

CONFLICT AND COOPERATION: “NEW FARMERS” IN ZIMBABWE, 2000- 2015

JOYLINE TAKUDZWA KUFANDIRORI

THIS THESIS HAS BEEN SUBMITTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN THE FACULTY OF THE HUMANITIES, FOR THE CENTRE OF AFRICA STUDIES AT THE UNIVERSITY OF THE FREE STATE.

FEBRUARY 2019

SUPERVISOR: DR. R PILOSSOF

CO-SUPERVISORS: DR. A MSEBA and DR. L PASSEMIERS

Declaration

I declare that the dissertation hereby submitted by me for the Doctor of Philosophy degree at the University of the Free State is my own independent work and has not previously been submitted by me at another university/faculty. I furthermore cede copyright of the dissertation in favour of the University of the Free State.

.....

.....

Joyline Takudzwa Kufandirori

Bloemfontein

Dedication

This thesis is dedicated to my son Jaden Atipaishe Chitofiri

Table of Contents	
Abstract.....	iv
Acknowledgements.....	vi
List of Abbreviations	viii
List of Glossary.....	x
List of tables and figures.....	xi
Chapter One: Introduction	1
1.1 Introduction.....	1
1.2 Locating and justifying Mashonaland Central Province as a Case Study.....	3
1.3. Problematising the FTLRP: Violence, Lawlessness and Relations	11
1.4. Background and Historiography of Land Reform in Zimbabwe.....	15
1.5. Post-Independence Historiography on the Land Question	20
1.6. Researching Land Reform in Zimbabwe: Sources and Challenges.	32
1.7. Structure	36
Chapter Two: Land Reform and Land Use in Zimbabwe c1980- c2002.....	39
Introduction.....	39
2.1. A Post- independence Trajectory of the Land Question in Zimbabwe.....	40
2.2. State led Resettlement Programs; 1980- 1990.	40
2.3. The Economic Structural Adjustment Period and the 1990- 2000 Land Reform.....	45
2. 4 “Land is the Economy and the Economy is Land: The Land Invasions and the FTLRP; 2000 and Beyond.”	50
2.5. Fast Tracking the Land Reform: Strategies, Processes and Key Players.....	56
2.6. Land Occupations in Mashonaland Central.....	59
2.7. The Government and the Politics of Post 2000 Land Occupations	66
Conclusion	69
Chapter Three: Cementing Lines of Disagreement: The State, the “New Farmer” and the Acquisition of Land Rights c2000 to 2015.....	71
Introduction.....	71

3.1 The Struggle for Control and Relevance: Unpacking the Complexities of Relations in the Land Occupations in Mashonaland Central Province.	72
3.2. Interference from War Veterans, Traditional Leadership and Party (ZANU PF) Officials.	73
3.4. The New Politics of Land Reform: Government Policy on Land, State Led Demarcations and the Formalisation of the Reform Process.	84
3.5. Farm Infrastructure, Property and Government Policy	95
Conclusion	109
Chapter Four: Narratives of Everyday Conflict among New Farmers.....	110
Introduction	110
4.1 Negotiating New Landscapes of Agricultural Territory	110
4.2. Boundaries and Everyday Conflict amongst New Farmers.	111
4.3. Contestations around Infrastructure	114
4.4. The Politics of “Othering” and Conflict among New Farmers	122
4.5. A1 and A2 Farmer Relations	127
4.6. Later Beneficiaries of the Land Reform Program and Conflict.	132
4.7. Gendered Struggles	134
Conclusion	136
Chapter Five: “New” Forms of Cooperation	137
Introduction	137
5.1. Operational Environment that Prompted Cooperation	138
5.2. Cooperation as Rooted in Communal Farming Traditions	140
5.3. Kinship Ties and Cooperation	141
5.4. Gender and Cooperation in the new Farming Landscape	148
5.5. Assessing Associations/ Organisations of Cooperation amongst New Farmers	150
5.6. Role of the State in Promoting Cooperation	157
5.7. The Fragile Nature of New Farmer Relations and Cooperation	160
Conclusion	173

Chapter Six: Conclusion	174
Appendices.....	187
Bibliography	207

Abstract

This thesis explores the Fast Track Land Reform Program (FTLRP) in Mashonaland Central Province, Zimbabwe from 2000 to 2015. It investigates the impact of continuous lawlessness and new farmer relations on productivity and land use after the implementation of the FTLRP. It argues that the FTLRP ushered in an unprecedented shift in Zimbabwe's agriculture landscape which radically transformed society, as new farmers walked into commercial land without structured or sustained support. The thesis explores how the political strategy adopted by the government from the year 2000 onwards to acquire land from the white owners continued to haunt the new farmers as there was no effort by the government to reconstitute institutions and laws that would guarantee respect and protection of property after the invasions. The government adopted a strategy that ignored existing laws that countered occupations and enacted laws to protect the occupiers. As such, the new farmers were vulnerable to the same anarchic political climate that had been faced by their white counterparts during the farm seizures. The thesis, therefore, argues that from the inception of the FTLRP to as late as 2015, insecurity occasioned by the general lawlessness commonplace at the time shaped the manner in which new farmers related to each other and was a major constraint to increased productivity. It contends that farmers had to cope with a new set of challenges that required major configurations in relations. The result was that the lawlessness, coupled with loopholes inherent within government policy on land allocation and resettlement, shaped the nature of relations that emerged in the new farming landscape. The thesis offers a comprehensive account of land use patterns and conflict among newly resettled farmers. It examines how the FTLRP brought about clashes amongst new land occupiers in the new agrarian terrain. It assesses how these struggles impacted on productivity and land use. The thesis also acknowledges the fact that relations amongst the farmers have not only been confrontational but have also been characterised by instances of cooperation. It, investigates how new farming patterns and demands have called upon the farmers to conjure up innovative ways of relating to each other especially in the context of the fragility occasioned by the lawlessness that pervaded the period. This thesis, therefore, considers relations amongst the new farmers and persistent lawlessness as crucial in assessing land use and production in the resettlement areas.

Keywords; Land reform, Zimbabwe, relations, new farmers, cooperation, conflict.

Opsomming

Hierdie verhandeling ondersoek die Versnelde Grondhervormingsprogram (*Fast Track Land Reform Programme* – FTLRP) tussen 2000 en 2015 in Zimbabwe se Mashonaland-sentraal provinsie. Dit analiseer die uitwerking van aanhoudende wetteloosheid en verhoudings tussen nuwe boere op produktiwiteit en grondgebruik na afloop van die implementering van die FTLRP. Daar word aangevoer dat die FTLRP ongekende verandering in Zimbabwe se landboulandskap ingelei het – dit het die samelewing drasties verander. Nuwe boere het hulself meteens sonder struktuur of volgehoue ondersteuning op kommersiële grond bevind. Die verhandeling ondersoek die nagevolge van die regering se post-2000 politieke strategie om grond van wit eienaars te bekom en wys dat nuwe boere ly onder die regering se versuim om weer lewe in bestaande instellings en wetgewing, wat die integriteit en beskerming van eiendom na afloop van die grondrekwisie sou waarborg, te blaas. Die regering het 'n strategie gevolg wat bestaande wette teen grondbesetting ignoreer, en wetgewing ingestel wat die grondbesetters beskerm. As gevolg hiervan is die nuwe boere vir dieselfde anargiese politieke klimaat, waarmee hulle wit eweknieë gedurende die besettings te kampe gehad het, vatbaar. Hierdie verhandeling voer aan dat, van die ontstaan van FTLRP tot so laat soos 2015, die algemene wetteloosheid wat op daardie stadium so alledaags was, die onderlinge verhoudings tussen nuwe boere beïnvloed en ook die verhoging van produktiwiteit verhoed het. Die gevolg hiervan was dat wetteloosheid, tesame met die skuiwergate binne regeringsbeleid oor grondtoekenning en hervestiging, bepalend vir verhoudings binne die nuwe landboulandskap was. Die verhandeling bied 'n omvattende verduideliking van patrone van grondgebruik en verhoudings tussen nuuthervestigde boere. Die manier waarop die FTLRP botsings tussen nuwe grondbesetters in die nuwe landbouomgewing teweeg gebring het, word ondersoek. Die impak wat hierdie konflik op produktiwiteit en grondgebruik gehad het, word geëvalueer. Die verhandeling erken egter ook dat die verhoudings tussen boere nie net vyandig was nie, maar ook deur samewerking gekenmerk is. Daarom ondersoek dit hoe nuwe landboupatrone en -eise die boere genoop het om vernuwende verhoudings te ontwikkel, veral in die lig van die wetteloosheid van hierdie periode. Begrip van die verhoudings tussen nuwe boere en die voortslepende wetteloosheid is onontbeerlik in die evaluering van grondgebruik en produksie in hervestigde areas.

Sleutelwoorde: Grondhervorming, Zimbabwe, verhoudings, nuwe boere, samewerking, konflik.

Acknowledgements

I would like to extend my greatest appreciation to my supervisors Dr Pilosof, Dr Passemiers and Dr Mseba for their intellectual guidance, support and encouragement throughout the journey. Without your insights, enthusiasm and unwavering support this thesis would not have been possible. Thank you for your constructive criticism and suggestions. You really made everything possible for me. I am also deeply indebted to Prof Phimister for availing me the opportunity to do this PhD. Thank you Prof for believing in me. A very special gratitude also goes out to Prof du Toit and Dr Macola for their guidance and invaluable support during the initial stages of this project.

I would like to unreservedly express my gratitude to Mrs Le Roux and Tarisai Gwena for all the administrative help and much needed support during the course of the thesis. Many thanks to the generals in the “dungeon” Lotti Nkomo, Unaludo Sechele and Miyanda Simbawachi. The “dungeon” really tamed us. My appreciation also goes to my other fellow graduate students, Victor Gwande, Eleanor Brown- Swart, George Bishi, Joseph Kachim, Sibanengi Ncube and Bryson Nkoma. We were all in this together. Thank you for your support and kindness. You all made the journey a lot easier.

I would like to convey my gratitude to National Archives of Zimbabwe staff, special thanks goes to Tryson Nyoni, Emmanuel Takura, Livingston Muchefa and Simba Mutenha. My sincere gratitude goes to Kudakwashe Mazuru from Herald House and Kingstone Mvundura from Parliament Library of Zimbabwe. My special gratitude also goes to the new farmers in Mashonaland Central who agreed to become participants in my study and generously gave me their time. This thesis would not have seen the light of the day without you. I am also deeply indebted to Arex officials and lands officials in Bindura, for the time rendered.

I am grateful to my siblings, parents and in laws who have provided me with all the moral and emotional support throughout this journey. To my brother Humphrey Kufandirori, thank you for accompanying me around the farms in Mashonaland Central. I know it was such a tiring experience. I am also grateful to my friends who have supported me along the way. Some deserve a special mention, Melatia Chipu Nengomasha, Geraldine Sibanda, Emina Minya, Tawanda Ray Bvirindi, Buhle Thete and Tendai Mbungo. I would also like to extend my heartfelt gratitude to all my colleagues at the ISG. Some deserve a special mention, Dr

Van Zyl-Herman, Dr Manamere, Dr Mlombo, Dr Masakure and Dr Nyamunda, Dr Mhike and Priscila Machinga. Thank you for your support throughout my PhD journey.

