lewthwaite. Defending the 2013 Westgate attack as retaliation for Kenya's incursion in Somalia with Operation *Linda Nchi* (2011-2012), Makaburi was adamant that "Islamically it is justified. We cannot allow foreign forces entering Muslim countries, killing innocent Muslim people and then it goes unpunished" (Crossley, 2014:The Internet). Makaburi also argued that Kenyan Muslims have no other recourse but to respond with violence against the violence they regularly face from the Kenyan state: "There is no law here. We are in the jungle …. We cannot see our fellow Muslims being slaughtered in front of their children and wives and not do anything. We are the ones being terrorised here …. Mombasa youths are looking for guns. It was nothing, then knives, and now it's guns" (Crossley, 2014:The Internet). Makaburi also insisted: "[I]n the Islamic *Sharia* we have revenge. The Kenya army is doing the same thing to people in Somalia. They are killing innocent civilians in Somalia …. The Quran is very clear in this. It says in revenge there is life. If you don't revenge … [the Kenyan army] will continue killing" (Ndzovu, 2017b:14). Makaburi also highlighted ineffective and counter-productive CVE and its role in radicalising Muslims, stating the following: "I am the one who is accused of radicalising when it's the police who are radicalising the Muslim youth by killing us" (Kiser, 2014:The Internet).

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[168] *Hijra* is a major theme and one of the biggest contentions within the Islamist movement as noted in Chapter 4, section 4.2.4 *Inconsistencies and irreconcilables within Islamist violent extremism*. Among the questions I posed then are: Can Muslims live in a secular state without undermining Islam? Is *hijra* from secular states to Islamic states an obligation for every Muslim? From Abdul Aziz Rimo's counsel for Kenyan Muslims to insulate themselves from the wider Kenyan 'un-Islamic' society, and Aboud Rogo's advocacy for Kenyan Muslims to make *hijra* to Somalia and other Muslim states, *hijra* is also a major theme among Islamists in Kenya.

Because of their public sermons and allegations of recruiting for *al-Shabaab*, Aboud Rogo and Abubaker Shariff Ahmed were charged with terrorism in 2010. After years of failed prosecutions on terrorism charges, Rogo and Ahmed were both killed in what is reported to be the Kenyan government's 'elimination programme', i.e., extrajudicial killings, carried out by state agents. Aboud Rogo was killed in 2012, sparking days of rioting and violence in Kenya, including the burning of several Christian churches. Abubaker Shariff Ahmed was killed in 2014. Both killings are linked with the Rapid Response Team (RRT), a formation within the paramilitary police, the General Service Unit (GSU). The GSU is part of Kenya's National Police Service (NPS). The RRT specialises in 'kill or capture' of high value targets operations and is reportedly trained by the US and UK intelligence services (the CIA and MI6). The RRT is accused of participating in renditions and extrajudicial killings of terror suspects (Crossley, 2014:The Internet; Ndzovu, 2018a:367-368; Shabibi, 2020a:The Internet, 2020b:The Internet).[169]

Taking stock of Islamism in Kenya, Amble and Meleagrou-Hitchens (2014:524) contend that "*jihadis* have found a surprisingly fertile recruiting ground … not confined to the minority Somali population … [but also among] … majority ethnic groups". *Al-Shabaab*'s appeal rests on casting itself as a pan-Muslim protector, embracing all Muslims, pledging to keep up attacks "until all Muslim lands are liberated from Kenyan occupation" (Warner, 2015:The Internet). This contrasts with the sectarian approach *al-Shabaab* follows in Somalia, viz., that "[a]nyone who does not subscribe to the Salafi doctrine is branded as an apostate" (Warner, 2015:The Internet). *Al-Shabaab*'s appeal to non-ethnic-Somalis and non-Muslims is by exploiting the state fragility-induced popular discontent in Kenya that is largely linked to state corruption and "offering money, weapons training and a quick conversion to Islam" (Warner, 2015:The Internet). The forgoing would make *al-Shabaab* a Salafi-Wahhabi-jihadi-takfiri organisation that speaks for the disenfranchised. *Al-Qaeda* (*al-Shabaab*'s patron) leader, Osama bin Laden, asserted that Islamism is a response to “severe oppression, suffering, excessive inequity, humiliation, and poverty” (in Pape, 2005:54). Later in section 6.5.2 *The long-war in Kenya*, I demonstrate how *al-Shabaab* also has irredentist, nationalist, and internationalist attributes.

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[169] See later in section 6.9 *Countering Islamist violent extremism in Kenya*, where I address Kenya's CVE architecture, including the role of the Anti-terrorism Police Unit (ATPU) and the Rapid Response Team (RRT).

6.5 NEW-WARS AND THE LONG-WAR

Kenya is at war. But this is a ‘war among the people’ as outlined in Chapter 5, section 5.2 *The origins of CVE: counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism*. If the notion that Kenya is a victim of external terror attacks were to stand up against empirical evidence, then there might be a case to argue that the war in Kenya is not an internal war. This is not the case. In section 6.2 *Kenya as a victim of external terror attacks*, I demonstrated the fundamental flaw of the notion of Kenya as a victim of external terror. The roots and drivers of the war in Kenya are found in the local setting and conditions in Kenya. Kenya is facing varied permutations of new-wars, and particularly one type of new-wars, viz., the long-war.

6.5.1 New-Wars in Kenya

In Chapter 1, section 1.8.1 *Key concepts*, I highlighted that Mary Kaldor (2012, 2013) characterises new-wars as being intra-state, more pernicious, more intractable, involving more non-state actors, and much more dominated by identity, than other types of violent conflicts before. Kaldor (2012:7) argues that “new-wars occur in situations in which state revenues decline because of the decline of the economy as well as the spread of criminality, corruption and inefficiency, violence is increasingly privatised both as a result of growing organised crime and the emergence of paramilitary groups, and political legitimacy is disappearing”. New-wars have a logic and character different from ‘old-wars’. Kaldor (2013:2) explains that “whereas old wars tended to extremes as each side tried to win, new-wars tend to spread and to persist or recur as each side gains in political or economic ways from violence itself rather than winning”. Therefore, instead of it being ‘a contest of wills’, war becomes ‘a mutual enterprise’ (Kaldor, 2013:2). Kaldor (2013:2) further explains that “[w]hereas old wars were associated with state-building, new-wars are the opposite; they tend to contribute to the dismantling of the state” in a world where “the distinction between state and non-state, public and private, external and internal, economic and political, and even war and peace are breaking down”.[170]

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[170] In response to the many critics of the new-wars paradigm, Kaldor (2013:1) explains that new-wars are not an empirical attempt to define contemporary wars as different from wars before the 1990s. In concert, Williams (2014:84) asserts that new-wars does not claim that contemporary violent conflict has no historical parallels or antecedents. Kaldor (2013:1) and Williams (2014:84) explain that new-wars is an approach, an ‘integrative framework for analysis’ that explains the logic of contemporary war. Kaldor (2013:4-5, 3) maintains that “the

The above attributes of new-wars are all evidenced in Kenya. Kenya is facing varied permutations of new-wars, including: (1) communal violence involving various ethnic groups (linked to land ownership, land use, and elections); (2) organised militias (often organised along ethnic lines); (3) banditry and criminal activity.[171] But new-wars as such are beyond the scope of this study. One type of the new-wars, the long-war, is the focus of this study. It is to the long-war that the discussion now turns.

6.5.2 The Long-War in Kenya

In Chapter 1, section 1.2 *Problem formulation*, I highlighted that after considering what future wars will look like, Shabtai (2016:316-317) finds that the struggle by Islamist violent extremism represents one aspect of what future wars will look like, that is, long confrontations characterised by strategic attrition. Hence, the characterisation of this struggle as 'the long-war' or 'the forever-war'. The fuel of such conflicts are the fault-lines between the state and identity groups within its population, and among identity groups themselves. The long-war in Kenya is thus firmly and deeply embedded in identity politics. Identity politics in this context takes the form of the assertion of identity to counter

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adjective 'new' does not have to do with any particular feature of contemporary conflicts nor how well it resembles our assumptions about reality, but rather it has to do with a model of war, … an idea of war".

[171] To illustrate these new-wars in Kenya, Kimenyi and Ndung'u (2005) outline communal conflict in Kenya since the 1990s involving various ethnic groups. Mwangi (2006) relates communal conflict and cattle-rustling in 2005 between Borana and Gabra in Marsabit County, as having led to what is known as the Turbi massacre. Triche (2014) relates recurrent communal violence between Turkana and Pokot communities in north-western Kenya, fought primarily over cattle rustling. Similarly, Debelo (2016) outlines intermittent communal violence in northern and north-eastern Kenya between Borana, Gabra, and Garri communities, mostly in the areas surrounding the border town of Moyale, fought primarily over access to grazing land, water sources, and cattle rustling. The Borana, Gabra, and Garri communities live on both sides of the border between Kenya and Ethiopia (another example of arbitrary colonial borders). Abdille (2017) relates recurrent communal violence linked to electoral competition between the majority Borana community and other minority ethnic groups, including Rendille, Gabra, and Burji, in northern Kenya, around Marsabit. In Isiolo, this communal conflict plays out between Borana and other minority ethnic groups, including Turkana, Meru, Samburu, and ethnic-Somali communities. The other type of new-wars in Kenya involves organised militias that many of these communities maintain because of the *de facto* absence of the state in the hinterlands of Kenya. Abdille (2017) relates various attacks by these ethnic militias in northern Kenya. These areas are awash with small arms. Katumanga (2013a:148-149) and Aluoka (2016:35) outline that the gravest 'ethnic' insurrection ever experienced in Kenya was when members of the Sabaot ethnic group rallied militant support against land expropriation. The group formed the Sabaot Land Defense Forces (SLDF) and took control of the Mt. Elgon areas adjacent to Kenya's border with Uganda in the 2006/2007 period, reportedly killing over 700 people, with over 120 people declared lost. Lafargue and Katumanga (2008) provide an outline of these organised ethnic militias during the 2007/2008 post-election violence in Kenya, and include the role of *Mungiki*, a Kikuyu militia that is tied to the governing elite in Kenya. The other type of new-wars in Kenya is widespread banditry and criminal activity. Blanchard (2013:12-13) outlines poaching and trade in illegal ivory in particular. This is where the political space and the criminal space intersect in and between Kenya and Somalia. In Chapter 8, section 8.3.5 *Cross-cutting indicator and impediments to CVE*, I outline that in 2010 it was estimated that up to 40 percent of *al-Shabaab*'s costs were funded by the ivory trade, in addition to illicit trading in other commodities such as charcoal and sugar. All these elicit activities are facilitated by corruption on both sides of the Kenya-Somalia border.

collective marginalisation, punishment, and insecurity by ethnic-Somalis and other Muslims in Kenya, and also by other identity groups that find themselves on the margins of society. Searching for ontological security, these identity groups on the margins of society, are amenable to radicalisation into Islamist violent extremism. This search for ontological security is the consequence of poor performance, in terms of both underperformance and misperformance, by the fragile state in Kenya, a prevailing condition ignited by the 'Big Bang' of independence in 1963 and sustained thereafter.[172]

The search for ontological security may create 'fighting identities'. Rich (2021:3) explains that with a fighting identity, "[r]ather than being perceived as exceptional circumstances, conflict, violence, struggle and even war can instead become seen as the necessary condition in which one's identity flourishes". In the context of *jihad* and symbolic violence, Sayyid Qutb and Franz Fanon characterise this fighting identity as 'a path to self-realisation and purification' and as 'cleansing, liberating, and empowering' (Gerges, 2009:4-6; Fanon, 2017:113, 106). In this regard, Kenya reflects a global trend. In Chapter 4, section 4.2. *Islamist violent extremism*, I elaborated that 'new terrorism' (since the 1990s) is driven by religious and ethnic identity (i.e., identity politics), whereas 'old terrorism' (1970s and 1980s) was driven by political ideology and geopolitical interests. Added to the account of the long-war as a war of attrition that is rooted in identity politics, one may also discern further attributes of the long-war, including: intention and objectives, the use of terrorism within the ambit of political bargaining, associated grievances, the use of terrorism as a communication strategy, and threat perceptions as linked to the long-war. Next, I address each of these attributes in the context of Kenya.

What are the intention and objectives of the long-war in Kenya? Cilliers (2015a:20-21, 23) and Borárosová *et al* (2017:126) assert that *al-Shabaab*, from its founding, has had a religious-nationalist orientation, with the following objectives: to establish a Somali Islamic state; to enforce the *Sharia*; and to rid Somalia of foreign influences. *Al-Shabaab*, however, also has irredentist aspirations, aligning itself with, and reigniting, the objectives of the irredentist movement of the 1960s and 1970s that sought to reunite all Somalis into a 'Greater Somalia' state, once divided by colonialism. Today, ethnic-Somalis are dispersed between Somalia, Kenya, Ethiopia, and Djibouti, and there are also significant numbers in Tanzania and Uganda. When *al-Shabaab* became a formal *al-Qaeda* affiliate in 2012, this affiliation linked *al-Shabaab* with the 'global' transnationalist-jihadi movement, transforming *al-*

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[172] Distinguished from physical security, ontological security is often derived from religion and (ethnic) nationalism, and is employed in the context of the individual, the community, and/or the state. Anthony Giddens (1984:75, 1990:124-125) defines ontological security as 'confidence or trust' (mostly in the future) and 'a sense of continuity and order'. Mitzen (2006:344) defines ontological security as 'the security of the self', and Kinnvall (2004:746) defines ontological security as 'the security of being' or 'a sense of confidence and trust'.

Shabaab into a transnationalist jihadi group. *Al-Shabaab* therefore also seeks to unite all Muslims and liberate Muslim lands (from secular or Christian rule and influence) in East Africa, and further afield.

Based on the irredentist, nationalist, and transnationalist Islamist objectives of *al-Shabaab*, four short-term and long-term objectives of Islamist violent extremism in Kenya, and by extension Somalia and East Africa, are conceivable and may be outlined: (1) to create conditions for the negotiation of a new social contract (a) between Muslims and the Kenyan state, or more narrowly (b) for ethnic-Somalis in Kenya; (2) to rid Somalia of external intervention and influence by (a) curbing and removing Kenya's (and all foreign) intervention in Somalia, or more narrowly (b) forcing the withdrawal of Kenyan forces (and AMISOM) from Somalia; (3) to create an Islamic state in Kenya, or more narrowly to secede parts of Coast, Eastern, and North-eastern regions of Kenya, and incorporate these regions into an Islamic state in Somalia; (4) more expansively to undermine Kenya as a proxy of the West, including derogating Kenya's economy and security apparatus, as part of efforts to achieve a Caliphate in East Africa, or an even more grander plan, as part of efforts to achieve a 'global' Caliphate.[173]

Al-Shabaab are often categorised as 'extremist-terrorist-criminals'. Such classification is unhelpful. Despite its variable grammar, terrorism is at its core about political bargaining. The failure to concede this has been one of the biggest limitations of traditional terrorism studies. Contrary to the tenets of tradition terrorism studies, and congruent with the tenets of critical terrorism studies, Schmid (2013:13-14) asserts that political action ranges from persuasion politics and, pressure politics, to violent politics. Persuasion politics occurs within the rule of law and the context of constitutionalism. Pressure politics is about government repression or applying pressure to an otherwise unresponsive government. Violent politics is about the violent suppression of challenges to the status quo, or the use of violence to challenge state power. Violent politics is therefore the failure of persuasion politics and pressure politics. Given Alex Schmid's (2013) analysis, one may attest that while terrorism may be shocking, and arguably, in all the world, morally reprehensible, it cannot be extricated from its political context. Terrorism by non-state actors should therefore not be any more shocking or any more morally reprehensible than state terrorism, including state terrorism by fragile states that subject their societies to 'unjust social orders', 'historical injustices', and structural, physical, and cultural violence.

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[173] See also Chapter 4, section 4.2.1 *Conceptualising Islamist violent extremism*, and section 4.2.3 *The intention and objectives of Islamist violent extremism*. How committed is *al-Shabaab* to the 'global' jihadi objectives, as opposed to the nationalist and irredentist objectives? Is this alignment with the 'global' jihadi movement merely instrumental, employed to attract fellowship, support, funding, and recruits? Is this alignment based on a deep, immovable, ideological belief? The answers to these questions remain indemonstrable and/or tentative.

Nonetheless, given the four short-term and long-term political objectives of Islamist violent extremism in Kenya as proposed above, the question is begged: How do these objectives align with the stated objectives of *al-Shabaab*? Linked to this question, if *al-Shabaab* has stated goals and objectives, has *al-Shabaab* been effective in communicating its motivation, objectives, and resolve to the Kenyan government? If that is the case, how has the Kenyan government received such communication? Does the Kenyan government believe the motivation, objectives, and resolve of *al-Shabaab*? In Chapter 4, section 4.2.1 *Conceptualising Islamist violent extremism*, I posed the question of whether *al-Shabaab*'s use of terrorism has effectively aggregated, articulated, and communicated its grievances, intention, and objectives to the Kenyan government. Linked to this, there is also the question of whether *al-Shabaab*'s targeting of Kenya is motivated by, and limited to, Kenya's policies and related perceived injustices, or whether its targeting of Kenya is motivated by an unlimited and uncompromising 'hatred' and discontent for the very existence of Kenya? If Kenya is in the crosshairs of *al-Shabaab* solely as a response to Kenya's 'unjust' policies, this will objectively constitute negotiable grievances. If Kenya is in the crosshairs of *al-Shabaab* based on an unlimited and uncompromising discontent for the very existence of the Kenyan state, this will constitute an uncompromising and non-negotiable position, particularly from the perspective of the Kenyan state. Let me present answers to the above questions.

Much of the answers to these questions may be assembled from the empirical evidence derived from communication from both *al-Shabaab* and the Kenyan government. With regards to *al-Shabaab*, my content analysis of the nine issues of *Gaidi Mtaani* (2012-2017) reveals *al-Shabaab*'s list of grievances and reasons for terror attacks in Kenya, including: (1) the Crusader (i.e., Kenya) occupation of Muslim lands; (2) the humiliation and historical massacres of Muslims; (3) the plundering of Muslim resources and the failure to protect the rights of Muslims; (4) Kenya's crusade, i.e., aggression towards, and persecution of, Muslims and Islam, including harassment, torture, renditions, and extra-judicial killings; (5) revenge for the killing of Imams and other Muslim leaders, and for the killing of Muslim women and children; (6) the liberating effect of violence for oppressed Muslims; (7) Kenya's exploitation and destabilisation of Somalia, including training and arming Somalian militias against Islamic Courts Union (ICU) and *al-Shabaab*; (8) Kenya's complicity in the defeat and compromise of the ICU; (9) Kenya as a proxy of the West and Kenya's participation in the global war on terror; (10) Kenya's military involvement in Somalia since Operation *Linda Nchi* (2011-2012) and in AMISOM.[174]

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[174] Launched in 2012, *Gaidi Mtaani*, i.e., On Terrorism Street, is an *al-Shabaab* publication. With the latest edition (Issue 9, September 2017), there are nine issues of this publication. The nine issues are referenced at various parts of this study. *Gaidi Mtaani* is published on various sites, including *Jihadology*: https://jihadology.net/. *Gaidi Mtaani* uses English and Kiswahili (not the Somali language), which may indicate *al-Shabaab*'s intentions to extend itself beyond not just Somalia and Kenya, but indeed to the rest of East Africa. Collectively, in the nine editions of the publication, Kenya is mentioned 482 times, compared to only 266 for Somalia. On the cover of

Of these grievances and displeasure with Kenya, which is the defining issue? What would make *al-Shabaab* stop its campaign in Kenya? What is the intention? What is the end-state? Has *al-Shabaab* been unable to aggregate and articulate their grievance and intention in Kenya? Is this a failure to articulate the intention and objectives clearly and coherently, or is it deliberate vagueness? Clearly, several of the above grievances and reasons for attacking Kenya are *ex post facto*, occurring way after the actual start of the long-war, and many resulting from the conduct of the long-war itself. Reasons such as the killing of Imams, Muslim leaders, and Muslim women and children, and harassment, torture, renditions, and extra-judicial killings, do not explain why the long-war started in the first place.

How is the challenge of Islamist violent extremism received and perceived in Kenya? A widely held threat perception in Kenya is that *al-Shabaab* poses an existential threat to the state of Kenya and Kenya's way of life (as opposed to Kenya's specific policies and actions). Take Kenya's National Strategy to Counter Violent Extremism (NSCVE), for example. The NSCVE defines violent extremists as "radicalised individuals who are prepared to engage in, or actively support, acts of violence in furtherance of radically illiberal, undemocratic political systems or ideologies" (Republic of Kenya, 2016a:7). Furthermore, the Citizen Support Mechanism (CSM), an organisation created by Kenya's National Counter Terrorism Centre (NCTC) 'to counter and prevent violent extremism in Kenya', claims on their Facebook page that "Kenya's democracy, liberty, inter/intra-faith harmony, and prosperity are threatened by terrorism and violent extremism" (CSM, 2019b:The Internet). In the foreword to the NSCVE, President Kenyatta maintains that violent extremists such as *al-Shabaab* reject Kenya's way of life. President Kenyatta describes this way of life as including: "Kenya's social and political fabric anchored in the nationalist covenant born from the struggle for independence and that is underwritten by our democracy, respect for the dignity of all people, regardless of race, religion, gender or nationality, and freedom of worship, association and speech" (Republic of Kenya, 2016a:9).

From the above one may deduce that the 'centre' in Kenya believes *al-Shabaab* to be threatening Kenya's secular, liberal, and democratic beliefs, norms, and goals. In essence, Kenya's 'way of life'. Is this belief based on empirical evidence, or is it a convenient belief used instrumentally? If the threat is framed as existential, and not policy induced, then it is easy to reject the threat as illegitimate and justify its violent suppression. In Chapter 4, section 4.2.1 *Conceptualising Islamist violent extremism*, I indicated that the stated intentions of terrorist organisations are often (deliberately?) misinterpreted and rejected by target states. Abrahms (2005:531) posits that *al-Qaeda* has been ineffective in utilising

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the publications is a map of Kenya (not Somalia), and the publication was launched in 2012, the same year *al-Shabaab*'s Kenyan affiliate, *al-Hijra*, was established. These factors may indicate *al-Shabaab*'s' focus on Kenya with the publication (Gaidi Mtaani, 2012a, 2012b, 2013a, 2013b, 2014a, 2014b, 2015, 2017a, 2017b).

terrorism as a communication strategy, having failed to convince the US that the US foreign policy influences and injustices in the Muslim world are the reason for being the target of terror attacks, rather than what the US believes to be Islamist 'hatred' for the values or the very existence of the US.

Despite the US rejecting the stated intent of *al-Qaeda*, there is little evidence to justify their doubting *al-Qaeda*'s intent. Abrahms (2006a:515) admits in a later study that "[t]he sum of empirical evidence - *Al Qaeda*'s [target selection], public statements, its private statements, and polling data from its supporter constituency - corroborates the claim that *Al Qaeda*'s goal is to coerce the United States into changing its foreign policies".[175] This has been an inconvenient truth for the US. Instead, *al-Qaeda* is dismissed and delegitimised because *al-Qaeda* 'justifiably' poses a non-negotiable 'uncompromising existential threat' to 'the Christian West'. It appears that the inconvenient truth of Kenya's 'unjust social orders and policies' as claimed by *al-Shabaab*, is equally dismissed and delegitimised in Kenya. This is despite efforts by *al-Shabaab* to communicate with the government in Kenya by using terrorism as a communication strategy. By illustration, *al-Shabaab* sent the message that "the *Mujahideen* would want to urge the Muslims in Kenya to stand up and help in inflicting pain on this British slave who does not understand any other language except that of the cane" (Gaidi Mtaani, 2013b:15).

The deliberate 'misinterpretation' of the intention of terrorism may also serve other more obscure purposes. In this regard, linking *al-Shabaab* with international terrorism and not local grievances, conveniently aligns Kenya with the 'global war on terror' and the attendant foreign aid, support, and influence. This will include the instrumental employment of perpetual CVE and counter-terrorism against *al-Shabaab* in this rent-seeking agenda. In Chapter 3, section 3.3 *The state fragility-security-development nexus*, I show that fragile states can and in fact do use their 'fragile status' and insecurity to attract international support, influence, and aid. Said 'aid', crucial to socio-economic relief efforts, finds its way into private banking accounts of rent-seeking public officials and is used in sustaining self-interested regimes. Perpetual CVE and counter-terrorism may serve other Kenyan self-interests. In this regard *al-Shabaab* not only accuses Kenya of interfering in Somali politics by supporting an 'apostate' government in Somalia, but also accuses Kenya of destabilising and exploiting Somalia.

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[175] Abrahams (2006a) finds that *al-Qaeda*'s attacks are based on no explanations, other than to coerce the US into changing its policies in the Muslim world. The intent includes the complete withdrawal of US forces, and the US ceasing to support 'apostate' and 'corrupt' Muslim governments. Abrahams (2006a:550-513, 515-517) finds that there is no evidence to support the claims that al-Qaeda is: (1) attacking the US and its allies as an end in itself; (2) seeking to change the values held by the US and its allies, and imposing *al-Qaeda*'s own 'illiberal' values; (3) seeking to provoke the US and its allies in fighting self-defeating wars of attrition in the Muslim world. In fact, according to Abrahms (2006a:517, 523), empirical evidence indicates that the involvement of the US in the wars in the Muslim world, or intervening in any other way, runs contrary to *al-Qaeda*'s intent of the complete withdrawal of US interests and influence in the Muslim world.

Other actors, including the Somalian government itself and the Arab League Parliament (Somalia is a member state of the Arab League), also accuse Kenya of destabilising and exploiting Somalia.[176]

Given the above, in essence, what does Islamism seek to achieve in Kenya? The stated intention of *al-Shabaab* is (1) to eliminate foreign 'infidel' influence in Somalia, and in East Africa, and (2) to establish an 'Islamic Emirate of Somalia' in Somalia, North-eastern Kenya, Ethiopia's Ogaden, and Djibouti (Global Security, nd:b:The Internet). This would mean areas currently inhabited by ethnic-Somalis and other Muslims. Based on statements and target selection by *al-Qaeda* and *al-Shabaab*, their stated intentions have been consistently communicated since the 1990s, and since 2006 with the formation of *al-Shabaab*.[177] One may accept that, linked to their intention, *al-Shabaab* will have various short-term and long-term objectives in Kenya, including: (1) the withdrawal of Kenyan forces from Somalia; (2) weakening Kenya's resolve and state power with actions such as polarising and radicalising society and undermining Kenya's economy and state legitimacy; (3) compelling neutral ethnic-Somalis and other Muslims to choose sides between *al-Shabaab* and those opposed to it; (4) creating conditions that will offer advantages for a long-term confrontation such as derogating Kenya's security apparatus, increasing popular support and funding, and alignment with the 'global' jihadi movement. Given the intention of Islamism and the objectives of the long-war, who exactly wages the long-war in Kenya?

6.6 ISLAMIST VIOLENT EXTREMIST GROUPS AND COMBAT UNITS IN KENYA

Several Islamist groups have been waging the long-war in Kenya since the 1990s when, the known Islamist group was *al-Qaeda* and its East Africa branch, East Africa *al-Qaeda* (EAAQ). Since the 2000s, the known Islamist group is the Somalia-based *al-Qaeda* Central affiliate, *al-Shabaab*, and its branch in Kenya, *al-Hijra*. *Al-Hijra* was known as the Muslim Youth Centre before 2012. *Al-Shabaab*'s known combat units that operate or are based in Kenya are Jaysh Ayman and the Saleh Nahban Brigade.

6.6.1 *al-Qaeda*, East Africa *al-Qaeda*, and *al-Shabaab*

Earlier in the current chapter in section 6.4 *The origins of Islamist violent extremism in Kenya*, I elaborated on how *al-Qaida* has had a presence in East Africa since the early 1990s. Later in this chapter in section 6.7 *Major Islamist terrorist activity in Kenya since the 1990s*, I will outline how *al-Qaeda* and its East Africa branch, planned and conducted the 1998 US Embassy attacks in Nairobi (Kenya) and Dar-es-Salaam (Tanzania) and the 2002 Mombasa attacks in Kenya. *Al-Qaeda*'s East Africa branch was known as East Africa *al-Qaeda* (EAAQ). EAAQ was formed from elements of the Somali Islamist group *al-Ittihad al-Islamiyya* (AIAI), i.e., Islamic Union. The AIAI was formed around 1983 by Somalis who had studied in Egypt and the Middle-East. The AIAI split in the early 2000s, with one faction forming part of *al-Ittihad Mahakem al-Islamiyya*, i.e., Islamic Courts Union (ICU). The ICU was formed around 2004. Both the AIAI and the ICU pursued the goal of establishing an Islamic state in Somalia (Menkhaus, 2010:187; Kabukuru, 2015:The Internet; Felter *et al*, 2021:The Internet).

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[176] See Chapter 7, section 7.4.5 *Cross-cutting indicator*, regarding said 'exploitation' of Somalia.

[177] I elaborate on these statements and target selection in Kenya in section 6.7 *Major Islamist terrorist activity in Kenya since the 1990s*. *Al-Qaeda* and *al-Shabaab*'s target selection in Kenya includes US, UK, Israeli, and other foreign targets, military targets, Kenyan institutions and symbols of power, and areas that are historically inhabited by ethnic-Somalis and other Muslims, targeting Christians and 'apostate' Muslims in these areas.

Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen (i.e., the *Mujahideen* Youth Movement), known as *al-Shabaab* (i.e., the Youth), was founded in 2006 as the youth wing of the ICU. *Al-Shabaab* by 2022 is 16 years in existence. A lengthy lifespan for a terror group. A lifespan that reveals the adaptability and resilience of *al-Shabaab* thus far. With the defeat and disbanding of the ICU around December 2006 after a US-backed Ethiopian military intervention (2006-2009) in Somalia, *al-Shabaab* emerged as a 'liberation force' against 'Christian Crusaders' and the leading Islamist group in Somalia. Since 2008, *al-Shabaab* is designated as an 'international terrorist organisation' by various countries, including the US, UK, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and the United Arab Emirates. Since October 2010, *al-Shabaab* is a banned organisation in Kenya, designated as an 'organised criminal group'. In 2012, *al-Shabaab* became an official *al-Qaeda* Central affiliate. Since then, *al-Shabaab* has had the responsibility of waging the long-war in East Africa (Kabukuru, 2012:The Internet, 2015:The Internet; Blanchard, 2013:2; Ndzovu, 2014a:122; Solomon, 2014b:187; Cilliers, 2015a:20-21, 23; Ingiriis, 2020a:362, 2020b:128-129; Kamau, 2021:212; Stern, 2019:9, 2021:12-13; Felter *et al*, 2021:The Internet).

Like the ICU, *al-Shabaab* emerged from the ashes of state fragility in Somalia. Solomon (2014b:187) observes that "[t]he period following Barre's ouster [1991-2006] was characterised by incessant inter- and intra-clan conflict. Warlords advancing personal and clan interests vied with one another, in the process carving out a patchwork of mini-fiefdoms". *Al-Shabaab* continues to operate unabated despite the deployment of AMISOM since 2007. Endemic state fragility also persists in Somalia despite state-building efforts by the international donor community and the formation of the federal government since 2012.[178] In Chapter 8, section 8.3.5 *Cross-cutting indicator and impediments to CVE*,

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[178] See the next chapter: 7.3.5 *Cross-cutting indicator*. I outline then how the state and government in Somalia went through various transformations following the collapse of Mohamed Siad Barre's dictatorship (1969-1991). Between 1991 and 2004 Somalia was a collapsed state with no central government. After the ICU defeated the warlords in early 2006, the ICU, until their own defeat by the US-backed Ethiopian military intervention at the

I elaborate on how, since being pushed out of their strongholds between 2012 and 2015, *al-Shabaab* has shown remarkable resurgence in recent times. *Al-Shabaab* is believed to have generated an annual income of US$180 million in 2021 despite being opposed by a coalition of forces since 2007. Testimony to the fact that the actions of this coalition have not shown much strategic effect against *al-Shabaab*.

Whilst *al-Shabaab* has been active in Somalia since 2006, in July 2010 *al-Shabaab* conducted its first major attack outside of Somalia, killing 76 people and injuring about 70 in two separate bomb attacks in Kampala, Uganda. The two suicide attacks were directed at spectators of the 2010 FIFA World Cup Final. *Al-Shabaab* justified the attack as reprisal for Uganda's participation in AMISOM. *Al-Shabaab*'s first recorded terrorist incident in Kenya was the May 2008 assailment of a police post in Liboi, Garissa County.[179] The September 2013 Westgate mall attack was the first major attack by *al-Shabaab* in Kenya. Since then, *al-Shabaab* has launched numerous attacks focused on Somalia and Kenya. *Al-Shabaab* maintains links and a presence in much of East Africa, including in Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Uganda, Tanzania, and Mozambique. Just across the Gulf of Aden, *al-Shabaab* also maintains ties with the Yemen-based *al-Qaeda* in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). Both are *al-Qaeda* Central affiliates (Blanchard, 2013:2; ISSP, 2016:4; ICG, 2018:2; ACLED, 2020:The Internet).

Decapitation has been one of the strategies pursued by the coalition of forces against *al-Shabaab*. The first leader of *al-Shabaab*, Aden Hashi Ayro, was killed in a US airstrike in 2008. Aden Ayro was succeeded by Ahmed Abdi Godane, also known as Mukhtar Abu Zubair. Godane was also killed in a targeted US airstrike in 2014. Since 2014, *al-Shabaab*'s leader is Ahmed Abdikarim Dirie, also known as Ahmed Umar or Abu Ubaidah. The US has posted a US$6 million bounty on Dirie's head (Horadam *et al*, 2011:The Internet; Cleaves, 2015:The Internet; Cilliers, 2015a:21, 23; Borárosová *et al*, 2017:131; Khalif, 2020:The Internet; Felter *et al*, 2021:The Internet; Hiraal Institute, 2022:4). Decapitation, i.e., the arrest or targeted killing of Islamist leaders, has not yielded success in ending Islamism as shown in Chapter 5, section 5.3 *Ending violent Islamist campaigns*. Despite the decapitation strategy and the coalition of forces against it, *al-Shabaab* remains a formidable force in both Somalia and Kenya and is

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end of 2006, established some order in much of Somalia. Between 2004 to 2012 Somalia had a Transitional Federal Government (TFG). From 2004 the TFG governed from Nairobi, Kenya, relocating to Baidoa, Somalia in 2006, and to Mogadishu only in 2007, with the support of the US-backed Ethiopian intervention. In August 2012, with the end of the mandate of the TFG, the Somalia Federal Government (SFG) was formed, instituting federalism in Somalia. But state fragility has consistently remained. In Chapter 3, section 3.6.1 *Indicators and measurement*, I outlined the relationship between state fragility and Islamist violent extremism in Somalia (as well as other related contexts). Somalia, together with Kenya's other neighbour, South Sudan, have alternated as the most fragile state in the world on the Fragile States Index between 2011 and 2017. Between 2016 and 2020 Somalia is rated the second most fragile state in the world (FFP, 2018:7, 2019:7, 2020a:7, 2020c:9, 2021:7).

[179] See Chapter 8, section 8.2.1 *Impediments to CVE in the arc of insecurity*, regarding the case of Liboi, Garissa.

considered a threat to much of East Africa. *Al-Shabaab* has also established formations in Kenya, including its branch *al-Hijra*, and the combat units Jaysh Ayman and the Saleh Nahban Brigade.

6.6.2 Muslim Youth Centre/*Al-Hijra*

To further repudiate the notion that Kenya is a victim of foreign Islamist terrorism, one may point to the Kenyan Muslim Youth Centre (MYC). The MYC was founded in 2008 in Majengo, Nairobi. A formal branch of *al-Shabaab*, the MYC changed its name to *al-Hijra* in 2012. *Al-Hijra* comprises of ethnic-Somalis and non-ethnic-Somalis, many from North-eastern and Coast regions. *Al-Hijra* literally means ‘the emigration’. Today, *al-Hijra* refers to a Muslim festival. Originally, *al-Hijra* referred to the emigration, escaping persecution, of Prophet Muhammad from Mecca to Medina. The concept of *al-Hijra* thus has a profound religious significance in Islam (McConnell, 2013:The Internet; Blanchard, 2013:2-3; Katumanga, 2014:162-163, 2017:152; Gisesa, 2014a:The Internet; Lind *et al* (2017:127).

There is a belief and call in Islamism that it is obligatory for every Muslim to emigrate (perform *hijra*) or withdraw from an un-Islamic state to an Islamic state, based on the view that Muslims cannot live in a secular state without undermining Islam. Regarding *al-Hijra* the organisation, its founder is Ahmad Iman Ali, an engineer who graduated from Jomo Kenyatta University of Agriculture and Technology. Iman Ali left Kenya for Somalia in 2009 and was appointed *al-Shabaab Amir*, commander, for Kenya affairs in 2012. Notably, Ahmad Iman Ali is from Nairobi and of Meru-Kamba parentage, not ethnic-Somali (Gisesa, 2014a:The Internet; Katumanga, 2014:162-163; Schmid, 2015:13;Mwangi, J, 2017:6-7; Chome, 2019b:The Internet). In section 6.4.2 *The long-war in Kenya*, I indicate that 2012 is also the year that the premier *al-Shabaab* publication, *Gaidi Mtaani*, with a distinct Kenya focus, was launched.

Al-Hijra is believed to have bases in Kenya and Tanzania (Adam, 2015:The Internet). In 2012 *al-Hijra* announced its focus and area of operations as “*jihad* in the region of east Africa with the obvious emphasis on Kenya …. [*Al-Hijra*’s] … lions will continue to spread the sword here in east Africa making Kenya an example for other east African countries” (Blanchard, 2013:2-3). Also in 2012, Ahmad Iman Ali designated Kenya as *dar-al-harb*, therefore a legitimate *jihad* target, based on (1) Kenya’s support for the US, Israel, and Ethiopia, and because (2) Kenya is ‘engaged in a war on Muslims’ (Kfir, 2017:778; Chome, 2019b:The Internet). According to IGAD’s Security Sector Programme (ISSP, 2016:4, 27-28) *al-Hijra* operatives and recruits routinely travel between Kenya and Somalia, receiving training and instructions in Somalia before returning to conduct operations in Kenya. *Al-Hijra* is also believed to have a strong presence and recruitment drive in Kenyan prisons, including planning and directing operations from these prisons. This brings me to the two *al-Shabaab* combat units in Kenya that are named after *al-Qaeda* and *al-Shabaab* leaders, viz., Jaysh Ayman and the Saleh Nahban Brigade.

6.6.3 Jaysh Ayman and the Saleh Nahban Brigade

Jaysh Ayman, i.e., ‘the army of Ayman’, named after *al-Qaeda* leader Ayman al-Zawahiri, emerged around 2014. Based in Lamu County and other Coast Region counties, one of Jaysh Ayman’s main operational areas is Boni Reserve. Jaysh Ayman comprises of Kenyan nationals, mostly from Coast Region, but also Somalian, Tanzanian, and Ugandan nationals, and European nationals.[180] The first major Jaysh Ayman attack is believed to be the 2014 Mpeketoni attack. Jaysh Ayman was also involved in the 15 January 2016 attack on the Kenyan Defence Forces (KDF)-run African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) forward base in El-Adde, Gedo Region, Somalia (UNSC, 2016:17; The Standard, 2016:The Internet; ISSP, 2016:22-24; Joscelyn, 2017:The Internet; Ndzovu, 2017b:6-7; Katumanga, 2017:152; Kamau, 2021:216). El-Adde resulted in 150 Kenyan soldiers killed, a further 11 soldiers were taken hostage, and several military vehicles and armaments were captured (UNSC, 2016:12). The UN Security Council defines El-Adde as “the largest military defeat in Kenyan history” (UNSC, 2016:12).

Marking the anniversary of El-Adde, on 27 January 2017, another lethal attack was launched at another KDF-run AMISOM base in Kulbiyow, Lower Juba, Somalia. *Al-Shabaab*’s Saleh Nahban Brigade, together with Jaysh Ayman, are reportedly responsible for the Kulbiyow attack. The Saleh Nahban Brigade is named after a Kenyan *al-Qaeda* operative and *al-Shabaab* leader, Saleh Ali Nabhan. Nabhan participated in the 2002 Mombasa attacks. Born in 1979 in Mombasa, Kenya, Saleh Ali Nabhan was killed by US Special Forces in 2009 in Barawa, Somalia. Like Jaysh Ayman, the Saleh Nahban Brigade has several Kenyan nationals within its ranks. The Saleh Nahban Brigade is also believed to have been involved in the El-Adde attack (Beeders, 2017:The Internet; Gisesa, 2017:The Internet).

Regarding Kulbiyow, *al-Shabaab* claimed to have killed 57 Kenyan soldiers, and to have captured weapons and military vehicles. Like other terrorist attacks, the number of casualties could be markedly higher, but hard to ascertain with any certainty, given the Kenyan government’s denialism and *al-Shabaab*’s propaganda (Cherono *et al*, 2017:The Internet; Beeders, 2017:internt). Among these insurgent attacks on the KDF bases and units in Somalia by *al-Shabaab*'s combat units such as Jaysh Ayman and Saleh Nahban Brigade, are a myriad of terrorist attacks in Kenya. In addition to military targets in Kenya and Somalia, *al-Shabaab*'s target selection for terrorism in Kenya involves foreign targets and interests (mostly US, UK, and Israeli), Kenyan symbols of power, and the Kenyan civilian population. The major Islamist terrorist attacks in Kenya from the 1990s to 2019 are outlined below.

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[180] Ayman al-Zawahiri, who took over leadership of *al-Qaeda*-Central after the targeted killing of *al-Qaeda* leader Osama bin Laden in 2011, was killed in a targeted US drone attack on 31 July 2022 in Kabul, Afghanistan (Ruiz, 2022:The Internet). The killing of Ayman al-Zawahiri is however unlikely to mean the end of *al-Qaeda*. In Chapter 5, section 5.3.1 *Repression and decapitation*, I demonstrate how and why decapitation (the killing or arrest of Islamist leaders) has not been successful as a counter-terrorism strategy in ending violent Islamist campaigns.

6.7 MAJOR ISLAMIST TERRORIST ACTIVITY IN KENYA SINCE THE 1990s

Outside of the context of the third wave of Islamist terrorism since the 1990s, Kenya has experienced varied terrorist activity in its history. The Kenyan state itself was founded through excessive British colonial state violence, and a consequent brutal war of independence that included the extensive employment of terrorism by both sides, viz., the British colonial state and the KLFA. The betrayal of independence, the transformation to a centralised state, and the constricted democratic space in the postcolonial state, have stifled peaceful dissent, and ensured that the history of violence between the state and society, and within society, continues unabated in the post-colonial period.[181] After independence Kenya experienced intermittent and recurrent bouts of terrorist activity. In 1975 the Maskini Liberation Front executed a series of bomb attacks, including attacks in Nairobi at the Starlight Nightclub and at a bus station, as well as at the summer home of Jomo Kenyatta in Mombasa. The bus attack left 27 people dead and 10 wounded, and the other attacks had no reported fatalities (Mogire and Mkutu-Agade, 2011:474; Miller, 2013:2).[182] There was also the 1980 attack by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) on the Norfolk hotel in Nairobi. An Israeli family owned the hotel. The bomb attack was in retaliation for the support that Kenya gave to Israel during the 1976 Israeli hostage rescue operation in Entebbe, Uganda. The Norfolk attack left 16 people dead and about a hundred wounded (Otenyo, 2004:76; Mogire and Mkutu-Agade, 2011:474; Bar, 2016:149).

Spurred on by the third wave of Islamist violent extremism since the 1990s, Kenya has become a hub of Islamist violent extremism. Islamist violent extremism finds expression in Islamist extremist narratives, Islamist terrorism, Islamist insurgencies, and Islamist proto-states. In Chapter 4, section 4.2 *Islamist violent extremism*, I highlight that it is Islamist terrorism that has been preeminent in Kenya.

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[181] *A Grain of Wheat* (1967) by Ngũgĩ wa Thiong'o captures the impact of the war of independence on the birth of the new state in 1963 and on ordinary Kenyans. It also captures the betrayal of independence by the postcolonial state. In the preface to the narrative, Ngũgĩ maintains that "[a]lthough set in contemporary Kenya, all the characters in this book are fictitious …. But the situation and the problems are real - sometimes too painfully real for the peasants who fought the British yet who now see all they fought for being put on one side".

[182] The Maskini ('poor people') Liberation Front is shrouded in controversy. One view is that it was a fictitious group created by the government to discredit and incriminate political opponents, including Josiah Mwangi Kariuki, who was killed in 1975, allegedly by Kenyan government agents (Mogire and Mkutu-Agade, 2011:474).

One of the instruments that this study employs as an analytical measuring instrument of terrorism in Kenya, is the Global Terrorism Index. The index however records terrorism by all non-state actors, not *al-Shabaab* alone. Between 2013 and 2017 Kenya received *high* impact scores on the Global Terrorism Index. In 2015 Kenya was ranked 19, with a score of 6.56. In 2016 the ranking was 22, with a score of 6.15, and in 2017 the ranking was 19, with a score of 6.11. In 2018 and 2019, Kenya had *medium* impact scores of 5.76 and 5.64, with the ranking of 21 and 23 respectively (IEP, 2020b:The Internet).[183]

To provide some perspective, in 2015 Iraq ranked number one with a score of 9.94, followed by Afghanistan (9.40) and Nigeria (9.28). Kenya's neighbour, Somalia, ranked number seven both in 2015 and 2016, receiving a terrorism score of 7.53 in 2015 and 7.65 in 2016. In 2018, for the first time since 2004, Afghanistan surpassed Iraq, taking the number one position with a score of 9.60. Iraq (9.24) was second, Nigeria (8.60) was third, and Somalia (7.80) was sixth position. In 2019, Afghanistan was still the first position with a 9.59 terrorism score, followed by Iraq (8.68) and Nigeria (8.31), with Somalia fifth position with a 7.65 score (IEP, 2016:10; 2017:10; 2018:8; 2019:8, 18, 2020a:8, 92). Although recording the lowest score (*low* impact) of 2.50 in 2004, the worst score of 6.60 (*high* impact) in 2014, Kenya has had *high* impact scores (6.00-7.99) between 2013 and 2017, *medium* impact scores of 5.76 in 2018 and 5.64 in 2019, and an average *medium* impact score of 5.04 between 2001 and 2019. The illustration below indicates the fluctuating but steadily rising terrorist activity in Kenya since 2001.



Created from Global Terrorism Index data (IEP, 2020b:The Internet)

In addition to not distinguishing Islamist terrorist activity from other forms of non-state terrorist activity, the aggregate state-level image above further conceals the variable geography of terrorist activity in Kenya. Islamist terrorist activity in Kenya is localised and geospatially concentrated in the arc of insecurity. The arc of insecurity was introduced in Chapter 2, section 2.3 *Research design*. I expand on this localised terrorist activity in Kenya in Chapter 7, section 7.2 *The arc of insecurity and Islamist violent extremism*, showing that terrorist activity (an indicator of Islamist violent extremism) is most virulent in areas where state fragility is most evidenced, i.e., in the arc of insecurity. In Chapter 8, section 8.2 *The arc of insecurity and impediments to CVE*, I show how impediments to CVE are also most pronounced in areas where state fragility is most evidenced, i.e., in the arc of insecurity. The core of this arc of insecurity is North-eastern Region, comprising Garissa, Wajir, and Mandera counties. I noted above that one of the instruments this study appropriates in measuring terrorist activity is the Global Terrorism Index. The index defines terrorist activity as (1) attacks, (2) fatalities, (3) injuries, (4) damage to property, and (5) impact. Given this definition, and within the context of the third wave of Islamist terrorism since the 1990s, the seven cases of major Islamist terrorist activity in Kenya are: the 1998 US Embassy attack; the 2002 Mombasa attacks; the 2013 Westgate attack; the 2014 Mpeketoni attack; the 2014 Mandera attacks; the 2015 Garissa attack; the 14 Riverside complex attack in 2019.[184]

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[183] In Chapter 2, section 2.4.1 *Case selection*, and Chapter 3, section 3.6.1 *Indicators and measurement*, I indicated that with the eighth edition of the index (2020), the data covers 2001 up to 2019. In 2021, the GTI was not issued. In the ninth edition of the index (2022), the index changed its main data source from the Global Terrorism Database to TerrorismTracker, and changed its methodology, now measuring terrorism in terms of annual (1) attacks, (2) fatalities, (3) injuries, and (4) hostages (not damage to property anymore), weighted over five years (IEP, 2022:2, 88-90). In this study, I use the dataset and methodology as used on the index up to 2019.

6.7.1 Nairobi (1998) and Mombasa (2002)

The August 1998 US Embassy attack in Nairobi resulted in 213 people killed, and more than 4, 500 people injured. The suicide bombing was claimed by *al-Qaeda*. The planning for the attack involved several Kenyan and foreign nationals and was carried out by two Saudi Arabia nationals (Botha, 2013:25-27; Okeyo and Abdisamad, 2016:26; Bar, 2016:148). In November 2002, two attacks occurred in Mombasa. The first was a suicide bomb attack on the Israeli-owned Paradise hotel (also known as Kikambala hotel) near Mombasa. Thirteen people were killed, and over 80 people injured (Botha, 2013:33; Otenyo, 2004:76; Okeyo and Abdisamad, 2016:26; Bar, 2016:149). Simultaneously, two ground-to-air missiles were launched at an Arkia Airline airplane (an Israeli airplane outbound for Israel) with 271 passengers on board, but the missiles missed the target. Whereas the 1998 attack was aimed against US interests and was carried out to commemorate the day the US landed in Saudi Arabi in preparation for the Gulf War in 1991, the two 2002 attacks were aimed against Israeli interests. Although the Mombasa attacks are also attributed to *al-Qaeda*, unlike the 1998 US Embassy attack, everyone involved in the planning of the Mombasa attacks were Kenyan nationals, except for one Sudanese national. Each of these two attacks in Mombasa was carried out by two Kenyan nationals, one of them believed to be Saleh Nahban (Blanchard, 2013:3; Botha, 2013:33, 2014a:3; Chome, 2019b:The Internet; Horn Institute, 2020b:1).

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[184] Outside of the major Islamist terrorist activity since the 1990s, Kenya experiences a myriad of sustained Islamist terrorist activity each year. This study, however, is not intended to be a definitive chronicle of all Islamist terrorist activity. Only those incidents that are significant to the aim and objectives of the study are included. Nevertheless, in Chapter 7, section 7.2.1 *Islamist terrorist activity in the arc of insecurity*, there is an outline of all reported *al-Shabaab* terrorist incidents in Kenya between 2010 and 2019, indicating that out of a total of 47 counties, *al-Shabaab*'s terrorist activity is singularly concentrated in 12 counties in the arc of insecurity in Kenya.

The US Embassy attack and the Mombasa attacks mark the start of a trajectory in the history of counter-terrorism and CVE since the 1990s in Kenya that has been marred by gross violations of human rights and civil liberties. For example, after the 2002 Mombasa attacks, “authorities carried out mass arrests and raids against suspects, which resulted in widespread human rights violations and fear in the predominantly Muslim Coast province” (Bachmann, 2012:46-47). In September 2003, officials arrested, mostly without trial, over 800 suspects in Mombasa, and an estimated 1, 200 other suspects in a wider campaign (Botha, 2013:35-36). In Chapter 7, section 7.3.1 *Cohesion indicators*, and Chapter 8, section 8.3.1 *Cohesion indicators and impediments to CVE*, I elaborate on how this history of state violence and terrorism continues unabated, fuelling Islamist violent extremism and generating intractable impediments to CVE. For example, in the 2014 CVE Operation *Usalama* Watch, more than 4, 000 ethnic-Somalis were detained without trial in Kenya and subjected to numerous other violations of human rights, including extortion, torture, disappearances, refoulment, and renditions.

6.7.2 From Westgate Mall (2013) to 14 Riverside Complex (2019)

Since its formation in 2006, the first major attack by *al-Shabaab* outside of Somalia was the July 2010 Kampala attack in Uganda. Their first recorded incident in Kenya was the May 2008 assailment of a police post in Liboi, Garissa County. The first major attack by *al-Shabaab* in Kenya was the September 2013 Westgate mall attack in Nairobi. This three-day siege of the mall in the Nairobi suburb of Westgate, conducted by four *al-Shabaab* militants, resulted in the killing of 67 civilians, leaving more than 200 others injured. Non-Muslims were targeted in the attack. The distinction between Christians and Muslims was made by *al-Shabaab* militants asking would-be victims to recite parts of the Quran or to recite the *Shahada*. The *Shahada* is a statement professing faith in Islam, viz., *there is no god but Allah, Muhammad is the Messenger of Allah*. The attack was immediately claimed by *al-Shabaab*. In separate statements, *al-Shabaab* held that the reason for the attack was Kenya’s military intervention in support of the Somalian government, firstly with Operation *Linda Nchi* (2011-2012) and then as part of AMISOM (since 2012), and the fact that Westgate mall was ‘Jewish-owned’ and frequented by Western nationals and Kenya’s elite (Blanchard, 2013:2; Gaidi Mtaani, 2013b:20; Mabera, 2016:367; Bar, 2016:149-150; ICG, 2018:6; IEP, 2014:22, 2015:27; ACLED, 2020:The Internet). *Al-Shabaab*’s spokesperson, Ali Dhere, declared: “We have said many times stay away from us. Leave our land, our people, stop fighting us. We warned them again and again but they ignored us. So we had to spill blood to send a message" (in Kibii, 2019:The Internet). Revealing that *al-Shabaab* realises and exploits state fragility in Kenya, *al-Shabaab* declared that Westgate was "[a] clear demonstration to the Kenyan Muslims that *Jihad* in Kenya is not impossible but, on the contrary, practical as [Kenya] … is merely a fragile third world country struggling for recognition in the continent" (in Gaidi Mtaani, 2013b:15).

The second major attack was the June 2014 Mpeketoni attack. This attack, carried out by about 50 *al-Shabaab* militants, left 60 non-Muslims dead. The town of Mpeketoni, in Lamu County, is over 90 percent Christian. Like the Westgate attack, the gunmen separated and spared Muslims. *Al-Shabaab* released a statement providing three reasons why Mpeketoni was attacked: (1) the invasion and occupation of Mpeketoni, originally a Muslim town, by 'Christian settlers'; (2) revenge for the invasion of Somalia by Kenyan troops, through Operation *Linda Nchi* and AMISOM; (3) the killing and oppression of Muslims in Kenya and Somalia (Anderson, 2014b:1-2; Bar, 2016:150; Lind *et al*, 2017:125, 128-129; Borárosová *et al*, 2017:128). The town of Mpeketoni is dominated by ethnic Kikuyu (hence the Christian connection) who came to Coast and North-Eastern regions as part of a state sponsored settlement scheme started by the Jomo Kenyatta Administration after independence. Said resettlements displaced locals, mostly being Muslims. In fact, the resettlements began with British colonialism as Kikuyu themselves were forcibly removed from the Rift Valley to make way for British settlement. Based on interviews with local Muslims in Lamu, Lind *et al* (2017:128), explain:

> In Lamu there are historical injustices. Mzee Kenyatta created an avenue for his own people to displace the Indigenous in Lamu. During the Kibaki era, the Kikuyu got an upper hand. They got access to financial institutions and infrastructure. This has created a huge division …. With *Al-Shabaab* now coming across the border, and the injustices present at the Coast, the resources that are available, people want a hand. *Al-Shabaab* is recruiting off of Swahili land grievances, it is arming them, giving them an ideology that 'your land has been taken away'.

Displacement or 'forced removals' to make way for big business and 'ethnic interlopers' in Coast Region reveal incessant grievances between Kikuyu and other ethnic groups, ethnic-Somalis, Bajuni, and Luo included. The Mpeketoni attack thus opens a window into the emotive issue of land allocation and alienation in Kenya, and in Coast Region in particular.[185] To show these grievances and their link to jostling for power in the constricted democratic space in Kenya, while *al-Shabaab* promptly claimed the Mpeketoni attack, President Kenyatta instead blamed this 'ethnic violence against a Kenyan community' (read: Kikuyu) on 'local political networks'. Said 'networks' are believed to be in reference to Raila Odinga, his party the Coalition for Reforms and Democracy (CORD), and his coethnics, the Luo (Gaitho, 2014:The Internet; Anderson and McKnight, 2015b:24; Nyagah *et al*, 2017:3).

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[185] The relationship between land allocation and alienation and political conflict involving varied ethnic groups in Kenya is beyond the aim and objectives of this study and in fact warrants a separate study. Harbeson (2012), Onyango (2014), and Nyongesa (2017) are good scholarly sources to consult in examining this relationship.

Following Mpeketoni, the next major attack was the 2014 November and December Mandera attacks. In the November attack, gunmen attacked a bus traveling from Mandera to Nairobi, killing 28 people, mostly being school-teachers. In the words of *al-Shabaab* spokesperson, Ali Mohamud Rage, "[t]he *Mujahideen* successfully carried out an operation near Mandera early this morning, which resulted in the perishing of 28 crusaders, as a revenge for the crimes committed by the Kenyan crusaders against our Muslim brethren in Mombasa" (Freeman, 2014:The Internet). The Mandera bus attack created the famous story of Salah Farah. Salah Farah was a Muslim teacher who was shot trying to defend his Christian colleagues and other passengers. Salah Farah died a month later in a Nairobi hospital from injuries sustained in the attack. In the December attack, 36 quarry workers were killed. Like the Westgate and Mpeketoni attacks, those believed to be Christians were separated and shot. Again, the distinction between Christians and Muslims was made by *al-Shabaab* militants asking would-be victims to recite parts of the Quran or to recite the *Shahada*. *Al-Shabaab* claimed both of the Mandera attacks, stating that the attacks were in retaliation for raids by Kenyan security forces on mosques in Coast Region, and against Kenya's occupation of Muslim lands (Freeman, 2014:The Internet; Obulutsa, 2014:The Internet, Walker and Arif, 2014:The Internet; Borárosová *et al*, 2017:128).

The next major attack was the April 2015 Garissa attack. Four *al-Shabaab* militants attacked Kenya's Garissa University, killing 148 students and security personnel, and injuring more than 80. As with the Westgate, Mpeketoni, and Mandera attacks, Muslims were separated and spared, and those identified as Christians were killed (IEP, 2015:27; Mabera, 2016:367; Bar, 2016:150-151; Malm and Gillman, 2015:The Internet). After Garissa, *al-Shabaab* issued the following statement (ICG, 2018:5):

> Do not dream of security in your lands until security becomes a reality in the Muslim lands, including the North Eastern province and the Coast and until all your forces withdraw from all Muslim lands. We will, by the permission of Allah, stop at nothing to avenge the deaths of our Muslim brothers until your government ceases its oppression and until all Muslim lands are liberated from Kenyan occupation. And until then, Kenyan cities will run red with blood …. [T]his will be a long, gruesome war in which you, the Kenyan public, will be the first casualties.

The last major attack in Kenya in the period under review is the 14 Riverside complex attack in 2019, otherwise known as the DusitD2 complex attack. The 14 Riverside complex attack on 15 January 2019 in Nairobi is the third of the four major ‘January attacks’ against Kenya. The first of these attacks was initiated by the 15 January 2016 El-Adde attack and followed by the 27 January 2017 Kulbiyow attack. However, as indicated earlier in the chapter in section 6.5 *Islamist violent extremist groups in Kenya*, both the El-Adde and Kulbiyow attacks were against KDF-run AMISOM forward bases in Somalia. The 14 Riverside complex attack in January 2019 therefore represents the first major attack on Kenyan soil since the 2015 Garissa attack. The 14 Riverside complex attack was carried out by five *al-Shabaab* members of the Saleh Nahban Brigade, killing 21 people. The Riverside complex attack is also the first recorded attack in Kenya where *al-Shabaab* used a suicide bomber (Joscelyn, 2019:internt; Chome, 2019b:The Internet; McConnell, 2019:The Internet; IEP, 2020a:17, Horn Institute, 2020a:1-2).[186]

In summation of the foregoing, between 1998 and 2019 there has therefore been seven major terrorist attacks in Kenya. Two of these attacks are attributed to *al-Qaeda*, and five are attributed to *al-Shabaab*. In between these major terrorist attacks, are a myriad of minor terrorist attacks that occur periodically in Kenya.[187] The Kenyan state has responded to this history of Islamist terrorist violence with CVE, which is embedded in Kenya’s experiences of counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency.

6.8 COUNTERING ISLAMIST VIOLENT EXTREMISM AND THE FRAGILE STATE IN KENYA

Al-Shabaab’s operational target selection, as shown by the 14 Riverside attack and the other major terrorist attacks highlighted in this chapter, is telling of *al-Shabaab*’s objectives as an Islamist-Salafi-takfiri-jihadi-insurgent-terrorist organisation, including the influence of its patron, *al-Qaeda*. The 1998 US Embassy attack, the 2002 Mombasa attacks, the 2013 Westgate attack, and the 2019 14 Riverside attack, were directed against the far-enemy, ‘unbelievers’ (read: Christians, in particular), and foreign influences, including the US, Israel, and their allies. The 2014 Mpeketoni attack, the 2014 Mandera attacks, and the 2015 Garissa attack were directed against the near-enemy (Kenya), ‘unbelievers’, and ‘occupiers of Muslim and Somali lands’. In section 6.6 *Islamist violent extremist groups and combat units in Kenya*, I showed that with the 2016 El-Adde and 2017 Kulbiyow attacks that were launched against KDF-run AMISOM forward bases, *al-Shabaab*’s target selection also includes military targets. Said attacks also reveal varying levels of scope, reach, and complexity. Whereas most attacks are in the east of Kenya, i.e., in Mandera, Wajir, Garissa, Lamu, and Mombasa counties, near *al-Shabaab*’s springboards such as Boni Reserve and southern Somalia (see Chapter 7, section 7.2.1 *Islamist terrorist activity in the arc of insecurity*), the Westgate mall and the 14 Riverside attacks struck at the core of the Kenyan state in Nairobi. Furthermore, whereas the Westgate and 14 Riverside attacks were carried out by four and five *al-Shabaab* militants respectively, the 2014 attack on the town of Mpeketoni was carried out by over 50 *al-Shabaab* militants. The 10 October 2018 attack at a school in Mandera involved more than 20 *al-Shabaab* militants. Before then, the 09 July 2016 attack on a police station and local businesses in Wajir involved more than 100 *al-Shabaab* militants (ACLED, 2020:The Internet).

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[186] The fourth ‘January attack’ was the 5 January 2020 attack on Manda Bay, Lamu County, at a US-run military base called Camp Simba and at the adjacent Manda Bay airfield. This was the first attack directly targeting US military personnel in Kenya. Several aircraft, vehicles, and other hardware were destroyed, totaling US$71.5 million. The attack was carried out by between 30-40 *al-Shabaab* militants. One US soldier and two US military contractors were killed. Five *al-Shabaab* militants were killed and five arrested. The number of the injured and those that escaped varies according to reporting source. Similar to the El-Adde and Kulbiyow attacks, a suicide car bomber was used in the Manda Bay attack to breach the perimeter of the military camp and the airfield in Manda Bay (Soila, 2020:The Internet; Demirjian, 2022:The Internet; Martin, 2022:The Internet).

[187] See Chapter 7, section 7.2.1 *Islamist terrorist activity in the arc of insecurity*, for an outline of all reported terrorist incidents attributed to *al-Shabaab* between 2010 and 2019 in Kenya.

Al-Shabaab’s attacks also show the ‘deviant’ violence that is used in terrorist operations, including the targeting of civilians. This uncovers Islamist terrorism as a congeries of ‘war, crime, and human rights abuses’. The 15 August 2017 attack near Boni National Reserve involved the kidnapping of, and sexual violence against, women from Ijara, Garissa. The 7 and 8 July 2017 attacks in Jima and Poromoko villages, Lamu archipelago, involved the beheading of nine men. The 23 June 2017 attacks in El-Wak, Mandera County, involved a raid at a local branch of Equity Bank. *Al-Shabaab* also employs suicide attacks. Whereas suicide attacks in Kenya are an *al-Qaeda* trademark as exemplified by the 1998 US Embassy attack and the 2002 Mombasa attacks, *al-Shabaab* has carried out suicide attacks in Somalia, including in the 2016 El-Adde attack on the KDF-run AMISOM forward base. The 14 Riverside attack in 2019 was the first major *al-Shabaab* attack in Kenya that involved a suicide bomber. Moreover, one of *al-Shabaab*’s formations, *Madax Jebis*, i.e., ‘head breakers’, is known for their very violent methods, including beheadings, amputations, and stoning (Katumanga, 2014:166; McConnell, 2019:The Internet; Stern, 2019:9, 2021:13; ACLED, 2020:The Internet; IEP, 2020a:17; Ingiriis, 2020b:129).[188]

Given the foregoing, whatever ethical views one has about terrorism, and however ‘unstrategic’ or ‘irrational’ some of *al-Shabaab*’s target selection may be deemed, these attacks serve to communicate *al-Shabaab*’s intent, motivation, will, and resolve, as an Islamist-Salafi-takfiri-jihadi group, with the intent to liberate and rid Muslim lands of apostate and foreign occupation and influences, establish an Islamic state, and enforce the *Sharia* in such a state. Moreover, despite the notion that *al-Shabaab* are ‘extremist-terrorist-criminals’ and not political actors, and the related argument on how to deal with them, there is enough evidence and acknowledgement to indicate that *al-Shabaab* are political actors with political objectives and a constituency in Kenya. Said constituency has historical grievances against the Kenyan state (Murithi, 2022:interview; Mwangi, 2022:interview). I contend in Chapter 4 and in the first part of this chapter, that there is also enough evidence to indicate that *al-Shabaab* are rational actors who employ terrorism instrumentally as envisioned in the rational choice theory.

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[188] According to Ingiriis (2020b:129), *Madax Jebis* operatives belong to *al-Shabaab*’s intelligence agency, *Amniyat*. *Amniyat* also acts as a counter-intelligence agency and a special paramilitary force.

The above introduces the response of Kenya to the contestation of the constricted democratic space by ethnic-Somalis and other Muslims since independence in 1963. Particular focus is on Kenya's CVE response to the third wave of Islamist violent extremism since the 1990s. Said response by Kenya may be summed up based on two themes: (1) the securitisation of the state; (2) renewed authoritarianism and centralisation. I noted before and I illustrate hereafter, the prevailing view of *al-Shabaab* as 'extremist-terrorist-criminals' (rather than political actors who engage in pressure politics and violent politics) within the security apparatus in Kenya. Terrorism by *al-Shabaab* is also delegitimised and criminalised and not viewed as a political instrument employed in pursuit of political objectives.

6.8.1 The Securitisation of the State

The point is made at the beginning of this chapter that to account for the incentive structure of Islamist violent extremism in Kenya, one needs to understand the origins, evolution, and nature of the fragile state in Kenya. The Kenyan state is a central actor, generating both insecurity and violence. This also holds true in the relationship between state fragility and CVE. The 'Big Bang' of independence in 1963 did not only unleash the secessionist attempts and aspirations of the former NDF and Coast Region, but also the securitisation of the state. The securitisation of the former NFD and Coast Region initiated a history of violence between the state and ethnic-Somalis and other Muslims. This securitisation started with the *Shifta* war, ushered in a history of counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism that accompanied the insurgent *Shifta* war and recurrent bouts of terrorist activity since the 1960s. Since the 1990s, the securitisation of the state is in response to the third wave of Islamist violent extremism, ushering in a history of CVE in Kenya that has its origins in counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism.

The 1960s and the 1990s therefore represent two distinct periods of state fragility and conflict risk in Kenya, and continuity not only in state fragility, but in the history of violence between the state and ethnic-Somalis and other Muslims. Responding to terrorism since the 1990, and extracting from socio-economic imperatives, securitisation spending between 2007 and 2016 is estimated at US$20.95 billion (in constant 2017 US$), divided between: internal security (11.727); military expenditure (7.730); private security (1.211); security agencies (0.279). Securitisation spending also includes the cost related to refugees and IDPs who are displaced by political conflicts and terrorist activity. The cost of refugees and IDPs in Kenya is estimated at US$9.37 billion in constant 2017 US$ between 2007 and 2016, an average of 0.75 percent of Kenya's GDP at the time. In 2019 alone, securitisation expenditure was estimated at US$1.5 billion, in constant 2019 US$ (IEP, 2020a:35, 37; UNDP, 2020a:8, 5-6, 24).

The securitisation of the state is pulpable in Kenya. In Chapter 2, section 2.4.2.1 *Multiple sources of evidence*, in addressing the use of autoethnography during the stage of data collection and in the general research and writing process, I made the point that for one to fully comprehend the securitisation of the Kenyan state, one needs to have the lived experience of security measures in public spaces in Kenya. This includes an appreciation of the palpable feeling one gets that the state is less democratic, society is less open, and freedom is more constricted. Flying into Kenya through Moi International or Kenyatta International, riding the *Madaraka* Express between Mombasa and Nairobi, or driving through the countryside, one experiences some of the most beautiful places in Kenya. However, intrudingly abundant, is evidence of the securitisation of the state. With the omnipresence of armed security forces in military fatigues, constant and permanent security checkpoints, and *al-Shabaab* apparently lurking at every corner, one is constantly reminded that not all is well in Kenya. I elaborate further on the securitisation of the Kenyan state in the context of Chapter 8.[189] First, the related renewed authoritarianism and centralisation of the state since the 1990s will be addressed.

6.8.2 Renewed Authoritarianism and Centralisation

The securitisation project is Kenya's considered response to the third wave of Islamist violent extremism since the 1990s. However, the securitisation of the state has resulted in the failure of the democratisation project that has also been undertaken since the 1990s following more than three decades of *de facto* and *de jure* one-party rule since independence, as well as the failure of the devolution of the state since the 2010 constitutional reforms. Instead, with the securitisation of the state and the parallel undertaking of CVE programming, there is renewed authoritarianism and centralisation of the state at the expense of political democratisation and socio-economic development. At the 69th session of the UN General Assembly in 2014, President Kenyatta duly conceded the tendency of CVE to be undemocratic and to undermine the socio-economic and political imperatives of security and development. President Kenyatta (2014:3) acknowledged the following:

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[189] The lived experience of securitisation in Kenya is based on the author's non-participant observations during trips to Kenya from 2016. I elaborate on securitisation in Kenya in the context of Chapter 8, section 8.2 *The arc of insecurity and impediment to CVE*, and section 8.4 *Increased state fragility in Kenya*?

