# THE INNER WORKINGS AND LOGICS OF INTERSECTIONALITY: AN ANALYSIS OF GENDERED (IN)SECURITY IN RWANDA

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# DECLARATION

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# ABSTRACT

Resisting a single-axis framework and adopting intersectionality in gendered security research and practice ensures that more inclusive and holistic security, and thus sustainable peace, is achieved in post-conflict societies. Yet, the way in which intersectionality is used in research and policy-making determines different outcomes that either take us further away or closer to that goal. The aim of this study is to explore how gender intersects with other systems of oppression to create experiences of gendered (in)security in Rwandan communities. My research suggests that the failure to cultivate a thorough understanding of intersectionality in gender security practice results in gender-based violence (GBV), gender discrimination and gender hierarchies, all of which threaten the sustainability of peace in the post-conflict era.

The key objective of my study is to critically evaluate the value of analysing the inner workings of intersectionality for the Rwandan context, gendered security research and practice, and Women, Peace and Security (WPS) work. The inner workings of intersectionality refer to the modes, dynamics, contestations and strategies that surround the concept. I use three logics to explore the inner workings of intersectionality. These are the logics of domination, addition, and interdependence. The logics are used in combination to cultivate a holistic understanding of intersectionality. I use a deconstructive discourse analysis to reveal how the different logics, and indeed the inner workings themselves, are (re)produced and the effects that the logics have, and have had, on gendered security in Rwanda. My conceptual exploration of the inner workings of intersectionality draws from examples in colonial, post-colonial and post-genocide Rwanda. I use a multi-level analysis, focussing on the everyday experiences of marginalised women, whose social location lies at the intersection of multiple systems of oppression, while also paying attention to larger structural power differentials that are filtered through the global economy and global security. My study shows that there is a link between the utilisation of intersectionality according to the logics and gendered (in)security.

Rwanda is a useful case study for the analysis of intersectionality because the history of Hutu/Tutsi political violence lends itself to an intersectional analysis. In addition, despite Rwanda's robust gender equality and gender security policy and legal frameworks, gendered insecurities, such as persistently high rates of GBV, continue to threaten the sustainability of peace in the post-genocide era. My analysis reveals how intersections have generated complex experiences of violence in Rwanda's past; how the misappropriation of intersectional thinking can lead to the creation of gendered (in)security silences, which allows gender discrimination to thrive and threaten peace in the contemporary moment; and how positive intersections can be cultivated through community forums for generating positive peace and gender justice at a local level.

**Key words:** intersectionality, gender security, WPS, postcolonial feminisms, decolonial feminisms, African feminisms, Rwanda, discourse, Feminist Security Studies, feminist International Relations.

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| | |
|---|---|
| ACLED | Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project |
| APSA | African Peace and Security Architecture |
| AU | African Union |
| AVEGA | Association of the Widows |
| CARE | Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere |
| CDR | Coalition for the Defence of the Republic |
| CEDAW | The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women |
| CRF | Continental Results Framework |
| DDR | Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration |
| DHS | Demographic and Health Survey |
| DRC | Democratic Republic of the Congo |
| ECOSOC | Economic and Social Council |
| ECOWAS | Economic Community of West African States |
| FAR | Rwanda Armed Forces |
| FemWise-Africa | African Network of Female Mediators |
| FFRP | Forum of Rwandan Women Parliamentarians |
| FSS | Feminist Security Studies |
| GBV | Gender-based violence |
| GMO | Gender Monitoring Office |
| GNU | Government of National Unity |
| GoR | Government of Rwanda |
| IDP | Internally displaced person |
| IPV | Intimate partner violence |
| IR | International Relations |
| LGBTQIA | Lesbian, gay, transgender, queer, intersex and asexual |
| MAJ | Access to Justice Office |
| MIGEPROF | Ministry of Gender and Family Promotion |
| MINALOC | Ministry of Local Government |
| MOH | Ministry of Health |

| | |
|---|---|
| MRND | National Revolutionary Movement for Development |
| NAP | National Action Plan |
| NATO | North Atlantic Treaty Organisation |
| NGO | Non-Governmental Organisation |
| NPPA | National Public Prosecuting Authority |
| NRA | National Resistance Army |
| NWC | National Women's Council |
| PARMEHUTU | Party of the Hutu Emancipation Movement |
| PFTH | Pro-Femmes/Twese Hamwe |
| RDF | Rwanda Defence Force |
| RNP | Rwandan National Police |
| RPA | Rwandan Patriotic Army |
| RPF | Rwandan Patriotic Front |
| RWAMREC | Rwandan Men's Resource Centre |
| SADC | Southern African Development Community |
| SGBV | Sexual and gender-based violence |
| STIWA | Social Transformation Including Women in Africa |
| UN | United Nations |
| UNAMID | African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur |
| UNAR | Rwandan National Union Party |
| UNSC | United Nations Security Council |
| UNSCR | United Nations Security Council Resolution |
| UwA | *Umugoroba w'ababyei* or Parents' Evening forum |
| VUP | Vision *Umurenge* Programme |
| WILPF | Women's International League for Peace and Freedom |
| WPS | Women, Peace and Security |

## GLOSSARY OF FOREIGN TERMS AND PHRASES

| | |
|---|---|
| *Abagore ntibafite ubwoko* | Wives have no identity |
| *Agahazo* | To dry one's tears |
| *Bandebereho* | Role model |
| *Banyarwanda* | Rwandese |
| *Femme libre* | A derogatory term used to refer to sex workers, as well as non-traditional, 'modern' and independent women |
| *Foyers Sociaux* | Colonial finishing schools |
| *Génocidaires* | The proponents of genocidal Hutu extremism |
| *Girinka* | Pre-colonial practice of gifting cows/Rwandan rural development programme |
| *Gucipira* | The social process through which a poor Tutsi became Hutu |
| *Ibikingi/Igikingi* | Land grants/grant |
| *Icyihuture* | The social process through which a Hutu man acquired cattle and became Tutsi |
| *Inganzwa* | Derogatory term for a man who always says yes to his wife |
| *Ingorora muco* | Rural detention centres |
| *Inshuti z'Umuryango* | Friends of Family |
| *Interahamwe* | Militias that executed the Rwandan genocide |
| *Inyezi* | Directly translated this means cockroaches, the word was used to refer to Tutsi insurgents post-1959 |
| *Inzu* | The family or 'house' |
| *Isange* | To feel at home |
| *Kwihutura* | The social process in which a prosperous Hutu became Tutsi |
| *Maniko* | Agents of the Second Republic's public morality campaign |
| *Mwami* | King |
| *Ndi umuyarwanda* | I am Rwandan |
| *Nta mugabo umwe* | None can live as an island |
| *Petits Tutsi* | Peasant Tutsi in the pre-colonial era |
| *Siyakwamukela* | You are welcome |
| *Turi abayarwanda* | We are Rwandan |

| | |
|---|---|
| *Ubudehe* | Socio-economic classification system for Rwandan social protection programmes |
| *Ubureetwa* | Hutu forced labour |
| *Ubwoko* | The clan |
| *Umudugudu* | Village (the lowest administrative unit of the Rwandan government) |
| *Umugabekazi* | Queen mother |
| *Umuganda* | Communal work |
| *Umugoraba w'ababyei* | Parents' Evening forum |
| *Umuryango* | The extended family or lineage |
| *Wamlekile ekhaya* | You are welcome |

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# CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

## 1.1 GENERAL OVERVIEW

With the end of the Cold War and the apparent shift from inter-state to intra-state warfare, came a growing awareness of the empirical and analytical shortcomings of traditional approaches to security (Hendricks, 2011: 6). Security came to mean more than what could be narrowly defined by state-centric conceptualisations and scholars began to question “what (or who) is to be secured, from what threats, and by what means” (Blanchard, 2003: 1291). The ‘deepening’ of the security concept calls for research, policy and practice to centre on the experiences, actions and needs of ordinary people in war and in peace (Buzan and Hansen, 2009: 189; Parashar, 2013: 619). A perspective that pivots from the experiences of the everyday ensures that more inclusive security is achieved, as it exposes the ways in which security discourses benefit particular people and are detrimental to others, particularly when they influence the policy-making process.

Feminist contributions to International Relations (IR) took this expansionary project further by exposing the ways in which the study of security and global politics are gendered (Tickner 1992: 6; Shepherd, 2007: 250). Feminist scholars use gender lenses to reimagine security practice and processes and to transform gendered hierarchies. Wibben emphasises that feminist research is a “political project committed to emancipation/empowerment and broader social justice” (Wibben, 2011: 591). These scholars have explored various themes, such as women on the margins of international affairs, women’s roles in war as soldiers and combatants, and women’s role as peacemakers, peacekeepers and peacebuilders (Hendricks, 2012: 13). Critical-feminist scholars have highlighted the empirical and analytical value of adopting an intersectional perspective in research. These scholars argue that employing a single-axis framework limits the emancipatory potential of gendered security processes (Kappler and Lemay-Hébert, 2019: 161; Wibben, 2016: 146). Despite abundant research, we still have much to learn about intersectionality and its application in gender/ed security policy and practice.[1]

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[1] While gender refers to the identity category (a state of being), gendered refers to the social process (the action of doing). In my study, I use the terms interchangeably.

The notion of understanding the interconnection of gender with other systems of power is informed by Black feminist thought, and in particular Kimberle Crenshaw's (1989, 1991) concept of intersectionality. Crenshaw (1989: 140) coined 'intersectionality' to describe Black women's experience of antidiscrimination law in the United States. She shows that antidiscrimination law relies on essentialised categories of identity, which are defined according to the normative experiences of privileged groups (Crenshaw, 1989: 149). Crenshaw (1989: 152) argues that Black women's experiences of discrimination were not adequately represented by the legal terminology of the time, as that terminology was defined according to the experiences of Black men (in the case of racial discrimination) and white women (in the case of sexual discrimination). Crenshaw (1991: 1244) suggests that the intersecting nature of race and gender-based oppression needs to be considered to begin creating new interpretations and understandings of the needs and experiences of Black women in the United States.

In the three decades since its inception, intersectionality has gained "axiomatic status" in feminist theory and women's studies (Carastathis, 2016: 25) and it has been described as the "most important contribution" of the discipline (McCall, 2005: 1771). In feminist research, intersectionality has been used by scholars to explore the impact of intersecting identities on transitional justice (Rooney, 2007: 174); the efficacy of gender mainstreaming in peacebuilding policy and practice (Kappler and Lemay-Hébert, 2019: 161); the value of a multilevel structural analysis (Yuval-Davis, 2006: 196); and the representational limitations of liberal-feminist gender policy frameworks and international instruments (Chan-Tiberghein, 2004: 464).

Part of the success of intersectionality can be attributed to scholars' thorough engagement with the concept. These range from critiques of the "mainstreaming" of intersectionality (Dhamoon, 2011: 230), to its "institutionalisation" (Nash, 2011: 13), its "depoliticization" (Bilge, 2013: 405) and its "colonisation" by non-Black-feminist deployments (Alexander-Floyd, 2012: 19). Nevertheless, intersectionality has been stretched thin and flattened-out, as feminist analyses and studies have decontextualised the concept by removing it from its original location and purpose (Henry, 2017: 4). I seek to follow in the footsteps of Anna Carastathis (2016) and return to Crenshaw's original use of the concept, while keeping in mind the broader postulations of Intersectionality Studies. Intersectionality will act as a springboard for my critical analysis of gender (in)security in Rwanda.

My study focusses on past, current and recent manifestations of intersectionality in the context of gender (in)security in Rwanda. My analysis is concerned with gender (in)security in Rwanda leading up to the civil war, during and after the genocide, and since the adoption of the new Constitution in 2003 to the present day.

## 1.2 RATIONALE

The first reason for the significance of the study is empirical in nature. I have chosen Rwanda as my case study because the history of the genocide, its gender and ethnic dimensions, and its aftermath lends itself to be explained through an intersectional lens, which can provide insight into how not to use intersectionality and what has and could happen when intersectionality is used in different ways.

In a timespan of approximately 100 days, the Rwandan genocide resulted in roughly 500 000 to 800 000 dead Tutsi and politically moderate Hutu (Guariso, Ingelaere and Verpoorten, 2017: 4; Russell *et al.*, 2016: 724). Although men were more likely to be killed than women, women were more likely to be targeted for rape and sexual violence than men (Sharlach, 1999: 90). Thus, during the genocide, it was estimated that between 250 000 and 450 000 women were raped (Tobin, 2012: 28). Sexual violence (in the form of rape, gang rape, rape with objects, sexual slavery, the forced transmission of HIV/AIDs and sexual mutilation) became an instrument of genocide (Jones, 2002: 81-82; Skjelsbæk, 2001: 213; Burnet, 2012: 108). It follows that sexual violence was used not only to inflict humiliation and terror in individual women, but it was also used to denigrate and breakdown the Tutsi group (Jones, 2002: 82; Burnet, 2012: 108; Weitsman, 2008: 565; Russell *et al.*, 2016: 723).

The gendered nature of the Rwandan genocide and civil war resulted in gender-specific social, economic and political difficulties in the wake of transition (Finnoff, 2010: 11; Jones, 2002: 85). Following the genocide, Wallace, Haerpfer and Abbott (2008: 113) write that the Rwandan population was approximately 70% female; yet, in surviving, women had to bear the brunt of the genocide’s effects, including dealing with their own personal traumas and experiences, a shifted social landscape, stigma and discrimination, as well as the burden of disease – as by 2001, "67% of genocide rape survivors were reportedly HIV-positive" (Kubai and Ahlberg, 2013: 470). Thousands of women were widowed, and thousands of children were orphaned (Kubai and Ahlberg, 2013: 470). Women were left to fill the places in society usually reserved for adult men, as they became heads of households, community leaders, economic providers and major political actors (Sharlach, 1999: 91).

Therefore, the Government of National Unity (GNU), informed by the strength of on-the-ground women's movements during the conflict, ensured that women were included in political decision-making at all levels during the country's democratic transition (Burnet, 2011: 15; Guariso *et al.*, 2017: 5; Hogg, 2009: 35). Women's specific security concerns are reflected in the policies, laws and political machinery of the new Rwandan state. Rwanda has been praised for the implementation of its gendered security framework (Berry, 2015: 2).

Despite this, the country still experiences high rates of gender-based violence (GBV) and intimate partner violence (IPV) (Stern and Carlson, 2019: 4). According to the 2014/2015 Rwandan Demographic and Health Survey (DHS), an estimated 20.7% of women aged between 15 and 49 in the general population had experienced physical or sexual violence at the hands of their husband or an intimate partner in the past 12 months; and 40% of married women reported that their husband had committed one or more of the four forms of IPV, namely, physical, sexual, emotional or economic abuse, against them (Stern and Carlson, 2019: 1-3). This implies that gender insecurity has not been sufficiently addressed, as a continuum of violence remains constant across Rwandan gender relations.

Scholars have pointed out two ruptures in Rwanda's gender policy framework that could contribute to this problem. The first is that in 2003, the Government of Rwanda (GoR) replaced all ethnic identities with the collective national identity of the *Banyarwanda* (Pruitt, 2017: 276; Hintjens, 2008: 10; Zorbas, 2004: 43). It became a crime to refer to ethnicity outside of the context of genocide, where ethnicity could only be used to refer to the Tutsi as survivors. Thus, the interlocking nature of gender and ethnicity is not represented in the gender policy framework of the Rwandan state. This suggests that there is a correlation between the persistence of gender insecurity in the country and the erasure of the gender/ethnicity intersection from the GoR's public discourse (Hudson, 2009: 268).

The second is the GoR's implementation of a liberal-feminist approach to peacebuilding. This approach uses broad categories of identity without acknowledging the operation of power relations between those categories, and within those categories (Hudson, 2009: 258). All 'women' are assumed to have the same security needs and experiences. And so, the intersections of multiple systems of oppression are not recognised and the interests of some are privileged while the experiences of others are marginalised. Debusscher and Ansoms write that the "lack of inclusion of non-elite voices" in Rwanda's gender-policy framework is "detrimental to women's empowerment" and "diminishes the relevance of policies" (Debusscher and Ansoms, 2013: 1113). The danger of this is that these security silences can contribute toward the destabilisation of sustainable peace in Rwanda, as they allow the continuum of violence to persist. Therefore, through the lens of the Rwandan case study, I intend to show how complex intersections manifest and impact on women's security.

The second reason for embarking on this study has to do with the fact that the 'how' of intersectionality is under-researched. Despite the scholarship on intersectionality that I mentioned in the introduction, gaps in intersectionality research remain. My study will identify one of these gaps, which is concerned with *how* systems of oppression intersect to create contextual experiences of gender insecurity. My research intends to show that part of why this question has remained unasked and unanswered is because the inner workings of intersectionality have been neglected by the open-ended utilisation of the concept. The open-ended application of intersectionality is when the concept is used to describe the intersections of privileged identities. When intersectionality is used in this way, the concept becomes disconnected from its original purpose of unveiling the experiences of marginalised identities, which minimises its critical potential.

In response to this, my study takes a 'back to basics' approach, as I explore the inner workings of intersectionality. Hudson (2012: 456) uses the term "inner workings" to explore the tensions that arise between representation and protection as two norms in gendered liberal peacebuilding. The term suggests that the subject of interest is enveloped by something else, which implies that it is then, in different ways, concealed and disguised. In the same way, if the inner workings of intersectionality are not externally discernible, the concept can be misunderstood and misused. For this reason, my study is geared toward excavating the inner workings of intersectionality, so that I can reveal not only how multiple systems of oppression intersect, but also the ways in which the interiorities of intersectionality have been left behind.

The inner workings refer to Crenshaw's (1989, 1991) original ideas, the feminist work that has emanated from those ideas, the contesting discourses that inform and surround that work, and the dialectical relationship between those discourses and the social/political world.[2] The inner workings are (re)produced across multiple levels according to different goals through different strategies. These strategies unfold according to particular patterns or logics. My understanding of 'logic' is informed by Laura Shepherd's (2008a) use of the concept. Shepherd (2008a: 294) refers to "logics of security", which she frames as the organisation of concepts within specific discourses of security. In my study, I identify three logics, namely the logics of domination, addition and interdependence (to be discussed later in Chapter two, section 2.5.3). My study will show that there is a link between the utilisation of intersectionality according to the different logics and gender insecurity in Rwanda. I argue that the failure to understand how intersectionality operates, results in violence and conflict, and in turn, limits the potential of policy to create sustainable peace.

And thirdly, following from this gap in the research that I want to address, I also make use of decolonial, postcolonial and African-feminist perspectives to propose an alternative way of looking at intersectionality. The alternative perspectives are significant because they work from the vantage point of the marginalised. My study will consider how the experiences of marginalised Rwandan women have been silenced by the liberal-feminist peacebuilding policy and practice of the GoR. I intend to show that the failure to consider the entanglement of multiple identities and power relations results in gender (in)security silences, which in turn, contribute toward the latent conflict potential of a society (Hudson, 2009: 259). Therefore, through an analysis of the inner workings of intersectionality according to the three logics, my study aims to provide insight into how multiple systems of oppression intersect to create experiences of physical and structural violence which impact the sustainability of peace.

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[2] I understand discourse to be the process through which symbolic phenomena are produced and shaped through social practice. I therefore define discourses according to their relationship with society (Shepherd, 2008a: 297; Hudson, 2012: 444). I expand on this definition of discourses and the inner workings and logics of intersectionality in Chapter two, section 2.5.3.

Feminist Security Studies (FSS) and Women, Peace and Security (WPS) literature use intersectionality as a tool for identifying the (in)security silences of marginalised individuals and communities, but feminist scholars do not offer insight into *how* these silences are produced through the intersection of multiple systems of oppression. While using Rwanda as my case study and relying on examples from the field, my research will explore the 'how' of this question where the logics will show that the different uses and understandings of intersectionality can either minimise or heighten Rwanda's latent conflict potential. The contribution of my study therefore lies in its conceptual exploration of the 'how' of intersectionality and the potential of using those insights to create sustainable peace in post-conflict communities.

## 1.3 PROBLEM STATEMENT

If the operation of intersectional systems of oppression is recognised in research and policy-making, it is then more likely that holistic security and thus sustainable peace is achieved in post-conflict communities such as Rwanda. Yet, the way in which intersectionality is used in research and policy-making will determine different outcomes that either take us further away or closer to that goal.

Liberal-feminist frameworks for peacebuilding treat identities as static and compoundable categories and they do not recognise the operation of power relations between those categories or within those categories. This results in the essentialisation of gender identities. Essentialised identities, such as 'men' or 'women', then represent the security interests and needs of privileged bodies and silences the security interests and needs of marginalised bodies. The material consequence of this is that funding and programmes are then directed toward the security of privileged groups before others, as the security needs of those who are marginalised are silenced.

In addition, this perspective sees the interlocking of oppressions as additive, where heavier burdens of oppression can be lightened by taking away other oppressions from the load. This is why liberal-feminist frameworks assume that putting women in places of economic and political power will create greater respect and security for women in societies. Yet, the danger of this approach is that it inevitably prioritises one oppression as the 'main load', such as gender, and misrecognises and silences the operations of the other oppressions that intersect with gender.[3] This creates new opportunities for violence and allows sustained practices of violence to continue, which collectively contribute toward the latent conflict potential of a society.

Intersectionality has also been used by FSS researchers to highlight the security silences of marginalised individuals and communities (Braun, 2011; Kappler and Lemay-Hébert, 2019; Lewis, 2013; Caplan, 2010). Yet, these researchers often do not offer a clear understanding of *how* intersectionality operates to create these experiences of insecurity, and nor do they offer a way of using intersectionality to create positive community relations for peacebuilding.

My research will explore this gap in the FSS and WPS literature through an analysis of the inner workings of intersectionality with reference to examples from the field in Rwanda. It is my contention that a thorough understanding of the inner workings of intersectionality will provide insight into *how* gender (in)security silences are created, *how* multiple systems of oppression intersect to create experiences of gender insecurity and *how* a positive form of intersectionality can be used to foster community-centred peacebuilding.

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[3] I expand on this in Chapter four, section 4.4.1. There are two levels to this approach, one where women are equated with men and another where the experiences of some women are equated with all women.

## 1.4 AIM AND OBJECTIVES

The aim of my study is to reveal the inner workings (the ‘how’) of intersectionality through a deconstructive discourse analysis to understand how gender intersects with other systems of oppression, and how this process creates experiences of gender insecurity in Rwandan communities. My study aims to do so by taking a ‘back to basics’ approach, which focusses on using intersectionality for the purpose of revealing the experiences of marginalised bodies and voices. My research also aims to study the potential of using a positive intersectionality concept informed by an African-feminist and decolonial/postcolonial perspective to create community-centred peacebuilding practices that contribute toward gendered security in marginalised communities. The aim is to contribute in this way towards strengthening the emancipatory potential of the concept.

More specifically the objectives are to:

- Discuss and outline the key tenets of the theoretical framework, drawn from FSS, WPS as well as postcolonial and African-feminist work (Chapter two);
- Critically analyse the theoretical as well as practical/empirical manifestations and implications of intersectionality used as a form or logic of othering and domination during the Rwandan genocide (Chapter three);
- Critically analyse the theoretical as well as practical/empirical manifestations and implications of intersectionality used as a form or logic of addition with a focus on Rwanda after the genocide (Chapter four);
- Critically analyse the theoretical as well as practical/empirical manifestations and implications of intersectionality used as a form or logic of interdependence with a focus on a peaceful future for Rwanda founded on the principles of an African-feminist and Ubuntu worldview (Chapter five); and
- Critically evaluate the lessons and insights gleaned from this analysis of the inner workings of intersectionality for both the Rwandan context as well for security in general (Chapter six).

The research questions flowing from these objectives are as follows:

- What are the main concepts and key tenets of the theoretical work in FSS, WPS, postcolonial-feminist and African-feminist literature? (Chapter two)
- How has intersectionality been used in FSS research? (Chapter two)
- What are the practical/empirical implications of using intersectionality as a logic of domination? (Chapter three)
- Has the historical intersection between ethnicity and gender contributed toward insecurity in Rwanda? (Chapter three)
- How do multiple systems of oppression intersect? (Chapter three)
- What are the practical/empirical implications of using intersectionality according to a liberal-feminist logic of addition? (Chapter four)
- Why does using intersectionality as a logic of addition create (in)security silences? (Chapter four)
- What are the theoretical and practical/empirical implications of using intersectionality as a logic of interdependence? (Chapter five)
- Can postcolonial and African-feminist worldviews be used to theorise a positive intersectionality? (Chapter five)
- Can a positive intersectionality be used to create a peaceful future for Rwanda? (Chapter five)
- What broader insights for security can be gleaned from my analysis of the gendered inner workings of intersectionality? (Chapter six)

## 1.5 METHODOLOGY AND ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS

### 1.5.1 Methodological considerations

My approach to the methodology of my study is qualitative in nature, which involves collecting non-numerical data to understand concepts, opinions and experiences. Denzin and Lincoln (2011: 4) state that qualitative research is used to explore the nature of a problem. As indicated above, there is a gap in the literature around understanding how the intersections of multiple systems of oppression occur, which limits insight into how their entanglement creates complex experiences of violence and therefore insecurity. My research will explore this gap by analysing the inner workings of intersectionality according to the three logics of security.

Boru (2018: 2) suggests that explanatory research asks ‘why’ and ‘how’ questions with the intention of identifying the causes and reasons for phenomena and to discover and report on different correlations, relationships and aspects of those phenomena. My study is then classified as explanatory research in a qualitative sense, as it seeks to account for and identify why gender relations remain a source of insecurity for Rwandan women, despite the GoR’s robust policy framework and machinery. Yet, my research is also descriptive-analytical. This is because it describes the inner workings of intersectionality in order to identify and obtain information and characteristics for the analysis of the correlations between intersecting phenomena and insecurity.

I will be using Rwanda as my case study for my analysis. Crowe *et al*. suggest that a “case study is a research approach that is used to generate an in-depth, multi-faceted understanding of a complex issue in its real-life context” (Crowe *et al*., 2011: 1). The Rwandan case study is not intended to be representative, but rather illustrative. My study is a desktop study through literature review. Data collection will be done through engaging with several bodies of literature, which include FSS and the WPS scholarship, Black feminism and the literature on intersectionality perspectives, and decolonial/postcolonial and African feminisms. The literature review includes primary sources, such as the GoR’s policy documents and the Ministry of Gender and Family Promotion (MIGEPROF) and the Gender Monitoring Office’s (GMO) annual gender reports, the Rwandan DHS 2014/2015, the 2009 and 2018 Rwandan National Action Plans (NAPs), and the studies and reports on the Rwandan

Men's Resource Centre's (RWAMREC) *Bandebereho* Couples Intervention and the GoR's *Umugoroba w'ababyei* (UwA) or, in English, the Parents' Evening forum; as well as scholarly articles from academic journals, books and previous studies done on gender insecurity in Rwanda and Southern Africa.

As it is based in conceptual analysis my study does not require fieldwork, but my study will use examples from the field. These examples will be illustrative, as they will provide a more detailed analysis of the nature of gender (in)security in Rwanda (Biba Starman, 2013: 34). The examples will therefore function in a supportive role, by providing understanding of the topic at hand through contextualisation.

In terms of analysis, I will use a deconstructive discourse analysis to reveal the different logics of intersectionality. There are two underlying processes that inform my analysis. The first involves a critical methodology of reading, which refers to the process of reading texts with the intention of identifying the different embedded gendered meanings and reflecting on how those meanings determine what/who is included and what/who is excluded from the text (Ackerly and True, 2019: 18). Macleod suggests that deconstructive discourse analysis involves "undermining the revelation of essence, de-stabilising meaning as presence, and disrupting dominant, taken-for granted notions of a subject" (Macleod, 2002: 8). I consider the discourses themselves, as well as the conditions that make their emergence possible. My focus is therefore on the social/power effects of discourse. My deconstructive approach is informed by the critical anti-colonial positions of decolonial/postcolonial and African feminisms.

The second process involves a methodology of text selection, where I decide which forms of text should be included in my analysis (Ackerly and True, 2019: 18). I will critically analyse the GoR's *National Policy against Gender-Based Violence* (2011), the *Revised National Gender Policy* (2021) and the NAPs (2009, 2018) for the implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325. I have chosen these texts as they are the main vehicles through which WPS norms, ideas and policy prescriptions have been localised in the Rwandan context. Following the critical discourse methodology of Madsen and Hudson, my research takes on the perspective that "language forms the entry point for understanding both the physical and social world of gendered peace and security" (Madsen and Hudson, 2020: 6). Thus, my reading of the language used in these policy documents will look for the organisation of the security concepts according to the three logics. I will be critically reading these policy documents "against the grain – that is, contrary to their ostensible logic to expose taken for granted usage of these concepts" (Hudson, 2017: 12). This critical discourse approach will give insight into the connections linking the logics of intersectionality, violence, insecurity and sustainable peace.

This process also extends to the larger field of debate, as well as the dynamics of the field, that surround gendered security, such as FSS and WPS scholarship and the feminist work that focusses on gendered security in Africa and in Rwanda in particular. It is important that I acknowledge the various schools of thought in the study of Rwanda. The negative school tends to focus on the repressive and dictatorial aspects of the post-genocide Rwandan regime, whereas the positive school tends to highlight the successes of the RPF-led government. My study relies on the empirical research of scholars from both schools – thus, I use both positive and negative examples from the field to illustrate the logics and inner workings in action.

### 1.5.2 Ethical considerations

Madushani (2016: 27) states that complex problems emerge from research in the social sciences, thus it is the researcher's responsibility to be morally transparent so that the research process and findings are reliable. Ethical considerations are therefore important when conducting research and gathering information (Edwards and Mauthner, 2002: 16). Feminist research ethics require the researcher to be attentive to the power of knowledge and epistemology, to recognise boundaries, marginalisation and silences, and lastly, to acknowledge their power differentials and situatedness (Ackerly, Stern and True, 2006: 5).

Feminist work is both a political and intellectual enterprise. This is because the feminist enterprise looks to destabilise the epistemology that has historically marginalised the experiences of women and other oppressed groups from dominant discipline cannons. Accordingly, Mama (2011: 7) suggests that African-feminist research is defined by the politics of critical engagement, which requires reflection and deepened understanding. Thus, feminist perspectives require the researcher to re-evaluate “their epistemological choices, boundaries and relationships throughout the research process (Ackerly and True, 2008: 705). The feminist enterprise, therefore, reveals the politics of the research process through a commitment to investigate “absence, silence, difference, oppression and the power of epistemology” (Ackerly and True, 2008: 694). I will adopt a critical perspective in my study that is informed by decolonial/postcolonial and African feminisms. This perspective asks me to interrogate the silences and limitations in my research, and to authorise the experiences of the marginalised.

Mama (2011: 5) suggests that African-feminist scholarship is globally informed, but also locally grounded. Thus, feminist work challenges the researcher to see and understand the world from the eyes and experiences of oppressed groups of women. The researcher must articulate previously unavailable narratives. This perspective informs the application of knowledge to bring about social change (Brooks, 2007: 56). As such, the concrete lived experiences of oppressed women provide the starting point for building feminist knowledge. This knowledge can then inform activists on how to resist women’s oppression and on how to implement solutions to overcome oppression. In this regard, my study will use examples from the field in Rwanda to contextualise and illustrate my conceptual analysis. It is important, however, that I acknowledge the limitations of my study in this respect, as without primary resources derived from my own research in the field, the insights that I can glean from my analysis are limited. In turn, while I draw from the fieldwork of others, this limitation has an impact on the recursive process of grounding the theorisation of the logics and inner workings in empirical contexts (Ackerly *et al.*, 2021: 3).

The situatedness of the researcher refers to what Haraway (1988: 581) calls “embodied objectivity”. The situatedness of the feminist researcher will inform his/her perspective in research, thus positive notions of objectivity are impossible to maintain. It is therefore necessary for the researcher to consider his/her positionality throughout the research process. My position is informed by a critical-feminist normative view of gender justice, and I declare this bias accordingly. A critical-feminist research encourages new lines of inquiry and moves beyond filling the gaps in established feminist terrains (Ackerly and True, 2019: 2). This position will inform my research decisions by guiding me to be attentive to the insights, experiences and interests of African women facing the violent legacies of colonialism, cultural imperialism, the global economy and epistemic power dynamics. In addition, as I will not be conducting fieldwork in Rwanda, my study is situated within social, cultural, economic and political processes of globalisation. Throughout my study I will commit to being reflective on the power relations, limitations and hierarchies that are produced through this nexus.

Finally, Vilma (2018: 25) asserts that a researcher must have respect for intellectual property and therefore must not plagiarise. To this end, I will acknowledge the work of other authors used throughout my study through the Harvard referencing method. I provide both in-text references and a reference list.

My study is a desktop study through literature review and will only be using information that is available in the public domain. Since I will not engage directly with human participants, my study does not pose any harm or risk to anyone and therefore does not violate any ethics.

### 1.6 CHAPTER LAYOUT

The research will be broken down into five chapters. Chapter two will sketch out the theoretical framework for my study. This chapter will outline the different concepts and theoretical tenets of FSS, WPS, and decolonial/postcolonial and African-feminist work. In this chapter, I will also outline my definition of the inner workings and logics of intersectionality. Chapter three will deal with the logics of domination through an analysis of the intersection between gender and ethnicity in Rwandan history. Chapter four will analyse the logics of addition in Rwandan gender policy documents as a liberal-feminist discourse and the (in)security silences that are produced through this approach. Chapter five will focus on the logics of interdependence and the potential of using a postcolonial African-feminist perspective for the development of a positive intersectionality concept. Lastly, Chapter six will be the conclusion. This chapter will provide a summary of the research and consider the insights gained from the analysis of the inner workings of intersectionality for gendered security in general.

# CHAPTER TWO: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

## 2.1 GENERAL OVERVIEW

The objective of this chapter is to discuss and outline the key tenets of the theoretical framework for this study, drawn from FSS, WPS as well as decolonial, postcolonial and African-feminist work. A theoretical framework is the broad “structure, scaffolding or frame” of a study (Merriam, 2009: 66). It includes the theories, terms, concepts, models and thoughts that are relevant to the study (Merriam and Tisdell, 2016: 88). Theories are broad ideas that organise many other ideas into an interpretative web, through which scholars look to understand, predict or explain natural or social behaviour, events and phenomena (Collins and Stockton, 2018: 5). The aim of theory in IR is “to offer a normative framework that can help make sense of global events” (Parashar, 2013: 624). IR theories are not homogenous, as scholars adopt dissimilar conceptual and intellectual criteria for the analysis of global affairs (Baylis, Smith and Owens, 2020: 8). Consequently, theories in IR are differentiated according to different values and assumptions about how to appropriately research the nature of world politics (Olivier, Neethling and Vrëy, 2015: 41). My research questions for this chapter are: ‘What are the main concepts and key tenets of the theoretical work in FSS, WPS, postcolonial-feminist and African-feminist literature?’ and ‘How has intersectionality been used in FSS research?’

Smith (1997: 167) divides IR theories into two broad theoretical points of view: explanatory/rationalist theories and constitutive/reflectivist theories. Explanatory theories set out to observe the world from an objective point of view (Ish-Shalom, 2006: 287). These theories endeavour to produce knowledge that is free of human bias (Baylis *et al.*, 2020: 8; Shepherd, 2010: 3). Explanatory theories fall into the ‘rationalist’ mainstream of IR – comprised of what Smith (2000: 376) calls the “neo-neo synthesis”[4] and to a lesser extent social constructivism. In contrast, constitutive theories see theorising as “a way of life, a form of life, something we all do, every day, all the time” (Zalewski, 1996: 346). From this perspective, theory is not external to the world it tries to explain or solve, as it is grounded in how we perceive the world we live in and our responses to it (Abend, 2008: 179). Our responses affect the phenomena we choose to study – this is what makes theory constitutive (Shepherd, 2010: 4). Smith (2000: 380) organises the constitutive theories of IR into a collective known as 'reflectivism'. Those who adopt reflectivist IR theories think that our concepts and ideas play a political role in global affairs and that these concepts themselves are actors "in the grand theatre of international relations" (Ish-Shalom, 2006: 287). Reflectivism is made up of a diverse set of approaches that are only united by their opposition to the rationalist IR mainstream (Smith, 2000: 380). Some of these approaches include critical theory, poststructuralism, feminist theory and postcolonial theory.

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[4] Smith argues that debates between neorealism and neoliberalism in the 1980s led to the formation of consensus in the IR mainstream in the 1990s, which he calls the “neo-neo synthesis” (Smith, 2000: 376).

This study is theoretically grounded in the reflectivist tradition. I do not use theory to represent an external truth about gender and security; rather, theory is the optic through which I consider the different ways of seeing and interpreting gender and security. Therefore, in the theoretical framework that follows, I use different reflectivist theories not to 'solve' the "puzzles and conflicts of IR" (Smith, 2004: 511), but to unwrap and understand the viewpoints of the different actors involved.

This chapter will provide a discussion and overview of the disciplinary environment, related concepts and theories relevant to the evolution of the study of security and gender in IR, specifically within the confines of feminist IR and FSS. This framing serves to set the stage for my proposed theoretical framework of the three logics of domination, addition and interdependence. In this chapter, I draw on the various developments of feminist IR to argue for the deepening of the security concept, so that a more inclusive and just security can be achieved. As IR was built through a direct relationship between academic work and policy practice (Singh, 1966: 2), a more comprehensive security concept ensures that social, economic and political material resources are geared toward the provision of security for all. For this reason, inclusive security practices have the potential to maintain a more sustainable peace and, in turn, generate emancipatory outcomes. Subsequently, this chapter is concerned with the role of intersectionality in feminist work, as the concept has been used to encourage a more inclusive approach to security.

In section 2.2, I outline three feminist knowledge projects that broadly encapsulate the contribution of feminist work to IR. In section 2.3, I consider the work of FSS scholars on gender and security, particularly those contributions on sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV).[5] In section 2.4, I explore the institutionalisation of the WPS policy ecosystem internationally and on the African continent, as well as the feminist work that deals with this process. In section 2.5, I sketch out the theoretical framework for my study drawn from critical-feminist perspectives. I use a holistic decolonial and postcolonial-feminist approach, which I situate in African feminisms, to inform my thinking on the inner workings and logics of intersectionality. Finally, in section 2.6, I provide an evaluation of the chapter.

## 2.2 THE CONTRIBUTION OF FEMINIST IR: NOT JUST ADDING WOMEN

In many rationalist IR theories, security is conceptualised in terms of the state, which limits the scope of inquiry to the precepts of 'national security' (Hudson, 1998: 18). National security refers to the protection of the state (through its arsenal of hard and soft powers) from external threats to its sovereignty; be those threats to its territorial integrity, issues surrounding political instability, military and defence arrangements or even economic and financial activities (Shinoda, 2004: 6; Blanchard, 2003: 1289; Hamber *et al.*, 2006: 489). Scholars within the reflectivist tradition have sought to deepen the security concept beyond the context of the state alone so that a more inclusive and just security can be achieved. The 'deepeners' ask the question of whose security is being threatened and support a definition of security that allows for alternative referent objects (Tarry, 1999: 10). This 'turn' focusses on the actions and experiences of ordinary people in and out of conflict and pushes scholars and practitioners to (re)consider what security means beyond the referent object of the nation state (Rothschild, 1995: 55). In this instance, security is a useful tool for realising emancipatory goals.

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[5] The term SGBV broadly covers physical, sexual and psychological violence, and the withholding of resources or access to services, or the threat of such (UN Refugee Agency, 2021: 1). This kind of violence is directed against all persons because of their perceived sexual orientation and/or gender identity. Conflict-related SGBV includes a wide range of acts (such as rape, sexual slavery and honour killings) committed in the home, the wider community and within the state itself. This violence is perpetrated during peacetime as well as during conflict and other periods of crisis (UNSG, 2019: 3).

Feminist IR scholars contribute to the deepening of the security concept. However, unlike other 'deepeners', feminist contributions recognise that the discipline of IR and international politics is gendered. Feminists suggest that when we rely on a universal identity as our unit of analysis, we assume that we all experience our humanity in the same way – rendering class-based, cultural, sexual, racial and gender differences invisible (Hudson, 2005: 157; Hoogensen and Rottem, 2004: 156). Consequently, the precarious, dynamic and varying ways in which identity/humanity can be experienced – particularly through those bodies who fall outside of the prescripts of masculinity – are misrepresented (Hudson, 2018: 48; Gómez and Gasper, 2015: 12; McKay, 2004: 156). Thus, there is a need to consider gender in the production of security.

In this section, I outline the contribution that feminism has made to IR in deepening the concept of security. I will highlight some of the important concepts, ideas and debates that broadly underpin feminist IR. Peterson divides the feminist contribution to IR into three knowledge projects, which she proposes "vary across a continuum of analytical commitments" (Peterson, 2004: 2). Tickner summarises the three knowledge projects as follows:

> First, exposing the extent and effect of masculinist bias; second, attempting to rectify the systematic exclusion of women by adding women to existing frameworks; and third, and by far the most radical and least understood project, reconstructing theory by recognising gender as an analytical and structural category (Tickner, 2010: 10).

I explore these feminist knowledge projects by considering the different work and contributions made by feminist IR scholars. Importantly, Lene Hansen (2010: 19) points out that feminism is not one homogenous bloc of thought; it reflects a wide range of perspectives generating many internal debates concerning how it should be represented. As Diana Thornburn (2000: 8) suggests, "there can never be a truly singular voice of feminist foreign policy simply because of the diversity of views within feminism itself". To this point, the three feminist knowledge projects outlined above take on different shapes and outcomes depending on the feminist position the contribution was written from.

### 2.2.1 Is IR really gender-neutral?

Across a multitude of disciplines, the feminist project begins by revealing the degree and consequences of masculine bias in research, practice and theorising. In this project, the absence of women is probed and the representation of women as 'less-than', in respect to androcentric criteria, is documented (Peterson, 2004: 3). Traditional IR thinks of itself as gender-neutral (Puechguirbal, 2012: 17), even though the discipline was birthed from an almost exclusively masculine point of view (Tickner, 1992: 9; Hendricks, 2011: 6). Judith Butler (1986: 30) suggests that the masculine typically writes about himself in his theories and histories. And, as most of these claims describe a universal human experience, it is then not considered necessary for him to write about his own situation in humanity – he is what is represented as quintessentially human after all. IR does not escape this gendered conceptual limitation, and, as a consequence, it too is nested within a long history of the masculine experience being the primary point of analytical departure (Tickner, 1992: 10; Halliday, 1988: 419; Sjoberg, 2010: 4). Accordingly, IR tends to claim conceptual ubiquity based on it being so-called 'gender-neutral' (Hudson, 2002: 115). Yet in reality, IR's perceived gender-neutrality is in fact a gender-blindness that masks a gender bias, with the masculine posturing as the universalised human norm (Jones, 1996: 405).

The traditional approaches to "malestream" (Youngs, 2004: 76) IR use abstract concepts as their primary units of analysis. The 'state', the 'individual' and the 'international system' are all abstractions that these scholars employ to lay claim to a perspective that they suggest is both universal and objective (Tickner, 1997: 625). They believe that their investigations are free from the boundaries and strains of the domestic and social world because their analyses are conducted within the abstract realm of 'high politics' – the domain of statesmen, diplomats and the military (Narain, 2014: 182). However, feminist scholars have shown that the ways in which these abstractions are described and analysed are in fact profoundly gendered (Tickner, 1992: 7). This is because, every abstraction is constructed in terms of power, autonomy, rationality and self-interest, all of which contribute toward the edifice of hegemonic masculinity. Therefore, in the name of universality, conventional IR approaches rely on a worldview that offers only partial insight into our international reality (Youngs, 2008: 45).

If we can appreciate that IR is gendered, we must also recognise that a discursive practice works to exclude feminised subjectivities from 'the table'. To recognise the subject as gendered is to recognise that there is a contestation of visibility between the hegemonic male Self and the marginal female Other. Hudson (2016: 2) maintains that gender is not only a marker of identity, but it is also a verb, as 'doing gender' is a political act. For this reason, Halliday (1988: 419) reminds us that 'doing gender' is reified in IR by real practices, such as policy instruments, that work to exclude women and other feminised identities from the discursive and public space of IR. That being so, feminist scholars seek to address the 'gender silences' present in the traditional approaches to IR (Enloe, 2004: 4). Dalby (1994: 597) insists that when one concentrates on the taken-for-granted constructions of male-dominated understandings of international politics, the gendered modes of power that maintain the 'malestream' status quo reveal themselves. Not only are women rendered invisible, as the international political issues that women face are also 'silenced'.

### 2.2.2 The value of 'adding' women to existing IR frameworks

The second feminist knowledge project flows from the first, in that it seeks to rectify the systematic omission of women and their experiences by adding them to existing IR frameworks (Peterson, 2004: 3). This knowledge project considers gender silences in research and policy-making to be an empirical problem. IR is a practical discipline – to this end, the assumptions, concepts and theories of IR shape the policy produced by international institutions and non-governmental organisations (NGOs), foreign aid programmes, regional organisations and national governments. If women are not included in these frameworks, then the strategies, initiatives and policies of these institutions do not appreciate the differential impact of global politics on women's lives. That being so, the everyday economic, social and political dimensions of women's insecurity (domestic violence, economic exploitation, disruption of education, access to health care services, pervasive food insecurity, migration and the right to property and inheritance) remain unaddressed (Duncanson, 2019: 111). This has material consequences, since the allocation of financial, institutional and human resources are not directed towards women's specific needs. Gender inequality is then reinforced, as international politics and processes foster the (re)organisation of societies according to male privilege and female domination.

When we do not add women to our analyses, a large proportion of the world's population remains materially insecure through structural economic and social violence. In turn, the everyday insecurity of women's lives reinforces their vulnerability to SGBV (both in and out of conflict) (Hendricks, 2015: 365; True, 2020: 87; Kostovicova, Bojicic-Dzelilovic and Henry, 2020: 258). As such, feminists have argued that a more peaceful world is only possible when women realise their full potential in an environment of equal opportunities (Parashar, 2009: 238).

In her landmark text *Bananas, Beaches and Bases: Making Sense of International Politics*, Cynthia Enloe argues that IR is a landscape peopled only by men and suggests that it is the responsibility of feminist work to ask, "where are the women?" (Enloe, 2014: xiv). Enloe (2014: 4) identifies the invisible role that women play in the international arena at various sites of global politics, such as military bases, diplomatic spaces and global corporations. By looking at global locations that are not ordinarily associated with women, Enloe (2014: 351) stresses that the "international is personal". Feminist IR scholars have contributed to the discipline by "re-assessing the role that gender and women play in the international arena" (Harel-Shalev, 2019: 1) and by making that role visible in research and policy-making.

For this reason, a major goal of feminist IR is to explore the international realm beyond and below the abstract level of the nation state, so as to consider the experiences and roles of women on the ground (Wibben, 2004: 105). The incentive of this project is not simply to 'add' women to the analysis of global politics, but to begin considering global politics from a fundamentally different point of view (Tickner, 2010: 10; Peterson, 2004: 7; Parashar, 2009: 236). The attention that feminist IR scholars pay to marginalised identities, communities, bodies and voices subverts many of the assumptions of traditional IR. These scholars offer new pathways for theoretical and empirical work that provides insight into the larger picture of global politics.

### 2.2.3 Gendering IR: rethinking and rewriting IR theory, concepts and methodology

For feminists, women's subjectivities and their everyday lives are the primary point of analytical departure, not only as a political project, but also because women's lives are productive sites for the redefinition of, and resistance to, patriarchal meanings and values (Wibben, 2004: 106). The practice of re-evaluating the male-as-norm analytical and conceptual boundaries of IR is the third feminist knowledge project (Tickner, 2010: 32). In this project, the distinction between sex and gender is crucial, as there is empirical and analytical value in embracing gender.[6]

Gender is not the same as being a member of a biological sex category (Sjoberg, 2010: 3). Instead, gender is made up of a system of symbolic meanings and power which produces the gendered social hierarchies that shape our place in and view of the world (Sjoberg, 2009: 187). In this regard, Detraz (2012: 4) writes that gender can be defined as "a set of socially constructed ideas about what men and women ought to be". Gender is not experienced in the same way by everyone (Detraz, 2012: 4; Sjoberg, 2009: 187), as gender is entangled with other power relations, be that race, nationality, sexuality, class, religion, ethnicity or culture (Hudson, 2002: 131; Medie and Kang, 2018: 39). Wibben (2020: 117) states that gender is a relational social category and that it should be understood according to a spectrum of identity. From this perspective, gender is not only the product of binary relationships between men and women, as gender is expressed and experienced as different and conflicting notions of femininity and masculinity (as well as non-conforming gender identities) across society.

Feminist IR scholars use gender to explore the nature of interconnecting international and local power structures and their impact on the wellbeing of individuals and communities. Including gender as a relational analytical category reveals that different feminised subjectivities have different security needs; and it modifies our knowledge of men and the masculinist/militarist thinking that saturates IR. To this end, feminist IR scholars have developed innovative methodologies and ways of approaching analyses of international affairs, including multilevel and multidimensional, narrative, ethnographic, as well as hermeneutic and interpretative approaches (Ackerly, Stern and True, 2006). These innovations have allowed feminism to bring in new issues and voices. Feminists have demonstrated how the lives of sex workers, domestic servants, home-based workers and care and reproductive labour are intertwined with global politics and the global economy (Tickner, 2010: 32).

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[6] While gender and sex are different, it is important to recognise that our knowledge of the sexes is constructed in and through a gendered lens. Thus, the strict distinction that privileges gender in an oppositional relationship with sex ends up contributing to the epistemic frame that also privileges heteronormativity (Ackerly and True, 2019: 24).

The three feminist IR knowledge projects outlined above are visible in the work of FSS scholars on peace and security. These scholars challenge the dominance of rationalist approaches in the study of peace and conflict, particularly in regard to the masculine bias that emanates from state-centric and militaristic definitions of security (Hendricks, 2011: 6; Hudson, 2002: 130; Stern and Wibben, 2014: 1; Shepherd, 2007: 250). FSS scholars hold that security issues cannot be fully comprehended unless they are studied through a prism of how people experience them in different ways (Sjoberg, 2016: 3). Accordingly, feminist contributions to security emphasise “the concept of the ordinary lives of bodies in war, who are involved in an intimate relationship with the ‘everyday’” (Parashar, 2013: 619). In the next section, I will sketch out some of the different contributions and important concepts, ideas and debates of FSS that are relevant to my study.

## 2.3 FSS CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE STUDY OF GENDER INSECURITY: THE GENDERED COMPLEXITIES OF CONFLICT-RELATED SGBV

FSS[7] is a field of study that engages with the idea of security through feminist research questions, approaches and politics (Stern and Wibben, 2014: 2). When gender is not considered, security research becomes “less descriptively accurate and predictively powerful” (Sjoberg, 2009: 191). FSS scholars find this to be both a normative and empirical problem and therefore deepen the concept of security to include the specific security concerns and experiences of women. Heidi Hudson (2002: 224) argues that the feminist perspective on security “not only highlights women’s position in relation to war, but also offers a more comprehensive critique of the contemporary security discourse”. This critique prepares the ground for an alternative conceptualisation of global security that includes the interests of both men and women, and in so doing, offers a more inclusive security concept and practice (Hudson, 2002: 116). Security is then reimagined through gendered lenses. These re-imaginings heighten the emancipatory potential of gendered security practices and processes, as they have the ability to transform gendered hierarchies.

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[7] There is contestation surrounding the name FSS. Laura Sjoberg (2009: 186) used this designation to highlight the feminist contribution to the field of Security Studies. However, as FSS has evolved, scholars have prioritised discursive inquiries and specific security issues, such as conflict-related sexual violence. For FSS work to be emancipatory, scholars insist that the continuum between gendered security and the Feminist Political Economy be appreciated in research (Hudson, 2015: 414; Duncanson, 2019: 124; Cohn, 2017: 3). For this reason, I ground my own discursive analysis with material examples from the field.

As conflict is gendered, FSS scholars hold that women are more vulnerable than men to security threats (Detraz, 2012: 13). In this section, I consider the pervasiveness of violence, in particular sexual violence, perpetrated against women and girls in conflict-related settings. I proceed by exploring the FSS contributions that deal with the complexities of SGBV against women and girls in armed conflict. Relevant to this research are those feminist contributions that contend with gendered security discourses. This work ties in with the burgeoning of studies that consider the multiple roles women play in armed conflict (Hendricks, 2011: 7). FSS discursive contributions point to the value of considering the relationship between private and public violence, and thereby, gender equality and sustained peace (Caprioli, 2005: 171). Feminist analyses of the continuum of violence between wartime and peacetime provide insight into the relationship between gender hierarchies and multidimensional structural violence. This point of view illuminates the ‘ordinary’ sources of women’s insecurity, such as domestic violence, IPV and the global neoliberal economy.

### 2.3.1 The variance of conflict-related sexual violence against women and girls

Pertinent to FSS is the mass public sexualised assault that women and girls experience during armed conflict (Heineman, 2011: 1-2). In the early 1990s, global outcry erupted in response to the mass rape of women in the Bosnian-Herzegovinian conflict. At the time it was estimated that between 20 000 and 50 000 non-Serbian women were raped by Serb soldiers (Kohn, 1994: 199). Most of these attacks targeted Muslim women and occurred while they were held in detention centres (Wood, 2006: 311). Since then, the incidence of conflict-related SGBV against women and girls has been increasingly acknowledged and documented around the world (Díaz, 2017). Reports from Syria, the Democratic Republic of the Congo

(DRC), Somalia, Sudan, Myanmar, Sierra Leone, Nepal, Liberia and Colombia reflect this characterisation (Ward, 2013; Shteir, 2014; UNSG, 2020a; UNSG, 2019).

Although conflict-related SGBV is multifarious and complex, international attention has zoned in on the sexual violence perpetrated against women and girls in conflict. This is in part because of the nature of this kind of violence and the appetite of international media outlets for "atrocity propaganda" (Sidebotham, Moffatt and Jones, 2016: 247), but it is also because there is a correlation between high rates of sexual violence against women and girls and armed conflict (Manjoo and McRaith, 2010: 12). For example, the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED) found that approximately 84% of sexual violence events recorded between June 2018 and June 2019 occurred within a period of armed conflict (Kishi, Pavik and Matfess, 2019: 17). What is more, of the sexual violence events in which the gender of the victim was reported, over 95% of those specifically targeted women and girls (Kishi *et al.*, 2019: 17). Women and girls who are most at risk of SGBV are typically either refugees or internally displaced persons (IDP), returnees, unaccompanied girls, displaced women and girls in urban settings, girl mothers, as well as women and girls with physical and mental disabilities (Holly and Stawski, 2019: 1; UNHCR, 2020: 4).

Unfortunately, the full extent of this kind of violence is unknown, as most incidents are likely to go unreported due to high levels of stigma and shame, the fear of further violence or retaliation from the perpetrator(s), a lack of support and survivor-orientated services, ignorance of rights and a lack of faith in the juridical system and wider response structures (Amnesty International, 2004: 16-17; UNSG, 2020a: 13). Under-reporting is compounded by the difficulties of collecting data in insecure environments (Shteir, 2014: 14). Hence, there is a lack of robust data on the prevalence of cross-national conflict-related sexual violence (Sidebotham *et al.*, 2016: 247).

Previously, security scholars assumed this kind of violence was an unfortunate by-product of warfare. Yet, the insight provided by feminist research indicates otherwise. A study by the Peace Research Institute Oslo of 48 African conflicts (both inter- and intra-state conflict) between 1989 and 2009 found that 64% of all active and organised armed groups were not reported to have engaged in any form of sexual violence (Cohen and Nordås, 2012: 2). As sexual violence is not inevitable in conflict, feminists have considered why some armed groups engage in this kind of violence while others do not. Part of this research focusses on armed groups' strategic use of sexual violence in conflicts (Eriksson Baaz and Stern, 2013: 2; Cohen, Hoover Green and Wood, 2013: 10). In this circumstance, sexual violence is instrumentalised as a tool or weapon of war (Skjelsbæk, 2001: 213; Bastick, Grimm and Kunz, 2007: 6). For instance, in Somalia, Al-Shabaab employs sexual violence as a strategy of social control in the communities under the group's influence (UNSG, 2019: 25).