To my husband, Kuda, thank you love for being my pillar of strength throughout this process. To my son Jaden, you gave me strength and hope in so many ways. This is also your achievement. I hope one day you will look at this thesis with a mature mind and be inspired in some way.

List of Abbreviations

AFC Agricultural Finance Corporation

AREX Agricultural Research and Extension

BSAC British South Africa Company

CFU Commercial Farmers' Union

DA District Administrator

DDF District Development Fund

DLC District Land Committee

ECD Early Child Development

ESAP Economic Structural Adjustment Program

FCTZ Farm Community Trust of Zimbabwe.

FTLRP Fast Track Land Reform Program (FTLRP)

GDP Gross Domestic Product

GMB Grain Marketing Board

GNU Government of National Unity

GPA Global Political Agreement

JAG Justice for Agriculture

LAA Land Acquisition Act

LAA Land Apportionment Act

LHC Lancaster House Constitution

LRRP Land Reform and Resettlement Program

IMF International Monetary Fund

LTA Land Tenure Act

MDC Movement for Democratic Change

NGO Non-Governmental Organisation

NLHA Native Land Husbandry Act

NR Natives Reserve

PLRC Presidential Land Review Committee

RDC Rural District Council

RF Rhodesia Front

TTL Tribal Trust Lands

ZANU PF Zimbabwe African Nation Union Patriotic Front

ZBC Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation

ZAPU Zimbabwe African People's Union

ZCC Zion Christian Church

ZNFU Zimbabwe National Farmers Union

ZNLWVA Zimbabwe National Liberation War Veterans Association

ZIMSTAT Zimbabwe National Statistics Agency.

List of Glossary

Chimurenga- means a revolutionary struggle.

Chimbwido- women supporters who were usually cooks in the liberation war.

Chisi- is a day designated by either traditional leadership or church leadership as a day of rest in which followers or subjects are not allowed to do any physical work especially in the fields.

Jambanja- Zimbabwean urban slang for violence and chaos. After 2000 the term was used to describe the violent and chaotic nature of farm occupations.

Karanga- is a shona dialect spoken by people who originated from Masvingo, and the southern to central parts of Midlands.

Korekore- is a Shona dialect, spoken by the people inhabiting in the North Eastern Zimbabwe

MaBhurandaya- is a derogatory term used to describe people of mostly Malawian and Zambian origin.

MaPositori- are members of the different apostolic churches in Zimbabwe.

MaVhitori- is a term used to derogatorily describe the *Karanga* people from Masvingo.

Mazioni- members of Zion churches in the country.

Mujibha- male youth auxiliaries who were mostly used by the freedom fighters for errands.

Mutupo- totem.

Nhimbe- is a communal work, done as part of a group.

Povo- people, the masses

Rukuvhute- umbilical cord.

Vadzimu- spirit mediums.

Varungu- white people

List of tables and figures.

Figure 1: Map of the Districts of Mashonaland Central Province. Generated by the author..... 3

Table 1: Population in Mashonaland Central, 2002 and 2012 Census..... 5

Table 2: Allocation of Land in Different Districts Under Different Models in Mashonaland Central... 6

Table 3: Gazetted Land per Province..... 10

Table 4: Agricultural Production Trends (000 tonnes): 1990s average versus 2000s. 13

Appendix 1: Interviews..... 187

Appendix 2: Statutes 197

Appendix 3: Pictures..... 200

Chapter One: Introduction

1.1 Introduction

This thesis explores the Fast Track Land Reform Program (FTLRP) in Zimbabwe from 2000 to 2015. The FTLRP refers to the compulsory acquisition of white owned land without compensation that was carried out by the Zimbabwean government between 2000 and 2002.¹ It should, however, be noted that the allocation of farms and resettlement of people on the land acquired during the FTLRP continued well beyond the 2000 to 2002 period. To better account for 2015 as the cut-off date for this study, it could be argued that there were no new significant policy shifts in the land reform trajectory between 2002 and 2014, since during this period Government focused on the redistribution of the farms that had been compulsory acquired or violently confiscated through the FTLRP (2000–2002).² However, since 2015, the Zimbabwean Government abandoned the chaos and violence that characterised the FTLRP, and adopted an incremental approach whereby, instead of encouraging land expropriation, the government allowed the indigenous black landholders to venture into mutually beneficial partnerships and agricultural contracts with the once ejected white commercial farmers.³ This shift, in government policy, accounts for the cut of date for this study. The study will utilise the term FTLRP for the entire period under study.

The study examines the connections between lawlessness, farmer relations, agricultural productivity and property. It argues that the weakening of institutions by government in order to facilitate the removal of white farmers in an environment of relative lawlessness, created an atmosphere of continued chaos in which the new farmers found themselves.⁴ It focuses on the legacy of contested land claims that culminated in the violent land takeovers of 2000 and beyond, and the nature of the relations that emerged amongst the new farmers and other stakeholders in the new farming landscape. The study acknowledges the importance of the impact of other factors such as the polarisation of the political environment, political patronage and the poor training and limited resources of new farmers and tenure insecurity in

¹ Before 2000, there were some land invasions represented by the Svosve people and others in 1997 and 1998. But 2000 marked the intensification of the FTLRP with direct government participation.

² A. Chilunjika and D. E. Uwizeyimana, “Shifts in the Zimbabwean Land Reform Discourse from 1980 to the Present”, *African Journal of Public Affairs*, 8, 3 (2015), 203 and O.Gutu, MDC vindicated over land issue, 2015, <http://nehandaradio.com/2015/01/05/mdcvindicated-land-issue/>, accessed, 29 September 2018.

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ The term government and Zimbabwe African Nation Union (Patriotic Front) (ZANU PF) are used interchangeably because, after 2000, the operations of the government and party became blurred, making it is difficult to separate the two.

reducing productivity. It, however, asserts that a full understanding of the Zimbabwean agricultural crisis must also tackle the issue of lawlessness that affected the new farmers in the same way it did the white commercial farmers and how it shaped relations among new farmers. It assesses how such relations influenced access, use of land and productivity. As such, the thesis offers a comprehensive account of land use patterns and conflict among newly resettled farmers. This thesis investigates how the FTLRP brought about significant struggles amongst new land occupiers as well as with other stakeholders that have interests in the new agrarian terrain. It assesses how such struggles had a momentous impact on productivity and land use. However, the thesis also acknowledges the fact that relations amongst the farmers have not only been hostile but have also been characterised by some instances of cooperation.

The thesis identifies the political and discursive strategies through which the new land owners sought legitimacy for themselves and negotiated the process of turning occupied lands into their “new farms.” It unpacks the internal struggles in the new farming arena by investigating their roots, their everyday dynamics and how they found expression in the politicisation of the state and its authority over the land. By so doing, the thesis carries out a comprehensive analysis of the clamour for commercial farms by members of the ruling elite and the displacement of resettled people by the ruling party elite who fight over prime land.⁵ The study is premised on the recognition that there is a lack of substantial empirical work on the relations of newly resettled farmers. Critical reviews of the FTLRP have focused on analysing its impact on aggregate economic indicators such as Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita, violence against the white farmers, the politicisation of the land reform process and its effects on groups like farm workers. This thesis, therefore, considers relations amongst the new farmers and persistent lawlessness as crucial in assessing land use and production in the resettlement areas. This thesis uses the term lawlessness to represent the state of disorder due to a disregard of the law that permeated the land reform areas during the FTLRP. It evokes the term in the context of how other scholars utilise the term *jambanja* to

⁵ B. Raftopoulos and I. Phimister, “Zimbabwe Now: Challenging the Political Economy of Crisis and Coercion”, *Historical Materialism*, 12, 4 (2004), 55- 82. Also see, L. Sachikonye, *The Situation of Commercial Farm Workers after Land Reform in Zimbabwe*, Report prepared by the Farm Community Trust of Zimbabwe (FCTZ), (Harare: FCTZ, 2003), 27.

describe the chaos, violence and disregard for law and order that was characteristic of the land reform era in Zimbabwe.⁶

1.2 Locating and justifying Mashonaland Central Province as a Case Study

Figure 1: Map of the Districts of Mashonaland Central Province. Generated by the author.

⁶ “*Jambanja*” is the Shona term for lawlessness or violence. This term has been appropriated and used to describe the mayhem that accompanied the FTLRP. Many different scholars have also made use of the term. See: J. Muzondidya, “Jambanja: Ideological Ambiguities in the Politics of Land and Resource Ownership in Zimbabwe”, *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 33, 2 (2007) and J, Chaumba, I. Scoones and W. Wolmer, “From Jambanja to Planning: The Reassertion of Technocracy in Land Reform in South-Eastern Zimbabwe”, *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 41, 4 (2003), 533-

The thesis uses Mashonaland Central as a case study. The province covers an area of 28,347 km² and has a population of 1,152,520, which represents about eight percent of the total Zimbabwean population.⁷ In terms of land size, Mashonaland Central is the smallest province outside of the two metropolitan provinces of Harare and Bulawayo, making it a much more manageable case study in comparison to other provinces. The province is divided into seven districts: Bindura, Centenary, Guruve, Mount Darwin, Rushinga, Shamva and Mazowe.⁸ Of these seven districts, Bindura, Centenary, Guruve, Shamva and Mazowe were commercial farming areas and hence are the focus of this thesis. The province encompasses the Northern mainland of the country and stretches into the Zambezi valley with the Mozambican border in the North- East. The capital of Mashonaland Central is Bindura, which is about 90 kilometers from Zimbabwe's capital city, Harare. It is an important agrarian province because of its good communication facilities and close proximity to markets. Compared to other provinces such as Masvingo, Matebeleland South and North, Mashonaland Central has a well-maintained road network which makes it easier to conduct research in.

In terms of agriculture potential, the province offers optimum conditions for commercial farming. Mashonaland Central province receives between 750mm and 900mm annual rainfall, and the area is characterised by clay, sandy-loamy and lime soils.⁹ The ecology of Mashonaland Central makes it an interesting case study. It is mostly suitable for tobacco, soy beans, cotton and horticulture.¹⁰ These crops are not only labour intensive, but also dependent on high-value farm infrastructure like irrigation facilities, tractors, combine harvesters, farm buildings, more workers' housing and dams for their production. The presence of livestock farmers in the province also means that there is additional high-value infrastructure, such as food stores, fencing gates and veterinary equipment. One farmer correctly described Mashonaland Central Province as a "very old farming, established area with well-established properties, very big irrigation setups, a lot of dams and very good infrastructure."¹¹ Thus, as far as the presence of movable and immovable agriculture facilities is concerned, Mashonaland Central Province is better endowed than the majority of the provinces in

⁷ Zimbabwe National Statistics Agency (ZIMSTAT), *Census 2012: National Report* (Harare: ZIMSTAT, 2012), 9.

⁸ http://www.pindula.co.zw/Mashonaland_Central, accessed 3 July 2016.

⁹ G. Kay, *Rhodesia: A Human Geography* (London: University of London Press, 1970), 21.