> We have become acutely aware that the interplay between democratisation on the one hand, and effective counter-terrorism on the other, presents severe challenges to our security and our governance institutions. Increasingly, terrorist actors are exploiting the expanding democratic space, sometimes feeding into and even influencing local politics. Unless we can provide an effective buffer to fight back this tendency, Kenya and indeed other countries will find it difficult to entrench democracy and the post-2015 development agenda.

Regarding socio-economic development, I highlight in Chapter 7, section 7.3.2 *Economic indicators* that fragile states are lagging behind in achieving the post-2015 SDGs, putting the 2030 *Agenda for Sustainable Development* of the UN in jeopardy. In this regard, estimated at 1.4 billion, the world's 'bottom billion' is projected to grow to 1.9 billion by 2030, of whom more than 80 percent will be living in fragile states. Nine in ten, living on less than US$1.90 a day, will be living in sub-Saharan Africa. In fact, according to projections on the 2019 and 2020 Social Progress Index, if the current trends are maintained, the world will not achieve SDG targets as planned by 2030, but only by the year 2082. The year 2082 is an adjusted estimation from a previous estimation of the year 2073. When factoring in the impact of the coronavirus pandemic, the projection is now 2092 (SPI, 2019c:22-23, 2020b:21).

According to the 2019 Africa SDG Index, Kenya was on track to achieve only one SDG out of a total of 17 SDGs by 2030. The 2020 Africa SDG Index indicates that Kenya is regressing with the achievement targets of all 17 SDGs (UNSDSN, 2019d: 22, 29, 106-107, 2020d:38, 40-41, 118-119). In Chapter 8, section 8.3 *State fragility and the development of impediments to CVE*, I demonstrate how limited state resources that are diverted to regime survival and the securitisation of the state at the expense of socio-economic and political imperatives, gravely contribute to ineffective and counterproductive CVE. This response locks the fragile state in a self-reinforcing insecurity dilemma, fragility trap, and conflict trap. The preoccupation with regime survival in Kenya, through the securitisation of the state, as well as renewed authoritarianism and centralisation, are reflected in the CVE architecture of Kenya.

6.9 COUNTERING ISLAMIST VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN KENYA

In Chapter 5, section 5.4 *Countering Islamist violent extremism*, I outlined the varied challenges facing CVE. These challenges represent impediments inherent to CVE as a field of public policy and planning. These challenges, related to the four stages of the CVE policy cycle, are evidenced in Kenya as well, where they serve as some of the most intractable impediments to CVE. The four stages in the CVE policy cycle are: assessment, development, implementation, and evaluation. With regards to policy assessment, the key questions include the question of whether one is fighting 'extremist-terrorists-criminals’ or bargaining with a political organisation that represents a specific constituency that has legitimate political grievances or legitimate political views. Regarding policy development, the key challenge is choosing and developing CVE approaches and programming, which are varied and often conflicting. The challenge of the choice of CVE approaches and programming presents the related and practical challenge of what is the suitable and proper mix between hard power and soft power.

With policy implementation, the challenge is to distinguish between what is CVE specific versus what is CVE relevant, largely given that CVE overlaps security and development imperatives. By illustration, in Kenya economic development is CVE relevant but economic development is not CVE specific. It is the equitable distribution of resources (following economic development) that is CVE specific, because equitable distribution addresses the gross horizontal and regional inequalities that are acute sources of grievances in Kenya. The last stage, policy evaluation, presents the challenge of measuring the failure, success, and ethical imperatives of CVE. What are the success metrics? Is the metric to ‘disrupt and deny the operational capacity’ or to ‘undermine and deny the intention and objectives’, of Islamism? How do you know whether CVE measures are either preventing or aiding radicalisation? Is CVE successful (i.e., desirable) if it succeeds in other areas but falls short of its ethical imperatives such as the legal and moral imperatives of policy, for example, constitutionalism and the rule of law? Is CVE successful if it achieves its security imperatives but fails at its development imperatives? Against which objective do you measure the success or failure of CVE, given the varied objectives of Islamism?

The foregoing and other related questions bedevil the theory and practise of CVE. In Kenya, the 2016 National Strategy to Counter Violent Extremism (NSCVE) is sparse in outlining Islamism as an ideology and a movement, i.e., outlining the nature of the threat, something critical to assessment as the first stage of the CVE policy cycle. With the fourth stage of the CVE policy cycle, viz., CVE evaluation, what the NSCVE calls ‘measuring CVE impact’, there is little beyond a handful of principles, including the principle that “[m]easurement should go beyond perception to engage with factual data and verifiable observation” (Republic of Kenya, 2016a:27). The NSCVE is also sparse on ethical issues beyond the indication that “CVE actors should operate within the spirit and letter of the Kenyan constitution, the rule of law, and binding regulations “ (Republic of Kenya, 2016a:27). What makes evaluation also difficult is the lack of transparency in CVE. As is the case in most countries, most terrorism, counter-terrorism, and CVE data is classified in Kenya (Kamau, 2021:221). This lack of transparency is also revealed with Kenya’s NSCVE. The complete NSCVE is classified. One has to rely on the abridged version of the strategy, greatly challenging CVE evaluation. The 2016 NSCVE is also yet to be revised, further limiting CVE evaluation. I revert to the foregoing CVE challenges and other impediments to CVE in Kenya in the context of Chapter 8. First, Kenya's CVE architecture as such will be addressed.

6.9.1 The CVE architecture of Kenya

The CVE architecture of Kenya is based on security and anti-terrorism legislation, policies and plans, and dedicated institutions. The architecture is anchored on both the 'all-government' and the 'all-society' approaches and programming. The key legislation, policies, and plans in this regard relate to policy-coordination, policing, law-enforcement, money laundering controls, intelligence-gathering, and prosecution, and include the 2010 Constitution, the 2012 Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA), the 2014 Security Laws Amendment Act (SLAA), the 2016 National Strategy to Counter Violent Extremism (NSCVE), and the 2021 Proceeds of Crime and Anti-Money Laundering (Amendment) Act (POCAMLA). Enacted before the 2021 POCAMLA, is also the 2010 Proceeds against Organised Crime Act (POCA). Key features of the foregoing will be highlighted next, starting with the 2016 strategy to counter violent extremism that is key to CVE policy and planning in Kenya. The NSCVE is based on nine CVE pillars, objectives of which may be summed-up as follows (Republic of Kenya, 2016a:15-16):

Psychosocial pillar	To address the 'psychosocial needs of individuals and communities' who are 'at risk' of radicalisation or have been radicalised.
Education pillar	To address radicalisation in learning institutions.
Political pillar	To 'engage political leaders' at the different levels of government and society in a democratic process 'to counter radicalisation'.
Security pillar	To implement legal-security measures against 'radicalisation'.
Faith-based and ideological pillar	To generate counter-narratives, promote 'freedom, democracy, and interfaith tolerance', 'increase resistance or resilience' against Islamism.
Training and capacity building pillar	To develop 'the right skills, tools, and awareness', and empower CVE planners and practitioners (in and outside of government).
Arts and culture pillar	To employ 'open-minded' arts and culture to counter the 'close-minded' Islamist ideology and to enhance 'communal and national resilience'.
Legal and policy pillar	To enact and enforce anti-terror legislation and policy to 'support the preventive and mitigation measures in CVE'.
Media and online pillar	To create partnerships with the media to reduce the impact and use of terrorist networks and to offer counter narratives to the Islamist ideology.

The above pillars emphasise key elements of both the offensive and defensive, and the ideological and communicative, approaches and programming in CVE. Curiously, the political and social-policy imperatives are not part of these nine pillars.[190] Kenya's NSCVE is thus eerily silent on the political and socio-economic grievances linked to lslamist violent extremism in Kenya. Ali-Koor (2016:7) maintains that socio-economic inequality, and the exclusion of Kenya's Muslim communities, are legitimate grievances that the Kenyan government must address. Ultimately, good governance does not only mean addressing inequality, but it also means improving the socio-economic conditions of society, making the state relevant again. The issues that Ali-Koor (2016) highlights are thus about the distribution of power and resources in society, something the CVE architecture of Kenya downplays.

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[190] See Chapter 5, section 5.4.3 *CVE approaches and programming*, for an outline of the CVE approaches and programming. I outlined then that offensive and defensive approaches emphasise hard power strategies, including the offensive use of the military, policing, and legislation, and the defensive use of measures such as

Kenya's CVE architecture, as reflected in policies such as the NSCVE, tends to interpret Islamism through the 'theological and social-psychological radicalisation model' (see chapter 8 for an outline of this model). This model, with a misplaced focus on social identity, explains radicalisation as a socialisation process based on Islamic beliefs and social networks. The result is that CVE/PCVE is 'Somalinised' and 'Islamised' in Kenya. Contrary to this model, Somali-identity, the mosque, the *madrassa*, the Islamist ideologue, or an extremist website, may each serve as vectors of Islamism, but these are not incubators of Islamism. The incubator of Islamism is state fragility. Kenya's CVE architecture, aside from its centralised offensive and defensive approach, is therefore also driven by the ideological and communicative approach, and the Kenyan security fraternity downplaying of the political and social-policy approach. While the 'theological and social-psychological radicalisation model' reflects the ideological and communicative approach, and the offensive and defensive approach is concerned with addressing the physical threat of Islamism, the political and social-policy approach correctly highlights the political and socio-economic grievances that form the link between state fragility and Islamism.[191] In addition to the 2016 NSCVE, as of 2019, all 47 counties in Kenya have CVE County Action Plans (CAPs). The CAPs are aligned with the NSCVE and are designed to direct and coordinate CVE at the county level. The CAPs are managed by County Action Forums (CAFs). The CAPs are largely designed to 'enhance community cohesion, peace, and patriotism' (Kamau, 2021:218).

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intelligence, infrastructure protection, crisis planning, and border security. Ideological and communicative approaches challenge the ideology of Islamism, emphasising counter-narratives, promoting secularism, as well as promoting norms and values such as religious tolerance and inclusion. Political and social-policy approaches employ soft power strategies, including persuasive and development measures that seek to address structural, political, and socio-economic grievances linked to the development of lslamist violent extremism. The foregoing approaches and programming are undertaken in the context of the 'whole-of-government' (WG) and the 'whole-of-society' (WS) approaches and programming (what is called 'all-government' and 'all-society' in Kenya).

[191] See the note above regarding CVE approaches and programming. Regarding the 'theological and social-psychological radicalisation model', see Chapter 8, section 8.3 *State fragility and the development of impediments to CVE* (section 8.3.4 *Social indicators and impediments to CVE* in particular). I outline then how, in explaining the radicalisation process, the 'theological' part of the model links Islamic beliefs with terrorism risk, and the 'social-psychological' part links social-networks with terrorism risk. The role of CVE/PCVE consequently, it is deemed, is to identity 'at risk' individuals in specific communities (i.e., establish a 'terrorist profile' or 'indicators of terrorism risk') based on religious beliefs, and friendships and kinships, or other social networks.

The approach of the CVE architecture of Kenya faces other varied forms of criticism, including the notion that it may reflect Western interests rather than domestic realities. Oando and Achieng' (2021:360, 354) maintain that since being designated an 'anchor state' in the 'global war on terror' following 9/11, and since adopting a CVE architecture that focusses on 'at risk' individuals (mostly ethnic-Somalis and other Muslims), Kenya's security and CVE architecture is "hugely dependent on Western counterterrorism frameworks, strategies, and at times, security priorities". Emphasising the influencing and persuasive elements of the ideological and communicative approach to CVE (rather than hard power compellence and coercion, or addressing relevant political and socio-economic grievances), Kenya's NSCVE envisages and outlines a DDRR process of deradicalisation, disengagement, rehabilitation, and reintegration (Republic of Kenya, 2016a:6, 16-17). The amnesty programme that is linked with this DDRR process however faces various challenges, including the lack of policy coordination, insufficient resources for the programme, inadequate financial support for participants, the fear of reprisals by potential participants from security agencies and communities, and from *al-Shabaab*, and a lack of coordination between government agencies and civil society organisations. Consequently, the amnesty programme has negligible results (Kamau, 2021:218-219).

Regarding measures against terrorism financing, the key legislation is the amended 2021 POCAMLA. Before this 2021 Amendment Act, the previous piece of legislation was the 2011 POCAMLA. The 2021 POCAMLA mainly makes provision for reporting obligations by specific professionals, asset recovery, and the freezing of bank accounts, all related to crime and money laundering, including that which is linked to terrorist activity. Under the older piece of legislation, the 2010 Proceeds against Organised Crime Act (POCA), which is designed to recover proceeds of organised crime, *al-Shabaab* is designated as 'an organised criminal group'. To curb terrorist activity as such, the key legislation encompasses the 2010 Constitution, the 2012 Prevention of Terrorism Act, and the 2014 Security Laws Amendment Act (Wanyonyi, 2022:The Internet; Kamau, 2021:212; Mwangi, 2017b:310, 2018a:5, 2018b:12).

The key legislation, policies, and plans against terrorism under the CVE architecture of Kenya have been highly criticised. In this regard, Kenya for a long time did not have terrorism legislation, which made the state an ungoverned terrorism legal space despite having had the earliest recorded terrorist attack since independence back in 1975. Kagwanja (2015:The Internet) consequently concluded that despite being 'in the vortex of terrorism' for years, Kenya has 'the most underdeveloped counter-terrorism architecture' in East Africa. In fact, Khamala (2019:97-98) points out, the Anti-Terrorism Police Unit (ATPU), which was created after the 1998 US Embassy attack, operated in a legal vacuum for many years. The first pieces of legislation in the attempt to create a legal framework to deal with terrorism since independence in 1963 is the 2012 Prevention of Terrorism Act, and the 2014 Security Laws Amendment Act. In Chapter 2, section 2.3.4 *Spatial and temporal variation and analysis in explanatory case studies*, I stressed how Kenya's civil society and judiciary resisted earlier attempts at enacting anti-terrorism legislation, including the 2003 Suppression of Terrorism Bill and the 2006 Anti-Terrorism Bill. Civil society and the judiciary feared the potential for violations of human rights, and given Kenya's identity politics, feared that such legislation will be used to target specific communities.

By dismissing *al-Shabaab* as 'extremist-terrorist-criminals', the CVE architecture also reveals the inclination to delegitimise and criminalise the use of terrorism by non-state actors. Since 2010 *al-Shabaab* is a banned organisation in Kenya, and as indicated above, *al-Shabaab* is designated as 'an organised criminal group' under the 2010 Proceeds against Organised Crime Act. Moreover, despite the levels of Islamist terrorist attacks recorded annually, the CVE architecture in Kenya is plagued by the low number of alleged terrorists being arrested, prosecuted, and convicted. The case of the two influential Islamist ideologues, Aboud Rogo and Abubaker Shariff Ahmed, is illustrative. In 2003 Aboud Rogo and his co-accused were found not guilty through a lack of evidence in support of their alleged involvement in the 2002 Mombasa attacks. A week before he was killed in 2014, Abubaker Shariff Ahmed was awarded KSh670, 000 (Kenyan Shillings) by the High court in Mombasa in compensation and damages for the unlawful seizure of property following a 2011 police raid. Furthermore, between 2010 and their alleged extra-judicial killings in 2012 and 2014 respectively, there was a series of failed prosecutions on terrorism charges against both Aboud Rogo and Abubaker Shariff Ahmed (Gisesa, 2014b:The Internet; Kiser, 2014:The Internet; Kamau, 2021:213).[192] I revert to these and other impediments to CVE in the context of Chapter 8. The key aspects of the 'all-government' and the 'all-society' approaches and programming to CVE in Kenya will be addressed next.

6.9.2 The All-Government Approach and Programming

An 'all-government' approach to CVE programming has been adopted to underpin the CVE architecture of Kenya. This approach is directed and coordinated by the National Counter Terrorism Centre (NCTC) in Nairobi. The NCTC was created in 2004 and codified by the 2012 Prevention of Terrorism Act. The Director of the NCTC, assigned to directing and coordinating Kenya's counter-terrorism efforts, and in particular the 2016 National Strategy to Counter Violent Extremism, and coordinating various government departments and security agencies, reports to the National Security

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[192] See also earlier in this chapter in section 6.4 *The origins of Islamist violent extremism in Kenya*, regarding the role of both Aboud Rogo and Abubaker Shariff Ahmed as ideologues in the Islamist movement in Kenya.

Advisory Committee (NSAC) of the National Security Council (NSC). The NSC is chaired by the president of Kenya (Republic of Kenya, 2016a:21). The all-government approach also involves public-private partnerships in CVE programming. In this regard Kenya's NSCVE maintains that the NCTC is "the lead agency to coordinate actors [state, non-state, and bilateral and multilateral partners] involved in the implementation process [of the NSCVE]" (Republic of Kenya, 2016a:15).

The all-government approach is criticised for being ineffective, counterproductive, and for securitising the Kenyan state. In *Killing a mosquito with a hammer*, Lind *et al* (2017) maintain that CVE in Kenya has proven to be ineffective and counterproductive. Nasser-Eddine *et al* (2011:59) point out that ineffective and counterproductive CVE "erode democratic principles and social cohesion, increase radicalisation and incite conflict and violence". This approach is also criticised for centralising CVE. In Chapter 5, section 5.4.3 *CVE approaches and programming*, I elaborated on the whole-of government approach, or the 'all-government' approach as it is called Kenya, with its principles of integration, centralisation, and coordination, that is designed to achieve efficiency and effectiveness in dealing with 'wicked problems' such as Islamist terrorism. However, the approach often leads to complex and cumbersome organisations, little autonomy and flexibility, slow coordination, and inhibiting centralisation, and hence less efficiency and less effectiveness, therefore undermining its intent.

The foregoing limitations of centralisation exist in Kenya's all-government approach as well. Take the case of the 2015 Garissa attack. The response time from the time the attack was reported to the time the police's paramilitary Rapid Response Team (RRT) was flown from Nairobi to Garissa (370 kilometres apart), was more than seven hours because decision-making first had to be escalated up to the National Security Advisory Committee and the National Security Council. With counter-terrorism and CVE resources such as the RTT centralised in Nairobi, the local security forces in Garissa were ill-prepared, and had to wait for centralised decision-making and centralised coordination as well before any response could be launched. By the time the RTT arrived in Garissa from Nairobi, 148 students and security personnel were dead, and 80 more were injured at the hands of four *al-Shabaab* operatives (Malm and Gillman, 2015:The Internet; Kigotho, 2015:The Internet; Mwangi, 2017c:16).[193]

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[193] With integration, centralisation, and coordination, there is also a lack of coordination, cooperation, and collaboration, as reflected in the lack of unified command and control in response to terrorist attacks in Kenya. Mwangi (2017c:16-18, 20-21) recounts the delay, incoordination, and bungling of the response to the 2013 Westgate and 2014 Mpeketoni attacks. Mwangi (2017c) ascribes the delayed response and lack of coordination, cooperation, and collaboration in inter-agency response to terrorist attacks, to what he calls 'neo-elitism' in Kenya, which encompasses personalised elite interests and behaviour among senior security officials. This inter-agency lack of coordination, cooperation, and collaboration is reflected in the relationship between the KDF and the NPS, and between the NPS and its specialised formations such as the GSU and the RTT.

The key institution in the CVE architecture of Kenya, is the National Counter Terrorism Centre (NCTC), which serves as the central coordinating agency. The NCTC coordinates both the all-government approach and the all-society approach. Key government departments are the ministries of the interior, defence, police, and foreign affairs. Various other key government agencies are involved, including the National Intelligence Service (NIS), County Security and Intelligence Committees, the National Police Service (NPS), the General Service Unit (GSU), the Anti-Terrorism Police Unit (ATPU), the Rapid Response Team (RRT), and the Crisis Response Team (CRT) (Republic of Kenya, 2016a:22; Shabibi, 2020a:The Internet, 2020b:The Internet; Kamau, 2021:213). Within the NPS, the ATPU deals with terrorism and specialises in terrorism investigations. The ATPU was formed after the 1998 US Embassy attack in Nairobi. Within the NPS is also the paramilitary police, the GSU. According to the 2013 Truth, Justice, and Reconciliation Commission (TJRC) report, the GSU's history of gross violations of human rights and linked impunity dates back to the *Shifta* war (1963-1968). Within the GSU's Recce Company, is the controversial RRT. The RRT was formed in 2004 and specialises in 'kill or capture' operations of high value targets. The RRT is reportedly trained by US and UK intelligence services (the CIA and MI6) in partnership with Kenya's NIS. Furthermore, as part of the GSU is the CRT, which specialises in surveillance and hostage rescue. The specialised paramilitary RRT and the CRT work jointly with the NPS's ATPU (KTJN, 2013:8, Khamala, 2019:97-98; Shabibi, 2020a:The Internet, 2020b:The Internet).

The RRT is accused of participating in renditions and extrajudicial killings of terror suspects. Earlier in the current chapter in section 6.4 *The origins of Islamist violent extremism in Kenya*, I elaborated on how the RRT is implicated in the killings of two influential Islamist ideologues in Kenya, Aboud Rogo (in 2012) and Abubaker Shariff Ahmed (in 2014). The RRT is also accused of renditioning of Kenyan terror suspects that were allegedly involved in the 2010 Kampala attack in Uganda. Seven Kenyan Muslims were brought to trial at Kampala's High Court in June 2015 for their alleged involvement in the Kampala attacks (Anderson and McKnight, 2015a:545; Shabibi, 2020a:The Internet, 2020b:The Internet). The rendition of the Kenyan nationals to stand trial in Uganda was not without controversy. Blanchard (2013:4) points out that "[t]he rendition has been challenged in the courts, as many were reportedly carried out without due process". I revert to these issues in the context of Chapter 8. Ancillary to the all-government approach, is the all-society approach, which I address next.

6.9.3 The All-Society Approach and Programming

An 'all-society' approach has also been adopted to underpin the CVE architecture of Kenya. The all-society approach is a civil society-based approach that is ancillary to the all-government approach.

The all-society approach also involves public-private partnerships in CVE programming. This approach is reflected in Kenya's NSCVE. In demonstration, the stated aim of the NSCVE is "to rally all sectors of Kenyan social, religious, and economic life to emphatically and continuously reject violent extremist ideologies and aims in order to shrink the pool of individuals whom terrorist groups can radicalise and recruit" (Republic of Kenya, 2016a:13). Within the all-society approach and programming, the key institution is the Citizen Support Mechanism (CSM). Kenya's National Counter Terrorism Centre (NCTC), as the designated central coordination agency, created the CSM 'to counter and prevent violent extremism in Kenya', coordinating CVE efforts between state and nonstate actors, and among non-state actors (CSM, 2019a:The Internet, 2019b: The Internet; Kamau, 2021:213).

The NSCVE underlies that "[i]t is citizen ownership of CVE that will provide Kenya's democracy long-term resilience against the appeal of violent extremism. Credible local forums that reflect the diversity and different points of view on the ground should be important engagement points for all CVE actors" (Republic of Kenya, 2016a:22). It is further maintained in the NSCVE that "[a]ll efforts by government bodies should provide for participation by citizens, NGOs/CBOs, the private sector, researchers and religious and civil leaders at the local and national level" (Republic of Kenya, 2016a:22). The role of civil society in CVE is highlighted. The NSCVE contends that "the private sector offers myriad opportunities to strengthen and even transform CVE, such as marketing expertise, training, media, and entrepreneurship experience, and Corporate Social Responsibility programmes in education and local development" (Republic of Kenya, 2016a:23). The NSCVE is intended to achieve nine outcomes that are linked to civil society. The first three outcomes are revealing of the 'theological and social-psychological radicalisation model' and the ideological and communicative approach that dominate the CVE architecture of Kenya. The first three outcomes are stated as (Republic of Kenya, 2016a:13):

> (1) For the Kenyan people to demonstrate patriotism as a minimum obligation to our Nationhood and its foundations in the pursuit of freedom for all Kenyans.
> (2) A deep appreciation throughout Kenya of the Kenyan Way of Life as represented in the rights and responsibilities in the Constitution.
> (3) The ability to delegitimise and reject violent extremist ideologies.

In achieving these outcomes, varied all-society CVE programming has been undertaken in Kenya. The nation-wide *Building Resilience Against Violent Extremism* (BRAVE) programme that started after the 2015 Garissa attack is an example of such programmes. BRAVE was organised and led by Muslim religious leaders and scholars and had as its objective "to counter the narratives and messaging of extremist groups to change radicalisation trends in … [Kenya]" (Kamau, 2021:218). BRAVE is typical of

Kenya's CVE or otherwise PCVE programming. CVE/PCVE programmes such as BRAVE are informed by the dominant ideological and communicative approach and the 'theological and social-psychological radicalisation model'. Both the ideological and communicative approach and the 'theological and social-psychological radicalisation model' being essentially 'ideological' responses to Islamism. They emphasise ethno-religious profiling to identify 'radicalisation risk' in individuals within specific communities and emphasise inoculating these 'at risk' individuals and communities against Islamism, drawing attention to 'a war of ideas', and giving prominence to counter-narratives against Islamism.[194]

Like the all-government approach, the all-society approach also faces particular challenges in Kenya. Among these challenges is the lack of capacity and specialisation in the government institutions that are entrusted with CVE. These institutions often do not have the goodwill and trust of communities. The result is the continuing challenges to implementing CVE policy at the 47 counties level. These challenges have also been exacerbated by the actions of the security apparatus in Kenya. Kamau (2021:218) contends that "security sector abuses during counter-terrorism operations, such as Operations *Usalama* Watch and *Linda Boni*, have soured the relationships between the communities and security agencies". I revert to these and other impediments to CVE in the context of Chapter 8.

6.10 CONCLUDING REMARKS

This chapter has examined the manifestation of Islamist violent extremism and CVE in the fragile state in Kenya as a contextual and explanatory setting. The first part of the chapter focused on Islamist violent extremism and firstly considered the notion of Kenya as a victim of external terror attacks. It is demonstrated that Kenya is not merely a victim of Islamist violent extremism, but an active incubator of Islamist violent extremism. Linked to this consideration, the chapter explained the relationship between state fragility and Islamist violent extremism in Kenya through two themes: (1) authoritarianism and centralisation; (2) constitutional reforms and devolution. The chapter then looked at the origins of Islamist violent extremism in Kenya, the notion of new-wars and the long-war in Kenya, Islamist terror groups and combat units in Kenya, and lastly, major Islamist terrorist activity in Kenya since the 1990s. The second part of the chapter focused on CVE in its examination of the Kenyan state as the explanatory setting for impediments to CVE through employing two themes: (1)

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[194] Varied PCVE programming in Kenya, addressing specific and varied aspects of PCVE as such, is beyond the aim and objectives of this study. About BRAVE, other PCVE programming and programme monitoring and evaluation projects such as Strengthening Resilience to Violent Extremism (STRIVE), the Community-Based Interventions in Kenya Programme (PROACT), and the *Nyumba Kumi* Initiative, see Zeuthen (2015), Ali and Bwana (2015), Finn *et al* (2016), Mirahmadi (2016), Mukuna (2019), Sigsworth *et al* (2020), and ISD (2022).

the securitisation of the state; (2) renewed authoritarianism and centralisation. The chapter then considered key aspects of the CVE architecture of Kenya, as well as key aspects of the all-government and the all-society CVE approaches and programming in Kenya.

One of the major misperformances of the Kenyan state is maintaining the constricted democratic space that has defined the state since independence. Muslims and ethnic-Somalis, as a politically significant but marginalised political identity, have contested this constricted democratic space in two distinct periods that are linked with two separate crises of state-building and nation-building in Kenya. The first period, starting in the 1960s with independence, produced the secessionist attempt in the former NFD (during the *Shifta* war: 1963-1968), as well as the secessionist attempt and calls for secession in Coast Region (intermittent since independence in 1963). The second period, starting in the 1990s, produced the current third wave of Islamist violent extremism. Islamist terrorism, as found in Kenya today, is simply the latest violent contestation of this constricted political space in Kenya. A state that struggles to define itself and live with itself in view of its uneasy relationship with marginalised sections of its society such as ethnic-Somalis and other Muslims (see also Chapter 8).

Despite devolution and the constitutional reforms of 2010, the persistent challenges of the insecurity dilemma, the fragility trap, and the conflict trap remain in Kenya. The result is that Islamist violent extremism rages on unmediated in any meaningful way. CVE has consequently remained not only ineffective but also counterproductive. CVE in Kenya has a misplaced emphasis on 'at risk' individuals (i.e., Muslims and ethnic-Somalis) based on the notion that religious beliefs and social networks exclusively explain the radicalisation process. Kenya has therefore prioritised the ideological and communicative approach to CVE which is largely designed to be 'open-minded' in order to counter the 'close-minded' Islamist ideology. Contrary to the 'theological and social-psychological radicalisation model' and the ideological and communicative approach that dominate CVE in Kenya, a Somali-Muslim identity, the mosque, the *madrassa*, the Islamist ideologue, or an extremist website, as social networks, may each serve as a vector or medium for Islamist violent extremism, but these are not incubators of Islamist violent extremism. The incubator, current and enduring, generating and sustaining Islamist violent extremism and impediments to CVE, is state fragility in Kenya.

It is the political and socio-economic grievances of a marginalised ethno-religious identity that seeks ontological security that form the link between state fragility and Islamist violent extremism in Kenya. Therefore, the CVE architecture, as well as the all-government and all-society approaches and programming in Kenya remain challenged at various levels. In addition, since the 1990s, in response to the third wave of Islamist violent extremism, the state has been highly securitised and centralised, with renewed levels of authoritarianism that have characterised state fragility in Kenya since independence. The state, in its underperforming and misperforming, is not merely the locus of Islamist violent extremism, but the principal actor, in fact, generating both insecurity and conflict. The state, its government, institutions, and society, in turn, become the object of the blame system of Islamist violent extremism and targets for *jihad*. For the sake of brevity and to avoid unnecessary repetition, I come back to these challenges and other impediments to CVE in Kenya in the context of Chapter 8. First, I address the relationship between state fragility and Islamist violent extremism in Kenya.

The next chapter, *State fragility and Islamist violent extremism in Kenya*, probes and answers the following central question: What is the relationship between state fragility and Islamist violent extremism? The chosen and undertaken research design enables both spatial (single-embedded) and temporal (longitudinal) variation and analysis in the explanation of this relationship. The single-embedded lens employs the theoretical instrument of the arc of insecurity, enabling within-case spatial variation and analysis. The longitudinal lens, employing the theoretical instrument of a causal sequence, enable within-case temporal variation and analysis. These two lenses are designed to structure the provision of four types of evidence, viz., (1) trace, (2) accounts, (3) patterns, and (4) sequences, and to anchor explanation-building, in this relationship between state fragility and Islamist violent extremism.

CHAPTER 7: STATE FRAGILITY AND ISLAMIST VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN KENYA

7.1 INTRODUCTION

This study is premised on a causal relationship between state fragility, Islamist violent extremism, and CVE, in Kenya. While regarded as more stable than many other African countries, Kenya has marked state fragility, with an average *alert* score of 96.2 between 2005 and 2019 on the Fragile States Index. The central proposition of the study is that state fragility provides the context and opportunity, and generates, Islamist violent extremism and impediments to CVE. In providing evidence in support of this proposition, this chapter shows said relationship in the context of state fragility and Islamist violent extremism. Chapter 8 shows this relationship in the context of state fragility and impediments to CVE. This chapter is divided into two major parts: (1) the arc of insecurity and Islamist violent extremism in Kenya; (2) state fragility and the development of Islamist violent extremism in Kenya.

In Chapter 2, section 2.3. *Research design*, I indicated that the relationship between state fragility and Islamist violent extremism may be drawn from two perspectives. Accordingly, the first part of the chapter models this relationship through a single-embedded lens by utilising the arc of insecurity as a theoretical analytical instrument. This enables spatial variance and analysis. The second part of the chapter shapes this relationship through a longitudinal lens, by means of a 'before-and-after' design aimed at employing a causal sequence as a theoretical analytical instrument. This enables temporal variance and analysis. The time order in the relationship between state fragility and Islamist violent extremism is initiated by Kenya's independence in 1963. The act of independence is the 'Big Bang' that released key historical markers, starting with the *Shifta* war (1963-1968), pitting state fragility against ethnic-Somalis and other Muslims. Embedded in the causal sequence are the 12 main indicators of state fragility as defined on the Fragile States Index, and key historical markers since the *Shifta* war.

7.2 THE ARC OF INSECURITY AND ISLAMIST VIOLENT EXTREMISM

In Chapter 2, section 2.3.4 *Spatial and temporal variation and analysis in explanatory case studies*, I outlined how the design of this study is single-embedded (in addition to being longitudinal), which enables within-case spatial variation and analysis. The construct of the arc of insecurity is employed to demonstrate this spatial variation within a single case. The arc of insecurity enables the provision and demonstration of pattern-based evidence, what Yin (2018:175) calls pattern-matching, and George and Bennet (2005:181) call the congruence method, to illustrate that Islamist violent extremism, as empirically substantiated by Islamist terrorist activity, rather than being generalised, is in fact localised. The arc of insecurity represents the areas and dimensions of the state that are outside the meaningful and effective control and management of the state, where the indicators of state fragility are most evidenced and intractable. In possessing spatial variation and analysis abilities, the single-embedded design enables me to trace patterns by demonstrating that variation in state fragility (X) results in variation in Islamist violent extremism (Y). Islamist violent extremism may consequently be demonstrated to be most virulent in areas and dimensions where state fragility is most evidenced. Patterns are also statistical. One may demonstrate statistical patterns such as higher poverty levels, lower access to public goods and services, and higher terrorist activity, in the areas where state fragility is most evidenced. George and Bennett (2005:181) note that the congruence method upholds that if variation in X results in variation in Y, the suggestion is that a causal relationship exists.

In Chapter 3, I showed how state fragility is often associated with governance underperformance as indicated by a capacity deficit or a deficit in political will. While state fragility may emanate from a lack of capacity, evidence in Kenya suggests that macro level poor performance in delivering public goods and performing state functions, or poor performance in the meso and micro levels of state fragility, emanates less from a capacity deficit than it does from state misperformance and institutional failure. State misperformance and failure are also localised and concentrated. Accordingly, in Chapter 6 (and in the context of this chapter and the next), I establish that empirical evidence also demonstrates how the arc of insecurity in Kenya is particularly neglected, marginalised, deprived, and securitised, through both omission and commission by the Kenyan state. I now turn to the causal relationship between state fragility and Islamist violent extremism, as outlined through a single-embedded case design lens, by employing the arc of insecurity as a theoretical, analytical, and explanatory instrument.

7.2.1 Islamist Terrorist Activity in the Arc of Insecurity

In Chapter 4, section 4.2 *Islamist violent extremism*, I established that Islamist violent extremism in Kenya finds expression through Islamist terrorism. This study thus employs terrorism as the empirical substantiation (i.e., indicator) of Islamist violent extremism, deriving an understanding of terrorism or terrorist activity from the Global Terrorism Index. Terrorism or terrorist activity therefore refers to (1) attacks, (2) fatalities, (3) injuries, (4) damage to property, and (5) impact. In Chapter 6, section 6.3.2 *Constitutional reforms and devolution*, I elaborated on how, from eight provinces/regions, the 2010 Constitution created the 47 counties in Kenya. I amend the Global Terrorism Index conception of terrorist activity to include the following terrorist incidents: (1) attacks; (2) armed clashes with security forces; (3) raids by security forces; (4) arrests of terror suspects. Reflecting this amendment, and the reforms of 2010, the Islamist terrorist incidents per county in Kenya are shown below. Only those incidents that are expressly attributed to and involve *al-Shabaab* are indicated.[195]

Region	**County**	**Year**										**County total**	**Region totals**
		2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019		
Coast	Kwale	--	--	1	--	3	1	7	2	1	--	15	134
	Kilifi	--	--	--	--	--	--	1	--	--	--	1	
	Mombasa	--	1	3	5	11	--	3	1	--	1	25	
	Lamu	1	2	1	--	11	12	12	31	13	3	86	
	Tana-River	--	--	--	--	2	--	--	4	1	--	7	
North-eastern	Garissa	3	8	18	14	9	10	8	20	11	6	107	263
	Wajir	1	2	1	3	2	4	3	4	9	6	35	
	Mandera	1	6	14	8	14	16	14	26	14	8	121	
Eastern	Marsabit	--	1	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	1	6
	Isiolo	--	--	--	--	1	--	--	--	3	--	4	
	Machakos	--	--	1	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	1	
Nairobi	Nairobi	--	4	12	4	5	--	--	--	1	1	27	27
Kenya's total		6	24	51	34	58	43	48	88	53	25	430	

Created from Armed Conflict Location and Event Data project (ACLED, 2020:The Internet)

Using Islamist terrorist incidence as an indicator of Islamist violent extremism, I employ the Global Terrorism Index as an analytical measuring tool of Islamist violent extremism, as well as to provide (1) trace, (2) accounts, (3) patterns, and (4) sequences, evidence, of Islamist violent extremism in Kenya. Another instrument that I employ is the Global Extremism Monitor (GEM), as well as the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data (ACLED) project. The Global Terrorism Index reveals fluctuating but steadily rising terrorist activity in Kenya since 2001 (by all non-state actors, not *al-Shabaab* alone). With the lowest score (*low* impact) of 2.50 in 2004, the worst score of 6.60 (*high* impact) in 2014, *high* impact scores (6.00 - 7.99) between 2013 and 2017, *medium* impact scores of 5.76 and 5.64 in 2018 and 2019, Kenya has an average *medium* impact score of 5.04 (out of 10.00) between 2001 and 2019 (IEP, 2020b:The Internet). Islamist terrorist incidents in Kenya are not generalised, but rather localised and singularly concentrated in the 12 counties in the arc of insecurity. As aforementioned, the employment of the arc of insecurity enables the demonstration of within-case variation and analysis. The variation in Islamist violent extremism (Y) is a consequence of the variation in state fragility (X). Said variation between X and Y therefore demonstrates that a causal relationship exists.

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[195] I include only those incidents linked with physical violence or the potential for physical violence as a coding rule, viz., attacks, armed clashes, raids, and arrests. The coding rule therefore excluded non-violent incidents such as reported movements, reported recruitment, or similar incidents. In terms of the coding rule, since its formation in 2006, *al-Shabaab* engaged in only three terrorist incidents in Kenya prior to 2010, one in 2008 and two in 2009. The first was an armed clash with security forces on 29 May 2008 in Garissa County. On 13 December 2009 there was an attack and an armed clash in Wajir County. Falling outside of the 12 counties between 2010 and 2019, are two outliers. In 2012 there was one arrest in Trans-Nzoia County in Rift Valley Region, and in 2013 there was an armed clash in Kiambu County in Central Region (ACLED, 2020:The Internet).

Since the first recorded terrorist incident in Garissa in 2008, two in Wajir in 2009, there was a surge in the incidence of *al-Shabaab* terrorist activity between 2010 and 2019. Six in 2010, 24 in 2011, 51 in 2012, to 58 by 2014, and 25 in 2019. There was a 750 percent increase between 2010 and 2012 (six in 2010 and 51 in 2012). The highest incidence occurred in 2017 (88 in total), and the lowest in 2010 (only six). Lamu County recorded the most terrorist incidents in a given year in the period under review (31 incidents in 2017). When translating the above table to the map of Kenya, it is quite glaring that though Kenya has 47 counties in total, Islamist terrorist activity is singularly concentrated in the 12 counties in the arc of insecurity as shown below (created from GeoCurrents Maps, 2020:The Internet). Of all 430 terrorist incidents between 2010 and 2019, almost a quarter, 121 incidents (28.13 percent) were in Mandera, 107 (24.88 percent) in Garissa, 86 (20 percent) in Lamu, 35 (8.13 percent) in Wajir, 27 (6.27 percent) in Nairobi, 25 (5.81 percent) in Mombasa, and 15 (3.48 percent) in Kwale. These seven counties represent 96.74 percent of all *al-Shabaab* terrorist incidents in the period under review. The other 14 incidents (3.25 percent) were in five counties: Tana-River, Isiolo, Kilifi, Machakos, and Marsabit.



This terrorist activity is even more concentrated in North-eastern Region (i.e., Mandera, Wajir, and Garissa counties). With 263 incidents, North-eastern Region accounts for almost two-thirds (61.16 percent) of all terrorist incidents between 2010 and 2019. Coast Region (i.e., Lamu, Mombasa, Kwale, Kilifi, and Tana-River counties) follows with 134 (31.16 percent), Nairobi County with 27 (6.27 percent), and Eastern Region (i.e., Marsabit, Isiolo, and Machakos counties) with six (1.39 percent) incidents. Kenya's Muslims are also concentrated in these 12 counties. According to the 2019 census (KNBS, 2019a:422), Kenya's Muslims live in predominantly in Mandera (856, 450), Garissa (815, 755), Wajir (767, 312), Kwale (520, 160), Mombasa (450, 740), Nairobi (326, 809), Tana River (256, 422), Kilifi (253, 966), Marsabit (217, 079), Isiolo (193, 775), Lamu (71, 786), and Machakos (12, 984), all representing 92 percent of all Muslims in Kenya. Furthermore, North-eastern Region, accounting for almost two-thirds (61.16 percent) of all terrorist incidents, is also home to almost half of Kenya's Muslims, i.e., 47.34

percent (2.4 million).[196] The foregoing raises the question: Why these 12 counties, and North-eastern Region in particular, are the locus and focus of Islamist violent extremism in Kenya?

7.2.2 Explaining Islamist Terrorist Activity in the Arc of Insecurity

I noted in Chapter 6, section 6.7 *Major Islamist terrorist activity in Kenya since the 1990s* that Mombasa and Nairobi are political and socio-economic hubs. This explains why out of 47 counties these two counties are targeted as they symbolise the power and authority of Kenya. But what about the other ten counties? A 'false universal' in Kenya and elsewhere that must be quickly dispelled is that the concentration of terrorism in eastern Kenya is a mere function or convenience of geography, i.e., the opportunity offered by proximity to the Somalian border. As an accident of geography and history, it is held that Kenya is an innocent bystander in the wrong place, at the wrong time. Given the hostile security space that *al-Shabaab* inhabits, the restrictions imposed by security measures in Kenya and Somalia, and the limitations posed by the means available to *al-Shabaab*, it is natural and logical that low-cost target selection and opportunity attacks such as those along the Kenya-Somalia border will take place as a matter of course. *Al-Shabaab*, however, are far from being a bunch of kids from suburbia, out on a Friday or Saturday night, driving around, looking for a chance to cause trouble.

I illustrated in Chapter 4, section 4.3.2.3 *Organisational approaches* that Islamist organisations are not social clubs. Mutations such as 'unstrategic target selection', 'indiscriminate violence', and 'opportunity attacks', reflect the tactical and organisational dynamics of these groups. However, they reflect neither the motivation for their formation nor the logic for their long-term intent. The why and how of organisational formation need not always align with subsequent organisational behaviour. One should thus be careful not to confuse the tactical or organisational objectives, with the strategic objectives, of Islamist terrorism. In the vein of the Clausewitzian dictum, Islamist terrorism finds its logic and meaning in political intercourse, i.e., in its political substance and strategic objectives, not in its tactical or organisational grammar, and certainly not in micro (individual) radicalisation and grammar. For these reasons, one should not miss the forest for the trees when it comes to the intent, utility, and the objectives of Islamist violent extremism and its expression, Islamist terrorism, in Kenya.

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[196] Muslims are 5.2 million, 54 percent (2.8 million) being ethnic-Somalis, all representing 11 percent of the 47.6 million population of Kenya. Some counties have sizable Muslim populations, for example, Kakamega County (Western Region), with a Muslim population of 88, 412. However, as opposed to the 92 percent (4.7 million) in the 12 counties in the arc of insecurity, the other eight percent (408, 956) Muslims are distributed over 35 counties. Christians are 85.5 percent of the total population. The rest of the population are Hindu, Traditionalists, or are indicated as 'other religions', 'not religious', or 'not stated' (KNBS, 2019a:1, 12, 422-423).

Contrary to the ‘false universal’ of geography and opportunity, there are logical and rational reasons why *al-Shabaab* focuses on counties in eastern Kenya. Consistent with the intention and objectives of Islamism, as shown in Chapter 4, section 4.2 *Islamist violent extremism*, and Chapter 6, section 6.5.2 *The long-war in Kenya*, *al-Shabaab* seeks to liberate Muslims from foreign (read: Christian) occupation and influences as well as apostate Muslim rulers, establish an Islamic state in East Africa, enforce the *Sharia* in such a state, and create an Islamic renaissance or revival in general. In Chapter 6, section 6.3 *Islamist violent extremism and the fragile state in Kenya*, it is also noted that North-eastern Region and parts of Eastern Region, were part of Somalia before colonialisation, and that Coast Region is Muslim dominated, with an Arab heritage that predates British colonialism. Coast Region was governed separately from the rest of Kenya until it was ceded to the new Kenyan state by the British upon independence. The ‘Big Bang’ of independence in 1963 released generative powers by declining the hope and promise of independence or local autonomy and causing secessionist aspirations and attempts in the former NFD and Coast Region. I also outlined in Chapter 6, section 6.3.2 *Constitutional reforms and devolution*, that one of the unintended outcomes of devolution in 2010 was to redraw battlelines in Kenya. Since 2010, it is not the eight regions but rather the 47 counties that are the battlefields where the struggle for equality and access to resources is waged. The 47 counties are the new administrative units where political bargaining, and the allocation of resources, take place.

In Chapter 6, section 6.7 *Major lslamist terrorist activity in Kenya since the 1990s*, the role of religion in target selection is illustrated in terror attacks such as Westgate (2013), Mpeketoni (2014), Mandera (2014), and Garissa (2015), where *al-Shabaab* gunmen separated and spared Muslims, killing those who were identified as Christians. Other attacks such as the US Embassy (1998), Mombasa (2002), Westgate (2013), and 14 Riverside complex (2019) attacks, and *al-Shabaab*’s subsequent statements, also show that *al-Shabaab* target selection such as Nairobi, Mombasa, and foreign owned entities, is based on symbols of Kenya’s power (the near enemy), and symbols of Kenya’s patrons (the far enemy), mainly the US, UK, and Israel. Kenya and its patrons are seen as supporting an apostate government in Somalia (the near enemy) and standing in the way of establishing an Islamic state in East Africa. The above show consistency with the intention and objectives of Islamism as an ideology and movement.

Furthermore, the incidence of terrorist activity by *al-Shabaab* since the surge from 2010, is explained by endogenous factors of state fragility in Kenya, as elaborated above in section 7.2.1 *Islamist terrorist activity in the arc of insecurity*. This incidence of terrorist activity is also attributed to exogenous and contextual factors beyond Kenya. These internal and external factors include Kenya’s participation in the ‘global war on terror’, *Linda Nchi*, *Usalama* Watch, and AMISOM, as well as Kenya’s interference in the politics of Somalia, and Kenya's perceived or real destabilisation and exploitation of Somalia. To avoid unnecessary repetition, I come back to these endogenous and exogenous factors later in the current chapter, in section 7.3.1 *Cohesion indicators*, and section 7.3.5 *Cross-cutting indicator*.

One key factor that explains lslamist terrorist activity in Kenya's arc of insecurity is demographic pressures. Indicator S1: *demographic pressures*, of the Fragile State Index, is instructive. Many of the demographic pressures in Kenya have their origins in the formation of the state. I indicated in Chapter 3, section 3.2 *What is state fragility*? that much has been written about the origins of the marginalised and fragile African state as an arbitrary and artificial colonial creation, largely resulting in state-formation preceding any sense of nationhood, the division of individual ethnic groups into different states, and imposed borders that did not consider local conditions. In the case of the Somali people, they were divided between British, French, and Italian colonies, and Ethiopia. The Somali nation is today divided between Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Somalia (Thomson, 2016:14, 23). The five-points star on the flag of Somalia symbolises what the Greater Somalia movement of the 1960s and 1970s viewed as inherent parts of Somalia, i.e., the five areas hosting Somali people at independence. When Somalia gained independence in 1960 it unified (1) British Somaliland, and (2) Italian Somaliland, but three regions lay outside the newly independent state, viz., (3) the Ogaden in Ethiopia, (4) southern Djibouti, and (5) the Northern Frontier District (NFD) in Kenya (Burbidge, 2015:22).

Post-independence in Kenya, ethnic-Somalis became an ethnic, religious, economic, and political minority, with most ethnic-Somalis identifying with their coethnics and coreligionists in Somalia and elsewhere, and not their fellow citizens in Kenya. See Chapter 6, section 6.3.1 *Authoritarianism and centralisation*, and the current chapter, section 7.3.2 *Economic Indicators*, for an outline of this marginalisation and exclusion of ethnic-Somalis and Muslims in North-eastern, Eastern, and Coast regions of Kenya. Ethnic-Somalis in Kenya, and the Somalia irredentist movement of the 1960s and 1970s, viewed north-eastern Kenya as part of Somalia. These issues have defined ethnic-Somali identity in Kenya since independence. According to Burbidge (2015), an identity which is feared by the Kenyan state. Burbidge (2015:20) contends that this suspicion of ethnic-Somali identity has "now merged with a narrative of foreign terrorism that pits Kenyan-Somalis against their own nation-state".

Rashid (2010:The Internet) points out that Kenya held a referendum in 1962 in the middle of the Lancaster House conferences. The conferences were organised in 1960, 1962, and 1963 to negotiate the independence of Kenya. The referendum was on the issue of the then NFD. The geographical area of the NFD was allocated to North-eastern Region and Eastern Region after independence. Eighty percent of the NFD population, dominated by ethic-Somalis and Oromo people, representing five of the then six districts in the NFD, voted to be part of Somalia. The five districts were Garissa, Wajir, Mandera, Moyale and Isiolo. The sixth district was Marsabit. Discounting the results of the 1962 referendum, President Jomo Kenyatta reportedly responded: "[p]ack up your camels and go to Somalia", and vice-President Oginga Odinga declared: "[w]e in Kenya shall not give even one inch of our country to Somali tribalist, and that is final".[197] The geographical area of the former NFD is shown below (Whittaker, 2015b:4). As an arbitrary British creation, but critically a post-independence affirmation of this British creation, Kenya neither originated out of the wishes of the Kenyan people nor Muslims in the NFD and Coast Region, and certainly not ethnic-Somalis. After disregarding the results of the 1962 referendum, the new Kenyan state violently suppressed the NFD in the ensuing irredentist *Shifta* war (1963-1968), branding the NFD and those who fought for the independence of the NFD as 'bandit(s)'. Since then, ethnic-Somalis and other Muslims, including North-eastern and Coast regions, have been marginalised and securitised in Kenya.[198] In 1967, when Somalia's prime minister, Mohammed Egal, signed a ceasefire agreement with Jomo Kenyatta, and hostilities officially ending in 1968, it signalled the end of the *Shifta* war, but also dealt a deadly blow to the dream of reincorporating the NFD into Somalia (Kabukuru, 2015:The Internet). It is this irredentist dream of the former NFD, added to calls for the secession in Coast Region since 1963, merged with Islamism, that *al-Shabaab* and *al-Hijra* have revived in Kenya, thus incorporating the secessionist and irredentist aspirations of the former NFD and Coast Region, within the modern-day Islamist agenda of agitating for an Islamic state in East Africa.



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[197] In Branch (2014:643) and Njeri (2015:The Internet) respectively. There was some attempt to return these pre-colonial parts of Somalia. In 1924 the British ceded Jubaland (then part of Kenya's North-eastern Region) to Somalia (Thomson, 2016:23). The issue of a Greater Somalia nonetheless remains unsettled.

[198] See Chapter 6, section 6.3 *Islamist violent extremism and the fragile state in Kenya*.

The colonial incorporation of Somali people in Kenya irrevocably tied the misfortunes of Somalia with Kenya. These misfortunes include Islamism, piracy, civil war, and diverse permutations of insecurity. I outlined in Chapter 3, section 3.4 *The criticism against the theory and application of state fragility* that the 'kin-country syndrome', as a theoretical, analytical, and explanatory instrument, is instructive in this regard. The 'kin-country syndrome', Lemarchand (1997, 2001) and Huntington (1996) maintain, refers to the existence and manifestation of cross-border ethnic-kin and religion-kin affinity and solidarity, in group relations, politics, and conflict. Lemarchand (1997:179; 2001:16) explains that "[w]here ethnic fault-lines cut across national boundaries conflict tends to spill-over from one national arena to the next, transforming kin-solidarities into a powerful vector of transnational violence". Huntington (1996:272) maintains that when such conflicts erupt, along identity fault-lines based on ethnicity and religion, coethnics and coreligionists, within the state, in the region, or around the world, often support and participate in the local conflict, with the tendency to escalate the conflict. But Huntington points at the capacity for kith and kin to also constrain and mediate the conflict. Lemarchand (1997:179) further explains that the kin-country syndrome is also responsible for "the transformation of refugee-generating conflicts into conflict-generating refugees".

The notion of 'conflict-generating refugees' is demonstrated in Kenya. Kenya received an average score of 8.1 (out of 10.00) between 2005 and 2019 on the Fragile States Index for the indicator S2: *refugees and IDPs*. Over the years Kenya has had several refugees and IDPs camps, one of them being the Dadaab complex in Garissa County. Dadaab complex has three camps, viz., Hagadera, Dagahaley, and Ifo, established since 1991 to host Somalia's refugees following the collapse of Somalian state in that year. Originally designed to host 90, 000 refugees, the complex has had a fluctuation in numbers over the years, hosting upwards of half a million refugees in some years. Twenty-eight years after 1991, at the end of 2019, Kenya hosted 488, 867 refugees and asylum seekers, of whom 264, 265 (54.5 percent) were from Somalia. At the end of 2019 Dadaab alone hosted 217, 151 (44 percent) refugees and asylum seekers, of whom 208, 431 (96 percent) were from Somalia. Dadaab has over the years therefore remained one of the largest refugee complexes in the world (Taylor, 2011:The Internet; Kirui and Mwaruvie, 2012:161; Cannon, 2016:25; UNHCR Kenya, 2019a:1, 2019b:1, 2019c:2).[199]

Relations between Kenya and Somalia's refugees are often turbulent. The government has periodically blamed Somalia's refugees in Dadaab of harbouring terrorists, or otherwise accused them of being terrorists themselves. Kenya intended to close the complex in 2016, following the 2015 Garissa attack, which was allegedly planned in Dadaab. Kenya's Interior Minister Joseph Nkaissery stated: "[f]or reasons of pressing national security that speak to the safety of Kenyans in a context of terrorist and criminal activities, the government of the Republic of Kenya has commenced the exercise of closing Dadaab refugee complex" (Lind *et al*, 2017:131). Foreign Affairs Minister Amina Mohamed informed the media: "[w]e are doing this [closing Dadaab] because of our own security. Let's close the camps and see what happens. We'll then see if the evidence we have presented was concrete or not" (Lind *et al*, 2017:132). Hosting refugees is a costly matter. It cost Kenya an estimated US$9.37 billion, in constant 2017 US$, between 2007 and 2016, or an average of 0.75 percent of Kenya's GDP at the time (UNDP, (2020a:8). While Dadaab is not closed, it remains a thorny CVE issue. I revert to the above in Chapter 8, section 8.2 *The arc of insecurity and impediments to CVE*, in the context of barriers to CVE.

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[199] The other two camps that formed part of Dadaab complex, viz., Kambioos and Ifo 2, were established in 2011, and closed in 2017 and 2018 respectively. In June 2019 their remaining asserts were handed over to the Kenyan national government and to the Garissa County government (UNHCR Kenya, 2019b:1, 2019d:1-2).

The demographic pressures in the arc of insecurity have therefore had a tremendous impact on the politics of violence and Islamist violent extremism in Kenya. I demonstrate below how the impact of demographic pressures in Kenya is also seen in the causal relationship between state fragility and Islamist violent extremism as viewed through a longitudinal research design lens. Illustrated on the Fragile States Index with the indicator S1: *demographic pressures*, these pressures score the worst in Kenya for the period under review, with an average of 8.8 (out of 10.00) between 2005 and 2019.

7.3 STATE FRAGILITY AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF ISLAMIST VIOLENT EXTREMISM

I outlined in Chapter 2, section 2.3.4 *Spatial and temporal variation and analysis in explanatory case studies* that added to being single-embedded (spatial variation), this study is also longitudinal. Being longitudinal with temporal variation, the study has a 'before-and-after' design, thus enabling the display of before and after the introduction of X, the *explanans*, the 'Big Bang' that explains the effects being observed. The *explanans* is state fragility. The observed effects, the *explanandum*, are Islamist violent extremism and impediments to CVE. The 'before-and-after' condition refers to before independence and after independence. The seminal moment, the 'Big Bang', is therefore Kenya's independence in 1963. This event affirmed the colonial weak foundations for statehood and nationhood, thus asserting state fragility itself. The act of independence also initiated the time order that released the secessionist attempts and aspirations of the former NFD (1963-1968) and Coast Region (intermittent since 1963), as well as Islamist violent extremism (since the 1990s).[200]

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[200] See Chapter 6, section 6.3 *Islamist violent extremism and the fragile state in Kenya*, and this chapter, section 7.2 *The arc of insecurity and lslamist violent extremism*.

Regarding X (state fragility), as indicated in Chapter 1, section 1.3 *The central proposition*, and Chapter 3, section 3.6.1 *Indicators and measurement*, the aggregate annual fragility scores for Kenya paint an overall bleak picture of state fragility. So does the aggregate average fragility score in the period under review. Kenya has an average *alert* score of 96.2 between 2005 and 2019.[201] With a longitudinal lens, I employ a causal sequence or causal pathway. The causal sequence encapsulates (1) the indicators of state fragility as outlined on the Fragile State Index, and (2) state fragility-induced key historical markers in Kenya. The historical markers span from the *Shifta* war (1963-1968) to Operation *Linda Boni* (since 2015). The causal sequence provides (1) sequences, (2) trace, (3) accounts, and (4) patterns, evidence, of this causal relationship between state fragility and Islamist violent extremism. This causal sequence also establishes a logic that may be applied not only in the case in Kenya, but also in similar contexts. Explanation-building is thus subjected to both empirical evidence and a causal logic, enabling analytic generalisation. The causal sequence enables the exposition of the *why* between X and Y, and by employing causal mechanisms, also enables accounting for the *how*, laying bare the black box of causality between X and Y, thus providing deeper, thicker, more robust, explanation. In building causal mechanisms, I also employ the following congruent middle-range theories and key factors: relative deprivation theory, rational choice theory, the constricted democratic space, marginalisation, insecurity, self-help and the survival motives, the blame system, disengagement (from the state), politically significant identity, and the kin-country syndrome.

In Chapter 2, section 2.3 *Research design*, I outlined how explanation-building in the study is premised on the formulation: cause (X) + causal mechanisms + context = outcome (Y). With a mechanisms-based explanation, the understanding is that state fragility and attendant social structures (entities), have attributes or properties that have causal capacity and tendency. By engaging in actions (activities), in a particular setting or context (in Kenya), these properties of state fragility enable and generate Islamist violent extremism. Based on a retroductive and an inductive-deductive analysis, this is how I formulated the theorised causal sequence between state fragility and Islamist violent extremism:[202]

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[201] It is in the disaggregated indicators where the most salient properties of the fragile state are revealed. In the period under review, each scored out of 10.00, Kenya scores the worst in the following indicators, in this order: demographic pressures (8.8), factionalised elites (8.7), group grievances (8.4), state legitimacy (8.2) refugees and IDPs (8.1), uneven economic development (8.0), external intervention (7.9), security apparatus (7.8), and public services (7.8). The latter two indicators share the eighth position. It is also significant to note that Kenya scores worse in uneven economic development (8.0), than it does in economic decline (7.1), suggesting a pre-eminence of misperformance, rather than underperformance. Refer to Chapter 3, section 3.6.1 *Indicators and measurement*, for the measuring scale and complete ranges on the Fragile States Index, as well as Kenya's fragility scores between 2005 and 2019.

[202] The theorised causal sequence is adapted from Beach's (2016:468) illustration of process-tracing and causal mechanisms. Mayntz (2004:241) maintains that mechanism statements "are causal generalisations about recurrent processes ... linking specified initial conditions and a specific outcome".

X-construct: *state fragility*	**Causal Mechanisms**		**Y-construct**: *Islamist violent extremism*
	Grievances	Response	
Causal statement	**Mechanism statement**		**Outcome statement**
State fragility has causal capacity and tendency; defined by insecurity, violence (structural, physical, and cultural), misperformance, underperformance, and institutional failure, with fault-lines at three levels of the state. viz.: macro (state institutions); meso (state-society relations); micro (between groups in society). State fragility provides the context, enables, and generates Islamist violent extremism.	The properties of state fragility, inclusive of the social structures that subsist in the fragile state, create political, economic, and social conditions that are defined by hopeless scarcity, denied opportunity, ineffective governance, and insecurity (plus ontological insecurity). These conditions include: the failure to accommodate the interests of an ethno-religious identity; a constricted democratic space; socio-economic and political marginalisation and insecurity; relative deprivation; violation and abuse by structures of governance and authority; the victimisation and repression of ethno-religious identity.	A politically significant ethno-religious identity, enabled by the kin-country syndrome, appeal to coethnics and coreligionists within and outside the state. With Islamist organisations, spurred on by self-help and survival motives, this ethno-religious identity, disengaged from the state, rationally responds to the challenges and conditions of state fragility by mobilising and adopting *jihad* to maximise their security within the state or through secession. The state, its government, and society are subject to the blame system of Islamism. The political-religious response is inspired by Islamism as an ideology and a movement that offers an alternative future that prescribes a return to *al-hakimiyya,* the sovereignty of God (Allah), as an all-inclusive solution for the lot of Muslims.	The development and sustainment of Islamist violent extremism, finding expression in Islamist terrorism (may also manifest in Islamist insurgencies and proto-states), in pursuit of religious-nationalist, secessionist/irredentist, and/or transnationalist objectives. These goals are often summed up as the creation of an Islamic state (or Caliphate), under Islam's canonical law, the *Sharia*.

The table above summarises the causal sequence. There is more than one pathway towards political violence in reaction to the conditions and grievances generated by state fragility. The pathway or causal sequence which is theorised and demonstrated in this study and most congruent with empirical evidence, is that of a politically significant ethno-religious identity that responds to the conditions of state fragility, through Islamist organisations and the Islamist movement, by organising, mobilising, and adopting political violence. I demonstrate in Chapter 6, section 6.3 *Islamist violent extremism and the fragile state in Kenya* that the constricted democratic space, together with this political significance of identity, has ensured the prevailing 'religious-political' response to the conditions of state fragility. Endemic insecurity, created by state fragility, drive an ethno-religious identity to seek ways of maximising their security within the state or often through secession. This ethno-religious identity disengages from the state and adopts Islamism.[203] Taşpinar (2009:79) has correctly observed that "when the mosque is the only outlet for mass politics, the outcome is predictable: the Islamisation of dissent. As dissent turns Islamic, what naturally follows is the politicisation of Islam …. Once political Islam is pushed underground, it turns more radical, aggressive, and resentful". Consequently, the pathway from state fragility to Islamist violent extremism is conclusively crystallised and defined.

The inspiration for agitating for political change against state fragility is Islamism, a political-religious ideology and movement that offers an alternative desired future. It prescribes *al-hakimiyya* as the solution to the conditions of state fragility that is defined by fault-lines, insecurity, misperformance, underperformance, institutional failure, and violence (structural, physical, and cultural). In a resultant 'war among the people', the state, its government, and its society, become the subject of the blame system of Islamism. The state is found culpable for the lot of Muslims and other communities on the fringes of society. This blame system reflects the beliefs of Islamists, based on their lived experiences, about who is to blame, or who or what is responsible, for their plight, conditions, or grievances. The use of direct violence (i.e., *jihad*), against the state, its government, and society, is justified in the context of the defence of Islam or Muslims, or in retaliation for injustices, whether real or perceived, against Islam or Muslims. Religion often coincides with ethnicity. Consequently, Islamist organisations and movements may appeal to both coethnics and coreligionists, within and outside of the state, as enabled by the kin-country syndrome, in defence of their coreligionists and coethnics, in their desire to return to *al-hakimiyya*, and in their objective to establish an Islamic state, based on the *Sharia*.

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[203] See Chapter 6, section 6.3.1.4 *The third wave of Islamist violent extremism in Kenya*, and section 6.5.2 *The long-war in Kenya*, and Chapter 8, section 8.3 *State fragility and the development of impediments to CVE*, for an outline of the 'insecurity dilemma' and the search for 'ontological security' by ethnic-Somalis and other Muslims.

The time order in this causal sequence is ignited by the 'Big Bang' of independence in 1963. In Chapter 6, section 6.3 *Islamist violent extremism and the fragile state in Kenya*, I demonstrated how after 1963 the causal sequence developed through specific state fragility induced historical markers. These historical markers, indicating both separation and continuity in state fragility and conflict risk, are encapsulated in two distinct periods of state fragility. The first period stretches from 1963 to 1990, and the second period is since the 1990s. Both periods are characterised by a crisis in state-building, a crisis in nation-building, as well as incessant insecurity. The main response to state fragility by ethnic-Somalis and other Muslims, in the first period, was through the secessionist attempt of the former NFD and the resultant *Shifta* war, as well as the intermittent calls for secession in Coast Region since 1963 (covered in Chapter 6). In the second period the main response is the third wave of Islamist violent extremism that has been raging from the 1990s (covered in this chapter).[204]

The 12 indicators on the Fragile States Index, with the key historical markers embedded, are employed to outline the theorised causal sequence as presented above. While the indicators are disaggregated as necessitated by an unavoidable linear narrative, the indicators interlink in reality. The 12 indicators are consequently considered in totality, albeit some more salient than others (as indicated at the beginning of this section of the chapter). The following fragility indicators will now be addressed: (1) cohesion, (2) economic, (3) political, and (4) social, indicators, as well as (5) the cross-cutting indicator.

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[204] Since 1963, the key historical markers involving and affecting ethnic-Somalis and other Muslims are: the *Shifta* war (1963-1968) and the Isiolo (1968), Garissa (1980), and Wagalla (1984) massacres. The markers are covered in Chapter 6. With the start of the third wave of Islamist violent extremism from the 1990s, the key historical markets are: Kenya's participation in the global war on terror since 9/11, Operation *Linda Nchi* (2011-2012), Operation *Usalama* Watch (2014), AMISOM (since 2012), and Operation *Linda Boni* (since 2015). These markers are covered in Chapters 7 and 8. These historical markers are present in the collective memory of ethnic-Somalis and other Muslims in and outside of Kenya. This impacts on their propensity to radicalise into Islamism.

7.3.1 Cohesion Indicators

I outlined in Chapter 3, section 3.6.2 *Cohesion indicators*, that the cohesion indicators speak to the notion that political governance rests on specific pillars, including legitimacy, accountability, and leadership. The pressures that are related to these indicators account for the eruption of different types of political violence, not Islamist-inspired terrorism alone. The cohesion indicators sustain the notion that when the state stops being relevant to its population, or the state marginalises and represses its population, it becomes easy for the population to undermine the authority of the government and to challenge the legitimacy of the state. Between 2005 and 2019 Kenya scored 8.7 for factionalised elites, 8.4 for group grievances, and 7.8 for security apparatus. After the social indicator, demographic pressures (at 8.8), Kenya therefore scores worse with factionalised elites (at 8.7) in the period under review. An initial outline of the three cohesion indicators is presented in Chapter 6, section 6.3.1 *Authoritarianism and centralisation*, demonstrating that since 1963 Kenya is defined by a constricted democratic space that is contested by factionalised elites who represent ethnic and religion-based identity alliances. The role of group grievances and the security apparatus, including the levels of marginalisation, fragmentation, and victimisation, have also been highlighted, leading to the secessionist attempts and aspirations in the former NFD and Coast Region, and the current Islamist violent extremism. I now expand on the role of the three cohesion indicators, viz.: factionalised elites, group grievances, and security apparatus, starting from the 1990s.

7.3.1.1 *Cohesion Indicators as Context and Permissive Causes*

The cohesion indicators speak to the crises in state-building and nation-building that have plagued Kenya since independence, leading to a secessionist civil war, military coups, communal violence, and elections-related violence. Since the 1990s, however, one has not seen conflicts such as civil wars and secessionist wars, that would be ignited by the extent of group grievances and factionalised elites found in Kenya. What has developed instead, is the new-wars and the long-war, as outlined in Chapter 6. One of these new-wars is cyclical elections-related communal violence. In a study that measured conflict risk related to elections in the 47 counties in Kenya, CRECO (2012:13) finds that of the 12 counties in the arc of insecurity, 10 are assessed *high* conflict risk. Regarding the other two counties, Lamu has *moderate* conflict risk and Machakos has *low* conflict risk. As is the case with Islamism, election related conflict risk is also linked to state fragility.[205] Kenya is a house divided. The Kenyan government fails to appeal to, and command, the loyalty of large sections of society. The failure of the centre to hold in Kenya is recognised and exploited by *al-Shabaab*. By illustration, following the 2013 Westgate attack, *al-Shabaab* stated that Westgate was "a clear demonstration to the Kenyan Muslims that *Jihad* in Kenya is not impossible but, on the contrary, practical …. [Kenya] is merely a fragile third world country struggling for recognition in the continent" (Gaidi Mtaani, 2013b:15).

The security apparatus in Kenya has also enabled Islamist violent extremism. Allen *et al* (2015:36) maintain that terrorist activity in Kenya is credited to "the failure to modernise security agencies, lack of investment in intelligence and policing capabilities, [and] corruption in security forces". This failure is demonstrated by the very ability of *al-Shabaab* to operate in Kenya. In the case of the *Al-Shabaab* branch in Kenya, *al-Hijra*, Adam (2015:The Internet) concludes that "government inadequacies in both Kenya and Tanzania have allowed *al Hijra* to grow and operate within their nations". Kenya therefore incubates conditions that enable and actively generate Islamist violent extremism. These conditions have largely resulted in the lived experiences of marginalisation and indiscriminate repression among specific sections of society, all calling into question the very legitimacy of the state.