However, not all conflict-related sexual violence is strategic. Cohen *et al.* (2013: 4) maintain that sexual violence can be opportunistic and committed for personal reasons. Swaine (2015: 760) suggests that sexual violence can also be dual-purpose, in that it meets both personal and political goals. On the other hand, Wood (2018: 2) argues that some forms of sexual violence can be described as a practice. This violence is "driven from 'below' and tolerated 'above', rather than purposely adopted in policy" (Wood, 2018: 2-3). In this instance, sexual violence is not orchestrated but tolerated by commanders because the perceived cost of prohibition is higher than the perceived cost of consequences (Wood, 2018: 11). This is apparent in the sexual abuse against women and girls perpetrated by UN peacekeepers and humanitarian aid workers (Hynes, 2004: 439; IASC, 2010: 11).

Cumulatively, this research has been fundamental for the policy-making process, as the security interests of female victims and survivors of sexual violence are now highlighted in peacekeeping, peacemaking, peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction programmes (Hendricks, 2011: 8).[8] In addition, feminist work has also led to the implementation of international legal instruments and frameworks designed to protect women and girls from violent atrocities in conflict, to tackle the impunity of perpetrators and to provide justice for survivors (Skjelsbæk, 2001: 231; Hendricks, 2011: 8). Yet, this research has also spotlighted sexual violence in a way that diverts attention from other forms of GBV targeting women and girls in conflict and peacetime (Meger, 2016: 150). This is despite abundant evidence that non-sexual GBV is more commonly perpetrated against women and girls in conflict-related settings (Kishi *et al.*, 2019: 7). Swaine (2015: 758) suggests that this spotlight has created a "hierarchy of harm". As a result, the needs of some women are prioritised through post-conflict services and programmes, and sometimes even reparations, whereas the needs of other women are neglected.

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[8] The international community acknowledged wartime sexual violence as a threat to peace and security in UNSCR 1820 (2008), which explicitly recognises sexual violence as a weapon of war, a crime against humanity and a threat to international security (PeaceWomen, 2019). I deal with the WPS agenda in section 2.4.

#### 2.3.2 Male and LGBTQIA victims and female perpetrators[9]

FSS work also critically unravels the gendered discourses that surround SGBV in wartime; particularly those discourses that assume this kind of violence is only perpetrated by men against women and girls. FSS scholars have, therefore, stressed the need to recognise different actors and survivors in research and policy-making, so that more comprehensive and inclusive security is achieved – especially in the context of providing services to survivors, ending the impunity of perpetrators and building more sustainable peace in the post-conflict era.

##### *2.3.2.1 Men, boys and LGBTQIA persons can be victims*

Although women and girls bear the brunt of conflict-related SGBV, the targeting of men and boys for sexual violence during wartime is regular, unexceptional and pervasive (Zalewski *et al.*, 2018: 2; Touquet and Gorris, 2016: 37-38; Henry, Rizvia and Tchoukleva, 2013: 1). Sivakumaran (2007: 267-270) documents forms of conflict-related sexual violence perpetrated against men, including rape, forced sterilisation, forced nudity, forced masturbation and genital mutilation. He suggests that power, dominance and emasculation play vital roles in targeting men for this kind of violence (Sivakumaran, 2007: 270). Based on reports by Amnesty International, Jones (1994: 133) and Zarkov (2001: 71) demonstrate that sexual violence was suffered by incarcerated men in the Bosnian-Herzegovinian conflict. Recently, the UN has stressed that male sexual violence is especially prevalent in detention settings (UNSG, 2020a: 6) – as reported in Libya, Afghanistan and Syria (Shteir, 2014: 17).

Recent research has been attentive to LGBTQIA experiences of conflict-related SGBV (Margalit, 2018). Violence against LGBTQIA people in conflict-related settings is a form of GBV that is often motivated by “homophobic and transphobic attitudes and directed at those perceived as defying hegemonic gender norms” (Kiss *et al.,* 2020a: 2). Abuse by security agents, the local community, family members and other asylum seekers or refugees is common (Kiss *et al.*, 2020a: 2). For example, Banwell (2018: 17) demonstrates that LGBTQIA individuals are especially vulnerable to honour killings in Syria. As a result, in conflict-related settings, LGBTQIA people tend to hide their sexual orientation or gender identity and the violence they experience due to harassment, discrimination, violence and exclusion from economic opportunities or access to services (Kiss *et al.*, 2020b: 13).

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[9] I use the umbrella term LGBTQIA to include several groups defined by a spectrum of diverse sexual orientations and gender identities. This includes lesbian, gay, transgender, queer, intersex and asexual people. There is not enough data disaggregated by the categories within the LGBTQIA concept to be able to account for the community's diverse experiences of conflict-related SGBV.

Unfortunately, conflict-related SGBV that specifically targets men, boys and LGBTQIA persons is under-theorised and under-studied. This is due to a multitude of factors. On the one hand, it is a consequence of survivors’ shame, guilt, fear, isolation and the stigma associated with male and LGBTQIA sexual violence (Kiss *et al.*, 2020a: 10; Shteir, 2014: 18). On the other hand, it is because of the narrowly defined gender discourse that conflates all conflict-related SGBV with women and girls. Thus, investigative bodies, courts and international human rights organisations often fail to associate the abuse and physical injury of men, boys and LGBTQIA persons with conflict-related SGBV (Kiss *et al.*, 2020b: 31-32). Moreover, medical practitioners and humanitarian workers are not always trained in this kind of violence and can be unaware of the signs (Kiss *et al.*, 2020a: 11). Furthermore, sexual violence against men, boys and LGBTQIA persons is invisible in countries where homosexuality is illegal, as survivors are vulnerable to criminal prosecution and imprisonment under anti-sodomy laws – this includes 71 countries in total (Human Dignity Trust, 2021), such as Afghanistan, Sudan, Uganda, Liberia and Libya (Henry *et al.*, 2013: 2; Shteir, 2014: 18).

#### *2.3.2.2 Women can be perpetrators*

FSS scholars maintain that women and girls are not only victims but also perpetrators of political violence, including conflict-related SGBV. For example, Caron Gentry and Laura Sjoberg (2015: 82) detail the sexual abuse and humiliation Iraqi prisoners endured at the hands of female United States soldiers at Abu Ghraib (Gentry and Sjoberg, 2015: 44). Similarly, based on her research on women’s political violence in Haiti, Benedetta Faedi (2010: 1054) reveals that women in paramilitary groups, criminal gangs and self-defence groups gang rape other women and members of enemy gangs. Likewise, Sara Brown (2018) details the direct acts of violence perpetrated by women during the Rwandan genocide, such as using physical force, killing, torture, rape, sexual assault and beatings. Still, women play indirect roles in the perpetration of conflict-related SGBV as well. For example, Hutu women participated in genocidal violence in Rwanda by singing, cheering and passing messages between male aggressors (Gentry and Sjoberg, 2015: 43). Swati Parashar's (2009, 2013, 2014) ethnographic research in Sri Lanka and Kashmir also focusses on the agential participation of women in the ordinary scenes of warfare. She demonstrates women's support of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam in Sri Lanka in non-combatant roles focussing on "ideological propaganda, medical care, intelligence gathering, fundraising and recruitment" (Parashar, 2013: 241). Moreover, female leaders plan and order the perpetration of political violence. Biljana Plavsic served as the president of the political organisation *Republika Srpska*. Plavsic is notorious for being an apologist for ethnic cleansing and was convicted of crimes against humanity in International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (Gentry and Sjoberg, 2015: 120).

By highlighting the roles of women as participants in conflict, FSS scholars have also problematised the traditional security essentialisation of women as passive victims in need of protection and the feminisation of peace (Puechguirbal, 2012: 8; Hudson, 2012: 449; Björkdahl, 2014: 25). Women are made out to be inherently more peaceful than men because of their responsibilities in the household as mothers and care givers (MacKenzie, 2009: 247). This has led to the association of women with peace on the international stage and has reinforced a strict gendered division of labour in the post-conflict reconstruction phase that prevents women from participating in peace-talks and negotiations at all decision-making levels (Puechguirbal, 2012: 4). The assumption that all women are inherently peaceful and therefore experience and participate in war in the same way reinforces those systems of gender that surround and subdivide women. This facilitates and maintains a lack of understanding and acknowledgement of the diverse post-conflict needs of women as combatants and civilians (such as counselling, support services for survivors of sexual violence, skills training, access to education and healthcare, and political and economic reconstruction and participation), and in accordance with diverse intersecting categories of identity (Swaine *et al*., 2019: 9). Gender-blind peace processes, therefore, limit opportunities to reshape gendered hierarchies in the post-conflict era and facilitate the systematic and historical omission of women from post-conflict planning and development activities (Hudson, 2012: 444).

Despite the well-documented literature on the multiple roles that women play in times of war, women are still excluded from post-conflict processes such as peace-talks, negotiations and Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) programmes (Henshaw, 2020: 64). Megan MacKenzie (2009, 2012) demonstrates the implications of gender-blind DDR programmes in Sierra Leone. She suggests that international NGOs focussed on women's victimhood over and above their agency as soldiers, which in turn, reconstructed female soldiers as wives, abductees, camp followers, domestic workers or sex slaves (MacKenzie, 2012: 15). Female soldiers were then 'reintegrated' by returning them to their 'normal place' in society, which put them in precarious positions in their homes and communities and made them vulnerable to forced marriage, sexual exploitation and isolation in the post-conflict era (MacKenzie, 2009: 258). Therefore, MacKenzie (2009: 243) stresses that gender needs to be addressed in post-conflict programming, as the failure to do so sacrifices gender equality and the overall effectiveness of the DDR process, as well as the chances for a sustainable transition from conflict to peace.

### 2.3.3 The continuum of violence: domestic violence, IPV and economic insecurity

FSS scholars are concerned with the relationship between violence and unjust gendered social structures because societies with more equal gender relations are less violent (Gizelis, 2009: 505; True, 2020: 85). Caprioli demonstrates that

> higher levels of gender inequality increase the likelihood of domestic conflict. States characterised by gender inequality, rooted in hierarchy, discrimination, and violence, necessarily support norms of violence. As such, states with gender inequality are primed for violence (Caprioli, 2005: 172).

It follows that if gendered power relations are not addressed as causal factors in conflict, as well as a form of violence in and of themselves, then the same conditions will be present in the post-conflict era, which allows for the potential recurrence of violence and the resumption of conflict (Swaine *et al.*, 2019: 4). Thus, there is a link between gender inequality and violence, as the pervasiveness of gender discrimination increases "the likelihood that a state will experience internal conflict" (Hudson, 2009: 256). Jaqui True (2020: 87) maintains that for sustainable peace to be achieved, practitioners and researchers must grapple with the multidimensional continuum of violence that extends from the private spaces of the home and the community to the public spaces of international politics. Feminist thinking on the continuum of violence has facilitated the breakdown of the dichotomous thinking essential to traditional security studies, such as that between public/private and war/peace.

FSS scholars highlight the different kinds of SGBV that are committed during the conflict period and in its wake. Similar to feminist IR, FSS scholars conceptualise violence in comprehensive terms (True, 2012: 5). Research both identifies and quantifies the connections between the gender norms that regulate conflict and those that regulate peace (True, 2020: 90). At a societal level, "risk factors" for GBV in conflict-affected contexts are those socio-cultural norms that disadvantage and subordinate women and girls, as well as the existence of a culture of impunity (Medie, 2015: 480). The gendered power relations within and across groups that make violence acceptable and systemic are part of the organisation of violence from the prewar to the postwar environment (Wibben, 2020: 117).

It is widely acknowledged that domestic violence is a worldwide problem both in times of conflict and peace (Hendricks, 2015: 365). The Child Protection in Crisis Learning Network study of five conflict-affected contexts found that in all sites a woman was more likely to be raped or experience physical abuse from someone she knew rather than a stranger (Swaine, 2015: 759). GBV is also a product of the structural dimensions of the international political economy through post-conflict neoliberal economic reconstruction policies (True, 2010: 40; Duncanson, 2019: 112). Under these conditions, the already marginalised socio-economic position of women leads to an increased vulnerability to male control and violence (Kostovicova *et al.*, 2020: 255). In underscoring the correlation between private and public violence, FSS scholars make a significant contribution to the notion of comprehensive security.

## 2.4 THE INSTITUTIONALISATION OF THE WPS POLICY ECOSYSTEM INTERNATIONALLY AND ON THE AFRICAN CONTINENT

Olonisakin, Hendricks and Okech (2015: 377) highlight three pillars of influence that have individually made fundamental contributions to global gender security. The first pillar is comprised of the contributions made by feminist IR and FSS scholars – I dealt with this pillar in the previous section of this chapter. The second pillar is comprised of the activities of civil society organisations, particularly the work of women’s groups in peacebuilding and advocacy, as well as the promotion of gender equality on the ground. And the third pillar is a cross-section of policy actors at global, regional and national levels. Olonisakin *et al.* (2015: 377) argue that when the three pillars converge, they offer “the promise of transformation – conceptually and practically – of the terrain on which gender inequality thrives”. The convergence of these three pillars led to the adoption of UNSCR 1325 on WPS and its follow-up resolutions – collectively referred to as the WPS agenda.

In this section, I consider the second and third pillars. My analysis shifts from a focus on academic feminist work, to the practical and material terrain of gender/ed security. Fundamental to this task is the institutionalisation of gender mainstreaming in various international, regional and national frameworks, instruments and mechanisms; and the role of civil society in shepherding and contributing to this process. My analysis takes its cue from Paul Kirby and Laura Shepherd (2020: 2) who conceptualise the WPS agenda as a ‘policy ecosystem’, as opposed to a clear and linear normative framework. The policy ecosystem concept is useful because it captures the complex ways in which the diverse WPS norms, actors and activities are bound together. I reflect on this in my overview of the second and third pillars, and then I consider how that complexity interacts with the first pillar through the convergence of all three – on an international level, as well as in the reproduction and domestication of the WPS agenda on the African continent.

### 2.4.1 Gender mainstreaming in global governance

The main vehicle through which gender security has been institutionalised in global governance is gender mainstreaming. Gender mainstreaming is defined by the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) as follows:

> It is a strategy for making women's as well as men's concerns and experiences an integral dimension of the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of policies and programmes in all political, economic and societal spheres so that women and men benefit equally and inequality is not perpetuated (ECOSOC, 1997: 2).

Gender mainstreaming is envisioned as a means for achieving equality between men and women as a matter of human rights and as a prerequisite for social justice, equality, development and peace (Walby, 2005: 321; True, 2010: 39). For this reason, gender mainstreaming is fundamental to the goal of feminist peace and gendered security, and is evident in the policy, programmes, legislation, practices and directives of international and regional institutions, national governments, transnational and local NGOs and corporate actors (Youngs, 2008: 45). The origins of gender mainstreaming can be attributed to *The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women* (CEDAW), adopted in 1979 by the UN General Assembly (True, 2010: 41). By accepting the Convention, Member States committed themselves to undertake a series of measures to end discrimination against women in all forms. In addition, *The Beijing Platform for Action*, ratified by all state parties present at the 1995 Fourth World Conference on Women, was also integral to the gender mainstreaming process (Youngs, 2008: 45). *The Platform* advocates for a new approach that promotes “a gender perspective in all legislation and policies” (UN, 1995: 86), so that all forms of discrimination against women are eradicated and the obstacles to the exercise of women’s rights are eliminated.

The roots of CEDAW and *The Platform* can be traced to the transnational feminist campaign for global peace, including the decades-long work of the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF) (Thomson, 2019: 599). Also noteworthy are the wide-ranging women-led struggles for peace on the African continent. African women’s groups, such as *Femmes Africa Solidarite* and the African Women’s Committee on Peace and Development, emphasised the disproportionate impact of armed conflict on women and girls and the explicit targeting of women and girls in African conflicts for sexual violence (Ilesanmi, 2020: 13; Haastrup, 2019: 378). African gender activists and other stakeholders demanded that the advancement of women be recognised as integral to the promotion of peace and security, and in doing so they contributed to the international framework for advancing gender equality and women’s rights (Hendricks, 2017: 76; Sharland, 2021: 105). Their work is visible in the 1985 UN World Conference on Women in Nairobi, the outcome of which was the *Nairobi Forward-Looking Strategies* (1985) document, and in the 1994 Fifth Regional Conference on Women in Dakar, Senegal, which produced the *African Platform for Action* document (Ilesanmi, 2020: 8; Diop, 2011: 173). These documents not only promoted gender equality on a regional level, but also informed many of the major elements of the *Beijing Platform for Action*, and thereby contributed toward the establishment of the principles articulated in gender mainstreaming in international security structures, instruments and policies (Ilesanmi, 2020: 8; Haastrup, 2019: 379).

These instruments and documents set the stage for the Windhoek Conference in May 2000, a workshop hosted by the Government of Namibia and organised by the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (Diop, 2011: 173; Hendricks, 2017: 74). The workshop focussed on mainstreaming a gender perspective into the work of multidimensional peace support operations and set out to examine practical ways through which the UN and Member States could strengthen the principles of gender equality (Lahoud, 2020: 14; Sharland, 2021: 105). The outcome document of the workshop was the *Windhoek Declaration and Namibian Plan of Action on Mainstreaming a Gender Perspective in Multidimensional Peace Operations* (2000), which emphasises the need to include the principle of gender equality in UN peace missions so as to ensure the effectiveness of peace support operations (UN, 2000: 2). This document directly influenced the comprehensive globalisation of gender mainstreaming in security practices and policy (Sharland, 2021: 103; Diop, 2011: 173).

### 2.4.2 International WPS architecture

In terms of security, gender mainstreaming looks to remedy the invisibility of women in security practices and policy by eliminating those legal obstacles to women’s presence and participation in peace-talks, negotiations and peacebuilding processes, and by ensuring that legal prescriptions for women’s economic and political equality are included in post-conflict reconstruction processes and statebuilding (Kreft, 2017: 133). The key policy development for gender mainstreaming in international security architecture is the ever-evolving WPS agenda. Due to the collective organisation of women’s peace movements, feminist activists, and the recognition of the contribution made by grassroots women’s organisations to conflict resolution and prevention, gender security became a topic of concern for the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) (Pratt and Richter-Devroe, 2011: 490). These efforts collectively formed the foundation for the adoption of UNSCR 1325 in October 2000. The Resolution signalled the arrival of gender on the international stage, as for the first time in history women's peace and security concerns were formally discussed and acknowledged by the UNSC (Ilesanmi, 2020: 7; Tryggestad, 2009: 539; Pratt, 2013: 773; Hill, Cohn and Enloe, 2004: 5). At the time of its adoption, UNSCR 1325 was celebrated as a breakthrough for women's rights in the peace and security arena and has since been distinguished as a "groundbreaking" resolution (Tryggestad, 2009: 539) and a "historic milestone" (Pratt and Richter-Devroe, 2011: 490). In light of the Resolution's 20th anniversary, Cynthia Enloe emphasises the major contribution that UNSCR 1325 has made to achieving the goals of feminist peace and gendered security:

> Today, twenty years after its passage, we forget how astounding it was for those women thinkers, researchers, and activists to have succeeded in getting Security Council delegates to vote for this groundbreaking resolution. In fact, we may be slipping into casualness when referring to 'womenpeaceandsecurity'. That's risky. It underestimates the past and present resistance (Enloe, 2020).

The Resolution has had a momentous impact on the practice and research of security, and that impact should not be taken lightly. UNSCR 1325 has four pillars: participation, protection, prevention and resolution and recovery (PeaceWomen, 2019). Primarily, the Resolution is concerned with the representation of women in decision-making institutions and in peace-talks. It also calls for a gender-perspective in the planning and implementation of peace operations and negotiations and highlights the need for increased attention to the protection and respect of women's rights. And lastly, it insists on the active participation of women in peacebuilding practices (Tryggestad, 2009: 540; Hill *et al.*, 2004: 7; Hudson, 2009: 263).

Resolution 1325 has been trailed by a series of ten follow-up resolutions. Five of the follow-up resolutions are primarily concerned with protecting women and girls from conflict-related sexual violence: UNSCR 1820 (2008), 1888 (2009), 1960 (2010), 2106 (2013) and 2467 (2019) (PeaceWomen, 2019). The other five resolutions shift away from a chief focus on conflict-related sexual violence. These are: UNSCR 1889 (2009), 2122 (2013), 2242 (2015), 2493 (2019) and draft 2532 (2020). Some of these resolutions deal with women's meaningful participation in peace processes, while others focus on assessment, monitoring, data collection, funding and the establishment of NAPs (Kaptan, 2020: 42).[10] UNSCR 1325 and its follow-up resolutions are integral to the enterprise of 'sustaining peace', a new approach to peacebuilding outlined in the 2015 review of the UN peacebuilding architecture (Cabrera-Balleza, 2020: 80). Despite this empirical progress, there are still ideological and political differences that stem from scholarly and civil society engagements with the agenda.

### 2.4.3 Contesting WPS perspectives in feminist research

Some accounts of the WPS agenda tend to conceptualise the resolutions as a set of norms that influence international security practices. Yet, Kirby and Shepherd (2020: 4) convincingly argue that the WPS agenda cannot "be reasonably described as a norm, because its various normative components are diverse". Instead, they suggest that the agenda is comprised of a group of disparate norms that collectively aspire to a coherent framework (Kirby and Shepherd, 2020: 4). Kirby and Shepherd (2020: 4) maintain that this 'coherence' is unstable, as it is produced "through claims and counter claims, rather than existing as a logical and necessary interrelation of parts". To suggest then that the agenda is a single normative framework is to assume that all WPS actors want the same thing, which in turn, risks obscuring profound differences within the field.

To remedy this conundrum, Kirby and Shepherd (2020: 2) offer an alternative way of thinking about the field of WPS activity through the concept of a policy ecosystem. The ecosystem metaphor is useful because it accommodates the complexity of diverse entities that co-exist and diverge in different and relational ways. The concept includes the full range of actors, activities and artefacts in the WPS field, as well as their interactions, such as practice, habits, acts, speech, guidelines, policies, frameworks, protocols and plans. These agents all have different and often competing needs and interests (Kirby and Shepherd, 2020: 7). This means that the agenda is (re)produced in complex ways, as the agenda is constantly being written and rewritten in different locations by different actors and across various time periods (Kirby and Shepherd, 2020: 20).

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[10] The NAPs are "national-level strategy documents" that delineate a government's plans to localise the WPS agenda (WILPF, 2021). These documents outline a country's key objectives and activities for securing the human rights of women and girls in conflict-related settings, and for ensuring the meaningful participation of women in peace and security structures at both a national and international level (WILPF, 2021).

The WPS policy ecosystem concept outlined by Kirby and Shepherd (2020) does not include the contributions of civil society and feminist researchers, yet the tendency for the ecosystem to (re)produce itself through the same relational-divergence is also evident in these spheres of WPS engagement. Two divergent feminist perspectives can be identified, an optimistic and a critical-feminist perspective (Hudson, 2017: 3-4). Although these two bodies of thought diverge in some ways, they also converge in practice, and thereby reiterate and (re)produce the complexity of the WPS ecosystem. From the optimistic perspective, the WPS resolutions represent a significant shift in security norms across the institutions of the UN and its Member States (Tryggestad, 2009: 552, 2010: 159). Jaqui True (2016: 307) maintains that the agenda is “the most significant international normative framework addressing gender-specific impacts of conflict on women and girls”. Tryggestad (2009: 159) argues that the WPS agenda has already become “an institutionalised set of norms with influence on UN peace and security interests”. Beyond doubt, UNSCR 1325 marks a significant step toward the pursuit of gender equality in the realm of peace and security and, at the very least, the WPS architecture ensures women’s concerns remain at the forefront of the international security agenda (Olonisakin and Ikpe, 2011: 231). The optimistic perspective therefore posits that the NAPs are a tangible way of grounding gender equality norms in local contexts (Basu, 2016: 370).

The second feminist perspective diverges from the first based on the material impact of the underlying discourses of the WPS resolutions. This critical-feminist perspective is wary of the liberal-feminist underpinnings of the language in WPS resolutions and is hesitant to celebrate the wins of WPS norm diffusion (George and Shepherd, 2016: 300; Pratt and Richter-Devroe, 2011: 498; Pratt, 2013: 779). This school is critical of the liberal peace framework evident in the feminist language of the resolutions.[11] The liberal peace framework emphasises security sector reform and DDR processes, institution building, good governance, democratisation, rule of law programming, human rights, reconstruction, free market reforms and development (Richmond, 2009: 559). Liberal peacebuilding can be a precursor for negative peace, understood broadly as the absence of war or direct violence, and not deeper positive peace, understood broadly as both the absence of war and the absence of social injustice or indirect violence (Galtung, 1969: 183). Liberal-feminist approaches to peacebuilding look to increase women's participation in those activities that correspond with this model without criticising the underlying militarised and imperialist language and assumptions of liberal peace (Pratt and Richter-Devroe, 2011: 498-90; Pratt, 2013: 773; Haastrup and Hagen, 2020:143).

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[11] The term ‘liberal peace’ refers to the dominant intellectual framework applied to the policies and practices of internationally supported post-conflict interventions (Sabaratnam, 2011: 1). This enterprise emerged from the idea that liberal societies tend be more peaceful than illiberal ones (Lemay-Hébert, 2013: 242). Hence, liberal peace entails building liberal democratic institutions and market economies in post-conflict states. However,

Critical-feminist scholars posit that the WPS resolutions and NAPs are undergirded by Western interventionist discourses, which privilege women's economic and political equality before other social and cultural needs (Pratt, 2013: 780; Shepherd, 2008b: 396; Ryan and Basini, 2017: 187). The critical-feminist perspective suggests that the underlying liberal-feminist language of the WPS resolutions silences other structural inequalities. This has resulted in an implementation gap, as women are being integrated into existing peace and security architecture without any processes of transformation occurring (Pratt and Richter-Devroe, 2011: 493). The gender norms advocated for by the WPS resolutions have not sufficiently translated into the everyday experiences of women in conflict and post-conflict situations, nor has there been a clear increase in women's participation in peace processes (Hendricks, 2015: 365; George and Shepherd, 2016: 301). The Council on Foreign Relations (2019) found that between 1992 and 2019, women constituted on average 13% of negotiators, 6% of mediators and 6% of signatories in major peace processes worldwide. The underrepresentation of women is also typically replicated in the committees and bodies set up to implement peace agreements once they have been signed. For example, in Mali, women make up just 3% of the National Commission on DDR, 6% of the National Council for Security Sector Reform, 20% of the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission and 4% of the subcommittees of the Agreement Monitoring Committee (UNSG, 2020b: 8).

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this kind of social engineering is grounded in narrow Eurocentric interests that are often at odds with the local experience (Richmond, 2011: 1).

These scholars suggest that the liberal-feminist approach to peacebuilding relies on the uncritical assumption that all women experience their insecurity in the same way. The term 'women' remains uncontested, and sex is conflated with gender (Hudson, 2016: 1). Thus, liberal-feminist gender mainstreaming has been characterised by an 'add-and-stir' approach, where women are added to peacebuilding talks, programmes and decision-making institutions (Senarathna, 2015: 84; Barnes, 2011: 121). Willett (2010: 150) maintains that this perspective narrowly defines security needs and interests along the male/female binary. This results in an uncritical reliance on homogenous groupings of women as peacemakers or victims and men as perpetrators or protectors (Hudson, 2016: 1). These scholars suggest that more attention needs to be paid toward the intersection of gender with other significant power relations (Haastrup and Hagen, 2020: 143; Pratt and Richter-Devroe, 2011: 494).

In recent years, a branch of critical-feminist scholars has closely aligned their perspective with Feminist Political Economy research. These scholars argue that the implementation of the WPS agenda is severely undercut by the scarcity of financial resources (Basu, 2017: 722; Duncanson, 2019: 122). This is due, in part, to how financing works in the UNSC itself, but it is also because the rhetoric of the agenda does not translate into dedicated budgeting for relevant staff, policies and resources (Basu, 2017: 723). For instance, as of November 2021, 98 UN Member States (51% of UN membership) have translated the WPS agenda into NAPs, but only 35 have included a budget for implementation (WILPF, 2021). In addition, these critical-feminist scholars draw attention to the silences around the post-conflict economic rights and well-being of women in the provisions of earlier WPS resolutions, which have been addressed to a limited extent in some later ones (Basu, 2017: 722; Duncanson, 2019: 116-17). These silences to the neglect of women's material security in the WPS ecosystem, especially in the context of post-conflict neoliberal economic reconstruction and the global feminisation of labour. In turn, gender-based inequality is sustained and created in the post-conflict economy, which cultivates gender discrimination and GBV and undercuts the sustainability of peace agreements (Bergeron, Cohn and Duncanson, 2017: 717).

These two broad feminist perspectives should not be read as polarised bodies of thought. Kirby and Shepherd (2020: 4) argue that the divergent norms in the WPS policy ecosystem are bound together under the unstable coherence of the ‘gender equality supernorm’. Similarly, True (2011: 77) suggests that gender equality is negotiated in policy practice. The liberal-feminist gender equality supernorm does not retain a single meaning, as it develops shifting meanings in response to various interventions and in different contexts. Thus, the optimistic and critical-feminist perspectives often converge in practice. Soumita Basu (2016: 363) affirms this idea in her assessment of the Global South’s claim to the WPS agenda. She demonstrates that the Global South is not a mere recipient of the resolutions, as hegemonic understandings of gendered security are negotiated and (re)articulated by Global South actors in practice, which results in “differing interpretations, resistances and subversions” (Basu, 2016: 363).

This is especially evident in the NAPs. Heidi Hudson (2017: 5) suggests that the language used in four African NAPs (Kenya, Liberia, Nigeria, and Uganda) offers an alternative reading beyond the two oppositional discourses. While NAPs are useful for the domestication of the norms of UNSCR 1325, they are formulated according to national needs and context. Thus, Hudson (2017: 12) finds that it is unhelpful to read the NAPs according to one school of thought over the other. This is because, the dominant liberal-feminist gender-equality language of the NAPs is intermixed with intimations of critical insight. Similarly, in their critical-discourse analysis of Rwanda’s two NAPs (2009, 2018), Madsen and Hudson (2020: 17) find that there are “dominant liberal-feminist, residual (postcolonial-feminist), and emergent (African-feminist) discourses” present in the plans. The language of NAPs is, therefore, ambivalent, dynamic and fluctuating. Hudson (2017: 24) suggests that these “mixed messages” mark a “conceptual opening” for critical engagement, which can facilitate an environment for emancipatory gender outcomes. The combination of liberal-feminist and critical-feminist perspectives is especially evident in the (re)articulation and domestication of the WPS ecosystem on the African continent through the African Union (AU) and other regional organisations.

### 2.4.4 The domestication of the WPS agenda in Africa

In this section, I outline how gender has been institutionalised in Africa through the structures, instruments and tools of the AU and other regional organisations, such as regional economic communities like the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). This section seeks to understand how visible the WPS agenda norms are on the continent and whether that visibility has contributed toward shifts in patriarchal and militaristic institutional culture that move security on the continent to a more transformational agenda. In addition, this section foregrounds the relationships between the regional and national levels of the WPS ecosystem that are built through norm translation and negotiation. By highlighting the continuities in the gender policy trends on a continental and regional level, this section serves as a backdrop for my analysis of Rwanda's own gender security policy framework in Chapters four and five.

In Africa, the WPS ecosystem and the principle of gender equality are visible at the local, national, regional and continental level in organisations such as the AU (Hendricks, 2015: 365, Hendricks, 2017: 78; Hudson, 2017: 11). Diop (2011: 174) explains that the transformation of the Organisation of African Unity to the AU in 2002 was the perfect opportunity to address the issues articulated in the main pillars of UNSCR 1325 in the organisation's legal and key policy frameworks. The AU explicitly embraces gender equality and gender mainstreaming as normative and policy priorities, including in structures and processes that deal with peace and security (Haastrup, 2019: 377). Article 4(l) of the *African Union Constitutive Act* states that the AU "shall function in accordance with the promotion of gender equality" (AU, 2000: 7). This suggests that the promotion of gender equality is one of the organisation's guiding principles (Diop, 2011: 174). In February 2009, in order to fast-track the implementation of global and regional commitments to gender equality the AU Assembly declared 2010-2020 the 'African Women's Decade' (Hendricks, 2017: 82). The AU's WPS commitments are implemented through a few departments and offices. These include the Women and Gender Development Directorate, the Office of the Special Envoy for Women and the Women, Peace and Security Programme (2015-2020) (Desmidt and Davis, 2019: 18-19).

According to a report by the Office of the Special Envoy on Women, Peace and Security, the WPS agenda was "midwifed" by Africa (Abdulmelik, 2016: 6). The ties between the continent and the WPS ecosystem run deep, not only because of the contributions made by African women's groups to the adoption of Resolution 1325 by the UNSC, but also because most armed conflicts in the last three decades have occurred on the continent. Some of the policy documents that express continental commitments and instruments in line with the WPS agenda are: the *Protocol to the African Charter on Human and People's Rights on the Rights* *of Women in Africa* (Maputo Protocol adopted in 2003), the *Solemn Declaration of Gender Equality in Africa* (2004), the *AU Gender Policy* (2008), the *Strategy for Gender Equality and Women's Empowerment* (2018), the *Framework for Post-conflict Reconstruction and Development* (2006) and the *Policy Framework for Security Sector Reform* (2011) (Abdulmelik, 2016: 10-11). Notably, in January 2013, the AU Summit adopted *Agenda 2063: The Africa We Want*. This document acts as the continent's 50-year blueprint for sustainable development and economic growth, and thereby guides the collective direction and goals of the AU for the continent (AUDA-NEPAD, 2020: 1). Aspiration six of the *Agenda 2063* is "an Africa whose development is people driven, relying on the potential of African people, particularly its women and youth and well cared for children" (AUDA-NEPAD, 2021).

Policy documents across the AU include references to the WPS agenda, but a comprehensive continental African action plan on UNSCR 1325 does not exist at this point in time. The two main documents that guide the African Peace and Security Architecture's[12] (APSA) work, the *AU Master Roadmap Practical Steps to Silencing the Guns by 2020* and the *APSA Roadmap 2016-2020*, both express some commitments to gender mainstreaming, but their references to UNSRC 1325 are weak (Hendricks, 2017: 79; Desmidt and Davis, 2019: 15). Nevertheless, the *Roadmap Practical Steps to Silencing the Guns* calls for women to be trained as mediators for diplomacy in conflict prevention (AU, 2016: 9). This was partly met through the establishment of the African Network of Female Mediators (commonly known by the acronym, FemWise-Africa), which aims to strengthen the role of women in conflict prevention and mediation efforts. The network provides a platform for "strategic advocacy, capacity building and networking aimed at enhancing the implementation of commitments for the inclusion of women in peacemaking in Africa" (Limo, 2018). The AU acknowledges the shortfalls of gender mainstreaming in the APSA, some of which include the development of indicators/monitoring mechanisms and the need to improve staff capacity for the implementation of gendered initiatives (Desmidt and Davis, 2019: 17).

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[12] The architecture consists of the Peace and Security Council, Panel of the Wise, Continental Early Warning System, African Standby Force, Peace Fund and Military Staff Committee (Diop, 2011: 176).

Notably, in May 2018, the AU adopted the *Continental Results Framework* (CRF) for Reporting and Monitoring on the WPS agenda in Africa (2018-2028) (Diop, 2019). The CRF provides a policy framework for tracking the progress made on implementing the commitments on WPS by the AU Commission and the Member States through the various instruments. Although there is abundant evidence of rhetorical commitments to the WPS pillars on the continent, implementation has been poor, mainly because the NAPs and strategies across the continent have "remained ends rather than means" (Diop, 2019: 4). The CRF serves to address part of this implementation gap by acting as a tool for monitoring the progress, achievements and weaknesses in terms of the implementation of the UNSCR 1325 on the continent.

Part of the monitoring process has focussed on the implementation of NAPs for UNSCR 1325 by AU Member States (Desmidt and Davies, 2019: 20). As of November 2021, 29 out of 55 AU Member States have UNSCR 1325 NAPs (WILPF, 2021).[13] Of these, nine countries have adopted second-generation NAPs, these are: Burundi (2017-2021), the DRC (2019-2022), Ghana (2020-2025), Kenya (2020-2024), Liberia (2019-2023), Niger (2020-2024), Nigeria (2017-2020), Rwanda (2018-2022) and Sierra Leone (2010-2014). In addition, two countries have adopted third-generation NAPs, namely, Mali (2019-2023) and Uganda (2021-2025). Moreover, many regional economic communities on the continent have adopted plans for the implementation of UNSRC 1325, such as ECOWAS, SADC, the Intergovernmental Authority of Development, the East African Community, the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region and the Economic Community of Central African States (Kampilipili, 2018; Abdulmelik, 2016: 14; WILPF, 2021).

It is clear that gender is visible in the regional instruments and structures for gender equality and in the security architecture of the continent. While this progress is worth celebrating, several challenges threaten implementation. Abdullah (2017: 5) argues that gender equality and women's rights are treated as 'women only concerns' rather than as critical issues to development and security on the continent. This is especially evident in the lack of material (human and financial) resources dedicated to these structures (Abdullah, 2017: 25). Like the

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[13] I deal with Rwanda's two NAPs (2009, 2018) in detail in Chapter four. My analysis reveals the logics of addition evident within Rwanda's gender security policy framework. As the NAPs are pivotal to that framework, they are an important piece of the analysis.

WPS agenda, the instruments, tools and structures of the AU and regional economic communities' zone in on women, as opposed to gender (Haastrup, 2019: 383). Feminist scholars therefore maintain that the focus on the continent and across the AU is to endorse the liberal-feminist gender equality regime (Hendricks, 2017: 79; Hudson, 2016: 8; Ilesanmi, 2020: 12-13). As a result, this almost exclusive focus on women has highlighted key technocratic, managerial goals that are guided by a concern for numbers: the number of women in decision-making institutions, on the ground in peace operations and in leadership positions in the AU, other regional organisations or at a national level (Kezie-Nwoha, 2017: 10). In addition, the emphasis placed on women has come hand in hand with the same almost exclusive focus on SGBV found in the WPS agenda (Haastrup, 2019: 382; Hendricks, 2017: 93). Although the focus on SGBV has been fundamental for protecting the human rights of women and girls on the continent, it has eclipsed other forms of violence that negate the gender insecurity of African women (Hudson, 2012: 454).

The liberal-feminist language evident in the African WPS policy ecosystem has facilitated the development of a narrow-gendered focus in the sector's structures and institutions, which does not take seriously patriarchal and militaristic power relations. What is more, this language has encouraged including women based on the uncritical assumption that women will ensure more democratic and accountable governance and sustainable peace (Kezie-Nwoha, 2017: 5). Thus, scholars have shown that although the representation of women is imperative for gendered security, this measure is insufficient for altering deep-rooted practices and behaviour (Kezie-Nwoha, 2017: 10-11; Hendricks, 2017: 93; Hudson, 2016: 11). Therefore, a normative agenda advocating for gender equality and for the implementation of UNSCR 1325 is in place in Africa but achieving the desired outcomes of these frameworks requires navigating and addressing huge implementation gaps (Hendricks, 2015: 366; Hendricks, 2017: 93).

Yet, there is also some evidence of critical-feminist thinking in African gender equality and gender security policy documents. For instance, the AU's new *Gender Strategy* recognises that gender is "part of the broader socio-cultural context, as are other important criteria for socio-cultural analysis including class, race, poverty level, ethnic group, sexual orientation, age, etc" (AU, 2018: 62). This intersectional definition of gender used in the document is not necessarily visible within the text itself; however, there are intimations of it within the framework. The tendency to represent women as one homogenous group is broken-up by the recognition of the specific needs of migrant women, women living in rural areas and women living with disabilities (AU, 2018: 13-14). The *Strategy* highlights these "target groups" because they are especially marginalised from formal structures and processes (AU, 2018: 13). By disaggregating these target groups, the *Strategy* hopes to specifically address the security needs and interests of different women. Despite this critical-feminist insight, the *Strategy* does base the inclusion of some of these groups on the value that these women can add to economic growth on the continent. This is especially evident in the rationale behind rural women, as they "contribute to agriculture and rural enterprises and fuel local and global economies" (AU, 2018: 13).

In addition, the relational quality of gender is emphasised through a small focus on the role of men and boys and the contribution that they can make to achieving gender equality. The *Strategy* recognises that "men and boys can and do make contributions to achieve gender equality" and that "dismantling patriarchy is no longer seen by all men as a win-lose proposition" (AU, 2018: 14). Moreover, the *Strategy* recognises that violence against women is "symptomatic of the accepted social norms in many countries and communities" (AU, 2019: 31) and that this violence occurs along a 'spectrum' that is not overtly focussed on conflict-related SGBV but also includes domestic violence, rape, female genital mutilation and intimidation, as well as "additional threats to women's *personal* security in periods of war and conflict " (AU, 2018: 31, my emphasis). The continuum of violence is acknowledged through a focus on harmful social norms and practices and their effect on women's bodily integrity and security. In this respect, the *Strategy* represents a combination of liberal-feminist and more progressive/transformational messages about how gender security will be achieved on the continent.

This brief analysis of the different discourses in the *Strategy*, points to trends that are evident in other regional, as well as national, African policy documents that deal with WPS. This framing is necessary, because I explore how these trends have been (re)produced in the GoR's own national-level policy documents that deal with gender equality and gender security in Chapters four and five. Thus, the converging/diverging (re)production of the different discourses that circulate the WPS ecosystem across various levels (international, regional and national) through norm translation and negotiation is the backdrop for the (re)production of the different logics and inner workings of intersectionality. In the following section, this chapter shifts from an overview of the literature, concepts and contestations relevant to my study and, instead, begins to lay the foundation for the theoretical framework for Chapters three, four and five.

## 2.5 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE STUDY OF THE INNER WORKINGS AND LOGICS OF INTERSECTIONALITY

This section discusses critical-feminist contributions (decolonial and postcolonial African-feminist work) and outlines how they inform my understanding and analysis of the inner workings and logics of intersectionality. I end the section with an overview of the logics of domination, addition and interdependence.

### 2.5.1 Critical-feminist perspectives

Critical feminism is an intersectional political philosophy that is committed to dismantling the heteronormative, capitalist, racist patriarchy (Cifor and Wood, 2017: 2). Feminism from this perspective is a tool for coalitional work in overlapping and interconnected political realities (Mohanty, 2003: 226). Hudson (2005: 157-158) maintains that "by constantly asking whether there are different ways of looking at the world, a critical-feminist perspective is geared towards addressing the politics of multiple overlapping identities". Critical-feminist scholars reveal that gender is entrenched in multiple power structures with the aim of changing the status quo (Schutte, 2007: 167; Harney-Mahajan, 2016: 3; Al-Wazedi, 2021: 156; Kerner, 2017: 847; George, 2006: 212; Rajan and Park, 2005: 54). Critical feminists look at the security of those on the margins of international politics and refocus security discourses from the referent object of the state to that of individual lives (Aharoni, 2014; Parashar, 2013, 2014; Medie, 2015; O'Manique, 2005).

As already indicated in section 2.4.3, not all critical-feminist approaches have been successful in this regard, as they tend to assume that gender and its intersections are experienced in the same way across all societies. This assumption is driven through the dominance of liberal-feminist approaches to gender security in the Global South, where gender and its associated violences are assumed to take on the same quality as it does in the West (Mohanty, 1988: 52). The danger of this is that the cultural and racial implications of being gendered are misrecognised and remain unseen, which limits the emancipatory potential of a critical approach. It is therefore necessary for me to consider the contributions of anticolonial-feminist thinking and the critical potential they offer my analysis. In what follows, I first explore decolonial feminism and then postcolonial feminism. I integrate an African perspective in my analysis of the different debates and contributions and consider a theoretical perspective that is informed by a blend of these two anticolonial positions.

#### *2.5.1.1 Decolonial thinking: prospects and limitations*

According to decolonial thought, European modernity and its emancipatory developments are part of a larger world historiography, one that acknowledges the causal relationship between European advances and the violence of colonialism and imperialism (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2015: 489; Dietze, 2014: 253; Escobar, 2007: 180). Breny Mendoza (2016: 113) maintains that “slavery, forced labour and the rightlessness of colonised peoples exist in dialectical relation to liberal notions of liberty, equality, justice and free labour”. In decolonial thought, modernity and its precepts are inconceivable without colonialism, as coloniality represents the dark underside of modernity (Mendoza, 2016: 113).

Coloniality is a key concept in decolonial thought and was introduced by the Peruvian sociologist Anibal Quijano (Quijano and Wallerstein, 1992: 550; Quijano, 2000: 536). The concept refers to the colonial matrix of power that brought about a new global order determined by the establishment of racial superiority through the control and exploitation of resources, productivity and labour (Kusnierkiewicz, 2019: 2; Gill and Pires, 2019: 293; Seroto, 2018: 4). Decolonial scholars argue that the colonial matrix of power did not end with independence but continues to shape the structural hierarchies of global capitalism and global politics today (Seroto, 2018: 4). Colonial control of wealth, military conquest and political authority was sustained through what Ngugi wa Thiong’o (1986: 16) calls “mental control”. Wa Thiong’o describes this process as follows: “Economic and political control can never be complete without mental control. To control a people’s culture is to control their tools of self-definition in relationship to others” (Wa Thiong’o, 1986: 16).

The colonial matrix of power is therefore maintained through the destruction and deliberate devaluation of indigenous people's culture, art and ways of knowing and being in the world, which is accompanied by the conscious elevation of Eurocentric regimes of knowledge (Escobar, 2007: 184). Thus, coloniality has maintained pedagogies and epistemologies that alienate (previously) colonised people from their own systems of knowledge, spirituality and culture (Dietze, 2014: 253). As a counter, the decolonial project seeks to unmask Eurocentric knowledge and uncover marginalised peoples' knowledge systems, spiritual beliefs and philosophies (Kusnierkiewicz, 2019: 3). The goal of decolonial thought is to create an agency-orientated paradigm of self-determination (Dastile, 2017: 93; Nabudere, 2006: 28).

Maria Lugones (2007: 190) argues that the decolonial enterprise does not pay enough attention to the impact of gender on postcolonial societies as part of the colonial matrix of power. She names this phenomenon "the coloniality of gender" (Lugones, 2010: 743). Taking some inspiration from Oyèrónkẹ́ Oyěwùmí's (1997) work on Yoruba gender relations in Nigeria, Lugones (2007: 197) argues that the dichotomous notion of gender identities (that being masculinity and femininity and accompanying heteronormativity) was introduced and transplanted onto colonised people through colonialism (Dietze, 2014: 266-67). Lugones (2007:198) suggests that the dichotomised cosmology of Eurocentric modernity made gender and race the central political organising principles of colonial societies and, in so doing, obscured other principles, such as seniority, that provided the basis for power and authority in pre-colonial societies. The imposition of internal gendered hierarchies was a powerful colonising tool, as it eroded the reciprocal character of indigenous social relations between men and women and broke down solidarity (Mendoza, 2016: 117).

Likewise, African-feminist decolonial thinkers argue that the oppression of women in Africa has its roots in the heterosexual patriarchy of the European imperial project (Makama *et al*., 2019: 3; Nkenkana, 2015: 45; Bertolt, 2018: 6). An African decolonial-feminist perspective insists that gender security on the continent needs to consider the role of global power structures in the perspectives and outcomes of security analyses, as the transformational potential of gender security can only be harnessed once the broader global power structures in which gender is contextualised and defined are interrogated (Nkenkana, 2015: 49-50).

Following from this, my research is informed by the decolonial-feminist practice of highlighting the global coloniality of power and its production of gender silences through the institutionalisation of the WPS agenda on the African continent. This project takes on a perspective that resists binary thinking and the essentialisation of gender identities by exploring the experiences of those women who are marginalised from global politics and by adopting alternative indigenous perspectives. However, the theoretical perspective of my research is not wholly decolonial, as it is also postcolonial in its orientation. The reason for this is because decolonial thinkers insist that their enterprise is defined by ridding their research of any Western points of reference (Asher and Ramamurthy, 2018: 3). This is based on the idea that the emancipatory potential of the decolonial project atrophies if scholars rely on "the master's tools" for knowledge production (Lorde, 1983: 27).

Hudson (2018: 49) questions whether the decolonial project achieves this goal, as it runs the risk of perpetuating "dichotomous thinking of the coloniser versus the colonised". Thus, the enterprise does not offer an alternative beyond the attempt to remove coloniality from the analytical gaze, which given the nature of the decolonial project is unlikely. As a result, decolonial thought focusses on the negative consequences of coloniality without offering positive solutions. In addition, decolonial perspectives are undergirded by a critique of world systems analysis (Grosfoguel, 2010) and, for this reason, they tend to focus on problematising, renegotiating and rethinking the larger more abstract structures of world politics. This critique is somewhat removed from the everyday lives of indigenous people, whose experiences should be at the centre of the decolonial enterprise. My study recognises these limitations, but this does not mean I dismiss the value that decolonial-feminist perspectives add to my analysis. On the contrary, decolonial-feminist work offers vital conceptual pathways for thinking about the convergence of critical and liberal-feminist discourses in the institutionalisation of the WPS ecosystem in Africa. For this reason, I look to supplement the decolonial approach with postcolonial-feminist perspectives.

#### *2.5.1.2 Postcolonial feminisms: positive solutions*

Postcolonialism is a critical framework and methodology used to interpret cultural, political and economic colonial forces (George, 2006: 212; Schutte, 2007: 165-66; Kerner, 2017: 847;

Dube, 1999: 216). Postcolonial scholars use poststructuralist tools (discursive and deconstructive analysis) to challenge the hegemony of the colonial regime and the coercive way it has produced (previously) colonised people as reduced, simplified and embedded in notions of nativism, custom and creed (Mama, 2001: 67). This implies that postcolonialism takes seriously the rearticulations of colonialism and imperialism evident in asymmetrical North-South power relations, the legitimation of knowledge, global capitalism and international policy (Kerner, 2017: 854; Schutte, 2007: 166; Harney-Mahajan, 2016: 1; Bhambra, 2014: 117; George, 2006: 213). The object of postcolonial thinking is to resist and subvert the de-historical artifacts of Eurocentric thought by revealing the ways in which indigenous/third world histories and knowledges are altered and muted by hegemonic colonial discourses (Tyagi, 2014: 45; Parashar, 2016: 371). Ultimately, these scholars seek to reassert marginalised voices and agency by producing alternative subaltern accounts of colonialism, capitalism and nationalism within and against these hegemonic discourses (Mendoza, 2016: 108-9).

Embedded in the postcolonial tradition is, therefore, both the culture of colonialism and a resistance to that culture (Mishra and Hodge, 2005: 378). This ambiguity is crucial to the critical potential of postcolonial thinking. It is for this reason that I supplement my decolonial approach with a postcolonial critical framework, as postcolonial thinking recognises the heterogeneity and interdependence of cultural experiences, while simultaneously resisting and deconstructing hegemonic discourses and power relations (Said, 1978: 36).

Early postcolonial texts did not engage with the concept of gender within the histories and legacies of colonialism and postcolonialism in a sustained manner (Harney-Mahajan, 2016: 1). Thus, postcolonial feminisms centre gender and its effects within this postcolonial perspective (Schutte, 2007: 166; Al-Wazedi, 2021: 156; Harney-Mahajan, 2016: 4; Rajan and Park, 2005: 54). In her pivotal essay *Can the Subaltern Speak?*, Spivak (1988: 94) outlines how Western knowledge systems produce the subaltern monolithic discursive subject of the poor ‘third world woman’. Spivak argues that this discursive practice silences women from the Global South through a form of “ventriloquism” (Mendoza, 2016: 109). Here, under the guise of giving voice to the oppressed, Western activist and academic discourses substitute Orientalist views of third world women for the lived realities of subaltern experience (Spivak, 1988: 102).

To describe this process, Spivak (1988: 76) uses the concept of othering. Othering is a discursive process through which a dominant in-group, or the Self, constructs dominated out-groups, or Others, through essentialised (real or imagined) differences. Othered persons are then bundled together and known according to broad negative stereotypes, which come into being through hierarchical power relations (Mauthner, 2013: 24). It is worth noting that othering produces binary constructions or dichotomies, such as men/women, white/black, rich/poor, straight/gay, trans/cis, and North/South (Culea, 2014: 95). These dichotomies are then reified through what Hudson (2014: 112) calls “technologies of othering”, or structural and physical violence. It is through violence and power that differences between identity groups are produced and maintained. Postcolonial-feminist scholars argue that Western liberal-feminist discourses ‘other’ women in the Global South, and in this way, misrepresent the complexity of everyday gendered experiences in the postcolonial context (George, 2006: 211).

Similarly, Chandra Talpade Mohanty in her landmark essay *Under Western Eyes: Feminist Scholarship and Colonial Discourse* (1988) articulates a critique of Western liberal-feminist scholarship on ‘third world women’. Mohanty (1988: 57) explores the Western feminist articulation of the ‘third world woman’ as perennially “ignorant, poor, uneducated, tradition-bound, domesticated, family-orientated, victimised” (Mendoza, 2016: 109). This image of the third world woman is predicated on the discursive self-presentation of Western women as “secular, liberated, and having control over their own lives” (Mohanty, 2003: 42). These two discursive vestiges enable and sustain one another, and, in so doing, authorise Western feminist writings on the Global South.

Mohanty (2003: 42) argues that this feminist project is tied into the larger economic and cultural colonisation of the ‘non-Western’ world. She expands her analysis by exploring the lived experiences of marginal women in relation to global capitalism (Mohanty, 2003: 119). Mohanty (2003: 232) maintains that the locations of indigenous, poor and third world women yield crucial knowledge about power and inequity within an integrated capitalist system. This is why she holds that cross-cultural feminist work must consider the intersection between the micropolitics of context, subjectivity and struggle, as well as the macropolitics of global economic and political systems and processes (Mohanty, 2003: 223). This intellectual move undergirds Mohanty's (2003: 226) call for building strategic coalitions and solidarities across feminist borders so as to create an inclusive paradigm for thinking about social justice. Kerner (2017: 855) argues that the goal of Mohanty's work is to change relations of difference into relationships of strategic solidarity, which makes her work action-orientated.

The action-orientated inflection of Mohanty's thinking is reflected in the interesting positive solutions that postcolonial feminisms offer as an alternative to the decolonial hyperfocus on the 'underside' or negative effects of coloniality. These solutions are drawn from the everyday experiences of indigenous women. The postcolonial-feminist enterprise is characterised by a commitment to "subaltern women and men who wage daily struggles in a post-conflict world" (Hudson, 2012: 447). Taking heed of this, my research will explore the alternative and positive ways of looking at gender and its intersections on the continent from the perspectives that postcolonial and African feminisms offer.

#### *2.5.1.3 African feminisms and their Ubuntu-inspired roots*

In the African context, it is important to recognise that the range of categories that impact social relations on the continent may be different from race, class and gender (Meer and Müller, 2017: 3-4). Many scholars (Oyěwùmí, 2004; Kisiang'ani, 2004; Bakare-Yusuf, 2004; Cornwall, 2005) suggest that male gender privilege and the accompanying discursive system of patriarchy are enshrined tenets of the culture of modernity, and therefore need to be treated critically. In particular, African-feminist scholars (Amadiume, 1987; Oyěwùmí, 1997) maintain that the foundational arguments of feminist literature in the West are not easily transferable to non-Western contexts. African feminisms offer an alternative to the global understanding of 'women's empowerment', by looking to African histories and cultures for indigenous tools for empowering women and enlightening men (Tamale, 2020: 227). Chigwedere (2010: 24) suggests that African feminisms aim to "revise and retain African traditions", and so these feminisms are grounded in an African cultural perspective, geo-political location and ideological viewpoint (Nkealah, 2016: 62). Thus, African feminisms are underpinned by an ideology of gender inclusion, collaboration and accommodation to ensure that both women and men contribute (even if not equally) to improving the material conditions of women (Nkealah, 2016: 63).

Two widely recognised African feminisms include Womanism and Motherism. Chikwenye Okonjo Ogunyemi (1985: 72) defines Womanism as a philosophy that “celebrates black roots, the ideals of black life”. The ideal of Womanism is “where every black person has a modicum of power and so can be a ‘brother’ or a ‘sister’ or a ‘father’ or a ‘mother’ to the other” (Ogunyemi, 1985: 72). It, therefore, calls for the meaningful union between black women, black men and black children in the pursuit of gender justice. Comparatively, Motherism offers an alternative view of women’s empowerment by taking inspiration from an African pastoral ideal of motherhood that celebrates the symbolic roles of service, care and nurturing central to African women’s lives (Lewis, 2001: 6). Catherine Obianuju Acholonu (1995: 110) writes that “Africa’s alternative to feminism is Motherism and Motherism denotes motherhood, nature and nurture”.