¹⁰ *Ibid*; See also www.fao.org/3/a0395e06.htm, accessed 1 January 2019.

¹¹ Quoted in C. Laurie, *The Land Reform Deception: Political Opportunism in Zimbabwe's Land Seizure* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016), 167.

Zimbabwe. An example of one such province which is not that well equipped with agriculture facilities is Masvingo Province, which from white settlement until 2000, was mostly devoted to cattle ranching as well as mining and sugar cane growing. As such it is not as endowed as Mashonaland Central which concentrated much more on intensive commercial farming, which required a lot of implements.¹²

The province has largely majority Shona speakers. The demography of Mashonaland Central showed major changes between 2002 and 2012, reflecting the effects of the land reform program. Districts that had the most commercial farms, such as Bindura, Mazowe and Shamva, experienced higher inter-census population increases than the mainly communal districts, such as Guruve, Muzarabani, Mt Darwin and Rushinga.¹³ For example, Mazowe's population increased by 22 percent from 199,408 people in 2002 to 243,999 people in 2012, which was greater than the provincial growth rate of 15 percent.¹⁴ This is mainly because of the movement of people onto new farms as farm owners and additional farmworkers brought in by the new farmers. As of 2012, Mazowe had 61,292 households. The communal areas consist of 36 percent of the population.¹⁵ The urban areas such as Mvurwi, Glendale and Concession consist of 8.8 percent of the population. The newly resettled areas and large commercial farming areas consist of 55 percent of the population. The average household numbers five persons.¹⁶

Table 1: Population in Mashonaland Central, 2002 and 2012 Census.

District	2002	2012	Change in %
Bindura District	142,026	168,894	19
Centenary district	107,718	122,791	14
Guruve district	84,828	124,041	12
Mt Darwin district	199,105	212,725	7

¹² The same conditions also exist in the three provinces of Mashonaland West, East and Manicaland.

¹³ C. Sukume, *et al*, *Space, Markets and Employment in Agricultural Development: Zimbabwe Country Report*, No.46 (Cape Town: Institute for Poverty, Land and Agrarian Studies, 2015).

¹⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁶ *Ibid.*

Rushinga district	67,134	74,040	10
Shamva district	98,046	123,650	26
Mazowe district	199,408	243,999	22
Total	998,267	1,070,000. 14	15
National Total	11,631,657	13,061,239	12

Source: Zimbabwe National Population Census: 2002, Zimbabwe National Population Census: 2012.

Table 2: Allocation of Land in Different Districts Under Different models in Mashonaland Central

	A1 Model		A2 Model			
District	Hectarage	Number of beneficiaries	Hectarage	Number of beneficiaries	Number of farms	Total number of beneficiaries
Bindura	76,618.07	3,454	28,421.29	428	149	3,882
Guruve	74,447.57	2,635	8,014.66	64	76	2,699
Shamva	31,286.06	1,851	12,478.25	378	74	2,229
Mazowe	217,588.05	5,478	145,692.50	873	431	6,351
Muzarabani	80,137.57	2,342	32,314.70	186	90	2,528
Total	480,077.32	15,760	226,921.40	1929	820	17,698

Source: Utete Report 2003.

Prior to 2000, Mashonaland Central had 871 white-owned large-scale commercial farms.¹⁷ This ownership structure was drastically changed by the implementation of the FTLRP. The

¹⁷ C. M. B. Utete, *Report of the Presidential Land Review Committee on the Implementation of Fast Track Land Reform Programme 2000-2002* (Harare: Government of Zimbabwe, 2003), 18 and

program distributed land according to two models. Farms were divided into small holdings which approximately measure from at least six hectares called A1 plots; and medium or large-scale holdings called A2 plots.¹⁸ A1 areas were defined by government as a “decongested model for the majority of landless people” living in over-crowded communal lands.¹⁹ The scheme provided an individual smallholding for residence, homestead garden and field crop cultivation, together with a large area set aside for common grazing to which all members of the new community settled on the former farm would have access. Beginning in 2000, the government equally prioritised the exclusive and resource driven A2 model, ostensibly to de-racialise the large-scale commercial farming areas.²⁰ They were composed of individual plots of land that are classified as small-, medium- and large-scale commercial schemes. A2 farms range from 25 hectares to 2,000 hectares in size, depending on the agro-ecological zone in which the farm was located. These farms were intended to be allocated to those with financial resources to develop them into commercial farms. Thus, the FTLRP changed the structure of the rural community by creating a large number and a wide range of new holdings in terms of farm size. There is, however, much overlap between the two categories. The actual farm size allocations in practice, however, showed wide divergences from pronounced policy. For example, Mazowe, Bindura and Shamva have huge A2 farms which were not divided and are mostly owned by senior politicians.²¹

Mazowe, Bindura and Shamva districts attracted people from different parts of the country, partly because of the proximity to Harare and partly because of its better road network. Some urbanites – mostly civil servants who work in Bindura, Shamva, Harare, Concession and Glendale – managed to get a stake in the districts (under) both A1 and A2 schemes. However, this does not discount the presence of new farmers from communal areas within Mashonaland Central Province like Chiweshe, Nyakudya, Mount Darwin, Madziwa, Rushinga, Bushu and Musana who also managed to secure a claim in these districts,

Commercial Farmers Union (CFU) figures in R. Pilosof, *The Unbearable Whiteness of Being, Farmers Voices from Zimbabwe* (Harare: Weaver Press 2012), 6.

¹⁸ A. Chimhowu and P. Woodhouse, “Forbidden but not Suppressed “Vernacular” Land Market in Svosve Communal Lands, Zimbabwe”, *The Journal of the International African Institute*, 80, 1 (2010), 27.

¹⁹ Matondi, *Zimbabwe’s Fast Track Land Reform* (London: Zed Books, 2012), 9.

²⁰ Government of Zimbabwe, *Land Reform and Resettlement, Revised Phase II. Harare, Zimbabwe: Ministry of Lands, Agriculture and Rural Resettlement* (Harare: Government of Zimbabwe Printers, 2001).

²¹ From my fieldwork, there is evidence of a proliferation of senior politicians in the province like Grace Mugabe, Saviour Kasukuwere, Nicholas Goche and Dickson Mafios.

especially under the A1 scheme. These districts, therefore, have an assortment of people from different backgrounds, ages, level of education, religious denominations, gender, ethnicity and political standing. Guruve and Muzarabani districts are further from urban centres and attracted people from neighboring communal areas like Dande, Mount Darwin and Rushinga. These districts also have other people from Masvingo who migrated there after independence and some who were working in the province as civil servants. However, even though there is a mixture of beneficiaries in the province, it is dominated by *Korekore* speaking people.²²

A majority of the farms in Mashonaland Central were allocated as A2 farms different, for example, from Masvingo Province where according to findings by Ian Scoones, land was allocated mostly for A1 plots.²³ In Mashonaland Central Province, A1 and A2 plots were allocated alongside each other in the same farming areas across the province. Of the 871 white owned farms in the province, a total of 820 farms had been resettled by 2003.²⁴ Of these 820 resettled farms, 653 had been resettled officially, whilst 167 were unofficially resettled.²⁵ Because of this radical shift in ownership, the province provided an excellent prism through which to observe the workings and effects of the reform process. Furthermore, the province has traditionally been viewed as a Zimbabwe African National Union (Patriotic Front) ZANU PF stronghold, and so some of the political aspects that this study deals with, including the relevance of violence and patronage, are very visible in the area. In as much as the provinces in Zimbabwe are unique and have their own localised experiences, a study of the experiences and narratives of the new farmers in Mashonaland Central Province provides a window to understanding the general situation prevailing in Zimbabwe's post FTLRP era.

The government supporting newspaper, *The Sunday Mail*, cites July 2000 as the month in which the resettlement exercise under the government's FTLRP exercise started in Mashonaland Central with a team of agricultural extension officers and officials from the District Development Fund assessing how demarcation of the plots was to be done on seven of the 20 Commercial farms identified for resettlement.²⁶ The Provincial Rural Development Officer at the time, Chrispen Mafusire identified, the first farm to be demarcated as Retreat Farm, in Bindura District measuring 1,346 hectares. A total of 54 families would get plots

²² *Korekore* is a Shona dialect spoken by the people inhabiting in the North Eastern Zimbabwe

²³ I. Scoones, *et al*, *Zimbabwe's Land Reform Myths and Realities* (Harare: Weaver Press, 2010), 34.

²⁴ Utete, *Report of the Presidential Land Review Committee on the Implementation of Fast Track Land Reform Programme 2000-2002*, 18.

²⁵ *Ibid.*

²⁶ "Resettlement Kicks off in Mashonaland Central", *Sunday Mail*, 20 July 2000.

measuring 10 acres each, under the A1 scheme.²⁷ Mafusire identified Viewfield Farm in Muzarabani, as the next farm earmarked for demarcation followed by Bonhein Farm in Guruve, Barrack Ramahori Farm and Farm Valley farms in Bindura District. He maintained that the farms earmarked were largely adjacent to overpopulated communal areas and those that were under the commercial farm settlement Scheme.²⁸ In the same year, the province had 400 farms designated for resettlement.²⁹ This data representing the state of affairs at the initial stages of the FTLRP is important, as it will help to show the key changes that happen to the agriculture landscape. It is important to note that these figures continued to increase and occupations continued until mid 2003 and diminished in scale afterwards.

The government of Zimbabwe formally announced the “fast track” resettlement program in July 2000, stating that it would acquire more than 3,000 farms for redistribution. Between June 2000 and February 2001, a national 2,706 farms, covering more than six million hectares, were listed in the government gazette for compulsory acquisition.³⁰ According to the CFU, which represented the large-scale commercial farming sector in Zimbabwe, more than 1, 600 commercial farms were occupied by invaders led by war veterans in the course of 2000.³¹ By November 2003, official government records showed that 6,712 farms covering an area of 12,387,571 hectares nationwide had been gazetted.³² However, scholars and Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) have questioned this number, and have argued that some farms were occupied only for a short period.³³ Indeed, the Presidential Land Review Committee (PLRC) of the same year estimated that government had acquired 6,422 farms covering 10,839,108 hectares. The fact that some farms were only occupied for a short period, may explain the discrepancies in figures. However, Sam Moyo argued that the

²⁷ *Ibid.*

²⁸ *Ibid.*

²⁹ “Accelerated Resettlement Programme Benefits Families”, *The Herald*, 3 July 2000.

³⁰ Ministry of Lands, Agriculture, and Rural Resettlement, *Land Reform and Resettlement Programme: Revised Phase II* (Harare: Government of Zimbabwe, April 2001).

³¹ Centre for Housing Rights and Evictions (COHRE), *Land, Housing and Property Rights in Zimbabwe* (Geneva: COHRE, 2001), 27.

https://issuu.com/cohre/docs/cohre_missionreport_landhousingprop, available at, accessed 25 August 2016; S. Moyo, “The Interaction of Market and Compulsory Land Acquisition Processes with Social Action in Zimbabwe’s Land Reform”, Paper Presented at SAPES Trust Annual Colloquium (Harare: September 2000), 31-32.

