

**BAD FAITH AND UNDERDEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA: THE CASE OF
THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO**

by

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DECLARATION

I, Mbay Vunza, hereby declare that the work contained in this dissertation is my original work, and that I have not previously submitted it in part or in its entirety to any other university for degree or diploma purposes.

Signed:

Date: November 2020

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DEDICATION

This study is dedicated to my late wife, Mmadikomo Lillian Vunza; to my late mother, Tsimba Marguerite Vunza; and to my late learned brother, Corneille Mbay Vunza.

ABSTRACT

The main research focus of this philosophical study is to investigate Jean Paul Sartre's philosophical concept of *bad faith* critically in relation to the situation of underdevelopment and development in Africa in general and, more specifically, the socio-economic situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo as a case study. This study thus uses an existential-phenomenological interpretation of bad faith (*mauvaise foi*) in the African situation. It also searches (normatively) how this question can be addressed.

The study starts (in Chapter 1) with some methodological and conceptual remarks that offer a preliminary basis on which the issues raised above will be addressed. These issues will be in a second step linked with an introductory definition of the concepts of underdevelopment, development and bad faith – which will be taken further in the following chapters. In Chapters 2 and 3, a more sociohistorical and empirical-theoretical discussion will be provided on the concepts of underdevelopment and development. In Chapter 2, the focus is on slave trade, colonialism and corruption. Chapter 3 provides six theories of underdevelopment: imperialism theory, modernisation theory, theory of balance and unbalanced growth, the aid problem and sociopsychological theory.

After these two sociohistorical and theoretical chapters, the focus shifts to an ontological interpretation of Sartre's concept of the human being (Chapter 4) and its implications for the concept of bad faith (Chapter 5) – which in many ways is the heart of the study. In Chapter 6, the critical interpretation of Sartre's concept of bad faith is applied to the situation of underdevelopment in Africa, with specific reference to the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). One of the central arguments of the study is that theories of underdevelopment and development are not the only reason for underdevelopment in Africa. The view is that the attitude of bad faith in African leaders and Africans in general is an important complementary reason of underdevelopment in Africa. The conclusion of the study (Chapter 7) revisits the argumentative path of the study and will make some recommendations for possible development in the African context.

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INTRODUCTION

1. INTRODUCTION

The post-colonial era has left Africa with a legacy of developmental failures. In consequence, many are understandably aware of this African condition that seems to continue without end. In this current situation, one can only ponder if Africa will remain impoverished forever, or should we have faith and hope that the situation might change for the better? This study will attempt to address these issues by offering an existential-phenomenological interpretation of bad faith (*mauvaise foi*) in the African situation. This study will not only analyse this Sartrean concept of bad faith at its various levels, but will also aspire to search how this attitude can be practical in the African context of development and underdevelopment – and more specifically in the context of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC).

The main research focus of this philosophical study is to investigate Jean Paul Sartre's philosophical concept of bad faith critically in relation to the situation of underdevelopment in Africa in general and, more specifically, the socioeconomic situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo.

This introduction will start with a succinct biography of Sartre and then proceed by linking the philosophy of Sartre, and more specifically, his concept of *bad faith*, to the problem of underdevelopment in Africa (with reference to the DRC). The introduction will end by providing a brief outline of the study.

2. SARTRE'S BIOGRAPHY

Jean-Paul Sartre was born in Paris, France, on 21 June 1905. He was a philosopher, playwright, novelist, screenwriter, political activist, public intellectual, biographer, and literary critic (as novelist and playwright, see Van der Hoven in Churchill e.a. 2014). He lost his father at an early age (15 months) and he was raised by his mother and grandparents (Sartre 1964; Cox 2008: 224-226; Flynn 2014).

His first encounter with philosophy was in 1920 after reading several texts on the subjects, especially essays on Henri Bergson's interpretation of consciousness. In

1924, he studied at École Normale Supérieure in Paris, where he met Simone de Beauvoir who will later become his life-long friend and companion. In 1933, studying in Berlin, he encountered the philosophy of amongst others, Edmund Husserl and Martin Heidegger, which influenced his phenomenological-existentialist philosophy.

In 1938, he published his first novel, *Nausea* (Sartre 1969), a work that shows the existentialist thought of Sartre, and brought him early recognition (Hatzimoysis 2011: 1–9). In the late 1930s, he also published the drama *The Wall*, other philosophical texts (Sartre 1948 and 1962) and began writing the manuscript, *Being and Nothingness*. This latter philosophical work was eventually published in 1943, and is an important source for this study, because of Sartre's perception of bad faith.

In the 1940s and 1950s, according to Flynn (2014: x),

Sartre published other plays, novels, short stories, literary, aesthetic and political criticisms, numerous prefaces to other people's works, and insightful philosophical studies, not to mention the founding and editing of a major journal of opinion and critique, *Les temps modernes*, which has appeared regularly since its first issue on 1 October 1945.

The 1940s and 1950s were also a time of radicalisation (Sartre 2007). He became interested in Marxism as complement to his phenomenological-existentialism and as a theoretical model to understand European and global politics from the 1950s onwards (Sartre 1952; 1976 and 1991). Part of this, and important for this study, was an interest in post-colonial developments in the so-called Third World (Sartre 2005).

Sartre was awarded the Noble Prize for literature in 1964, which he rejected for the simple reason that he refused to receive any type of recognition, distinction or award from the establishment for any of his works (Cohen-Solal 1987: 446–448). His last work, from the middle of the 1960s onwards, was a massive intellectual historical biography on the anti-establishment figure of the 19th century, Gustave Flaubert (Sartre 1981-1993). He became blind in 1973 and throughout the 1970s, his health deteriorated (De Beauvoir 2012). On 15 April 1980, Jean Paul Sartre died in the Paris hospital Broussais due to pulmonary oedema.

3. SARTRE'S PHILOSOPHY AND THIS STUDY

The core theme in Sartre's philosophy is arguably freedom and its relation to human consciousness (Cox 2006). Sartre's phenomenological-existential ontology is relevant for the African condition, in the sense that the main objective of his entire philosophical corpus has been the human project of the self and its other (Sartre 2001: 151-162). In short, Sartre is convinced that,

to determine what kind of a self a human being chooses as his project is to determine not only what kind of human being the chooser is, but also who the human being may be in his particularity in virtue of the choices which make his life meaningful. (Gordon 1995: 5)

In this study, the Sartrean understanding of the human being as a self and the related notion of bad faith will be brought in a critical dialogue with socio-political concepts such as underdevelopment (and development).

According to Sartre, the concept bad faith can be defined as a lie to oneself. He differentiates between a lie to oneself, which refers to bad faith, and a "lie in general". The main difference between the two is that with bad faith it is self-deception, hiding the truth to one single consciousness, but in the structure of a lie in general there are two consciousnesses, one being aware of the truth, but hiding it from the other consciousness.

The choice of Jean Paul Sartre's philosophy for this analysis is justified by the fact that Sartre constitutes

... one of the major philosophical influences on Francophone anti-colonial thinkers and activists, as well as postcolonial theory. Sartre stands out as the Western philosopher who was most conspicuously involved in the politics of the anti-colonial movements, both in his writings and as an activist (Lamouchi 1996: ix).

As indicated in the biographical sketch above, Sartre was extensively concerned with colonial and "Third-World" issues from 1948 onwards. His first engagements were on

racism and Negritude, as well as on the triumph of revolutionaries in Morocco and Algeria.

Sartre's influence in the writings of Franz Omar Fanon cannot go unnoticed, because he can be said to be a product of Sartre's philosophy on postcolonial critique, and anti-colonial reaction. Sartre can be considered as being among the first philosophers who changed his historical experiences of Africans by reformulating his political and philosophical position. He became increasingly concerned with the question of abusive power relations in Africa. Fanon in *Black Skin, White Masks* (1986: xxxiv) claim, amongst others, that "the depersonalized, dislocated colonial subject can become an incalculable object, quite literally, difficult to place". According to Mudimbe (1988), Sartre did not influence George Balandier or Joseph Ki-Zerbo, nor did he necessarily guide all African thinkers. "Nevertheless, his insights illuminated the trends and preoccupations of African scholarship. His path to liberation meant a new epistemological configuration under the sovereignty of dialectical reason" (Mudimbe 1988).

Sartre's philosophical work, namely *The Critique of Dialectical Reason* (1976), represents his attempt to mediate dialectically his (earlier) ethics of individual freedom, responsibility and authenticity, on the one hand, with processes of history and power, on the other. In the section, "Racism and colonialism as praxis and process" – the inspiration for the opening chapter of *The Wretched of the Earth* (Fanon 2004) – according to Young (2004), Sartre was one of the earliest European theorists to develop a theory of history in which colonialism and the pervasive violence of the colonial regime were a major component, and which gave a significant role to anti-colonial resistance. In this sense, "Sartre's account of historical determinism remains unique in the way in which he combined subjectivity, the consciousness of acting as an historical agent, with the totality of determining historical processes" (Young in Sartre 2005: xv).

In addition, Sartre had a powerful influence on the black Francophone writers who lived in Paris in the 1940s and 1950s – particularly Césaire, Fanon and Memmi. Besides Sartre's influence, they also came across the "works of some African writers, in particular Senghor and Diop, who operated within the orbit of the Pan-African

movement and had developed the reaffirmation of black culture in the form of Negritude” (Young in Sartre 2005: xvi).

The cultural redefinition that Negritude provided – as a result of a militant metropolitan diaspora of anti-colonial radicalism – allowed African colonised subjects to transform themselves from the objectivity and reduction of abject deculturalisation. According to Sartre,

... the essence of blackness that Africans pursued was not conceived as a prior entity in existence, but as the product of life choices: Africanism and Negritude, like anti-colonialism, were the products of situational engagement (Lamouchi 1996: xxiv).

In the words of Sartre in *Black Orpheus* (1948), Negritude is considered as being “an act more than ... a frame of mind” (Sartre 1988: 314). For Mudimbe (1988: 83) it is in *Black Orpheus* that “Sartre transforms Negritude into a major political event and a philosophical criticism of colonialism”. He writes:

In *Black Orpheus* Sartre presents the means for a struggle against the dominant ideology and affirms the right of Africans to fashion a new mode of thought, of speech, and of life ... The oppressed class must first take conscience of itself ... This taking of conscience is exactly the opposite of redescending into one’s self; it has to do with a recognition in and an action of the objective situation of the proletariat ... A Jew, white among white men, can deny that he is a Jew, can declare himself a man among men. The Negro cannot deny that he is Negro nor claim for himself this abstract uncoloured humanity (Mudimbe 1988: 84).

The Negro creates an anti-racist racism. He does not at all wish to dominate the world; he wishes for the abolition of racial privileges wherever they are found; he affirms his solidarity with the oppressed of all colors (Mudimbe 1988: 85).

Although Fanon disagrees at certain points with Sartre in his *Black Skin White Mask* (1986), he firmly applies Sartre’s dialectical principle in *The Wretched of the Earth* (2004) and brusquely states, “there will not be a Black culture ... the Black problem is a political one” (Mudimbe 1988: 85). In short: Sartre’s contribution reformulated and

sharpened the politics of Negritude in Senghor. He also articulated the psychology of colonialism in Memmi (itself a nuanced response to his own Manichaeic account of the colonial divide) and the power dynamics of neo- and postcolonialism in his analysis of the political role of Patrice Lumumba. As indicated Sartre eventually confronted the French reading public with Fanon's revolutionary discourse of liberation by emphasising the epistemological revolution that was taking place (Lamouchi 1996: xi; Young 2004).

Being human for Sartre, as discussed in Chapter 4, is not constituted by any stationary, pre-existing essence. The point is rather that a human being's essence is self-motivated and formed by the choices made by the individual. This implies that an individual being is not static, but in a constant state of self-transformation, playing an active part within the space of possibilities – a conscious collection of individuals who make history (Sartre 2006: xii).

Finally, it is important to say something of the reading strategy that will be followed in this study. In many ways it is all about reading Sartre on bad faith and underdevelopment after intellectual developments in the last few decades (Rajan 2002; Roudinesco 2008). In short, it is a plea for a more complex reading of Sartre before and after deconstruction. On this point Howells (2006: 2) writes on Sartre's deconstruction and reconstruction:

Not only did Sartre's critics of the sixties and seventies attempt, unwittingly perhaps, to fossilise him in the classical works he had himself by then outgrown, but they did not accord those works themselves a fair reading. The decentered subject, the rejection of a metaphysics of presence, the critique of bourgeois humanism and individualism, the conception of the reader as producer of the text's multiple meanings, the recognition of language and thought structures as masters rather than mastered in most acts of discourse and thinking, a materialist philosophy of history as detotalised and fragmented, these are not the inventions of Lacan, Foucault, Levi-Strauss and Derrida ...

4. UNDERDEVELOPMENT, DEVELOPMENT AND THE DRC

Underdevelopment is a concept usually used to refer to certain material situations such as lack of jobs, healthcare and proper living conditions. These concepts are not only linked to material conditions and needs, but they also carry personal, psychic and symbolic implications. It is with reference to this that Sartre's philosophy could be useful. Based on these perspectives, the aim of this study is to address the complex relation between internal and external factors that facilitate African countries to follow such a slow developmental path. Sartre refers to Marx's remark in *The Eighteenth Brumaire* (1852) in which he claims that

men make their own history, but not of their own free will; not under circumstances they themselves have chosen but under the given and inherited circumstances with which they are directly confronted (Marx 1973: 146),

Sartre, on the other hand, denies that individuals must be entirely determined by economic or historical circumstances. He rather suggests that individuals possess a responsibility for themselves and their way of being in the world which entails free choice (Young in Sartre 2005: xv).

The most active period of colonisation in Africa lasted less than a century. The period relevant here, which affected the greater part of the African continent, occurred between the late nineteenth and the mid-twentieth centuries. Although this period represents just a moment in Africa's history, it is still deeply controversial. This signifies a new historical form and creates new radical types of discourse on African traditions and cultures.

Given that the continent of Africa is at the centre of political and economic interest, this study will attempt to open new ways of thinking, understanding and interpreting the problem of underdevelopment and development in Africa. One of the aims here is to broadly depict and expose the complexities and diversities of the African experience since the years of independence. The issue here is to try to identify new paths the African continent can follow to be able to move away from the condition of bad faith.

Eventually, the concepts of bad faith and underdevelopment will be analysed in relation to the Democratic Republic of Congo. It is hoped that this study will reflect broadly on the postcolonial experiences of most African countries, given their similarities (Falola and Oloruntoba, 2018; Falola and Oloruntoba, 2020).

5. OUTLINE OF THE STUDY

As stated, the main research focus of this philosophical study is to investigate Jean Paul Sartre's philosophical concept of bad faith critically in relation to the situation of underdevelopment in Africa in general, and to apply it to the socioeconomic situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo as a case study. Against this background the study will take the following argumentative path.

In Chapter 1, the research approach of the study will be discussed. It starts with some methodological and conceptual remarks that offer an introductory basis on which the issues of underdevelopment and development as well as the Sartrean concept of bad faith are addressed. The chapter thus ends by providing a brief interpretation of Sartre's concept of bad faith in relation to the concepts of underdevelopment and underdevelopment in Africa – more specifically with reference to the DRC as a case study. The introductory remarks on the concept of underdevelopment here is then taken further in the next chapter.

As said, the concept “underdevelopment” will be interpreted in Chapter 2. In this regard, certain sociohistorical causes for underdevelopment will be provided, namely slave trade, colonialism and corruption. The interpretation of each factor will be used to evaluate the extent to which underdevelopment has been constituted. The concept of development will also be explained in order to understand how other countries achieve it, while in Africa it is still a challenge. Here the concept of good leadership will be introduced as a possible reason for development and developed societies. This introduction of development may be helpful to understand where the continent of Africa is making wrong choices regarding leadership.

In Chapter 3, the interpretation of the historical and social causes of underdevelopment is extended in an empirical-theoretical direction by considering some theories of underdevelopment. Here theories of imperialism, modernisation,

balanced and unbalanced growth, dependency, aid-giving and the social psychological condition are considered. These theories may be assisting underdevelopment negatively to get stronger within the African context instead of eliminating it. The impact of each theory on Africa will be interpreted clearly in this chapter. The last of these theories, namely sociopsychological theories, serve as bridges to the next chapter. Sociopsychological theories emphasise the extent to which individuals are exposed to or influenced by a certain type of environment. This will determine how they grow both economically and socially.

The interpretation of underdevelopment in Chapters 2–3 is linked to Sartre’s ontological understanding of the human being in Chapters 4–5. In Chapter 4, three modes of being are introduced, namely: *being-in-itself*, *being-for-itself* and *being-for-others*. These three modes provide an understanding of how the human mind and actions are perceived in the world. The first two modes explain that a human being thinks only for itself, which will have an influence on the underdevelopment. Here it will be explained how human relations can interchangeably be object-subject, where competition is important. In this regard, the other (human) is seen as an enemy, which will give rise to conflict in relationships. It will also be explained how a “look”, in which human beings see one another as objects, is a threat to others. The point is that shame, because of being looked at, influences underdevelopment. Shame causes human beings not to move out of their comfort zone. This all shows that as human beings we do not want to be responsible for others human beings. This influences the behaviour of leaders, which leads either to development or underdevelopment, a point taken further in Chapter 6.

Chapter 5 builds on Chapter 4 by considering Sartre’s concept of bad faith. Bad faith emerges and exercises its attitude within human beings. Here it will be shown how patterns of bad faith originate from Sartre’s two modes – namely being-in-itself and being-for-others. The relationship between existence and essence (and that existence precedes essence) will be considered here, as well as how this consideration may lead to bad faith. The Heideggerian notion that a human being is thrown into the world as a *Dasein* (as explained by Rogers 2014) will be investigated to give a clear understanding of human action. The interpretation of bad faith and related concepts will eventually be brought into discussion with the phenomenon of bad faith amongst

leaders and followers that end up promoting underdevelopment instead of development.

In Chapter 6, the focus shifts to the political history and politics of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). It starts with a comparison of the DRC before and after independence to identify the causes of underdevelopment. The leadership of different politicians will be examined. Next, the interpretation of bad faith in the previous chapter will be considered pertaining to underdevelopment in the DRC during slavery and colonialism, and even after that. This brings two possible ways of bad faith forward; first, emphasising facticity, and secondly, emphasising transcendence. Possible practical consequences of bad faith will also be discussed: shame of own language, reverse voluntary slavery and colonialism, readiness to be re-colonised and xenophobic attacks. Similar instances of bad faith that indicate underdevelopment in other African countries will also be considered.

Chapter 7 will bring the study to a close. Findings, recommendations and limitations will be discussed, regarding the reciprocal problems of underdevelopment and bad faith in Africa. In essence, underdevelopment in Africa cannot be solely attributed to slavery and colonialism anymore, precisely because Africans got political power since independence. What happened thereafter has been their making, and have acted in bad faith in most instances due to the corruption of the leaders as demonstrated by the case study of the DRC.

CHAPTER 1: UNDERDEVELOPMENT AND SARTREAN BAD FAITH.METHODOLOGICAL AND CONCEPTUAL REMARKS

1.1 INTRODUCTION

Many philosophers have different views on the problem of underdevelopment in Africa, and the interpretations on what can or ought to be done differ significantly. The post-colonial epoch has left the African continent with a legacy of static/ non-progressive development and, as a matter of fact, many are reasonably critical of the African “poverty industry” that appears to linger without end. From this, two questions came to mind. Will the African continent remain impoverished? Should faith and hope be kept alive, believing that the situation could positively change?

Ever since World War II, we have been confronted by a global struggle to improve the living conditions of the so-called *developing countries*, particularly those situated in Africa. For many years, there have been many queries regarding the origins of underdevelopment, because liberated African countries, for instance, have made claims that the underdevelopment they face in their countries is mainly due to events of the past, namely slavery, colonialism and other reasons. This study will analyse the certainty of these reasons.

Some scholar had perceived, post-Cold War, that we were entering an era of the ‘end of history’ and the end of intercontinental warfare (Fukuyama, 1992). Sadly, however, history shows us that we have not yet achieved this. Undeniably, it appears as if the world is not stable and more so, hostile. In Africa many battles gravitate towards matters of religious, cultural and tribal differences, but a continuous theme (relating to armed conflicts) is over resources and wealth. Many African countries seem to have given up the struggle for the economic emancipation of their people, and for this reason many African countries have been classified as “underdeveloped” for so many decades.

We presently live in a period of decisive shifts in global politics, values and economic struggle. This period is characterised by the fact that long under-acknowledged

communities are reassessing their rights to recognition and respect. Is Africa participating in the search for this new dawn?

It would be pointless to search for Africa's reasons for underdevelopment in common places or blame the underdevelopment in Africa on well-known reasons. Instead of making assumptions, it is necessary to research and analyse the root causes. It is possible that they may be different from the commonly known reasons. Therefore, the issue of underdevelopment in Africa spans several generations back and cannot only be justified by the usual historical reasons, namely slavery, colonialism and many others.

This chapter will start with some remarks on the research approach that will be the basis on which the issues raised above will be addressed. The issues raised above will be in a second step linked with the concepts of underdevelopment, development and bad faith as introduced in this chapter, and taken further in Chapters 2–3.

1.2 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES AND QUESTIONS

It has been stated earlier that the main research focus of this study is to investigate Jean Paul Sartre's philosophical conception of *bad faith* critically in relation to the situation of underdevelopment and development in Africa in general and, more specifically, the socioeconomic situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo as a case study.

The focus of Sartre's ontology of the human being, for the purpose of this study, can be described as the human project of constructing itself as a self, with application in the African context. In other words, he argues that,

to determine what kind of a self a human being chooses as his project is to determine not only what kind of human being the chooser is, but also who the human being may be in his particularity in virtue of the choices which make his life meaningful. (Gordon1995: 5)

The Sartrean conception of bad faith, which will be explored later in this chapter, is part and parcel of his ontology of the human being and will be linked to the concepts of underdevelopment and development in this chapter and further on in the study.

Succinctly formulated at this stage, Sartre defines *bad faith* as a “lie to oneself”. He differentiates between a lie to oneself, (which refers to *bad faith*) and a lie in general. The difference is that bad faith is self-deception, where an individual, hides the truth in one single moment of consciousness, but in the structure of a lie in general there are two consciousnesses – me and the other.

Underdevelopment as explained in this and the next two chapters is a concept that is based on certain historical and social incidences and can be explained by means of certain theories. Underdeveloped nations are also characterised by an extensive difference between the haves and the have-nots, and an unhealthy balance of trade. The economic and social development of many developing countries has not been uniform (Szentcs 1976).

After the analysis of the concepts, *underdevelopment*, *development* and *bad faith*, towards the end, I will attempt to link the correlation between underdevelopment and bad faith in Africa with the Democratic Republic of the Congo as case study.

This study’s justification then is to analyse and interpret the various factors of underdevelopment in Africa and to link this phenomenon with the concept of *bad faith*, and the prevalence of bad faith in African leaders and Africans themselves. Bad faith could be of theoretical help to understand underdevelopment in Africa caused by bad faith leaders. Against this background the objectives of this study are:

- To define and analyse the concept of underdevelopment within the African context.
- To understand Sartre’s major concept of bad faith.
- To interpret Sartre’s philosophy of bad faith within the African context.
- Extract the relation between bad faith and underdevelopment on the African continent.

Many other countries on other continents were exposed to slavery and colonialism, but they managed to move positively from these conditions and today they are counted among developed countries. Many years have passed since African countries became independent and Africans have taken their own destiny, but instead of a developmental progress as promised during the struggle for independence, the African

situation has gone from bad to worse. What then is the fundamental problem to this phenomenon?

This research is guided by questions such as:

- Why does the African continent fail to move on?
- Why can Africans not develop their own countries?
- Is bad faith in African leaders not the main reason for Africa's underdevelopment?
- Is bad faith in Africans themselves not a contributor to Africa's underdevelopment?

1.3 RESEARCH METHOD AND VALUE OF STUDY

This research will consist of a critical and hermeneutical reading of the primary and secondary sources on Sartre's notion of bad faith and on the concept of underdevelopment. The study is also exploratory in its consideration and interpretation of bad faith and underdevelopment in Africa. According to Babbie et al. (2001: 80), they emphasise:

exploratory studies are quite valuable in social scientific research. They are essential whenever a researcher is breaking new ground, and they can almost always yield new insights into a topic for research. The chief shortcoming of exploratory studies is that they seldom provide satisfactory answers to research questions, though they can hint at the answers and can give insights into the research methods that could provide definitive answers.

This research then will attempt to:

- satisfy our interest and yearning for a better understanding;
- assess the viability of undertaking a broader study;
- try, if possible, to advance approaches to be engaged in any related study;
- elucidate fundamental terms namely; underdevelopment, development and bad faith;

- influence the significance of forthcoming research on this topic; and
- to advance a new hypothesis about this phenomenon of underdevelopment in Africa.

With the continent of Africa being at the centre of recent economic research, this study will open new ways of understanding and analysing the problem of underdevelopment in Africa. The study provides an existential-phenomenological interpretation of bad faith in an African situation, which will not only elucidate this Sartrean concept at the level of its ontological foundations, but also try to find out if this attitude can be changed. Finally, it examines the attitude of bad faith, with specific reference to the Democratic Republic of the Congo. It is hoped that this study will broadly assist the postcolonial experiences of most African countries, given their similarities.

Another value of this analysis is that it broadly depicts and exposes the complexities and diversities of the African experience since the years of independence. The issue here is to try to identify new paths which the African continent can follow and be capable of moving away from the phenomenon of *bad faith*. The position here is in agreement with Gordon (1995: 8) when he argues that, to really understand human reality, is

to choose and to examine one determined attitude which is essential to human reality and which is such that consciousness instead of directing its negation outward turns it toward itself. This attitude, it seems to me is bad faith (*mauvaise foi*).

This interpretation might be construed as the recognition that bad faith is ontological; in other words that it is innate, inherent to the character of every human being. However, *bad faith* is a nothing else than behaviour that is acquired – that can be addressed!

1.4 INTRODUCTION TO THE CONCEPTS OF UNDERDEVELOPMENT, DEVELOPMENT AND BAD FAITH

For the rest of this chapter the concepts of underdevelopment (1.4.1. and 1.4.2.), development (1.4.3.), and bad faith (1.4.4.) will be introduced and continued more intensively in Chapters 2–5.

During the early years of African independence, many Africans, as Roxborough (1979) envisioned modern industrial capitalism as a qualitatively new kind of society they wished to imitate or to live in. The initial belief amongst most Africans was that these countries would undergo a process of “political development” or “modernisation” comparable with established Western democracies. However, very soon after the independence of most African countries, it became obvious that this was not going to happen.

The essence of political movements which headed liberation in Africa and the native customs of the underdeveloped countries enforced the new elite into compelling beliefs for a complete political and economic shift. Colonial intellectuals were prepared to partake in politics; they were keen to offer their expertise for the wellbeing of their respective nations. Some scholars who graduated in the years of nationalistic fervour did not go into specialised careers but went directly into their country’s politics (Shils 2011).

Some intellectuals got involved in the politics and leadership of their countries with more focus on holding to political power and neglecting the economic aspect of their countries. The so-called “freedom fighters” claimed the acquisition of political independence as the result of their physical fight against the colonisers; therefore, they felt entitled to take over their country political power, even if they did not have the capability to govern. This is the genesis of political and economic problems many African countries face today.

1.4.1 Introducing the concept of underdevelopment

The concept of underdevelopment will be introduced here and discussed in more depth in Chapters 2–3. The remarks here anticipate the logic to be followed in the

upcoming chapters: socio historical as well as theoretical interpretations of underdevelopment will be provided.

According to most dictionaries, underdevelopment means the condition of being insufficiently developed. "Underdevelopment" seems to be a term characteristic of Third-World countries. However, there are often some difficulties in defining and understanding this concept of underdevelopment.

Underdevelopment as a concept is sometimes used to describe Third World countries that are understood as less developed. Some thinkers have a problem with the view of considering these countries as 'developing countries', preferring the term, "countries in need of development" (Bernstein 1978: vi). This holds some truth, considering Roxborough's (1979:55) dependency theory. According to this theory, underdevelopment is measured by the level of aid a country needs.

Szentes (1976: 23), in his definition of underdevelopment, evaluates the income of the country per capita, the GDP (Gross Domestic Product) and the level of institutionalisation to determine if a given country is developed or underdeveloped. However, Huntington (1968), uses the level of political maturity to determine development. That is, Huntington (1968: 397) considers this political maturity as "political development".

Underdevelopment also occurs when assets are not used to their full socio-economic advancements. This results in the local or regional progress being sluggish in numerous cases than it should be. Furthermore, it manifests from intricate interactions of internal and external reasons that permit underdeveloped countries only lopsided progressive advancements (Frank 1969).

Nations that are underdeveloped are also characterised by an extensive difference between their wealthy and impoverished people, and demeaning trade equilibrium. This unbalanced trade is what Szentes (1976: 26) sees as a result of the fact that underdeveloped countries focus mainly on their natural resources. In addition, Roxborough holds the view that

Expansion of market and an increase of production including in agriculture is also considered in the analysis of underdevelopment. The emphasis

sometimes is on capital investment, not on the ways and means of achieving capital formation. (1979: 13–14).

Frank (1969) continues by distinguishing between few rich nations and many deprived nations. He notes that it is typically apprehended that commercial developments take centre stage in a successions of capitalist phases and that today's underdeveloped countries are considered backward/behind, because developed countries have long passed this economic phase. On the other hand, Roxborough (1979: 56–58) contends that underdevelopment is not anti-progress, but purposeful downward development. In this case, the author makes the questionable assumption that people in general always seek to live a better life and will not intentionally remain backward. Only those who possess the resources and capital of the world exploits others to purposefully remain on the top ladder of the economy while the masses are beneath, helpless.

The organization of supply and demand in industrialised and emerging countries, according to Hirschman (1983: 226), is in a way that industrialised countries can acquire profits from international trade. The current order of distribution of resources interrupts growth and development, and these imbalanced trade relations are understood as the motives for underdevelopment.

Frank (1969) argues that it is sometimes believed that Third-World countries are underdeveloped, not because of natural-material reasons, but mostly because of historical actualities, and because of the power of circumstances. These unfavourable historical conditions, especially colonialism, kept these areas aside from the rapid world economic growth.

Underdeveloped countries can be advanced with the assistance of appropriate use of their wealth and resources. The focus of underdeveloped countries should be in investing in its people through education, for the educated population is in a better chance of improving their country's economy and social well-being. Maybe in this regard (of education) people from these countries can understand and avoid the attitude of self-deception, i.e. 'bad faith'.

Contrary to the new understanding of developmental dynamism through which organizations and institutions materialize and transform for pure economic reasons, as a result of choices by private individuals and parties, to boost shared welfare in

response to shifts in factor price, Doner (2009) holds that political leaders are crucial to the establishment of institutional advances. He continues that “the availability of institutional capacities depends on the ways in which resource claims and resource availability influence the calculus of national political elite operate” (Doner 2009: 19). Regarding the question on why some countries develop faster than other, or why there are those that grow and those that diminish, Doner (2009) correctly emphasises the issue of institutional capacities to address the major problems of collective actions in development activities.

In the interpretation of underdevelopment in Africa, certain theories (discussed in greater detail in Chapter 3), can be helpful.

1.4.2 Theories of underdevelopment

i) Imperialism theory. Modern imperialism is what Leys (1975:33) describes as “neo-colonialism”. The imperialism theory describes the dominion of underdeveloped countries by industrialised countries as a result of diverse economies and high-tech levels. This therefore results in uneven power potential due to different economic growth.

ii) Modernisation theory. According to modernisation theories, the country’s core issues ranges from literacy, traditional agrarian organisation, the general population’s traditional approach, social stratification /division of labour, poor communication and infrastructure, are responsible for underdevelopment (Reyes, 2001).

iii) Dependency theory. De Beer and Swanepoel (2000: 39–44) hold that “dependency theory is the body of theories developed by various intellectuals, both from the Third World and the First World, which suggests that wealthy nations need a peripheral group of poorer states in order to remain wealthy.” This theory suggests that the destitution of countries on the periphery is not due to the fact that they are not incorporated into the world system, but rather what hinders them is their integration into this system. These disadvantaged countries are considered as providers of natural resources and cheap labour.

iv) Theory of balanced and unbalanced growth. This theory perceives the main hindrances to development in the contracted market and in the restricted economic

opportunities. Here, only a handful of beneficial investments realised simultaneously that they have the opportunity of making mutual demands. “The real bottleneck in breaking the narrow market is grasped here in the scarcity of capital, and therefore, all potential sources have to be mobilised. If capital is available, investments will be made. However, in order to guarantee balanced growth, there is a need for investment planning by the government.” (Roxborough 1979: 13).

v) The aid problem. In his book *The Bottom Million* (2007), the Oxford economist Paul Collier states that aid alone will not be competent enough in addressing the problems of the bottom, many of which are in Africa, increasingly falling behind the rest of the world. He notes that, unlike oil, aid can convey higher rates of growth (an estimated 1 per cent more in annual growth rates over the last 30 years) partly by offering skills, improving infrastructure and, more controversially, reducing capital flight by making private investment more attractive. The role of aid has in recent years “probably been overemphasised, because it is the easiest thing done by [the] Western world since it fits so comfortably into a moral universe organised around the principles of sin and exploitation” (Mills 2010: 317).

vi) Social psychological theory. Hagen (1962: 9) builds on McClelland’s concept that

... a level of development correlates with achievement motivation. He offers reasons why achievement motivations differ between societies and their classes and strata. He argues that in traditional societies, the status of individuals is stable. Children learn to act according to established norms, and nonconformities (initiative) are reprimanded. If a new group gains power by external influence, the status of the old elite is challenged and weakened, causing insecurity and frustration, which lead to changed behaviour. Consequently, the impact falls on the family structure; children tend to become dissatisfied with society and willingly accept new values. In time, they become innovative personalities who could become the dominant groups in society and cause economic development. Similar phenomena may happen as far as the altering situation of marginal groups or minorities is concerned.

Certain social psychological conditions, though, can push a human being to behave in bad faith.

To summarise: From these different theories of underdevelopment the researcher can conclude that underdevelopment is not necessarily the result of a lack of development. It is the outcome

... of an ill-guided kind of universal development. It could be the historical abuse of income, especially during the period dominated by capitalist neo-colonialism, which is responsible for much of the underdevelopment in the world today (Frank 1969).

However, even if these theories give us a good idea, surely, they cannot be the sole reason of underdevelopment in Africa. We must look further.

1.4.3 Introducing the concept of development

Underdevelopment cannot be considered without at least stating how people and thinkers understand the concept of development. Alan Thomas (2000: 777) usefully distinguishes three main contemporary meanings of the term “development” as follows:

- “As a vision, description or measure of the state of being of an anticipated society”;
- “As an historical process of social change in which societies are altered over long periods”; and
- “As consisting of cautious efforts aimed at improvement on the part of numerous agencies, including governments, organisations and social movements”.

A variety of theoretical methods and models of development arose within the courses of the advancement of capitalism at different periods and places. In short, the

burden of development was to compensate for the negative propensities of capitalism through the reconstruction of social order. To develop, then, was to ameliorate the social misery which arose out of the immanent process of capitalist growth (Cowen and Shenton 1995: 16).

Development can also be considered as a form of life betterment. In this context, development as improvement, and as a state of recreating inherent capitalist growth in the face of the public despair and class struggle, needs to be elaborated. Here Cowen and Shenton (1991) insist

... on the creation of development as an ameliorative doctrine and a set of state practices to build social and political order in capitalism. This means that they did not explore the 'inventions' and doctrines of development devoted to achieving accumulation and economic growth.

The principal goal of development seems to be to overcome "poverty, ignorance and disease" through suitable approaches of growth, dispersal and the provision of public goods.

In this context, the doctrine of development shifts towards visions of a needed society incorporated in their hopefulness and socio-political currency, however, the organised device of progress expanded, in part through a novel internationalisation of its agencies. This is something African leaders tend to ignore.

In addition, there are also those who define development as "modernity"; they take development mostly for economic terms. This understanding of development underpins much of the work of international organisations such as the World Bank, and many national governments in both the Global North and the Global South. "The World Bank, for example, uses Gross National Income per capita (GNI p.c.) to differentiate between the countries of the world into development and underdevelopment categories" (Willis 2011: 3).

Due to the differences of ideologies of development and the variety of measures, through which it can be mentioned, "assessing 'development' requires proxies" (Morse 2004: 1388). For instance, if we are to look at the World Bank, the indicator for economic development is indicated as *GNI p.c.* An additional issue when assessing development is the problem of comparing different countries, without considering their different historical socio-economic innovations. According to Bulmer and Warwick they stipulate that "collecting huge amounts of information through national censuses needs significant resources; trained personnel and technology for analysing the results

which are clearly not equally available to all national governments.” (Bulmer and Warwick 1993: 25).

Thirdly, development measures are quantitative. This focus is reasonable, given the need to make comparisons across time and space, and to deal with massive amounts of information. However, by focusing on quantitative measurement, the subjective qualitative measurements of development are left out. In measuring development in the world, qualitative aspects of development are usually ignored most of the time.

As alternative, post-colonial methods seek to interrupt methods of thinking about the world based on assumptions and to identify differences, chiefly within the setting of places and peoples who have been at the receiving end of colonialism. In this context, bad faith can be a measuring tool of qualitative development and therefore underdevelopment can also be the result of bad faith.

According to Loomba “... the concept ‘post-colonialism’ usually indicates an era after colonialism, and also describes a method to understanding social, economic, political and cultural processes”. “This includes both the material legacies of colonialism, such as urban structures and social hierarchies, as well as how specific forms of knowledge are valued at the expense of others” (Loomba 1998: 16). If we look at Frantz Fanon’s *Black Skin White Masks* (1986) he highlights the effects of European colonialism on the mentalities of colonised Black people. Post-colonial discourse therefore is “an attempt to understand not only the observable legacies of colonialism, but also the ideas of ‘development’ that have been transferred as part of the colonial process” (McEwan 2009: 77).

It could be argued that development as a discourse on society and process has been largely based on Eurocentric assumptions. According to this view development has integrated large areas of the world into a Northern-dominated economic, political, and social system which has destroyed indigenous cultures, threatened environmental sustainability, and has created feelings of inferiority among people of Africa. Post-colonial (and postmodern) approaches to development, though, have also received some criticism. Here, theorists are accused of “playing academic games”, rather than dealing with the day-to-day problems that millions of the world’s poorest people face (Nederveen Pieterse 2010; Simon 1998; Sylvester 1999).