Pertinent to my study are those African feminisms that foreground the relationality of gender, these include: Stiwanism, Nego-feminism and Snail-sense feminism. Molara Ogundipe-Leslie (1994: 230) developed Stiwanism, or STIWA for short, which stands for Social Transformation Including Women in Africa. Stiwanism discusses the idea of strategic partnering with men in ways that are rooted in African cultures, cosmologies and worldviews (Ogundipe-Leslie, 1994: 207). According to Stiwanism, the female struggle hinges on the commitment of both men and women. Meanwhile, Obioma Nnaemeka (2003: 360-61) defines Nego-feminism as “the feminism of negotiation; no ego feminism”. Nego-feminism is framed as a feminism of “negotiation, give and take, compromise and balance” (Nnaemeka, 2003: 378). Feminists must negotiate “patriarchal land mines” and make compromises with men to gain freedoms for women’s benefit (Nnaemeka, 2003: 378). Lastly, Akachi Adimora-Ezeigbo (2012) proposes the theory of snail-sense feminism. The metaphor of the snail suggests that women should navigate harsh patriarchal terrains with caution, flexibility, foresight and an awareness for danger, and with the double sensibility to bypass obstacles. A snail-sense feminist negotiates her way around patriarchy, collaborates with non-sexist men and uses diplomacy in her feminist dealings with society at large (Adimora-Ezeigbo, 2012: 27). Like Nego-feminism and Stiwanism, this is a conciliatory rather than a confrontational approach to gender-based oppression.

The African-feminist paradigm emphasises an alternative, positive view of gender and its role in society based on the lived experience of African communities and insists on collaboration between men and women to create peaceful and prosperous communities (Cornwall, 2005; Nnaemeka, 2005). Mekgwe (2008: 13) posits that feminist writing in and about Africa is both an activist movement and a body of ideas that underscores the necessity for the positive transformation of society where women are recognised and respected as full citizens of life (Mama, 2020: 364). Thus, it is worthwhile to consider the African-feminist understandings of gender relations that can contribute toward creating safer communities and more sustainable peace.

One such understanding is Ubuntu feminism. Ubuntu feminism focusses on the role of care ethics in African communities and the implementation of an Ubuntu perspective when evaluating and theorising gender relations (Cornell and van Marle, 2015: 1). Ubuntu is an African worldview, ethic and humanist philosophy (Biney, 2014: 29), encapsulated by Mbiti's dictum: "I am because we are; and since we are, therefore I am" (Mbiti, 1969: 108-109). Or, in other words, to be human is to recognise your humanity as a function of the existence of others. One's humanity is then contingent on one's obligations to one's community. In this context obligation is not seen as a burden or imposition, but as a "means of sustaining one's place in a network of belonging: that most vital attribute of humanity, sociability, and ultimately, being-in-the-world" (Praeg, 2014b: 97). Thus, Ubuntu offers a worldview that is characterised by the core values of "communalism, interdependence, compassion, empathy, respect, and dignity" (Idoniboye-Obu and Whetho, 2013: 230-234).

It emphasises that the individual is a function of the community, and the community is a function of the individual (Chisale, 2018: 7). The individual and the community are inextricably linked. Nussbaum (2003: 22) aptly captures this relationship as follows: "Ubuntu sees community rather than self-determination as the essential aspect of personhood". Thus, Ubuntu feminism looks at the roles that women play in African communities from a perspective which highlights the collaborative function of gender roles, care ethics and the thriving of community life (Cornell and van Marle, 2015: 7; Chisale, 2018: 1; Ngunjiri, 2016: 225). By connecting African feminist care ethics to the communitarian values of Ubuntu philosophy, Ubuntu feminists emphasise the value of the interconnectivity and relationality of gendered relations for creating just gendered communities (Chisale, 2018: 6).

Yet, it is also important to recognise that Ubuntu can be inherently patriarchal (Nicolaides, 2015: 201). Molly Manyonganise (2015: 2) states that the discourses on Ubuntu have "conveniently ignored the implications of *Ubuntu* on gender". The notion of personhood in Mbiti's dictum, in other words the 'I' and the 'we', are presented as neutral gendered identity markers (Sanni and Ofana, 2021: 389). Chitando (2015: 276) argues that this conception of Ubuntu glosses over the hierarchical ways in which personhood and identity are constructed in African cultures. Praeg (2007: 141) deftly outlines the tensions between positive and egalitarian notions of Ubuntu and the "phallo-primocentric values" – the privileging of male and age above all other identity categories – that dominate many traditional African societies. Thus, in many instances, Ubuntu is used to sustain a hierarchical social, political and economic order in which men enjoy full and privileged status, and women's membership and participation in the community is taken for granted (Chitando, 2015: 276). For example, Chisale (2016) demonstrates that a woman is considered to have Ubuntu when she places the interests of the community over her rights as a woman. In this case, the interests of the community are equated with her expression of submission to men and her conformity to the hierarchal structure of the community. Likewise, Ilze Keevy (2014: 66) outlines the ways in which indigenous South African cultures use Ubuntu to engender and legitimise deep-seated patriarchy and gender domination. For Ubuntu to be a resource for the transformative struggle of gendered security in Africa, it needs to be progressively understood and adapted.

Cornell and van Marle (2015: 6) posit that Ubuntu can also be used as a critique of patriarchy. They argue that Ubuntu feminism embodies acts of resistance (Cornell and van Marle, 2015: 6); where women's practice of care work in the community is both a site of oppression and freedom. Cornell and van Marle (2015: 6) illustrate this through the allegory of Penelope, Odysseus's abandoned wife. They refer to Adriana Cavarero's (1995: 14) retelling of the story, where Penelope weaves a burial shroud for her dead father-in-law. She weaves on her loom all day and proceeds to unweave the same cloth at night. She claims that she will remarry once she has finished the shroud, yet in unweaving her work at night she never finishes and so, according to custom, she is not obliged to marry any of her suitors. While she weaves and unweaves, Penelope manages to work within and against her traditional role, and in doing so, creates a new emancipatory feminist space of her own making. Cornell and van Marle suggest that Penelope's weaving and unweaving is representative of the productive power of resistance, which they call the feminist politics of refusal, "a refusal of not only patriarchy, but also of any notion of a feminism unmodified" (Cornell and van Marle, 2015: 6).

It is therefore important to use the positive aspects of Ubuntu, such as the emphasis on community, while remaining critical of how Ubuntu has been used by patriarchy to marginalise women as well. In this regard, Heidi Hudson (2021) uses a combination of Ubuntu feminism and feminist ethics of care principles to emphasise the importance of collective responsibility for ending war and sustaining peace. Similarly, Magadla and Chitando (2014: 189) suggest that the positive aspects of African Humanism and Ubuntu can be used to create solutions to GBV on the continent.

An African-feminist approach is informed by the consideration of complex power relations that emanate from overlapping identities, such as gender, race, class and culture. African feminisms then marry with the postcolonial-feminist practice of interrogating intertwined power relations, which is similar to the thinking purported in (critical) Intersectionality Studies. The two bodies of literature seek to dismantle the unitary notion of 'women' by considering the impact of various co-constituted identities, such as race, class, ethnicity, sexuality, religion and nationality (Chiweshe, 2018: 79).

My study falls into the postcolonial-feminist practice of investigating the contextual experience of gender insecurity through a perspective which prioritises the operation and intersection of co-constitutive power relations. In the context of gendered security on the African continent, a postcolonial perspective reveals that there are different ways in which intersectionality is conceptualised and used. Crucially, the ways in which intersectionality is used impacts the ability of research and policy to address and remedy violence that stems from a matrix of interlocking power relations. It is then necessary to consider intersectionality and its multiple manifestations – from its origin to its misappropriations. Thus, in the next section I explore intersectionality in the writing of Black feminists and consider the different ways in which intersectionality has been used in FSS.

### 2.5.2 Intersectionality revisited

The idea that patriarchy interacts with other systems of power to uniquely disadvantage some groups of women more than others has a long history within Black feminism's intellectual and political tradition (Davis, 1981; hooks, 1982, 1984; Hill Collins, 1986, 1989). Sojourner Truth, a Black feminist and abolitionist, in her famous 1851 speech at the Women's Rights Convention asked "and ain't I a woman?" (King, 1988: 43) to show that her experience of womanhood, because of her race, was made to be vastly different from that of white women in the United States at the time. The examination of the interconnectivity of multiple systems of power has taken on many forms in Black feminism since Truth's speech, such as the jeopardy models (Beal, 2008; Smith, 1985; King, 1988), Hill Collin's (1990) matrix of domination and Crenshaw's (1989, 1991) framing of intersectionality.

The jeopardy models of intersectionality, such as "double jeopardy" (Beal, 2008: 166), "triple jeopardy" (Smith, 1985: 8) and "multiple jeopardy" (King, 1988: 47), are referred to as additive models. This is because these models suggest that inequality increases with each additional layer of marginalisation (Hillsburg, 2013: 5), linked to a particular identity construction, being added. The additive model constructs people's experiences of oppression as separate, independent and summative.

In contrast to the additive model, the Combahee River Collective's (1977: 210) "interlocking systems of oppression" and Hill Collins' (1990: 226) "matrix of domination" suggest that systems of power are interconnected at a personal, community and structural level. Barbara Smith (1979), a founding member of the Combahee River Collective, stresses the interconnective nature of class, race, sex and sexuality, stating that "the "isms" are connected" (Smith, 1993: 12, original emphasis). This genealogy of antiracist-feminist thought laid the foundation for the saliency and reception of Kimberle Crenshaw's (1989, 1991) notion of intersectionality across the feminist academe. Crenshaw coined the concept in her ground-breaking essay *Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics* (1989). In this essay, Crenshaw argues that the doctrinal definition of discrimination is insufficient for capturing and remedying Black women's experiences of discrimination. To illustrate this, Crenshaw uses two metaphors: the car intersection and the basement. She writes that:

> Discrimination, like traffic through an intersection, may flow in one direction, and it may flow in another. If an accident happens in an intersection, it can be caused by cars travelling from any number of directions and, sometimes, from all of them. Similarly, if a Black woman is harmed because she is in the intersection, her injury could result from sex discrimination or race discrimination (Crenshaw, 1989: 149).

The metaphor shows that single-axis thinking fails to accurately capture the experiences of those who are discriminated against by more than one system of oppression. Adding to this, Crenshaw asks us to:

> Imagine a basement which contains all people who are disadvantaged on the basis of race, sex, class, sexual preference, age and/or physical disability. These people are stacked – feet standing on shoulders – with those on the bottom being disadvantaged by the full array of factors, up to the very top, where the heads of all those disadvantaged by singular factor brush up against the ceiling. Their ceiling is actually the floor above which only those who are *not* disadvantaged in any way reside. In efforts to correct some aspects of domination, those above the ceiling admit from the basement only those who can say that "but for" the ceiling, they too would be in the upper room (Crenshaw, 1989: 151; original emphasis).

The basement metaphor shows that single-axis thinking (re)produces social, economic and political hierarchies. And so, this metaphor touches on the role of macro-structures, such as the law, the economy or governing institutions, in the (re)production of systems of oppression. By focussing on structures of power, the basement metaphor illustrates that intersectionality is not just about identity politics. It demonstrates that identity politics are (re)produced through hierarchical systems of power, which have a very real and material impact on the lives of marginalised individuals and groups. The basement metaphor reflects that intersectionality is about the analysis of the structural systems that create complex disadvantage.

Crenshaw expands on her metaphorical explanation of intersectionality in her ground-breaking paper *Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence* (1991) by offering a threefold definition of the concept: structural intersectionality, political intersectionality and representational intersectionality. The first element, structural intersectionality, refers to the ways in the intersection of gender and race make women of colours' experiences of discrimination and violence qualitatively different from other groups of women (Crenshaw, 1991: 1245). Structural intersectionality therefore addresses the different individual experiences of people at the intersection of multiple identities. Notably, both positive and negative identity categories contribute to structural intersectionality. A person can be advantaged by a social category that enables social, political or economic empowerment, while simultaneously being disadvantaged by belonging to other social categories that are sources of subordination (Boogaard and Roggeband, 2010: 56).

The second element, political intersectionality, describes how intersecting categories of identity are relevant to the policies and political strategies of subordinate identity groups (Crenshaw, 1991: 1245). As Crenshaw (1991: 1245) puts it, "women of colour are situated within at least two subordinated groups that frequently pursue conflicting political agendas". The agenda of these two groups, people of colour and women, are determined and defined by the privileged members of those groups, namely white women and men of colour. And so, neither group represents the experiences, needs or political visions of women of colour, as the politics of "antiracism reproduces patriarchy and feminism reproduces racism" (Carastathis, 2016: 51). Women of colour are asked to choose between two political identities that both deny fundamental aspects of their subordination (Crenshaw, 1991: 1252). The final element, representational intersectionality, is concerned with the ways in which images, narratives or tropes of women of colour draw from sexist and racist discourses (Crenshaw, 1991: 1282). In addition, representational intersectionality points to how group representations distort the complexity of in-group differences. In this way, the interests, needs and experiences of women of colour are not wholly/accurately represented in the media, which contributes to their objectification and subordination (Carastathis, 2013: 707).

Building on Crenshaw's threefold definition, Leslie McCall (2005: 1773-74) offers three ways of approaching the methodology of intersectionality research: anticategorical, intracategorical and intercategorical complexity. Anticategorical is "based on a methodology that deconstructs analytical categories" (McCall, 2005: 1773). This approach looks to deconstruct static categories, such as women or black, and instead prioritises fluidity (Winker and Degele, 2011: 52; Walby, Armstrong and Strid, 2012: 227). This is because stable unitary categories have a tendency to essentialise experiences, which, in turn, misrepresents "the complexity of lived experience" and ultimately results in inequality and exclusion (McCall, 2005: 1773). The anticategorical approach maintains that categories only serve to reinforce and reproduce systems of oppressions that the analyst may be hoping to disrupt (Nash, 2008: 5).

When using intracategorical complexity, the analyst interrogates the boundary-making process of differences within one category. The focus is on groups that have been neglected through the intersection of multiple systems of oppression on a micro-level (Winker and Degele, 2011; 52; Walby *et al.*, 2012: 227). And finally, the focus of intercategorical complexity lies somewhere in between the first two approaches (McCall, 2005: 1784). This approach requires scholars to provisionally and strategically adopt existing analytical categories to document the relationships of inequality along multiple and conflicting dimensions (Walby *et al.*, 2012: 227). Intercategorical complexity focusses on the relationships between social groups.

Yet, following Yuval-Davis (2015: 640), it can be unproductive to read intercategorical and intracategorical complexity as mutually exclusive. Yuval-Davis (2015: 640) highlights the value in combining the two approaches in her analysis of the politics of belonging. She suggests that the critical value of an intersectional analysis is emphasised when it is situated in the experience of social categories and groupings, such as with intracategorical complexity. However, Yuval-Davis (2015: 641) also emphasises the socio-economic perspective of intercategorical complexity. This nuance between intracategorical and intercategorical complexity is where the analysis of my study is situated. My study recognises both the micro experiences of intersecting phenomena and the macro processes that impact their intersection.

Carastathis (2016: 38) points out that there is a tension between understandings of intersectionality as a metaphor and intersectionality as a multi-level framework for analysis. This tension has resulted in open-ended interpretations around what intersectionality is or is not and has allowed the concept to travel widely across various feminist and critical race inquiries – from legal theory to history, from literature to philosophy and from geography to queer studies (Davis, 2008: 68). Thus, feminist scholars have disagreed about the 'status' of intersectionality – whether it is a theory/theoretical framework, a methodology or an analytical tool (Moi, 2015: 205). While my intention is not to answer this question definitively, this contestation acts as a backdrop for framing my study on the inner workings of intersectionality.

The ease with which intersectionality has been accommodated into the feminist mainstream has led to (mis)interpretations of the concept that limit its emancipatory potential. One such example of this process can be identified in gender mainstreaming processes in global governance. Yuval-Davis (2006: 195) suggests that the liberal-feminist gender mainstreaming of international instruments relies on the ideas expressed by additive models of oppression. Liberal-feminist solutions to gender insecurity issues prioritise gender in a singular manner by looking to add women into political and economic spaces that they were previously marginalised from, without considering the intersections of other systems of oppression at play. Hancock (2007: 227) suggests that these models do not take into account the complexity of multiple oppressions, and as a result, they reproduce gender silences that place the security of marginalised individuals and communities at risk.

In this respect, Marsha Henry (2017: 5) warns researchers against using the concept of intersectionality in such a way that it "becomes detached from identity politics and those racialised subjects for whom it was written". Moi (2015: 207) writes that the generalisation of intersectionality puts the concept at risk of "becoming empty – so inclusive that it no longer means anything in particular". Thus, Henry (2017: 17) maintains that the emancipatory potential of intersectionality lies in how it has been used by Black women to highlight the silences that are produced through the intersections of multiple power relations. And therefore, when intersectionality is used to explore privileged identities, its main offering is rendered redundant. As a result of these challenges, many of the projects that claim to use intersectionality in their methodology end up flattening out the critical tenets of Crenshaw's original concept (Alexander-Floyd, 2012: 4; Kerner, 2017: 849; Nash, 2011: 447).

The co-optation of intersectionality by the feminist mainstream has blunted intersectionality's critical emancipatory edge. It is then important to think about decolonising Intersectionality Studies and what this process entails. Mendoza (2016: 103) recommends employing research methods that authorise marginalised voices and de-centre the experiences and interests of privileged groups. For instance, Braun (2011: 142) explores the intersections of international development and patriarchy in the rural highlands of Lesotho. She finds that intersectionality offers insight into the invisible burdens rural women have had to bear through the project's implementation.

In FSS and the WPS literature, intersectionality has successfully been used by researchers to examine the security silences produced through liberal-feminist approaches to peacebuilding, human rights, transitional justice and development (Ackerly and True, 2008; Rooney, 2007; Yuval-Davis, 2006; Kappler and Lemay-Hébert, 2019). Kappler and Lemay-Hébert (2019: 161) argue that an "intersectionality of peace approach" highlights the hybridity of the everyday experience through the acknowledgement of the power relations that shape the formation of identities in peacebuilding contexts. These researchers have used intersectionality to understand why the experiences of some are marginalised, while the experiences of others are privileged, by emphasising the operation of power relations both between and within groups (Kappler and Lemay-Hébert, 2019: 162; Wibben, 2014: 745, 2016: 146).

In my study, I look to build on the contribution of these scholars. I use intersectionality as tool for the analysis of power relations, the dangers of the essentialisation of identity categories and the invisibility of the experiences of the marginalised. My study will follow the approach of Yuval-Davis (2015) and combine the perspective of both intracategorical and intercategorical complexity, as my analysis is geared toward a multi-level perspective. I am concerned with how intersectionality is understood, institutionalised and implemented in feminist research, policy and practice on a macro-level through gender mainstreaming in international and national institutions, transnational NGOs and regional organisations. Yet, I am also interested in the micro-level material consequences of this process, as well as the dialectical relationship between these two spheres.

My combined perspective is grounded in a ‘back to basics’ approach. This entails going back to Crenshaw’s (1989) original ideas about intersectionality and rooting my analysis in her two metaphors of the traffic intersection and the basement, while simultaneously considering the contesting feminist discourses that emanate from these ideas. I also reflect on the ways in which these contesting discourses play out in the implementation and institutionalisation of intersectionality in gendered security research, policy and mechanisms, and the material consequences of this process.

### 2.5.3 The inner workings and logics of intersectionality

In this section, I explain how I understand the two conceptual anchors of my study, the inner workings and logics of intersectionality, as well as their relationship to each other. The inner workings of intersectionality refer to a ‘larger’ multi-level intersectionality concept. This includes both intersectionality as a concept in its own right and how intersectionality is understood, applied and implemented in feminist research, policy and practice. It centres on Crenshaw’s (1989) original ideas, as well as the feminist research that stems from those ideas and the various contesting discourses that have informed and developed from that research. By extension, the concept involves the dialectical relationship between those contesting discourses and the social/political world in feminist practice. As a result, the inner workings of intersectionality are unstable – they shift with context, time and space. Meanwhile, the logics are a ‘smaller’ intersectionality concept. These are the analytical prisms through which I explore how the inner workings are (re)produced across the different discursive and social/political levels. The logics reveal how the inner workings of intersectionality operate, which in turn, helps us to better understand intersectionality as a concept, and how it can be used to achieve emancipatory outcomes.

These two concepts are my gateway for understanding how multiple systems of oppression intersect, and for understanding how these intersections create complex experiences of violence and insecurity. I proceed by first outlining how I define, understand and apply discourse in my study. I then consider the dialectical relationship between discourse and our social/political world and how that relationship can result in the power to include/exclude. I argue that the power to include/exclude follows particular patterns of discourse, and that these patterns of discourse play out in powerful ways in gendered security research, policy and practice – especially in the understanding, implementation and application of intersectionality. I then link these dialectics to the inner workings and logics of intersectionality and define these two concepts and their relationship. Finally, I provide an overview of the three logics that I rely on in my study and their respective strategies for the (re)production of the inner workings of intersectionality.

*What is discourse?* Discourse, as it is used here, is the process through which written and verbal language is (re)produced and shaped through social practice (Shepherd, 2008a: 297; Hudson, 2012: 444).[14] In this respect, language has an internal relationship with society, which implies that linguistic phenomena are social phenomena and vice versa (Bucholtz, 2003: 44; Wodak, 2001: 63-64). As discourses are embedded within social practices, they do not exist in a vacuum. Discourses are in constant conflict with other discourses that operate across our social terrain and are, therefore, not static in time and space. Any sense of knowledge or meaning is only temporarily fixed in discourse.

*Discourse as the power to include or exclude:* Yet often meaning, or knowledge-making, comes into being through a system of exclusionary practices and structures (Björkdahl and Selimovic, 2015: 314). The production of knowledge through discursive systems is thus intrinsically political. Discourses are organised through practices of inclusion and exclusion, which structure our sense of reality and identity and, in turn, formulate and give meaning to the "objects of which they speak" (Björkdahl and Selimovic, 2015: 314). Power is then replicated in the way that symbolic practices construct our perceptions of reality. This is not to assume that individuals' have no agency within a discursive system, as the individual participates in the production of the discourse itself. Therefore, to understand how discourses operate, one must consider how they (re)produce our material and immaterial social reality.

International security discourses shape what is considered to be a threat to security and what the objects of securitising practices and policy are (Shepherd, 2008a: 294). Security discourses are then moulded through a relationship between power/discourse and political institutions/practice (Hudson, 2012: 444). As discourses are built through practices of inclusion and exclusion, security discourses are arranged according to the practice of prioritising the security of some over others. This relationship is constituted through different discursive logics, which impact the security of individuals in different ways (Shepherd, 2008a: 295). To realise the emancipatory potential of security practices, it then becomes necessary to consider how different logics of security operate and whether they really address the insecurities that threaten sustainable peace.

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[14] Following Foucault (1972: 49), discourse is not limited to text and verbal language, but includes all symbolic practices and their relationship to power structures and knowledge production (Mills, 1997: 16).

*Discourse and the (re)production of conceptual patterns:* Different discourses are (re)produced through different patterns or configurations of concepts. Shepherd (2008a: 294) calls these logics. She defines 'logics of security' as "the ways in which various concepts are organised within specific discourses of security" (Shepherd, 2008a: 294). In her definition, Shepherd (2008a: 294) also includes the "claims" and "assumptions" that inform the arrangement of security discourses, as well as the "policy prescriptions" that stem from them. For Shepherd (2008a: 294), every security discourse has a distinct primary focus, or the referent object, and a perspective about how the international system should be arranged to ensure the security of that object. A deconstructive discourse analysis of the assemblage of security discourses therefore reveals patterns of language, text and power, through which different logics of security can be identified (Hall, 2020: 71).

*Dialectics of gender discourses, social practices and intersectionality?* In terms of gender security, different understandings about gender result in a dialectical relationship between discourse and social practice, through which gendered security discourses are (re)produced and translated. Deconstructive discourse analysis can be used to reveal the patterns of this relationship, which then provides insight into how gendered security discourses operate in different social, political and economic contexts (Hall, 2020: 71). By exposing the logics that underpin gendered security discourses, we can begin to assess whether gendered security policy and practice works to address or negate the insecurity of marginalised men, women and LGBTQIA folk in conflict-affected and post-conflict societies. Of particular interest to my study are the logics of gendered security that surround gender and its interconnection with other markers of identity, such as race, ethnicity, class, nationality, sexuality or disability. Gender and its intersections are known and understood according to different points of view.

These points of view operate according to particular logics, which have different gendered results in terms of the impact of post-conflict peace and reconstruction processes.

In this respect, my study will use a deconstructive discourse analysis to reveal the different logics that inform the implementation of intersectionality within the realm of gendered security scholarship, policy and practice. My study seeks to reveal the interior nature of the discourses that surround intersectionality, as these mechanisms, and the impact they have on insecurity, violence and the experiences of gendered subjects within a hierarchical system of gender differentiation, are not always outwardly visible.

Central to my study is the inner workings of intersectionality. As the interiority of intersectionality is not outwardly visible, it can be misunderstood and, in turn, misappropriated. This dilemma is evident in the open-ended varied application of intersectionality, which has allowed scholars to use the concept in their analyses of the intersections of privileged bodies. By removing intersectionality from its critical roots, this application dulls the concept's emancipatory potential. I am therefore interested not only in the interior world of intersectionality, but also the ways in which that interior world has been neglected.

Part of why the inner workings of intersectionality have been overlooked is because feminist scholars have prioritised the *why* questions over the *how* questions. Commonly, when feminist scholars use intersectionality, they use it as a tool to highlight the complexity of interlocking systems of oppression and, in doing so, they expose the silences that are produced by a single-axis lens in gender security research, policy and practice. From this point of view, the primary question being asked is '*Why* are these silences being produced?', and not '*How* are these silences being produced?' or rather '*How* do systems of oppression intersect to create complex experiences of insecurity?' By disregarding the *how* question, these scholars have glossed over the inner workings of intersectionality, which has obscured the different ways in which the concept has been applied.

For this reason, I am interested in highlighting the different discursive strategies within the intersectionality concept to make sense of the dialectical relationship between intersectionality and the gendered security discourses and practices that emanate from international, national and non-governmental institutions. This dialectical relationship is formed between the different modes, dynamics and contestations of intersectionality and the social practice of these in the political space.

*The connection between logics and inner workings:* As mentioned above, I use the term inner workings to refer to the intersectionality concept in totality. I also explained that the inner workings are made up of different levels of (re)production. These levels are not distinct from one another, they operate as a relational whole. Yet, that operation is unstable and malleable to context, space, time and power. Understanding intersectionality then requires that we take seriously the different ways in which the inner workings are (re)produced. The (re)production of the inner workings is determined by different material goals which result in specific strategies of (re)production. Once revealed, it is evident that these strategies are produced according to different logics, or patterns of (re)production. The logics then inform *how* a strategy unfolds and achieves its material goals. By analysing the logics, I uncover part of *how* the inner workings of intersectionality operate, which offers insight into *how* different systems of oppression intersect. The circular relationship between these concepts is represented in Figure 1.

Figure 1 The logics and inner workings of intersectionality



Material Goals: Material consequences are directed toward different ends; these ends are the goals
Strategies: Different strategies (means) develop to achieve different ends
Logics: The pattern of (re)production of the strategies
Discourse: Logics manifesting as discourse
Security Practice: The different discursive applications of intersectionality in gender security policy

The logics excavate different strategies of intersectionality that are present within the gendered security discourses of the FSS and WPS literature and the WPS international policy ecosystem. This gives us insight into the inner workings of intersectionality, and into the application of intersectionality in gender security research and policy-making. Therefore, the logics offer a discursive roadmap into the inner workings of intersectionality as a concept. They also uncover the inner workings that emanate from the dialectical relationship between different interpretations of intersectionality and the implementation of those by international and regional institutions, national governments and civil society. These logics have the potential to either reinstate the gender status quo or to transform it. In my study, I have identified three logics: the logics of domination, addition and interdependence. The relationship between these logics is represented in Figure 2.

Figure 2 Logics as the discursive roadmap for the inner workings of intersectionality



*The logics of domination:* The strategies/inner workings of intersectionality that operate according to the logics of domination are applied and understood in line with Crenshaw’s (1989: 149) metaphor of the traffic intersection. According to the metaphor, in order to bring to light the interiority of intersectional violence, one needs to recognise and then highlight the co-constitution of different oppressive systems. This approach reveals the logics of domination that are at play and the discursive strategies that unfold according to these logics. The focus is on how oppressive intersections come into being and how those intersections create experiences of violence and therefore insecurity for marginalised bodies. This is the conventional way of implementing intersectionality. In Chapter three, my study explores the logics of domination through the discursive strategies of othering and difference and the (re)production of violent subject/object relations with reference to the Rwandan colonial, postcolonial, civil war and genocide periods.

*The logics of addition:* The strategies/inner workings of intersectionality that operate according to the logics of addition are informed by the liberal-feminist interpretation of intersectionality. This application of intersectionality misrecognises how different systems of oppression intersect. Instead of seeing them as co-constitutive, they are seen as additive. The interconnectivity of oppressive systems is then misrecognised, as the complexity of oppression is reduced to compounded static identity markers/variables. There are two levels of (re)production of these logics: a hegemonic level and a residual level. On the hegemonic level, gender (an essentialised 'women' category) is incrementally included into the masculinised and militarist discourses of mainstream security practice through liberal-feminist gender mainstreaming mechanisms, conventions and policies. On the residual level, diverse groups of marginalised women are 'added-into' the discursive (re)production of more dominant liberal-feminist discourses. Here, diverse experiences are recognised, such as the experiences of rural women, poor women, women with disabilities or women refugees; yet, inevitably, one identity, more often than not gender, is prioritised, and the roles of other identities, such as race, nationality, sexuality or ethnicity, are diminished. The (re)production of the logics of addition across both levels creates gender (in)security silences, as the nuance of gendered violence and the multiplicity of oppression is lost. This is illustrated through Crenshaw's (1989: 151) basement metaphor, where those who face multiple categories of discrimination are not admitted to the floor above and are left in the basement, precisely because the intersection of these categories is a location of social invisibility. By uncovering the logics of addition, one reveals the violence (re)produced through the strategies of silence and sameness evident in hegemonic single-axis and in residual diversity frameworks. I analyse the logics of addition in Chapter four through the strategies of silence and sameness evident in the hegemonic gender equality regime in post-genocide Rwanda.

*The logics of interdependence:* The logics of interdependence offer a novel way of thinking about and implementing intersectionality in feminist research, policy and practice. This is because the logics of interdependence transcend an oppression-orientated analysis by looking at those strategies that (re)produce positive intersections. The logics of interdependence are critical, as they are informed by the alternative perspectives of African feminisms. These logics are informed by Cornell and van Marle (2015: 6) use of the Penelope allegory. I build on the politics of refusal illustrated through the allegory by going beyond her practice of weaving and unweaving on an individual level to include practices of re-weaving on a community level. In this instance, the inner workings of intersectionality are (re)produced through strategies of interconnection, the goal of which is positive peace/gender justice. These are the positive co-constitutive intersections that have the dual-potential to engender experiences of violence, as well as experiences of peace. I analyse the logics of interdependence in Chapter five through the strategies of interconnection evident in the reports and studies related to the GoR's UwA intervention.

## 2.6 EVALUATION

The objective of this chapter was to discuss and outline the key tenets of the theoretical framework for this study. This chapter has therefore considered the different ways of seeing and knowing gendered security in global politics. Two research questions guided this chapter, the first was, 'What are the main concepts and key tenets of the theoretical work in FSS, WPS, postcolonial-feminist and African-feminist literature?', and the second was 'How has intersectionality been used in FSS research?'

In the first half of this chapter, I focussed on the different and sometimes contesting concepts, theories and approaches relevant to my study, drawn from feminist contributions to IR, the opposing and converging optimistic and critical-feminist perspectives in FSS, and the WPS policy ecosystem internationally and on the African continent. I highlighted the complexity and nuance evident in the WPS ecosystem and the feminist engagement with the field. These trends are represented in the process of norm translation, negotiation and 'feedback' between the international, regional and national levels of the policy ecosystem. This approach recognised that the interactions between liberal-feminist and critical-feminist discourses create opportunities for the co-optation of critical imaginings, while simultaneously generating conceptual openings that are fertile for the possibility of new emancipatory gendered outcomes.

This holistic perspective prepared the ground for the second half of the chapter, which focussed on building the theoretical framework for Chapters three, four and five. I relied on the theoretical and conceptual contributions of decolonial and postcolonial African feminisms. And I used that integrated approach to define the inner workings and logics of intersectionality – the two conceptual anchors of my study. The inner workings referred to the intersectionality concept in totality. It therefore included Crenshaw's (1989, 1991) original ideas and conceptualisations, as well as the feminist work that has stemmed from those texts, the different contesting discourses within that feminist work, and the dialectical relationship between those discourses and the social/political world. These dialectics play out in the social world according to different goals with different strategies, and these strategies (re)produce the inner workings according to different patterns or logics. In the last section, I laid out the conceptual dynamics of the logics of domination, addition and interdependence. The logics of domination unfold through strategies of othering and difference, whereas the logics of addition unfold through strategies of silence and sameness, and the logics of interdependence unfold through strategies of interconnection.

In revealing the logics of intersectionality, I made a theoretical argument about *how* the inner workings of intersectionality are (re)produced, which I suggested gives us an understanding of *how* multiple systems of oppression intersect and create experiences of gender insecurity. In Chapters three, four and five, I apply these conceptual insights to the Rwandan case study. In Chapter three, the first of my empirical chapters, I set the stage for my analysis of the logics of addition and interdependence by analysing the more conventional logics of domination evident in the historical intersections between gender, ethnicity and race in Rwanda.

# CHAPTER THREE: THE LOGICS AND INNER WORKINGS OF DOMINATION

## 3.1 GENERAL OVERVIEW

Intersectionality is an analytical framework, concept or methodology used to reveal the interconnections between identities, and how those interconnections create variable experiences of discrimination and privilege. An intersectional lens provides the conceptual space to engage with the complexity of gender insecurity, which needs to be considered if sustainable peace is to be achieved in post-conflict communities. In this chapter, my objective is to critically analyse the theoretical as well as practical/empirical manifestations and implications of understanding and applying the inner workings of intersectionality through the logics of domination. I aim to analyse how the inner workings of intersectionality are (re)produced through the strategies of othering and difference, which unfold according to the logics of domination. As indicated in Chapter two (page 69), the logics of domination are informed by Crenshaw's (1989: 149) traffic intersection metaphor. This is typically how intersectionality is applied and understood in feminist research. In this instance, the focus is on the inability of a single-factor analysis to capture the nature of complex experiences of violence and, following on from this, the empirical, practical and theoretical value of highlighting the interconnections of different systems of oppression in research.

The dynamic discursive (re)production of binary differences between corporate identity groups – and the dialectical interaction between those discourses and the modalities of social, economic and political power – is not a haphazard process. In fact, the (re)production occurs according to discursive patterns of inclusion/exclusion and subject/object power relations which have a particular goal: the domination or oppression of a different identity group. Hence, the logics of domination. These logics come into being through what I call the strategies of othering and difference. As the goal is domination, the strategies are inherently violent discursive phenomena. This is then a means-ends analysis, which untangles the different levels through which the strategies of othering are (re)produced and reveals the different contestations and dynamics that make up the logics of domination. In revealing these logics, I also unearth *how* the multi-level strategies of othering can be used to understand intersectionality, and, in turn, *how* different systems of oppression intersect and create experiences of complex discrimination and violence.

In this chapter, I ground my analysis in the strategies of othering and difference evident in pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial Rwanda.[15] In particular, I am interested in the intersecting racial, ethnic, autochthonous and gendered strategies of othering. I analyse how the intersections between the strategies of othering (re)produced the logics of domination evident in the power relations between the Hutu and Tutsi, and how these logics manifested themselves through sexual violence in the Rwandan genocide. My research questions for this chapter are as follows: 'What are the practical/empirical implications of using intersectionality as a logic of domination?', 'Has the historical intersection between ethnicity and gender contributed toward insecurity in Rwanda?' and lastly, 'How do multiple systems of oppression intersect?'

In section 3.2, I layout the theoretical groundwork for the chapter. In section 3.3, I provide an overview of how the transethnic political identities of Hutu, Tutsi and Twa came into being through the expansion of the pre-colonial Rwandan state. I then demonstrate how these identities were racialised and ethnicised through an analysis of the (re)production of the intersecting racial and ethnic strategies of othering in colonial institutions. In section 3.4, I focus on the intersections of autochthonous strategies of othering with the racial and ethnic strategies of othering evident in the Hutu Power ideology, postcolonial nation-building project, the civil war and genocide. In section 3.5, I build on the argument of the previous sections by analysing the (re)production of the intersecting racial, ethnic and autochthonous strategies of othering with gendered strategies of othering in the colonial period and in the post-colonial era. In section 3.6, I focus on how these intersections played out in the genocide through sexual violence. Finally in section 3.7, I evaluate my analysis of the logics of domination and the inner workings of intersectionality.

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[15] In Chapter two, section 2.5.1, I defined postcolonialism as a critical framework and methodology; here, the term post-colonial broadly refers to those post-independence territories once dominated by the realities, processes and power dynamics of imperialism and colonialism, as well as the cultural phenomena produced in or about these places (Harney-Mahajan, 2016: 1).

## 3.2 THE LOGICS OF DOMINATION: OTHERING, DIFFERENCE AND VIOLENCE

The logics of domination are informed by the notion of ‘othering’, which takes its cue from Edward Said’s (1978) Orientalism. Said (1978: 48) argues that Western knowledge presents the Orient as irrational, childlike and exotic, which is in direct contrast to the rational and mature Occident. He suggests that Western knowledge about the Orient is used to negatively characterise him/her as inferior (Said, 1978: 49). This acts as the ideological underpinning and justification for the imperial and colonial economic and political interests of the West (Mauthner, 2013: 26). Orientalism, thus, relies on the construction of dichotomies between categories such as race, religion, development and modernity. These dichotomies are formed through subject/object relations in discourse, a process known as othering (Mauthner, 2013: 25).

Gayatri Spivak (1988: 75) postulates that it is through othering that the subject is defined, where the subject knows itself as itself on the basis that it is not the Other. The Western subject chooses what is constitutive of itself in conversation with what it is not, which then renders what it is not as devoid of the subject – the subaltern object or the colonial Other (Spivak, 1988: 102). The Other may then only be known according to how it is unlike the subject, and never for what it is. In fact, the knowledge of what it is, is almost entirely lost, as its existence is reduced to a mere statement, or marker, of difference. Spivak (1988: 80) questions whether we can ever know the Other, and indeed, if the Other can even speak for itself within the confines of Western knowledge systems.

Culea (2014: 95) states that othering is “built on oppositional binaries” where perceptions of difference “reveal gaps between white and black, primitive and civilised, educated and uneducated, good and bad, lazy and hardworking, even human and nonhuman”. These dichotomies are then reified through what Hudson (2014: 112) calls “technologies of othering”, or structural and physical violence. Perceptions of difference formed through othering are, therefore, intimately connected to psychological, linguistic, cultural, economic and political power. It is through these modalities of power that the colonised Other is devalued and discriminated against (Hall, 1997: 261).

The colonised Other is a homogenised cultural, political and racial essentialisation, whose ‘depravity’ is regulated and contained through the ‘civilising’ forces of cultural, structural and physical colonial and imperial violence (Culea, 2014: 96). Othering forms the discursive foundation of those racialised hierarchies that legitimised violent colonial policies, practices and administration such as slavery, conquest, dispossession, imprisonment, rape, serfdom, forced labour and killing (Nnaemeka, 2008: 1749-50; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2012: 421). It is the interconnection between essentialised difference-making and power that characterises the logics of domination.

The logics of domination are products of the ‘underside’ of modernity, as they are produced and maintained through the binary thinking that characterises coloniality (Mendoza, 2016: 114). Thus, the dichotomous thinking that produces the logics of domination is also an artefact of the coloniality of power (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2012: 422; Sithole, 2015: 25). Frantz Fanon suggests that the colonial world is divided in two: the zone of being and nonbeing (Roberts, 2004: 140; Grosfoguel, 2016: 10). The zone of being is occupied by the Self, the conqueror, the coloniser and the settler and is defined by images of beauty, abundance, domination and self-assurance – it is effectively, the zone of ‘civilised’ humanity. On the other hand, if one does not belong to this zone, if one is made to be a colonised Other whose humanity is denied, then one cannot claim the rights and assurances of a “civilised human being” (Roberts, 2004: 140) and is condemned to inhabit the zone of nonbeing. The zone of nonbeing is captured by Fanon’s notion of the *damnes* (the damned or the wretched) and is occupied by the African Other, or ‘Bantu’ – the epitome of primitivism, infantilism and darkness (Nnaemeka, 2008: 1749; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2012: 421; Sithole, 2018: 36). In other words, the zone of nonbeing can also be described as the “coloniality of being” (Quijano, 2000: 536), which has race at its centre (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2012: 422). The zone of nonbeing persists through the period of independence and into the present as the coloniality of being, where the coloniality of power continues to marginalise the experiences of the African Other. In this way, the *damnes* of colonialism are reproduced in and through the coloniality of power in the postcolonial nationalist African state (Mamdani, 2003: 144).

The logics of domination produce the zones of being and nonbeing, and in so doing, ensure that the African Other remains the *damnes* through ‘technologies of othering’. Fanon (1963:

75) suggests that colonial violence "does not magically disappear after the ceremony of trooping the national colours". This is because, the logics of domination have reproduced themselves in the African nationalist psyche. Fanon (1963: 85) argues that "the colonised man finds his freedom in and through violence", as for him/her, the only way for the colonised Other to assert his/her humanity is through the agency of violence. Decolonisation requires the African Other to take and not accept a condition of freedom (Roberts, 2004: 144). Therefore, anticolonial violence has intrinsic value, as violence is an act of agency and is then also a claim to humanity (Roberts, 2004: 143). For this reason, the liberation struggles of African nationalists reproduced colonial violence in order to discharge colonial violence. Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2012: 438) posits that this "further formed a seedbed for future cultures of violence". The logics of domination persist in the condition of the postcolonial state, just used in different modes for different means. It is through the coloniality of power that Mahmood Mamdani's (2003: 136) "victim-turned-perpetrator" repoliticises the racial identities of the colonial past, and in so doing, (re)produces the logics of domination that maintain a zone of being and nonbeing, subject and Other, in the post-colonial moment.

The nuts and bolts of the logics of domination are the strategies of othering and difference. The goal of the strategies of othering is the subjugation or oppression of Others (re)produced through dehumanising violence over various time periods. To achieve this goal, the strategies unfold according to discursive patterns (different subject/object relations).[16] These create discourses of difference, which, once dialectically (re)produced on an institutional level, manifest in the material social and political world through structural and physical violence or "technologies of othering" (Hudson, 2014: 112). Pertinent to the continued (re)production of the strategies of othering is thus the interconnection between the practice of discursive difference-making and power. It is the technologies of othering that produce and maintain the colonial zones of being and nonbeing well into the post-colonial era.

Thus, the logics of domination are informed by McCall's (2005: 1773-74) intracategorical complexity approach, as attention is paid to the process of boundary-making and boundary-defining. The intracategorical approach considers the complexity of lived experience within social groups at points of intersection. In addition, the logics of domination borrow from the intercategorical approach (McCall, 2005: 1773), as the logics also document the changing and dynamic configurations of inequality between social groups (see Chapter two section 2.5.2). In the sections that follow, I argue that the transethnic and fluid pre-colonial Tutsi/Hutu categories were reshaped into bipolar political identities in the post-colonial era. This was achieved through the (re)production of the intersecting racial, ethnic, autochthonous and gendered strategies of othering in hierarchical colonial and post-colonial institutions.

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[16] For a visual representation of these relationships see Figure 1 page 68.

## 3.3 FROM TUTSI PRIVILEGE TO TUTSI POWER

It is generally supported by scholars that the transhistorical identities of Rwanda – Hutu, Tutsi and Twa – did exist in the pre-colonial era (Mamdani, 2020: 42; Hintjens, 2001: 27; Nikuze, 2014: 1090). Collectively, they represented a cultural community of Kinyarwanda speakers through “centuries of cohabitation, intermarriage and cultural exchange” both within the borders of the Rwandan state and on a regional level (Mamdani, 2020: 74). Traditionally, these identities were not defined along racial or ethnic lines; instead, these identities were markers of political and economic status (Hintjens, 2001: 27; Temoney, 2016: 5; Mamdani, 2020: 59). Tutsi, Hutu and Twa were terms that indicated membership to different political communities within a single incorporated feudal social structure, the Rwandan monarchy, which functioned through a unified system of power centralised around the Tutsi *mwami* (king) and his court (Hintjens, 2001: 27). It was through the imposition of European race theories that Tutsi privilege and Hutu oppression were rigidified and frozen in time. In this section, I show that while Tutsi supremacy was originally developed and supported by Tutsi privilege under *Mwami* Rwabugiri in the late nineteenth century, the end product, Tutsi power, was reproduced through “a far more comprehensive colonial ideology” of the Tutsi as a civilising and alien Hamitic race (Mamdani, 2020: 89). I argue that the intersecting operation of ethnic and racial strategies of othering in and through colonial institutions is what allowed Tutsi racial supremacy and Hutu oppression (and thereby Tutsi and Hutu racial difference) to become a ‘natural fact’ and politically volatile.

### 3.3.1 The transethnic political identities of pre-colonial Rwanda

By the late nineteenth century, the political power of the Rwandan pre-colonial state was centralised in the hands of the Tutsi *mwami* (king) (Mamdani, 2020: 64). This political process corresponded with shifting social processes, namely patron-client relations. Historically, the ownership of cattle was representative of wealth and, in turn, power (Baisley, 2014: 44-45). The Tutsi, as pastoralists, were those who had many cattle; in contrast, the Hutu, as agriculturalists, and the Twa, as forest dwellers, were those without cattle and therefore of lower group status (Temoney, 2016: 5; White, 2009: 473). The Hutu/Tutsi relationship was defined according to clientship, where a client could offer labour or presentations of goods in exchange for the use of a cow, land or protection (Baisley, 2014: 45). Clientship took on different forms over the centuries, which affected the reciprocity of the patron/client relationship (Newbury, 1988: 134-35).

From the first quarter of the nineteenth century, a land grant called *ibikingi* became common. *Mwami* Rwabugiri (1860-95) expanded the boundaries of the Rwandan state through a series of military campaigns, which led to "the incorporation of "Hutu" statelets in both eastern and western Rwanda" (Mamdani, 2020: 69). Hutu lineages which had previously enjoyed tenure over land found their autonomy eroded, as local Hutu chiefs were removed and swapped out for the king's Tutsi acolytes (Mamdani, 2020: 66). The Tutsi king gave his most "prominent army chiefs, favoured warriors and loyal clients" the authority to establish a new land domain, or *igikingi* (singular form of *ibikingi)* (Newbury, 1980: 99). The tenure of Hutu communities became conditional on payment of presentations in food and labour to the Tutsi *igikingi* owner or local chief (Newbury, 1980: 100). The authority of Hutu lineages began to wear away and new social and political relationships that fostered inequality and domination materialised.

Mass Hutu cultivators' loss of land rights explains the consolidation of *ubureetwa* by *Mwami* Rwabugiri, a kind of clientship that entrenched Tutsi/Hutu inequality. *Ubureetwa* demanded manual labour for the local Tutsi authority, "performed as "payment" for occupation" of the *igikingi* (Mamdani, 2020: 66). This form of clientship applied only to Hutu and not to *petits*

Tutsi[17] and was "the most hated and humiliating […] It symbolised the servitude of the Hutu vis-à-vis the dominant minority" (Newbury, 1980: 100). *Ubureetwa* directly contributed to the decline of the social status of the Hutu and polarised social difference between Hutu and Tutsi (Mamdani, 2020: 66; Baines, 2003: 481). It was, therefore, through the expansion of the pre-colonial Rwandan state and the correspondent shift in social processes, such as clientship, that the Hutu came to be known as a transethnic political identity of subjugation (Mamdani, 2020: 69-70). The political identity 'Hutu' referred to a variety of ethnic communities whose authority was diminished under the subjugation of the pre-colonial Rwandan state.

However, the fabric of traditional Rwandan society was not only determined by the Tutsi/Hutu hierarchy. These different political communities were also bound through clan and locality allegiances, military service and common religious and cultural practices (Hintjens, 2001: 28). Hutu, Tutsi and Twa were connected through shared obligations, as the Hutu and Tutsi lived together, not only as neighbours, but also intimately through marriage (Adekunle, 2007: 5; Mamdani, 2020: 70). Pointedly, there is much historical evidence of intermarriage between Tutsi, Hutu and Twa that spans centuries (Temoney, 2016: 5). Inasmuch as status divided pre-colonial Rwandans, due to the interconnectivity of the different social groups, these boundaries were permeable and fluid, which allowed for movement across the Tutsi and Hutu identity lines (White, 2009: 473; Wielenga, 2014: 126). An individual's status could change, as a prosperous Hutu could become Tutsi (*kwihutura*) and a poor or unsuccessful Tutsi could become Hutu (*gucipira*) (Mamdani, 2020: 70). In addition, a male Hutu could change his status to that of a Tutsi through the acquisition of cattle (*icyihuture*) (Temoney, 2016: 5). This movement implies that, just as the Hutu were a transethnic group of subjects, the Tutsi were a transethnic group affiliated to power – those that were "in power, near power, or simply […] identified with power" (Mamdani, 2020: 75). Yet, with the establishment of German (1897-1916) and, after World War 1, Belgian (1916-onwards) colonial rule over the Ruanda-Urundi territory, the relatively fluid transethnic political identities of Hutu and Tutsi became frozen in time through the imposition of European race theories (White, 2009: 472; Temoney, 2016: 5; Kubai and Ahlberg, 2013: 472).

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[17] Mamdani (2020: 74) refers to Tutsi who were not part of the ruling elite as the "*petits* Tutsi". These Tutsi lived in similar socio-economic circumstances as their Hutu counterparts, many of them did not own cattle and relied on client-patron relations (Eltringham, 2006: 433).

### 3.3.2 The Hamitic hypothesis

Rival colonists (the Belgians, Germans, English and French) shared the conviction that evidence of organised state life in pre-colonial Africa was due to invading groups that had come from elsewhere (North and Northeast Africa and the Middle East) and conquered local populations (Eltringham, 2006: 425). These migratory groups were known as Hamites and the idea that they were "the hidden hand behind civilisation" on the continent is what is referred to as the Hamitic hypothesis (Mamdani, 2020: 87). The hypothesis was supported by nineteenth century anthropology and 'race science' (Baisley, 2014: 48; Fox, 2011: 283; Kubai and Ahlberg, 2013: 472).

European adventurers, missionaries and settlers could not accept that an indigenous African people developed a monarchical kingdom that was as sophisticated as Rwanda was at the time (Baines, 2003: 481). The observation that the Tutsi minority ruled over a majority of transethnic Hutu subjects was erroneously combined with the description of the ruling Tutsi elite from the central court, which portrayed their physical features as 'European-like' and emphasised their slender faces and height; whereas those who were defined as Hutu and Twa were described as lower down on the evolutionary ladder because of their shorter stature and broader facial features (Hintjens, 2001: 29; Uvin, 2004: 155). This racial typology was used to support the hypothesis that the Tutsi were a settler Hamitic group, the Galla from the Middle East or Northeast Africa, and not indigenous to Rwanda (White, 2009: 473; Baisley, 2014: 48). The Galla were said to have invaded Rwanda sometime in the fifteenth century, subjugated the Hutu and Twa people and assimilated with the Rwandan society of the time through the development of a common language, culture and religion (Kubai and Ahlberg, 2013: 471). As a Hamitic group, the Tutsi were described as the descendants of a lost tribe of Israel, biologically closer to Europeans than their Hutu subjects (Temoney, 2016: 5). In time, the Tutsi were re-branded as racially superior settlers and the Hutu and Twa as the conquered Bantu destined to serve them (White, 2009: 474 Baines, 2003: 480; Wielenga, 2014: 126; Eltringham, 2006: 431; Uvin, 2004: 149). This racialised hierarchy was used as the rationale behind colonial institutional reforms (Mamdani, 2020: 87).

The transethnic political identities of pre-colonial Rwanda were, therefore, eclipsed by and (re)produced within racialised colonial ideologies, which then informed the organisation and administration of colonial political and juridical institutions. There was a dialectical shift from the discursive level (informal racial myths) to the material level (formal racial, social, economic and political processes). This shift was the product of two intersecting strategies: the racial and ethnic strategies of othering. In following sections (3.3.3 and 3.3.4), I outline how these intersecting strategies of othering and difference (re)produced the Tutsi and Hutu as two bipolar, static and internally homogenous racial identities through colonial institutions.

### 3.3.3 Ruanda-Urundi: the 'halfway house' of colonial rule[18]

In this section, I expand on how the organisation of political power in colonial Rwanda reified essentialised racial and ethnic differences between the Tutsi, Hutu and Twa through strategies of othering. It was common for twentieth century African colonies to combine characteristics of both direct and indirect colonial rule (Mamdani, 2020: 26). Yet, the administration of the Ruanda-Urundi territory took on another complicating quality – the Tutsification of customary authorities. In what follows, I outline the complex character of colonial institutions in Rwanda and how this created unequal power configurations between different colonised groups, which in turn, made the racial and ethnic difference between these groups a natural and violent 'fact' of life.

Under direct colonial rule, strategies of othering (re)produced a racial hierarchy of civilisation through a single legal order (Mamdani, 2020: 25). The colonial state distinguished between a political minority of civilised rights-bearing settlers who occupied the zone of being and a political majority of yet-to-be-civilised disenfranchised indigenous groups who occupied the zone of nonbeing. In other words, the identities of the coloniser Self and the colonised Other became a political reality through the bifurcated application of civil law, in which access to the regime of rights was determined along racial lines (Roberts and Mann, 1991: 12). Direct rule split the colonial world in two: black and white, colonised and coloniser, native and settler (Mamdani, 2020: 25). Here, racial strategies of othering were made-to-be-real through judicial and political institutions, which in turn, materially (re)produced the racialised hierarchy of colonial society.

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[18] Mamdani (2020: 35) uses this term to describe the combination of indirect and direct rule in colonial Rwanda.

In contrast, indirect rule (re)produced a hierarchy of civilisation through separate legal universes and therefore relied on multiple strategies of othering (Roberts and Mann, 1991: 20-21). Here, racial strategies of othering (re)produced racial difference between the foreign coloniser Self and the native colonised Other; while ethnic strategies of othering then (re)produced ethnic differences between racialised native groups (Mamdani, 2020: xiii). Under indirect rule, every native ethnic group was considered a different cultural community and had its own distinct "customary" law, to be implemented by its own "native authority", administered in their "home area" (Mamdani, 2020: 24). Indirect rule was then characterised by the operation of both racial and ethnic strategies of othering (Müller-Crepon, 2020: 5-6; Naseemullah and Staniland, 2016: 14; McNamee, 2019: 142-43).

As stated above, it was common for colonial administrations to combine the institutional features of direct and indirect rule, yet what made colonial Rwanda different was that the native authorities and customary law were not ethicised, they were racialised (Mamdani, 2020: 35). For this reason, Mamdani (2020: 35) refers to the administration of colonial Rwanda as a "halfway house" of colonialism. The racial strategies of othering that (re)produced the Tutsi as racially superior Hamites (and therefore as a foreign race different from the Hutu and Twa) then legitimised their authority as 'proxy' colonists – the Tutsi governed *all* colonised communities as the custodians of customary law (Eltringham, 2006: 434). This means that the Hutu and Twa were not governed by their own ethnic authorities, as would have been the case in a standard example of indirect rule.

Yet, the Tutsi were (although closer to power than the Hutu or Twa) not white settlers who enjoyed full access to civil society and the liberal rights associated with that community. The relative depravation and advantage of the Tutsi reified the racial difference between them and the Hutu and Twa, and the white settlers. The *racial* strategies of othering, therefore, (re)produced the Tutsi as what Mamdani (2020: 27) refers to as a "subject race"[19], racially distinct from both the white settler and the black native. As a subject race the Tutsi were racially associated with the coloniser, as these two groups were both recognised as non-indigenous and therefore superior to the African natives under their authority (Mamdani, 2020: 28). For this reason, the Tutsi were afforded certain privileges through their role as proxy colonists and participated in and benefited from 'the machinery of colonial rule, as agents, whether in the state apparatus or in the marketplace" (Mamdani, 2020: 27) – an enterprise Mamdani (2020: 271) refers to as "Tutsi power". Thus, the *racial* strategies of othering that (re)produced Tutsi privilege, were the same that (re)produced Hutu and Twa oppression as black natives. At the same time, *ethnic* strategies of othering differentiated these two groups from each other and other indigenous communities on the continent. The Hamitic hypothesis therefore fed into the *racial* strategies of othering that transformed the Tutsi from an elite group into a migrant identity of subordinate political power – foreigners racially distinct from their Bantu subjects (Mamdani, 2020: 102). The Tutsi were not differentiated from the Hutu and Twa through *ethnic* strategies of othering, as they were not seen as black natives; they were a different and alien race.