³² S. Moyo, *A Review of Zimbabwean Agricultural Sector Following the Implementation of the Land Reform: Overall Impacts of the Fast Track Land Reform Programme*, No.1 (Harare: African Institute for Agrarian Studies, 2004).

³³ Moyo, “The Interaction of Market and Compulsory Land Acquisition Processes with Social Action in Zimbabwe’s Land Reform”, 22.

differences arose from weakness in the land acquisition data management system, made worse by the frequent changes caused by the “need to gazette most farms, which are successfully contested in courts or those whose time-bound notices and orders expired before hearings.”³⁴ These statistics serve as a vivid depiction of the magnitude of land appropriations at the time.

Table 3: Gazetted Land per Province

Province	Area (Ha)	Percent of land
Mashonaland West	1,814,270	14.65
Mashonaland East	1,402,116	11.32
Mashonaland Central	976,655	7.88
Manicaland	682,257	5.51
Midlands	1,350,483	10.9
Matabeleland North	2,043,764	16.5
Matabeleland South	2,129,171	17.19
Masvingo	1,992,158	16.08

Source: ZANU PF Conference Central Committee Report, 2003

³⁴ Moyo, *A Review of Zimbabwean Agricultural Sector following the Implementation of the Land Reform*, 45.

1.3. Problematising the FTLRP: Violence, Lawlessness and Relations

The majority of new farmers make claims that the chaotic, violent, and disorganised character of the land occupations during the FTLRP and the nature of government intervention (or lack thereof) caused property and land use conflict in the newly resettled farms, resulting in disruptions in production. Moyo asserts that the FTLRP caused a significant drop in agricultural production and food availability in particular.³⁵ He contends that the main field crops: maize, wheat, tobacco, soya beans and sunflower experienced both reduced area plantings and output volumes, especially among A2 farmers.³⁶ Tony Hawkins has indicated that from 1998 to 2008, agricultural output slumped by more than 60 percent. The estimate for 2012 was 2,100,000 tones, half of what was produced 12 years earlier.³⁷ Scholars have used different reasons to account for this decline of agricultural productivity after the land reform. Patrick Bond showed how crony capitalism destroyed agriculture and created dependency on humanitarian food aid.³⁸ Other scholars like Mahmood Mamdani contend that sanctions led to the decline in agricultural productivity.³⁹

The literature on how violence and chaos surrounds the FTLRP led to the decline of productivity is extensive.⁴⁰ Other scholars have shown how lack of equipment and inputs, lack of know-how and shortage of labour have taken a toll on Zimbabwe's agricultural sector.⁴¹ Some pointed out to drought as the cause of decline in agricultural productivity.⁴²

³⁵ *Ibid.*

³⁶ *Ibid.*

³⁷ *Daily News*, 4 November 2012, <https://www.dailynews.co.zw/articles/2012/11/04/the-cost-of-zimbabwe-s-land-reform>, accessed 5 December 2018.

³⁸ P. Bond, "An exchange between Patrick Bond and Mahmood Mamdani", *London Review of Books*, 30, 24 (2008).

³⁹ Mamdani, "Lessons of Zimbabwe", *London Review Books*, 30, 33 (2008), 67.

⁴⁰ A. Selby, "Commercial Farmers and the State: Interest Group Politics and Land Reform in Zimbabwe" (D. Phil, Oxford University, 2006); A. Hammar, B. Raftopoulos and Stig Jensen (eds), *Zimbabwe's Unfinished Business: Rethinking Land, State and Nation in the Context of Crises* and J. Alexander "Squatters', Veterans and the State in Zimbabwe" in A Hammar, B. Raftopoulos and Stig Jensen (eds), *Zimbabwe's Unfinished Business: Rethinking Land, State and Nation in the Context of Crises* (Harare: Weaver Press, 2003);

P. Bond and S. Manyanya, *Zimbabwe's Plunge: Exhausted Nationalism, Neoliberalism and the Search for Social Justice* (Pietermaritzburg: University of Natal Press, 2002).

⁴¹ J. Chaumba, *et al*, "New Politics, New Livelihoods: Changes in the Zimbabwean Low veld since the Farm Occupations of 2000", Research Paper 3, March (Brighton: Institute of Development Studies (2003), C. Richardson, *The Collapse of Zimbabwe in the Wake of the 2000–2003 Land Reforms* (Lewiston: Edwin Mellen Press, 2004) and D. Moore, "Is the Land the Economy and the Economy the Land?" Primitive Accumulation in Zimbabwe", *Journal of Contemporary African Studies*, 19, 2 (2001), 253-266.

⁴² Moyo, *et al*, "Review of the Zimbabwean Agricultural Sector Following the Implementantion of the Land Reform", 3; See also, Mamdani, "Lessons of Zimbabwe."

Studies on the FTLRP have indicated that the program has led to decreased aggregate national production. According to Ian Phimister, “much of the land has not been worked in any systematic way, with the result that tobacco and maize production has plummeted.”⁴³ Another scholar, Derman points out that the economy had become an empty shell of itself, citing how the leading export crop, tobacco, yielded 55 million tonnes for the international market in 2005, compared to 240 million tonnes prior to the FTLRP.⁴⁴ It is important to note, however, that tobacco production revived because of the increase of small scale farmers involved in tobacco production and the fact that the small-scale black farmers had gained experience and interest in growing tobacco.⁴⁵ In 2014, Zimbabwe produced 217 million kilogram of tobacco, the third-largest crop on record.⁴⁶ Moyo and Scoones, *et al* trace the change in total output of various crops since 2000 using national figures and their findings show a general downward trend with exceptions such as cotton, small grains, round nuts and beans.⁴⁷ Due to the interdependencies established between the agricultural and the manufacturing industries, by 2003 this contraction of the agricultural sector also saw the manufacturing sector and the entire economy shrink by 15 percent.⁴⁸ Even the ruling party’s 2013, economic blueprint the Zimbabwe Agenda for Sustainable Socio-Economic Transformation (ZIMASSET) demonstrated the need to restore the agricultural sector so that Zimbabwe would re-emerge as the “Bread Basket of Southern Africa”.⁴⁹

This thesis will show that the lawlessness that characterised the FTLRP had serious detrimental consequences for the success of the program, in particular, and on agricultural production in general. The anarchy that had begun during the occupation of farms kept on haunting the new farmers. Furthermore, the lack of planning and general disorder that characterised the FTLRP also became emblematic of the deterioration of relations amongst

⁴³ I. Phimister, “*Rambai Makashinga* (Continue to Endure)”: Zimbabwe’s Unending Crisis”, *South African Historical Journal*, 54, 1 (2005), 113.

⁴⁴ B. Derman, “After Zimbabwe’s Fast Track Land Reform: Preliminary Observations on the near Future of Zimbabwe’s Efforts to Resist Globalisation” (Montpelier, 2006).

⁴⁵ “In Zimbabwe Land Takeover, a Golden Lining”, *New York Times*, 20 November 2012, See also, “Tobacco Boom Shows Success of the Land Reform”, *The Herald*, 28 June 2013 and “Zimbabwe’s Tobacco Industry Continues to Grow”, *Zimbabwe Independent*, 6 June 2014.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*

⁴⁷ S. Moyo, “Three Decades of Agrarian Reform in Zimbabwe: Changing Agrarian Relations”, *Journal of Peasant Studies*, 38, 3 (2011), 493-531 and Scoones, *et al*, *Zimbabwe’s Land Reform Myths and Realities*.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*

⁴⁹ ZIMASSET is an economic blueprint that was crafted by the ZANU PF government in 2013 as part of its developmental and political campaign initiative. It was enshrined in the party’s manifesto as part of its long-term development agenda.

the new occupiers with regards to use and control of farm property left by the former white farmers. The Zimbabwe government's inability to provide a policy framework to spearhead the land reform program in tandem with the failure to support the new farmers with finances and farming facilities provided an environment conducive to emergence of conflict amongst new farmers and other stakeholders on the fast track farms. However, in some instances, this led to cooperation amongst the new farmers.

Table 4: Agricultural Production Trends (000 tonnes): 1990s average versus 2000s.

Crop	1990s Avg	2002/3	2005/6	2006/7	2007/8	2009/10	2010/11
Maize (percent)	1,685.6	1,058.8 (737.2)	1,484.8 (711.9)	952.6 (743.5)	575.0 (774.2)	1,322.66 (721.5)	1,451.6 (713.9)
Wheat	248.4	122.4 (750.7)	241.9 (72.6)	149.1 (740.0)	34.8 (786.0)	41.5 (783.3)	164.8 (75.3)
Small Grains	164.8	112.8 (731.5)	163.9 (70.6)	120 (727.2)	80.1 (751.4)	193.9 (17.7)	13.1 (147.2)
Edible Dry Beans	5.3	7.1 (34.0)	21.5 (305.7)	30 (471.7)	3.8 (728.3)	17.2 (224.5)	
Groundnuts (shelled)	86	86.5 (1.8)	83.2 (72.2)	100.2 (17.8)	131.5 (54.7)	186.2 (119.1)	230.5 (168.0)
Oilseeds Soya Beans	92.8	41.1 (755.6)	70.3 (724.3)	112.3 (21.0)	48.3 (747.9)	70.2 (724.3)	84.2 (79.3)
Sunflower	41.2	16.9 (758.9)	16.7 (759.3)	25.7 (737.6)	5.5 (786.7)	14 (766.1)	11.5 (772.1)
Key export							
Tobacco	198.3	93.5 (752.8)	44.5 (777.6)	79 (760.2)	69.8 (764.8)	123 (757.1)	177.8 (710.3)
Cotton	207.8	159.5 (723.2)	207.9 (0.1)	235.0 (13.1)	226.4 (9.0)	260 (25.1)	220.1 (5.9)

Source: S. Moyo, Three Decades of Agrarian Reform in Zimbabwe: Changing Agrarian Relations”, 519. Moyo cited Ministry of Agriculture, Mechanisation and Irrigation Development as his source

The FTLRP has, therefore, provoked a range of responses, focussing on whether the program was a success or failure. This was further extended to include some scholars who examined the violence that prevailed during the FTLRP and considered the plight of white farmers and black farm workers.⁵⁰ Brian Raftopoulos, for example, argues that land reform has not been a complete failure however, the reform has not ended the land question. Rather, it has raised a whole series of new issues pertaining to land reform that confront Zimbabweans.⁵¹ One of the unresolved questions has to do with lawlessness which has caused lack of security amongst the new beneficiaries. Another issue is the inheritance and use of farm property left behind by former white owners.⁵² The Zimbabwe government had neither the zeal to protect the new farmers they parcelled land to nor the money or the capacity to provide infrastructure to the new farmers. This contributed to conflicts arising amongst land beneficiaries. In cases where A2 and A1 farmers were allocated land on the same farm, serious problems of management and ownership of assets arose. In most instances the A2 farmers ended up inheriting most of the farm assets and refused to share their usage with A1 farmers.⁵³ Given the importance of such equipment to agricultural production and land use, new farmers have continued to fight over access to ownership of the farm infrastructure.