More recently the recognition of diversity in constructing development theories has also been noted. Here, the context within which theories operate is important with a concept such as *post-development* that came forward. Post-development stresses the importance of the discourse of development and how this concept is defined and discussed. Far from being neutral, these theorists understand development through prevailing power relations and have definite opinions which development ideas are right, and which is wrong. As McEwan (2009: 146) indicates, within the context of postcolonialism, “Development discourse promotes and justifies very real interventions with real consequences.”

The work of the post-development theorist Arturo Escobar, who uses Colombia as a case study to discuss the development process, can be mentioned here. Escobar means by development the highly technocratic approach adopted by the World Bank, US government and other Northern institutions in the post-World War II period. He argues that before “the north” came into Colombia, there was no such thing as “poverty” and therefore no need for “development”. According to him phenomena like low life expectancies, lack of formal education, houses, water and electricity were not usually regarded as problems. The point is that by imposing external norms and expectations on the Colombian society and economy, the country was interpreted as “lacking development”.

After this brief analysis of the concept *underdevelopment*, Jean Paul Sartre’s concept of bad faith will now be introduced.

1.4.4 Introducing Sartre’s concept of bad faith

Some central aspects of Sartre’s concept of ‘bad faith’ will be introduced here in a succinct manner – a more detailed discussion will take place in Chapters 4–5. This introduction will start with a general background by considering Sartre’s ontological view and how it impacts on his view of the human being (i). This will provide a good footing to understand his concept of bad faith (ii). At the end of this section, an attempt will be made to reconnect the discussion here with earlier remarks made on the concepts of underdevelopment and development and its implications for African life (iii).

i) Sartre's ontology starts with the position that "Being is opaque to itself, brute, inert, neither active nor passive, meaningless, resistant to consciousness, pure *immanence*." (Sartre 1958: xli; Moran 2000: 356). Being is equally beyond negation as affirmation.

At this point Sartre links this description of being as a world full of brute, inert matter, with the concept of "being in-itself" (*être en-soi*). He contrasts this formulation with the concept of human consciousness, "being-for-itself" (*pour-soi*). "This terminology has its origins in German philosophy from Kant, Fichte and Hegel (on to Husserl and Heidegger). Opposed to the monolithic and undifferentiated, being in-itself is, as indicated, being 'for-itself' (*pour-soi*), or consciousness, which, in Hegelian terms, always seeks to develop itself and come into identity with itself. The *en-soi* is a condition of the *pour-soi*. The *pour-soi* is not its own base (though Sartre sometimes talks as if it were self-founding); rather, it depends utterly on the in-itself. Consciousness is always described in a manner which suggests the influence of Heidegger, as an "irruption into being, or as a fissure in being" (Moran 2000: 357). Sartre (1958) puts it neatly as follows,

Presence to self, on the contrary, supposes that an impalpable fissure has slipped into being. If being is present to itself, it is because it is not wholly itself. Presence is an immediate deterioration of coincidence, for it supposes separation.

Yet, Sartre claims there is no relation possible between in-itself and for-itself – they do not communicate with each other. In short, for Sartre "... there is only being in-itself on the one hand, and human projects on the other. These projects are attempts of consciousness to achieve being in-itself while remaining conscious. Thus, the 'for-itself' has an ultimate, fundamental project: to be both being and knowing; in short, to be what it never can be, namely God" (Moran 2000: 357). The object of consciousness is a being beyond consciousness.

All consciousness, grasping at the reality of being in-itself, is as said, "uncreated, neither active nor passive". Being-for-itself, on the other hand, is never in complete identity with itself; it is, as Moran (2000: 386-387) aptly states, "... decompression of being ... fissured or fractured..." being. Consciousness, for-itself, even in its direct

presence to self, never completely coincides with itself. Consciousness is a 'non-thing'; it is a nothingness – *Being and Nothingness*. “The origin of this risk is that the nature of consciousness is to be what it is not and not to be what it is.” (Kaufman 1956: 270)

To this Sartre adds that self-consciousness is the only manner of existence possible for consciousness. The real merit of Sartre’s contribution, though, is not his complex and problematic ontology as sketched here,

... but the way in which it provides close descriptions of various *human situations* that are rich in phenomenological and philosophical insight. Chief among these descriptions are accounts of what it is to be in ‘bad faith’ (*la mauvaise foi*), to adopt a ‘persona’ that is at odds with one’s Protean shifting amorphous existence (Moran 2000: 387).

ii) Bad faith is an “eidetic analysis of self-deception” (*mauvaise foi*). In bad faith a person denies his/her true choice. Human consciousness is truly free, fully Protean. It is open and pure possibility – can be anything. Yet, at every instant, we are embedded in the historical situation, *situé*. Human beings are caught up in facticity or “the situation” in Sartre’s words.

Authenticity (a concept that Sartre gets from Husserl’s *Jemeinigkeit* and Heidegger’s *Eigentlichkeit*) is how we respond to the situation in a manner which acknowledges and preserves our freedom. To be authentic is to grasp one’s freedom and recognise it. Sartre’s most interesting discussions concern the way which we come to consciousness of ourselves in the light of how others see us. Not only do we give ourselves projects; we also have ourselves as we are viewed by others, our being-for-others (*être-pour-autrui*) (Moran 2000: 388).

The linkage between Sartre’s ontology of the human being and the interpretation of African circumstances (later in this study) is motivated by the fact that the main objective of his philosophical corpus is based on the real and social life of the human project. In other words, Sartre is convinced that,

to determine what kind of a self a human being chooses as his project is to determine not only what kind of human being the chooser is, but also who

the human being may be in his particularity in virtue of the choices which make his life meaningful. (Gordon 1995: 5)

If human beings always make choices in life situations, they also choose the type of life they want to live.

Sartre, though, sketches various situations which bedevil authentic and free inter-subjective human relations. According to his understanding, a human being confronted with freedom and responsibility tends to use the attitude of bad faith as a scapegoat or excuse. Here his position is based on a fundamental ontology of being as sketched above. In this sense his interpretation is mainly existential rather than metaphysical, because of its focus on the human reality with all its daily activities and situations. Within human situations Sartre makes use of real examples of life to explain the phenomenon of bad faith. The existentialist concept of bad faith “describes the phenomenon where a human being, under pressure from societal forces, adopts false values and disowns his or her innate freedom to act authentically. It is closely related to the concept of self-deception and resentment.” (Poster 1975).

Furthermore, bad faith may be formed through deception, corruption, hypocrisy and lack of authenticity. Sartre (1958: 375) calls this

the belief that there is something intrinsically good-in-itself, which is inherent in the world as absolute value and is discoverable by people and this leads to bad faith. For example, women in love may in bad faith allow themselves to be subjugated by their lovers who have created a dependency of the woman on him.

This attitude of bad faith is at the centre of human existence. It is based on the human being's relation to himself and to others. As the human being lives in society, his attitude towards himself influences his relation to others. In this regard the analysis of bad faith puts us in a better position to understand the fundamental patterns of human reality. If we strongly wish to get out of the impasse created by the attitude of bad faith, we must first examine all its patterns and describe them. This will enable us to attempt to answer the following question: What is in the nature of man making him or her capable of bad faith?

Sartre also defines the concept of bad faith as a “lie to oneself”. According to Sartre, a person with an attitude of bad faith is incapable of genuine and authentic social interaction and intention and commitment (Elwyn 2012). “Through bad faith a person seeks to escape the responsible freedom of being-for-itself.” (Sartre 1958: 628) This attitude also creates a certain anguish for man. It can be manifested practically by a kind of abdication, wherein all our acts seem to be dictated by an “outside being”. In this regard it may seem “useless for human reality to seek to get out of this dilemma, one must either transcend the other or allow oneself to be transcended by him” (Gordon 1995: 46). Against this background it is now necessary to look at some concrete examples of bad faith in daily living and human situations.

Firstly, there is the duality of facticity-transcendence within human beings. Sartre refers to facticity as certain realities which partially determine a human being: colour, body, sex, the society in which we live, etc.

By the mere fact that we can contemplate our facticities and examine them as ‘objects’, we know that we are not identified with them. We can thus interpret our relation to these ‘facts’, and in this sense, we transcend them. (Catalano 1974: 82)

This is manifested in every human activity. On the other hand, bad faith wants to make this transcendence impossible.

But bad faith does not wish either to coordinate them nor to surmount them in a synthesis. Bad faith seeks to affirm their identity while preserving their differences. It must affirm facticity as being transcendence and transcendence as being facticity, in such a way that at the instant when a person apprehends the one, he can find himself abruptly faced with the other. (Sartre 1958: 56)

In the conflict between human ‘facticity and transcendence’, the attitude of bad faith appears. However, for Sartre a person must be a fusion of ‘facticity and transcendence’, even if bad faith attempts to separate them. keep them apart. Living in bad faith cannot be considered as a permanent state of man’s life, but rather a certain style of behaviour or attitude that can be changed. Gibbs (2011) correctly reiterates that “bad faith essentially involves either a misplaced emphasis on facticity

(in-itself) or transcendence (for-itself).” The approach of ‘bad faith’ is always a trap to all human beings, but the responsibility of the human being is to avoid it at all costs.

Secondly, the attitude of bad faith is characterised by the perpetual escape from the being-for-itself to the being-for-others and vice-versa. In this eternal game of human being, the danger is that the conscious being pretends to be nothing else except a being-for-others, which simply means that he plays the role assigned to him by others. Therefore, his acts must be determined by how he is meant to be. This attitude is a denial of not being able to control what we can control. It is also an attempt for the being-for-itself to give up his choices, and evade his own human reality, and disappear into a sea of being. A person using bad faith as a rule of conduct is strictly determined by his outside (unreflected) life, but easily forgets his real essence of life, which is mainly his freedom.

Thirdly, the attitude of bad faith is also manifested by the human being in a situation of *anguish*. Anguish is usually defined as confrontation within the self. Sartre’s idea of anguish neither refers to fear of a person in the face of certain event he considers as inevitable, nor to the fear a person experiences while thinking of what might happen. He simply “means more precisely the feeling which is experienced when we probe what may depend on our decision to act in one way or another” (Champigny1972: 18). In a situation of anguish a person is forced by the fact that he is the one who must make the choices that constitute him. This therefore puts her in a total confrontation with herself and forces her to admit to herself what she really is and accept the responsibility of her own choices. For Sartre the situation of anguish is the possibility of the attitude of bad faith, because human beings are in anguish in order to escape from anguish, but within the unity of a single consciousness.

This attitude of anguish is practically manifested by a certain abdication wherein all our acts seem to be dictated by an ‘outside being’. People then no longer live their lives, but they live to please ‘others’ watching them. It is, in fact, anguish to flee anguish, which presupposes that one can decentre oneself in relation to what one is. One can be anguished in the form of ‘not being it’ and can dispose of a nihilating power at the heart of anguish itself. This nihilating power nihilates suffering insofar as one flees it and nihilates itself. This attitude is what we call bad faith (Sartre, in Gordon 1995: 15). In his critical analysis of the idea of bad faith, Sartre refers to the

phenomenon of human experience in general by considering it as an 'attempt to retreat from the anguish of freedom and responsibility.' (Sartre 1958).

Fourthly, for Webber (2007: 54), "... the central example in Sartre's *Being and Nothingness* is the inferiority complex. The goal of this is to present oneself to self and others as intrinsically inferior to others." Sartre (1958: 459, 528–529) asserts that

pursuing this project involves adopting further projects that one cannot hope to achieve, or that one pursues in hopeless ways, so that when one fails to achieve these goals, the blame can be pinned on their natural inferiority.

This is in an attitude that will later be investigated regarding African leaders. To resolve this attitude of inferiority, Sartre (1958: 471) claims that,

At all events the 'inferiority complex' can arise only if it is founded on a free apprehension of our being-for-others. This being-for-others as a situation will act in the capacity of a cause, but all the same it must be discovered by a motive which is nothing but our free project. Thus the inferiority which is felt and lived is the chosen instrument to make us comparable to a thing; that is, to make us exist as a pure outside in the midst of the world.

The complex of inferiority pushes human beings to escape from their responsibilities. They assign their freedom as a responsibility to others. Gibbs (2011) writes in this regard that "bad faith is the primary obstacle to authentic existence; the forfeiting of the responsibility of freedom".

Fifthly, there is a need in the context of the analysis of the concept of bad faith to link it with the attitude of shame in human beings. The attitude of shame that is born of bad faith is different from the aspects of shame on which that bad faith relies. Sartre should make his position here clearer, maybe by discussing the two aspects of shame separately. He is not doing it in within the overall structure of *Being and Nothingness*. Sartre is pursuing the much more limited aim of showing that certain actual behaviour patterns reveal something peculiar and fundamental about our existence, namely that we are what we are not and are not what we are. Using Heidegger's terminology, we can say that Sartre's discussion weaves a concern with the ontic facts of our current

existence into his investigation of the ontological structures of our kind of existence (Heidegger 1962: 3–4).

Finally, after discussing these five examples of bad faith in everyday life and human situations, we are coming full circle by asking: Where does bad faith come from in the first place? Is it from the structures of our ontology? Lacking a fundamental nature, writes Ronald Santoni, “human reality” as Sartre understands it “is immediately and perpetually disposed to flee from its nothingness, to fill its emptiness, to become something” (2008: 30); an “original or primitive ontological bad faith”, he claims, that “congenitally” or “naturally”, underpins any particular project of bad faith (Santoni 2008: 31; Thomas 2010: 1).

Indeed, towards the beginning of *Being and Nothingness*, Sartre does say that bad faith “is essential to human reality” (1958: 71). Towards the end of the book, he reiterates this when he argues that “human reality is the desire for being-in-itself” (1958: 586). He thinks that the structure of human reality encompasses the desire to have a fixed nature, the desire for being-in-itself, the desire that drives the project of bad faith (Butler 2012).

However, we should not conclude from this that Sartre thinks of this as part of the ontology of our existence, for that would contradict his claim that we can “radically escape bad faith” through the “self-recovery of a being that was previously corrupted”. He calls it “authenticity” (Sartre 1958). We should rather bear in mind that Sartre is offering a phenomenological ontology of existence and existential psychoanalysis of the method in which that ontology is played out in our culture.

Webber (2007: 89) believes that

bad faith involves a specific kind of self-deception, on Sartre’s view, in which one is continuously presented with evidence that we do not have fixed natures, in the form of an awareness that we ourselves need not behave in the ways in which we do behave.

iii) The challenge of this introductory sketch of bad faith is now to show how it can be linked to the concepts of underdevelopment and development – and its eventual relevance for socio-political circumstances in Africa and more specifically in the

Democratic Republic of the Congo. Here the question is: Can the issue of bad faith address the major spiritual and material crisis of contemporary African societies. Two issues that are important here are authenticity and the being-with-others.

In the coming Chapters (3,4 and 5), after a critical analysis of Sartre's concept of bad faith, and theories of underdevelopment and development in Africa, this study will establish and justify the link among these in connection with the African reality with specific reference to DRC.

1.5 CONCLUSION

It is a fact that the development gained by the African continent before and during the colonial era was delayed or even stopped at the time when Africans themselves took over the leadership of their countries. Various reasons, as introduced in this chapter were offered to justify the low level of development – amongst others the low number of African intellectuals and technicians, slavery, and the looting of Africa by the colonisers. The problem is that these arguments might have been valid at the time when African countries only had a small elite prepared intellectually to take over from the colonisers. Today these arguments seem to be invalid, given that the continent can proudly boast having produced many intellectuals, technicians and possesses immense natural resources. Despite these assets, there have been no significant changes in most, if not all African countries. On the contrary, in most cases, the situation has deteriorated, as is illustrated by economic and political failures.

It can be argued that postcolonial African states could not keep up with international economic growth. Africa in general had a lower development level at the time of independence.

Decolonisation in Africa was primarily triggered by international factors and most territories were not prepared for internal development. The colonial economy had not penetrated so deeply in the African society. Apart from the European minorities in the southern part of the continent, Africa lacked strong enterprising minority groups with transactional networks of the type formed by the Chinese in South Asian countries. (Rodney 1972: 140).

It is at this point that the attitude of bad faith was introduced as a possible way to interpret the practices of practices of tribalism, corruption, and political 'lies' amongst leaders – and more specifically African leaders. In the next two chapter (and Chapter 6) it will be argued that there is a link between the slow development and progress of the African continent and the leadership styles find on the continent.

CHAPTER 2: UNDERDEVELOPMENT: SOCIOHISTORICAL REMARKS

2.1 INTRODUCTION

In the previous chapter, some introductory remarks were made on the phenomena of underdevelopment and development with reference to Africa. In this chapter (and the next one) these remarks will be expanded and deepened. In many ways this chapter provides a sociohistorical basis for the next chapter, which will be more theoretical on the phenomenon of underdevelopment/development.

It is also important here to mention the link between bad faith and the upcoming reflections about underdevelopment. One way to see this link is to see economic activity and the emergence of capitalism as the major economic system not as something natural (*in-itself*), but the result of human consciousness (*for itself*) and interaction (*with-another*).

The challenge of this study thus is to provide a good sociohistorical (this chapter) and theoretical sketch (Chapter 3) of the phenomenon of underdevelopment and development as human activity and thus relevant for the ontological distinction that Sartre makes between the *in-itself* (nature), on the one side and the *for-itself* (human consciousness) and *being-with-another* (human interaction), on the other hand. In this sense, human history and human economic activity are thus part and parcel of *being-for-itself* and *being-amongst-others*. They are also the basis for human suffering and emancipation.

This chapter will start with further remarks on the concept of underdevelopment (especially definitional differences) and then move on to a substantial discussion of certain sociohistorical reasons for underdevelopment (namely slave trade, colonialism and corruption). The chapter will end by revisiting the concept of development.

2.2 THE AFRICAN EXPERIENCE

For a better understanding of the concept 'underdevelopment' within the African context, a brief analysis of the African experience before any contact with the external

world is needed. African societies are known to be collectivist societies. For this reason, the group is paramount, and the group's interests clearly supersede the personal ones.

A person defines his identity in terms of belonging to a group. Everyone belongs and is responsible to a group. For instance, when a person commits an offense against another person, the offense reflects badly not just on the individual offender but on his group as well (Khapoya 1994: 43).

Because of the economic and social changes now taking place in Africa, the collectivist ethos is being challenged, because it is now possible for one to move to a city and find the means to support himself and his immediate family, become autonomous and possibly self-sufficient, to the extent that the group can no longer exercise any form of control over him.

Considering Khapoya's view (1994: 59) in precolonial Africa, there were two types of political systems: states and stateless societies. States were organised structurally much as modern states are. They had bureaucracies to carry out certain functions such as collecting taxes, supervising ceremonies, entertaining dignitaries and forcing people to do what the kings or chiefs wanted them to do. The stateless societies, on the other hand, were politically decentralised entities. They had no bureaucracies to speak of and tended to be based on kinship (i.e. lineage systems and extended families) before the advent of Europeans, most Africans lived in "stateless" societies.

The hierarchical system or succession to power was highly centralised, presided over by a very powerful king and served by an efficient bureaucracy or a military machine. The society was organised in such a manner that the king, paramount chief, or military commander had subordinates who exercised whatever power they had entirely at the discretion of the person at the top. This form of succession to power has greatly influenced the modern African leaders, as will be demonstrated in the coming chapters.

2.3 DEFINING UNDERDEVELOPMENT

According to Labini (2001: 1),

... after the beginning of the process of decolonisation, at the conclusion of the Second World War, several economists began to study systematically the problems of underdeveloped countries. These problems were considered from both an analytical and a practical standpoint, that is, with the purpose of understanding the causes of underdevelopment and suggesting measures of economic policy intended to promote growth.

The original meaning of the term *underdevelopment* seems to indicate that existing resources have not been exploited. Underdevelopment can also be said to be a product of the misuse of natural resources that forcibly deter countries from economic expansion and hinder the social change needed to uplift people in an integrated economical system, which can benefit everyone. It is the outcome of an ill-guided kind of development. For this reason, underdevelopment takes place when resources in a given country are not used to their full potential, resulting in local or regional development being slower than it should be.

Consequently, some countries are identified as either developed or not, depending on the definition of underdevelopment being used. Underdevelopment implies a kind of teleology, where some nation states are fully developed, on the one hand, and other nation-states are completely underdeveloped. This then becomes a system of self-producing stagnation – a complex system of reciprocal supporting internal factors that allow the less developed countries only a skewed development progression. Against this background the world became divided between rich and poor countries – also internally between rich and poor individuals and peoples in a specific country.

An underdeveloped country can either be one that is developing but has not quite yet caught up with other developed countries, or one that shows little signs of improving its internal conditions. Underdevelopment can also refer to economic backwardness, which may include not being independent and relying on other countries for survival. The economic and social development of various developing countries may vary on different points. They may have an unequal trade balance, which results from their

dependence upon raw materials and natural resources, usually only a handful, for their export. As said above, one can sympathise with this definition, since it is believed that underdevelopment is rooted in the concept of the nation and of the state. However, it is also important to acknowledge that for some people it is irrelevant which nation and which state they belong to, although public and private infrastructure is what generally gives rise to this misconception (Coetzee 1988: 37–39).

The important thing, given the definition of underdevelopment so far is that an indispensable component of modern underdevelopment is *exploitation* – the (external) exploitation of one country by another and the (internal) exploitation of one group by another. Both forms of exploitation have been plaguing countries across the African continent for a very long time. It has many negative effects on the African population, for example poverty, illiteracy, corruption and lack of accountability.

Returning to external exploitation means that countries that are labelled “underdeveloped” in the world are exploited by others and the underdevelopment mentioned here is normally linked to the so-called Third World and post-colonialism. During the 1970s, the concept of underdevelopment became current in the field of development studies – an important subfield within the social sciences. It deals with the issue why economic growth has been oblique in so-called post-colonial countries. In this sense, underdevelopment refers to a certain economic situation, symptoms of which include lack of access to job opportunities, healthcare, potable water, food, education and housing. For some theorists the concept of underdevelopment is the closest related to the phenomenon of poverty. This brings us to the issue of underdevelopment and the so-called Third World. Most underdeveloped countries are marked or characterised by several common traits, namely (Coetzee 1988: 40):

- They have distorted, and highly dependent economies devoted to the production of primary products for export to the developed world.
- They also have strong traditional, rural social structures, high population growth and widespread poverty.
- They are characterised by poor and undemocratic governance, a high illiteracy rate, disease, abuse of individual freedom and liberty.

- Their public officials and people placed in authority are generally not accountable to their own people.

As helpful as this definition is, it is important to retain the differentiation that was already mentioned above about the underdeveloped world. It includes countries on different levels of economic development and despite the poverty of most of its population, the ruling elite of most underdeveloped countries are wealthy. Against this background, the immense social differences between people in the same country divide these countries economically into two: the rich bloc and the poor bloc. These blocs culminate in the formation of two worlds in one country, namely the world of well-developed, minority wealthy people, and the world of the majority poor. This economical gap splits African countries into two groups that are unable to understand each other: the group that can barely survive, which comprise two-thirds of the country's population and lives in the underdeveloped areas; and the remaining one third, which lives in the rich areas. Along the same lines one could argue that underdevelopment is the abusive concentration of income by the elite who has direct political access to the economic resources of the state.

Still (despite the differentiation made) most countries characterised by underdevelopment in Africa are faced with exploitation by other countries and the underdevelopment with which Africa is now preoccupied seems to be the product of capitalist and colonial exploitation. Frank (1969: 123) writes, "... an indispensable component of modern underdevelopment is that it expresses a particular relationship of exploitation namely; the exploitation of one country by the other..."

Various theoretical models have been proposed to deal with the exploitation of one country by another. There is a thinking that development should be in terms of stages, models, and industry rotations. Marxists hold that there are socioeconomic and sociohistorical factors the capitalist models ignore. By explaining the problems pointed out by Marxists, however, does not mean they are completely acceptable. Capitalist models, on the other side, explain how economies ought to develop. Unfortunately, this does not take away that governmental and political exploitation interfere with the general tendencies laid out by capitalist models (Coetzee 1988: 40–41). Most of the time, this interference influences the so-called developing nations negatively.

Against the background of such an economic reading it is easy to classify Africa as the most underdeveloped continent in the world. The continent comprises more than fifty countries and more than half of these countries are on the United Nations' data list of the least developed.

On the other hand, Du Bois (1947) notes that Africa is the home of civilisation and that those countries that are considered developed today had their roots in Africa and share its civilisation. He continues that this form of civilisation began in the Nile River in Egypt where there was an abundance of resources and no hunger. Du Bois alleges that prior to the invasion by the Europeans, African people had their development initiatives on the right track. This remains an allegation or an assumption. It is also suggested that Africans themselves produced certain kinds of products that clearly indicated their innovative capacities. Does this mean that underdevelopment in Africa is a surprise and seems to be the result of the inferior character or the lack of capacity to become creative? Du Bois rather counters that after the invasion by Europeans, Africans were manipulated through means such as religion and technology; thus, their capacities were left undermined. Amin (1972), on his part, concurs that underdevelopment in Africa was due to the collision of Europeans and Africans, whereby Europeans had more power of dominance. One of the central questions of this study and investigation is whether this can be justified after all these years.

Mills (2010: xx), for example, argues that "Africa has failed not because of external factors, though they have played a part". This statement seems to imply that Africans will have to take responsibility for their destiny, and it is also clear that no single reason can be pinpointed with evidence to claim that it is *the* cause of underdevelopment on the African continent. This chapter (and study) will address both these challenges.

2.4 ACCEPTED CAUSES OF UNDERDEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA

It is so that the African continent has suffered several misfortunes, namely slavery, colonialism, corruption, poverty, illiteracy, civil wars and political instability. This chapter will focus on these important challenges (mainly social-historical by nature) that contributed to underdevelopment in Africa. Many of these challenges were already present when during the decolonisation of Africa in the 1960s, when a new generation witnessed a whole continent opening up and spurring widespread engagement and

intellectual curiosity. This intellectual curiosity persisted even when the continent has become marginalised in the public debate. This is probably partly due to the disappointment over Africa's lack of development reinforced by a one-sided, negative picture painted by the media (Paris 2002: 44). As the discussion unfolds, problems such as slavery, colonialism and corruption were back on the underdevelopment agenda again.

2.4.1 The problem of slave trade

The slave trade is considered as one of the causes of underdevelopment in Africa. The allegation is that the cruelties of this trade have left scars on both the African and European psyche. The export of many African people across the Atlantic has been a factor in Africa's lack of development, because of the gap created by the population which just disappeared. The explanations for the origins of Africa's severe underdevelopment are given by history and much of Africa's poor performance is usually justified by these years of the slave trade.

The African slave trade was a method whereby Africans were sold to colonisers to perform slavery duties. This method damaged the Africans in such a way that it was soon normalised. To this day, Africans believe in working for colonisers to have a living. This study aims to enlighten and free Africans from this mentality. Furthermore, other Africans leaders must not behave as if they are the colonisers of their fellows.

It is believed that the slave trade was a strategy that the Europeans utilised to penetrate and become sovereign in African countries. Moreover, with an increase in slave trade, African countries that were affected were left with fewer people. Slavery resulted in communities being fragmented both politically and ethically. This all caused political instability to the extent that communities could not fully pursue the economy of their regions. Slave trade tended to overshadow the trade of other goods; even though it enabled certain kingdoms to increase their power, it had a devastating effect on the groups affected by the kidnappings and conflicts that accompanied the trade.

Slavery in Africa was not a foreign thing, as suggested by many thinkers. Types of slavery also occurred amongst different ethnic groups in Africa. However, it was on a small scale. Moreover, prior to the intensity of slavery, it is alleged that African

communities were increasingly prosperous, with a rising population and growing interregional trade (Ajayi, 2010: 290). When the trade intensified, the conditions were greatly altered and left many countries depopulated. The slave trade theory is one of the main views of the historical root reasons of the underdevelopment in Africa. According to this view, Africa's involvement in slave trade caused a massive depopulation of its communities.

Power has played a significant role in the process of underdevelopment in Africa. Rodney (1972) asserts that underdevelopment in Africa occurred in different forms, he goes on to explain that underdevelopment happens when one is forced to lose total power into the hands of other people. Rodney (1972) further notes that in the case of Africa, the slave trade played a significant role in determining the conditions of the African continent today. African people found themselves having lost their political power in favour of the Europeans. McAreavey (2009) states in this regard that the community power debate stems from the idea of who holds power and who does not.

According to Rodney (1972), slave trade became the basis for European expansion and the state of underdevelopment in Africa. Trade between the Europeans and Africans seems to have been based solely on enslaving African people, which later caused imbalances in development. He asserts that the process by which slaves were captured was mainly violent, which included kidnapping, warfare and tracking African people.

Rodney (1972) and Springer (2018) continue that slavery did not occur as a peaceful trade in Africa; however, it was largely accompanied by violent behaviour. Therefore, slavery is not only about the number of people that was taken out of the country, but also according to the amount of social violence it accompanied. Even though there are no clear figures about the outflow of people out of the continent, Rodney (1972) suggests that large numbers of slaves were taken out of the African continent.

In certain cases, the remaining African population was engaged in slave-hunting in exchange for certain goods from the European traders, thus neglecting local agricultural and technological industries. Rodney (1972) points out that Africans were manipulated from their industries, which later caused Africa to become buyers of goods which in fact they could produce themselves.

Rodney (1972) contends that African countries lost development opportunities that could have sustained them. This was due to the advancing technology of the Europeans that even awarded them dominance over African markets.

It is believed that, prior to technological advance of the Europeans, Africans were traders of certain goods and materials such as cloth using basic tools and instruments (and traditional iron smelting). However, after the dominance of the Europeans on the world market, the demand for African products decreased. This seemingly led to African people abandoning their own market. Therefore, the African skills and expertise were neglected because of cheap products offered by the European market.

Since colonialism, and through the slave trade, Africans have also been exploited in the sense that they provided cheap labour to sustain the foreign development of other continents. The dominance of the European market was perhaps because Europeans had more advanced technology that enabled them to dominate Africa.

Rodney (1972) continues that the major motive of the slave trade and colonialism was not only the exploitation of the colonised but to generate the profits that would go back to the ruling colonial empires. He notes that the underdevelopment of Africa was not the result of their inferior character or their inability to think, as some would put it; it was due to the collision between these two forces (Europeans and Africans) where the one had more power to overcome the other.

The African labour reserves were centres of labour extraction to work for low wages while producing maximum profits for Europeans. In order to sustain growing capitalism, cheap, large and readily available labour was a necessity. This therefore suggests that Africa was seen more as an economic space.

For Peter de Haan (2020: 43), many Africans believe that slavery has occurred as a result of the demand for labour for the market and the ability of those in power to extract labourers. Furthermore, one can assert that slavery was associated with economic benefits; nonetheless, the benefits of the hard work by slaves were enjoyed by those in power (in this case, the Europeans and some African Leaders).

Ajayi (2010: 289) suggests that slave in the Western Europe sense, is "... a single category of a person with a total loss of freedom and whose person and labour were

the property of another". He then differentiates between three types of slavery, the internal, Indian and Atlantic slave trade. Moreover, he notes that Atlantic slave trade played a significant role in explaining the difference between the developed and underdeveloped countries. Atlantic slave trade thus created a platform for colonisation in Africa. This form of trade was central to the cause of underdevelopment around the 19th century. Central to the idea of slave trade is that the Europeans have been prospering at the expense of Africa. Therefore, the relationship created was that of Africa developing Europe while Europe underdeveloped the continent.

In short, it is evident from various thinkers that slavery had a major influence on the state of underdevelopment in Africa today. Rodney (1972) suggests that power has played a significant role in facilitating the inequalities between the developed and the underdeveloped. Africans were overpowered by European ideologies of civilisation, and this left them powerless.

2.4.2 Colonialism and its consequences

The link between slave trade and colonialism has already mentioned in the previous section. In this section the issue will be addressed in more detail how colonialism influenced the developmental situation of the African continent. Examining colonialism is very important, because it is alleged that the origins of many problems that African countries are faced with since independence – from ethnic division, conflict among citizens from different tribes, economic dependencies, authoritarianism and corruption – could be found in the policies instigated by colonial powers. For this reason, Guest (2005: 111) concludes that ethnic conflict in Africa has its roots in manipulation of tribal loyalties by the colonial authorities.

Although generalisations are of course dangerous, colonialism and colonisation basically mean organisation, arrangement.

The two words are derived from the Latin word *colère*, meaning to cultivate or to design. Indeed, the historical colonial experience does not and obviously cannot reflect the peaceful connotations of these words. However, it can be acknowledged that the colonists (those settling a region), as well as the colonialists (those exploiting a territory by dominating a local majority) have all

tended to organise and convert non-European areas into fundamentally European constructs (Mudimbe 1988: 1).

Before examining the nature of colonialism in Africa it is imperative to ask the perennial question: “why was Europe interested in Africa in the first place”? To answer appropriately to this matter, Mazrui’s view on this matter will be considered seriously. Mazrui (1969:61-66) provides three possible reasons for African colonisation by the West:

The first reason has to do with the need to gather scientific knowledge about the unknown. Africa, then referred to as the ‘Dark Continent’ provided just the right kind of challenge, It held a lot of mystery for European explorers, who travelled and observed and recorded what they saw.

The second reason stem from European ethnocentrism or racism, itself rooted partly in Western Christianity.

Implicit in the Christian doctrine (as well as in Islam, it might be added), is the prerequisite that followers of the faith spread the gospel to others and win converts, since much of Africa followed their own traditional religious beliefs, Europeans felt that there was a definite need to proselytise and convert Africans to Christianity (Mazrui, 1969: 61–66).

In the early years of Christianity (like Islam) evangelisation was often combined with military campaigns. Later, other methods of persuasion (and softer coercion) were applied. Missionaries, for example, were responsible in setting up health clinics, schools, and social service centres. They treated the sick and educated people about western practices of health. European languages were taught to Africans, who in turn assisted missionaries in translating the Bible into African languages to help disseminate Christian doctrines.

The third reason was grounded on imperialism, the desire by European patriots to contribute to their country’s grandeur by laying claim to distant lands.

Three ambitions also stand out and caused Europeans to be so interested in colonising the African continent. These ambitions were *political, cultural and*

economic. The political motivation has to do with eighteenth century political ideas, which equated and presented colonial possessions with prestige and status. Beyond the political satisfaction of becoming a great power, acquisition of a colony also gave a possible economic boost and a large reservoir of manpower to be drawn upon in time of war. The cultural reason for colonization was deeply rooted in the ethnocentrism of the European nation-states, who regarded anyone different as being culturally inferior. In the case of the Africans, because they were not technologically advanced or their achievements were not written about and therefore not known to the rest of the world, the Europeans felt for no reasonable reason that it was their duty to civilize and uplift the African people. On the issue of colonialism and the economy, Sartre (2005) attempted in his "Colonialism as a System" attempted a thorough analysis of the mechanics of colonial economics. Here he connects to aspects of Marx's argument about that colonialism presented capitalism in naked form, stripped of the decorous clothing of European bourgeois society (Marx 1973: 324). Colonialism also operates in a different temporality from Western capitalism, in the time of its secondary system. In addition, Fanon points to the differences of temporality within the colonial domain, a "time-lag" between the cosmopolitan modernity of the nationalist leaders and the peasantry (Sartre 2005: xiv).

It is believed that prior to African countries being colonised, trade networks were implemented in certain harbours across Africa by foreigners. They used to trade and exchange commodities such as spices and jewellery. As the European trade expanded, they started penetrating the interior of Africa. Moreover, the Europeans' manipulation of the Africans by means of religion, giving them alcohol and jewellery in exchange for signing treaties that gave them an advantage over land and the resources of the continent. This is how the Europeans managed to penetrate Africa slowly and prepare the beginning of colonialism.

Before colonisation began, Africans had been trading with one another. The Inter-African trade came to a rushed halt with the advent of the colonial era. Any trade had to be carried out only through the European powers. One of the consequences of this arrangement was that African countries were distanced from one another. Even today, it is convenient to fly from Africa to Europe than between African countries and this kills the local African relation to one another. It is so that African economies were so

entangled with the economies of European colonial powers that, after independence, these economies and states could not really trade with one another. However, if Africans really wanted to change this situation it could have been done.

Colonialism has played a significant role in explaining the current state in developing countries in Africa. Moreover, Africa was colonised by the Europeans in the 19th century, during which period the African continent was dominated by European foreign rulers. Europeans invaded Africa and became the dominant rulers on a continent that was not their own. It was only in the twentieth century that many African countries that had been oppressed or colonised gained their independence. However, it is argued that even though colonialism is said to have ended, a new wave of colonialism has emerged – and this can be referred to as neo-colonialism.

As Fanon suggests, post-colonial African states are still embedded in colonial ideologies and therefore, African countries cannot achieve full emancipation if they are characterised by weak and colonial state capacities.

In fact, the economic aspect of colonization has probably received the greatest amount of attention. For a long time, Europe justified its colonization of Africa on grounds that it was its moral duty to uplift Africans from their backward and uncivilized state. Eventually of the many plans that the colonial powers had for civilizing and modernizing Africa, none of them seem to have included modernization. Against this background the logic of Africa producing raw materials to be processed in Europe, and then re-exported to Africa at prices that Africans could ill afford, has continued to characterize a substantial proportion of economic relations between Africa and Europe.

Colonialism formed artificial and nonviable nation states that lacked legitimacy. This is the basis cause of continued ethnic conflicts and civil wars that revenge the continent since the day of decolonisation. One crucial link between colonisation and underdevelopment is the formation of a political map that is economically irrational and dysfunctional. Even though settlers acted as a link between natives and the imperial hegemony, they did not succeed in closing the geographical, ideological and commercial gap. The European states could expand, from their side, through advanced technology such as shipbuilding, navigation, cartography, mining and

agriculture productivity. Their knowledge and practical awareness of the earth surface provided created a position of power.

Brook (1985: 42) emphasises that the political and ethnic tension in Africa after independence cannot be understood without looking at them within the context of colonial time. European dominance over Africa was also associated with violent behaviours whereby some of the people, especially young men and women, were forcibly taken to become slaves. Moreover, manipulation strategies were evident in this discourse such as using religion and other forms of civilisation by the European as a way of deceiving African people and expanding their territory of dominance. In order to control large masses successfully with a small number of soldiers and officials, colonial powers used divide-and-rule policies that caused division and hatred on the continent. For this reason, Brook (1985: 42) concludes that colonialists, while drawing the modern map for Africa, paid no attention to ethnicity, culture and race for them to be able to work together in unity.

In political terms, the rulers who controlled the trade in Africa were held up in a particular form of dependence that had an insightful effect on African political culture. The colonial system can also be critiqued for extreme use of violence and considering the fact that in certain cases land was confiscated and Africans were subjected to forced labour.

Colonial rule in underdeveloped countries was encouraged and justified as one strategy that these countries could use to gain advantage and follow the path of their colonial counterparts that were more developed. However, the strategy of colonialism as an essential tool for development has not been a success for most African countries since they remain underdeveloped. Instead, it is argued that colonialism has perpetuated the already existing bad conditions in developing countries.