7.3.1.2 *Cohesion Indicators as Drivers*

The histories and lived experiences of the marginalisation and indiscriminate repression of ethnic-Somalis and Muslims are marked by the *Shifta* war, and the Isiolo, Garissa, and Wagalla massacres, as outlined in Chapter 6, section 6.3.1 *Authoritarianism and centralisation*. Such histories and lived experiences have continued since the 1990s with the 'war on terror', *Linda Nchi*, *Usalama* Watch, AMISOM, and *Linda Boni*, targeting and affecting ethnic-Somalis and Muslims in Kenya, and their coethnics and coreligionists in East Africa. Kenya's participation in the 'war on terror' is one of the factors that has given impetus to Islamism in Kenya. In fact, Kenya's historical close relations with the US, UK, and Israel, has irreversibly linked local Islamism in Kenya to the 'global' jihadi movement (Aronson, 2013:24-25; Amble and Meleagrou-Hitchens, 2014:528). Kenya has been one of the top five recipients of US State Department Anti-Terrorism Assistance (ATA) funding (Blanchard, 2013:17;

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[205] The Constitution and Reform Education Consortium (CRECO) measures elections-related communal conflict risk in the 47 counties based on seven dimensions: political, security, legal, economic, social, cultural, and environmental dimensions, on a scale of 0 - 20 (low risk: 0 - 10; moderate risk: 11 - 14; high risk: 15 - 20. The factors linked to conflict risk (all of them state fragility indicators), grouped under structural factors and trigger or accelerator factors, include the following: weak state institutions; corruption; marginalisation of minorities and ethnic intolerance; competition over land, political goods, and other resources; weak security and electoral border conflicts; poverty, inequality, and underdevelopment (CRECO, 2012:9, 11-12, 16, 21).

Mabera, 2016:367). Blanchard (2013:1) points out that "[w]ith US aid levels reaching almost US$1 billion annually in some years, Kenya ranks among the top recipients of US foreign assistance globally". Kenya is also seen as a proxy for the West. *Al-Shabaab* contends that *Linda Nchi* was nothing but "Kenya … waging a war on behalf of the United States in return for a meagre salary and perhaps the gradual gentrification of Kenyan slums with 'white' tourists" (Gaidi Mtaani, 2012a:9).

Operation *Linda Nchi* (i.e., 'Protect the Nation') has thus continued the legacy of violence between ethnic-Somalis and Muslims, in and outside of Kenya, and the government in Kenya. The stated aim of *Linda Nchi* was to neutralise *al-Shabaab* in Somalia, as the transitional government in Somalia was unable to safeguard southern Somalia and its side of the border between Somalia and Kenya. The immediate trigger for *Linda Nchi* was *al-Shabaab*'s incursions in Kenya, specifically the kidnapping of foreign tourists and aid workers in Lamu and Garissa counties. Within a period of five weeks, in September and October 2011, *al-Shabaab* crossed into Kenya and killed a British tourist and captured his wife, abducted a French woman who later died in their custody, and kidnapped two Spanish aid workers from the Dadaab refugee complex (Throup, 2012:The Internet; Blanchard, 2013:4). In the two years of Operation *Linda Nchi* (2011-2012), there was a spike in terror attacks, on Kenyan night clubs, police stations, bus stops, and Christian churches (Amble and Meleagrou-Hitchens, 2014:524). This spike is also demonstrated earlier in the chapter in section 7.2.1 *Islamist terrorist activity in the arc of insecurity*. From only six terrorist incidents in 2010, there were 24 incidents in 2011, and 51 in 2012, a 750 percent surge in terrorist incidents in Kenya between 2010 and 2012. The following year, September 2013, the Westgate attack was carried out. Westgate was *al-Shabaab*'s first major attack in Kenya, carried out in retaliation for *Linda Nchi*. Allen *et al* (2015:51) point out that *al-Shabaab* also justified the 2015 Garissa attack as retaliation for Kenya's participation in *Linda Nchi* and AMISOM.

The 2014 Operation *Usalama* Watch (i.e., 'Security Watch') has added to the history of violence between ethnic-Somalis, Muslims, and their government in Kenya. This CVE operation, starting in April 2014, resulted in detention without trial of over 4, 000 ethnic-Somalis, and various other violations of their human rights, including extortion, torture, disappearances, refoulment, and renditions. The operation was largely conducted in regions that have substantial ethnic-Somalis and other Muslim populations, thus creating the impression that Muslim communities were being unfairly punished for the actions of a few Islamist extremists (Botha, 2014a:20-21; Ali-Koor, 2016:2; Mwangi, 2018b:10). Mawiyoo (2015:The Internet) sums up Operation *Usalama* Watch in the following manner: "[w]hile ethnic-Somalis had historically been pigeon-holed as bandits [*shifta*], warlords and pirates, now they were ATM machines - and *al-Shabaab* militants". Balakian (2016:90) finds that "Operation *Usalama* Watch was one episode in ongoing struggles between [ethnic] Somalis … and the Kenyan state".

CVE, and CVE operations such as *Usalama* Watch, characterised by weak investigations that lead to failed prosecutions of alleged Islamic extremists, extrajudicial killings, torture, detention without trial, and widespread disappearances, alienate Muslims and open them up to Islamism (Ali-Koor, 2016:6). If such state terrorism persists, it creates barriers to CVE. Chapter 8, section 8.3.1 *Cohesion indicators and impediments to CVE*, detailing the Political Terror Scale, shows such terrorism, carried out by agents of the Kenyan state, between 1990 and 2019. Bachmann (2012:41) affirms that state terrorism has generated 'anger and fear' among Muslims in Kenya. Furthermore, in Botha's (2014a:20) study, 65 percent of the respondents, i.e., Kenyan-born members of *al-Shabaab* and their relatives, point to Kenya's counter-terrorism (and CVE) policy as the single most important push factor in joining *al-Shabaab*. Denoeux and Carter (2009a:31) also asserts that indiscriminate CVE enhances radicalisation whilst justifying retaliatory attacks. Both these effects strengthen the recruitment drive by Islamists.

AMISOM has also added to the history of violence between ethnic-Somalis, Muslims, and the Kenyan government. AMISOM has been active since 2007. The UNSC authorised AMISOM in January 2007, and within its mandate, to support the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) in Somalia against *al-Shabaab*. Kenya joined AMISOM later in 2012. The Kenyan forces that participated in Operation *Linda Nchi* (2011-2012), were rehatted in 2012 to form part of the Kenyan contingent in AMISOM (Mwangi, 2016:127; Blanchard, 2013:4; Mabera, 2016:367). *Al-Shabaab* justified the 2013 Westgate attack as retaliation for *Linda Nchi* and AMISOM. Westgate was the second most deadly terrorist attack in Kenya since the 1998 US Embassy attack, and the first major attack in Kenya by *al-Shabaab* (Blanchard, 2013:2). To avoid unnecessary repetition, I return later in section 7.3.5 *Cross-cutting indicator* to the impact of the 'war on terror', *Linda Nchi*, and AMISOM, on Islamist violent extremism in Kenya.

Among the impacts of the foregoing historical markers on Islamist violent extremism in Kenya, from the *Shifta* war to AMISOM, is the depreciated social cohesion that is observable in Kenya today, which undermines the development of an inclusive social contract, and legitimate political leadership. In addition, the security apparatus is defined by indiscriminate repression and victimisation, instead of protection and service. This makes the state unresponsive, unaccountable, and less relevant, for ethnic-Somalis and other Muslim communities. This adds to the indicators *factionalised elites* and *group grievances* that explain Islamist violent extremism. Ombaka (2015:22) concludes that "apart from their nominal citizenship they really have no reason to feel that they are a part of Kenya". Based on interviews by Mkhadar Yussuf (2015:The Internet) with Kenyan ethnic-Somalis in Nairobi during the annual Somali Heritage Week, one ethnic-Somali contends that "being a Kenyan should not out shadow the fact that you are Somali ethnically. At the end of the day, though, we are still not all accepted as Kenyans by our brothers and sisters. And that is why you hear about the phrase 'Kenyan-Somali'. I don't think that phrase would exist if we were fully accepted as Kenyans because you will not hear of a Kenyan Kikuyu or a Kenyan Luo or something like that. We are all Kenyans of different, yet vibrant and rich ethnic backgrounds". Another ethnic-Somali bemoans that "[t]his Kenyan-Somali and Somali-Somali thing is a confusion of identity. People are confused. Do you give allegiance to the people you are identified with or the country that you feel you belong to and yet is oppressing you?".

According to the *Awjama* Cultural Centre (2018:13), in their report on the 2018 Somali Heritage Week, the heritage project is designed to demystify negative perceptions of ethnic-Somalis in Kenya, and specifically to "give a counter-narrative of the stereotypes about the Somali community in Kenya; to showcase and preserve the Somali culture; to enhance positive co-existence among Kenyans; promote social responsibility and celebrate dialogue; to promote peace through celebrating Somali culture with the diverse Kenyan community". The Somali Heritage Week, initiated in 2015, has become an annual cultural festival, necessitated narrowly by the marginalisation of Somali-Muslim identity, and broadly by the three levels of state fragility in Kenya that have generated Islamist violent extremism, viz.: (macro) in state institutions; (meso) in state-society relations; (micro) between groups in society. *Dialogue: sharing our stories and building hope*, was the theme of the Somali Heritage Week in 2019.

7.3.2 Economic Indicators

In Chapter 3, section 3.6.3 *Economic indicators*, I indicated that between 2005 and 2019, Kenya scored 8.0 for uneven economic development, 7.7 for human flight and brain drain, and 7.1 for economic decline. I did not find evidence that the indicator E3: *human flight and brain drain*, had any impact on state capacity and the politics of violence in Kenya. At the beginning of this chapter, I contend that state fragility stems less from a capacity deficit, and more from the abuse of such capacity in Kenya. Islamist violent extremism is thus generated more by state misperformance, and less by state underperformance, in Kenya. To explain Islamism in Kenya, one must examine *uneven economic development*, not *human flight and brain drain*, and definitely not *economic decline*. In fact, the economy is doing quite well, with an annual Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth rate that is one of the highest not only in Africa but in the world. The problem is that the economy is excluding not only individuals, but groups and regions, creating horizontal inequalities and thus popular discontent.

7.3.2.1 *Economic Indicators as Context and Permissive Causes*

I outlined in Chapter 3, section 3.2 *What is state fragility?*, that in contrast to the economic decline that is associated with most fragile states in sub-Saharan Africa, Kenya has one of the fastest growing economies. The annual GDP growth rate, averaged at 5.45 percent between 2004 and 2019, is shown on the left. The highest growth in the period under review was 11.60 percent in the fourth quarter of 2010. The lowest growth was 0.20 percent in the fourth quarter of 2008. In 2019 the annual GDP growth rate in Kenya is 5.4 percent (Trading Economics, 2020c:The Internet). From an economy of US$40 billion in 2010, measured by nominal GDP, Kenya's economy had more than doubled by 2018. In 2018, the economy of Kenya was US$87.928 billion, making Kenya the fourth largest economy in sub-Saharan Africa. In 2019, the economy of Kenya is US$98.607 billion, the third largest economy in sub-Saharan Africa (IMF, 2019:The Internet). The size and growth rate of the national economy indicate that Kenya has relative strength and capacity to perform state functions and deliver public goods. Put differently, the inability to adequately perform state functions and deliver public goods is not necessarily a function of economic weakness in Kenya. With the third largest economy in sub-Saharan Africa in 2019, ranking below only Nigeria and South Africa, Kenya has more capacity than the average country in the subregion. The (in)ability to perform state functions and deliver public goods emanate from misperformance at the macro, meso, and micro levels of the state, not from economic weakness.



Before the spurt of economic growth from 2010, Kenyan society had been plagued by low levels of human development, as measured by the Human Development Index (HDI). While there has been some advancement, from a 0.482 HDI value in 1990, by 2005 Kenya's HDI value was only 0.500, indicating persistent low human development (i.e., below 0.550). By 2010, Kenya had reached medium human development (0.550 - 0.699) with a score of 0.551. While Kenya has had a long history of low economic development, from 2004 Kenya has seen rising economic growth, and is classified as a lower middle-income country since 2014. As shown above, Kenya's annual GDP growth rate has averaged 5.45 percent from 2004 to 2019, one of the fastest growing economies in the world. Before then, between 1990 and 2000 Kenya had negative growth in human development, from 0.482 in 1990 to 0.461 in 2000. Since 2010, the HDI values reflect an upward trend in human development. From an HDI value of 0.482 in 1990, in 2010 the HDI values was 0.551, and in 2019 it had risen to 0.601. On the left is the HDI values for Kenya between 1990 and 2019. The HDI value increased by 24.7 percent in the period under review.[206]



The *medium* HDI of 0.601 in 2019 is below the world average of *high* HDI at 0.737 (UNDP, 2020d:353-354). But the HDI has a bias towards national economic growth and does not reveal disparities in human development within society. The Inequality-adjusted Human Development Index (IHDI) was thus introduced in 2010. The IHDI uses the same dimensions and indicators as the HDI yet adjusts them to account for inequality. When there is no inequality, the IHDI has the same value as the HDI. The IHDI falls below the HDI as inequality rises (UNDP, 2020a:1, 4-5, 2020c:1, 4-5). In the case in Kenya, because of the high levels of socio-economic inequality, Kenya's IHDI value is considerably lower than the HDI value. The 2019 HDI value for Kenya of 0.601, indicating *medium* human development, drops by 26.3 percent when discounted for inequality, resulting in an IHDI value of only 0.443, indicating *low* human development, lower than the world average IHDI value of 0.587 in 2019 (UNDP, 2020b:4-5, 2020d:353-354).[207]

What the IHDI tells us is that despite marked improvements in the national economy, the gap between the rich and the poor is increasing in Kenya. Below in this section of the chapter, through the Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI), I demonstrate that poverty has an ethnic and religious face in Kenya, disproportionately affecting more ethnic-Somalis and other Muslims than most groups in Kenya. The chasm between the HDI and the IHDI is telling as Kenya, on average between 2005 and

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[206] Created from Human Development Index (HDI) data (UNDP, 2020b:2-3). The HDI has retroactive revisions of the data, and therefore I use the latest dataset: 1990-2019, and not those published in previous reports. The HDI assesses progress in three domains of human development: (1) a long and healthy life (measured by life expectancy at birth), (2) access to knowledge (measured by mean years of schooling and expected years of schooling), and (3) a decent standard of living (measured by GNI PPP per capita). GNI PPP per capita refers to gross national income (GNI), converted to international dollars, using purchasing power parity (PPP) rates, divided by the total population. The HDI has four categories, placed on a scale of 0 to 1: (1) *very high* human development is 0.800 and above; (2) *high* human development is 0.700-0.799; (3) *medium* human development is 0.550-0.699; (4) *low* human development is below 0.550 (UNDP, 2016a:1-3, 2019a:1-3, 2020c:1-4).

[207] The 2020 Human Development Report includes a new lens of examining human development, the Planetary-pressures-adjusted Human Development Index (PHDI). The PHDI uses the same three domains as the HDI and the IHDI but is calibrated to also account for the pressures and strains of human progress on the planet, by adding the two domains: (4) carbon dioxide emissions, and (5) material footprint. Similar to the IHDI in the case of inequality, the PHDI value of most countries is significantly lower than their HDI value. By illustration, Kenya's 0.601 HDI value in 2019 drops to a 0.594 PHDI value, but still a narrower gap than the world average HDI value of 0.737, which drops down to a world average PHDI value of 0.683 (UNDP, 2020d:235, 242-244, 353-354).

2019, also scores worse with uneven economic development (8.0), rather than economic decline (7.1) on the Fragile States Index. I also showed that Kenya in fact has one of the fastest growing economies (thus not a declining economy). The 2018 Inclusive Development Index (IDI) further shows that Kenya's Gini coefficient is 41.6 percent for income distribution (all forms of income) and 77.2 percent for wealth distribution (all assets), indicating high levels of income inequality, and even higher levels of wealth inequality (WEF, 2018:22, 24).[208] Such uneven development is also evidenced by the Gross County Product (GCP), averaged between 2013 and 2017, as a share of Kenya's GDP, reflecting the relative economic strength and weakness of the 12 counties in the arc of insecurity:[209]

Gross County Product in the arc of insecurity	**Nairobi**	**Mombasa**	**Machakos**	**Kilifi**	**Kwale**	**Garissa**	**Wajir**	**Mandera**	**Tana-river**	**Marsabit**	**Lamu**	**Isiolo**
as % of national GDP	21.7	4.7	3.2	1.6	1.1	0.6	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.4	0.2
Ranking	1	4	5	20	32	40	41	42	43	44	45	47

The above ranking is based on the 47 counties in Kenya. Collectively, including the above GCP figures, the foregoing measures and indicators point to high levels of inequality, not only among individuals. Critically, they point to both horizontal and regional inequality. Such high levels of inequality are neither inevitable nor unavoidable. Extreme poverty and inequality are deliberate political choices that are accepted, even actively pursued, by the state and the government that runs the state, when they allow the selfish inclinations of human nature to flourish. Marginalisation has in fact been the story of Kenya since independence. Kenya is a state defined by a constricted democratic space and zero-sum politics, all contested by identity alliances and factionalised elites. Kenya's Commission on Revenue Allocation found that "[t]he inequalities were manmade …. They were about prejudices and self-aggrandizement on the part of Kenya's leadership and ethnic bigotry" (CRA, 2012b:51).

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[208] The Gini coefficient measures inequality in income and wealth distribution. It is scored between 0 percent, i.e., perfect equality, and 100 percent, i.e., perfect inequality. The Inclusive Development Index (IDI) measures this economic inequality based on three dimensions: (1) growth and development; (2) inclusion; (3) intergenerational equity and sustainability. The three dimensions are each allocated four indicators: *Growth and development*, (1) GDP per capita, (2) employment, (3) labour productivity, (4) healthy life expectancy. *Inclusion*, (5) median household income, (6) poverty rate, (7) income Gini coefficient, (8) wealth Gini coefficient. *Intergenerational equity and sustainability*, (9) adjusted net savings, (10) public debt, as a share of GDP, (11) dependency ratio, and (12) carbon intensity of GDP (World Economic Forum [WEF], 2018:2, 24, 22).

[209] Created from the 2019 Gross County Product (GCP) report and the 2020 County Budget Briefs (CBBs). The main economic activity in each county, as a percentage of GCP, is: Nairobi (60 services, 25 manufacturing, 14 other industries), Mombasa (67 services, 14 manufacturing, 18 other industries), Machakos (43 services, 17 manufacturing, 16 other industries, 24 agriculture), Kilifi (54 services, 7 manufacturing, 7 other industries, 32 agriculture), Kwale (47 services, 7 other industries, 46 agriculture), Garissa (48 services, 3 manufacturing, 6 other industries, 43 agriculture), Wajir (37 services, 9 other industries, 54 agriculture), Mandera (50 services, 10 other industries, 40 agriculture), Tana-river (38 services, 7 other industries, 55 agriculture), Marsabit (30 services, 23 other industries, 47 agriculture), Lamu (40 services, 2 other industries, 58 agriculture), and Isiolo (66 services, 13 other industries, 21 agriculture). The GCP percentages and ranking are averages for 2013-2017, and the main economic activities in the 12 counties are based on 2017 figures (KNBS, 2019b:7, 9, 11; KIPPRA, 2020(a-l):1-3).

Having looked at other indexes and indicators, a more comprehensive measure of socio-economic inequality is arguably the Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI). Similar to the IHDI, the MPI was also initiated in 2010, replacing the Human Poverty Index (HPI). Although the MPI uses the same three dimensions as the HDI and the IHDI, viz., health, education, and living standard, the MPI is calibrated to measure acute deprivation in these three dimensions. Thus, while the HDI uses one indicator for each dimension, the MPI uses multiple indicators for each dimension.[210] The 2020 MPI indicates that Kenya has a national 0.178 (17.8 percent) poverty index, much higher than the world average of 0.114 (11.4 percent). As a share of the national population, there is a 38.7 percent incidence of poverty, 46.0 percent intensity of poverty, 34.9 percent vulnerability to poverty, and 13.3 percent of the population are experiencing severe poverty (OPHI, 2020b:1). Observing MPI poverty per region, clearly North-eastern Region, and parts of Eastern and Coast regions, are collectively the most deprived areas in Kenya. The devil, however, is in the detail, i.e., not in national or regional poverty levels, but in (subregional) county level poverty and in ethnic poverty. Be that as it may, shown above are Kenya's rounded off MPI values per region (OPHI, 2020a:30).[211]



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[210] The MPI measures (1) the incidence of poverty (i.e., the percentage of people who are MPI poor) and (2) the intensity of their poverty (i.e., the average share of indicators in which poor people are deprived), based on three dimensions: education, health, and living standard, utilising 10 indicators. The 10 indicators allocated by dimension are: *Education*, (1) years of schooling and (2) school attendance. *Health*, (3) nutrition and (4) child mortality. *Living standard*, (5) cooking fuel, (6) sanitation, (7) drinking water, (8) electricity, (9) housing, and (10) asserts. The three dimensions are linked to seven Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), viz., 1-4, 6-7, and 11: (1) no poverty (2) zero hunger, (3) good health and well-being, (4) quality education, (6) clean water and sanitation, (7) affordable and clean energy, and (11) sustainable cities and communities. Vulnerability to multidimensional poverty is when an individual, household, community or region is deprived in 20-33.33 percent of the 10 indicators, above 33.33 percent is classified as multidimensional poverty, and between 50-100 percent is classified as severe multidimensional poverty. The measuring scale ranges from 0.0 percent to 100.0 percent, alternatively 0.000 to 1.000, with 100.0 percent or 1.000 representing the highest MPI poverty level (OPHI, 2018a:2-6, 2018b:1, 4-5, 10, 2019a:1-2, 7, 21, 2019b:1-2, 4-5, 10, 2020a:4-5, 21, 30, 2020b:1-2, 10).

[211] The 2020 MPI points out that the impact of the floods and the locust outbreak of 2019/2020 in Kenya is greater in the regions with higher MPI values. These areas are indicated on the map above (OPHI, 2020a:28, 30). Turi (2021) points to the draught of 2021 (linked to climate change) in Kenya as a 'threat multiplier' in communal conflicts between pastoralist and farming communities in various counties, including Marsabit, Turkana, Samburu, Isiolo, Baringo and Laikipia (for a brief outline of these communal conflicts see Chapter 6, section 6.5.1 *New-wars in Kenya*). The above again show that fragile states fail to prevent, mitigate, or manage varied pressures faced by states, including pressures from diseases like Malaria and Ebola, natural disasters like floods, locust outbreaks, and droughts, and human-made disasters like extreme poverty and terrorism (see Chapter 3).

North-eastern Region, with a 0.503 (50.3 percent) index, is the most deprived region in Kenya. With 263 (out of 430) incidents, this region also accounts for almost two-thirds (61.16 percent) of all Islamist terrorist incidents between 2010 and 2019 in Kenya (see section 7.3.2 *Islamist terrorist activity in the arc of insecurity*). As a proportion of the population in the region, there is an 86.7 percent incidence of people living in poverty, 58.1 percent intensity of poverty, and 63.9 percent of the population living in severe poverty. Coast Region has a 0.222 (22.2 percent) poverty index, with a 45.9 percent incidence of poverty, 48.2 percent intensity of poverty, and 21.0 percent of the population living in severe poverty. Eastern Region has a 0.190 (19.0 percent) poverty index, with a 42.1 percent incidence of poverty, 45.1 percent intensity of poverty, and 14.0 percent of the population living in severe poverty (OPHI, 2020b:7). While Eastern Region has poverty levels only slightly higher than the national averages, the northern counties of Eastern Region, viz., Marsabit and Isiolo, are more deprived than other counties such as Embu and Machakos in Eastern Region.[212]

With poverty indexes of 0.503 (50.3 percent), 0.220 (22.2 percent), and 0.190 (19.0 percent), these three regions coexist with the average 0.108 (10.8 percent) index for developing countries, Kenya's 0.178 (17.8 percent) index, Central Region's 0.078 (0.78 percent) index, and Nairobi's 0.038 (0.38 percent) index (OPHI, 2020b:7, 2020a:42). The collective lived experience in the three regions is also equivalent to, or even worse off than, that of people living in some of the most deprived regions in the world, including in G7+ countries such as Burundi, the Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, East-Timor, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, South Sudan, and Yemen.[213] North-eastern Region has a poverty index similar to South Sudan's 0.580 index, Burkina Faso's 0.519 index, Chad's 0.533 index, the Central African Republic's 0.465 index, and Burundi's 0.403 index. The Coast and Eastern regions have poverty indexes that are comparable to Guinea-Bissau's 0.372 index, Yemen's 0.241 index, East-Timor's 0.210 index, Haiti's 0.200 index, Comoros' 0.181 index, and Namibia's 0.171 index (OPHI, 2020a:41-42, 2020b:7). The levels of deprivation in North-eastern, Coast, and Eastern regions of Kenya, are therefore comparable to some of the most deprived countries in the world. This is despite Kenya being the third largest economy in sub-Saharan Africa. The relatively small national economies of Burkina Faso (14.593), Namibia (14.368), Chad (11.026), South Sudan (3.681), Burundi (3.573), the Central African Republic (2.321), Guinea-Bissau (1.397), and Comoros (1.179), are compared to Kenya's 98.607 national economy, all in billion US$ nominal GDP, in 2019 figures (IMF, 2019:The Internet).

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[212] The northern counties of the Rift Valley, viz.: Turkana, West Pokot, Samburu, and Baringo, are also more deprived than other counties in the Rift Valley. Herein lies a limitation of the MPI in Kenya, viz., the inability to measure multidimensional poverty based on the 47 counties, instead of the eight regions. In aggregating deprivation per region, the MPI conceals the variation in deprivation that exists within these regions. Therefore, although the MPI is arguably a much more comprehensive measurement of socio-economic inequality than other indexes, a much more accurate picture, i.e., more approximating of reality, would be a measurement of relative deprivation based on the 47 counties in Kenya. A disaggregated MPI measurement in Isiolo and Marsabit would reveal higher levels of deprivation in those counties than is currently revealed by the aggregated MPI value for Eastern Region. Coast Region would also reveal this variation in county deprivation. Consequently, the MPI correctly reveals high levels of deprivation in North-eastern Region because this region encompasses collectively three marginalised and deprived counties (i.e., Garissa, Wajir, and Mandera). County-level disaggregation would also be more approximating of reality as the counties in Kenya are central administrative units where the allocation of resources and political bargaining takes place, and therefore the appropriate units to use in measuring relative deprivation. See in the current chapter in section 7.3.4 *Social indicators*, the County Development Index, and the Comprehensive Poverty Report. These two indexes measure human development and multidimensional poverty respectively, in Kenya's 47 counties, and not in the eight regions.

[213] The G7+ self-classify as 'fragile and conflict-afflicted' (see Chapter 3, section 3.2 *What is state fragility*?).

Ethnic-Somalis in specific have the lived experiences of some of the most deprived identity groups in Kenya. For the first time the 2020 MPI had a supplement that disaggregated multidimensional poverty by ethnic groups, by documenting horizontal inequality in 24 countries, including Kenya (Alkire and Kovesdi, 2020:1-3). Ethnic-Somalis have a poverty index of 0.458 (45.8 percent), a 79.27 percent incidence of poverty, and a 57.77 percent intensity of poverty, most of them having to subsist on less than US$1.90 a day, all coexisting with Kenya's national index of 0.178 (17.8 percent). In fact, of all Kenyan ethnic groups, only ethnic-Turkana and ethnic-Samburu have higher deprivation than ethnic-Somalis. Ethic-Turkana have a poverty index of 0.472 (47.2 percent), an 80.23 percent incidence of poverty, and a 58.80 percent intensity of poverty. Ethic-Samburu have a poverty index of 0.528 (52.8 percent), an 85.21 percent incidence of poverty, and a 61.95 percent intensity of poverty. By comparison, ethnic-Taita-Taveta have a poverty index of 0.073 (0.73 percent), an 18.70 percent incidence of poverty, and a 38.79 percent intensity of poverty. Kikuyu have a poverty index of 0.066 (0.66 percent), a 16.13 percent incidence of poverty, and a 40.87 percent intensity of poverty. There is therefore a 63.14 percentage difference in the incidence of poverty between ethnic-Somalis and ethnic-Kikuyu (Kovesdi and Mitchell, 2020:The Internet; Jennings and Oldiges, 2020:12).[214]

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[214] Whereas there is a difference in measuring poverty by multidimensional poverty (MPI) as opposed to monetary poverty (i.e., less than US$1.90 a day) as reflected in other contexts, in Kenya there is a correlation between MPI poor and monetarily poor. The proportion of people who are MPI poor is similar to those that are also monetarily poor, surviving on less than US$1.90 a day. The 2021 MPI also disaggregate poverty by ethnic groups, this time in 41 countries (not 24), including Kenya. The 2021 MPI figures for Kenya are comparable to the 2020 MPI. The figures on the 2021 MPI are: a national index of 0.171 (17.1 percent), a 37.5 percent incidence of poverty, and 45.6 percent intensity of poverty. Ethnic-Somalis have a 0.431 (43.1 percent) poverty index, a 75.3 percent incidence of poverty, and a 57.3 percent intensity of poverty. Ethnic-Turkana have a 0.479 (47.9 percent) poverty index, an 81.4 percent incidence of poverty, and a 58.9 percent intensity of poverty. Ethnic-Samburu have a 0.502 (50.2 percent) poverty index, an 85.2 percent incidence of poverty, and a 58.9 percent intensity of poverty. By contrast, ethnic-Taita/Taveta have a 0.080 (0.80 percent) poverty index, a 20.0 percent incidence of poverty, and a 40.2 percent intensity of poverty. Ethnic Kikuyu have a 0.069 (0.69 percent) poverty index, a 17.0 percent incidence of poverty, and a 40.6 percent intensity of poverty (Jennings and Oldiges, 2020:12; Alkire *et al*, 2021a:The Internet; OPHI, 2021a:4, 12, 30; OPHI, 2021b:1, 10).

In taking stock of the foregoing statistics, it is clear that nearly six decades since independence in 1963, the dividends of democracy and economic growth in Kenya have not reached many individuals, households, and communities of North-eastern, Coast, and Eastern regions, neither the 92 percent of Muslims who live in the 12 counties in the arc of insecurity, nor the 79.27 percent of ethnic-Somalis who are MPI poor and surviving on less than US$1.90 a day. These neglected and denied dividends include increased welfare and opportunity, shared growth, social justice, and broadly available and shared political goods. Instead, as shown in Chapter 6, the state has marginalised and securitised these regions and communities since independence. To employ the terminology of development practitioners, the people of North-eastern, Coast, and Eastern regions, largely Muslims and ethnic-Somalis, have been *left behind* by the Kenyan state.[215] In Chapter 3, section 3.6 *The application of state fragility: the Fragile States Index*, I asserted that *a hungry man is* [proverbially] *an angry man*, i.e., a deprived community is an aggrieved community. Thus, the relationship between the relative deprivation (induced by state fragility) and political violence, becomes self-evident. In this case political violence takes the form of Islamist terrorism as driven by, and as an expression of, Islamism.

As indicated above, the MPI is linked with seven SDGs (i.e., 1-4, 6-7, and 11). Shown below, in section 7.3.4 *Social indicators*, the Social Progress Index (SPI) measures the outcomes of the 17 SDGs (SPI, 2019c:22-23, 2020b:19-20). The MPI and SPI (and other indexes in this study) capture different dimensions and outcomes of state fragility. Similar to these indexes, the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) Index, which measures progress towards achieving the SDGs, also highlight widespread deprivation, low social progress and well-being, and general low human development, in Kenya. The 2019 and 2020 SDGs Index indicate that Kenya is lagging behind in achieving the seven SDGs that are linked to the MPI, viz.: (1) no poverty; (2) zero hunger; (3) good health and well-being; (4) quality education; (6) clean water and sanitation; (7) affordable and clean energy; (11) sustainable cities and communities (UNSDSN, 2020b: 21, 254, 2019d:22, 29, 106-107, 2020c:1).[216] Scored on a scale of 0 (worst) to 100 (best) on the SDGs Index, in 2018, Kenya was scored 57.0 (out of 100), ranking 125 out of 162 countries assessed. In 2019, Kenya was scored 60.2, ranking 123 out of 166 countries assessed. What the 2019 and 2020 SDGs Indexes tell us is that despite some limited progress, fragile states such as Kenya are unlikely to achieve the SDGs targets by 2030 (UNSDSN, 2020b: 21, 254, 2019c:1, 2020b:27, 276, 2020c:1). In fact, according to the 2019 Africa SDGs Index, Kenya is 'on track' to achieve only one SDG by 2030, viz., SDG 12: responsible consumption and production. SDG 13: climate action, is classified as experiencing 'challenges' but 'on track'. SDG 8: decent work and economic growth, is classified as experiencing 'challenges' but 'moderately improving'. The other 14 SDGs are classified as experiencing either 'significant challenges' or 'major challenges', in Kenya (UNSDSN, 2019d: 22, 29, 106-107). In 2019, Kenya regressed with the achievement targets of all 17 SDGs.

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[215] See the UNDP (2018) discussion document, *What does it mean to leave no one behind*?, and the AU (2015) policy document, *Agenda 2063: The Africa We Want*. 'Leave no one behind' is a key principle of the *2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development* of the UN and the *Agenda 2063: The Africa We Want* of the AU.

[216] The SDGs Index was introduced in 2015. Both the SDGs Index and the World Happiness Index, which are addressed later in section 7.4.4 *Social Indicators*, are produced by the United Nations Sustainable Development Solutions Network (UNSDSN). Added to the seven SDGs mentioned above, the UNSDSN (2019b:1, 2020b:40) lists the following SDGs (17 in total): (5) gender equality; (8) decent work and economic growth; (9) industry, innovation and infrastructure; (10) reduced inequalities; (12) responsible production and consumption; (13) climate action; (14) life below water; (15) life on land; (16) peace, justice, and strong institutions; (17) partnership for the goals. The 17 SDGs, all to be achieved by 2030, are measured in terms of a four-tier scale: (1) achievement; (2) challenges; (3) significant challenges; (4) major challenges, each measured by their current trend, whether (1) on track to be achieved, (2) moderately improving (3) stagnating, or (4) decreasing.

The 2020 Africa SDGs Index classifies SDGs 8, 12, 13 and 15 as experiencing 'challenges', SDGs 1, 4-5, 10-11, 14 and 17 as experiencing 'significant challenge', and SDGs 2-3, 6-7, 9 and 16 as experiencing 'major challenges', in Kenya. The 2020 Africa SDGs Index also has a 'leave no one behind' index, which measures inequality in the achievement of the SDGs. In terms of the 'leave no one behind' categories, 'income inequality' is classified as experiencing 'significant challenges', 'extreme poverty and material deprivation' and 'access to and quality of services' are classified as experiencing 'major challenges'. Kenya's 60.2 SDGs Index score in 2019 is reduced to 50.4 on the 'leave no one behind' index, which indicates the high levels of inequality in achieving the SDGs in Kenya (UNSDSN, 2020d:38, 40-41, 118-119). Granted, many of the wealthiest countries with high levels of human development are also struggling to achieve all SDGs, as attested on the 2019 SDG Index (UNSDSN, 2020b:1). In fact, measuring the outcomes of the 17 SDGs, the 2019 Social Progress Index calculates that if the current trends are maintained, the world will not achieve the SDG targets as planned by 2030, but only by 2073. The 2020 Social Progress Index adjusts this projection to 2082 (SPI, 2019c:22-23, 2020b:21).[217]

Despite this world trend, given the levels of absolute and relative deprivation and low social progress and well-being, compounded by the absence of socio-economic safety nets, the lack of progress in achieving the SDGs is much more severe, with more dire consequences, for Kenya. Poverty in Kenya acquire a completely different meaning when considering what poverty means in other parts of the world. Kenya's GDP per capita is 4, 330, compared to the world's average of 16, 944 GDP per capita, and compared with an average of 6, 562 GDP per capita for other lower middle-income countries in 2019, all in 2017 US$ PPP (World Bank, 2020:The Internet). Not only does Kenya underperform, in section 7.4.4 *Social Indicators*, the Social Progress Index (and other measures) provides evidence that Kenya has underperformed consistently over a lengthy period. Kenya is consistently failing to translate high rates of economic growth into commensurate social progress. Instead, Kenya generates exclusion and inequality, and consequently relative deprivation and popular discontent, thus political violence.

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[217] When factoring in the impact of the coronavirus pandemic, the projection is 2092 (SPI, 2020b:21).

Given the effort required to curb and mediate the drivers of Islamist violent extremism, Kenya simply cannot afford to perform as badly as it does on the SDGs Index (or other indicators that are related to state fragility). Specifically, Kenya cannot afford to persist in underperforming on the SDGs that are linked to the drivers of Islamism, including those related to peace, justice, responsive institutions, well-being, and access to public goods and resources, and those related to inequality, relative poverty, and hunger. However, as already noted, the SDGs are unlikely to be achieved by 2030, which creates the spectre of even more deprivation for communities, particularly the 92 percent of Muslims that live in the arc of insecurity in Kenya. This is a global trend. In this regard, 628 million people globally were affected by hunger (undernourished) in 2014. In 2019, the figure was 688 million, and the number is projected to be 900 million by 2030 (UNDP, 2020d:56-57). Furthermore, estimated at 1.4 billion, the world's 'bottom billion' is projected to grow to 1.9 billion by 2030, more than 80 percent will be living in fragile states. Nine in ten of people, living on less than US$1.90 a day, will be living in sub-Saharan Africa, Kenya included (Baker, 2017b:3; OECD, 2018:17, 53, 95; World Bank, 2018d:The Internet).

The Human Development Report 2020 includes the new Planetary-pressures-adjusted Human Development Index (PHDI), which warns that future human development will have to consider the pressures of human progress on the planet. These pressures include mutually reinforcing social imbalances such as inequality, and planetary imbalances brought about by factors such as climate change, all characterised by ecological threats that are often clustered under the rubrics of natural disasters and resource scarcity (UNDP, 2020d:3-5, 12-14, 24-25). The conclusion: "More material resources matter … because they expand people's opportunities, from one generation to the next, … *when fairly distributed and within planetary boundaries*" (UNDP, 2020d:6). The levels of unrestrained economic activity that have characterised human progress so far, leading to high economic growth and greater prospects for social progress, may therefore not be sustainable for the future of humankind. This is the prospect for marginalised communities in Kenya. Particularly those that live in the arid and semi-arid areas that form the greater part of the arc of insecurity. Again, this points to greater levels of state fragility and greater levels of its associated outcomes, further locking Kenya in the mutually reinforcing insecurity dilemma, the fragility trap, and related conflict trap.

In fact, in 2018 Kenya created the Ministry of Devolution and the Arid and Semi-Arid Lands (ASALs). According to the Ministry, ASALs make up 89 percent of Kenya, covering 29 of the 47 counties. The

Ministry notes that ASAL counties have 'the lowest development indicators' in Kenya, a factor highlighted in this study, and elaborated on in this chapter. Except for Nairobi, Mombasa, and Machakos, all counties affected by Islamist terrorism in Kenya are ASAL counties. Marsabit, Isiolo, Mandera, Wajir, Garissa, and Tana-River are classified as arid, and Lamu, Kilifi and Kwale as semi-arid (Republic of Kenya, 2019:The Internet). In Chapter 3, I detail how resilient states have the coping capacity to mitigate the effects of the varied pressures. By contrast, fragile states do not have equivalent capacities to cope with the effects of pressures from human-made disasters such as extreme poverty and terrorism, or the effects of climate change and ecological threats. This is whether climate change and ecological threats serve as drivers, enablers, or exacerbators of political violence *writ large*, or terrorism in particular. In Somalia, the link between state fragility, climate change, and terrorism, is empirically founded. There exists a clear causal pathway of the impact of increased desertification and recurrent droughts and floods on food and water security, feeding into increased migration and the fight over already scarce resources, thus fueling marginalisation and discrimination against minority clans. All combine to drive the destitute into the ranks of *al-Shabaab*.[218]

Raineri (2020) points to the link between climate change, environmental degradation, and Islamist terrorism in the Sahel Region, particularly the border area across Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger. This link is based on increasing competition for scarce resources as caused by climate change. Raineri (2020:7-8) finds that, whereas empirical evidence does not show a direct causal link between climate change, resource competition, and Islamist terrorism, when such competition takes place in the context of unequal resource distribution or unequal governance frameworks, such a causal link is patently generated. The 2020 Global Terrorism Index shows that the six countries in sub-Saharan Africa with the greatest increase in terrorism in 2019, which include Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, also face between two and five ecological threats. In the case of the Lake Chad Region (within the Sahel Region), *Boko Haram* has exploited the impact of ecological threats in the region by taking over large geographical areas, including gaining access to Lake Chad. This makes *Boko Haram* an alternative security provider and an alternative employer (IEP, 2020a:59-60).[219]

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[218] In the case in Somalia, see Kuele and Miola (2017), Eklöw and Krampe (2019), and Green (2020). In Kenya, Turi (2021:The Internet) finds that climate change and the draught in 2021 have exacerbated communal conflicts over land ownership and usage, between pastoralist and farming communities, in: Turkana, Marsabit, Isiolo, Samburu, Laikipia, Baringo, Narok, and Kajiado. Furthermore, the UN predicted that 2.4 million people in Kenya's arid and semi-arid counties will struggle to find food and water in 2021/2022 because of the drought (Pietromarchi, 2021:The Internet). Demonstrated by Marsabit and Isiolo above, the 12 counties in the arc of insecurity are therefore also not immune to the link between state fragility, climate change, and conflict risk.

[219] The Sahel is the semi-arid region directly south of the Sahara Desert, stretching from Mauritania and Senegal, including Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Nigeria, and Chad, to Sudan and Eritrea. According to the 2020 Global Terrorism Index, there are two ecological hotspots in sub-Saharan Africa, viz.: the Sahel-Horn belt from Mauritania to Somalia, and the southern African belt from Angola to Madagascar. With the link between climate

7.3.2.2 *Economic Indicators as Drivers*

The foregoing are everyday conditions experienced by the world's 'bottom billion' as characterised by Collier (2007). In Chapter 3, section 3.3 *The state fragility-security-development nexus*, I noted the grave conditions where the world's bottom billion reside. In such an environment of hopeless scarcity, with communities that have experienced generations of socio-economic and political marginalisation, with little or no socio-economic safety nets, life is cheap, and recruitment for anyone who can offer food and a cause is equally cheap (Rotberg, 2004:6; Collier, 2007:20; UNDP, 2017:6, 50). North-eastern, Coast, and Eastern regions of Kenya, where more than 90 percent of ethnic-Somalis and other Muslims live, constitute Kenya's bottom billion. By commission and omission, the fragile state in Kenya has already half-recruited, on behalf of *al-Shabaab*, the next jihadi intake in these regions. The answer to the question of whether people on the fringes of society are amenable to enlistment into Islamist violent extremist organisations such as *al-Shabaab* is therefore patently obvious. The UNDP (2017:5), in its study on violent extremism in Africa, which included former members of *al-Shabaab*, also found that 'employment' was 'the single most frequently cited reason for joining an extremist group'.

Low human development, inequality, and related state fragility conditions are linked to the socio-economic, group, and individual drivers of Islamist violent extremism. In this regard, Aronson (2013:25) points out that almost half the population in Kenya live below the poverty line. But absolute poverty does not explain conflict, rather, it is relative poverty that does. Allen *et al* (2015:44) finds that the link between relative poverty and Islamist extremist violence is strongest in low-income but highly unequal societies, pointing out that the economic deprivation of Kenya's Muslims and specifically the Muslim majority Coast and North-East regions, as well as Somalis as an ethno-religious minority, explain Islamist violent extremist in Kenya. Muhula (2009:86) contends that "horizontal inequalities remain the single most important determinant of political contests in Kenya". Botha (2014c:106) also contends that "when religion or ethnicity is linked to political or economic marginalisation, these differences are used to identify and justify the use of violence against *the other*". It is this deprivation that *al-Shabaab*'s affiliate, *al-Hijra*, is exploiting. Adam (2015:The Internet)

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change and/or ecological threats and Islamist terrorism, the Institute for Economics and Peace also agrees that the link is not linear (IEP, 2020a:59-60). Linking state fragility, climate change, and Islamist terrorism in the Sahel, Crawford (2015) finds that factors such as political and economic instability, inequality, historical grievances, poor governance, weak institutions, and corruption, combine to either exacerbate existing tensions or trigger conflicts, including Islamist terrorism. Amy Below (2019) finds that climate change is a 'threat multiplier'. Instead of being a direct trigger/cause of conflict, climate change exacerbates already existing conditions for conflict. Be that as it may, state fragility in places such as Kenya undermines the capacity of the state to manage the effects of climate change or ecological threats either as 'drivers' or as 'threat multipliers' of political conflict.

maintains that "*Al Hijra* has pivoted its recruitment propaganda on Muslim marginalisation, social stagnation and economic disempowerment thus appealing to many young unemployed Muslims".

Amble and Meleagrou-Hitchens (2014), based on interviews with non-ethnic-Somali former members of *al-Shabaab*, highlight the incentive of financial gain for joining *al-Shabaab* that cuts across ethnicity and even religion for the new converts into Islam. Given the reality of low living standards and the lack of economic opportunities for many in Kenya, indigenous Kenyan members of *al-Shabaab* joined on the promise of a monthly salary of KSh40, 000 (Kenyan Shillings), about four times the national salary average (Amble and Meleagrou-Hitchens, 2014:525). There has also been reports of offers upwards of KSh200, 000 per month. Such economic incentives are presented at the heart of the country's Muslim majority (i.e., North-Eastern Region) that has significantly lower human development indicators, with very high unemployment rates among Muslim youth (Amble and Meleagrou-Hitchens, 2014:530). Muhula (2009:100) also underlines that not only is North-eastern Region one of the poorest in Kenya, but the region also records the worst in all measures of socio-economic well-being. In this regard, Ali-Koor (2016:5) also notes that youth unemployment in Muslim-dominated Coast and North-eastern regions is 40-50 percent higher than the national unemployment average.

The employment and financial incentive however form only one part of the total incentive structure of *al-Shabaab*. Aside from the instrumental employment and financial incentive, the incentive structure of *al-Shabaab* is primarily based on varied levels of radicalisation among the differentiated members of *al-Shabaab*. Furthermore, while informed by different but interacting levels of radicalisation, the incentive structure is based on the invariable intention of returning to *al-hakimiyya* and the objective of creating an Islamic state based on the *Sharia*. The varying levels of radicalisation range from what the Africa Center for Strategic Studies categorises as cultural, socio-economic, political, and group-individual drivers of violent extremism (ACSS, 2016:8, 10, 12, 14). This is what most analyses fail to appreciate. The employment and financial incentive, and the varying levels of radicalisation are just as utilitarian and instrumental as terrorism itself. However recruited or enlisted, and whatever varying motivations or objectives of individuals within the group, the logic and intent of the group itself remain singular and constant (see Chapters 4 and 6). Moreover, the employment and financial incentive was most prominent when *al-Shabaab* controlled the port of Kismayo between 2006 and 2012, including the illicit charcoal trade.[220] This brings me to the political indictors.

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[220] See section 7.3.5 *Cross-cutting indicator*, and Chapter 8, section 8.3.5 *Cross-cutting indicator and impediments to CVE*.

7.3.3 Political Indicators

The three political indicators in the Fragile States Index are: (1) state legitimacy; (2) public services; (3) human rights and the rule of law. Between 2005 and 2019, Kenya scored an average of 8.2 for state legitimacy, 7.8 for public services, and 7.1 for human rights and the rule of law. Since independence, Kenya has been mostly an authoritarian state, undermining state legitimacy, human rights, civil liberties, the rule of law, and the provision of public services. In Chapter 3, section 3.6.4 *Political indicators*, I elaborate on how authoritarianism and the crises of governance and legitimacy are linked with political violence *writ large*, including secessionist attempts, insurgency, coup attempts, communal violence, and elections related violence. All have defined Kenya since independence.[221]

The above political indicators have also generated Islamist violent extremism in Kenya. In Chapter 6, section 6.3.1.4 *The third wave of Islamist violent extremism in Kenya*, I elaborate on how the social legitimacy perspective regards the state as ‘a political marketplace that is defined by competing political ideas and political bargaining’. If a state lacks the capacity to appeal to, and command, the loyalty of sections of society in such a marketplace, that state is deemed fragile. Kenya is evidently failing to command the loyalty of particular sections of its society in the contest between itself and *al-Shabaab*. It must be accepted that, although delegitimised because of the relations with terrorism, and despite their close linkages with religion, Islamist organisations are essentially political entities and formations that compete for the ‘hearts and minds’ of society. The regime in Kenya is clearly failing to effectively control and manage this hegemonic struggle in the political marketplace in Kenya.

7.3.3.1 *Political Indicators as Context and Permissive Causes*

At the 2015 Summit on Countering Violent Extremism, former US President Barack Obama (2015b:The Internet) concluded that “[w]hen peaceful, democratic change is impossible, it feeds into the terrorist propaganda that violence is the only answer available”. This speaks to the levels of authoritarianism in Kenya that have stifled peaceful forms of popular dissent and restricted the democratic space, including extensive violations of human rights and civil liberties, as illustrated through the Political Terror Scale and the Freedom House Index (see the next chapter).[222] The Institute for Economics and

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[221] See Chapter 6, section 6.3 *Islamist violent extremism and the fragile state in Kenya*, and the current chapter, in section 7.3.1 *Cohesion indicators*.

[222] In Chapter 8, section 8.3.1 *Cohesion indicators and impediments to CVE*, I detail the Political Terror Scale, outlining political terror or state terrorism between 1990 and 2019 in Kenya. In Chapter 8, section 8.3.3 *Political indicators and impediments to CVE*, I also outline the Freedom House Index, indicating that Kenya was rated as *not free* (5.5 - 7.0) prior to 2002, and invariably *partly free* (3.0 - 5.0) between 2002 and 2019.

Peace (2018:58, 2019:2) points out that extensive abuse of human rights, as indicated by political terror, is a major driver of terrorism. The Institute describes political terror as involving actions such as extra-judicial killings, torture, and imprisonment without trial, by agents of the state.

Such authoritarian tendencies are also revealed when coming to civil society in Kenya. Civil society is a key institution in ensuring political accountability and transparency. However, as the Africa Center for Strategic Studies (2016:8) laments, “civil society, arguably the ideal sector for acting against cultural, [group and individual] drivers [of Islamist violent extremism], is often weak and curtailed in Africa”. Ombaka (2015:17) asserts that civil society in Kenya is “more likely to be viewed with hostility… [and] perceived as ‘the enemy’ by certain sections of the state elite who have on occasion derided it as ‘the evil society’”. Ombaka (2015:17) holds that international donor funding account for 91 percent of funding for civil society in Kenya. The Kenyan government proposed to limit foreign funding to 15 percent. This was seen as an effort to reign in civil society groups and stifle dissent.

This was after 2010 when these groups were critical of CVE efforts and the perceived undermining of the ICC, following the indictment of Kenyan politicians for the 2007/2008 post elections violence. In Ombaka’s (2015:17) words, restricting funding from 91 to 15 percent, is an effort to “throttle this sector into extinction”. Civil society are voluntary, independent, privately funded, formally organised groups that are vital as democracy watchdogs. However, with the deficiencies of Africa’s economies, an independent capitalist class that will fund civil society, has not developed. Englebert and Dunn (2014:121-122) contend that whichever civil society that exists in Africa, that civil society tends to be heavily foreign-donor funded, which undercuts their perceived independence and impartiality, often pitting them against local governments. At times, civil society is even partly funded by government, further diminishing their independence and impartiality. It is no wonder then that the African state fosters abusive structures of governance, with minimum accountability and lack of transparency as reigning conditions. Such misgovernance defines state fragility, as further shown hereafter.

7.3.3.2 *Political Indicators as Drivers*

I argued under the cohesion indicators that the violation of human rights and civil liberties in Kenya, particularly as they relate to ethnic-Somalis and Muslims, may be traced from the *Shifta* war (1960s) to Operation *Linda Boni* (since 2015). This has fuelled social fragmentation, histories of victimisation, and narratives of humiliation, linking these local experiences with similar experiences of ethnic-Somalis and Muslims in East Africa and elsewhere in the world. Denoeux and Carter (2009a:31-32) contend that “the greater and the more intense the exposure to victimisation at home, the more the perceived slaughter of Muslims around the globe will tend to resonate on a deep, personal level”. It has become clear for Muslims on the margins of society that electoral democracy and political representation in Kenya do not yield democracy dividends such as increased welfare and equity, access to state resources, and protection of human rights, civil liberties, and the rule of law.

Social fragmentation, marginalisation, and discontent are reflected on views regarding the electoral process, and on the utility of the electoral process, in Kenya. Both the MRC and *al-Shabaab* have therefore repeatedly called upon all Muslims in Kenya not to participate in the (constricted) democratic process and to boycott elections in Kenya. By illustration, *al-Shabaab* warned against participation in the 2013 elections in Kenya (Gaidi Mtaani, 2013a:5):

> *Harakat Al-Shabaab Al Mujahideen* also calls upon the Muslims in Kenya to fully boycott the coming elections and not to be repeatedly deluded by the illusory promises of the government. Not only is the participation in the elections prohibited in Islam but also the current government has terribly failed to protect the rights of Muslims in Kenya. Therefore, Muslims must take the matter into their own hands, stand united against the *Kuffar* and take all necessary measures to protect their religion, their honour, their property and their lives from the enemies of Islam.

At the 2015 Summit on Countering Violent Extremism, former US President Barack Obama (2015a:The Internet) also warned that “[w]hen governments oppress their people, deny human rights, stifle dissent, or marginalise ethnic and religious groups, or favour certain religious groups over others, it sows the seeds of extremism and violence. It makes those communities more vulnerable to recruitment”. Simons and Tucker (2007:399) consequently point to the fact that because Kenyan Muslim “communities have long been treated as marginal to the political process and marginal to the development of the country [, it] renders them precisely the kinds of communities in which terrorists should be able to find support”. The fragmentation, marginalisation, and discontent are also reflected in the provision of public goods, and more narrowly, social services, in Kenya.

The provision of public goods and services is perhaps the most tangible state function in the eyes of the population, often used as a proxy for governance itself. Therefore, fragility in the provision of public services has a huge impact on state legitimacy and state authority. One failure in the provision of public services in Kenya is in the provision of security and the lack of trust in the security apparatus of the state as addressed earlier in the current chapter in section 7.3.1 *Cohesion indicators*. Another failure is in the provision of education as a public good. This has enabled the operations of foreign funded *madrassas*, and the importation of extremist ideas in the education sector in Kenya by foreign actors such as Saudi Arabia. To avoid unnecessary repetition, I revert to this later in the chapter in section 7.3.5 *Cross-cutting indicator*, to briefly outline the role of *madrassa* education and the role of external actors in the process of radicalisation into Islamist violent extremism in Kenya.

Public services are lacking in the arc of insecurity. Ombaka (2015:15-16) contends that there are few state-run health facilities and educational services in these areas. Ombaka (2015:16) finds that "[c]ivil society as exemplified by non-governmental organisations (NGOs), especially missionary non-governmental organisations, is the only source of health and education services that most of these areas know …. [U]p to 80 percent of the health programmes in this region are supported by NGOs". The few state-run facilities that exist are poorly staffed, and mostly staffed by non-residents. By illustration, Ombaka (2015:16) points to the November 2014 Mandera attack where *al-Shabaab* militants attacked a bus travelling from Mandera to Nairobi as a typical example. Among the dead were 24 schoolteachers travelling to their home counties after the schools closed for Christmas holidays. The bus had to travel on the circuitous and road along the border with Somalia, as there was no other road directly from Mandera to Nairobi. This route exposed the bus and its passengers to this attack of opportunity.[223] Abdille (2017:The Internet) points to the near absence of the state in such areas as the peripheral areas of Isiolo and Marsabit. Abdille (2017:The Internet) contends that "[f]or a long time, the Catholic Church and non-governmental organisations have been the main service providers. In this region the Catholic Church has been able to reach where the government has been unable to reach: building hospitals, schools, water points". These ungoverned spaces in peripheral Kenya are sources of discontent for communities, and thus safe havens and incubators for Islamists.

Given the foregoing, how relevant and legitimate is the fragile state in Kenya to the people of these regions at the margins of society, particularly when Islamist violent extremism promises an alternative and desired future, viz., *al-hakimiyya*, in this life in the Islamic state, and in the hereafter in heaven? Where the state is either absent, or repressive, unresponsive, unaccountable, and therefore irrelevant, the state, its government, and its institutions, lose what Rotberg (2004:6) calls 'the mandate of heaven', viz., legitimacy. Consequently, any promise of a better or different future by *al-Shabaab* and/or Islamist ideologues, is deemed better than the lived experience of the current conditions of state fragility. This acute disjuncture between the state and sections of society, is what

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[223] The 2014 Mandera attack produced the famous story of Salah Farah. Salah Farah was a Muslim teacher who was shot trying to defend his Christian colleagues and other passengers. See Chapter 6, section 6.7.2 *From Westgate mall (2013) to 14 Riverside complex (2019)*.

Islamist violent extremism exploits. The social indicators of state fragility also point to these debilitating and conflict-generating conditions of state fragility that drive Islamist violent extremism.

7.3.4 Social Indicators

Demographic pressures, defined by social fragmentation, identity-based political and socio-economic marginalisation, and the corruption that ferment structural-horizontal inequality and discontent, do not only provide the context of broader political conflict analysis, but unlocks the specific challenge of Islamism in Kenya. In the current chapter in section 7.2.2 *Explaining Islamist terrorist activity in the arc of insecurity*, I noted how demographics play a key role in explaining Islamism in Kenya. Between 2005 and 2019 Kenya scores an average of 8.8 for demographic pressures, and 8.1 for refugees and IDPs, as the two social indicators on the Fragile States Index. At 8.8, demographic pressures represent the worst fragility score per indicator in the period under review. Thus, Kenya's societal pressures simply outweigh the capacity and political will of the Kenyan state to manage these pressures.

7.3.4.1 *Social Indicators as Context and Permissive Causes*

The demographic attributes of Kenyan society include ethnic identity, religious adherence, horizontal marginalisation and inequality, as well as the issue of Somalia's refugees. Fifty four percent of the Muslim community in Kenya also happen to be Kenya's ethnic-Somalis. These linkages are important in understanding demographic pressures in Kenya. Solomon (2014a:2) contends that "[r]eligions … do not exist in a historical vacuum. They are interconnected by issues such as ethnicity, politics, economics, [and] migration". Socio-economic marginalisation, based on identity, is characteristic of Kenyan society in general. However, as demonstrated in this study, it is the Muslim minority that remains collectively, and disproportionately, alienated and deprived, and on the fringes of society.

Kenya is infamous for high levels of corruption linked with socio-economic marginalisation. Corruption is also linked with social (economic and political) drivers of Islamist violent extremism. Ajulu (2000:139) and Aronson (2013:25) maintain that with independence, Jomo Kenyatta introduced a government system that was characterised by rampant corruption, surpassed only by his successor Daniel arap Moi's kleptocracy. High levels of public sector corruption persist to this day in Kenya. Based on an inverted scale of 0-100, with 0 measuring *highly corrupt* and 100 *very clean*, Transparency International (2020a:3-4), on their Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), score Kenya at 28 points (out of 100) in 2019. This score puts Kenya at a higher level of corruption than the world average of 43 points, ranking Kenya 137 out of 180 countries assessed. Kenya has an average CPI score of 23.05 points between 1996 and 2019. Kenya has the worst score of 19 points in 2002 and 2003, and an all-time best score of 28 points in 2017 and 2019. Kenya's CPI scores between 1996 and 2019 are indicated on the left (Trading Economics, 2020a:The Internet).[224]



Contemplative of such levels of corruption as one finds in Kenya, Solomon (2014a:3) maintains that "rampant corruption … alienates citizens from the state and supports perceptions that the government is an illegitimate one". Aside from the political-economic cost, corruption has huge social outcomes. Denoeux and Carter (2009a:21) contend that "[w]hat is critical here is not social exclusion only, or social exclusion per se, but the message of denial of humanity, individuality, and dignity which extreme forms of social exclusion appear to convey to those who are its victims". Heinrich (2017:The Internet), using data from the Corruption Perceptions Index and the Social Inclusion Index, displays the relationship between corruption, social exclusion, and inequality, and finds that inequality is a source of popular discontent. Heinrich (2017:The Internet) finds that "[c]orruption leads to an unequal distribution of power in society which, in turn, translates into an unequal distribution of wealth and opportunity".

Ombaka (2015:18) concludes that "[c]orruption misallocates development resources and the citizens who are entitled to services do not get them…, [leading to] further marginalisation and exclusion of the already marginalised populations of these counties [in the arc of insecurity in Kenya] and therefore to greater violence". At the 2015 Summit on Countering Violent Extremism, former US President Barack Obama (2015b:The Internet) similarly concluded that when individuals "feel entirely trapped in impoverished communities, where there is no order and no path for advancement, where there are no educational opportunities, where there are no ways to support families, and no escape from injustice and the humiliations of corruption - that feeds instability and disorder, and makes those communities ripe for extremist recruitment". Corruption not only permits, but drives, Islamist violent extremism. In Chapter 8, I show that corruption also enables and generates impediments to CVE.

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[224] Although I consider the CPI scores since the inception of the index in 1995, the methodology used on the index between 1995 and 2011 has since changed. In 2012 Transparency International changed the CPI methodology, incorporating 13 standardised data sources to enable year-on-year comparison (see Transparency International, 2020b). Strict year-on-year comparison should therefore be limited to the period 2012 to 2019.

7.3.4.2 *Social Indicators as Drivers*

Following 'the handshake' of 2018, Uhuru Kenyatta and Raila Odinga lament the levels of corruption in Kenya, variously characterising corruption in Kenya as 'an existential threat' to the state, 'undermining both public and private institutions', and 'undermining Kenya's aspirations as a nation' (Kenyatta and Odinga, 2018:6).[225] Corruption drives and enables Islamism by fermenting horizontal inequality and popular discontent, and undermining CVE efforts by reducing the capacity of the state. Denoeux and Carter (2009a:40) contend that "the more corrupt the environment, the easier it becomes for violent extremists to develop a foothold in the community, to infiltrate themselves in private-sector activity, and/or to develop connections to organised crime - all of which can enhance significantly their recruitment and organising efforts". Otenyo (2004:82) points out that a corrupt bureaucracy such as Kenya's make infiltration and bribery easy. He contends that such corrupt bureaucracy is 'likely to be extremely inept and incompetent' and 'will not generate enough revenue for social security needs'. Ombaka (2015:13) contends that "corrupt police and other government employees who are willing to break rules for bribes are weakening Kenya's ability to prevent terror attacks by Somali militants …. This factor of corruption alone has made Kenya more vulnerable to terrorism and internal insecurity than its equally or even weaker neighbours". According to Ombaka (2015:18) there is a history of significant corruption and bribery within the police service in Kenya. Regarding the military, Ombaka (2015:20) recounts how, following the Westgate Mall attack (2013), Kenyan society was shocked to see closed-circuit television footage of responder Kenyan soldiers looting stores in the mall. Such are the levels of documented depravity in the security apparatus.

Corruption in Kenya, as a driver of social exclusion and marginalisation, has relegated ethnic-Somalis and Muslims to the margins of Kenyan society. Allen *et al* (2017:7) contend that "the economic, social and political marginalisation of ethnic or religious groups is widely believed to increase the risk of [Islamist] violent extremism". Choi and Piazza (2016) also contend that the exclusion of particularised ethnic groups is a consistent and substantial predictor of domestic terrorism, rather than general political repression or economic discrimination. Choi and Piazza (2016:38) maintain that these minority ethnic groups resort to terrorism rather than other forms of political violence, because "[t]errorism, … is more cost-effective than civil war and thus becomes a more viable option for ethnic groups that intend to pursue their political rights through the use of force". This pursuit of rights or goals through violence is often spurred on by the absence, or inadequacy, of societal resilience. Lack of societal resilience, as Van Metre (2016:14-17) would say, refers to the lack of capacity and competency to resist and opt out of violent political conflict, and find peaceful ways of reaching collective goals. The lack of societal resilience is largely indicative of the depreciation of social cohesion in Kenya. Kenya has been unable to reverse the depreciation of social cohesion and manage societal pressures such as assertive and impositional Islamist identity. Instead, Kenya has historically actively marginalised ethnic-Somali and Muslim identities. The marginalisation of ethnic-Somalis and Muslim identity, whether real or perceived, is a major source of popular discontent and collective action.

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[225] See also Chapter 6, section 6.3.1.1 *Contesting the constricted democratic space in Kenya*.

The inability of the Kenyan state to manage its societal pressures is also reflected in the state of social progress and well-being as experienced by Kenyan society. Since its inception in 2012 to date, the World Happiness Index (WHI) is instructive in this regard. The index assesses levels of national happiness, with happiness as a measure of social progress, and therefore the desired goal of public policy. Happiness is defined as the evaluation of life satisfaction or the evaluation of 'subjective well-being'. Happiness being a function of cognition, and not emotion. Scored on a happiness ladder scale of 0.00 - 10.00, Kenya receives an average score of 4.461 between 2012 and 2019 on the WHI. Kenya ranked 121 out of 153 countries assessed in 2019, with a happiness score of 4.583, well below the world average of 5.450 (UNSDSN, 2020a:21, 135). There is therefore a happiness deficit in Kenya, reflecting the low quality of life and low social progress, as experienced by many Kenyans that struggle to climb the 10-step happiness ladder on the WHI. There has been some limited progress since 2012. But, as the WHI shows on the left, for many in Kenya, the pursuit of happiness remains unsatisfied.[226] Let me illustrate this lack of social progress in the arc of insecurity. As a percentage in each county, the 2019 census indicates households in Kenya that have no amenities other than the open bush to 'dispose human waste' (use the toilet): Tana-River (48.6), Marsabit (47.4), Wajir (43.6), Mandera (39.4), Garissa (36.2), Kwale (31.7), Isiolo (30.6), Lamu



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[226] The graph above is created from World Happiness Index data (UNSDSN, 2013:24, 2015:28, 2016:22, 2017:22, 2018b:22, 2020a:26, 2020a:21). Data for 2013 is not available. In 2020, Kenya's happiness score is 4.607, maintaining a ranking of 121 (UNSDSN, 2021:22). In addition to GDP per capita, as a measure of (economic) well-being, the World Happiness Index considers a range of other non-material indicators of social progress and well-being that captures six main variables or 'predictors of life evaluation': (1) GDP per capita; (2) social support; (3) healthy life expectancy; (4) social freedom; (5) generosity; (6) trust or absence of corruption (among society and in government institutions). The six variables or predictors are scored on a happiness ladder scale between 0.00 to 10.00, with 0.00 being the least level of happiness, i.e., 'the worst possible life', and 10.00 being the highest level of happiness, i.e., 'the best possible life'. All states are measured against the baseline of 'Dystopia', an imagined country with the least happy people (Dystopia being the opposite of Utopia). Dystopia has a score of 1.97 in 2019, and an average score of 2.004 between 2012-2019, two points lower than Kenya's score of 4.583 in 2019 (UNSDSN, 2012:64, 2013:11, 19, 2015:22-24, 2016:16-18, 2018b:18, 2020a:20-22, 2020a:16-17, 19-21).

(17.9), and Kilifi (17.0). This level of absolute and relative deprivation coexists with 0.1 percent for Nairobi, and 0.9 percent for both Mombasa and Machakos (KNBS, 2019a:310-312, 316). That is the reality of 92 percent of Muslims who live in these counties in Kenya. The third largest economy in sub-Saharan Africa, one of the fastest growing economies in the world with an average GDP growth of 5.45 percent between 2004 and 2019, the 2019 census displays that Kenya's economy has not translated into social progress in the arc of insecurity, thus has not increased the happiness index of citizens.

In 2012, Kenya's Commission on Revenue Allocation (CRA) created the County Development Index (CDI), and based on three development categories, identified Mandera, Wajir, Marsabit, Tana-River, Kwale, Garissa, and Kilifi as 'most marginalised', and Isiolo, Machakos, and Lamu as 'moderately marginalised'. Only Mombasa and Nairobi were classified as 'well off', meaning, above the baseline national development average of 0.520 at the time (CRA, 2012a:23-24). The Commission largely links marginalisation in Kenya to 'poor governance', 'uneven allocation of resources', and 'historical injustices', and defines marginalisation as "a process of social exclusion from the dominant socio-economic, cultural and political structure" (CRA, 2012a:iv, 2012c:1).[227] Excluding Nairobi, Mombasa, and Machakos, nine of the 12 counties in the arc of insecurity are classified among the 15 counties that have suffered 'historical injustices' by the Kenyan state since independence (CRA, 2012b:59-64). The Commission on Revenue Allocation defines historical injustices as 'harms and wrongs' committed against "individuals and groups who may be dead but whose descendants are alive" (CRA, 2012b:4). These 'harms and wrongs' include: legalised discrimination; land alienation; state repression; underrepresentation in politics and national development; massacres, extrajudicial killings, and collective punishment; discriminatory laws, regulations and practices; religious profiling; deprivation of education (CRA, 2012b:59-64).[228] Kenya's Muslims, of whom 92 percent are concentrated in these

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[227] The Commission on Revenue Allocation (CRA) was stablished in terms of Article 215 of Kenya's 2010 Constitution, with the mandate to promote and make recommendations on the 'equitable sharing of revenue' within the 47-counties system. The Commission also makes recommendations on matters of restitution, as part of national reconciliation, for marginalised groups and communities, including making recommendations on the allocation and disbursement of Kenya's Equalisation Fund. Like the UNDP's principle *Leave no one behind* (UNDP, 2018), the Commission's vision is *No Kenyan left behind*. The County Development Index (CDI) is based on four dimensions: (1) health; (2) education; (3) infrastructure; (4) poverty gap, and nine indicators: *Health*, (1) sanitation; (2) immunisation; (3) birth deliveries with qualified medical personnel. *Education*, (4) secondary education; (5) literacy level. *Infrastructure*, (6) water; (7) roads; (8) electricity. *Poverty gap*, (9) percentage of people below the poverty line. Similar to the HDI, the measuring scale on the CDI is 0 to 1. With a baseline of the development average of 0.520 at the time in Kenya (low human development is below 0.550), the CDI then ranked the 47 counties in three categories: (1) most marginalised, i.e., 0.519 and below; (2) moderately marginalised, i.e., 0.521 - 0.599; (3) well off, i.e., 0.600 and above (CRA, 2012a:16, 18-21, 23-24, 27, 2012b:2-4).