The above are some of the circumstances that created conflict over usage of farm property and equipment. The new official demarcations that were introduced after the land reform was regularised, meant that some of the farm property was now “owned” by specific plot owners and fell outside the geographical boundaries of other occupants. However, most of these new farmers have continued to claim ownership and right of use of such property, including

⁵⁰ Examples of such scholars include: B. Rutherford, *Working on the Margins: Black Workers, White Farmers in Post-Colonial Zimbabwe* (Harare: Weaver Press, 2001); B. Rutherford, “Commercial Farm Workers and the Politics of (Dis) Placement in Zimbabwe: Colonialism, Liberation and Democracy”, *Journal of Agrarian Studies*, 1, 4 (2001), A. Hartnack ““My Life got Lost”: Farm workers and Displacement in Zimbabwe”, *Journal of Contemporary African Studies*, 23, 2 (2006), 173- 192 and G. Magaramombe, “Rural Poverty: Commercial farm Workers and Land Reform in Zimbabwe”, Paper Presented at the SARP Conference on Land Reform and Poverty Alleviation in Southern Africa (Pretoria, April 2001).

⁵¹ B. Raftopoulos, “The State in Crisis Authoritarian Nationalist, Selective Citizenship and Democracy in Zimbabwe”, in A. Hammer, B. Raftopoulos and S. Jensen (eds), *Zimbabwe Unfinished Business, Rethinking Land, State and Nation in the context of crises* (Harare: Weaver Press, 2003), 190.

⁵² By property, this research refers to farm infrastructure left by white farmers, that includes fixed assets like greenhouses, produce grading complexes, tobacco barns, irrigation systems, dams, milk parlours, pigsties, compounds, grinding mills, silos and grading and movable assets like tractors, combine harvesters, lorries and carriers.

⁵³ Matondi, *Zimbabwe’s Fast Track Land Reform*, 171.

tobacco barns, dams, grading sheds and workers compounds. Conflict thus arose amongst many new farmers over the right to use farm property taken in different forms, sometimes spilling over into court cases and sometimes into violence. Some farmers have used their financial strength to have an advantage over other farmers whilst others have drawn upon their political connections. Meanwhile, some war veterans and peasants have sought to defend their rights of use by taking advantage of their claims as forerunners of the land reform.

1.4. Background and Historiography of Land Reform in Zimbabwe

1.4.1 Historical aspects of the Land question and the Historiography of the Colonial Economy and Colonial Land Alienation

The racialised land imbalance that existed at independence had a long colonial history. It was created by the deliberate dislocation of Africans from fertile land into marginal areas by the use of force and successive legislations imposed by the colonial government. By 1894, the colonial government had established reserves meant for African settlement and in 1898 the British South Africa Company (BSAC) officially sanctioned the use of force in establishing a racial solution to the land issue.⁵⁴ According to the 1899 Order in Council, “the Council shall assign to the natives land sufficient for their occupation, whether as tribes or portions of tribes, and suitable for agriculture and pastoral requirement.”⁵⁵ This was a euphemism for the policy of forcibly resettling Africans in reserves. By 1905, under this new land allocation policy, there were about 60 Natives Reserves (NRs), occupying about 22 percent of Southern Rhodesia, and nearly half of the African population of 700,000 now lived in reserves.⁵⁶ They had by then lost approximately 16 million hectares to the settlers. By 1920, the NRs constituted an area of 8.7 million hectares while the number of white farms (Company/freehold) reached 2, 500 encompassing an acreage of approximately 15 million hectares.⁵⁷

The allocation of Africans to marginal zones and other discriminatory policies were meant to protect European farmers; what Robin Palmer called the squeezing out process.⁵⁸ This control of land subsequently became the key mechanism for ensuring European political and

⁵⁴ R. Palmer, *Land and Racial Domination in Rhodesia* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977), 77.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*

⁵⁶ H. Rolin, *Rolin's Rhodesia* (Bulawayo: Books of Rhodesia, 1978).

⁵⁷ Palmer, *Land and Racial Domination in Rhodesia*, 79.

⁵⁸ *Ibid*, 80.

economic dominance over Africans. In January 1925, the Rhodesian government appointed the Morris Carter Land Commission to examine ways in which the growing land problem could be resolved.⁵⁹ The Commission presented its Report in November 1925, recommending slight increases in land allocation to both the settlers and Africans. This report became the basis for the 1931 Land Apportionment Act (LAA), which codified the racial division of land in Rhodesia.⁶⁰ Having contentiously and conveniently “proven” that it was the “irrational” behaviour of Africans and not its own laws that was the root cause of the land problem, the administration began using a combination of persuasion and force to ensure compliance with its policies. Chiefs and headmen were rewarded with money, regalia and other tokens of state appreciation if they persuaded their people to peacefully comply with the provisions of the various land Acts. The period 1935 to 1955 saw the forcible removal of 67,000 African families from their traditional lands into new NRs to make way for white-owned farms on state woodlands.⁶¹ By and large, the LAA of 1931 and Native Land Husbandry Act (NLHA) of 1951 created land for whites while blacks were pauperised.⁶²

In December, 1962, the hard-line conservative party of the settlers, the Rhodesian Front (RF) took office. Well supported by white farmers, the RF mandate was to pull Rhodesia out of the Federation, cut links with Britain, and entrench white minority rule. In 1969, the RF brought in the Land Tenure Act.⁶³ The primary aim of the Land Tenure Act was to update the LAA, providing even more inflexible regulations. The main new feature was the re-division of Rhodesia into roughly equal African and white settler areas. The Special Native Purchase Areas and Unreserved categories were now formally abolished.⁶⁴ The settler area was also

⁵⁹ S. J. Ndlovu, “Mapping Cultural and Colonial Encounters, 1880s to 1930s”, in B. Raftopoulos and A. Mlambo, *Becoming Zimbabwe: A History from the Pre-colonial Period to 2008* (Harare: Weaver Press, 2009), 66.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*

⁶¹ *Ibid.*

⁶² The LAA remained the cornerstone of colonial land policy. It banned African land ownership outside the reserves except in prescribed areas. As a result, there was serious land shortages, land degradation and deterioration of African agricultural productivity. The act was amended several times. In trying to deal with the effects of LAA, the NHA was passed, which reduced the number of cattle owned and land utilised according to carrying capacity. For more on this see, for example; D. S. Moore, *Suffering for Territory: Race, Place and Power in Zimbabwe* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2005) and I. Phimister, “Rethinking the Reserves: Southern Rhodesia’s Land Husbandry Act Reviewed”, *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 19, 2 (1993), 225- 239.

⁶³ J. Herbst, “The Dilemmas of Land Policy in Zimbabwe” in S. Baynham (ed), *Zimbabwe in Transition* (Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell International, 1992), 129.

⁶⁴ For more on this also see: V. E. M. Machingaidze, “Agrarian Change from above: The Southern Rhodesia Native Land Husbandry Act and African Response”, *The International Journal of African*

protected by a number of new constitutional safeguards, instituted to prevent the legal abolition of land segregation.⁶⁵

The Second *Chimurenga* initially began in 1966 as primarily urban forms of protest against an increasingly repressive state. Land became one of the rallying cries of peasant conscientisation, as peasants were well aware of local land grievances.⁶⁶ The guerrillas' task was to elevate the personal and local discontent of the peasants to a national level, and to make them aware that the war was being fought to redress the historical experience of land dispossession. Africans did not take the appropriation of land lightly and land was a key grievance of the second *Chimurenga/Zvimurenga*.⁶⁷ The NLHA and efforts to enforce it had led to the emergence of a new generation of African nationalists, and a new brand of nationalism that would culminate in war within the next decade.¹² The war ended in 1980 with the signing of the Lancaster House agreement and land was central during the negotiations. But the clauses of the Lancaster House Constitution (LHC) failed to redress colonial land inequalities.⁶⁸

Given its deep roots in the history of Zimbabwe, the land question has been a dominant theme in Zimbabwe's historiography. Diverse ideologies as well as scholarly representations have added value to the historiography on the land question and have provided a very broad explanation of the land issue in Zimbabwe. The historiography on land and land use is rich. It is represented by scholars such as, Jocelyn Alexander, Ian Phimister, Henry Moyana, Robin Palmer, Neil Parsons and Sam Moyo.⁶⁹ Central to the historiography on land are works that

Historical Studies, 24, 3 (1991), 557-588 and W. R. Duggan, "The Native Land Husbandry Act of 1951 and the Rural African Middle Class of Southern Rhodesia", *African Affairs*, 79, 315 (1980), 227-239,

⁶⁵ A. Cheater, "The Ideology of "Communal" Land Tenure in Zimbabwe: Mythogenesis Enacted?" *Africa*, 60, 2 (1990), 188.

⁶⁶ For different views on the war, also see: S. J. Ndlovu-Gatsheni, "Rethinking *Chimurenga* and *Gukurahundi* in Zimbabwe: A Critique of Partisan National History", *African Studies Review*, 55, 3 (2012), 1-26; F. Chung, *Re-Living the Second Chimurenga: Memories from the Liberation Struggle in Zimbabwe* (Harare: Weaver Press, 2006) and B. M. Mupfuvi, "Land to the People: Peasants and Nationalism in the Development of Land Ownership Structure in Zimbabwe from Pre-Colonialism to the Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) period" (PhD, University of Salford, 2014).

⁶⁷ To appreciate the part played by land alienation in the liberation struggle see variously, T. Ranger, *Peasant Consciousness and Guerilla War in Zimbabwe* (London: James Currey, 1985) and H.V. Moyana, *The Political Economy of Land in Zimbabwe* (Gweru: Mambo Press, 1984).

⁶⁸ For a further discussion of the Lancaster House Negotiations, see, J. Davidow, *Peace in Southern Africa: The Lancaster House Conference on Rhodesia, 1979* (London: Westview, 1984).

⁶⁹ J. Alexander, "The Historiography of Land in Zimbabwe: Strengths, Silences, and Questions", *Safundi: The Journal of South African and American Studies*, 8, 2 (2007), 183-98; I. Phimister, *An*

focus on a thorough examination of the economic rationalities of settler control of land. Robin Palmer's publication, *Land and Racial Domination in Rhodesia*, is a good example of this.⁷⁰ This work is one of the ground breaking texts on the subject of settler land alienation, eviction, and racial discrimination. Published in the 1970s, Palmer's work delivered a much needed account of agricultural history of the white settler colony. It offered a refreshing analysis that integrated changes in land policies with the essential element of the impact of these changes on the development of African agriculture. This was a welcome historiographical development in a period that was dominated by publications like Lewis H Gann's *A History of Southern Rhodesia* which had made very little attempts to explain developments within African society.⁷¹ It was in such an intellectual environment that Palmer's book provided a detailed analysis of the formulation and implementation of land policy in Southern Rhodesia between 1890 and 1936. It explained how white settlers acquired most of the best land and how they consolidated their acquisitions. Palmer analyses Zimbabwe's colonial land tenure and the corresponding phases in the suppression of the country's African population; the destruction of flourishing African agriculture; the creation of a class of African wage labour integrated into the white economy; the segregation of African land and agriculture and the strict limitation of African opportunity in the white economy.