Fanon (2004:106) writes,

that colonial domination gave preferential treatment to certain regions. The colony's economy was not integrated into that of the nation as a whole. It is still organized along the lines dictated by the metropolis. Colonialism almost never exploits the entire country. It is content with extracting natural resources and exporting them to the metropolitan industries thereby

enabling a specific sector to grow relatively wealthy, while the rest of the colony continues, or rather sinks, into underdevelopment and poverty.

Many socioeconomic, cultural and political factors contribute to Africa as the most underdeveloped continent. Yet the colonial legacy for most African countries has done the most damage. Colonialism resulted in exploitation of labour, unfair taxation, the creation of artificial states, the shipping out of Africa of natural resources out of Africa.

For many thinkers, the most subversive act of colonialism was introduced to the minds of Africans by Europeans, the idea that during colonialism material progress and prosperity were possible for the masses, was tested but has always failed. During colonial times, ordinary people seemed to have accepted that their material conditions were fixed. (The theme of the effect on colonialism on the minds of Africa is a major issue for this study on the link between bad faith and underdevelopment.)

The dilemma facing Africans is how to deal with the overwhelming presence and power of Western influence. If the desire of Africans is legitimate, then one is compelled to accept the position in the 19th-century evolutionist who believed that Western civilisation is of higher material order than African civilisation, because it can meet African aspiration that the traditional society cannot. Due to the traumatic experience of colonialism, it is argued that its shortcoming was not having a satisfactorily transformed African society and laying a solid foundation for modernisation. With it came the idea of progress but did not give people the tools and infrastructure to build the new civilisation that would enable them to realise their dreams and live authentically.

Therefore, although full of desire for modernity, Africans are unable to achieve their desired civilisation. Besides the skills and infrastructure, Africans lacked appreciation of the total and complex nature of transformation from simple agrarian society to modern technology civilisation. For example, the idea of, rather than trekking for miles to fetch water, running water being piped into home was unknown. With colonialism came the idea of progress – today can be better than yesterday and tomorrow better than today. The Africans, according to this argument, did not accept the challenge.

Having blamed Africa's underdevelopment and regression on colonialism, post-independent Africans in general believe that the elimination of external forces would

automatically result in modern development. Consequently, there was a lack of understanding that modernisation and development required radical development and internal change.

Although external factors may be probable causes of the underdevelopment of Africa, can Africans be at fault for some of their problems? It can be pointed out that African colonialism cannot be the only cause for underdevelopment. For example, Ethiopia and Liberia are two countries in Africa that have never been under colonial rule, but they share the same problem with the rest of the continent. One can concede that Africa's state of underdevelopment has also been caused by other factors.

2.4.3 Corruption as a curse for the African continent

The focus so far has been on external factors contributing to underdevelopment. In this section it shifts to the phenomenon of corruption. Politically speaking, corruption is generally defined as the abuse of public power of any form for personal ends. Corruption is not solely an African problem – it seems to be a global problem – but its practices in Africa seem to be supported and protected openly by governments.

However, in the last few decades, it has deepened. Since the 1970s, it has become part of virtually all countries in Africa. In this regard, the hope – that the easing of political and economic restrictions that characterised the 1990s after the end of the Cold War would go some way towards reducing this phenomenon – faded.

Many believed that through increased openness of the public sphere leading to political pluralism, press freedom, and democratisation should mobilise efforts to overcome corruption – as elsewhere. However, emerging democracies are still fragile and seem to find the task of tackling recognized corrupt activities in their respective countries very difficult, almost impossible.

Political corruption occurs when government officials use their powers for illegitimate private gain and misuse of government position for other purposes. The illegal acts committed are mostly with private persons or companies that are not directly involved with the public sphere (Seligson and Passe-Smith 1998: 137). Corruption in this sense include bribery, extortion, cronyism, nepotism, patronage, and embezzlement. Criminal enterprise such as drug trafficking, money laundering, and trafficking can also

be added. In some nations, corruption is so common that it is expected when ordinary businesses or citizen interact with government officials.

One of the endpoints of political corruption is a 'kleptocracy', which literally means rule by thieves. What constitutes corruption differ depending on the leadership of the country. Certain corrupt practices may be legal in one country while illegal in another. In many African countries, government officials have wide-ranging and undefined powers, which most of the time makes it very difficult to distinguish between what is legal and illegal in any given situation.

It is clear that corruption has political injustice as one of its many consequences. African leaders, by trying to defend and justify their corrupt behaviour, they make use of political injustice to suppress their opponents. Political injustice entails the violation of individual liberties such as: The denial of voting rights, infringements on rights to freedom of speech or religion and inadequate protection from cruel and unusual punishment. Such injustice often stems from unfair procedures and involves a kind of politics in which only some can have a voice and representation in the processes and decisions that affect them.

With reference to corruption, certain events pertaining to leadership can justify the argument so far. In *The Sowetan* (6 November 2014: 17) the following was reported on a meeting between Jacob Zuma and the leader of the official opposition Mmusi Maimane. It reads as follows:

It isn't convention that the leader of the opposition requests a meeting with the state president; such meetings would ordinarily come at the request of the president himself. But these are extraordinary times for South Africa, which necessitate measures out of the ordinary. As the leader of the opposition, I wrote to President Jacob Zuma for an urgent meeting on matters of national importance. The fact is; my president is running away from all accountability and he refuses to take this country into his confidence to explain his many wrongs. By requesting to meet President Zuma, I simply extend to him the personal invitation to open-up and to be honest and frank; to come clean, so to speak.

Buried deep inside his written representations to the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) in 2009, is a shocking utterance which demands reflection. It has been well publicised that Zuma told the NPA that corruption is a victimless deed, and that it is a “Western paradigm”. When about R30billion of taxpayers’ money are criminally lost, each year, to the corruption activities of those in Zuma’s government, this country is rightfully undermined by the president’s views.

Zuma’s failure to account to parliament by answering a full session of oral questions, as expected at least four times a year, was unacceptable and breaks the rules of parliament. When the president failed to account to the National Assembly, he opened the door for ministers to do the same. It is not the questions asked that embarrass the president, but rather his answers to those questions.

Individuals who occupy the West Wing of the Union Buildings will come and go, but what will forever remain is the duty of the office of the president to respect the constitution, parliament and the people of the Republic of South Africa (Christie 2000). This is the common feature for many African leaders.

Such procedural injustice contributes to serious social and political problems. Where voting is perceived to be unfair, any outcome it produces is liable to be unstable and cause conflict. To add, all procedures that are carried out in a biased manner will end up in serious conflict. When these allegations of corruption link up with employment, such issues can lead to serious economic and social problems (Seligson and Passe-Smith 1998: 139–140).

Patrick Chabal and Jean-Pascal Daloz (in Mills 2010: 256) argue that in Africa perversely chaotic and irrational processes like “corruption” were actually logical and even profitable strategies for exploiting resources.

2.5 FURTHER REMARKS ON THE CONCEPT OF DEVELOPMENT

In the previous chapter it has already been indicated that the concept of *development* has carried very different meanings, contributing to the view that a universally accepted definition is difficult to accomplish.

The term *development* dates from the post-war era of modern development thinking. In fact, earlier practices have been regarded as antecedent of development policy, although the term *development* was not necessarily used at the time. In a more general context, the core meaning of development can be linked to advanced industrialised countries. This view is echoed by Rapley (2007:1), who claims that “development has come a long way in the past six decades. As both an enterprise and a scholarly discipline, development became significant in the period immediately following the World War II”.

“The development based on a state-controlled economy with a high level of protectionism took an unfortunate form in Africa. These countries became what Frederick Cooper has called gatekeeper states that acquired most of their revenue from customs duties, concessions to foreign companies, visas, foreign exchange control, and foreign aid” (Almond and Coleman 1996: 320). This does not constitute a sustainable form of economy.

Peet and Hartwick (2009:1) have a different view on development. They claim that “Development means making a better life for everyone.” In other words, real development must be beneficial to all community members. A better life for everyone simply means essentially achieving basic needs such as enough food, a healthy place to live, and being treated with dignity and respect. It is obvious that a better life for all is a desirable goal, but not everyone thinks that development is universally realisable in our times.

As Tyler and Ward (2011: 124) state, an economy only develops through community involvement. People who only request and wait for resources from the government have a high chance of enriching themselves by not delivering to the communities. Tyler and Ward (2011) continue in this regard that communities awaiting resources become the victims, whereby their representatives get and use such resources for their personal gain.

Nederveen Pieterse (2010: 3) states,

For a development theory to be significant, social forces must carry it. To be carried by social forces it must match their worldview and articulate their

interest, it must serve an ideological function. However, to serve their interest, it must make sense and be able to explain things.

Community representatives have responsibilities to design rural development programmes and implementation.

Rural development is essentially about conveying positive change to groups of people within rural communities (Buller and Wright, 1990). A community might benefit from rural development schemes but not all individuals within that community are likely to benefit equally. When a government releases finances for community development, positive effects towards individuals and associated communities are expected, otherwise there will not be a just financial support.

Peet and Hartwick (2009:2) argue that “development means starting change at the bottom rather than the top”. The key unit or the starting point of any real development must be the community. For any real development to succeed, community interests must not clash with bureaucratic inefficiency.

Kenny (2003: 413) writes that

it is a common feature of theories of development that the state is, for good or bad, central to the development process. The state is either the solution, the only way to combat structural weaknesses that hold back growth.

This position, though, can be challenged, because the states in Africa seem to be fragile and weakened by internal division along tribal or ethnic lines. In this view, a good policy can be rejected by a section of the population in a country due to its origin. In other words, a policy suggested by a member of an opposing or different tribe may be rejected on the basis that it might promote the prominence of the other tribe.

For Mills (2010:26), development’s aim is to improve the quality of life of people. It requires finding the mutual institutional and policy instruments to increase productivity, and productivity comes from “speed, innovation and excellence in innovation”. Africa is still dependent on primary commodity exports and global prices of these. While its infrastructure has lagged by comparison with some countries, this was not always the case. There have frequently been vested interests in keeping this dependence. Mills

(2010: 192) argues that it is more interesting why many African countries avoid putting the correct policies and procedures in place to facilitate trade – simple ones that are cheaper and quicker than infrastructure.

Tesoriero (2010: 2) states that the modern welfare state in Western societies has not been able to provide all that it promised in the optimistic days of post-war consensus. This is not the only case in the Western societies; it is the case in Africa as well. Promises are always made, but the delivery of the services is usually avoided. For example, African leaders in general make promises to their people during election campaigns, assuring delivery of a better life for all, but after elections, nothing is achieved of those pre-election promises. One such promise is the Reconstruction and Development Programme houses to all those in need promised by the African National Congress of South Africa in 1994. After more than twenty years of rule, people are still found staying in shacks made of plastic, cardboard boxes, mud and corrugated iron.

It can be interpreted that the funds that are supposed to build houses for the needy are taken for personal use, which is the reason why political leaders from villages will relocate to cities, live in mansions and drive expensive cars.

As a result, individuals in communities become independent in greedy ways. For example, a spaza shop owner sells goods to his fellow community members at high prices to enrich himself quickly, whereas his fellow community members remain in poverty and underdeveloped situations. This leads to the growing concentration of global economic power into the hands of a few, which encourages individualism even more. Much value is placed on the individual and his achievements. With much economic power in the hands of a few, they get richer and more people become even poorer. As a result, this leads to a competition of the exploitation of the poor, power and riches. The result of this is weaker social ties and the exclusion of others. This is the reason most people in urban or developed communities no longer care about their neighbours. In almost Sartrean language, Tesoriero (2010) writes that the other is no longer to be included and enfolded, but is to be suspected, feared and excluded.

As seen above, one of the consequences of corruption is that it brings competition amongst government officials spreading to community individuals, further dividing individuals, communities and the country. If the finances for communities'

infrastructures were used as intended, planned and agreed, there would be no competition and division (McAreavey 2009: 8). Due to corruption there is a tendency among government officials to purchase low-quality material for the communities' infrastructures. The use of low-quality materials has as a consequence that the government will keep repairing, obviously delaying any attempt at development. As Tyler and Ward (2011:210) explain, this bad behaviour also extends even the time for development and for underdevelopment. The country takes time on underdevelopment and on the process of development (Tyler and Ward 2011).

Another factor preventing efficiency in development is a lack of discipline in managing the assets of the government. Government assets tend to become the personal property of the chosen few.

According to Nederveen Pieterse (2010: 8),

there are several ways of making sense of the shift of meaning of development over time. One is to view this kind of archaeology of development discourse as deconstruction of development and as part of development critique. Another is to treat it as part of historical context: it's quite sensible for development to change meaning in relation to changing circumstances and sensibilities.

One can assert that development is considered as a mirror for changing economies and social capacities, priorities and choices. For this reason, understanding development theories in context means understanding it as a response to problems and arguments at the time. Therefore, development theories also show images of improvement or desirable change.

2.6 CONCLUSION

In this chapter it was argued that the concept of development is both a socio-historical and political (external), and a man-made (internal) phenomenon. It should be clear from the above discussions that a solution to the challenge of underdevelopment can be accomplished under certain conditions as discussed. The argument here is that an integral part of the solutions the challenges proper policy and good leadership.

According to Mbeki (2009: 11–14), economic growth in Africa, as in the rest of the world, depends on an energetic private sector. However, entrepreneurs in Africa face discouraging constraints. They are prohibited from creating wealth by a predatory political elite that controls the state. The African political elite uses marketing boards and taxation to divert the country's savings to finance their own consumption and to strengthen the repressive apparatus of the state. The general population who is entitled to benefit becomes the biggest loser.

The legacy of the colonial period and the slave trade has led to a particularly brutal political competition for control of the state apparatus – thus leading to both military and civilian ideological and authoritarian regimes. This has been normal and daily practice of African countries since the end of the 1960s. It clearly indicates that development was not necessarily the primary objective of African regimes; rather the tightening of political control, the control of the flow of resources and the development of personal networks rather than well-functioning public institutions that serve their people. The number of government employees increased as a result (Almond and Coleman 1996: 320–323).

One of the reasons for underdevelopment in post-independence African countries is the failure of public leadership. In addition the development state based on a state-controlled economy with a high level of protectionism took on an unfortunate form in Africa in particular. The latter led to a fierce competition for the control of the state apparatus and contributed to military and civilian authoritarian regimes under various ideological banners – since the end of the 1990s in Africa.

Against this background the word “developing” was substituted with “underdeveloped”. One of the reasons for this is to avoid any unpleasantness that may be attached to the second term, which might be interpreted to mean mental, physical, moral and similar kinds of underdevelopment (Dar-Es-Salaam 1973). Instead of entertaining the war of concepts, action must be taken to prove this.

In the coming chapter, the discussion in this chapter will be expanded by critically considering different theories on underdevelopment. The theories that were initially supposed to enhance the living conditions of Africans by developing them ended up adding to underdevelopment and promoting it. Even though these theories depict the

issue of underdevelopment in Africa, unfortunately they do not justify and solve the problem.

CHAPTER 3: THEORIES OF UNDERDEVELOPMENT

3.1 INTRODUCTION

Different philosophers and scholars had their views and understanding of the reasons for the continent of Africa's continuous underdevelopment. In the previous chapter, an attempt was made to define underdevelopment in a sociohistorical manner. This chapter examines different conceptions among scholars and attempt to answer questions such as: Is there a formula for growth common among developing markets? Is there a possibility of enjoying high growth and at the same time reduce social inequality? Are there similar features between high-growth and low-growth economies in terms of the political environment?

In attempting to answer these questions in this chapter, different theories commonly believed to be the basis of Africa's underdevelopment will be introduced and interpreted. These theories vary according to different schools of thoughts, but the focus of this research will be on six of them, namely: Imperialism theory, dependency theory, modernisation theory, theory of balanced and unbalanced growth, dualism theory, the aid problem, and social and psychological theories. The choice for the interpretation of these theories is justified by the fact that they are generally the most used in justifying underdevelopment in Africa, even if all together they are perspectival and cannot fully explain the reason of underdevelopment in Africa.

The challenge for Africans, according to (Mills 2010:78), is less knowing "what" they should do; rather, "how" they can do it. This statement seems to be negative and undermining Africans, but it depicts and describes the lack of economic direction witnessed in African countries.

3.2 IMPERIALISM THEORY

Succinctly put, imperialism theory is the theory whereby colonisers seem to impose their ways of doing things to those colonized. In Imperialism theory the domination of underdeveloped areas by industrialized countries is justified as the consequence of different economic and technological levels and unequal power as a result of different

economic growth. The consequence of the development of industrial capitalistic societies is a pressure for expansion which may lead to military or political acquisition (colonies) or to maintain economic dependence (developing countries).

Different theories have their own account of the reason for the process of expansion, but an important interpretation is to see it as the result of the inability to manage within countries the consequences of permanent technological innovation and their effects on the society.

Imperialism is a policy option, not an unavoidable outcome of capitalism. The growing concentration of wealth within the richer countries leads to underconsumption for the mass of people. According to Mills “[i]nvestors who have put their money in foreign lands, upon terms which take full account of risks connected with the political conditions of the country, desire to use the resources of their government to minimise these risks, and so to enhance the capital value and the interest of their private investments. The investing and speculative classes in general also desire that Great Britain should take other foreign areas under her flag in order to secure new areas for profitable investment and speculation” (Mills 2010: 70).

The traditional African economies, which were based on subsistence and independent agricultural production, were forced to produce exportable agricultural goods according to the needs of the occupying country.

The aspiration for revenue maximisation causes production away from the needs of the internal market and leads to the organization of new markets in such contexts. This leads to the wrecking of autochthon production and markets, which lead to joblessness in underdeveloped areas. On this point Lenin (1966: 14) has remarked that a decrease of investment possibilities and profit rate, in industrialised countries, lead to an export of capital in order to maximise profit elsewhere. In the underdeveloped areas, this capital is invested, not according to the needs of those on the receiving end but based on the exploitation of underdevelopment areas.

Modern imperialism is what Leys (1975: 33) describes as neo-colonialism. According to Kuhnen (1987: 18), “the thesis of classical imperialism theory has been disproved empirically. New imperialism theories, therefore, postulate the dependency theorem with a new explanation of exploitative relations. While imperialism is seen as

phenomenon of capitalism and these theories are based on Marxian concepts, the fact remains that communist countries also participate in the exploitation of developing countries by welcoming the advantages of the world market”.

As Roxborough (1979: 55) indicates, original hypothesis of imperialism wanted to explicate the deficiency of weighty economic crises in the continued growth of capitalist nations of Western Europe. Therefore, the attention of the theories of imperialism lays in the origin of imperialism in the metropolitan nations, rather than in its effects on the economic development of the rest of the world.

In his theory of imperialism, Hobson (2005) argues that there is deficient valuable demand in the metropolis, due to low earnings; as a result, capitalists need to locate markets for their goods overseas. Hobson (2005) believes that income reorganization would cure this crisis of underconsumption. He argues that “the declining rate of profit in the metropolis meant that, with the opening of the colonies, there were more investment opportunities abroad”.

The whole host of approaches under the heading “Imperialism theories” assume a dependency of developing countries on external circumstances that enable exploitation. By enhancing the reliance relation underneath the exploitation of developing countries, imperialism theories develop this idea further. They hypothesize that those external influences direct to an inner structural deformation, which maintains the external dependency. This progression begun with the political and military reliance of colonies, which have been exploited through the obliteration of the aboriginal lifestyle and customs, economic extraction, and forced integration, into the international division of labour. The elite accept the norms and standards of industrialised countries and collaborate in maintaining the situation as it is (Myrdal 1957: 60).

According to imperialism theory industrialised countries dominate underdeveloped areas due to different economic and technological levels leading to unequal power potential. In the wake of this industrial capitalistic societies use economic, military and political pressure to maintain economic dependence. In this process local production and markets are destroyed leading to unemployment and further dependence. Lenin made the argument that capital is invested, not according to the needs of

underdeveloped countries, but according to interests of industrial countries. The profit is transferred to the industrial countries whose development is based on the exploitation of underdevelopment areas.

The new stage of relation linking industrialised and developing countries can be called technological-industrial reliance. Developed countries invest in the production and exportation of raw materials in developing countries, devise with their potential of power the terms of trade in their favour, and thus perpetuate the international distribution of labour. This is all the result of different economic and technological levels and unequal power potential resulting from a different economic growth. Different theories have their own explanation of the reason for the pressure for expansion, but it is always seen as the result of the inability to cope internally with the consequences of permanent technological innovation and their effects on the society (Diamond 1992: 456).

The desire for profit maximisation causes production beyond the needs of the internal market and leads to the establishment of new markets in underdeveloped areas. According to Haynes (2002: 61), Africa had the worst economic and developmental record in the world in the 1980s and 1990s. African countries, including Angola, Benin, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (formerly Zaire), Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Liberia, Mali, Mozambique, Niger, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Uganda and Zambia, are among the world's poorest states (World Bank 2001: 174–175). However, programmes launched to improve their economic statuses failed and helped propelling popular anti-state protests at apparent regime incapacity.

Africans in general are not satisfied with negative consequences of imperialism for their economic progress, but they failed to demonstrate practically that they can improve their economies on their own without the assistance of Western countries.

3.3 MODERNISATION THEORY

Modernisation theory emerged in the 1950s as an account of how the industrial societies of the northern hemisphere developed. This theory questions that societies develop in predictable stages through which they become increasingly sophisticated. This theory explains that development depends primarily on the importation of

technology as well as several other political and social ideologies that bring forth change. Modernisation theory evolved from two ideas about social change in the 19th century, namely positivism that views development as societal evolution in progressive stages of growth and the idea of traditional versus modern societies.

Based on these ideas, modernisation theory consists of three factors:

- “Identification of types of societies, and an explanation of how those designated as modernised or relatively modernised differ from others;
- Specification of how societies become modernised, comparing factors that are conducive to transformation; and
- Generalisations about how the parts of a modernised society fit together, involving comparisons of stages of modernisation of modernised societies with clarity about prospects for further modernisation” (Coetzee,1988: 17–19; Szentes 1976: 25)

Inevitably, for a better understanding of modernisation theory, the Weberian human traits for development should be added: “discipline, honesty, humility, high-quality leadership, and a social commitment to people” .In addition, technology, capital and expertise in the form of skills or training should not be left out (Mills 2010: 37).

Modernisation has depended not simply or even mainly upon borrowings from the West, but on people’s ability to change and modernise themselves (Mills 2010: 155). According to modernisation theories, internal factors in countries such as literacy, traditional agrarian structure, the traditional attitude of the population, and the lack of communication and infrastructure seem to be responsible for underdevelopment. An absence of democracy or of a well-developed, effective or efficient democracy played a role in the economic choices of African leadership. It determined the manner of infrastructure expenditure (rural versus urban, primary versus secondary roads, airports versus potable water) (Mills 2010: 253).

It led to the preferred use of state subsidies to ensure the compliance of the electorate and the indispensability of government and middlemen, rather than the extension of harder-to-control and more rewarding (for the public at least) market opportunities. Differences in structure and historical origin are considered of slight importance;

international dependencies are not considered. Consequently, a change of these indigenous factors can be a strategy for development. According to the modernisation theorists, the industrialised countries are the model for economy and society, and this model must be reached for Africa to think of any form of development.

There is a competition between the least developed and the most developed country, and each country must defend its position. The difference with industrialised countries is the degree of backwardness which must be averted. Appropriate measures are the modernisation of the production apparatus, capital aid, and transfer of knowhow, so that the developing countries can reach that stage of industrialised countries speedily. Development is thus seen as an increase in production and efficiency, and measured primarily by comparing per capita income (Kuhnen 1987: 11).

Many African countries had lost over a third of their skilled professionals to emigration (Chimedza e.a. 2018). The costs of skills leakage were enormous. For instance, the educational capital of African emigration to the United States stood at \$640 million annually. The annual loss through (cumulative) brain drain wealth has been estimated at some \$17,5 billion. By comparison, donor-provided technical assistance amounted to some \$4 billion annually, supporting some 100 000 expatriates. Such migration has been within the power of African governments at least to contain through the promotion of better working conditions within state institutions and the establishment, inter alia, of a meritocracy (Mills 2010: 201).

Modernisation theory is a socioeconomic theory also known as the Development theory. It intends to highlight the positive role played by the developed world in modernising and facilitating sustainable development in underdeveloped nations.

The modernisation theory consists of three important characteristics (Coetzee, 1988: 17–19; Szentes 1976: 25):

- “Identification of types of societies, and explanation of how those designated as modernised or relatively modernised differ from others;
- Specification of how societies become modernised, comparing factors that are conducive to transformation; and

- Generalisations about the parts of a modernised society fit together, involving comparisons of stages of modernisation and types of modernised societies with clarity about prospects for further modernisation.

For the societal changes to transform a traditional society into a modern one takes time. Modernisation theory emphasises, sometimes, the internal obstacles to social change, namely the traditional elite, religious values, and morality combine to make the social change difficult. Therefore, people become resistant to any change, especially if it affects their beliefs.

Modernisation theory considers the absence of capital, technology and modern social values within a society as the cause of underdevelopment. It posits that the problem which held back the development of underdeveloped societies is related to the irrational way in which resources are allocated in the so-called traditional society. Traditional societies therefore can only become modern (developed) by rationalising resource allocation and by the elimination of cultural, institutional and organisational roadblocks that did not allow countries to develop.

According to the modernisation theory, underdeveloped countries evolve by starting from a stage with a traditional society and through an evolutionary process change its society by rationalising it and becoming a modern and developed society (Przeworski and Limongi 1997: 155).

Since the modernisation theory saw underdevelopment as a natural state from where all societies must necessarily begin, the prevailing idea for developing parts of the world when the modernisation theory held sway in development discourse was that development was likely only if the societies changed certain traditional belief patterns.

During the transition period of a society from traditional to modern, some challenges need to be mentioned:

- There is a great deal of social dislocation among members of the same society.
- Corruption and bribery usually become endemic.
- Democratic values, respect for human rights and other modern ideas are for the moment weak and poorly established.

- The judiciary is often under political influence and does as the current regime dictates it.

According to Peet and Hartwick (2009: 121) “modernization theory refers to whether societies are similar or not to the model of modern industrial society”. They further claim that

modernization meant specialization of economic activities and occupational roles and the growth of markets; urbanization, mobility, flexibility and the spread of education; spread of democracy and the weakening of traditional elites; growing differentiation between the various cultural and value systems, secularization and the emergence of a new intelligentsia.

For these reasons, modernisation was the process of change towards those types of social, economic and political systems that have developed. Munoz (1981: 1) echoes this view when he suggests that cultural change is one precondition for economic development, and that the progress in poor areas could take place only through the spread of ‘modernism’ originating in the developed world.

However, according to Peet and Hartwick (2009: 126) “most African countries are poor and still going through the developing stage”. They claim that the modern man is more developed than a traditional man. They believe that a modern man is open to new experiences, punctual, trusts people to meet obligations, values technical skills, has high value on education and science, universalistic and optimistic, while the traditional man is not receptive to new ideas, interested only in immediate things, uninterested in new information, concerned with the short term, distrustful of people beyond family, particularistic and fatalistic.

Mills (2010: 147) agrees that

[c]ountries need leaders who are committed to achieving growth and who can take advantage of opportunities from the global economy. They also need to know about the levels of incentives and public investments that are necessary for private investment to take off and ensure the long-term diversification of the economy and its integration in the global economy.

The suggestion here is that African leaders can fail to open their countries for new, economic developments. This has to do with the typical social form of personality and attitudes towards urbanisation, education, secularisation, exposure to the global media or technology and so on.

Peet and Hartwick (2009) is correct to view modernisation as a spatial diffusion process, originating at specific contact points with the West, such as cities or colonial administration centres. This leads to the development of transportation, communication and media, integration of urban systems, the breaking of traditional ethnic, money economy, education, contact with urbans to ensure modernisation.

In conclusion, the view of dependency theorists are correct in claiming that modernisation theory is “an oversimplified and generalised theory with strong racial stereotype and cultural bias; as it ignored specific historical experiences and phases of prosperity in societies that had not changed their traditional culture” (Przeworski and Limongi 1997: 155).

3.4 DEPENDENCY THEORY

Dependency theory stands in a tension with the common free market theory of interaction. It was first developed in the mid-20th century, drawing on a Marxian analysis of the global economy, and in direct confrontation with the free market economic policies of the post-War era.

The free market ideology holds, at its most basic, that open markets and free trade benefit developing nations, helping them eventually to join the global economy as equal players. The belief is that although some of the methods of market liberalisation and opening may be painful for a time, in the long run they help to establish the economy firmly and make the nation competitive at global level. Dependency theory became fashionable during the 1960s and 1970s, when the free-market policies of development theory seemed to have collapsed in the developing world.

These days, although not as popular as in its heyday, dependency theory is nonetheless well-known in progressive circles amongst groups and social movements working on alternative modes of capitalism in the developing world. For some scholars,

dependency theory first became known in the 1950s through the work of Raul Prebisch, who argued that the prosperity of poor nations tended to decline when the wealth of rich nations improved. The theory soon diverted into diverse schools. Andre Gunder Frank, for example adapted it to Marxism. Finally, "Standard" dependency theory argued against internationalism and any hope of progress in less developed nations towards industrialisation and a liberating revolution (Chilcote 1984: 31).

Dependency theory

is an historical condition which shapes a certain structure of the world economy such that it favours some countries to the detriment of others and limits the development possibilities of the subordinate economies – a situation in which the economy of a certain group of countries is conditioned by the development and expansion of another economy, to which their own is subjected. (Dos Santos 1970: 226)

The dependency theory also posits that the degree of dependency increases as time goes on. Wealthy countries use their wealth to influence developing nations further into adopting policies that increase the wealth of the wealthy nations, even at their own expense. At the same time, they protect themselves from being turned on by the developing nations, making their system more and more secure as time passes. Capital continues to migrate from the developing nations to the developed nations, causing the developing nations to experience a lack of wealth, which forces them to take out larger loans from the developed nations, further indebting them.

After gaining political independency as African states, the economical restraints with the former colonial powers endured. All financial resources, which were needed to conduct industrialisation, to reconstruct infrastructure and political institutions and armies, were given from foreign banks and governments mainly the former colonial powers and the World Bank (Fresnillo 2007: 3). Dos Santos expands this point that countries have their economies conditioned by the development and expansion of another economy to which their own is subject. Dependency conditions a certain internal structure which is as a function of the structural conditions of distinct national economies (Dos Santos 1970: 48, in Roxborough 1979: 66)

Dependency theory has the perspective of claiming to provide conceptual and analytical tools capable of explaining the relative underdevelopment. In this regard, the dependency approach has a fundamental advantage, as it is open to historically grounded conceptualisation in underdeveloped contexts. Dependency theory is one of the interpretations of development as well as a challenge to development theory.

In other words, dependency is the process by which less developed countries are incorporated into the global capitalist system. The dependency orientation attempts to clarify the process of integration of the periphery into the international capitalist system and the developmental implications thereof.

According to Dos Santos (1978: 35),

dependency theory is the body of theories by various intellectuals, both from the Third World and the First World, that propose that the wealthy nations of the world need a peripheral group of poorer states to remain wealthy.

The theory postulates the cause of poverty in the countries of the periphery is not caused by lack of integration into the world system, however how they are incorporated into the system. The nations of the periphery provide cheap minerals and raw materials, labour, and markets for obsolete technology so that wealthy nations could enjoy a higher standard of living. First-World nations actively, but not necessarily consciously, perpetuate a state of dependency through various policies and initiatives.

The issue of power is here important. Power is the ultimate determinant in human society, being basic to the relations within any group and between groups. It implies the ability to defend one's interests and, if necessary, to impose one's will by any means available. The issue of power plays an important role in the relations between peoples. Here one of the foci is manoeuvrability in bargaining – the extent to which a people survives as a physical and cultural entity. When one society finds itself forced to relinquish power entirely to another society, that is a form of underdevelopment.

De Beer and Swanepoel (2000: 39–44), echo this view and hold that dependency theory is the body of theories by various intellectuals, both from the Third World and the First World, which focuses on the need of wealthy nations needing a peripheral group of poorer states in order to remain wealthy. On this point dependency theory is

also sensitive that the poverty of countries in Africa is not because they are not integrated into the world system, but because of how they are integrated into the system. Against this background, dependency is multifaceted involving economic pressures (by providing natural resources, cheap labour, a ground for obsolete technology and markets to wealthy nations) media control, politics, banking and finance, education, sport and all aspects of human resources development. Any attempt by the dependent nations to resist the influences of dependency could result in economic sanctions and/or military invasion and control. However, this is rare, and dependency is enforced far more by the wealthy nations setting the rules of international trade and commerce (Chilote 1984: 31).

The dependency theory was also elaborated upon by the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA) responsible for studying the development problem from an underdeveloped perspective. Frank (1969) has simplified and popularised many of the ideas of Dependency produced by ECLA through his work published in English. He (1969) argues that underdevelopment is the result of an unevenly structured global capitalist system. His key term of the “development of underdevelopment” suggests that the global capitalist system taken as a unit of analysis is characterised by a metropole-satellite relationship in which surplus is continuously appropriated and expropriated upwards to the metropolis. This occurs because each metropole has monopoly economic power in its bit of the system, rather than a free market. Given this scenario, any real development will require a revolutionary break from the system. To build a counter hegemony to the existing colonial matrix of power. Dependency theorists see underdevelopment in other parts of the Third World because of imperialism and colonisation (Chilcote 1984: 31).

Dependence theory then interprets the development of industrialised countries and the underdevelopment of developing countries as parts of one historical process. Underdevelopment, from this point of view, is not a phase on the way to industrialisation, but rather a consequence of capitalism. In its concentration on external factors, possible internal conditions are neglected or considered irrelevant. In other words, the internal factors of developing countries are considered less important or as symptoms and consequences of dependence. Developing countries are dependent countries. The economic and political interests of industrialised countries

determine their development or underdevelopment. Goals are imposed. Underdevelopment is not backwardness, but intentional downward development (Fei and Ranis 1964: 55). Thus, the centre-periphery relationship reproduces itself within developing countries. Between metropolis and rural hinterland, relations are like those existing between industrial and developing countries. (Myrdal 1957: 60).

Although dependence theories differ, the economic factors always dominate. External trade theories concentrate on economic relations between countries. Imperialism theories stress the politico-economic interest while *dependencia* theories concentrate on the deformation of internal structures by dependence which perpetuates the situation. Dependence theories focus on explanations of the genesis of underdevelopment and pay little attention to strategies of overcoming this situation. Implicit development here means liberation, the end of structural dependence, and independence (Ranis, 1964: 55).

According to Munoz (1981: 32), the dependency perspective is “structural or macro-sociological, its focus is on the mode of production, patterns of international trade, political and economic linkages between the elite in peripheral and central countries’ alliances and conflicts”. The time dimension is a crucial aspect of what is fundamentally a historical model. Dependency theory is fundamental in its perception of human nature. It assumes that human behaviour in economic matters is a “constant”. Individuals will behave differently in different contexts not because they are different but because the contexts are different.

In this regard, transformation from underdevelopment to development results from the realignment of dependency relations over time. Dependency is descriptive and its macro-sociological formulations are much minimal subject to translation into a simple set of explanatory propositions. The strength of the dependency perspective lies in the consideration of a richer body of evidence, a wider range of phenomena and more promising from a methodological point of view.

Although dependency theories normally do not concentrate on strategies for development beyond the demand for structural changes, independence and participation, there has been a long-standing strategy aimed to overcome this shortage (Lewis 1965: 25). Local resources are in this sense important, allowing for a certain

degree of cooperation and a more nuanced relation to industrialised countries. The goal is a reformation of the internal social and economic structure and, afterwards, re-entry into the international relations under conditions of equal rights (Myrdal 1957: 60). The way to reach this goal is via a self-reliance policy, i.e. a development according to the felt needs of population based on local resources, increase of agricultural production to satisfy basic needs, and the concentration of decentralisation with the participation of the masses. It has more the character of a goal vision than of a strategy for implementation (Nurke 1968: 69).

As postulated by Kuhn (1987: 19), the multitude of approaches combined under the leading dependency theories are also built on the hypothesis of an outside dependency of embryonic countries which makes exploitation probable. According to Kuhn (1987:19) “they postulate that external dependencies lead to an internal structural deformation which perpetuates the external dependency”. Such a process began with the political and military dependency of colonies, which have been exploited through the destruction of the indigenous lifestyle and culture, economic extraction, and forced integration into the international division of labour.

This asymmetric incorporation caused structural changes in the peripheral societies: an economy oriented in the direction of the needs of the industrial countries and practical dependency of the conventional zone on this export-oriented sector. The dynamics of reproduction of the modern sector in developing countries are like those of industrialised countries, thus leading to an extreme stratification, that is, the externally oriented elite and marginalised masses. The elite accepts the norms and values of the industrialised countries and cooperate in maintaining the *status quo*. Such a deformation of the economic and social system leads to structural heterogeneity: The rich elite and the marginal masses, the destruction of traditional economy oriented towards fulfilling the internal needs. Thus, the centre-periphery relationship reproduces itself within developing countries (Kuhn 1987: 19).

Although external factors may be the probable cause of the underdevelopment of Africa, can the African people themselves be at fault for some of their problems? This question can be answered by considering deforestation. Due to the scarcity of arable agricultural land, farmers cut down virgin forests to obtain land for farming. When all the trees are removed, flooding results, which brings mosquitoes and the deadly

disease of malaria. Thus, Africans themselves indirectly add to this health issue that prevents them from leading a better quality of life. Africans should therefore take some responsibility for this problem.

According to Munoz (1981: 2),

the external dependency is the use of imported goods from other countries as a means of provision. To deal with this, industrialisation through import substitution, the promotion of exports of manufacturers, and institutional changes in favour of under-developed countries at the international level was suggested.

This is further explained as economic dependency, which means the need of competence to influence the effective rudiments of an economic system. This is symbolised by a deficiency of interdependence among the economic functions of a system. This means that “the system has no internal dynamic that would enable it to function as an independent autonomous entity” (Brewster *et al.* 1973: 91).

Peet and Hartwick (2009: 17) restate a point that has been made that dependency theory is holistic by placing a country into the larger system. In other words, it stresses the external causes of underdevelopment rather than causes internal to a peripheral society. The emphasis is on economic rather than social or cultural interactions. Interestingly dependency theory can transform into radical politics and the need for a kind of socialist revolution, although purely nationalist politics could also emerge from the more spatial versions of the dependency perspective.