[228] In addition to the nine counties in the arc of insecurity that have suffered historical injustices as identified by the Commission (out of the total 15), the tenth county is Taita Taveta in Coast Region, and the other five counties, viz., Turkana, Samburu, West Pokot, Narok, and Kajiado, are in Rift Valley Region. This is consistent with another finding of this study, which is that state fragility has generated not only Islamist violent extremism

12 counties, are a constituency of the Consortium for the Empowerment and Development of Marginalised Communities (CEDMAC). Indicative of the nature and levels of marginalisation and 'harms and wrongs' against Muslims in Kenya, whether real or perceived, the constituency of CEDMAC comprises of the very margins of society in Kenya, including not only Muslims, but also 'pastoralists, hunters and gatherers, forest dwellers, urban slum dwellers, and riverine communities'.[229]

The study by the Kenya National Bureau of Statistics (KNBS), titled *Exploring Kenya's inequality: pulling apart or pooling together*? (2013), corroborates these extreme regional inequalities. The KNBS study examines inequality, between and within the 47 counties in Kenya, through nine indicators: levels of poverty; household expenditure; education; employment; access to water; sanitation; cooking fuel; electricity; housing. The study finds that counties such as Tana River, Kwale, Kilifi, Lamu, Mandera, Wajir, and Marsabit, are among the most deprived of the 47 counties in Kenya in terms of these nine indicators (KNBS, 2013:41). These regional socio-economic disparities in Kenya are also reflected in the vast differences in life expectancy as an indicator of the quality of life. Achoki, Miller-Petrie, Glenn *et al* (2019:92, 133-134), show the huge gaps in life expectancy in the 47 counties in Kenya.[230]

Added to the gaps among these counties, life expectancy in Kenya declined between 1984 and 2003, from 58.8 in 1984, 55.7 between 1990 and 1995, to 51.8 years by 2003 (UNDESA, 2019:The Internet). It is in the middle of this period of decline in life expectancy (1984-2003), that the third wave of Islamist violent extremism took off (since the 1990s), finding fertile ground in the conditions of state fragility in Kenya, resulting in the first Islamist terrorist attack in the third wave of Islamist violent extremism since the 1990s in Nairobi, viz., the 1998 US Embassy attack. In fact, between 1990 and 2002 Kenya's GDP per capita declined from 3, 210 in 1990 to 2, 834 in 2002 (in 2017 US$ PPP). Between 1990 and 2000 Kenya also had negative growth in human development as reflected on the Human Development Index, from an HDI value of 0.482 in 1990 to 0.461 in 2000 (World Bank, 2020:The Internet; UNDP, 2020d:2-3). With the general decline in economic and human development indicators, there has thus also been the specific decline in the quality of life in Kenya. This resultant decline in the quality of life is particularly evidenced by the decline in life expectancy in the 12 counties in the arc of insecurity. Although there has been some growth in life expectancy in all the 12 counties between 1990 and

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and the long-war. But, added to Islamist violent extremism and the long-war, state fragility has also generated other types of new-wars in Kenya since the 1990s. See Chapter 6, section 6.5 *New-wars and the long-war*.

[229] CEDMAC is a platform of civil society organisations in Kenya. See Uraia Trust (2020:The Internet).

[230] The gaps in life expectancy are best illustrated by the counties with the highest and lowest life expectancies in Kenya. To illustrate, in 1990, there was a 19-years gap in life expectancy between Bomet County (68.8) and Homa Bay (49.9). In 2006, this gap was 20 years, between Laikipia County (62.8) and Homa Bay (43.0). In 2016, the gap was 15 years, between Laikipia (71.8) and Homa Bay (57.0). Homa Bay has the lowest life expectancy in Kenya, followed by Migori County and Tana-River (Achoki, Miller-Petrie, Glenn *et al*, 2019:92, 133-134).

2016, mostly from 2006, eight of the 12 counties, viz.: Machakos, Nairobi, Mombasa, Kilifi, Kwale, Marsabit, Lamu, and Tana-River, showed decline in life expectancy in the 16 years between 1990 and the formation of *al-Shabaab* in 2006. The following illustrates these disparities in life expectancy:

Life expectancy in the arc of insecurity		**Machakos**	**Nairobi**	**Mombasa**	**Kilifi**	**Garissa**	**Kwale**	**Marsabit**	**Isiolo**	**Lamu**	**Mandera**	**Wajir**	**Tana-River**
Year	1990	66.5	64.1	62.8	59.0	59.6	58.2	61.4	55.0	58.7	58.3	57.9	57.5
	2006	63.8	59.8	60.2	58.5	61.4	57.9	60.0	58.5	57.9	60.3	58.7	53.5
	2016	69.5	69.3	68.7	67.6	66.6	66.0	65.9	65.6	65.5	64.3	64.1	60.3
Ranking		10	11	14	21	26	30	31	32	33	38	40	45

Created from Achoki, Miller-Petrie, Glenn *et al* (2019:85, 133-134)

The ranking above is based on the total of 47 counties in Kenya. Although there has been fluctuation in county life expectancy between 1990 and 2016, on average Machakos has the highest life expectancy out of the 12 counties, and Tana-River the lowest, revealing a 10-year gap between these two counties. The 12 counties, including Tana-River with a life expectancy of 60.3, coexist with Laikipia County's life expectancy of 72 years, a 12-year gap between Laikipia and Tana-River (Achoki, Miller-Petrie, Glenn *et al*, 2019:92). Ranking at 45, Tana-River has the third lowest life expectancy in Kenya, whereas Laikipia's life expectancy, at 72 years, is comparable to the world average of 73 years.[231] Such low quality of life in the arc of insecurity, as measured by life expectancy, is not surprising when one examines the levels of relative poverty and deprivation in the 12 counties in the arc of insecurity.

Unlike the MPI, which measures poverty based on the eight regions in Kenya (see 7.3.2 *Economic indicators*), the *Comprehensive poverty report* (2020), published by the Kenya National Bureau of Statistics (KNBS), shows these extreme levels of poverty in the 47 counties. Compared to the 2020 MPI, a much grimmer picture is presented by the 2020 *Comprehensive poverty report*. In the report, multidimensional poverty is measured based on seven dimensions: nutrition; education; economic activity; information; access to water; sanitation; housing. A person, a community, or county is considered multidimensionally poor if deprived in at least three of these seven dimensions. Monetary poverty is measured through absolute poverty (i.e., extreme poverty), at a per capita monthly income of below KSh3, 252 for rural areas, and below KSh5, 995 for urban areas (KNBS, 2020:10, 14-15).

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[231] The advances in the quality of life are briefly addressed in Chapter 3, section 3.2 *What is state fragility*? I outlined then that at the start of the second industrial revolution the world average life expectancy was 30 years. Currently it is 73 years and projected to be 77 by 2050. The second industrial revolution (1870-1970), with unprecedented technological-economic advances, propelled the world from rural agricultural societies to urban industrialised societies. The current quality of life is thus not primordial. Collier *et al* (2018:8) point out that "[a]ll countries were once fragile". Today's fragile states, the world's 'bottom billion', Collier (2007:3) maintains, "coexist with the twenty-first century, but their reality is the fourteenth century". In Kenya, life expectancy was 48.4 at independence in 1963, and still 57.4 by 1990. There was in fact a decline between 1984 and 2003, from 58.8 in 1984 down to 51.7 years by 2003. Thirty eight of the 47 counties had a decline in life expectancy between 1990 and 2006. In 2019, the average life expectancy is 66.4 years (Achoki, Miller-Petrie, Glenn *et al*, 2019:88; UNDESA, 2019:The Internet). The 2020 HDI calculations puts this figure in 2019 at 66.7 (UNDP, 2020b:2-3).

The above figures are well below the very low international poverty line of US$1.90. The breadline or poverty limit of US$1.90 per day, in 2011 PPP prices, establish what was believed to be a minimum cost of living per person since 2015 as determined by the World Bank. Poverty limit has been criticised for being wholly inadequate for human survival and basic human needs. Hence, the revised per day poverty threshold of US$3.20 for lower middle-income countries such as Kenya and US$5.50 for upper middle-income countries such as South Africa, was adopted. The national poverty line in the US in 2019 was US$35 per day or US$12,760 per year.[232] Be that as it may, based on the breadline of KSh3, 252 for rural areas and KSh5, 995 for urban areas, Kenya has a national average of 35.7 percent incidence of monetary poverty and 53.0 percent incidence of multidimensional poverty. Monetary poverty and multidimensional poverty in the arc of insecurity, reflected as a share of the total population in each county, and ranked out of the 47 counties, may be shown as follows:[233]

Monetary and multidimensional poverty in the arc of insecurity	**Mandera**	**Wajir**	**Marsabit**	**Kwale**	**Garissa**	**Tana-river**	**Kilifi**	**Isiolo**	**Lamu**	**Machakos**	**Mombasa**	**Nairobi**
Monetary poverty	76.7	61.7	63.2	47.2	64.2	57.0	46.1	50.7	27.7	23.1	27.1	16.6
Multidimensional poverty	91.5	90.0	85.8	74.6	69.0	62.0	59.9	53.1	51.0	39.4	24.5	12.6
Ranking	1	2	4	11	17	20	23	28	31	39	45	47

Created from 2020 *Comprehensive Poverty Report* data (KNBS, 2020:85-87)

The ranking above is for multidimensional poverty based on the 47 counties in Kenya. Mandera, as the most deprived county with 91.5 percent multidimensional poverty, co-exists with Nairobi's 12.6, Kiambu's 18.1, and Mombasa's 24.5 percent multidimensional poverty (KNBS, 2020:85-87). Whether evidenced by horizontal inequality, historical injustices, marginalisation, a happiness deficit, the lack of a basic amenity such as a toilet, life expectancy, or any measure of state fragility, Dystopia is decidedly the collective lived experience of 92 percent of Muslims who call these 12 counties home, and 79.27 percent of ethnic-Somalis who are MPI poor and existing on less than US$1.90 a day. The average inhabitants of these counties may not know about state fragility indicators, the measures of multidimensional poverty, or Gini coefficient and life expectancy disparities, but there cannot be any doubt that they are patently and incessantly aware of what state fragility-induced deprivation feels like and are equally aware of the grossly reduced capabilities and prospects they have as individuals and communities. In direct reaction to these state fragility conditions and factors, if one objectively considers Islamised dissent by a politically significant ethnic-Somali-Muslim identity as a vector, with promises to Muslim followers of a return to *al-hakimiyya*, and with Islamist leaders counselling *jihad* as the way to get there, the pathway to Islamist violence crystallises. In the next chapter, Chapter 8, I also demonstrate when unpacking the varied impediments to CVE in Kenya, that ineffective and counterproductive CVE further crystallises and defines this causal sequence to Islamist violence.

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[232] See Hickel (2015), Sharma (2018), World Bank (2018d, 2020), and Federal Register (2020).

[233] While the MPI and the *Comprehensive poverty report* both measure multidimensional poverty, and have dimensions and indicators that overlap, they cannot be substituted one for the other. Their methodologies are different, so is their datasets. Differences in these two resources are therefore inevitable. The *Comprehensive poverty report* is based on the multiple overlapping deprivation analysis (MODA) methodology of UNICEF. The 12 indicators used in the report, allocated according to the seven dimensions, are: *Nutrition*, (1) underweight; (2) food security. *Education*, (3) secondary or higher education. *Economic activity*, (4) labour market. *Information*, (5) information devices; (6) exposure to media. *Water*, (7) drinking water source; (8) distance to water source. *Sanitation*, (9) toilet type. *Housing*, (10) housing material; (11) indoor pollution; (12) source of lighting. The MODA methodology enables the differentiated use of dimensions and indicators for five population designations, viz.: (1) children under five years; (2) children (6-17 years); (3) youth (18-34 years); (4) adults (35-59 years); (5) the elderly (60 years and above). The seven dimensions and the 12 indicators reflected here are used to measure multidimensional poverty among the youth and adults (KNBS, 2020:4, 6, 10, 14-15, 43).

Another insightful measure of social progress and life satisfaction is the Social Progress Index (SPI), by the Social Progress Imperative. The Social Progress Imperative defines social progress as “the capacity of a society to meet the basic human needs of its citizens, establish the building blocks that allow citizens and communities to enhance and sustain the quality of their lives, and create the conditions for all individuals to reach their full potential” (SPI, 2017:15). Such social progress is not idealistic, it is the basic responsibility of any state and the government that runs the state, liable for the welfare of their society. Similarly, the Ibrahim Index defines governance as “the provision of political, social, economic and environmental public goods and services that every citizen has the right to expect from their government, and that a government has the responsibility to deliver to its citizens” (MIF, 2020:8). Such governance is also not idealistic, it is a structured response to basic needs of any society. Between 2010 and 2019 Kenya received an average score of 53.67 (out of 100) on the SPI, indicating a consistent period of *low* social progress, well below the world average of 64.24 in 2019. *Low* social progress (51.29 - 62.41) is the second lowest range on the index. Earlier in section 7.3.2 *Economic indicators*, I showed how Kenya fails to convert high national economic growth into broadly shared social progress. Instead, state fragility generates exclusion and inequality, and thus popular discontent, dissent, and violence. The collective lived experience of much of the arc of insecurity is consequently singularly comparable to that of the most deprived regions in the world. In 2019, Kenya is ranked 115 out of the 163 countries assessed. Kenya’s persistent *low* social progress is illustrated on the table below.[234]

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[234] The table below is created from SPI and World Bank data (SPI, 2014:15, 2015:17, 148, 2016:17, 137, 2017:5, 75, 2018:7, 2019a:7, 2019b:The Internet, 2020a:The Internet, 2020b:14, 2020c:1; World Bank, 2020:The Internet). The 2020 Social Progress Index dataset: 2010-2019, has retroactive revisions of the data, social progress scores, and world ranking. I therefore use the latest revised data, and not those published in previous

Social Progress Index, Kenya: 2010-2019										
Social Progress Score	**49.88**	**50.60**	**53.03**	**53.14**	**53.57**	**53.84**	**54.45**	**55.16**	**55.95**	**57.10**
GDP per capita (US$)	3, 330	3, 439	3, 502	3, 612	3, 709	3, 825	3, 953	4, 046	4, 204	4, 330
Year	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
Ranking	118	119	117	117	119	119	120	119	117	115

The meaning of the figures above is that with only 14.47 percent growth in social progress in ten years, viz., from 49.88 to 57.10, social progress does not reflect Kenya's economic growth, which rose from US$3, 330 to US$4, 330 GDP per capita (2017 PPP prices), showing a 30.03 percent increase. Calculated between 1990 and 2019, economic growth rose from US$3, 210 to US$4, 330 GDP per capita (2017 PPP prices), showing a 34.89 percent increase. Clearly then, economic growth in Kenya does not result in commensurate social progress. In addition, and of particular significance in this study, Kenya underperforms and misperforms on the Social Progress Index on the indicators that are linked to state fragility and conflict risk, viz.: political killings and torture; access to justice; corruption; equality of political power by social group; discrimination and violence against minorities (SPI, 2020c:1).

The energy mix of society is another measure of social progress. Among the varied sources of energy, electricity, and access to it, are seen as the apex of social progress. The 2019 population census report indicates that Kenya's energy mix comprises electricity, natural gas, biogas, solar, paraffin, firewood, and charcoal. After examining the use of cooking fuel by type in the 12 counties in the arc of insecurity, the following reflect the percentage of households in the arc of insecurity that are not connected to the electricity grid and must thus still rely on firewood and charcoal (KNBS, 2019a:330-337):[235]

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reports. The index uses three dimensions to measure social progress: (1) *basic human needs*; (2) *foundations of well-being*; (3) *opportunity*. These three dimensions are allocated 12 indicators: *Basic Human Needs* (1) nutrition and basic medical care; (2) water and sanitation; (3) shelter; (4) personal safety. *Foundations of Well-being* (5) access to basic education; (6) access to information and communication; (7) health and wellness; (8) environmental quality. *Opportunity* (9) personal rights; (10) personal freedom and choice; (11) inclusiveness; (12) access to advanced education. The 12 main indicators are further subdivided into 51 indicators, all measuring outcome, not input. The index allocates an aggregate progress score on a scale of 0-100, 100 indicating the highest level of social progress. The aggregate score is compared against the state's GDP per capita (in 2017 PPP prices). State performance is then compared to 15 peer countries with a similar GDP per capita. Measured thus against their economic output, the index ranks countries on the outcomes of social and environmental indicators from highest to lowest on six tiers of social progress: (1) *very high*, 90.14 - 92.73; (2) *high*, 82.99 - 89.56; (3) *upper middle*, 72.05 - 81.92; (4) *lower middle*, 63.52 - 71.52; (5) *low*, 51.29 - 62.41; (6) *very low*, 31.06 - 50.08. On a scale of 0-100, the thresholds for the six tiers are calculated independently for each year. Based on the assessed 163 countries' scores, the foregoing thresholds are calculations based on 2019 data as reflected on the 2020 Social Progress Index (SPI, 2019a:4-5, 2019c:22, 28-29, 2020a:The Internet, 2020b:5-6; Stern, Krylova and Harmacek, 2020:1-36).

[235] A disaggregated report based on the 2020 MPI, rating access to electricity, finds that 71.62 percent of the population in Kenya are deprived of electricity (compared to 56 percent for sub-Saharan Africa). In the case of North-eastern Region (i.e., Mandera, Wajir, and Garissa counties), comparable to the 2019 census figures on the table below, which puts the figure at 6 percent, the World Bank finds that only 7 percent of the population in North-eastern Region have access to electricity (Alkire *et al*, 2021b:7, 39; World Bank, 2018c:1).

Cooking fuel by type in the arc of insecurity: firewood and charcoal	**Mandera**	**Tana-River**	**Wajir**	**Marsabit**	**Garissa**	**Lamu**	**Kwale**	**Isiolo**	**Kilifi**	**Machakos**	**Mombasa**	**Nairobi**
Percentage of households	96.4	95	94.8	93.1	91.1	87.9	85.2	84.4	80.1	60.1	27.9	3.4

The diagram above further reflects the lived experiences of state fragility in the arc of insecurity, and the sharp absolute and relative deprivation in North-eastern Region as a collective (i.e., Mandera, Wajir, and Garissa counties), coexisting with Mombasa and Nairobi counties. Such misperformance, which creates 'unjust social orders', is the basis for the popular discontent and collective action by groups that find themselves on the margins of society. This is true of the 92 percent of Kenya's Muslims that subsist in these 12 counties, and 79.27 percent of ethnic-Somalis who are MPI poor and surviving on less than US$1.90 a day. Such misperformance is also shown by the Political Terror Scale, revealing that since 2012, at level four, political terror in Kenya, carried out by agents of the state, has 'expanded to large sections of society' that 'engage in politics or political ideas'. CVE operations such as *Usalama* Watch (2014) reveal that these targeted 'sections of society' are largely ethnic-Somalis and other Muslims. The resultant popular discontent and collective action, countered by often indiscriminate ethno-religious profiling and state suppression, have led to the self-reinforcing cycles of the insecurity dilemma, and its associated fragility and conflict traps, that persist in Kenya today. This situation is outlined in Chapter 8, in the context of the link between state fragility and impediments to CVE.[236]

Kenya underscores the empirical evidence demonstrating that economic growth, as a function of GDP growth, does not lead to social progress as purported by theories such as the trickle-down-effect, or as Dapel (2019:The Internet) states, theories that purport that 'growth is good for the poor'. Contrary to such theories, social progress is a function of both economic growth and *concerted* government policy designed to bring about such progress. In fact, GDP is an inadequate, and even an inaccurate, measure of the well-being of a nation. As highlighted by what the *Global Happiness Policy Report* (UNSDSN, 2018a) calls the 'beyond GDP agenda/movement', the progress and well-being of sections of society may be impeded in the middle of high national economic growth, by state misperformance and institutional dysfunction, as presented by state fragility. Inhibiting the progress and well-being of sections of society ferments inequality, relative deprivation, and popular discontent, which in turn create a fertile ground for extremist ideologies and movements such as Islamist violent extremism. Kenya is illustrative. The Social Progress Imperative rightly finds that "[c]itizens' demands for better lives are evident in uprisings such as the Arab Spring and the emergence of new political movements in even the most prosperous countries, such as the United States and France" (SPI, 2017:10). One is therefore fittingly reminded of the yellow-vests movement in France as an analogous case.[237]

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[236] See Chapter 8, section 8.3 *State fragility and the development of impediments to CVE*, and section 8.3.1 *Cohesion indicators and impediments to CVE*, and this chapter, section 7.3.1.2 *Cohesion Indicators as drivers*.

Such deprivation is more acute in Africa. The 2017 World Happiness Report underscores the point by stating that that "African people's expectations that they and their countries would flourish under self-rule and democracy … have [not] been met" (UNSDSN, 2017:110). In Chapter 3, section 3.4 *The criticism against the theory and application of state fragility*, parallels were drawn with the case in Nigeria. It revealed that, like the case in Kenya, GDP growth has done very little to alleviate poverty in Nigeria. Dapel's (2018b:2, 2018a:11) analysis of poverty mobility in Nigeria indicates that, despite impressive GDP growth figures, "the incidence of poverty in Nigeria between 1980 and 2010 rose from 27.2 percent to 69.0 percent", thus "about 91 percent of the poor can expect to spend their lives in poverty". This, even though Nigeria recorded an average of 3.79 percent annual GDP growth rate between 1982 and 2019 (Trading Economics, 2020b:The Internet). Similarly, parallels were also drawn with the case in Tunisia, particularly the years around the 2011 Arab Spring and thereafter.[238]

Prior to the Arab Spring, Tunisia was considered an otherwise economic success story. Like Kenya, Tunisia remains a regional political and economic hub. Between 1999 and 2008, Tunisia's GDP growth rate averaged 5 percent a year, with a record high of 6.3 percent in 2007, and was projected to exceed 5 percent in 2011, far exceeding other lower-middle-income countries in the period under review (Stampini and Verdier-Chouchane, 2011:6; Bouoiyour *et al*, 2017:2). But like Kenya and Nigeria, despite high GDP growth rates, there is rising inequality and a lack of social progress in Tunisia. It is thus no wonder that added to waging a domestic Islamist campaign, Tunisians were the largest source of foreign fighters (between 6, 000 and 7, 000) for Islamic State at the height of the ill-fated Caliphate between 2014 and 2016 (Trofimov, 2016:The Internet; Wright *et al*, 2016:9). The 2019 Fragile States Index indicates that although the 2011 revolutionary zeal appears to have stalled in Tunisia, after seven years and counting, "[t]he very conditions that sparked the mass popular uprisings that later became the Arab Spring, have not gone away. In fact, many of the economic, social and political indicators that began deteriorating on the FSI in the years preceding the Arab Spring are worsening again" (FFP, 2019:22). These conditions included "falling standards of living, a growing rural-urban divide, high unemployment, government corruption, and a lack of political and personal freedoms"

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[237] See Kimmelman (2018) and Grossman (2019) for an outline of the yellow-vests movement in France. What started as protests against a proposed fuel tax hike in late 2018 soon evolved into a violent mass movement against rising living costs (and other grievances) for people that find themselves at the margins of society in France, what Kimmelman (2018:1) characterises as 'peripheral France'.

[238] When parallels are drawn between the Arab Spring, Tunisia, Nigeria (and other relevant contexts), and Kenya, such parallels serve only one purpose, to anchor the case in Kenya. There is no claim for a cross-case comparison.

(FFP, 2019:21). As they are in Nigeria, these fragility conditions in Tunisia are present in Kenya too, thus explaining the collective Islamist call in these countries for a return to *al-hakimiyya*.

The foregoing explain why and how Islamist violent extremism is generated in these fragile states. These shared conditions and factors not only explain the internationalisation of Islamist violent extremism but also impact on the formulation of views regarding the status of Islam and the position of Muslims in the world, and resultant collective mobilisation and action towards the objectives of Islamist violent extremism as the desired future. The blame system of Islamism invariably places culpability for the lot of Islam and Muslims squarely on the external intervention of patrons (mostly Western governments) of what are deemed to be apostate and unaccountable Muslim governments, and/or these apostate and unaccountable Muslim governments themselves, and/or governments that are conceived as 'Western puppets' or 'Western proxies', or similar conceptions. This brings me to the last indicator on the Fragile States Index, i.e., the cross-cutting indicator, external intervention.

7.3.5 Cross-cutting Indicator

In Chapter 3, section 3.6.6 *Cross-cutting indicator*, I elaborated on how external intervention stresses the role and impact of external actors in the execution and management of state functions, their role in the pressures faced by the state, as well as the impact of the rivalries between external actors on the recipient state. When the state is unwilling or unable to perform state functions, deliver political goods and public services, or manage the pressures faced by the state, which include the maintenance of security, economic opportunity and welfare, and the provision of public goods and services, the invariable outcome is that the role of external actors (and sub-state actors) gets amplified, even displacing the role of the state. External actors are also able to transplant their own politics on the recipient state. These external actors may be state actors and non-state actors, including coreligionists and coethnics, as is the case in Kenya. These actors may embroil the recipient state in the affairs of other states, such as Kenya's involvement in the US-led global war on terror since 9/11, and Kenya's involvement in Somalia since Operation *Linda Nchi* (2011-2012) and AMISOM (2012-to date).

Unlike other indicators on the Fragile States Index, external intervention is used as both a driver and a contextual-exogenous condition in explaining Islamist violent extremism in Kenya. The contextual-exogenous conditions include Kenya's fragile neighbourhood, which constitutes a largely ungoverned space. Kenya's neighbourhood is largely characterised by the porous border with Somalia and the instability linked with the politics of Somalia, the threats emanating from Kenya's surrounding fragile states, proximity to the Middle East and the politics of that region just across the Gulf of Aden, a highly militarised neighbourhood at the crossroads of political-economic competition among a myriad of foreign powers, a neighbourhood awash with small arms, and one regarded as an epicentre of the fight against Islamist terrorism. Kenya's Citizen Support Mechanism (CSM) laments this, and states that "[w]e choose friends but God gives us neighbours" (CSM, 2020:The Internet). The CSM was created by the NCTC 'to counter and prevent violent extremism' (CSM, 2019b:The Internet). Kenya scores an average of 7.9 between 2005 and 2019 for *external intervention* on the Fragile States Index.

7.3.5.1 *The Cross-cutting Indicator as Context and Permissive Cause*

Kenya finds itself encircled by other fragile states that are facing varied facets and levels of insecurity, mostly also conflict-affected, all of whom impact on Kenya's security. Within this fragile geopolitical context, as elaborated in Chapter 3, section 3.6.1 *Indicators and measurement*, shared state fragility has enabled the internationalisation of Islamism. The case of Yemen and Somalia is illustrative. Yemen and Somalia share poverty, famine, corruption, porous borders, and intense political and social fragmentation. Consequently, proximity and shared fragility have enabled the formation of ties, across the Gulf of Aden, between *al-Shabaab* in Somalia, with *al-Qaeda* in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in Yemen, both affiliates of *al-Qaeda*. They also enabled the formation of ties with criminal networks between both countries (Carter, 2012:75; Blanchard, 2013:2). Carter (2012:75) finds that "[t]hese two countries, the poorest in their regions, have become gateways for extremism and radical insurgencies …, [linking terror networks between and beyond] the Arabian Peninsula and the Horn of Africa".

Carter (2012:67) also points out that the Arabian Peninsula and the Horn of Africa are characterised by "inadequate governance, corruption, porous borders, fragile economies, and social strife". Moreover, Kenya's immediate neighbours, viz.: Ethiopia, Somalia, Tanzania, Uganda, and South Sudan, each offer their own challenges to the security of Kenya (Aronson, 2013:24-25).[239] In the case of Somalia, Somali piracy for years posed a threat to international shipping in and out of the port of

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[239] Besides Somalia, the security challenges posed by Kenya's other immediate neighbours, and Kenya's wider geopolitics beyond the Horn of Africa, are beyond the scope of this study. In highlighting contextual factors in the development of Islamist violent extremism in Kenya, Ayferam and Muchie (2016:788), Onyango-Obbo (2019:The Internet), and the Horn Institute (2019c:8-9, 17-19, 32-34) point out that the Horn of Africa, home to a range of fragile states, is highly militarised with US, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, China, Saudi Arabia, Russia, Turkey, and UAE military bases, thus linking the region with the competing politics and interests of all these countries. This makes already complex local conflicts even more complex and intractable. In Chapter 6, section 6.5.1 *New-wars in Kenya*, I illustrated that the outcome is a region that is awash with small arms, enabling various types of violence that include terrorism, communal violence involving various ethnic groups and organised militias, as well as widespread banditry and criminal activity such as poaching, piracy, and cattle-rustling.

Mombasa in Kenya (Blanchard, 2013:5). Additionally, state fragility in Somalia, mainly the inability of Somalia to ensure its own domestic security and secure its own borders, has drawn its neighbours and other actors into the domestic conflict in Somalia between *al-Shabaab* and its predecessors such as the ICU, and the Somalian government (Englebert and Dunn, 2014:297-298). Englebert and Dunn (2014:297-298) conclude that Islamism by *al-Shabaab*, and maritime piracy by various groups, represent two dominant threats to Somalia's neighbours as well as to the international community.

Within this fragile and volatile geopolitical context of Kenya, is Kenya's direct access to the Gulf of Aden and the Arabian Peninsula, which links Kenya to the politics of the Middle-East, including the politics of Islamist violent extremism (Aronson, 2013:24-25). With this proximity to the Middle-East and the impact of that region, East African youth, particularly from Tanzania, Uganda, and Kenya, have steadily and increasingly been exposed to radical Islam and militant Islamist organisations through the education provided by local *madrassas* and university education, employment opportunities in the Middle-East, and access to the media in the Arab world. These institutions of learning and character-building are largely facilitated and funded by Saudi Arabia, but also UAE, Qatar, Turkey, and Egypt (Patterson, 2015:18; Ali-Koor, 2016:3-4). The ability of external actors to take over an essential state function and a fundamental public good such as education, reflects the fragility of the Kenyan state. The Kenyan state has been either unable or unwilling to provide adequate public goods, including education, security, and sources of livelihood, across Kenya, and more acutely so in rural areas and in the Muslim dominated Coast and North-eastern regions, and northern parts of Eastern Region.

At the 2015 Summit on Countering Violent Extremism, former US President Barack Obama (2015a:The Internet), observed that "[w]here young people have no [alternative or secular] education, they are more vulnerable to conspiracy theories and radical ideas, because it's not tested against anything else". Amble and Meleagrou-Hitchens (2014:526) thus conclude that "[m]any of Kenya's leading Muslim figures lay much of the blame for the spread of global *jihadist* ideology at the feet of Saudi Arabia's global programme to spread *Salafism* beyond its own borders". Wahhabism, an orientation of Salafism, has been present in Kenya since the 1970s, but has particularly taken root since the 1990s (Lind *et al*, 2017:128). Ali-Koor (2016:4) maintains that "[i]n Kenya, the Saudi government has for decades provided financial support and scholarships to the Kisauni College of Islamic Studies in Mombasa". Ali-Koor (2016:7) concludes that alternative forms of education, including more local educational opportunities, are required to counter the influence of radical Islam from the Middle East, but also from some local *madrassas* and mosques. There is a more nuanced view to that of Ali-Koor and cohorts. In this regard, Allen *et al* (2015:40-41) and the UNDP (2017:50), are of the view that the role of *madrassa* education in radicalisation is overstated. Although *madrassas* may facilitate radicalisation, recruitment, and training, it is not *madrassa* education as such that plays a role in radicalisation, but the nature of that education. Quality *madrassa* education, capable of promoting peace and coexistence, often serves as a source of resilience against radicalisation. This explains why most Muslims do not support Islamist violent extremism. Fair *et al* (2016) come to similar conclusions.

Given US interests in the region, and Kenya's close relations with the US (UK, and Israel), Islamism in Kenya is now inextricably linked to both the 'global jihadi movement' and the 'global war on terror'. Solomon (2013:428) contends that any international support that does not consider the legitimacy of the state, serves to transform sub-state terrorism into international terrorism. Somalia, Kenya, and Uganda are cases in point. Bachmann (2012:47) concludes that "[t]he case of Kenya demonstrates how governments in the global South make use of international security assistance for purposes of regime stabilisation". In Chapter 3, section 3.3 *The state fragility-security-development nexus*, I show how countries like Kenya and Uganda instrumentalise their insecurity and 'fragile status' to attract international support, influence, and aid (including development and counter-terrorism aid). This 'aid' is often used to sustain self-interested regimes and rent-seeking public officials that do not serve the width and depth of their societies. These states may thus also instrumentalise conflict, corruption, and need, for the benefit of the few. Aid agencies and foreign governments are then deemed complicit and culpable for enabling these misperforming and underperforming fragile states. It is therefore telling after attacks such as Westgate (2013), Mpeketoni (2014), and Garissa (2015), when *al-Shabaab* justifies its attacks in Kenya on Kenya's political and military intervention in Somalia in support of what is perceived to be a puppet and an apostate government in Somalia, and deriding Kenya itself for being a Western proxy (see Chapter 6, section 6.7 *Major Islamist terrorist activity in Kenya since the 1990s*).

Yet, outside of Ethiopia's and Kenya's military interventions between 2006 and 2009 and between 2011 and 2012 respectively, *al-Shabaab* faces a range of military opposition, including Somalian government forces, various Somali militias, AMISOM, and US forces. It is, however, the influence of the US that *al-Shabaab* singularly highlights in the current international intervention in Somalia. This intervention is characterised by *al-Shabaab* as 'the fight against Islam'. *Al-Shabaab* (in Gaidi Mtaani, 2012b:25) maintains that because the US was unwilling to fight in Somalia since the 1990s, the fight

> had to be a proxy one, so AMISOM was created, Ethiopia armed and financed, and Kenya's role defined. For America's interests, it's much cheaper to use third world blood for their wars for two main reasons, [the third world's] … military cost peanuts and their blood is insignificant …. [A]ny amount of bribe or bounty that can be used to crush … [*al-Shabaab*] America will finance, any

> military equipment or force that is needed will be provided, the command is obvious, use any means necessary to crush *Al-Shabaab*, or more precisely, Islam.

7.3.5.2 *The Cross-cutting Indicator as a Driver*

In Chapter 6, section 6.2 *Kenya as a victim of external terror attacks*, I elaborated on how the myth that Kenya is a victim of external terror attacks does not hold against empirical evidence. The reasons for Islamist violent extremism in Kenya are embedded in the fragile state in Kenya itself, including specific domestic and foreign policies and actions of the Kenyan state that are deemed to be unjust. These unjust policies and actions include the nature of Kenya's involvement in Somali politics. These policies and actions are deemed to undermine the interests of Muslims, the intent and objectives of Islamist violent extremism, including the formation of an Islamic state in Somalia and East Africa. Specifically, these policies and actions relate to Kenya's interference in Somali politics by: (1) supporting an 'apostate' government in Somalia; (2) destabilising Somalia; (3) exploiting Somalia.

Kenya and Ethiopia's support for the Somalian government calls for further elucidation fist. In Chapter 6, section 6.6 *Islamist violent extremist groups and combat units in Kenya*, I outlined how 2006 marked Ethiopia's military intervention to oust Islamic Courts Union (ICU), *al-Shabaab*'s precursor, in support of the transitional government of Somalia. AMISOM deployed the following year in 2007, also in support of the transitional government. Ethiopian forces withdrew from Somalia in 2009, returning in 2014 to join AMISOM. Earlier in the current chapter in section 7.4.1 *Cohesion indicators*, I indicated that Kenya's military incursion in Somalia started with Operation *Linda Nchi* (2011-2012), designed to neutralise *al-Shabaab* in Somalia. The Kenyan forces that participated in Operation *Linda Nchi* were rehatted in 2012, to form part of the Kenyan contingent in AMISOM. Kenya therefore forms part of an international contingent that stands between *al-Shabaab* and the defeat of what is deemed to be an apostate government in Somalia, and between *al-Shabaab* and the creation of an Islamic state.[240]

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[240] The Somalian state went through varied transformations since the 1990s, and so did the government of Somalia that *al-Shabaab* deems to be 'apostate' and 'a Western puppet'. Between 1991 and 2004 Somalia was a collapsed state with no central government. Between 2004 to 2012 Somalia had a Transitional Federal Government (TFG). From 2004 the TFG governed from Nairobi, Kenya, relocating to Baidoa, Somalia, in 2006, and to Mogadishu in 2007. In August 2012, with the end of the mandate of the TFG, the Somalia Federal Government (SFG) was formed, starting federalism in Somalia. Today, with the seat of the federal government, Banadir Regional Administration, in Mogadishu, Somalia theoretically comprises six Federal Member States (FMS), viz.: Somaliland, Puntland, Galmudug, Hirshabelle, South-West State, and Jubaland. Only the latter five regional states are FMS of the Federal Republic of Somalia (FRS). Despite being viewed as a FMS, Somaliland, self-declared independent since 1991, still seeks international recognition as a sovereign state (Call, 2008:1492, 1501; Hanson and Kaplan, 2008:The Internet; Yusuf and Elder, 2013:The Internet; Elmi, 2021:The Internet).

Kenya and Ethiopia also stand accused of destabilising Somalia. *Al-Shabaab* declares that since the 1990s, Kenya and Ethiopia are "the two governments which are the worst enemies of Somalia …. Ethiopia was used to arm specific warlords and Kenya to arm other warlords, and Somalis ended up killing each other, caused mayhem, and every warlord grabbed his portion of Somalia" (Gaidi Mtaani, 2012b:23). Starting in 2010, Kenya trained militias from the Ogaden-Darod clan, including *Ras Kamboni* militia, led by Ahmed Mohamed Islam (known as Ahmed Madobe), the current President of Somalia's Jubaland State. The Ogaden-Darod are an ethnic-Somali clan that live on both sides of the border, Kenyans in North-eastern Region, and Somalians in Jubaland. Jubaland includes three regions in Somalia, viz.: Gedo, Middle Juba, and Lower Juba, bordering three counties in North-eastern Region of Kenya, viz.: Mandera, Wajir, and Garissa counties, and Lamu County in Coast Region. Kismayo, a strategic town and port in southern Somalia, is in Lower Juba. Kenya's incursion in Somalia with Operation *Linda Nchi*, and the capture of Kismayo from *al-Shabaab* in 2012, was done with Ogaden-Darod militias, including *Ras Kamboni*. All these militias are opposed to *al-Shabaab*. Kismayo was the hub of the *al-Shabaab*'s (and its predecessor the ICU) proto-state in central and southern Somalia between 2006 and 2012. The port in Kismayo earned *al-Shabaab* about US$25 million annually, adding to the estimated annual income of US$70 - 100 million for *al-Shabaab* around this time (Throup, 2012:The Internet; Kabukuru, 2012:The Internet; Sheriff *et al*, 2015:53; Mwangi, 2016:122-124).

Despite the nationalist objective of unifying all Somalis, and an all-embracing Islamist ideology, *al-Shabaab* is disproportionately supported by marginalised clans. Solomon (2014b:188) points out that "[s]eventy per cent of Al Shabaab's support base emanates from weaker clans - specifically the Rahanweyn-Digil clans". Furthermore, although Jubaland is inhabited not only by Ogaden-Darod, but other clans as well, the Jubaland Administration is dominated by the Ogaden-Darod clan (Solomon, 2014b:191; Mwangi, 2016:122-124). By favouring the Ogaden-Darod clan in Jubaland since 2013, Mwangi (2016:129) concludes, Kenya has risked further pushing marginal clans into the ranks of *al-Shabaab*. Islamism in Somalia thus also reflects the clan divisions that define Somali politics.[241]

The paradox of Somalia is that parallel to these divisions, Somalia is a monoethnic state. In Chapter 4, section 4.2.4 *Inconsistencies and irreconcilables within Islamist violent extremism*, I outlined that Somalia is also an over 99 percent Muslim-majority state, mostly being Sunni Islam. As with most

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[241] As is the case with *al-Shabaab* and Jubaland, and much of politics in Somalia, clan politics also played a key role in the case of the short-lived Islamic Courts Union (ICU), between 2006 and 2007. Jones, Liepman and Chandler (2016:11) point out that the Hawiye clan dominated the ICU, controlling 10 of the 11 courts in the ICU in 2006. Somali clans and clan politics in Somalia as such, are beyond the scope of this study. Solomon (2014b) is a suitable scholarly source for outlining the distribution of Somali clans and the political significance thereof.

Islamist terror attacks, *al-Shabaab* attacks then kill and affect more Muslims than followers of other religions, and more ethnic-Somalis than other ethnic groups. The other contradiction is that parallel to the clan divisions, is Somali nationalism. Such nationalism was displayed during the irredentist movement of the 1960s and 1970s. Burbidge (2015:20) and Onyango-Obbo (2019:The Internet) contend that since the 1960s, Kenya and Ethiopia have feared Somali irredentism, which is why they still maintain the 1963 mutual defence pact against Somalia. In Chapter 6, section 6.3 *Islamist violent extremism and the fragile state in Kenya*, I elaborated that the defence pact was in response to this irredentist movement that sought to reincorporate ethic-Somalis into a 'Greater Somalia', risking the territorial integrity of Kenya and Ethiopia. Mwangi (2016:122) thus contends that "Kenya and Ethiopia, take every opportunity to promote the fragmentation of Somalia …. A weaker fragmented Somali state with several federal entities is … ideal for neighbouring states due to a number of socio-political and economic reasons". These reasons are centred on the fear that a strong central government in Mogadishu will reinforce renewed Somali irredentism and emboldened Islamist predispositions. Because of these fears, Kenya and Ethiopia have supported the 'Jubaland Initiative', i.e., a region and government in southern Somalia that will act as a buffer between Kenya and Ethiopia, and Somalia.

IRIN News (2013:The Internet) reports that "[m]any Somalis have long accused Kenya and Ethiopia of having a destabilising effect on Somalia; they see Kenyan and Ethiopian involvement in the Jubaland process as a self-interested attempt to establish proxies there". Throup (2012:The Internet) contends that Kenya and Ethiopia "would be quite willing to accept the balkanisation of Somalia with five or six regions linked in a weak confederal structure". *Al-Shabaab* also contends that a fragmented and unstable Somalia is what the 'foreign infidel' promotes, and asks the following rhetorical question: "Where was the international community and AMISOM the last 20 years while vying tribal warlords were wreaking havoc in Somali cities and committing every vice and human right violation possible?" (Gaidi Mtaani, 2015:10). The 'Jubaland Initiative' was put in process in Kenya since 2009. Initially opposed by the Somalia Federal Government (SFG), in May 2013, in a deal brokered by Ethiopia, Jubaland became a semi-autonomous region. In August 2013, the SFG signed an agreement with the Jubaland delegation, establishing an Interim Juba Administration. Jubaland is now a Federal Member State (FMS) of Somalia, with Ahmed Madobe, a key Kenyan ally, as President of Jubaland (Yusuf and Elder, 2013:The Internet; IRIN News, 2013:The Internet; Mwangi, 2016:120, 122-123).

With the creation of Jubaland, the hope is to have a government in Jubaland that can keep *al-Shabaab* away from Kenya and Ethiopia (IRIN News, 2013:The Internet; Solomon, 2014b:191). Added, Jubaland is important because this is where the strategic port of Kismayo is situated, and the adjacent offshore oil and gas reserves at the centre of the maritime border dispute between Kenya and Somalia (see further elaboration on this below). On 19 September 2019, the leader of *al-Shabaab*, Ahmed Dirie, issued a statement in response to Ahmed Madobe's August 2019 re-election as President of Jubaland. Ahmed Dirie accused Kenya of imposing Ahmed Madobe on Somalia, vowing that *al-Shabaab* "shall not allow our neighbouring enemies to run [the] show in Jubaland. We are a sovereign nation and nobody can forcefully choose leaders for us" (Hivisasa News, 2019:The Internet). In August 2019, Somalia's President, Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed (known as Mohamed Farmajo), also accused Kenya of imposing Ahmed Madobe, characterising this as 'internal interference' in Somali politics (Hivisasa News, 2019:The Internet).[242] The question of Somaliland has further added to accusations that Kenya is destabilising Somalia and interfering in Somali politics. Despite being viewed as a Federal Member State (FMS) by the central government in Mogadishu, Somaliland has self-declared independence since 1991 and seeks international recognition as a sovereign state. Contrary to the counsel from Somalia, and in a move seen by Somalia as undercutting their efforts to reincorporate Somaliland into Somalia, Kenya, together with Ethiopia and Djibouti, have established diplomatic ties with Somaliland (Dahir, 2020: internet; Mutambo, 2020:The Internet; Odula, 2020:The Internet).

Reverting to the issue of Jubaland, Kenya's other reasons for creating a pro-Kenyan buffer in Jubaland, other than keeping *al-Shabaab* away from Kenya, include: stemming Somalia's Islamist radicalisation; creating a stable southern Somalia for future resettlement of Somali refugees currently residing in Kenya; protecting the adjacent strategic city of Lamu in Lamu County; the economic significance of the port and town of Kismayo; the large oil and gas reserves off the coast of Kismayo (Mwangi, 2016:123; Yusuf and Elder, 2013:The Internet). Being adjacent to southern Somalia, Lamu County has been a hotspot of terror attacks, which threatens economic activity and economic planning in Kenya. These attacks in Lamu, and in Coast Region in general, and the linked oil and gas reserves off the coast of Kismayo in the Indian Ocean, bring this study to the issue of Kenya’s exploitation of Somalia.

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[242] Despite the long history of foreign policy collaboration regarding Somalia, Kenya and Ethiopia's national interests in Somalia do not always coincide. By illustration, Kenya and Ethiopia were on opposite sides during the 2019 elections in Jubaland. Kenya supported their longtime ally Ahmed Madobe whereas Ethiopia sided with Somalia's President Mohamed Farmajo in opposing the re-election of Ahmed Madobe. Mohamed Farmajo wanted to centralise political power within the federal system and feared a renegade regional government in Jubaland under Ahmed Madobe. Ethiopia also fears such a regional government in Jubaland. Largely, Ethiopia fears that Ahmed Madobe and the Jubaland government will renegade on their undertaking not to support secessionism in Ethiopia, as they belong to the same clan as the secessionist Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) of Ethiopia. Moreso, Ahmed Madobe has close ties with another secessionist group in Ethiopia, the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF). The ONLF and the TPLF, both seeking secession in Ethiopia, threaten the territorial integrity of Ethiopia. In fact, Ahmed Madobe is a former member of Islamic Courts Union (ICU), *al-Shabaab*'s precursor, and was governor of Lower Juba, with Kismayo as its capital, under the ICU in 2006. With Ethiopia's military intervention between 2006 and 2007, in support of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) in Somalia, leading to the fall and disintegration of the ICU in late 2006 and early 2007 respectively, Ahmed Madobe was arrested by Ethiopian forces trying to cross the border from Somalia into Kenya. Madobe was then held in an Ethiopian prison. Changing sides, in a deal brokered by Kenya, Madobe was released in 2009 to be part of the TFG in Somalia. Following his short stint as a member of parliament in the TFG, Ahmed Madobe and his *Ras Kamboni* militia were instrumental in Kenya's military incursion in Somalia with *Operation Linda Nchi*, and in the capturing of Kismayo from *al-Shabaab* in 2012 (Kiruga, 2019:The Internet; ICG, 2020:1-3, 5, 9-11).

This exploitation of Somalia by Kenya, whether real or perceived, is best illustrated by the long-standing maritime border dispute between Kenya and Somalia that appeared before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) between 2014 and 2021. To conflate issues, Kenya’s Attorney General, Prof. Githu Muigai, maintained at the ICJ that “Kenya has made exceptional sacrifices for Somalia .... Its soldiers have fought Al Shabaab. Kenyan citizens have been victims of terrorist attacks. Kenya has also been hosting over half a million Somali refugees for almost 25 years. The least Kenya can expect from Somalia is that it will honour its bilateral agreements” (in Kimonye, 2015:The Internet). The Kenya-Somalia agreement, signed on 7 April 2009, was about settling the maritime border dispute out of court, an agreement that Somalia renegaded on by approaching the ICJ (Kimonye, 2015:The Internet). The maritime border dispute is, in fact, a quarrel between Kenya and Somalia about offshore oil and gas exploration and exploitation zones in the Indian Ocean. These maritime gas and oil zones were deemed to be on the Kenyan side of the border. With Somalia claiming the area, a triangle of 162, 579 square kilometres, Kenya stands to lose the offshore oil and gas reserves. Kenya may also be forced to compensate Somalia, having already sold mining rights in some of these zones to Western oil and gas companies. Both prospects are unfavourable to Kenya. Pointing to this dispute, Kenya’s Citizen Support Mechanism (CSM), an organisation created by Kenya’s NCTC ‘to counter and prevent violent extremism in Kenya’, contends that “the bonds that have held Kenya and Somalia for decades are breaking each day because of … the Maritime dispute” (CSM, 2020:The Internet). On the 19 September 2019 statement, the leader of *al-Shabaab*, Ahmed Dirie, also raised the issue of the maritime-border dispute. Ahmed Dirie (on Radio Dalsan, 2019:The Internet; Radio Kulmiye, 2019:The Internet) condemned the role of the US, Kenya, and Ethiopia in exploiting Somalia, maintaining that

> [t]here seems to be an increase in the invasion led by the United States .... Hostility by Christians against Muslim society has increased. The objective of this hostility is to loot the oil wells in the country and other natural resources such as fish, and to hand our oceans over to Kenya and Ethiopia .... We tell the world that we don’t compromise on our oceans and we need our society to be aware that Kenya has already engulfed a large swathe of our territory before aiming for the maritime claim.

Somalia, a member-state of the Arab League, also has support from their Muslim-kin in the Arab League. The Arab League Parliament has condemned Kenya’s claim to the oil and gas reserves.

Speaking through Somalia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Arab League Parliament "calls on Kenya to stop its hands on Somali territorial waters, which are an integral part of the Arab waters, and rejects its false pretensions to draw up a new, unfounded map while rejecting its threats to interfere in Somalia's internal affairs" (SomaliMedia, 2019:The Internet). In turn, the Kenyan Ministry of Foreign Affairs declared that "Kenya is prepared and ready to defend its territorial integrity at any cost and considers all those directly or indirectly involved, whether Kenyan or non-Kenyan in encroachment of Kenya's territory as enemies of the State and as adversaries of the Kenyan people" (SomaliMedia, 2019:The Internet). Other external actors have also taken sides in the dispute. For example, Britain and Norway support Somalia, and the US and France support Kenya (CSM, 2020:The Internet).

This has been an evolving dispute adding to conflict dynamics within Kenya and between Somalia and Kenya, thus adding to the external impetus for Islamist violence in Kenya. The maritime dispute also appeals to the affinity and solidarity of ethnic-Somali coethnics and Muslim coreligionists in East Africa, the Arabian Peninsula, and further afield. Kenya's Citizen Support Mechanism (2020:The Internet) contends that the only amicable solution to the maritime border dispute is a negotiated settlement, and that whatever decision is made by the ICJ, *al-Shabaab* will emerge as the winner. This is an undesirable prospect according to the Support Mechanism. The Support Mechanism explains that if the ICJ rules in favour of Somalia, Kenya may withdraw from AMISOM, and as such leaving a power vacuum that will be exploited by *al-Shabaab*. Otherwise, if the court rules in favour of Kenya, this will draw Somalia closer to *al-Shabaab*, therefore incentivising both Somalia and *al-Shabaab* to 'destabilise peace in Kenya'. On 12 October 2021, the ICJ delivered its judgment, drawing a new maritime boundary line and siding largely with the claim made by Somalia (ICJ, 2021).

Responding to the ICJ judgment, President Kenyatta avowed: "At the outset, Kenya wishes to indicate that it rejects in totality and does not recognise the findings in the decision .... Fellow Kenyans, when I became President on 9th April 2013, I took an oath to protect the territorial integrity of the Republic of Kenya. I do not intend to abrogate my solemn oath" (Kenyatta, 2021:1, 4). President Farmajo responded: "I thank Allah ... for the fruit of the long struggle made by the Somalis in preventing Kenya's desire to claim ownership of part of Somalia's sea" (Aljazeera, 2021:The Internet). The final resolution of this dispute is yet unclear, although indications are that the dispute is most likely to be resolved by negotiations rather that an all-out war between Somalia and Kenya. What is patently evident is that the dispute is a clear and present danger with prospects for escalation into open conflict between Kenya and Somalia, especially if stoked by external actors siding with the opposing Kenyan state and Somalian state. The maritime border dispute, as evidenced by the statements from *al-Shabaab* and the Arab League, has also added to the drivers and contextual-exogenous conditions of Islamist violent extremism in Kenya. This maritime dispute (including resistance against the 'Jubaland Initiative', among other factors), also serve as an example of the confluence of interests and objectives against Kenya, between *al-Shabaab* as religious nationalists and the national federal government of Somalia.

I noted at the beginning of this section of the current chapter that unlike other indicators on the Fragile States Index, the indicator X1: *external intervention* serves as both a driver and a contextual-exogenous condition, in explaining Islamist violent extremism, in Kenya. Thus, whereas external actors and Kenya's fragile and volatile neighbourhood account for the contextual-exogenous factors that explain Islamist violent extremism in Kenya, the various forms of Kenya's intervention in Somalia, in themselves, are drivers of Islamist violent extremism in Kenya. These interventions by Kenya, which reflect Kenya's foreign policy in Somalia, include any one or any combination of: (1) supporting an 'apostate' government in Somalia, (2) destabilising Somalia, and/or (3) exploiting Somalia, as covered in this section of the chapter. Because of the treatment of Muslims in Kenya, and Kenya's interference in Somali politics, thus Kenya's domestic and foreign policies that are deemed to be unjust, Kenya has become *dar al-harb* in the eyes of both the Islamist movement and *al-Shabaab*. Contrary to the 'false universal' that 'our foreign policy has nothing to do with these terrorist attacks', what the indicator X1: *external intervention* critically demonstrates is that internationalised Islamism and cross-border Islamist terrorist activity are direct consequences of the foreign policy of the US and its allies in the Middle-East and in other Muslim countries such as Somalia. In the case in Kenya, the indictor X1: *external intervention* also demonstrates that Kenya's foreign policy in Somalia, and Kenya's domestic policies that have resulted in the marginalisation and securitisation of ethnic-Somalis and other Muslims in Kenya, have generated, and sustain, Islamism and Islamist terrorist activity in Kenya.[243]

7.4 CONCLUDING REMARKS

To explain the incentive structure of Islamist violent extremism and to examine the relationship between state fragility and Islamist violent extremism, is to examine and explain social phenomena that cannot be subjected to controlled conditions in the same way as laboratory experiments. While the strict controlled conditions of laboratory experiments cannot be duplicated, we may functionally reproduce these conditions by mitigating against the intrusion of extraneous factors and enhancing accuracy and confidence in the research process and the research results. In this regard Kenya contains and demarcates the conditions under which I examine the relationship between state fragility and Islamist violent extremism. In Chapter 2, section 2.3 *Research design*, I elaborated on how other factors that functionally reproduce these controlled conditions include case selection criteria, case boundaries, within-case spatial variation and temporal variation, and the attributes for a casual explanation. Secondly, to study the relationship between state fragility and Islamist violent extremism is to study a social reality that is inhabited by self-regulating and self-interpreting social structures and human agency, i.e., the notion of human beings as 'reflective open systems', who both shape and are shaped by the world around them. Because of these two factors, a causal explanation, by definition, is inferred, based on a theoretical proposition that is supported by congruent empirical evidence.

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[243] See Chapter 4, section 4.2.1 *Conceptualising Islamist violent extremism*, and section 4.3.1.1 *The clash of civilis*ations, and Chapter 6, section 6.5.2 *The long-war in Kenya*, and this chapter in section 7.2.2 *Explaining Islamist terrorist activity in the arc of insecurity*, for an analysis of this 'false universal' regarding the direct impact of US foreign policy on Islamist terrorism, and the direct impact of Kenya's domestic and foreign policies on ethnic-Somalis and other Muslims in Kenya and their coethnics and coreligionists in Somalia and elsewhere.

As Yin (1981:61) puts it, an explanatory case study bases its conclusions on an explanation that is most congruent with established facts. Robert Yin (2018:179) contends that "[t]o 'explain' a phenomenon is to stipulate a presumed set of causal sequences about it, or 'how' or 'why' some outcome has occurred". Similarly, John Gerring (2004:350) maintains that "[t]he analysis of any causal relationship hinges on the counterfactual assumption - that without X (or with more or less of X), Y would be different". John Gerring (2005:169, 170) further maintains that causes are "events or conditions that raise the probability of some outcome occurring .... To be causal, the cause in question must generate, create, or produce the supposed effect". John Gerring (2010:1502) also maintains that "[o]ne would like to know not only whether X causes Y but also how it does so". With a critical realist basis for explanation, founded on the formulation, cause (X) + causal mechanisms + context = outcome (Y), this study finds that state fragility (i.e., X or *explanans*), the associated causal mechanisms, and the context of Kenya, explain the why and the how of Islamist violent extremism (i.e., Y or *explanandum*).

The chapter sought to answer this central question, viz.: What is the relationship between state fragility and Islamist violent extremism in Kenya? Based on the theoretical proposition of state fragility and supported by congruent empirical evidence, this study finds this relationship to be a causal relationship. State fragility has causal capacity and causal tendency. By virtue of its inherent debilitating and conflict-generating properties, state fragility has the ability and tendency to bring about outcomes, events, phenomenon, or conditions, one of which is political violence. One specific form of such political violence is terrorism. The properties of state fragility include weak, failing, and abusive structures of governance and authority, endemic corruption, and extraction of rents from the population, the lack of capacity and willingness to provide public goods and basic services, and low levels of economic development. All of these properties of state fragility are often linked to the marginalisation of specific identity groups in society. State fragility as a unit of analysis, i.e., the source of explanation, is evidenced at three separate but related units of observation, viz.: in state institutions, in state-society relations, and in the relationship between groups in society. These three units of observation are what I have hitherto referred to as three levels of state fragility, viz.: macro, meso, and micro levels. These three levels of state fragility, as I point out, reveal structural flaws, i.e., fault-lines, (1) in state institutions, (2) in state-society relations, and (3) between groups in society. A fragile state is consequently defined by underperformance, misperformance, violence (structural, physical, and cultural), and insecurity, at these three levels of fragility or units of observation.

The study finds that state fragility provides the context and permissive causes for Islamist violent extremism. Critically, by raising the probability of Islamist violent extremism occurring, and initiating the time order in this causal relationship, state fragility is also a driver of Islamist violent extremism. The study finds that state fragility generates changes in Islamist violent extremism, i.e., Islamist violent extremism is most virulent in areas where state fragility is most prevalent. Islamist organisations such as *al-Shabaab* and its patron *al-Qaeda* Central, which are formed in response to conditions of state fragility, react to the present undesirable and rejected conditions of fragility by proposing a desired and preferred future, that of a return to *al-hakimiyya*, as defined by the creation of Islamic states that are governed by the *Sharia*. Furthermore, these organisations focus their efforts and operations in areas where state fragility is most evidenced, i.e., where state fragility fault-lines are most acute. These areas and conditions of state fragility include the failure to accommodate Muslim and Islamic interests, the repression and marginalisation of Muslim identity, and the failure to improve the lot of Muslims. In such fragile states, in their failing to provide security, justice, and equitable opportunity, Islamist violent extremism becomes the outlet through which the hopeless scarcity, acute deprivation, and frustrated expectations, that bubble up from ‘below’ in society, escape and find their expression. The state, its government, institutions, and society, become the object of the blame system of Islamism. In a resultant long-war, said state, its government, institutions, and society, are deemed to be legitimate targets for *jihad*, including being targets for cultural and direct violence. Kenya is therefore not merely the context in which Islamist violent extremism plays out. Kenya is the principal actor. The state is itself the source of insecurity and conflict, and a cardinal actor in the conflict.

Studies to date on Islamist violent extremism in Kenya have so far at best yielded incomplete answers, and at worst inaccurate and misleading answers. These studies have failed to reveal the proverbial elephant for what it is. This is where state fragility as a phenomenon, a conceptual-analytical framework, and a theoretical perspective, employed as the *explanans* of Islamist violent extremism, and the Fragile States Index as a conceptual-analytical measuring instrument of state fragility, have unmatched value and utility. State fragility and the Fragile States Index reveal the elephant for what it is, in all its complexities, in a coherent, systematic, and comprehensive manner. In Chapter 3, I detail how, unlike other indexes on state fragility, the Fragile States Index has unmatched value and utility given the aim and objectives of this study. The index not only highlights the pressures on the state and state institutions, on state-society relations, as well as group relations within society, but critically, the index identifies when these pressures outweigh the capacity of the state, thus exposing the state to the risk of various permutations of insecurity, including political violence. In this instance such political violence takes the form of Islamist terrorism as an expression of Islamist violent extremism.

The Fragile States Index, however, is not the holy grail of state fragility. It does not, conclusively, uncover the context, causes, properties, symptoms, and outcomes of state fragility. Such a holy grail is yet to be discovered. The Fund for Peace (2017b:13) also concedes that the index is 'an entry point for further interpretive analysis' (see Chapter 3). In this regard, aggregating fragility data over time at the state level, the Fragile States Index provides (1) sequences, (2) trace, and (3) accounts, evidence, but not (4) patterns evidence, of state fragility. The MPI does provide patterns evidence of state fragility, but only of one dimension of state fragility, that is, relative multi-dimensional poverty. However, this is at the level of the eight regions in Kenya, not the 47 counties. Disaggregated data of multi-dimensional poverty at the 47 counties level is a more accurate approximation of reality, as the aggregated regional data conceal variation in deprivation that exists within the eight regions. More so, it is the 47 counties, not the eight regions, that are the central administrative units where the allocation of resources and political bargaining takes place. Therefore, counties are the appropriate units to examine in observing relative deprivation in Kenya. In Chapter 6, I outlined how one of the unintended outcomes of devolution since 2010 was to redraw battlelines in Kenya. Since 2010, the 47 counties are the new battlefields where the struggle for equality and access to resources is waged.

To mitigate the foregoing and other limitations, the study relies on multiple sources of evidence, including field research, elite interviews, and various other indexes that reveal varied dimensions and indicators of state fragility. The indexes include the Fragile States Index itself, the Multidimensional Poverty Index, the County Development Index, the Social Progress Index, the SDGs Index, the Freedom House Index, the Political Terror Scale, the Corruption Perceptions Index, the Global Terrorism Index, and the new Planetary-pressures-adjusted Human Development Index. The Global Terrorism Index reveals one outcome of state fragility, viz., political violence, and specifically one form of political violence, viz., terrorism. But the Global Terrorism Index records only non-state terrorism. Therefore, one must turn to the Political Terror Scale to account for state terrorism in Kenya. Such state terrorism has added to the unproductive and counterproductive CVE one finds in Kenya, which largely results in undermining democratic principles, increased radicalisation, and the hardening of positions on both sides of the conflict, thus the failure of CVE (see the next chapter, Chapter 8).

Explaining the need for the new Planetary-pressures-adjusted Human Development Index, the *Human Development Report 2020* makes the point that "[t]he challenges we face, and the possibilities before us, have always been more complex, much more multidimensional and interconnected than a single metric - or even a handful of metrics, no matter how good - could ever capture on its own. Complexity requires more lenses" (UNDP, 2020d:11-12). The various indexes provide these lenses and aid in deepening our evolving understanding of state fragility and the relationship between state fragility and Islamist violent extremism. Critically, these indexes, and other resources employed in this study, including field research and elite interviews, exhibit a convergence of multiple sources of evidence, all demonstrating various dimensions of the syndrome that is state fragility, including the nature, causes, symptoms, and properties, of state fragility. This convergence of sources of evidence is also reflected in demonstrating the outcomes of state fragility, which is Islamist violent extremism in this case. Such convergence of sources of evidence adds to the cogency, confidence, and reliability in analysis and findings regarding this relationship between state fragility and Islamist violent extremism in Kenya.

Since in Kenya Islamist violent extremism finds expression in terrorism, rather than insurgency or proto-states, I employ terrorist activity or terrorist incidence as the empirical substantiation of Islamist violent extremism. Of the 47 counties, apart from Nairobi County as the political-economic hub in Kenya, all Islamist terrorist incidents by *al-Shabaab* occur in 11 counties in, collectively, three of the most fragile regions in Kenya, viz.: North-eastern, Coast, and Eastern regions. Prior to 2010 *al-Shabaab* engaged in only three terrorist incidents in Kenya. The first incident occurred in 2008 and the other two in 2009. The first incident was an armed clash between *al-Shabaab* and Kenyan security forces on 29 May 2008 in Garissa County. On 13 December 2009 there were two incidents in Wajir County. One was an attack by *al-Shabaab*, and subsequently, an armed clash between *al-Shabaab* and Kenyan security forces. It is therefore at the height of state fragility in Kenya that *al-Shabaab* initiated its terrorist activity in Kenya. The Fragile States Index registered a record *high alert* at 101.4 in 2008 and 100.7 in 2009 for Kenya in the aftermath of the 2007/2008 post-elections communal violence that brought Kenya to the precipice of a civil war and resulted in a constitutional crisis. There was also a notable spike following Kenya's military incursion into Somalia with Operation *Linda Nchi*. From only six terrorist incidents in 2010, and 24 in 2011, there were 51 terrorist incidents in 2012 in Kenya. In the three-year period between the constitutional reforms and the creation of the 47 counties in 2010 and *Linda Nchi* (2011-2012), there was thus a 750 percent increase in terrorist incidents in Kenya.

With a total of 430 Islamist terrorist incidents between 2010 and 2019 in Kenya, 121 (28.13 percent) occurred in Mandera, 107 (24.88 percent) in Garissa, 86 (20 percent) in Lamu, 35 (8.13 percent) in Wajir, 27 (6.27 percent) in Nairobi, 25 (5.81 percent) in Mombasa, and 15 (3.48 percent) in Kwale. These are therefore the seven counties most affected by Islamist violent extremism, representing 96.74 percent of all Islamist terrorist incidents in Kenya between 2010 and 2019. The other 14 (3.25 percent) incidents took place in Tana-River, Isiolo, Marsabit, Machakos, and Kilifi, counties. North-eastern and Coast regions, with 397 combined incidents, account for 92.32 percent of all Islamist terrorist incidents between 2010 and 2019 (the other 6.27 percent occurred in Nairobi County, and 1.39 percent occurred in Eastern Region). North-eastern Region alone, with 263 incidents, account for almost two-thirds (61.16 percent) of all Islamist terrorist incidents in Kenya between 2010 and 2019. North-eastern is the most deprived region, and the middle of the epicentre of Islamist terrorism.

The above terrorist activity is consistent with the contestation of the constricted democratic space by ethnic-Somalis and other Muslims as a marginalised compound minority that is otherwise politically significant and acts as a political coalition. Ethnic-Somalis and other Muslims are a political, economic, religious, and ethnic minority in Kenya. According to the 2019 population census, Kenya's Muslims are 5.2 million, accounting for 11 percent of the population. Ninety-two percent (4.7 million) of Kenya's Muslims are concentrated in the 12 counties in the arc of insecurity, the epicentre of Islamist terrorist activity in Kenya. Almost half of them, i.e., 47.34 percent (2.4 million), live in North-eastern Region, the middle of the epicentre of Islamist terrorist activity in Kenya. Fifty four percent (2.8 million) of Kenya's Muslims are ethnic-Somalis, comprising six percent of the total population. Almost eighty percent (i.e., 79.27) of ethnic-Somalis in Kenya are multi-dimensionally poor, most making ends meet on less than US$1.90 a day. Moreso, and as shown in Chapter 6, since independence in 1963, the fragile state in Kenya has securitised Muslim and ethnic-Somali communities, subjecting them to 'unjust, deliberate, and avoidable social orders', 'historical injustices', as well as violence (structural, cultural, and direct), and state terrorism. This acute insecurity continues unabated in Kenya.

Since the 1990s, spurred on by the third wave of Islamist violent extremism and self-help and survival motives, the response of ethnic-Somalis and other Muslims to these insecurity conditions of state fragility has been Islamist violent extremism and its manifestation, Islamist terrorism. In Chapters 4 and 6, I demonstrated that terrorist activity in Kenya, including target selection, is consistent with the tactical, organisational, and strategic objectives of terrorism as employed by Islamist organisations such as *al-Shabaab*. These varied objectives or levels of terrorism include creating fear and imposing costs (i.e., tactical objectives), recruitment and publicity (i.e., organisational objectives), as well as employing terrorism for coercive bargaining and policy or regime change (i.e., strategic objectives). The terrorist activity and target selection that is strategically designed to induce policy changes or regime change, is also consistent with the intent of the Islamist movement, which is a return to *al-hakimiyya* (i.e., the sovereignty of God [Allah]), aimed at liberating Muslim lands of *kuffar* and foreign occupation and influences, delivering Muslims from apostate and unaccountable governments, creating Islamic states, enforcing the *Sharia* in such states, and generating an Islamic renaissance.

The intensity of Islamist violent extremism in the arc of insecurity in Kenya also shows consistency with findings in the studies by Putnam (1993) and Buhaug *et al* (2011), as outlined in Chapter 2, section 2.3.4 *Spatial and temporal variation and analysis in explanatory case studies*. Buhaug *et al* (2011) assert that in internal conflicts, the areas where conflicts emerge are rarely typical or representative of the state. These localities often exhibit distinct deviancies from the state, representing places and areas where fault-lines are most acute, and from where conflicts erupt. In illustration, but in explaining variation in regional government performance (i.e., 'institutional success') in Italy, Putnam (1993) found that this variation was because of variation in prevailing regional conditions (i.e., 'civic life'). In explaining conflict emergence, based on economic factors, Buhaug *et al* (2011:815) found that "geographical variation in income and wealth within countries is very influential in shaping the risk of violence through its impact on incentives and opportunities for mobilisation". Therefore, whereas the conditions for political violence may exist within the state in general, political violence tends to erupt in the most deprived regions and across the most deprived areas or dimensions of the state.

Such variation is also demonstrable in the case in Kenya. The variation in state fragility and the contingent variation in Islamist violent extremism (and in impediments to CVE) in Kenya explains not only the incentive structure of Islamist violent extremism, but also the formation and locus of this ideology and movement and the locus of the eruption of its expression, viz., Islamist terrorism. Islamist violent extremism and Islamist terrorism are therefore particularly virulent in the arc of insecurity in Kenya, where state fragility is most evidenced and deeply entrenched, as demonstrated by indexes such as the Multidimensional Poverty Index and the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data project. Having erupted in the fault-line that is North-eastern Region, starting in Garissa County in 2008 and Wajir County in 2009 (in the context of *al-Shabaab*), Islamist terrorist activity in Kenya is also most virulent in North-eastern Region, the middle of the epicentre of state fragility and Islamist violent extremism in Kenya. Said variation in X and Y indicates the existence of a causal relationship.