Most works on land in Zimbabwe have, therefore, used Palmer's position on the history of land and land alienation as a starting point from which to examine the land question. They use his explanation of the expropriation of African lands and African grievance to account for the nature and character of land struggles in Zimbabwe right up to the post-2000 land reform period. Alexander's describes *Land and Racial Domination in Rhodesia* as a "prime exemplar" of the revisionist writing that came to dominate the historiography of the 1970s and which so carefully documented the processes of appropriation and discrimination."⁷² This

Economic and Social History of Zimbabwe 1890-1948: Capital Accumulation and Class Struggle (Harlow: Longman, 1988); Moyana, *The Political Economy of Land in Zimbabwe*.

J. Alexander, *The Unsettled Land State-Making and the Politics of Land in Zimbabwe, 1893-2003* (Harare: Weaver Press, 2006); R. Palmer and N. Parsons (eds), *The Roots of Rural Poverty in Central and Southern Africa* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977); Palmer, *Land and Racial Domination in Rhodesia* and S. Moyo, "The Land Question", in I. Mandaza (ed), *Zimbabwe: The Political Economy of Transition, 1980-1986* (Dakar: Codesria, 1986),165.

⁷⁰ Palmer, *Land and Racial Domination in Rhodesia*.

⁷¹ L. H. Gann, *A History of Southern Rhodesia: Early Days to 1934* (London: Chatto and Windus, 1965).

⁷² Alexander, "The Historiography of Land in Zimbabwe."

description befits the degree and nature of the influence that the work has had on understanding Zimbabwe's history in general and of the FTLRP in general. Such influences, in a large measure, are present in this study especially with regards to unpacking the government's utilisation of the appropriation claims in their post 2000 land grab.

It is important to note that Palmer's work is not the only contribution that provides a different perspective to the writings of such scholars as Gann.⁷³ Critical political economy studies or economic and social history works like Phimister's, "Zimbabwean Economic and Social Historiography since 1970" and Duncan Clarke's PhD thesis, "The Political Economy of Discrimination and Underdevelopment in Rhodesia with special reference to the African worker, 1940-1973", also provided an alternative view of Rhodesia's history.⁷⁴ Although these works do not focus specifically on land, they demonstrate the shift in historiography which positions Palmer's work. Such shifts provide, for this study, a much more nuanced background of the land question which helps in positioning the FTLRP in its proper historical context.

By using a regional historiographical perspective, Palmer and Parsons offered a plausible step in determining the causes of contemporary social and economic dysfunctions in central and Southern Africa in *The Roots of Rural Poverty in Central and Southern Africa*.⁷⁵ The different contributions in this book focus on Southern African pre-colonial economies and their alteration under the impact of white rule. Such a background is important in providing for this study, a fuller understanding of the land question and its origins in Zimbabwe and the subsequent land reform crisis in post-colonial Zimbabwe. As such, a majority of these works are significant historiographical contributions that offer an important historical explanation of the causes and process of Zimbabwe's FTLRP, especially the historical challenges to agrarian transformation. The farm invasions from 2000 onwards and the chaotic land redistribution exercise have been mostly understood and analysed against this historical background.

⁷³ Such scholars as W. Barber, L. H. Gann and others, were mostly informed by modernisation theory, and viewed colonial capitalism as progressive, even for Africans.

⁷⁴ I. Phimister, "Zimbabwean Economic and Social Historiography since 1970", *African Affairs*, 78, 311 (1979), 253- 268 and D. Clarke, "The Political Economy of Discrimination and Underdevelopment in Rhodesia with Special Reference to the African Worker, 1940-1973" (PhD, St Andrews University, 1975).

⁷⁵ Palmer and Parsons (eds), *The Roots of Rural Poverty in Central and Southern Africa*.

The major benefit of this historiography for this study is that the bulk of these publications have traced the role of race and class in the evolution of the land question in Zimbabwe. They have explored the extent to which the era of colonial domination racialised the land issue, a theme which the post-colonial government led by Robert Mugabe fully utilised to justify the land invasions during the FTLRP. The bulk of the works demonstrate that race had always been used by the colonial authorities as a decisive factor in land acquisition and allocation throughout the colonial period. This is a line that the post-colonial state uses in its dealing with land during the FTLRP in defence of its campaign to drive whites from the land from 2000 onwards.

1.5. Post-Independence Historiography on the Land Question

Post-independence Zimbabwean studies of the land question have tackled the issue from many different perspectives informed by the direction the government took to deal with land redistribution in the three decades since independence in 1980. The majority of works that look at the period between 1980 and 1990 have focused their attention on a review of the performance of land redistribution during this period. They reflect that not only was the pace of the market led reform strategy slow, it also delivered marginal, low productivity land and led to the overburdening of an already financially constrained state.⁷⁶ They have also focused their attention on the restrictions of the Lancaster House agreement on the newly independent government's ability to effect any changes that would allow them to speed up the pace of land reform.

However, for those texts written in the post-colonial period that highlight the colonial era, the influence of political economy and social history paradigms continued to be present. These include Henry Moyana's *The Political Economy of Land*, and as part of a broader perspective, Phimister's, *A Social and Economic History of Zimbabwe*.⁷⁷ Like Palmer's book Moyana's work also focused on the history of colonial land alienation, the racialisation of land under various colonial laws, including the LAA of 1931, the role of African land grievances in fuelling the armed struggle, the Lancaster House Constitution's role in the

⁷⁶ Examples of such works include Moyo, "The Land Question in Zimbabwe" and S. Moyo, and P. Yeros, "Land Occupations and Land Reform in Zimbabwe: Towards the National Democratic Revolution", in S. Moyo and P. Yeros (eds), *Reclaiming the Land: The Resurgence of Rural Movements in Africa, Asia and Latin America* (London: Zed Books, 2005).

⁷⁷ Moyana, *The Political Economy of Land in Zimbabwe* and Phimister, *An Economic and Social History of Zimbabwe 1890-1948*.

immediate post-colonial land reform process.⁷⁸ The work discusses the many theories of racism and segregation propounded by the defenders of the colonial government, as well as the rationalisation for white rule and the economic exploitation of African people and land. This text is a clear cut demonstration of the influence of the political economy paradigm in Zimbabwe's historiography on land and, like so many works of its kind, it offered important explanations and highlights of the major historical issues on land and land use in Zimbabwe which include land expropriation, land and animal husbandry and the creation of the African peasantry.⁷⁹ These are important junctures that open up, for this study, a historically important framework for a discussion on land and land use.

Phimister's, *An Economic and Social History of Zimbabwe*, is also a comprehensive text in Zimbabwe's historiography. It is a refreshing read for this period as it departs from the dominant patriotic or nationalist history undertones dominant during the time. It packages the story of African struggles in colonial Zimbabwe which is central in not only understanding Zimbabwe's political economy, but also in understanding some of the post 2000 dynamics of the land struggles.⁸⁰ The book has a strong Marxist perspective and gives an account of the struggles of ordinary men and women in the countryside, the mines and industrial areas against colonial capitalist structures and domination. These are some of the themes that the Zimbabwean government used to justify the FTLRP and they provide an important perspective that this study uses for unpacking some key debates on this controversial program.

Reviewing the emerging historiographies on land from approximately 2000 onwards, Tinashe Nyamunda identifies how the majority of works have expanded into "confronting the unfolding political and economic crisis following the "fast track" land reform."⁸¹ Therefore, there has been a lot of work published after 2000 that has provided an interesting take on Zimbabwe's land issue, igniting a fierce debate on the merits and demerits of Zimbabwe's

⁷⁸ Moyana, *The Political Economy of Land in Zimbabwe*.

⁷⁹ Other such works include, Moyo, "The Land Question in Zimbabwe." ; S. Moyo, "The Political Economy of Land Acquisition and Redistribution in Zimbabwe, 1990-1999", *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 26, 1 (2000), 5- 28; S. Moyo, "Land Concentration and Accumulation after Redistributive Reform in Post- Settler Zimbabwe", *Review of African Political Economy*, 38, 128, (2011), 257- 276; Moyo, "Three Decades of Agrarian Reform in Zimbabwe." and M. Rukuni and C. K. Eicher (eds), *Zimbabwe's Agriculture Revolution* (Harare: University of Zimbabwe Publications, 1994).

⁸⁰ Phimister, *An Economic and Social History of Zimbabwe 1890-1948*.

⁸¹ T. Nyamunda, "Insights into Independent Zimbabwe: Some Historiographical Reflections", *Strategic Review for Southern Africa*, 36, 1 (2014), 76.

FTLRP. Most of these works project the extremely separating influence of the debate between what Roger Southall describes as a “minority position that argues that the radical restructuring of agrarian capital has served as a progressive tendency that has opened up opportunities for black small scale farmers” versus “a majority position that insists that land redistribution has dramatically undercut agricultural production, thereby severely undermining food security for most Zimbabweans.”⁸² By and large, therefore, scholarship on Zimbabwe’s FTLRP has been polarised either in support or against the program. This latter position “brings to the fore violent state action in instigating land occupations and in thwarting political opposition to “fast track.”⁸³ The former position mostly represents a Zimbabwean nationalist perspective that offers a cautious endorsement of the FTLRP, even if critical of the motivations, means and manner of ZANU PF’s post-2000 land reform program. On the other hand, the latter position is largely associated with academics, who have strongly criticised ZANU PF’s transformation of postcolonial democracy into a brutally authoritarian regime at war with the majority of its people.⁸⁴ What these works do not do is to analyse the FTLRP from the perspective of relations and the anarchy that kept on affecting the new land beneficiaries, a position that this study intends to do.

In the early years of the FTLRP, debates oscillated between celebrating the warranted reversal of colonial land dispossession and condemning the vicious and totalitarian indifference to the rule of law, particularly property rights, that it involved. These debates concentrated on the direct political aims of the FTLRP, selectively emphasising aspects such as “violence”, “disorder”, and “chaos”. A majority of the works also claimed that the ruling ZANU PF elite and the state made use of the FTLRP for electoral support and that only ZANU PF followers benefited. The scholarship focusing on land occupations has followed a similar path – with some scholars praising the program and others taking a critical approach to it.

Early land reform works have been produced by different scholars; Amanda Hammer and Brian Raftopoulos, Alexander, Donald Moore, Moyo and Paris Yeros and Joseph Chaumba. Hammer and Raftopolus’ book, *Rethinking Land, State and Nation in the Context of Crisis*, has a refreshing take on Zimbabwe’s land issue which takes due account of the historical

⁸² R. Southall, “Too Soon to tell? Land Reform in Zimbabwe”, *Africa Spectrum*, 46, 3 (2011).

⁸³ *Ibid.*

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*

roots of Zimbabwe's crisis.⁸⁵ For the two, the crises has many sides even as it focuses on the intricate interchange of developments since the crunch constitutional referendum result in February 2000 which was considered by many as a defeat of the ruling party, ZANU PF. Hammer and Raftopolous thus argue that the crisis should be best understood as a complex set of historically defined, interconnected and reciprocally reinforcing crises that need to be unpacked and analysed in relation to one another.⁸⁶ For both authors, the persistent violence of the state supports a dictatorial nationalism whose self-serving answers to the land question are designed to reward some and punish others.⁸⁷ These are key observations on the FTLRP and they provide a platform for this thesis to unpack the continued violence that also affected the new farmers. It provides a stage to analyse why the violence was deployed and packaged in the manner that it was. Chaumba *et al* examines the composition of the new settler communities; trace the ways in which new livelihood opportunities are differentiated by age, gender and wealth; and explore contrasting motivations for land occupation. In their work they also investigate the emerging power relations in the new resettlement areas by examining the compromise and tensions between war veterans, new committee structures, traditional authorities and new local elites.⁸⁸ These are some of the issues that this study grapples with.