Haynes (2002: 11) emphasises that the “dependency theory explains political and economic outcomes in developing countries by referring primarily to external factors”. This view led to other countries’ enjoyment of strong economic growth and development. Neo-dependency points to a new component of actual relations between rich countries and poorer developing ones. The shortcomings of the dependency definitions have already been given. The focus on the external reliance component of dependency, the reliance on a dynamic complement outside the national economy, and the ways in which the linkage with this dynamic complement, disrupt and distort economic and political processes within the local economy. Dependency then is a situation in which a certain number of countries have their economies conditioned by

the development and expansion of another. As stated previously the dependent countries are thus put in a backward position exploited by the dominant countries. A dependency perspective assumes that the development of a national or regional unit can only be understood in connection with its historical insertion into the worldwide politico-economic system, which emerged with the wave of colonisations of the world. This global system is thought to be characterised by the unequal but combined development of its different components.

According to Mills (2010: 15), the “top-down imposition of states and borders of Africa’s rich ethnic and sectarian tapestry by colonial powers has helped to institutionalise weak governance structures”. On the other hand, the issue of Africa overcoming dependency and underdevelopment is controversial and cannot be separated from the theoretical definition of dependency. Critiques of dependency theory are offered within a nation as well as internationally. In this regard dependency theory tends to trace its roots before the emergence of modern post-colonialism. Within a nation dependency theory can be applied to regions within a country.

To overcome dependency, there is a need to replace imports with domestic products. It is important to distinguish internal and external structural components as they are connected in the explanation and practising of dependency theory on underdevelopment. Dependency in societies is a complex set of practices in which the external and internal dimensions are operating in such a way that internal variables may very well reinforce the pattern of external linkages.

3.5 THEORY OF BALANCED AND UNBALANCED GROWTH

Every engaging controversy has taken place between two groups of writers in the theory of economic development in recent years. One group advocates the theory of Unbalanced Growth and denies in almost unequivocal terms the usefulness of the doctrine of Balanced Growth, which the other upholds with great insistence. Much of this controversy, it appears, has not been very fruitful (Roxborough 1979).

There are two major difficulties in the whole Balanced-Unbalanced Growth discussion. Firstly, different writers often refer to different concepts by the terms ‘balanced’ and ‘unbalanced’. Secondly, they make different empirical and welfare assumptions and

then deliberate them from different points of departure. The two most critical assumptions are (a) regarding the availability of resources, and (b) with respect to the quantity to be maximised, whether it is the rate of growth per capita income, or per capita consumption.

This theory can be used on technical terms referring to the balance between the size of the markets, the volume of supply, and the demand for capital. It is the same balance between the division of labour, the extent of production and the extent of the market which worried Adam Smith.

Consequently, this theory is usually defined as the simultaneous expansion of output in several complementary consumer goods industries according to income elasticities of demand, in such a way to maintain inducements to investment. It relates to consumer goods industries, and it does not involve unlimited supplies of capital (Roxborough 1979). In this context this theory sees the main obstacles to development in narrow free market terms. Only a bundle of complementary investments realised at the same time has the chance, in this regard, of creating mutual demand.

As Peet and Hartwick (2009: 71) indicate, the balanced growth was known as “a wave of new investments in different brands of production can emotionally succeed, enlarge the total market and so break the bonds of the stationery equilibrium of underdevelopment”. For this reason, it is claimed that development is a chain of disequilibria. In this, the task of development policy is to solve tensions, disproportions, and disequilibria.

Development is seen here, in free market terms, as capital expansion and an increase of production, including agriculture. Any form of structural hindrance is not included in this way of thinking. The catchword is market dependence. Capital investment is here the emphasis, not the ways and means of achieving capital formation. The assumption is that there is ability and willingness for rational investment decisions within a traditional society. The problem is, though, that due to the fact that this approach will likely be limited to small sectors of the society, it is not unlikely that this approach will lead to super-imposing a modern sector on the traditional economy (Roxborough 1979: 13–14).

Development is dependent on the capacity of individuals to work collectively. It depends less on wresting political control from other nations than it does on deliberate and steady processes of nation building. According to Mills (2010: 173), “this stresses parliamentary processes, for example, rather than individual personalities, and assiduously builds internal capacity, good governance and the rule of law, rather than seeking rapid development solutions through external aid”.

Meier and Baldwin (1957: 281) also take the same view that population pressure is, in their opinion, one of the characteristics of the underdeveloped countries. It manifests itself in three ways: Latent unemployment in agriculture, a high proportion of dependents per adult due to a high birth rate, and lastly the rapid growth population due to the drop in the mortality rate. In their view, “population pressure” is responsible for the fact that the labour force is an abundant factor in the underdeveloped countries.

There is a huge increase in the populations of underdeveloped countries, often referred to as a population explosion, and this rapid increase in population and especially the number and proportion of young dependents further deteriorates the economic indices (per capita income, consumption and production). It requires increased efforts to attain a higher level of growth to address serious burdens in the sphere of food supply, public education, health and social services, and job creation. In other words, in the underdeveloped countries, the rate of population growth is very high, while the rate of economic improvement is very low. High birth rate is the leading obstacle in the way of economic development (Szentes 1976: 31).

Furthermore, a low level of productivity is a characteristic of the economy of underdeveloped countries. As a matter of fact, the natural conditions and resources of underdeveloped countries can hardly be regarded as unfavourable in general when it is common knowledge that there are countries in Africa that are very rich in mineral resources. Some of them have a very high potential of waterpower and although climatic conditions are disadvantageous in some countries, they are favourable in others (Szentes 1976: 33).

Mills (2010: 212) echoes this view and agrees that Africa’s poverty has not come about because its people do not work hard. Even though their productivity is low, health, skills, chauvinism and leadership are part of the reason. To reiterate, few people

worldwide can claim to work as hard (and for less reward) as rural African women – or, indeed, African women *per se*.

3.6 THE AID PROBLEM

Too much dependence on aid can lead to no development and no decrease in poverty at all. “Africa has enjoyed preferential access to international markets, but still slips behind, because of its over-reliance on primary commodity exports” (Mills 2010: 12). Mills contends that rather than ameliorating the worst of African poverty, African countries are poor precisely because of aid which “perpetuates underdevelopment and guarantees economic failure in the poorest aid-dependent countries” engendering “laziness on the part of the African policymakers in remedying the continent’s critical woes” (Mills 2010: 315). Even though there is an industry behind aid, it is an open question whether aid leads to the problem of African development. It is not the sole or core reason why African leaders choose to disregard their people, or why states are often predatory. It does not explain why aid has been an effective development tool in other contexts, notably in Asia. Aid is not the reason why Africa is poor.

The pernicious effects of external dependency and aid are more apparent in the so-called ‘fragile’ or ‘failed’ states, which in many cases abrogated the resource responsibility to others, though often not to the necessary authority. In the case of these countries, donors should not blindly give money directly to the state, despite the temptations. If this is done, it risks removing the already weakened link of accountability between the government and its people (Mills 2010: 231).

In other words, the involvement and interest of these donor states have had other unintended consequences. It has increased the scope for African governments to externalise their problems, and to make their bad political choices on economic reform (Lancaster 2007). Thus, the donor dimension significantly removes the link of responsibility between African governments and their constituency, regardless of the system of government (Swart 2011).

Ferguson (1994) suggests that bureaucratic power within many African countries, combines with donor practices, prevent fundamental changes required for African economies to take off. This African failure is not a mystery, but a rational choice by

African leadership, especially on crucial issues. The reality of donor countries is that they cannot deliver development; they can only deliver aid. Meanwhile, aid can make a difference if it falls into good hands; and development in Africa, just as it has done elsewhere, depends on favourable domestic factors. This illustrates that resources mostly are not the principal problem, but rather the absence of governance and political leadership. We know today that change must come from within, as was found during the imperial and post-colonial eras.

Riddell (in Mills 2010: 316) and Picciotto (2011) are somewhat of the same observation that while the development cooperation industry has made a positive, but mixed, difference – ranging from humanitarian relief, commerce, culture, protection of human rights, the promotion of democracy and the global fight against the proliferation of transnational problems such as disease and weapons of mass destruction along with terrorism – it could have done far better with better management and evaluation.

Mills (2010: 16) maintains that donors have a responsibility towards African development, not least since their actions have served, in the worst cases, to shape the choices available to African leaders and alter their accountability to their populations. Donors can safeguard the international dimension. Essentially, this is about how Africa should engage with itself, rather than how the donors should engage with Africa.

The way in which the world has chosen to deal with Africa's poverty and development challenges has been with enlarged volumes of aid. No country has ever advanced through aid only. Most of the donors themselves did not develop in this way. On the contrary: aid can have a rush of unintended and negative results that make development less, not more, likely.

While most African governments have naturally favoured externalising their problems through a focus on donor resources – in the case of many, such flows are imperative to the wellbeing of their economies in the short term – understandably, they have liked to create as much policy and political 'wiggle-room' for themselves with the donors as possible.

This is according to Paul Kagame, when he stated at the Nelson Mandela Foundation in Johannesburg in May 2009, "Africa must stop relying on aid." (Mills 2010: 319)

External aid has contributed to development in the health and education sectors, but it also helped to consolidate the regimes in power at the time. Many donor countries, with little coordination and mostly in intense competition with one another, sparked a new “Scramble for Africa” that was again irrational in economic terms (Almond and Coleman 1996: 324).

3.7 SOCIOPSYCHOLOGICAL THEORIES

In the theories examined thus far, underdevelopment and development emphasize solely economic, neglecting individual or group values and motivations. Sociopsychological theories on the other hand do consider the economic factors to be the main determinants of underdevelopment and development. However, they add a new dimension to the discussion. Although “they reduce the causes to aspects of one discipline, like economic theories, they are partial explanations as well” (Kuhnen 1987: 16). For Levy (2015) sociopsychological theories, though, opens a space to engage with Sartre’s concept of bad faith to deal with the causes of underdevelopment in Africa – something that has been neglected for a while.

According to this perspective, the cause of underdevelopment might have social and psychological factors, even if most of the time, these factors are considered irrelevant or seen as racist symptoms. The development of industrialised countries and the underdevelopment of developing countries are part of one historical process. The latter are thus dependent countries. The economic, political, and social interests of industrialised countries regulate their development or underdevelopment. As Roxborough (1979: 55) puts it underdevelopment is not backwardness, but intentional downward development.

Peet and Hartwick (2009: 124) claim that underdevelopment can be influenced by the social, psychological and behavioural dimensions. They continue that the differences in human personalities to technological progress and social change are more likely to either positively or negatively influence the economic development (Peet and Hartwick 2009: 125).

In traditional societies, people’s conceptions of the world include the perception that uncontrollable forces restrict and dominate their lives. They are thought to fear the

world and its problems – leading to uncreativity and authoritarianism. However, this could be changed if people experience a decrease in respect and a new identity is formed, an innovative personality with an elevated need to attain. Human motivation expresses an urgent need for achievement, power and affiliation with others.

In many theories of underdevelopment, these aspects of social and psychological influence are usually ignored. In the potential link between Sartre's concept of bad faith and underdevelopment in Africa there is the underlying view that in interpreting the phenomenon of underdevelopment one cannot underestimate the social and psychological influences (Feist and Feist 2009). Human personality is a pattern of relatively permanent and unique characteristics that give both stability and creativity to a person's behaviour. People are motivated to seek pleasure and to reduce anxiety. The motivation and desire derive from psychical and physical energy springing from basic drives.

The dynamic force behind people's behaviour is striving for success or superiority. With this, individuals' psychology holds that everyone begins life with physical deficiencies that actuate feelings of inferiority, which motivate a person to strive for superiority or success. Stated in psychological terms, all people seek success in the unfolding narrative of humanity. Humans are motivated by such physiological needs as desire and safety. Abusive characters aggressively and violently take what they desire, rather than passively receive it. Once needs are satisfied, they temporarily lose their power, but after a time, they recur. The motivation for a behaviour may be unconscious or unknown to the person. When one need is satisfied, it ordinarily loses its motivational power and is then replaced by another need.

Most people believe that their parents, peers or partners love and recognise them only if they meet those people's expectations and approvals. Guilt comes forward in people that deny their potentialities regarding fellow humans or remain oblivious to their dependence on the natural world. The issue of intentionality is important here. It gives meaning to experience and allows people to make decisions about the future. Appropriate functional autonomy could be mentioned here as the key that confers unity on personality which refers to those self-sustaining motives that are related (for example, running for weight loss) (McMartin 1995).

Personality refers to all those psychological characteristics of the individuals – emotional, mental and spiritual – in which he or she consistently differs from other people. With this definition, a person's behaviour can be influenced by his mental state and/or thoughts, regardless of them being right or wrong. No matter whether the act done is wrong or right; a defence-mechanism is always used to defend the act. For instance, the misuse of power to steal can be defended by denial as defence mechanism. People deny such actions. Denial is explained as a commonly used first line of defence against accepting and dealing with painful or shameful, parts of external reality. This is because a person's processes are psychologically channelled by the ways in which he anticipates events. This shows that people premeditate about actions to take and, are liable to them all, regardless of action approved or not (Ellis et al. 2009). This can be used on the physical and personality of leaders who misuse people's power for personal gain.

It is alleged that familial and social origins of personality disturbances (Horney et al. 1995) are rooted in troubled social relationships. Further, neurotic needs develop when dealing with basic anxiety manifesting itself in an unhealthy preoccupation with one of ten neurotics needs. They develop in childhood as defence mechanisms against the basic anxiety, but then continue through adolescence into adult life. They are as follows (Honey 1942):

the need for affection and approval, partners confine one's life within narrow limits, power over others, exploitation of others, recognition and prestige, personal admiration, superior achievement, self-sufficiency and independence and lastly, perfection in order to be unassailable.

Though these are not the only neurotic needs, a few of them can be used to define political leaders' misuse of government power and assets, as is the case in many African countries. Behaviour is explained in terms of innate characteristics as individual difference because of genes. The structure of organism and the nature of these connections define who we are and the nature of our personalities. Everything that makes us aware, unique and active originates in the organ within our skills. Most emotional experience can be traced at least in part to these brain centres. The major portion of human personality is genetic or biological in origin and adapted to physical survival is quite compelling. Status seekers are exploitative, opportunistic, deceitful,

exhibitionistic and had childhood experiences of being valued by parents only for success and accomplishments, the result is that their defence strategy includes maintaining an image of superiority in order to impress others.

President Kagame disputes the idea that handicaps are handicaps only because they are underdeveloped, and that it is not that they cause underdevelopment. He claims that development is all about the “need to respect local wisdom, build a culture of innovation and create investment opportunities in product development, new distribution systems and innovative branding”. In this, he argues,

Government activities should focus on supporting entrepreneurship not just to meet these new goals, but because it unlocks people’s minds, fosters innovation and enables people to exercise their talents. If people were shielded from the forces of competition, it was like saying they were disabled. (Mills 2010: 179)

Kagame’s argument clearly alludes to the attitude of bad faith in Africans. His plea is for all Africans to unlock their minds, accept their situations and improve it on their own.

3.8 CONCLUSION

The theories examined above are simply limited theories chosen to demonstrate the causes of underdevelopment. They elucidate features however do not exhaust the core reasons of underdevelopment in Africa. The account is average for certain historical situations and circumstances of production while they are less relevant for others. They offer a strategy for overcoming the prevailing situation and initiation development which may be suitable under certain economic and social conditions but are not applicable to all.

African leaders and policymakers are quick to point out the distinct differences in culture, history and demographics that often undermine the relevance of Asian and Latin American models in the African context (Mills 2010: 123). Chang (in Mills 2010) contends that the role of climate, like geography, was not an a priori reason for underdevelopment either. A country’s inability to overcome a poor climate is only, he

says, a symptom of under-development. Indeed, noting the structural handicap arguments overall, Chang continues (in Mills 2010: 174) that “those handicaps are handicaps ... only because you are under-developed; it is not that they ‘cause’ under-development”.

Mills (2010: 282) identifies three difficulties applying to development processes in other African states: The first is the need to understand why previous initiatives had failed, one result of which was that South Africa’s growth and development record since the advent of democracy in 1994 had been very process, event and document driven, centring on summits, policy papers, consultations and new growth paths. There is a difference between planning and doing stuff. Secondly, the Growth Path document presumes a level of government agreement and capacity that has not, hitherto, existed. Thirdly, if the political will is absent to make any strategy happen, the Growth Path is inevitably fated to go the way of other similarly well-meaning documents.

A general theory of development is still wanting. Such a general theory is indeed a difficult ask. It would have to include an explanation of underdevelopment for different countries; an explanation of the development process of industrialised countries; and a strategy for overcoming underdevelopment in developing countries. In addition, it would have to include a multidisciplinary approach. This entails the different levels at which development takes place (from the local to the international level), the relations between the different sectors and strata of society and economy; and the international dimensions of the development process (Myint 1954: 101).

If there is a coherent model of economic growth which emerges from these theories, certain principles can be identified as central to its issues (Mills 2010: 154):

- “Those states that have done more reforms have generally done better.”
- “The executive, and especially the chief executive (usually the president), must steer economic reform and make it a priority, establishing a high-powered team and granting it regular access to his or her office.”
- “Reforms are not about the apparently zero-sum relationship between state and market but require more state capacity and much more market freedom.”
- “The need for reform never ends, and new lessons are learnt continuously”.

- “Given the difficulty of undertaking development regimes within a hungry population, there is a need to align poverty reduction and growth strategies.”
- “Money is never the key problem – governance, government capacity, skills, and the right policy set are more important.”
- “Natural resource management is important. How such resources are managed will help to determine the extent and duration of the benefit extracted.”
- “There is the need for a comprehensive reform vision, from the top reaching down to individual citizens.”

The above are common features of successful reformers. Of course, each country will develop its own route to development. In highlighting a difference between “imposed” and “indigenous” modernities, Jacques (in Mills 2010: 155) argues that all modernising programmes, if they are to be successful, must be seen by the participants as “indigenous”. If Africa is to learn from the development experiences of others, it will have to do so in a way that is “owned” and shaped by Africans, rather than being seen as part of the latest episode of domination and exploitation (Mills 2010: 156).

To summarise: Underdevelopment seems to refer to calamities that the third world is reduced to servitude by their former colonisers. This view is reinforced by the fact that the increase of wealth in colonising nations results in the reduction of the attributes of what we know as development in the third world. On the other hand, while such a rigid argument was questioned in this chapter, it was argued that in the absence of a concise theory to guide political activities, decision-makers must have some yardsticks to measure whether their strategies and tools will achieve the goals of the society. Even though the question of goals in the development process is a political question, and differences of opinion and conflict are possible, a level of agreement seems to be possible (Myint 1954: 101).

One such an agreement is that the preservation of human dignity and the fulfilment of basic needs are the foremost goals of every society. While there may be differences of opinion with the different paths of development, at least five basic goals could serve as a guideline: 1) economic growth to secure food and other requirements for the population; 2) social justice to reduce inequality; 3) employment as means of earning

an income; 4) participation as political involvement and social sharing; 5) and independence as freedom from external domination. While individual societies may have different opinions on the priorities of these goals, in the absence of a general theory of development, one can use the criterion of fulfilment of these goals as a yardstick in development. Development is then understood as a simultaneous progress towards these five goals (Myint 1954: 101).

Against the background of this and the previous chapter it is now possible to move to Sartre's sketch of human being, in general, and his concept of bad faith. This focus and interpretation in the coming two chapters will help to establish the link between Sartre's understanding of the human being in relation to his concept of bad faith and underdevelopment in Africa.

CHAPTER 4: SARTRE'S CONCEPTION OF THE HUMAN BEING

4.1 INTRODUCTION

After the two chapters on the socio-historical perspectives on underdevelopment and certain theories of underdevelopment, mixed with some remarks on development, it is now fitting to turn to Sartre's ontological understanding of the human being that will be later linked to bad faith. (Some preliminary remarks on Sartre's understanding of the human being and its link to his concept of bad faith have already been made previously in Chapter 1.)

In this chapter the three modes of being, namely being-in-itself, being-for-itself and being-for-others, will be the basis to interpret Sartre's concept of bad faith in the next chapter. The aim here is to provide a good interpretative framework of the philosophical context within which Sartre's ontological thinking of the human being can be understood and to equip the reader with the essential background on his thinking.

Sartre's view of the human being seems to be dual. He distinguishes two worlds, namely the world of objects and the world of subjects. According to his ontology, these two worlds are represented by two different modes of existence. The first mode, referring to object, is related to being-in-itself and the second mode, known as being-for-itself, is related to the conscience of subjects. Sartre defines consciousness as "a being such that in its being, its being is in question in so far as this being implies a being other than itself" (1958: 47). This definition manifests the dependency of the for-itself vis-à-vis another consciousness. For this reason, any study of the for-itself cannot be only an ontological study but also a social one.

Sartre (1958) uses the terms *being-for-itself* (*pour-soi*) to refer to human beings, possessing consciousness, and thereby not coinciding with themselves, and *being-in-itself* (*en-soi*) to refer to beings that are there. These include inanimate objects, plants and animals. To the two dual modes of existence referred to above is added a third one, which is the mode of being known as *being-for-others*. This latter mode will also be interpreted and shown to be a contributing factor or not to bad faith in humans and human behaviour.

4.2 L'EN-SOI AS BEING IN-ITSELF

Danto's understanding of Sartre's in-itself can be summarised that *etre-en-soi*s "beings which in themselves, and which are objects for an alien consciousness, having no consciousness of their own" (1975: 50). In comparison, the for-itself is a possibility and the in-itself is a reality. The in-itself being an inanimate has nothing to strive for, it has no essence to seek. The in-itself simply *is*. Here Sartre (1958: xlii) claims that "being-itself has no within which is opposed to without and which is analogous to judgement, law, a consciousness of itself". The being-in-itself "is", it is also considered as full positivity, and knows no otherness, because it exhausts itself in being. Therefore, the in-itself cannot be derived from a possibility because it is.

In Sartre's view, "there is a possibility when instead of being purely and simply what I am, I exists as the right to be what I am. But this very right separates me from what I have the right to be" (1958: 99). This characteristic seems not to be present in the in-itself's ontological being. The in-itself is always considered as what it is in the entire plenitude of its identity. Catalano (1974: 108) expresses this view when he claims that "possibility is as surpassing of the in-itself that come, to the in-itself only through the being of the human reality that is its own surpassing". Accordingly, the being-in-itself can be understood as a being which is what it is, it is in-itself, it is. The being in-itself is also full of itself. This principle of identity which is characterised by being full of itself is also the negation of every type of relation at the heart of being-in-itself. According to Smith (1964: 27,) being-in-itself is

...[p]rimarily the condition of anything inanimate, anything which, in Sartre language, coincides completely with itself, it is a plenum, all of one piece, with no disposition to become other than it is, no potentiality.

This understanding of the in-itself is not entirely reserved for things, it can also designate a constituent of human reality, and when it does so, it manifests itself as bad faith. The in-itself can also be characterised as being which is not subject to time.

4.2.1 The being-in-itself is not characterised by temporality

The in-itself does not know any temporality. It is a non-temporality and is defined by certain characteristics, namely "It is, and no-one can claim that it is no longer. It is only

actuality. It does not have any consciousness; therefore, it has nothing to strive for. It is not influenced by the time factor.”

These characteristics of the in-itself not being subject to time being in another problem, that of “presence”, meaning that the in-itself can never by itself be present to itself because “being-present, in fact, is an ecstatic mode of being of the for-itself” (Sartre 1958: 712). Being present necessarily needs self-consciousness, knowledge and recognition of the other consciousness. It is also a fact that

presence to self, on the contrary, supposes that an impalpable fissure has slipped into being. If being is present to itself, it is because it is not wholly itself. Presence is an immediate deterioration of coincident, for it supposes separation (Sartre 1958:77).

4.4.2 Specific characteristics of the in-itself

The being-in-itself has certain characteristics that define it. Teffo’s study (1990) and Danto’s analysis (1975), identifies some of them, namely:

- The being-in-itself is. It has no known cause. “The existence of being-in-itself is not necessary. It is contingent. It is just a brute fact” (Spade 2010: 92). Just as it is metaphysically uncaused, so it is logically and epistemologically unexplained. It is, it exists in and by itself without any reason or explanation. There is not enough reason for the existence of being-in-itself (Spade 2010: 92).
- It is uncreated and unproduced. It is beyond passivity and activity.
- It is beyond negation and affirmation.
- The being-in-itself is what it is and is not what it is not.
- It is full of itself and does not know or have any emptiness. It coincides with itself. It is opaque. It has no within as opposed to without. It is solid, isolated.

“The being-in-itself is superfluous, that is, there is no good reason why it should be there, rather than not being there.” (Spade 2010: 91) There is no reason for it to be

there. The being-in-itself is a being that has no capacity or possibility to choose; therefore, it is an object.

In the philosophy of Martin Heidegger, an important influence on Sartre, being-in-itself is contrasted with the being of persons, which he describes as *Dasein* (Heidegger 1962:27), “Dasein means: care of the Being of beings as such that is ecstatically disclosed in care, not only of human Being ... Dasein is itself by virtue of its essential relation to Being in general.” (Heidegger 2000: 31) On the other hand, being-in-itself, is for Heidegger the most vague and general concept possible to contemplate, but also the topic of greatest interest to him as a philosopher. Being-in-itself here refers, in contrast with Sartre, to objects in the external world – a mode of existence that simply is. It is not conscious, so it is neither active nor passive and harbours no potentiality for transcendence. This mode of being is relevant to inanimate objects, but not to humans, who Sartre says must always make a choice.

4.3 LE POUR-SOI AS BEING-FOR-ITSELF

Existentialists usually define being-for-itself as a becoming. This characteristic of being striving to be is what allows me to claim that being is not yet what it will be and at the same time is already what it is not.

Danto’s view is that the being-for-themselves are conscious being, they are “... beings’ part of whose nature is that they are aware of themselves and cannot exist as such without this awareness” (1975: 50). For this reason, Sartre uses the concept being-for-itself and consciousness interchangeably. It is its line of demarcation with the being-in-itself which knows no consciousness. For him the for-itself has a consciousness and is at the same time a consciousness (Vunza 1998: 13).

By contrast, Sartre argues that the “... for-itself is but not in the same sense as the being itself. It is, we may say, even if it is a being which is not what it is which is what it is not” (1958: 79). When Sartre claims that the for-itself is not what it is, and is what it is not, he in fact refers to the relationship which exists between facticity and transcendence in the sense that a person has simultaneously facticity and transcendence as aspects of his being. There is a difference between facticity and transcendence.

As transcendence, a human being is not what he is in the sense that he is much more than his history, his environment: that is, he is much more than just what can be predicated of him. This is because he has his own possibility, intentions and expectations, which contribute to his actual and future life. The human being itself is a possibility to be realised. He is transcendence. He is also transcendence which also needs to be transcended.

As facticity, a human being is not future. He is what he is presently and what he has done. He is his part, to the extent that he cannot change it. Similarly, he is a facticity since he cannot change his situation.

For Sartre, the for-itself "... is in relation to myself as subject that I am concerned about myself and yet this concern reveals to me a being which is my being without being-for-me" (Gardner 2009: 221). Being looked at is no different from the look towards trees for example, that we formulate ideas, opinions and facts that can never be approved or disapproved by the trees themselves. We end up possessing ideas and perceptions about others, thereby reducing them to objects at that moment. Against this background Sartre (1958: 55) claims that one must either transcend [nihilate] the other or allow oneself to be transcended by him or her. The essence of the relations between consciousnesses is not the *Mitsein* (being with), but conflict. In this sense the for-itself comes into existence because of the unavoidable presence of others. In this process we are self-consciousnesses who seek to create our own projects and meaning, we face each other as *rival* project creators (Sartre 1958: 307). Human beings thus perceive each other as *objects*, and the reduction to mere object status continually threatens to negate self-consciousness and freedom (Sartre 1958: 340). Sartre argues that it is with 'the look' that we threaten to reduce the other to object status. He uses the example of the feeling of shame to illustrate this point. It is Sartre's view that shame appears as an intersubjectively induced feeling (Sartre 1958: 302).

Sartre's position differs from the intersubjective implications of Heidegger's concept of *Dasein*. *Dasein* is Being that is aware of, and interested in, its own Being. In Heidegger's philosophy, one of the most fundamental ways to understand Being is through relationships, the *Dasein*. All things stand in a relation to all other things – and by virtue of his stress on *Dasein*'s ontological distinction, things may also stand in relation to *Dasein*.

4.3.1 The being-for-itself as a lack

The fact that the for-itself is always in search of its own essence and values denotes a certain 'lack'. However, this lack cannot be present in the in-itself, which is all positivity, full and complete. Teffo, for example, writes, "while the for-itself lacks the in-itself, the in-itself does not lack the for-itself" (1990: 26). The fact that there is no reciprocity between the for-itself and the in-itself can be considered as one of the main differences between the being-for-itself and being-in-itself. The lack of the for-itself is because it is usually characterised by an emptiness which necessarily needs to be filled with deliberate actions. It needs to create its own values and essence. The for-itself compares to the in-itself, as a being, is simply a becoming, which means that he is nothing except what he intends to make of himself, because he will never be a thing or a readymade consciousness that needs only to be taken unless he accepts for himself such condition.

As a lack, the for-itself needs something to complete it. Without the gap or vacancy in the for-itself, conscious being would become unconscious being-in-themselves, which are determined by whatever they are, without any choice or option. The for-itself must be understood as the dynamic aspect of the self, poised in the present and solicited by a future which constantly reshapes the self.

Another sign of lack of the for-itself is the fact that it cannot coincide with itself. Therefore, the being of consciousness "is haunted by the presence of that with which it should coincide in order to be really itself" (Vunza 1998: 15). "That is to say, the For-itself seeks for the self-identity or the completeness which is the characteristic of a different mode of being, namely Being-in-itself." (Warnock 1965: 44) The for-itself always attempts to achieve its goal, which is to coincide with itself or try to be perfectly identified with its own, but unfortunately this existence is doomed to failure.

According to Gardner (2009: 119), the "for-itself negates itself as lack, in order to be that-which-it-lacks", resulting in "the empirical establishment of particular lacks as lacks endured or suffered" and providing "the foundation of affectivity in general".

The failure of the for-itself to coincide with itself or with its goal is due to its characteristic of freedom, which is a fundamental condition of its being and its aspect

of perpetual becoming. That is why Catalano's (1974: 105) view can be qualified when he claims that

human reality is therefore, by its very nature an "unhappy" consciousness. It is perpetually invested with the ghost of a totality that it can never be but that I must perpetually attempt to be. The very being of consciousness consists in its failure to be its original project of identity.

What would then be required, therefore, for the for-itself to carry forward the original project of the in-itself? Sartre argues that, in terms of the for-itself's structure as lack, that "the for-itself is a lack of self-coincidence to which corresponds the for-itself-as-self, and the for-itself's projection of itself towards this quasi-entity in the form of desires" (Gardner 2009: 106).

The for-itself both is and is not its past and its future. It is also both is and is not the contingent being which composes its facticity. The being of consciousness "does not coincide with itself" and lacks the self-identity of the in-itself, implying that the for-itself both is and is not itself (Gardner 2009: 114). Here time must be understood in terms of temporality and original temporality in turn must be understood in terms of the for-itself's reflexivity, specifically, its "temporalisation" of itself (Gardner 2009: 110).

The failure of the for-itself to achieve its own goal is the being of the human reality which is, in other words, the nothingness of consciousness; in this context, Every human being in his life has a goal and always strives to achieve it. Nonetheless, insofar as a human being fails to achieve the goal of its existence, he is at a distance from it and therefore is conscious of it. And it is this consciousness that makes a being-for-itself different from being-in-itself. For Macquarie,

Sartre's *pour-soi* gets defined in terms of negation and freedom. The *pour-soi* comes into being, (exists and emerges) by separating itself from the *en-soi* (in-itself) ... The *pour-soi* is free to choose its essence. It is being is its freedom. (1972: 67–68)

Let us acknowledge that the for-itself is essentially the being that must determine itself, its existence and its essence. The consequence of this non-coincidence would be the

fact that the unity of the for-itself would effectively dissolve into the duality of two in-itselfs. For Sartre (1958: 78),

it is the obligation for the for-itself never to exist except in the form of an elsewhere in relation to itself, to exist as a being which perpetually effects in itself a break in being. This break does not refer us elsewhere to another being; it is only a perpetual reference of self to self, of the reflection to the reflecting, of the reflecting to the reflection.

The for-itself is a lack because of the fact that the aim of the in-itself is not to give rise to being-for-itself on, but rather in order to get rid itself of contingency and thereby found itself (Gardner 2009: 102):

The for-itself exists in order that being should get rid of contingency, but its being is just as contingent as that of the in-itself, so it exists as the non-fulfilment of an aim. The for-itself exists therefore as something being unattained or missing, i.e. it exists as defective, and therefore as something which exists negatively.

Gardner (2009) question this by saying if being-for-itself is lack, what exactly is it that is lacked (*le manque*)? According to Sartre what the for-itself lacks, is itself as being-in-itself, "itself in the mode of identity", self-coincidence.

This characteristic of lack justifies the concrete situation of the for-itself. It is both a flight from and a pursuit of the in-itself. It flees the in-itself and at the same time pursues it. It flees the in-itself to seek freedom and avoid being a thing, but it pursues the in-itself when it abdicates from its own freedom. The for-itself does not even have to choose his freedom because he is condemned to having it. So, the for-itself's attempt to surrender his freedom is futile, especially if this is aimed at becoming an in-itself.

The perpetual attempt by man to surrender his freedom gives the possibility to the idea that man is a useless passion. For Sartre (1958), man sometimes strives for the realisation of an impossible ideal which is to deny his own existence through the abdication of his freedom. Let us remember here that for Sartre to be is to be free.

4.3.2 The being-for-itself as facticity and possibility

The term *facticity* refers to an existential situation where the for-itself's is situated in particularity: in a descriptive sense it simply means what is expressed by the fact of being here and there (Gardner 2009: 99). Through facticity we understand our physical, spatio-temporal placement and position in the world and all the specific interpersonal, social, cultural, institutional, political and historical relations in which we each stand (Gardner 2009: 99). Our facticity is nothing else than the transcendental ground of our particular *situation* and contingency.

Sartre (1958: 403) argues that,

although our bodies are the primary element of our facticity, we only find and know our bodies because they are posited for us by others, the look of the other situates our bodies by perceiving our physical presence as an object, and we come to perceive ourselves through this objectification. We therefore come to see our bodies as objects, as a being seen by others, as a *being-for-others*.

The for-itself, to the researcher's view, must apprehend itself not only as consciousness but also as facticity. The facticity of the for-itself refers to its gratuity and non-necessity of its 'being there'. It explains its unjustifiable presence of being in the world (Bloom 2018).

the for-itself is, in so far as it appears in a condition which it has not chosen ... it is so far as it is thrown into a world and abandoned in a 'situation'; it is pure contingency inasmuch as for it as for things in the world, as for this wall, this tree, this cup ... (Sartre 1958: 79).

The for-itself must realise that he is in the world without any specific reason and must understand that he does not have any foundation.

In other words, a being which would be its own foundation could not suffer the slightest discrepancy between what it is and what it conceives, for it could produce itself in conformance with its comprehension of being and could conceive only of what it is. (Sartre 1958: 50)

There is then an obvious question which arise: What am I if I am a being which is not my own foundation? How can my relation to myself be defined and understood? And if I am not my own foundation and if the other also is not his own foundation, how can our relation to each other be possible?

The body-as-for-itself is my facticity, entailing that the necessity that I be embodied is just the necessity that I exist contingently. My relation to my body-as-for-itself, thus reproduces the general character of facticity. My body as the-body-for-the-other (*le corps pour-autrui*), has the character of an object, “a thing among other things”. I have this experience when I have made the Other an object, a “transcendence-transcended”, as belonging to the order of instruments, as something which I can “utilise” or which “resists” me, and which is “indicated laterally by the instrumental-things of my universe” (Gardner 2009: 145).

This explication of the body of the Other for me is at the same time, Sartre claims, an account of my body for-the-Other, since “the structures of my being-for-the-Other are identical to those of the Other's being-for-me” (Gardner 2009: 145). The for-itself is constantly in flux, changing. In fact, it is a flux, a change. The being of the for-itself is not like the stable, inert being of things, of substances that kind of being is appropriate to the in-itself (Spade 2010: 209).

How then can I be responsible for my facticity? The interesting thing here is that I have nothing to say about my facticity. I cannot control or prevent it. I did not ask to exist, after all. And yet as Sartre says, I am responsible for my facticity. I am responsible for it in the sense that it is up to me what to do with it, what I make of it. I am completely free in that respect – the possibilities are endless. It is up to me how I go beyond my circumstances, how I transcend them (Spade 2010: 212). I am thus a combination of facticity and transcendence. I am a facticity transcended, the transcending of a facticity. In many ways the self is an event that takes place in a certain definite context. The self has no control at all over what the context is; but he or she do decide what happens in that context, and in that sense he or she is responsible for it. In short: I am not responsible for my facticity – the context – in the sense that I can change it or can prevent it. But I am responsible for it in the sense that it is in my care and entrusted to me (Spade 2010: 212).

This can be understood, since the for-itself as I stated earlier in so far as it is – is not its own foundation. In this regard it might be possible that even the idea of bad faith in a human being and relations might become irrelevant because one can enquire how a being which is not its own foundation can be accused of bad faith if it cannot know itself and the reason of being there, why it is there not somewhere else.

Although the human reality is not an in-itself, Sartre says that there is a sense in which the for-itself is. In particular, we cannot choose the circumstances of our birth and our entire bodily condition. These 'facticities' appear to us as having no foundation or justification. (Catalano 1974: 100).

Facticities are thus contingent, but this does not mean that we are tied by them; they help us understand that man's presence in the world is an unjustified fact.

Accordingly, the for-itself aims to "recover being" and to that end it employs reflection: reflection "is the means by which the for-itself attempts to put itself inside its own being by gathering itself into a unity and beholding itself as a totality. The goal of the for-itself in reflection is to make of itself a given which finally is what it is". If this effort succeeds, subsequently the for-itself would be to itself as an object-in-itself within its own interiority (Gardner, 2009: 98). The for-itself apprehends

"itself as not being its own foundation" and therefore as a contingent existent. The for-itself apprehends itself also as being self-nihilating, "the foundation of its own nothingness" ... the for-itself is the in-itself losing itself as in-itself in order to found itself as consciousness. (Gardner 2009: 100)

The for-itself stands in a relation of negative ontological dependence to the in-itself. The for-itself "is perpetually determining itself not to be the in-itself" meaning that the for-itself can establish itself "only in terms of the in-itself and against the in-itself". This justifies the claim that the for-itself is a lack of being (Gardner 2009: 101).