While the average inhabitants of North-eastern Region or any of these counties may not know about the properties of state fragility, or factors such as multidimensional poverty, Gini coefficient and life expectancy disparities, the blame system, rational choice theory, the kin-country syndrome, politically significant identity, or even the central tenets of the ideology and movement that is Islamist violent extremism, they live under the impacts of these factors, they know what absolute and relative deprivation feels like, they know what gravely reduced capabilities and prospects they have as individuals and communities, they know about ethno-religious profiling, collective punishment, and state terrorism, and they know that all of these are not accidents, but the consequences of deliberate and avoidable government policies in Kenya. In Chapter 6, I outlined how ethnic-Somalis and Muslims are also collectively aware that in seeking ontological security within the state, the electoral route is not a viable option. This realisation is occasioned by varied factors and collective experiences, including: the nature and extent of ethno-politics in Kenya; election results in Kenya often reflecting no more than an ethnic-alliance census; ethnic-Somalis and Muslims make up only six and 11 percent of the population respectively; their history of marginalisation and securitisation; peaceful means of dissent have been stifled since independence in 1963; Islamism has been criminalised since the 1990s.

Decidedly, Dystopia, ‘unjust, deliberate, and avoidable social orders’, and ‘historical injustices’, are the collective lived experience for 92 percent of Muslims (most being ethnic-Somalis) in Kenya who call the 12 counties in the arc of insecurity home. It is also the lived experience of 79.27 percent of ethnic-Somalis who are multi-dimensionally poor and mostly subsisting on less than US$1.90 a day, or that of the more than 4, 000 ethnic-Somalis who were detained without trial during Operation *Usalama* Watch (2014) and subjected to numerous other violations of human rights, including extortion, torture, disappearances, refoulement, and renditions. Or, as the 2019 population census indicates, the close to 50 percent of households in these 12 counties that have no amenities other than the open bush to ‘dispose human waste’ (use the toilet). Or the over 95 percent of households in these 12 counties that are not connected to the electricity grid and must still rely on firewood and charcoal as cooking fuel. This collective lived experience of ethnic-Somalis and other Muslims in Kenya is felt by their coethnics and coreligionists outside of Kenya, and in Somalia in particular. In Chapter 6, I also elaborated on how the *Shifta* war (1963-1968), and the Isiolo (1968), Garissa (1980), and Wagalla (1984) massacres, are also present in the collective memory of ethnic-Somalis and other Muslims in and outside of Kenya. All the foregoing collective memories and collective lived experiences combine to impact on the development of both Islamist violent extremism and impediments to CVE.

In response to the excesses and failures of state fragility, Fawaz Gerges (2009:273) finds that Islamist violent extremism offers and promises both ‘moral salvation and political deliverance’. Islamist violent extremism thus offers ontological security by returning to *al-hakimiyya* in the Islamic state under the *Sharia*, and counsels *jihad* as the means and the way to get there. Therefore, whether one employs the single-embedded lens or the longitudinal lens in examining the relationship between state fragility and Islamist violent extremism, the causal pathway between X and Y, viz., state fragility and Islamist violent extremism, is conclusively crystallised and defined. This causal pathway, the black box between X and Y, is explained by the context of Kenya as well as specific causal mechanisms, which include: the effects of the insecurity dilemma in Kenya; the levels of ontological insecurity as experienced by ethnic-Somalis and other Muslims; self-help and survival motives; the search by ethnic-Somalis and other Muslims to maximise their security either within the state in Kenya or through secession.

The next chapter examines and provides evidence of the relationship between state fragility and impediments to CVE. These impediments to CVE, which lead to ineffective and counterproductive CVE, ultimately result in the failure of CVE. The next chapter is also designed to enable both spatial (single-embedded) and temporal (longitudinal) variation and analysis. The single-embedded design lens employs the theoretical instrument of the arc of insecurity, and the longitudinal design lens employs the theoretical instrument of a causal sequence. The single-embedded and the longitudinal lenses together make provision for four types of evidence, viz., (1) trace, (2) accounts, (3) patterns, and (4) sequences, which is employed in explanation-building of the causal relationship between state fragility and impediments to CVE. The chapter ends with an exploration of the extent to which the conduct of Islamist violent extremism and CVE may have aided in compounding state fragility in Kenya.

CHAPTER 8: STATE FRAGILITY AND COUNTERING ISLAMIST VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN KENYA

8.1 INTRODUCTION

The chapter seeks to answer this central question: What is the relationship between state fragility and CVE in Kenya? This question is informed by two observations. The first view is that state fragility has debilitating causal capacity and tendency, limiting the options available for the said state to effectively mediate Islamist violent extremism and the incentive structure of this ideology and movement. The second observation is that state fragility has conflict-generating causal capacity and tendency, with said states often misperforming with heavy-handed and indiscriminate CVE, and hence aiding instead of mediating radicalisation. State fragility generates impediments to CVE, which renders CVE ineffective and counter-productive, with the result that CVE is failing acutely in such fragile states. The chapter is divided into three parts: (1) the arc of insecurity and impediments to CVE in Kenya; (2) state fragility and the development of impediments to CVE in Kenya; (3) an exploration of the extent to which Islamist violent extremism and CVE may have augmented state fragility in Kenya. The link between state fragility and CVE is defined by the insecurity dilemma and the associated fragility and conflict traps that have locked Kenya in self-reinforcing cycles of insecurity and political violence. The proposition thus is that state fragility (the *explanans*), provides the context (setting), and opportunity (enablers or permissive causes), and generates (drives or causes) impediments to CVE, thus leading to ineffective and counterproductive CVE, and ultimately the failure of CVE (the *explanandum*).

A caveat before proceeding. This chapter (and the study) does not purport to offer solutions or make recommendations about the challenges of Islamist violent extremism and CVE or state fragility. What I seek to do, is to offer and demonstrate a logic that outlines the consistent conditions and factors under which specific processes and outcomes are likely to occur. In regards CVE, these processes and outcomes relate to how and why particular impediments to CVE are enabled and generated by state fragility, and how and why these impediments undermine the effectiveness of CVE. The singular object therefore is which conditions and factors, enabled and generated by state fragility, impede, and will impede in future, the success of CVE in Kenya. Several of these impediments to CVE, such as endemic insecurity and inequality, the oligopoly of political and terrorism violence, depreciated monopoly on the use of violence, depreciated social cohesion, depreciated resilience, disengagement (from the state), a constricted democratic space, marginalising and conflict-generating hegemonial exchange, the challenged state legitimacy and state authority, the lack of sources of economic opportunity and livelihood, and regional underdevelopment and differentiated development, also apply in the case of the broader and related state-building and nation-building in Kenya. Despite these broader likely applications, these impediments as they apply to CVE in Kenya, remain the object.[244]

In Chapter 5, section 5.3 *Ending violent Islamist campaigns*, I expanded on how terrorist organisations, invariably inhabiting hostile security environments, historically have a short life expectancy. *Al-Qaeda*, more than 30 years in existence (formed in 1988), is in fact an anomaly. The Global Terrorism Database (GTD) substantiates that between 1970 and 1997, only 1.26 percent of these terrorist organisations lasted more than twenty years, 4.62 percent lasted 11-20 years, 4.62 percent lasted 6-10 years, 14.77 percent lasted 1-5 years, and 74.72 percent of them did not survive their first year of existence. This trend is again recorded between 2002 and 2019. In 2002 there were 104 active terrorist organisations, and only 47 (45.19 percent) survived a year later in 2003. By 2019 only 19 (18.26 percent) of these organisations were active. The latest data in 2022 also show the same pattern in the life expectancy of terrorist organisations. Of the 84 terrorist organisations that were active in 2015, only 46 (54.76 percent) were active in 2018, and only 32 (38.09 percent) were active by 2021 (IEP, 2022:5, 67).

In Chapter 5, section 5.3 *Ending violent Islamist campaigns*, I further elaborated how terrorist groups regularly die from natural causes, and not by counter-terrorism or CVE measures alone. These natural causes include: the drying up of funding sources (for reasons other than any countermeasures); the natural death of leaders; implosion resulting from internal conflict; disillusionment with the ideology or organisation (by leaders, the rank-and-file, or a complicit community); the lack of international support or a disapproving international environment. Given the foregoing, formed in 2006 and 16 years in existence (in 2022), the life cycle of *al-Shabaab* might therefore be nearing its end, and so might the third wave of Islamist violent extremism, as it has been raging since the 1990s already.

If *al-Shabaab* and the lslamist movement in Kenya and East Africa do not die of natural causes, CVE in Kenya faces particularly intractable impediments that are enabled and generated by state fragility. I examine these impediments by employing two lenses within the research design, viz., a single-embedded lens (i.e., spatial variation) and a longitudinal lens (i.e, temporal variation). These two lenses, by creating multiple points of observation through spatial and temporal variation, enable within-case variation, observation, and analysis, as well as within-case causal explanation. These two lenses also enable the demonstration of four types of evidence, viz., (1) trace, (2) accounts, (3) patterns, and (4) sequences, in the causal relationship between state fragility (X) and impediments to CVE (Y), in Kenya (the setting). In examining this relationship, I first consider the single-embedded lens.

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[244] Added, and as initially noted in Chapter 1, state-building is the touted remedy for both state fragility and CVE, and resilience is prescribed in the context of both state fragility and CVE. Despite such interactions and their adaptable application, the distinctions between these phenomena and concepts should be kept in mind.

8.2 THE ARC OF INSECURITY AND IMPEDIMENTS TO CVE

In Chapter 2, section 2.3 *Research design*, I established that this study employs the arc of insecurity as a theoretical, analytical, and explanatory instrument, which enables within-case variation, analysis, and explanation of impediments to CVE in Kenya. With the construct of the arc of insecurity, one can demonstrate that variation in X (state fragility), generates the contingent variation in Y (impediment to CVE). Impediments to CVE are consequently most defined in areas and dimensions of the state where state fragility is most evidenced, which is in the arc of insecurity. The arc of insecurity, or its equivalents such as ungoverned spaces or stateless spaces, is more than a geographical construct. The arc of insecurity encompasses physical, legal, political, economic, and social public spaces, as well as areas and dimensions of the state, which are outside the meaningful and effective control and management of the state. These public spaces are defined by insecurity, abuse, and political violence.

In the third chapter, I noted that state fragility is often associated with underperformance, i.e., a capacity deficit. While state fragility may stem from a lack of capacity, evidence suggests that whichever poor performance features in Kenya emanates less from a capacity deficit and more from state misperformance, i.e., abuse, which leads to endemic insecurity. Underperformance and misperformance are often also localised and concentrated. Hence, in Chapter 6 (and in the context of Chapter 7 and this chapter), I further offer empirical evidence demonstrating that state fragility is localised and concentrated in the arc of insecurity. The Kenyan state has historically marginalised, deprived, and securitised the arc of insecurity. It is in the arc of insecurity where the indicators of state fragility are most evidenced and at their core most intractable, and where impediments to CVE are to be found and at their centre most obstinate. The result is ineffective and counterproductive CVE, and thus the failure of CVE. Let me first focus on the arc of insecurity as a geographical construct.

8.2.1 Impediments to CVE in the Arc of Insecurity

Based on the Kenyan state's absence, abstinence, and abuse in its functions and responsibilities, Musambayi Katumanga demarcates Kenya as a 'trifurcated space' that is defined by insecurity and an oligopoly of political violence. The first space is the 'imagined nation-state'. This is a national space where, instead of a common citizenship, access to the state and access to state resources are often provided by differentiated political connections and ethnic affiliation. The second is the 'gerontocracy' space. This is a space of contested predation where youths and gangs, tied to the elite and engaged in criminal activity and political violence, are employed by the elite to gain political power, and exclude others from gaining political power. The third is the 'indigeneity' space. Participation, representation, and security in this space is limited to members of the ethnic group and based on ethnic belonging and notions of autochthony. What is common in all three spaces is identity that seeks to exercise exclusive control in each space and that employs violence to exercise such control, while marginalising and excluding 'the other'. The armed groups that operate in these three spaces include criminal gangs like Kenya's *Taliban* and the Baghdad Boys, ethnic militias like the *Mungiki* (a Kikuyu militia that is tied to the governing elite), as well as Islamist organisations like *al-Shabaab*. These three spaces are not invariable but fluid. In this regard the political elite and ethnic militias navigate all three spaces in Kenya, including the space where the political and the criminal intersect (Katumanga, 2005:512-513, 2013a:146-148, 150-152, 2013b:13-17, 2014:146, 2017:140-141). Katumanga (2013b:13) contends that these are "[c]losed spaces … that are constructed in discourses and behaviour of state institutions and citizens to belong to certain groups either on ethnic, … or religious reasons".[245]

The foregoing outlines insecurity and oligopoly of political violence in the three spaces in Kenya. I highlighted in Chapter 6, section 6.5.1 *New-wars in Kenya*, that this oligopoly of violence manifests itself in the new-wars that have defined Kenya since the 1990s. These new-wars encapsulate: (1) communal violence, which links varied ethnic groups (related to land ownership, land use, and elections); (2) activities of organised militias (often run along ethnic lines); (3) banditry and criminal activity.[246] Furthermore, as shown in Chapters 4 and 6, the Global Terrorism Index records terrorist activity by all non-state actors since 2001 in Kenya, including organised militias, as well as *al-Shabaab*. Employing six terrorism impact ranges, with *medium* impact (4.00 - 5.99) as the third highest terrorism impact range, the Index records an average *medium* terrorism impact score of 5.04 (out of 10.00) between 2001 and 2019 in Kenya.[247] However, as demonstrated in Chapter 7, despite this oligopoly of non-state terrorism, which comprises of participation by other non-state actors such as organised militias, the geography of terrorism in Kenya reveals that the terrorism space is dominated by Islamist terrorism, and led by *al-Shabaab* in the long-war that is most resolute in the arc of insecurity. The long-war is even more concentrated at the core of the arc of insecurity, i.e., the centre of state fragility, which is North-eastern Region (i.e., Mandera, Wajir, and Garissa counties).[248]

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[245] Oligopoly is contrasted with monopoly. These concepts are borrowed from Economics. Whilst oligopolies are encouraged and monopolies are discouraged in an economic market, this is the opposite in a security market. In the state as a security market, the state provides security and violence as products or services. If the state fails in this role, varied non-state actors lay claim to the role. See Andreas Mehler (2004) for an outline of this concept, what he calls 'oligopolies of violence'. Added to monopoly (one actor) and oligopoly (few actors), Mehler (2004) adds 'polypoly', where a multitude of non-state actors participate in a security market. A polypoly invokes images of something close to a Hobbesian 'state of nature', i.e., an imagined stateless society. Hobbes (1651:62) describes life in a state of nature as 'every man, against every man', where life is 'solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short'. In Chapter 3, section 3.2 *What is state fragility*? I outlined how a strong or resilient state is expected to provide security and exercises monopoly over the use of violence within its boundaries. In contrast, in fragile states, with the state absent or abstaining, and the state itself generating insecurity, varied non-state actors act as alternative security providers and exercise oligopoly of violence in different spaces within the state. The state and its agents then either compete or cooperate with these non-state actors. In the case in Kenya, the security market is not only defined by an oligopoly of political violence, but participation in the (non-state actor) terrorism space in Kenya, although dominated by *al-Shabaab*, is also not limited to *al-Shabaab*.

[246] See Lafargue and Katumanga (2008) for an outline of the role of organised militias during the 2007/2008 post-election violence that brought Kenya to the precipice of a civil war, including the role of *Mungiki* (Kikuyu) and *Taliban* (Luo). Furthermore, as is the case with the political elite and these organised militias, with the intersection between the political and the criminal spaces in Kenya, *al-Shabaab* is also involved in banditry and

It is in this arc of insecurity where state fragility is most evidence. As a result, not only is the oligopoly of political and terrorism violence there most demonstrated, but this is also where the struggle for the 'hearts and minds' in Kenya is most intense, and social cohesion is at its lowest. In Chapter 6, I highlighted how Islamism as an ideology and a movement, and *al-Shabaab* as an Islamist organisation, are contesting the political marketplace in a struggle for 'hearts and minds' and a struggle of competing ideas in Kenya through the employment of both pressure politics and violent politics. In the contest between secularism and Islamism, and a struggle for ontological security in Kenya by ethnic-Somalis and other Muslims, the fragile state is struggling to command the loyalty of sections of society in a political marketplace that is defined by (coercive) political bargaining. With the fragile state failing to create and solidify a collective identity (i.e., social cohesion), the capacity, legitimacy, and authority of the state remain challenged.[249] The foregoing impediments to CVE are also reflective

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criminal activity, sometimes in collusion with Kenyan actors, including state actors such as the Kenya Defence Forces (KDF), making the war in Kenya (and Somalia) settle into a 'mutual enterprise' instead of a 'contest of wills', in essence a war with no destined end, thereby creating another intractable impediment to CVE. See later in the current chapter in section 8.3.5 *Cross-cutting indicator and impediments to CVE*.

[247] The eight edition of the Global Terrorism Index (2020) covers the period 2001-2019. In 2021 the index was not issued. In the latest 9th edition of the Index (2022), the Index changed its main data source from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) to TerrorismTracker and changed both its methodology and definition of terrorism (IEP, 2022:2, 88-90). I use the dataset and methodology prior to 2022. See also Chapter 4, section 4.2 *Islamist violent extremism*, and Chapter 6, section 6.7 *Major Islamist terrorist activity in Kenya since the 1990s*.

[248] See Chapter 7, section 7.2 *The arc of insecurity and Islamist violent extremism*. With a total of 430 Islamist terrorist incidents between 2010 and 2019 in Kenya (all occurring in 12 counties in the arc of insecurity), North-eastern and Coast regions (i.e., eight counties out of a total of 47 counties in Kenya), with 397 incidents, account for 92.32 percent of all Islamist terrorist incidents in Kenya in this period. North-eastern Region alone (three counties), with 263 incidents, accounts for almost two-thirds (61.16 percent) of all Islamist terrorist incidents in Kenya between 2010 and 2019. With 92 percent (4.7 million) of Kenya's 5.2 million Muslims (11 percent of the population) concentrated in the 12 counties in the arc of insecurity, North-eastern and Coast regions (eight counties) are home to 75 percent (3.9 million) of Kenya's Muslims. North-eastern Region alone (three counties) is home to 47.34 percent (2.4 million) Muslims, almost half of Kenya's Muslims. Fifty four percent (2.8 million) of Kenya's 5.2 million Muslims are ethnic-Somalis, constituting six percent of the population in Kenya.

[249] See Chapter 6, section 6.3.1.4 *The third wave of Islamist violent extremism in Kenya*, and section 6.5.2 *The long-war in Kenya*.

of the challenges in the larger crises of state-building and nation-building that defines state fragility. In addition to these impediments, as well as group grievances and demographic pressures from ethnic-Somalis and other Muslims in the arc of insecurity, which salient impediments in the arc of insecurity and in North-eastern Region in particular demonstrate obstinacy to CVE in Kenya, and how?

But first, in Chapter 5, section 5.4 *Countering Islamist violent extremism*, and Chapter 6, section 6.9 *Countering Islamist violent extremism in Kenya*, I outlined the challenge facing states and militaries involved in ‘wars among the people’. The reduced utility of force, even the futility of force, in such wars, aimed predominantly at the distribution of power and resources in society, reduces the utility of offensive and defensive approaches to CVE approaches and programming, thus limiting the response choices available to the state. This is an inherent impediment to the success of CVE. I also outlined other challenges that represent impediments inherent to CVE in general. Such impediments are also reflected in the context of Kenya. These impediments relate to the four stages of a CVE policy cycle, viz., assessment, development, implementation, and evaluation. In the case of assessment, the challenges include the differentiated meaning of CVE, which overlaps security and development imperatives. The differentiated meaning of CVE triggers the challenges that are related to the second stage, viz., policy development. In this stage the challenge is choosing and developing a CVE approach and programming among varied and often conflicting approaches and programming. With policy implementation, the challenge is to distinguish between what is CVE specific versus what is CVE relevant, given that CVE overlaps security and development considerations and imperatives. The last stage, policy evaluation, presents the challenge of measuring the failure, success, and ethical imperatives of CVE. Relevant questions to ask include: What are the success metrics of CVE? Is the success metric to ‘disrupt and deny the operational capacity’ or is it to ‘undermine and deny the intention and objectives’ of the Islamist organisation? How do you know whether CVE measures are preventing or aiding radicalisation? Is CVE successful (desirable) if it succeeds in other areas but falls short of its ethical imperatives? Is CVE successful if it achieves its security imperatives but fails at its development imperatives? Against which objective do you measure success or failure, given the varied objectives of Islamist violent extremism? The answers to these questions remain highly contested.

In addition to the above impediments that are inherent to CVE in general, there are impediments to CVE that are particular to fragile states, and which may also be demonstrated in the case in Kenya. The first impediment as generated by state fragility is that the fragile state, whether underperforming or misperforming, is incentivised to overly rely on heavy-handed coercive measures, a hammer often being the only tool in the CVE toolbox of such fragile states. To avoid unnecessary repetition, I revert to these heavy-handed tendencies of CVE in Kenya later in the chapter, when I will review them through a longitudinal lens.[250] In addition to these heavy-handed tendencies, what also defines fragile states and impediments to CVE in fragile states, is ungoverned spaces (observed through a single-embedded lens in this second part of the chapter). Ungoverned spaces serve as enablers (safe havens) and drivers (incubators) of Islamist violent extremism and impediments to CVE. Ungoverned spaces, what Ngunyi and Katumanga (2014:1) and Katumanga (2014:141-142, 2017:140-141) call distance decay, are the result of the lack of state penetration in Kenya. The lack of state penetration, ungoverned spaces, or distance decay, reflect more than geography and physical space. These ungoverned spaces result from both underperformance and misperformance, with the state absent or abstaining, creating conditions for both underdevelopment and insecurity. In Kenya, the further from the centre, the less governance, services, and public goods, the less meaningful and effective is state control and management, the more insecurity and lawlessness prevail, the more incentives for oligopolies of violence are afforded, and the more challenging the CVE project becomes.[251]

One ungoverned physical space in Kenya within the conceptualised arc of insecurity, is Boni National Reserve in Garissa County. Boni Reserve is on the border with Lamu County and covers 1 339 square kilometres. Boni Reserve is part of Boni Forest that stretches from Tana River County to the coast. As in the case of Sambisa Forest in Borno state, Nigeria, where *Boko Haram* operates with impunity, Boni is where *al-Shabaab* operates with similar impunity, an area that is a springboard for various terrorist attacks, including the 2014 Mpeketoni attack (see Chapter 2, section 2.3 *Research design*). Katumanga (2017:162-163) categorises Boni Reserve as a 'wormhole' that connects Somalia and Kenya.[252] Boni is, in fact, a wormhole that *al-Shabaab*'s combat unit, Jaysh Ayman, has particularly used extensively for their bases and operations, for moving both men and materials, and for intelligence gathering. In an effort to separate the communities that live in Boni Reserve from *al-Shabaab* combatants, the Kenyan government expelled these communities from Boni, thus fermenting even more local disquiet and grievances. Katumanga (2017:163) contends that by "forcing the Boni people out, the government has affirmed its inability to secure community in favour of controlling a geographical space".

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[250] See section 8.3 *State fragility and the development of impediments to CVE*.

[251] Katumanga (2014:142, 2017:140-141) differentiates between varied types of distance decay, including: administrative distance decay, decay in the regulatory framework, economic decay, and security distance decay.

[252] Wormholes are related to, and distinguished from, blackholes and whiteholes. These three concepts are borrowed from Astrophysics. Wormholes are a theoretical conception that is associated with Albert Einstein and Nathan Rosen's theory of *general relativity*, dealing with matter and energy, and space and time. Wormholes are conceived as 'bridges', 'tunnels', 'passageway', or 'shortcuts', linking different and separate locations, points in space, or points in time (even separate universes). Wormholes are said to enable travel across and through space and time, shortening distances between different and separate points and locations. Wormholes therefore also allow for the possibility of time travel. See Sutter (2021) and Font (2021).

The CVE Operation *Linda Boni* (i.e., Protect Boni), was launched in September 2015 with the intention of dislodging *al-Shabaab* from this stronghold. This multi-agency operation was initially planned for 90 days to cover Lamu and parts of Tana River, Garissa, and Kilifi counties. The extensive operation was conducted from eight police stations and 11 military bases. Passed the 90 days, and years after the initial operation was launched, Boni is still not secured. Kamau (2021:216-217) highlights four main reasons for the failure of Operation *Linda Boni*: (1) the sheer size of the reserve and forest and its density make it difficult to pinpoint hideouts even with aerial surveillance; (2) with the nearby permeable border with Somalia, it is easy to escape or move between Boni and Somalia; (3) the security apparatus does not have the goodwill and trust of the local communities; (4) there was a lack of capacity, coordination, and integration between the varied security agencies that were involved.[253]

The shared border with Somalia, stretching from Mandera to Wajir, and to Garissa counties, is also an ungoverned space in Kenya. There are varied wormholes connecting Kenya and Somalia occurring along this almost 700 kilometres porous border. These wormholes include even official border posts. Extensive corruption ensures that not only legitimate travel and commerce are offered safe-passage through border posts, but also criminal and terrorist movement. The permeable border is consequently a CVE nightmare for Kenya, hence the Kenyan government’s plans to build a wall along this border since 2014. Wakube *et al* (2017:6) observe in the case of the condition of the border at various parts of Garissa and Wajir counties, that “[o]n the unpaved, poorly signed roads trailing east, one could easily stumble unawares across the border into Somalia”. The border is therefore largely imagined and highly postulated. Cannon (2016:26) states that the proposed 700 kilometres wall was to stretch from the border point with Ethiopia and Somalia in Mandera County in the north to Kiunga in Lamu County on the coast. But, as Cannon (2016) contends, if the objective is to keep *al-Shabaab* out of Kenya, the border wall will not succeed in what it is designed to achieve. Among other reasons, Cannon (2016:22-23, 30) lists the following: (1) the wall may reignite border disputes and further separate communities; (2) the high levels of corruption in Kenya lowers the success rate of the wall, i.e., ‘the wall is as good as the people guarding it’; (3) the existence of alternative routes, viz., sea or air; (4) *al-Shabaab* cells, made up of Kenyan citizens, are already in Kenya. This is why in March 2019 the Kenyan Parliament suspended the building of the wall, citing as reasons, the refusal of the local communities to leave the affected border areas, attacks on construction workers and their equipment, and concerns relating to corruption and quality in the building of the wall (Kamau, 2021:217).

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[253] Kamau (2021:216-217) points out that Operation *Linda Boni* involved varied government agencies, including members of the Kenyan Defence Forces (KDF), National Police Service (NPS), Kenya Forestry Service (KFS), Kenya Wildlife Service (KWS), National Youth Service (NYS), and the National Intelligence Service (NIS).

Hinterland counties such as Mandera, Wajir, Garissa, and Lamu, constitute another ungoverned physical space. In Chapters 6 and 7, I elaborated on how these counties in Kenya are underdeveloped and securitised. By illustration, Ombaka (2015:16) blames the 2014 Mandera bus attack on the lack of the road infrastructure in this arc of insecurity. The lack of road infrastructure forces buses to travel along the Kenya-Somalia border, instead of directly from Mandera to Nairobi, thus exposing travellers to cross-border terror attacks such as the Mandera attack.[254] The lack of infrastructure in these areas, highly undermining CVE imperatives, also specifically impede the type of response and response time of security forces to terrorist activity. Given the lack of infrastructure, the arc of insecurity is difficult and even impossible to police. I consider the 2015 Garissa University attack in illustration.

Aside from failing to react to intelligence warnings about the impending attack, and weak security measures at the University, Garissa is also faulted for the slow response time, which is also blamed on the centralised ‘all-government’ CVE decision-making centred in Nairobi. The local security personnel arrived two hours after the attack. The Rapid Response Team (RTT) took more than seven hours to respond and had to be flown from Nairobi to Garissa (370 kilometres apart). By the time the RTT arrived in Garissa, 148 students and security personnel were dead and 80 more were injured at the hands of four *al-Shabaab* militants (Kigotho, 2015:The Internet; Malm and Gillman, 2015:The Internet).[255] Another example of delayed response is the first ever recorded *al-Shabaab* terrorist incident in Kenya. On 29 May 2008, about 20 *al-Shabaab* militants assailed a police post in Liboi, Garissa, freeing from police custody, among others, Jermaine Grant, and Saleh Nahban. All escaped to Somalia before security forces could respond. Saleh Nahban was killed by US Special Forces in 2009. Jermaine Grant was re-arrested in Kisauni, Mombasa, in December 2011. Grant is serving a combined 13-year sentence in a Kenyan prison on forgery-related charges and for possession of explosive materials (Christian, 2019: The Internet; Chome, 2019b:The Internet; ACLED, 2020:The Internet).[256]

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[254] See Chapter 6, section 6.7 *Major Islamist terrorist activity in Kenya since the 1990s*.

[255] In addition to the lack of infrastructure in the arc of insecurity, see Chapter 6, section 6.9 *Countering Islamist violent extremism in Kenya*, regarding centralised and coordinated decision-making, with security and CVE assets like the RTT also being centralised, and the combined impact on the effectiveness and efficiency of CVE. The centralised ‘all-government’ approach in Kenya, designed to achieve efficiency and effectiveness in CVE, has instead resulted in complex and cumbersome organisations, slow coordination, and inhibiting centralisation.

[256] Jermaine Grant had links with Samantha Lewthwaite. Both are British nationals and reportedly members of *al-Shabaab* and/or *al-Qaeda*. Grant is reportedly a bomb-maker. Before being freed at Liboi in 2008, when Grant and Nahban were arrested at the Dadaab refugee complex in Garissa, Lewthwaite was reportedly in their company but was not arrested (Blundy, 2015:The Internet; Christian, 2019:The Internet; Chome, 2019b:The Internet; see also section 8.3.1 *Cohesion indicators and impediments to CVE*). Nahban was one of the planners and executors of the 2002 Mombasa attacks. One of *al-Shabaab*’s combat units, the Saleh Nahban Brigade, is named in honour of Saleh Nahban (see Chapter 6, section 6.6.3 *Jaysh Ayman and the Saleh Nahban Brigade*).

In addition to the foregoing physical spaces, there are also ungoverned social spaces in Kenya that serve as impediments to CVE. These ungoverned social spaces relate to households and communities, demographic pressures, and group grievances in the arc of insecurity, and more so in North-eastern Region. Households and communities in Kenya constitute other wormholes linking Kenya and Somalia, and within Kenya. They enable safe-passage, support, and protection of Islamism and *al-Shabaab*. In Chapters 6 and 7, I outlined how these households and communities, in their facing ontological insecurity and being perennially subjected to 'unjust social orders', and having suffered 'historical injustices', are supportive and sympathetic to *al-Shabaab*, the Islamist movement, and to the plight of ethnic-Somalis and other Muslims, or groups similarly on the margins of society. This makes them very amenable to radicalisation into Islamist violent extremism. Ombaka (2015:13) concludes that among these communities in the arc of insecurity in Kenya, insecurity is "a normal burden of citizenship".

The origins of this burden of citizenship may be traced to the securitisation of the state in Kenya which started in the former Northern Frontier District (NFD) simultaneous with independence in 1963. The securitisation of the state started with the passing of emergency laws and securitisation regulations. These laws and regulations were made in response to the *Shifta* war (1963-1968). However, these emergency laws and securitisation regulations, including the *Preservation of Public Security Regulations* and the *North Eastern and Contagious Districts Regulations*, did not end with the war. They were only lifted in 1991 following the process of democratisation and the reintroduction of multiparty elections in Kenya. Starting with the passing of the state of emergency in December 1963, these laws and regulations underwent several amendments, including the 1966 amendments (Whittaker, 2012a:346, 2012b:391, 403-404, 407, 2015a:647, 649; Wakube *et al*, 2017:6).[257]

The laws and regulations gave wide ranging powers to the state and its security apparatus. By illustration, the eight kilometres stretch along the Somalia-Kenya border was declared a 'prohibited zone' and anyone found in that zone without a pass or permission was liable to arrest. The eight kilometres were extended to 24 kilometres through the 1966 amendments. Furthermore, the state could confiscate any livestock or property of anyone who was suspected to have either committed a crime or supported *shifta*. In addition, these emergency laws and securitisation regulations allowed for search, seizure, and arrest without a warrant, ‘screening’ and detention without trial, restrictions on movement, and a curfew between 18:30 and 06:30. Initially covering only the NFD, these laws and regulations were extended to include Coast Region after the 1966 amendments. This ‘collective punishment’ by the post-colonial Kenyan state of the NFD and Coast Region for the *shifta* insurgency, expanded the securitisation, neglect, and marginalisation of these two regions that were started by British colonialism (Whittaker, 2012a:346-348, 360, 2012b:392, 403-404, 2015a:644, 647-649).

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[257] In Chapter 6, I outline that between 1964 and 1991 Kenya had *de facto* (1964-1982) and *de jure* (1982-1991) one-party rule, with the Kenya African National Union (KANU) ruling between independence in 1963 to 2002, through two KANU party leaders: Jomo Kenyatta (1963-1978, died in office) and Daniel arap Moi (1978-2002, was constitutionally barred from further running for office). This dominance ended when KANU lost elections in 2002 to the National Rainbow Coalition (NARC), ending almost four decades of KANU-one-party-rule in Kenya. This however has not ended imperial presidency and authoritarian tendencies in Kenya. Such continued imperial presidency and authoritarian tendencies are discernible in Kenya's current securitisation laws and regulations.

The emergency laws and securitisation regulations culminated in the implementation of the *manyatta* strategy, starting in June 1966. In Chapter 6, I outlined that *manyatta* refers to a settlement or a village. This forced settlement (i.e., villagisation) of frontier populations into government villages was a counter-insurgency strategy that was designed to separate the population from *shifta*. *Manyatta* was however also a social reform strategy aimed at sedentarisation and was created to replace pastoral life with sedentary modes of socio-economic life, and to bring ‘dissident’ pastoral groups under the control of the state. With *manyatta*, everyone in the frontier areas were compelled to be registered and to live in these villages, which were guarded by the army and the police. Residence and movement in and out of *manyatta* were controlled by compulsory identification documentation and a special pass. With these measures, *manyatta* enabled securitisation. But *manyatta* also had crushing socio-economic impact. Therefore, whilst *manyatta* may have achieved some success as a counter-insurgency strategy, *manyatta* failed as a socio-economic reform strategy. The outcomes of the *manyatta* strategy included great losses in livestock, the decimation of pastoral life, and the start of the largescale impoverishment of the former NFD and Coast Region (Whittaker, 2012a:349, 353-354, 360-361, 2012b:403-404, 406, 2015a:648-649). Security imperatives simply trounced development imperatives. Whittaker (2012a: 353) maintains that instead of being development initiatives, these government villages “bore a striking resemblance to [colonial] Mau-Mau detention centres”.[258]

After the end of the *Shifta* war, instead of being dismantled, these government villages expanded to host the newly disenfranchised communities. Bandit activity, including cattle raiding, and communal conflict, centred around land ownership, land use, and access to water points, also continued after the war. The 1960s emergency laws and securitisation regulations also continued to be implemented, to be lifted only in 1991. Therefore, between the end of the *Shifta* war and 1991, state violence continued, as evidenced by the Garissa (1980) and Wagalla (1984) massacres. Collective punishment, such as detention without trial, curfews, and the seizure of livestock and property, also continued. The

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[258] See also Chapter 6, section 6.3.1.2 *Secession in North-Eastern and Eastern regions*, for an elaboration of the *manyatta* strategy during the secessionist *Shifta* war.

1984 Wagalla massacre itself was an act of collective punishment. Responding to communal conflict between Degodia and Ajuran (two ethnic-Somali clans), after a Degodia attack on an Ajuran village, security forces rounded up, detained, and killed 5, 000, Degodia men in Wagalla, Wajir County, resulting in what we know today as the Wagalla massacre (Whittaker, 2015a:642, 650-651).[259]

Through state violence and collective punishment, government impunity was maintained. In this regard, the Kenyan government passed the Indemnity Act No. 5 in 1970 that inoculates the state from legal proceedings and claims for compensation for the gross violations of human rights during the *Shifta* war. The Indemnity Act covers North-eastern Region and parts of Eastern and Coast regions, viz.: Garissa, Wajir, Mandera, Isiolo, Marsabit, Tana-River, and Lamu counties. I highlight later on in this section that the Indemnity Act remains in force despite numerous appeals and attempts to have this Act repealed. One such attempt was in 2010. After parliament passed the Indemnity Repeal Bill of 2010, Mwai Kibaki refused to sign this bill into law. Another demonstration of the imperial presidency that has defined Kenya since independence. After 1991, this time to counter the threat of Islamist violent extremisms, there has been renewed securitisation of the state in Kenya, including the recreation of the 1960s securitisation laws and regulations. For example, during Operation *Usalama* Watch (2014), more than 4, 000 ethnic-Somalis were detained without trial and subjected to other violations of human rights, including extortion, torture, and disappearances. Moreover, after the Garissa attack (2015) a dusk-till-dawn curfew was applied in Garissa (Nation, 2010:The Internet; KTJN, 2013:8-9; Whittaker, 2012a:359, 2012b:407, 2015a:652; Botha, 2014a:20-21; Ali-Koor, 2016:2, 6).

The foregoing has been the lived experiences of communities in much of the arc of insecurity in Kenya, particularly the core of this insecurity, viz., North-eastern and Coast regions. It is in these communities that political bargaining and the battles for the 'hearts and minds' in the CVE campaign will be most fiercely contested, and the whole CVE campaign may be lost. Kenya's Social Cohesion Index also reveals that the three counties in North-eastern Region, viz.: Garissa, Wajir, and Mandera, have the most depreciated social cohesion in Kenya. These three counties also have the lowest levels of trust in: (1) government; (2) public institutions; (3) anyone other than their coethnics and coreligionists.[260] These factors reveal these communities as social spaces where fault-lines are most acute in Kenya. These communities are Kenya's 'bottom billion'. As Paul Collier (2007:3) found, they "coexist with the twenty-first century, but their reality is the fourteenth century". In the vein of Susan Rice (2001), the acute fault-lines in the arc of insecurity transform these communities into, not only the 'soft underbelly' for Islamist violent extremism, but, in fact, 'incubators' of Islamist violent extremism. Responding to the excesses of state fragility in these hinterland counties and communities, identity groups adopt varied forms of disengagement from the state. Disengagement strategies may include emigration, retreating into self-sufficiency by relying on kinship and reverting to subsistence farming, surrendering to criminality, and finally, all manners of political violence. In the arc of insecurity these disengagement strategies manifest through new-wars, which include communal violence that link varied ethnic groups, activities of organised militias, and banditry and criminal activity. In particular, ethnic-Somalis and other Muslims embrace Islamism as a response to said excesses of state fragility.[261]

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[259] For a brief outline of the Wagalla massacre (and other relevant massacres that involved ethnic-Somalis and other Muslims) see Chapter 6, section 6.3.1.2 *Secession in North-Eastern and Eastern regions*.

[260] The Social Cohesion Index is elaborated on in section 8.3.4 *Social indicators and impediments to CVE*.

Furthermore, given the lack of economic governance in the arc of insecurity, particularly in North-eastern Region, these areas have truly little formal economic activity. Instead, they have promoted the rise of informal economies and crime. Ombaka (2015:16) finds that in these regions "the money economy is not particularly strong; apart from facilitating the buying of weapons and the paying of bribes, cash may not hold much value". Given these factors, and consequently disengaged from the state, Ombaka (2015:14) maintains that the arc of insecurity "no longer recognises the laws of the state that is Kenya". The crisis of state legitimacy, loss of state authority, and therefore disengagement from the state by sections of society, result from the demographic pressures and group grievances one finds in the arc of insecurity, which all combine to constitute impediments to CVE in Kenya.

The demographic features of Kenya, inclusive of ethno-religious differentiation and fragmentation, and identity-based marginalisation, exclusion, and corruption, which combine to ferment structural and horizontal inequality as well as collective discontent, result in a myriad of demographic pressures and implosions. These pressures and implosions, which create impediments to CVE, manifest in the arc of insecurity in the most acute manner. In Chapter 7, I outlined that Muslims number 5.2 million in Kenya, of whom 54 percent (2.8 million) are ethnic-Somalis, together representing 11 percent of the 47.6 million population of Kenya. At 2.8 million, ethnic-Somalis are six percent of Kenya's population. Ninety-two percent (4.7 million) of Kenya's Muslims, are concentrated in the 12 counties in the arc of insecurity. North-eastern Region alone, in covering three counties, viz.: Mandera, Wajir, and Garissa, and being dominated by ethnic-Somalis, is home to almost half (i.e., 47.34 percent) of Kenya's Muslims. Moreover, North-eastern Region and Lamu County in Coast Region, share the border with the federal state of Jubaland in Somalia. Jubaland includes the three regions in Somalia, viz.: Gedo, Middle Juba, and Lower Juba. Somali clan dynamics are also at play here. The Ogaden-Darod clan live on both sides of the border, Kenyans in North-eastern Region, and Somalians in Jubaland.[262]

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[261] See Thomson (2016:219-222) for an outline of disengagement strategies that communities and individuals adopt in response to the failures and excesses of state fragility. As I outlined in Chapter 1, 1.8.1 *Key concepts*, 'disengagement from the state' is related to the notions of 'place detachment' and 'insularity', all three revealing depreciated resilience, which all explain the alienation of ethnic-Somalis and other Muslims from the Kenyan state. I introduced the concept of resilience in Chapters 1 and 5. See also in this section of the current chapter and later in section 8.4 *Increased state fragility in Kenya*? where I further elaborate on this concept.

Linborg (2016:The Internet) finds that Islamist violent extremism "is caused in large part by grievances tied to social marginalisation, political exclusion, lack of access to justice or resources, and repression or abuse by state and security services …. A well-documented example is the condition of the 2 million-plus ethnic-Somalis living in Kenya, and the growth among them of *al-Shabaab*". Subjecting an ethno-religious identity to such unjust social orders and historical injustices creates impediments to CVE as demonstrated by factors such as securitisation, state terrorism, marginalisation, and a constricted democratic space. In addition, the failure to implement the 2013 Truth, Justice, and Reconciliation Commission (TJRC) recommendations relating to the *Shifta* war (1963-1968), and the Isiolo (1968), Garissa (1980), and Wagalla (1984) massacres that all occurred in the arc of insecurity, impedes the prospects not only of CVE but of national reconciliation in Kenya. Among the recommendations that were made by the TJRC were the following: acknowledgment of atrocities; restitution; reparations (including for land injustices); apology; establishing memorials; instituting criminal investigations and prosecutions; economic development of marginalised regions; a comprehensive and sustained national dialogue; repealing Indemnity Act No. 5 of 1970 that shields the Kenyan government from legal proceedings and claims for reparation for the gross violations of human rights during the *Shifta* war.[263] Since the 1990s, Kenya's participation in the 'war on terror', Operation *Linda Nchi* (2011-2012), the CVE operations *Usalama* Watch (2014) and *Linda Boni* (since 2015), and AMISOM since 2012 (ATMIS since 2022), have added to this history of state violence, impunity, and dominance that define state-society relations, all adding to impediment to CVE, and therefore the failure of CVE, in Kenya.

Another manifestation of these demographic pressures and group grievances emanates from the plight of refugees and IDPs in Kenya. Kenya has hosted Somalia's refugees since 1991, mostly at the Dadaab complex in Garissa County. The Kenyan government has periodically blamed Somalia's refugees in Dadaab of harbouring terrorists, or otherwise accused them of being terrorists themselves. Most notably, after the 2015 Garissa attack, which was allegedly planned in Dadaab, there were mounting calls to close the complex.[264] Hosting refugees and IDPs is also a costly endeavour. The cost of refugees and IDPs in Kenya between 2007 and 2016 was estimated at US$9.37 billion (in constant 2017 US$), or an average of 0.75 percent of GDP at the time (UNDP, 2020a:8). Mwangi (2017a:117) concludes that "Kenyan Somalis and Somali refugees who live or reside in Kenya's ungoverned spaces are stateless persons given the adverse violent structural and physical conditions under which they live". Somalia's refugees are a CVE sticking point in Kenya. One of the reasons of establishing a buffer state in Jubaland is therefore to resettle the refugees from Dadaab in Jubaland, Somalia. Since 2014 Kenya has supported the voluntary repatriation of more than 90, 000 refugees from Somalia.[265]

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[262] See Chapter 7, section 7.2.1 *Islamist terrorist activity in the arc of insecurity* and 7.3.5 *Cross-cutting indicator*.
[263] Set by the *Truth, Justice, and Reconciliation Act* of 2008, the TJRC mandate was to investigate and establish a record of gross human rights violations by the state from independence in 1963 to the post-elections violence of 2007/2008. A provision in the timeline was also made to cover the colonial era. The TJRC timelines for implementation of its recommendations ranged from 6 to 36 months. About the TJRC, the TJRC report, and the failure to implement the TJRC recommendations, see Asaala (2010), KTJN (2013), HRW (2019), and Maliti (2020).

In addition to ungoverned physical and social spaces, another defining feature of state fragility is lack of resilience or depreciated resilience. Said depreciated resilience is demonstrable in the arc of insecurity in Kenya. The communities in the arc of insecurity have not only become amenable to Islamist violent extremism, but violence has become a viable political option for them. Peaceful forms of dissent have been stifled in these communities since the *Shifta* war. Marginalised and securitised, they have more in common with their coethnics and coreligionists across the border in Somalia than their fellow citizens in Kenya. Moreover, ethnic-Somalis, making up only six percent of the population, realise that the electoral route is not a viable political option in changing their conditions given the nature and extent of ethno-politics in Kenya. Consequently, in seeking ontological security, with their resilience depreciated, secession and Islamist violent extremism, are seen as viable political options. As Van Metre (2016:13) contends, resilience explains why some communities can resist Islamist violent extremism, opt out of political violence, and find peaceful ways for collective action, whilst others cannot. Depreciated resilience in the arc of insecurity is empirically substantiated by indicators such as evidence of disengagement from the state, the levels of oligopoly of political violence and terrorism, and support for Islamist violent extremism and *al-Shabaab*. Resulting from eroded resilience, being insulated, detached, and alienated from the Kenyan state and their neighbours, these communities have become wormholes for Islamist violent extremism and for *al-Shabaab*.

It has become quite clear that for as long as the forgoing impediments to CVE persist, CVE will remain ineffective and counterproductive in Kenya, and more so in the arc of insecurity. Whereas the foregoing section was designed to outline the *how* of impediments to CVE in the arc of insecurity, by providing (1) trace, (2) accounts, (3) patterns, and (4) sequences, evidence, of these impediments, the next section is designed to outline the *why* of impediments to CVE in the arc of insecurity. The pertinent and central question to contemplate in this regard is: Why are impediments to CVE pronounced in the arc of insecurity, and more so in North-eastern Region in particular?

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[264] See Chapter 7, section 7.2 *The arc of insecurity and Islamist violent extremism*.

[265] See Chapter 7, section 7.2 *The arc of insecurity and Islamist violent extremism*, and section 7.3.5 *Cross-cutting indicator*.

8.2.2 Explaining Impediments to CVE in the Arc of Insecurity

In Chapter 7, section 7.2.2 *Explaining Islamist terrorist activity in the arc of insecurity*, I elaborated on how there are logical and rational reasons why *al-Shabaab* focuses on counties in east Kenya, in North-eastern and Coast regions. There are also logical and rational reasons why impediments to CVE are pronounced in the arc of insecurity, and in North-eastern and Coast regions in particular. The first impediment to consider is the oligopoly of political and terrorism violence in the arc of insecurity. Given the multiple actors in this security market, a mutually reinforcing cycle of insecurity and violence has developed, which undermines security and CVE measures. The state is challenged in maintaining legitimacy, authority, and thus order in these regions. Related to this oligopoly of violence is the impediment presented by political bargaining. If Islamism is a struggle about the distribution of power and resources in society, and CVE are measures, efforts, and means of counteracting the objectives of Islamism, then political bargaining lies at the heart of this struggle and the measures against it. CVE will remain challenged as long as the state fails to command the loyalty of sections of society and achieve social cohesion in this political marketplace that is defined by (coercive) political bargaining.

The other impediment to CVE is the heavy-handed and indiscriminate CVE itself. As was the case with counter-insurgency during the *Shifta* war, CVE in the arc of insecurity has developed elements of a pacification campaign. CVE becomes a law-and-order enforcement project on recalcitrant 'extremist-terrorists-criminals' who are often identified through ethno-religious profiling. Such heavy-handed and indiscriminate CVE merely serves to increase radicalisation, thus undermining the intended objectives of CVE.[266] Added to heavy-handed and blanket CVE, the next major impediment to CVE are physical and socially ungoverned spaces in the arc of insecurity. Ungoverned spaces not only enable and generate Islamist violent extremism, but also serve the same purpose in regards impediments to CVE. Ungoverned spaces such as Boni Reserve, the permeable Kenyan-Somalia border, neglected hinterland counties such as Lamu, Garissa, Wajir, and Mandera, and marginalised communities in these counties, are wormholes that enable safe passage, protection, and support, for both Islamist violent extremism and *al-Shabaab* itself. The state simply does not exist for communities in these ungoverned spaces.

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[266] I come back to these heavy-handed and indiscriminate CVE measures later in the current chapter in section 8.3 *State fragility and the development of impediments to CVE*, when I am employing the longitudinal lens.

Underdeveloped and securitised, these spaces also restrict specific CVE measures such as reaction time to terrorist attacks and restrict the levels and nature of all manner of other CVE responses and counter measures. Katumanga (2017:161) references specific counter measures such as the required infrastructure, and the correct mix of police, paramilitary forces, and the military. These and other counter measures reflect the logic of the presence of the state and the force-to-space ratio that are so critical in any counter-terrorism, counter-insurgency, and CVE efforts. The arc of insecurity therefore lacks the infrastructure and resources required for security and development that is so critical for CVE. Kenya's Commission on Revenue Allocation points out that the marginalised counties in Kenya are generally "cut off from the national axis of growth …. They have poor road networks and do not have access to sufficient electricity for household or industrial usage. The availability of basic services, quality water, sanitation, and security, which are core to economic growth, is limited in these areas. These areas therefore lack the endowment and significance to attract potential investors" (CRA, 2012c:4). In addition to such lack of development that is CVE-relevant but not CVE-specific, these areas in the arc of insecurity in Kenya also lack the security and development resources that are CVE-specific.

The other set of ungoverned social spaces revolve around households and communities in the arc of insecurity. Neglected, marginalised, securitised, subjected to 'unjust social orders' and 'historical injustices', including lack of economic opportunities, these households and communities have disengaged from the state. The Kenyan government has inadvertently radicalised these communities into Islamist violent extremism 'on behalf' of *al-Shabaab*. Ombaka (2015:22) finds that ethnic-Somali and Muslim communities in the arc of insecurity, "apart from their nominal citizenship they really have no reason to feel that they are a part of Kenya". This also explains why and how these communities disengage from the state and embrace Islamist violent extremism as a disengagement strategy. When the state stops being relevant, the population disengages from the state, and it becomes easy for the population to undermine government authority and to challenge state legitimacy, undermining any CVE efforts. Moreover, when state legitimacy is undermined, the security apparatus of the state can no longer exercise monopoly over the use of force, uphold the rule of law, or provide law and order.

Similar to the barrier presented by political bargaining in the contest between the Kenyan state and *al-Shabaab*, the lack of social cohesion, including the lack of trust in people who are not their coethnics and coreligionists, and associated lack of trust in 'their' government and in public institutions, serve to undermine any CVE efforts in these communities. Detached and alienated, these households and communities have disengaged from the state, are pushed from supporting the state and are pulled towards embracing Islamist violent extremism instead. The other impediment to CVE is the shared demographics with Somalia and the demographics of eastern Kenya itself, which have made demographic pressures and group grievances in the arc of insecurity both communicable and intractable. The reason why obstacles to CVE would be most pronounced in the arc of insecurity and in North-eastern Region in particular is simply because of these demographics and the fact that this is where Islamist terrorist activity occurs and is singularly focused. Given the demographics of the arc of insecurity, including the presence and treatment of ethnic-Somali refugees and IDPs in this area, the historical grievances of ethnic-Somalis and other Muslims in these counties, and their shared affinity for their coethnics and coreligionists in neighbouring Somalia (enabled by the kin-country syndrome), it is clear why these communities in the arc of insecurity have become wormholes for *al-Shabaab*.

The arc of insecurity also corrodes the resilience required to counter Islamist violent extremism. The UNDP (2020a:1) contends that horizontal inequality and marginalisation “weaken social cohesion and people’s trust in government, institutions, and each other”. Depreciated resilience, like depreciated social cohesion, undermines not only a sense of community, shared loyalty, and common enterprise, but by creating impediments to CVE, also undermines CVE. Which of these impediments will be most defining in undermining CVE in the arc of insecurity in Kenya cannot be said with any measure of confidence or conclusiveness. What is clear, however, is that these impediments all interact, and all contribute to the failure of CVE. It is also clear that these impediments will remain as long as the state is *de facto* absent and abstaining in the arc of insecurity. Lastly, it is clear that demographic pressures have singularly had a marked impact in generating impediments to CVE in the arc of insecurity, as observed and demonstrated through the single-embedded lens. The impact of demographic pressures is also demonstrated as observed through a longitudinal lens. Illustrated on the Fragile States Index with the indicator S1: *demographic pressures*, these demographic pressures score the worst in Kenya, with an average of 8.8 (out of 10.00) between 2005 and 2019. I return to these demographic pressures in particular in section 8.3.4 *Social indicators and impediments to CVE*. First, I outline the logic of the causal relationship between state fragility and impediments to CVE by employing a longitudinal lens.

8.3 STATE FRAGILITY AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF IMPEDIMENTS TO CVE

In Chapter 6, section 6.3 *Islamist violent extremism and the fragile state in Kenya*, I elaborated on how when one explains Islamist violent extremism in Kenya, one needs to understand the origins, evolution, and nature of state fragility in Kenya. Similarly, to explain impediments to CVE in Kenya, one needs to understand the origins, evolution, and nature of state fragility in Kenya. This part of the chapter accordingly employs the longitudinal lens (temporal variation), tracing (i.e., discovering and detailing evidence of) impediments to CVE in Kenya since the ‘Big Bang’ of independence in 1963 as derived from the properties of state fragility that are embedded in the Fragile States Index, viz.: cohesion, economic, political, and social indicators, and a cross-cutting indicator. Coupled to these indicators of state fragility, this part of the chapter teases-out the origins and evolution of CVE in Kenya (from counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism) from key historical markers, ranging from the *Shifta* war (1963-1968) to AMISOM since 2012, and Operation *Linda Boni* since 2015. I then theorise a causal sequence in the relationship between state fragility and CVE through process-tracing causal mechanism between state fragility (X), and impediments to CVE (Y) in Kenya (the setting).

The causal sequence establishes a logic that is applied in Kenya and in contexts similar to that of Kenya. This logic enables analytical generalisation, with the understanding that state fragility and CVE, and their relationship, are not unique to Kenya. The causal sequence enables an explanation of not only the *why* between X and Y, but by employing causal mechanisms, the *how* between X and Y may also be outlined, laying bare the black box of causality between X and Y, and providing deeper, thicker, more robust, explanation. Based on a retroductive and inductive-deductive analysis, this is how I formulated the theorised causal sequence between state fragility and impediments to CVE.[267]

X-construct: *state fragility*	**Causal Mechanisms**		**Y-construct**: *Impediments to CVE*
	Conditions	Constraints and Abuse	
Causal statement	**Mechanism statement**		**Outcome statement**
State fragility has causal capacity and tendency; defined by insecurity, violence (structural, physical, and cultural), misperformance, underperformance, and institutional failure, with fault-lines at three levels of the state, viz.: macro (state institutions); meso (state-society relations); micro (between groups in society). State fragility provides the context, enables, and generates impediments to CVE.	The properties of state fragility, inclusive of the social structures that subsist in the fragile state, create political, economic, and social conditions that are characterised by incapacity and abuse. These conditions include favouring specific identities in hegemonial exchange. Preoccupied with regime survival, the government securitises the state, further constricting the democratic space. CVE is integrated and coordinated and defined by centralisation and hard power at the expense of democratisation and soft-power. State resources are diverted to security functions at the expense of socio-economic and political imperatives.	These conditions limit the options available, ending in hampering constraints, including: the incapacity of the economy to provide access and sources of livelihood; the limited capacity of the legal system to successful prosecute terrorism suspects; limited official budgets to deal with the causes (not symptoms) of Islamist violent extremism. The conditions also lead to abuse, including: the indiscriminate repression and victimisation of an ethno-religious identity; undermining the rule of law; continued insecurity and abuse by the state. The victimised ethno-religious identity becomes the wormhole of Islamist violent extremism.	From state incapacity and abuse, impediments to CVE are created, CVE becomes counterproductive and ineffective, resulting in failure, unable to eradicate or mediate Islamist violent extremism, eroding democratic principles, social cohesion, and state legitimacy, increases radicalisation, incites more conflict and violence, and promotes state-building that bolsters state institutions at the expense of nation-building. The compound outcome is self-reinforcing insecurity dilemma and fragility and conflict traps.

The above summarises the theorised causal sequence between state fragility and impediments to CVE, and the resultant failure of CVE. In Chapter 2, section 2.3 *Research design*, I noted that in explanation-building, and based on Critical Realism, I employ the formulation: cause + causal mechanisms + context = outcome, accepting that mechanisms-based explanations involve social structures (entities) that have attributes or properties (with causal capacity and tendency), that engage in actions (activities), thus generating (causing or driving) impediments to CVE. The explanation of the relationship between state fragility and CVE is thus subjected not only to empirical evidence, but to a causal logic as well. The following key factors are used to outline the causal mechanisms between X (state fragility) and Y (impediments to CVE): institutional weakness, incapacity, and abuse; preoccupation with regime survival over political and socio-economic imperatives; the securitisation of the state; the constricted democratic space; hegemonial exchange; indiscriminate repression and victimisation; wormholes. Whilst the cause is state fragility, the observed outcome is impediments to CVE, and the compound outcome is the insecurity dilemma, and the fragility and conflict traps that remain observable in Kenya.

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[267] The theorised causal sequence is adapted from Beach’s (2016:468) illustration of process-tracing and causal mechanisms. Mayntz (2004:241) maintains that mechanism statements “are causal generalisations about recurrent processes ... linking specified initial conditions and a specific outcome”.

Given the foregoing, it is critical to be aware that CVE is a field of public policy and practise and is not as theory-driven and as theory-laden as the field of Islamist violent extremism. An analysis of the state-of the-art of CVE and impediments to CVE is therefore guided less by theoretical propositions, and more by empirical evidence of what has been shown to be effective and productive and likely to be so in future, or the opposite. I need to qualify, however, that even though Islamist violent extremism is more theory-laden and more theory-guided than CVE, Islamist violent extremism and CVE are not theory-determined. This study thus relies on empirical evidence to support its theoretical proposition. In this regard, state fragility is shown to particularly serve as a straitjacket in CVE approaches and programming. As Maslow (1966:15) warned in what is now known as *the law of the instrument*, “it is tempting, if the only tool you have is a hammer, to treat everything as if it were a nail”.

Relying on the hammer as the main tool in their CVE toolbox, CVE in Kenya has proven to be ineffective and counterproductive, with an overdeveloped predisposition towards hard power and coercive means. If the purpose of CVE is conflict resolution, i.e., to end Islamist violent extremism and terrorism in Kenya, then it is self-evident that CVE is failing because this purpose continues to be unachieved. Whereas ineffective CVE does not achieve the intended outcomes at all or does not achieve these outcomes within a given period, counterproductive CVE inadvertently achieves unintended results or undermines the intended results. The unintended results include increased radicalisation, the development of counter-extremism and Islamophobia, the erosion of democratic principles and social cohesion, and the bolstering of state institutions and regime survival at the expense of nation-building and social cohesion, thereby creating more popular discontent and increased and accelerated state fragility. The compound consequence is the fragility trap and conflict trap in such fragile states. The fragility trap may be defined as "a closely interlinked circle of underdevelopment, political instability or conflict, and ineffective state capacity" (Gelbard *et al*, 2015:7). Because of the persistent fragility trap, the conflict trap also remains in Kenya. The conflict trap comprises the conditions that make a state perennially prone to conflict. Once the conflict has started, the cycle of violence becomes a trap from which it is difficult to escape (Collier *et al*, 2003:x, 4-5, 79, 117, Collier, 2007:x).

The fragility and conflict traps are related to the insecurity dilemma. In an insecurity dilemma, both the state and society face security threats, and the potential for conflict emanate primarily from internal domestic insecurity. The insecurity dilemma occurs in states that are "major threats to the security of their own populations" (Sørensen, 2007:358). Instead of being concerned with external threats, the leaders of these states "are preoccupied primarily with internal threats to the security of their state structures and to the regimes themselves" (Ayoob, 1991:263). The insecurity dilemma therefore occurs in the context of state fragility, alongside conditions that include weak and abusive state structures, unequal access to state power, the lack of social cohesion, and challenges to the legitimacy and authority of the state. It is in these conditions, in pursuit of state-building, and attempting to maximise its power and security, that the insecure state instead increases the insecurity of specific identity groups, and inadvertently, its own insecurity. Reinforcing this insecurity dilemma regarding ethnic-Somalis and other Muslims in the case in Kenya, the more the Kenyan state undertakes "to counter opposition to its [preservation], repression and corruption ..., the more opposition it encounters" (Katumanga (2013a:132), and "[t]he more repressive [Kenya's] counterterrorism measures become, the more resilient … [*al-Shabab*] becomes, [thus] creating a vicious cycle of violence" (Mwangi, 2017b:312). This is the vicious cycle that impedes CVE in Kenya.[268]

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[268] The insecurity dilemma differs from the security dilemma as conceived in International Relations (IR). In IR theory the security dilemma refers to the notion that because of structural anarchy (i.e., the absence of a sovereign or central government in the international system) in asserting rules-based order and peace in inter-state relations, with individual states concerned about their own survival, the anarchic international system encourages self-help, thus incentivising individual states to maximise their own security. Because of factors like uncertainty, suspicion, and fear over other states' intentions, and competition for power, other states interpret these heightened security measures as threatening their own security. The dilemma or predicament is that whereas survival and self-help motives are intended to increase state power and thus state security and peace, these motives inadvertently end up increasing (the potential for) insecurity and conflict. In IR theory anarchy therefore does not denote lawlessness, chaos, or disorder, but the absence of a sovereign in the international system. The insecurity dilemma, on the other hand, explains (in)security in the context of fragile states. Sørensen (2007:365) points out that in this instance, "anarchy is domesticated". In this context anarchy does not refer to 'the lack of a sovereign in the international system', but 'the lack of a representative, responsive, accountable, legitimate, and effective central government within the state', leading to individual identity groups, left to their own devices, to face ontological insecurity. These groups, ethnic-Somalis and other Muslims in this case, in their experiencing marginalisation, abandonment, or even persecution by central government because of this 'domesticated anarchy', and propelled by survival and self-help motives, are incentivised to escape their insecurity by maximising their power and security within the state or through secession. Regarding the concepts

The insecurity dilemma and the fragility and conflict traps produce a vicious cycle, inciting more radicalisation, more violence, and more fragility as resources are inevitably diverted to regime survival and security functions at the expense of political and socio-economic imperatives. The enduring character and consuming quality of violence by both the state and the Islamist organisation generate more grievances and become the reasons, in themselves, for more violence. The violence (structural, cultural, and direct) between the state and ethnic-Somalis and other Muslims, historically marked from the counter-insurgency *Shifta* war (1963-1968) to the CVE operations *Usalama* Watch (2014) and *Linda Boni* (since 2015), still prevails and serves as evidence of the self-reinforcing cyclical nature of such violence. The challenge is to escape the insecurity dilemma and the fragility and conflict traps, by transforming the very conditions that have created this dilemma and these two traps in the first place. However, instead of reducing insecurity, CVE has added to the insecurity that has defined Kenya since independence. I stressed the dangers of ineffective and counterproductive CVE through a single-embedded lens in the earlier part of this chapter in section 8.2 *The arc of insecurity and impediments to CVE*. Below, I develop an outline of these dangers further, by employing a longitudinal lens.

In Kenya, the time order in the causal sequence between state fragility and impediments to CVE is initiated by the 'Big Bang' of independence in 1963. The current CVE has its origins in counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism as responses to secession in the former NFD and Coast regions of Kenya since independence. In Chapter 6, I elaborated on how the causal sequence then developed through specific state fragility linked historical markers, starting with the *Shifta* war.[269] I employ these historical markers and the 12 main indicators of the Fragile States Index to demonstrate the causal sequence between state fragility and impediments to CVE. In Chapter 7, section 7.3 *state fragility and the development of Islamist violent extremism*, I noted that the constraints of the linear narrative

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of security and security dilemma in general, and the insecurity dilemma in particular, what Ayoob (1995) calls 'a security predicament', see Ayoob (1991, 1995), Job (1992), Sørensen (2007), and Tang (2009).

[269] See Chapter 6, section 6.3 *Islamist violent extremism and the fragile state in Kenya*, and section 6.8 *Countering Islamist violent extremism and the fragile state in Kenya*. The historical markers, indicating both separation and continuity in state fragility and conflict risk, are encapsulated in two distinct periods of state fragility in Kenya. The first started in the 1960s and the second started in the 1990s. Both periods are characterised by a crisis in state-building and a crisis in nation-building. Starting with independence in 1963, the key historical markers are: the *Shifta* war (1963-1968) and the Isiolo massacre during the war (1968), Garissa massacre (1980), and Wagalla massacre (1984). With the start of the third wave of Islamist violent extremism since the 1990s, the key historical markets are: Kenya's participation in the global war on terror since 9/11, Operation *Linda Nchi* (2011-2012), Operation *Usalama* Watch (2014), AMISOM since 2012 (ATMIS since 2022), and Operation *Linda Boni* since 2015. The main response to the conditions of state fragility by ethnic-Somalis and other Muslims in the first period, was through the secessionist attempt of the former NFD, the resultant *Shifta* war (1963-1968), and calls for secession in Coast Region that have been intermittent since 1963. In the second period, the main response is the current third wave of Islamist violent extremism, raging since the 1990s. Counter-terrorism, counter-insurgency, and CVE, are therefore respective responses to secession and Islamist violent extremism in Kenya.

dictate that the indicators of state fragility are disaggregated in analysis. It is important, however, to know that the indicators reinforce each other and interact in ways that may be inextricable in reality. The indicators are thus considered in totality, albeit some being more salient than others, in revealing the theorised causal sequence between state fragility and impediments to CVE.[270] I now address these state fragility indicators, with the historical markers in Kenya embedded in the narrative.

8.3.1 Cohesion Indicators and Impediments to CVE

The cohesion indicators of the Fragile States Index speak to the notion that political governance rest on central pillars that include legitimacy, authority, and leadership. Cohesion indicators sustain the notion that when the state stops being relevant to its population, it becomes easy for the population to undermine the authority of the government and to challenge the legitimacy of the state, consequently undermining any CVE efforts, including the civil-society driven ‘all-society’ approach to CVE. An underperforming and misperforming government will also undermine the ‘all-government’ approach. The cohesion indicators are each scored out of 10.00. On average between 2005 and 2019, Kenya scored 8.7 for factionalised elites, 8.4 for group grievances and 7.8 for security apparatus. Firstly, the security apparatus of the state. Said apparatus of a fragile state may enable and generate impediments to CVE. State terrorism or political terror is instructive in this regard in the case in Kenya.

Linked to the repression and control of society, state terrorism may be measured by the annual Political Terror Scale (PTS). The PTS defines state terrorism as “violations of basic human rights to the physical integrity of the person by agents of the state within the territorial boundaries of the state”. According to Haschke (2019:1, 2), these violations of the physical integrity of the person include

> torture and cruel and unusual treatment and punishment; beatings, excessive use of force and brutality; rape and sexual violence; killings and unlawful use of deadly force; summary or extra-judicial executions; political assassinations and murder; political imprisonment, arbitrary arrest and detention; incommunicado and clandestine imprisonment and detention; forced disappearances; kidnappings, forced relocations and removal.

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[270] Kenya scores the worst in the following indicators, in this order: demographic pressures (8.8), factionalised elites (8.7), group grievances (8.4), state legitimacy (8.2) refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) (8.1), uneven economic development (8.0), external intervention (7.9), security apparatus (7.8), and public services (7.8). Each indicator is scored out of 10.00. The figures in brackets are averages of each indicator between 2005 and 2019. Refer to Chapter 3, section 3.6.1 *Indicators and measurement*, for the measuring scale and complete ranges on the Fragile States Index, as well as Kenya’s fragility scores in the period under review.

The PTS distinguishes state terrorism from general political repression. Wood and Gibney (2010:370) contend that the more effective and complete the state is in repressing society, the less likely it is that society will challenge state authority, and thus the less likely acts of state terrorism will be. The PTS measures state terrorism on a 1 to 5 ordinal scale, based on three dimensions, viz.: scope, intensity, and range. Kenya's state terror levels vary between level three and level four. Level three indicates that the range and intensity of political terror levels are 'extensive'. Level four indicates that these levels have 'expanded to large sections of society' but acts of terror are still limited to those who actively 'engage in politics or political ideas', i.e., ethnic-Somalis and other Muslims in this case. With 5 being the highest level of terror, the following are political (state) terror levels in Kenya since 1990:[271]



Created from Political Terror Scale data (Gibney, Cornett, Wood *et al*, 2020)

State terrorism is reflective of state fragility, indicating the misperformance of the state, state generated insecurity, and endemic state violence. State terrorism, by adding to the historical markers

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[271] Level one indicates that the state is under 'secure rule of law' with acts of state terror being 'extremely rare'. Level five indicates that acts of state terror have become indiscriminate, expanding to 'the whole population' or 'an entire section of society'. The Political Terror Scale (PTS) is based on annual reports on human rights practices by Amnesty International (PTS-A), the US State Department (PTS-S), and Human Rights Watch (PTS-H). I use the PTS-S data. The three dimensions of state terror are defined as: (1) *scope*, the type of violence (for example: torture, imprisonment, and killings); (2) *intensity*, the frequency of the type of violence; (3) *range*, the sections of society targeted and/or the percentage of the population targeted. The five state terror levels are coded as:

Level 1	*Refers to countries under a secure rule of law. People are not imprisoned for their views and state/political torture is rare or exceptional. Political murders are extremely rare.*
Level 2	*There is a limited amount of imprisonment for non-violent political activity. However, few persons are affected, torture and beatings are exceptional. Political murder is rare.*
Level 3	*There is extensive political imprisonment, or a recent history of such imprisonment. Execution or other political murders and brutality may be common. Unlimited detention, with or without a trial, for political views is accepted.*
Level 4	*Civil and political rights violations have expanded to large numbers of the population. Murders, disappearances, and torture are a common part of life. Despite its generality, on this level terror affects those who interest themselves actively in politics or ideas.*
Level 5	*Terror has expanded to the whole population. The leaders of these societies place no limits on the means or thoroughness with which they pursue personal or ideological goals.*

The agents of the state are defined as: police, law enforcement, guards, and security personnel; military and paramilitary organisations; executives and members of executive agencies and bureaucracies; members of the criminal justice and penal systems (for example, prison guards); intelligence agents; militias; death squads; political parties and their organisations; mercenaries and private military contractors; foreign personnel such as peace-keepers supplementing domestic capacity (Wood and Gibney, 2010:372-373; Haschke, 2019:2-4).

that range from the *Shifta* war (1963-1968) to Operation *Linda Boni* since 2015, and by involving and affecting ethnic-Somalis and other Muslims inside and outside of Kenya, has also made Islamist violent extremism intractable. Such state terrorism generates impediments to CVE. It reveals CVE as a mixture of ‘war, crime, and human rights abuses’, increases radicalisation, and intensifies violence. In this regard, Willy Mutunga (2018:9), Kenya’s former Chief Justice, makes the claim that we need “to ask ourselves whether or not states that kill, murder, starve, steal, and raid national resources with catastrophic consequences, are not terrorist states”. Moreover, the Global Terrorism Database further highlights that “92 percent of all terrorist attacks between 1989 and 2014 occurred in countries where violent political [state] terror was widespread” (in Schmid, 2016:17). Similarly, in Botha’s (2014a:20) study of Kenyan-born members of *al-Shabaab*, 65 percent of the respondents pointed to Kenya’s counter-terrorism (read: CVE) policy as the single most important push factor in joining *al-Shabaab*.