Alexander's book, *The Unsettled Lands*, argues that to understand Zimbabwe's land crisis, an appreciation of the specific details of the connections between state making and the politics of land from the very beginning of the Rhodesian state, is crucial.⁸⁹ This is an important argument, for Zimbabwe as it demonstrates how legacies of past policies and contests over land and state remain close to the surface. Alexander offers important historiographical reflections on the state and land use, which assists with buttressing perspectives on the land question that this study grapples with. The biggest strength of Alexander's work is her ability

⁸⁵ A. Hammer, *et al*, "Zimbabwe's Unfinished Business: Rethinking Land, State and Nation", in A Hammar, B. Raftopoulus and Stig Jensen (eds), *Zimbabwe's Unfinished Business: Rethinking Land, State and Nation in the Context of Crises* (Harare: Weaver Press, 2003); 1- 48; Alexander, *The Unsettled Land State-Making and the Politics of Land in Zimbabwe, 1893–2003*; Moore, *Suffering for Territory*, S. Moyo and P. Yeros, "The Radicalised State: Zimbabwe's Interrupted Revolution." *Review of African Political Economy*, 34, 111 (2007), 103- 21; S. Moyo, "The Land Occupation Movement and Democratisation in Zimbabwe: Contradictions of Neo-liberalism", *Journal of International Studies*, 30, 2 (2001), 311- 330 and J. Chaumba, *et al*, "New Politics, New Livelihoods: Agrarian Change in Zimbabwe", *Review of African Political Economy*, 98 (2003), 587.

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*

⁸⁸ Chaumba, *et al*, "New Politics, New Livelihoods: Agrarian Change in Zimbabwe."

⁸⁹ Alexander, *The Unsettled Land State-Making and the Politics of Land in Zimbabwe, 1893–2003*.

to understand the land question from its genesis in the colonial period and the impact of the movement from one policy angle to another. Donald Moore's book, *Suffering for Territory*, combines a selection of ethnographical studies of land struggle with a theoretical analysis of modes of power, subjectivity, and territory in Zimbabwe using a case study of Kaerezi.⁹⁰ Moore's work is not only a history of land, but also engages with key themes like colonialism, nationalism, gender and conservation. In addition, it contributes substantially to our conceptualisation of the state and state power, development, and rural livelihoods in general. Alexander and Moore's works assist this thesis with a nuanced overview of the perpetuation of land dispossession from the black population. However, in as much as their work provides an important historical perspective on Zimbabwe's land question and analyses the violence and economic decline and lawlessness that prevailed during and after the FTLRP, particularly "the shifts in the nature of authority over the land", it does not pay attention to the impact of the shifts in the relations of the new occupants which is a niche that this dissertation effectively accounts for.

Moyo and Yeros have also taken a celebratory stance of Zimbabwe's land movement. Indeed, most of Moyo's works from 2000 to 2002 have mainly justified FTLRP as a legitimate program that satisfied the land hunger of the peasantry.⁹¹ This position is cognisant of the fact that the same peasantry have largely been affected by the general state of lawlessness that have continued after the FTLRP. Again, Moyo and Yeros' work make a strong argument that the war veterans association is an organic organisation that represents the rural masses.⁹² As such, they present the organisation as largely impartial in its role of mobilising communities for land invasions, as opposed to how it has been presented by other scholars as simply a key architect of ZANU PF party machinations in its political campaigns. This representation of the war veterans' body by Moyo and Yeros is contrary to a majority of the findings made by this study. This thesis contends that the war veterans' body was largely an extension of the ZANU PF party and it, in many instances, carried out the bidding of its political master. It maintains that even its handling of affairs between the new farmers was essentially partisan with decisions skewed in favour of those farmers who were regarded as pro- ZANU PF.

⁹⁰ Moore, *Suffering for Territory: Race, Place and Power in Zimbabwe*.

⁹¹ Moyo, "The Land Occupation Movement and Democratisation in Zimbabwe: Contradictions of Neo-liberalism"; Moyo and Yeros, "The Radicalised State: Zimbabwe's Interrupted Revolution."

⁹² Moyo and Yeros, "Land Occupations and Land Reform in Zimbabwe: Towards the National Democratic Revolution."

Another publication that represents the war veterans as a progressive, peasant driven body is Wilbert Zvakanyorwa Sadomba's, *War Veterans in Zimbabwe's Revolution*.⁹³ The book draws on Sadomba's first-hand experiences as a farm occupier in Mazowe. In it, he argues that the spirit mediums, peasants and war veterans instigated and conducted land takeovers in the period 1998–2000.⁹⁴ For him, this popular grassroots venture was, from 2000 onwards, promptly appropriated by the state and ruling ZANU PF political elites for self-serving political gain and economic corruption.⁹⁵ Sadomba makes a compelling argument that while the seizures were eventually co-opted by ZANU PF, they started out as a coalition of veterans and the rural and urban poor. Sadomba's book is essential for this study because it provides a unique position on the origins of and processes accompanying the land reform. It also provides a better picture of the war veterans by unpacking some of the key characteristics that made them central figures to the FTLRP. This consideration is useful for this study because of its attempt to try and understand the many representations of the war veterans. The book provides another dimension of the reform process that this study has encountered in Mashonaland Central Province. Sadomba reports how other war veterans later lost land they had acquired in Mazowe to ZANU PF and state elites.⁹⁶ The same kind of findings are made by this study, which unravels the centrality of evictions and lawlessness that made war veterans and other new farmers vulnerable to the politically powerful individuals.

Scoones *et al* in their book challenges somewhat overstated “myths” that have dominated representations of Zimbabwe post- 2000 land reform. For them the controversial land invasions were not a complete economic disaster and the authors are careful not to characterise it as a success either.⁹⁷ The study provided an analysis of the new livelihood paths that have materialised after the land reform and highlights how some of the newly resettled farmers have made fairly large investments on their land, and how a process of “accumulation from below” is already underway. Scoones *et al* argue that far from being a disaster, small-scale farmers had begun to turn the situation around. Many were improving the output of the farms they had taken over and some were outperforming the white farmers

⁹³ Z.W. Sadomba, *War Veterans in Zimbabwe's Revolution: Challenging Neo-Colonialism & Settler & International Capital* (Harare: Weaver Press, 2011).

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*

⁹⁵ M. Tendi, “Nationalism and the Betrayed Revolution in Zimbabwe”, *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 44, 1 (2018), 194.

⁹⁶ Sadomba, *War Veterans in Zimbabwe's Revolution: Challenging Neo-Colonialism & Settler & International Capital*.

⁹⁷ Scoones, *et al*, *Zimbabwe's Land Reform: Myths & Realities*.

they had displaced.⁹⁸ This study takes a different perspective from Scoones and argues that the farmers have generally struggled and at the centre of their problems has been the nature of their relations, which have principally been shaped in an environment of lawlessness.

Another publication that celebrates the FTLRP is Joseph Hanlon, Jeannette Manjengwa and Teresa Smart's *Zimbabwe Takes Back its Land*.⁹⁹ The book analyses, inter alia, how the newly resettled farmers have invested on their land and how FTLRP has enhanced women's access to land. Although it is critical about various deficiencies of the FTLRP process and the subsequent agrarian reforms, like many of the works that celebrates the success of this period, the book is largely uncritical of the reform process and especially of its outcomes. The authors' approaches involve historicising the land question and analysing existing statistical data. Their biggest weakness, however, is that their arguments mainly focus on the success and efficacy of the recent land reform and gives little notice to evidence on the ground depicting serious challenges of the reform process. The research also pays little attention to the brutality of the land grabs, ignoring the human rights abuses that took place and the illegality of the process. Instead the authors concentrate on gathering evidence from the new farmers they visited and looked at their "successes" as presented and represented by them. The title of the book and its dominant narrative also obscure the many conflicts that took place, and continue to play out, at the local and national level, which extend beyond simple contradictions of black versus white. As my work attempts to demonstrate, land conflicts went beyond the race card as dispossession became a black on black affair through evictions of land beneficiaries by other powerful black individuals.

The discourses of belonging and recovery of ancestral lands significantly influenced the way land reform unfolded and how claims over land were made by people from diverse geographical backgrounds. Examples of such works comes from Mujere and Fontein who have both produced ethnographic work on the meaning of land reform for different actors.¹⁰⁰ They both analyse the conflicts between autochthons and migrants over the control of the new resettlement areas. It is important to note that histories of forced removals and

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*

⁹⁹ J. Hanlon, J. M. Manjengwa and T. Smart, *Zimbabwe Takes Back its Land* (Virginia: Kumarian Press, 2013).

¹⁰⁰ J. Fontein, *Remaking Mutirikwi: Landscape, Water and Belonging in Southern Zimbabwe* (New York: James Currey, 2015); J. Mujere, "Land, Graves and Belonging: Land Reform and the Politics of Belonging in Newly Resettled farms in Gutu, 2000- 2009", in L. Cliffe *et al*, *Outcomes of Post 2000 Fast track Land Reform Zimbabwe* (New York: Routledge, 2013), 217-238.

autochthonous claims together with an element of belonging influenced the way the land occupations unfolded in the area. These claims played a part in shaping relations that have emerged amongst new farmers.

Works on the FTLRP has also given a fair amount of attention to its effects on the former white owners of land. Rory Pilosof and Angus Selby have both contributed work in this regard. Pilosof's book "provides a very direct means to engage with the trauma of the land occupations" and he does that effectively by using oral testimonies from white farmers, memoirs written by white farmers about the land invasions and analysis of white farmer interviews.¹⁰¹ It also accounts for the context for violence and lawlessness which is utilised by this thesis.¹⁰² By and large, the same kind of lawlessness and chaos that Pilosof grapples with as it affected the white farmers is also handled by this thesis. The only difference is that such lawlessness and chaos was now directed towards the new farmers who had initially benefited from it. Selby explored the collapse of white farming sector in the face of the land invasions and how the remnants of white farming sector were rendered powerless.¹⁰³ This analysis of the position of white farmers by Selby also became the same scenario for new farmers who replaced them which is a central theme pursued in this thesis.

Charles Laurie's book, *The Land Reform Deception*, is critical of the FTLRP. His work challenges the portrayal of land redistribution in Zimbabwe as a sincere exercise by the government to address colonial-era racialised land inequalities.¹⁰⁴ It provides a detailed analysis of the emergence of the land redistribution exercise and how it was conducted. It focuses on the period from 2000 to 2008 and analyses what it describes as government seizure of commercial farms "using illegal and violent methods against a largely unarmed population of farmers and farm workers."¹⁰⁵ Laurie details the changing composition of the land occupiers and the shifts in their motives, the range of often violent tactics they used, and some of the responses of white farmers to these confrontations. His analysis of what he calls different "protection schemes", which some white farmers found themselves negotiating with different land occupiers and leaders within ZANU PF, is very useful. The concept of protection schemes feeds into the argument raised in this thesis that attempts at cooperation

¹⁰¹ Pilosof, *The Unbearable Whiteness of Being, Farmers Voices from Zimbabwe*.