The for-itself is also defined as not a being only and considered also as a becoming and classified as being of possibilities. In this context, the for-itself must create its own values because it is a lack. In this regard Sartre (1958: 96) claims,

I am the lacking for-itself in the mode of having to be the for-itself which I am not, in order to identify myself with it in the unity of the self. Thus the original transcendent relation of the for-itself to the self perpetually outline a project on identification of the for-itself with an absent for-itself which it is and which it lacks. What is given as the peculiar lack of each for-itself and what is strictly defined as lacking to precisely this for-itself and no other is the possibility of the for-itself. The possible rises on the ground of the nihilation of the for-itself. Thus the for-itself can not appear without being haunted by value and projected towards its own possible. Yet as soon as it refers us to its possible, the cogito drives us outside the instant toward that which it is in the mode of not being it.

Hence, the for-itself as being of possibilities must be open to all possibilities out there, outside itself; he must choose them and strive for them. Sartre (1958: 99) continues that,

the possible is – so to speak – an option on being, and if it is true that the possible can come into the world only through a being which is its own possibility, this implies for human reality the necessity of being its being in the form of an option on its being.

Even if one can claim, following Sartre's view that the for-itself is a being of possibilities, one must acknowledge that the for-itself is and is not its own possibilities.

Again, as with negation, value, and lack, Sartre's point is that possibility comes into the world through man's being and not through his knowledge. Thus, while it is true to say that without man there would be no possibilities, it is not true to say that possibility depends on man's knowledge of something as possible. (Catalano 1974: 108)

It can be said that possibility is prior to being. Something can be merely possible and yet not be real. Possibilities, though, have a kind of being. We speak of real possibilities. And yet that possibility is not a reality, and never will be. Mere possibilities are therefore somehow real, and yet not real (Spade 2010: 221).

These characteristics of the being-for-itself refer to as considered as a being of possibilities make it different from the being in-itself. It is only a conscious being which can be aware of its own possibilities, and of what he is not or is not yet. Warnock (1965:62) is justified when she claims that “Being-in-themselves have no possibilities; or, rather, all their possibilities are realised at once at the moment of creation. From then on, they behave as they were made to behave” (Warnock 1965: 62). I need to acknowledge that the being-in-itself knows no possibilities; it is an already determined being. Any relation, which can exist, between the being-in-itself and its possibility can only be established by a being which stands facing possibilities, that is the being-for-itself. Thus, Teffo (1986: 31) claims that

possibility is a possibility for a free being that recognises it as such and even tries to be one with it. Thus freedom will forever be a freedom to be executed by a being of possibility, a being that is haunted by its emptiness and value it has created.

The for-itself as being of possibilities is of course the immediate consequence of the for-itself characteristic of being a ‘lack’, which is always striving towards a certain essence. In this context the for-itself can be understood as the “Imminent coming-to-be for-itself which is always projecting itself beyond what it is to what it would become” (Teffo1990: 29). The fact is that a man is not an ‘is’; he is continually in the process of becoming to really reach his full potential. And to realise himself, he needs full recognition and implementation of his freedom. But this freedom is determined by all human possibilities present in man’s reality. Man’s task is that even though determined by certain realities, he must project himself and strive towards his freedom which is his real being.

In this context, the possibilities and deterministic reality forced by the for-itself are not limitations to its realisation, but, on the contrary, an opening to freedom because “[i]n short, from the moment that I want to account for my immediate being simply in so far as it is what it is not and is not what it is, I am thrown outside it toward a meaning which is out of reach and which can in no way be confused with immanent subjective representation” (Sartre 1958: 100). The for-itself is always in search of its own meaning, which need to be found out there.

This view make rise to an existential question: can a human being claim to have reached or fulfilled his possibilities? To Sartre, it seems that a complete being is only the being-in-itself which has no possibilities and therefore strives for nothing. And by so doing it has negated its freedom because "... the being which for-itself lacks, the being which would make the for-itself a self by assimilation with it – this being is still the for-itself" (Sartre 1958: 100). The for-itself as being of possibilities always excludes the in-itself as a possibility to strive for except in the case of the conscious abdication of its freedom. "Conscious being is usually aware of itself and of objects (beings) around it. Nevertheless, to be perceived and known by a conscious being can happen to an object in the world, a being in-itself."

This relation between the for-itself and the in-itself is usually defined as rotation based on knowing and being known. Is there any other type of relation between the for-itself and the in-itself.

Warnock (1965: 61) argues that there is a special relation between the for-itself and the in-itself, of course knowing and being known is one of the fundamental relations between the for-itself and the in-itself. Sartre echoes this by claiming that this relation can exist only because of the nothingness at the centre of the for-itself. Knowledge in this sense entails that there is a distance and tension between subject and object: She distinguishes the object from herself, and thereby form the judgement, "I am not the object." This distance between the subject and the object is the gap or even nothingness at the heart of the for-itself (Warnock 1965: 61). Thus, the for-itself as a conscious being must be responsible in its being for its special relation with the in-itself.

Despite the special relation of knowledge that exists between the for-itself and the in-itself, it cannot be claimed that the world of things arises because a conscious being knows that the world exists. On the contrary, man's being is such that he is a knowing being. Man, as being consciousness must be aware and conscious of something other than himself, which obviously is the being-in-itself.

4.4 THE BEING-FOR-OTHERS AS WE, US, THEY AND THEM

In the analysis of the for-itself and the in-itself so far, an attempt has been made to elucidate the Sartrean ontology, focussing on the *en-soi* (in-itself) and the *pour-soi* (for-itself) as Natanson (1973) explains. This analysis of the *en-soi* and the *pour-soi* will help us understand our third mode of being, namely the *being-for-others*. This third mode of being, (being-for-others) comes into the picture because Sartre believes that a human being is thrown into the world without his will. When he comes into the world, he finds other beings in the same situation, i.e. being which have been thrown into the world as well without any given purpose.

When the human being is aware on of this situation he can behave as *pour-soi* or *en-soi* according to the choices he makes, but the fact remains that he must enter into relations with other beings he finds in the world. Sartre admits that these relations between human beings are usually those of conflicts, like the relation between the for-itself and the in-itself, the reason being that

The Other, on the contrary is presented in a certain sense as the radical negation of my experience, since he is the one for whom I am not subject but object. Therefore, as the subject of knowledge I strive to determine as object the subject who denies my character as subject and whom himself determines me as object. (Sartre 1958: 228)

In the analysis of this third mode of being, Sartre does not use the concepts *for-itself* or *in-itself*; instead, he uses the concepts: *us-objects* (to refer to the in-itself) or the *they-subject* (to refer to the for-itself). At the beginning of this problem of the existence of the other in relation to others is a fundamental presupposition, which claims that the other is the other and that the other is the self who is not me and different from myself. In other words, the other out there is the one who is not I and the one who I am not.

Sartre clearly expresses this when he claims that the other plays a fundamental role in the being of the self, because the other is the indispensable mediator between me and I. By exploring the concepts of 'look', we will attempt, drawing on Sartre, to elucidate how this can be possible.

Sartre (1958: 238) claims that,

in my essential being I depend on the essential being of the other, and instead of holding that my being-for-myself is opposed to my being-for-others, I find that being-for-others appears as a necessary condition for my being-for-myself.

To be a human being, in other words, I recognise the other in order simply to be able to refuse him, through that recognition the other is also the one for whom my for-itself effectively is, at the same time I affirm my existence also through the other. In this sense the other is not conjectured, but experienced.

“[T]he Other is the indispensable mediator between myself and me. I am ashamed of myself as I appear to the Other.” (Gardner 2009: 222) This comment suggests that the only experience I can have is of me. I can never meet with anything except the consciousness which is mine. But it is the other that is somehow a link for my relation to myself,

by the mere appearance of the other, I am put in the position of passing judgment on myself as on an object, for it is as an object that I appear to the other [...] But at the same time I need the other in order to realise fully all the structures of by being. (Gardner 2009: 222)

When I am conscious of myself, I am conscious of myself as the self, and not as the other. I am me, and not the other (you). In a phenomenological sense it is only through the other that I am conscious of who I am. Importantly I only get a grasp of who I am by knowing who I am not. Being aware of the other lets me know of who I am. The important thing here is that my relation to others is thus a kind of internal negation. Insofar as I know and am myself, I am profoundly affected by my not being myself; it is what makes me up and different (Spade 2010: 254).

Sartre believes that one means of access to the other is being aware of the other as an object. It is also a fact that the other can be revealed to me self as “a presence in person”. It is then obvious that in our human being daily life, the other is always among other objects. But I must also admit that a man-object is unique among objects of perception, because unlike other common objects, he has his own perception. Furthermore, it is in the world that the other is first to be sought, but at the side of consciousness as a consciousness. For Sartre the fact that we are conscious of being

an object is simultaneously our awareness of the other as subject. Although the self can act as if the other is a mere object, this attitude can only be a pretence of the immediate pretence of the other as subject. Here lies the conflictual type of relationship between the self and the other. In this sense, the fact that the self will never succeed, either in reducing the other to an object or in assimilating the other's freedom.

For Warnock (1965: 65), a real awareness of other's existence there are two possibilities: I am, firstly, aware of the fact that my bodily existence is something which is known to other people. Secondly, I will be aware of the bodies of other people and this will help me to be aware of their real existence in the world. She then concludes that

at one and the same time as I am aware of myself, I necessarily become aware that the people exist and are observing me ... thus our knowledge that other people exist and are conscious, is part and parcel of our awareness of ourselves (Warnock 1965: 65).

From Sartre's study of Hegel, Husserl and Heidegger (1958), there are four points which can be considered as necessary conditions for a valid theory of the existence of the other.

- First, we must recognise that we cannot prove the existence of others. It is impossible, in principle, to imagine any experiment or criteria under which the existence of the other would be guaranteed, for solipsism remains a logical possibility.
- Secondly, we must recognise that we are not looking for the reason of the other's existence, but for the other as a concrete being who is not me.
- Thirdly, the other must be publicised as a concrete being concerned with our being and not as a mental representation conforming to the other with some level of probability.
- Finally, the other must be exposed with the cogito as having an internal relation of not being me.

Being-for-others is described as a "refusal of the other" and as "a negation effected by me upon myself": the Other is a "refused self", a "not-me-non-object" which grips me

objectively and hence in alienated form, but I cannot refuse to assume responsibility for the “alienated Me”, which the Other delivers back to me without engendering “the collapse of Myself” (Gardner 2009: 139). The existence of others is simply a “contingent necessity” or “factual necessity” (Gardner 2009: 142). The “I” and the “other” always play the role of being subject or object. Let us reflect how this can be possible.

We encounter others; we do not constitute them (Spade 2010: 257). For Sartre, the fundamental way I encounter other minds is not by knowing they are out there, but rather by means of feelings of shame through the look or the gaze (Spade 2010: 260). You can never see yourself as others see you. The endeavour to do so – the attempt to see yourself as an object – is bad faith. You become the object of the other. Thus, “you are for-others what you never succeed in being for-yourself. Thus, you are exposed; you are vulnerable” (Spade 2010: 261).

Spade (2010: 261) uses a metaphor to express the same view. For him, you try to be noble; let us say, you try to be good, or try to be intimidating. But you never make yourself noble or good or intimidating, just like that. You can never define yourself in that way and make it stick. But the other can do it to you. He decides whether you are noble or good or intimidating. He passes judgment, projects his values on things – including you. He sees you as you really are. Of course, you might very well ask: Who is he to define who I am? Why should his evaluation of me affect me like that? Why should I accept his point of view any more than my own? (Spade 2010: 261)

We need then to accept that, a human being recognise himself in the Other’s judgment, even though he may have absolutely no idea what they are. The Other’s judgments cut me to the core. Why should his judgments be able to hurt me unless I recognise myself in them? Yet they are beyond my control. All my life I am involved in defining myself, at becoming what I am, at being a definite in-itself. Why should the other succeed where I don’t succeed? Why should the other’s judgment be able to define me any more than my own estimation of myself – succeed in defining me in a way that sticks (Spade 2010: 262)?

It is so that the other have a kind of authority in the definition of myself – in the decision what kind of person I am. I recognise myself in his or her judgments of myself. This

recognition of myself in the other's judgments is not a matter of how I think of myself (Spade 2010: 263). In this sense I'm not alone in the world. Just like the certainty of my own existence, this certainty is not something I can prove; it is a certainty I am – a being-for-itself.

In short, my being as a for-itself is not just an isolated being; it is a social being. This social being of mine is not a necessary structure. I could have existed even if no-one else did.

According to Fanon (1986: 177-178),

Sartre has shown that, in the line of an unauthentic position, the past “takes” in quantity, and when solidly constructed, informs the individual. He is the past in a changed value. But, too, I can recapture my past, validate it, or condemn it through my successive choices. The black man wants to be like the white man. For the black man there is only one destiny. And it is white. Long ago the black man admitted the unarguable superiority of the white man, and all his efforts are aimed at achieving a white existence.

In submission and bad faith, a black man suddenly finds himself in a world in which things do evil; a world in which he claims to be summoned into battle; a world in which it is always a question of annihilation or triumph. A black man suddenly finds himself thrown into the world like any other being and he recognises that he has one right only: that of demanding human behaviour from the other. In most circumstances a black man always tries to surrender this responsibility to others. However, in fact, he does not have the right to allow himself to bog down. He does not have the right to allow the slightest division in himself or with others. He does not have the right to allow himself to be closed in what the past has determined.

4.5 HUMAN RELATIONS AS INTERCHANGEABLY OBJECT-SUBJECT

Concerning human relations, Sartre sombrely contends that every partner in a relationship does not really love the other. There is rather the attempt to make the other love the self by using certain language to reduce the other to object status while

“constituting” themselves in the “fullness of being and ... [being] recognised as such” (Sartre 1958: 483).

Human relationships raise interesting problems for human beings in society which culminate at the fact that the other is always viewed with an attitude of hostility and objectification. In this way, Sartre is sceptical about Heidegger’s attempt to envisage a non-antagonistic intersubjectivity. In this sense he equates Heidegger’s ontology to the image of “the crew” in which self-determination and individuality (the you and me) sinks into the sameness and repetition of the “we” (Sartre 1958: 333).

Such a view of self-determination is not compatible with Sartre’s existential ontology where the threat of objectification and reification drives selves to create and recreate themselves from one moment to the next. For Sartre the intersubjective constitution of character is simply a mode of “being-for-others” that is not constituted by the individual but by the Other (Sartre 1958: 457).

Considering Sartre, to understand his relations, I must admit that my relationship with the other is fundamentally defined as a relation of conflict, manifested in the objectification of the other. In this conflictual relation between me and the other, the main aim of each of us is to get hold of the position of subject and consider the other as an object. The other then is usually experienced by me as an object, even though he cannot be a particular object, because in some instances the other gets hold of the position of subject and also considers me as an object. This is because

man escapes me, in that, however carefully I kept him in sight and try to have him as an object of attention as I might have a stone or a tree as an object, I cannot read with his eyes, not think what he thinks. The massif is nothing but an object for me; a man cannot be merely that. (Warnock1965: 76)

I must admit that even if I consider the other being as an object, I must also recognise that this other sometimes escapes me inasmuch as he unfolds himself progressively and takes his own distances from me.

In fact, if I consider the other as an object; he then puts me in conflict with myself, insofar as the knowledge of myself is concerned. If the other is considered as an

object, how then can he play the role of being my mediator for my knowledge: “I cannot know myself in the Other if the other is first an object for me; neither can I apprehend the other in his true being – that is, in his subjectivity” (Sartre 1958: 243). I need to recognise that my awareness of the other is first being for whom I am an object, although he does not constitute me as an object for myself, but I am an object for him. I therefore appear to the other inasmuch as the in-itself appears to the for-itself as an object. That is, I appear to him as a mere object of observation.

In short. Either I make myself not-be a certain being, and then he is an object for me, and I lose my object-ness for him. In this case, the other ceases to be the other-me. Or else the other makes himself not-be me, in which case I become an object for him, and he loses his own object-ness. Thus, originally the other is the not-me-not-object (1958: 285).

The other is an object of a type, he is not an eternal object because there are instances wherein the other can also be a subject. The other has the possibility and capacity to transcend either the state of subjectivity or objectivity.

4.5.1 The look as a threat to others

At least one of the modalities of the other’s presence to me is object-ness. In his relationships a human being is treated or considered as an object by the other through the *look*. In this case, the look is first an intermediary which refers me to myself. It is also the instrument used by the other to take me as an object. Therefore, the phenomenon of the look does not really refer immediately or necessarily only to be organ of sight, but it refers to any type of my awareness of the presence of the other. People usually consider as ‘look’ the fact of convergence of the eyes in a certain direction only. I can also talk of a look when there is, for instance, a rustling of branches, the sound of footsteps, the movement of a curtain.

The other's look fixes and separates me from my possibilities, spatialises me and inserts me into “universal time”; I finally become “a temporal-spatial object in the world”. My being is, according to Sartre, “written in and by the Other's freedom”. The meaning of the other’s look is like an action. Here Sartre uses the common-sense order of explanation: Against this background it is not because we get knowledge of

others that we are affected by them; it is because we are affected by others ontologically that we have knowledge of them (Gardner 2009: 139).

Because of the mere fact of being conscious of the look, one must immediately apprehend the other as subject and accept the status of being an object.

The other possesses me by looking at me, for in this way he creates me as a person. At the same time, I seek to possess him. While I attempt to free myself from the hold of the other, the other is trying to free himself from mine; while I seek to enslave the other, the other seek to enslave me. We are by no means dealing with unilateral relations with an object-in-itself, but with reciprocal and moving relations ... (Warnock 1965: 83)

It is also a fact that I cannot be an object for an object. There is an object only for a consciousness to be aware of it. Therefore, there must be a radical conversion of the other if he is to consider me as an object. Thus, I cannot necessarily consider the other's look as a true sign of his object-ness. What it can only manifest is the fact that being-seen by the other is the truth of also seeing the other, because

it is in and through the revelation of my being-as-object for the other that I must be able to apprehend the presence of his being-as-subject. For just as the other is as probable object for me-as-subject, so I can discover myself in the process of becoming a probable object for only a certain subject. (Sartre 1958: 256-257)

What we usually apprehend in the other-as-object is also another being who see other objects; that is, this being is also a subject for other objects. The self then becomes an object among others seen through the other's look. Therefore, no conscious being can escape this situation of being at the same time as a being-for-itself and being in-itself, in other words, of being a subject-object. Catalano (1974: 162) continues that "through the other's look, not only is my transcendence transcended, but my spatializing and temporalizing are spatialized and temporalized ... However, before the other's look, I am a looked-at look".

Besides all these forms of awareness of the other I must recognise and strongly affirm the existence of the other and also my existence for others, because I cannot really

be the other unless at the same time I accept and assume my being-as-object for the other. Catalano (1974: 154) writes, "I see the other as one who sees me, and because he sees me, I would affect him in his emotions and ideas. I simultaneously recognise, however, that his consciousness is not and cannot be mine."

In conclusion we can, in accordance with Warnock's view, state two main consequences of being looked at.

- The first consequence is the fact that, as an object of another look, I become a thing like to be judged like all other things in the world.
- The second one is the fact that once I am aware of the other's look, I surely realise that I am not the master of the situation. Therefore, in the eyes of the other, I am an object not merely of perception but also of appraisal. This is clearly manifested by the attitude of shame. In this situation, the solution is that: I escape the other by leaving him with my withdrawn me in his hands. Also, as I choose myself as a discarding away from the Other, I assume and recognise as mine that this alienated me. My pulling away from the other-that-is, my Self is by its essential structure as assumption as mine of this me which the other refuses; we can even say that it is only that (Sartre 1958: 285).

4.5.2 Shame as consequence of being looked at

Sartre also introduces the problem of the other with reference to the experience of shame. For example, being noticed (witnessed) while performing a vulgar gesture, I feel ashamed of myself (Gardner 2009: 127).

Thus, one feels shame when one judges one's acts as they appear to another (Buchan 1996: 195). One feels it because one is aware of having been seen by another, "By the mere appearance of the other, I am put in the position of passing judgement on myself as on an object, for it is an object that I appear to the other." (Sartre 1958: 302)

Sartre furthermore emphasises the absence of any gap between myself and the object that I am for the Other in a case like shame. If shame is possible, then it must be possible for me to have consciousness, hence knowledge, of the Other (Gardner 2009: 128).

In contrast with Sartre's view there is the intersubjective work of Mead (1934) and Buchan (1996: 197), who interestingly argue, that the internalisation of social mores and attitudes which he (Sartre) called the "generalised other" is essential for the development of a stable and integrated personality. Mead holds that the development of self-hood hinges upon the ability to perceive and judge oneself as others do; hence the need to internalise the generalised other. As indicated above for Sartre the mere "look" or gaze of the other is a potent threat to one's autonomous self-consciousness.

Buchan (1996: 198), though also shares the view that the nature of our intersubjective situation, our being-for-others, is characterised by tension and conflict. For Kruks (2005) this position is not far from Sartre's position that conflict inheres in all human relations due to the radically individual nature of consciousness. Since each consciousness constitutes [the meaning of] its own situation, the Other can appear within it only as a locus of *counter*-constitution, as an objectifying power and threat – the other as hell.

Shame thus is an intentional, non-positional, pre-reflective self-consciousness, one which presupposes, of course, the existence of the Other (Gardner's (2009: 127). In this original and primitive one appears before the Other. It is a consciousness of myself as an object given to the consciousness of the Other, who thereby mediates my relation to myself. The "aspect of my being" discovered through shame belongs to a dimension of the for-itself, namely its being-for-others, *etre-pour-l'autre*. My shame is not for me but rather for the other.

As Sartre describes it, we are caught in a kind of "Maginot Line mentality" of having to protect our freedom by reflecting or projecting the threat which others pose to us back toward them (Taylor 1985:174). Nonetheless, this situation is still intersubjective in a certain sense.

The other is the indispensable mediation between myself and me. This is again proven in the attitude of shame. I can only be ashamed of myself as I appear to the other. By the mere appearance, I am put in the position of judging myself as an object, because I appear to the other as an object. If I make a vulgar gesture while being alone, I cannot judge or blame it, but if I discover that the other has seen me (or is aware of my vulgar gesture) then I am forced to pass judgment on my actions (Vunza 1998: 35). This

notion of vulgarity, which provokes shame, always implies an interrelation. This gives the other the possibility to have a good or bad portrait of me, and I can recognise myself in that image.

Shame is a kind of recognition. I simply recognise that I am only as the other sees me. I am then just a being in-self for the other. For Sartre, “shame is shame of self, it is the recognition of the fact that I am indeed that object which the other is looking at and judging. I can be ashamed only as my freedom escapes me in order to become a given object” (1958: 261).

Shame reveals to me the other’s look and the self at the end of the look. The awareness of shame brings us to consider seriously the two main question of the existence of the other and our real relation to the other. The attitude of shame helps us to feel both responsibility for our action and the immediate effect of our actions towards others. This simply means that I need the other to fully realise the structure of my being.

However, pure shame is simply a feeling of being an object and recognising self in the degraded, fixed, and dependent being. Shame can be considered as the feeling of an original fall, not because of the fact that I may have committed this or that particular fault, but because I have “fallen” into the world in most of things and that I need the mediation of the other in order to be what I am (Sartre 1958: 288). Shame usually occurs when a person realises that he is really the centre of interest of the other’s look; in other words, a person realising that he is the object at which the other is looking and which the other is judging.

Sartre claims that everyone has already had experiences of being looked at by the other and be filled with shame. To feel shameful is to accept the belief that one is not alone: a necessary condition of feeling shame is to believe that there are other people. It is a fact that to be able to think of oneself as a shameful object needs that one believes that he is the object of the look by other people. The existence of other people does not follow from the feeling of shame by individuals. However, this is one of the ways we can establish with certainty the existence of the other. Shame is an acknowledgement of the other as other passing judgment on our conduct or actions.

Shame can also be moved by jealousy or curiosity. I look through a keyhole and press my ear to the door – I want to know and discover what is being said within. Footsteps in the hall tell me that I have been seen, and I am suddenly “affected in my being” (*atteint dans mon être*): my own structure undergoes “essential modifications”, for I am now consciousness of myself being an object of the look of the Other (Gardner 2009: 136). As previously indicated, I am aware of the Other-as-object, in the keyhole case, of the Other-as-subject, and it is only because consciousness of the Other-as-subject (*conscience-sujet*, of *l’autrui-sujet*) is possible, that consciousness of the Other-as-object (*conscience-objet*, of *l’autrui-objet*) is possible (Gardner 2009: 136).

I can also regard the Other as an object, as one object among many in my world. In this sense I am safe by announcing my distance; I keep control of the situation, and the Other’s threat is disarmed. Or I can regard him as a subject, as a consciousness that defines me by his look, one that has his own views and opinions about life or the other external to him. In that case, I lose control of the situation; I become an object for him. My being-for-itself becomes a being-for-him and a being-for-others (Gardner 2009: 266).

In conclusion, shame is essential in human relations through which the self, recognises and acknowledges the other as subject beyond reach. This attitude of shame helps human beings to get a true comprehension of their self-ness. It must also serve as their motivation for constituting the other as an object. In this relation of conflict between the self and the other, there is a possible solution that can help escape the situation of being treated as an object by the other. The human being can opt for “solipsism”, which is the object of the next section.

4.5.3 Being alone (Solipsism) as a solution to other’s look

The attitude of solipsism can be considered as one of the solutions to the problem of the other. It is the affirmation of *moi* (myself) my ontological solitude. It is the radical affirmation that the self is totally different and independent of the other. This is proof that it is a tendency of the for-itself to ignore the force of the other’s look.

In fact, the independence of the for-itself is just an ideal, because it cannot be possible in human beings’ daily life. Solipsism is “a pure metaphysical hypothesis, perfectly unjustified and gratuitous; for it amounts to saying that outside of me nothing exists

and so it goes beyond the limits of the field of my experiences” (Sartre 1958:229). If we admit that I and the other are two separate substances, it is then difficult to escape the possibility of solipsism on the part of me and the other, because the real free union without slavery between the two may seem impossible.

Unfortunately, solipsism simply denies facts of our experience. We do experience the world as containing Other consciousnesses (Spade 2010: 246). We can always attempt to avoid, ignore others.

From the preceding consideration, the being-for-others is not only an ontological structure of the for-itself, meaning that the being-for-others cannot be derived from the being-for-itself as we derive a consequence from a principle. Of course, I must admit that our human-reality must be simultaneously for-itself and for-others and accept all consequences of this relation.

For Sartre (1958: 282),

[it] would perhaps not be impossible to conceive of a for-itself which would be wholly free from all For-others and which would exist without even suspecting the possibility of being an object. But this For-itself simply would not be man.

Another possible solution to this problem of the other is the real change of our ontological and social attitude towards the other. Instead of analysing the relation between the self and the other as a relation for-others, we will have to analyse it as a relation with-others. In this regard we must acknowledge that we need relationships to fulfil ourselves, but not to define ourselves.

In *The Transcendence of the Ego*,

Sartre made an original attempt to refute solipsism, arguing that his relocation of the 'I' in the world and outside consciousness renders me no less accessible to the intuitive cognition of Others than I am to my own attempts at self-knowledge. (Gardner 2009: 134).

4.6 BEING-FOR-OTHERS VERSUS BEING-WITH-OTHERS

Heidegger understands human beings as a specific kind of Being. In this sense he refers to the human being as *Dasein*, which means 'Being-there' (Solomon 1972). By using this expression, he emphasises the fact that a human being cannot be considered except as being present in the middle of a world amongst other things (Warnock 1965). *Dasein* is 'to be there' and 'there' is the world. It means that humans are embedded and absorbed in the physical, literal, tangible day to day world (Steiner 1978).

It holds that philosophy should be able of telling us the meaning of Being, of the where and what *Dasein* is (Heidegger 1962). The postulation is that the world "is", and that this fact is naturally the primordial phenomenon and the basis of all ontological inquiry. The world is here, now and everywhere around us. We are totally immersed in it, and after all, how could we be anywhere else? *Dasein* exists, *Dasein* is there. Furthermore, *Dasein* is an entity in which I myself am.

Dasein may exist either authentically or inauthentically, but still the character of *Dasein*'s character needs to be understood *apriori* as being "grounded" in the state of Being that he called "Being-in-the-world" (Heidegger 1962). Heidegger holds that we are thrown into the world and that our Being-in-the-world is a "thrownness" [*Geworfenheit*]. This concept is for Heidegger a primordial banality which had long been overlooked by metaphysical conjecture. Human beings are thrown with neither prior knowledge nor individual option into a world that is there before and will remain there after they are gone (Steiner 1978).

On this point Heidegger moves to the social level. Here the claim to belong to others is dangerous because human beings robs others' *Dasein* of their own accountability by making every decision and judgment for them. Human beings do this because they can say that they are responsible only for some decisions, not otherwise. For Heidegger this is passivity which leads to the alienated self – the everyday man (*Das Man*) who is fatally empty of moral autonomy and, therefore, of moral responsibility. Still this must also be qualified. Personal autonomy must go beyond mere independence, for the quest to define and develop oneself can only occur in the presence and relation with others (Buchan 1996: 198).

Where my being-for-others takes the form of being-with-others, “*être-avec-l'autre*” or *Mitsein*, it appears that I am “not in conflict with the Other but in community with him”, and that all “recognise one another as subjectivities”, as Hegel explains Spirit (Gardner 2009: 182). Heidegger in *Being and Time* claims that the world of *Dasein* is a “with-world”, *Mitwelt*, and that *Dasein* has “being-with”, *Mitsein* or *Mitdasein*, as one of its fundamental modes; we are with one another in a sensible sense, as not with stones or hammers (Gardner 2009: 133).

Interestingly enough, Sartre criticises this position as arbitrary, since being with another is only one of many possible relations. There exists also, for example, being against the Other, being for the Other, the Other's being for me and so on. These asymmetrical or conflictual modes of relating to the Other is no less primordial than being with. “Heidegger's image of human intersubjectivity, Sartre suggests, is that of a mute “crew”, of persons as united in an “oblique interdependence” in place of frontal opposition, of a “we” instead of “you and me”, of mere “co-existence” in “ontological solidarity”” (Gardner 2009: 134).

4.7 CONCLUSION

It is so that the world in which we are thrown (*Dasein*) has others in it, and the existence of others is totally indispensable to the facticity of being-there. Understanding of others in the world and the association of the ontological status of others with our own *Dasein* is, in itself, a form of Being. Being-in-the-world is a being-with, and that the understanding of the present-ness of others is to exist (Steiner 1978).

Human beings, for Sartre, are not like objects and created things around them (such as rocks and trees, or tables and chairs) and characterised merely by physical properties such as size, weight, or dimensions. Human beings have self-consciousness and hence are able to create and re-create themselves. Sartre (1958: 9) uses this distinction by referring to self-consciousness as existing *for-itself* or *being-for-itself* (Sartre 1958: 9).

The for-itself then is completely opposed to the highly structured and determined nature of the in-self. As Kruks (2005) and Buchan (1996: 199) explain, the consciousness of being-for-itself “is the power to put the world of things into question,

to alter, or to transcend it". It has been shown that the Sartrean distinction between the for-itself and the in-itself, the capacity of the for-itself to negate the in-itself and thus escape its influence, we find a concept of autonomy as the achievement of a form of 'critical distance' between the self and its situation.

As will be explained in Chapter 6, this autonomy or freedom is also sometimes experienced as 'anguish', for ultimately I am not the self which I will be, or "I am the self which I will be, in the mode of not being it." Sartre (1958: 68) and Buchan (1996: 201) express their views that the sense of who I am at this moment may be the direct nihilation of my previous identity; and the person I am today may have nothing whatever to do with the person I may be in future. There is no limit to what I may be or become, and because our self-consciousness is a nothingness which lacks structure and certainty, it is both indestructible and unpredictable; I literally cannot know how my self-consciousness will evolve and change (Flynn 1984: 7).

Sartre's other explanation to the dilemma of other minds emerges from a detailed critique of other solutions, and "consists in an argument by elimination: Sartre tries to show that his account must be accepted, because all other possible accounts fail, and that it coheres uniquely with the metaphysics of his analysis" (Gardner 2009: 127). Although Sartre gives follows in a sense in the footsteps of Hegel, Husserl and Heidegger for having attempted to understand the connection between self and Other, he takes their arguments in a direction where he problematises the Other as "constitutive of my consciousness" (Gardner 2009: 131; Rae 2011 and Priest 2000).

As discussed earlier in this study, Sartre's understanding of human being in general is influenced by his view that "existence precedes essence". That is, human beings have no definition or 'essence' given to it in advance. On the contrary, with "Man makes himself"– he defines himself only in the process of living. Consciousness is free, not confined to the limits of a definition or nature (Spade 2010: 99).

Against this background, Spade (2010: 100) continues that Sartre believes that "man is condemned to be free." Man is abandoned in the world, all alone, without any help, where he must engage in a world undeniably bearing the whole responsibility. He is accountable for his very desire of fleeing responsibilities. To make himself passive in

the world, to refuse to act upon things and upon Others is still to choose himself as responsible of his acts.

That is precisely why human beings apprehend themselves in suffering that is neither the foundation of its own being nor of the Other's being. Compelled to decide the meaning of being within the world, the human being must realise his condition as being thrown into a responsibility which extends to his very abandonment which he commits, regret or find excuse, and flee.

The person as a being-itself creates himself from nothingness. One figures life alone, from nothing as nothing was carried into existence. Thus, a person who is the "being-for-itself" certainly does not possess a predetermined essence like a rock or a table. According to Sartre, human beings derive meaning by acting upon the perennial unknown future and thus creates themselves as a being which is not something as one might describe at a certain point of time. Therefore, this being referred to here is at a "continuous flux" (Biswas 2016: 2).

In the coming chapter(s) the ontological analysis of the human being, as discussed in this chapter, will be linked to the concepts of bad and underdevelopment.

CHAPTER 5: SARTRE'S UNDERSTANDING OF THE CONCEPT *BAD FAITH*

5.1 INTRODUCTION

In this chapter, the aim is to define the ontological meaning of the concept *bad faith* according to Sartre. Different patterns of bad faith will also be mentioned and interpreted. Sartre's controversial claim that existence precedes essence will also be investigated. Heidegger's concept of *Dasein* as a being thrown into the world without its knowledge will also be revisited.

For Buchan (1996: 200), "individuals are forever longing to fill the emptiness of consciousness with solidity or meaning". Which is why, we are tempted to try to bridge the (irrevocable) divide between disembodied consciousness (the for-itself) and concrete situation (facticity, in-itself). Sartre calls this "bad faith", for it essentially amounts to a renunciation of authenticity.

To exercise bad faith, then, means that the individual consents the in-itself, and not the for-itself, as the basis of all value in the world. To be in the condition of bad faith is to assume the "role of entities with fixed and determined natures", to flee "from the reality of the responsible, free, and unpredictable for-itself into a false simulation of an object in-itself". Bad faith is the primary impediment to authentic existence; the forfeiting of the responsibility of freedom.

This fundamental distinction of be-ing is crucial to an understanding of Sartre's bad faith: That which consists in such misapprehension in "affirm[ing] facticity as being transcendence and transcendence as being facticity". Bad faith essentially involves either a misplaced or too great an emphasis on facticity (in-itself) or transcendence (for-itself).

5.2 WHAT IS BAD FAITH?

The attitude of bad faith refers to a fact or phenomenon of human reality, but it is not understood by everyone as "bad faith" nor is Sartre's definition of bad faith universally accepted.

Self-deception is a complex and perplexing phenomenon. How can you actively hide something from yourself? One possible answer is its informative nature about the mind more generally, or at least it seems that any theory of the nature and structure of the mind that cannot cater for self-deception must be wrong.

Self-deceptive belief gives the absurd impression because of the features distinguishing deception from mere error. Deception makes the deceived to believe something that the deceiver does not believe. There are different forms of this: You might make me believe something that you know to be false; or make me believe something that you merely believe to be false; or bring me to believe something that you have no real opinion about its truth. When the deceiver and the deceived are the same person, it becomes perplexing.

Kaufman (1956) siding with West (2008), prefers to translate Sartre's *mauvaise foi* as "self-deception" instead of the usual "bad faith":

Living in bad faith or self-deception is then described in terms of those who do not recognise their freedom and responsibility and effectively renounce from their personal decision-making, often preferring to agree to the pressures and expectations of others.

For Webber (2007: 21), bad faith is simply an affirmation of "psychological determinism" by which we attempt to convince ourselves that we have a static nature that is productive of our acts. For example, psychoanalysis puts in the place of bad faith the idea of a lie without a liar. It allows me to understand how it is possible to be lied to without lying to oneself since it places one in the same relation to self that the Other is in respect to one. It replaces the duality of the deceiver and the deceived, the vital condition of the lie, by that of the "id" and the "ego". It introduces into my subjectivity the deepest intersubjectivity structure of the *Mit-sein* (Sartre 1958:51).

McCulloch (1994) defines this concept as characterised by either "absence" or "unrealised possibilities". He has realised that only the present exists. The past cannot hold him back, as it is characterised by "absence" and his present self can thus strive towards achieving the "unrealised possibilities" of the future. "For bad faith is, if one is to adhere to Sartre's ontology, implicit in all human understanding." (1994: 18, 34-36, 50, 66)

Heidegger defines the lie as a normal and necessary phenomenon of the (*Mit-sein*) of human beings. As he always presupposes my existence, there is a relationship between my existence for the other and the existence of the other for me. However, in the case of bad faith, Sartre places a kind of intersubjectivity on one and the same subject.

Lapointe (1971) takes Sartre's (1958: 48) point of view that bad faith as "a lie to oneself, on condition that we distinguish the lie to oneself from lying in general". The difference between a lie in general and a lie to oneself (bad faith) is the fact that, in the case of the lie in general, we are in the presence of two different subjectivities, the first one being in total possession of the truth but hiding it completely from the second one who will consider and accept that lie as truth (cf. Daniels in Tymieniecka 2005: 207-225). In the case of bad faith, the duality of the deceiver and deceived does not exist. Bad faith exists in a single consciousness. Thus, it is from myself that I am hiding an unpleasant truth or presenting as truth a pleasing untruth.

Sartre (1958: 49) holds, in this regard, that the one to whom the lie is told and the one who lies is one and the same person. This implies that I must know as deceiver the truth, which is hidden from me as the one deceived. One must distinguish a lie and the truth he's hiding from himself. In other words. I must know the truth in order to conceal it more carefully – and this not at two different moments, but in the unitary structure of a single project.

It can be understood that for Sartre it is when I consciously attempt to achieve a false self-identity by discovering one aspect of myself, or falsely identifying with anyone aspect of myself, that I engage also in bad faith. In this sense, the deceiver and the deceived can be said to be both me, in the sense of being aspects or structures of myself, and not me, in the sense that not one aspect is all of myself that can represent me fully.

Catalano has a different standpoint when he argues that

there are three elements to a lie. First, one must believe something to be true. Second, one must express to another the opposite of what is believed. Third, for a lie to succeed the other must believe in the statement expressed (1974: 79).