Given the foregoing, the security apparatus therefore reflects hampering and abusive state fragility in Kenya. By illustration, in a study of military culture since independence, Katumanga (2014:146) finds that “[d]espite its professional capacity and potential for state-building role, the military [in Kenya is] … a force for assuring mainly, regime consolidation and [resource] extraction”. Corruption within the security apparatus further undermines CVE efforts by reducing the capacity and effectiveness of the state, and thereby generating impediments to CVE. A corrupt bureaucracy makes infiltration and bribery easy, is ‘likely to be extremely inept and incompetent’, and ‘will not generate enough revenue for social security needs’ (Otenyo, 2004:82). The “corrupt police and other government employees who are willing to break rules for bribes are weakening Kenya’s ability to prevent terror attacks …. This factor of corruption alone has made Kenya more vulnerable to terrorism and internal insecurity than its equally or even weaker neighbours” (Ombaka, 2015:13). According to Ombaka (2015:18), the police service in Kenya “comprise a significant number of corrupt individuals whose main qualification for joining the service was because they were able to bribe their way into it”. Regarding the military, Ombaka (2015:20) recounts how, following the Westgate Mall attack (2013), Kenyan society was shocked to see closed-circuit television footage of responder Kenyan soldiers looting stores in the mall. Such are the levels of documented depravity in the security apparatus in Kenya.

The case of Samantha Louise Lewthwaite vividly demonstrates the impact of corruption as an impediment to CVE. Lewthwaite, a British national, is the widow of one of the four London (2005) attack suicide bombers. Nicknamed the ‘white widow’, she is believed to have been involved in varied terrorist activities with *al-Shabaab*, including the planning of various attacks in Kenya, Westgate (2013) and Garissa (2015) included. Before these attacks, Lewthwaite was arrested in Kisauni, Mombasa in

December 2011 but reportedly bribed her way out of custody, escaping to Somalia. Lewthwaite, one of the world's most wanted terror suspects, is linked with the planning and plotting of terror attacks in the UK, Africa, and the Middle East, dating back to 2011 (De Wet and Tolsi, 2013:The Internet; Patel, 2013:The Internet; Mongare, 2019:52; Thorburn, 2022:The Internet). Before 2011, Lewthwaite was exonerated for the London attack in 2005. She soon after left Britain for East Africa. Corruption also facilitated her safety in Johannesburg, South Africa, and her safe passage in and out of South Africa between July 2008 and February 2011. She used a falsely obtained South African passport under the name Natalie Faye Webb, facilitated by corrupt officials from the South African department of Home Affairs. While in South Africa, Lewthwaite used another alias, viz., Asmaa Shahida Bint-Andrews (De Wet and Tolsi, 2013:The Internet; Patel, 2013:The Internet; Thorburn, 2022:The Internet).[272]

Corruption, bribes, favouritism, and ethnic concerns define the security apparatus in Kenya. In North-eastern Region, where impediments to CVE are most obstinate, acts of corruption include the misappropriation of allowances linked to CVE duties (i.e., 'hardship allowances'), and the issuing of ID documents, passports, and work permits in exchange for bribes. There are also the issues of a housing crisis, poor salaries, and poor medical services within the security services. The security apparatus in Kenya also faces institutional incapacity in varied areas such as investigations, resources, and funding in particular (Mwangi, J, 2017:10; Katumanga, 2017:159-161; Mongare, 2019:55-56). In the case of the police, whilst the UN recommends a police-to-civilian ratio of 1:450, in Kenya the ratio is 1:1, 250. Private security companies employ more than five times the number of both the police and military personnel (Usalama Reforms Forum, 2019:20, 40; Zheng and Xia, 2021:5). The result is that security is privatised and the preserve of the privileged few and not a shared public good in Kenya.[273]

An absent and abstaining state, performing poorly, whether underperforming or misperforming, having lost the trust of its society and its monopoly over the use of violence, faces an uphill CVE battle. Katumanga (2017:163) contends that "[t]he soldier here has to be seen and to act as an engineer, medic, teacher or a nurse, in short a social reformer, seeking to build a new social order". Something Katumanga suggests, is lacking in the security apparatus. Katumanga (2017:163-164, 165) is adamant that given the historical injustices in Kenya, a new social order is required, based on the recent 2010 Constitution. This social order cannot be built on regime survival, extraction, rentier tendencies, or the identity group marginalisation that define state fragility since independence. It is also clear that such social order can neither be based on an underperforming and misperforming security apparatus, nor can it be achieved with the levels of endemic insecurity that defines state fragility in Kenya.

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[272] I indicated earlier in section 8.2.1 *Impediments to CVE in the arc of insecurity*, Samantha Lewthwaite had links with Jermaine Grant (both British nationals and reportedly members of *al-Shabaab* and/or *al-Qaeda* Central) and Saleh Nahban. In May 2008 when Grant and Nahban were arrested at the Dadaab refugee complex in Garissa (and later freed by *al-Shabaab* militants whilst being held at a police post in Liboi, Garissa) Lewthwaite was reportedly in their company, yet was not arrested. All escaped to Somalia. Grant, reportedly a bomb-maker, was re-arrested in Kisauni, Mombasa, in December 2011 (in the same operation during which Samantha Lewthwaite was arrested in and reportedly bribed her way out of custody, escaping to Somalia). After the 2011 arrest and prosecution, Grant is serving a 13-year sentence in Kenya on forgery-related charges and for possession of explosive materials. Nahban, one of the planners and executors of the 2002 Mombasa attacks, was killed by US Special Forces in 2009 in Somalia. One of *al-Shabaab*'s combat units in Kenya is the Saleh Nahban Brigade, named in honour of Nahban (see Chapter 6, section 6.6 *Islamist violent extremist groups and combat units in Kenya*). Lewthwaite is believed to be in Yemen currently with another *al-Qaeda* affiliate, the *al-Shabaab* aligned AQAP.

[273] Regarding privatised security, see later in the chapter in section 8.4 *Increased state fragility in Kenya*?

Other impediments to CVE are linked to group grievances relating to the conduct of the security apparatus in Kenya. These grievances relate to 'historical injustices' such as the *Shifta* war (1963-1968) and the Isiolo (1968), Garissa (1980), and Wagalla (1984) massacres, and CVE operations such as *Usalama* Watch (2014), and *Linda Boni* (since 2015). Historical injustices are deliberate policy choices of the Kenyan government and given their impact on Kenyan politics, on lslamist violence extremism, and on CVE, they are also leadership failures. About these historical injustices, Kenya's Commission on Revenue Allocation (CRA, 2012b:4) maintains that "past regimes practiced or permitted what we judge to have been gross, systemic injustices". Critically, the 2016 NSCVE does concede that "[r]adicalisation is often fed by real and perceived local disaffection and alienation from the state, and mainstream political life" (Republic of Kenya, 2016a:23). However, the NSCVE is curiously silent on the causes, nature, and impact of this 'local disaffection and alienation'. To avoid unnecessary repetition, I address group grievances later in the current chapter in section 8.3.4 *Social indicators and impediments to CVE*, where I link group grievances with impediments to CVE in the context of the two social indicators on the Fragile States Index, viz.: S1: *demographic pressures*, and S2: *refugees and IDPs*.

Factionalised elites add to impediments to CVE in Kenya. The indicator C2: *factionalised elites*, receives the second worst score (i.e., 8.7) on the Fragile States Index between 2005 and 2019. In Chapter 6, section 6.3 *Islamist violent extremism and the fragile state in Kenya*, I elaborated on how the constricted democratic space in Kenya is contested by factionalised elites and politically significant identity alliances. Instead of legitimate and representative leadership, there is brinksmanship and gridlock among the elite in Kenya. Access to the state and state resources are defined by differentiated hegemonial exchange with the elite seeking political power and access to state resources in exchange for support from their communities. The factionalised elite in Kenya have also used the economy of danger in exchange for regime survival and the suppression of legitimate grievances. Salter (2003:116, 121, 125) defines the economy of danger as the political employment of the danger of terrorism, or perceptions of such danger, as a commodity or resource, to justify questionable government policies and actions, and to supress dissent against such policies and actions. Later in the current chapter I elaborate on the impact of the economy of danger under political indicators and the cross-cutting indicator. Furthermore, I elaborate on hegemonial exchange under economic and social indicators.

8.3.2 Economic Indicators and Impediments to CVE

Kenya scored 8.0 for uneven development, 7.7 for human flight and brain drain, and 7.1 for economic decline, on average in the period under review. In Chapter 7, section 7.3 *State fragility and the development of Islamist violent extremism*, I noted that I did not find evidence that *human flight and brain drain* had any impact on state capacity and conflict dynamics in Kenya. Likewise, there is no evidence to indicate that the indicators E1: *economic decline* and E3: *human flight and brain drain*, have any impact on impediments to CVE in Kenya. The role of both indicators would have suggested a capacity deficit. I also noted at the beginning of this chapter (and in the context of Chapters 6 and 7), that state fragility in Kenya stems less from a capacity deficit, more from the misuse and abuse of existing capacity. Instead of the other two economic indicators, it is E2: *uneven economic development* that best explains impediments to CVE in Kenya. This indicator reveals pressures from structural and horizontal inequality in Kenya, which are linked with the development of impediments to CVE.

In fact, as I noted in Chapter 7, section 7.3.2 *Economic indicators*, Kenya has one of the fastest growing economies with an average GDP growth rate of 5.45 percent between 2004 and 2019. From an economy of US$40 billion in 2010, Kenya’s economy had more than doubled by 2018. In 2018 Kenya’s economy was US$87.928 billion, the fourth largest economy in sub-Saharan Africa after Nigeria, South Africa, and Angola. In 2019 Kenya’s economy was US$98.607 billion, ranking third after Nigeria and South Africa. Despite the size and the growth of the national economy, there is abundant evidence of sustained and extensive differentiated development and endemic horizontal inequality in Kenya. Instead of being unable to ‘act right’ because of a capacity deficit, Kenya in fact has the required cold fiscal capacity to ‘act right’.[274] Kenya quite simply and actively fails to ‘act right’ as an accountable and responsive state. Next, I demonstrate the resultant horizontal and regional inequalities in Kenya.

The Social Progress Index demonstrates that between 2010 and 2019 Kenya’s economy rose from US$3, 330 to US$4, 330 GDP per capita (in 2017 PPP prices), indicating a 30.03 percent increase, but social progress rose from 49.88 to 57.10, indicating only a 14.47 percent increase. Thus, economic growth in Kenya does not result in commensurate social progress for large sections of Kenyan society. The 2018 Inclusive Development Index shows that Kenya's Gini coefficient is 41.6 percent for income distribution (all forms of income) and 77.2 percent for wealth distribution (all assets), indicating elevated levels of income inequality and even higher levels of wealth inequality. Kenya's Gross Country Product, averaged between 2013 and 2017, shows that out of the 12 counties in the arc of insecurity, besides Nairobi, Mombasa, and Machakos, seven counties contribute the lowest share of the national GDP, and the other two are among the lowest. Out of the 47 counties, Isiolo's share is 0.2, Lamu is 0.4, Marsabit, Tana-river, Wajir, and Mandera each contribute 0.5 percent, and Garissa's share is 0.6 percent. With the other two counties, Kwale's share is 1.1 percent and Kilifi's is 1.6 percent. Machakos contributes 3.2 percent and Mombasa 4.7 percent. Nairobi contributes 21.7 percent to GDP.

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[274] One must accept that capacity is relative, and never infinite. Whilst Kenya has more capacity than the average African state, Kenya does not have, for example, South Africa’s capacity, including economic capacity.

In 2019, Kenya had a multidimensional poverty index of 17.8 percent. The picture is different in regions dominated by ethnic-Somalis and other Muslims. North-eastern Region has a poverty index of 50.3 percent, 22.2 percent in Coast Region, and 19.0 in Eastern Region. The 2020 Multidimensional Poverty Index has a supplement that measures multidimensional poverty by ethnic group, indicating that 79.27 percent of ethnic-Somalis are multidimensionally poor, subsisting on less than US$1.90 a day, compared to only 16.13 percent multidimensional poverty for ethnic-Kikuyu. There is then a 63.14 percentage difference in the incidence of multidimensional poverty between ethnic-Somalis and ethnic-Kikuyu. In fact, of the more than 40 ethnic groups in Kenya, only ethnic-Turkana and ethnic-Samburu have higher deprivation than ethnic-Somalis in Kenya. Among ethnic-Turkana, 80.23 percent are multidimensionally poor, and among ethnic-Samburu, 85.21 percent are multidimensionally poor.

Furthermore, Kenya's Commission on Revenue Allocation, which was created following devolution and the 2010 constitutional reforms, has a County Development Index (CDI) that classifies Mandera, Wajir, Marsabit, Tana-River, Kwale, Garissa, and Kilifi as 'most marginalised', and Isiolo, Machakos, and Lamu as 'moderately marginalised'. Only Mombasa and Nairobi were classified as 'well off', meaning above the baseline national average of 0.520 human development. The County Development Index measures human development and marginalisation based on four dimensions, viz.: (1) health; (2) education; (3) infrastructure; (4) poverty gap, on a scale of 0 to 1. The counties that are classified as 'most marginalised' (i.e., 0.519 and below) by Kenya's County Development Index therefore score below what is generally regarded as 'low human development' (i.e., below 0.550) by the global Human Development Index (HDI), and those counties that are classified as 'moderately marginalised' (i.e., 0.521-0.599) are in the range of 'medium human development' (i.e., 0.550-0.699). The County Development Index classifies 'well off' as 0.600 and above, i.e., in the range of 'medium human development' as classified by the global HDI.[275] Nine of the 12 counties in the arc of insecurity (excluding Nairobi, Mombasa, and Machakos) are also listed among the 15 counties that have suffered 'historical injustices', i.e., 'harms and wrongs' committed by the state, in Kenya since independence.[276]

The forgoing horizontal and regional inequalities in Kenya result from ethno-politics, patronage politics, and hegemonial exchange. Hegemonial exchange is a form of representation and co-optation where the fragile state, otherwise unable to assert its hegemony, distributes patronage, goods, and services, in exchange for support, neutrality, or some form of compliance, from specific identity groups because of their political significance. Whilst such ethno-religious regional power may be used to facilitate peaceful co-existence or solve disputes, manage conflicts, and address grievances among communities, hegemonial exchange is shown to be inefficient, unsustainable, and counterproductive in the long run. The required and necessary ethnic-balancing act is precarious and fragile, produces short-term and limited representation, and is unstable in the context of limited and declining resources (Rothchild, 1985:71-73; Lake and Rothchild, 1996:59; Thomson, 2016:64-65). In Chapter 6, section 6.3 *Islamist violent extremism and the fragile state in Kenya*, I highlighted how hegemonial exchange is central to the constricted democratic space in Kenya, as well as to Kenya's electoral system and conflict dynamics. Clearly, Kenya cannot continue with 'business as usual', for example, by placating ethnic-Somalis and other Muslims through an extension of hegemonial exchange to include them. That would be recreating the very conditions that generated state fragility-insecurity and the resultant Islamist violent extremism in the first instance. Another outcome of hegemonial exchange is that the regions and communities impacted by Islamist violent extremism are among the most underdeveloped in Kenya. The non-equitable share of power and resources among regions and identity groups in Kenya therefore constitutes one of the major impediments to CVE in Kenya.

Added to the marginalisation of regions and identity groups, throwing money at the problem, instead of addressing the debilitating and conflict generating properties of state fragility, will also only compound the problem. The case of the 20-years long-war in Afghanistan is illustrative. In Chapter 5, section 5.3 *Ending violent Islamist campaigns*, I elaborated on how the cost for the US alone (excluding its partners) between 2001 and 2021 for the war in Afghanistan is estimated at US$2.261 trillion. Despite the copious amounts of money spent on Afghanistan, one may safely show that Afghanistan is less safe in 2021 than it was in 2001 before and following 9/11. The US-led war and CVE project, by not addressing state fragility in Afghanistan, simply failed. This sets the scene for political indicators.

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[275] With a baseline national average of 0.520, and 'well off' as 0.600 and above, Kenya's CDI does not cater for the upper ranges of human development as catered for in the global HDI. The upper ranges of the HDI are *high* human development (i.e., 0.700-0.799), and *very high* human development (i.e., 0.800 and above).

[276] The above indicators of horizontal and regional inequality, starting with Kenya's GDP and the Social Progress Index, ending with the counties that have suffered 'historical injustices', including those in the arc of insecurity, are elaborated and referenced in Chapter 7, section 7.3.2 *Economic indicators*, and 7.3.4 *Social indicators*.

8.3.3 Political Indicators and Impediments to CVE

The three political indicators on the Fragile States Index are state legitimacy, public services, and human rights and the rule of law. On average, between 2005 and 2019, Kenya scored 8.2 for state legitimacy, 7.8 for public services, and 7.1 for human rights and the rule of law. State fragility in Kenya has generated varied crises. Key among them are the challenges to state legitimacy and the linked loss of state authority. Thomson (2016:108) contends that "[l]egitimacy should be at the heart of any government. Without it, coercive measures must be deployed to maintain authority .... [I]t is far more productive to keep a society content by providing for its needs than it is for a self-interested ruling elite to seek compliance through violence". UN Secretary-General, António Guterres, is also adamant that "the creation of open, equitable, inclusive and pluralist societies, based on the full respect of human rights and with economic opportunities for all, represents the most tangible and meaningful alternative to violent extremism" (UNDP, 2017:iii). Legitimacy is obtained through the creation of such societies. Such legitimacy is challenged in Kenya and thus remains one of the key impediments to CVE, with the Kenyan government failing to obtain the goodwill and trust of sections of its society.

Within the political ambit and notions of legitimacy, the factors and issues that are framed as indivisible by both sides will also add to impediments to CVE in Kenya.[277] One example of issues that may be deemed indivisible is the partition of the state of Kenya or the secession of a part of Kenya. Such a prospect is undesirable to the Kenyan state, for various reasons. For example, the secession of North-eastern and Coast regions will greatly reduce Kenya's geographical area and population, and cut-off Kenya's access to the sea, rendering Kenya landlocked. Predominantly, such a geographical separation will increase Kenya's transaction costs, affect its imports and exports, and remove Kenya's claims in the Indian Ocean, including the lucrative oil and gas reserves that are currently in dispute between Kenya and Somalia, with dire consequences for Kenya as a political and socio-economic entity.[278] Given Kenya's history, including the *Shifta* war (1963-1968), it is unlikely that Kenya will give in to the objective of a 'Greater Somalia' that has been goal-set by *al-Shabaab* as part of their agitation for an Islamic state in East Africa.[279] Martin Kimani, former Director of the National Counter Terrorism Centre (NCTC) and currently Kenya's Permanent Representative to the United Nations (UN), recently reiterated a long-standing Kenyan policy on secession/irredentism and Africa's borders, at an emergency meeting of the UN Security Council in response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Martin Kimani (in Chappell, 2022:The Internet; Demianyk, 2022:The Internet), contends that

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[277] Indivisibles is borrowed from the study field of conflict resolution. Indivisibles are tangible or intangible, material or non-material, and include issues, concerns, or goods. Hassner (2003:8, 12-13) defines indivisible as 'perfectly cohesive', with 'unambiguous boundaries', that 'cannot be substituted or exchanged'. Albin (1991:47) says indivisibles 'cannot be split physically into parts', and 'cannot be compromised on, without losing their intrinsic value'. Indivisibles are often deemed non-negotiable because they cannot be substituted with something of equal value or because they would lose their value once divided. Indivisibles may be the territorial integrity of Kenya (based on Kenya's perspective), or the area of what will be the 'Greater Somalia' or the 'Islamic state', or the ontological security of ethnic-Somalis and other Muslims (based on *al-Shabaab*'s perspective).

> Kenya, and almost every African country, was birthed by the ending of empire. Our borders were not of our own drawing …. [Nevertheless,] [r]ather than form nations that looked ever backwards into history with a dangerous nostalgia, we chose to look forward …. We believe that all states formed from empires that have collapsed or retreated have many peoples in them yearning for integration with peoples in neighbouring states …. However, Kenya rejects such a yearning from being pursued by force. We must complete our recovery from the embers of dead empires in a way that does not plunge us back into new forms of domination and oppression. [At independence in 1963,] [w]e rejected irredentism and expansionism on any basis, including racial, ethnic, religious, or cultural factors. We reject it again today.

Post-colonial President Kenyatta and vice-President Odinga employed much more colourful language to express Kenya's policy on secession/irredentism. At an OAU meeting in 1963, Oginga Odinga declared: "We in Kenya shall not give even one inch of our country to Somali tribalist, and that is final" (Njeri, 2015:The Internet). In 1962 already, Jomo Kenyatta's reported articulation of this policy to ethnic-Somalis in Kenya was: "Pack up your camels and go to Somalia" (Branch, 2014:643). Following the October 2021 ICJ ruling on the Kenya-Somalia maritime border dispute, favouring the claim made by Somalia, President Uhuru Kenyatta also articulated this policy, stating that "Kenya wishes to indicate that it rejects in totality and does not recognise the findings in the decision .... Fellow Kenyans, when I became President on 9th April 2013, I took an oath to protect the territorial integrity of the Republic of Kenya. I do not intend to abrogate my solemn oath" (Kenyatta, 2021:1, 4).[280]

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[278] See Chapter 7, section 7.3.5 *Cross-cutting indicator*, for an outline of the maritime border dispute between Kenya and Somalia that is related to the oil and gas reserves off the coast of Kismayo in the Indian Ocean.

[279] See Chapter 7, section 7.2.2 *Explaining Islamist terrorist activity in the arc of insecurity*, and section 7.3.5 *Cross-cutting indicator*, for an outline of the irredentist 'Greater Somalia' movement of the 1960s and 1970s and *al-Shabaab*'s incorporation of the objectives of this movement in the current long-war since the 1990s.

[280] Kenya's position about its territorial integrity and its policy against secession, and its position regarding the irredentist movement in Somalia, have been consistent since independence. See also Chapter 7, section 7.2.2 *Explaining Islamist terrorist activity in the arc of insecurity*, and section 7.3.5 *Cross-cutting indicator*.

A related indivisible is the Islamisation of the Kenyan state or parts of Kenya. Islamisation stands in stark contrast with electoral democracy, revealing the dichotomy between secularism and Islamism in Kenya. Abbink (2014:101) contends that "the more religious people become, the more the need may arise for a secular state order where each person can be his or her religious self". Otherwise, people withdraw into their religious enclaves. Social cohesion in a multi-religious society is only possible in a truly secular state. CVE in Kenya, however, pays lip service to secularism. It does not help to purport to be a secular state and then have a constitution with a preamble that starts: "We, the people of Kenya-acknowledging the supremacy of the Almighty God of all creation" and ends: "God bless Kenya" (Republic of Kenya, 2010:12). Although Article 8 of the constitution states that 'there shall be no state religion', to be perceived to be a Christian state becomes a logical conclusion based on lived experiences and perceived reality. Islamism, an ideology of the disenfranchised, will then logically find reasons to view and frame Islam and by association, Muslims, as marginalised in Kenya.

Indicator P2: *public services*, also reveals other impediments to CVE in Kenya. These impediments emanate from the provision of basic public services such as toilets, sewage network, water, and electricity, or wider public goods such as security, education, and sources of economic opportunity and livelihood. The provision of essential public services and public goods is the most tangible state function in the eyes of society, often used as a representation and barometer of governance itself. Fragility in the provision of public services and public goods therefore has a massive impact on state legitimacy and on related barriers to CVE. As is the case with hegemonial exchange, as outlined in the current chapter in section 8.3.2 *Economic indicators and impediments to CVE*, the state simply cannot continue with 'business as usual', and not provide essential public services and public goods in an equitable manner, if the state is to reclaim and regain relevance in the eyes of marginalised groups that have become amenable to radicalisation into Islamist violent extremism. This is absolutely critical in the case of the arc of insecurity, particularly in the counties of North-Eastern and Coast regions.

Indicator P3: *human rights and the rule of law*, also reveals varied impediments to CVE in Kenya. The Freedom House Index (FHI) is instructive. The Index has a status of *partly free* for Kenya for 2019, with a rating of 4.0 (out of 7), and an aggregate score of 48 (out of 100). Below is an illustration of the sustained period of low levels of freedom in Kenya between 2000 and 2019. Kenya has been classified as *not free* (i.e., 5.5 - 7.0) before 2002, and consistently *partly free* (i.e., 3.0 - 5.0) since 2002:[281]

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[281] In Chapter 6, section 6.3.2 *Constitutional reforms and devolution*, I outline that between 1964 and 1991 Kenya had *de facto* and *de jure* one-party rule. Electoral democracy was reintroduced in 1991. The ruling party, the Kenya African National Union (KANU), governed between 1963 and 2002. Regarding the Freedom House Index (FHI), the rating of the index is on a scale of 1 to 7, with 1 indicating *most free* and 7 indicating *least free*. The



Created from Freedom House Index data (Freedom House, 2020b:The Internet)

Kenya's status of *partly free* is typical of many other African states. The hybrid regime, *partly free*, is the main political system in Africa since the 1990s (Englebert and Dunn, 2014:199-203). *Freedom in the world 2020* classifies 49 percent of sub-Saharan Africa's 49 states as *partly free*, 37 percent as *not free*, and only 14 percent as *free* (Freedom House, 2020a:26). The 2020 Ibrahim Index also shows a decline in governance performance in Africa's 54 states between 2010 and 2019. This decline is largely driven by the two categories of governance: (1) *participation, rights, and inclusion*; (2) *security and the rule of law* (MIF, 2020:21-24).[282] Such performance in governance reveals the hybrid regime as constituted by a congeries of both democratic and authoritarian features. This uneasy coexistence of electoral democracy that has very few democracy dividends, with authoritarian features and tendencies that exclude and repress groups in society, thus generating grievances, and makes political violence a perceived viable option for resolving grievances and political conflict. The more the fragile and insecure state imposes itself, the more opposition it creates. The outcome is the cyclical insecurity dilemma that is outlined in section 8.3 *State fragility and the development of impediments to CVE*.

The violations of human rights and civil liberties as captured on the Freedom House index and the Political Terror Scale, particularly in the course of the conduct of CVE, reveal Kenya as an ungoverned legal space. A space outside of the meaningful and effective control of the state. In Chapter 6, section 6.9 *Countering Islamist violent extremism in Kenya*, I outline that the key legislation, policies, and plans

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rating is divided into *free* (1.0 - 2.5), *partly free* (3.0 - 5.0), and *not free* (5.5 - 7.0). The rating is used in conjunction with an aggregate score of 0 to 100, with 0 indicating *least free*, and 100 indicating *most free*. Freedom House measures the levels of freedom utilising 10 political rights indicators and 15 civil liberties indicators. Political rights are grouped into three subcategories: (1) electoral process; (2) political pluralism and participation; (3) the functioning of government. Civil liberties are grouped into four subcategories: (1) freedom of expression and belief; (2) associational and organisational rights; (3) the rule of law; (4) personal autonomy and individual rights. The status of *not free* indicates that political rights and civil liberties are highly restricted, and *partly free* means that although there is some level of respect and protection, these rights and liberties are *not* respected and protected (Freedom House, 2017:2, 2019a:2-3, 2019b:The Internet, 2020a:2, 2020b:The Internet).

[282] In the same ten-year period, there was some positive growth in the other two categories: (2) *foundations for economic opportunity*; (4) *human development* (MIF, 2020:21-24). See Chapter 3, section 3.4 *The criticism against the theory and application of state fragility*, where I provide a brief outline of the Ibrahim Index.

against terrorism under the CVE architecture of Kenya have been highly criticised. The legal framework in the CVE architecture of Kenya is largely criticised for being underdeveloped with the first pieces of legislation enacted only since 2012, including the 2012 Prevention of Terrorism Act and the 2014 Security Laws Amendment Act. The first CVE policy is the 2016 National Strategy to Counter Violent Extremism, which is yet to be revised. Kenya's CVE architecture is also criticised for the low number of alleged terrorists being arrested, prosecuted, and convicted. Kenya's CVE architecture is further accused of undermining human rights and civil liberties, as well as the rule of law. The renditions and refoulment of terror suspects are illustrative. In employing the economy of danger, Kenya has justified renditions and refoulment in the name of 'national security' (Horowitz, 2013:The Internet). Kenya therefore in fact exploits the fear of terrorism to purchase regime survival and unlawful conduct.

Kenya had sent terror suspects, including its own citizens, to the US-run Guantanamo Bay base in Cuba, to Somalia, Ethiopia, and Uganda for interrogation and to stand trial. Renditions, as opposed to extraditions, are problematic because they occur in a covert context, often outside the law, and suspects are sent to places with less rigorous regulations for the humane treatment of alleged terror suspects. In the case of refoulment, terror suspects, refugees, and asylum-seekers are sent back to countries where they are likely to face persecution, including torture, all against the law. The 2008 *Salim Awadh Salim et al versus the Commissioner of Police et al* case is illustrative. In said court case, the High court in Nairobi ruled that "[t]he imperative to fight terrorism … is not a sufficient reason to ignore the rule of law" (Horowitz, 2013:The Internet). The court found that the Kenyan state violated both Kenyan law and international law, including Kenya's Constitution. The court awarded the 11 terror suspects, seven Kenyan and four foreigners, each damages ranging between KSh2 - 4 million (Kenyan Shillings) for unlawful detention, ill-treatment, and rendition (Horowitz, 2013:The Internet).

Renditions and refoulment to detention centres like Guantanamo Bay and to places like Somalia have created impediments to CVE in Kenya by undermining state legitimacy, polarising society, increasing radicalisation, and inciting retaliatory terror attacks. *Al-Shabaab* maintains that "Muslims who have not been compromised understand … [that] when harassment, torture, renditions, detentions, and extra judicial killings occur on their presumed 'cheap' blood, they track down the source of such actions back to the masters" (Gaidi Mtaani, 2012b:22). Such state terrorism and violations of human rights and civil liberties, as demonstrated by these renditions and refoulment, which targets mainly ethnic-Somalis and other Muslims, are 'unjust social orders' and 'historical injustices' that have added to demographic pressures and group grievances in Kenya, adding to impediments to CVE in particular.

8.3.4 Social Indicators and Impediments to CVE

Kenya's demographics that are defined by social fragmentation, do not only provide the context of broader political conflict analysis and the specific challenge of Islamist violent extremism, but also point to specific keys in unlocking the challenge of impediments to CVE in Kenya. Kenya's demographics and related challenges are linked to the two social indicators of state fragility on the Fragile States Index. Each scored out of 10.00, Kenya scored 8.8 for demographic pressures, and 8.1 on average for refugees and IDPs between 2006 and 2019. At 8.8, demographic pressures represent the worst score on the index in the period under review.[283] Social fragmentation or depreciated social cohesion, very much reflects the incapacity of the fragile state to deal with demographic pressures and the pressures linked to refugees and IDPs in Kenya, factors found to impact on the success of CVE.

Hellsten (2008:156) has observed in Kenya "socio-economic disparities and historical injustices due to corruption, nepotism, cronyism, and other forms of favouritism". Van Metre (2016:6) contends that Islamist violent extremism in Kenya rests largely on a "well-circulated victimisation narrative that has gained traction on the basis of unaddressed historical injustices, particularly socioeconomic and political exclusion, skewed development, and past injustices around land allocation". Hence, social groups in Kenya do not perform well on the attributes of social cohesion, viz.: a sense of community, shared loyalty, common enterprise, constructive interdependence, and peaceful coexistence. This is in stark contrast to what is implied by Kenya's national motto, *Harambee* (i.e., all pull together). The depreciated social cohesion is demonstrated in the 12 counties in the arc of insecurity, particularly in the three counties in North-eastern Region. Kenya's Social Cohesion Index, developed under Kenya's National Cohesion and Integration Commission (NCIC), is illustrative (Onsomu *et al*, 2017:23, 35-36):[284]

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[283] See Chapter 7, section 7.2.1 *Islamist terrorist activity in the arc of insecurity*, 7.2.2 *Explaining Islamist terrorist activity in the arc of insecurity*, and this chapter: 8.2.1 *Impediments to CVE in the arc of insecurity*, for an outline of refugees and IDPs, and the demographic features of Kenya, with specific reference to the arc of insecurity.

[284] The Social Cohesion Index measures social cohesion across six dimensions, viz.: trust, peace, equity, prosperity, diversity, and identity, on a scale of 0 – 100, with 0 indicating the lowest level of social cohesion. The coding of the six dimensions on the Social Cohesion Index may be summarised as follows:

Trust	*Intergroup trust (ethno-religious identities), trust in government, trust in institutions.*
Peace	*Intergroup peaceful coexistence, the impact of crime, insecurity (including national security and terrorism), ethnic-religious-political tensions on law and order.*
Equity	*Distribution of public goods and opportunities across communities and regions*.
Prosperity	*Economic status and well-being, response to basic needs, levels of education, life expectancy.*
Diversity	*Exposure to other ethno-religious (political) groups, acceptance, and protection of diversity.*
Identity	*Ethno-religious identity versus national identity, political participation*.

Social cohesion is correlated with other indicators. To illustrate, social cohesion has a negative correlation with poverty and inequality, and a positive correlation with human development and life expectancy (Onsomu *et al*, 2017:11, 16-18, 24-27, 33-34). The case in Kenya supports this finding regarding such correlation. See Chapter 7, section 7.3.2 *Economic indicators*, and section 7.3.4 *Social indicators*.

Kenya's Social Cohesion Index (SCI)	Wajir	Garissa	Mandera	Tana-River	Machakos	Kwale	Marsabit	Isiolo	Lamu	Kilifi	Mombasa	Nairobi
SCI score %	22.0	36.5	38.8	43.0	46.6	53.2	55.1	57.4	58.7	59.8	61.4	63.7
Ranking	47	46	45	44	43	35	29	22	14	12	11	3

The above ranking is based on Kenya's 47 counties. Kenya's social cohesion average is 56.6 percent. Thus, seven of these 12 counties are below average. The lowest score of the six components on the index is the *equity* dimension at 34.6 percent, indicating the marginalisation and grossly unequal distribution of public goods and opportunities across communities and regions in Kenya. Collectively, Wajir, Garissa, and Mandera, rank the lowest of the 47 counties. The disaggregated six dimensions (trust, peace, equity, prosperity, diversity, identity) are even more telling. For example, *trust* levels in Wajir are as low as 2.6 percent, in Garissa, 8.9 percent, and in Mandera, 14.4 percent. The national average is 43.7 percent. *Equity* in Mandera is a low 13.9 percent, in Wajir, 15.1 percent, and in Garissa, 39.0 percent. *Prosperity* in Wajir receives the lowest score on the index at 0.0 percent, Garissa scores 20.5 percent, Mandera 21.1 percent. The national average is 60.5 percent (Onsomu *et al*, 2017:19, 23, 35-36). Surely, with these low levels of *trust*, and the levels of group and regional marginalisation as reflected by the *equity* and *prosperity* dimensions, both the all-government and the all-society CVE approaches and programming in Kenya face particularly intractable challenges. Attributes such as shared loyalty and common enterprise, integral and indivisible to such CVE, are grossly compromised.

In addition to the depreciated social cohesion, the Islamisation and the Somalinisation of Islamist violent extremism and CVE in Kenya have added to the demographic pressures and the pressures linked to refugees and IDPs in the arc of insecurity. Much of said Somalinisation and Islamisation of Islamist violent extremism and CVE is manifesting in growing counter-extremism, even Islamophobia, among sections of society and in government in Kenya. A 2014 editorial piece that appeared in one of Kenya's leading newspapers, the *Daily Nation*, illustrates such counter-extremism in the case of ethnic-Somalis. The managing editor, Mutuma Mathiu (2014:The Internet), wrote the following:

> It would appear that every little, two-bit Somali has a big dream - to blow us up, knock down our buildings and slaughter our children. They declared war on us and we thought it was a small matter that some guy in government was going to take care of. We were wrong …. For years, it has been my job to sit here at my desk and look at the pictures of many events, some of them atrocities, others not so. I look at the eyes of people and I can tell what kind of human beings they are. I have learnt to recognise the frozen, blazing eyes of the killer; the unblinking, reptilian stare of those who had crossed the line from human to monster.

I noted earlier that Kenya has hosted Somalia's refugees since 1991, mostly at the Dadaab complex in Garissa County. The Kenyan government has periodically accused Somalia's refugees in Dadaab of harbouring terrorists, or otherwise accused them of being terrorists themselves. Most notably, after the 2015 Garissa attack, which was purportedly planned in Dadaab, there were mounting calls to close the complex.[285] Such counter-extremism is extended from Kenyan ethnic-Somalis and Somalia's refugees to other Muslims in Kenya. In this regard Ndzovu (2017a:156) has observed "a quiet rage simmering among Christians, against Islam". One prominent member of the Christian clergy in Kenya, David Oginde, had this to say about Kenyan Muslims as a collective (Ndzovu, 2017a:169):

> It is sad but the Muslim fraternity has been nonchalant in their support of government in the fight against terrorism. When the counter-terrorism Bill was tabled in Parliament many years ago, they fought it tooth and nail until it was totally diluted. Whenever terror suspects have been arrested, this religious community has often come out in strong public defence demanding their unconditional release …. [W]hen security forces storm into mosques accused as 'radicalisation' centres of the jihadis, both religious and political leaders from the community strongly criticised 'the government for high-handedness, and defilement of places of worship' …, ironically, the same passionate condemnation 'is rarely seen when innocent Kenyans are massacred' by the jihadis.

Mwakimako (2007:288, 289), speaks of the perceived 'Islamic difference' in Kenya, noting a widely held view that "not all Muslims are terrorists, but all terrorists are Muslim". Highlighting this perceived 'Islamic difference', following the 1998 US Embassy attack, former President Daniel arap Moi reportedly said: "The bombers would not have done what they did if they had been Christians" (Mwakimako, 2007:295). Mahmood Mamdani's *Good Muslim, Bad Muslim* (2002) is also instructive. Mamdani (2002:766-768) has observed a tendency to mesh and confound politics with religion since 9/11, linking terrorism with Islam (both the religion and its adherents), and classifying Islamic culture (all Muslims) or a section of Islamic culture ('the bad Muslims') as violent and regressive. Orthodox Muslims are considered to be 'extremist' and 'bad'. The only 'good Muslims' are deemed to be 'moderate Muslims'. Hence, PCVE suffers from "a reductive focus on Muslims and Islam" (Nasser-Eddine *et al*, 2011:5). Instead of isolating and mediating the political and socio-economic issues involved, PCVE has an inapt fixation with Islam. In reality, as Mark Juergensmeyer (2019b:109) correctly pointed out, ideas, ideologies, or religious ideas, originate out of economic and socio-political contexts and realities, not the other way around. With the misplaced emphasis on Islam, PCVE risks alienating the very religion it should be reliant upon for finding solutions. This is the reality of Kenya's interpretation of Islamism through the theological and social-psychological radicalisation model.

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[285] See Chapter 7, section 7.2 *The arc of insecurity and Islamist violent extremism*.

Explaining radicalisation, this model directly links Islamic beliefs and social-networks and kinship, with terrorism risk. The model then defines radicalisation as a social construction. The role of PCVE is consequently reduced to identifying 'at risk' individuals in specific communities (i.e., generating a 'terrorist profile' or 'indicators of terrorist risk') based on Islamic beliefs, kinships, and other social networks (Breidlid, 2021:227-228). PCVE then adopts a reductive focus on 'bad ethnic-Somalis' and 'bad Muslims' who have been 'radicalised'. Contrary to the theological and social-psychological radicalisation model, Islam, and social networks such as the mosque, *madrassa*, the Islamist ideologue, or extremist websites, may each or collectively serve as a medium or vector for Islamism, but they are not incubators of Islamism. The incubator of Islamism is, quite decidedly, state fragility.[286]

Radicalisation is not the flu virus that individuals in certain communities are at risk of catching by having 'extremist' religious beliefs and interacting in social networks. Rather, once grievances develop in reaction to the limitations and excess of state fragility, and political dissent against state fragility is forced underground by government repression and gets Islamised, not by Islam but by Islamism, through mediums such as the mosque, *madrassa*, Islamist ideologue, or extremist websites, only then does political dissent acquire an Islamist character. An individual or community can only be 'radicalised' when their emerging worldview and blame system lines up with that of an already existing ideology and movement. This ideology and movement, and its organisations, in turn are created in reaction to state fragility. Islamist violent extremism, as induced by the properties of state fragility, is fixed around politics in its widest sense, i.e., about the distribution of power and resources in society. Curiously, despite the dominance of the theological and social-psychological radicalisation model in Kenya, the NSCVE does grant that "[r]adicalisation is often fed by real and perceived local disaffection and alienation from the state, and mainstream political life" (Republic of Kenya, 2016a:23).

The conduct of CVE itself, being heavy-handed and indiscriminate, adds to demographic pressures and the pressures linked to refugees and IDPs and group grievances. Ali-Koor (2016:6) points out that CVE activities in Kenya alienate the Muslim population and make them susceptible to Islamism. These CVE activities include weak investigations that lead to failed prosecutions of terror suspects, extrajudicial killings, detention without trial, and widespread disappearances. Bachmann (2012:41) asserts that these CVE activities generate 'anger and fear' among Muslims in Kenya. Moreover, indiscriminate CVE enhances radicalisation whilst justifying retaliatory attacks. Both these effects strengthen recruitment efforts by Islamists (Denoeux and Carter, 2009a:31). Anderson and McKnight (2015b:26) thus conclude that "[t]here are no better recruiting agents for *al-Shabaab* than the poorly trained, ill-disciplined, and corrupt soldiers and police who carried out Operation *Usalama* Watch". Such unrestrained conduct undermines inclusive social contracts, norms, and values. This makes the state even less relevant to aggrieved communities, as such adding to impediments to CVE in Kenya.

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[286] Kenya's CVE architecture, aside from the centralised offensive and defensive approach, is dominated by the ideological and communicative approach, and the downplaying of the political and social-policy approach. Whereas the 'theological and social-psychological radicalisation model' reflects the ideological and communicative approach, the political and social-policy approach correctly highlights the political and socio-economic grievances that link state fragility and Islamist violent extremism. See Chapter 5, section 5.4.3 *CVE approaches and programming*, and Chapter 6, section 6.9 *Countering Islamist violent extremism in Kenya*.

Just as the conduct of CVE can radicalise Muslims, such conduct can also encourage conversion to Islam and radicalisation into Islamist violent extremism. Islamism, as an ideology and a movement of the disenfranchised, appeals to communities living on or pushed towards the fringes of society. *Al-Qaeda* leader Osama bin Laden asserted that the Islamist movement and Islamist terror attacks are responses to "severe oppression, suffering, excessive inequity, humiliation, and poverty" (in Pape, 2005:54). Converting to Islam and embracing Islamism then becomes an act of empowerment. The new faith affords new and wider "avenues of self-empowerment and connection to audiences and solidarity networks outside their own group" (Abbink, 2014:92). The new converts and those who have renewed their faith, i.e., 'born again' Muslims, "are more zealous, and eager to prove both their worthiness and dedication to their newfound ideological community" (Nasser-Eddine *et al*, 2011:40). The conduct of CVE can thus create fault-lines where fault-lines did not exist before, forcing Muslims and non-Muslims alike to take sides in the conflict, thus crystallising divisions, making the challenge of Islamist violent extremism more intractable and more pervasive. From the foregoing it is evident that Kenya's societal pressures far outweigh the capacity and political will of Kenya to manage these pressures. The cross-cutting indicator, external intervention, reveals additional impediments to CVE, which are far more intractable as they lie even more outside of the control of the Kenyan state.

8.3.5 Cross-cutting Indicator and Impediments to CVE

The last indicator on the Fragile State Index is the cross-cutting indicator, X1: *external intervention*. External intervention links the role, influence, and impact of external actors to CVE in Kenya. External intervention scored 7.9 (out of 10.00) on average between 2005 and 2019. External intervention reveals that besides state fragility in Kenya, impediments to CVE in Kenya emanate from Kenya's fragile and volatile neighbourhood. Kenya's neighbourhood is a cocktail of varied forms of endemic insecurity, and it is thus disposed to violent political conflict. In Chapter 7, section 7.3.5 *Cross-cutting Indicator*, I elaborated on how Kenya's neighbourhood is home to a range of fragile states, considered an epicentre of the fight against Islamist terrorism, and home to varied military bases, including those by the US, France, China, Saudi Arabia, Russia, Turkey, and UAE. This neighbourhood is thus contested by foreign interests, it is highly militarised, and it is awash with small arms. In this neighbourhood, it is Somalia that presents the most intractable impediments to CVE in Kenya.

In the current chapter, in section 8.2 *The arc of insecurity and impediments to CVE*, I outlined the impact of Kenya's shared demographics with Somalia. The shared conditions and historical grievances of ethnic-Somalis and other Muslims in east Kenya, and their shared affinity and solidarity with their coethnics and coreligionists in Somalia (explained by the kin-country syndrome), make collective grievances and conflict communicable. Denoeux and Carter (2009a:31-32) find that "the greater and the more intense the exposure to victimisation at home, the more the perceived slaughter of Muslims around the globe will tend to resonate on a deep, personal level". Islamist violent extremism is consequently internationalised by coreligionists and coethnics inside and outside of a state like Kenya. Katumanga (2017:164) accordingly contends that the Islamist threat in Kenya has regional overtones. The broader objective is to establish an Islamic state in East Africa, not only in Kenya, in Somalia, or in 'Greater Somalia'. The exploitation of 'regionalised identities' and religious identity by *al-Shabaab* must consequently be countered by a 'new regionalism' that considers communities, the state, and the region in East Africa. This new regionalism, Katumanga (2017:164) asserts, still lacks in East Africa.

Moreover, the communicable properties of shared state fragility ensure that state fragility in Somalia will add to impediments to CVE in Kenya. Ingiriis (2020b:130-132, 139) characterises state institutions in Somalia as 'dysfunctional', 'corrupt', 'personalised', and highly dependent on foreign partners such as the donor community and AMISOM. In fact, because of endemic corruption in Somalia, in 2020 the president of Djibouti, Omar Guelleh, expressed the fear that *al-Shabaab* may ultimately control the government of Somalia by 'buying' parliamentary seats in the then upcoming December 2021 parliament elections in Somalia (Soudan, 2020:The Internet). To validate this fear, the May 2022 presidential elections in Somalia were marred by reported large-scale 'vote-buying'.[287]

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[287] Somalia and its government remain highly unstable and fragile. On 15 May 2022, Somalia held its presidential elections. Hassan Sheikh Mohamud was elected president, defeating the incumbent Mohamed Farmajo. Hassan Mohamud was president between 2012 and 2017 and was defeated in the 2017 elections by Mohamed Farmajo. These elections indicate the type of anomaly Somalia has become, and not only based on these exchanges between Mohamud and Farmajo, and the recycling of other leaders with very little change taking place. In fact, the last elections based on universal suffrage in Somalia was in 1969. Fast forward: Mohamed Siad Barre's dictatorship, 1969-1991, the collapsed state (with no central government), 1991-2004, and the transitional federal government, 2004-2012. Resume in 2012. Since the federal government in 2012, Somalians do not

The Somalian military is also not performing to expectations. Ingiriis (2020b:130) asserts that federal government forces have been shown to “lack the necessary conviction, discipline, principle, and spirit to engage [*al-Shabaab*]”. Felter *et al* (2021:The Internet) also observe that in Somalia, “[e]ven in areas they hold, the central government and federated states struggle to administer territory, provide basic services, and overcome a decades-long legacy of corruption and mismanagement of state institutions”. This begs the following question: Given such state fragility in Somalia, will Somalia be able to govern, protect and defend itself against *al-Shabaab* without external support? The case in Afghanistan demonstrates that such fragile states are unable to do so. Whilst US intelligence services warned on 10 August 2021 that with the US withdrawal it will take thirty to ninety days for Afghanistan to collapse in the face of the *Taliban* advance, it took just five days! By 15 August the Afghan government in Kabul had collapsed and several units of the Afghan security forces surrendered without firing a shot, others defecting and joining *Taliban* (Mellen, 2021:The Internet).

The other obstacle to CVE in Kenya is the unresolved war in Somalia. The war can settle into a conflict equilibrium with no end in sight. Open-ended CVE has been the hallmark of CVE, characterised by mission creep with mutating objectives. The 20 years long-war in Afghanistan is again illustrative. The initial objectives in 2001 were clear, achievable, military objectives, viz.: (1) degrade *al-Qaeda* (as a security threat); (2) deny *al-Qaeda* a safe base of operations in Afghanistan (by deposing *Taliban*); (3) prevent another attack such as 9/11 on US soil. These objectives were achieved. These clear military objectives soon mutated into state-building and nation-building, with new objectives such as ‘peace’, ‘stable and inclusive political structures’, ‘democracy and human rights’, and ‘a stable economy’ (Biden, 2021:The Internet). Added to such mission creep and mutation of objectives, is the post-conflict challenge of restoring governance and maintaining peace. In this regard, having learned from the failures of the 2001 Afghanistan invasion, former US secretary of state, Colin Powell, warned about invading Iraq in 2003 that “[i]f you break it, you own it” (Samuels, 2007:The Internet). As Colin Powel explained: “When you take out a regime and you bring down a government, you become the

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participate in elections (because of security concerns). Instead, in a clan-based power-sharing electoral system, clan delegates, forming ‘electoral colleges’ (each college has 101 members), ‘elect’ members of the national parliament (MPs), and the MPs ‘elect’ the president. The president of Somalia, Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, was thus ‘elected’ in an election marred by reported mass corruption and ‘vote-buying’, in a third round of voting involving 275 MPs of the lower house who were ‘elected’ by 27, 775 ‘clan delegates’, ‘representing’ around 16 million Somalians. The Senate: the upper house, with 54 members, also participated. The electoral process is managed by state and federal ‘election implementation committees’. Vote-buying can then involve clan leaders and clan delegates, members of both houses of parliament, and members of election implementation committees, who can vote as directed by the highest bidder, including *al-Shabaab*. Voting took place within the ‘green zone’ that is guarded by the AU mission, where the government remains, with very little control outside of Mogadishu (SDP and SPA, 2020:1-8; Dahir and Fezehai, 2022:The Internet; Aljazeera, 2022:The Internet).

government … until a [new] government [is] put in place" (Samuels, 2007:The Internet). Colin Powell concluded that after removing Saddam Hussein in Iraq in 2003, the US failed 'to become the new government until a new government was put in place'. Consequently, counter-terrorism and the CVE project failed, nation-building and state-building also failed, in Iraq (Samuels, 2007:The Internet).

In the case in Kenya, if the objective of *Linda Nchi* (2011-2012) was forward defence, designed to limit or deny *al-Shabaab*'s terrorist attacks on Kenyan soil, the re-hatting of Kenyan soldiers in AMISOM since 2012 has clearly mutated that objective into state-building and nation-building. Instead of 'a contest of wills', as Kaldor (2013:3) conceptualises, Kenya's war against *al-Shabaab* in Somalia (and in Kenya) may well have settled into an open ended 'mutual enterprise' with no clear exit criteria.[288] In such a war no one is 'winning', and no one is 'imposing their will' in any meaningful way that has tangible and decisive results. Thus, the actions of *al-Shabaab*, AMISOM, Kenya, Somalia, or the US have no strategic effect. Only piecemeal and reversible political and military gains are achieved. In such wars, as Salter (2003:121) found in the case of the 'global war on terror' since 9/11, there is "no process to be completed, no conditions of success or failure". This is one of the reasons why it is difficult to evaluate the success or failure of CVE. In Chapter 3, section 3.2 *What is state fragility*? I highlighted how the DRC is a classic case of war as a mutual enterprise. Since the 1990s, the DRC has maintained both a 'fragility equilibrium' and a 'conflict equilibrium', neither imploding nor improving.

In the case in Somalia, AMISOM has been deployed since January 2007. In April 2022, AMISOM was replaced by the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS). The mandate of ATMIS, which ends in December 2024, has stabilisation and state-building objectives, including: 'degrading *al-Shabaab* and other terrorist groups'; 'providing security'; 'developing the capacity of the Somali security forces, justice, and local authorities'; 'supporting peace and reconciliation'. ATMIS is intended to support the 2018 Somalia Transitional Plan (STP). The STP is designed to transfer AU governance responsibilities to the Somalian government and its security apparatus (Helfrich, 2022:The Internet). But, as indicated above and illustrated by the case in Afghanistan, how capable will Somalia be by the end of 2024 to govern itself without external intervention? How capable will the Somalian military be by the end of 2024 to protect and defend Somalia without ATMIS or US support? In the case in Kenya, clearly, a war in Somalia with no destined end is an impediment to the success of CVE in Kenya. Given the links between *al-Shabaab* in Somalia and AQAP across the Gulf of Aden in Yemen, a never-ending war in Yemen is also an impediment to CVE in both Kenya and Somalia.[289]

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[288] See Chapter 6, section 6.5.1 *New-wars in Kenya*. One of the key characteristics of new-wars, according to Mary Kaldor (2012, 2013), is that instead of being 'a contest of wills' like old-wars, new-wars tend to be 'a mutual enterprise'. A mutual enterprise should be distinguished from a stalemate. Whilst a stalemate suggests a state of equilibrium after both sides exerted themselves and still failed to impose their will on each other, in a mutual enterprise this is not the case. To illustrate, Kenya has not committed significant national resources in the war effort in Somalia, and the hallmark of terrorism, insurgency, and the long-war, evidenced in *al-Shabaab*, is to bide time. Instead of seeking a decisive victory on the battlefield, the objective is to fight a war of attrition, over-time depreciate the capacity of Kenya's security apparatus, economic strength, and political will.

Another indicator that the war can settle into a mutual enterprise is the historical evidence that wars often degenerate into profit making business ventures. Such evidence exists in Somalia. In Chapter 7, section 7.3.5 *Cross-cutting indicator*, I noted that between 2006 and 2012, the ICU and thereafter *al-Shabaab*, created a revenue generating proto-state in central and southern Somalia, with Mogadishu and Kismayo as political and socio-economic hubs. *Al-Shabaab* has further created varied revenue streams, including wide taxation, extortion, and smuggling networks that comprise illicit trade in khat, drugs, charcoal, sugar, ivory, and human trafficking. Based on these revenue streams and revenue from controlling the port in Kismayo, the UN estimated that *al-Shabaab* earned an annual income of US$70 - 100 million before being pushed out of its strongholds between 2012 and 2015, with about US$25 million from Kismayo alone. Aided by corruption on both sides of the border, sugar is smuggled and sold in Kenya, earning *al-Shabaab* between US$12 – 18 million a year (Sheriff *et al*, 2015:53; UNSC, 2016:26-27, 40-41; Africa Defence Forum, 2017:The Internet; Mongare, 2019:53; Stern, 2021:8, 14).

With the trade in illicit charcoal, the UN found that *al-Shabaab* collaborated with the Kenya Defence Forces (KDF) contingent in AMISOM and Somalia's authorities, despite the two being officially at war with *al-Shabaab*. The UN also indicates that the KDF contingent was making US$2 per bag of charcoal and US$2 per bag of sugar exported and imported through Kismayo even around 2016, despite, in the case of charcoal, the 2012 UN ban on the export of charcoal from Somalia. In 2010, it was estimated that up to 40 percent of *al-Shabaab*'s costs were funded by illicit ivory trade. In 2012, *al-Shabaab* was estimated to have earned US$25 million from illicit charcoal trade (Sheriff *et al*, 2015:53; UNSC, 2016:26-27, 40-44; Africa Defence Forum, 2017:The Internet; Stern, 2021:16-17). Anderson and McKnight (2015b:11) assert that "[i]nstead of diminishing *al-Shabaab*'s resources, Kenya's invasion appears to have made them richer". Despite setbacks since 2015, *al-Shabaab* is believed to have an annual income of US$180 million in 2021 (Hiraal Institute, 2022:8). Clearly, with the intersection between the political and the criminal spaces, and if the war is profit-making and satisfying business interests on both sides of the border, and ensuring regime survival and the rentier state, there is no incentive to end the war. In fact, the incentive is to prolong the war and exploit lawlessness.

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[289] Islamist violent extremism, as an ideology and a movement, links the Horn of Africa with the Arabian Peninsula (and the broader Middle East). These links are discernible with close cooperation between Islamist organisations as is the case with *al-Shabaab* in Somalia and *al-Qaeda* in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in Yemen. Both are *al-Qaeda* Central affiliates. These links are explained by state fragility, with Somalia and Yemen being the most fragile states in their regions, and for years among four of the most fragile states in the world. See Chapter 3, section 3.6.1 *Indicators and measurement*, and Chapter 7, section 7.3.5 *Cross-cutting indicator*.

Again, the foregoing demonstrates that instead of a contest of wills, the war may have well settled into a mutual enterprise, serving the need for regime longevity and business interests in both Kenya and Somalia, a war with neither clear nor achievable military and political objectives, nor clear exit criteria. Whatever international support is received may therefore serve to prolong the conflict rather than resolve it. In Chapter 3, section 3.3 *The state fragility-security-development nexus*, I showed how fragile states can and do use their 'fragile status' to attract international support, influence, and aid, including state-building and counter-terrorism aid. This 'aid' finds its way into banking accounts of rent-seeking public officials and is used in sustaining self-interested regimes that do not serve their societies. Bachmann (2012:47) also finds that "[t]he case of Kenya demonstrates how governments in the global South make use of international security assistance for purposes of regime stabilisation". Similar to using the economy of danger to exploit the fear of terrorism, instability and fragility are used to purchase regime survival and justify unlawful conduct and questionable government policies.

In summation, which of these impediments to CVE are and will in future be most defining? In Chapter 3, section 3.6 *The application of state fragility: the fragile states index*, I noted that in a regression analysis of 91 countries that included Kenya, former president of the Fund for Peace, Pauline Baker (2017a:5, 10, 2017b:10), found that the lack of state legitimacy is the leading driver of fragility and conflict risk. With a coefficient of 7.13, every increase in the state legitimacy indicator added to a 71.3 percent increase in fragility and conflict risk. But measured collectively, three main factors, viz.: state legitimacy, demographic pressures, and uneven economic development, generated 'the slippery slope for fragility and violence'. Which properties of state fragility, as reflected through the 12 indicators on the Fragile States Index, generate impediments to CVE that largely undermine CVE in Kenya? Otherwise, the question may be reformulated in the following manner: Which of the ungoverned spaces in Kenya and in Kenya's neighbourhood generate the most defining impediments to CVE?

The properties of state fragility interact in complex ways that may be inseparable. What is clear, however, is that as Baker (2017a, 2017b) found in the case of the link between state fragility and conflict risk, the case in Kenya also demonstrates that in the relationship between state fragility and impediments to CVE, those impediments that emanate from the lack of state legitimacy, demographic pressures, and uneven economic development, are among the most salient. State legitimacy, demographic pressures, and uneven economic development are among the top six (out of 12) worst performing indicators in Kenya on the Fragile States Index between 2005 and 2019. Illustrative of the complex interactions of the various impediments to CVE that stem from state fragility, I examine below the insecurity dilemma, fragility trap, and conflict trap that threaten to lock Kenya in a forever-war and in further fragility, thus undermining not only CVE, but also undermining the wider imperatives of state-building and nation-building.

8.4 INCREASED STATE FRAGILITY IN KENYA?

Has the conduct of Islamist violent extremism and the struggle against Islamist violent extremism increased state fragility in Kenya? Whereas this study is about state fragility as the context, enabler, and driver of Islamist violent extremism and barriers to CVE, the impact of Islamist violent extremism and CVE on state fragility in Kenya is mostly exploratory. However, some concrete observations and demonstratable evidence of increased state fragility in Kenya are attainable. In this regard, it is observable that although state fragility in Kenya has stabilised since the record levels of state fragility following the 2007/2008 post-elections violence, the enduring nature of state fragility in Kenya has ensured that Kenya remains locked in an insecurity dilemma, a fragility trap, and a conflict trap.[290]

In Chapter 3, section 3.6.2 *Cohesion indicators*, I elaborated on the lesson from W.B. Yeats' *The second coming* (1921) and Chinua Achebe's *Things fall apart* (1994), in that things do fall apart when the centre does not hold. In *Things fall apart* (1994), it is not the pressures of colonialism that lead to the demise and displacement of the African political system, but the weaknesses and fault-lines of the African political system itself that inadvertently lead to its own demise and displacement. Equally, the pressures presented by Islamist violent extremism do not explain the levels of fragility, conversely the levels of resilience. Rather, it is the weaknesses and fault-lines of the fragile Kenyan state itself that explain the high levels of fragility and the low levels of resilience, as well as the reasons why Islamist violent extremism has been able to take root and develop and could manage to remain impervious to mediation and eradication because of impediments to CVE that state fragility generates. Kenya is a house divided, struggling to stand, its centre gingerly secured by extractive as opposed to inclusive economic and political institutions. As Acemoglu and Robinson (2012:429-430) finds in *Why nations fail* (2012), it is *inclusive* economic and political institutions that explain the success of nations.[291]

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[290] Initially recorded with a *high warning* score of 88.6 in 2005, Kenya received a score of 93.4 in 2007 on the Fragile States Index, jumping to 101.4 in 2008 and 100.7 in 2009, following the 2007/2008 post-elections violence, and leading to the constitutional reforms of 2010. Between 2010 and 2019, the fragility score has remained on the *alert* range (90.0 - 99.9), 98.7 in 2010 and steadily declining to 90.3 by 2019. See Chapter 1, section 1.3 *The central proposition*, and Chapter 3, section 3.6.1 *Indicators and measurement*, for the ranges on the Index, as well as Kenya's fragility scores between 2005 and 2019. In the latest 2020 data, Kenya slightly improved from *alert* (90.0 - 99.9) to *high warning* (80.0 - 89.9), down - 1.1 point from 90.3 to 89.2 (FFP, 2021:7).

As *Harambee* (i.e., all pull together) continues to remain out of reach, Kenya is not likely to succumb to the cold without, Kenya will succumb to the cold within.[292] Similar to the coincidence in *The cold within* (2012), through a series of accidents of history, state fragility was initiated by the British colonial state. This colonial state that had weak foundations for statehood and nationhood, was affirmed and sustained by the post-colonial Kenyan state, leading to authoritarian governance, demographic pressures, group grievances, lack of state legitimacy, a social cohesion deficit, and other fault-lines one finds in Kenya today. The defining features of state fragility in Kenya are however not found in their colonial origins, but in the post-colonial constricted democratic space, and in post-colonial endemic insecurity, which have resulted in a civil war (1963-1968), secession attempts and aspirations (since 1963 to date), coup attempts (in 1971 and 1982), communal and electoral violence (since the 1990s), varied permutations of new-wars (since the 1990s), and the long-war that was initiated by *al-Qaeda* since the 1990s, and which *al-Shabaab* is leading since their formation in 2006 (see Chapter 6).

State fragility has also resulted in the marginalisation and securitisation of ethnic-Somalis and other Muslims. Facing acute insecurity, including ontological insecurity, seeking to maximise their security within the state or through secession, driven by self-help and survival motives, spurred on by the third wave of lslamism since the 1990s, this ethno-religious identity, disengaged from the state, has instead embraced Islamism as an ideology and a movement in response to state fragility. Earlier in the current chapter in section 8.2 *The arc of insecurity and impediments to CVE*, I highlighted that other identity groups in Kenya have adopted other forms of disengagement from the state in response to the limitations and excesses of state fragility, mostly withdrawing into self-sufficiency, criminality, and communal violence. The foregoing causes an undermining of state authority, the monopoly over the use of violence, and the ability to ensure security and enforce the rule of law. Instead, it institutionalises an oligopoly of political violence and criminal violence by varied non-state actors such as militias and criminal gangs, and the oligopoly of terrorist violence that is dominated by *al-Shabaab*.

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[291] See Chapter 3, section 3.2 *What is state fragility*? for an elaboration on the varied conceptualisations of state fragility, including Acemoglu and Robinson's (2012) 'extractive institutions' and Collier's (2007) 'bottom billion'.
[292] An extrapolation from *The cold within* (2012) by J.P. Kinney. *The cold within* (2012) is about six characters who, by coincidence, find themselves trapped in a shelter in the middle of a cold storm. Each have the means, symbolised by a log of wood each is hiding, to save themselves and the other. They are, however, unwilling to do so as in saving themselves they will have to save the other. Unwilling to use their logs to keep the fire going and thus save themselves and each other, they keep the logs hidden and they finally all die from the cold. J.P. Kinney concludes that it is not the cold storm outside, but the 'cold' within each of them, that kills them.

State fragility, both enduring and immediate, is the threat in Kenya since independence in 1963, not *al-Shabaab*, not the Islamist movement. By illustration, measuring negative peace, which is defined as the absence of violence or the absence of the of fear of violence, the Global Peace Index (2021) ranks Kenya 116 (out of 163) in the world, and 27 (out of 44) in sub-Saharan Africa, with a *medium* 'state of peace' score of 2.254 (IEP, 2021a:9-10, 20).[293] Multiple state and non-state actors, not only *al-Shabaab*, are involved in the oligopoly of political and terrorism violence in Kenya, all of whom combine to contribute to this 'medium' score of negative peace. In a study of the drivers of insecurity in Kenya, Atta-Asamoah (2015:7, 9) finds that between 2008 and 2014 *al-Shabaab* was liable for only nine percent of all incidents and fatalities linked to insecurity in Kenya. A whopping 91 percent of these incidents and fatalities was credited to organised violence by 'ethnic' militias and criminal gangs, to communal conflicts, and also to Kenya's security forces. *Al-Shabaab* is thus not *the threat* in Kenya.

In his first speech to the UN General Assembly as President of Kenya in 2014, Uhuru Kenyatta (2014:2) contended that "[s]tate weakness in many African countries comes from a history of development paradigms and practises that have weakened the state. We must commit to build strong, resilient and accountable states that can effectively respond to shocks, adversities and emergencies". The reality, however, is that Kenya has been unable to effectively respond to adversities and shocks, recover from them, or nurture norms, attitudes, and institutions that foster peaceful resolution of conflicts. In sum, Kenya has been unable to nullify violence as a viable political option. The expansion and sustainment of Islamist violent extremism in Kenya is a case in point. However, it must be granted that more resilient states such as the US have also been unable to effectively respond to shocks or recover from them, perhaps telling of the falling levels of resilience in the US in recent times in their history.

In Chapters 1 and 5, I emphasised the capacity of state institutions to withstand and manage shocks. I also concluded that the capacity of society to resist and opt out of political violence, including Islamist terrorism, denotes resilience. The 2020 Global Terrorism Index (GTI) has a more nuanced outlook on the concept of resilience. The 2020 GTI defines resilience as the capacity of a social system to cope with the initial effects of shocks, minimising damage and losses, and its capacity to recover from such shocks, to re-establish itself. One such shock was 9/11. Instead of re-establishing itself post 9/11, the

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[293] The Global Peace Index is an annual assessment of 163 countries, based on a scale of 1 - 5, with 1 being 'most peaceful' and 5 being 'least peaceful'. Kenya ranks a medium 3. The index has 23 indicators (one of which is terrorism), which are divided among three assessment domains, viz.: (1) ongoing domestic and international conflict; (2) societal safety and security; (3) militarisation. The index has five *state of peace* ranges, viz.: (1) very high; (2) high; (3) medium; (4) low; (5) very low (IEP, 2021a:9-10, 12, 20, 74-76). See Chapter 4, section 4.2.1 *Conceptualising Islamist violent extremism*, for an elaboration on the concepts of *violence* and *peace* within the context of Islamist violent extremism and CVE.

US underwent systemic change because of the impact of 9/11. This is what distinguishes low resilient states from high resilience states. Whereas societies with high resilience return to pre-shock levels of well-being, structures, and norms, those with low resilience are changed, they develop new levels of well-being, and adopt new structures and norms (IEP, 2020a:71-72). The impact of 9/11 led to fundamental changes in US society since 2001. The US was forced to self-modify. In demonstration, the indicator *internal conflict*, a measure of political violence and heightened perceived terrorism threats, worsened in the US. A series of securitisation policies were enacted, including the 2001 Patriot Act and the Aviation and Transportation Security Act, the 2002 Homeland Security Act, and the 2004 Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act. Internet content became subject to greater monitoring and legal regulation. This greater monitoring and legal regulation and the greater securitisation policies, largely resulted in the encroachment on civil liberties, heightened surveillance of society, increased security checks, and increased monitoring of communications (IEP, 2020a:72-73).