### 3.3.4 Tutsi power

In this section, I outline the colonial institutional reforms that were fundamental to the calcification of Tutsi power and Hutu oppression. Belgian colonial authorities instituted political reforms in the decade of 1927-36, which deflated the power of the *mwami* (king) (Binewa, 2004: 4; Mamdani, 2020: 88). This came hand in hand with the streamlining of local government and the restraining of the powers of the chiefs (Hintjens, 1999: 253). By 1926, the traditional trinity of chiefs consisting of the chief of the pastures (Tutsi), the chief of the land (Hutu) and the chief of the men (Tutsi) were abolished, and their powers were fused into one single Tutsi chief (Hintjens, 2001: 30). Thus, *all* Hutu chiefs were systematically deposed and replaced with Tutsi chiefs (White, 2009: 474). This led to abuses and the augmentation of despotic Tutsi rule, as the valuable checks and balances of the trinity were now lost. Tutsi men were given almost exclusive rights to customary power and privilege, while almost all Hutu men were excluded from these opportunities (Uvin, 2004: 158; Newbury, 1998: 11). The Tutsification of the chiefship set the stage for the institutionalisation of Tutsi power – the deployment of Tutsi as a proxy colonial ruling class (Storey, 2012: 11; Eltringham, 2006: 434). Tutsi power was instituted through the reorganisation of key institutions, namely education and taxation (Mamdani, 2020: 89; Kiwuwa, 2012: 76-77). These reforms turned the Hamitic racial supremacy of the Tutsi into an institutional fact and fundamentally altered the political, social and economic relations between the Tutsi, Hutu and Twa so as to justify a racialised local administrative hierarchy (Mamdani, 2020: 88).

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[19] Alongside the white settler, colonial law also constituted subject races. These were those colonised groups that were identified as racially distinct from indigenous Africans. They received preferential treatment under the law and were integrated into the machinery of colonial rule – they were both "instruments and beneficiaries of colonialism, however coerced the instrumentality and petty the benefits" (Mamdani, 2020: 27).

By the early 1930s, a two-tier education system was in place: a French medium stream and a separate Kiswahili medium stream. The Tutsi were taught in French and the Hutu were taught in Kiswahili. The intention was to provide the Tutsi with an assimilationist education that would instil a Hamitic ethos and prepare them for administrative positions in government (Mamdani, 2020: 90; Nikuze, 2014: 1090; Kiwuwa, 2012: 76). In contrast, the intention of the Kiswahili stream was to prepare the Hutu and Twa for manual labour. The colonial education system clearly rigidified Tutsi supremacy, particularly because it prepared them for employment in state agencies (Nikuze, 2014: 1089; Baisley, 2014: 41). The best jobs available to the colonised population were reserved for Tutsi, as only Tutsi were allowed to be employed by the colonial administration and the army (Baisley, 2014: 41).

Tutsi customary authorities implemented, with the support of Belgian forces, forceful and constraining policies against the Hutu people, including unfair taxation, forced labour, forced cultivation and forced migration (Uvin, 2004: 158). In 1927, *ubureetwa* (clientship in the form of forced Hutu labour) was specifically regulated by the Belgian colonial authorities (Newbury, 1980: 102). Previously, *ubureetwa* had been levied on the basis of local kin groups, where a single representative fulfilled the group's obligation. After the reforms, however, a Tutsi chief could legally oblige every Hutu male under their authority to perform *ubureetwa* for one day per week, which made heavier demands on Hutu labour (Newbury, 1980: 103). As the *petits* Tutsi were exempt from any forced labour, these reforms guaranteed that the Tutsi reaped the privilege of being 'higher up' on the civilisation hierarchy than the Hutu (Mamdani, 2020: 66).

The racialised hierarchy was then set in stone through the 1933 census (Mamdani, 2020: 101). Every colonised individual was classified as either Tutsi, Hutu or Twa and issued with a card proclaiming their official identity as biological and legal fact (Baines, 2003: 481; Newbury, 1995: 12; Hintjens, 2001: 30; White, 2009: 474). From then on, the Hutu and Tutsi were legislated as different racial groups. Crucially, the processes of *kwihutura, gucipira* and *icyihuture* were no longer possible (Mamdani, 2020: 101; Hintjens, 2001: 30).

To summarise, the strategies of othering are a function of essentialised difference-making. This means that the differences between corporate identity groups become politically volatile through their interconnection with oppositional discursive practices of inclusion and exclusion, which operate in and through modalities of power across the social, political and economic landscape. Collectively, these operations (re)produce the logics of domination. The strategies of othering (re)produced Tutsi privilege as Tutsi racial superiority and Hutu subjugation as racial inferiority through the political regime of the Rwandan colonial state. This regime employed a 'halfway house' administration, or a combination of direct and indirect rule, which relied on the intersection between racial and ethnic strategies of othering. The intersecting ethnic and racial strategies of othering unfolded according to binary patterns of discourse (subject/object relations) that were dialectically (re)produced in the material world, which in turn, created and maintained essentialised racial and ethnic differences between Tutsi and Hutu. The (re)production took place through colonial institutions, which created and (re)produced Tutsi power and Hutu subjugation by means of the technologies of othering, or structural and physical violence. This colonial violence produced and maintained a zone of being (occupied by white settlers), a zone of partial being (occupied by Tutsi) and a zone of nonbeing (occupied by Hutu and Twa). In the following section, I explore how the goals and (re)production of the two strategies shift through the development of Hutu extremism, which paves the way for the intersections with autochthonous strategies of othering.

### 3.4 HUTU POWER: THE VIOLENCE OF 'VICTIMS-TURNED-PERPETRATORS'[20]

In the waning days of colonialism, a Hutu counter-elite emerged from the economic opportunities provided by the introduction of a market-based economy and cash-crop exports, as well as the inclusion of more Hutu students in secondary and higher education institutions in the 1940s and 1950s (White, 2009: 475; Newbury, 1998: 12; Mamdani, 2020: 106-108). Despite this structural base ripe for change, Hutu were still excluded from the political power, civic and administrative service and the private spheres of employment (Sellström and Wohlgemuth, 1996: 27-28). Due to the frustration of being locked into the margins of society, this group developed into a political counter-elite "poised to tap into the grievances of the Hutu peasantry against local Tutsi despots" (Mamdani, 2020: 106).

The emergence of the Hutu political counter-elite coincided with the collapse of the relationship between the Tutsi aristocracy and the Belgian colonial administration (Kamunanwire, 1998: 46). Tutsi monarchists were pushing for immediate and total independence and sought monetary, military and diplomatic support from Communist countries in this regard (Kamunanwire, 1998: 47-52; Mamdani, 2020: 121). The political prerogative of the Tutsi elite was informed by a Hamitic ethos and called for the restoration of a 'traditional' balance of power by reinstituting the political supremacy of the Tutsi monarchy and chiefs (Kiwuwa, 2012: 75-76; Newbury, 1998: 12; Mamdani, 2003: 141). In contrast, the Hutu counter-elite was not in favour of immediate independence, as they feared a premature transition would further entrench Hutu subjugation in the new political order, and so the Hutu counter-elite called for democracy before independence (Mamdani, 2020: 117). Although the decolonisation movement led to the rise of several political parties, the opposing political tendencies of the Tutsi elite and Hutu counter-elite championed the emergence and dominance of two racially distinct parties: the *Union Nationale Rwandaise* (UNAR), or the Rwandan National Union Party, which represented the political interests of the conservative Tutsi monarchists, and *Parti du Mouvement et de l'Emancipation Hutu* (PARMEHUTU), or the Party of the Hutu Emancipation Movement, which represented the revolutionary aspirations of the Hutu counter-elite and appealed to a common Hutu subaltern nationalism (Kiwuwa, 2012).[21]

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[20] Mamdani (2020: 167) coined this phrase to refer to the historical cycle of violence between Tutsi and Hutu.

The Belgians took offense to the more radical anticolonial appeals of the Tutsi elite (Kamunawire, 1995: 49; Hintjens, 2001: 33). Consequently, in the late 1950s, the Belgians and a sympathetic clergy supported the movement for independence rooted in the subaltern Hutu majority led by PARMEHUTU (White, 2009: 475; Hintjens, 2001: 31; Uvin, 2004: 162). The movement called for a democracy that was representative of "*le peuple majoritaire*" or 'the people' (Hintjens, 2001: 31). The idea was that Rwanda belonged to Hutu people, the land's 'true inhabitants' who had suffered for centuries (Uvin, 1999: 257). In March 1957, the demands of this nativist rallying cry were acutely represented by the *Bahutu Manifesto*, written and published by Hutu intellectuals (Eltringham, 2006: 433). The *Manifesto* called for equality of opportunity and improved access to education, employment and social rank (Newbury, 1998: 12). The language of the document relied on racialised Hamitic terminology and claimed that "the conflict between the Hutu and Hamites – i.e., foreign-Tutsi" was fundamental to the Rwandan conundrum and called Hutu freedom from the colonial regime of both the "Hamites" and the "Bazungu" (Mamdani, 2020: 104), or the Tutsi and white settlers (Wielenga, 2014: 126-27; White, 2009: 475).

The Hutu counter-elite and the Tutsi elite used the same logics of domination to support their disparate political goals. Yet, the (re)production of the logics in each instance followed inverse directions, as the strategies of othering operated according to different material goals: Hutu domination in the case of the Tutsi and Tutsi-reckoning in the case of the Hutu. For the Hutu revolutionaries, the strategies of othering were employed to reinforce the idea of Hutu indigeneity and Tutsi non-indigeneity, which supported the nationalist claim of the Hutu subaltern majority as a native ethnicity. Whereas the Tutsi monarchists employed the strategies of othering to reinforce their non-indigeneity and Hutu indigeneity, here the claim to political power was associated to their racial superiority and not nativism.

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[21] The two dominant political tendencies described here were not homogenous across the board. There were rivalries between the Tutsi conservative monarchists and more moderate reformists. There were also tensions between PARMEHUTU and other Hutu political parties that drew from broader constituencies (some included the *petits* Tutsi) (Mamdani, 2020: 119; Kamunanwire, 1998: 53; Kiwuwa, 2012: 78-79).

### 3.4.1 Keeping difference alive: the intersection of racial, ethnic and autochthonous strategies of othering

The strategies of othering produced and maintained discourses of racial difference between Tutsi and Hutu. The interconnection of these discourses with the colonial technologies of othering made the racial differences between Hutu and Tutsi a harmful and violent reality. As indicated above, indigeneity separated civilising races from native ethnicities in colonial discourses – ethnicities (Hutu and Twa) were indigenous, races (white settlers and Tutsi) were not (Mamdani, 2020: 35). Moving into the postcolonial era, the racial and ethnic differences between Hutu and Tutsi were kept alive through strategies of othering that (re)produced the idea of Hutu indigeneity and Tutsi non-indigeneity.

Colonialism politicised indigeneity "as a settler libel of the native" (Mamdani, 2020: 14). Yet, through the decolonisation process, the native response was to positively reassert indigeneity. At the same time, the 'non-indigeneity' of the Tutsi was reaffirmed by the Hutu nationalist movement to lay claim to Rwanda as its 'rightful' and 'true' inhabitants. It is evident that autochthonous strategies of othering interconnected with both racial and ethnic strategies of othering in the ideology of the Hutu revolution and the post-colonial nation-building project. Bøås (2009: 21) writes that autochthony means "emerging from the soil", which implies "local forms of belonging as it refers to someone with a supposedly indisputable historical link to a particular territory". This ideology asserts that some groups, over others, have undeniable rights to land, property, employment and social benefits, because they are 'of the soil' and are therefore recognised as 'true' citizens of the political unit (Bøås, 2009: 21; Gausset, Kenrick and Gibb, 2011: 138). Autochthony is then also a call for excluding strangers or "allochthons", which inspires and legitimises violent efforts to protect 'the soil' from those strangers (Ceuppens and Geschiere, 2005: 386). These discourses rely on the dichotomous subject/object relation of native/alien, or indigenous/non-indigenous. Autochthony is "built up through various strategies and is the object of a constant renegotiation, fluctuating according to power balances and the regional or national political context" (Gausset *et al.*, 2011: 140). In this section, I sketch out the intersections between the racial, ethnic and autochthonous strategies of othering and discourses of difference evident in the ideology of

Hutu postcolonial nationalism, or Hutu Power. I also explore the (re)production of these strategies in the institutions of the post-colonial Rwandan state.

#### *3.4.1.1 The 1959 Rwandan revolution and the institutionalisation of violence*

In July 1959, PARMEHUTU and UNAR militants clashed (Kamunanwire, 1998: 56). When news spread that UNAR militants had assaulted a Hutu sub-chief, peasant violence targeting Tutsi chiefs and local authorities spread across the country – it is estimated that more than 200 Tutsi were killed in the revolt and many more fled into exile (Mamdani, 2020: 123). The fear of Tutsi retaliation became the driving force behind the 1959 Rwandan revolution, which was the first time in Rwanda's history that political violence was used to demarcate civilian Hutu from civilian Tutsi (Hintjens, 2001: 32). Decolonial violence directed against the Tutsi was heralded as a harbinger of social justice for the Hutu (Mamdani, 2003: 141). Therefore, the colonial violence that maintained Hutu subjugation and Tutsi power evolved into Fanon's violence of decolonisation – the self-assertion of the colonised Other's humanity, the "violence of victims-turned-perpetrators" (Mamdani, 2020: 10).

Belgian administrators initiated a state of emergency and began to substitute Tutsi chiefs with Hutu counterparts (Kamunanwire, 1998: 56; Uvin, 1999: 257; Mamdani, 2020: 124). As Hutu chiefs controlled the levers of local power, Hutu nationalist proponents (supported by the Belgians) were able to reorganise the central state. This led to the collapse of the Tutsi monarchy and the establishment of a new republic (Mamdani, 2020: 124). The revolution paved the way for elections in 1961, convincingly won by PARMEHUTU (Mayerson, 2010: 18), and a presidential system was established (Baines, 2003: 481; White, 2009: 475; Uvin, 1999: 256). During this time, many Tutsi powerholders and ordinary Tutsi fled the country. Significantly, *ubureetwa* and the rights of chiefs to demand any other kind of forced labour were abolished (Mamdani, 2020: 134); in addition, all *ibikingi*, the lands assigned to Tutsi notables, were reappropriated and redistributed to the landless Hutu by PARMEHUTU authorities (Takeuchi and Marara, 2009: 8).

Mamdani (2020: 269) argues that the 1959 revolution was the seedbed for the development of Hutu Power – a subaltern ideology employed to protect and defend the Hutu state from Tutsi power. This nativist ideology illustrates the intersections between the racial, ethnic and autochthonous strategies of othering. The material goal of Hutu Power was the removal of Tutsi from all positions of power and their expulsion from Rwanda (Baines, 2003: 481). This move was informed by the overriding conviction that the authentic Rwandan nation was Hutu and therefore “power in an independent Rwanda must also be Hutu” (Mamdani, 2020: 145). This enterprise confirmed the Hutu and Tutsi as different racial identities, and (re)produced and reinforced those identities by (re)politicising the colonial discourses that defined them as native and alien. The intersections between the racial, ethnic and autochthonous strategies of othering continued to take shape through the postcolonial nation-building project (Mamdani, 2020: 36).

#### *3.4.1.2 The shifting (re)production racial difference in the First/Second Republics*

In this section, I explore how the Hutu nation was crafted through the maintenance and adaptation of colonial structures and institutions, and how this process (re)produced and reified the racial difference between Hutu and Tutsi.

Independence was marked by discrimination against the Tutsi minority. The First Republic (1961-73), a one-party state ruled by PARMEHUTU and led by President Kayibanda, was born (White, 2009: 475; Uvin, 2004: 164). Kayibanda and his post-revolutionary government built their authority on the claim that the post-colonial Rwandan state, the ‘Hutu nation’, was the official protector of Hutu freedom from Tutsi power (Mamdani, 2020: 36). From 1961-64, defeated Tutsi elites made counter-revolutionary moves, mostly in the form of small and unsuccessful insurgency efforts from exile (White, 2009: 475). Some Tutsi refugees (who called themselves *inyezi* or cockroaches because of their stealth) attempted to return militarily, launching guerrilla attacks from Burundi and Uganda (Hintjens, 2001: 33). In response to these attacks, the target of Hutu nationalist ideology broadened beyond local manifestations of Tutsi power (the chiefs and UNAR monarchists) and extended to all Tutsi (Mamdani, 2003: 141). This meant that *all* Tutsi (even the *petits* Tutsi of the same socio-economic standing as the Hutu majority) were framed as members of an alien racial minority, which in turn, ensured that all Tutsi intrinsically represented the threatening return of Tutsi power. Violence ensued in the form of a series of pogroms against the Tutsi population and politically moderate Hutu, with thousands killed and many more forced into exile (Storey, 2012: 11; Baisley, 2014). For example, PARMEHUTU militants killed more than 2 000 Tutsi in early 1962 and in late 1963 at least 10 000 more were massacred. During this time, between 140 000 and 250 000 Tutsi fled the country (Uvin, 2004: 153). The Tutsi that remained in Rwanda were only permitted on the basis that they were a "resident alien minority" (Mamdani, 2020: 126) that had no claim to political power.

The racialised colonial structure of government and society was kept intact, as the post-revolutionary government continued to classify the Tutsi as foreign Hamites through identity cards (Mamdani, 2020: 141). These same colonial identity cards were used to confine Tutsi to the private sphere (White, 2009: 475). Strict quotas (9% Tutsi and 90% Hutu) were applied to the civil service, military and education (Hintjens, 2001: 34; White, 2009: 475). Also, persons in the military and government were discouraged from marrying across racial lines (White, 2009: 475). This was because "only the indigenous – ethnic groups – could rightly belong, fully, to both civil and political society" (Mamdani, 2020: 135). Mamdani writes that as ethnicity "was said to separate different groups among the indigenous", then "the political distinction between minority and majority could only be relevant within the ethnic domain" and as a different race, "the Tutsi were not a political minority; they were politically foreign, as it were, resident aliens" (Mamdani, 2020: 135). Those racially classified as non-indigenous were not seen nor treated as civil beings in the First Republic.

Unlike the post-revolutionary government of Kayibanda, the Second Republic (1973-94) identified with General Habyarimana and his party, the *Mouvement révolutionaire national pour le développement*, or the National Revolutionary Movement for Development (MRND), sought to redefine and "rehabilitate" the Tutsi from a foreign race to an indigenous ethnic minority in the official vocabulary of the state (Mamdani, 2020: 138). This rhetorical commitment was reiterated through Habyarimana's policy of reconciliation (Wallis, 2018: 42). Although the 'indigenous' Tutsi now had civil and political rights, this did not translate to real political participation, representation or power. Habyarimana clarified his notion of reconciliation as follows:

> It is not a question of bringing the Tutsi back to power, which would be equivalent to re-establishing the pre-1959 situation; but each ethnic group has its place in the national fold.

> There is a Tutsi minister in my government; there are Tutsi senior civil servants in the administration; and Tutsi officers in the army (Mamdani, 2020: 140).

Although the Tutsi were now defined as an ethnic minority and integrated (albeit peripherally) in the state apparatus, they were still denied authority in local government structures. Here, the 1959 revolutionary move to replace all Tutsi chiefs with Hutu counterparts was upheld (Mamdani, 2020: 141). This, together with the retention of the quotas of the First Republic, acted as an administrative reminder that the Tutsi were different from everyone else, and that the state was watching out for the interests of the Hutu majority (Uvin, 1999: 165). It is in this way that the ethnic strategies of othering preserved the implicit (re)production of the racial and autochthonous strategies of othering, as the bipolar identities of (protector) Hutu and (threatening) Tutsi continued to be (re)produced through the institutions of the post-colonial state.

### 3.4.2 Racial othering and difference intensified: the re-emergence of 'Hutu Power' as a genocidal political tendency

In the previous section, I dealt with the emergence, operation and (re)production of the strategies of othering and difference, in this section I focus on the manifestations that arise from that process. Habyarimana's reconciliatory spirit was not shared by all the members of his government, and as a consequence, factions developed within the MRND along anti-Tutsi lines (Mamdani, 2020: 141). The backdrop of this anti-Tutsi sentiment was defined by two structural factors: a north/south regional divide and inequality (Newbury, 1998: 15; White, 2009: 475; Storey, 2012: 14). By the end of the 1980s, Rwanda was characterised by extreme poverty, suffering, injustice and corruption. The poor were subjected to permanent exclusion from the benefits of development and the *akazu* (meaning 'little house')[22] enriched themselves and their allies through criminality and corruption (Storey, 2012: 14; Wallis, 2018: 45; Uvin, 1999: 260). This generated resentment and undercut the legitimacy of the regime. To detract from the political and economic failings of the *akazu*, anti-Tutsi factions began scapegoating the Tutsi in the media and the political practice of discrimination against the

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[22] The term, *akazu*, was used to refer to the country's ruling clique. This group was made up of northern elite Hutu – centred around Habyarimana's wife, Agathe Kanziga, and her male relatives (Storey, 2012: 14; Wallis, 2018: 45).

Tutsi intensified, evident in the refusal to admit the post-1959 Tutsi refugees back into the country (White, 2009: 476).

Mamdani (2020: 157) argues that the political crisis in Rwanda was part of a larger crisis of postcolonial citizenship in the Great Lakes Region. From 1959 to 1964, it was estimated that between 50 000 and 70 000 Tutsi fled to Uganda, but by 1990 their numbers had swollen to around 200 000 (Mamdani, 2020: 164). The refugees became part of the *Banyarwanda* (Rwandese) ethnic group. Initially the Ugandan government was receptive, but their continued presence created major humanitarian, economic and political problems. Over the years, the *Banyarwanda* were subjected to arbitrary surveillance, questioning and detention (Mamdani, 2020: 167). Additionally, neither the refugees nor their children, were granted Ugandan citizenship (Magnarella, 2005: 811). In the 1980s, many *Banyarwanda* joined Yoweri Kaguta Museveni's National Resistance Army (NRA) in the bush (Magnarella, 2005: 811). Significantly, once Museveni took power in 1986, he declared that the refugees would be eligible for citizenship if they had been residents in Uganda for longer than ten years (Mamdani, 2020: 174). However, once conflict erupted between Ugandan ranchers and *Banyarwanda* squatters over escalating rent for grazing land in southern Uganda, armed violence between the two groups ensued (Mamdani, 2020: 176-78). This created a tense security problem which reinvigorated anti-*Banyarwanda* sentiment among ordinary Ugandans and Museveni's political opponents (Mamdani, 2020: 181). Thus, Museveni's government decided that all non-indigenous groups, even those that fought for the NRA, were to be prohibited from claiming citizenship in the post-guerrilla state and that they would be forbidden from owning land or holding state positions (Mamdani, 2020: 182). In doing so, the colonial link between citizenship and indigeneity was redrawn and the lines of racial difference between the indigenous (Ugandans) and the non-indigenous (*Banyarwanda*) were reaffirmed (Mamdani, 2020: 181).

Consequently, Museveni resolved to return the refugees to Rwanda (Magnarella, 2005: 812). Habyarimana's government insisted that it could offer no future to the Tutsi refugees (Mamdani, 2002: 489). In 1987, now politically homeless, the Tutsi refugees formed the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) in Uganda and committed themselves to returning to Rwanda through military means (Mamdani, 2002: 489). The logic of repatriation by invasion was supported by the Ugandan government, with the precondition that there would be no opportunity for return (Mamdani, 2020: 183-84). In October 1990, the military arm of the RPF, the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA), entered Rwanda across the Uganda border with the material assistance of the NRA (Magnarella, 2005: 812). Thus, Mamdani (2002: 500) maintains that the invasion of Rwanda by the RPA "was a testimony to a citizenship crisis on both sides of the border".

The return of second-generation Tutsi exiles from Uganda in the form of the armed invasion of the RPA raised the spectre of Tutsi power once more in the minds of the Hutu elite (Mamdani, 2020: 189). In the context of a civil war, Hutu Power was reinvigorated as a mainstream ideology by the anti-Tutsi party *Coaltion Pour la Défense de la République,* or the Coalition for the Defence of the Republic (CDR) (Mamdani, 2002: 500). The objective of the propagandists was to undo the reconciliatory efforts of Habyarimana, and to recast the Tutsi as a foreign race once more (Mamdani, 2020: 190). The RPF were reframed as the conquerors of old who had come back to reinstate Tutsi power in Rwanda and the war was about keeping that power at bay (Mamdani, 2020: 191). Again, all Tutsi came to represent the threat of Tutsi power, and so, as the RPA advanced, the propagators of Hutu Power began to target civilian Tutsi through periodic massacres (Mamdani, 2020: 192).

The Arusha Accords of 1993 called for reconciliation and multiparty governance (Burnet, 2011: 8). This had the potential to weaken the political strength of Hutu Power, and thereby threatened the privileges of Rwanda's Hutu political elite. A genocidal tendency arose from the threat of democratic opposition and military defeat. Consequently, Hutu extremists (or *génocidaires*) began drawing up strategies to eliminate this threat through the genocide of the Tutsi people (Sharlach, 1999: 391; Mamdani, 2020: 215). Mamdani argues that a significant shift had taken place, as while Hutu Power in the First and Second Republics was an ideology born from the bipolar struggle with Tutsi power and the desire to "acquire political supremacy over it", the *génocidaires* looked for a "final solution to this bipolarity in the physical elimination of the Tutsi" (Mamdani, 2020: 270). Thus, the rhetoric of the *génocidaires* arose from Hutu Power, but of "its negative side" (Mamdani, 2020: 270). The genocidal political tendency not only provided the Hutu elite with a scapegoat, but also gave grounds for the recruitment of between 30 000 and 50 000 unemployed boys and young men to the *Interahamwe*, the youth wing of the CDR, which later formed the foundation of the militias that carried out the genocide (Baines, 2003: 484; Williamson, 2016: 42). The militias consisted of the internally displaced and destitute victims of the RPF's war, refugees from Burundi[23] and the beneficiaries of the 1959 revolution (ordinary peasants who gained access to land through redistribution and the Hutu middle class) (Mamdani, 2020: 217). By early 1994, intensive media and government propaganda had identified all Tutsi living in Rwanda as alien and as the enemy (Guariso *et al.*, 2017: 4).

On 6 April 1994, Rwanda's president, Juvenal Habyarimana, was assassinated (Hudson, 2009: 264). It has been suggested that Habyarimana was assassinated by extremist Hutu forces who objected to the 1993 Arusha Accords, in which the president had agreed to share power with the Tutsi affiliated RPF (Guariso *et al.*, 2017: 9). The assassination provided the political spark necessary for conflict and the call to anti-Tutsi violence harvested massive support (Hudson, 2009: 264). In a timespan of approximately 100 days, the genocide resulted in an estimated 500 000 to 800 000 dead Tutsi and politically moderate Hutus, while hundreds of thousands also lost their lives while fleeing the country (Guariso *et al.*, 2017: 4). The genocidal call for Hutu Power required Hutu men and women to protect the nation from the foreign invaders, the RPA, and internal enemies – male Tutsi, male Hutu dissidents and their female Tutsi conspirators (Baines, 2003: 485). Tutsi men and boys, including infants, were specifically targeted in the first stages of genocide, because they represented the source of Tutsi power, as the Tutsi were a paternally-defined group. Indeed, the specific targeting of men in the initial stages of the genocide was profoundly gendered (Williamson, 2016: 42; Jones, 2000: 188; Taylor, 1999: 43).[24] The genocide came to an end when the RPA gained control over the capital, Kigali, on 4 July 1994. Remnants of the defeated *Forces Armées Rwandaises* (FAR), or the Rwandan Armed Forces, and *Interahamwe* fled to the eastern Congo, from where they conducted insurgency operations until the late 1990s (Mamdani, 2002: 501).

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[23] Following the 1993 election in Burundi, President Melchior Ndadaye came to power, which marked the first time in history that a president of Burundi was Hutu. Later in the same year, the majority-Tutsi army killed the president and political violence took a hold of the country. This led to around 200 000 Hutu crossing the border into Rwanda (Mamdani, 2020: 215).

[24] In section 3.6, I detail the gendered aspects of the genocide, as well as the gendered nature of the Hutu Power ideology.

Hutu extremists bid to contain the return of Tutsi power through the genocidal extermination of all Tutsi in the country. The strategies of othering come into being through the dialectical relationship between discourse and the political/social world. The shape/pattern of this relationship is determined by material political goals. In this case, the goal was to establish and retain Hutu Power by eliminating the political threat of Tutsi power through genocide. This goal determined the (re)production of the racial, ethnic and autochthonous strategies of othering, a (re)production that unfolded according to the logics of domination. In the following section, I outline the intersections evident between these strategies of othering and gendered strategies of othering.

## 3.5 THE GENDERED STRATEGIES OF OTHERING

In pre-colonial Rwanda, lineages of higher status were Tutsi, whereas lineages of subjugation and of little political power were Hutu and Twa. These lineages were organised according to patrilineal descent. As argued in previous sections of this chapter (3.3.2 and 3.3.3), the transethnic Tutsi political identity was racialised, and the transethnic Hutu political identity was both racialised and ethnicised, through the ideologies and institutions of colonialism. Thus, the patrilineal structure of the lineage ensured that the racialised/ethnicised differences between these groups were reinscribed through particular gendered relations and identities. This implies that the (re)production of the ethnic and racial strategies of othering intersected with gendered strategies of othering in colonial institutions. Similarly, the intersections of the gendered strategies of othering with the racial, ethnic and autochthonous strategies of othering are also evident in the (re)production of gendered Hutu nationalism and extremist discourses. In this section, I explore these intersections as well as their (re)production through the disciplining state-sponsored violence directed against female bodies in the colonial and post-colonial era, leading into the civil war and during the genocide.

### 3.5.1 From patrilineage to patriarchy: the historical evolution of gender and kinship

The discursive enterprise of creating and maintaining essentialised differences between different identity groups is unstable, and that instability is reflected in the shifting (re)production of the strategies of othering and difference. In this section, I argue that the gendered quality of Rwandan kinship acts as the backdrop for the emergence of the gendered strategies of othering. I therefore outline how kinship transformed from a social and cultural process of patrilineal identity-making into a site of patriarchy.[25]

Pertinent to relations within and between different kinship communities in Rwandan history was, and still is, the gendered nature of these bonds – both in terms of in-group connections and in terms of out-group interactions. Rwandan kinship is organised into three communities: the *inzu* (the house), the *umuryango* (the lineage and extended kin) and the *ubwoko* (clan) (Fox, 2011: 284). These institutions ensure that the culture, oral history and customs of Rwandan society are passed on from one generation to the next (Adekunle, 2007: viii). It is through the *inzu*, *umuryango* and *ubwoko* that the individual's identity comes into being. The relationships between individuals within these groups were the source of political, economic and social empowerment in pre-colonial Rwanda. Although the composition and role of these kinship groups may have shifted over time, the centrality of these social institutions to Rwandan life has not (Adekunle, 2007: 97; Fox, 2011: 284).

The *umuryango*, or lineage, defined the transethnic identities of Hutu and Tutsi. A lineage was bound through mutual obligations to other lineages (Mamdani, 2020: 54-55). The distribution of power across these obligations, such as through clientship, determined whether a lineage was Hutu or Tutsi. In pre-colonial Rwanda, these kinship groups were organised according to patrilineal descent (Mamdani, 2020: 53). Thus, patrilineages were fundamental to the structure of pre-colonial Rwandan society (Burnet, 2012: 100). Under the patrilineal kinship system, widows, married women and unmarried girls derived their social identities, status and rights to land from the men related to them (Burnet, 2012: 100). This is encapsulated by the Rwandan proverb *abagore ntibafite ubwoko*, which loosely translates to 'wives have no identity' (Burnet, 2014: 133). It is important to qualify that these practices were not necessarily based in patriarchy; instead, they represented a Rwandan notion of personhood, where being is constituted through an individual's kin relations, stages of life and status in community (Burnet, 2012: 100).

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[25] My understanding of patriarchy is informed by Catherine Nash's (2020: 43) definition: "Patriarchy is a system of relationships, beliefs, and values embedded in political, social, and economic systems that structure gender inequality between men and women." Adding to this definition, I understand patriarchy to be a system borne from unequal binary, heteronormative relations. These affect the gendered experiences of all individuals in society – including the LGBTQIA community.

Historically, gender relations in Rwanda were, therefore, determined by the complimentary roles and obligations of women and men. The role women played in the reproduction of lineage ensured that motherhood was seen as a critical social identity and gave women social status that they otherwise would not have had within the patrilineal social structure (Adekunle, 2007: 14; Burnet, 2012: 100). Women leveraged their motherhood status to navigate and enhance their power and position within the family, lineage and wider community (Burnet, 2012: 99). In this way, women could carve out spheres of power.[26] Yet, this power was dependent on a complex set of social and political conditions, and so the privileges and influence of women varied according to the context of how power was distributed across society at the time. The complimentary nature of gender relations and the status/power of motherhood in pre-colonial Rwandan was characterised by the structure of monarchical power. Oral historical accounts indicate that the Tutsi *mwami* did not rule alone. The queen mother, or *umugabekazi*, co-ruled the nation with equal power and autonomy to that of her son, the king (Taylor, 1999: 51; Buscaglia and Randell, 2012: 76; Watkins and Jessee, 2020: 85). Women also held positions within religious institutions, practicing as mediums and priestesses (Pauwels, 1951; Berger, 1981), as well as traditional healers (Plancke, 2021: 287).

During the Belgian colonial period, the patrilineal nature of Rwandan society was reinforced through the colonial state's administration and policies, which meant that women could no longer claim land, property or authority through the lineage system (Arnston-Kynn, 2013: 60; Jefremovas, 1991: 381). The colonial system eroded the institutions that gave women access to resources and intensified the development of institutions (such as forced Hutu labour) that required women's labour in the household (Jefremovas, 1991: 380-81). Women were excluded from monetised non-domestic and non-agricultural work, which ensured their subordination to men and weakened their customary rights (Arnston-Kynn, 2013: 60-61). The gradual dismantling of the powers of the monarchy came with the erosion of the rites and symbols of Tutsi power, including the political role of the queen mother (Buscaglia and Randell, 2012: 76).

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[26] These roles differed according to status, wealth and who was in power at the time. Tutsi women could manipulate their status for more authority and political power. For example, Tutsi women could leverage their status to act as patrons over land or to acquire cows (Jefremovas, 1991: 381). It was also not uncommon for Tutsi women to inherit chiefships from their husbands, fathers or brothers (Uwineza, Pearson and Powley, 2009: 10). In addition, the wives of wealthy men had significant autonomy and full control over the running of the household, as their husbands were often absent serving the king (Plancke, 2021: 287).

In the 1950s, the Belgian colonial administration introduced a new social policy that focussed on educating the daughters of the colonised elite through finishing schools known as *foyers sociaux* (social homes) (Hunt, 1990: 447). The idea behind these institutions was to advance the civilising mission by 'freeing' the colonised from tradition and custom through educating elite colonised women on how to raise a 'civilised society' (Buscaglia and Randell, 2012: 72-75; Hunt, 1990: 457). The enterprise of the *foyers sociaux* was to consolidate the imposition of Western gender roles. The same Hutu intellectuals that engineered the Hutu nation then adopted a reductive colonial icon of Hutu womanhood as the 'mother' of that nation. The colonial model of female domestication was considered a necessary part of the post-colonial nation-building project, as these institutions were consolidated in the First and Second Republics (Buscaglia and Randell, 2012: 78). In addition, Rwandan women held no substantial political offices, lacked the legal right to inherit property or open a bank account and were prohibited from joining profit-making organisations (Berry, 2015: 2).

The gendered dimensions of Hutu/Tutsi difference transformed from being defined in terms of patrilineage into terms of patriarchy through the imposition of Western gender relations in colonial institutions. This process corresponds with a shift in how gendered differences were understood, as gendered differences became a site of unequal power relations and domination, as opposed to a site of relative power and interdependence.

### 3.5.2 The gendered dimensions of Hutu Power

Handrahan (2004: 436) argues that ethnicities are "created and maintained, in part, through the use of gendered identities". Both the symbolic and biological reproductive and sexual capacities of the female body can be seen as significant markers of male-defined collective political identities (Handrahan, 2004: 437; Yuval-Davis, 1993: 27; McLean Hilker, 2014: 356). For this reason, women's ability to physically reproduce members of a political group is at the centre of many community-building projects and nationalist campaigns (McClintock, 1993: 62; Yuval-Davis, 1993: 628). Women are often "required to carry [the] 'burden of representation' as they are constructed as the symbolic bearers of the collectivity's identity and honour, both personally and collectively" (Yuval-Davis, Anthias and Campling, 1989: 45). The boundaries between 'us' and 'them' (or in this case Hutu and Tutsi) are reproduced through the boundaries between 'our women' and 'their women' (Alison, 2007: 80). These boundaries are maintained by regulating the sexual or marital relations of women, as the reproducers of ethno-nationalisms (Okech, 2019: 6). Young women are socialised to ensure that they "are taught to be pure, well-behaved and contained citizens and mothers, and men are taught to be brave defenders of both the family and the nation" (Fox, 2011: 288). In this way, the enterprise of discursive racial and ethnic difference-making comes into being in and through gendered difference-making, as the discursive boundaries that define Tutsi and Hutu womanhood (re)produce the discursive boundaries of racial and ethnic essentialised difference.

As a racialised indigenous identity, the Hutu were classified as an ethnicity under colonial administration (Mamdani, 2020: 73-75). In what follows, I argue that the autochthonous reassertion of the racialised/ethnicised Hutu identity in the post-colonial nation-building project/goal played out through the strategy of violent regulation of Hutu and Tutsi female bodies. This violent process reified essentialised differences between Tutsi and Hutu women based on their reproductive capacity and sexuality.

#### *3.5.2.1 The mother of the Hutu Nation*

The status of motherhood was redefined through colonial policies of domestic female morality. The gender roles of patrilineal society were reproduced as patriarchal and the boundaries that defined Hutu motherhood and womanhood were reproduced through colonial institutions of domesticity. In this respect, the complimentary power of women that once defined Rwandan kinship and political power was, in many ways, undermined and transformed. With the 1959 revolution and the 'birth' of Hutu Power, the colonial reproduction of motherhood was used to reframe women as the primary biological and cultural reproducers of the Hutu nation (Baines, 2003: 482). As female bodies have the capacity to carry and birth children, women became the site of ethnic continuity. Here, 'of the soil' took on a new gendered meaning. The intersection of the gendered, racial, ethnic and autochthonous strategies of othering (re)produced the notion of Hutu motherhood in such a way that Hutu women's bodies became the site of Hutu indigeneity, and in turn, Hutu Power.

Hutu women's bodies were represented "as the authentic, inner country whose purity, sexuality and traditional roles must be secured" (Baines, 2003: 484). Jefremovas (1991: 379) argues that the "language of public morality and stereotype" was used to regulate Hutu women's participation in politics and the formal economy. Only those Hutu women who leveraged their role as devoted mothers, virginal daughters or virtuous wives were allowed to participate in the public sphere, and if their participation was deemed threatening, they were forced out and labelled as loose women, or *femme libre* (Jefremovas, 1991: 383).

Although women gained some legal protections in the post-colonial period, they remained subordinated to men (Burnet, 2012: 101). This was made a legal fact through the Family Code in 1992, which formalised men as the heads of households (Sharlach, 1999: 391). The regulation of women's bodies was reinforced through the Rwandan Catholic Church, which determined morally acceptable sexual behaviour for women. The partnership between the Church and post-colonial state ensured that contraceptives and abortion were illegal (Baines, 2003: 483). Therefore, the dialectical (re)production of the ethnic, racial, autochthonous and gendered strategies of othering in the social/political space resulted in the strict supervision of Hutu women's participation in the public sphere through the regulation of their sexual morality and reproductive capacity. Hutu women had to embody and leverage the notion of Hutu womanhood in order to gain access to the rights of citizenship.

#### *3.5.2.2 The Hamitic woman*

The virtue ascribed to Hutu female bodies was constructed in contrast to representations of Tutsi female bodies as both threatening and desirable – as the ultimate *femme libre*. To reify the idea of Hutu motherhood as the site of Hutu indigeneity, and thereby Hutu Power, the racial, ethnic, autochthonous and gendered strategies of othering relied on the binary construction of the opposite: the Hamitic woman. Tutsi women became the site and source of Tutsi non-indigeneity and represented the ever-threatening return of Tutsi power. Thus, the sexual and reproductive capacity of Tutsi women was disciplined, or contained, by Hutu public morality discourses. The discourses of female public morality created a strict binary between Hutu and Tutsi women, which reinforced the idea of racial and ethnic difference. Here, the intersection between the racial, gendered and autochthonous strategies of othering (re)produced the colonial framing of Tutsi women as 'Hamitic women' to reassert the alterity of the Tutsi racial identity.

Beyene (2014: 83) argues that the colonial Hamitic representations of both Tutsi men and women were eroticised. This points to the intrinsic connection between the racialisation and sexualisation of colonised peoples in colonial discourses. In particular, the sexualisation of Tutsi women in colonial iconography was closely linked to their fertility (Beyene, 2014: 83). Tutsi women were promoted as the source of Tutsi continuity. They were described as more beautiful, intelligent and biologically superior to their Hutu and Twa counterparts (Herndon and Randell, 2013: 73; Taylor, 1999: 46; Baines, 2003: 489; Beyene, 2014: 85). Just as the racial and ethnic strategies of othering supported the reassertion of Tutsi non-indigeneity in colonial ideology, the intersection of the same strategies of othering with gender created an even greater alienating discourse around the identity of Tutsi women. Tutsi women were said to be 'out of reach' of the ordinary Hutu man. This is why a Hutu man had to participate in *kwihutura*, or to "shed Hutuness" (Mamdani, 2020: 70), in order to marry a Tutsi woman. Yet, Tutsi women were also the life-force and the seat of Tutsi power, represented by the role of the queen mother in the Rwandan royal court. For this reason, the rearticulations of the intersections between the strategies of othering in Hutu extremist discourses (re)produced images, representations and tales of Tutsi women as both sexually desirable and threatening.

The Hutu Power ideology dialectically (re)produced Tutsi women's racial alterity and essentialised discursive difference through the violent regulation of their sexuality and reproductive capacity. This came to the fore in the Second Republic (Taylor, 1999: 44; Baines, 2003: 484). Under the guise of protecting public morality, Habyarimana's government institutionalised a campaign against urban single women in the year leading up to the genocide. These women were either educated, had a modern dress sense, were with respectable employment or were in romantic relationships with European aid/humanitarian workers (Baines, 2003: 484). Typically, these women were also beautiful, and therefore, they were (almost automatically) considered to be Tutsi (Taylor, 1999: 47). These women were represented as prostitutes, or *femme libre*, even though most of them were not (Taylor, 1999: 44).

Agents, known as *maniko*, as well as soldiers, would enforce this regime by openly intimidating and assaulting women found to be in violation of public morality codes (Taylor, 1999: 45). In early 1983, most of the women incarcerated were Tutsi. Many were badly treated, and some had been raped by their captors (Taylor, 1999: 44). Once charged with 'vagabondage' or prostitution, hundreds of Rwandan women were incarcerated in rural detention centres called *ingorora muco* or "moral straightening-out centres" (Taylor, 1999: 44). By regulating sexuality and public morality, the post-colonial state sought to 'protect' the Hutu nation from the 'corrupting' forces of Tutsi women's racial alterity. Thus, despite Habyarimana's call to recast the Tutsi as an indigenous ethnic group, his policies continued to regulate the seat and site of Tutsi power within the country – Tutsi women and those independent women associated to Hamitic notions of beauty. Here, the masculine Hutu protector identity powerfully reasserted the need to contain the looming threat of Tutsi power, embodied by Tutsi womanhood. The intersections between the strategies of othering with gender created and maintained certain femininities and masculinities that reinforced violent ideas about Hutu/Tutsi racial difference.

The image of the sexually deviant Tutsi woman was reinforced through Hutu extremist literature in local Rwandan publications and magazines, especially in the form of cartoons and caricatures of Tutsi women participating in sex acts that deviated from Rwandan sexual norms (Taylor, 1999: 62). This powerful, anti-Tutsi propaganda is apparent in what was called the 'Hutu Ten Commandments', first published in December 1990 in the *Kangura* (Mama and Okazawa-Rey, 2016: 20; Brown, 2014: 454). The focus on Tutsi women in the Commandments is apparent. The Commandments warned Hutu men against Tutsi women, insisted that Hutu women made better mothers and wives, and called upon Hutu women to ensure that their sons, brothers and husbands did not fall 'out of line' (Mama and Okazawa-Rey, 2016:21).

Thus, as the reproducers and bearers of their respective racial/ethnic identities, Tutsi and Hutu women came to represent the site of Tutsi power and the Hutu nation. The intersection of the ethnic, racial and gendered strategies of othering with the autochthonous strategies of othering in the Hutu Power ideology then added a new dimension. As the mothers of the Hutu nation, Hutu women's reproductive capacity was regulated by a strict public moral code; while, as the threatening site of Tutsi power, Tutsi female bodies were disciplined and contained through repressive state-sponsored violence. The disciplining violence directed toward Tutsi and Hutu female bodies in the post-colonial era reinforced the idea of their fundamental difference on the grounds of racial/ethnic alterity.

The various strategies therefore draw attention to assorted discursive differences between corporate identity groups, but the intersecting operation of the strategies ensures that the collective (re)production of these differences works toward a common goal. In this case, making and sustaining Hutu/Tutsi difference worked toward the common goal of power/control over the bipolar political struggle with Tutsi power.

## 3.6 THE (RE)PRODUCTION OF THE STRATEGIES OF OTHERING IN GENOCIDAL SEXUAL VIOLENCE

The intersecting strategies of othering outlined above pervaded Rwandan society throughout the civil war and “translated into the systematic violation of Rwandan women during the genocide” (Green, 2002: 753). The destruction and mutilation of Tutsi women’s bodies was not only a bid to eradicate the threatening return of Tutsi power, but it was also the enterprise of defining and asserting the boundaries of Hutu masculinity as protectors of the Hutu nation, and therefore Hutu/Tutsi racial and ethnic difference. Thus, Handrahan (2004: 433) states that although men suffer tremendously in war, there is a positive identity aspect for men who defend ‘their’ women and homeland. According to Okech (2019: 5), this explains the link between the construction of ethno-nationalisms and the violent gendered targeting of women both during and after war. In this section, I outline the relationships between the gendered, racial, ethnic and autochthonous strategies of othering and the sexual violence committed during the genocide.

Historically in Rwanda, it was uncharacteristic for women to be targeted in political violence (Williamson, 2016: 42). Yet, once most men and boys had been killed in the genocide, the national organisers ordered women and girls to be killed too (Baines, 2003: 487). It was common practice to rape and sexually torture Tutsi women before killing them. The (re)production of the intersections between the strategies of othering resulted in extreme acts of violence against Tutsi women during the genocide, such as the mutilation of genitalia, the cutting off of breasts, disembowelment, the purposeful infection of women with HIV, rape, gang rape, sexual slavery and forced gestation (Coomaraswamy, 1999: 6; Handrahan, 2004: 433; Burnet, 2012: 98; Sharlach, 2000: 98-100; Baines, 2003: 487-49; Hamel, 2016: 288-89). It was estimated that between 250 000 and 450 000 women were raped (Tobin, 2012: 28), and that 90% of Tutsi women and girls who survived the genocide were sexually assaulted in some way (Weitsman, 2008: 573).

### 3.6.1 Genocidal rape and social death

Sexual violence was used not only to inflict humiliation and terror in individual women, but it was also used to denigrate and breakdown the Tutsi racial/ethnic group (Sharlach, 2000: 90; Hamel, 2016: 82; Weitsman, 2008: 563; Hudson, 2009: 264; Russell *et al.*, 2016: 724). This corresponds with the shift in Hutu Power from an ideology born out of the need to protect against the resurgence of Tutsi power, to a political tendency geared toward the elimination of Tutsi power altogether. In this instance, sexual violence was not a consequence of genocide, but a tool of genocide (Skjelsbæk, 2001: 219). Tutsi women were systematically targeted based on their state-issued identity cards at roadblocks (Buss, 2009: 157). Yet, when such cards were lost, the militia and soldiers relied on arbitrary physical Hamitic features to distinguish Tutsi women from Hutu women. A woman's fate was often determined by her 'beauty' and whether she had easily identifiable 'Tutsi' features, such as "cow's eyes', straight teeth, a shapely physique and meek disposition" versus 'Hutu' characteristics, such as "a broad nose, stout stature and course mannerisms" (Arntson-Kynn, 2013: 66). Many reports indicate that Hutu women were killed for their Tutsi features and conversely some Tutsi women were spared because they did not look Tutsi enough (Baines, 2003: 486).

It is clear that the same intersections between the racial, ethnic, autochthonous and gendered strategies of othering that legitimised the violent regulation of Tutsi female bodies in the Second Republic played out powerfully during the genocide. The strategies of othering worked together once more to reaffirm the boundaries of the Hutu nation by reasserting Tutsi racial/ethnic difference through gender-based forms of torture, including rape (Baines, 2003: 488). The widespread rape of Tutsi women was undertaken to humiliate, punish and torture them. This is evident in the extent of the violence, where women's sexual organs were mutilated with machetes, boiling water and acid, and in the practice of using all kinds of tools to penetrate them – from spears to gun barrels and bottles (Herndon and Randell, 2013: 73; Taylor, 1999: 50). Tutsi women were not only raped because there was a desire on the part of Hutu men to explore perceived radical sexual otherness, but also because their bodies became the site for the affirmation of Hutu masculinity through the eradication of the 'mother' of Tutsi power. Rape was then instrumentalised to "occupy the womb" of Tutsi women, which served to eradicate the paternally-given Tutsi identity (Weitsman, 2008: 565).

Due to the value of kinship relations and the centrality of motherhood, the rape and torture of women sought to break down those relations that were central to personhood and being for Tutsi people (Denov, Eramian and Shevell, 2020: 55). Thus, mass rape was intended to prolong suffering and destroy the roots of the Tutsi kinship: "rape sets in motion continuous suffering and extreme humiliation that affects not just the individual victim but everyone around them" (Baines, 2003: 488). Heidi Hudson (2014: 101) writes that genocidal rape in Rwanda went beyond the "materialities of suffering", as it caused egregious harm to the Tutsi social community. Hudson (2014: 101) bases her argument on Claudia Card's (2003: 64) understanding of 'social death' in genocide. This is when the "social relations – organisations, practices, institutions – of the members of a group are irreparably damaged or demolished" (Card, 2003: 69). Card (2003: 69) argues that genocidal rape leads to family breakdown, as it intentionally strips victims of the ability to participate in social activities. The aim is their social death, not just their physical death, as "it is not just the physical life of victims that is targeted but the social vitality behind that identity" (Card, 2003: 76). Genocidal rape was used to strip away the social vitality of Tutsi women, as 'bearers' of the Tutsi identity. Since a woman's social status and identity were derived through her relationships with her male family members, the stigma of sexual violation made Tutsi women socially 'unseen' and thus guaranteed their social death and the broader social death of the Tutsi community (Denov *et al.*, 2020: 42).

### 3.6.2 Beyond a singular genocidal 'rape script': the politics of including other victims and perpetrators

Tutsi women were not the only survivors of sexual violence and torture during the genocide. In fact, the experiences of Hutu women are well documented, as are the experiences of men and boys (Di Caro, 2019: 89; Buss, 2009: 159). This variability points to the fact that the rape and sexual torture of Tutsi women because they were Tutsi was only one "rape script" (Burnet, 2015: 2) of the Rwandan genocide. An epidemiological survey of Rwandan women, regardless of ethnicity, living in Rwanda in 1994 found that 49.4% of them had been raped during the genocide (Burnet, 2012: 2). The survey shows that Hutu women also suffered tremendously, a reality that is often lost. Buss (2009: 155) posits that the recognition of rape as an instrument of genocide is important but can disguise the mechanisms by which individual accounts of rape and sexual violence are silenced. The genocidal rape script, although accurate, provides a partial account of the complexity of sexual violence during the genocide.

It is important to then consider the different goals of the strategies of othering, and thereby the direction of their (re)production. In the case of Hutu women being targeted for their association with 'Tutsi-ness', rape and sexual torture was used to keep Hutu women in line with the Hutu extremist reassertion of indigeneity, and indeed, by extension, the mother archetype of the Hutu nation. Deviance was therefore punished. This kind of violence was especially directed at a community level toward Hutu wives of Tutsi men (Chakravarty, 2007: 240). In this respect, sexual violence was not a tool to torture and eliminate the racialised and alien Other through social death, it was an attempt to protect the 'racial' purity of the ethnic, indigenous Self. The inverse binary operation of the intersecting strategies therefore also affirmed Hutu/Tutsi racial alterity through gendered discourses of difference. In addition, Hutu women were raped by the RPA during the civil war and by Hutu militia for reasons that have nothing to do with their ethnicity (Burnet, 2012: 10). Moreover, there were also cases where men and boys were raped and subjected to forms of sexual slavery during the genocide (Buss, 2009: 159).

The nuance of these intersections is also represented in the level of Hutu female participation in the genocide. The role of prominent women in the Rwandan genocide as organisers is well documented (Gentry and Sjoberg, 2015: 122). Pauline Nyirmasuhuko is perhaps the most notorious case. She served as the Minister for Women and Family Affairs in Habyarimana's last government (Gentry and Sjoberg, 2015: 124). Her role in the genocide made her the first woman to be charged with genocide and rape as a crime against humanity in international jurisdiction (Gentry and Sjoberg, 2015: 126). Nyiramasuhuko "regularly visited places where refugees had been congregated and personally supervised the selection of hundreds of Tutsi men for the slaughterhouse" (Jones, 2002: 83). In addition, in her capacity as the commander of her *Interahamwe*, she ordered the militiamen: "before you kill the women, you need to rape them" (Gentry and Sjoberg, 2015: 126). Yet, on a grassroots level, Hutu women also participated by acting as spies, exposing Tutsi and moderate Hutu in hiding, stealing resources and looting, murdering Tutsi children and raping Tutsi boys (Brown, 2014: 459; Jones, 2002:

84). Additionally, Hutu women also helped to pressure Tutsi women into accepting their fate as sex slaves and concubines for Hutu militiamen (Jones, 2002: 84).

Therefore, the variable material goals of the strategies determine the intersections between the racial, ethnic, autochthonous and gendered strategies of othering. This points to the value of conducting an intersectional analysis through the logics of domination, as the contesting, converging and variability of the (re)production of the strategies of othering result in complex expressions of violence. In revealing the (re)production of the strategies, we can begin to not only unearth these complexities, but also understand how they come into being. In particular, it gives us insight into how different systems of oppression intersect. An analysis of the logics of domination therefore provides insight into how parts of the inner workings of intersectionality operate.

## 3.7 EVALUATION

The aim of this chapter was to critically analyse the theoretical as well as practical/empirical manifestations and implications of understanding and applying the inner workings of intersectionality through the logics of domination. My research questions for this chapter were as follows: ‘What are the practical/empirical implications of using intersectionality as a logic of domination?’; ‘Has the historical intersection between ethnicity and gender contributed toward insecurity in Rwanda?’; and lastly, ‘How do multiple systems of oppression intersect?’

To answer the first question, the practical/empirical implications of using intersectionality as a logic of domination can be divided into two broad groups. Firstly, this analysis revealed how different systems of oppression intersect and impact the security of different Rwandan communities across the history of the state. In cultivating a thorough understanding of how this process occurred, my analysis provides insight into how to approach the complexity of gender insecurity. Due to the practical implications of security research, a more thorough understanding of how different systems of oppression intersect can feed into the policy-making process and demand an application of intersectionality that goes beyond paying ‘lip service’ to the concept. Also, in attempting to understand how complex expressions of violence come into being, we can work towards translating that understanding into the programmes and policy that deal with gender insecurity in the international security and development sectors. Secondly, in recognising the different strategies and their intersectional operation, my analysis has encouraged nuance, which resists representing the experiences of corporate identity groups according to the lives of its privileged members. There is empirical value in resisting a single-factor analysis and in highlighting the experiences of marginalised communities, as it offers a deeper understanding of the impact of conflict and the manifestations of political violence and encourages inclusive solutions to insecurity.