Sartre's analysis of human relations distinguishes categories of behaviour of a human being in their common encounters with others, namely: sadism/hate/indifference/love, being-with (the "we") relationships. These concrete modes of relating to one another are a manifestation of bad faith. If one defines these concepts determining human relations, then sadism is an attitude of the self, which regards other human beings as mere objects among other objects in the universe. This attitude forces human beings to undermine others.

The concept of bad faith is a pervasive theme throughout Sartre's philosophical works. It is the human's lack of identity with itself which makes bad faith possible for that specific human being. How does such duality – Sartre's reference to the "the double property of the human being" – get expressed in bad faith? Bad faith is an unattractive psychological phenomenon that is part and parcel of humans. Roughly speaking bad faith is an attitude that is adopted to distract oneself from the existential disaster that we constantly face.

Hate can be defined as that strong desire to negate another being sometime without any specific reason. Thus, if I negate others, I may also be able to nihilate them and claim myself to be the only being. To hate someone is first to recognise his existence; that is, to recognise his existence as a threat to mine, and to feel the desire to destroy him. My desire to destroy the other is my denial of all possibilities of being objected. I destroy the other with the intention to remain alone and have no threat whatsoever to my subjectivity. The only other I can accept to live with is the other-object (in-itself), which poses no threat to my subjectivity. Therefore, I do not need to develop any attitude of hate towards him. This explains and justifies Sartre's insistence on the fact that human relations are based essentially on conflict.

This situation may become difficult to overcome, especially given the tendency to claim that human reality does not only live in the attitude of bad faith, but sometimes it really embodies it in the sense of being bad faith. Bad faith is problematic because it allows us to escape responsibility for our moral choices by treating humanity as the passive object of larger, organised forces – human nature, emotional passions, social pressures, the Will of God, etc. Sartre's contribution on this point is that if we act to shape our destiny, we need to accept and deal with the awesome responsibility this brings.

According to Sartre, this knowledge – that the other has a freedom capable of looking back at me – influences me to hide from myself. I am then part of a sort of solipsistic practice. Others which I pass by in the street are magic objects with which I interact in a determined manner. I barely notice them and act as if I am alone in the world. I brush against “people” as against a wall. I avoid them as obstacles. Their freedom-as-object is for me nothing else than adversity. In my mind they can’t even look at me. If they have some knowledge of me, that knowledge does not touch me. It is all about a pure modification of their being, which does not interact between them and me and which is affected (Sartre in Gordon 1995: 39).

Webber adds that the affirmation of psychological determinism is central to bad faith. This is achieved by pretending that our facticity is our transcendence. Our ability to go beyond the current situation is devoid of any freedom and instead derives from a fixed character – our facticity. In such a situation we can pretend that we still have our usual abilities of transcending situations without positing any freedom or an unfixed character.

This view by Sartre helps one to understand clearly how the attitude to bad faith can affect human relations to the extent of spoiling them. These forms of relations can, of course, be changed if the person living in bad faith admits his attitude of bad faith and accepts to become authentic. Unfortunately, most of the time, the person living in bad faith deliberately ignores and/or denies his situation. This makes the task of changing his attitude more difficult and sometimes impossible.

Following Nietzsche, Sartre suggests that man should choose to act as if his existence were a game (Mitchell 2020). To live such a life means to understand that one is totally free and thus responsible for each choice and action made, because the being-in-itself remains inaccessible and, hence, one does not know what the truth and, at the same time, the meaning of life is. Such an interpretation of human existence implies that one should answer no to the statement that a necessary account of what right action exists.

Bad faith disregards the norms and criteria of truth as they are accepted by the critical thought of good faith. It decides, in the first place, what the nature of truth is. In this process a truth appears, a method of thinking, a type of being which is like that of objects; the ontological characteristic of the world of bad faith with which the subject

suddenly surrounds himself is this: that there being is what it is not, and is not what it is.

In the case of bad faith, there is no knowledge of deceitful concepts or a cynical lie. The first principle of bad faith is to flee what it cannot flee, to flee what it is. This very flight exposes to bad faith an inner disintegration in the heart of being, and it is this disintegration which bad faith wishes to be. It seeks to flee the in-self by means of the inner disintegration of one's being. It denies this very disintegration as it denies that it is itself bad faith. It is all about "not-being-what-one-is-not". If bad faith is possible, it is because it is an immediate, permanent threat to every project of the human being. In this sense consciousness covers in its being a permanent risk of bad faith. The origin of this risk is the fact that the nature of consciousness simultaneously is to be what it is not, and not to be what it is.

When I refer to authentic life, I simply refer to a form of self-recovery of being, which was previously corrupted by the attitude of bad faith. In human relations bad faith can manifest itself in various ways without full knowledge of the person implicated. At this stage of investigating the attitude of bad faith in human relations one can clearly see how it appears difficult for human beings to be really authentic. For most existentialists,

Existence is authentic to the extent that the existent has taken possession of himself and, shall we say, has moulded himself in his image. Inauthentic existence, on the other hand, is moulded by external influences, whether these be circumstances, moral code, political or ecclesiastical authorities, or whatever. (Macquarrie 1972: 206)

The attitude of bad faith is also present in people's relation vis-à-vis their own body. There is a kind of denial or a reluctant acceptance of our situation in an "imposed body" we did not choose. Gordon illustrates this situation in his example of people wearing cosmetics. For Gordon, cosmetics cover up the body and can be presented as the body. It is the body as the body appears. A made-up body presents no flesh: hair is covered with chemicals; skin is powdered over, or perhaps painted; clothing covers the rest. The made-up person can present himself as a smiling clown although he himself is conscious underneath as crying; or the made-up person can present

himself as a sad face, although he is conscious of himself as laughing (Gordon 1995: 37).

These dualities which can coexist in a human being, seem, after the foregoing analysis, not necessarily forms of bad faith, but at least they are attitudes with the aim of deceiving others. And in their aim of deceiving others they also manifest a clear self-deception. I would like to be seen by others as having long hair; meanwhile I know that I am ugly but through cosmetics I want to be beautiful. It is quite evident that the social relations of my body to the other's body can be decided as relations of pure and indifferent exteriority, but which can influence my being and that of others.

This game of make-up gives me a certain assurance that others do not know my real and true me, because others are only in contact with "me" made up. This attitude can push me not only to the denial of my body, but at the same time to the denial of myself vis-à-vis others. It is then a real attitude of bad faith; I deny my body as mine by convincing myself that my "real perspective" is my perspective beyond me and my body. Let me here state clearly that, in this view, it is also a form of bad faith to play along with others' bad faith.

5.3 PATTERNS OF BAD FAITH

In his analysis of the attitude of bad faith in human relations, Sartre distinguishes two main kinds of bad faith, which he illustrates with two well-known examples. The two kinds of bad faith basically refer to Sartre's two ontological modes of being, namely the being-in-itself and the being-for-others.

The first pattern of bad faith is that in which, to protect himself against the recognition of his own freedom, a conscious being, a Being-for-itself, pretends to be a *thing*, a Being-in-itself, which therefore has no choice, but is managed by other people, or is just inert. (Warnock 1965: 56)

Referring to this first pattern of bad faith, Sartre gives the example of a woman who accepts a date with a man. In the process of the conversation the man manifests, through some action, an attraction towards the woman, but the woman prefers to ignore all advances and acts performed by the man, which are aimed to express his

desire and intentions. In real fact, the woman knows the exact intention of the man. She also knows her real attitude towards the man's actions, but she continues to behave in such a way as to avoid and ignore that which she knows. The aim of the woman here is to postpone the crucial moment of decision indefinitely. For example, if the man can hold her hand in his, her hand will remain inert; neither consenting nor resisting. At that moment she considers herself as a thing. The same applies to all other actions of the man; she just considers them how they really are – simply existing in the mode of the in-itself. The reason behind this woman's attitude is that

[a]fter all, her body is not her personality, and what is *actually* an advance to her person in its sexuality she attempts to contemplate as a *possibility*, as happening to 'another'. Thus, his hand is not in *her* hand, but in a *hand*.
(Catalano 1974: 83)

This example shows how the woman is clearly tied to her bad faith; therefore, she makes use of various tricks in order to ignore her real situation and remain in the situation she has created. Not only does she reduce herself to a being-in-itself through her own body which she recognises and denies at the same time; she also has the tendency to reduce all acts of her companion to being-in-itself in the sense that she ignores the presence and "touches" of her companion's hands.

The second pattern of bad faith Sartre describes with reference to the example of a waiter in a café. Sartre holds that a waiter in a café pretends to be nothing except a being-for-others. In this regard, the waiter acts and behaves according to how people expect him to act; the opposite would mean the non-fulfilment of his duty. As Warnock expresses it clearly, "[t]he waiter does not pretend to be a *thing*, as the girl does who treats her hand as a thing. He pretends to be *nothing but* what people label him – that is, a waiter" (1965: 59). Thus, he is forced to play the role of being a waiter in a café and be recognised as such.

This example of a waiter in a café shows the paradox of Sartre's analysis of bad faith, at the level of human relations. In Sartre's study of one of his three modes of being, being-for-others, he insists on the important role played by society in human social relations. Nonetheless, he also acknowledges that a human being must be free of all types of social pressure and influence. The paradox consists of the fact that, if I refuse

to acknowledge my social self, I deceive myself. But this does not mean that I am better off if I try to be only my social self. In this example, the waiter in the café identifies himself with his social self and abdicates the responsibility of his “own self”. This suggests that a human being must always find a way between his own self and the social self. This will help a human being to avoid the attitude of solipsism or to be just an “us”.

This attitude of Sartre is that of paradoxical humanism, because it reminds man of the following three realities:

- i) there is no legislator for his acts besides himself,
- ii) we can realise that it is not by turning back upon himself, but always by seeking, beyond himself (with others) an aim which is one of freedom or of some realisation,
- iii) and man can realise himself as truly human and authentic.

In short: I cannot obtain any truth whatsoever about myself, except through interaction with another. As indicated before, the other is inseparable to my existence and with regard to any knowledge I can have of myself. Consequently, the intimate discovery of myself is also the revelation of the other as a freedom which confronts me, and which cannot think or will without doing so either for or against me (Kaufmann 1956: 303).

As indicated earlier, a human being has the right to decide what he will become, because each one’s existence is his own, and unique. I must insist here that these considerations must not lead us into complete relativism and total individualism. This attitude of uniqueness of each human being does not exclude the necessary idea of humanity or abandon the idea of universal morality. Although it is true that, as human beings, we always live in society, i.e. with others, and that this certainly forces us to obey a set of moral rules likely to help us live in harmony, we cannot sacrifice our “own self” for the sake of trying to reconcile with others.

In this analysis of human social relations, we have indicated the conflicts and tensions a human being usually faces. On the other hand, we have shown how a human being is a being of will, choices, freedom and how she must strive to attain them in order to

be herself. On the other hand, the suggestion is made that a human being is “thrown” in the world and “abandoned” to himself. This also shows his characteristic of a finite being. Even though a human being is thrown into the world and abandoned to himself, he is not alone to live in this situation (Rogers 2014). This brings in one important aspect of a human being forward, being-with-others in the world. But in this community of being, the danger is that a human being can be swallowed up in an unauthentic collectivism of the “us”.

In the light of this conceptual analysis of various patterns of bad faith, Champigny is correct that: The trouble with the notion of bad faith is that, based on the contradictory definition of human reality, any kind of behaviour may be interpreted as in bad faith. To be useful, the notion of bad faith should be tied to that of responsibility; bad faith may occur only where responsibility is felt, if not explicitly understood, by the person involved. Bad faith then means an attempt to turn action into gesture and moral responsibility into mythical confusion or aesthetic detachment (1972: 29).

On the basis of the conceptual and social analysis of bad faith, bad faith can be considered as an effort by consciousness to hide from his existential condition of suffering, of its living as longing and desire, as an unfulfilled, empty being, as a being subject to continuous confrontation with herself and her own freedom.

A human being is not condemned to live only in bad faith. He is also capable of good faith. Even though Sartre insists on the attitude of bad faith as a human state or condition which determines the behaviour of some individuals, he also acknowledges the existence of the attitude of good faith. For him a person cannot live in bad faith as a state because he can also choose to live in good faith. For this reason, Catalano (1974) claims that bad faith and good faith begin from an awareness of the same inner disintegration (desegregation), the same awareness that we are what-we-are-not and are not what-we-are. But in good faith and bad faith, we suffer this lack of perfect identity with consciousness differently.

“In good faith we start with the realization that we are freedom; we recognise, however, that we can exist only by tending in the direction of being, only by trying to become what we freely choose to be. We also recognise that our very flight toward being will

never be achieved as an identity. In good faith we do not flee our freedom, and we do not flee the very fact that our good faith is always in question” (Catalano 1974: 88).

Two types of good faith can be differentiated: the first one is ignorant good faith. It implies believing what we believe, it is also a belief without awareness of the belief as a belief.

This form of good faith carries the threat of bad faith since to remain believing what one believes, to remain presenting belief with the posture of knowledge, requires closing off the possibility of questioning one’s belief as belief. (Gordon 1995: 56)

The second form of good faith is the authentic good faith, which implies recognising one’s situation as really what it is. The focus in the coming chapter will be the analysis of the attitude of authentic good faith, because it is an attitude toward evidence and admission of truth.

Sartre clearly states in his definition of bad faith that this attitude forces one to ignore and hide from the anguish of his own good faith. The human being is then justified to take an attitude toward truth which can allow him to behave as if he is ignorant of his own reality. “To be ignorant is not identical with being unaware. One can be aware of what one does not know.” (Gordon 1995: 57)

The difference between good faith and bad faith lies, accordingly, in the fact that when a person is in a situation of good faith, he must first decide and consider which reasonable evidence to believe and allow himself to be convinced only on the basis of what he considers as a reasonable amount of evidence. But in the situation of bad faith a person first believes and then deliberately decides not to consider too much reasonable evidence of his belief.

In Catalano’s (1974: 90) words the difference between bad faith and good faith is the fact that: in good faith, we commence with a realisation that we are our failure to *be* one with our body, our environment, and our entire situation, but we are still aware of the need of suffering towards the being that we would like to be. In bad faith, we attempt to see ourselves both as the product of our environment and heredity, and as

“cursed” by being unable to be what we would wish to be. We then choose this failure and attempt to rest and enjoy it.

In the situation of good faith, a person is put face to face with her freedom and accepts her reality and her responsibility. But in the situation of bad faith a person always attempts to flee his own freedom and convinces himself that it is independent of his will. Here the paradox is the fact that a person is conscious of lying to himself (falsehood) and yet believes his lies and convinces himself again that his lies are not lies but truths.

The attitude of bad faith is usually sustained by the anguish which requires that

I realize that there is inevitably a gap, as we have seen, between myself now and my possibilities, which are, however, genuinely *my possibilities*. I choose between them, and whatever I choose makes me what I am. (Warnock 1965: 53).

Even if bad faith can be considered as an essential attitude to human reality, it cannot be understood as a permanent state of human consciousness. As mentioned in the interpretation of the attitude of good faith, a human being is also able to adopt the attitude of good faith and leave the one of bad faith (Rae 2011: 74). This means that there is a permanent swing of the human consciousness from the attitude of bad faith to the attitude of good faith and vice-versa. In other words, neither of the two attitudes (bad faith and good faith) can consequently be a permanent condition of a human being.

5.4 HOW CAN A HUMAN BEING ESCAPE BAD FAITH?

Sartre found the answer to this question through the existentialist principle which states that “existence precedes essence”. This principle needs to be treated with caution. If bad faith is an essential attitude of human being, therefore, whether a person is in bad faith or good faith does not matter because it is independent of his real being.

According to Gordon (1995: 57), the foundation of bad faith, then, is good faith, good faith as a possibility to which one take an ironic stand, a negative attitude, as a primary

mode of being. Maintaining the contradiction, bad faith's ultimate foundation is the posture of good faith in order to deny what it is – that is, bad faith. Likewise, the foundation of good faith is the possibility of becoming bad. Ontologically, bad faith's possibility rests on the possibility of mediation presenting itself as immediacy.

In real life a human being is confronted by the situation which sometimes can force him/her to surrender his/her freedom. Therefore, he will find it justifiable to adopt hopeless behaviour, even the attitude of bad faith.

Gordon (1995: 60) agrees partially with Sartre when he claims that bad faith re-apprehends good faith and slides to the very origin of the project of good faith. This supposes a self-recovery of being which was previously corrupted. This self-recovery we shall call authenticity.

In view of this distinction between bad faith and good faith, by Gordon, there is also a difference between strong and weak bad faith. Briefly, strong bad faith refers to the fact that an individual is hiding from his own freedom. But in the case of weak bad faith, which is also known as institutional bad faith, it has a specific meaning and many implications. Here we will focus more on institutional bad faith.

Weak bad faith, for Gordon(1995: 45), refers to the web of beliefs and artifices that constitute the general spirit of seriousness that allows the individual to hide from his and others' freedom with excessive facility. It affects the social sphere by concealing human reality with a prevailing, institutional condition of unfreedom, of the self-denial and discouragement of freedom.

Headley (2000) suggests partially that this institutional bad faith is considered as weak because of the fact that it expresses itself in the system of beliefs which is clearly manifested in the daily activities of human beings, and such a system is supported and maintained by all choices which can or cannot be made in solution to the acceptance or denial of his own responsibility.

This attitude creates in society two separate results usually known as the "us" and the "we". The main difference between the two, is the fact that the "us" refers to two or more freedoms who are aware of themselves as seen by others and taken as objects.

The “we” can be considered as a point of view from which others are seen and considered as objects. The “we” plays the role of being the consciousness of the “us”.

The problem with the “we” is that the “we” constitutes consciousness of “me and *others*” – in a word, *us*. For “we” to be, we must also be *us*. To get out of this circle seems to require being consciousness without an object, “a mode of being rejected outright in our ontological framework”. (Gordon 1995: 46)

This clearly shows that those who accept and assume the role of being an “us” as their totality are also forced to admit their own objectification by losing their subjectivity and hence hide from their freedom. As discussed earlier on, this may be the reason of Sartre’s claim that “the essence of the relation between consciousness is not the *Mitsein*, it is conflict” (Gordon 1958: 555), conflict in so far as there is an external confrontation between subjectivities.

Through these human beings’ conflict the “us” can even affirm that they exist only as hidden from others (the “we”), the “we” then can easily utilise for their own profit the ontological duality which may exist between myself and the eyes of others. The “we” will then appear as being able effecting the synthesis between the unconscious and the conscious. Therefore, the “us” can really know themselves only through the mediation of the “we”.

5.5 WHY IS IT THAT EXISTENCE PRECEDES ESSENCE?

For many philosophers the distinction between existence and essence has been one of the most disputed issues in philosophy, because of its wide applicability and usefulness. It can be said that to claim that anything “exists” is simply to point to the fact “that it is”. Existence is usually characterised by concreteness, particularity, determined in space and time. In contrast, essence refers to the form in which the existent exists. Therefore, the essence of anything consists in “what it is”; it is constituted by basic characteristics that make it one kind of object different from another.

The belief in a certain belief is to accept the situation of bad faith. In such a situation the whole responsibility lies in the person who is faced with all choices.

To determine what kind of a person a human being chooses as his being is to determine not only what kind of human being he/she chooses to be, but also *who* the human being may be in his particularity in virtue of the choices which make his life meaningful. (Gordon 1995: 5)

Concerning this existentialist principle, certain religious beliefs claim that human beings have a fixed essence assigned for them to determine how they shall live and behave from their birth. This view claims that whatever happens in the human life cannot be changed. Therefore, they conclude that God has in advance predetermined human existence. This belief is sometimes known as predestination, which simply means that the destiny of human beings has been traced and each follows it without any excuse. But according to Sartre's existentialism, human beings must create their essence as they go along with their life, by trying to fill the gap between themselves and their future, which also includes reality and unknown possibilities of their existence. For Warnock (1965: 53–54),

... there is no *essential* human nature given in advance. Men are struck down in the world, and they become whatever they choose to become by doing and feeling what they choose to do and feel.

It is indispensable that choice is always possible, but what is not possible is not to choose. Human beings must always make choices in life and must be aware of the fact that not choosing also is still a genuine and real choice.

Sartre's attitude of bad faith presupposes that a human being is aware of his freedom in his various living situations, because each choice a person makes determines his life and has the power to change these choices.

For this reason, man *is* basically what-he-is-not – man is his *possibilities*. She is freedom, which is the lack within her being; and she is his consciousness insofar as this *is not* a “what” or objective nature. In other words, man is not what-he-is. Man *is not* his body, his past, his environment. In bad faith, man attempts to keep separate what he is from what he is not (Catalano1974: 84).

This view of Catalano to deal with human reality as a being which is what it is not and which is not what it is, is also sustained by Sartre. This is also echoed by Gordon (1995: 56) when he claims that one can thus be in bad faith because of coextensive ironic and ontological considerations. Human reality exists on an ironic fine line. It can “be what it is not” precisely in order not to be what it is. One can believe in order not to believe, love in order to hate, try to succeed in order to fail, and so forth. Thus, in order to be true to oneself, one also must be able to lie to oneself; in order to choose one’s freedom, one must be able to deny one’s freedom.

For existentialist philosophers, man as such is not definable, this is because he is not a being, but he is becoming. Man can be something if he makes himself by choosing his essence. Man is simply what he conceives himself to be as he wills. For if indeed existence precedes essence, no-one can be allowed to justify his actions by reference to a given and specific human nature which cannot be justified. This leads us then to claim that the idea of determinism does not affect man’s behaviour. Man is left alone, without any guardian, with no other option than to take responsibility for his freedom. To express these views Sartre uses the concept of abandonment.

By his concept of abandonment Sartre means that there is no God who establishes values or sets an ideal of humanity towards which each man must strive. Each must invent his own values, and he exists authentically in so far as he strives to realise values that really are his own. (Macquarrie 1972: 207)

Man is thus condemned to be free.

5.6 A HUMAN BEING IS THROWN IN THE WORLD AS A *DASEIN*

For Sartre and most existentialist philosophers, man did not create himself; he is thrown into the world, and from that moment he alone is responsible for everything he does. With this situation of abandonment goes the attitude of anguish of the unknown. The anguish with which we are concerned here cannot be the one which leads to the attitude of inaction. It is the anguish well known to those who have the sense of responsibility. It is the anguish which calls man to act through his daily choices.

Man, in the state of being free, carries the weight of the world on his shoulders. She is responsible for the world and for herself as a way of being. Here the concept of “responsibility” is taken in its ordinary sense as consciousness (of) being the indisputable author of an event or of an object. It is all about the responsibility of the for-itself, since she is the one by whom it happens that there is a world; since she is also the one who makes herself be. It is a situation in which she finds herself, where the for-itself must wholly assume this situation in all its complexity.

I am ashamed of being born, or I am amazed at it. I livingly rejoice about it or I assume this life as bad. I never encounter anything except my responsibility. Which poses a critical question that: does being born depend on the on to be born? Absolutely not! That is why I must not ask, “Why was I born?” or curse the day of my birth or declare that I did not ask to be born, for these various attitudes toward my birth. For example, as far as I realise a presence in the world – there is absolutely nothing else but to accept this birth in full responsibility and of making it mine.

If existence is really essence, “man is responsible for what he is. Thus, the first effect of existentialism is that it puts every man in possession of himself as he is and places the entire responsibility for his existence squarely upon his own shoulders (West 2008). And, when we say that man is responsible for himself, we do not mean that he is responsible only for his own individuality, but that he is responsible for all men” (Sartre in Kaufman 1956: 291).

Consequently, the recognition that I’m totally free and authentic, that existence precedes man’s essence implies that he is a free being who cannot, in any situations, but will his freedom. On the other hand, such a person must also realise that he can also not will the freedom of others.

The fallen person, in Heideggerian language, is not someone who has fallen into sin, in the traditional Christian sense, but a person who has given up on creating him or herself and creating an authentic existence out of the circumstance they find themselves. Such people allow themselves to be distracted by the moment, they only repeat what they are told, and they are alienated from the production of value and meaning. In other words, they have so fallen into “bad faith” that they no longer recognise or acknowledge their freedom.

Heidegger considers man as *Dasein*, which simply means “being there”. According to him, man as *Dasein* “in the world is a continuous being who thinks about the meaning of everything that is, not for any particular result, but because he is a thinking, that is, a musing being” (Stumpf 1993: 505). The “there” refers to the world in which the *Dasein* occupy a space and time. The complete formulation of the *Dasein* is therefore: “being-in-the-world”, in specific time and space.

Then: Who is the *Dasein*? For Heidegger (1962: 80), the *Dasein* is always an “I” not others. He is the “I itself”, the “subject” and the self. The “*Dasein* is an entity which is in each case I myself; it’s being is in each case mine” (1962: 150). But the *Dasein* is a being of the world. And in the world the *Dasein* finds other beings, because the *Dasein* is not a “being there” alone, he must accept and live with other *Dasein*.

The focus must not only be in the spatial situation of things but in their mode of being. Heidegger (1962: 155) holds that, “The world of *Dasein* is a *with-world* (*Mitwelt*). Being-in is Being-with Others. Their Being-in-themselves within-the-world is *Dasein-with* (*mitdasein*).” For him the relation among human beings can be the one of subject to subject. The *Dasein* must acknowledge that he is not alone in the world; the presence of others must not be as a threat. In relation with others, the *Dasein* must remain authentic. This simply means that he must remain himself and avoid playing a mere role of behaving according to how others want him to behave.

Heidegger does not consider the *Dasein* as an isolated “I” without others. Others are given to us as the being-in-the-world. The *Dasein* does not and cannot create them, he finds them through in the world also. Of course, being with others is different from being with things (objects) that are present-at-hand. In being with others there is a relationship of being from *Dasein* to *Dasein* (from human being to another human being). Even though we can analyse the other (a human being) we can never consider or encounter him as a person-thing present-at-hand. In real life that we can meet others as working for us, but this cannot be a reason for them to be considered as things.

When Others are encountered, it is not the case that one’s own subject is *proximally* present-at-hand and that the rest of the subjects, which are likewise occurrents, get discriminated beforehand and then apprehended;

nor are they encountered by a primary act of looking at oneself in such a way that the opposite pole of a distinction first gets ascertained. (Heidegger 1962: 155)

A human being, in his relations with others, must always be cautious and considerate. He must avoid considering others as mere objects and must relate to them as other human beings having the same capacities and values.

Dasein as being there is a thrown into the world as a being-in-the world and thrown into the publicness of the they. The *Dasein* has fallen into the world and has also fallen away from itself and its own authenticity; therefore, losing its potentiality for being its real self, he has then to strive for his authenticity together with others. In other words, "... fallenness into the world means an absorption in Being with-one-another" (Heidegger 1962: 220).

Fallenness must always be understood as a necessary existential characteristic of *Dasein*, and as an existential mode of being-in-the-world with others. It must in no way be considered as a bad and deplorable stage of a human being's existence. Waterhouse (1981: 85) echoes this when he claims that "this brute fact of simply being-there, willy-nilly, Heidegger calls my thrownness". In this case *Dasein*'s thrownness is part of its facticity. We cannot regard *Dasein* as merely an object present-at-hand, because it always strives for its own essence.

It is a fact that, at birth, *Dasein* realises that he is in the world and realises that he has never chosen to be in the world, but finds himself in the world, occupying a certain space at a given time. This can never be denied nor proven. The world can be in this case considered as the place where the human reality makes known to itself what it is. In this regard Sartre claims that "... without the person, there is no world" (1958: 104). The world is created by the human being's awareness.

Being thrown into the world can also be alienating.

This alienation closes off from *Dasein* its authenticity and possibility. It does not, however, surrender *Dasein* to an entity which *Dasein* itself is not, but forces it into its inauthenticity. The alienation of falling – at once tempting

and tranquillising – leads by its own movement to *Dasein's* getting entangled in itself. (Heidegger 1962: 222)

If this is viewed from another perspective, I can admit that *Dasein* has also fallen away from itself as an authentic being, because of its acceptance to be in the world for no clear reason. Although fallenness is a necessary ontological structure of *Dasein* with its characteristic of inauthenticity, the *Dasein* as Being-there has the possibility to modify its inauthentic structure, into an authentic and have valuable existence.

As a being-with, the *Dasein* is in certain cases tempted to surrender its authentic being and live only as a being-with. But Heidegger's claim that

thrownness is neither a 'fact that is finished' nor a fact that is settled. *Dasein's* facticity is such that as long as it is what it is, *Dasein* remains in the throw, and is sucked into the turbulence of the they's inauthenticity. (1962: 223)

The attitude of bad faith usually poses a serious threat to man's freedom. A life dominated by bad faith can never be a free life; the only possibility is to live an inauthentic life, with the ideal of sacrificing his freedom. A human being using bad faith as rule of conduct is strictly determined by his outside life, a pleased life, but forgets his real essence and goal which is freedom. As Sartre puts it clearly,

Through bad faith a person seeks to escape the responsible freedom of being-for-itself. Bad faith rests on a vacillation between transcendence and facticity which refuses to recognise either one for what it really is or to synthesize them. (1958: 629)

For Sartre, as Buchan (1996: 199) puts it, the yearning for authentic self-hood is embedded in the world. Sartre translates Heidegger's idea that individuals are thrust or 'thrown' into the world into their abandonment in the world. "He calls this description of the self as its "facticity", the contingent, physical situation into which the for-itself is thrown.

On a critical note, there is a slight contradiction in Sartre's analysis of human freedom. On the one hand, he insists on the freedom of the individual for an authentic life, but

on the other hand, he insists on a certain respect for others' freedom. The contradiction may seem apparent, but it is profound. It is difficult, if not impossible, for a person to live an authentic life without crossing the border of someone else's freedom. Thus, for a sustainable harmony in social life any human being must accept a certain degree of inauthenticity or a certain abdication of his freedom and choices.

Both Sartre and Heidegger interpret freedom as a project which becomes a frame of reference by which we interpret the world around us. This project, though, is and can only be situated in the real world. It is the very situation of freedom which makes freedom possible. Individuals continually confront obstructions and "resistances" in the world, but these only attain meaning when interpreted or manipulated by us in the quest to realise our projects.

There are rules of social life which usually are imposed on men by the society without their agreement, and they ought to respect them, at least to be considered as "real man". Man, sometimes must obey them without necessarily assimilating them.

Sartre's freedom as an emptiness appears to be a blind search for whatever else can fill in the emptiness. As a random and blind search for whatever else can fill in the emptiness, Sartre's freedom seems to be pointless, purposeless, absurd as his conception of existence. (Teffo1990: XI)

On the other hand, one must accept responsibility. Authentic living requires that I accept that freedom is my defining characteristic, and that in order to truly exercise my freedom I must accept that I am responsible for my choices, defining and giving meaning to my own self.

5.7 CONCLUSION

After the interpretation of the Sartrean concept of bad faith in this chapter, we will attempt to show in the next chapter how the underdevelopment in the DRC is influenced by this attitude of bad faith.

The upcoming chapter will elucidate how the DRC society seems to be divided into two specific worlds (worlds): The world of leaders and their direct protégés, friends, and relatives, who enjoy the wealth and other benefits of the whole state, on the one

hand, and the world of objects, composed of the downtrodden and the wretched of the earth.

Bad faith tries to circumvent the anguish (*angst*) that comes with the realisation that our existence has no coherence except for what we ourselves create. Bad faith is thus a choice within us – a way that a person uses their freedom to avoid dealing with the consequences of that freedom.

It is I who pull myself from the nothingness to which I aspire. It is because of this nothingness in which one exists that the present can always be accessed as that which allows a reconfiguration of the long-term project in consideration of future ambition.

In the coming chapter, a link will be established between Sartre's understanding of the concept of bad faith and the problem of underdevelopment in Africa (Morris 2014) – with special reference to the DRC.

CHAPTER 6: BAD FAITH AND UNDERDEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA: THE CASE OF THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO

6.1 INTRODUCTION

In the previous chapter, an interpretation of Sartre's concept of bad faith has been provided. In this chapter, an attempt will be made to establish if bad faith can be of help as one of the reasons for Africa's underdevelopment, specifically examining the DRC case.

The chapter will start with a background to the political history of the DRC, which then will be linked to earlier arguments that the underdevelopment in the DRC is due to bad faith in the DRC leadership and its people. For this reason, the historical interpretation will focus on the period that commenced just before 1960 when the DRC gained its independence from Belgium under the presidency of Kasa-Vubu, and throughout the long period of Mobutu's reign, from 1965 until 1997, when he was overthrown by Laurent Kabila in 1997. The period of Joseph Kabila (son of Laurent Kabila), ranging from 2001 until 2016, will also be covered in the investigation. Eventually, the influence of different governments in the DRC since independence will be discussed to determine the possible link between underdevelopment in the DRC and the attitude of bad faith.

This analysis will focus mainly on the less obvious, yet insidious and often equally destructive policy choices that have stunted Congolese development. Although many Congolese have preferred to place the blame for the continent's predicament, and thus the solutions, at the door of outsiders, there is not much that the external community can achieve without Congolese agreement and participation.

It is believed that colonial structures 'left Africa with a more multifaceted and destructive institutional legacy in the 1960s than at the beginning of the colonial period.' Political and economic development institutions in many African colonies, specifically in the DRC,

meant that, rather than forming critical juncture for improvements in their institutions, independence formed an opening for unscrupulous leaders to

take over and strengthen the extraction that European colonialists presided over (Acemoglu and Robinson 2013: 116).

6.2 A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE CONGO

6.2.1 The DRC before independence

The Congo's origins as a state were different from any other African country. The Congo as a state began life not as a colony, but as the personal property of Léopold II, an aspiring, greedy and devious monarch whose lust for territory and wealth was mostly responsible for igniting the *Scramble for Africa* among European powers. Determined to achieve what he called "a slice of this *magnifique gâteau Africain*", in 1878, "he hired the Welsh-born journalist-explorer Henry Morton Stanley, who had recently returned from an epic journey across Africa, to carve out a territory for him along the Congo River" (Meredith 2011: 94).

Over a period of five years, Stanley signed 'treaties' with more than 400 African chiefs, persuading them to give up their sovereignty, and proceeded to launch a network of outposts in the equatorial forests of the Congo basin on Léopold's behalf (Meredith 2011: 95).

Some of these treaties are contested today, because some tribes were forced to agree to these treaties without full knowledge of their consequences.

In 1885, after many manoeuvres, Léopold achieved international authorisation for his personal empire, calling it the Congo Free State. It was an area of nearly one million square miles, seventy-five times the size of Belgium and one-thirteenth of the African continent. It included a web of interconnecting rivers, navigable by steamboat, running deep into the interior and a wealth of resources such as ivory, palm oil, timber and copper.

Pondering a choice of title for himself, Léopold at first considered *Emperor of the Congo*, but eventually he settled for the more modest *King-Sovereign*. Henceforth, Léopold's principal aim was to amass as large a fortune for himself as possible. Ivory was his main aim at first (Meredith 2011: 95).

Léopold's next fortune came from wild rubber. With the invention of the pneumatic tyres, fitted first to bicycles and then to motor cars in the 1890s, the demand for rubber and its price soared. Using a system of slave labour, business companies, sharing their profits with Léopold, stripped the Congo's equatorial forests of all the wild rubber they could lay their hands on, imposing quotas on villagers and taking hostages whenever necessary. However, "the public outcry that eventually erupted over the Congo's 'rubber terror' forced Léopold reconsider his approaches of dealing with indigenous people. He then agreed to give up his private empire to the Belgian government" (Meredith 2011: 96).

The greed, violence and madness that swamped the Congo Free State of Léopold was captured by Joseph Conrad in his novel *Heart of Darkness*, which he wrote after working as a riverboat captain on the Congo river for some months. The central character in the novel, Kurtz, the head of Inner Station, is renowned for his exploits as a colonial collector.

It was said of him: *Sends in as much ivory as all the others put together.*
But he is a sick man, troubled by memories of his own savagery, and finally dies, whispering in despair, *the horror, the horror.* (Meredith 2011: 95)

The Congo was and is an immensely profitable venture. In Meredith's view (2011: XX) no other colony in Africa possessed such a richness of diamonds, copper and uranium. The mineral resources of Katanga (mainly copper), when first discovered, were aptly described as "*a veritable geological scandal* (Meredith 2011: xx). By 1959, "the Congo was producing nearly 10 per cent of the world's copper, 50 per cent of its cobalt and 70 per cent of its industrial diamonds. "Meredith (2011: 97) continues to explain that all this enabled Belgium to keep a framework of law, order and development, which far surpassed the efforts of other colonial powers.

Belgian rule assumed that the Congolese people, given wise leadership and enough material benefits, would be content with Belgian rule for the rest of their lives. For this reason, no Congolese was ever asked about this system of government. The Congolese had no political voice; no rights to own land or to travel freely. They were basically subjected to no life of their own, and thereby just following a freedom less life. "They were subject to curfews in urban areas; in rural areas and to a forced labour.

Though primary schools flourished, there was no higher education available except in Catholic seminaries.” (Meredith 2011: 97). In short: The Belgians set out to isolate the Congo from outside influence and to prevent any emergence of a black elite which might organise and insist on a change in the system. Eventually the Belgians never devised any coherent policy for bringing independence to the Congo. When violence came, they reacted with surprise and alarm. When the Congolese nationalists demanded change, they improvised political and administrative reforms. Fearful for a colonial war, they simply handed over power as rapidly as they could. The hurry with which Belgium agreed to Congolese demands for independence in 1960 was based on a gamble known as *le pari Congolais* – the Congo Bet. In this process very few Congolese acquired any experience of government or parliamentary life. No national or even provincial elections had ever been held. Only in 1957 had the Belgians permitted Congolese to take part in municipal elections in principal towns. Meredith (2014: 570) writes:

... lack of skilled personnel was acute. In the top ranks of the civil service no more than three Congolese out of an establishment of 1,400 held posts and two of those were recent appointments. By 1960, the total university graduates were thirty. Indeed, the largest complement of trained manpower was priests – six hundred in total. At the end of the 1959–60 academic year, only 136 students completed their secondary education. There were no Congolese doctors; no secondary school teachers; no army officers.

The Belgians believed that because of the inexperience of Congolese politicians, they would be gratified with the trappings of power while leaving the Belgians to run the country as before. Congolese would head government ministries, but the core of the colonial state – the bureaucracy, the army and the economy – would remain in Belgian hands.