Because of the above securitisation post 9/11, the indicators *human rights protections* and *freedom from torture* also deteriorated in the US. Post 9/11, policies gave greater powers to the Executive of government, and to its security forces, and led to a limiting of judicial review, i.e., the ability of the court system to review and challenge or invalidate Executive decisions and actions. Linked to degraded *powers of judicial review*, the indicator *law and order*, a measure of the legal system's strength, effectiveness and impartiality, and the extent to which citizens abide by the law, also worsened. These changes persist. Among the foregoing illustrations, only *human rights protections* and *freedom from torture* have returned to pre-9/11 levels. The indicator, *internal conflict*, securitisation policies, the monitoring and regulation of The Internet, the powers of judicial review, and the indicator *law and order*, have not returned to pre-9/11 levels. 9/11 has thus irreversibly changed the US (IEP, 2020a:72-74).[294] Islamist violent extremism, as represented by 9/11 (added to far-right extremism), has exposed the fault-lines and deteriorating levels resilience in the US. The above illustrate that since 9/11 the US is even more fragile, unable to re-establish its social and governance well-being, structures, and norms to pre-9/11 levels. Crawford (2021:9) points out that in 2001 when 9/11 occurred, the US Department of Defence (DoD) base budget and its 'overseas contingency operations' budget was just over US$300 billion. In 2021 the figure was just over US$700 billion. One may safely argue that despite this increase which relates to the 'global war on terror', the world is a less safe place. As the 2019 Global Terrorism Index highlights, since 9/11 "the number of Salafi-jihadist groups has more than doubled, their membership has tripled, and they are present in more countries than ever before" (IEP, 2019:82).

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[294] *Human rights protections* scored 100 points in 2001 on the *Global State of Democracy*, deteriorating to below 70 by 2003, returning to 100 by 2014, and still at 100 by 2018, but not returning to the above 130 score of 1998 when the US had more protections. *Freedom from torture* scored 100 points in 2001 on the *Global State of Democracy*, deteriorating to almost 50 points by 2002, improving to almost 120 before 2010, and reaching almost 140 points in 2018, above the 130 score of 1998 when the US had more freedom from torture, as compared to 2001. The securitisation policies that started since 2001 have not been reversed. The indicator *internal conflict* scored 100 points in 2001 on the *Global State of Democracy*, rising to almost 140 in 2002, and still almost 120 in 2018. *Monitoring and regulation of The Internet* scored 100 points in 2001 on the *Varieties of Democracy*, rising to 120 in 2002, and remained slightly above 120 up to 2018. The *powers of judicial review* scored 100 points in 2001 on the *Varieties of Democracy*, deteriorated to almost 90 by 2004, and remained just above 80 in 2018. The indicator *law and order* scored 100 in 2001 on the *Global State of Democracy*, deteriorating to below 85 by 2003, below 80 by 2007, and below 85 from 2008 until 2018 (IEP, 2020a:72-74).

The foregoing is reflected also in Kenya. Islamism and CVE have generated systemic changes in Kenya. Kenya is now more centralised, securitised, militarised, less democratic, and in many respects, more fragile. This is despite the stable and improving scores on indexes such as the Fragile States Index. The fragility and conflict traps, and the insecurity dilemma evidenced in Kenya, threaten to lock Kenya in a never-ending and self-reinforcing cycle of violence and haemorrhaging. Concomitantly, resources and energies are diverted to the security function and regime survival, instead of being utilised for socio-economic and political imperatives. The irony of the securitisation project is that the state is not more secure, but less secure. In increasing, integrating, and coordinating efforts against Islamist violent extremism, the state is now highly centralised and militarised, and less democratic.

In Chapter 6, section 6.8.1 *The securitisation of the state*, I elaborated on how securitisation spending has abstracted limited resources away from socio-economic and political imperatives. Responding to terrorism, securitisation spending in Kenya between 2007 and 2016 is estimated at US$20.95 billion (in constant 2017 US$), which is divided between: internal security (11.727), military expenditure (7.730), private security (1.211), and security agencies (0.279). Securitisation spending includes the cost related to IDPs who are displaced by general political conflict and terrorist activity. The cost of refugees and IDPs is estimated at US$9.37 billion (in constant 2017 US$) between 2007 and 2016 or averaged 0.75 percent of GDP in that period. Securitisation spending in 2019 was estimated at US$1.5 billion (in constant 2019 US$). The cost of violence in 2020 was estimated at US$9 billion (in 2020 PPP), forming four percent of Kenya's GDP in 2020 (UNDP, 2020a:8, 5-6, 24; IEP, 2020a:35, 37, 2021a:91).

As is the case with the US and its 'global war on terror', one may again safely argue and demonstrate that despite the increases in securitisation spending in Kenya as indicated above, Kenya is less safe than it was in 2008 when the first *al-Shabaab* terrorist incident was recorded in Liboi, Garissa. With the increased levels of terrorist violence and securitisation as a response, public spaces in Kenya have also changed. Society is less open, and freedom is more restricted. Evidence of the securitisation of the Kenyan state is abundant. With the omnipresence of armed security forces in military fatigues, constant and permanent security check-points, hotels and other accommodation facilities turned into what may only be described as security compounds, and *al-Shabaab* apparently lurking at every corner, one is constantly reminded that not all is well in Kenya.[295] Adding to endemic insecurity is the privatisation of security, which limits the security of ordinary citizens against *al-Shabaab*. Security, a shared public good provided by the state, is now the preserve of only the privileged few in Kenya.

Private security companies employ more than five times the number of both the police and military personnel in Kenya. In the case of the police, whereas the UN recommends a police-to-civilian ratio of 1:450, the world average ratio is 1:400. In Kenya, the police-to-civilian ratio is 1:1, 250. The private security sector in Kenya has an annual gross revenue of over KSh300 billion (Kenyan Shillings). It comprises about 600 registered and active service providers (150 are foreign-owned), and employs more than 500, 000 active security guards (excluding support personnel). The strength of the national police service in Kenya is just over 100, 000 and the military strength is 29, 000 active personnel (Nation, 2019:The Internet; Usalama Reforms Forum, 2019:20, 40; Zheng and Xia, 2021:5, 9-10; World Bank, 2021:The Internet). There are other indicators that Kenya is more fragile, and unable to re-establish its social and governance well-being, structures, and norms that were instituted by democratisation after 1991 up to the 2010 constitutional reforms and the process of devolution. Security institutions such as the National Security Advisory Committee and the National Security Council that were created by the 2010 Constitution have been strengthened and entrenched, and the Anti-Terror Police Unit that was created after the 1998 US Embassy attack, the Rapid Response Team that was created in 2004, and the post-1990s securitisation laws and policies that started with Kenya's 2012 Prevention of Terrorism Act and the 2014 Security Laws Amendment Act, including the 2016 National Strategy to Counter Violent Extremism, still exist and have not been repealed or reversed.

8.5 CONCLUDING REMARKS

The central question of this chapter was: Which conditions and factors impede and will in future impede the success of CVE, in Kenya? In Chapter 2, section 2.3 *Research design*, I clarified that to answer such a question is to respond to, and to explain, social phenomena that cannot be subjected to controlled conditions in the same way as laboratory experiments. Although we cannot reproduce the strict controlled conditions of laboratory experiments, we can, however, functionally reproduce these conditions while mitigating against the intrusion of extraneous factors and enhancing accuracy and confidence in the research process and the research results. In this study, Kenya contains and demarcates the controlled conditions and boundaries under which I examine the factors that impede CVE. Other factors that functionally reproduce these controlled conditions include case selection criteria, case boundaries, within-case spatial and temporal variation, and the attributes of a casual explanation. Secondly, to study these conditions and factors that impede CVE is to study a social reality that is inhabited by self-regulating and self-interpreting social structures and human agency. This qualifies the notion of human beings as 'reflective open systems' who both shape and are shaped by the world around them. Because of these two factors, a causal explanation, by definition, is inferred, based on the theoretical proposition of state fragility (in this case), and congruent empirical evidence.

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[295] Based on the author's non-participant observations on trips to Kenya from 2016. See Chapter 2, section 2.4.2.1 *Multiple sources of evidence*, Chapter 6, section 6.8.1 *The securitisation of the state*, and the current chapter, section 8.2 *The arc of insecurity and impediment to CVE*, where I address non-participant observation, the use of autoethnography during data collection and the general research and writing process, as well as the securitisation of the Kenyan state, and especially securitisation in the arc of insecurity.

An explanatory case study bases its conclusions on an explanation that is most congruent with established facts (Yin, 1981:61). Therefore, "[t]o 'explain' a phenomenon is to stipulate a presumed set of causal sequences about it, or 'how' or 'why' some outcome has occurred" (Yin, 2018:179). John Gerring (2004:350) thus maintains that "[t]he analysis of any causal relationship hinges on the counterfactual assumption - that without X (or with more or less of X), Y would be different". Gerring (2005:169, 170) also maintains that causes are "events or conditions that raise the probability of some outcome occurring. To be causal, the cause in question must generate, create, or produce the supposed effect". Gerring (2010:1502) further maintains that "[o]ne would like to know not only whether X causes Y but also how it does so". With this critical realist basis for explanation, founded on the formulation: cause + causal mechanisms + context = outcome, this study finds that state fragility (*explanans*), the attendant causal mechanisms, and the context of Kenya, explain the how and why of these impediments to CVE (*explanandum*) in Kenya. The cause therefore is state fragility (X), and the observed outcome is impediments to CVE, and hence the failure of CVE (Y) in Kenya. Kenya is the setting (*context*). With a mechanisms-based process tracing explanation, the causal process between X and Y is formulated as: social structures (entities in the fragile state) have state fragility attributes or properties (which have causal capacity and tendency), and they engage in actions (activities), as such generating (causing or driving) impediments to CVE and thus the failure of CVE.

I indicate at the beginning of this chapter that Islamist violent extremism may end from natural causes, consequently withdrawing the need for CVE in response. Given the measured usual lifespan of the waves of Islamist violent extremism, the third wave, by now raging since the 1990s, may be nearing its end. Similarly, based on recorded relatively short life expectancy of terrorist organisations, *al-*

Shabaab, now 16 years in existence (in 2022), may be nearing its natural death. Even if the natural death of *al-Shabaab* does not occur in the expected time, what is evident is that impediments to CVE will continue to impede the success of CVE in Kenya, and state fragility will remain the dominant challenge in mediating Islamist violent extremism. State fragility has causal capacity and causal tendency. By virtue of its inherent debilitating, conflict-generating, and abusive properties, state fragility has the ability and tendency to bring about outcomes, events, phenomena, or conditions, mostly adverse, including state incapacity and misperformance. The study finds that state fragility provides the context (setting) and opportunity (enabler or permissive cause) and generates (drives or causes) impediments to CVE, rendering CVE approaches and programming ineffective and counter-productive, and thus causes CVE to fail. State fragility has incapacitating properties, based on underperformance, and conflict-generating and abusive properties, based on misperformance. With its incapacitating properties, state fragility serves as a straitjacket in CVE. The hammer, it would appear, is the main tool in the CVE toolbox of fragile states. Because of incapacity, the fragile state lacks the economic and the material resources necessary for CVE to deal with the developmental factors and socio-economic drivers of Islamist violent extremism. The fragile state also has failing institutions that are ineffective in implementing CVE imperatives. With its conflict-generating and abusive properties, state fragility misperforms, rendering CVE ineffective and counterproductive through associated activities such as state terrorism and the endemic violation of human rights and civil liberties. CVE in fragile contexts therefore tends to be heavy-handed and indiscriminate.

What is also evident is depreciated resilience in Kenya. In the context of lslamist violent extremism and CVE, resilience explains why some communities can resist lslamist violent extremism, opt out of political violence, and find peaceful ways for collective action and conflict resolution, whilst others cannot. Whatever levels of resilience existed in Kenya, these have been further eroded by the conduct of lslamist violent extremism and CVE. If resilience is (1) resisting, (2) managing, and/or (3) recovering from Islamist violent extremism, there is evidence to demonstrate that Kenya has failed and continues to fail on all three counts. Firstly, lslamist violent extremism has taken root as evidenced from and since the *al-Qaeda* attack in 1998 and the first *al-Shabaab* terrorist incident on Kenyan soil in 2008. Secondly, the Political Terror Scale and the Freedom House Index indicate that Kenya has not managed the struggle against Islamist violent extremism well. These indexes document that CVE has been both ineffective and counterproductive, resulting in increased radicalisation and terrorist violence. Thirdly, Kenya has not been able to recover and re-establish itself from Islamist violent extremism. This is demonstrated by securitisation policies that undermine human rights, civil liberties, and the rule of law, the challenges to providing law and order, the privatisation of security, and continued *al-Shabaab* attacks, that persist. The combined result is that since 2010 Kenya is less democratic, and insecurity is compounded. State fragility, defined by endemic insecurity, fault-lines, violence (structural, cultural, and direct), and as such both underperformance and misperformance at the micro (groups in society), meso (state-society relations), and macro (state institutions) levels of the state, is entrenched.

Correctly understood, CVE in Kenya is about politics *writ large*, i.e., the distribution of power and resources in society, and about conflict resolution in response to the grievances driven by the ‘unfair’ and ‘unjust’ distribution of said power and resources. This ‘unfair’ and ‘unjust’ distribution of power and resources is generated by state fragility. Islamist violent extremism, an ideology and a movement of the disenfranchised, in response to the limitations and excesses of state fragility, seeks to reassert a marginalised and an alienated ethno-religious identity in search of ontological security. As Osama bin Laden pointed out, Islamist violent extremism is a response to “severe oppression, suffering, excessive inequity, humiliation, and poverty” (in Pape, 2005:54). The reassertion of identity in Kenya then takes place as constructed on identity politics, viz., the affirmation of identity to counter collective marginalisation, punishment, and insecurity experienced by ethnic-Somalis and other Muslims, as represented by *al-Shabaab* among other Muslim and ethnic-Somali formations in Kenya. That is what CVE must respond to in Kenya. Instead, CVE, mistakenly, is dominated by the theological and social-psychological radicalisation model that links Muslim identity and social networks to ‘terrorism risk’. Flowing from this flawed view and logic, CVE, stated otherwise PCVE, is then reduced to identifying and countering ‘at risk’ individuals (in specific communities, mostly, ethnic-Somali and Muslim communities) by establishing and responding to ‘a terrorist profile’ or ‘indicators of terrorist risk’. This assessment is based on religious beliefs, friendships, kinships, and other social networks.

Social networks such as the mosque, *madrassa*, Islamist ideologue, and extremist websites, are mediums that are employed by an aggrieved ethno-religious identity for collective mobilisation and common cause. These vectors or mediums are, however, not the causes of Islamist violent extremism. The cause, the incubator, of Islamist violent extremism, in fact, is state fragility. In having a misplaced emphasis on ‘a terrorist profile’ or ‘indicators of terrorist risk’, CVE, consequently, has a misplaced emphasis on Islam and ‘extremist bad Muslims’ and is dominated and influenced by fluffy ideas such as ‘a war of ideas’ and ‘countering extremist narratives’. In finding a resolution to Islamism, Kenya’s NSCVE prescribes in CVE a DDRR process of deradicalisation, disengagement, rehabilitation, and reintegration. Moreover, framing radicalisation almost as the flu virus that ‘at risk’ individuals in specific communities, risk catching, the NSCVE defines radicalisation as a process of “ideological conditioning of individuals and groups to socialise them into violent extremism” and defines counter-radicalisation as "efforts to delegitimise violent extremist ideologies, and to deter recruitment into specific terrorist groups or campaigns. It involves targeted efforts to reduce the access to citizens by influential individuals" (Republic of Kenya, 2016a:6). In Chapter 7, I outlined how ethnic-Somalis and other Muslims, or anyone on the fringes of the fragile state in Kenya, are already acutely aware of the reduced prospects they have as a consequence of state fragility. They are also acutely aware that their conditions are not an outcome of some accident, but rather, the outcome of deliberate policy choices that have been actively pursued by the Kenyan state. There is no amount of 'targeted efforts to reduce the access to citizens by influential individuals', as envisaged by counter-radicalisation, that will make them less aware of the 'unjust orders' and 'historical injustices' they are subjected to by state fragility.

The foregoing gravely flawed conception of Islamist violent extremism and CVE, together with the linked dismissal of *al-Shabaab* as 'terrorist-extremist-criminals' instead of being correctly seen as political actors that represent a constituency in Kenya (albeit engaged in violent politics), comprises the first impediment to CVE. This is a conceptual and mental impediment that gravely limits the ability of Kenya, and adversely impact the political will of Kenya, to mediate and resolve the challenge of Islamist violent extremism. Other impediments to CVE in Kenya may be subsumed under the rubric of conceptualised ungoverned spaces. Ungoverned spaces, together with attributes such as violence (cultural, structural, and direct), endemic insecurity, and depreciated resilience, define state fragility. The ungoverned spaces include Kenya's physical spaces, as well as non-physical spaces such as cohesion, economic, political, and social spaces, and Kenya's fragile and volatile neighbourhood. Several impediments to CVE in Kenya that emanate from these spaces are also impediments to the broader and related challenges to state-building and nation-building. Nevertheless, I consider and address these impediments as they apply in the specific case of CVE, starting with physical spaces.

Ungoverned physical spaces such as Boni Reserve, the permeable border with Somalia, and hinterland counties such as those in North-eastern Region, viz.: Garissa, Wajir, and Mandera, pose grave challenges to CVE. These ungoverned spaces enable and generate impediments to CVE. Outside the meaningful control and management of the state, these spaces have become wormholes that offer safe passage, protection, and support for *al-Shabaab*. The cases of Operation *Linda Boni* and the response to the Garissa attack demonstrate how these areas, in lacking infrastructure and state presence, impact on the effectiveness of CVE. In the case of the border with Somalia, the added impediment of corruption also shows how an ungoverned border may impede the effectives of CVE by enabling safe passage and protection for *al-Shabaab*. The hinterland counties, underdeveloped and securitised, also lack the resources necessary for the two pillars of CVE, viz.: security and development, and therefore also impact on the effectiveness of CVE. These hinterland counties also contain communities that have disengaged from the state. Distrustful and alienated, they seek alternative sources of ontological security. Islamist violent extremism offers such an alternative source of security.

In addition to physical spaces are cohesion spaces. In these cohesion spaces the state fails to govern and command the security market in Kenya that is defined by endemic insecurity, an oligopoly of political and terrorism violence, and consequently the depreciated monopoly of the state over the use of violence. In this contested security market in Kenya, with the state either absent or abstaining, and the state itself in fact generating insecurity, varied non-state actors, from 'ethnic' militias to criminal gangs, act as alternative security providers and exercise oligopoly of violence in different spaces within the state. Added to other forms of political and criminal violence, there is also a terrorism space in this security market. The terrorism space, although dominated by *al-Shabaab*, is not limited to *al-Shabaab*, but involves a range of actors, from organised militias to agents of the state themselves (through state terrorism). In addition to the criminal, political, and terrorist violence spaces, there is the space at the intersection between the political and the criminal. This political-criminal space is also defined by an oligopoly of violence, through participation by organised militias, criminal gangs, *al-Shabaab*, and even agents of the state. For example, the illicit charcoal and sugar network in Kenya has involved criminal gangs, *al-Shabaab*, and agents of the state on both sides of the Kenya-Somalia border.

The above oligopoly of political and criminal violence adds to the limited utility of force that is inherent in CVE. The state, having lost monopoly over the use of violence, also has limited legitimate use of violence in CVE. In a battlespace of a war among the people, contrasted to a conventional battlefield opposing military forces, CVE limits the use and utility of force. Offensive and defensive approaches to CVE are thus limited in use and in efficacy. However, even if violence was limitless in use, and as noted in Chapter 5, section 5.3 *Ending violent lslamist campaigns*, offensive and defensive approaches to CVE can only respond to physical threats and symptoms of Islamist violent extremism, and nothing else. Added to this 'futility' of force in such a war, corruption in the security apparatus has also gravely reduced capacity and effectiveness in CVE. From bribery to fraudulently obtained ID documents and passports, favouritism, to engaging in illicit trade and cooperating with *al-Shabaab*, business interests, and criminal gangs, the security apparatus in Kenya may not be up to the task of CVE.

The all-government approach also presents barriers to CVE. This approach, based on centralisation, coordination, and integration, is designed to achieve efficiency and effectiveness in CVE. Instead, this approach has resulted in complex and cumbersome organisations, slow coordination, and inhibiting centralisation. The 2015 Garissa attack is illustrative. The response time from the time the attack was reported to the time the RTT was flown from Nairobi to Garissa (370 kilometres apart), was more than seven hours because decision-making had to first be escalated up to the National Security Advisory Committee and the National Security Council. By that time, 148 students and security personnel were dead, 80 more injured at the hands of only four *al-Shabaab* operatives. In addition to being cripplingly centralised, the CVE architecture of Kenya has a misplaced reliance on the theological and social-psychology model as outlined above. CVE and PCVE are then mistakenly reduced to identifying and countering 'at risk' individuals in particular communities based on religious beliefs and social networks, instead of correctly identifying and mediating the political and socio-economic issues, which are generated by state fragility, that drive Islamist violent extremism. CVE consequently has a misplaced emphasis on Islam and ethnic-Somali identity. CVE is therefore also plagued by a misplaced preoccupation with 'a war of ideas' and 'counter-narratives'. Islamist ideas and narratives, as well as social networks such as the mosque and *madrassa*, are mediums of Islamism, not causes of Islamism. CVE in Kenya is also increasingly plagued by counter-extremism and what may well be Islamophobia.

In Kenya CVE is also heavy-handed, indiscriminate, abusive, and suffers from state terrorism. The CVE Operation *Usalama* Watch (2014) is illustrative. In this operation more than 4, 000 ethnic-Somalis were detained without trial and subjected to numerous other violations of human rights, including extortion, torture, disappearances, refoulment, and renditions. Therefore, through undermining the rule of law, and violating human rights and civil liberties, CVE creates fault-lines where fault-lines did not exist before, and increases radicalisation, thus undermining its intended purpose. In conducting CVE, Kenya has also employed the economy of danger to purchase regime survival and justify unlawful conduct and other questionable government policies. The court cases of Aboud Rogo, Abubaker Ahmed, and Salim Awadh Salim *et al*, as outlined below under *political space*, serve as examples.

In reality, the magnitude of Islamist terrorism in Kenya does not justify the economy of danger. As Atta-Asamoah (2015:7, 9) finds, between 2008 and 2014, *al-Shabaab* was responsible for only nine percent of all incidents and fatalities linked to insecurity in Kenya. Ninety-one percent of these incidents and fatalities are credited to other actors, including Kenya's own security forces. In addition to these levels of insecurity by actors other than *al-Shabaab*, security has become privatised in Kenya. Instead of being a shared public good that is centrally provided by the state, as would be required for CVE, security has become the preserve of a privileged few. Ordinary citizens on the fringes of the state are left to their own devices. Added to these other impediments, the cohesion space in Kenya is most plagued by ineffective leadership. The defining determinant of the success or failure of any state programme, including CVE, is the quality of its political leadership. Instead of said inclusive quality leadership, political leadership in Kenya is defined by factionalised elites who engage in narrow gridlock and brinkmanship, and who represent narrow ethnic and religion-based identity alliances. The state's motto, *Harambee* (i.e., all pull together), consequently remains far from being a reality.

Other impediments to CVE in Kenya emanate from the economic space. One has to acknowledge that Kenya neither has infinite resources, nor does Kenya have the official government budgets to deal with the development imperatives of CVE. There is, however, no evidence in Kenya to indicate that a lack of capacity, as would be suggested by Fragile State Index indicators such as E1: *economic decline* and E3. *human flight and brain drain*, contribute in any way to impediments to CVE. In fact, it is the abuse of such capacity when it exists that impacts adversely on impediments to CVE in Kenya. It is the differentiated nature of the economy, rather than the capacity of the strength of the economy itself, that explains impediments to CVE in Kenya. By illustration, the indicator E2: *uneven economic development*, provides evidence of horizontal and regional inequalities in Kenya despite Kenya having one of the fastest growing national economies in the world. Kenya's GDP growth rate averaged 5.45 percent between 2004 and 2019, and the size of the economy more than doubled between 2010 and 2019. From US$40 billion in 2010, Kenya's economy was US$98.607 billion by 2019.

The economic space in Kenya is defined by horizontal inequality, group marginalisation and exclusion, and a general lack of sources of economic opportunity and livelihood for specific communities, including ethnic-Somalis and other Muslims. Whatever economic growth is achieved, through hegemonial exchange, power and resources are distributed by favouring some groups and excluding others. Hegemonial exchange is therefore both marginalising and conflict-generating by creating grievances among groups in society. The results of hegemonial exchange include differentiated low human development and disengagement from the state. Consequently, different groups adopt varied disengagement (from the state) strategies in Kenya. One of the main disengagement strategies adopted by ethnic-Somalis and other Muslims in Kenya is Islamist violent extremism. In addition to a misperforming economy that is based on marginalisation, simply throwing money at the problem is also a barrier to CVE. The case in Afghanistan clearly shows that after 20 years of the US throwing at least US$2.261 trillion at Afghanistan, without addressing the cause of lslamist violent extremism, the CVE project failed, and state-building and nation-building that favoured regime survival also failed.

Whatever levels of development aid and counter-terrorism aid is received, if this aid does not address the cause of Islamism violent extremism but supports regime survival and goes into private banking accounts of rent-seeking public officials, this is not supporting CVE, whether in Kenya or in Somalia. Nor does it advance CVE when the proceeds of military aid fall into the hands of the Islamist organisation. In Chapter 5, section 5.3.1 *Repression and decapitation*, I elaborate on how *Taliban* now have sophisticated military equipment they did not have before 9/11 in 2001, courtesy of the US. When US forces withdrew in August 2021, they left behind over US$7 billion worth of modern military hardware in Afghanistan, including aircraft, air-to-ground armaments, military vehicles, weapons, and communications equipment, all of which are now owned by *Taliban*. In fact, the US has reportedly no plans to retrieve or destroy this hardware. A similar prospect is a great likelihood in Somalia with a government that has demonstrated itself to be unable to govern on its own without external support since 2004 with the transitional government, and since 2012 with the federal government.

The political space in Kenya also presents other impediments to CVE. The Kenyan state fails to govern and command the political marketplace. A democratic political marketplace is defined by competing political ideas as well as political bargaining. Instead, in Kenya the constricted democratic space does not allow competing ideas and peaceful dissent, and therefore does not engender peaceful collective action and conflict resolution. In a political marketplace, depending on what the state allows and engenders, political action ranges from persuasion politics to pressure politics and violent politics. In representing marginalised Muslim interests, Muslim formations such as the *Kenyan Muslim Leaders* and the *National Muslim Leadership Forum* engage in persuasion politics. *Al-Shabaab* engages in pressure politics and violent politics in representing related Muslim interests. State fragility in Kenya ensures that persuasion politics is limited in achieving any political programme, making pressure and violent politics the only viable options. Instead of engendering persuasion politics, the state uses force to suppress competing ideas and peaceful dissent. Consequently, they transform such ideas and dissent into violence, thus transforming persuasion politics into pressure politics and violent politics.

CVE in Kenya also pays lip service to secularism. Pretending that religion does not exist, or being secular in theory and Christian in fact, serve only to perpetuate the perceived or real marginalisation of Islam and Muslims as a minority. This creates grievances and undermines any CVE programme, even among non-Islamist Muslims. A truly secular state acknowledges and encourages all religions. Such a secular state, in a multi-religious society, will serve imperatives of CVE. Within the political realm other political issues involved may be intractable or even impossible to negotiate. These issues may be subsumed under the notion of indivisibles. Indivisibles may include, on the side of the Kenyan state, the territorial integrity of Kenya or the Islamisation of the Kenyan state. On the side of *al-Shabaab* indivisibles may include the physical area of what will be the ‘Greater Somalia’ or the ‘Islamic state’, or the ontological security of ethnic-Somalis and other Muslims. Such indivisibles limit the prospects of both conflict resolution and CVE. Consequently, the key to resolving such indivisibles, outside of dividing Kenya or Islamising the state, is to convince (by persuasion or coercion) *al-Shabaab* to accept 'lesser', yet more inclusive, objectives that may include political representation, equal rights, equitable economic opportunity, and guarantees of acceptable levels of ontological security (however defined). In sum, this will mean *failure and reorientation* by *al-Shabaab*, in achieving the objective of creating an Islamic state. In Chapter 5, section 5.3 *Ending violent Islamist campaigns*, I noted that *failure and reorientation* relies on the acceptance, even in the interim, of failure or setback, and the acceptance of peaceful means, including converting the terrorist organisation into a political party or interest group. Kenya is yet to impose its will on *al-Shabaab* in that manner. This is a key impediment to CVE.

Within this political space in Kenya is the legal space. Kenya is criticised for having a weak, ineffective, and counterproductive terrorism legal space, and a very small number of alleged terrorists being arrested, prosecuted, and convicted. Kenya is also accused of undermining human rights and civil liberties, and the rule of law, mainly through unlawful detentions, torture, renditions, and refoulment of terror suspects. The case of the two Islamist ideologues, Aboud Rogo and Abubaker Shariff Ahmed, is illustrative. In Chapter 6, section 6.4 *The origins of lslamist violent extremism in Kenya*, and section 6.9. *Countering Islamist violent extremism in Kenya*, I elaborate on how, in 2003 Aboud Rogo and his co-accused were found not guilty based on a lack of supporting evidence for their alleged involvement in the 2002 Mombasa attacks. Between 2010 and their alleged extra-judicial killings in 2012 and 2014 respectively, there was a series of failed prosecutions on terrorism charges against Aboud Rogo and Abubaker Shariff Ahmed. In 2014 Abubaker Shariff Ahmed was awarded KSh670, 000 (Kenyan Shillings) by the High court in Mombasa in compensation for unlawful seizure of property.

The case of Salim Awadh Salim *et al* and the 2014 CVE Operation *Usalama* Watch, are also illustrative. In the 2008 case of Salim Awadh Salim *et al,* the High court in Nairobi ruled that "[t]he imperative to fight terrorism … is not a sufficient reason to ignore the rule of law" (Horowitz, 2013:The Internet). The court awarded the 11 terror suspects each damages ranging between KSh2 - 4 million (Kenyan Shillings) for unlawful detention, ill-treatment, and rendition by the Kenyan state. As outlined earlier, in Operation *Usalama* Watch, more than 4, 000 ethnic-Somalis were detained without trial and subjected to various other violations of human rights, including extortion, torture, disappearances, refoulment, and renditions. No one has been brough to justice for these violations of the law in the course of Operation *Usalama* Watch. Instead of principles such as fairness and equality before the law, the CVE legal framework in Kenya, as illustrated in cases like those of Aboud Rogo and Abubaker

Shariff Ahmed, the Salim Awadh Salim *et al* case, as well Operation *Usalama* Watch, indicates that this CVE legal framework in Kenya, in fact, leans towards the attributes of a pacification campaign.

Within the political space is the indicator P2: *public services*, as reflected through the Fragile States Index. In the differentiated political-economic space in Kenya that includes some groups and excludes others, is the segregated provision of social services and public goods (i.e., public services). Public services such as security, education, health, and sources of economic opportunity and livelihood, are the most tangible and most visible state functions and state responsibility, and therefore proxy and barometer for governance itself. This is where state fragility is at its most tangible and visible as well. Failure to deliver these public services and goods constitutes failure and abuse by state institutions, making the state, and the government that runs the state, irrelevant in the lived experiences of excluded communities. The differentiated provision of social services and public goods in Kenya is thus a source of grievances and an impediment CVE. Such differentiated provision of social services and public goods has also generated depreciated state legitimacy and the loss of state authority. The visible outcome is disengagement from the state by marginalised and excluded communities. Said dissatisfaction, alienation, and disengagement are reflected in the social space in Kenya.

Kenya is a social space that is defined by depreciated social cohesion, depreciated resilience, and disengagement from the state. The fragile and ‘secular’ state is also failing to appeal to, and command, the loyalty of sections of society in a political marketplace that is contested by Islamism and *al-Shabaab*. Affected households and communities, including their coethnics and coreligionists among refugees and IDPs in Kenya, insecure and securitised, do not trust the government, public institutions, or anyone other than their coethnics and coreligionists as reflected by indexes such as Kenya’s Social Cohesion Index. These households and communities, refugees and IDPs, have become amenable to radicalisation into Islamist violent extremism. Shared demographics with Somalia, as enabled by the kin-country syndrome, also ensures that such grievances are communicable between Kenya and Somalia. Such demographic pressures, including unresolved group grievances that are linked to the history of violence in Kenya, as well as prohibitive, abusive, and unjust social orders such as marginalisation and historical injustices, undermine the goodwill of society that is so integral to CVE.

Since 2012, Kenya’s Commission on Revenue Allocation has presented evidence that ethnic-Somalis and other Muslims are among identity groups in Kenya that have suffered historical injustices since independence. Among these ‘harms and wrongs’ that have been committed by the Kenyan state, the Commission includes: ‘land alienation’; ‘massacres, extrajudicial killings, and collective punishment’;

'discriminatory laws, regulations, and practices'; 'religious profiling'; 'deprivation of education'.[296] Added and linked to these historical injustices, the failure to implement the recommendations of the 2013 Truth, Justice, and Reconciliation Commission further impedes CVE in Kenya. Among the recommendations of the commission were the following: acknowledgment of atrocities; restitution; reparations; apology; establishing memorials; criminal investigations and prosecutions; economic development of marginalised regions; a comprehensive and sustained national dialogue; repealing the Indemnity Act No. 5 of 1970 that protects the Kenyan government from legal proceedings and claims for compensation for human rights violations committed by the state during the *Shifta* war. Since the 1990s, Kenya's participation in the 'global war on terror', and CVE operations such as *Linda Nchi*, *Usalama* Watch and *Linda Boni*, as well as renditions and refoulment of terror suspects, refugees, and asylum-seekers, against a particularly ethno-religious identity, have added to this history of discrimination, state terrorism, and impunity, adding significantly to impediments to CVE in Kenya.

Kenya's fragile and volatile neighbourhood has also added impediments to CVE in Kenya. Shared demographics and shared grievances by ethnic-Somalis and other Muslims in Kenya and Somalia, dictate that CVE cannot be successful in Kenya if CVE is not successful in Somalia. Beyond Somalia, Islamist violent extremism is also a regional threat. But, outside of the context of AMISOM and now ATMIS, there is no East Africa or Horn of Africa response. This will serve as an impediment to any CVE effort in Kenya. In the case of Somalia, added to shared demographics and shared grievances, shared state fragility with Somalia is another impediment to CVE in Kenya. As Afghanistan has so dramatically illustrated, and there is equally such evidence in Somalia, it is unlikely that a fragile state such as Somalia will be able to govern itself, protect itself, and fend-off or defeat *al-Shabaab* without external intervention. The combined outcome, therefore, is not only impediments to CVE in Kenya, but also the sustainment of state fragility and Islamist violent extremism in both Kenya and Somalia.

There are also indications that the war in Somalia may have well settled into a mutual enterprise. Since 2006 in the context of *al-Shabaab*, AMISOM since 2007 and now ATMIS since 2022, and Kenya since Operation *Linda Nchi* (2011-2012), the war in Somalia has become a war with no destined end. This is not because the war has reached a stalemate. By contrast, no significant amounts of state resources in the war effort have been committed by Kenya, only piecemeal and incremental efforts have been made. The Somalian government is still confined to the ‘green zone’ in Mogadishu, protected by AMISOM and now by ATMIS. Designated an ‘international terrorist organisation’ since 2008 by various countries including the US, UK, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and the United Arab Emirates, and declared an ‘organised criminal group’ and banned in Kenya since 2010, *al-Shabaab* is still able to self-generate an estimated annual income of US$180 million in 2021. This is telling that there is no military solution to this political conflict, despite the military response as a default response. The AU has been at it for 15 years (in 2022 with AMISOM) and planning for 17 years (by end of 2024 with ATMIS). This time-frame is comparable to ‘America’s longest war’, i.e., the 20-years long-war in Afghanistan. As in Afghanistan, none of the opposed sides are ‘winning’ or ‘imposing their will’. The actions of neither of the actors involved have generated any strategic effect, be it *al-Shabaab*, AMISOM (now ATMIS), Kenya, Somalia, or the US. Only piecemeal and reversible political-military gains are achieved.

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[296] In Chapter 6, section 6.3.2. *Constitutional reforms and devolution*, I outlined that the Commission on Revenue Allocation was stablished in terms of Article 215 of Kenya's 2010 Constitution with the mandate to promote and make recommendations on the 'equitable sharing of revenue' within the 47-counties system. As part of national reconciliation, which is another part of the mandate of the Commission, the Commission on Revenue Allocation makes recommendations on matters of restitution for marginalised groups and communities, including making recommendations on the allocation and disbursement of Kenya's Equalisation Fund. The Commission classifies ethnic-Somalis and Muslims among 'marginalised groups' that have suffered 'historical injustices' in Kenya.

A fragile neighbour and a forever-war next door, combined with shared demographics and shared grievances, and therefore communicable conflict, undermine any CVE efforts in Kenya. There are also ties between the Horn of Africa and the Arabian Peninsula, and specifically ties between the war in Somalia and the war in Yemen just across the Gulf of Aden. The ties between *al-Shabaab* in Somalia and its ally AQAP in Yemen, and their patron *al-Qaeda* Central, including the broader Islamist movement, will thus also undercut CVE efforts in Kenya. Given the above barriers to CVE that emanate from varied ungoverned spaces, and related factors such as challenges to state legitimacy, authority, and capacity, Kenya’s war risks turning into a mutual enterprise for years, a state of long drawn-out ‘fragility equilibrium’ and ‘conflict equilibrium’. These barriers will undermine any CVE efforts and will also undermine the wider and related imperatives of state-building and nation-building in Kenya.

Having achieved the sixth research objective of this study, which was an examination of the relationship between state fragility and CVE in Kenya (i.e., state fragility being context, permissive cause, and driver of impediments to CVE), the next and last chapter deals with the last research objective, which is to reach conclusions about the relationship between state fragility, Islamist violent extremism, and CVE in the context of Kenya, with analytic generalisation in other applicable contexts in sub-Saharan Africa. The next and last chapter contains a summary and conclusions of the study.

CHAPTER 9: CONCLUSION

9.1 INTRODUCTION

This study is a systematic, contextualised, explanatory, critical enquiry into the relationship between state fragility, Islamist violent extremism, and CVE, in a natural setting in which this relationship occurs. The chosen natural setting, representative of this relationship, is Kenya. The design of the study provides for nine chapters. The chapters are: (1) Introduction; (2) Research design and methodology; (3) State fragility: theory and application; (4) Islamist violent extremism: analysis and theoretical perspectives; (5) Countering Islamist violent extremism: the state-of-the-art; (6) Islamist violent extremism, countering Islamist violent extremism, and the fragile state in Kenya; (7) State fragility and Islamist violent extremism in Kenya; (8) State fragility and countering Islamist violent extremism in Kenya; (9) Conclusion. This final 9th chapter contains a summary and conclusions.

9.2 SUMMARY

The aim of the study was to *critically examine the relationship between state fragility, Islamist violent extremism, and countering Islamist violent extremism, in Kenya*. This study defines violent extremism as *identity-based ideologies and movements, constituted by linked but at times competing organisations, that often espouse violence, including terrorism*. Violent extremism is linked with varied identity-based categories based on ethnicity, race, religion, and gender. Ethnic violent extremism mostly seeks to achieve ethnic separatism. Racial (right-wing) violent extremism pursues racial supremacy or separatism. Religion-based violent extremism includes Christian, Hindu, Buddhist, and Islamist categories. The religion-based groupings seek to establish societies that are based on the values of their religions and thus seek to create Christian states, Hindu states, Buddhist states, or Islamic states, respectively. The last category is a fairly narrow and nascent extremist male category, also known as violent political misogyny, that broadly seeks a society where females are subordinated.

Violent extremism is linked to ‘fundamentalism’ and ‘extremism’. Fundamentalism presupposes an exclusive belief in and imposition of ‘one religion’, ‘one way of life’, ‘one set of values and norms’, or similar conceptions. Extremism denotes ‘at the extreme of the political spectrum’ or ‘far removed from the centre’. Violent extremism is also a retrogressive ideological category, hankering on the past. In the case of ethnic-extremism, whereas the prevailing centre tends to be cosmopolitan and based on civic-nationalism, ethnic violent extremism hankers on national enclaves and ethnic-nationalism.

Regarding racial extremism and violent political misogyny, although the world has made progress in racial and gender equality, these two categories seek to reverse such progress as has been made through the pan-Africanist movement and the feminist movement. Regarding religion, whereas the current state system is based on secularism and the rejection of religious-political authority, religious extremism is a counter-revolution, seeking to re-subject both private and public life (not just spiritual life) to religious principles. Within the realm of religion-based violent extremism, the focus of this study is Islamism. Islamist violent extremism seeks to create Islamic states (or the Caliphate) and institutionalise the *Sharia*, Islam's canonical law, in such states. There are therefore both parallels and divergence within violent extremism. By illustration, whereas ethnic violent extremism and Islamist violent extremism are ideologies of the disenfranchised, right-wing violent extremism and violent political misogyny are ideologies of supremacy or the perceived loss of dominance. Membership may also be shared. For example, violent right-wingers are also often violent political misogynists.

In focussing on Islamism as distinguished from other forms of violent extremism as noted above, in this final chapter I abbreviate Islamist violent extremism as IVE, radicalisation into Islamist violent extremism as RIVE, countering Islamist violent extremism as CIVE, and preventing and countering Islamist violent extremism as PCIVE. Reverting to the aim of this study, the aim of the study may be separated into four related components. The first component was to examine state fragility as the driver of both IVE and impediments to CIVE in Kenya. Whilst state fragility is the *explanans* (X), IVE and impediments to CIVE are the *explanandum* (Y). The relationship between state fragility, IVE and impediments to CIVE, is a causal relationship. This causal relationship is the case that is examined. Kenya is the setting. Kenya is a veritable and representative context, containing and demarcating the controlled conditions under which the case is examined. The case in this instance is therefore a conceptual phenomenon and not a physical entity. In causality, the understanding is that without X, Y would be different, and with the introduction of X the result is either more of Y or otherwise less of Y. Consequently, X generates changes in Y and/or X raises the probability of Y occurring. The causal relationship is anchored on a Critical Realist basis for explanation, founded on the formulation: cause (X) + causal mechanisms + context = outcome (Y). Accordingly, state fragility, the attendant causal mechanisms, and the context in Kenya, explain the how and why of IVE and barriers to CIVE, in Kenya.

The study is based on a case study research approach, design, and methodology. The design is both single-embedded and longitudinal. Accordingly, with a single-embedded design, the second component of the aim of the study was to demonstrate why and how variance in state fragility has generated variance in both IVE and impediments to CIVE. The spatial variance is demonstrated with the employment of the theoretical construct of *the arc of insecurity* as well as patterns evidence. The expectation was that IVE will be most virulent, and impediments to CIVE will be most defined, in the areas where state fragility is most evidenced. Since this study's design is also longitudinal, the third component of this study's aim was to demonstrate how and why over time state fragility causes and sustains IVE and impediments to CIVE, and how and why state fragility initiates the time order in the relationship between state fragility, IVE and impediments to CIVE. This temporal variance is demonstrated by employing the theoretical construct of *a causal sequence*, based on state fragility indicators and sequences evidence, including key historical markers that range from the *Shifta* war.

Although the relationship between state fragility, IVE, and impediments to CIVE is observable since the 1990s in Kenya, this relationship was initiated by the generative powers of the 'Big Bang' of independence in 1963, pitting state fragility against ethnic-Somalis and other Muslims. The sequences evidence includes state fragility related historical markers that range from the insurgent *Shifta* war (1963-1968) to the CIVE Operation *Linda Boni* (since 2015). The research design consequently provides for multiple points of observation by employing two lenses, viz., a single-embedded lens and a longitudinal lens, enabling both spatial and temporal variance, analysis, and causal explanation. The arc of insecurity and the causal sequence are two theoretical-analytical and explanatory instruments that are employed in this examination. This study accordingly contains compound and converging lenses and instruments in examining this relationship between state fragility, IVE, and CIVE in Kenya, thus adding to the cogency, confidence, and reliability in the analysis and findings of the study.

The fourth and final component of the study's aim was to trace, detail, and explain IVE and impediments to CIVE, in Kenya. The development and sustainment of both IVE and impediments to CIVE are directly attributed to state fragility. The study accordingly demonstrates that state fragility, based on its inherent debilitating and conflict-generating properties, has causal capacity and causal tendency. Causal capacity and causal tendency refer to the ability and the tendency of an entity (the fragile state) to generate specific outcomes, events, phenomenon, or conditions. There are three categories of causal capacities and causal tendencies, viz.: deterministic, random, and probabilistic. Dupré and Cartwright (1988:522) explain that "[a] deterministic capacity is one which, under specifiable circumstances, always produces its effect. A random capacity sometimes produces its effect and sometimes does not, but nature does not determine how often or how regularly it does so. A probabilistic capacity also operates only sometimes, but the strength of the tendency to produce the effect is nomologically fixed". State fragility, in agreement with Critical Realism as arrogated in this study, is both deterministic and probabilistic as the *explanans*. These two Critical Realist principles of causal explanation, viz., deterministic and probabilistic, are contrasted with two Positivist principles of causal explanation, viz., regularity and predictability (see Chapter 2, section 2.3 *Research design*).

In generating IVE and impediments to CIVE, state fragility has a deterministic capacity within given causal mechanisms and in a specific context. The specific context includes necessary conditions such as a fragile-functional state that has the capacity to induce grievances, yet the incapacity to mediate or supress these grievances, and a marginalised, yet politically significant ethno-religious identity, coexisting with a fickle, fragile, and unstable, national identity. Contextual conditions also include the influence of the unequal global order, the status of Islam and Muslims in that global order, and the influence of the transnational Islamist ideology and Islamist movement. State fragility also has a probabilistic capacity. The debilitating and conflict-generating properties of state fragility increase the probability of, the generation of, and variance in, both IVE and impediments to CIVE. Given this deterministic and probabilistic causal nature of state fragility, the theorised causal sequence in the relationship between state fragility, IVE, and impediments to CIVE, may be summarised as follows:



As conceptualised above, and following the causal formulation of cause (X) + causal mechanisms + context = outcome (Y), state fragility provides not only the context (setting), but also the opportunity (enablers or permissive causes) for IVE and impediments to CIVE. State fragility, critically, also drives (generates or causes) IVE and impediments to CIVE, and therefore the failure of CIVE. The resultant explanation-building consist of causal sequences with causal patterns and causal mechanisms, involving the properties of state fragility (comprising causal capacities and causal tendencies), inclusive of the actions (activities) of social structures (entities) that subsist in the fragile state, that generate (cause) IVE and impediments to CIVE. The entities that subsist in the fragile state include state institutions and agents of the state, and reciprocal entities in the Islamist movement such as Islamist ideologues and Islamist organisations. These reciprocal entities in the Islamist movement also have attributes or properties (with particular causal capacities and tendencies). The Kenyan state therefore has both structure and agency, and both structure and agency are necessary in explaining

IVE as well as impediments to CIVE. It is however not the state but the *nature* of the state (i.e., state fragility) that is the unit of analysis, i.e., the source of explanation, i.e., X or the *explanans*.

The time order in the causal sequence between state fragility, IVE, and impediments to CIVE, is initiated by state fragility. State fragility remains the cause of IVE and impediments to CIVE (and hence the failure of CIVE), but the compound outcome of the insecurity dilemma, fragility trap, and conflict trap, create conditions for further fragility and further political violence. State fragility thus reproduces its own causes. This is not to be confused with tautology. By illustration, political violence is both a cause and an outcome of state fragility. But time order is critical in causal explanations. The key here is that in the causal sequence between state fragility, political violence, and impediments to conflict resolution, the time order is initiated by state fragility. The state is fragile first, that is, it misperforms, underperforms, generates insecurity, and its institutions fail, before any form of political violence occurs, and consequently before any impediments to the resolution of such violence develop. The fragile state subjects an ethno-religious identity to structural, cultural, and direct violence, before this ethno-religious identity adopts Islamism as well as direct and cultural violence in response. In turn, the typically unrestrained conduct of both the long-war and CIVE, merging an uneasy congeries of 'war, crime, and human rights abuses', creates further fragility and further cycles of political violence. This unrestrained conduct includes 'deviant methods' by *al-Shabaab* such as attacks on the civilian population, beheadings, sexual violence, stoning, and amputations. The unrestrained behaviour by the Kenyan state, as documented and measured on indexes such as the annual Political Terror Scale and the Freedom House Index, includes disappearances, extra-judicial killings, detention without trial, torture, refoulment, and renditions. State fragility and political violence are further generated as state resources are diverted to regime survival and securitisation at the expense of political and socio-economic imperatives, in addition to the state's misperformance in exercising indiscriminate repression and in ignoring legitimate grievances. All of this result in further radicalisation.

Let me further illustrate this phenomenon of state fragility reproducing its own causes in the context of *al-Shabaab*. In Chapter 6, I elaborate on how a content analysis of *Gaidi Mtaani* reveals a list of factors and reasons provided by *al-Shabaab* for designating Kenya as *dar al-harb*, i.e., the house of war and injustice, and thus a target for *jihad*. These factors and reasons include the killing of Imams, Muslim leaders, Muslim women, and children. It also includes the harassment, torture, renditions, and extra-judicial killings of ethnic-Somalis and other Muslims. Clearly these factors and reasons for attacking Kenya are *ex post facto*, arising after the actual start of the long-war and resulting from the conduct of both the long-war and CIVE themselves. These reasons do not account for why the long-war that has been raging since the 1990s started in the first place. Instead of identifying and highlighting the causal factors from the initial debilitating and conflict-generating properties of state fragility that started in 1963 in Kenya, most of these *ex post facto* factors have now become the rallying call for *al-Shabaab* to ethnic-Somalis and other Muslims in mobilising support for the long-war and in Muslims identifying the issues involved in the long-war. In the first period of state fragility (1963-1990), it is not the ‘Big Bang’ of the denial of the 1962 referendum results that is the rallying call. The denial of the results of the 1962 referendum ignited a chain reaction of secession and violence (structural, cultural, and direct), so unleashing the secessionist *Shifta* war (1963-1968) and the violent repression of that war. Instead of it being the denial of the results of the 1962 referendum, the rallying call rather is the subsequent atrocities committed during the *Shifta* war, including the atrocities committed later in the course of the Isiolo (1968), Garissa (1980), and Wagalla (1984) massacres.[297]

Let me revert to the beginning of the two causal sequences, starting with state fragility. State fragility is a conceptual framework, analytical instrument, and a theoretical perspective. State fragility also relates to the phenomenon where the state is defined by endemic insecurity, violence (structural, cultural, and direct), underperformance, misperformance, and structural fault-lines at three levels of the state, viz.: macro, meso and micro. State fragility also has specific properties or inherent attributes that have causal capacity and causal tendency. The properties of state fragility are both debilitating and conflict-generating. These properties include: abusive structures of power and authority; the rule of law often being undermined by citizens and the government alike; endemic corruption; extraction of rents from the population; the state not affording economic opportunities for its citizens, not adequately providing political goods, and having ungoverned spaces; the state being a source of insecurity for its own society (through actions such as discrimination, repression, detention without trial, extrajudicial killings, and other abuses of human rights and civil liberties); the state marginalising, securitising, and subjecting ethno-religious identities to ‘unjust and avoidable social orders’ and to ‘historical injustices’. The ethno-religious identity in this case is ethnic-Somalis and other Muslims.

State fragility (X) therefore demonstrates how the state may be employed not only as a level of analysis, but as a unit of analysis. The unit of analysis being *the nature of the state*, i.e., state fragility. Far from being merely the stage on which the drama of IVE and CIVE plays out, a state such as Kenya is the principal actor on that same stage. The state, acting through its agents, is itself the source of endemic insecurity and pervasive conflict, thus its government, institutions, and society become the object of the blame system of IVE, and therefore the (perceived) legitimate target for *jihad*. It is this very same state then that must be replaced with an Islamic state, accompanied by the Islamisation of its government, institutions, and society, based on Islamic values and the *Sharia*. The nature of the state, as a unit of analysis, explains both IVE and impediments to CIVE. Such state fragility is detected and evidenced in three units of observation, viz.: in state institutions (macro), in state-society relations (meso), and in relations between groups in society (micro). These three units of observation may also be referred to as the three levels of state fragility, viz.: macro, meso, and micro. State fragility in Africa emanates from specific sources, including colonialism, marginalisation by the global political-economy, and critically, post-independence underperformance and improper performance, thus making state fragility particularly endemic and entrenched in Africa, especially in sub-Saharan Africa.

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[297] In the 1962 referendum, 80 percent of the former NFD, dominated by ethic-Somalis and representing five of the then six districts in the NFD, voted to be reincorporated into Somalia. The results of this referendum were ignored by the new Kenyan government, leading to the *Shifta* war and its violent repression. The *Shifta* war and calls for secession in Coast Region since 1963 became the start of the many confrontations between state fragility and ethnic-Somalis and other Muslims that was to last to this day in Kenya (see Chapters 6 to 8).

It is this part of the world that former UNSG Ban Ki-moon once characterised as ‘an arc of upheaval and distress’ (UNDP, 2015:6), and Susan Rice (2001:The Internet) defined as the world’s ‘soft underbelly’ and ‘an incubator’ for global terrorism. This part of the world is also where most of the world’s ‘bottom billion’ reside. Paul Collier (2007:3) contends that the bottom billion “coexist with the twenty-first century, but their reality is the fourteenth century”. This reality in this part of the world is defined by endemic and out of pace (with the world) insecurity and underdevelopment. Just as fragility is particularised in the world, such fragility is also particularised in Kenya. Kenya’s ‘bottom billion’, ‘arc of upheaval and distress’, ‘soft underbelly’, and ‘incubator’ for terrorism, is the arc of insecurity. As a geographical or physical construct, this is an area that encompasses 12 counties (out of 47 counties) where the indicators of state fragility are most pronounced, IVE is most concentrated, and impediments to CIVE are most intractable. The core of this arc of insecurity, where state fragility-induced fault-lines are most acute, is North-eastern Region, which covers three counties, viz.: Garissa, Wajir, and Mandera. Specific causal mechanisms exist in the relationship between state fragility and IVE. Causal mechanisms are used to build causal sequences, otherwise known as causal pathways or causal reasoning, between X, i.e., cause (state fragility) and Y, i.e., effect/outcome (IVE). In building causal mechanisms between X and Y, I employ two congruent middle-range theories, viz.: relative deprivation and rational choice theories, as well as the following factors: the blame system; a constricted democratic space; marginalisation and exclusion; endemic insecurity; the insecurity dilemma; self-help and survival motives; disengagement (from the state); politically significant identity (religion and ethnicity); the kin-country syndrome (based on coreligionists and coethnics).

The outcome or observable effect is the development and sustainment of IVE or Islamism. Since the interest of this study is the violent strand of Islamism, IVE and Islamism are used interchangeably. IVE or Islamism is an ideology and a movement that comprises organisations that have links with each other yet are also often in competition with each other. *Al-Shabaab*, which is opposed to Islamic State in Somalia (ISS), is an organisation that seeks to achieve, in East Africa, the objectives of the international Islamist movement, whose leadership is contested by two organisations, viz., *al-Qaeda* Central (AQC), and Islamic State (IS). Both based in Somalia, *al-Shabaab* and ISS are each respectively affiliated to *al-Qaeda* Central and Islamic State. Significantly though, despite their lacking a united pan-Islamist front, and despite the violent competition between its organisations, the shared intention of the Islamist movement is a return to *al-hakimiyya*, i.e., the sovereignty of God (Allah). This shared intention is to be achieved through two key, tightly associated objectives, viz.: (1) creating Islamic states (or the Caliphate), (2) implementing in said states, the *Sharia*, i.e., Islam's canonical law. The Islamist movement manifests through its organisations that pursue three Islamist campaigns: (1) Islamist terrorism (and linked extremist narratives); (2) Islamist insurgency; (3) Islamist proto-states. These campaigns are designed to achieve the central intention and the two related objectives of the Islamist movement. Moreover, most fragile states are either former colonies, the locus of Cold War superpower rivalries, or the location of Western interference and influence. It is these very same fragile states in other parts of the world and in Africa, including Kenya, that Islamists call home. IVE as a result has distinct post-colonial (anti-imperialist) and anti-Western features. Islamists want to rid Muslim lands of foreign influences (the far enemy) and replace their 'non-Islamic' states (the near enemy) with Islamic states. These foreign influences are perceived to be dominated by Christianity or secularism. Christianity and secularism are both seen as living in *al-jahiliyya*, i.e., the age of ignorance. 'Non-Islamic' states are seen as 'Western puppets' and 'apostate', thus sell-outs of the Islamist ideal.

The second outcome or observable effect of state fragility is the development and sustainment of impediments to CIVE, and hence constitutes failure of CIVE. Counter-insurgency, counter-terrorism, and CIVE are acutely ineffective and counter-productive in fragile contexts. In this regard, state fragility not only limits the options available to deal with phenomena such as IVE, but it in fact also tends to incentivise heavy-handed and indiscriminate CIVE. By failure, I mean that IVE is either not eradicated or mediated, or CIVE does not achieve its intended outcomes within given timeframes. Ineffective and counter-productive CIVE includes CIVE that privileges state-building over nation-building, and security over development, thus achieving unintended outcomes such as the establishment of heavy-handed and indiscriminate state institutions, the erosion of democratic principles, social cohesion, and state legitimacy, and the increase in radicalisation, counter-extremism, and Islamophobia. This, in turn, result in the self-reinforcing cycle of the insecurity dilemma, fragility trap, and conflict trap.

Impediments to CIVE include the following extensive list: endemic insecurity and horizontal inequality; the oligopoly of political and terrorist violence; depreciated monopoly on the use of violence; depreciated social cohesion; depreciated resilience; disengagement (from the state); a constricted democratic space; marginalising and conflict-generating hegemonial exchange; challenged state legitimacy and state authority; state terrorism and the violation of human rights and civil liberties; heavy-handed and indiscriminate CIVE; corruption (with its impact on the effectiveness of the security apparatus, and on the distribution of power and resources in society); the misplaced preoccupation with Islam and ethnic-Somalis and other Muslims as an identity group (rather than the political and socio-economic grievances that drive Islamist violent extremism); the dismissal of *al-Shabaab* as 'extremist-terrorist-criminals' (rather than political actors that have a constituency in Kenya); the lack of sources of economic opportunity and livelihood; a fragile and volatile neighbourhood. Other impediments to CIVE in Kenya are related specifically to neighbouring Somalia and include the following: state fragility in Somalia; the war in Somalia; the ties between the war in Somalia and the war in Yemen (binding *al-Shabaab* and AQAP); the relationship between IVE in Somalia and Kenya and the broader Islamist movement, including the role of *Al-Qaeda*-Central, the patron of both *al-Shabaab* and AQAP. These and other impediments to CIVE undercut all CIVE efforts in Kenya.

There are also specific causal mechanisms in the relationship between state fragility and impediments to CIVE. In building these causal mechanisms between state fragility (X) and impediments to CIVE (Y), I employ the following factors: institutional weakness, incapacity, and abuse; preoccupation with regime survival over political and socio-economic imperatives; the securitisation of the state; constricted democratic space; hegemonial exchange; indiscriminate repression and victimisation; wormholes. Regarding wormholes, as I outline in Chapter 8, section 8.2.1 *Impediments to CVE in the Arc of Insecurity*, the study's conception of wormholes is derived from the Astrophysics theory of *general relativity* that is linked with Albert Einstein and Nathan Rosen, dealing with matter and energy, and space and time. Wormholes are 'bridges', 'tunnels', 'passageway' or 'shortcuts', linking different and separate locations, points in space, or points in time (even separate universes). Wormholes enable travel across and through space and time, shortening distances between different and separate points and locations. In this study these wormholes are conceived to include communities in hinterland counties such as Lamu, Garissa, Wajir, and Mandera (that are marginalised and securitised and hence disengaged from the state), ungoverned spaces such as Boni Reserve, and the porous border with

Somalia. The wormholes that are found in Kenya, and those that link Kenya with Somalia, ensure the safe passage and support for *al-Shabaab*, and serve as incubators for IVE and impediments to CIVE.

Furthermore, there are five discernible causal patterns in the relationship between state fragility, IVE and CIVE. The first two patterns are plainly contained in this relationship. These first two pattens are: (1) state fragility as cause (X) and IVE as effect/outcome (Y), and (2) state fragility as cause (X) and impediments to CIVE (and hence the failure of CIVE) as effect/outcome (Y). State fragility is also often particularised. Because of this particularisation, the other observable causal patterns are: (3) IVE (empirically substantiated by Islamist terrorism) tends to erupt in areas where state fragility indicators are most evidenced (i.e., where state fragility induced fault-lines are most acute); (4) IVE is most virulent in areas where state fragility is most evidenced; (5) impediments to CIVE are most defined where state fragility is most evidenced. State fragility (X) therefore causes Y, raises the probability of Y occurring, and generates changes in Y. Y being IVE and impediments to CIVE. In addition to the forgoing the causal mechanisms and causal patterns in the causal sequence between state fragility, IVE, and impediments to CIVE, is the context in Kenya. This context includes: (1) a fragile but functional state that generates insecurity and grievances but is unable to mitigate or ameliorate such insecurity and grievances, thus generating an insecurity dilemma; (2) the existence of a marginalised, yet politically significant ethno-religious minority (i.e., ethnic-Somalis and other Muslims), which is prompted by identity politics; (3) a fickle, fragile, and unstable national identity, which is promoted by ethno-politics and hegemonial exchange. The causal sequence (with its linked causal patterns) therefore follows the pathway of cause (X) + causal mechanisms + context = outcome (Y).

I start with the first causal sequence. IVE reacts in response to the undesirable prevailing conditions of state fragility by seeking an alternative and desired future. This desired future, the good society, seen as an all-encompassing solution to the conditions of state fragility, is defined as the return to *al-hakimiyya*, the sovereignty of God (Allah). Hence, Islamism is of the view that God (Allah), as the Sovereign, naturally has the highest governmental and legal authority. The good society is defined as a theocracy (i.e., 'rule by God [Allah]'), established in the form of an Islamic state (or the Caliphate), founded on Islamic canonical law, the *Sharia*. Despite a dominant current worldview based on secularism, religion, thus, may be and is used to contest politics, with Islamism competing for political power and influence similar to any political organisation, including political parties, or other actors, including the military. In reacting to the conditions of state fragility, and the ensuing pursuit of *al-hakimiyya*, Islamism, in finding itself far from the prevailing political centre, often finds expression in violent Islamist campaigns, including Islamist terrorism and extremist narratives, Islamist insurgencies, and Islamist proto-states. In Kenya, IVE finds expression in Islamist terrorism and extremist narratives.

In the second causal sequence, once these Islamist campaigns are waged, the fragile state reacts with counter-insurgency, counter-terrorism, and/or CIVE. However, the condition of state fragility also causes impediments to CIVE, renders CIVE ineffective and counterproductive, and hence leads to the failure of CIVE. As indicated earlier, ineffective CIVE means that the CIVE does not achieve its intended outcomes at all or does not achieve these outcomes within given timeframes. Counterproductive CIVE means that CIVE inadvertently achieves unintended results or undermines the intended results. The unintended results include the development of more political violence and more radicalisation, the development of counter-extremism and Islamophobia, the erosion of democratic principles, and the bolstering of state institutions and regime survival at the expense of nation-building, thus creating more popular discontent, further eroding social cohesion and state legitimacy, and increasing state fragility. Failure of CIVE means that CIVE is unable to eradicate or mediate Islamist violent extremism or resolve the grievances of the ethno-religious identity. The compound outcome in such fragile states is the insecurity dilemma, fragility trap, and conflict trap, as summarised in the causal sequence above.

At the beginning of this chapter, I indicated that a case may be either a physical entity or a conceptual phenomenon. In this study, the case is a conceptual phenomenon, viz., *the relationship between state fragility, IVE, and CIVE*. Such a relationship is neither unique to Kenya, nor is the phenomena of state fragility, IVE, and CIVE. Although these phenomena and their relationship are not unique to Kenya, the study is not based on a comparative analysis. Instead, being average, typical, and ordinary, in terms of case selection criteria, Kenya serves as a representative and veritable laboratory, containing and demarcating the controlled conditions under which the case is examined. In examining the case under these controlled conditions, I not only generate a contextual explanation but also generate a causal logic that may be applicable to similar contexts, thus enabling analytic generalisation. Relying on the conceptual-analytical and theoretical framework of state fragility as the *explanans*, and accounting for IVE and impediments to CIVE as the *explanandum*, the study is theory-based and theory-laden, but the study is not theory-determined. In addition to being theory-based, the study is accordingly also based on verifiable empirical evidence (observable and demonstrable facts). To demonstrate the causal relationship between state fragility, IVE and CVE, the study relies on four types of empirical evidence as intimated above, viz.: (1) trace evidence; (2) accounts evidence; (3) sequences evidence; (4) patterns evidence. A trace is a piece of evidence about the existence of phenomena, and an account is the content, matter, or substance, of that evidence. Trace and accounts may be equated with what is often referred to as indicators or empirical substantiations. With trace evidence I discover and detail evidence of state fragility, IVE, impediments to CIVE, variation in state fragility, variation in IVE, and variation in impediments to CIVE. With accounts evidence I detail the substance or content of such trace evidence. In this regard the Fragile States Index not only measures state fragility but also provide traces of the existence of such state fragility, as well as the content, matter, or substance, of that fragility. Similarly, the Global Terrorism Index not only measures terrorist activity but also provides traces of terrorist activity, as well as the content, matter, or substance, of such activity.

In Kenya IVE finds expression in terrorism. I thus employ terrorist activity as indicator or the empirical substantiation, and measure, of IVE. Based on the Global Terrorism Index conception, terrorist activity is defined as: (1) attacks; (2) fatalities; (3) injuries; (4) damage to property; (5) impact (of this terrorist activity). The first four elements are calculated annually, and the fifth element, i.e., impact, is calculated over a five-year period. Based on a scale of 0.00 (no impact), and 0.01 - 1.99 (*very low* impact), to 8.00 - 10.00 (*very high* impact), Kenya has the lowest *low* impact score of 2.50 in 2004 on the Global Terrorism Index, the worst *high* impact score of 6.60 in 2014, *high* impact scores between 2013 and 2017, *medium* impact scores of 5.76 and 5.64 in 2018 and 2019, and an average *medium* impact score of 5.04 between 2001 and 2019. The *low* impact range is 2.00 - 3.99, the *medium* impact range is 4.00 - 599, and the *high* impact range is 6.00 - 7.99.[298] Furthermore, I employ the Fragile States Index as an analytical measuring instrument of state fragility. The Fragile States Index, with 12 main indicators, measures state fragility on a scale of below 20.0 (*very sustainable*) to 110.0 - 120.0 (*very high alert*). Kenya has the best *high warning* score of 88.6 in 2005, the worst *high alert* score of 101.4 in 2008 and 100.7 in 2009, and an average *alert* score of 96.2 between 2005 and 2019. The *high warning* range is 80.0 – 89.9, the *alert* range is 90.0 – 99.9, and the *high alert* range is 100.0 - 109.9.

The third type of evidence, patterns evidence, is mostly demonstrated through the single-embedded lens in the study. Patterns evidence is employed to demonstrate that variation in X generates variation in Y, thus providing further evidence of a causal relationship between state fragility (X), and IVE and CIVE (Y). I employ the construct of the arc of insecurity to demonstrate this variation. As outlined above, the particularised state fragility in Kenya, as particularised in the arc of insecurity, has produced three major causal patterns that may be summarised as: (1) IVE tends to erupt where state fragility is most evidenced; (2) IVE is most virulent where state fragility is most evidenced; (3) impediments to

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[298] The Global Terrorism Index has since changed its main data source from the Global Terrorism Database to TerrorismTracker and changed both its methodology and definition of terrorism. In this study I use the dataset and methodology, as well as the definition of terrorism, as used on the Index up to 2019.

CIVE are most defined where state fragility is most evidenced. Patterns are also revealed by emergent themes that followed multiple stages and cycles of data mining. Four major themes emerged.

The first theme is *authoritarianism and centralisation* and is linked with the constricted democratic space in Kenya. This constricted democratic space is contested by factionalised elites and politically significant ethno-religious identities. In the case of ethnic-Somalis and other Muslims as an ethno-religious identity, this has manifested in the secession attempts and calls for secession in the former NFD and Coast Region since the 1960s, and agitation for the formation of an Islamic state in the current wave of Islamist violent extremism since the 1990s. Faced with such challenges to state power and the integrity of the state, and an ethno-religious identity that is disengaged from the state and thus seeks ontological security elsewhere, the fragile state has responded with *constitutional reforms and devolution* since 2010. *Constitutional reforms and devolution* is the second pattern theme identified. Despite said constitutional reforms and devolution, the fragile Kenyan state has been unable (unwilling?) to mitigate or ameliorate insecurity and grievances as experienced by ethnic-Somalis and other Muslims, resulting in the third identified pattern theme, i.e., the persistent *securitisation of the state* that started in the 1960s and continues to date since the 1990s. The securitisation of the state led to the fourth identified pattern theme, which is the *renewed authoritarianism and centralisation* that started in the 1990s and is observable in Kenya today. One may therefore identify two periods of state fragility and attendant conflict risk in Kenya. The first period starting from the 1960s, and the second starting from the 1990s. Each period is defined by continuity and change in the history of endemic insecurity and violence in Kenya, pitting state fragility against ethnic-Somalis and other Muslims. The four themes and the two periods of state fragility blur the distinction between patterns evidence and sequences evidence, thus revealing the interaction between the two types of evidence.

Patterns are also statistical. These statistics are demonstratable in areas and dimensions where state fragility is most evidenced in Kenya, viz., in the arc of insecurity. The arc of insecurity, as a geographical construct, refers to 12 (out of 47) counties in Kenya. The core of this arc of insecurity is three counties that constitute North-Eastern Region, viz.: Garissa, Wajir, and Mandera. One may show in these areas or dimensions of the state varied statistical patterns such as higher deprivation levels, lower access to public services and public goods, lower life expectancy, higher terrorist activity, and given the high number of terrorist attacks, a low number of alleged terrorists being arrested, prosecuted, and convicted. Three major statistical patterns are discernible concerning the 430 Islamist terrorist incidents that are attributed to *al-Shabaab* that occurred in Kenya between 2010 and 2019. Before 2010 *al-Shabaab* was involved in only three terrorist incidents in Kenya, one in 2008, and two in 2009.

As a coding rule, I amended the Global Terrorism Index's conception of terrorist activity and defined terrorist activity to include the following violence related terrorist incidents: (1) attacks; (2) armed clashes with security forces; (3) raids by security forces; (4) arrests of terror suspects.