In terms of the second question, I found that the historical intersection between ethnicity and gender has contributed significantly toward insecurity in Rwanda. Yet, my analysis of the logics of domination revealed a much more complex picture. I demonstrated that the interconnections between race, ethnicity, autochthony and gender created a 'perfect storm' for conflict in Rwanda. There were other strategies of othering and difference (such as class, geographical location and religion) that my analysis did not explicitly touch on, which nonetheless would have contributed to this 'storm'.

Finally, to answer the third question, multiple systems of oppression intersect through a multi-level and complex process. I have revealed parts of how this process occurs through an examination of the logics of domination, which I did through a deconstructive discourse analysis of the strategies of othering and difference. The strategies are systematic patterns of discourse (subject/object relations) that create and sustain essentialised differences between corporate identity groups. The strategies are a multi-level concept, as they include both the discursive level and the dialectical (re)production of discourses in the social/political world. I demonstrated that this dialectical (re)production was reified through the technologies of othering (structural and physical violence). Although the strategies draw attention to variable differences, the (re)production of those differences occurs through an intersectional process. The different strategies of othering therefore operate in concert. This process is not haphazard, it is strategically driven by a collective goal: the domination of a different identity group, broadly essentialised as the Other. By assessing the operation of the logics of domination and their strategies, one gains insight into how different systems of oppression intersect and how those intersections create complex experiences of insecurity.

Therefore, although this approach to intersectionality research is conventional, it is also empirically, theoretically and analytically valuable, as it provides meaningful insights into the complexity of violence, conflict and insecurity, as well as discrimination and privilege, and the relationship between identity and social, economic and political structures. However, since an analysis of the inner workings of intersectionality through the logics of domination chiefly focusses on using intersectionality to reveal the intersections of systems of oppression and difference, it does not yield a way forward. And this approach also does not account for strategies of sameness and addition, which is the object of scrutiny in the next chapter. It is for these reasons that the different logics are used in combination (see Figure 2 page 69). In Chapter four, my analysis takes stock of the gender (in)security framework of the post-genocide Rwandan state.

## CHAPTER FOUR: THE LOGICS AND INNER WORKINGS OF ADDITION

### 4.1 GENERAL OVERVIEW

Critical-feminist scholars argue that while there is a need for future WPS academic work to reflect seriously on localisation and intersectionality, there is also a need to resist the depoliticisation of these critical concepts once they have been adopted (or rather co-opted) by the feminist mainstream (Haastrup and Hagen, 2021: 29; Henry, 2021: 25; Eriksson Baaz and Parashar, 2021: 5). Parashar (2020: 24) writes that the "intellectual economy of WPS privileges normative whiteness and the voices of western feminists who command resources, claim expertise and advance theories to understand conflict outside the Global North". Thus, how intersectionality is applied in WPS work and expertise can take the concept further away from its critical roots. At the expense of gender justice and peace activism, intersectionality can then be used to uphold the same reformist agenda and status quo of dominant liberal-feminist perspectives within the policy ecosystem.

The focus of this chapter, therefore, is on how intersectionality is misunderstood and misused when it is co-opted by the feminist mainstream in practice and research. In what follows, I analyse the inner workings of intersectionality according to the logics of addition. The logics of addition are informed by the Black feminist jeopardy models of oppression, which see categories of identity and experiences of discrimination as discrete and 'additive'. These logics are represented by Crenshaw's (1989: 151) basement metaphor, which illustrates how models of compound discrimination obfuscate the intersections between the experiential level of intersubjective power relations and larger structural power differentials. As these logics reduce complex intersectional experiences into singular compound markers of discrimination, such as gender, they are (re)produced through discursive strategies of sameness and silence. The goal of the strategies is not gender transformation, but gender reform (see Chapter two, section 2.4.3).

The logics of addition operate across two levels of (re)production – the hegemonic level and the residual level. Within the hegemonic configuration, the logics of addition operate across another two levels. On the first level, the strategies of sameness equate the experience of women with men, and on the second level, the strategies equate the experience of all women with some women. Typically analyses of liberal-feminist discourses focus on the first level. In this chapter, however, I principally pay attention to the second level of the hegemonic configuration. On this level, the strategies (re)produce the liberal-feminist discourse that tries to address gender discrimination through a single-factor framework. This is when the experiences of all women are represented by the experiences of some privileged women through the homogenising tendencies of the strategies of sameness. The (re)production of the strategies of sameness then produce gender silences, as the insecurities of marginalised women who have intersectional experiences of discrimination are eclipsed through the discursive process. The residual level of (re)production is when different women's experiences are incrementally included into the hegemonic (re)production of the logics of addition. The origins of the residual discourse lie in critical thought, but once this discourse is integrated into the feminist mainstream it cuts ties with its political roots. Intersectional perspectives then become more tolerable discursive elements, as the diversity discourse is absorbed by the dominant liberal-feminist (re)production of the strategies of silence and sameness.

In this chapter, I reveal the different levels of (re)production of the logics of addition to highlight the consequences of when the inner workings of intersectionality are left behind through the appropriation of the concept by the feminist mainstream. Thus, the objective of this chapter is to critically analyse the theoretical as well as practical/empirical manifestations and implications of intersectionality used as a form or logic of addition with a focus on Rwanda after the genocide. And my research questions are: 'What are the practical/empirical implications of using intersectionality according to a liberal-feminist logic of addition?' and 'Why does using intersectionality as a logic of addition create (in)security silences?'

In section 4.2, I provide a general overview of the organisation of political power in the post-genocide Rwandan state, and I consider the implications of the RPF's policy of ethnic amnesia. This section sets the stage for my analysis of Rwanda's gender machinery and policy framework. In section 4.3, I outline the successes and failures of the GoR's gender equality regime. In section 4.4, drawing from Rwandan examples, I explain how the logics of addition are (re)produced on the hegemonic and residual discursive levels through the strategies of sameness and silence. I argue that the strategies of sameness and silence create gender (in)security silences, which allow gender discrimination to thrive and threaten the sustainability of peace in Rwanda. In section 4.5, I conduct a deconstructive discourse analysis of these logics in the 2009 and 2018 Rwandan NAPs. Finally, in section 4.6, I provide an evaluation of the chapter.

## 4.2 POST-GENOCIDE RWANDA IN CONTEXT

This section serves to prepare the ground for my analysis of gender (in)security in Rwanda later in the chapter (section 4.3), as it is important to contextualise the political environment in which Rwanda has developed its gendered security policy framework. Here, I explore the organisation of political power in the post-conflict Rwandan state. I also briefly outline the connections between the GoR's security and development enterprise and its policies of national unity and reconciliation. I argue that the policy to de-racialise and de-ethnicise political identities through the introduction of the national civic identity of the *Banyarwanda* has silenced the present-day (re)production of the historical intersections between gender, race and ethnicity. The challenge is that structural violence threatens the sustainability of peace in the long-term.

### 4.2.1 Victor's justice and Tutsi Power

Critical to building the post-genocide Rwandan state was the challenge of uniting "a *guilty majority* alongside an aggrieved and *fearful minority*" in a single political community (Mamdani, 2020: 266, original emphasis). Mahmood Mamdani (2020: 272) frames the Rwandan nation-building project in terms of victor's justice, as the victor (the RPF) must "remain on constant guard, lest the spoils of victory be snatched yet again". Mamdani (2020: 270) argues that this political enterprise is underpinned by three convictions. The first has to do with the RPF's "moral responsibility for the very survival of all remaining Tutsi' in the region, and indeed, around the world (Mamdani, 2020: 270). The second follows on from the first, in that Tutsi survival is dependent on the establishment of "Tutsi Power" in the post-genocide state (Mamdani, 2020: 268).[27] Any challenge to Tutsi Power is understood as a threat to the safety of Tutsi everywhere and must, therefore, be contained at all costs – this rationale legitimises the RPF's pursuit of political power with impunity (Mamdani, 2020: 271; Ingelaere, 2010: 290). The third has to do with the kind of peace that is possible under the political condition of Tutsi Power, which in the mind's eye of the RPF is an armed peace. Mamdani (2020: 271) maintains that it is these three convictions that undergird the organisation of political power in the post-genocide Rwandan state.

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[27] Here, Mamdani (2020: 231) capitalises Tutsi Power because the underlying political tendency has changed from the 'Tutsi power' of the colonial period. What was once petty political power through proxy colonialism is now an established political regime bolstered by a Tutsi monopoly over the state and military.

Following the decisive RPA military victory over the FAR and the *Interahamwe*, the RPF decided to unilaterally implement the terms of the Arusha Accords and established the GNU headed by President Pasteur Bizimungu, a senior Hutu member of the RPF at the time (Silva-Leander, 2008: 1607). While the appointment of a Hutu president and cabinet ministers gave the appearance of an ethnically-balanced government, the RPF installed loyalists as deputies within Hutu-led ministries. In reality, political power was concentrated in the hands of a small group of individuals closely associated with Vice President Paul Kagame, who ascended to the presidency in March 2000 (Thomson, 2013: 98). The new regime faced insurmountable obstacles: approximately 10% of the population was dead; by the end of 1996, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees estimated that there were almost 1.2 million refugees living in eastern Zaire (now the DRC), 600 000 in western Tanzania, 270 000 in Burundi and 90 000 in Uganda and of those that had remained in the country, many suffered from extreme physical, psychological and social harm (Thomson, 2013: 95, 98).

During this time, the RPF's security agenda primarily focused on counter-insurgency operations aimed at stabilising the country and responding to the military incursions of the *génocidaires* and *Interahamwe* that had fled to neighbouring Zaire (Thomson, 2013: 97; Silva-Leander, 2008: 1608). The RPF held that those who fled did so because they were guilty of genocide, and thus the RPA was often indiscriminate in its military operations (Hintjens, 2008: 26). Human rights organisations have detailed some of the war crimes committed by the RPA during this period (Zorbas, 2004: 41). For example, in April 1995, the RPA killed an estimated 8 000 civilians, many of whom were perceived to be Hutu, at the Kibeho IDP camp on the Tanzanian border (Thomson, 2013: 97) and "the killings took place in full sight of UN troops, who were unable to intervene" (Hintjens, 2008: 26).

In 2002, the GoR's military operations in the DRC has ceased and the focus of the RPF's security agenda shifted from concern for the military threat of Hutu Power forces to those ontological insecurities that threatened the sustainability of Tutsi Power (Beloff, 2021: 4). The state clamped down on critics (Hutu and Tutsi alike) of the regime: political opponents, investigative journalists and civil society organisations (Silva-Leander, 2008: 1608; Thomson, 2013: 113; Hintjens, 2008: 11). Prominent figures went into exile, while others were assassinated, imprisoned or disappeared (Thomson, 2013: 98). The RPF populated the administrative machinery of government and military by granting positions of power and prestige to predominantly Anglophone Tutsi loyalists who grew up in exile in Uganda (Thomson, 2013: 105; Ansoms, 2011: 242). The "Tutsification"[28] of political and military power has ensured that access to power, wealth and knowledge is the reserve of Tutsi elites (Reyntjens, 2013: 19).

### 4.2.2 The stickiness of the racial and ethnic strategies of othering

The resolve of the RPF was to eradicate those conditions that led to the genocide in the first place (Mamdani, 2020: 271). 'Never Again' became the ideological backdrop for the political decisions of the post-genocide regime (Hintjens, 2008: 6). To this end, in the immediate aftermath of the genocide, the RPF made the critical decision to scratch the use of Hutu, Tutsi and Twa as political identities from the public discourse. Rather, the GNU opted for a 'genocide framework' which categorised the population according to their experience of the genocide (Mamdani, 2020: 266; Burnet, 2015: 213; Hintjens, 2008: 15). There are five political categories used by the Rwandan state, international development agencies, NGOs and civil society organisations, namely returnees, refugees, victims, survivors and perpetrators (Mamdani, 2020: 266).

The returnees are mainly Tutsi and some Hutu exiles who returned with the RPF. Members of this group tend to be identified as Anglophone 'Ugandans' and occupy the top tiers of the military and government (Hintjens, 2008: 13). The refugees are divided into two groups – the pre-genocide 1959-1973 refugees or old caseload refugees and the post-genocide 1994-1997 refugees or the new caseload refugees (Mamdani, 2020: 266). The victims are both Tutsi and Hutu – critically, the latter are said to be victims of the massacres of internal political opposition and not the genocide. When it comes to living victims, this identification is limited to the Tutsi genocide survivors and the old caseload refugees (Mamdani, 2020: 266).

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[28] While Thomson (2013), Reyntjens (2013) and Ansoms (2011) argue that political and military power remain ethnicised in Rwanda, it is difficult to verify their position through empirical evidence (such as census data) as ethnic identities have been removed from the Rwandan public discourse. For this reason, from now on, I qualify their position as the 'perceived Tutsification' of the post-genocide state.

Survivor is only applied to Tutsi. As the genocide was directed at the Tutsi, a survivor is then a Tutsi who was in the country at the time of the genocide and is still alive today (Mamdani, 2020: 267). The assumption is that every Hutu who opposed the genocide was killed and so every living Hutu was either an active participant or passive onlooker – these are the perpetrators. That being so, Mamdani (2020: 267) writes, "to be a Hutu in contemporary Rwanda is to be presumed a perpetrator". Regardless of whether they participated in the violence or not, or whether they were in fact victims of violence themselves, all living Hutu are seen as perpetrators. Even those Hutu born after the genocide are considered responsible, as the GoR unequivocally takes the position that the violence was committed in their names (Makhunga, 2019: 389).

The collectivisation of Hutu guilt acts as the moral justification for the RPF's model of victor's justice (Burnet, 2015: 214; Zorbas, 2004: 46; Waldorf, 2011: 49; Makhunga, 2019: 390). By globalising Hutu culpability, the boundaries of ethnic and racial difference between Hutu and Tutsi are reasserted (Thomson, 2013: 116). Collective Hutu guilt limits Hutu participation in community life and delegitimises their participation in political structures. Conversely, Tutsi survivors are those who have been compensated for their personal and physical losses through initiatives supported by foreign aid and humanitarian assistance, such as the *Fond National pour l'Assistance aux Rescapés du Génocide* (FARG) or the Genocide Survivors Support and Assistance Fund, medical care and shelter provision services (Buckley-Zistel, 2006: 146). The five descriptors carry with them perceived assumptions about which groups have 'rights' to mourning practices, material assistance and social support in the wake of the genocide (Zorbas, 2004: 47; Burnet, 2015: 214).

The allocation of material resources and the organisation of political power keep vestiges of the ethnicised and racialised strategies of othering and difference alive in the post-genocide era. Yuko Otake's (2019) ethnographic research on the Musanze district in Northern Rwanda illustrates these dynamics. Historically, Musanze had a small Tutsi population, and so the number of genocide survivors in the district was 1 893, making-up only 0.6% of the total genocide survivors in the country (Otake, 2019: 173). Musanze was part of the main battleground following the genocide, and during this period many citizens were either slaughtered or experienced gratuitous violence. Eight years after the fighting had ceased, the impact of the war was made evident by the number of orphaned children in the district; 21% of children in the district are orphaned, which is 5% higher than the national average (Otake, 2019: 173). Despite this, support to victims in the district has been limited. In this respect, Otake quotes from her field notes:

> An international aid worker who supports grassroots reconciliation said, "I don't know what to say when I see that Tutsi genocide survivors are living in beautiful houses whereas moderate Hutu families who helped them and even had devastating injuries live in poor broken houses just in the same corner." (man, 40s, fieldnotes, Aug-18-2015) (Otake, 2019: 173).

These circumstances have provoked grievances against the government by people in Musanze. One of Otake's research participants recounted:

> I can tell you that.... they are getting support. They are getting food. [...] I came back from Zaire [as a refugee] but they [the government] have never supported me. [...] Who does not have *igikomere* in the heart? [...] Who did not experience the war? Everyone, everyone has been living with problems. But why don't they include 'others'? [...] We have wounded feelings (*ibikomere*), which are very difficult, but where can we go [to seek for help]? (60s, interview, May-6-2016) (Otake, 2019: 174).

The experiences of residents of the Musanze district illustrate how the allocation of resources according to different experiences of the genocide have resulted in structural inequalities in the post-genocide era.

In addition, this framework does not allow for in-group distinctions within categories, as there is no possibility for there to be different kinds of victims, survivors and perpetrators (Thomson, 2013: 115). The framework therefore actively silences the experiences of individuals from mixed families who lost family members or were themselves victims of violence (such as the Hutu widows of Tutsi men killed in the genocide or the children of inter-ethnic marriages) (Thomson, 2013: 116; Burnet, 2015: 218, 223), and those who were victims of the RPA's violence in the civil war and in the aftermath of the genocide (Buckley-Zistel, 2006: 146).

Thus, Zorbas argues that the five categories have a "misleading neutrality to them, appearing to be more technical, a-political, a-historical and nonethnic" than they really are (Zorbas, 2004: 47). By politicising different experiences of the genocide, the new official language has maintained, and some scholars argue intensified, the differences between Hutu and Tutsi (Burnet, 2015: 213). This is evident in research that has explored the saliency of ethnic and racial identities in the private lives of Rwandans (Buckley-Zistel, 2006: 138; Silva-Leander, 2008: 1609; Zorbas, 2004: 42). For example, McLean Hilker (2014: 362-64) demonstrates that young Rwandans in Kigali continue to ethnicise and racialise heterosexual politics and inter-ethnic romantic relations. This is particularly evident in respondents' use of Hamitic gendered stereotypes to describe young Tutsi women's promiscuity and beauty. McLean Hilker (2014) refers to some of the young participants' comments in this respect:

> Rwandan boys prefer Tutsi girls ... because we say that Tutsi girls are more beautiful and more direct sexually ... It's said that they make love more often and that it is easier to make love with Tutsi girls because they are not ashamed ... for a Hutu girl, it can take a boy two hours to persuade her to make love, but only one hour for a Tutsi girl. It's said that in the past, if a Tutsi girl went to stay with her Aunt, the Aunt would say, 'oh, don't sleep alone, sleep with your cousin' ... and the aunt left the Tutsi girl to make love with her cousin ... there is even a Rwandan proverb which says that a Tutsi girl can sleep with her cousin. This would be impossible for a Hutu (Françine, age 27) (McLean Hilker, 2014: 363).

> Tutsi girls always think that they are so beautiful ... when we have ... dances with the neighbouring boys school, the Tutsi girls think that all the boys are only watching them ... Tutsi girls always feel superior over the others ... They think that everyone is admiring them ... Often, they are very rude and behave badly, but they think that being a Tutsi girl is enough ... they say that because they are beautiful, they will find men with money and a good position in society (Consolée, age 16) (McLean Hilker, 2014: 363).

Purdeková and Mwambari (2021) discuss how these politics played out in the public response to the 2019 Miss Rwanda beauty competition. According to Purdeková and Mwambari (2021: 8), Miss Rwanda is keenly followed by the Rwandan public. In 2019, the pageant allowed ordinary Rwandans to express their views on the competition via social media platforms, such as Twitter. In particular, a young woman (perceived to be Hutu) from a rural area in Rwanda, Josiane Mwiseneza, was the subject of public scrutiny. After collating the posts and tweets about Mwiseneza at the time of the pageant, Purdeková and Mwambari (2021: 8) point out how she was "likened to a gorilla and to a former Hutu President, associated with 'genocide deniers,' and ridiculed for her low social status and lack of foreign language skills". Some of the tweets that circulated were:

> *Igihe ni iki Abahutu nabo bagatorwa muri nyampinga, Josiane 100% turi kumwe ikamba rigomba kuba iryawe igihe Abatutsi batorewe birarambiranye.*
>
> Translation: Time is now that Hutus can be selected to be miss, Josiane 100%, we are together, the crown must be yours, we are tired of Tutsis always being voted' (Purdeková and Mwambari, 2021: 10).
>
> *Ntamuhutukazi wabaye miss rwose ise yaraguye tingitingi nyuma yo kunywa amaraso y'abana b'in- zirakarengane, ndarivuze ndamaze.*
>
> There is no Hutu who has ever become Miss when her father died in Tingitingi (reference to refugee camp in Zaire) after he drunk the blood of innocent children, I have said it whatever the consequences (Purdeková and Mwambari, 2021: 10).

The public debates about the Miss Rwanda 2019 pageant point to the ways in which identity divisions and racialised stereotypes continue to impact Rwandan interpersonal relations in the present moment.

#### *4.2.2.1 Negationism, genocide ideology and the security regime of the post-genocide state*

Major legal changes were introduced through the adoption of the 2003 Constitution (revised in 2015), which marked the end of the transitional GNU and the beginning of the new Rwandan regime under the rule of the RPF, led by President Kagame (Hintjens, 2008: 16). The new policy and legal framework concretised the decision to eliminate ethnicity and race from the public domain, and in so doing, drove the categories Hutu, Tutsi and Twa once and for all "into the realm of private spaces" (Hintjens, 2008: 16). The use of, or reference to, ethnic or racial identity is now considered a serious crime of "negationism" (Hintjens, 2008: 10) or "genocide ideology" (Waldorf, 2011: 55).

Many scholars have argued that this move was, although noble, not entirely innocent. Waldorf (2011: 52) maintains that the broad legal definitions of negationism and genocide ideology allow the RPF to silence critics, journalists and political opponents. Similarly, Thomson (2013: 114) argues that the RPF frames policing ethnicity as a matter of state security and sustaining peace. Meanwhile, other scholars have argued that the attempt to de-racialise and de-ethnicise Rwandan political identities is a strategy to obscure the perceived Tutsification of political and military power (Reyntjens, 2013: 19; Buckley-Zistel, 2006: 133; Zorbas, 2004: 45).

The decision to erase ethnicity is rhetorically reinforced by the RPF's official historical narrative of the genocide, which places ultimate blame for the violence on the divide-and-rule policies of the Belgian colonial administration (Hintjens, 2008: 15; Blackie and Hitchcott, 2018: 24; Reyntjens, 2013: 195; Thomson, 2013: 81-82). The rationale behind unmaking ethnicity therefore lies in a decolonial desire to break away from the legacy of coloniality and the Hutu/Tutsi cycle of violence. Makhunga (2019: 383) argues that the rhetorical backbone of the 'New Rwanda' is the ideology of *Ndi umuyarwanda* or *Turi abayarwanda*, respectively meaning 'I am Rwandan' and 'We are Rwandan' in Kinyarwanda, which draws from a romanticised and historically inaccurate narrative of pre-colonial harmony between Hutu, Tutsi and Twa (Makhunga, 2019: 388). This reimagined, neo-traditional ideal is defined in terms of a collective civic identity, the *Banyarwanda*, which undergirds the RPF's unity and reconciliation enterprise and acts as the backdrop for the nation-building project of the post-genocide state (Wielenga, 2014: 122). Consequently, the historical intersections between the gendered, racial, autochthonous and ethnic strategies of othering and difference explored in Chapter three have been obscured by the introduction of the new national civic identity, the *Banyarwanda*. Some scholars are cautious about celebrating Rwanda's decision to regulate, politicise and enforce a national project of "chosen amnesia" (Buckley-Zistel, 2006: 131), as they fear that the stickiness of racial and ethnic identities in Rwandan social life will threaten the sustainability of peace (Hudson, 2009: 268; Mamdani, 2020: 274; Thomson, 2013: 85; Hintjens, 2008: 31; Silva-Leander, 2008: 1602).

#### *4.2.2.2 The interconnections between the urban/rural economic divide, structural violence and ethnicity*

The securitisation of perceived Tutsi Power has come hand in hand with the regime's development enterprise. For the post-genocide state, the security of the regime is connected to improving human security and rapid economic development. The country's development agenda aims to transform Rwanda's economy into a middle-income country through the establishment of good governance and a responsive state bureaucracy, the modernisation of agriculture and rural society, the development of a strong private sector and comprehensive human resources development (Thomson, 2013: 108; Reyntjens, 2016: 71-72; Ansoms, 2011: 240). Overall, these goals fit within a top-down developmentalist agenda where the state plays a central role in reshaping the social and economic environment at all levels (Ansoms, 2011: 240; Zorbas, 2004: 5). This agenda was originally grounded in four policy documents: *Rwanda Vision 2020*, *Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper* 2008, *Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy* (EDPRS) I (2008-2012) and II (2013-2018) (Takeuchi, 2019: 125).[29]

Under the leadership of the RPF, Rwanda has experienced significant economic growth and poverty reduction (Takeuchi, 2019: 123; Ansoms, 2009: 9). From 2001 to 2006, the average annual growth amounted to 4.6%, which represents 2.7% in per capita terms (Ansoms, 2009: 10). From 2010 to 2019, growth averaged at 7.2%, while the average in per capita terms grew at 5% annually (World Bank, 2021). Economic growth has been accompanied by poverty reduction. Between 2000 and 2010, the percentage of people living in poverty fell from 59% to approximately 46%, and then down to 38% in 2016 (World Bank, 2020: xii). Despite these gains, scholars have argued that the benefits of development tend to bypass the poor majority, especially in rural areas (Ansoms, 2009: 10). Statistical indicators suggest that Rwanda is now more class divided and polarised than ever before (Hintjens, 2008: 20). For example, inequality has remained high, which is represented by the trends in Rwanda's Gini coefficient. By 2001, the coefficient rose to 0.47, representing a situation in which the richest 20% of the population enjoyed the same consumption level as the poorest 80%. This inequality trend has persisted. In 2006, the coefficient reached 0.51 (Takeuchi, 2019: 123), and in 2017 it declined to 0.43 (World Bank, 2021). The consistently high Gini coefficient is worrisome, as high levels of inequality are correlated with an increased risk of falling back into conflict (Ansoms, 2009: 63).

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[29] In recent years the GoR has reviewed its development policy and has published the *Rwanda Vision 2050* policy document and the *National Transformation Strategy I* (2017-2024) which outline the country's new economic and development goals (MINALOC, 2020a: 44). In these documents, the focus is on transforming Rwanda into an upper-middle income country by 2035 and a high-income country by 2050, as well as the promotion of a more inclusive and sustainable form of development (MINALOC, 2020a: 44).

Economic progress has been limited in rural areas. This is especially concerning considering that approximately "17.5% of the Rwandan population of 12 676 224 is urban and […] 82.5% (i.e. 10 457 885) of the Rwandan population is rural" (Uwizeyimana, 2020: 58). The benefits of economic growth remain concentrated in the hands of a small class of agricultural entrepreneurs, while most rural families are confronted by food shortages, hardship and destitution (Ansoms, 2009: 14; Reyntjens, 2016: 73; Rashidghalam, 2017: 105). Scholars maintain that the GoR's development enterprise exacerbates the rural-urban class divide (Hasselskog and Schierenbeck, 2015: 951; Ansoms, 2011: 241; Uwizeyimana, 2020: 58). In this way, structural violence continues to widen the socio-economic chasm between the haves from the have-nots, the urban and the rural.

In summary, I have outlined the political environment and structural factors within which the GoR has developed and adapted its gender equality legislative and policy framework. The organisation of political power in the post-genocide state and the subsequent security and development agenda contribute toward the conditions of structural violence which could implicitly (re)produce the ethnic and racial strategies of othering and difference in the present. This necessarily implies that the intersections between these and the gendered strategies of othering did not end with the RPF's political declaration of ethnic and racial amnesia. Rather, it points to a reality in which fundamental aspects of gender insecurity are ignored by the GoR's gender policy and legislative regime. In the following section, I consider the emergence of the women's movement in the aftermath of the genocide, women's subsequent political and economic gains and the formalisation of the GoR's gender equality regime. I argue that the multi-level (re)production of the logics of addition evident in the GoR's gender security policy documents has resulted in gender (in)security silences, which in turn, create opportunities for gendered forms of discrimination and violence to thrive in the post-conflict state.

## 4.3 THE SUCCESSES AND PITFALLS OF RWANDA'S GENDER EQUALITY LEGISLATIVE AND POLICY FRAMEWORK

Feminist scholars maintain that war causes ruptures in the gendered social order, which provide women with opportunities to make political and economic gains in the post-war period (Berry, 2017: 831; Burnet, 2008: 382). The post-war transition period is, therefore, critical for enhancing women's access to rights and gender equality. However, Berry qualifies that these gains are often "curtailed in the aftermath of conflict, as the masculine ethos of military victory denies women their place in the post-war transition, and the patriarchal gender order is once again established in the home" (Berry, 2017: 831).

In this section, I explore this regressive phenomenon in the Rwandan context. Rwanda offers us a paradox: although the country's leadership has demonstrated a commitment to gender equality and has a robust gender security policy framework, patriarchal social attitudes continue to be cultivated in the post-genocide era on a community and intersubjective level, which in turn, propagates and reinforces violent gendered cultural norms that threaten gender security in the country. I argue that part of the reason why this paradox governs the post-war gendered social landscape is because of the discursive logics of addition that undergird the hegemonic liberal-feminist and residual diversity discourses in the GoR's gender equality policy regime.

### 4.3.1 The role of women's organisations in post-genocide reconstruction

In the wake of the genocide, many Rwandan women were faced with the pragmatic reality that they had to assume responsibilities and activities ordinarily reserved for men. Either killed, exiled, imprisoned, displaced or in military service with the RPF, men were few and far between (Ortiz, 2020: 9). Accordingly, women and girls found themselves taking on roles in the domestic and public spheres of Rwandan life previously prohibited to them – reflecting a family and community-level shift in gendered authority (Burnet, 2008: 384; Newbury and Baldwin, 2000: 6).

On top of ordinary care work responsibilities, women were, therefore, confronted with the difficulties of trying to navigate the survival of their families. In the face of these challenges, Rwandan women turned to one another to rebuild their communities – as individual women,

women's associations and women's groups (Newbury and Baldwin, 2000: 6; Ortiz, 2020: 10).[30] Two prominent umbrella organisations developed during this period, these were the Association of the Widows (known in French as the *Association des Veuves du Genocide* or by the acronym AVEGA *Agahozo*)[31] (Burnet, 2008: 372-74) and Pro-Femmes/Twese Hamwe (PFTH), which in English means, 'For Women, All Together' (Gruber Foundation, 2011b). Thus, by meeting women's basic needs and by building local support systems for survivors, national and local women's organisations played a critical role in rebuilding Rwandan society (Burnet, 2008: 371-72). What is more, the impact of these organisations did not stop at the national level, as their work and experiences were crucial for the formulation of UNSCR 1325 as well (Hudson, 2009: 290).

### 4.3.2 Rwanda's gender equality regime

The work of women's organisations cultivated a political environment that was ripe for securing women's political and economic rights in the post-genocide era (Berry, 2017: 836; Madsen, 2019: 174). Critically, the RPF was a catalyst for the success of women's organisations' advocacy work. From the outset, the RPF demonstrated a commitment to gender mainstreaming in both its political and armed wings, and since securing political power, the party has continued to expand the rights, representation and participation of women in all spheres of public life (Burnet, 2008: 367; Turianskyi and Chisiza, 2017: 8; Burnet, 2019b: 91). The RPF has mainstreamed women across government and appointed women to high-profile positions as ministers, secretaries of state, Supreme Court justices and parliamentarians (Burnet, 2008: 367; Debusscher and Ansoms, 2013: 1116; Aguiari, 2014: 132; Ortiz, 2020: 9). In turn, these gains in women's political representation have opened doors for many legal and policy changes that have enhanced Rwandan women's claims to equal rights and opportunities (Burnet, 2019a: 15). In this section, I briefly outline the institutional framework and gender machinery responsible for securing women's rights and gender equality, as well as the crucial legal gains and policy documents that these institutions have championed. This outline serves to set the stage for my discourse analysis of the logics of addition in section 4.4.

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[30] This was not a new phenomenon. The foundations for women's organising were already laid by the women's movement geared toward establishing democracy in the mid-1980s (Newbury and Baldwin, 2000: 6; Holmes, 2018: 229; Burnet, 2019a: 3).

[31] *Agahazo* is a term in Kinyarwanda which means to "dry one's tears" (Gruber Foundation, 2011a). Colloquially, the acronym AVEGA is used alongside '*agahozo*' to refer to the organisation, hence AVEGA *Agahozo*.

The RPF's gender equality framework is spearheaded by the government's gender machinery, which is comprised of the MIGEPROF, the *Forum des Femmes Rwandaises Parlementaires* (FFRP) (or the Forum of Rwandan Women Parliamentarians), the National Women's Council (NWC) and the GMO (Burnet, 2019b: 93). By working collectively, the GoR's gender machinery has ensured that gender equality was incorporated into Rwanda's long-term reconstruction vision, which stands in stark contrast to the highly patriarchal society that dominated Rwanda before the genocide.

The GoR is committed to many international and regional conventions, charters, declarations and instruments. Many of these were outlined in Chapter two, sections 2.4.2 and 2.4.4, such as CEDAW, the *Beijing Platform for Action* and the Maputo *Protocol* (Aguiari, 2014: 136; Nyiransabimana, 2018: 7). In addition, the GoR actively recognises UNSCR 1325 in its gender policy framework. In 2009, Rwanda developed its first NAP for UNSCR 1325, and following an evaluation in 2015, developed a second-generation NAP in 2018 (Madsen, 2019: 174).[32] These documents, as well as their central tenets, are referenced in the significant gender policy and legislation developed by the Rwandan gender machinery in the last two decades. There is, then, an evidenced commitment on the part of the GoR to domesticate the liberal-feminist discourses that undergird the larger "gender equality supernorm" which populates international documents, conventions and policy frameworks (Kirby and Shepherd, 2020: 4).

These documents also informed Rwandan political elites' decision to make gender equality a national priority when they included a commitment to continuously update and adapt gender legislation and policy as a cross-cutting pillar in Rwanda's guiding blueprint for development, *Vision 2020* (2000) – this commitment to gender equality was reiterated in the more recent *Vision 2050* (2020) document (Kwaleyela and Kangwa, 2018: 63-64; Burnet, 2019a: 10). Through various economic policy mechanisms, the government has tried to address the underlying obstacles to women's participation in economic growth by creating a favourable environment where all social groups, including women, can participate in the country's development process (Nyiransabimana, 2018: 8). However, for the GoR, the gender equality regime tends to be warranted by an economic rationale, which sees gender equality as an imperative for growth rather than as a just end in and of itself (Kwaleyela and Kangwa, 2018: 64). Louise Mushikiwabo, who previously served as the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation from 2009 to 2018 and is now the current Secretary-General of the *International Organisation of la Francophonie* (OIF), describes the GoR's approach as follows:

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[32] I go into further detail about the two Rwandan NAPs in section 4.5.

> Unfortunately, with our economic development approach, we talk about gender equality in numbers – such as how many women are in politics, how many have started financial activities so they can be economically independent. Even if these ideas have some link to feminist, it's not clear that we're coming from the angle of knowing our rights and being able to ensure them. We're coming from an angle that doesn't touch on the relationships between men and women (Hunt, 2019: 343).

Some of the main vehicles for the translation of the liberal-feminist gender equality supernorm are the Constitution and the country's accompanying gender-sensitive legal code. In its preamble, the Constitution states that the country is committed to ensuring equal rights for all Rwandans without prejudice, while respecting principles of gender equality in national development (Nyiransabimana, 2018: 5; Debusscher and Ansoms, 2013: 1117). It further affirms that women should hold a minimum of 30% of posts in government decision-making positions and sets a mandate for gender mainstreaming throughout all state institutions (Nyiransabimana, 2018: 6; Ortiz, 2020: 5; Kwaleyela and Kangwa, 2018: 65; Burnet, 2019a: 11; Svobodová, 2019: 128). Thus, women are required to occupy at least 30% of seats in both chambers of Parliament, and political parties are likewise required to reserve 30% of their positions for women (Turianskyi and Chisiza, 2017: 8).

Subsequently, in the 2003 election, 48.8% of seats in the lower chamber and 34.6% of seats in the upper chamber went to women (Turianskyi and Chisiza, 2017: 8). Over the last two decades, the number of women in both chambers has steadily increased (IDEA, 2021). In the 2018 election, women were awarded 61% of the seats in the lower chamber, and in 2019 women made up 38% of the seats in the upper chamber (IDEA, 2021). With these numbers it is no surprise that Rwanda boasts by far the best global record for female political representation in parliament (Thornton, 2019). Along with gender quotas, the GoR has effectively combined quotas with innovative decentralised structures of governance, such as the NWC, which collectively facilitate broader participation of women in decision-making institutions at all levels of the state (Hudson, 2009: 304).

Nevertheless, scholars maintain that just because the Rwandan Parliament is majority female, this does not mean that female political participation has automatically led to greater gender equality or a more egalitarian and peaceful society, and it certainly does not guarantee that women's interests will always be prioritised (Turianskyi and Chisiza, 2017: 12; Burnet, 2008: 363, 2011: 326, 2019a: 8). Several scholars argue that the RPF's women-friendly approach is a strategy for maintaining political dominance and for retaining the favour of its international partners (Turianskyi and Chisiza, 2017: 9; Mumporeze and Nduhura, 2019: 359; Burnet, 2008: 363). While prioritising women's rights and gender equality has indeed been an avenue for creating a positive 'image' of Rwanda on the world stage and a useful soft power resource, this reality was more of a by-product of an initiative that focussed on making substantive changes to Rwandan women's everyday lives.

Instituted during Rwanda's reconstruction process, provisions for safeguarding gender equality are enshrined in the country's formal legal code (Burnet, 2019a: 10). Above in section 4.3.1, I described the factors that led to the proliferation of woman-headed and child-headed households in the aftermath of the genocide. The resultant gendered shifts in family and community authority left these women in a precarious situation, as Rwandan law limited women and girls' rights to participate in the formal economy and to own or inherit property (Newbury and Baldwin, 2000: 3). These households were then extremely vulnerable to having their property and homes expropriated by others, especially male kin (Newbury and Baldwin, 2000: 4). The dangerous position many women found themselves in, prompted civil society organisations, the MIGEPROF and the FFRP to work closely together to develop a legislative and policy framework that would secure women's equal rights to inheritance and access to economic opportunities in the post-genocide era (Burnet, 2019b: 93). They successfully lobbied decision-makers in the RPF and managed to make these gender equality gains a formal reality (Burnet, 2019a: 10). With the adoption of Organic Laws 22/1999, 08/2005, 43/2013 and the 2005 *Land Policy*, women now had equal rights to inheritance, land ownership and joint-property ownership with their husbands (Kayigema and Rugege, 2014: 54). In addition, the legal regime ensures that women can enter contracts and employment, open a bank account and own property without the need for permission from their husbands (Ortiz, 2020: 10). These laws are bolstered through critical gender policy documents, namely the *National Gender Policy* (2010, 2021).

One of the greatest achievements regarding gendered security in Rwanda was the passage of Organic Law 59/2008 on the Prevention and Punishment of Gender-Based Violence (2008), more commonly known as the GBV bill (Svobodová, 2019: 128). This was one of the few times when legislation originated in Parliament, and not the Executive (Turianskyi and Chisiza, 2017: 12). Burnet (2019b: 94) argues that the GBV bill is transformative because it directly challenges deeply entrenched cultural values that subjugate women's rights, not only by outlawing domestic violence, but by also going further to define non-consensual marital sex as rape and as a punishable crime. This piece of legislation also laid the groundwork for establishing centres for reporting and support (Turianskyi and Chisiza, 2017: 12). It has been vigorously implemented and transformed multiple institutions, including the creation of the *Isange* One Stop Centres and an Access to Justice Office or *Maison d'Accès à la Justice* (MAJ) in every district (Burnet, 2019b: 94, 100).[33] Another noteworthy initiative is the Gender Desks in the Rwanda Defence Force (RDF), the Rwandan National Police (RNP) and the National Public Prosecuting Authority (NPPA), which offer gender training for personnel, counselling and support for female staff, as well as comprehensive services for survivors of SGBV (such as legal and reporting assistance) (Burnet, 2019b: 97).

In this regard, women's political representation in all levels of government has been critical for the progress made in formally and legally entrenching gender equality and gendered security (Kayigema and Rugege, 2014: 54). In addition, the increased political representation of women has offered critical opportunities for the public to challenge normative gendered ideologies related to women and their place in Rwandan society. This marks a significant departure for Rwanda's collective cultural imagination, as women are now encouraged to take on visible roles in public life (Burnet, 2011: 328). Louise Mushikiwabo describes her own experience of this shift:

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[33] The *Isange* One Stop Centres are "multi-sectoral and interdisciplinary programme aimed at providing psychosocial, medical, police and legal services to adult and child survivors/victims of gender-based violence and child abuse occurring in the family or in the community at large" (MIGEPROF, 2021: xiii). *Isange* means to 'feel at home', or 'feel most welcome' in Kinyarwanda (GoR, 2018: 20). In the MAJ, a staff member is assigned to deal with GBV cases in every district (MIGEPROF, 2011: 9).

> I hadn't ever seen Rwandan women actually campaigning, let alone doing so with all their energy, with so much passion, and outdoing men. You think, "That's just politics." But how does a woman stand in front of a crowd and brag about things she's done, and talk about what she plans to do? I couldn't believe it. And the positive and tacit support you saw in men when some of these women would come out and say, "Look, I've made a big difference: I've sheltered orphans. I'm very active in the school in my neighbourhood. I can do this for my community." You'd see smiles on men's faces (Hunt, 2017: 147).

While there are still Rwandans who speak against gender equality and who label independent or outspoken women as 'loose women', these voices are no longer met with tacit approval; they are instead framed by political elites as the "un-evolved points-of-view" (Burnet, 2008: 382) of the past or as a function of 'traditional culture', which is at odds with what is described as Rwanda's "new, modern culture" (Holmes, 2018: 228).

With these successes in mind, Rwanda is generally considered to be a model for other post-conflict societies on women's participation in peace and nation-building processes (Hudson, 2009: 290; Madsen, 2020: 3). More than 20 years after the genocide, issues of peace, security and gender remain high on the GoR's agenda (Madsen, 2019: 174). The GoR has adopted a holistic approach to gender security. It stresses the synergies between responding to domestic gender insecurities, such as high levels of GBV and IPV, and UN peace support operations where Rwandan peacekeepers are engaged (Holmes, 2014: 321). The GoR has also demonstrated that it is committed to recruiting more female military and police personnel (Holmes, 2014: 321). In this respect, at the 2019 UN Peacekeeping Ministerial Conference, the Minister of Defence, Major General Albert Murasira remarked: "In line with the United Nations goal of increasing women peacekeepers, the Republic of Rwanda is currently ranked 2nd highest major contributor of female police and troops and we are committed even to do more" (Murasira, 2019: 2).

Yet, while Rwandan gender policies and legislation may theoretically put women on an equal footing as men, in practice, the full and comprehensive integration of women remains limited (Newby and Sebag, 2020: 160). For example, gender parity remains low in some levels of decentralised government, as there is a visible gender imbalance in favour of men (Nyiransabimana, 2018: 6). The GMO (2019: 57) reports that in 2018 only 26.7% of District Mayors were women. And, where women are represented in numbers that are on par with national levels, they tend to be in offices that are presumed to be more feminine; for example, 66.7% of Vice Mayors in Social Affairs are women, whereas only 16.7% of Vice Mayors in Economic Affairs are women (GMO, 2019: 57). Despite the political will to promote gender equality in leadership positions, the number of women still fall behind men in terms of involvement in local government decision-making (Nyiransabimana, 2018: 6). The underrepresentation of women in the lower levels of governance is not unique to the sector, as women are also poorly represented in other public institutions and in the private sector where patriarchal attitudes thrive (Kwaleyela and Kangwa, 2018: 69).

Similar trends are evident in Rwanda's security institutions. Georgina Holmes writes that many of the Rwandan female military personnel she interviewed for her study had "a strong desire to serve in the military from a very early age" and believed that "being a soldier empowered them" (Holmes, 2018: 239). The women also emphasised the practical benefits to a career in the military, such as the benefits of "job security, a competitive salary, access to paid maternity leave, and a chance to gain a military-funded, degree-level education" (Holmes, 2018: 239). Despite these accolades, women are significantly underrepresented in the GoR security structures. For instance, although the number of female military personnel did increase from 241 in 2004 to 633 in 2014 (Holmes, 2018: 237), active servicewomen only make up 4.6% of the RDF today (Newby and Sebag, 2020: 158). Similarly, only 21% of RNP personnel are female (GMO, 2020: 60). Representatives from the Gender Desks of the RDF and the RNP maintain that women are reluctant to join the military and the police because traditional values and attitudes depict women in security institutions as aggressive and uncomfortably masculine (GMO, 2020: 60). In this respect, Holmes (2018: 239) cites a senior ranking female soldier who observes that "in Rwandan culture, and not only Rwandan culture, very few women would like to join the military. They still think that the military is a man's job".

The low number of women in security institutions then translates into less female personnel sent in contingents to UN missions. Thus, while Rwanda is the second highest contributor of female personnel to UN missions in Africa following Ethiopia (UN peacekeeping, 2021: 1), in 2019 only 4.1% of troops and 9.2% of military observers and staff officers in Rwandan contingents were women (Watson, 2019: 10). Holmes (2019: 72) argues that a gendered division of labour influences the roles that female military peacekeepers play in UN missions, such as the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID). Like other studies (Heinecken, 2015; Sion, 2008), Holmes (2019: 72) demonstrates that Rwandan women peacekeepers in UNAMID are routinely excluded from performing certain security practices and are confined to 'safe' spaces and 'safe' tasks. The female peacekeepers do not join their male counterparts on short-duration day patrols (unless they are specifically required), night patrols or long-duration patrols (Holmes, 2019: 72). While four of the women interviewed by Holmes (2019: 72) are employed in intelligence gathering, none had ever engaged in DDR or security sector reform programmes. In fact, most of the interviewees work with local populations in 'soft' areas, such as empowerment and education projects, HIV/AIDs awareness and reproductive health (Holmes, 2019: 73).

Enforcing and implementing progressive gender laws and policy mechanisms remains a challenge, as underlying patriarchal gender relations regularly prevent women from activating or controlling their rights and from taking advantage of the formal opportunities made available to them (Berry, 2015: 5; Kwaleyela and Kangwa, 2018: 66; Kagaba, 2015; Burnet, 2008; Ortiz, 2020: 6). Thus, while public ideas about gender equality and women's rights have rapidly changed in the past 20 years, gender roles and the gendered division of labour in the household, family, extended kin group, as well as in state institutions, have been more resistant to change (Burnet, 2019a: 14). In the next section, I consider the relationship between gender cultural norms and gender insecurity in Rwanda.

### 4.3.3 The gender (in)security silences in Rwanda's gender equality regime: the persistence of patriarchal gender norms and GBV

Gendered social and cultural norms are at odds with general GoR-endorsed perceptions of gender equality. Kagaba (2015) and Burnet's (2008, 2011) research serves as illustrative examples of this phenomenon. These scholars reveal that while Rwanda's new laws have transformed women into equal partners in the home, these same laws have inadvertently led to increased workloads for women. As care work is still predominantly perceived as a woman's domain, women are now required to balance the demands of employment with their domestic responsibilities (Kagaba, 2015: 575; Burnet, 2008: 385, 2011: 329). These social norms, cultural values and practices are, therefore, a major barrier to the implementation of Rwanda's gender equality laws and policies (Abbott, Mugisha and Sapsford, 2018: 1017).

In recent years, some studies have pointed to incremental shifts in patriarchal norms (Slegh, Kimonyo and Ruratotye, 2021: 16; MIGEPROF, 2019b: 51). For example, Ortiz (2020: 26) found that most of her respondents agreed that gender equality is important for sustainable economic growth. Similarly, in a MIGEPROF study on the root causes of GBV, 80.2% of the respondents either disagreed or strongly disagreed with the statement that "woman should not speak on behalf of a group in the presence of one or several men" (MIGEPROF, 2019b: 51-52); and 94.8% of the respondents either disagreed or strongly disagreed with the statement that "a man who takes joint decisions with his wife should be referred to as *Inganzwa* (always says yes to his wife)", which is understood to be an emasculating term (MIGEPROF, 2019b: 51-52). For the most part, however, researchers have not recorded sustained changes in the perception of women's roles in the home or the community (Ortiz, 2020: 16; Slegh *et al.*, 2021: 30; Burnet, 2019a: 14).

This suggests that unequal power/gender structures still exist and that questions of patriarchal gendered norms need to be addressed (Madsen, 2019: 185; Gasasira *et al*., 2021: 47). As a result, women's political, social and legal gains have been undermined by a patriarchal backlash, which has extended violence beyond the theatre of war into women's daily lives (Berry, 2017: 834; Kwaleyela and Kangwa, 2018: 69). Thomson *et al*. (2015: 2) argue that the rate of IPV had almost doubled in Rwanda from 34% in 2005 to 56% in 2010, which places Rwanda among the countries with the highest rates of IPV against women in the world (Gasasira *et al*., 2021: 47).

Since the adoption of the 2009 and 2018 NAPs and the implementation of the *National Policy against GBV* in 2011, there is little indication that these numbers have shifted by any significant measure. In a 2019 study, 73.6% of women respondents indicated that they had been a victim of one or more forms of domestic violence in their lifetime, while 21.8% responded not having been a victim of domestic violence and 4.5% preferred to keep quiet on this issue (Habumuremyi and Habamenshi, 2019: 243). High levels of IPV are accompanied by persistent dangerous gendered cultural norms and attitudes. For instance, a 2019 survey found that 45.3% of the male and 50.1% of the female respondents disagreed or strongly disagreed with the following statement: “A wife has the rights [*sic*] to say no to sex request from her husband” (MIGEPROF, 2019b: 52) – indicating the prevalence of the strong cultural belief that a wife must submit to her husband’s authority. What is more, the survey indicated that 67% of men and women are still tolerant of GBV across the county (MIGEPROF, 2019b: 91).

The high level of tolerance for GBV is accompanied by low reporting rates. Burnet (2019b: 101-102) writes that alongside poverty and economic dependence, the two other main structural factors that make victims reluctant to report their abuse are the culture of silence surrounding domestic violence and social and cultural norms deeming many types of domestic violence as normal. Similarly, Kagaba (2015: 583) demonstrates that women who do report IPV, risk violent reprisal by their partner/spouse, being ostracised by family and neighbours, and the burden of the entire household falling on her while her husband is in jail. For this reason, Kagaba (2015: 583) argues that “women often choose silence as a form of protection”. Thus, most Rwandans choose not to report GBV crimes, as only 42% of individuals report sexual or other physical violence, and only 3% report this violence formally (Svobodová, 2019: 129).

The other reality is the operational shortfalls in the GoR’s protection machinery, particularly the One Stop Centres. Although there is a One Stop Centre in every district (44 in total), a MIGEPROF (2019b: 69) study has demonstrated that only 16% of the respondents were aware of the existence of the One Stop Centres, while 50% indicated that the services were inaccessible and 18% reported that the Centres were too far away. The study reveals that most of the centres do not have professional social workers and legal officers. Inadequate staff means that the Centres are strained in delivering comprehensive services, and so, services such as transport for GBV survivors and home visits, among others, are unavailable due to budget constraints. In fact, the study found that most Centres could not afford to stay open for 24 hours, which means that their services are not available at night (MIGEPROF, 2019b: 96). Therefore, the persistence in dangerous gendered norms and the underperformance of Rwanda's gender machinery, correlates with a high rate of GBV.

Undoubtedly Rwanda has made significant advances in gender equality, women's empowerment and gendered security. However, long-standing patriarchal values and attitudes still prevail across all sectors of Rwandan society (Kwaleyela and Kangwa, 2018: 69; Holmes, 2018: 229; Mumporeze and Nduhura, 2019: 366). Increasing female participation and securing equal gender rights are therefore a necessary – though not sufficient – step towards gender security, as the rights-based approach has not managed to change the underlying social structures that produce women's subordination (Guariso, Ingelaere and Verpoorten, 2018: 1362-63; Debusscher and Ansoms, 2013: 1113). In other words, even if there are changes in the formal rules of the game, it can still leave the situation largely unaltered for women on the ground (Guariso *et al.*, 2018: 1363; Berry, 2015: 4).

The gains Rwandan women made by acquiring new roles in society have at times obscured (and antagonised) "untransformed aspects of women's and girl's social lives" (Hudson, 2009: 306). Rose Mukantabana, a practicing lawyer and the first female president of the lower house of Parliament describes her own observations of this phenomenon:

> A lot has been done in our country about women's rights, women's promotion, but there is a lot to do because of history and tradition. I worked in the Association of the Defense of Women and Children's Rights – Haguruka – where the main activity is training in laws protecting women. Each year, we'd see about six thousand cases of domestic violence, and we'd provide legal assistance to the victims (Hunt, 2017: 311).

The gaps between local perceptions of gender cultural norms and the goals of gender equality reforms endure, which raises questions about why these incongruities exist (Ortiz, 2020: 6). This indicates that the GoR has struggled in terms of a context-driven approach to gender security, as top-down inclusionary measures have not been effectively combined with culturally sensitive "methods to eradicate structural barriers to women's participation" (Hudson, 2009: 308). Consequently, gender (in)security silences have developed, which allow the (re)production of the gendered logics of domination to continue in the present. In turn, the coloniality of gender is kept alive in the post-genocide era, and in some instances, new opportunities for different forms of gender discrimination and violence have materialised. In the following section, I explore the logics of addition that undergird Rwanda's gender security policy framework. I argue that these logics (re)produce gender (in)security silences, which threaten the sustainability of peace in the post-genocide era.

## 4.4 LOGICS OF ADDITION: HEGEMONIC AND RESIDUAL LEVELS OF (RE)PRODUCTION

In this section, I outline how the logics of addition are (re)produced across the multiple levels of the WPS ecosystem. Like in Chapter three (page 77), I adopt a combined intercategorical and intracategorical approach, as I consider the structural dimensions of inequality on multiple and conflicting levels, while also revealing the complexity of the lived experience of marginalised groups at points of intersection (McCall, 2005: 1773-74). I identify two discursive formations that are a product of this pattern of (re)production: the hegemonic liberal-feminist discourse and a residual diversity discourse. I proceed by outlining how the logics of addition are (re)produced on the hegemonic discursive level through the strategies of sameness and silence.[34] Inspired by Madsen and Hudson's (2020) framing, I then explore how the logics of addition are (re)produced on the residual discursive level. This framing offers insight into how intersectionality can be misappropriated and 'stretched-thin' of its original political goals once it is co-opted by the feminist mainstream. In turn, by revealing the logics of addition, I also reveal that using intersectionality inappropriately can, indeed, result in gender silences, which allows gender inequality and discrimination to thrive. Through my analysis of the logics, this section shows how the inner workings and logics of intersectionality come into being in the feminist mainstream.

### 4.4.1 The hegemonic level of (re)production of the logics of addition

The dominant liberal-feminist discourse is (re)produced across the multiple (international, regional, national and local) levels of the WPS ecosystem. This hegemonic discourse follows the liberal-feminist integrationist pattern of (re)production, which is why I call it the logics of addition. These logics look to include additional 'cross-cutting' concepts into an already established discursive system without challenging the underlying power differentials of that system. The logics of addition are (re)produced through discursive strategies of sameness and silence. Unlike the strategies of othering and difference discussed in Chapter three, these strategies do not unfold through intersecting subject/object relations. Rather, these strategies, although prefaced by a similar binary configuration of thought, unfold through compounding constituent categories of identity.

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[34] Figure 1, page 68, represents the relationships between discourse, the logics and the strategies.

Within the hegemonic configuration of the logics of addition, there are two more subsequent levels of (re)production. On the first level, the strategies of sameness equate women with men. This tendency is a function of liberal feminism, which is naturally informed by key tenets of liberal thought (Arat, 2015: 676; Lee, 2013: 372). Put simply, liberal thought emphasises man's ability to reason, his right to participate in governance and his freedom from state control, especially regarding the management of his property (Arat, 2015: 676). Liberal feminists oppose biological reductionist thinking that defines a woman's place in society according to her reproductive capacity (Arat, 2015: 676). Women are recognised as rational beings, intellectually on par with men and therefore interchangeable with men, or at least of equal value to society – hence, the strategies of sameness (Zalewski, 2010: 11). This rationale supports the demand for women to have the same opportunities and to enjoy the same liberal rights as men (Arat, 2015: 676). Emphasis is then placed on gradual change through legislative reform, gender policy frameworks and antidiscrimination laws, which act as formal avenues for some women to gain access to some sources of power (Arat, 2015: 675-76; Heathcote, 2018: 377). The goal of the strategies is gender reform and not gender transformation. This is because, dominant WPS liberal-feminist discourses are aligned with the goal of increasing the number of women in decision-making bodies, institutions and structures – not the resistance to, or eradication of, the gendered and militarised status quo (Heathcote, 2018: 377; Lee, 2013: 372; Debusscher and Ansoms, 2013: 1113).