To ensure a favourable outcome in elections leading to independence, the Belgians also planned to divide the Congolese by trying to support the activities of “moderate” pro-Belgium status quo. By making use of this strategy, the Belgians planned to reject the Congolese wish for independence. This justifies declarations such as “if we have a little luck”, said Belgium’s Minister for the Congo, August de Schryver, in May 1960,

a few weeks before independence, “We shall have won the independent Congo bet.” (Meredith 2014: 571)

Only eighteen months before, the Belgians had been supremely confident about their hold over the Congo. The only protests about Belgian rule had come from groups of *évolués* seeking greater status for themselves. According to Meredith (2014: 571), “the essential wish for the Congolese elite”, Patrice Lumumba, a 31-year old postal clerk, wrote in 1956, “is to be Belgians and to have the right to the same freedoms and the same rights”. But in January 1959, with a suddenness that shook Belgium to the core, Leopoldville was torn by vicious rioting.

A conference in January 1960 was the first instance when the Belgians consulted Congolese opinion. Belgian negotiators hoped to achieve an agreement that would lead to a phased transfer of power over a period of about four years. However, this did not sit well with the Congolese. Belgian negotiators found themselves confronted with a united front of Congolese delegates, who were excited by the prospect of power and position; therefore, demanding instant elections and independence on 1 June 1960. After negotiations, most of the Congolese were willing to concede to an extra thirty days of Belgian rule. Fearing the alternative would be a violent war of independence, Belgium agreed to the independence of the Congo on 30 June 1960.

6.2.2 Joseph Kasa-Vubu and Patrice Lumumba’s era

Six months after independence in 1960, however, four different regimes existed in the Congo: the central government in Léopoldville (Kinshasa) under Kasa-Vubu, supported by Mobutu as the army chief of staff like Podur (2020) narrates; Moïse Tshombe’s government at Elisabethville (Lubumbashi) in Katanga; the ‘Diamond State’ of Albert Kalonji in South Kasai; and the Lumumbist government in the east based at Stanleyville (Kisangani). Unfortunately, each relied on foreign patrons and troops to keep order.

Although the Katanga secession had to end in 1963, a year later, further revolt broke out in the east, with Lumumba’s former supporters setting up a “People’s Republic of the Congo”. In all, a million people were estimated to have died, though this did not stop the civilian government in the capital, which continued to squabble until 24 November 1965, when Mobutu staged his second and last coup (Mills 2010: 258).

Meredith writes that “the essential wish of the Congolese elite”, according to Patrice Lumumba in 1956, is to be “Belgians and to have the right to the same freedoms and the same rights” (2011: 97).

Following the violent events in Leopoldville, the capital of the Congo, and in June 1960 alarmed by the possibility that they might be drawn into an independence type of war, the Belgian government sought to regain the initiative by inviting the leaders of thirteen political parties to a conference in Brussels aimed at discussing the terms and timetable for independence. This was the first occasion on which the Belgian authorities had consulted Congolese opinion. Among those who attended were Kasa-Vubu, Tshombe and Lumumba.

After independence, the risks involved were enormous. ‘Except at a local level, no Congolese had achieved any experience of government or parliamentary life. No national or even provincial elections had ever been conducted. The lack of skilled personnel was acute.’ (Meredith 2011: 100).

During the squabble for independence, Lumumba publicly accused Belgian officers of fomenting rebellion and dismissed Janssens and other senior officers. In subsequent negotiations with the army, Lumumba decided that the entire officer corps should be replaced by Congolese. Lumumba then appointed Victor Lundula as army commander. He was a former sergeant who had last served in the army in the Second World War. As chief of staff, Lumumba chose his trusted personal aide, Joseph Mobutu, who had spent seven years in the *Force Publique* working mainly as a clerk, rising to the rank of sergeant-major, and the highest rank open to Congolese. Discharged from military service in 1956, Mobutu had taken up freelance journalism; he had also become a paid informer for the Belgian police, providing detailed reports on the activities of fellow Congolese.

It is said that “within a fortnight of independence, the Congo’s predicament was critical. Internal security had collapsed, the army had degenerated onto a rabble, the exodus of whites abandoned the administration bereft of expertise, Léopoldville was in turmoil, the secession of Katanga threatened to break the country apart, and Belgium was energetically eyeing for ways of ousting Lumumba’s government.” (Meredith 2011: 103).

In desperation, “Lumumba appealed to the United Nations (UN) for help. Acting with remarkable speed, within days the UN prepared a major airlift of foreign troops, mainly from African countries, and set plans in motion for a large civilian task force to run public services.” (Meredith 2011: 103). Lumumba’s outcry, though, provoked Congolese politicians in Léopoldville to be exasperated by his incessant quarrelling, his dictatorial habits and impetuous decisions. In an increasingly volatile mood, Lumumba insisted that the UN force be used to expel Belgian troops. Then he ‘issued an ultimatum threatening that if UN had not removed Belgian troops by 19 July 1960, he would ask the Soviet Union to intervene.’ Lumumba’s frenetic manoeuvres came at a time when the Cold War was at one of its peaks and infuriated the United States. To the Congo’s misery and confusion was now added the possibility of being a Cold War hot spot (Meredith 2014: 575).

Earlier, on 11 July 1963, the crises had escalated. With the connivance of Belgium and the support of Belgian mining and commercial firms, the Katangese leader Moïse Tshombe, grasped the opportunity of the chaos to declare Katanga an independent state. Belgian regular officers previously attached to the *Force Publique* began training a new Katangese *gendarmérie*, and a Belgian technical assistance mission was sent to the Katangese capital, Elizabethville to act, in effect, as a shadow government. Belgium’s plan was to use Katanga as a base from which to establish a pro-Belgian government in Leopoldville (Meredith 2014: 575).

On 15 August 1960, obsessed by the necessity for military victory in Katanga and facing yet another secession in south Kasai, the main source of the Congo’s diamond riches, Lumumba took the fateful decision to ask the Soviet Union for immediate military help. With the support of Soviet aircraft, trucks, crews and technicians, he planned to send a military force first to regain control in south Kasai and then to march on Elisabethville to overthrow Tshombe.

Despite Lumumba’s efforts, the mutiny in the Congo spread. In scores of incidents, whites were trampled, shamed and raped. Detained by panic, the white population fled in thousands. The Belgian government urged Lumumba to allow Belgian troops stationed in the Congo to restore order, but Lumumba refused. Belgium then unilaterally ordered Belgian forces stationed in the Congo into action and arranged to fly in reinforcements. As Belgian troops took possession of key points, including

Leopoldville airport, Lumumba felt that Belgium was trying to re-impose its rule. He broke off diplomatic relations and declared that, from his point of view, the Congo was now at war with Belgium.

Moves to get rid of Lumumba gathered momentum. Urged on by Belgian advisers, US diplomats and his own Congolese supporters, President Kasa-Vubu announced Lumumba's dismissal as prime minister, accusing him of acting arbitrarily and plunging the Congo into civil war. Lumumba in turn announced that he had dismissed Kasa-Vubu as president. Western governments sided with Kasa-Vubu; the Soviet bloc with Lumumba.

While Mobutu assembled an interim government in Leopoldville, retaining Kasa-Vubu as president, Lumumba, after seeking UN protection, continued to live at the prime minister's residence on the banks of the Congo River, guarded by an inner circle of UN troops. Various assassination schemes were set in motion. Many of Lumumba's enemies were determined to get rid of him.

In November, shortly after the UN General Assembly had bowed to American pressure and accorded recognition to Kasa-Vubu's administration, Lumumba decided to escape from Leopoldville and head for Stanleyville, his main political base, to set up a rival regime there. "If I die, *tant pis*," he told a friend, "the Congo needs martyrs." Halfway to Stanleyville, he was caught, severely beaten and taken to an army prison in Thysville, about a hundred miles south-west of Leopoldville. As rebellions erupted in the Stanleyville region, in Kivu Province and in North Katanga, a coterie of Belgian officials and Congolese politicians, including Mobutu, decided to dispose of Lumumba once and for all, sending him to Elisabethville, Tshombe's capital, knowing that it was tantamount to a death sentence. On January 1961, he was executed by a firing squad under the command of a Belgian officer (Meredith 2014: 576).

The problems of the Congo continued year after year. It became a war zone for warring factions, raiding soldiers, foreign troops, mercenary forces, revolutionary enthusiasts and legions of diplomats and advisers. Katanga's secession lasted for two more years until, in 1963, the United Nations resolved to finish it off. Rebellions in the eastern Congo ended in 1964, with a death toll of a million Congolese. In Leopoldville, politicians bickered endlessly. On 14 September 1963, Mobutu, with the active

encouragement of the US Central Intelligence Agency and the connivance of UN officials, announced “he was assuming power himself. He then ordered the expulsion of all Soviet personnel in early 1964. In 1965, Mobutu, the army commander, then stepped forward a second time and assumed the presidency for himself, which seemed at the time to offer some sort of respite.” (Meredith 2014: 577).

6.2.3 Mobutu SeseSeko Gbendu Waza Banga’s era

When he came into power in 1965, Mobutu Sese Seko attempted to stabilise and unite the country from the chaos he had inherited from his predecessors Patrice Lumumba and Kasa-Vubu (Ndikumana et al.2003:15). As General Joseph Mobutu he set out to create a “new Congo” from the ashes of civil war and political strife. Mobutu soon managed to impose some form of central control over most parts of the Congo within a few years. His economic strategy seemed effective. The copper mining industry was nationalised, Inflation was surprisingly halted, and the currency was stabilised.

Greater unity led to the introduction of his new philosophy commonly known as “Authenticity”; literally translated it simply means a return to his people’s roots. With the “authenticity” programme, which was launched in 1971, Mobutu tried to consolidate national unity by forming a feeling of national identity. Western culture was abolished, traditional culture elevated, and the name of the country changed from the Democratic Republic of the Congo to Zaire. Next, in 1972, leading by example, Joseph Desire Mobutu adopted another name, and he became Mobutu Sese Seko kuku Gbendu waza Banga.

In the “mid-1970s, however, ‘authenticity’ evolved into Mobutuism, which promoted a cult of personality aimed at legitimising Mobutu’s absolutism.” (Ndikumana et al. 2003: 15). During this period, constitutional rights were undermined, and state power, in Zaire, became solely Mobutu and his cronies’ affairs. The Congo served its citizens very badly, but nonetheless, the Congolese maintained a commitment to the notion of a single national entity and identity, in part a legacy of Mobutu’s rule and programmes of Zaireanization and *authenticité* – later known simply as Mobutuism – in part a reaction to perceived outside interference (Mills 2010: 259).

“Mobutu, as a statesman, was a personal ruler without legal and institutional obstacles to what he could do as head of state. He positioned loyal adherents, often members of his own ethnical group, in crucial positions in government and administration” (AFRODAD 2005: 18). The Zaireanization programme, which was launched in 1973, had the aim of the nationalisation of the country industry to the benefit of all – but the consequences of Zaireanization were disastrous for the country.

Even though President Mobutu used the state to enrich himself and his associates, through the Zaireanization programme, which included the “mass expropriation of foreign economic interest. He presided over a centralised state with slight authority over much of the country and had to petition foreign assistance to stop the provinces of Katanga and Kasai from seceding.” (Acemoglu and Robinson 2013: 90).

Mobutu

used the central bank for his own purposes, commandeering whatever funds he asked, funnelling massive sums abroad to buy luxury houses, office blocks and grand estates in Belgium, France, Switzerland, Spain, Portugal, Italy and other countries. He built himself a huge palace complex costing \$100 million in the depth of the equatorial forest at Gbadolite, a small village 700 miles north-east of Kinshasa (Leopoldville), which he considered as his ancestral home. The airport there was capable of managing supersonic Concorde, which Mobutu often chartered for his trips abroad (Meredith 2014: 610).

Everything collapsed as the Congolese failed to maintain their enterprises with their Western trading partners.

Following Mobutu’s example through Zaireanization, Congolese were forced “to drop their Christian names for African ones. Priests could face five years imprisonment if they were caught baptising a Zairean child with a Christian name” (Mills 2010: 259). Mobutu turned Zaire into his personal fiefdom. He was the sole guide and leader of a single national political party, assumed grand titles and laid down a centrally steered ideology everyone was instructed to adhere to. Year by year, he accumulated vast personal power, ruling by decree, controlling all appointments and promotions and deciding on the allocation of government revenues. It came as no surprise that

Mobutu's Zaire had been reduced by 1994 to little more than a carcass, stripped of all wealth. The currency was worthless. The provinces were largely separate fiefdoms, remote from the reach of central government. This happened long before the hordes of Hutu *génocidaires* arrived.

For example, as Wrong (2002) notes, between 1965 and 1990, when the one-party system ended, Zaire had seen 51 government teams come and go, an average of two a year. Each had an average of 40 ministers and deputy ministers. These are known as the 'fat cats' of the Mobutu era, who kept the system running at the expense of its people.

With fatal consequences, Mobutu allowed Hutu power extremists to carve out a ministate in Kivu. Foreign aid agencies rushed to support the refugee camps that the *génocidaires* controlled, fattening their coffers by employing civil servants, doctors, nurses and other professional staff loyal to the cause. Having regrouped, the *génocidaires* launched raids into Rwanda and attacked Tutsi groups in Kivu, intending to annihilate them. In retaliation, Kagame combined his forces in Rwanda with Tutsi militias in Kivu, determined to wipe out the *génocidaire* threat (Meredith 2014: 640).

The rebellion which started in eastern Congo in 1996 was ostensibly led by Laurent Kabila, a former rebel leader from North Katanga with a reputation for greed and brutality. It is alleged that the mastermind behind this campaign was Kagame. As one town after another fell to the rebels, Laurent Kabila decided to press on to Kinshasa to overthrow Mobutu's regime. Finally, in May 1997, as the rebel army approached the capital, Mobutu fled to his palace in Gbadolite and then escaped into exile, dying from cancer in Morocco three months later.

'His successor, the one-time revolutionary colleague of Ché Guevara, Laurent Kabila, proved little better. However, he soon turned against his Rwandan and Ugandan sponsors as he tried to cement his Congolese support base and reverse the impression that, as Mills (2008) explains it "he was simply a foreign stooge". He then decided to get rid of Rwanda and Uganda, which was suicidal for him.

6.2.4 Laurent and Joseph Kabila's era

Indeed “it was a mockery, a very sad travesty indeed, that Laurent Kabila, who mobilised an army against Mobutu's Zaire, would then group a regime just as corrupt and possibly even more disastrous. It was without doubt preposterous that he attempted to start a ‘Mobutuist’ personality cult assisted and abetted by Dominique Sakombilongo, previously Mobutu's minister of information” (Acemoglu and Robinson 2013: 361). For them the Congo is the typical example of oligarchy because the essence of the iron law of oligarchy, this face of the vicious circle, is that new leaders overthrowing old ones with promises of radical change bring nothing but more of the same.

Installed as the president of what was renamed the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Kabila ruled with the same tyrannical methods that Mobutu had employed. He surrounded himself with friends and family members, packed his administration with supporters from North Katanga, imprisoned political rivals and relied on a security apparatus to maintain control.

However, his relations with his Rwandan sponsors soon soured. When Kabila sought to assert his independence, dispensing with Tutsi backers and turning to Hutu militias for support, Kagame ordered the Rwandan army to invade and overthrow him (Meredith 2014: 641).

Many African countries intervened, with the specific intention to take advantage of the Congo's disintegration. Angola and Zimbabwe, to name just few, decided to support Laurent Kabila's weakening power, but Uganda supported Rwanda in trying to overthrow Congo's established regime.

In return for military support, Kabila readily handed out mining and timber concessions and offered favourable deals in diamonds, cobalt and other minerals. Angola gained control of Congo's petroleum distribution and manufacture. Zimbabwe established combined ventures in diamonds, gold and timber and got awarded a stake in the state mining company.

After a series of torturous negotiations, a peace deal in 2002 required of ‘foreign armies from Rwanda, Uganda, Angola and Zimbabwe to withdraw.’ As a result, over

a period of four years, 'more than three million people had died, mostly from starvation and disease, the largest toll of any conflict in African history. 'However, in the Eastern Congo, there was no respite from violence. Rival militias, some acting as proxy forces for sponsors in Rwanda and Uganda, others controlled by local warlords, continued their wars of plunder, bringing yet more years of misery to a population desperate for peace (Meredith 2014: 642).

There are several actors involved in illicit and illegal exploitation. Most of the uncontrolled mining occurs in artisanal mining, where miners work as *creuseurs* (diggers)in the mines, either legally, with concessions ceded to them by the Congolese government, or illegally, with concessions owned by private persons or companies, or illegally without concessions, working for local authorities or rebels (Cuvelier 2009: 11).

In this regard, the Congo's conflict can be described as a "resource war", motivated by control over the Congo's rich natural resources in the form of gold, diamonds, copper, cobalt and timber. In many ways, the scope of the armed conflict has shifted from political to economical motivations. This is not only the case that rebel groups profit from the mining activities, but government forces control some of the most important mining sites in the Kivus, and do not restrain themselves from intervening in mining activities (Spittaels and Hilgert 2009). The control of these mineral resources enables the armed groups to finance their war. "Once the conflict starts, the various parties derive gains from the conflict through 'war economies', which motivates and sustains the continuation of conflict." (Ndikumana et al. 2003: 24). As consequence, the lines between political and economic interests have disappeared, as economically motivated alliances between political groups are formed for lucrative purposes. The losers are the local population, who live close to the mines.

After Kabila senior had been assassinated by his bodyguard in January 2001, his son and successor, Joseph, took over the government in a kingship sort of succession. Unfortunately, after few years of governing the DRC, well before the first-ever democratic elections in October 2006, Joseph Kabila continued to govern the country.

6.3 BAD FAITH AND AFRICA

Nunn (2007: 166) explains that

given the escalating evidence of the relationship between the Congo's past and its current economic performance, a natural question may arise. Why do these occasions (slavery and colonialism), which ended years ago, continue to matter today in the Congo? Are the reasons of slavery and colonialism still the only ones for underdevelopment of Congo?

This segment will attempt to respond to that.

If one takes a closer look at some African countries in general and in this study particularly the DRC case, one will notice that even after slavery and colonialism, Congo is still underdeveloped after so many years. Would it be farfetched if the claim is made that this state of underdevelopment is due to bad faith, i.e. the Congolese brought this current predicament upon themselves? We will attempt to answer this question in what follows.

Greg Mills (2011) echoes the same view and claims that the focal reason why 'African people are poor is because their leaders' and themselves in bad faith have made this choice. It is obvious that countries can develop their economies and grow if their leaders take sound decisions in the national interest. This is also true in those African countries that have performed well. I am of the view that success in African economy does not require a miracle; it can be achieved. If Africans cannot change their past, they can mould their future.

In *Africa Unchained*, George Ayittey, as quoted by Maathai (2009: 125), draws a distinction between those Africans whom he terms "the cheetahs" and those he calls "the hippos". The cheetahs are the young Africans, who, as this designation suggests, are agile and dynamic, ready to move Africa ahead. They are confronted, however, by the hippos, sturdy members of the older generation who cling to power and protect their territory fiercely when they perceive they are being attacked. In blaming African leaders and their people, Mills (2011) explains that :

for not grabbing these opportunities it is also true that they have often taken decisions under difficult conditions. No-one disputes that leaders face big governance challenges in Africa. Yet in other parts of the world they are

usually considered as obstacles to be overcome, not as permanent excuses for failure.

In more than half century of independence, the Congo has not realised its potential. The argument is that there are often vested interests behind keeping this status quo of underdevelopment in the Congo. More telling is the fact that “Congolese have avoided putting in place the correct policies and procedures to facilitate development for many years” (Mills 2011).

The Congo is not underdeveloped because its people are lazy, nor is the Congo underdeveloped because it lacks natural resources. Compared to many other countries, it is a veritable treasure trove of minerals (Mills 2010: 13). If the dismal Congolese economic performance could be put down, it is because of the attitude of bad faith by Congolese leaders, but then the question is: Why does the Congolese population not intervene to move out of this situation? The simple answer is that the Congolese population is also in bad faith and believe that they lack the means to change the *status quo*.

The primary reason why Congolese “are poor is because their leaders make this choice on their behalf” (Mills, 2010:174). They make these choices because they have some advantages. They are not held responsible by anyone, because Congolese leaders have without failure managed, with the help of the population in bad faith, to externalise their problems, making them the responsibility of others. That Congolese leaders have been allowed to get away with corruption and ill-discipline can be attributed in bulky part to a relative deficiency of real bottom-up pressure on leadership (Mills 2010: 14). The main self-deception that occurs in the Congo is corruption. It is illogical to ill-use money given to the country from outside nations meant for development and expect the development to occur miraculously when money was used recklessly by officials.

Bad faith causes leaders to abuse power, the very power they were given by the people. It can be argued that underdevelopment is caused by the same people that are elected to develop the country. What they do is to conceal the truth by shifting the entire blame to an external reason, namely slavery or colonisation. However, since slavery and colonisation have been abolished, why then are leaders still unable to

improve their own country's economic situation and the lives of their people? What is leadership 'bad faith'? Leadership bad faith comprises of lying to oneself about one's situation, racial, cultural, economic, and social predicament.

6.3.1 Two practical forms of being in bad faith

So, what does underdevelopment have to do with bad faith or self-deception? Bad faith is the perpetual attempt to escape from self-responsibility. There are two ways of escaping this fact; the one way is the attempt to convert people into objects that project a mere facticity and a transcendence. A human being, by its nature, is both facticity and transcendence. But when a human being chooses to focus only on one of these aspects, he lives in bad faith.

i) Focusing too much on facticity. Imagine a Congolese leader since independence who is against poverty, non-development. However, he still does not help any of his people. When people ask him about this discrepancy between his claims and actions, he simply replies that he has no power. He just concludes that he is a weak man crippled by his being just a black man.

So, what is the bad faith of this man (self-deception)? It is his attempt to flee his responsibility. Yes, by labelling himself as a 'weak' man, he attempts to make himself into an object (facticity), a bad faith moves to run away from his transcendence, which would include his freedom to choose not to be a weak man. He knows deep inside that he could, if he really put his mind to it, free himself and live according to his values; however, his bad faith is an attempt to move away from this fact.

ii) Focusing too much on transcendence. In this regard, one can refer to an example that Sartre himself uses in his *Being and Nothingness* (1958). He describes a man who engages in homosexual behaviour and associates the activity with guilt. While he acknowledges his failure, he refuses to consider himself as a failure. He tries to argue that he just has no power because of the circumstances he is in, but he is not a failure. He attempts to ignore his facticity by only focusing on his transcendence. That is his bad faith. Given that we are both transcendence and facticity, Sartre's answer is therefore not that he ought to label himself as a failure, but he must take the responsibility of his acts. It is my view that this applies to African leaders who are

engaged in mediocre governance and blame slavery and colonialism for not being able to do anything for their people.

6.3.2 Possible practical consequences of bad faith

While the African leaders evade their transcendence by attempting to label themselves as weak, they inherently know that they could choose not to be corrupt. Though the African leaders escape their facticity, attempting to avoid being labelled negatively, they innately know that they are that which they attempt to avoid. Even if one acknowledges all of this, by admitting that one is in bad faith, then that itself is bad faith, because that is an attempt to make one's bad faith into facticity.

Sartre's concept of bad faith in this context is an individual deceiving him or herself in order to find a way out of an internal conflict situation.

Another example Sartre uses in his book, *Being and Nothingness*, is when a man approaches a woman requesting for sex but choosing the words carefully and telling all sorts of lies to get what he really wants – the woman in bed with him. In that case, if the woman accepts the offer using bad faith, she will do it believing that the seducer loves her and has only good intentions, but deep inside she knows that is not true. Then she deceives herself by allowing to be seduced by him, because she also wants sex, but the raw idea makes her uncomfortable; that is why she reframes it. One basic difference from the regular concept of bad faith and Sartre's concept is that while the first is about deceiving someone else, the last is about one deceiving oneself.

The above example implies that in bad faith an individual acts against the part of himself that disagrees with 'me' (as if he were two different people), trying to convince himself about a lie he himself created. For Sartre, the individual is radically free. Every choice we make in life – for better or worse – we make it. Nobody helps us make a choice – even if we ask somebody for help to decide, we choose the person that we ask, and we choose that person because we already know what he believes.

Since this is the central fact of life for Sartre, then 'bad faith' means pretending that it is not true. 'Bad faith' means pretending that there are universal rules that we should live by, but we know that, and we all know it. Therefore, we should stop pretending.

Specific attitudes which made it possible for black Africans to be accused of bad faith will now be addressed, namely being ashamed of their own language, reverse voluntary slavery, reverse voluntary colonialism, and African xenophobia.

i) Ashamed of their own language. According to Fanon (1961) “to speak a language is to take on a world, a culture”, it is no surprise then that one of the methods and means Blacks utilize to go back to their roots through language and culture as a form of resistance against the dominant, but this has remained a pipe dream all these years after independence. African leaders always fall into Frantz Fanon’s trap of black skin white mask: the inferiority complex of not being comfortable in one’s own skin and language. They detest their language and reject their culture in favour of a European language and culture, a function of long years of cognitive domination. Blacks still serve their old masters freely, because in bad faith they claim that they cannot do anything on their own.

During colonialism and +slavery, whites were accused of stealing minerals from the Congo that benefited only themselves, but today Congolese still steal minerals that benefit whites. Black leaders steal raw materials in the Congo to be sent to the West for their own benefit, leaving their own brothers and sisters to starve.

ii) Reverse voluntary slavery. Slavery as a system and condition of forcing individuals to work without proper remuneration or appreciation was once a dominant mode of world trade, which necessitated a struggle for manumission and independence. It can be said that colonialism also triumphed at the back of slave labour, which the struggle for liberation sought to end. However, presently odd jobs in Europe and America, which are claimed to be degrading for human beings, are awarded voluntarily to Congolese in Europe for them to survive. Congolese are sold voluntarily in Libya, just for them to be taken to Europe and work as slaves on farms in Europe. Congolese voluntarily join the group of immigrants who take the risk to swim across ocean and sea to reach Europe and offer themselves to Europeans as slaves for a better life.

iii) Reverse voluntary colonialism. Congolese are keen to go back to their colonisers to provide for them. Congolese take the risk to ‘smuggle’ themselves into European flights, land illegally in Europe, be arrested escaping their own country, running away

from their own leaders to go voluntarily be colonised in the land of colonisers because their own brothers and sisters have betrayed them.

More than two-thirds of Africa's populations are estimated to live in conditions of extreme poverty. By the mid-1980s, most Africans were as poor as, or poorer than they had been at the time of independence. To escape the maelstrom, large numbers of trained and qualified Africans sought work abroad, further diminishing the ability of governments to cope (Meredith 2014: 621). They are ready to be recolonised in the land of the colonisers.

During the war for independence, black African leaders waged a war to free their people from bondage, and their people supported them. Today the wars of independence have transformed into wars of the 'stomach' and greed of black Africans against black Africans, to name but a few. African blacks destroy institutions built by colonisers and prefer the few and insufficient institutions of education used by their colonisers, but they cannot build their own to improve and teach their own culture.

iv) African xenophobia. South Sudan against North Sudan; South Sudan against itself; Central Africa against itself; Rwanda against itself (genocide); the DRC against itself; Angola against itself; South Africa against itself.

Brothers and sisters kill one another. In bad faith, African leaders still preach that these wars are carried out by the West. If this assertion is true, it simply means that the colonisers believe that Africans are just 'big children', which is true in the sense that they cannot think on their own; they are always guided even to commit evil against themselves. How, then, do people remove themselves from underneath the boot of those who control them and their resources; who violate their rights and destroy their livelihoods, or even take their lives? (Maathai 2009: 115).

African leaders also contribute to the underdevelopment of Africa through irrational policies that result in widespread and continuing wars in Africa. At any time, at least sixteen African countries are involved in some form of warfare or aggressive acts against one another. This all require a lot of resources buying various types of armaments and ammunition from Europe, America and elsewhere to kill their own people. In this manner, money intended for upliftment, development projects and initiatives are spent on the project of warmongering.

From the early 1990s on the hope was that corrupt policies that contributed to the under-development of Africa would stop. President Thabo Mbeki of South Africa even became excited with the idea of the African Renaissance – a new wind of leadership blowing across Africa. Rebirth was in the air. Notably, new leaders in Ethiopia, Eritrea, Rwanda and Uganda, not to forget the Republic of South Africa, were seen as agents of accountability, good governance, and mature decision-making. Sadly, this did not last for long.

The Congo does not lack natural resources. In fact, it could be argued that the Congo's greatest curse is the vast richness of what lies underneath it. Certainly, compared to many countries, it is supposed to be a veritable land of treasure. It is a major exporter to the world of uranium, gold, copper, manganese and diamonds. "If leaders are the main reason why Congo is poor, why have they made obviously bad choices at the expense of hundreds of millions of their people?" (Mills 2010: 229).

What, then, lies behind the failure to pursue development? Why has the Congo failed to work as well as other countries? The fact that Congolese electorates have remained astonishingly passive in the face of bad rulers is part of the population's bad faith.

Moss (2007) observes that the "politics and developmental trajectory of many African countries appear to have been dominated by a handful of powerful men or, in many cases, a single man who often stays in power for an extended period". In such an environment, decisions tend to be made by "individuals rather than bureaucracies", laws were "applied very selectively", the route to power was "restricted", depending on "who you know", while such "personal rule" often meant "that there is little distinction made between public resources and private wealth".

In the Congo there is a belief that whoever controls the state becomes the recipient of its extreme influence and wealth that it generates, the aim is to capture power and enrich one group of leaders and his associates at the expense of the rest.

6.4 PARALLEL OF INSTANCES OF BAD FAITH IN SOME AFRICAN COUNTRIES

Certainly, after independence, most Africans had the expectation that their societies (including themselves) would become wealthier. Instead, Africa became poorer and more dependent on an infusion of aid from the very regions that had colonised and exploited the continent (Maathai 2009: 76).

Although in recent years the state of development in Africa seems to have changed the voices of Africans speaking to these challenges, they remain unheard by African leaders. Unfortunately, the situation only reinforces the perception that “African solutions for African problems do not exist, and that Africans are not equally equipped to propose a vision for Africa’s development or provide concrete actions to bring it about” (Maathai 2009: 78).

In Maathai’s words (2009: 114), the realisation of good leadership could begin with an African president or prime minister stepping forward and proclaiming:

[W]e have a problem in our country and as a people. We are cheating and undermining ourselves, and we need to change. For whether it is a policeman bribing a bus driver, or a government minister receiving a kickback in order to license a business, or someone stealing someone’s else’s crops to make a quick penny—we are failing ourselves, our country, those who came before us, and, indeed, future generations. I want us as a country to work on it. And it will start with me, and I will do my best to fight greed and corruption. I will value honesty in whatever I do. I will genuinely put the people first.

Then it could extend to the people themselves. It is up to a critical mass of Africans to deal with the problem of leadership, which would be a step away from stasis. This opened up the following questions: Do they feel marginalised? Are the people capable of acting in such a way that the resources are used equitably? Is the issue of statehood valued? Are those entrusted with positions of leadership committed to enhance the welfare of their fellow citizens? These are cardinal questions for a working society, and their answers express themselves through a system of governance, which can evolve and change to meet the needs of the people over time.

It is surprising to observe that Africans have seemingly tolerated poor leadership over many decades. Is it passivity, or apparent deference to their leaders – even when the

latter has proven so disastrous to their countries and lives? There is a belief that these attitudes are the result of Africans' tendency to venerate their elders.

The above view cannot be justified by cultural belief because, as Mwaniki (2013: 484) reasons,

culture provides a people self-identity and character. It allows them to be in harmony with their environment, to form the basis for their sense of self-fulfilment. It improves their capability to guide themselves, make their own decisions, and to protect their interests. It is their reference point to the past and their connection to the future. Therefore, without culture, a community loses self-awareness and guidance, and grows weak and susceptible. It disintegrates from within as it suffers a lack of identity, dignity, self-respect, and a sense of destiny.

For this reason, people without culture feel insecure and doubtful and are obsessed with the gaining of material things and public displays, which give them a momentary security. This is the case in many countries in Africa today. In many situations, African culture has been abused and undermined the poor.

In contrast to much practices in Africa, Lee (2000, in Mills 2010: 289) also stresses the importance of leadership as a gel holding society together, of the need to develop a common nationhood as a prerequisite for development and advancement, and of the related need to avoid living in two different realities: an indifferent elite at the top of the pile with the bulk of society scraping a living at the bottom.

Why has identity mattered so much and in such a pernicious way in Africa? Why would African leaders take aid, make the right noises about reform, and then change very little of substance with respect to governance and the way political systems function and were accountable? Why would they make political choices based on narrow personal or local interests without the apparent commitment to popular welfare? Why are they unable, or unwilling, to build growth coalitions that transcended these narrow interests and divides? (Mills 2010: 289)

On 6 November 2014, an article was published in a South African newspaper *The Sowetan* (p. 17), titled "Home-grown health system not good enough for leaders". The

article denounced the bad attitude of African leaders who neglect their health infrastructure in their country and resort to Western infrastructure whenever they encounter personal health problems. The first case is the one of the Zambian President Michael Sata, who died in foreign health facilities, and failed to honour the African motto claiming, “African solutions to African problems”. That he died while getting treatment in London represents all that is wrong with leadership in Africa. Other African presidents known to have sought treatment abroad include the late Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe, the late Levy Mwanawasa of Zambia and Bingu Wa Mutharika of Malawi.

After five decades of self-government, why has the continent not produced a hospital equipped to provide treatment to their ailing presidents or ordinary citizens? Why do African leaders have to fly to their country’s former colonial masters to seek such treatment? Is this because of their failure to do better than the minimal development provided by the colonialists? African leaders resorting to a foreign hospital is a statement about the dysfunction or non-existence of a health system in their own countries.

In November 2018, Gabon President Bongo had to be rushed to Saudi Arabia for treatment. How can we understand this if the Bongos have been in power in Gabon for more than 50years? Why could they not have built at least a hospital of an acceptable standard, even just to cater for their family? There is a problem to believe that they were stopped by Westerners or that they did not have the financial capability to achieve that.

For months, Guinea, Sierra Leone and Liberia were ravaged by the Ebola virus. The outbreak was one of over 20 recorded on the continent since 1976. However, these countries, and indeed the entire continent, were taken aback. Previous outbreaks in some parts of the continent were contained before thousands died.

Historical evidence shows that the Ebola virus predominantly attacks in Africa. This knowledge should have spurred Africa to take the lead in medical research and put in place preventative measures. Instead, available treatment is imported from abroad. Dealing with Ebola, as the current outbreak has demonstrated, requires healthcare facilities with proven efficacy. This includes well-trained doctors and nurses,

laboratories in working order and the availability of hospital beds. These are things that many African countries are unable to guarantee when dealing with the anticipated and common maladies that strike ordinary people daily.

The many decades of independence on the continent have been defined by instability, intrastate wars and poor economic management. Policymaking has been encumbered by deadly, rather than healthy political ambition and by jockeying for power. Independence delivered the prospect of African leaders to rally together with their people to build strong political institutions and resilient, competitive economies. But looting and corruption have been the mainstay, leaving crucial things like healthcare facilities underdeveloped.

In the same South African newspaper *The Sowetan* (7 November 2014: 21), there was also an article titled, "Nigeria to grow, eat own rice". In this article the author reveals how a mega-plan by the Nigerian President Goodluck Jonathan deceived his people by promising to produce rice locally while knowing that it is not achievable. Lagos in Nigeria enjoys a perfect rice-growing climate over a vast area; yet it is the world's second-biggest importer of rice, often from countries on the same warm, wet tropical latitude as top exporter Thailand. President Goodluck Jonathan made local manufacture of rice a signature promise of his election campaign in 2011. His government then had the ambitious goal to import zero rice by the end of 2015, with all kinds of incentives to farmers. But sadly, of this ambitious dream only a pipe dream remained.

It is one of those inexplicable African paradoxes, like the fact that Africa produces, yet suffers regular fuel shortages; or that it is sitting on the world's eighth-largest gas reserves but can only produce a few hours of power a day.

Each of these countries provides a different type of example, from those that have diversifying their economies to those emerging from civil war, even if they are all dramatically emblematic of the continent's challenges and hope (Mills 2010: xix). This realisation is popularly shared by Robert Calderisi (2006).

6.5 BACK TO BAD FAITH IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO

As argued above, and repeatedly throughout this chapter, the DRC is a rich country and should be able to develop the standard of living of its people by making efficient use of these resources for all. Unfortunately, this has not been the case. Unfortunately, the country is poor, because it has been ruled by people that have organised the country for their own benefit at the expense of the vast majority of people. Political power has been concentrated in a few hands and has been used to create great wealth for those with the contacts and the inside information and networks. The losers, as stated before, have been the ordinary Congolese people.

Even after so many years of independence, the DRC is still not democratic, which in no way implies that the democratic countries are always in a good state. One would mostly find oppression in nations that are not democratic, in the sense that the president of the country, instead of being a servant of the people, is autocratic and oppresses his people. In such countries one would find an individual ruling longer than he should and, using deception or, better yet, exercising bad faith, being elected into power for many more terms, in most cases against the wish of the people and the country's constitution. It is evident that such countries will be poor and underdeveloped, leaving their nations helpless and hopeless.

Authoritarian systems in the DRC allow no room for progressive politicians. Those who chose to become politically active were usually branded as agitators. Even nowadays, such individuals are deprived of opportunities to take part freely in political activities. After colonial rule, the primary aim of Congolese leaders was to assume political power in their country from European colonial authorities for their personal benefit.

Unfortunately, after winning political power with independence, these leaders had no will of heart whatsoever of distributing that authority with anyone else; rather, they were frightened of what might happen to them if they ever lost control of the reins of government. In Africa as a whole, many African nationalist leaders, not having been exposed to the democratic traditions of their pre-colonial culture, were determined not to share power, nor let anyone challenge them. Generally, liberation movements in Africa have no democratic intention of sharing power; rather, they are organised purely to take over the power from the colonial authorities.

After independence, African countries and their leaders were confronted with two problems, the one political and the other economic. The political challenge was to try to broaden the legitimacy of their power while building cohesive national unity without any ethnicity. The economic goal was to grow productivity to improve the well-being of African people. Unfortunately, so many years after independence these challenges still remain persistent and real.

In claiming to fight for unity among their people after independence, many African nationalist leaders instead fell into the trap of initiating 'one-party states. Many views have been advanced by various African leaders to justify a one-party system as being more suitable to independent African states than a multiparty system. They advocate the ever-present danger of tribalism.' According to Khapoya (1994: 193), African leaders have suggested,

that permitting more than one party would encourage people to form parties based along tribal or micro-national interests rather than national issues. It is indeed fair to say that much political conflict in Africa has sprung from demands for economic and political benefits being expressed in ethnic terms.

These one-party regimes created highly centralised governments, in which officials acted as agents of maintaining law and order, while the state imposed severe limits on basic political freedoms. Their claim still was that a multiparty system would only encourage regional, ethnic or tribal separatism, which could undermine national unity.