Based on the foregoing coding, with the first pattern, 100 percent (430 incidents) of these incidents occurred in 12 (out of 47) counties in the arc of insecurity that are either symbols of Kenya's power (Nairobi County) or are historically inhabited by ethnic-Somalis and other Muslims (11 counties in the former NFD and Coast Region). Ninety-two percent (4.7 million) of Kenya's Muslims are concentrated in these 12 counties. Regarding the second pattern, 92.32 percent (397 incidents) of these incidents occurred in eight counties in North-eastern and Coast regions, the locus of the ethnic-Somali and Muslim secessionist movements since the 1960s. With the third pattern, 61.16 percent (263 incidents) of these incidents occurred in North-eastern Region alone, encompassing three counties in a region that is the most deprived in Kenya as evidenced by state fragility indicators and demonstrably the middle of the epicentre of IVE. Accounting for almost two-thirds (61.16 percent) of all Islamist terrorist incidents in the period under review, North-eastern Region is home to almost half of Kenya's Muslims i.e., 47.34 percent (2.4 million). It is also in North-eastern Region where social cohesion is at its lowest, thus forming one of the key impediments to CIVE. On a scale of 0-100, with 0 indicating the lowest level of social cohesion, Kenya's Social Cohesion Index scores Wajir at 22.0 percent, Garissa at 36.5 percent, and Mandera at 38.8 percent. The national average is 56.6 percent. The six disaggregated dimensions on the Index are even more telling. *Trust*, for example, is coded as intergroup trust (ethno-religious identities), trust in government, and trust in institutions. Trust levels are as low as 2.6 percent in Wajir, 8.9 percent in Garissa, and 14.4 percent in Mandera. The national average is 43.7 percent.

The fourth and last type of empirical evidence employed is sequences evidence. This evidence type reveals that state fragility (X) initiates the time order in the causal sequence between state fragility (X) and IVE and impediments to CIVE (Y), i.e., state fragility causes IVE and impediments to CIVE. Sequences evidence also enables me to show the evolution of this relationship between X and Y, from its origins in the 1960s to its manifestation since the 1990s. Sequences evidence is mostly shown through the longitudinal lens. In between X and Y, I subject the causal relationship not only to causal evidence, but by employing causal mechanisms and context, I also submit this relationship to a causal logic, i.e., causal reasoning. In doing so, I am unpacking the black box of causality between X and Y, to provide deeper, thicker, more detailed, more robust, explanation, thus providing further evidence of a causal relationship. Beach (2016:469, 470) contends that trace, accounts, sequences, and patterns, evidence, as employed in this study, leave “empirical fingerprints [the ‘smoking gun’] of underlying causal processes”. Such evidence aids in achieving the central aim and objectives of the study.

Given the aim of this study, the study was designed to achieve the following seven objectives: (1) to analyse state fragility as a conceptual-analytical and theoretical framework, i.e., state fragility as the X explaining Y, with Y as IVE and impediments to CIVE; (2) to outline IVE and its related analytical frameworks and theoretical perspectives; (3) to sketch out the state-of-the-art regarding CIVE; (4) to outline and analyse the manifestations of IVE and CIVE in Kenya; (5) to probe the relationship between state fragility and IVE in Kenya; (6) to examine the relationship between state fragility and CIVE in Kenya; (7) to reach conclusions about the relationship between state fragility, IVE, and CVE. With the seven objectives, I conceptualised and designed the study around nine chapters as outlined at the beginning of this summary and conclusions chapter, and in Chapter 2. The first chapter is the introduction to the study. The research design and methodology are covered in the second chapter. The literature review is divided into three chapters, covering objectives 1 - 3. The discussion and analysis are divided into another three chapters, covering objectives 4 - 6. Objective 7, which ‘to reach conclusions’, is subsumed in this concluding chapter, i.e., Chapter 9.

As an introduction to a brief summation of the chapters, note that Chapter 1 lays the foundation of the study by outlining the background, problem formulation, the central proposition, aim and significance, research design and methodology, literature review, and the structure, of the study. Chapter 2 outlines the research design and methodology. In design and method, the study was intended to be theoretically grounded, empirically demonstratable, and to have practical application. The research design is an explanatory, single-embedded, and longitudinal case study, enabling a theory-based, empirical, retroductive, and deductive-inductive analysis. The research methodology is based on three triangulated sources of evidence: elite interviews, field research, and a literature and data study. These three purposeful and snowball sampling-based methods enabled triangulation within and between data sources. I also employed theory triangulation between state fragility, as well as psychological, instrumentalist, and, organisational, approaches. I employed radicalisation theory, the two middle range theories, viz., relative deprivation and rational choice theories, and the natural systems model, as representative of psychological, instrumentalist, and organisational approaches, respectively. Whilst the study’s conceptual-analytical framework and theoretical approach remains state fragility, an integrated conceptual-analytical-theoretical approach was followed in incorporating congruent elements of psychological, instrumentalist, and organisational approaches to state fragility.

Two approaches have been dominant within the philosophy of science. The first approach is the deductive, nomological, explanatory approach that is associated with Positivism and Empiricism. The second approach is the inductive, descriptive, narrative, ideographic approach that is associated with Interpretivism and Constructivism. This study arrogates another approach, Critical Realism, as the rationale and philosophical validation for this study's case study approach, design, and methodology. In explanation-building Critical Realism employs process-tracing of causal mechanisms (with related causal patterns) to build a causal sequence or causal reasoning, between X and Y, with the following formulation: cause (X) + causal mechanisms + context = outcome (Y). This retroductive formulation unpacks the black box of causality between X and Y, answering both the why and how of the causal process, and subjecting the causal process to both causal evidence and a causal logic. This retroductive analysis is then supplemented by other two modes of scientific reasoning, viz., inductive analysis and deductive analysis. Added to building causal mechanisms (with related causal patterns) between state fragility (X) and IVE and impediments to CIVE (Y), i.e., retroduction, I thus relied on emergent patterns of covariation from empirical data, i.e., induction, as well as predicted patterns of covariation from theoretical propositions, i.e., deduction, to build the explanation in the relationship between X and Y.

The case study, wrongly perceived in some quarters as 'a single data-point that is based on a single point of observation', in fact relies on multiple points of observation, which are based on spatial and temporal variation. The longitudinal (temporal) lens enabled me to trace and detail, over time, the origins and evolution of IVE and barriers CIVE in Kenya. The generative causal powers of the 'Big Bang' of independence in 1963 in Kenya, initiated a causal pathway of violence which pitted state fragility against ethnic-Somalis and other Muslims. Whilst the relationship between state fragility, IVE, and barriers to CIVE in Kenya are linked to the third wave of Islamist violent extremism since the 1990s, the time order in this link was initiated by the 'Big Bang' of independence in 1963. Independence unleashed secessionism in the former NFD, which was dominated by ethnic-Somalis, a designated group of people brutally suppressed in the resultant *Shifta* war (1963-1968). The *Shifta* war came on the back of a 1962 referendum where 80 percent of the population in the former NFD, representing five of the then six districts in the NFD, voted to be reincorporated into Somalia. The five districts were Garissa, Wajir, Mandera, Moyale and Isiolo. The sixth district was Marsabit.[299] Independence also unleashed intermittent calls for secession since 1963 in Coast Region, a geographical area dominated by Muslims. These calls for secession have been denied to this day by the Kenyan government.

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[299] The town of Moyale on the border with Ethiopia remains, but the district of Moyale has since been partitioned between Marsabit and Wajir counties. The six districts of the former NFD cover the geographical area of current five counties in Kenya, viz.: Garissa, Wajir, Mandera, Marsabit, and Isiolo (see Chapters 6 and 7).

After 1963 the history of violence between the state and ethnic-Somalis and other Muslims and their victimisation and securitisation continued, resulting in varied historical markers, including the Isiolo (1968), Garissa (1980), and Wagalla (1984) massacres. Since the 1990s, the Islamist movement, and *al-Shabaab* since 2006, had merged this history of violence between the fragile state and this ethno-religious identity and the historical secessionist aspirations of the former NFD and Coast Region, with the current Islamist agenda of agitating for an Islamic state. The current long-war therefore represents the continued contestation of the constricted democratic space and the continued search for ontological security since 1963, either within the state but mostly through secession, by marginalised, yet politically significant ethnic-Somalis and other Muslims, in Kenya. Emerging out of counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism that date from 1963 as its precursors and contributors, the current CIVE, as part of a trajectory of the Kenyan response to secession and IVE, largely represents the continued silencing (not resolution) of the grievances of ethnic-Somalis and other Muslims in Kenya.

The longitudinal lens also enabled me to trace the emergence and evolution of the Islamist-Salafi-Wahhabi-jihadi ideology since the 1980s in Kenya. The emergence and evolution of this ideology in Kenya is associated with Islamist ideologues such as Abdul Aziz Rimo (1949-2015) and his *Ansari* movement who advocated for a return to 'pure' Islam, framed Muslim grievances along religious lines, and consequently proposed Islam as the only solution to the political challenges faced by Muslims in Kenya. Added to Abdul Aziz Rimo, other influential ideologues in Kenya are Aboud Rogo (1968-2012) and Abubaker Shariff Ahmed (1961-2014). The longitudinal lens further enabled me to trace the origins of the third wave of IVE in Kenya, a phase guided by democratisation following more than three decades of *de facto* and *de jure* one-party rule, viz.: 1964-1982 and 1982-1991. Democratisation opened the space for renewed political bargaining, including that of the Islamist-jihadi ideology. It is in this period of renewed political bargaining that the Islamic Party of Kenya (IPK) was formed in 1992. The IPK was swiftly proscribed by the arap Moi government for 'promoting Islamic fundamentalism'.

Denied of peaceful dissent and political participation, it was IPK activists that helped *al-Qaeda* set up its East Africa branch in Kenya and Somalia, i.e., East Africa *al-Qaeda* (EAAQ). The formation of EAAQ led to the 1998 US Embassy attacks in Kenya and Tanzania and the two 2002 Mombasa attacks in Kenya. Therefore, the third wave of IVE in Kenya manifested in the 1998 US Embassy attack in Nairobi and the two 2002 Mombasa attacks. In the case of *al-Shabaab*, formed in 2006, their first recorded terrorist incident in Kenya is the assailment of a police post in Liboi, Garissa, on 29 May 2008. This first incursion in Kenya took place at the height of state fragility in Kenya. Following the post-elections crisis of 2007/2008 that brought Kenya to the brink of a civil war, Kenya received a record score of *high alert* at 101.4 in 2008 and 100.7 in 2009 on the Fragile States Index. Since then, *al-Shabaab* has launched a myriad of attacks on Kenya, prompting Operation *Linda Nchi* (2011-2012) as part of a forward defence intervention in Somalia that was designed to prevent or limit these terror attacks in Kenya.

With the longitudinal lens, I could demonstrate a notable spike in Islamist terrorist activity following Kenya's military incursion into Somalia with Operation *Linda Nchi*. Only six terrorist incidents in 2010 increased to 24 in 2011, and 51 in 2012. In the three-year period between the constitutional reforms of 2010 and the creation of the 47 counties, and the end of *Linda Nchi* (2012), there was therefore a 750 percent increase in Islamist terrorist incidence in Kenya. The longitudinal lens also enabled me to trace the first major *al-Shabaab* attack in Kenya that involved a suicide bomber, i.e., the 14 Riverside complex attack on 15 January 2019. This was the third of the four major 'January attacks' by *al-Shabaab*. In Chapter 6, I show that the first of these attacks was the 15 January 2016 El-Adde attack, followed by the 27 January 2017 Kulbiyow attack. The fourth January attack was the 5 January 2020 Manda Bay attack at a US-run military base in Lamu County. This attack was the first attack directly targeting US military personnel in Kenya. With the longitudinal lens I can also chart Kenya's counter-terrorism and CVE trajectory, from participating in the 'global war on terror' since 9/11, to the CIVE operations *Linda Nchi* (2011-2012), *Usalama* Watch (2014), and *Linda Boni* (2015), up to AMISOM since 2012 and ATMIS since 2022. This counter-terrorism and CIVE trajectory, targeting and affecting ethnic-Somalis and other Muslims, is tainted by abuses of human rights and civil liberties by agents of the state as recorded on indexes such as the Freedom House Index and the Political Terror Scale.

The single-embedded (spatial) lens enabled me to demonstrate the concentration of IVE in Kenya, and also to show the particularised obstinacy of impediments to CIVE in Kenya. Indicated by Islamist terrorist incidence, I can reveal that of all the 47 counties in Kenya, all Islamist terrorist incidents between 2010 and 2019 exclusively occurred in 12 counties that constitute the arc of insecurity. With a total of 430 Islamist terrorist incidents in this period, 121 (28.13 percent) occurred in Mandera, 107 (24.88 percent) in Garissa, 86 (20 percent) in Lamu, 35 (8.13 percent) in Wajir, 27 (6.27 percent) in Nairobi, 25 (5.81 percent) in Mombasa, and 15 (3.48 percent) in Kwale. These seven counties account for 96.74 percent of all Islamist terrorist incidents in the period under review. The other 14 (3.25 percent) incidents took place in Tana-River, Isiolo, Marsabit, Machakos, and Kilifi counties.

Further patterns are discernible. With a total of 430 Islamist terrorist incidents between 2010 and 2019, eight counties in North-eastern and Coast regions, with 397 incidents, account for 92.32 percent of all Islamist terrorist incidents in this period. The other 6.27 percent occurred in Nairobi County, and

1.39 percent occurred in Eastern Region, viz.: in Isiolo, Marsabit, and Machakos.[300] The three counties in North-eastern, viz.: Garissa, Wajir, and Mandera, with 263 incidents, account for almost two-thirds (61.16 percent) of all Islamist terrorist incidents in this period. Impediments to CIVE are also particularised in the arc of insecurity, and in North-eastern Region specifically. Wormholes in North-eastern Region, identified as impediments to CIVE, such as Boni Reserve, the permeable border with Somalia, neglected and underdeveloped hinterland counties such as Lamu, Mandera, Wajir, and Garissa, and the marginalised and securitised communities in these counties, collectively ensure safe-passage, protection, and support for *al-Shabaab*. These communities are socio-economically and politically disengaged from the state, many withdrawing into self-sufficiency, criminality, and communal violence. Most have adopted IVE as a strategy of disengagement from the state.

The single-embedded lens enabled me to show that 92 percent (4.7 million) of Muslims in Kenya are concentrated in the same 12 counties in the arc of insecurity, the epicentre of Islamist terrorist activity. Almost half of Kenya's Muslims i.e., 47.34 percent (2.4 million), live in North-eastern Region, the middle of the epicentre of Islamist terrorist activity. Fifty four percent (2.8 million) of Kenya's Muslims are ethnic-Somalis who mostly reside in North-eastern Region. This lens also enabled me to reveal that 79.27 percent of ethnic-Somalis are multidimensionally poor, mostly subsisting on less than US$1.90 a day. Ethic-Somalis, coexisting with Kenya's average 17.8 percent MPI index, have a 63.14 percentage difference in the incidence of multidimensional poverty between themselves and ethnic-Kikuyu. In fact, of all the ethnic groups in Kenya, only ethnic-Turkana and ethnic-Samburu have higher deprivation than ethnic-Somalis as measured by the MPI.[301] Based on the 2019 population census, the single embedded lens enabled me to reveal that close to 50 percent of households in these 12 counties have no amenities other than the open bush to 'dispose human waste' (use the toilet). There are also over 95 percent of households in these 12 counties that are not connected to the electricity grid and must still rely on firewood and charcoal as cooking fuel. Only seven percent of households in the three counties in North-Eastern Region have access to the national electricity grid. I also pointed out earlier in this section of the current chapter that it is also in North-eastern region where social cohesion, as recorded on Kenya's Social Cohesion Index, is at its lowest in Kenya. Said depreciated social cohesion serves as one of the key impediments to CIVE in Kenya.

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[300] The five affected counties in Coast Region are Lamu, Mombasa, Kwale, Tana-River, and Kilifi.

[301] Kenya thus underperforms and misperforms with regards to other identity groups, not only ethnic-Somalis and Muslims. By illustration, Kenya's Commission on Revenue Allocation (CRA) lists Turkana and Samburu counties among the 15 counties that have suffered 'historical injustices', i.e., 'harms and wrongs' committed by the state in Kenya since independence. This explains the oligopoly of political violence as well as the new-wars one finds in the arc of insecurity in Kenya since the 1990s as outlined in Chapter 6, section 6.5 *New-wars and the long-war*. Regarding the CRA, see Chapter 6, section 6.3.2 *Constitutional reforms and devolution*.

The single-embedded lens also shows how the Kenyan state have targeted a particular ethno-religious identity, i.e., ethnic Somalis and other Muslims, under the pretence of security measures in the CIVE project. To illustrate, the CIVE Operation *Usalama* Watch (2014) almost exclusively targeted more than 4, 000 ethnic-Somalis who were detained without trial and subjected to various other violations of human rights, including extortion, torture, disappearances, renditions, and refoulment. With this lens one can also show the deplorable quality of life in the arc of insecurity in Kenya. Looking at life expectancy as a measurement of the quality of life, eight of the 12 counties in the arc of insecurity showed a decline in life expectancy between 1990 and the formation of *al-Shabaab* in 2006. In addition, the CIVE Operation *Linda Boni* (since 2015) involved the forced relocation of communities that live around Boni Reserve, further adding to the grievances and impediments to CIVE in the arc of insecurity. In such a setting of arrested development, state generated hopeless scarcity, frustrated expectations, and violent repression, the state in effect serves as a recruitment agency for any 'saviour' movement or institution, in this case, the Islamist movement, and *al-Shabaab* in particular.

Built on a representative case, the study has clear case selection criteria. On all three counts of case selection criteria, viz., (1) state fragility, (2) IVE, and (3) CIVE, Kenya, being typical, average, ordinary, is *representative* of the case. Significant for being selected as a representative case, Kenya, whilst being among 20 of the most fragile states on the Fragile States Index since 2008 (except for 2014, 2016, 2018 and 2019), is not among the most fragile states in the world for having *very high alert* scores. Kenya has an average *alert* score at 96.2 (out of 120) between 2005 and 2019 on the Fragile States Index. Secondly, IVE, empirically substantiated by terrorist activity and measured by the Global Terrorism Index, is on average *medium* level in Kenya. Kenya has an average *medium* impact score of 5.04 (out of 10.00) between 2001 and 2019 on the Global Terrorism Index. Kenya also ranks a *medium* 3 on the Global Peace Index (on an ordinal scale of 1 - 5, 1 being 'most peaceful' and 5 'least peaceful'). Thirdly and lastly, CIVE in Kenya is about countering Islamist terrorism (and related extremist narratives), not wider violent campaigns such as an Islamist insurgency or an Islamist proto-state.

Case selection also involved clearly defined and demarcated conceptual, spatial, and temporal, case boundaries. Conceptually, the study is a theory-based, empirical inquiry into the relationship between state fragility, IVE and CIVE (the case) in Kenya (the context). Kenya is purposefully selected for being typical, thus representative of the link between state fragility, IVE and CIVE. In terms of spatial demarcation, the case is limited to Kenya and the arc of insecurity in Kenya, except for instances where Kenya's neighbours such as Somalia and Ethiopia play a pronounced role, or where the Horn of Africa or East Africa, as Kenya's volatile and fragile larger neighbourhood, have relevance. Since this is also a longitudinal study, the temporal demarcation is contemporary Kenya, encompassing the current third wave of IVE since the 1990s. However, since this study is based on a contextual explanation, there are contextual references to the period just before independence and after independence in 1963.

The temporal demarcation of the study is the end of 2019, a period of 56 years since independence. This demarcation is largely designed to enable the uniform coverage of multiple, parallel, and interacting longitudinal data sources that are used in the study. Furthermore, this demarcation enables the exclusion of the impact of COVID-19, an exogenous-extraneous factor, in the relationship between state fragility, Islamist violent extremism, and impediments to CVE, in the setting in Kenya. The impact of COVID-19, with its far-reaching socio-economic and political effects starting to be experienced since the start of 2020, is yet to be fully contemplated and understood. The 2022 Global Terrorism Index accordingly maintains that "[i]t is still to be seen whether the economic impact of COVID on countries that are already fragile, [in particular, the increase of government deficits caused by increased public spending during the pandemic …,] will increase frustrations with governments, aggravating existing political tensions and possibly leading to further civil unrest" (IEP, 2022:12). The indications are that all states, and sectors of states, even the Islamist movement, have experienced a 'fragile moment' stemming from the impact of COVID-19. By illustration, except for the January 2020 Manda Bay attack in Lamu County on military installations, *al-Shabaab* has not launched a major attack in Kenya since the last major attack at 14 Riverside complex in January 2019.[302] However, this has not impacted long-term trends in the link between state fragility, IVE and CIVE. More significantly, the 2019 temporal demarcation does not limit explanation-building as explanation-building covers relevant developments beyond 2019, and thus, explanation-building is valid beyond 2019.

The next three chapters are linked under *Literature Review*. In Chapter 3, I outlined state fragility as the theoretical proposition of the study, i.e., the *explanans*, accounting for the development and sustainment of the *explanandum*, which is IVE and impediments to CIVE. The chapter deals with the notion of state fragility as a phenomenon, a conceptual-analytical framework, and a theoretical perspective, and the attendant varied perspectives regarding this notion, including the state fragility-security-development nexus, the criticism against state fragility, the value and utility of state fragility, and the Fragile States Index as an analytical measuring instrument of state fragility. Chapter 4 deals with IVE by conceptualising IVE, outlining IVE as an ideology and a movement, outlining the intention and objectives of IVE, and outlining the major inconsistencies and irreconcilables within IVE. The chapter further outlines three analytical frameworks and three theoretical perspectives that are associated with IVE. The analytical frameworks are the following: the clash of civilisations, globalisation and uncertainty, and local conditions. The theoretical perspectives are the following: psychological, instrumentalist, and organisational, approaches. The three approaches or perspectives are presented as alternative theoretical propositions to state fragility as the *explanans*.

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[302] Regarding states, I highlighted initially in Chapter 2, section 2.4.1 *Case selection*, and elaborated in Chapter 3, that despite the shared 'fragile moment', not all states are 'structurally fragile'. Resilient states will recover quicker and have less-lasting effects, whilst fragile states such as Somalia and Kenya may well sink deeper into fragility, or will be more impacted, for a longer period, by COVID-19. Fragility is also a relative-variable-ranging condition, in space and time, that affects institutions of the state, relations within the state, geographical regions of the state, and other areas and dimensions of the state. As it was before COVID-19, during, and after COVID-19, resilient states will have pockets of fragility, and similarly, fragile states will have pockets of resilience, and some states remain objectively more fragile than others, or otherwise objectively more resilient than others.

In Chapter 5, I focus on CIVE. The chapter firstly considers counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism as the precursors and the locus of the origins of CIVE. The chapter then reflects on the different pathways that are offered individually but mostly in combination in ending violent Islamist campaigns. These CIVE pathways may be grouped as follows: (1) repression and decapitation; (2) failure and reorientation; (3) success and negotiations. Furthermore, I examine CIVE as such, including the following: conceptualising CIVE, the CIVE-security-development nexus, and the varied CIVE approaches and programming. These CIVE approaches and programming may be grouped as follows: (1) whole-of-government and whole-of-society; (2) offensive and defensive; (3) ideological and communicative; (4) political and social-policy. The CIVE approaches and programming, similar to the above CIVE pathways, are not mutually exclusive. In fact, the six CIVE pathways are embedded in the eight CIVE approaches and programming. The CIVE pathways and the CIVE approaches and programming are pursued in varied combinations. Lastly, the chapter considers the varied challenges of evaluating CIVE, inclusive of the challenges associated with the ethics of CIVE.

The other three chapters are grouped under *Discussions and Analysis*. The first of these chapters is Chapter 6. The first part of Chapter 6 focuses on IVE and opens with an analysis of the commonly held myth of Kenya as a victim of external terror attacks. The chapter then examines the Kenyan state as the explanatory setting in the development of IVE by employing two themes: (1) authoritarianism and centralisation; (2) constitutional reforms and devolution. This first part of the chapter then looks at the origins of IVE in Kenya, new-wars and the long-war in Kenya, Islamist terror groups and combat units in Kenya, and lastly, major Islamist terrorist activity in Kenya since the 1990s. The second part of the chapter focuses on CIVE, examining the Kenyan state as the explanatory setting for impediments to CIVE by employing two themes: (1) the securitisation of the state; (2) renewed authoritarianism and centralisation. The chapter then considers key aspects of CIVE in Kenya, including the CIVE architecture, and the two dominant CIVE approaches and programming, viz.: ‘all-government’ and ‘all-society’. Chapter 7 examines the relationship between state fragility and IVE in Kenya, and Chapter 8 examines the relationship between state fragility and CIVE in Kenya. In both chapters I rely on two lenses, i.e.: a single-embedded lens (spatial) and a longitudinal lens (temporal). Based on the evidence uncovered in these chapters, the study finds that state fragility (the *explanans*), provides the context (setting), opportunity (enablers or permissive causes), and generates (drives or causes) IVE and impediments to CIVE (the *explanandum*), in Kenya (the context), thus leading to ineffective and counterproductive CIVE, and hence the failure of CIVE. This brings me to the conclusions of the study.

9.3 CONCLUSIONS

There are fierce contestations regarding what we know and how we know, when it comes to state fragility, Islamist violent extremism, and CIVE. This is also the case in the context of Kenya. There is also a view that CIVE in Kenya, resulting from particularly intractable impediments, has largely been ineffective and counterproductive. The study’s problem formulation was therefore informed by the following curiosity: *Which factors account for the development and sustainment of IVE and impediments to CIVE, in Kenya?* The theoretical proposition of the study attributes these factors to the properties or attributes of state fragility that have causal capacity and causal tendency. Based on this curiosity and the theoretical proposition of state fragility as an explanation of IVE and impediments to CIVE in Kenya, the research question was formulated as such: *What is the relationship between state fragility, IVE, and CIVE, in Kenya?* In answering this research question, and based on what this study has discovered, specific findings may be made. But before outlining these findings, it is important to reiterate that this study was neither designed to predict the outcomes of state fragility, nor offer recommendations regarding state fragility, IVE, and impediments to CIVE. The study was designed to establish and demonstrate a logic that shows the consistent conditions under which specific processes and outcomes occur and are likely to occur in future. What is this logic?

The logic is not based on micro-radicalisation. To account for the incentive structure of IVE and impediments to CIVE one cannot rely on micro radicalisation. To do so is to employ an unsuitable level of analysis. By erroneously relying on micro radicalisation, the answer as to what is the incentive structure of IVE depends on whom you ask. Are you asking members of the terror group (who direct, plan, and carry out the violence), ‘sympathisers’ (who provide active support), ‘social movement radicals’ (who share goals), or ‘moderates’ (found among a sympathetic public)? If you are asking members of the terror group, are you asking ‘ideological activists’, ‘professional jihadis’, ‘drifters and followers’, ‘socially frustrated youths’, or are you asking ‘free riders’? Still within the terror group, are you asking the leadership group or are you asking the rank-and-file? If you are asking the leadership group (i.e., ‘true believers’ or ‘ideological activists’), then among this leadership are you asking ‘pragmatists’ or ‘purists’, or are you asking ‘base builders’, or rather asking ‘advocates of violence’?

Micro radicalisation reveals the differentiated roles, types, and levels of motivation and objectives, and dissimilar levels of commitment and participation, found within the Islamist movement and Islamist organisations. At the most, micro radicalisation can reveal the character and grammar of IVE, not its logic or meaning, intent or strategic objectives. Micro radicalisation, removed from the context of the Islamist movement and its organisations, and the context of meso and macro radicalisation, loses logic and meaning. Erroneously, there is a fixation in Kenya of identifying ‘at risk’ individuals (in specific communities) by creating a ‘terrorist profile’ or ‘indicators of terrorist risk’ based on religious beliefs, friendships, kinships, and other social networks, as set by the prevailing ‘theological and social-psychological radicalisation model’. Social networks such as kinship, friendship, the mosque, *madrassa*, or Islamist ideologues, including Islam (the religion), are mediums of IVE and mediums of impediments to CIVE. They are neither incubators of IVE nor incubators of impediments to CIVE.

With the fixation on detecting and inoculating ‘at risk’ individuals in specific (read: Muslim and ethnic-Somali) communities in Kenya, there is consequently a misplaced emphasis on Islam and ‘extremist’ ‘bad Muslims’ that are ‘radicalised’ and must therefore be countered in ‘a war of ideas’, through countering their ‘extremist narratives’ and keeping them from ‘influencing’ these ‘at risk’ individuals. This is to miss the logic and the political and socio-economic drivers of IVE and impediments to CIVE for the grammar and the mediums or vectors of IVE and impediments to CIVE. Islam, and the social networks that are employed by members of Islamist organisations and those that are sympathetic to the Islamist movement, are merely mediums or vectors employed by a politically significant ethno-religious identity for collective grievances, mobilisation, and action. The Islamist movement and lslamist organisations such as the Afghan *Taliban* and *al-Shabaab* are first and foremost political actors that represent specific constituencies. Dismissing them as ‘irrational-extremist-terrorist-criminals’ is neither going to make them less of political actors, nor is it going to resolve the challenge of CIVE. Fish (2002:30) profoundly concludes in the context of the West that “[t]hese men are not irrational; rather they act from within a rationality we rightly reject, if only because its goal is our destruction”.

The 2018-2021 negotiations between the US and the *Taliban* in Doha, Qatar, demonstrate that Islamists like *Taliban* are far from being ‘irrational-extremist-terrorist criminals’ (see Chapters 4 and

5). The negotiations and the outcome of the negotiations, i.e., the signed 2020 *Taliban*-US agreement, make provision mainly for four interdependent political issues: (1) the state of Afghanistan will not be used against the security of the US and its allies, or in support of any individual or organisation (including *al-Qaeda*) that threaten the security of the US and its allies; (2) the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Afghanistan; (3) intra-Afghan negotiations concerning a ceasefire and the future of Afghanistan; (4) a permanent and comprehensive ceasefire. The US-*Taliban* negotiations and the outcome of the negotiations are therefore based on clear, rational, and negotiable political issues that may be reduced to two factors, viz.: (1) the security of the US and its allies; (2) the territorial integrity and political independence of Afghanistan. Nowhere in the four-page agreement is there mention of religion, Islam, Christianity, culture, values, ideology, radicalisation, extremism, the mosque, *madrassa*, kinship, friendship, lslamist ideologues, 'hatred', 'jealousy', 'the clash of civilisations', 'extremist narratives', 'at risk' individuals or communities, or anything similar or related.

To account for the nature of IVE and the failure of CIVE, one must look elsewhere. The incentive structure of IVE is contained in what the Africa Center for Strategic Studies (2016) defines as cultural, socio-economic, political, and group and individual drivers of IVE. All these drivers are all encapsulated in the debilitating and conflict-generating properties of state fragility. These properties of state fragility are inclusive of the social structures that persist in such fragile states, as contained within meso and macro radicalisation. The fragile state is consequently the subject of the blame system of Islamist violent extremism, and its government, institutions and society, are the target for *jihad*. It is this fragile state that generates endemic insecurity and political conflict that is pursued to be replaced with an Islamic state, and to have its government, institutions, and society, Islamised. The state is not simply the context and the locus of IVE and CIVE. The state is the principal agent and antagonist.

The logic or motivation for joining Islamist organisations, and establishing Islamist organisations in the first place, are therefore found in the enduring conditions created by unjust socio-economic and political orders, as represented, and defined by state fragility. This is where state fragility as an analytical theoretical approach and perspective, and the Fragile States Index as an analytical measuring instrument of state fragility, have unsurpassed value. Hedström and Ylikoski (2010:58) rightly contend that in explanation-building the "key challenge is to account for collective phenomena that are not definable by reference to any single member of the collectivity". Accounting for collective phenomena, at a suitable level of analysis, is where this study has unmatched value and utility. IVE and CIVE are simply not micro-level phenomena, they are collective pursuits, with collective goals and outcomes. The collective goals of IVE are aimed at challenging the 'apostate' and the secular state.

The study finds that state fragility explains the development and sustainment of IVE and impediments to CIVE in Kenya. Through its debilitating and conflict-generating capacity and tendency, state fragility enables and generates enduring conditions that result in the two observable outcomes, viz., IVE and impediments to CIVE. Regarding the research design and methods, the research design of this study contributes to four areas of methodological significance. The research design demonstrates: (1) how to frame a case study around a conceptual phenomenon, as opposed to a physical entity; (2) how to conduct a single case study in an explanatory mode, as opposed to an exploratory, descriptive, or evaluative mode; (3) how to build explanation in a single-embedded, longitudinal, case study, enabling spatial and temporal variation and analysis, thus creating varied points of observation; (4) how to make analytic generalisations from a single representative case, by establishing a logic or conditions, with patterns of covariation, causal patterns, and mechanisms-based causal sequences, that may be applied to similar contexts. Significantly, the study also employs data triangulation. Data triangulation involved the triangulation of three research methods or sources of evidence, viz.: elite interviews, field research (non-participant observation), and a literature and data study. These three purposeful and snowball sampling-based methods enabled triangulation within and between data sources.

The significance of the study is also in its choice of the philosophy of science and in its causal explanation-building. Political Science scholars (and the social sciences in general) are often left with the choice of two extremes. Either following the deductive, nomological, explanatory approach (associated with Positivism/Empiricism) or following the inductive descriptive, narrative, ideographic approach (associated with Interpretivism/Constructivism). Critical Realism, by employing retroductive causal mechanisms to build causal sequences between the X and the Y, presents a third alternative. This approach enables answering not only the why, but also the how, of the causal process, in explaining the observed phenomenon. Explanation-building is then formulated as: cause + causal mechanisms + context = outcome. Such an explanation goes beyond accounts that do not explain the process of how X generates Y, but merely outline the relationship between X and Y. Tracing (i.e., discovering and detailing evidence of) causal mechanisms, conversely, unpack this black box of causality between X and Y, provide deeper, thicker, more robust, explanation. The causal process is consequently subjected not only to causal evidence, but to the demonstration of a causal logic as well.

In addition to data triangulation, the contribution of the study is also in theory triangulation. I triangulate the theoretical framework of state fragility with psychological, instrumentalist, and organisational, approaches. I employ (1) radicalisation theory, (2) the two middle range theories, i.e., relative deprivation theory and rational choice theory, and (3) the natural systems model, as representative of (1) psychological, (2) instrumentalist, and (3) organisational approaches, respectively. Whilst the conceptual-analytical framework and the theoretical approach remain to be state fragility, an integrated conceptual-analytical-theoretical approach is followed, by incorporating congruent elements of psychological, instrumentalist, and organisational approaches to the central framework of state fragility. I further examine three analytical frameworks that are associated with IVE, viz.: (1) the clash of civilisation; (2) globalisation and uncertainty; (3) local conditions. After having examined the clash of civilisations, I discounted this framework. Subsequent to holding this framework against empirical evidence, I found this framework wanting and devoid of supporting empirical evidence. The globalisation and uncertainty framework enables me to account for the international context to the local conditions. The local conditions framework itself speaks to the properties of state fragility. I consequently fuse congruent elements of the globalisation and uncertainty framework and the local conditions framework, with the central theoretical framework of state fragility.

Deepening the conception of state fragility is then another contribution of the study. The understanding of state fragility that is generated through this study is that study fragility is: (1) a conceptual framework (2) an analytical instrument, (3) a theoretical perspective, and (4) a phenomenon that affects the state, institutions, regions, dimensions, and other aspects, of the state. State fragility is defined by endemic insecurity, underperformance (weakness), misperformance (abuse or improper use), endemic violence (structural, physical, and cultural), institutional failure, malfunctions, flaws and fault-lines, at three levels of state fragility or three units of observation, viz.: macro (state institutions), meso (state-society relations), and micro (between groups in society). State fragility is about poor performance. But poor state performance is often conceived as underperformance or a state capacity deficit and weakness, by designating ungoverned spaces that define such fragile states as safe havens and permissive causes or enablers. The current study demonstrates that state fragility is not only about a capacity deficit, or state weakness, or underperformance, but also about misperformance, i.e., abuse or improper use. State fragility is therefore also about the abuse or improper use of such capacity and strength when it exists. State fragility is accordingly also about improper performance and the abuse of power by the state. Ungoverned spaces are consequently not merely safe havens and enablers. Ungoverned spaces in such fragile states also actively generate IVE and impediments to CIVE by creating and sustaining political and socio-economic grievances and disengagement from the state. State fragility consequently has both debilitating and conflict generating properties that are further linked with both (under)development and (in)security, thus explaining varied development and security challenges, including Islamist violent extremism and challenges related to countering Islamist violent extremism.

The study further contributes in its novel data analysis. The study employs retroduction, deduction-induction, multiple sources of evidence, synthesising various indexes, employing an interdisciplinary approach, and placing the fragile (and marginalised) African state at the centre of the discourse on IVE and CIVE. I highlighted earlier that in explanation-building, Critical Realism prescribes the employment of process-tracing of causal mechanisms (with related causal patterns) to build a causal sequence, between X and Y, with the following formulation: cause (X) + causal mechanisms + context = outcome (Y). This retroductive formulation unpacks the black box of causality between X and Y, by answering both the why and how of the causal process, and by subjecting the causal process to both causal evidence and a causal logic. This retroductive analysis is then supplemented by two other modes of scientific reasoning, i.e., inductive analysis, and deductive analysis. To illustrate, in addition to building causal mechanisms (with related causal patterns) between state fragility (X) and IVE and impediments to CIVE (Y), i.e., retroduction, I relied on emergent patterns of covariation from empirical data, i.e., induction, as well as predicted patterns of covariation from theoretical propositions, i.e., deduction, in explanation-building. Fletcher (2017:190) correctly contends that the key outcome of retroduction "is to modify, support, or reject existing theories to provide the most accurate explanation of reality". That was one of the key objectives of this study, given the state of flux in state fragility, IVE and CIVE.

By analogy of the fable of blind men and the elephant, accounts of IVE and CIVE in Kenya are divergent, piecemeal, and in many respects, presented in problematic ways. State fragility has revealed the elephant (i.e., IVE and CIVE) in Kenya for what it is, and not a wall, snake, spear, tree, fan, or rope. By employing state fragility in explanation-building, as an exercise in piecing a puzzle together, the elephant is revealed for what it is, in all its complexities, in a coherent, systematic, and comprehensive, manner. The study further found convergence of multiple sources of evidence with Kenya performing badly on a range of indicators within these sources of evidence. This convergence of multiple sources is revealed through synthesising field research (non-participant observation), interviews with knowledgeable informants, a literature and data study, and in addition to the State Fragility Index, synthesising congruent indexes such as the inequality-adjusted HDI, the Corruption Perceptions Index, the Inclusive Development Index, the MPI, the SDGs Index, the Social Progress Index, the Social Cohesion Index, the Freedom House Index, the Global Terrorism Index, and the Political Terror Scale. All these sources of evidence reveal various facets and outcomes of state fragility, adding to our understanding of the theory of state fragility, the application of the theory of state fragility, and the outcomes of state fragility. The outcomes in this case being IVE and impediments to CIVE.

The study also followed an interdisciplinary approach. In studying interacting and multi-layered phenomena, as this study does, Political Science, as the master-science and a juncture discipline, enabled me to synthesise conceptual-analytical-theoretical instruments and perspectives, beyond the confines of individual disciplines.[303] I relied on this interdisciplinary approach regarding various aspects of the study. These varied facets of the study include notions of the state, society, human nature, identity, socio-economic and political relations (across borders and within the state), political conflict *writ large* and terrorism in particular, conflict resolution, knowledge and evidence, theory and application, social reality and social phenomena, social structure and agency, the foundations for causality and social explanation, as well as the specifics of state fragility, IVE, CIVE, and the context of Kenya. With this interdisciplinary approach, I extracted not only from Political Science, but from International Relations, History, Sociology, Geography, Economics, Psychology, and other disciplines, including Astrophysics. I further pulled from the body of knowledge in several fields of study, incorporating political thought, political-economy, geopolitics, social psychology, security studies, development studies, policy and planning, and studies in conflict resolution. I also extracted from critical terrorism studies, and the study fields of violent extremism and countering violent extremism.

Based on the foregoing and what has been discovered in this study, it is evidenced that Kenya is a combustible cocktail of abusive structures of authority and government, group marginalisation and exclusion, horizontal inequalities, elite factionalism, ethnic polarisation, religious discrimination and radicalisation, indiscriminate repression and victimisation, and agitation for secession. Kenya is also situated in a fragile and violative neighbourhood, with reigning state fragility in its immediate neighbourhood, which includes the impact of shared state fragility, shared demographics, and shared grievances with Somalia. This fragile neighbourhood also extends to the influence of the politics of IVE in the Arabian Peninsula across the Gulf of Aden, with shared state fragility between Somalia and Yemen, and alliance between *al-Shabaab* in Somalia and AQAP in Yemen. Yemen and Somalia are the most fragile states in their regions, and featured for years among four of the most fragile states in the world. Together with this shared fragility, they share Islamist linkages and mutual support. Furthermore, together with a shared fragile neighbourhood, shared demographics, and shared grievances, local grievances are also influenced by the international context of the status of Muslims in the current global order and the need to challenge such an order. All of the regional and international context impact on the relationship between state fragility, IVE, and CIVE, in Kenya. Having established the causal link between state fragility, IVE, and CIVE, one lingering question may remain: If state fragility spawns IVE and impediments to CIVE, then why are all fragile states not incubators of IVE and as a result, contributing to impediments to CIVE? The reasons are as follows:

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[303] Aristotle presented a convincing argument in *The Nicomachean Ethics* (350 BCE) that Political Science is the master-science.

Two necessary conditions must prevail. The first necessary condition is that the fragile state must be fragile but functional. IVE requires a level of organisation. In a collapsed state the conditions are too chaotic, too unmanageable, and there is a myriad of actors (such as warlords) that control incoherent areas. These are conditions not conducive to the operations of an Islamist organisation. The two distinct cases of Somalia and Kenya are demonstrative. IVE did not find traction when Somalia was a collapsed state between 1991 and 2004. IVE only found traction after some order was restored from 2004 by Islamic Courts Union (ICU) until their defeat at the end of 2006, following a US-backed Ethiopian military intervention in support of Somalia’s Transition Federal Government (TFG). After the defeat of the ICU, some level of order was further maintained by the TFG. The term of the TFG was between 2004 and 2012. In Kenya, the third wave of IVE found traction from the 1990s as Kenya was already a fragile but functional state. The second necessary condition is the political significance of religion (often coinciding with ethnicity) in such a fragile state. An Islamist organisation, whether of domestic or foreign origins, does need to latch on to local organised Muslim grievances to take root, and to gain and maintain support. While there is a distinction between Islam (the religion) and Islamism (the ideology, movement, and its organisations), Islamism cannot exist without Islam, even if it is a distorted or ‘extremist’ version of Islam. Islamism in a fragile state develops when the political significance of Islam plays out in the context of a repressed and marginalised Muslim minority (as is the case in Kenya) or intra-Muslim factionalism and sectarianism (as is the case in Somalia).

In addition to the two necessary conditions, a range of contextual conditions play out. These context specific contextual conditions include: (1) a fragile neighbourhood or proximity to other fragile states; (2) the global order and the status of Islam and Muslims in the global order; (3) the influence of the international Islamist ideology and movement; (4) the role of Muslim-kin and linkages of local Islamists with other foreign Islamists; (5) a region that is an epicentre of the fight against Islamist terror, or local participation in regional or international counter-terrorism or CVE efforts. In the case of a fragile neighbourhood, or their proximity to other fragile states, such a neighbourhood, through its neighbours (actors or agents), make the causes, symptoms, and consequences of state fragility communicable. This holds true of Islamist violent extremism and its expression, viz., Islamist terrorism.

The global order and the status of Islam and Muslims in the global order also have impact. The current global order is characterised by inequality. Islam is marginalised, particularly in Muslim-minority countries. By extension, so are Muslims in such a global order. The global order is dominated by Western and Christian states. When religion is inserted in a contested public space in such a global order, religion becomes political, inseparable from political influence, bargaining, and competition.

The international Islamist ideology and movement also have impact. IVE is an international movement and network of shared ideas, objectives, and connected, albeit sometimes competing, organisations. This network, and the position of Muslims in the world, provide the international context to local grievances. Similarly, the role of Muslim-kin and linkages of local Islamists with foreign Islamists also have impact. Although Muslim-kin can constrain and mediate the local conflict, the tendency is that Muslim-kin and foreign Islamists will participate in the local conflict, even escalate the local conflict and amplify local grievances by linking the local conflict with their own conflicts and their own grievances, as well as the internationalised IVE. The linkages of Muslim-kin between Somalia and Yemen are a case in point. A region such as East Africa that is considered an epicentre of the fight against Islamist terror, and which participates in such regional or international counter-terrorism or CIVE efforts, also adds to the international context of local grievances. State fragility remains the cause, but state fragility occurs within given conditions and within given contexts, both local and international, including the two necessary conditions and their five contexts as outlined above.

Together with the other findings of this study, there was also one specific unexpected finding. Many of the challenges faced by fragile states emanate from a capacity deficit. This is not the case in Kenya. To illustrate, there is no evidence to suggest that E3: *human flight and brain drain*, contributed to state incapacity and conflict dynamics in Kenya. Likewise, there is no evidence to indicate that the two economic indicators E1: *economic decline* and E3: *human flight and brain drain*, contributed to impediments to CIVE in Kenya. The role of both indicators would have suggested a capacity deficit. Instead, state fragility in Kenya stem less from a capacity deficit, and more from the abuse of such capacity. Instead of the other two economic indicators, it is the indicator E2: *uneven economic development* that explains not only IVE in Kenya, but also impediments to CIVE in Kenya.

Given the findings of the study, what are the implications? What has become clearly observable is the reality of worsening state fragility, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa, as well as the prospect of worsening outcomes of such state fragility, including heightened IVE and increased impediments to CIVE. Significantly, it is clear that the global Sustainable Development Goal targets will not be achieved by 2030, and that the *2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development* will have to be deferred. This is a prospect that will not alleviate the plight of marginalised communities such as ethnic-Somalis and other Muslims in Kenya. The world's 'bottom billion', estimated at 1.4 billion, is projected to grow to 1.9 billion by 2030, with more than 80 percent living in fragile states. Nine in ten of the bottom billion, living on less than US$1.90 a day, will be living in sub-Saharan Africa, Kenya included. There is a linked second trend, that of the growing appeal of Islamism to both Muslims and non-Muslims in sub-Saharan Africa. This growing appeal of Islamism results in new converts to Islam and 'born-again' Muslims, joining Islamist organisations. These new converts and 'born-again' Muslims are more zealous in their new-found ideology. The UNDP in its study on *extremism in Africa* (2017), thus warns of the very real prospect of an even greater spread of IVE in Africa than has been witnessed recently. The UNDP (2017:6) maintains that 'largely imported ideologies', such as Islamism, now 'serve as a lightning conductor' for local frustrations and anger in Africa. Converting or reverting to Islam, and joining an lslamist organisation, is an act of self-empowerment for individuals and communities left to their own devices, marginalised, or even persecuted, by the fragile state in sub-Saharan Africa. On the margins of society, abandoned and often persecuted by the fragile state, the Islamic state promises a viable refuge and an alternative desired future. Any promise of a better future is better than the Dystopia the fragile state has become for people on the margins of society in sub-Saharan Africa.

Linked to the two trends is the growing link between state fragility, climate change, and IVE (and consequently barriers to CIVE). The impact of global climate change in sub-Saharan Africa in this link is already clearly observable in the Lake Chad Region (within the Sahel Region), as well as in Somalia. In Somalia, the link between state fragility, climate change, and Islamist terrorism is established. In Chapter 7, I highlighted the causal pathway demonstrating the impact of increased desertification and recurrent droughts and floods on food and water security in Somalia, which feeds into increased migration and the fight over already scarce resources, thus increasing the marginalisation and discrimination of minority clans, and driving the destitute into the ranks of *al-Shabaab*. In Chapter 7, I also elaborated on how the draught of 2021/2022 in Kenya, which is linked to climate change, already shows climate change as a 'threat multiplier' in communal conflicts between pastoralist and farming communities in varied counties, including Marsabit, Turkana, Samburu, Isiolo, Baringo, and Laikipia. While these causal linkages are not always linear, it has become clear that state fragility in fragile states such as Kenya will especially undermine the capacity and will of the fragile state to manage the effects of climate change or ecological threats that serve either as drivers or as 'threat multipliers' of political conflict, Islamist terrorism included. The future, it appears, will get worse before it gets better.

There is no crystal ball for the future of IVE and there is no magic wand in CIVE. Be that as it may, given (1) the worsening state fragility in sub-Saharan Africa, and (2) the increasing appeal of IVE in this sub-region, which are trends one also finds in Kenya, what does the case in Kenya suggest about similar cases in sub-Saharan Africa? What do we know? Analytic generalisation, otherwise known as contextual, theoretical, or contingent generalisation, may be made in this regard, based on the findings as established in this representative case in Kenya. Yin (2012, 2018) asserts that, based on a theoretical proposition, analytic generalisation may be made from a single case by establishing a logic that is applicable in other situations. George and Bennet (2005) also assert that analytic generalisation may be made from a single case by establishing conditions under which specified outcomes occur or are likely to occur (see Chapter 2). Such a logic has been established and demonstrated in this study. These conditions have also been established and demonstrated this study. The two, the logic and the conditions, are based on the theoretical proposition of state fragility, relevant causal mechanisms and related causal patterns, and relevant context. Founded on this established logic or conditions, one can explain the relationship between state fragility, IVE, and CIVE, through the following main finding and analytic generalisation: State fragility (the *explanans*) provides the context (setting) and opportunity (enablers or permissive causes) and generates (drives or causes) IVE and impediments to CIVE (the *explanandum*). State fragility therefore explains both the development of IVE and the failure of CIVE.

After examining the relationship between state fragility, IVE, and CIVE in the context of Kenya, the case in Kenya has revealed causal sequences (with causal patterns and causal mechanisms) that shed light, given the context, on similarly fragile states that experience IVE and barriers to CIVE. This is true in specific and existing fragile contexts in sub-Saharan Africa. The logic that has been established, or the conditions that have been established, in the case in Kenya, may be applied in these contexts. These fragile contexts with marginalised yet politically significant Muslim minorities or intra-Muslim factionalism and sectarianism, include Nigeria, Cameroon, the Central African Republic (CAR), Chad, Somalia, Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, and Mozambique. The Islamist organisations that already operate in these contexts include *Boko Haram*, Islamic State in West Africa Province (ISWAP), *Ansaru*, *al-Shabaab*, Islamic State Somalia (ISS), *Ansar Dine*, Islamic State Greater Sahara (ISGS), *Jama'at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin* (JNIM), *al-Qaeda* in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), and *Ansar al-Sunnah*. These varied organisations are affiliated or have links with either Islamic State (IS) or *al-Qaeda*-Central (AQC), the two organisations that are vying for the global leadership of the Islamist movement.

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APPENDICES

Appendix A: The interview protocol.

Appendix B: The interview guide.

Appendix C: A template of the letter of request to conduct interviews.

Appendix D: Research study information leaflet and informed consent form.

Appendix A: The Interview Protocol

The following is the protocol that I employed for the interviews. The protocol is a set of principles that guided me in the management of the interview process. There was no need to control for different research assistants since none were involved, and no need thus for a detailed layout.

Preparations before the interview

- The instruments of the interview must be ready for use, i.e., laptop, recording device, journal, and pen.
- Ensure that the venue is conducive for the interview.
- Ensure that the participant is comfortable, and ready to continue with the interview.

Before the start of the interview

- Thank the participant and introduce yourself.
- Outline the purpose of the interview.
- Highlight issues of confidentiality (see appendix D**:** *Research study information leaflet and informed consent form*, for details in this regard).
- State the duration of the interview.
- Explain how the interview will be conducted.
- Provide an opportunity for the participant to ask questions.
- The participant must provide written informed consent or recorded verbal assent.

During the interview

- Keep the questions short and straight to the point.
- Ask for clarification where necessary, considering the interview guide.
- Manage the responses to enable relevant data to be collected. Be sensitive not to ask leading questions in this regard, and not be too impatient when the participant engage with issues that are marginal to the research question, research aim, or research objectives.
- Ask for any additions that the participant might deem necessary, that were not covered by the interview.

At the end of the interview

- End the interview within the time allocated.
- Thank the participant again.

- Confirm how the participant can be contacted for follow-up questions.
- Indicate to the participant how they can access the research results.
- Confirm on the consent form, to the participant, who they may contact if they are unhappy with the way the interview was conducted.

After the interview

- Transcribe the recording after the interview.
- Forward the transcript of the interview to the participant to enable respondent validation.
- The recording must be serialised and saved in a password protected environment.
- The transcript and textual notes (i.e., journal) must be serialised and locked in a secured environment.
- The recordings, transcripts, and textual notes (i.e., journal) serials must be indicated in the register. The register must be locked in a secured environment.

Appendix B: The Interview Guide

The Interview Guide

The following is the interview guide that I employed, containing a set of core questions that elicit answers to the research question and research objectives. These core questions were designed to be semi-structured, enabling follow-up questions and clarification. The questions are presented here in no particular order as to how they were presented to different informants.

- Is Islamist violent extremism (and terrorism) an internal Kenyan problem, or is Kenya a victim of external attacks? Or is it a combination of both?
- What are the factors and conditions (historical, geographical, political, economic, social, and regional) that have led to the growth of Islamist violent extremism (and terrorism) in Kenya? Why is Kenya prone to terrorist attacks?
- Are Kenyans open to recruitment or enlistment by *al-Shabaab* (and its affiliates)? If so, why? and which sections of society in Kenya are open to this recruitment or enlistment?
- Are individuals open to Islamist radicalisation in Kenya? Which factors contribute to Islamist radicalisation of individuals in Kenya?
- There are studies that indicate an increasing number of new converts to Islam that growingly swell the ranks of Islamist organisations. Is there evidence in Kenya of this phenomenon? If so, what are the contributing factors?
- Is Islamist violent extremism (and terrorism) generalised in Kenya, or does it affect regions? Which regions, and why those regions?
- Are Muslims (and ethnic-Somalis), as a community, marginalised in Kenya? What is the nature and impact of this marginalisation?
- Which (known) Islamist terrorist groups operate in Kenya?
- In your estimation, what are the objectives of *al-Shabaab* (and its affiliates) in Kenya? Are these objectives achievable?
- Has Kenya's involvement in Somalia (since Operation *Linda Nchi* and AMISOM, and now ATMIS) made Kenya more open to Islamist violent extremism (and terrorism)? If so, why?
- Is counter-terrorism/CVE in Kenya counterproductive? Does it (1) erode democratic principles and social cohesion, and/or (2) increase radicalisation and incite more conflict and violence?
- What are the obstacles to counter-terrorism/CVE in Kenya?

- What options does Kenya have (besides counter-terrorism/CVE), in dealing with Islamist violent extremism (and terrorism)?
- Does Kenya have the resources/capacity/political will to deal with Islamist violent extremism (and terrorism), given the options available?
- What is the content of counter-terrorism/CVE approaches and programming in Kenya?
- Is it time for the Kenyan government to negotiate with *al-Shabaab* (and its affiliates)?
- In your estimation is *al-Shabaab* (and its affiliates) prepared to negotiate with Kenya? Given the prevalent notion in the literature and the media that Islamist terrorist organisations 'do not want a seat at the table, they want to destroy the table'.
- In your estimation, which demands by *al-Shabaab* will be non-negotiable for the Kenyan state?

- Is Kenya a fragile state?
- If Kenya is a fragile state, which factors contribute to this fragility?
- If Kenya is a fragile state, what is the relationship between this fragility, Islamist violent extremism (and terrorism), and counter-terrorism/CVE? and what challenges does this relationship create?

State fragility in this study is understood to be: (1) a conceptual framework (2) an analytical instrument, (3) a theoretical perspective, and (4) a phenomenon that affects the state, institutions of the state, regions of the state, dimensions of the state, *et cetera*. State fragility is defined by endemic insecurity, underperformance (weakness), misperformance (abuse), endemic violence (structural, physical, and cultural), institutional failure, fault-lines, and malfunctions at three levels of the state (i.e., three units of observation), viz.: macro (in state institutions), meso (in state-society relations), and micro (between groups in society).

The fragile state, as a unit of analysis, has debilitating and conflict-generating properties that have causal capacity and causal tendency. These properties include: abusive structures of power and authority, the rule of law is often undermined by citizens and the government alike, endemic corruption, extraction of rents from the population, the state does not afford economic opportunities for its citizens, does not adequately provide political goods, has ungoverned spaces (varied dimensions of these public spaces, including: geographical, economic, social, political, legal, etc.), there are horizontal inequalities, the state is a source of insecurity for its own society (for example: through discrimination, repression, detention without trial, extrajudicial killings, and other abuses of human rights and civil liberties), and the state marginalises, securitises, and subjects ethno-religious identities to 'unjust, deliberate, and avoidable social orders' and 'historical injustices'. The ethno-religious identity, often politically significant, mobilises and acts in response to these properties of state fragility. This collective mobilisation and collective action find affinity and support with the coethnics and coreligionist of this ethno-religious identity outside of the fragile state, internationalising what otherwise would have been domestic grievances and a domestic conflict.

The outcome of state fragility is various crises, including the crises of state-building, nation-building, social-cohesion, governance, and legitimacy. Ultimately, the outcome of state fragility is varied forms of political conflict and violence, including Islamist violent extremism and its manifestation, Islamist terrorism (given the context of politically significant ethno-religious identity like Somali-Muslim identity in Kenya). Another outcome of state fragility is that state fragility generates barriers to countering Islamist violent extremism and its manifestation, Islamist terrorism. These two causal pathways are dependent on specific factors. The first causal pathway is defined by specific causal mechanisms and context, linking state fragility (X) to Islamist violent extremism and its manifestation, Islamist terrorism (Y). The second causal pathway is defined by specific causal mechanisms and context, linking state fragility (X) to barriers to countering Islamist violent extremism and its manifestation, Islamist terrorism (Y). Because of these generated barriers, the net result is the failure of countering Islamist violent extremism as well as the failure in countering Islamist terrorism.

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Appendix C: A Template of the Letter of Request to Conduct Interviews

REQUEST FOR PERMISSION TO CONDUCT RESEARCH

Dear (Name), (Position), (Institutional/Organisational affiliation).

I am a doctoral studies candidate and hereby request permission to conduct research at your (Institution/Organisation).

DATE: The research project is scheduled for 12 November 2018 – 24 October 2022.

RESEARCH PROJECT TITLE: Islamist Violent Extremism and the Fragile African State: The Case in Kenya.

PRINCIPLE INVESTIGATOR / RESEARCHER NAME AND CONTACT NUMBER

Benjamin Mokoena Tel: +2722 702 3117 Email: benjaminmokoena@sun.ac.za

FACULTY AND DEPARTMENT: Faculty of Humanities, Department of Political Studies and Governance, University of the Free State (UFS).

STUDY LEADERS' NAMES AND CONTACT NUMBERS

Study leader: Prof. Hussein Solomon
Tel: +2751 401 9454
Email: SolomonH@ufs.ac.za

WHAT IS THE AIM / PURPOSE OF THE STUDY?

The aim of the study is to examine the relationship between state fragility, Islamist violent extremism and countering Islamist violent extremism, in Kenya. The study is in fulfilment of the requirements of doctoral studies undertaken at the University of the Free State (UFS).

WHO IS DOING THE RESEARCH?

Benjamin Mokoena; a doctoral candidate with the Department of Political Studies and Governance, at the University of the Free State (UFS).

HAS THE STUDY RECEIVED ETHICAL APPROVAL?

This study has received approval from the Research Ethics Committee of the University of the Free State (UFS), with approval number: UFS-HSD2018/0745, dated 12 November 2018. This approval was extended with approval number: UFS-HSD2018/0745/21, dated 25 October 2021. Copies of the approval letters may be obtained from the researcher.

WHY IS YOUR INSTITUTION/ORGANISATION INVITED TO TAKE PART IN THIS RESEARCH PROJECT?

The reason why the (Institution/Organisation) is chosen is because the (Institution/Organisation) is at the heart of countering violent extremism and counter-terrorism in Kenya. The personnel at the (Institution/Organisation) also have the lived experience and knowledge of violent extremism and terrorism, as well as countering violent extremism and counter-terrorism. I obtained your contact details from the public media/research articles/your website. Thus, your (Institution/Organisation) was selected through purposeful sampling because of your knowledge of violent extremism and terrorism, as well as countering violent extremism and counter-terrorism. I would like to conduct one-on-one semi-structured interviews with selected members of the (Institution/Organisation).

WHAT IS THE NATURE OF PARTICIPATION IN THIS STUDY?

The (Institution/Organisation) is requested to allow the researcher access to your premises, non-classified archival documents, and identify (after obtaining permission from potential participants) potential participants for the study, or alternatively providing information (viz.: the consent form and the researcher’s contact details) to potential participants.

The identified participants will be requested, through semi-structured interviews, to provide their knowledge and experiences, as well as opinions related to violent extremism and terrorism, as well as countering violent extremism and counter-terrorism, in Kenya. The interviews will involve recordings as well as the taking of written notes. The questions that will be asked relate to non-classified knowledge and experiences as well as opinions related to violent extremism and terrorism, as well as countering violent extremism and counter-terrorism, in Kenya. The one-on-one interviews are expected to take 60 minutes. There is a minor risk expected, given the sensitivity and politicised nature of the topic. This risk is limited to the requirement to disclose the name of the participant and institutional/organisational affiliation in publications stemming from this study. However, the researcher is not going to ask about classified information, and the participants are also not expected to provide any classified information. The participants will be required to provide written informed consent or recorded verbal assent.

WHAT ARE THE POTENTIAL BENEFITS OF TAKING PART IN THIS STUDY?

The benefit for participating in this study is the contribution to the body of knowledge and original research regarding violent extremism and terrorism, as well as countering violent extremism and counter-terrorism, in Kenya.

WHAT IS THE POTENTIAL RISK FOR TAKING PART IN THIS STUDY?

There is a minor risk expected, given the sensitivity and politicised nature of the topic. This risk is limited to the requirement to disclose the name of the participant and institutional/organisational affiliation in publications stemming from this study. Participants are thus required to provide consent either as written informed consent or recorded verbal assent. The names of the participants, institutional/organisational affiliation, including answers to interview questions, will be used in the study strictly when such consent is provided.

WILL THE INFORMATION BE KEPT CONFIDENTIAL?

Responses will be attributed by name and affiliation. Confidentiality, therefore, will neither be guaranteed nor protected.

HOW WILL THE INFORMATION BE STORED AND ULTIMATELY DESTROYED?

The transcripts of the interview as well as the recordings of the interview will be stored for a period of five years in a locked and password-protected environment for verification and respondent validation in regard of the present study, and for future research or academic purposes. Future use of the stored data will be subject to further Research Ethics Review and approval if applicable. After five years the transcripts of the interview as well as the recordings will be destroyed.

WILL THERE BE PAYMENT OR ANY INCENTIVES FOR PARTICIPATING IN THIS STUDY?

The participants will not receive any form of payment. The incentive to participate in the study is the contribution the participants will make to the body of knowledge and original research, increasing our understanding of violent extremism, and countering violent extremism, in Kenya.

HOW WILL THE INSTITUTION / ORGANISATION BE INFORMED OF THE FINDINGS / RESULTS OF THE STUDY?

If you would like to be informed of the final research findings, please contact Benjamin Mokoena on +2722 702 3117 or at benjaminmokoena@sun.ac.za. The findings are accessible for up to a year after the interview. Should you require any further information or want to contact the researcher about any aspect of this study, please contact the principal investigator, Benjamin Mokoena, at the above-mentioned contact details. Should you have concerns about the way in which the research has been conducted, you may contact the principal investigator's study leader, Prof. Hussein Solomon on +2751 401 9454 or at SolomonH@ufs.ac.za. The Research Ethics Committee of the University of the Free State may be contacted through the secretary of the committee; Ms. Charné Vercueil on +2751 401 7083 or at vercueilcc@ufs.ac.za.

Yours sincerely

(BENJAMIN MOKOENA)
PH.D. CANDIDATE: UNIVERSITY OF THE FREE STATE

Appendix D: Research study information leaflet and informed consent form

RESEARCH STUDY INFORMATION LEAFLET

DATE: The research project is scheduled for 12 November 2018 – 24 October 2022.

TITLE OF THE RESEARCH PROJECT

Islamist Violent Extremism and the Fragile African State: The Case in Kenya.

PRINCIPLE INVESTIGATOR / RESEARCHER NAME AND CONTACT NUMBER

Researcher: Benjamin Mokoena
Tel: +2722 702 3117
Email: benjaminmokoena@sun.ac.za

FACULTY AND DEPARTMENT: Faculty of Humanities, Department of Political Studies and Governance, University of the Free State (UFS).

STUDY LEADERS' NAMES AND CONTACT NUMBERS

Study leader: Prof. Hussein Solomon
Tel: +2751 401 9454
Email: SolomonH@ufs.ac.za

WHAT IS THE AIM / PURPOSE OF THE STUDY?

The aim of the study is to examine the relationship between state fragility, Islamist violent extremism and countering Islamist violent extremism, in Kenya. The study is in fulfilment of the requirements of doctoral studies undertaken at the University of the Free State (UFS).

WHO IS DOING THE RESEARCH?

Benjamin Mokoena; a doctoral candidate with the Department of Political Studies and Governance, at the University of the Free State (UFS).

HAS THE STUDY RECEIVED ETHICAL APPROVAL?

This study has received approval from the Research Ethics Committee of the University of the Free State (UFS), with approval number: UFS-HSD2018/0745, dated 12 November 2018. This approval was extended with approval number: UFS-HSD2018/0745/21, dated 25 October 2021. Copies of the approval letters may be obtained from the researcher.

WHY ARE YOU INVITED TO TAKE PART IN THIS RESEARCH PROJECT?

Dear study participant

You have been selected through purposeful/snowball sampling and are invited to participate in the study because of your lived experience and/or knowledge of violent extremism and terrorism, as well as countering violent extremism and counter-terrorism, in Kenya.

WHAT IS THE NATURE OF PARTICIPATION IN THIS STUDY?

You will be requested, through semi-structured interviews, to provide your knowledge and experiences, as well as opinions related to violent extremism and terrorism, as well as countering violent extremism and counter-terrorism, in Kenya. The interviews will involve recordings as well as the taking of written notes. The questions that will be asked relate to non-classified knowledge and experiences as well as opinions related to violent extremism and terrorism, as well as countering violent extremism and counter-terrorism, in Kenya. The one-on-one interviews are expected to take 60 minutes. There is a minor risk expected, given the sensitivity and politicised nature of the topic. This risk is limited to the requirement to disclose the name of the participant and organisational affiliation in publications stemming from this study. However, the researcher is not going to ask about classified information, and the participants are also not expected to provide any classified information. You will be required to provide written informed consent or recorded verbal assent.

CAN THE PARTICIPANT WITHDRAW FROM THE STUDY?

Participation in this study is voluntary and you are under no obligation to participate. If you do decide to take part, you will be given this information leaflet to keep and be asked to sign a written consent form or have your verbal assent recorded. You are free to withdraw at any time during the interview without giving a reason.

WHAT ARE THE POTENTIAL BENEFITS OF TAKING PART IN THIS STUDY?

The benefit for participating in this study is your contribution to the body of knowledge and original research regarding violent extremism and terrorism, as well as countering violent extremism and counter-terrorism, in Kenya.

WHAT IS THE ANTICIPATED INCONVENIENCE OF TAKING PART IN THIS STUDY?

The only inconvenience anticipated is the minor risk expected, given the sensitivity and politicised nature of the topic. This risk is limited to the requirement to disclose the name of the participant and organisational affiliation in publications stemming from this study. You are thus required to provide consent either as written informed consent or recorded verbal assent. Your name, organisational affiliation, including your answers to interview questions, will be used in the study strictly when you provide such consent or assent.

WILL WHAT I SAY BE KEPT CONFIDENTIAL?

Your responses will be attributed by name and affiliation. Confidentiality, therefore, will neither be guaranteed nor protected.

HOW WILL THE INFORMATION BE STORED AND ULTIMATELY DESTROYED?

The transcripts of the interview as well as the recordings of the interview will be stored for a period of five years in a locked and password-protected environment for verification and respondent validation in regard of the present study, and for future research or academic purposes. Future use of the stored data will be subject to further Research Ethics Review and approval if applicable. After five years the transcripts of the interviews as well as the recordings will be destroyed.

WILL I RECEIVE PAYMENT OR ANY INCENTIVES FOR PARTICIPATING IN THIS STUDY?

The participant will not receive any form of payment. The incentive to participate in the study is the contribution the participant will make to the body of knowledge and original research, increasing our understanding of violent extremism, and countering violent extremism, in Kenya.

HOW WILL THE PARTICIPANT BE INFORMED OF THE FINDINGS / RESULTS OF THE STUDY?

If you would like to be informed of the final research findings, please contact Benjamin Mokoena on +2722 702 3117 or at benjaminmokoena@sun.ac.za. The findings are accessible for up to a year after the interview. Should you require any further information or want to contact the researcher about any aspect of this study, please contact the principal investigator, Benjamin Mokoena, at the above-mentioned contact details. Should you have concerns about the way in which the research has been conducted, you may contact the principal investigator’s study leader, Prof. Hussein Solomon on +2751 401 9454 or at SolomonH@ufs.ac.za. The Research Ethics Committee of the University of the Free State may be contacted through the secretary of the committee; Ms. Charné Vercueil on +2751 401 7083 or at vercueilcc@ufs.ac.za.

Thank you for taking time to read this information leaflet and for participating in this study.

INFORMED CONSENT FORM

I, ____ , agree to take part in the study entitled *Islamist Violent Extremism and the Fragile African State: The Case in Kenya*, conducted by Benjamin Mokoena, the researcher/principal investigator. I confirm that Benjamin Mokoena has informed me about the nature, procedure, potential benefits, and anticipated inconvenience of participation.

I also acknowledge that the researcher and/or the University of the Free State cannot be held liable for any negative repercussions stemming from my agreement to have my name and/or the name of the organisation I am affiliated with disclosed in any publication based on this study. I understand that respondent statements will be attributed by name and/or affiliation in publications.

I hereby agree/disagree to have my name and the name of my organisational affiliation disclosed in publications based on this study.

Full Name of Participant: ____

Signature of Participant: _______________________________________ Date: ______________________

I declare that:

- I have read the attached information leaflet (or had it explained to me) and it is written (or explained to me) in a language with which I am fluent and comfortable.
- I have had sufficient opportunity to ask questions and all my questions have been adequately answered.
- I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at any time without penalty or prejudice.
- I am aware that the findings of this study will be processed into a research report, journal publications and/or conference proceedings.
- I agree to the recording of the interview.
- I have received a signed copy of the informed consent agreement.

Full Name of Participant: ____

Signature of Participant: _______________________________________ Date: ______________________

Full Name of Researcher: ____

Signature of Researcher: _______________________________________ Date: ______________________