To achieve this goal, the strategies reduce the multifactorial complexity of intersecting systems of oppression into disparate identity categories, which are then treated as static components of larger systems of oppression – this brings us to the second level of the hegemonic configuration, where some women are equated with all women. In the case of the WPS policy ecosystem, complex gender relations are reduced to a single static identity category, 'women'. This is so, because in practice it is easier to integrate a single factor (women) into an already-established technocratic discursive system, such as liberal peacebuilding, than to transform the system as a whole (Zalewski, 2010: 26; Davids, Van Driel and Parren, 2013: 6). Rather than transforming the substantive and structural disadvantages that hinder women's full participation in any community, the liberal-feminist vision for change has, in many ways, been reduced to a depoliticised box-checking exercise (Heathcote, 2018: 381; Hankivsky, 2012: 172; Bond, 2012: 230; Clisby and Enderstein, 2017: 232; Subrahmanian, 2007: 114). Therefore, on this level of (re)production, the strategies of sameness then condense all gendered experiences into one homogenised 'women' identity category.

Crenshaw's (1989) basement metaphor is a useful tool to illustrate how the strategies of sameness operate (see page 59). Legislation and policies look to 'correct' discrimination by admitting people from the basement above to the ground floor through a "hatch" (Crenshaw, 1989: 151). Yet only those who are at the top are admitted to an unencumbered liberal life. Thus, the hatch is representative of a single-factor identity category that is defined according to experiences of the most privileged members of a disadvantaged group. The reductive function of the strategies of sameness is not arbitrary, as the interconnections between structural disadvantage and identity facilitates an essentialising discursive process that excludes the most vulnerable in society.

If we apply the basement metaphor to the strategies of sameness in the WPS policy ecosystem, it is evident that the 'hatch' – the single-factor women category – is informed by a narrow liberal-feminist understanding of gender-based domination. The four pillars of the WPS ecosystem (participation, protection, prevention and relief and recovery) are then geared toward integrating, protecting, representing and assisting those women at the top of the basement. While these measures create opportunities for gender progress, they also create opportunities for gender inequality to thrive. This is because, the strategies of sameness are also strategies of silence. The single-factor liberal-feminist 'women' category represents the experiences, needs and interests of privileged women, and so, in the process of discursive homogenisation, the strategies of sameness silence the experiences, needs and interests of those women at the bottom of the basement – those whose identity lies at the intersection of gender with other categories of identity, such as race, class, sexuality or disability. The security needs of marginalised women cannot, then, be materially redressed by WPS policies and programmes formulated according to a single-factor gender framework, since in silencing the intersectional quality of their experiences, the framework fundamentally misunderstands vital aspects of their insecurity. Consequently, this process does not encourage gender awareness, promote cultural sensitivity or emphasise local knowledge (Hudson, 2009: 298).

#### *4.4.1.1 The hegemonic level of (re)production of the logics of addition in the Rwandan context*

The GoR's gender policy framework tends to look to remedy discrete areas of gender discrimination by increasing the number of women in positions of authority and in political decision-making bodies, by assisting women to enter the formal economy, and by ensuring that girls have increased access to basic education and that women have increased access to higher education. The MIGEPROF defines gender in the *Revised National Gender Policy* (2021) as follows:

> Gender is a social and cultural construction, which distinguishes differences in the attributes of men and women, girls and boys, and accordingly refers to the roles and responsibilities of men and women. It also refers to the state of being male or female in relation to the social and cultural roles that are considered appropriate for men and women (MIGEPROF, 2021: 9).

Although the MIGEPROF recognises gender as a set of power relations, the institution does not define gender as an *intersecting* set of power relations. In addition, this definition is based on a narrow binary vision of gender relations between men and women, and therefore does not recognise the spectrum of genders, gender identities and sexualities across society. This definition is adapted from the United Nations Children's Fund's definition (UNICEF, 2017: 2), and so the grounding of the liberal-feminist 'gender equality supernorm' is evident in how gender is framed in the GoR's principal gender policy document. When gender mainstreaming processes are typically analysed, the focus is on the ways in which gender perspectives are integrated into masculinised institutions (the first level of the hegemonic configuration). In this case, it is argued that gender is added onto other identities. Yet, where gender is the focus, like in gender mainstreaming instruments, policies and mechanisms, gender is prioritised over other identities (the second level of the hegemonic configuration). Gender is addressed first, and then other forms of oppression are treated as separate experiences that are 'added onto' gender. There are, thus, two configurations that characterise the 'add-and-stir' approach, one in which gender is added into existing masculinised frameworks (the hegemonic configuration comprised of two levels), and one in which diverse women's experiences are added into liberal-feminist frameworks (the residual configuration).

In the Rwandan context, the hegemonic level of (re)production of the logics of addition has connected with the elimination of ethnicity from public discourse and the criminalisation of genocide ideology and negationism. Indeed, Hudson (2009: 308) holds that banning ethnicity from public discourse has also been detrimental to the feminist cause, as the historical intersections between the racial, ethnic, autochthonous and gendered strategies of othering are not recognised in the GoR's gender security policy framework. The critical differences in Tutsi, Hutu and Twa women's experiences of violence in the genocide, as well as those differences between Tutsi women who survived the genocide and those who are returnees, are ignored. For instance, Jeanne D'Arc Mukasekuru, a young female activist who identifies as a 'potter' – the term used today to euphemistically refer to the Twa, as the Twa traditionally made a living through selling ceramics made from clay in the forests – highlights the dire conditions of poverty that most potter women face (Hunt, 2017: 324). She contrasts the experience of potter women in relation to Rwanda's gender equality regime: "You have to know that they are Rwandese. Even if Rwanda is developing, there are people who are still living a miserable life, being left behind (Hunt, 2017: 327). The activist discusses her attempts to share potter women's experiences with government officials:

> So I asked Minister Inyumba [The Minister of Gender post 1994 and of MIGEPROF May, 2011 to June, 2012] what could be done for our women, so that they can see themselves as valued too. Minister Inyumba said that women are looked at the same – there shouldn't be a difference because of ethnicity (Hunt, 2017: 327).

While Jeanne's community's experience is not unique in Rwanda, her story and her advocacy does point to the harms of assuming the remedies for gender equality, gender discrimination and GBV help all women in the same way.

In addition, women's opportunities to participate in the national political sphere are limited by the language they speak and their class. The Anglophone returnees (returnees and refugees from Uganda and Tanzania) tend to occupy higher social and economic positions than their Francophone counterparts (returnees and refugees from Burundi and the DRC), or those Tutsi women who survived the genocide (Newbury and Baldwin, 2000: 4). Thus, many of the women nominated by the RPF to occupy seats in Parliament are Anglophone returnees (Berry, 2017: 839). The dynamics of language and class were especially visible in the Miss Rwanda 2019 pageant (Purdeková and Mwambari, 2021: 9). As discussed on pages 120-121, a presumed-to-be-Hutu contestant, Mwiseneza, experienced a barrage of online harassment because of her perceived ethnicity. Likewise, the issue of language became a topic of debate on social media platforms when Mwiseneza was eliminated because she failed to answer her pageant questions in French or English (Purdeková and Mwambari, 2021: 9). Her elimination provoked many online to comment on the barriers of language in Rwanda. For example, Ange Kagame tweeted: "Speaking Kinyarwanda should suffice. Miss Universe pageants have translators for the contestants that don't speak English. PLUS, the questions themselves are poorly worded in poor English (sad emoji)" (Purdeková and Mwambari, 2021: 9). While this example does not illustrate the experience of those women who have limited knowledge of English/French in political positions, it does highlight the linguistic barriers to entry that the official languages place as "many Rwandans in rural areas do not speak either English or French, which automatically brings forth complex intersections of class, ethnicity, even migration histories" (Purdeková and Mwambari, 2021: 9).

It follows that the integrationist goals of the GoR's gender equality enterprise ignore significant class and ethnic differences among women, which have determined the distribution of material hierarchies between these different groups. The status of survivor, perpetrator, refugee and returnee, determines who receives material, human and financial resources, and who has the capacity to run for political office. Accordingly, in their literature review on studies concerned with women's political inclusion in Rwanda, Mumporeze and Nduhura (2019: 363) reveal that most of these studies (88%) indicate that only a small number of urban elite women have reaped the benefits – improved self-confidence, salaried positions, purchasing power and domestic help at home – from the GoR's gender equality legal code and policy framework. Therefore, hierarchies of material redress ensure that the ethnic and racial differences between Hutu and Tutsi are kept alive in the post-genocide era (Berry, 2017: 833).

The gender equality policy framework adopted by the GoR has institutionalised the mainstreaming of a liberal-feminist concept of the 'women' category across its decision-making institutions. This category is the single-factor ‘hatch’ in Crenshaw’s basement, and it is geared toward helping those women who occupy privileged positions enter the first floor – representative of unencumbered liberal citizenship. In the Rwandan context, this category, although still fundamentally informed by the liberal-feminist concept, takes on different understandings of who is privileged and the life they will be admitted to above the basement. Rwanda is not a liberal state, and so Rwandan women are not being incrementally admitted into the realm of liberal citizenship by the GoR’s gender equality ‘hatch’. They are, however, admitted to a life that affords them greater political and economic advantages than those women left in the basement. These women, typically Anglophone returnees or the leaders of women’s survivor organisations, are the privileged beneficiaries of the GoR’s gender policy and legislation.

In sum, I argue that the logics of addition on the hegemonic level are (re)produced through strategies of sameness that define the needs of all women according to the needs of Rwandan society’s most privileged women. The strategies of sameness are also strategies of silence, as they obfuscate the experiences of those women who are marginalised by intersecting systems of discrimination based in race, ethnicity, sexuality and class. In the next section, I provide an example of how the strategies of sameness and silence have generated situations of gender (in)security in Rwanda.

#### *4.4.1.2 House girls and intersections of class and gender*

One group of women whose struggles are silenced by the GoR’s gender equality regime is those women and girls who subsidise the economic inclusion of privileged women – informal care workers. Debusscher and Ansoms maintain that the contribution of care work to Rwanda’s economic development is invisible to the government’s reconstruction agenda, as this contribution “is excluded from the definition of work in national accounts and its implications for inequality are not discussed” (Debusscher and Ansoms, 2013: 1122). Informal care work has a distinctive class dimension. Many families of the upper and middle classes have one or more “house girls or boys” to help with running the home (Debusscher and Ansoms, 2013: 1122). These labourers often come from poor rural families, where they have not had the opportunity to finish their education or, sometimes, even attend primary school

(Ladič, 2015: 164). Mostly, they work without contract, which implies that they receive a low wage and are made to endure bad working conditions (Debusscher and Ansoms, 2013: 1122).

Ladič argues that house girls are a subaltern group, “pushed to the margins of society, whose voices are most often not heard” (Ladič, 2015: 164). In her interviews with house girls in Kigali, Ladič (2015: 171) found that most of the house girls were not aware of the high percentage of women in national politics and those who did, did not give much importance to it as they did not feel that having women in parliament directly impacted their lives. In addition, most of the house girls interviewed claimed that economic development in Rwanda does not have any effect on their life. Only a few said their work is slightly easier due to electricity and running water (Ladič, 2015: 176). On the contrary, one of them said that when fetching water at least she had the opportunity to meet with other people, but now, having running water in the house, her employers do not allow her to leave the compound; they limit her movement and social life (Ladič, 2015: 176). This example serves to illustrate that the ambitious gender equality agenda of the GoR is made possible through the exclusion of some of its citizens, which essentially entrenches their subordination even more deeply (Berry, 2015: 3). In this way, the (re)production of the logics of addition through the strategies of sameness and silence on the hegemonic level in Rwanda’s gender equality regime creates gender (in)security silences – in this instance the economic exploitation of subaltern girls. In the following section, I consider how the logics of addition are (re)produced through the strategies of sameness and silence on the residual discursive level in Rwanda.

### 4.4.2 The residual levels of (re)production of the logics of addition

In Chapter two, section 2.4.3, I argued, following Kirby and Shepherd (2020), that the WPS policy ecosystem is discursively (re)produced through diverging and converging feminist perspectives, discourses, ideas, norms and approaches. Thus, although the integrationist liberal-feminist discourse is dominant throughout the ecosystem, Madsen and Hudson (2020) show that other residual and emergent discourses are present as well. These different feminist discourses are either tolerated (or sometimes co-opted) by the liberal-feminist mainstream, or they interact with hegemonic discourses in ways that unlock the WPS ecosystem to emancipatory gendered conceptual openings (Hudson, 2017). These trends are especially evident in the domestication of the WPS ecosystem on the African continent in the WPS policy documents and reports of regional organisations and national governments.

Madsen and Hudson (2020: 5) argue that dominant liberal-feminist discourses successfully prevent “rival heterodoxies of truths from gaining a foothold”, since they permit “residual elements to co-exist/survive” in the WPS policy ecosystem. Madsen and Hudson go on to explain that liberal-feminist discourses tolerate critical perspectives, because they are “secure in the knowledge that players such as NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organisation] or Global North development agencies can continue to coopt the WPS agenda without paying too much attention to the critique of an ‘add-women-and-stir’ approach” (Madsen and Hudson, 2020: 5). These critical perspectives then become residual discursive formations, which “either formed part of the previous hegemony or previously stood in opposition to the dominant ideas, but now (actively) co-exist on the fringes of the dominant discourses” (Madsen and Hudson, 2020: 5).

#### *4.4.2.1 The residual level of (re)production of the logics of addition globally and regionally*

The residual discourse that is of interest to my analysis of the logics of addition is the ‘diversity discourse’ evident in WPS policy, toolkits, reports, policy notes and guidebooks, as well as in the feminist research that engages with these documents. This discourse has its origins in the work of civil society and critical scholars from the Global South. Inspired by elements of Black feminist and postcolonial-feminist thought, this discourse expands the scope of gender mainstreaming so that the diverse needs and experiences of marginalised women are integrated into the WPS ecosystem. Here, the desire is to make gendered security practice and scholarship more inclusive by adding other identity categories, such as race, ability, or sexuality, into the documents that populate the WPS policy ecosystem (Hankivsky, 2012: 174). This discourse explicitly acknowledges that women are not a homogenous group, and that class, age, sexual orientation, gender identity, race, ethnicity, geographic location, education, as well as physical and mental ability distinctly affect certain groups’ needs, interests and concerns (Hankivsky, 2012: 174).

The integration of the residual diversity discourse is not new to the UN, as the UN has shown some commitment to rhetorically adopting intersectionality in its work. For instance, in preparation for the UN World Conference against Racism, held in September 2001, Kimberle Crenshaw was invited to the UN headquarters in Geneva to discuss intersectionality (Arat, 2015: 676). More recently, the concept has appeared in various UN Women policy briefs and reports. A recent UN Women (2020) report uses intersectionality to analyse the interconnections between climate change, gender security and peace. The report states that it "applies an intersectional approach, which exposes the dynamics that occur as gender identity interacts or overlaps with other identity markers, […] creating multiple layers of marginalisation and discrimination" (Nagarajan *et al.*, 2020: 14). In addition, the report also recognises that treating "men and women as homogenous groups can reinforce harmful stereotypes that perpetuate economic, social and political inequalities" (Nagarajan *et al.*, 2020: 14). This pattern of adoption is also evident in the WPS policy ecosystem. In the two most recent UN Secretary-General reports (2020, 2021) on conflict-related sexual violence, the need for the recognition of intersecting inequalities in the survivor-centred approach articulated in UNSRC 2467 (2019) is stressed – especially in responses to the diverse needs of women in the face of the COVID-19 pandemic (UNSG, 2020a: 5, 2021: 31). What is more, the 2020 UN Secretary-General report on WPS explicitly states:

> Moving forward, more attention must be paid to the intersecting forms of discrimination that many women face based on race, ethnicity, ability, economic status, sexual orientation and gender identity and to the removal of structural barriers to increase the participation of a diverse complement of women in preventing and resolving conflict and building peace (UNSG, 2020b: 4-5).

Although there is an apparent rhetorical commitment to intersectionality at the centre of the WPS policy ecosystem, this commitment does not extend to the resolutions themselves. The recent draft UNSRC 1054 (2020) does not mention intersectionality at all, and only considers the diversity of women with reference to the "imbalanced geographical representation of women" in the implementation of UNSRC 1325 (UNSC, 2020: 3).

These examples show that intersectionality has not been entirely ignored by the UN. Still, the adoption of the concept is on the institutional margins of the organisation, such as in reports and policy briefs written in partnership with civil society. The concept has not been integrated into the central discursive channels of the UN in a meaningful way, and when it has been, it is tolerated as a residual discourse used to rhetorically reinforce the UN's commitment to increasing diversity.

Thus, as a residual tendency, this discourse does not explicitly disrupt the hegemonic WPS liberal-feminist discourse. Rather, it is integrated into the dominant discourse's already-established pattern of discursive (re)production – the logics of addition. In the process, the critical tenets of the diversity discourse are then incrementally co-opted and depoliticised, as they are now used to support the integrationist (re)production of the feminist discursive mainstream (Hankivsky and Mussell, 2018: 308). The same integrationist perspective that governs the implementation of gender mainstreaming in male-dominated institutions and structures, is employed when the feminist establishment mainstreams intersectionality perspectives in the WPS ecosystem. As the (re)production of the logics of addition is bolstered and not disrupted by the integration process, the intersectionality discourse becomes a more palatable version of its original political self: the diversity discourse. This residual tendency is then easily tolerated by the technocratic discursive landscape of gender mainstreaming.

Even though the diversity discourse encourages WPS policies, programmes and research to recognise that gender intersects with other identities to create qualitatively different experiences of discrimination, privilege and disadvantage, gender (or rather, women) remains the primary focus, to which other factors of identity are added (Yuval-Davis, 2006: 195). That being so, the diversity discourse assumes that unitary categories are based on a homogenous static constituent set of experiences which can simply be added together to represent different groups of women (Hankivsky, 2012: 177). This then encourages feminist practitioners, policymakers and researchers to start with and prioritise gender and to then pick other categories of identity to add, in a piecemeal way, into their analysis or policy framework (Hankivsky, 2012: 175). In this way, the (re)production of logics of addition ensures that the level of analysis is limited to the experiential realm (intersubjective identity politics), and that the connections between macro axes of power and the experiences of actual concrete people remain obscured (Yuval-Davis, 2006: 198; Hankivsky and Cormier, 2011: 219).

This misappropriated version of intersectionality facilitates an approach that focusses on identity alone, as it does not accurately capture the intersections between different social locations. Consequently, the interconnections between those contextual experiences of complex identity and larger power differentials are obscured (Yuval-Davis, 2006: 198; Hankivsky and Cormier, 2011: 219). The problem with this is that the structural dimensions of discrimination and privilege are not recognised, which then facilitates the essentialisation of identities through the residual discursive (re)production of the strategies of sameness. The strategies of silence are then also (re)produced on the residual level, because although different groups of women are now visible within the WPS ecosystem, gender is still prioritised as a unitary and static category. Thus, those who do not occupy privileged positions by virtue of their race, geographic location, sexual orientation, gender identity or ability, continue to confront marginalisation in the policy-making process (Hankivsky, 2012: 176).

In this way, the (re)production of the strategies of sameness and silence on the residual discursive level continues to reify hierarchies of differential access to a variety of resources – economic, social, political and cultural – which reinforces the oppressive consequences of intersecting social locations (McKinzie and Richards, 2018: 4). This can also lead to competition between different groups for scarce resources, or “hierarchies of victimhood” (Berry, 2017: 389), whereby different marginalised groups of women compete for political and monetary support of dominant groups at the cost of excluding others (Hankivsky, 2012: 176). In doing so, the strategies of silence and sameness create new opportunities for different forms of gender discrimination to manifest. This prevents coordination and coalition-building between diverse groups of women and inhibits the development of solutions that can transform the entire logic of distribution and result in emancipatory outcomes (Berry, 2017: 839).

This process is evident in the African gender equality and WPS policy documents, such as the AU *Strategy for Gender Equality and Women’s Empowerment* discussed in Chapter two section 2.4.4. This document does make use of an intersectional definition of gender, however, on closer inspection, this definition is a product of the residual diversity discourse. Although it recognises the relationship between gender and context, it does not stress the complexity that emerges from the intersection of gender with other categories of identity.

Rather, the definition frames the other "important criteria for socio-cultural analysis" as discrete 'add-ons' to a gender-based analysis (AU, 2018: 62). The logics of addition are then evident in how the document considers the needs of different marginalised groups of women, such as rural women, migrant women and women with disabilities (AU, 2018: 15-16). Although diversity is being 'mainstreamed' in this way, the (re)production of the logics of addition ensure that the liberal-feminist gender (or rather 'women') concept is still the priority, to which other additional identity factors are considered. Thus, strategies of sameness and silence ensure that the policy is inevitably geared toward the needs and interests of privileged women, and where marginalised groups are included into the gender mainstreaming project, they are discursively integrated through the logics of addition. In doing so, the policy's 'theory of change' ends up generating hierarchies of victimhood by pitting these groups of women against one another for scarce resources, which limits opportunities for coalition-building among diverse groups of women.

#### *4.4.2.2 The residual level of (re)production of the logics of addition in Rwanda*

In the Rwandan context, the residual diversity discourse is especially evident in the *National Policy Against GBV* (2011) and the *Revised National Gender Policy* (2021). This residual diversity discourse incrementally includes various 'vulnerable' groups into the protection and prevention strategies outlined by the policy documents. The *National Policy Against GBV* states that "the prevention of GBV, in the short term [*sic*], requires identification of those at risk as well as targeted support to prevent them from becoming victims" (MIGEPROF, 2011: 7). Thus, this policy looks to identify those in Rwandan society who are especially vulnerable to GBV, and in doing so, introduces the residual diversity discourse into the gendered security policy ecosystem of the Rwandan gender machinery. The policy specifically identifies "children without parental care", "children born out of rape", and "people with disabilities" (MIGEPROF, 2011: 7).

In addition, the 'vulnerability' classification of Rwanda's *Ubudehe* classification system is also included in the GBV policy. In Rwanda, the Ministry of Local Government (MINALOC) uses the *Ubudehe* programme to categorise all citizens based on their socio-economic standing in society (Thomson, 2013: 140). According to the *Ubudehe* manual, in several town hall meetings, communities sit together to determine which category every household belongs to and compiles a dataset (Ezeanya, 2015: 5). The *Ubudehe* categories are then used across different ministries to determine who they need to target with their policies (Ezeanya-Esiobu, 2017: 15). The categories are as follows: *Umitindi Nyakuja* (the destitute), *Umutindi* (the very poor), *Umukene* (the poor), *Umukene Wifashije* (the resourceful poor), *Umukungu* (the food rich) and *Umukire* (the money rich).[35] The first three groups are considered to be the most "vulnerable" in society (Thomson, 2013: 140). In the *National Social Protection Polic*y (2020), MINALOC defines the vulnerable as:

> An individual or household who, for whatever reason, is less able to withstand socio-economic shocks and is therefore at an elevated risk of experiencing declines in welfare and or other forms of social deprivation. In the context of this strategy key vulnerable groups in Rwanda include low income and/or labour-constrained individuals or households such as older people, people with disabilities, female-headed households etc. (MINALOC, 2020b: 5).

The gender machinery uses the 'vulnerable' classification for identifying groups in special need of prevention and protection activities. In the strategies outlined to protect vulnerable groups, the GBV policy states that it will "increase the capacity of vulnerable groups to protect themselves from GBV" and that it will "reinforce programmes for economic empowerment of vulnerable groups" (MIGEPROF, 2011: 14). There is therefore a recognition of not only those who are characteristically vulnerable to GBV, such as orphaned children, but also those who are vulnerable due to their socio-economic status.

These trends are also evident in the new *National Gender Policy* (2021). The policy recognises the relationship between its programmes and the programmes within the Social Protection sector, particularly in improving "gender equality and equity in education, health and through social protection interventions" (MIGEPROF, 2021: vii). Specifically, the policy recognises that "women constitute the majority of vulnerable people benefiting from VUP-direct support" (MIGEPROF, 2021: 26). VUP stands for Vision *Umurenge* Programme. This is an integrated local development programme that targets poverty, economic growth and social protection in rural areas (NISR, 2020). In addition, the policy goes further to disaggregate the vulnerable category and considers who has been left out. It identifies that teen mothers are left out of all social support programmes that are “meant to benefit the vulnerable population” (MIGEPROF, 2021: 41) and it highlights the need to “map and address gender issues facing people with disabilities” who are classified as ‘vulnerable’ (MIGEPROF, 2021: 42). Beyond, the ‘vulnerable’ class category, the policy also considers the needs of women living in rural areas and the challenges they face in gaining access to family planning (MIGEPROF, 2021: 39).

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[35] In the last year, the GoR has undertaken a review process of the *Ubudehe* classifications and has updated them (Ntirenganya, 2021). The new classifications are A, B, C, D and E. Households in category A and B are well-off and are expected to be partners in community development (MINALOC, 2020b: 34). Households in category C and D have labour capacity but earn a low income, they benefit from a range of social-protection programmes (MINALOC, 2020b: 34). Meanwhile, households in category E are under the 'vulnerable' classification and receive full government support. These households are comprised of people outside the workforce, disabled people, child-headed households and older people (Ntirenganya, 2021).

Yet, the inclusion of these diverse class groups does not fundamentally destabilise the general (re)production of the liberal-feminist homogenising logics of addition, as they are included almost as an afterthought. By adding them into the analysis as discrete experiences that need a special focus, the complexity of intersecting systems of oppression is not recognised. In this way, although diversity is accounted for, it is accommodated within the already-established pattern of discursive (re)production of the logics of addition. The strategies of sameness and silence continue to (re)produce hegemonic and homogenised categories of ‘women’ while tolerating the additional diversity categories. This process of co-optation then dulls the critical edge of including diverse perspectives into gender policies and political practice. In the following section, I conduct a deconstructive discourse analysis of the hegemonic and residual levels of (re)production of the logics of addition in the 2009 and 2018 Rwandan NAPs in order to reveal how the inner workings of intersectionality can be obscured and misappropriated.

## 4.5 THE LOGICS OF ADDITION IN ACTION: A DECONSTRUCTIVE DISCOURSE ANALYSIS OF THE 2009 AND 2018 RWANDAN NAPS

In this section, I explore how the logics of addition are (re)produced on a hegemonic and residual level through the liberal-feminist discourses on participation, prevention, protection and recovery in the 2009 and 2018 NAPs. I argue that the logics of addition are (re)produced on the hegemonic level through the strategies and sameness and silence. These logics then accommodate the residual diversity discourse, by subsuming constituent and discrete marginalised groups into the dominant pattern of discursive (re)production. And so, the experiences of marginalised groups are recognised, but they are represented as composite additional factors. This framing does not fundamentally challenge the homogenising operation of the logics of addition since these additional experiences are tolerated as a residual discourse. Thus, the participation, protection, and recovery discourse may appear more representational, where in fact, the (re)production of the strategies of silence and sameness is bolstered.

### 4.5.1 The logics of addition and the representation-participation discourse

In terms of participation, the 2009 NAP states under the third pillar that the objective is to "reinforce women's participation in peace building and security" (GoR, 2010: 17). This objective is underlined by three commitments: to ensure that there is follow-through on the provisions made by the Constitution for women's participation in all decision-making institutions; to put mechanisms in place that encourage women's participation in peace and security; and to ensure that women are represented in diplomatic and peace negotiations (GoR, 2010: 17). The participation pillar points to the need to train women in peace and security areas, to "reinforce the capacity" of women leaders so that they can "actively participate" in peacebuilding and security practice and to create working conditions that "contribute to women's development" (GoR, 2010: 18).

Although on the surface these goals may seem to be transformative, the indicators and strategies for achieving these goals are not. The indicators for the third pillar are number-based, which means that securing women's participation in peace and security is reduced to an exercise of measuring the number of women included in various institutions and mechanisms, the number of women-focussed programmes/infrastructures and the number of training sessions conducted (GoR, 2010: 18-19). In reducing the idea of women's participation to a numbers game, the 2009 NAP conflates women's participation with their representation. In addition, beyond briefly referring to a need to create a work environment that is supportive of women, there is no indication of needing to transform those patriarchal assumptions and cultural norms that bar women from entering and meaningfully participating in peace and security institutions in the first place.

Madsen and Hudson (2020: 560) argue that the 2009 NAP rationalises women's participation based on portrayals of women as "the peaceful gender". This rationale takes its cue from the

*National Gender Policy* (2010) which frames women's participation in terms of neo-traditional gender tropes dredged-up from a romanticised version of the country's pre-colonial past (MIGEPROF, 2010: 9). Here, the political narrative of women's participation is (re)told through "familiar scripts of the pre-colonial period, in which the Queen Mother within the royal family as part of the Tutsi institution had significant influence" (Madsen and Hudson, 2020: 560). The idea is to draw on traditional narratives about women's leadership in both the domestic and public sphere so as to ground women's participation in politics within the Rwandan cultural context (GoR, 2010: 18). As mothers and peacemakers within communities, women are portrayed as proponents of conciliatory politics, and so, their involvement is seen as fundamental for maintaining peace and ensuring good governance (Kwaleyela and Kangwa, 2018: 67). For example, it is pointed out that women have specific abilities concerning "dialogue and non-violent communication in conflict management" (MIGEPROF, 2010: 9). The strategies of sameness homogenise the experience of all women according to this feminised peacemaker model. As a result, the participation of all women is reduced to a discursive archetype representative of those women who embody this experience (Björkdahl and Selimovic, 2015: 324).

The (re)production of the strategies of sameness in the 2009 NAP results in the conflation of women's representation with the participation of women. An unintended consequence of this tendency is the (re)production of the strategies of silence, as the strategies of sameness negate the experience of multiple overlapping identities, which manifest when different women and men (and other gender identities) experience security at the intersections of gender, race, ethnicity, age, class, sexuality and disability (Hudson, 2014: 14). The 2009 NAP text, therefore, constructs an essentialist understanding of what women's participation in peacebuilding can look like, which creates a "scripted (empty) agency" that is "self-disciplining" (Björkdahl and Selimovic, 2015: 324). In the process, the hegemonic WPS liberal-feminist logics of addition are (re)produced in the Rwandan context, which ultimately leads to the (re)production of asymmetrical power relations on the national and local level.

Madsen and Hudson (2020: 12) argue that the discursive framing of women's participation under the first pillar in the 2018 NAP shifts away from the hegemonic liberal-feminist discourse on women's numerical representation and accommodates some residual discursive formations concerning the preconditions for women's active participation (GoR, 2018: 11). This discourse is informed by data (see section 4.3) that point to the differential representation of women in 'hard' and 'soft' sectors of decentralised government, as well as the barriers to women's participation in other public institutions and in the private sector, such as the judiciary and the media respectively (GMO, 2019: 60, 65). Furthermore, the 2018 NAP recognises the need to work with men, as opposed to seeing women's participation as solely a women's issue (GoR, 2018: 32). Significantly, although the 2018 NAP indicators for women's participation do, to some degree, carry over the same commitments to increasing the numbers of women in various institutions as the 2009 NAP, there are additional qualitative indicators, such as a survey of "women's perception on the quality and impact of gender related legal instruments and institutional frameworks" (GoR, 2018: 27).

It is then evident that although the Rwandan NAPs seem to be dominated by the (re)production of the hegemonic liberal-feminist logics of addition, they do also have other contextual and nuance-driven residual discursive elements, which indicates that the NAPs have the potential to be useful instruments for ensuring women's active participation, "rather than merely facilitating the quantitative measurement of numerical representation" (Madsen and Hudson, 2020: 12). With that being said, even within this qualitative framing, the 2018 NAP still uses a homogenised notion of all women, particularly with reference to representation-participation. There is no demonstrated concern for the differential representation or participation of diverse women, based on their ethnicity, race, class or sexuality (Madsen and Hudson, 2020: 11-12). Therefore, these residual leanings identified by Madsen and Hudson (2020) are subsumed by the (re)production of the logics of addition, and thus, they do not challenge the hegemonic operation of these logics. Rather, they are tolerated and the (re)production of strategies of sameness and silence continues to generate gender (in)security silences.

### 4.5.2 The logics of addition and the prevention-protection discourse

Hudson (2014: 20) argues that the representation-participation discourse and the prevention-protection discourse are intertwined in the Rwandan NAPs. This is because the NAPs frame women's participation as essential for the prevention of conflict and for the sustainability of peace. The conceptualisation of the prevention pillar (the first pillar of the NAP) cannot be separated from how peace is understood by the 2009 NAP. Here, peace is understood in positive terms, where "conflict management and conflict resolution mechanisms are not launched only when conflict arises; they are there to control or prevent latent conflicts" (GoR, 2010: 10), which requires a long-term engagement with social and economic inequalities and other underlying structural causes. Thus, in gender terms, prevention entails assessing whether gendered structures play a role in the conditions that perpetuate war, militarism and violence (Hudson, 2014: 19).

In the 2009 NAP, the first pillar focusses on the prevention of GBV. This is because the effects of SGBV during the genocide continue to impact survivors in the present. In addition, consideration is given to the continuum of violence in the post-genocide era, represented by persistently high levels of GBV, which threatens gender security and is recognised as a trigger for conflict. The prevention strategies highlighted by the 2009 NAP are geared toward cultivating a legal and political environment that protects women's rights and endorses gender equality (GoR, 2010: 11-12). Emphasis is also placed on the promotion of the One Stop Centres and the 'Village of Hope', a clinic founded by the Rwanda Women's Network for victims of SGBV (Madsen and Hudson, 2020: 564; Madsen, 2018: 74).

The indicators and activities under the first pillar rely on the integrationist logics of hegemonic liberal-feminist discourses, as again the emphasis is placed on quantitative indicators. Thus, the success of the 2009 NAP's prevention efforts is measured in terms of the "Number of policies that are revised", the "Number of officials trained in gender, peace and security", the "Number of women leaders who have been trained", and the "Number of people who know the contents of these laws and conventions" – to name a few (GoR, 2010: 13). Only one indicator under this pillar considers the "quality of the laws that have been adopted" (GoR, 2010: 14). Beyond an indication for the need of an inventory of discriminatory practices, it is telling that qualitative assessments of the underlying structural gendered causes of GBV do not feature under the first pillar. Instead, the prevention pillar functions to incrementally include gender reforms into the Rwandan legal and political system. Prevention, like participation, is then discursively (re)produced through the hegemonic logics of addition. As a result, this pillar does not address the underlying gendered power relations that cultivate violent masculinities and gendered cultural norms. In fact, it creates a legal and political environment that looks to protect women and girls from SGBV. The prevention pillar therefore collapses into the protection pillar (Hudson, 2014: 20).

The second pillar focusses on the protection of women's rights and considers the needs of women in peace and security. The activities under this pillar include the training of peacekeeping and security forces on humanitarian international law and the fight against GBV, as well as the setting-up of community services that provide reproductive health services and legal and psychosocial assistance for GBV victims (GoR, 2010: 14-15). Like the first pillar, the indicators under the second pillar are predominantly quantitative, considering the "Number of soldiers and police officers who have been trained" or the "Number of cases reported" (GoR, 2010: 15-16).

However, the second pillar in the 2009 NAP also accommodates the residual diversity discourse, as the needs of different groups of women are taken into consideration. For example, one activity is focused on the social and economic reintegration of female ex-combatants into communities; another activity insists on different special services for refugees, returnees and displaced women in camps and residential care facilities; and finally, an additional activity focusses on the need to put infrastructure in place for women with disabilities (GoR, 2010: 16). Yet, the residual diversity discourse is integrated into the hegemonic (re)production of the logics of addition, and therefore, the discourse does not challenge the homogenising tendencies of the strategies of sameness and silence that (re)produce the liberal-feminist representation-participation and prevention-protection discourses. Instead, these logics incrementally include different groups of marginalised women into the already-established discourse pattern which protects the needs and interests of privileged women. Thus, they are included through the same 'box checking' exercise. This is represented by the same discursive pattern of (re)production in the indicators under this pillar; for example, the "number of women combatants that have reintegrated their communities" (GoR, 2010: 16).

As the residual diversity discourse is integrated into the (re)production of the logics of addition, the different experiences of these vulnerable groups are seen as separate. In turn, the intersectional nature of complex structures of discrimination is not captured by the discourse. This leads to two consequences. Firstly, gender is still prioritised, and the strategies for protection, participation, prevention and recovery are then geared toward privileged women. This is why the diversity discourse is a misappropriated version of intersectionality, because once it is absorbed into the (re)production of the logics of addition, it is (re)produced through the same strategies of silence and sameness, and the hierarchies of material access are reinforced. Secondly, the interconnections between the struggles of different marginalised groups of women are not highlighted, and so they are often made to compete for the same scarce resources. In turn, opportunities for collaborative feminist solutions are then undermined.

In the 2018 NAP, prevention (the second pillar) and protection (the third pillar) go hand in hand (Madsen and Hudson, 2020). A strong emphasis is placed on improving the operational capacity of the One Stop Centres and their ability to provide comprehensive services for victims of SGBV (GoR, 2018: 8). The 2018 plan also focusses on "improving intervention strategies in the prevention of violence against women" at a community level (GoR, 2018: 8). Here, the idea is to engage men and strengthen community institutional capacities to prevent and respond to violence. Community structures, such as community policing, the Child Protection Committees, the UwA (the Parent's Evening) and the *Inshuti z'Umuryango* (the Friends of Family), have been established at the village and district level. These structures raise awareness on women's rights and Rwanda's gender-sensitive laws, the different forms of SGBV and the reporting process. Moreover, these initiatives aim to bring women and men together to discuss SGBV, specifically domestic violence, and the protection of children at a community level (GoR, 2018: 16). These efforts stem from an explicit recognition of the relationship between prevention and protection, and therefore the need to remedy structural causes of gender inequality and discrimination, as well as a need to address the gaps in the policy and legal framework that make it difficult for women to exercise their rights (GoR, 2018: 17-18; Madsen and Hudson, 2020: 15).

The residual diversity discourse is carried through into the protection (the third pillar) and the relief, recovery and rehabilitation (the fourth pillar) pillars in the 2018 NAP. The diversity discourse accounts for the varying needs of "vulnerable groups, including ex-combatants, refugees and victims of GBV" (GoR, 2018: 19). For instance, under the third pillar the plan outlines the need for a state-funded programme for legal aid for vulnerable victims of GBV (GoR, 2018: 35). It specifically states that this is a "pro-poor fund" (GoR, 2018: 37), thus the same 'vulnerable' class status indicated in the *Revised National Gender Policy* (2021) and the *National Policy against Gender-Based Violence* (2011) is (re)produced in the protection discourse of the 2018 NAP. This signifies a recognition of the need of different women across class lines. The class differentiation is also carried through in respect of the rehabilitation needs of women ex-combatants. The plan details the grants that are directed toward female ex-combatants living with disabilities – they are also recognised under categories one and two in the *Ubudehe* programme, and therefore receive social protection benefits, such as "vulnerability support for education, vocational training or income generation opportunities" (GoR, 2018: 19). This represents a slight shift in the (re)production of the logics of addition, as the gender, class and disability of the ex-combatants are not represented as compounded forms of discrimination. The ways in which the ex-combatants' needs are framed appears to be more intersectional than additional in nature.

### 4.5.3 The logics of addition and the recovery and rehabilitation discourse

The fourth pillar in the 2018 NAP focusses on increasing gender accountability in humanitarian assistance, DDR programmes and economic reconstruction efforts in Rwanda. Emphasis is placed on women's access to socio-economic services and rights, integrating and including women in recovery, relief and peacebuilding, and programmes for women refugees (GoR, 2018: 9). Under this pillar, the plan details separate gender sensitive strategies for women refugees and returnees. Thus, the plan utilises the categories to distinguish those returnees (mostly understood as Tutsi) from refugees (mostly understood as Hutu) discussed in section 4.1. Specifically, it outlines the need for recovery projects for "victims of GBV in refugee camps" (GoR, 2018: 42) and to "train women on income generating activities in refugee camps" (GoR, 2018: 44); while it outlines the need for a "comprehensive program for induction of returnees including aspects of gender equality, women empowerment and GBV" (GoR, 2018: 43).

These are, therefore, notably different programmes targeted at different groups of women for different reasons. Yet, unlike the more intersectional framing identified earlier, here the diversity discourse represents these experiences and needs of the two different groups of women as separate. Thus, they are incrementally integrated into the (re)production of the protection pillar through hegemonic logics of addition, and in doing so, the strategies of sameness and silence are not fundamentally challenged. In addition, these two groups (returnees and refugees) are positioned in competition with each other for resources under the same pillar. Moreover, the 2018 plan specifically states that the "demobilization and reintegration programme has further provided Vulnerability Support Window Grants to all female ex-combatants" (GoR, 2018: 19). This points to the reality that two vulnerable groups (widows and female ex-combatants) are supported through a single grant system. Ultimately, competition for scarce resources limits opportunities for the formation of coalition-based feminist organising among these marginalised groups.

Yet, Madsen and Hudson (2020) also identify emergent discourses in their analysis of the Rwandan NAPs. This category "refer[s] to new and often contested ideas, discourse and practices that display sufficient longevity and potential for alternative futures" (Madsen and Hudson, 2020: 6). In the case of the NAPs, as well as the Rwandan gender policy framework more broadly, intersectionality is (re)produced through another discursive pattern – the logics of interdependence. These logics are grounded in African feminisms and, as an alternative discourse, they represent a rupture in the (re)production of the logics of addition. Specifically, the discursive framing focusses on *positive* and conciliatory relations between men and women. I explore the manifestation of these logics on the local and national level in Rwanda in the following chapter.

## 4.6 EVALUATION

The objective of this chapter was to critically analyse the theoretical as well as practical/empirical manifestations and implications of intersectionality used as a form or logic of addition with a focus on Rwanda after the genocide. And the research questions for this chapter were: 'What are the practical/empirical implications of using intersectionality according to a liberal-feminist logic of addition?' and 'Why does using intersectionality as a logic of addition create (in)security silences?'

I explored the gender (in)security silences that are (re)produced through the logics of addition on the hegemonic and residual levels. On the hegemonic level, the logics of addition were (re)produced through the discursive strategies of sameness and silence. Here, the remedy for gender discrimination is framed in terms of a single-factor framework. The single-factor framework assumes that all women experience gender discrimination in the same way, and so the discursive boundaries of what it means to experience gender domination are defined according to privileged women following the strategies of sameness. The strategies of sameness then silence those women who are marginalised by multiple intersecting systems of oppression. This creates hierarchies between different groups of women, as the needs of some are materially redressed while the situation of others remains unaltered. The strategies of sameness and silence in the WPS policy ecosystem (re)produce a particular liberal-feminist 'women' category, whose experience of gender discrimination is remedied through integrating 'her' into the liberal peacebuilding, security and development enterprise. Once domesticated in the Rwandan context, this 'women' category does integrate some privileged women into the decision-making organs of the state and has facilitated the generation of a legal regime that protects women's rights, but still gender (in)security silences remain. This is because the structural factors (e.g., patriarchal gender norms) remain unchallenged and the (re)production of the strategies of sameness and silence necessarily also creates a situation where the subordination of marginalised women is intensified.

Yet, on the residual level of (re)production, the diversity discourse tries to remedy this by including the experiences of other groups of women into the dominant gender equality framework. This discourse has its roots in intersectional thought, and therefore considers the qualitatively different experiences of various groups of marginalised women. However, once mainstreamed, the critical tendencies of this discourse are flattened-out. This is because, these different groups are integrated into the (re)production of the hegemonic logics of addition, and so, their inclusion does not challenge the dominance of the liberal-feminist strategies of silence and sameness. Instead, the groups are treated as discrete and their experiences as compoundable – the intersectional quality of their complex experiences of insecurity is then lost. The diversity discourse is tolerated by the hegemonic liberal-feminist mainstream by being subsumed under its integrationist pattern of discursive (re)production. The uninterrupted (re)production of the strategies of silence and sameness then continues to prioritise the needs and interests of privileged women. In representing experiences of marginalised groups of women as separate and compoundable, the strategies of sameness limit opportunities for building feminist coalitions between different groups.

Therefore, to answer the first question, the practical implication is that the logics of addition do not lead to gender transformation, rather, these logics end up reinforcing hierarchies of material access and, in turn, create conditions in which gender inequality can thrive and threaten the sustainability of peace. Thus, empirically in Rwanda, this has allowed privileged women to be the main recipients of the gender equality policy and legal framework. Those women whose social situation lies at the intersection of class, race, ability, sexuality or ethnicity are then marginalised from accessing and enjoying their rights. Consequently, the logics obscure the structural dimensions of intersectional oppression and those negative gender cultural norms and attitudes that support the perpetration of violent gender relations remain unaddressed.

And to answer the second question, gender (in)security silences are then generated through the strategies of sameness and silence on the hegemonic level, because the intersectional nature of gendered discrimination is not considered. Although on the residual level different marginalised women are integrated into the framework, their experiences of insecurity and the strategies developed to deal with these issues are treated as discrete and compoundable. As a residual discourse, the diversity approach does not challenge the strategies of sameness and silence and as a result gender (in)security silences continue to be (re)produced. This integrationist approach leaves the fundamental intersectional nature of their insecurity unaddressed, and it undermines opportunities for coalition building between different marginalised groups.

This chapter has, therefore, through a deconstructive discourse analysis of the inner workings of intersectionality according to the logics of addition, revealed what happens when the intersectionality concept is co-opted and misused by the feminist mainstream. Yet, the residual diversity discourse also points to the possibility of rupturing the dominant liberal-feminist discourses with patterns of critical insight. In the following chapter, I explore the emergence of the logics of interdependence on the national and local level of the Rwandan gender policy framework. These logics reveal the emancipatory possibilities of a positive intersectionality concept informed by African feminist thought.

# CHAPTER FIVE: THE LOGICS AND INNER WORKINGS OF INTERDEPENDENCE

## 5.1 GENERAL OVERVIEW

African women's agency in peacebuilding processes lies in their cultural and socio-political obligations and responsibilities that contribute to the survival and overall well-being of their families and community in times of crisis and conflict, and in times of peace (Isike and Uzodike, 2011: 33; Ibnouf, 2021: 150). Isike and Uzodike (2011: 34) argue that there is value in developing an African-feminist paradigm for peacebuilding based on African women's practical approaches to conflict prevention, diplomacy and conflict resolution. As this perspective is grounded in the concrete experiences of African people, it offers a critical imagining of gendered security. This is because it emerges from the material and discursive realities that lie at "the intersection of heteropatriarchal capitalist and gendered militarist oppressions at national and global levels" (Madsen and Hudson, 2020: 6).

In this chapter, I aim to contribute to this paradigm by analysing the inner workings of intersectionality through the logics of interdependence. The objective of this chapter is to critically analyse the theoretical as well as practical/empirical manifestations and implications of intersectionality used as a form or logic of interdependence with a focus on a peaceful future for Rwanda founded on the principles of an African-feminist and Ubuntu worldview. This chapter will answer three research questions: 'What are the theoretical and practical/empirical implications of using intersectionality as a logic of interdependence?'; 'Can postcolonial and African-feminist worldviews be used to theorise a positive intersectionality?'; and 'Can a positive intersectionality be used to create a peaceful future for Rwanda?'

My approach takes its cue from African feminisms, which underscore the value of cooperating with men and leveraging positive cultural traditions and norms for gender justice. This alternative imagining sees gender in relational terms and emphasises the interdependence between men and women, the family and the community, the community and the nation. Madsen and Hudson maintain that the African-feminist 'freedom to relate' is a gateway for conceptualising a positive intersectionality concept, which is different from "the notion of intersectionality as constructed around a negative relationality of interlocked oppressions only" (Madsen and Hudson, 2020: 6). I expand on this understanding by considering how positive intersections are (re)produced through discursive strategies of interconnection. I link the strategies of interconnection to Ubuntu-feminist care ethics. These are practices of feminist caregiving that bring Ubuntu 'to life'.

The strategies of interconnection are, therefore, (re)produced through Ubuntu-inspired discourses and practices that affirm the human dignity of all others. This requires engaging with the alterity of Others and (re)asserting the interdependence of our shared humanity by actively challenging the discursive and material factors that engender the complex conditions of oppression. In (re)producing the strategies of interconnection, we begin to weave practices and discourses that affirm the interdependence of our personhood, which can then be leveraged to develop community-based solutions to gender insecurity. The goal of the strategies of interconnection is, thus, a transformative vision of gender peace. In revealing how the strategies of interconnection (re)produce the logics of interdependence, I also reveal how the inner workings of a positive intersectionality concept come into being. In turn, this re-imagining offers new pathways for bolstering the emancipatory potential of the intersectionality concept.

In the Rwandan context, the logics of interdependence emerge within an incredibly complex discursive and political environment. In this chapter, I analyse two co-existing dominant discourses that are cloaked in a vocabulary inspired by notions of gender relationality and interdependence – the national and global engaging-men discourses. The national engaging-men discourse leans into Rwandan cultural traditions and pre-colonial history to cultivate a discourse of gender equality and complementarity. In contrast, the global engaging-men discourse is a product of hegemonic liberal-feminist WPS protection discourses. These two discourses have trickled-down to the local level through gender-based interventions and policies that are a product of financial and logistical partnerships between the GoR, international NGOs and Rwandan civil society organisations. This complex discursive environment constrains the opportunities for the local logics of interdependence to trickle-up to the national level. In addition, the top-down organisation of political power in Rwanda limits the possibilities for positive interdependence to take root in Rwandan society, which restricts the emancipatory possibilities of cultivating positive intersections through community-based gendered security processes. This analysis serves as a precursor for my assessment of the logics of interdependence evident in the GoR's Parents' Evening forum. The forums illustrate how the inner workings and logics of interdependence could be (re)produced through strategies of interconnection at a local level. I use the Parents' Evening programme/UwAs as a strategic (and not a perfect) example, as the logics of interdependence actualised through the UwAs are constrained by many structural and operational limitations.

In section 5.2, I outline the entanglement between the national and global engaging-men discourses in the Rwandan gender policy framework and the structural limitations created by the organisation of political power in Rwanda. I suggest that these factors complicate the discursive environment in which the logics of interdependence emerge. In section 5.3, I provide a theoretical framework for the logics of interdependence and the strategies of interconnection, and I link these to the positive intersectionality concept. In section 5.4, I carefully and strategically use the example of the GoR's Parents' Evening forum to illustrate how the strategies of interconnection (or positive intersections) (re)produce the logics of interdependence, and I explore the possibilities of using this framing to harness the emancipatory potential of intersectionality. In section 5.5, I provide an evaluation of the chapter.

## 5.2 ENGAGING MEN: TRICKLING-UP AND TRICKLING-DOWN[36]

In Chapter two, section 2.4.3, I argued that while WPS documents (such as the NAPs) are vehicles for domesticating dominant liberal-feminist norms at a national level, these documents can also potentially facilitate the 'trickling-up' of emergent and residual discourses that are informed by local imaginings/contexts (Madsen and Hudson, 2020: 3). These interactions are complex and can either lead to the co-optation of critical perspectives by more dominant discourses, or the development of discursive ruptures which offer new and creative conceptual openings for emancipatory gender thinking and initiatives (Madsen and Hudson, 2020: 3). Thus, it is imperative that my assessment of the logics of interdependence first considers the discursive environment in which these logics emerge, as well as the structural arrangements through which these discourses are reified in the social/political world.

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[36] Madsen (2019: 178) argues that norm translation is a contested and active process. Although the dominant gender equality WPS norms 'trickle down' to national and local levels, local perspectives also 'trickle up' through feedback loops created by national women's organisations and civil society groups (Madsen, 2019: 187).

The logics of interdependence are premised on African-feminist principles of gender relationality and the gendered care arrangements that sustain familial and community life both in times of peace and in times of conflict (Ibnouf, 2021: 155). Yet, there are also more dominant discourses that replicate relational discursive arrangements and appear to appreciate the value of care work to the well-being of the community and society. These discourses encourage the practice of engaging men in initiatives that promote gender equality and women's empowerment, and in doing so, co-opt the language of interdependence for different ends. In this section, I deal with two of these: the national and global engaging-men discourses. This complex picture serves as the backdrop for my analysis of the logics of interdependence in the Parents' Evening forum in section 5.4.

### 5.2.1 The national engaging-men discourse: trickling-up or not really?

Even though Rwanda's gender policy framework is dominated by the logics of addition characteristic of hegemonic liberal-feminist discourses, these logics interact with a national discourse that stresses the need to engage men, boys and the community in initiatives that promote gender equality and women's rights. I call this national discourse the national engaging-men discourse because it sees women's empowerment as a project that can be achieved by framing gender equality in terms of gender complementarity (Rwabyoma, 2014: 78). The national engaging-men discourse is inspired by central tenets of African feminisms and positive Rwandan cultural values. Emphasis is placed on the cultural value of interdependence and the cooperation of men and women in fighting against gender-based oppression. In contrast with hegemonic liberal-feminist WPS perspectives, this discourse does appear to offer alternative imaginings of gendered security and gender equality. Yet, this discourse is (re)produced through the top-down institutions of the Rwandan authoritarian state. Thus, the national engaging-men discourse can be used for ends which have more to do with protecting the status quo (the perceived Tutsification of political power) than gender justice.

#### *5.2.1.1 Setting the stage: the roots of the national engaging-men discourse*

In the post-genocide period, Rwandan women have drawn from traditional beliefs that endorse women's 'natural' resistance to violence and acumen for peace to make the case for women's inclusion in decision-making institutions and the protection of women's rights (Hudson, 2009: 306). Rwandan women have used positive cultural resources to support women's authority in leadership positions, and indeed, the value of gender equality to the well-being of Rwandan families and communities (Turianskyi and Chisiza, 2017: 8). While this strategy can reinforce the (re)production of the strategies of sameness and silence by relying on dangerous essentialisations, it also falls in line with the approach of Ubuntu-inspired African feminisms (Hudson, 2009: 306). This is because, the gender project is done in cooperation with men, where culture and tradition are seen as tools, rather than obstacles, for renegotiating traditional obligations and creating just gender relations. The national strategy of engaging men is, then, not new to the Rwandan political landscape, as this strategy takes inspiration from key tenets of traditional Rwandan gender roles, identities and relations, which see gender as a positive conciliatory relationship between men and women based on the mutual associations, ideas and roles (Madsen, 2018: 75).

The FFRP's gender equality work is an illustrative example of the national engaging-men discourse. In 2004, the FFRP launched a campaign to realise the enactment of the GBV bill. Hebert (2015: 30) argues that the drafting process of the GBV bill was distinctive for a few reasons. First, the draft law was initiated, written and sponsored by women parliamentarians and civil society actors (Hebert, 2015: 30). Despite government suppression of activists, the FFRP cooperated with civil society in the body's legislative work on women's rights (Hebert, 2015: 30). This cooperative pragmatism is reminiscent of the cross-ethnic collaboration of women's organisations in the wake of the genocide, and it speaks to the African-feminist values of working within and against existing structures for collective emancipatory outcomes (Pearson, 2008: 22). Second, the drafting process was highly inclusive and involved nationwide grassroots consultations in which female and male parliamentarians would engage local communities and receive feedback on the priorities addressed by the new law (Pearson 2008: 32-35). And third, the FFRP and civil society deliberately sought out male allies to support the bill's passage (Nyiransabimana, 2018: 12; Burnet, 2019b: 96).

Part of the strategy for securing men's support was the decision to use language that acknowledged the vulnerability of women and girls as well as men and boys to GBV. They also linked the law with African communitarian values, which allowed them to frame GBV as a 'community matter' and not just a 'women's issue' (Carlson and Randell, 2013: 119). In doing so, the FFRP stressed that addressing GBV was the collective project of the entire Parliament (Hebert, 2015: 30). Thus, although the law recognises that men are primarily the perpetrators of GBV, the document treats men and women equally in the prevention and punishment of GBV, as it stresses the value of partnership between men and women in transforming negative social attitudes and behaviours.[37]

Gender complementarity is a central component of the Rwandan policy documents that address GBV on a community level. For instance, the *National Policy against GBV* (2011) outlines community-based strategies for preventing GBV, which look to transform "entrenched ideas of gender roles and negative social attitudes" by leveraging positive cultural values (MIGEPROF, 2011: 6). The policy emphasises that culture "is not static, but rather changes over time as attitudes and expectations change in society" and it highlights that "historical cultural values" can have a "positive impact on GBV prevention" (MIGEPROF, 2011: 6). The policy goes on to list six African values that government will employ in its community-based prevention initiatives. The first is unity and cohesion, which stresses the importance of both the community and the individual, as well as the "collective responsibility for the well being [*sic*] of all members of the community" (MIGEPROF, 2011: 6). The second is respect and dignity for all. The third is the importance of family, or in other words, the "values placed on family ties" which ensure that "the honor and security" of all family members is prioritised (MIGEPROF, 2011: 7). The fourth is non-violent conflict resolution in every aspect of social life and the "protection of and respect for the life of vulnerable groups" (MIGEPROF, 2011: 7). The fifth is the empowerment of women through initiatives that leverage the positive aspect of womanhood in Rwandan culture, such as their vital role as

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[37] It must be acknowledged that the GoR frames the relationality of gender in heteronormative terms. Carlson and Randell (2013: 116) emphasise that significant social stigma is directed against LGBTQIA folk in Rwanda. LGBTQIA situations in life are not openly discussed in the government's gender programmes and policy.