In many ways, after independence, African leaders tried to unify their nation out of the many ethnic groups living in their country, all of which have maintained some of their distinct institutions and identities throughout the colonial era. At the same time, they also sought to establish productive economic systems that might succeed in helping ordinary people to realise their hopes and dreams for a better life in the future.

One can safely claim that the DRC is the richest country in Africa in terms of mineral resources. Then one might ask, why is it also one of the most underdeveloped countries in the world? Clearly this must be the result of self-deception. Because, if this country were rich in the true sense of being rich, then we would not be going on and on about it being underdeveloped. With the natural resources in the Congo, one

may wonder why it is underdeveloped even today. It could be argued that this points to self-deception/bad faith. Without doubt, bad faith may just be one of the reasons why the DRC is underdeveloped. As mentioned earlier, there is an absence of political will to develop, and this is self-deception, as one would get into office claiming he is for development and change, but their actions contradict their discourse.

In the broader international debate, the Congo has become marginalised. It is largely due to the disappointment over the country's lack of development. The DRC's poor economic performance is one of the biggest enigmas in the history of global political economy. A large literature has emerged trying to explain the reason for the DRC's growth tragedy.

During the last fifty years, hundreds of billions of dollars have been paid to governments around the world as 'developmental' aid. A large amount of it has been wasted in overheads and corruption. "Worse, a lot of it went to dictators such as Mobutu, who depended on foreign aid from his Western patrons both to buy support from his clients to shore up his regime and enrich himself" (Acemoglu and Robinson 2013: 452).

It can also be claimed that in the DRC with all its resources, an unequal trade system has never created adequate national wealth to invest in their infrastructure (such as roads and electricity supply when they produce in abundance) and industry so that they can advance properly as a country.

Whereas the solution to Congo development is primarily internal, Congolese leaders have successfully, with the help of their people, managed to externalise their issues, making them the responsibility (and apparently the fault too) of others.

Far from being the fount for development, the Congo's mineral oil wealth has served instead to enrich the elite. The economic and social development of the Congo is being held back. The modern Democratic Republic of the Congo remains poor, because its citizens still lack the economic institutions that generate the basic incentives that make a society prosperous.

Most academics and commentators emphasise entirely different factors as to why a country such as the Congo is poor. Several emphasize that the Congo's poverty

derives from its vast geographical terrain. Others, though point to cultural aspects that are supposedly adverse to economic development and prosperity. The argument is that Congolese lack the sort of work ethic and cultural traits that have allowed others to prosper. In this sense they emphasise certain beliefs that are inconsistent with economic success. Thirdly, there is the view that the rulers of the Congo simply do not know what is needed to make their country prosperous; having followed incorrect policies and strategies in the past.

This study has clearly demonstrated so far that the interpretation of Congolese underdevelopment, i.e. the people's understanding, turns out to provide a general explanation for why poor countries are poor. It has been shown that poor countries are poor for the same reason that the Congo is poor. The DRC's solution will be the decision of their citizens to overthrow the elite who controls power and creates a society where political rights are much more broadly respected, where the government is accountable and responsible to citizens, and where the great mass of people could benefit from economic opportunities.

Would it not have been better for Mobutu to set up the necessary economic institutions that would increase the wealth of the Congolese, rather than deepening their poverty? If he had managed to increase the prosperity of his nation, would he not have been able to have even more money and infrastructure for himself and his people? Mobutu, though, was rather busy accumulating riches, while his country was plunged ever deeper into decline and decay. Corruption and embezzlement became part of the very fabric of society. Certain civil servants and army officers, on the inside, played their parts blatantly while teachers and hospital staff went unpaid for months. Hospitals close for lack of medical equipment and resources. The infrastructure in the form of rural road network and the river transport system disintegrated. Agricultural production has plummeted. Large imports of food are required to keep the urban population alive. The level of employment has fallen below that at independence. Reports estimate that two-fifths of Kinshasa's inhabitants suffer from severe malnutrition. So the old story presents itself: the state only to serve the interests of the ruling elite, while the masses have to fend for themselves (Meredith 2014: 610).

The impact of the Congo's failing economies on ordinary life is severe. Crippled by debt and mismanagement, the Congolese government can no longer afford to

maintain adequate public services. Hospitals and clinics run short of medicine and equipment; schools lack textbooks, electricity supplies are erratic, telephone systems break down, roads and railways deteriorate, unemployment soars, and living standards are deplorable. The Congolese people and their leaders have failed to change the Congo. Why? The answer, short and clear, is that it was not in their interests to do that. The case study in this chapter has demonstrated through its analysis and examples that the attitude of bad faith is a proper explanation of the underdevelopment in the Congo.

6.6 CONCLUSION

The DRC, as mentioned earlier, inherited a set of political and economic institutions in 1960. For the first few years, these were remained relatively untouched. The decolonisation of the Congo in the 1960s, though, was a watershed experience for the generation that have witnessed a free opening up of the whole country open; it created engagement and intellectual curiosity, but later the country collapsed. Despite regular (disputed) elections political institutions were consciously destroyed, and economic institutions transformed to benefit only the leadership of the country and their associates. The black majority was now in control, but instead of the former colonisers, the black leadership and the elite were now filling their pockets. Over time, the economic institutions became even more corrupt, and incomes in the DRC collapsed. The economic and political failure in the DRC is yet another expression of the iron law of oligarchy – in this instance, with the repressive regime of the successive leaders in the Congo since independence.

The Congo's poor economic performance is one of the largest puzzles in growth and development economics. A huge literature has emerged trying to explain the source of the Congo's growth tragedy. It is so that colonialism played a big role in the underdevelopment of the DRC. Colonialism resulted in the exploitation of labour, unfair taxation, the creation of artificial states and unfair terms of trade. One cannot deny that many African problems are because of a combination of external Western-African factors. Nevertheless, as indicated in this chapter, many of the problems facing the DRC are due to internal causes. Ethnic differences, as well as political and cultural

traditions have made it challenging to build strong institutions. Leaders made use of these differences in bad faith to create more division in the society.

It is therefore not fully correct to allege that Westerners did not want them to be able to make their own manufactured goods; in a way, they wanted the Congolese to be dependent on them. The truth is that the Congo has never accumulated enough national wealth to invest in their infrastructure (such as roads and electricity supply) and industry so that they can improve properly as a country.

While the Congolese government spends enormous energy on negotiating new trade access, they spend comparatively little time fixing things directly within their power, such as corruption and bad faith.

To be a leader you need to have clear objectives, and you need to be honest in telling people what you are going to do no matter how unpopular this might be. Because you need to tell people what they need to know, not what they want to hear. (Mills 2010: 113)

Desker et al. (2008) argue that African failure to provide “public goods, such as law and order, defence, contract enforcement, and infrastructure” has its roots in Africa itself. Although much research remains to be done prior to one gaining an intense understanding of exactly how and why colonialism and the slave trade have been so detrimental to economic development, it cannot be said to be the only reason for underdevelopment to the point of not considering aspects such as leadership, civil society and bad faith.

One of the central arguments of this chapter is that the DRC needs a revolution in leadership, not only from the politicians who govern, but from an active citizenry – where the country is placed above the narrow needs of ethnic groups or insider politicians. The elite must recognise that usual way of doing things is not in the interest of the welfare of its citizens and it did not contribute to long-term growth and stability.

Against the background of the Kasa-Vubu, Mobutu and even the Kabila eras, both the Congolese and their leaders must address the mind-set of bad faith that affects many African peoples everywhere. They must believe in themselves again; they must clear their own path and forge their own identity. They have a right, like all people, to be

governed with justice, accountability, and transparency – and in a manner that people are not just objects. They must all rise.

It is so that few African leaders, as Guest (2005: 12) observes, "... allow ordinary citizens the freedom to seek their own fortunes without official harassment". Few uphold the rule of law, enforce contracts or safeguard property rights and "many are blatantly predatory, serving as the means by which a small elite extracts rents from everyone else." As indicated, Mbeki (2009) has pointed to quality of leadership as the key explanation for African performance. African leaders, he argues, sustain and reproduce themselves by perpetuating the neo-colonial state and its attendant socioeconomic systems of exploitation, which renders any attempt at development futile.

Swart (2011: 127) questions and attempt to answer why does the Congolese elite do not see the noticeable advantage in developing their economies and uplifting their people. Why do Congolese electorates allow them to get away with bad choices? Even the new generation of leaders in the Congo who apparently, at the outset, shook off the 'big man' image, were very quick to adapt to the realities of staying in power, but not in the interests of their people.

The economic and social development of the Congo is arrested. This is intensified through the backward economies and societal systems within which Congolese leaders and elites steer the country. Why do Congolese leaders fail to adopt the policies for creative growth and initiative that had proven successful in other parts of the developing countries? Can we still claim that the hasty manner of decolonisation left most Congolese leaders woefully unprepared to run their newly independent state? It is extraordinary that the Congolese people have choices of leadership but still select those who make bad choices. It is an extreme example of a populace that has remained inexplicably passive in the face of bad, outrageous government policy.

According to Khapoya (1994:212),

It would not be fair, however, to present current African conditions as hopeless. Indeed, many African nations have accomplished much since achieving self-rule during the 1950s and 1960s. A new sense of nationhood has taken root in most African countries. More and more

Africans have come to identify themselves as citizens of their new countries, and African leaders have taken responsibility for development policies, some of which have proven useful.

Many questions about the ability of African countries to make it on their own after independence have been raised for many years. African leaders have been searching for winning formulas ever since. Centralised economies, based on bad policies, one-party regimes, corruption, civil wars caused by the struggle for power, have failed to deliver the prosperity Africans had fought for and their leaders had promised them since independence.

Africans themselves will have to take the lead in changing their systems and improving their lives. They cannot sit observe and be spectators. Years of encouraging and expert advice from the West; years of foreign aid have not changed much in lifting Africans out of poverty. As Richard Sandbrook (1985: 148) argues with respect to economic reform:

Africans must look to domestic responses to their crisis. The realities of the international economy and the immensity of the problems confronting the people compel this conclusion. Of course, the international order does need reform. But we must recognise Africa's limited economic power and thus its limited capacity to force or benefit from a new international order.

For many years, Africa as a continent has not been a major player on the world stage. Instead, the African continent has been the target of massive exploitation by other countries in the international system, without defending itself. Ultimately African states failed to agree to a stronger union. African countries are simply not ready for a strong political union that can unite and defend the interests of the continent.

It is so that many Africans still trust their leaders and want to believe and follow them. Many African leaders have misused this naïve trust that stems from the majority being uneducated, uninformed, and unexposed. Sadly many citizens still view their struggle leaders as super-human or untouchable. Moreover, where there is poor leadership, the Congolese need to stand up for the leaders they want and not settle for the leaders they get. Too many Congolese leaders have been the narrow leaders of their countries rather than genuine statesmen for the entire nation. They have played upon people's

desire to tail someone who would lead them from their difficulties to an immediately better life, rather than joining with them to solve their own problems by exploiting them.

To realise any positive development, however, weak leaders and wrong policies will have to be replaced over time by those who not only make claims but also implement good ideas of development for their societies; a vision around which a set of positive changes can be structured and the people united. For Buchan (1996: 198), therefore, the facts of our situation should not preoccupy us; what should preoccupy us is what we make of this situation. The point is that unless Congolese from all levels of society recognise and embrace the challenge of leadership, they will not move forward. In other words, the old culture of underdevelopment, corruption, and modes of inadequate leadership will remain a challenge. This means that Congolese leaders at all levels must take responsibility for developing the situation through self-help, awareness raising and discipline in the broadest sense of the word. Since no-one knows the DRC better than they do, they must use their ideas to come up with the best solution for development.

Of course, changing this situation requires leadership to make choices informed by popular needs rather than narrow interests, and to take steps that increase competition and reduce corruption: Improving transparency and accountability, reducing trade barriers, ending often politically motivated subsidies and ensuring market-based pricing, reducing bureaucracy and simplifying procedures – in short, enabling business to focus on the market rather than government. Leadership not only has to be of high-quality, but also have courage (Mills 2010: 37).

If a critical mass of Congolese who adopt an attitude of resistance over exploitation, collective responsibility over individual gain, and common feeling for the country rather than narrow ethnic nationalism, the country will develop. They will also have an opportunity to experience an African revival such as what Thabo Mbeki, the former President of South Africa, envisioned when he invoked the *African Renaissance*. While it is necessary to challenge the governments and their leaders, the citizens of African countries (civil society) also have a role to play in demanding development that discourages dependency (Maathai 2009: 76).

We all know that with the numerous numbers of natural resources the DRC should not be underdeveloped. The argument in this chapter is that Africa in general and the DRC in particular have failed not only because of external factors, but because of the attitude of bad faith, as has been identified. As indicated in this chapter, the Sartrean concept of bad faith could be of help when it comes to the Congo. As mentioned earlier, there is an absence of political will to develop. This itself is self-deception, as one would get into office claiming that he is all for development and change, but his actions are opposite to the claim.

Neither the Democratic Republic of the Congo's unsatisfactory post-independence performance, nor the many examples of apparent economic mismanagement can solely be blamed on ignorance or lack of a good number of educated cadres. After all, if ignorance and education were the problem, benevolent leaders would quickly learn over these past years what types of policies could significantly improve their citizens standard of living.

Most commentators have focused on how to get the African continent right, while what is really needed is an explanation for reasons the African continent always 'gets it wrong'. This study has proven that getting it wrong in Africa is regularly not about ignorance or culture, but poor countries are so because leaders make choices that craft poverty. They get it wrong not by mistake or ignorance, but on purpose. To understand this, research has gone beyond economics and studied instead how decisions are taken, who makes them, and why those people decide to do what they do. All this is done in 'bad faith'.

Independence for the DRC created a critical juncture. Sadly, while the people were expecting a positive movement towards economic growth and then rapid industrialisation, the country is spinning towards widespread economic decline. After a short period of opportunity, many African leaders reverted to dictatorship to rule their respective countries. This move blocked, or at the very slightest did nothing to encourage the spread of the needed development for their people. We need to acknowledge here that dictator regimes are not pluralistic and fear any creative spirit. Many have centralised policies, or at least states that are centralised enough to impose bans on innovations or any type of development. The consequences of dictatorship and political centralisation are predictable.

The roots of many economic and political failures in the DRC can be traced back to the independence era. The deteriorating economic performance lastly led to the emergence of a serious opposition to one-party rule. Many political actors came forward with the claim to salvage the political and economic situation of the country. However, they all wanted in bad faith just to share the economic benefits of the state. That is why all political parties and regimes one after the other did not change the situation for the better in any way. In most cases, any parliamentary elections were far from competitive; the results were predicted even before elections, which is still the situation today.

This situation, though, should not lead us to despair. This study not only attempted to paint a bleak picture of Africa and the DRC. Provided the mistakes of the past are learnt from, putting the Congo right and achieving its potential may well not only be less complicated than we fear, but the results can come much quicker than we realise, and the transformation we all yearn for will take us all pleasantly by surprise. This hope for Africa (and more specifically the DRC) will be further taken in the final chapter, with some concluding remarks.

CHAPTER 7: END REMARKS

This study started with a general discussion of underdevelopment and development, with constant reference to Africa. This was both in the form of a socio-historical (Chapter 2) and empirical-theoretical discussion (Chapter 3) of the issue. In the latter chapter it was argued that the various theories of underdevelopment are not fully helpful in explaining the origins of underdevelopment throughout Africa, and mostly incorrect in their emphasis, but also unable to account for the lack of any positive change, especially after independence. Various factors mentioned in this chapter, for example colonialism, modernisation and the problem of aid, are unable to explain not only the differences we see across several parts of the world today, but also why many other nations who suffered the same fate managed to improve their destiny.

Against this background we proceeded with an ontological argument to be an interpretative complement to the problem of underdevelopment in Africa (Chapters 4–5). Here Sartre’s concept of the human being and bad faith (as applied to Africa) asserts that underdevelopment in Africa persists because African people and African leaders in general claim not to know how to develop their countries. This idea was taken further in the previous chapter. In this chapter, this line of argumentation will be continued by taking the issue of African leaders further, and then addressing African civil society, the question of aid, bad faith, and the DRC as case study for a final time.

7.1 THE QUESTION OF AFRICAN LEADERSHIP

This study questions why had Africa failed to adopt the policies for growth that had proven to be successful in other parts of the developing world as Swart (2011) indicates. Some of these examples, which were discussed in his study, are well known to Africans and the development community at large. Yet, no amount of aid can ‘fix’ African states if their leaders continue to make the wrong choices pertaining to development. How can the motto – which claims that to any African problem an African solution must be sorted out – be implemented in this case? The common attitude of African leaders always to lament their problems and try to seek solutions external to Africa must come to an end.

African heads of state and government, in their periodic meetings at the African Union headquarters, use these sessions to pledge African solidarity. They are very good at this, especially when it has to do with shielding one another from accountability at home or at the International Criminal Court. They have the tendency to protect one another from their common failures. However, at the height of the Ebola epidemic, a critical point for the survival of the African people, African solidarity seemed to have made way for real politics. Instead of opening their purses and doors to send help to their struggling brothers and sisters, some leaders closed their borders. Here there was no African 'ubuntu diplomacy' to speak of. It was predominantly the United States (US) and Europeans that hit the ground running. African doctors and nurses who want to lend a hand have thus far had to do it at their own initiative under the auspices of non-governmental organisations.

The greatest curse of the African continent, far from being only colonialism and apartheid, is home-grown leaders who in bad faith put their personal interests and ambitions before those of ordinary citizens. Rather than being the agents of substantial change, many betray the trust vested in them. The devastation we are witnessing in Africa has put a nail in the coffin of the notion of "African solutions to African problems". If Africa does not take itself seriously, why should the rest of the world do that?

If African leaders are no more or less greedy than leaders on other continents, what lies behind such predatory behaviour? This study has pointed in the direction of bad faith of African leaders who always live a lie to themselves and play the innocent guilty to justify their failures.

By the 1980s, Africa as a whole was known for its 'Big Men' – a policy which entitled army dictators presidents to enforce their personal control, tolerating neither opposition nor dissent, licensing secret police to silence their critics, cowing the press, emasculating the courts, and making themselves exceedingly rich. Once in power, their preoccupation was to stay in power, employing whatever means necessary.

At the beginning of the 21st century, during the wave of independence, many African countries had relatively new leaders. These leaders, a number of whom came to power through coups or civil wars or both, may not have oppressed their peoples so much than those they succeeded, but they did not usher in the necessary changes in

leadership and improve their people's lives. On the contrary, they made their people live like 'animals and prisoners' in their own countries.

This study also argues that the training of the political leadership across the continent of Africa is also important, but it is neglected and overlooked. It is common knowledge that the idea of preparing political leaders for the exercise of political power has deep historical roots all over the world, even in the traditional African traditions. However, some thinkers like Renshon (1990: 313) still claim that

the idea of preparing people for a position of leadership presents two major difficulties from the standpoint of traditional democratic theory. The first is the concern that leadership education is inherently elitist and therefore suspect. The second is that such education would result in an increase in the psychological and political distance between leaders and citizens and tend to encourage citizen passivity and erode accountability.

This argument reflects the concern that specialised preparation may increase the psychological distance already built into leader/citizen relations, with damaging results for the leader's identification with and ties to ordinary citizens. Leaders ordinarily have more contact with one another than with the average citizen, and as a result they may be more likely to develop feelings of solidarity with their peers.

Another difficulty with preparing persons for holding political power in Africa is simply that it is not done systematically. For a variety of reasons, in Africa, unlike in other Western democracies, developing leaders and leadership skills are not viewed as an important issue for which comprehensive, integrated training is needed. Again, the laissez-faire approach to leadership development seems to be consistent with the African democratic mythology, based on the assumption that 'every child is born a leader and can become a president'. Given these feelings, leadership preparation may be seen more as futile than dangerous.

According to Acemoglu and Robinson (2013: 66),

the leaders of African nations that have failed over the last half century under insecure property rights and economic institutions, impoverishing their fellow led Africans even more. They did not let this to happen because

they thought it was good economics. They did so because they could get away with it and enrich themselves at the cost of the rest, or that they thought it was good politics, their way of remaining in power by purchasing the support of crucial groups or the elite.

Few African leaders, as Guest (2005: 12) has observed,

... allow ordinary citizens the freedom to seek their own fortunes without official harassment. Few uphold the rule of law, enforce contracts or safeguard property rights...[and] ...many are blatantly predatory, serving as the means by which a small elite extracts rents from everyone else.

Mbeki (2009) has been cited earlier on the importance of the quality of leadership as a key explanation for African performance. Unfortunately, African leaders, he argues, sustain and reproduce the neo-colonial state and its attendant socioeconomic systems of exploitation, which makes any attempt at development futile.

7.2 AFRICAN CIVIL SOCIETY

This study has come to the realisation that the euphoria that accompanied the respective transitions to liberation and independence is gone. Now there is only the realisation that to make the dream of peace and prosperity in Africa come true, all Africans need to work very hard, and Africans themselves will have to take control of their lives in a way they have not yet been called upon to do. The era of the second liberation of Africa, internationally and domestically, indeed, may just have begun.

Furthermore, most importantly, bad choices were made because better choices in the broad public interest (civil society) were, in many cases, not in the leaders' personal and often financial self-interest. Bayart (1993: 48) contends in this regard that from a Western perspective, "Africa is variously seen as doomed, crippled, disenchanted, adrift, coveted, betrayed or strangled, always with someone to blame". Bayart (1993) continues to state that corruption is a pragmatic response.

Amassing and redistributing of wealth had come to be expected of politicians. "Material prosperity", Bayart says, "is one of the chief political virtues rather than being an object of disapproval." Wrong (2002: 49) writes on Kenya that activities were often described

in terms of food or eating; hence the title of his book – *It's Our Turn to Eat*. This was “not limited to the elite members of the political classes; contrary to the popular image of the innocent masses, corruption and predation are not found exclusively among the powerful. Rather, they are means of social and political behaviour shared by a plurality of actors on a great scale.” (Bayart 1993). This is where civil society comes into the picture.

Herbst (2008) argues that African failure “to provide public goods such as law and order, contract enforcement, and infrastructure” has its roots also in Africans themselves. Although ample research remains to be conducted before we have a deep understanding of exactly how and why colonialism and the slave trade have been so detrimental to economic development, it cannot be said to be the only reason for underdevelopment to the point of not considering bad faith. That would be a false route for analysis. It is a false route, because market failures due to inexperience and wrong advice from Westerners is are not the full story why Africans could not take the destiny of their countries into their own hands. Africans in general tend to refute that African countries are poorer than the rest of the world because their leaders have the same mistaken views of how to run their countries, leading to the prevalence of poverty.

7.3 THE QUESTION OF AID

Swart (2011: 128) explains that aid is used as one means for African countries to externalise their problems. It has also institutionalised economic competitiveness, not least through raising currency values, and distorting political economies through keeping leadership in power, whatever their poor economic choices.

From a donor perspective, the arguments against the current system of aid fall into two categories: the ‘tweakers’, who believe that the benefits outweigh the costs, but that improvements are necessary; and the ‘revampers’, who believe that aid generally does more harm than good and that Africans need to find their own way. Most analysts fall into the first group. This is an understandable place to be, not least since “there are a variety of different types of aid, ranging from humanitarian relief (generally funded by donors but carried out by NGOs) to development assistance (funded by donors and usually carried out by governments)” (Mills 2010: 314).

Calderisi (2006),

who worked for the World Bank for over 20 years, spending much of his time in Africa, holds that Africa's problems have been fundamentally of its own making: dictatorial, *kleptocratic* governments, venal corruption, and poor economic policies and practices that strangled entrepreneurship, combined with a cultural fatalism.

If aid does more harm than good, then what should be the role of the outside world in Africa? Aid and advisory businesses bring very real problems with them, but on the other hand, there is the danger that if they withdraw altogether, Africa might well sink rather than swim on its own. Aid has also played into the hands of the African governments that control it, allowing them to avoid facing up to questions about how they would develop without it (Mills 2010: 335).

There are two important lessons here. First, this study has argued that foreign aid is not a very effective means of dealing with the failure of nations in Africa today and for African development. Foreign is of little assistance in this respect, and certainly not in the way that it is currently organised. If we want to recognise and address the roots of world inequality and poverty it is important that we do not attach our hopes on false promises. The real root of underdevelopment is the attitude of bad faith. Secondly, for any foreign aid to be useful for the development of Africa, using the existing flows, economics and political institutions need to be improved significantly.

7.4 COLONISATION AND INDEPENDENCE IN AFRICA

Whether colonisation hurt or helped Africans is a very contested subject both for Africans and Europeans. They usually support different opposing views. It is a problem that will continue to engage intellectual passions and may never be fully resolved. It is unfortunate that much of the foregoing discussion on colonisation focuses on the negative side of the ledger.

At this point Khapoya can be quoted extensively:

... on the negative side, the following points need to be mentioned. There was massive exploitation of Africa in terms of resource depletion, labour

exploitation, unfair taxation, lack of industrialisation, the prohibition of inter-African trade, and the introduction of fragile dependent one-crop economies. Ethnic rivalries were fuelled, especially through the implementation of the colonial policy of indirect rule. The alienation and undermining of traditional African authority patterns, through the use of chiefs for colonial duties, made the task of nation-building that much more difficult. The creation of artificial boundaries has been the basis of much suffering in African states, as political conflicts have flared up from time to time because of territorial claims and counterclaims. By imposing arbitrary boundaries on the African people, countries were created with the stroke of a pen. African culture and values were destroyed through the imposition of alien religions and culture (Khapoya 1994: 145).

... broadly speaking, there are insufficient benefits of colonisation that many scholars are likely to agree on. The first is the introduction of Western medicine, which has made an incredible difference to the survival rates of the African population. Secondly, the introduction of formal education merits to be mentioned in helping to broaden the African's outlook and to unlock the hidden potential of the African people. Thirdly, the inadequate infrastructure that colonial authorities established became the foundation upon which new African leaders built their new national institutions. Fourthly, the introduction of Islam and Christianity to African people greatly simplified African spirituality and created a new basis for Africans with diverse backgrounds to come together (Khapoya (1994: 146)

7.5 BAD FAITH

As indicated, the basis of these conflicts is largely the fault of elite leadership who designs economic institutions to enrich themselves and prolong their power at the cost of most people in their countries. The different histories and social structures of African countries obviously contribute to different kind of elites in every country. On the other hand, the reason why these elite leaders persist in leading their countries is related to a vicious circle which basically lead to the impoverishment of their citizens through bad faith.

The independence of the DRC was an opportunity missed, accompanied by the recreation of the same type of institutions that was there during the colonial period. There are huge differences in living standards around the world. Even the poorest citizens in many countries have incomes and access to healthcare, public services, and economics and social opportunities that are more superior to those available to the vast mass of people living in Africa.

Did this all need to be so? Was it historically, geographically, culturally or ethnically predetermined that other parts of the world would become so much richer than sub-Saharan Africa over the last hundred years or so? Was it inevitable that the Industrial Revolution would get under way outside Africa?

This study has tried to answer these fatalist questions, by arguing that we need to understand the reasons some nations are prosperous, while others fail and are poor. This study then argues, amongst others, that the attitude of bad faith is one of the main reasons of the failed African states and all these fatalist excuses. This ontological explanation provides a well-grounded understanding to interpret and explain the reason for underdevelopment within the African context.

This study has attempted to achieve this interpretation on two levels: The first is the empirical-theoretical distinction between known underdevelopment theories and false reasons for underdevelopment (as discussed in Chapters 2–3). The second is our ontological interpretation for why bad faith in African leaders and Africans in general are the real cause for the underdevelopment in Africa (Chapters 4-6). An important part of the argument was the link between bad faith, economic and political failures on the Africa continent with a specific attention to the Democratic Republic of the Congo (Chapter 6).

Many analysts got it all wrong by suggesting that underdevelopment in Africa is the result of bad economic policies and political institutions, and then proposing a list of improvements. These improvements include a decrease in the size of the government sector, privatisation, improvements in the efficiency of public service provision, macroeconomic stability, and suggestions how to improve the functioning of the state itself by stressing anticorruption measures. The conclusion of this study unfortunately

holds that even if all these amendments can be implemented, if Africans themselves and African leaders still live in bad faith, no development will ever take place.

Although many of these improvements might be helpful, the approach of international organisations in Africa and elsewhere is still steeped in an incorrect perspective that fails to recognise the role of political institutions, culture and the role African leaders play in their failure. The attempts by international organisations to engineer economic growth by prescribing de-contextualised better policies and institutions to poor countries cannot be successful, because they do not take place within the context of an explanation of why bad policies and institutions are chosen in the first place, except that the leaders of these poor countries make the choice knowingly. The consequence is that these sound policies are not adopted and not implemented, because there is a big divide between theory and practice.

What can be done to kick-start or perhaps just facilitate the process of development on the African continent? The authentic answer of course is that there is no positive external recipe for any development in Africa. Naturally there are some obvious factors that would make the process of development more likely to get off the ground. These would include the fact that African leaders should stop externalising the problem. Africans must stop playing the blame game of being victimised by their white colonisers who left Africa many years ago and were called back by the same Africans to come and rescue them from sinking into the sea of poverty and mismanagement. That is why in Fanon's view

... there is a fact: White men ponder themselves superior to black men. There is another fact: Black men want to substantiate to white men, at all costs, the richness of their thought; the equivalent value of their intellect. (1986: 3; cf. also Kassab 2017, Chapter 9).

However painful it may be for any African to accept this conclusion, Fanon (1986: 4) is correct when he claims within this context: "For the black man there is only one destiny, and it is white." Against this background, white civilisation and culture have forced with tacit agreement of an existential deviation on black people what is often called: the black soul is a white man's artefact – simply meaning that a black man is only a creation of a white man. Fanon (1986: 8) makes this point as follows:

the black man has two dimensions; the one with his fellows, the other with the white man. A black man behaves differently towards a white man and towards another black man. If a black man is among his own, he will have no problem, except in minor internal conflicts, to experience his being through others. There is of course the moment of "being for others", as discussed earlier. Among his own, the black man sometimes does not know at what moment his inferiority complex comes into being through the other and affect his way of relating to them negatively.

Sartre (1995: 68) also echoes this view in his essay on anti-Semitism:

They [the Jews] have allowed themselves to be poisoned by the stereotype that others have of them, and they live in fear that their acts will correspond to this stereotype ... We may say that their conduct is perpetually overdetermined from the inside.

That such self-division is part of colonialist subjugation is beyond question; no-one would dream of being sceptical that its major artery is provided for from the heart of those several theories that have tried to validate that the Negro is a stage in the slow evolution of monkey into man. But if the black is aware that this was imposed upon him from the outside, why can he not fight against this belief? The attitude of bad faith is so prevalent amongst Africans that it sometimes manifests itself through fatalism, where many Africans have given up for any hope of change or progress in their countries.

It seems as if the attitude of bad faith in the black African is also accompanied with a kind of inferiority complex, which is intensified in particular among the elite and the leaders, who must struggle with it unceasingly. Their way of doing so is sometimes naïve; black Africans tend to believe that for anything to be considered good the approval must come from the West. They compare anything to try find similarities with what the white man has; they do not believe in themselves. It is from within that the black man will seek admittance to the white sanctuary. The attitude of bad faith derives from this intention.

In bad faith the black man believes that he is just a child who cannot be blamed for his irrational actions, because they can be blamed on slavery and colonialism. It is

necessary to see whether it is possible for the black man to overcome his feeling of inferiority or insignificance. To rid his life of this attitude will also help him solve the problem of bad faith and *ipso facto* the problem of underdevelopment.

The black man in bad faith is constantly running “away from his own individuality to annihilate his own presence. Whenever a black man protests, there is alienation.” In Fanon’s words (1986: 43),

... the Negro, having been made inferior, proceeds from humiliating insecurity through strongly voiced self-accusation to despair. The attitude of the black man toward the white, or toward his own race, often duplicates almost completely a constellation of delirium, frequently bordering on the region of the pathological.

This study has shown that, for its development, the destiny of the African continent lies solely in the Africans themselves. Any borrowed solution to this problem of underdevelopment in Africa will only solve the problem at face value, but not significantly. The plea of this study is for all Africans to honestly take their destiny in their own hands and avoid at all costs the attitude of bad faith.

7.6 ON THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO AGAIN

Linking with the earlier discussion on leadership styles in Africa, but bringing it to the DRC, Maathai (2009: 19) argues that leaders “must foster values such as fairness, justice, and working for the common good, rather than avoiding to recognize violence and exploitation, or promoting narrow self-interest and opportunism. Perhaps the most important quality that the African leadership needs to cherish, and which is desperately lacking across the continent, is a sense of service delivery to their people. Too many Africans still live in the hope that their leaders will be magnanimously not to take advantage of their weakness and vulnerability, and instead remove the causes why so many continue to live in fear.” (Maathai 2009: 19). On this point, Maathai (2009: 126) claims that a new generation of African leaders, drivers of a potential African Renaissance, have in some cases provided their countries with much-needed economic growth, political stability, and a measure of national reconciliation after years of devastating civil conflict and mismanagement. But other leaders, being in power for

quite a few years, have also initiated conflicts with their neighbours, compromised elections, and sought to contain political dissent – the familiar situation that must be challenged.

When African nationalist leaders and parties started governing after independence, they inherited intense problems which were to influence the succeeding course of politics on the continent. Major problems included their people's high expectations of national development amid intractable economic problems and territorial and ethnic divisions conducive to political instability. The same challenges were also encountered in the DRC.

The African Congolese people's high expectations stem partly from the extravagant promises made by nationalist leaders in the process of competing for popular support. During political rivalries leading to independence and later during elections campaigns, many politicians vowed in bad faith to bring about dramatic changes in people's lives. They promised that, once independence was achieved, or elections won their leadership would provide good jobs, decent houses, adequate healthcare, and free education. Disappointment set in as soon as the people discovered that their leaders could not deliver on all their promises. The economic experience of the independent Zaire and DRC during the past five decades has been rooted in their continued dependency on external powers in all sectors.

According to Maathai (2009: 19), people

must grasp the obtainable opportunities and not wait for someone else to magically make growth happen for them; they must become conscious that, no matter how meagre their capacities and resources, they have the means to protect what is theirs.

For Congolese to progress, they must in general be accountable, responsible and ready to serve others. If this can be new attitude of every Congolese, it will more likely that even the generations to come will be responsible and be able to improve their standard of living. People will feel empowered to challenge leaders if they misbehave and they will be forced to bring about the kind of change that enhances the strength of freedom. People in the Congo will then live a better life in their country and not strive to move to other countries. They will also have their fair share of the considerable

natural resources with which the DRC is blessed with. It entails implementing decisions that encourage the dynamism and entrepreneurship of the DRC peoples.

This renaissance of the Congo demands that its leaders not merely support honesty, uprightness and transparency in government from the President and the highest ministerial level down to the grassroots, but also to represent it in their behaviour as well. Congolese leaders or their supporters should no longer play politics with ethnicity, grab public lands, sell off national resources, and loot the treasury, or tolerate such actions by others.

Finally, in Maathai's (2009: 286) words, we will have a generation of Africans who

embrace a set of values, like service for the common good, and commitment, persistence and patience until a goal is realised. They will live their lives for something larger than themselves.

Acemoglu and Robinson (2013:452) is correct that

the idea that rich western countries should provide large amounts of 'developmental aid' in order to solve the problem of poverty is based on an incorrect understanding of what causes poverty.

As argued above, "putting an end to foreign aid is impractical and would likely lead to additional human suffering. Aid also eases the guilt of many citizens of Western countries who feel unease about economic and humanitarian disasters around the world. Aid, and the enormous complex of international organisations and NGOs associated with it, will keep the *status-quo* intact." (Acemoglu and Robinson 2013: 545).

What can then be done to kick-start the development in the Congo? The honest answer of course is that there is no easy recipe for achieving this. Naturally there are some obvious factors that would make the process of development more likely to get off the ground.

It has been argued that the DRC needs a revolution in leadership – not only from the politicians who govern, but from an active citizenry that prioritises education way above the narrow needs of its own ethnic group. Those in power must recognise that

the way Congo has been handling its affairs of state has not protected or promoted the welfare of the country's citizens, or even provided for the long-term growth and stability of its nation. This ought to be unacceptable to the new leadership in the Congo.

However, to attain this, over time, weak leaders and wrong policies will have to be replaced by those who can consciously lead others with respect; those who have a vision around which a set of development plans can be structured for people to live together.

The study holds that the revolution in leadership and the need to instil a sense of service among Congolese cannot be confined only to those at the top of the Congo leadership. However, the researcher agrees with Maathai (2009: 19) when she claims that

even the poorest and least empowered of Africa's citizens need to rid themselves of a culture that tolerates systemic corruption and inefficiency, as well as self-destructive tendencies and selfishness. They must grasp the available opportunities and not wait for someone else magically to make development happen for them; and they must realize that, no matter how meagre their capacities and resources, they have the means to protect what is theirs.

Congolese peoples, from all walks of life, need to hold politicians and themselves accountable. They must value long-term sustainability over short-term gain and instant gratification, and plan wisely for an uncertain future, rather than settle for an expedient present. Everyone should feed, nurture, and love the Congo so she can thrive and provide. Congolese leaders must wait for the international community to provide financial help and aid before doing the right thing. Half a century after independence, it is incumbent upon the Congolese government to work for the good of its people without the need of external forces. Too often, the Congo is still presented as a helpless victim of its own making.

The Congolese government must ask itself what policies it can adopt and what commitments it can make so that the images of Congolese people can express a new

reality: one not riddled by malnutrition and street children addicted to drugs, but that of healthy, hardworking students and intact families.

As it has been demonstrated, poor countries like the Congo are impoverished because their leaders make choices that create poverty. They get it wrong, not by mistake or ignorance, but on purpose, using bad faith to enrich themselves than to serve the people of Congo.

Where does this lead us? To nothing short than admitting, making people ashamed of their own existence is like annihilating them. According to Sartre, the solution to this is instead,

teaching them to become aware of the potentials they have forbidden themselves, of the passivity they have paraded in just those situations in which what is needed is to hold oneself, like a sliver, to the heart of the world, to interrupt if necessary the rhythm of the world, to upset, if necessary, the chain of command, but in any case, and most assuredly, to stand up to the world.(Fanon1986: 57)

In other words, the black man or woman should no longer be confronted by the dilemma put to him or her which claim, “turn white or disappear”; they should be able to take the responsibility of his possibilities of existence.

African leaders and Congolese leaders, through bad faith, fail to improve their people’s lives, and not only their people get further left behind, but the country could face further hardships and even widespread disaster. As this study comes to an end, choices Africans and Congolese can make to change their situation have been clearly identified and interpreted; therefore if the attitude of bad faith can be avoided, the hope of the development in Africa in general and in the DRC in particular is possible.

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