"pillars of households" (MIGEPROF, 2011: 7). Finally, the sixth is passing on positive cultural values to children in the community (MIGEPROF, 2011: 7).

This national engaging-men discourse is also (re)produced across the text of the two NAPs. The 2009 plan specifically cites the "men engaged approach in fighting against gender based [*sic*] violence" (GoR, 2010: 6) and links this initiative to the work of community dialogue forums (GoR, 2010: 11). These forums are framed as places in which community members can collectively engage with one another on issues that threaten the security of the community. Similarly, under the second pillar of the 2018 plan, the intervention strategies for preventing SGBV include the intention to engage "the community and especially men" (GoR, 2018: 23), as well as the need to initiate sensitisation campaigns for men and boys to "encourage them to actively participate in community anti-GBV structures" (GoR, 2018: 32). Although the national engaging-men discourse may be on the margins of the two NAPs, it takes centre stage in the *Revised National Gender Policy* (2021), as the policy dedicates two priority areas (four and five) to leveraging "positive cultural norms that support best practices for gender promotion" and to ensuring the effective engagement of men and boys in gender-based strategies and programmes (MIGEPROF, 2021: 43). The policy also links the prevention of SGBV with "establishing and strengthening family cohesion" through home-grown initiatives (MIGEPROF, 2021: 18).

Pertinent to the development of the national engaging-men discourse is the work of Rwandan civil society organisations, such as RWAMREC.[38] In 2006, RWAMREC was established by Rwandan men in response to the increasing rates of GBV in Rwanda (Carlson and Randell, 2013: 120). Initially, the organisation was specifically created to engage men in ending violence against women and themselves, yet the organisation quickly realised that ending the scourge of GBV required working with men and women alike, as well as with the community as a whole (Carlson and Randell, 2013: 120). The vision of RWAMREC is to help create a "peaceful society where women and men share roles and responsibilities of raising families and governing society in equality and human rights" (RWAMREC, 2021c). To achieve this vision, RWAMREC engages with communities on gender issues through the promotion of "adopting positive forms of masculinities to end men's violence against women and children in Rwanda" (RWAMREC, 2021c).

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[38] The translation of the national-engaging men discourse to the realm of civil society speaks to the structural relationship between the GoR and civil society more generally. Scholars maintain that the RPF views civil society organisations as extensions of the state. Rather than playing a critical 'watchdog' role, these organisations tend to bolster the state by offering technical support in areas of service provision – filling in those gaps where the state lacks capacity (Reyntjens; 2015: 19; Ansoms *et al.*, 2018: 14; Björkdahl and Selimovic, 2015: 327). The 'auxiliary' function of civil society was formalised through the Law on Non-Profit Associations, which authorised the GoR to monitor the activities of NGOs and to control the projects, budget and hiring process of these organisations (Thomson, 2013: 124; Silva-Leander, 2008: 1614).

RWAMREC has four primary areas of intervention: community mobilisation; the promotion of non-violent behaviour and positive masculinities in secondary schools; policy advocacy; and the promotion of healthy families (Carlson and Randell, 2013: 121). While all these interventions are important, critical for the emergence of the national engaging-men discourse were RWAMREC's community mobilisation initiatives, which include dialogue sessions and gender workshops. The instructors first work with men and women in distinct groups, after which they come together for discussion and reflection (Carlson and Randell, 2013: 121). These workshops encourage dialogue among the participants on the relationships between men and women and troubles that may surface in these relationships, as well as the perceived causes of any difficulties and their effects (RWAMREC, 2012: 16). The leaders of the workshops encourage men and women to rethink how they understand culture, especially in the justification of the oppression of women. The workshops urge the participants to think about their behaviour in relation to others and help them to live in ways that promote the well-being of themselves, their partners and their community (RWAMREC, 2012: 16). Carlson and Randell (2013: 122) write that the participants in these workshops "reported that they experience a greater feeling of self-worth, peace and contentment in their lives". Borne out of these activities is a partnership between RWAMREC and MIGEPROF that is geared toward the formation of community groups specifically designed to deal with GBV at the village level (Rwabyoma, 2014: 79; RWAMREC, 2012: 5).

#### *5.2.1.2 State control and the limits of the national engaging-men discourse*

The national engaging-men discourse is a product of the GoR's 'home-grown' development and security enterprise. This rhetorical framework is based on policy initiatives that are informed by cultural principles, practices and values drawn from Rwanda's pre-colonial history (RGB, 2021). Scholars argue that these neo-traditional programmes bolster state control over the population (Reyntjens, 2016: 65; Mgbako, 2005: 220; Uwimbabazi and Lawrence, 2013: 267). The national engaging-men discourse may look like it is a product of the (re)production of the logics of interdependence, except it is not. This discourse leans on positive Rwandan cultural traditions and gender relationality, but the goal of using these is not necessarily gender justice. In addition, the national engaging-men discourse is based on a binary conception of gender identity, relations and sexuality, and it does not consider the intersections of gender with other social, economic or political locations. Although this discourse could offer pathways for the 'trickling-up' of the logics of interdependence to the national level, the organisation of political power in the post-genocide Rwandan state limits this possibility. This is because, the national engaging-men discourse is premised on a notion of interdependence that does not engender 'true' (unfettered) positive collective dependence but is rather used to bolster the control of the state at the local level.

This reality is exemplified by the *imihigo* system. *Imihigo* is a home-grown solution for performance contracting, which alludes to the pre-colonial Rwandan tradition of "making ambitious commitments, announcing achievements and in the case of failure facing public shame" (Hasselskog, 2016: 182). Binding contracts are signed between every government body and the administrative level above it, all the way up to the office of the President (Ndahiro, 2015: 17). The contracts stipulate goals and targets to be reached in a specific timeframe with measurable indicators (Ndahiro, 2015: 2). Household *imihigo* contracts are presented by the GoR as a participatory form of development and governance – the idea is that households and local communities set their own targets, and that these trickle-up and influence the plans and policies at higher levels of government (Hasselskog, 2016: 183). Yet, Hasselskog (2016: 192) demonstrates that residents do not formulate their own targets, rather the *imihigo* contracts are used to localise national (and even international) objectives at the household level.

In terms of gender equality and gender security, the *Revised National Gender Policy* (2021) highlights the need to use *imihigo* contracts in the monitoring and evaluation of gender equality and gender security policy frameworks and programmes (MIGEPROF, 2021: 47). The policy also stipulates the need to enforce family level *imihigo* planning to ensure that national gender norms are adopted in households (MIGEPROF, 2021: 35). The *imihigo* system points to the trickling-down of national gender norms and objectives and highlights how the structure of political power in the post-genocide state limits the opportunities for the trickling-up of the local logics of interdependence.

This discursive environment is further complicated by the trickling-down of the global engaging-men discourse. While the national engaging-men discourse is inspired by the Rwandan cultural context and central tenets of African feminisms, the global engaging-men discourse is not. The global engaging-men discourse is an appendage of liberal-feminist narratives disguised in a vocabulary of gender relationality. In the next section, I explore the interaction between these two discourses and the translation of these norms to the local level.

### *5.2.2 Trickling-down: the global engaging-men discourse*

Within the WPS policy ecosystem there appears to be a growing consensus surrounding the need to include men and boys in activities and policies that deal with conflict-related SGBV, as well as the need to involve men and boys in promoting gender equality and challenging traditional masculinities and militarism (Watson, 2015: 50; Touquet and Gorris, 2016: 38; Shepherd, 2020: 626; Duriesmith, 2019: 2). The first-time men and boys were explicitly mentioned in the WPS resolutions was in UNSC Resolution 2106 (2013), which affirms "the enlistment of men and boys in the effort to combat all forms of violence against women" and sees the participation of men and boys as "central to long-term efforts to prevent sexual violence in armed conflict and post-conflict situations" (UNSC, 2013: 1). In addition, UNSCR 2106 recognises that sexual violence in conflict and post-conflict situations affects men and boys, among other vulnerable population groups (UNSC, 2013: 2). The global engaging-men discourse is also prominent in other gender mainstreaming mechanisms in global governance, such as the UN's *HeForShe* campaign (Duriesmith, 2019: 11; Watson, 2015: 55).

The discourse of ‘engaging’ or ‘enlisting’ men is linked to several international organisations that brand their work in relation to WPS (Duriesmith, 2019: 4). Of interest to this study is the work of Promundo, the MenEngage Alliance and Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere (CARE) International, all of which are proponents of working with men and boys in dialogues, workshops and activities. These organisations link patriarchal cultures of violence to militarism, SGBV and IPV, bad outcomes in maternal health and pre/post-natal care, child malnutrition and abuse, female genital mutilation, women’s economic exclusion, women’s disproportionate burden of care work and the proliferation of HIV/AIDS (Promundo, 2019; MenEngage, 2019: 4; CARE, 2021). The theory of change that undergirds the activities and programmes of these organisations is: if men confront the negative aspects of their masculinity and recognise their role in harming others, then it is possible to shift those attitudes, behaviours and norms that support a culture of violence, patriarchal power dynamics and the oppression of women (Carlson and Randell, 2013: 115; Duriesmith, 2017: 1-2). The idea is that working with men in dialogic spaces encourages them to adopt positive masculinities, which in turn, fosters non-violent gender relations and support women’s empowerment and gender equality (RWAMREC, RBC and Promundo, 2021a: 102). The assumption is that this “will facilitate wider societal shifts around gender and violence against women” (Duriesmith, 2017: 2).

#### *5.2.2.1 Coloniality and the global engaging-men discourse*

Scholars have argued that the global engaging-men discourse does not take into account the role of intersecting identities and other structural power dynamics (Duriesmith, 2017, 2019; Wright, 2020; Shepherd, 2020). Duriesmith (2017: 10) maintains that the global engaging-men discourse treats masculinities as “conscious attitudes” and not as a function of economic structure, development and security practice or other intersecting identity factors. The global engaging-men discourse focusses on changing attitudes and social norms, while paying little attention to the larger dynamics structural that propel GBV (Mannell *et al.*, 2018: 2). As the role of intersecting matrices of power is not recognised, the global engaging-men discourse reifies a particular kind of masculinity – that of “real men” or “good men” who protect women from other groups of men (Duriesmith, 2017: 5). Thus, this discourse plays into and does not transform the hegemonic WPS liberal-feminist protection discourse, which essentialises all men as either protectors or perpetrators and all women as victims in need of male protection.

As the structural dimensions of gender relations are not recognised, this discourse risks reifying the harmful narrative that SGBV is perpetrated by 'bad men' who hold misogynistic beliefs (Duriesmith, 2017: 10). By reinforcing the dichotomy between 'good' and 'bad' men, Wright maintains that the global engaging-men discourse props up male privilege

> through language that constructs men as protectors of women, or by rewarding men for small acts of solidarity that do not involve giving up power over women, often entailing work that women have been doing for years with little recognition or recompense (Wright, 2020: 659).

Moreover, the 'good' men construct is based on a Western interpretation of masculinity. Although engaging-men programmes do contextualise the curriculum and training through partnerships with local organisations, the understanding of gender relations and the theory for change are not informed by indigenous cultural norms or practices. Thus, these programmes promote a "civilisational project" for transforming 'bad men' in the Global South (Duriesmith, 2017: 9). The global engaging-men discourse is therefore undergirded by the coloniality of dominant racialised and imperial discourses that are (re)produced through the development sector and liberal peace agenda (Wright, 2020: 646). Another critique is that the global engaging-men discourse draws funding away from work that focusses on women's specific security needs and experiences (Wright, 2020: 660; Duriesmith, 2017: 6). In what follows, I briefly consider how these trends are (re)produced in the Rwandan context through the illustrative example of the *Bandebereho* (which means role model in Kinyarwanda) intervention.

#### *5.2.2.2 The entanglement of the global and national engaging-men discourses in Rwanda*

The discursive framing of the national engaging-men discourse is different from the global engaging-men discourse, as it takes inspiration from (and co-opts) indigenous understandings of relational and conciliatory gender norms. Yet, the discursive commitment to engaging men and boys in Rwandan gender policy and programmes has also acted as a strategic platform, as the Rwandan government has leveraged this discourse to gain financial, academic and logistical support from dominant international WPS actors. The GoR has therefore actively adopted the global engaging-men discourse in its gender policy framework. This is evident in the *Revised National Gender Policy* (2021) which asserts the GoR's commitment to "men engagement through men and boy centred approaches such as [the] *Men engage* campaign and *HeforShe* movement" (MIGEPROF, 2021: 27). Similarly, under the second pillar of the 2018 NAP, which focusses on the prevention of violence against women, the GoR (2018: 32) highlights the need to "sensitize boys and men to join the *HeForShe* campaign to promote positive masculinity". The global engaging-men discourse has trickled-down to the level of civil society in Rwanda through the operational and funding partnerships between Promundo, the MenEngage Alliance, CARE international, the MIGEPROF and RWAMREC. These partnerships have culminated in multiple programmes. However, in this study, I will only cover one: the *Bandebereho* intervention. In what follows, I briefly outline the objectives, successes and weaknesses of this intervention.

#### *5.2.2.3 The Bandebereho intervention: successes and shortfalls*

Promundo and Rutgers World Population Fund launched the MenCare+ programme in 2013 (Doyle *et al.*, 2014: 519). The initiative works via health care sectors to "involve men in maternal, newborn and child health, sexual reproduction health and rights, and violence prevention in Indonesia, Brazil, South Africa and Rwanda" (Doyle *et al.*, 2014: 519). The programme partners with local organisations in each of these countries in efforts to "break inter-generational cycles of violence" by instilling "equitable norms around gender, emotional connection, and care" (Doyle *et al.*, 2014: 519). In Rwanda, the MenCare+ programme was implemented in collaboration with RWAMREC. The *Bandebereho* programme was implemented in 30 districts and worked in direct partnership with the MIGEPROF and the Ministry of Health (MOH) (Doyle *et al.*, 2014: 519).

The intervention was conducted with expectant fathers and fathers of young children and their partners and spouses (Prevention+, n.d.: 2). The programme included dialogue sessions with the fathers alone, as well as in couples, which covered a version of Program P[39] that was adapted to the Rwandan context (Prevention+, n.d.: 2). This curriculum included sessions on gender and power, fatherhood, couples' communication, shared decision-making, violence, caregiving, child development and maternal and reproductive health (Prevention+, n.d.: 2).

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[39] 'Program P' was designed by Promundo in response to the International Men and Gender Equality Survey. It is a curriculum that aims to encourage men to involve themselves in care work, to benefit mothers, prevent violence against women and children and positively impact family well-being (Promundo, 2021).

The cornerstone of the intervention was introducing men to caregiving roles that would encourage them to relate positively to their partners, family members and community (Doyle *et al.*, 2014: 518). The intervention provided couples with a dialogic space, in which they could "question and critically reflect on gender norms and how these shape their lives", "rehearse equitable and non-violent attitudes and behaviors in a comfortable space with supportive peers", and "internalize these new gender attitudes and behaviors, and apply them in their own lives and relationships" (Doyle *et al.*, 2018: 7). The sessions encouraged the couples to discuss their hopes and fears about being/becoming parents, as well as any challenges or tensions they were experiencing in their relationships. The idea behind these sessions was to impart the skills necessary for building "stronger, more equal and non-violent relationships among couples" (Prevention+, n.d.: 1).

In their assessment of the *Bandebereho* intervention, Doyle *et al.* (2018: 12) found that the programme led to substantial improvements in multiple areas: a reduction in women's experience of physical and sexual IPV, an uptake in modern contraceptive use and a more equitable division of labour in the household.[40] In addition, participants reported a reduction in male dominance in household decision-making and a more equitable division of household labour (Doyle *et al.*, 2018: 12). These findings correlate with qualitative research conducted by Doyle *et al.* (2014: 527) earlier on in the intervention, which revealed that the male participants expressed having greater respect and value for the partners' opinions.

While the intervention did show positive effects in dealing with IPV, high rates of violence persisted: at the end of the intervention programme, about one in three women in the intervention group reported experiencing IPV in the past year (Doyle *et al.*, 2018: 14). And, although men were more involved in care work, women's time spent on household responsibilities did not change. In fact, the care workload of most female participants was consistently recorded at more than eight hours per day (Doyle *et al.*, 2018: 14). Similar tendencies were revealed by a recent follow-up study, which explores how the *Bandebereho* couples have coped with the challenges of the COVID-19 pandemic (Doyle *et al.*, 2021: 3). By interviewing the couples five years after the intervention had ended, Doyle *et al.* (2021: 9) wanted to find out whether the couples implemented the lessons from the programme in this period of extreme stress. The study demonstrated that, compared to the control group, the *Bandebereho* participants were more likely to report "a strengthening of couple relationships (and less likely to report worsening relations), increased communication about household decisions, and feeling less frustration with their partners and children" (Doyle *et al.*, 2021: 23).

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[40] Based on these results, the *Bandebereho* intervention has been integrated into the health care system and scaled-up through a partnership between Promundo, RWAMREC, the MOH and the MIGEPROF. This project is currently being tested in the Musanze district (Doyle *et al.*, 2021: 4).

Unsurprisingly, the pandemic and the resultant lockdowns did increase the amount of time spent on care work for most households, and the *Bandebereho* couples reported that men helped with the additional burden or shared it equally with their partners (Doyle *et al.*, 2021: 9). However, the men and women interviewed reported large discrepancies in the amount of care work they were doing. While a substantial number of women reported taking on most of the additional care burden themselves, few men confirmed this trend in their own reports (Doyle *et al.*, 2021: 12). Doyle *et al.* (2021: 9) suggest that this finding shows that "men may have underestimated women's time spent on care work, which is likely to be reflective of the historical invisibility and undervaluing of care work that is predominantly undertaken by women".

The *Bandebereho* intervention was successful in "bending" (McLean, Heise and Stern, 2020: 24) some negative gendered behaviours, attitudes and perceptions of some men and women. However, the intervention did not fundamentally transform unjust or inequitable gender relations. This is partly because the intervention does not address the intersections between larger structural power imbalances generated through the neoliberal global political economy and harmful gender beliefs and cultural norms on the local level. As a result, the programme pays little attention to intersecting identities and assumes that all men and women experience traditional gender norms in the same way. Clearly, the global engaging-men discourse is (re)produced through logics of addition similar to the hegemonic liberal-feminist discourses that populate the WPS policy ecosystem. Moreover, the intervention looks to 'correct' negative masculinities by encouraging men to adopt 'better' more 'positive' masculinities, rather than renegotiating the gendered hierarchies that support patriarchal social and economic family and community structures. The intervention sees tradition as an obstacle to gender equality and therefore does not draw from vital cultural resources for shifting harmful gendered cultural norms. One such resource is the collectivist humanist orientation of Rwandan communities. This was not a core component of the programme. Instead, the emphasis was placed on the individual binary gender relations between heterosexual couples.

#### *5.2.2.4 Where do the logics of interdependence fit in?*

An analysis of the entanglement between the global and national engaging-men discourses on a local and national level reveals an incredibly complex picture. While this picture must be kept in mind, there is still much to be gained from designing security policies based on contextual understandings of masculinities and femininities, and their intersections with structures of oppression and structures of interconnection.

The global engaging-men discourse domesticates dominant WPS liberal-feminist protection norms, which are (re)produced through logics of addition that essentialise masculinities into categories of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ and associate the female experience with victimhood. This discourse is also undergirded by the levers of coloniality, and therefore, reifies particular racialised assumptions about the interconnections between gender relations and culture on the African continent. The global engaging-men discourse may appear to be a proponent of gender relationality when it really is a hegemonic discourse masquerading itself in new vocabulary.

Yet, the global engaging-men discourse co-exists alongside the national engaging-men discourse. The national engaging-men discourse appears to have emerged from the Rwandan gendered experience, culture and traditions. Thus, it challenges the colonial logics that undergird the global engaging-men discourse, as it is grounded in the African collectivist tradition of thinking about gender relations as a function of the family and the broader community. It therefore recognises that the process of transforming gender relations is a socially, politically and economically embedded process, and not just about shifting the dial on patriarchal attitudes (Mannell and Dadswell, 2017: 208). This discourse could potentially offer pathways for the trickling-up of the logics of interdependence. Yet, the national engaging-men discourse does not espouse an intersectional vision of gender relations, and it does not bring about 'real' gender relationality. This is because it reinforces, and does not disrupt, the political status quo. It therefore does not inherently challenge national and local structural, material and institutional hierarchies (Mannell and Dadswell, 2017: 208).

While the depth of state control needs to be acknowledged, it is also important to highlight the ways in which ordinary Rwandan citizens work within and against these structures. Thomson (2013: 133) demonstrates that Rwandans employ strategies of everyday resistance against centralised state power, which are characterised as subtle, indirect and non-confrontational acts that make daily life more sustainable. Thomson (2013: 133) identifies different everyday acts of resistance performed by Rwandans which involve a combination of persistence, prudence and individual efforts to accomplish a specific goal. While Thomson's (2013) study focusses on acts of individual resistance against the GoR national unity and reconciliation policy, my study builds on this perspective and identifies some ways in which Rwandan communities engage in collective community action against conditions of gendered and material injustice. By acting collectively within the boundaries of decentralised state structures, such as dialogic community forums, ordinary Rwandans create spaces that are geared toward resisting the domination of the most vulnerable in the community. While these are not a perfect example of the logics of interdependence, they do illustrate the emancipatory potential of leveraging positive intersections. I argue that it is on the local level that the logics of interdependence come to life, within and alongside (and potentially against) centralised state power. I analyse these logics in section 5.4 by referring to the illustrative example of the GoR's UwA policy. In the following section, I lay out the theoretical groundwork for the logics of interdependence and I link these logics to a positive intersectionality concept.

## 5.3 THE LOGICS OF INTERDEPENDENCE: CONCEPTUALISING A POSITIVE INTERSECTIONALITY

As stated in Chapter two, section 2.5.1, the theoretical framework of my study is informed by both decolonial and postcolonial African-feminist thought. Like decolonial-African feminists, in Chapters three and four I sought to reveal the inner workings of the larger macro indices of coloniality and the neoliberal global order, and how these generate experiences of complex gendered insecurity in Rwanda. Yet, in doing so, I also relied on the context-driven approach of African postcolonial-feminist scholars who centre their analyses on the lived experiences of African women. My understanding of the logics of interdependence is therefore developed in line with the specific political, economic, cultural and traditional realities of African women (Tamale, 2020: 43). My approach is geared toward positive solution-orientated thinking, and so I take seriously Sylvia Tamale's (2020: 21) assertion that "Africa must think beyond deconstruction" and must think about "re-constructions".

Therefore, the logics of interdependence do not replace the logics of domination or addition. Rather, the different logics should be used in combination with one another, as it is imperative to understand which strategies of othering and difference, and which strategies of silence and sameness, are (re)produced within different social, political and economic locations.[41] Once we know how the intersections of multiple systems of oppression create contextual experiences of complex inequality and domination, and once we have revealed the ways in which those intersections are misinterpreted, co-opted and (re)produced by neoliberal forces, the next step is to build culturally-relevant solutions to gender insecurity.

African countries that localise the gender equality supernorm encounter incongruencies between liberal-feminist perspectives on women's emancipation and 'culture', wherein culture and tradition are framed as the opposite of, or even the obstacle to, achieving gender equality. Instead, African-feminist scholars argue for adopting terms and strategies that reflect African worldviews for engendering real gender justice and for affirming social diversity in African communities (Tamale, 2020: 209; Venganai, 2015: 151; Magadla and Chitando, 2014: 177; Gouws and Van Zyl, 2015: 166). As gender equality rights are a necessary but insufficient precondition for gender justice, Heidi Hudson (2009: 293) argues that African feminisms strike a balance between "universal normative principles of gender equality and traditional values such as *ubuntu* (the interconnectiveness of each human being, consensus-building, and social solidarity)". Hudson (2009: 293) holds that it is the task of African feminists to consider "using a notion of gender equality that embraces cultural difference but does not reinforce cultural subjugation" and that leverages "communitarian rather than individualist rights and duties toward family, community, the state and the international community". Thus, for Tamale (2020: 209), the way forward is to acclimate the language of gender equality rights to African cultural contexts. This is achieved by moving away from a "narrow quantitative conceptualization of equality towards a more qualitative, participatory notion" of equity that addresses systemic injustice and affirms the human dignity of the marginalised (Tamale, 2020: 211). In the theoretical framework that follows, I outline the concepts and ideas drawn from Ubuntu-inspired African feminisms that inform how I understand the logics of interdependence. I then map out the notion of positive intersectionality and I show how we can leverage positive intersections for engendering gender justice/peace.

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[41] The entanglement of the three logics is represented by Figure 2 in Chapter two, page 69.

### 5.3.1 African feminisms, comparable worth and Ubuntu: metaphors of weaving, unweaving and re-weaving

African feminisms centre the project for gender justice on the lived experience of African women. Thus, African feminisms are informed by the roles that African women play in caring for their families and communities. Gendered practices of caregiving are implemented by African women in times of war and peace to build safe and prosperous communities (Isike and Uzodike, 2011: 33). For instance, Fatma Ibnouf (2021: 149) highlights the vital roles played by women in saving lives and sustaining communities during the conflict in Darfur. Darfurian women in IDP camps care for children, elders, relatives, the injured, the disabled and the dying, while also dealing with their own war-related trauma and grief (Ibnouf, 2021: 153). Ibnouf (2021: 155) links the vital care activities performed by these women to the critical and practical role women play in peacebuilding processes. Similarly, Hudson (2021) argues that there is a link between African women's commitment to nurturing and sustaining communal life and the evidenced commitment on the part of African women's groups and organisations to ending war. This holistic approach to building collective human security is the springboard for my conceptualisation of the logics of interdependence.

The focus of African feminisms is on the contextual expression of gender at the familial and community level, and so, central to the African-feminist enterprise is the relationality of gender and the "comparable worth" of women and men to the well-being of the family and the community (Nzegwu, 1994: 85). Here, gendered duties, roles and responsibilities taken on by men, women and third genders[42] are obligations that contribute to the maintenance and survival of the community (Nzegwu, 1994: 92). It follows that the interdependent nature of African communities yields a notion of gender equality based on the idea that different genders are complimentary, as their “duties, though different, are socially comparable” (Nzegwu, 1994: 85). African feminisms emphasise that the path for gender justice needs to be paved by working with men to redefine the boundaries of culture and tradition. Sometimes this requires strategically reclaiming the vital roles of women to the community (usually caring roles such as motherhood) and leveraging these roles for emancipatory outcomes (Mangena, 2009: 25; Manyonganise, 2015: 5; Isike and Uzodike, 2011: 55). Thus, Tamale (2008: 64) maintains that culture is a “double-edged sword that can be wielded creatively and resourcefully to enhance women’s access to justice”. The complementarity of gender relations equips African feminists with useful tools for achieving gender justice – and one such tool is Ubuntu (Tamale, 2020: 227).

An ethos of reciprocity, interconnectedness and solidarity – Ubuntu – is visible in the foundations of most indigenous African social configurations (Tamale, 2020: 221). The Ubuntu worldview is undergirded by an appreciation for the “interconnectedness of all things; the spiritual nature of human beings; collective/individual identity and the collective/inclusive nature of family structure; oneness of mind, body and spirit; and value of interpersonal relationships” (Graham, 2013: 144). Human beings are intertwined in a world of ethical relations, a web that includes the family, the community, the living-dead[43] and the environment (Gouws and Van Zyl, 2015: 173). This implies that human beings are then born into a world obligated to others, and those others are, in turn, obligated to them (Cornell and van Marle, 2015: 2). From this perspective, the survival and dignity of the collective is the mutual obligation of all, as Ubuntu understands the individual to be inherently communal, embedded in the relations that generate and sustain life (Tamale, 2020: 224; Gouws and Van Zyl, 2015: 174). Ubuntu does not, then, deny individuality, but recognises and values the individual within a larger context (Oelofsen, 2018: 43). These bonds are expressed by caring for others, where allowing another to suffer is seen as part of a process that dehumanises both the Other and oneself (Gouws and Van Zyl, 2015: 173). One's humanity is thus diminished by acts that disregard the dignity of others, such as greed and deeds of domination (Gouws and Van Zyl, 2015: 173).

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[42] Studies show that sex and gender is viewed as a spectrum in many non-Western cultures and that these societies accommodate ‘third genders’ (Tamale, 2020: 120). In the African context, a well-cited study of third genders is Ifi Amadiume’s (1987) ethnographic work in which she accounts for the *nhany* (male daughters) and *igba chu* (female husbands) of the Nnobi, an Igbo community in Nigeria.

[43] Ubuntu includes a symbiotic relationship between the living and the living-dead or ancestors (Curle, 2015: 130). Mbiti (1990: 25) states that “the living dead is a person who is physically dead but alive in the memory of those who knew him in his life, as well as being alive in the world of spirits”. The living relies on the good-will of the living-dead, as the living-dead provide guidance and sustain the life force of the family and community; while the living-dead relies on the living for the rites and rituals of a proper burial so that they may enter the world of spirits (Amanze, 2003: 46).

Ubuntu is underpinned by a moral and ethical foundation that requires one to respect others if one is to respect oneself (Mangena, 2009: 24). In practice, Ubuntu has a high regard for relationships that nurture collective human dignity. It is for this reason that, in principle, Ubuntu could not accept the oppression of women and other marginalised gender identities and sexualities (Tamale, 2020: 227; Oelofsen, 2018: 47). Thus, Tamale (2020: 229) argues: "Just as gender equality is an ideal that we aspire to, the concept of Ubuntu is an ideal that can take us a step closer to that aspiration". The core values cherished in Ubuntu can therefore be "strategically deployed to operationalize gender justice, albeit after a careful interrogation and historicization of the concept itself" (Tamale, 2020: 229). Similarly, Magadla and Chintando (2014: 177) argue that Ubuntu can contribute to reconfiguring masculinities and femininities that have been disrupted by the violence of colonialism, as Ubuntu demands that we (re)imagine how we should 'do' gender in the post-colonial moment. They maintain that Ubuntu is an indigenous resource that can transform masculinities by providing a culturally-understood language and value system. Poignantly, Magadla and Chitando (2014: 184) write that "men are more likely to embrace the quest for gender justice if it can be demonstrated that their own value system leads to gender justice".

At the same time, Ubuntu is a function of deep-seated patriarchal power relations that undergird some African cultures and traditions (Keevy, 2014; Mangena, 2009; Manyonganise, 2015). The instrumentalisation of Ubuntu by patriarchal and gerontocratic discourses facilitates the othering of people with low status, young people, women and gender non-conforming people (Gouws and Van Zyl, 2014: 175). This reality must be given due consideration, as Ubuntu has been evoked to legitimise the 'natural' inferiority of women and LGBTQIA folk, which has effectively sustained GBV in African societies and undermined the formal equality of genders and sexualities in the public space (Magadla and Chitando, 2014: 181; Cornell and van Marle, 2015: 2; Manyonganise, 2015: 2). Thus, any Ubuntu-inspired solution or strategy for gender justice needs to take seriously the idea of first situating and problematising its patriarchal roots.

Yet, Ubuntu is not a stagnant custom, nor is it a vestige of a romanticised pre-colonial past; Ubuntu is a "living tradition" (Magadla and Chitando, 2014: 188). As Ubuntu is lived and practiced in African communities today, 'doing' Ubuntu then entails the constant reinvention of culture in the contemporary moment (Tamale, 2020: 221). This is because a community is not static in time and space – it requires a continued process of cultivation on part of its members, which includes the constant (re)assessment of relations between members (Manyonganise, 2015: 7). The contestations and dynamism that surround Ubuntu allow it to be owned by both the perpetrators of gender violence as well as the proponents of gender justice (Magadla and Chitando, 2014: 190; Venganai, 2015: 151). For this reason, Cornell and van Marle (2015: 2) argue that to regard Ubuntu as either conservative or fundamentally patriarchal misunderstands the transformative potential of Ubuntu. In fact, Manyonganise (2015: 7) maintains that Ubuntu can be "liberating and life-giving to women".

Cornell and van Marle (2015: 6) frame the political project of Ubuntu feminism as a "politics of refusal". This project is illustrated by the allegory of Penelope, Odysseus's abandoned wife, who weaves and unweaves her father-in-law's burial shroud. Her practice of unweaving the day's work ensures that she never finishes, which buys her the time to avoid marrying any potential suitors. Cornell and van Marle (2015: 6) argue that Penelope's weaving and unweaving is analogous to the Ubuntu-feminist practice of working both within and against traditional cultural roles, and in doing so, engenders the possibility of creating new spaces for emancipatory gendered outcomes. In my conceptualisation of the logics of interdependence, I build on the allegory of Penelope to illustrate how the politics of refusal can be cultivated on a community level. I contextualise Penelope's weaving and unweaving in the African artistic and utilitarian practice of weaving (Adekunle, 2007: 68). The process of community-building through weaving is described by the Weaving Kenya Women's Collective as follows:

> The language of "weaving" is a foundational claim to our cultural traditions and legacies of women working and speaking together, of collaboration and co-operation. We claim not any

> one method or fabric, but the practice of weaving our labor and weaving the imagination of women together, so as to make something new (Weaving Kenya Women's Collective, 2015: 86).

I take inspiration from the future-inflection of weaving highlighted by the Collective and I add that in weaving and unweaving, the community re-weaves strategies of interconnection which (re)produce the logics of interdependence.

In July 1997, the Peace Basket cooperative was established as a means of income generation for Rwandan villagers living in conditions of extreme poverty. Basket weaving was a way for villagers to increase their income, improve their living conditions and satisfy their socio-economic needs, such as food, clothing, medicine and shelter (Sentama, 2009: 120). Yet, in his study of the cooperative as a model of bottom-up peacebuilding, Ezekial Sentama (2009: 120) found that the cooperative members also expressed a sincere desire to alleviate their loneliness in the wake of the genocide. The desecration of the Rwandan social fabric left many alone, orphaned, widowed, imprisoned or exiled, and as a result cooperative members emphasised the desire to share the unbearable weight of their loneliness with others (Sentama, 2009: 120).

Sentama (2009: 122) stresses that the members of Peace Basket emphasised the sense of community they gained through their participation in the cooperative. The alleviation of loneliness came about because the cooperative provided space for communication and conviviality (close friendship and mutual support) (Sentama, 2009: 122). Members from both sides of the conflict were given the choice to work together in efforts to improve their collective economic future. Sitting side-by-side, weaving baskets together, ended-up creating mutual pathways for members to overcome their feelings of mistrust, suspicion, anger and even hatred toward members of other ethnic groups (Sentama, 2009: 121). Sentama (2009: 124) demonstrates that Peace Basket created space for social contact between members of conflicting parties, which in turn, fostered positive communication among them. In this way, the practice of weaving together gave the cooperative members a sense of community through their participation in the space (Bratberg, 2013; 47). Apart from the money that they were able to earn, the cooperative members generally expressed that they liked the cooperative because it “brought us together”, “broke down divisions” and “united us” (Sentama, 2009: 123). These sentiments are aptly reflected by one participant’s testimony:

> My son, this cooperative is very important for all of us; the killers and us. Ask them, they will tell you. Our relationships? Yoyoyoyo! It restored everything! We told you that before, no! Before, none could look at each other, but now see! We are together, and you are asking whether it had done anything? If it brought us together we survivors and those killers, and that we now live convivially, what do you want me to say, you son? It made it! (Sentama, 2009: 121).

Based on her observations of the same cooperative, Bratberg (2013: 48-49) writes that some of the members highlighted the Rwandan proverb, *nta mugabo umwe*, or ‘none can live as an island’, to describe the sense of community and mutual dependence that the weaving cooperative provided for them.

In weaving together, the survivors and perpetrators of the genocide were able to build or re-weave channels of communication, which in turn, fostered healthy and stable relations. Both Hutu and Tutsi participants emphasised the importance of the cooperative in providing a space for dialogue with other cooperative members. Here, perpetrators expressed remorse and took responsibility for their actions when they felt ready to, and survivors, in turn, accepted their truth (Bratberg, 2013: 47). Together the cooperative members healed one another little by little and created new positive social bonds between them (Bratberg, 2013: 47). By weaving together, and thereby working toward their individual and collective future, the cooperative participants, as widows, perpetrators, survivors and orphans, were forced to recognise the human dignity of the Other (Bratberg, 2013: 48-49). In doing so, the participants (re)affirmed their sense of community, and in turn, shaped a new transformational social space that was geared toward ensuring the social and economic security of all participants. The Peace Basket cooperative illustrates the potential of unweaving relations that affirm the alterity of the Other and of re-weaving new positive relations (both social and economic) through logics of interdependence as a model for developing community-based peacebuilding.

To summarise, the logics of interdependence build on the politics of refusal by including the idea of weaving as a ‘language’ of relationality. In this instance, the inner workings of intersectionality are (re)produced through strategies of interconnection, where positive intersections are leveraged to re-weave social relations that produce safer communities. Just as the logics of domination recognise the intersections of complex social locations that have developed because of coloniality, the logics of interdependence recognise the positive intersections, and thus transformative potential, that undergird the living experience of these social locations. Here, the focus is on using the positive interconnective quality of identities and power relations for the discursive and social (re)production of interdependence, which in turn, can foster community-orientated solutions to violence. The goal of the strategies of interconnection is gender peace. These logics therefore seek to unlock the emancipatory potential of intersectionality by moving beyond identifying oppressive intersections and by moving toward re-weaving positive intersections that create sustainable peace.[44] Analysing intersectionality through the logics of interdependence is thus an action-oriented approach that is geared toward creating emancipatory outcomes.

### 5.3.2 Thinking through the strategies of interconnection as positive intersections

As the logics of interdependence are about cultivating positive intersections for emancipatory outcomes, the politics of refusal illustrated through the weaving metaphor is not only about gender. Positive intersectionality is about positive gendered relations, but it also includes, by necessity, those co-constitutive power relations formed within and through other social, political and economic locations and identities. The logics of interdependence refuse the various intersecting (on a micro, meso and macro level) levers of coloniality and the neoliberal global order, and work within and against those to create new interconnections that, in the action of weaving, unweaving and re-weaving together, create spaces that have the potential to engender sustainable peace.

In doing so, the logics of interdependence offer solutions to the homogenising and essentialising tendencies of the logics of addition by grounding the analysis within context.

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[44] The relationships between the logics, strategies, goals and inner workings are represented in Figure 1, page 68.

This context-driven approach recognises the interconnections of local intersecting social categories with macro power differentials. These logics keep in mind the "push-pull of multiple forms of power thrust on Africa to the bottom" via the neoliberal global order and the positioning of "Africa itself […] at the assemblage point of multiple structural inequalities and erasures, relative to other continents" (Tamale, 2020: 67). It follows that the positive solutions-oriented approach of the logics of interdependence is then not only focussed on the emancipatory potential of building intersecting coalitions at a local level, as it also involves building alliances with other critical and indigenous feminisms globally. This positioning is inspired by Mohanty's (2003) call for building feminist coalitions across mutual commitments, and not on, as May (2015: 5) puts it, "principles of homogeneity or sameness".

The Ubuntu-inspired roots of the logics of interdependence reflect the inherently political aspect of the logics of interdependence. This relates to Leonhard Praeg's (2014b: 14) characterisation of Ubuntu as a "critical humanism". For Praeg, Ubuntu conceives possibilities for our shared humanity that directly challenge the foundations of the global political economy, as Ubuntu prioritises the "relations of power that systematically exclude certain people from being considered human in the first instance" (Praeg, 2014b: 14). The connectedness between individuals' humanity overcomes the objectification of the Other, as to 'do' Ubuntu one must engage with the humanity of the Other (Gouws and Van Zyl, 2015: 175). Thus, 'doing' Ubuntu requires one to act in line with an alternative vision for humanity, as it advocates for the significance of an African communitarian ideal or value within a global neoliberal order dominated by radical individualism (Cornell and van Marle, 2015: 5). African-feminist strategies for gender justice that are inspired by Ubuntu are therefore also strategies for fighting against the forces of coloniality and imperialism.

This points to the relationship between Ubuntu feminism and positive intersectionality, as applying the principles of Ubuntu feminism necessitates actively challenging and reconstructing those discourses and accompanying conditions of structural and physical violence (the logics of domination) that render individuals and groups as racial, gendered, classed, ethnic, sexualised and disabled Others. There are, thus, parallels between the positive intersectionality concept and Martha Minow's (1990: 15) argument for relationality, where relational-thinking is posited as the most significant way to shift our understanding of the problems of difference (or the logics of domination), as seeing difference relationally requires one to “focus on the relationships within which we notice and draw distinctions” (Robinson, 2021: 31). Robinson (2021: 30) maintains that relational feminist ethics require careful attention to the needs and perspectives of Others, as Others are not apart from us – we are, instead, fundamentally dependent on one another. Actualising Ubuntu necessitates that the humanity of Others is affirmed through respect, compassion and mutual deference. By evoking these positive intersections, we can then fight against conditions of inequality that deny our collective human dignity, which in terms of gender security, allows us to “advocate against issues of state repression, GBV, the expropriation of women’s sexuality and reproductive capacities, property inheritance and the exploitation of domestic labour” (Tamale, 2020: 234).

Tamale (2020: 234) suggests that we can realise this through a “combination of intellectual effort and praxis, the unity of reflection and action”, as this approach allows for contextual sensitivity as well as the transformation of the global material hierarchies that foster gender injustice and inequality. Thus, although positive intersectionality is embedded in context, it also situates familial and communal interdependence in the broader, relational geopolitical and economic context. For this reason, leveraging the logics of interdependence for building safer and more peaceful communities requires a deep understanding of “the particularities of social location, historical background, structural conditions and relationships between relevant moral actors” (Robinson, 2021: 31). A positive intersectionality concept therefore involves engendering discursive strategies of interconnection which affirm that the community (on a familial, community, local, national and international level) is part of who we are. In recognising those intersections, we are then forced to work together in re-imagining and re-weaving our collective future. This future-oriented vision is what lends the positive intersectionality concept to emancipatory gendered outcomes, as it requires a continual commitment to strategies of interconnection that challenge and renegotiate discursive and material hierarchies.

### 5.3.3 The links between the strategies of interconnection and Ubuntu-inspired feminist ethics of care

As stated earlier, the logics of interdependence are (re)produced through the strategies of interconnection. The goal of the strategies of interconnection is gender peace, and so these strategies unfold through patterns of (re)production that unweave those violent discourses that create political, economic, cultural and social Others. While unweaving, the strategies are also simultaneously (re)produced through processes that re-weave those discourses that propagate positive intersectional relations by cultivating radical human interdependence. Here, the fundamental moral principles of Ubuntu that foster a deep sense of mutual belonging (hospitality, compassion, respect for human dignity, harmony and generosity) are linked to feminist ethics of care (Chisale, 2018: 3-4; Du Plessis, 2019: 43). The strategies of interconnection are therefore discursively (re)produced through Ubuntu-inspired feminist caregiving – the care work practices performed by women on which the material, social and emotional survival of African societies depends (Ibnouf, 2021: 154). Hudson (2021) outlines two Ubuntu principles that are relevant to the feminist objective of gender peace: hospitality and the conditions that make hospitality possible.

The hospitality is generally associated with reciprocity, openness and the acceptance of others, where others are those who “come in from outside; another continent, another race, another civilisation, another worldview. Strangers are people with other values, other perspectives, other objectives, other principles of life” (Oduyoye, 2001: 95). This hospitality also extends to the environment and the living-dead; holistically connecting past, present and future in a web of ecological togetherness (Hudson, 2021). Ubuntu therefore embraces both those from within and those from outside, as it is a sacred duty to welcome and care for family, the ancestors, kin, travellers and guests during their stay in the community. This hospitality is encapsulated by the Nguni saying *Siyakwamukela or wamlekile ekhaya*, which means “you are welcome” (Chisale, 2018: 5). Thus, the denial of hospitality to strangers is considered to be malevolent, as in practice it requires the deliberate denunciation of another’s, and therefore one’s own, dignity (Mdluli, 1987: 64). Hospitality is grounded in the caregiving practices that promote mutual responsibility for collective solidarity, interests and satisfaction.

Oduyoye (2001: 104) explains that showing hospitality is presumed to primarily be a woman's obligation. Typically, women are responsible for making sure that "a guest is fed, sleeps in clean linen and baths with warm water" (Chisale, 2018: 6).[45] However, Chisale demonstrates in her study based on a rural Zulu community in South Africa that her participants understood hospitality as a "communal concept or partnership between a husband and wife" (Chisale, 2018: 6). Her participants were the elders in the community, and as elders are regarded as the "custodians of indigenous knowledge" (Keane, Khupe and Seehawer, 2017: 21), they offered vital insights into the connection between Ubuntu and care practices. The elderly men and women cited that the responsibilities of caring for a traveller were shared "between husband and wife because it uplifted the family name" (Chisale, 2018: 5). Chisale's (2018) findings demonstrate that, in Ubuntu feminism, the ethics of care are not a women-only obligation; rather, these ethics and practices are a collective project of the community (Hudson, 2021).

Hospitality requires one to open one's home to the Other, and in doing so, to recognise your co-constituted human dignity. This is not an easy process, as it requires deliberate choice and thoughtful action (Hudson, 2021). Enacting hospitality is an active political commitment to the well-being of all others, and is therefore, at its heart, a practice that embodies the politics of refusal. A hospitable outlook is thus the first step toward unweaving and re-weaving social, political and economic spaces that have the potential to transform inequitable power relations. Yet, to be truly hospitable, and thereby enact the strategies of interconnection, one needs to develop a capacity for identifying with Others and displaying solidarity with their situation. This process requires engendering the freedom to relate (Du Plessis, 2019: 44). Hoffmann and Metz (2017: 158) argue that this is different from the "negative liberty of 'freedom from' the interference of others"; instead, an individual's freedom is articulated in terms of their ability to care for others, suggesting that freedom is inherently a form of interdependence with others, as our collective future depends on actualising the mutually-obligated nature of human existence (Hoffmann and Metz, 2017: 153).

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[45] Here, the criticism of Ubuntu as a patriarchal institution is relevant. Feminist scholars argue that the practice of hospitality ignores the welfare of women and exploits their sexuality by making them vulnerable to sexual violence and abuse (Keevy, 2014: 71; Oduyoye, 2001: 101-2). These criticisms illustrate that Ubuntu is used by dominant patriarchal discourses for violent ends. Recognising the ways in which Ubuntu has legitimised violence against women and other marginalised gender identities is the first step in renegotiating these roles and obligations. These practices must be interrogated and confronted, collectively by all genders, if the logics of interdependence are to truly take root in a society.

In practice, this requires different identity groups to work with one another to eradicate the oppression of all Others through the creation of dialogical spaces between them (Hudson, 2021). These spaces are created through the strategies of interconnection, which are, in turn, unwoven and re-woven on an individual and community level by showing solidarity and hospitality to Others and through engaging in actions that promote the freedom to relate. The active element of the strategies of interconnection is important, as it requires the deliberate (and difficult) recognition of the power imbalances and material hierarchies that are sustained through familial and communal roles and obligations. This specifically involves recognising and reconstituting those obligations that sustain patriarchal gender relations. It then entails a process of renegotiating inequitable and unjust relations and enacting in their stead practices that bring the freedom to relate to life on an intersubjective level.

The (re)production of the strategies of interconnection is a contested, dynamic and unstable process, as the strategies evoke a continual process of re-imagining our collective future while being cognisant of the role of context and the nature of relationships. For Robinson (2021: 32), embracing this uncertainty requires “epistemological humility”, which in practice opens care ethics to continual critique. What makes the logics of interdependence potentially transformative in the long-term is the emphasis on conflict and cooperation, as this dynamic process requires that we continually reimagine a future that cultivates gender justice and positive peace. Thus, like Penelope, putting the logics of interdependence into action requires a collective commitment to continually un-weave negative intersections and re-weave positive intersections. It is this continual commitment to an uncertain but just collective gendered future that underscores the emancipatory potential of the logics of interdependence and positive intersectionality.

## 5.4 THE LOGICS OF INTERDEPENDENCE AT WORK: WEAVING POSITIVE INTERCONNECTIONS THROUGH THE PARENTS' EVENING FORUM

In this section, I use the GoR's Parents' Evening forum as an illustrative example of the (re)production of the logics of interdependence through the strategies of interconnection. I adopt the Parents' Evening forum as a strategic, and not a perfect, example of the logics of interdependence. I first outline the role of community forums in Rwanda's gender/ed security policy and the operational relationships between these structures and other gender institutions. Following this, I provide an overview of what the UwAs are and how they operate. In the final sections, I explore how the UwAs foster economic and gendered strategies of interconnection for ensuring the collective security of the community, and I highlight the structural limitations of the forums and the impact that these have on the emancipatory potential of actualising the logics of interdependence in the Rwandan context. I then link the strategies of interconnection to the idea of building positive intersections, and I consider the possibilities of harnessing the emancipatory potential of the positive intersectionality concept.

### 5.4.1 Rwanda's gender security framework and the role of community forums

Pertinent to the government's plan for eliminating GBV from Rwandan society are the decentralised structures that deal with GBV from the *umudugudu*[46] (village) level upwards – the GBV and Child Protection Committees (MIGEPROF, 2011: 9). The *National Policy against GBV* (2011) affirms the links between positive cultural values, preventing GBV, supporting victims of violence and community groups:

> The strength of the community is a strong and positive cultural tradition in the country. The support to victims and the care for the most vulnerable within the society that can be found in every Rwandan community must be harnessed to effectively prevent and respond to GBV (MIGEPROF, 2011: 13).

Every village in the country has a GBV committee – there are approximately 14 000 in total (Mannell *et al.*, 2018: 3). The committees are there to improve awareness about GBV at a local level; refer victims to suitable services/institutions; report perpetrators to the authorities; carry out home visits; and report statistics on GBV to the district level (Mannell *et al.*, 2018: 3; MIGEPROF, 2011: 17). Six community members are elected to the committee: the village Chief; someone responsible for social affairs; a representative from the NWC; a person responsible for security; a person selected for their integrity; and somebody responsible for information (Mannell *et al.*, 2018: 3). As the Committees are composed of locally elected members from within the community, the community has some ownership over the design and implementation of the committee's activities (Mannell and Dadswell, 2017: 199).

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[46] *Umudugudu* is a Kinyarwanda term for the lowest administrative unit in Rwanda, also referred to as a village (Twikirize and Spitzer, 2019: 258).

At the lowest level the GBV committee will gather information from the community on GBV-related cases and activities. Mannell *et al.* (2018: 5) write that the committees primarily deal with cases of interpersonal violence between men and women, in which case they attempt to advise and reconcile affected parties. The GBV committees also play an observational role, as they check up on new reports of violence, as well as on the individuals and couples they have worked with in the past (Mannell *et al.*, 2018: 5).

In the case where the conflict between parties is irreconcilable, the committees turn to public dialogue spaces at the village level to discuss solutions (Mannell *et al.*, 2018: 7). The community then initiates reconciliation activities between the affected parties. Yet, if the forum fails to come up with a solution, if the case is particularly complex, if the violence is particularly severe or if the perpetrator continues to commit acts of violence, cases are passed up the chain of authority to the cell, sector and district GBV committees (Mannell and Dadswell, 2017: 205). If these bodies cannot resolve the issue, the case is then reported to the local police (Mannell *et al.*, 2018: 3; Mannell and Dadswell, 2017: 205). The committees are thus the go-between structures that coordinate the roles of the local authorities, protection services and the community in responding to GBV (Mannell *et al.*, 2018: 9). While the GBV committees are the formal bodies for intervention at the community level, Mannell *et al.* (2018: 7) found that neighbours and community elders and leaders also intervene in GBV cases, by either reporting it to the committee or a community forum, or by speaking directly with the couple. Thus, Mannell *et al.* (2018: 9) maintain that the community members are "not only listening to women and providing social support but engaging in public community forums as means of putting pressure on men to stop abuse and to ensure public accountability".

Community dialogue is an essential tool in the GoR's approach for addressing GBV, as it utilises traditional norms and activities that emphasise the interdependence of those in the community and the need to work together to eliminate violent cultural norms and behaviours (MIGEPROF, 2011: 13; MIGEPROF, 2021: 35). GBV is understood as a community concern and not only a personal issue. The community dialogue forums have become essential for building solidarity around the need to prevent and respond to GBV, and to address the culture of silence (Mannell and Dadswell, 2017: 205). Mannell *et al.* (2018: 10) maintain that public dialogue facilitates processes that enable communities to take charge of their collective future, "whereby communities see themselves as interdependent knowledgeable agents able to bring about [positive] change to their surrounding social and structural environment" (Mannell *et al.*, 2018: 10).

There are two main public spaces for community dialogue. The first is the monthly meeting of the community, *umuganda*[47], which involve government-mandated community infrastructure projects and the discussion local topics of concern. In addition, the meetings provide an opportunity for government representatives to engage with the community (Mannell *et al.*, 2018: 7). The second is the UwA, or Parents' Evening forum. In what follows, I analyse the logics of interdependence while using the UwA as an illustrative example of the (re)production of strategies of interconnection on a community, district and national level, as well as the potential of using these logics for creating gendered security.

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[47] *Umuganda* is a term for communal work in Rwanda (Hasselskog, 2015: 159). This is a government home-grown solution practiced on the last Saturday of every month, which is followed by community meetings led by local leaders (Twikirize and Spitzer, 2019: 258). *Umuganda* includes work on infrastructure projects, such as building schools or houses for those in need and cleaning public spaces. All able-bodied citizens between the ages of 18 and 65 are expected to participate, and the failure to do so is met with a fine or imprisonment (Bresler, 2019).

### 5.4.2 The nuts and bolts of the Parents' Evening forum and its limitations

The Parents' Evening forum, or UwA, was officially launched in March 2013. It is a home-grown solution rooted in the social and cultural context of Rwanda that is geared towards addressing the social and economic well-being of the population (Uwihangana, Hakizamungu and Bangwanubusa, 2019: 81; Mukabikino, 2020: 2; Uwihangana *et al.*, 2020: 74; Katabarwa, 2018: 1). According to the 2018 NAP, there are 14 837 UwAs in the country (GoR, 2018: 33). The functioning of the UwA is overseen by the village committee of the NWC (Katabarwa, 2018: 13). The local NWC reports on the activities and achievements of the UwA to the District Executive Committee, which in turn, reports to the MIGEPROF on a quarterly basis (Katabarwa, 2018: 14). The activities of the Parents' Evening forum focus on supporting the fundamental social unit of Rwandan society – the family. The UwA policy links the well-being of the family to the community, and in turn, the well-being of the community to the district, and the district to the nation. This perspective is informed by the GoR's social protection policy framework, which sees harmonious family relations as essential for the country's economic growth and security (Katabarwa, 2018: 18).

The UwA, and other community-level events, are part of the GoR's gender security strategy (MIGEPROF, 2019a: iii). The 2018 NAP describes the UwA as "a prominent mechanism to prevent violent family conflicts, including those related to SGBV, protect children and report abuses and discuss ways to handle them" (GoR, 2018: 16). Similarly, in the *Revised National Gender Strategy* (2021), the UwA is a key policy action under priority areas two and three. Priority area two focusses on accelerating women's economic empowerment by ensuring equal access and control of productive resources and economic opportunities (MIGEPROF, 2021: 34). In this respect, the policy emphasises the role of the UwA as a community-level mechanism designed for promoting "consensual decision making at the household level" (MIGEPROF, 2021: 35). Priority area three focusses on promoting gender equality and equity in education, health and the social protection sector. While recognising the persistence of GBV in Rwandan communities and the gaps in the government's institutional framework, the policy sees community-level mechanisms, such as the UwA, as an essential intervention for eradicating GBV and child abuse. The policy stresses the need to enhance the capacity of the UwA and the need to link their work to the health sector (MIGEPROF, 2021: 40).

The Parents' Evening forum evolved from the Women's Evening forum, which gained momentum in 2010 as an opportunity for women in the community to discuss and address the challenges they were facing (Katabarwa, 2018: 1). Typically, women would gather in the evening when they were somewhat free from their responsibilities at home (Uwihangana *et al.*, 2019: 81). As the evening became more popular, the MIGEPROF and the NWC took inspiration from the successes of RWAMREC's couples dialogue programme and the *Bandebereho* project and suggested that the forum include men; thus, forming the Parents' Evening forum (Uwihangana *et al.*, 2019: 81). Now, the UwA is a gathering that brings together male and female parents, including single parents, from the same village, as well as young men, women, boys and girls (Katabarwa, 2018: 13).

The UwA is therefore a community forum that exists at the village level (Rwabyoma, 2014: 79). Here, the community gathers to discuss improving family relationships, nonviolent conflict resolution, domestic violence, gender equality, household budgeting, family planning, hygiene and health, parenting and children's rights (Uwihangana *et al.*, 2019: 81; Gasasira *et al.*, 2021: 58; Burnet, 2019b: 101; Uwihangana, 2014: 63; Mukabikino, 2020: 2). Typically, the UwA meets once a month but if there is a crucial issue that needs to be discussed an ad hoc forum is convened to settle the issue (Uwihangana *et al.*, 2019: 84; Mukabikino, 2020: 2). The forum is regarded as a platform that offers valuable dialogic opportunities for community members to engage with one another about the problems they may be facing, and in doing so, the forum creates space for individuals to participate in shaping the collective future of the community (Uwihangana *et al.*, 2020: 74). The UwA relies on the long-standing Rwandan practice and culture of collective action and mutual support to solve problems within a community (Katabarwa, 2018: 2).

The UwA is a state-led programme, and thus, the forums have been assigned mandates and responsibilities in line with the government's development goals. First, the forum is meant to instruct children in the village about the values of Rwandan culture, especially those that pertain to the complementarity of gender relations, the laws surrounding GBV and the roles of men and women in marriage (Mukabikino, 2020: 22). Second, the forum hears the testimonies of people who are struggling with various economic and social challenges – the idea here is that the community should solve family problems together and learn from one another (Uwihangana *et al.*, 2019: 84). Third, the forum is supposed to discuss the government's plans and programmes for development and engage in activities that uplift the economic situation of all in the community (Mukabikino, 2020: 22). Fourth, the forum is meant to advocate for those in the community who are victims of domestic violence and abuse. In this respect, the forum works with the GBV committee to assist survivors, and it performs a reconciliatory role in conflict resolution (Mannell *et al.*, 2018: 8). Fifth, the forum was designed to help parents work together in raising their children. And finally, the forum was conceptualised as a meeting point for the community (Uwihangana *et al.*, 2019: 84; Mukabikino, 2020: 22).

It is necessary to address the challenges that the UwA forums face. A noteworthy challenge is the low turnout of men. In their study, the MIGEPROF (2019b: 40) found that of the survey participants who indicated that they frequently attend the Parents' Evening, 45.6% were men and 54.5% were women. Field observations of UwA activities confirm this trend. For instance, Uwihangana *et al.* (2019: 90) write that "in Tumba Sector, Huye District, only three men were present, while 17 women were in attendance". Similarly, Mannell *et al.* (2018: 7) state that "men were included in the events as 'parents', but often did not attend", while Katabarwa (2018: 43) observes that some participants still assume that the forum "is meant for mothers only". In addition, the attendance rates of both men and women are lower in urban areas than in rural areas. For example, in a survey, the MIGEPROF (2019b: 41) found that only 28% of participants living in Kigali attended UwA meetings, while in more rural areas of the country the proportion was much higher, i.e., 57% in the Southern Province and 71% in the Eastern Province.

Outside of attendance, the UwAs also face operational challenges. Katabarwa (2018: 47) highlights three key areas, namely training, monitoring and budget. First, there is a need for the elected leaders of the forum to be trained in managerial and technical skills and in mediation and counselling techniques. Second, the monitoring and evaluation system for the UwAs needs to be fine-tuned so that there is a clear channel of communication on the activities of the forum between the local village and higher levels of government (Katabarwa, 2018: 47). Third, the activities of the forums are constrained by budget, as the UwA needs to appeal to the village executive committee to gather funds for community projects (Katabarwa, 2018: 48).

A significant structural limitation of the Parents’ Evening forum is the authoritarian nature of the Rwandan government and the impact this has on the emergence of the logics of interdependence. The UwAs are state-induced, controlled and monitored. No matter the limitations identified by Katabrawa (2018: 47-48), this reality impacts the ability of the logics of interdependence to trickle-up to the national level and weakens the emancipatory potential of the positive intersections cultivated through the Parents’ Evening forums at the local level.

In section 5.2. of this chapter, I highlighted the entanglement of the national and global engaging-men discourses and I argued that these discourses complicate the discursive environment in which the logics of interdependence emerge. In section 5.2.2.4, I referred to Thomson’s (2013) work on the strategies of everyday resistance that Rwandans employ in the face of centralised state control. While Thomson (2013: 133) identifies practices of individual resistance to the GoR’s unity and reconciliation policy, her work points to the ways in which Rwandans resist state authority through seemingly ordinary activities. It would therefore be a mistake to assume that there is no possibility for Rwandans to act through collective everyday resistance, such as those embodied by the politics of refusal characterised by the logics of interdependence.

My use of the UwA as an illustrative example is, therefore, strategic. This approach draws from Spivak’s (1985: 214) notion of strategic essentialism. Spivak (1985: 214) argues that strategic essentialism is a temporary political practice (not a universal way of conducting political struggle) wherein an oppressed group temporarily downplays the differences within a group and assumes group unity and a positive self-conception for the sake of achieving socio-political goals, such as fighting against gender-based oppression and violence (Eide, 2016: 349). Strategic essentialism is not to be allowed to encourage reductionist interpretations of human experience that negate human dignity. In this instance, I temporarily downplay (while still recognising) the structural limitations of the UwAs, and I adopt the forums as an illustrative example of the logics of interdependence. I have made this decision due to the political value these dialogic forums offer, as the UwAs create spaces which engender a positive reimagining of intersectionality that has the potential to elicit emancipatory outcomes. This reading of the Parents' Evening forum must remain politically strategic and cannot be used to claim an established 'truth' or 'authenticity' about the logics of interdependence at a local level in Rwanda.

In the following section, I explore how the strategies of interconnection are (re)produced through the discourses and actions that are fostered by the relational framework of the UwA forums. I argue that the UwAs create transformative spaces through practices of caring for the collective well-being of all in the community. The UwAs illustrate the process of continuously unweaving and re-weaving positive intersections through strategies of interconnection. In revealing the logics of interdependence at work in the discourses that are (re)produced through the UwA forums, I show how positive intersections can be used to engender community-driven peacebuilding processes. In turn, by showing how positive intersections are (re)produced, I illustrate how the inner workings of the positive intersectionality concept operate, which in turn, opens conceptual pathways for harnessing the emancipatory potential of intersectionality.

### 5.4.3 The Parents' Evening forum and the (re)production of the strategies of interconnection on a family and community level

The UwAs (re)produce the strategies of interconnection through helping to create, in the words of a civil servant, "friendship, familiarity, and a sense of solidarity among those who frequently attend" (Uwihangana *et al.*, 2019: 86). The dialogic public space of the forum cultivates, and is in turn cultivated by, the interdependence of family members, neighbours and community members. Strong relational bonds then encourage the community to work together toward their collective socio-economic benefit (Uwihangana *et al.*, 2019: 89). Thus, in meeting each other in the spirit of creating a better future for all, the members create a space that provides the community with opportunities to "open up their minds, increase empathy, and widen their hearts to support their colleagues in need" (Uwihangana *et al.*, 2019: 87). The dialogue among the members of the UwA (re)produces strategies of interconnection through practices of caring for those in need. This requires enacting the value of hospitality, which necessitates recognising the human dignity of all others in the community and being compelled to care for the marginalised and disadvantaged. In this respect, Uwihangana *et al.* cite the sentiments of two UwA participants:

> This lady's house … was destroyed by rain. In our meeting, the president of our forum told us that we have to help her, that there was no reason to go and beg at the sector or the district office. We collected money, bought trees, made dry-mud bricks and we re-built her house (Uwihangana *et al.*, 2019: 87).

> For instance, one member of *umugoroba w'ababyeyi* [touching another member's shoulders] gave birth and we had planned to visit her. Our president reminded us that it is our responsibility to bring her a gift. We bought an *igitenge* [African loin cloth] and food items. When she went for vaccination, she was well clothed like other women who have husbands; you understand that we supported her. When someone passes away, we buy a coffin and are in charge of all burial expenses (Uwihangana *et al.*, 2019: 87).

The participants of the UwA are compelled to care for one another because their own human dignity is necessarily bound to the human dignity of all others in the community. The strong feelings of empathy and collective activities that care for and support those who are vulnerable or disadvantaged in the community illustrate the value of recognising dependency and caring for dependents as an ordinary part of human life. The UwA members express a deep concern for the living conditions of those in their community and are willing to contribute to a common good. This is especially evident in the advocacy function of the UwAs, where members advocate for those in the community who are 'vulnerable' and need socio-economic assistance from the government's social protection programmes (Uwihangana *et al.*, 2019: 90). The director of social protection in the Ngoma Sector, Huye District, explains:

> Members of *umugoroba w'ababyeyi* collect money and give it to a person as capital or they buy livestock for farming. Sometimes, the representative of *umugoroba w'ababyeyi* can approach local leaders and ask them to include a person in need on the list of beneficiaries of development programmes [if they fulfil the criteria] (Uwihangana et al., 2019: 89).

Sometimes these benefits are shared among the members. For example, a participant explains how cows are shared through the *Girinka*[48] programme:

> The *girinka* programme allows sharing cows in the community. When the cow has a calf, the latter is donated to another selected beneficiary and so on and so forth, and at the end of the day, many people have cows and their family situation improves (Uwihangana et al., 2019: 90).

While spending time together in the UwA gives the members the opportunity to know who needs assistance, it is the interdependence that is fostered through the dialogic structure of the forum that compels them to share the available resources for the benefit of the entire community (Uwihangana *et al.*, 2019: 89). In addition, the Parents' Evening forum also provides the community with opportunities to plan for their needs together so that no one is left behind. For instance, a UwA in the Southern Province ensures that everyone in the forum plans for and receives the government-sponsored health insurance:

> There is a lady in charge of social affairs in the committee of our forum. When it is time to pay for health insurance, we gather all the fees together, there and then. She goes [with the money] to the Health Centre to pay for the whole group and we all get the health insurance card on time (Uwihangana *et al.*, 2020: 75).

The dialogic spaces created through members' participation in the UwA therefore strengthen family and community bonds and engender practices of caring for all others in the community. In this way, strategies of interconnection are (re)produced through positive relations that affirm solidarity and mutuality, which compels the community to assist and advocate for those in vulnerable socio-economic positions. In doing so, the logics of interconnection are (re)produced through the dialogic space of the forum, and in turn, positive intersections across economic lines are woven for the benefit of the community's collective future.

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[48] The *Girinka* programme or the 'One Cow, One Family' policy is a development strategy implemented by the GoR to transform the rural economy, which seeks to bring economic upliftment for vulnerable groups, particularly female and child-headed households (Kubai and Ahlberg, 2013: 474). *Girinka* refers to a traditional pre-colonial practice in which people would exchange cows as gifts of friendship and neighbourliness (Hasselskog, 2016: 316). While the One Cow policy has been incredibly successful in alleviating child malnutrition and creating food security (Kayigema and Rugege, 2014: 60), the policy does not consider the gendered implications of raising livestock in Rwanda. As it is taboo for women to milk cows, some single women rely on male relatives, neighbours or friends to milk the cow for them. In their study, Kubai and Ahlberg (2013: 476) found that this left some women vulnerable to sexual abuse, as sometimes payment was required for milking cows in the form of sexual acts.

### 5.4.4 Resolving, mediating and negotiating: the collective project of addressing GBV

Katabarwa (2018: 18) explains that, through dialogue, the UwA members exchange ideas and educate one another on how to address the challenges to their families' welfare. Katabarwa (2018: 18) highlights that these discussions are often framed in cultural terms that emphasise harmony between men and women and the complementarity of gender relations in the home. Thus, the activities of UwAs focus on preserving family ties by upholding values of tolerance and humility (Uwihangana, 2014: 67). In his study, Katabarwa (2018: 8) shows that members value the idea of sharing domestic roles – in terms of care work responsibilities, as well as decision-making about economic resources, family property and finances (Katabarwa, 2018: 18). Yet, these sentiments are not held by all who attend the UwAs. This makes the forum a productive space for collectively renegotiating negative cultural gender norms and behaviours, as the forum acts as a space for men and women to engage with contradictory views about gender relations. In her study, Uwihangana (2014: 67) demonstrates that while some members tended to blame culture for benefiting men, protecting masculine interests and resisting change, others valued those positive aspects of Rwandan culture that can be used to uplift the status of women in the community. The UwA therefore creates a dialogical space that, in the process of collectively renegotiating cultural practices, unweaves and re-weaves gendered strategies of interconnection, which in turn, actualises the politics of refusal.

In terms of renegotiating harmful traditional gender norms, the Parents' Evening forum has become a critical space for identifying victims of domestic abuse in the community and for providing them with the necessary treatment, care and attention (Mukabikino, 2020: 34). The UwAs have thus become a space for victims of domestic violence to break their silence on the abuse they experience at home (Mukabikino, 2020: 3). This ties into the UwA's role in addressing family-related conflicts. In providing a platform for public accountability for cases of GBV, the forum plays a critical role in listening to couples, as well as individuals, and offering advice (Mannell *et al.*, 2018: 8). The UwA is not necessarily a space for intervention, but rather a space where one can tell one’s story and receive support from the community. In this respect, Mannell and Dadswell cite the experience of a UwA member:

> In the umugoroba w’ababyeyi for instance, a woman may stand up and share her story with others that her husband has been beating her regularly ... The woman feels that it has become too much and so she suddenly breaks out and shares with other women as a way of seeking help. This is because in the umugoroba w’ababyeyi the women get to know each other so closely, form friendships and hence feel comfortable to share their stories (Mannell and Dadswell, 2017: 204).

In his study of nine UwA forums in the Kagugu Cell, Katabarwa (2018: 34) was able to identify specific discursive approaches that encouraged mediation and negotiation for resolving conflict between affected parties. When an incident of domestic violence is brought to the attention of the UwA, the forum helps the parties involved to resolve the conflict by acting as a mediatory space in which the couple or family members are encouraged to resolve their differences and come up with mutually acceptable solutions (Katabarwa, 2018: 35). The UwA does not force the members to agree with the solution, rather, the forum plays a role in helping couples to accept responsibility and negotiate their own settlement or agreement (Katabarwa, 2018: 35). Uwihangana *et al.* refer to the testimony of a participant in their study who reflects on the mediatory function of the forum:

> When there are conflicts between spouses, we invite the husband and his wife; we talk to them in order to know the causes of the conflict. Whoever is responsible for the conflict is encouraged to ask for forgiveness, the other one is encouraged to forgive, and we encourage them to start afresh and set objectives for the future. A committee is elected that will do follow-up consultations until everything is sorted out (Uwihangana *et al.*, 2019: 88).

When mediation and negotiation does not work, the violence continues or the couple does not show a commitment to the solutions agreed to at the forum, the UwA plays an arbitration role. Here, the UwA listens to both sides and then conducts a hearing in which all parties present evidence through documents, witnesses, exhibits and testimonies (Katabarwa, 2018: 35). At the end of this process, the forum makes a collective decision about the way forward. If the parties agreed to be bound by the UwA’s decision, the solution is presented to the village council who then ensures that the decision is enforced by the police (Katabarwa, 2018: 36).

The Parents' Evening forum creates opportunities for the community to (re)negotiate those harmful gender assumptions and norms that legitimise the oppression of women. Here, the collective hears the testimonies of survivors, negotiates reconciliation strategies and works together to eliminate GBV from their community. While these positive intersections may be evident, there are also some notable limitations.

The first is that the Parents' Evening policy does not account for the potential abuse of power by members in positions of authority in the UwAs, as the forums are only subject to review via the monitoring and evaluation system of those already in positions of authority within the village, cell and district. This is especially concerning as the principles of Ubuntu can be used for patriarchal goals. Those in positions of authority can therefore influence the prospect of the forum being used for reinvigorating (rather than renegotiating) harmful gender practices and norms. For instance, Mannell *et al.* (2018: 6) found that the GBV committees sometimes encourage women to marry their abusers because once they are married, they have full rights and protection under the law – this practice puts many women's lives at risk and could easily bleed into the work of the UwAs due to the interconnected nature of the two structures. This seriously constrains the prospects of engendering a form of collective positive dependence that can be used to create emancipatory gender outcomes.

The second is that the solutions to IPV do not regularly tackle persistent intersecting inequalities, such as economic disparities, that manifest in the relationships between male and female partners. While the forums do play a valuable role in advocating for those who are economically marginalised in the community, I found little evidence that the positive economic caring practices engendered through the forums are seen as interconnected to the work that deals with GBV. In addition, the forums seem to prioritise physical violence over psychological and economic GBV. This phenomenon is not limited to Rwandan communities however, as evidence points to a similar prioritisation of physical IPV in multiple contexts (Mannell *et al.*, 2018: 10). Moreover, the UwAs do not openly discuss violence or problems experienced by LGBTQIA folk, nor does the policy acknowledge the need for this (Carlson and Randell, 2013: 116). Inherently, this limits the emancipatory potential of the dialogic approach, as the experiences and rights of LGBTQIA people are silenced. Taking seriously the idea of 'putting-into-action' interdependence and collective responsibility for gender justice requires recognising the human dignity of *all* others.

### 5.4.5 The possibilities of the logics of interdependence for creating gender security and positive peace

The strategies of interconnection are actualised through caregiving practices that show hospitality, embody the freedom to relate and affirm the community's interdependence. The strategies of interconnection (re)produce positive gendered and economic relations, which are then leveraged to redress the material inequity and violence experienced by those who are marginalised in the community. The practice of collectively meeting and acting to affirm the dignity of all others in the community through the dialogic of the forum is a continual project. Thus, the (re)production of the strategies of interconnection requires that the community constantly reassess, renegotiate and revise the ways in which they enact their collective interdependence. This contested and cooperative process is what lends the positive intersectionality concept to the project of gender justice and gender peace.

The positive intersectionality concept is, thus, engendered through unweaving the logics of domination, while also resisting the logics of addition and re-weaving logics of interdependence. The positive intersectionality concept extends beyond the home and community because it makes explicit connections with global politics. This is so, because the strategies of interconnection involve a process of understanding, interrogating and renegotiating those discursive relationships of inclusion and exclusion that are (re)produced across different levels of political, economic and social power relations. These relationships are the product of the global political economy and global security, and so, there is a connection between practices of care and international affairs (Robinson, 2011: 583). Thus, leveraging positive intersections can have a direct impact on an individual's gendered security, and in turn, the security of the community and the state (Hudson, 2021). Moreover, the logics of interdependence foreground the reality that dependence (or needing care) is a vital, and normal, aspect of human existence, because providing and receiving support is necessary for our collective survival (Hudson, 2021). These logics therefore emphasise the emancipatory potential of a conception of gendered human security grounded in a deep appreciation for human interdependence and relationality.

## 5.5 EVALUATION

The objective of this chapter was to critically analyse the theoretical as well as the practical/empirical manifestations and implications of intersectionality used as a form or logic of interdependence – with a focus on a peaceful future for Rwanda founded on the principles of an African-feminist and Ubuntu worldview. This chapter answered three research questions: 'What are the theoretical and practical/empirical implications of using intersectionality as a logic of interdependence?'; 'Can postcolonial and African-feminist worldviews be used to theorise a positive intersectionality?'; and 'Can a positive intersectionality be used to create a peaceful future for Rwanda?'

The logics of interdependence are (re)produced through strategies of interconnection, the goal of which is gender justice. The nuts and bolts of these discursive strategies are Ubuntu-feminist ethics of care that embody the freedom to relate, in particular hospitality and the human conditions that make hospitality possible. This perspective goes beyond just recognising negative intersections and moves towards conceptualising solutions to complex experiences of insecurity through a positive intersectionality concept. As this approach is informed by Ubuntu and African feminisms, it is based in the daily realities of African women's lives. Such politics is situated in context but recognises the relationship between the local experience and larger matrices of power. Thus, the logics of interdependence acknowledge the impact of intersecting systems of oppression on the ground, while also offering a perspective that is critical of coloniality, imperialism and the neoliberal global political economy and security.

To answer the first question, analysing the inner workings of intersectionality according to the logics of interdependence offers a pathway for beginning to think beyond the 'negative' lens of the logics of domination. While it is necessary to highlight how multiple systems of oppression intersect and create complex experiences of insecurity, the practical implication of this approach is that there is no way forward. The logics of interconnection are solution-oriented, as they open conceptual pathways for practitioners and scholars to design feminist research, policies and programmes that leverage positive intersections for emancipatory outcomes.

In addition, as these logics are informed by African feminisms, they are drawn from alternative empirical examples of gender-relationality and community-based collective activities. It is important to note, however, that the practical viability of using dialogic community forums (as the practical example of actualising the strategies of interconnection in this chapter) to engender the logics of interdependence on a community level requires careful consideration of the broader structural environment and the organisation of political, economic and social power. Following on from this observation, to answer the second question, the perspectives gleaned from African and postcolonial feminisms constitute the bedrock of the positive intersectionality concept. Yet, using Ubuntu requires careful consideration and historisisation of the concept itself, as Ubuntu can be instrumentalised for patriarchal gender goals.

Finally, to answer the third question, a positive intersectionality concept is the first step toward creating a peaceful future in Rwanda. The UwA example illustrates the possibilities of (re)producing strategies of interconnection in gender security policy and practice. Through the collective dialogic space, the members of the forum unweave and re-weave practices and discourses that recognise the human dignity of the marginalised. Thus, they actively redress the violence of those material hierarchies that dehumanise Others. The dialogic space becomes a site for the (re)production of the politics of refusal, as the community collectively (re)negotiates the boundaries of patriarchy and begins to leverage the positive aspects of gender relations for outcomes focussed on preserving the health, security and prosperity of the community.

Yet, the Parents' Evening forum is a strategic, and not a perfect, example of the potential of the logics of interdependence, as these forums are limited by significant structural factors. In addition, as ethnic identities have been erased from the public discourse in Rwanda and LGBTQIA folk experience stigma and ostracisation, the possibilities of using the positive intersectionality concept for building a peaceful future in Rwanda is limited. This is because, using the positive intersectionality concept requires taking seriously the idea of deliberately recognising the interdependent nature of our human dignity. That being said, the emancipatory potential of the logics of interdependence is cultivated through the continual practice of unweaving and re-weaving. The goal of gender justice and positive peace is an 'end-point', but this goal necessitates a process of continuously reimagining what gender justice should look like in any given circumstance or context. Recognising and enacting the logics of interdependence is a constant dynamic and contested process. The emancipatory spaces created through the (re)production of the strategies of interconnection are therefore open to practices that require us to continually reimagine our collective human future.

Thus, policy and research need to cultivate this dynamic quality of positive intersectionality in order to harness the emancipatory potential of the concept. Part of this process involves using the logics in combination, which then necessitates a more holistic perspective. In the Rwandan context, the complex discursive environment (defined by the complex interactions between the global and national engaging-men discourses) and the top-down organisation of political power limit the potential of unbridled interdependence from taking root in Rwandan communities.

# CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSION

## 6.1 GENERAL OVERVIEW

Feminist IR and FSS scholars adopt a point of view that pivots from ordinary people's everyday experiences of global politics. This perspective looks at IR through a gendered lens and reveals the ways in which security research, discourses and process benefit men and are detrimental to women. In practice, this means that material (financial, human and logistical), social and political resources are not geared toward the provision of security for all. Such gendered security discourses reify differential hierarchies of distribution, which inevitably undermine efforts to end war and create sustainable peace. For this reason, the 'gendering' of the security concept is essential so that a more inclusive and holistic security is achieved. The security architecture that deals with gender security in global governance is the WPS agenda and the accompanying WPS policy ecosystem.

While my study was a desktop study conducted through a literature review, I adopted a normative perspective where ordinary women's everyday experience of global politics mattered. Following from this position, my contribution was situated in the disciplinary environment of feminist IR and FSS. My study was geared toward contributing to the feminist political project committed to emancipation and gender justice.

Premised on the need for greater inclusivity, I situated my study in the work of critical-feminist scholars who call for adopting intersectionality in the empirical, theoretical and analytical work of gendered security research. Feminist scholars have used intersectionality to explore the limits of a single-axis framework in gendered security processes, and following from this, they have also used the concept to highlight the insecurities of marginalised women, whose social situation lies at the intersection of multiple systems of oppression. Despite ample research, there is still much more to learn about intersectionality and the application of the concept in gendered security research and practice. My contribution sought to supplement one such gap, which has to do with the 'how' of intersectionality. Feminist scholars have asked 'why' gender (in)security silences are produced, but they have paid less attention to 'how' these silences develop, and thereby 'how' multiple systems of oppression intersect. As a consequence of glossing over the 'how' question, intersectionality has travelled widely across the feminist mainstream. Through this process of co-optation, the concept has been stretched-thin of its original political intentions. In answering the ‘how’ question, it was imperative that my study took a ‘back to basics’ approach. This approach was centred on the two conceptual anchors of my study: the logics and inner workings of intersectionality. Through my analysis of the inner workings according to the three logics, my study aimed to provide insight into how the inner workings of intersectionality are (re)produced, which revealed how multiple systems of oppression intersect, how intersectionality has been misused, and how developing community-based interventions for gender justice and sustainable peace has raised the potential of using a positive intersectionality concept.

I chose Rwanda as my case study because, due to my own African-feminist critical leanings, I needed to ground my analysis of the logics and inner workings in context. In addition, the history of insecurity, conflict and genocide in Rwanda lends itself to an intersectional analysis. Furthermore, Rwanda has implemented a robust gender security policy framework and yet gender insecurities (persistently high levels of GBV and IPV, as well as patriarchal gender relations/structures) still threaten the sustainability of peace in the country. Revealing how gender (in)security silences are (re)produced through a deconstructive discourse analysis of the logics and inner workings, therefore, provided insight into how multiple systems of oppression continue to negate the gender security of Rwandans and, indeed, how to develop indigenous solutions to this problem through leveraging positive intersections. Following from this insight, Rwanda also offered creative African-feminist inspired solutions to community-based gender security problems, which I used to ground my theorisation of the positive intersectionality concept.

The objective of this chapter is to critically evaluate the lessons and insights gleaned from this analysis of the inner workings of intersectionality for both the Rwandan context as well as for security in general. The research question for this chapter is, ‘What broader insights for security can be gleaned from my analysis of the gendered inner workings of intersectionality?’ I first, in section 6.2, provide summaries of Chapters two, three, four and five. I also highlight the key empirical and theoretical findings of each of these chapters. In section 6.3, I then consider the implications of analysing the inner workings of intersectionality according to the logics for gendered security research and practice, the WPS ecosystem and WPS academic work, and for gender security in Rwanda. In this section, I emphasise the contribution of my study and I make some recommendations for future research.

## 6.2 CHAPTER SUMMARIES AND KEY FINDINGS

### 6.2.1 Chapter two: theoretical framework

As my study was situated within the IR reflectivist tradition, I adopted a perspective that views theories as constitutive of what I set out to understand and/or reveal – the inner workings and logics of intersectionality and the relationships of these concepts with gendered security practice and research. The first half of this chapter provided a broad overview of some of the key theoretical tenets and concepts within feminist IR and FSS that were relevant to the study. Feminist academic contributions have highlighted women's, men's and the LGBTQIA community's experiences of conflict-related SGBV. This scholarship, together with the advocacy work of international, regional and local civil society organisations and women's groups, resulted in the international recognition of women's rights in times of conflict and crisis – in the form of international instruments, mechanisms and resolutions, such as UNSCR 1325. The adoption of UNSCR 1325 (and the subsequent development of the WPS agenda and WPS policy ecosystem) was, and has been, crucial for women's security across the globe. The ecosystem, as well as the feminist academic perspectives (optimistic and critical-feminist schools) that engage with the agenda, are characterised by converging and diverging discourses, norms, assumptions and patterns of thought. This dynamic process yields shifting meanings and understandings of gendered security in different contexts (such as on the African continent), and this ambivalence creates useful conceptual and empirical pathways for emancipatory gendered outcomes.

In the second half of the chapter, I focussed on building the theoretical framework for the empirical chapters of my study. Anti-colonial critical-feminist perspectives are geared toward revealing the interconnections between gender and other categories of identity. A holistic approach, drawn from decolonial and postcolonial African feminisms, uncovers the relationship between African women's contextual experiences of insecurity and larger power differentials (such as coloniality, the neoliberal political economy and global security). Simultaneously, this approach also uses the lives, traditions and context of African women to develop culturally-relevant solutions to gender insecurity on the continent, inspired by the central tenets of African feminisms, such as the political value of collaborating with men, Ubuntu care ethics and a positive view of conciliatory gender relations. There are parallels between the critical-feminist project of recognising and addressing the politics of multiple overlapping identities and the work of Black feminist and Intersectionality Studies scholars concerned with the interconnection of gender with race, class and sexuality. Thus, adopting a holistic decolonial/postcolonial-feminist approach was useful for my analysis of the inner workings.

This framing served as the backdrop for my understanding of the two conceptual anchors of my study: the inner workings and logics of intersectionality. The inner workings was the 'larger' intersectionality concept, which includes Crenshaw's (1989, 1991) original ideas, the feminist work and discourses that have stemmed from and engaged with those ideas, and the dialectical relationship between those discourses and the social/political world (feminist security practice). As the inner workings of intersectionality were not always outwardly visible, it became necessary to reveal these through a deconstructive discourse analysis, as well as the ways in which the inner workings have been misunderstood and misappropriated. The logics were therefore the analytical prisms through which I examined how the inner workings were (re)produced across the multiple (local, national and international) levels of the WPS policy ecosystem. The logics can be defined as patterns of discourse, or configurations of concepts, that are (re)produced through different discursive strategies with different goals. I used three logics:

- The logics of domination, (re)produced through the strategies of othering and difference with the violent goal of another group's oppression (Chapter three).
- The logics of addition, (re)produced through the integrationist strategies of sameness and silence with the goal of gender reform (Chapter four).
- And the logics of interdependence, (re)produced through positive strategies of interconnection with the goal of gender justice/positive peace (Chapter five).

### 6.2.2 Chapter three: the inner workings and logics of domination

This chapter revealed how different systems of oppression intersect through an analysis of the logics of domination. The logics of domination are (re)produced through strategies of othering and difference, the goal of which is the domination of an out-group. I traced the intersections between the racial, ethnic, autochthonous and gendered strategies of othering and I argued that these intersections negated the security of Rwandans in the colonial and the post-colonial periods and manifested in the violence of the civil war and genocide. By focussing on the intersections of multiple social locations, this perspective yielded an analysis that highlighted how one community's experience of complex violence can be qualitatively different from another's. And, in the process, this analysis also pointed to the shortfalls of a single-axis framework. Although analysing the inner workings according to the logics of domination is a more conventional approach, it does underscore the empirical, practical and theoretical value of analysing intersections, as well as the political significance of foregrounding the experiences of those whose social location lies at the interconnection of multiple systems of oppression.

In the Rwandan context, the empirical value of analysing the logics of domination lies in the 'fuller' picture gained through recognising intersections and assessing how these have impacted the security of different identity groups throughout Rwandan history. While my study did not touch on all the strategies of othering that were relevant to the Rwandan experience (such as regional, class-based and religious dimensions), it did illustrate the value of analysing complex experiences of insecurity through the lens of the logics of domination. These insights are valuable for sustaining peace in Rwanda. This is because, without a thorough understanding of how these intersecting strategies operated in the past, and indeed, how they continue to be (re)produced in the private lives of Rwandans today, fundamental aspects of Rwandans' insecurity remain 'unseen'. The practical implication of this is that essentialised differences continue to be reified through differential access to resources, funding and state-assistance, which keeps the logics of domination alive in the post-genocide era, locks Rwandan society in the Hutu/Tutsi stranglehold and threatens the sustainability of peace in the country.

For gendered security and WPS research, analysing the inner workings of intersectionality according to the logics of domination illustrates the theoretical value of cultivating a thorough understanding of the intersectionality concept. By revealing how the different strategies of othering were (re)produced through the dialectical relationship between difference-making discourses and the social/political world, I offered conceptual pathways for thinking about how multiple systems of oppression intersect, and indeed, how these intersections manifest in the lives of marginalised identity groups through complex experiences of violence. Therefore, a thorough understanding of intersectionality can move us closer toward 'seeing' the complex insecurities of individuals and groups. These insights, in turn, can be used to generate a more holistic understanding of how gender insecurity manifests in the lives of marginalised women, and it can be used to inform how scholars should look to approach/apply intersectionality in WPS and gendered security research.

The application of a thorough understanding of intersectionality in feminist research can filter through and influence how the concept is applied by practitioners in the WPS policy ecosystem. This could encourage policy-makers to move beyond paying rhetorical 'lip service' to the concept, and to begin developing more inclusive policies and instruments that truly take hold of the concept's political roots and critical edge; although this requires starting from a perspective that is grounded in the experiences of marginalised groups of women and LGBTQIA individuals. This approach does leave intersectionality vulnerable to co-option by the feminist mainstream and it does not offer pathways for thinking beyond an oppression-focussed analysis. This is why the logics of domination were accompanied by an analysis of the logics of addition (Chapter four) and the logics of interdependence (Chapter five).

### 6.2.3 Chapter four: the inner workings and logics of addition

This chapter revealed how intersectionality has been misunderstood, co-opted and misappropriated by the feminist mainstream through an analysis of the logics of addition evident in the discourses that circulate the multiple levels (international, regional and national) of the WPS policy ecosystem. I identified two discursive formations of the logics of addition: the hegemonic liberal-feminist discourse and the residual diversity discourse. These logics are (re)produced through strategies of sameness and silence, the goal of which is gender reform. The logics of addition are illustrated through Crenshaw's (1989) basement metaphor, which highlights the critical relationship between the experiential realm (identity politics) and social, economic, political and juridical structures and institutions (macro power relations). In this chapter, I traced the hegemonic and residual logics of addition evident in the GoR’s gender equality and gender security policy framework through a deconstructive discourse analysis of the *Revised National Gender Policy* (2021), the *National Policy against GBV* (2011) and the two NAPs (2009 and 2018).

On the hegemonic level of (re)production, the logics of addition are a product of the liberal-feminist integrationist agenda. The idea is to encourage gender reform within institutions and structures through gender mainstreaming policies, instruments, mechanisms and anti-discrimination legislation. In terms of WPS, this enterprise is characterised as the ‘add-and-stir’ approach. There are two levels to the ‘add-and-stir’ approach. On the first level, women are recognised as having equal value to society as men and are viewed as interchangeable with men – hence, the strategies of sameness. The project is to eliminate the formal barriers to gender equality, and to ensure equal opportunities for women’s participation and representation in security institutions, organisations and decision-making bodies. Yet, an unintended consequence of this approach is that it does not directly challenge the underlying militarised and masculinised discourses and power relations that undergird these structures and exclude women from actively participating in the first place.

On the second level, where gender is the focus like in gender mainstreaming mechanisms and policies, the ‘add-and-stir’ approach shifts from (re)producing sameness between men and women to (re)producing sameness among women. The category ‘women’ is defined according to the experiences of those women who are the most privileged in society, and through this discursive process, the needs of *all* women are represented by *some* women. The experiences of those women whose social, economic and political location lies at the intersection of multiples systems of oppression are, then, ‘silenced’ through the homogenising tendencies of the logics of addition – hence, the strategies of silence. The practical implication of the (re)production of the hegemonic logics of addition is that material hierarchies are reformed, not transformed. As the status quo is maintained, some women gain access to vital resources, while most do not. This seriously undermines the efforts of international institutions, policies, instruments and mechanisms to ensure women’s security needs are met and it is generative of conditions that allow gender discrimination and inequality to thrive.

On the residual level of (re)production, the strategies of sameness and silence are discursively (re)produced through the diversity discourse – the misappropriated version of intersectionality. This discourse stems from the work of civil society organisations and critical-feminist scholars from the Global South. It looks to expand the scope of the gender mainstreaming agenda by including the experiences of diverse groups of women. Through the diversity discourse, the qualitative differences between diverse groups of women are recognised and accounted for in liberal-feminist gender mainstreaming processes and initiatives. In the Rwandan NAPs, this is represented by quantitative indicators which are used to measure not only the number of women in different security initiatives and decision-making bodies, but also the number of women from different 'vulnerable' groups who have benefited from the state's social protection programmes. The diversity discourse is tolerated by the hegemonic logics of addition as a residual formation. Instead of disrupting the strategies of sameness and silence, the diversity discourse ends up being absorbed into the same technocratic, integrationist pattern of discursive (re)production. And through the co-optation process, the original political intentions of the diversity discourse are lost.

In practical terms, the diversity discourse treats the experiences of different groups of vulnerable women as static and unrelated, which misrecognises the interconnective nature of the structural dimensions of their insecurity. This creates 'hierarchies of victimhood', as different women are made to compete for the same scarce resources. In turn, opportunities for building positive feminist coalitions that have the potential to reorganise the distributive logic of gendered security policy frameworks are undermined.

Analysing the inner workings of intersectionality according to the (hegemonic and residual) logics of addition is, therefore, theoretically and practically useful. This is because this approach reveals how the inner workings of intersectionality are obfuscated through the co-optation of the concept by the feminist mainstream in the WPS policy ecosystem, as well as by those scholars that engage in WPS work. Analysing these logics also reveals the ways in which the misappropriation of intersectionality supports the liberal-feminist, and the militarised and masculinised, status quo – ultimately leading to vulnerable groups of women and LGBTQIA folk continuing to face marginalisation in the policy-making process. The danger of this is that complex experiences of gendered violence and insecurity remain unaddressed, and new forms of gender discrimination are given the opportunity to emerge. If we know how *not* to use intersectionality, we can begin generating ways of using the concept that disrupt the distributive logic of global security and the global economy – one such approach is analysing intersectionality according to the logics of interdependence.

### 6.2.4 Chapter five: the inner workings and logics of interdependence

This chapter offered a novel approach for analysing intersectionality, which was geared toward theoretically fleshing-out a positive intersectionality concept through an analysis of the inner workings according to the logics of interdependence. The logics of interdependence are (re)produced through strategies of interconnection, the goal of which is gender justice/positive peace. Emerging from the specific political, economic and cultural realities of African women, this perspective adopts terms and strategies that reflect African worldviews for achieving gender justice and for affirming social diversity in African communities. The logics of interdependence were illustrated through a weaving metaphor. I used African women's care work (in times of war and peace) as the springboard for theorising the logics of interdependence, as well as the inspiration for what positive intersectionality could look like in practical terms.

There are many cultural tools in the African-feminist's arsenal for achieving gender justice – one such tool is Ubuntu. Practicing Ubuntu requires actualising a deep-seated sense of interdependence that is at odds with the marginalisation, oppression or domination of women and LGBTQIA folk. Ubuntu can be used to cultivate new positive intersections – or strategies of interconnection. This is because Ubuntu is a living tradition – it is practiced across different African communities in the contemporary moment. Thus, the (re)production of strategies of interconnection is continually open to contestation, cooperation and flux. The dynamism that is inherent to this pattern of discursive (re)production, lends the logics of interdependence to the emancipatory practice of continually re-imagining our collective gendered future and enacting strategies of interconnection that are aligned with that future. The strategies of interconnection are therefore (re)produced through discourses that affirm the freedom to relate by unweaving logics of domination while simultaneously re-weaving positive intersections across the multiple levels of society (intersubjective, community, national, international), which have the potential to be leveraged for building processes that engender gender justice and positive peace.

I contextualised my analysis of the logics of interdependence through examples from the GoR's gender security and gender equality policy framework – in particular, the Parents' Evening forum. There are many factors that complicate the emergence of the logics of interdependence in the Rwandan context. Firstly, there are two dominant discourses (the global and national engaging-men discourses) that use the language of gender relationality to support neoliberal and national security interests. Secondly, the authoritarian nature of the Rwandan state inhibits the expression of the logics of interdependence at a local level and limits the opportunities for the local logics of interdependence to 'trickle-up' to the national level.

Yet, to assume that there is no possibility for the politics of refusal to be actualised in the Rwandan context would be a mistake, as scholars (Thomson, 2013) have shown that Rwandans engage in tacit strategies of everyday resistance to centralised state power. Thus, my decision to use the Parent's Evening forum as an example of the logics of interdependence was strategic. This is because the UwAs illustrated what positive intersectionality could practically look like through the structure of dialogic community forums. The UwAs allow the community to engage on issues that affect them and encourage them to act as a collective unit. The objective of the Parents' Evening is to provide a dialogic space in which communities can actualise gendered and economic strategies of interconnection that are geared toward protecting the dignity of the marginalised and creating a more equitable society.

There are many structural limitations that curtail the emancipatory potential of the UwAs. The Parents' Evening forum is a state-led programme, and so the forums can be used as tools for localising national and international discourses (the men-engaging discourses). In addition, there are few checks and balances in place beyond the reporting mechanism to higher levels of governance. Moreover, the strategies of interconnection are vulnerable to co-optation, as they can be used to bolster patriarchal goals in the UwAs, as opposed to emancipatory gendered outcomes.

The potential of leveraging positive intersections for gender justice and sustainable peace in Rwanda is thus limited. The reason for this is because actualising the strategies of interconnection requires that the human dignity of *all* others is recognised and affirmed through activities that embody the freedom to relate. As long as marginalised communities (such as LGBTQIA folk) and ethnicities are 'silenced' from the national security agenda, and if structural/material hierarchies are maintained, the ability of positive intersections to generate emancipatory gendered outcomes at a local level is undermined. Nevertheless, actualising the strategies of interconnection requires the continual collective commitment to reimagine a shared just gendered future. This process is therefore, by nature, resistant to the hierarchies that define the Rwandan political landscape, and thus, cultivating positive intersections could be used as a mode of resistance against those conditions that threaten sustainable peace in Rwanda.

For gendered security research and WPS work, the positive intersectionality concept offers valuable pathways for moving beyond an oppression-focussed analysis, as the concept opens doors for thinking about positive solutions grounded in context. In addition, the perspective encourages a relational approach that leverages solidarities between different critical and indigenous feminisms that could be used to coordinate international feminist organising for gender just goals. In practical terms, it is worthwhile to include dialogic community structures in gender-based policies and interventions on the continent, yet only once due consideration has been given to local cultural contexts. Furthermore, checks and balances that protect these spaces from being appropriated by patriarchal and neoliberal forces need to be put in place.

### 6.3 KEY FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

My analysis revealed that there is empirical, practical and theoretical value in gendered security research that focusses on the inner workings and logics of intersectionality. By cultivating a thorough understanding of intersectionality, not only as a critical discursive tool but also as a depoliticised discursive formation, (1) I provided insight into *how* multiple systems of oppression intersect; (2) *how* these intersections create complex experiences of gender insecurity; (3) *how* the concept is 'flattened-out' or 'stretched-thin'; (4) *how* this process of co-optation creates gender (in)security silences; (5) *how* using intersectionality inappropriately fosters conditions in which gender discrimination thrives; (6) *how* positive intersections come into being; and (7) *how* positive intersectionality can be used to create emancipatory gendered outcomes.

(1) Through my analysis of the logics of domination (Chapter three), I revealed that multiple systems of oppression intersect through discursive strategies of othering and difference and that these intersections manifest in the social/political world through physical and structural violence. The strategies of othering and difference are (re)produced through the similar patterns of discursive (re)production based in subject/object power relations. While the goal of the strategies is domination, not all strategies are arranged in ways that ensure the domination of the same group. Thus, by conducting a deconstructive discourse analysis, I was able to reveal which strategies' configuration of concepts were coordinated in ways that supported either Hutu or Tutsi domination. This gave me insight into how the (re)production of the ethnicised strategies of othering was bolstered through the (re)production of the racialised, gendered and autochthonous strategies of othering – and thereby how different systems of oppression intersect.

(2) A deconstructive discourse analysis (Chapter three) revealed that the intersections between the ethnic, racialised, autochthonous and gendered strategies of othering in the post-colonial Rwandan state created different complex experiences of gender insecurity for Hutu and Tutsi women (and among women within these groups). While both groups of women were targeted by state-disciplining violence in the post-colonial era, and by sexual violence in the genocide, the underlying rationale that supported this violence was different. The intersections between the strategies of othering differentiated the

motivation behind this violence, complicating the expression of gender insecurity. Thus, while the root causes of gendered violence stemmed from similar conditions, the direction of the discursive (re)production of the strategies resulted in different motivations behind the violence that caused Hutu and Tutsi women to have differential experiences of gender insecurity in the post-colonial state.

(3) Intersectionality is thinned-out or watered down when it is co-opted by the feminist mainstream in ways that take the concept further away from its original political intentions (Chapter four). For instance, when the concept is used to analyse the intersections that affect privileged bodies, intersectionality is reduced to an exercise of identifying different interconnecting categories of identity – the analysis remains on the experiential level. The structural dimensions of the interconnections between identity politics and larger power differentials are lost and the political edge of intersectionality is blunted.

(4) Gender (in)security silences are created when the strategies of sameness and silence are (re)produced across a gender security policy document (Chapter four). The strategies of sameness operate across two levels. On the first level, the strategies (re)produce sameness between men and women; on the second level, the strategies (re)produce sameness among women. It is on the second level that the experiences of some privileged women are taken to represent all women, which then silence the experiences of those whose insecurity is caused through the intersection of multiple systems of oppression.

(5) As the residual diversity discourse is absorbed into the integrationist logics of hegemonic liberal-feminist discourses, the diversity discourse is then tolerated on the rhetorical margins of the mainstream and used to incrementally include different groups of vulnerable women into the analysis. In this instance, scholars and practitioners treat other identities as categories that are added onto gender, which then misrepresents complex gender insecurities as compounded phenomena. As a result, practitioners tend to prioritise gender (read: liberal-feminist 'women' category) and then add in other identity factors as an afterthought – this reinforces rather than transforms material hierarchies, as privileged women are still prioritised, and vulnerable women continue to face

marginalisation in the policy-making process. Thus, the strategies of sameness and silence are not disrupted, and so, gender (in)security silences continue to be (re)produced. This process obfuscates the interconnecting structural dimensions of different marginalised women's insecurities, which forces these groups to treat their struggles as separate phenomena. Ultimately, this undermines opportunities for building feminist coalitions that are geared toward challenging the logic of distribution of the global political economy and global security.

(6) Positive intersections come into being through processes that actualise the logics of interdependence (Chapter five). This requires (re)producing the strategies of interconnection on an intersubjective, community, national and international level. The strategies of interconnection are those Ubuntu-inspired discourses that affirm the human dignity of all others through caregiving practices. This involves 'unweaving' logics of domination by engaging in the alterity of the Other and challenging the discursive and material factors that engender complex conditions of oppression. At the same time, such positive intersections enable a 're-weaving' of discourses that affirm our interdependence and the human dignity of the marginalised, while using these positive intersections as the basis for building community-based solutions to gender security.

(7) Positive intersections are useful for creating emancipatory outcomes because they require continual cultivation on part of the members of the community. This implies that the members are required to reimagine what gender justice/positive peace could/should look like for all members of the community. The (re)production of positive intersections is thus a contested and dynamic process, which in turn, requires those who cultivate strategies of interconnection to be critical of the ethics of care they embody. The openness of positive intersections to the practice of re-imagining and criticality is where the emancipatory potential of the concept lies. Positive intersectionality, that takes heed of the task of re-imagining and criticality, can be practically implemented through dialogic community forums.

### 6.3.1 Practical/empirical and theoretical implications of the study

The *empirical implications* of my analysis are grounded in the alternative lived experiences of gender insecurity in Rwanda. Throughout Rwandan history, the intersections of multiple systems of oppression (filtered through the global political economy) ensured that Hutu women experienced their insecurity in ways that were qualitatively different from Tutsi women, and vice versa. In the post-genocide era, the elimination of ethnicity from the public discourse has not altered this state of affairs, as the ethnic/racialised strategies of othering are kept alive through differential access to resources and opportunities. While it would be a mistake to suggest that ethnicity is as significant a factor in the lives of Rwandan women today as before the genocide, it would also be a mistake to assume that this identity plays no role in persistently high levels of GBV and patriarchal gender norms in the country – especially given the connections between ethnicity, gender, race and violence in the past. Beyond ethnicity, my analysis also emphasised other identities that influence gender (in)security in Rwanda in the contemporary moment, such as class and sexuality, which revealed how marginalised women have been ‘left behind’ by the Rwandan gender security and gender equality policy framework. This is significant, because gender (in)security silences allow gender discrimination and gender inequality to thrive, which in turn, threatens the sustainability of peace in Rwanda in the long-term.

My analysis of the different logics also revealed the different manifestations of intersectionality in the Rwandan context. While many scholars have highlighted the role of ethnicity, race and class in negating the gendered security of Rwandan women throughout history, there was empirical value in representing how the misappropriation of intersectionality (in the form of the residual diversity discourse) continues to create gender (in)security silences in Rwanda today. The empirical examples that illustrated the (re)production of the logics of addition therefore also revealed the different ways in which gendered security policies, programmes, instruments and mechanisms can either take us further away or closer toward achieving the goal of gender peace. These findings are valuable to other contexts, not only on the African continent but also globally, as the diversity discourse is a global discourse, and is (re)produced on all levels of the WPS policy ecosystem.

In addition, on the local level gender is understood in relational terms, which may initially appear at odds with the goals of the GoR's gender equality and gender security framework. Thus, it is empirically valuable that my study revealed that it is possible to cultivate culturally-relevant understandings of gender equality that are rooted in how gender is lived at a community level – based in the care arrangements between men and women that sustain community and familial life. In the Rwandan context, I revealed that while the GoR may appear to recognise and leverage Rwandan cultural gender norms for positive gendered outcomes, this has more to do with concretising centralised state power at a local level than developing indigenous approaches toward achieving gender justice. This finding is useful, because it would be a mistake to assume that just because a project, policy, instrument or intervention uses the language of relationality and interconnection, it is a transformative initiative. Thus, while I found that the complementarity of gender relations can be used to create gender peace in Rwanda, I also found that this language has been partly co-opted by the GoR for reasons that have more to do with protecting the political status quo. My analysis highlighted the nuance between the political value of adopting African-inspired alternative and critical perspectives for developing context-based approaches to gender insecurity, and the limitations of this approach as these discourses can be co-opted or misappropriated by national governments and international actors.

My study revealed that analysing the logics and inner workings of intersectionality can contribute toward cultivating perspectives in gendered security practice that are geared toward gender transformation and not gender reform. This requires adopting a strategy that uses the three logics concurrently (represented by Figure 2, page 69), which means recognising the different intersecting categories of identity relevant to a particular society, integrating a perspective that deals with these co-constitutive factors simultaneously and building positive intersections through culturally-relevant tools and discourses that generate a deep-seated sense of interdependence in families and communities.

In Rwanda, I highlighted the role of dialogic community forums in this respect, which renegotiate harmful gender relations. While these were relevant to the Rwandan context, they could also be adopted in other African contexts that use similar community forums at a village level. Yet, the terms and conditions, as well as functioning of the forums would need to be altered to fit the cultural context of that particular society. Moreover, as the Rwandan example illustrates, the forums need to be designed in a way that cultivate 'true' collective dependence. This is very difficult to do in a global political economy that fosters gross inequality, and on a continent where militarism and masculinism runs rife. This does not make initiatives that generate strategies of interconnection unworthwhile, it just means that practitioners would need to be wary of how they design and implement policies that are inspired by this approach, as they need to safeguard these spaces from being co-opted by patriarchal or neoliberal forces.

These practical implications point to the main *theoretical contribution* of my study: the positive intersectionality concept. By moving beyond an oppression-focussed analysis, my study made headway on thinking about leveraging positive intersections for creating gendered security. Positive intersectionality does not replace analysing, highlighting or examining negative intersections, and it cannot be used without also simultaneously thinking through how it is/can be co-opted. But what is does offer, is insight into another side of gender that had been neglected by feminist scholars. By revealing this 'other side' and foregrounding the value of interdependence, positive intersectionality provides a more holistic understanding of what defines our gendered experiences in a non-essentialist way. In the African context, defining features of gendered relations are those practices undergirded by the notion of relational interdependence. These engender care and nurture, empathy toward the needs of the community, the acceptance of differences and strategies for collaboration.

Embracing these qualities contributes to deepening our understanding of gendered security, because it necessitates shifting from a perspective that focusses on those liberal institutions, techniques and systems that seek to end war and conflict alone (negative peace), and to begin generating perspectives that prioritise the kinds of gendered relationships (on an intersubjective, community, national and international level) that make positive peace possible – rooted in receptivity, relatedness and responsiveness. For feminist organising, the positive intersectionality concept is useful, because it offers corridors for building coalitions between different feminist groups that move beyond essentialising experiences. The relationality embodied by positive intersectionality encourages indigenous and critical feminisms to coordinate strategies against the conditions of militarism, the global political economy and global security while affirming their own needs, context and experience.

For Rwanda, the positive intersectionality concept can be used to create emancipatory community-driven spaces that resist unequal power relations. These spaces are generated within structures that are limited by the top-down organisation of political power. Yet, generating positive intersections requires the actualisation of the politics of refusal – the refusal of all kinds of oppression. This is done within and against state power, as the positive intersectionality concept comes into being alongside the structures it resists – positive intersections are not separate from negative intersections. Thus, in the Rwandan context, the strategy of resistance embodied by positive intersectionality could be used to unweave those material and discursive hierarchies that threaten sustainable peace and re-weave community-based spaces of interconnection that enable interconnectedness and empowerment rather than conflict and competition.

### 6.3.2 Recommendations for future research

Within the confines of FSS and WPS research, my recommendations are as follows:

- I propose the integration of the combined approach (three logics) into future work that deals with intersectionality and inclusivity in gendered security. This could yield insights into how the inner workings are (re)produced through the logics in different contexts on the African continent, which is fundamental for building a thorough understanding of intersectionality, both theoretically and empirically.
- It would be valuable to investigate how the residual diversity discourse has been (re)produced in the NAPs of other African countries and regional organisations, and to assess the impacts of this discourse on the gendered security of other groups on the continent.
- In addition, it would be worthwhile to investigate how funding is divided between different groups of vulnerable individuals (such as ex-combatants, refugees, disabled women, rural women and the LGBTQIA community) in those NAPs that have an

allocated budget, and how this may limit the ability of these groups to coordinate their activities.

- The positive intersectionality concept needs to be bolstered through further theoretical and empirical work.
- There is a need for empirical fieldwork that investigates, reveals and considers how African women in different contexts understand positive intersections, how they cultivate positive intersections through caregiving arrangements, and how they have used positive intersections to resist conditions of inequality and violence. These insights can be used to generate theory that further supports, challenges and develops the positive intersectionality concept.
- In addition, there is a need for archival research on how Ubuntu-feminist ethics of care were used by pre-colonial African women (and possibly LGBTQIA individuals) to wage peace and diplomacy and maintain social harmony, and to consider the relationships between these practices and the methods, actions and strategies of African women presently. Insights gained from this work could then be used to develop an African-feminist model of peacebuilding.
- For Rwanda specifically, there is a need for feminist research on the successes and failures of home-grown solutions to gender insecurity in the country. It is worthwhile to critically examine the functioning and limitations of the UwAs so that the policy that guides the implementation of the forums is generative of gender just outcomes. Although it would be difficult to conduct this kind of research given the limitations (culture of silence and authoritarian control) researchers encounter while conducting fieldwork in Rwanda, it would nonetheless be valuable to ascertain if these dialogic structures are conducive for the politics of refusal while also being sources of state-control at the local level.
- In addition, there is a need to conduct research on how LGBTQIA individuals experience the UwAs, as well as their experience of other gender institutions in Rwanda, such as the Gender Desks and One Stop Centres.

Feminist practical/empirical and theoretical contributions bring us closer to realising the political emancipatory project of broader gender justice. The goal of the WPS agenda is security for all people. Sustaining peace requires the full, equal and meaningful participation of women in all their diversity – gender should always be at the forefront and never an afterthought in promoting international security.

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