¹⁰² *Ibid.*

¹⁰³ Selby, "Commercial Farmers and the State: Interest Group Politics and Land Reform in Zimbabwe."

¹⁰⁴ Laurie, *The Land Reform Deception: Political Opportunism in Zimbabwe's Land Seizure Era*.

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.*

by many of the remaining white farmers were hinged upon their desire to seek favour amongst the new farmers in a bid to save themselves from possible eviction. Laurie's detail of the farm equipment seizure also provides for this thesis the operational environment which caused conflict amongst the new farmers as they fought for control of the remaining farm property. In a big way, Laurie's uncovering of the major actors of the land seizures as well as their motives and strategies is very useful to this study because of its focus on the motives and strategies of the same characters as well. His assessment of the influence of politically connected individuals in shaping the direction and nature of the invasions is a revealing account that this thesis fully utilises in assessing some of the elements that shaped and determined relations amongst the new farmers. In as much as the book limits its assessment of the impact on productivity to only the land seizures and its attendant violence, it provides this study with key pointers on issues pertaining to farm property and land use during the FTLRP. The production figures, which he also provides, help in determining the pace of the program in the period under study.

It is important to note that, after 2000, there is an increasing number of empirical studies that have been undertaken across Zimbabwe's provinces. These empirical studies provided the much needed evidence that had been lacking in the literature on Zimbabwe's land reform. These studies captured the complex nature of FTLRP. Indeed, continuous research over the years has generated a collection of evidence-based findings of the outcomes: how land was acquired and disposed of; how it has been used; how far new farmers have carved out new livelihoods and viable new communities; the major political and economic problems they and other stakeholders such as former farm-workers, commercial farmers, and the overall rural society now face. There has been a plethora of works that have looked at issues related to everyday interactions amongst new farmers in the post FTLRP. These include Murisa's thesis, which documents the story of how the newly resettled land beneficiaries organised themselves socially in response to the various economic challenges that they encountered.¹⁰⁶ The study, through an analysis of primary and secondary data, provides a fresh understanding of the social outcomes of the FTLRP. It evaluates how the state failed to react sufficiently to rural grievances by providing adequate support for farm production through the supply of inputs such as seeds and fertilisers.¹⁰⁷ Murisa also evaluates how local networks of

¹⁰⁶ T. Murisa, "An Analysis of Emerging Forms of Social Organisation and Agency in the Aftermath of "Fast Track" Land Reform in Zimbabwe" (PhD, Rhodes University, 2009), 58.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid.

cooperation were established to complement individual household efforts. In the process, Murisa's research also showed the other side of new farmer relations where farmers are not always in conflict but unite for a cause. This position is also taken by this study in its analysis of new farmer relations.¹⁰⁸ Another thesis in the same mould as Murisa's work is Chiweshe's study, which seeks to understand how emerging communities borne out of the FTLRP in Zimbabwe have been able to ensure social cohesion and social service provision using farm level institutions.¹⁰⁹ These two pieces of work have added value to this thesis especially with regards to providing concrete evidence of grassroots cooperation by farmers in the resettlement areas and some of the challenges that such cooperation has faced. Indeed, this thesis also makes similar claims of cooperation in Mashonaland Central Province, which speak to cooperation as an outcome of the numerous challenges that the new farmers faced.

A key text that has attempted to investigate the economic and social outcomes of the FTLRP using empirical evidence is Lionel Cliffe *et al's* book, *Outcomes of Post 2000 FTLR in Zimbabwe*.¹¹⁰ The collection of chapters from different scholars focused more on the broader questions of what diverse pictures are emerging about local livelihoods rather than looking back to explore again the big political issues about the origins of the FTLRP. The book brings together nine important studies that present empirical analyses and data of what has happened over the past decade.¹¹¹ What gives these studies value is the fact that they all depart from the polarised political narratives that have dominated the topic of FTLRP and attempts to present a balanced view on the FTLRP. On the one hand it shows the reform as catastrophic in terms of human rights, agricultural productivity, and economic prudence. On the other hand, it presents the reform as more representative, removing millions of hectares of land originally held by a small group of white landowners and distributing it to hundreds of thousands of small holders, providing a platform for poverty eradication. The most important contribution of this book is that, until recently, most studies on the FTLRP were not supported by any hard evidence. In as much as the last few years has seen a significant volume of independent empirically-based material from detailed local studies, it is the first initiative to compile these empirical studies into one collection in order to contribute to a more informed debate. That debate is useful for this study because of its ability to bring to the forefront key issues that

¹⁰⁸ Ibid.

¹⁰⁹ M.K. Chiweshe, "Farm Level Institutions in Emergent Communities in Post Fast Track Zimbabwe: Case of Mazowe District" (D.Phil, Rhodes University, 2012).

¹¹⁰ Cliffe, *et al*, *Outcomes of post-2000 Fast Track Land Reform in Zimbabwe*.

¹¹¹ Ibid.

relate to everyday existence and interactions amongst new farmers which have a huge bearing on the choices they make as producers.

Matondi's *Zimbabwe's Fast Track Land Reform*, provides a detailed analysis of a whole range of aspects of the FTLRP.¹¹² Matondi examines such issues as violence associated with land occupations. The book is a significant intervention in the history of land reform in Zimbabwe and it is important to this study because it explains the position of the government on land reform especially on land allocation. This explanation helps to contextualise the claims it makes that the nature of relations amongst new farmers was shaped by the policy direction taken by the government.

One of the key arguments made by Matondi is the fact that the insecurities for the new farmers generated through the lack of tenure hampered productivity gains.¹¹³ This argument provides a point of departure for this thesis and uses it to assess how such insecurities were partly responsible for shaping the nature and character of relations that emerged in the newly resettled farms. Matondi also shows how the haphazard and politicised FTLRP led to many extra-legal bodies to influence access to land and the security of tenure, which undermined state institutions.¹¹⁴ Such insecurity, Matondi argues, helped to undermine food production, employment creation and foreign currency generation. This is the same kind of argument that this thesis makes. It makes a connection between new farmer relations occasioned by such cases of insecurity and their effect on productive activities. As such, the book does well in providing a framework for the examination of such processes such as land acquisition, allocation, transitional production outcomes, social life, gender, and tenure and how these have influenced and been influenced by the forces driving the FTLRP.¹¹⁵ More important, the book points to continuing uncertainties of tenure as one of the most problematic legacies of the FTLRP.

After 2000 there was a proliferation of works that focused on women. These studies explore connections between gender and land reform with specific reference to women's ability to

¹¹² Matondi, *Zimbabwe's Fast Track Land Reform*.

¹¹³ B. Rutherford, Review, "The Political Economy of Post-2000 Zimbabwe: An Engagement with Recent Zimbabwean Scholarship", *Labour, Capital and Society*, 45, 2 (2012), 124.

¹¹⁴ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁵ Matondi, *Zimbabwe's Fast Track Land Reform*.

access land and participate in this land reform processes in Zimbabwe.¹¹⁶ A few women managed to acquire land individually, the majority via men and particularly through marriage and cultural contracts. Patience Mutopo's work argued that, despite the contradictory patterns in patriarchy, women had the ability and mechanisms to make use of these contradictions in accessing land and shaping mobile livelihoods.¹¹⁷ In her book, Allison Goebel discusses FTLRP and its implications for women.¹¹⁸ In as much as most of them tend to agree that to some extent women benefited after FTLRP, they fail to address the key challenges that women kept on facing in their struggles over the control of such land. My work will try to unpack how women who claim a stake in the reform programme have survived.

A significant section of the post FTLRP historiography has also brought attention to the plight of the most vulnerable group in the land reform process; the farm worker. Blair Rutherford's book epitomises this and gives a detailed analysis of farm workers in post-independence Zimbabwe.¹¹⁹ Elsewhere, Rutherford documents what he terms "the uneasy fit of commercial farm workers within the politics and development of Zimbabwe."¹²⁰ He analyses how the various public actors have represented farm workers during the land occupations and the ways in which some farm workers have responded to the occupations.¹²¹

A common sentiment amongst those who write about farm workers is that this social group is the most neglected and that their situation has deteriorated significantly because of the FTLRP. Andrew Hartnack's work examines the impact of displacement on farm workers following the FTLRP. Taking a case study approach of a farm located in the outskirts of Zimbabwe's capital city, Harare, he concludes that the impact of these displacements were varied and not a uniform process.¹²² In another publication, Hartnack provides a chronicle of

¹¹⁶ P. Mutopo, "Women's Struggles to Access and Control Land and Livelihoods after Fast Track Land Reform Programme in Mwenezi District, Zimbabwe", *Journal of Peasant Studies*, 38, 5 (2011), 1021- 46; 203-28 and A. Goebel, *Gender and Land Reform in Zimbabwe Experience* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2006).

¹¹⁷ Mutopo, "Women's Struggles to Access and Control Land and Livelihoods after Fast Track Land Reform Programme in Mwenezi District, Zimbabwe."

¹¹⁸ Goebel, *Gender and Land Reform in Zimbabwe Experience*.

¹¹⁹ Rutherford, *Working on the Margins*.

¹²⁰ Rutherford, "Commercial Farm Workers and the Politics of (Dis) Placement in Zimbabwe: Colonialism, Liberation and Democracy."

¹²¹ *Ibid.*

¹²² Hartnack, "My Life got Lost", 173- 192.

the “everyday lives of internally displaced” farm workers.¹²³ Likewise, Godfrey Magaramombe’s, *Rural Poverty: Commercial farm Workers and Land Reform in Zimbabwe*, offers an analysis of land reform and the political realities facing and hindering the farm workers in their endeavours to carve out livelihoods for themselves.¹²⁴ Moyo and Walter Chambati conclude that the impact of FTLRP on farm workers was diverse and complex.¹²⁵ Their main argument is that FTLRP have had both positive and negative consequences on farm workers. They maintain that studies on farm workers in Zimbabwe have cited rate of 50 percent job loss but these studies ignore new forms of re-employment in the same sector.¹²⁶ In as much as these work focus mainly on farm workers, they provide important nuances that reflect significantly on conflict amongst new farmers as they fight for labour.

Therefore, the rich historiography on land and land use in Zimbabwe projects the different ideological influences on the subject. It also demonstrates how fundamental historical events have tended to influence the direction and appreciation of the FTLRP. Some works are policy focused and do not provide any detail of the everyday dynamics of land use and the conflicts that have been a direct result of the disorganised and violent nature of the FTLRP. The politics of the FTLRP, with regards to property, demarcation of boundaries, insecurity and lawlessness that kept on haunting the new farmers and relations which evolved after the program is largely absent from the available discourse on Zimbabwe’s land reform.

1.6. Researching Land Reform in Zimbabwe: Sources and Challenges.

The study is based on a qualitative research making use of various primary sources that complement each other. It also makes extensive use of available secondary literature including published books, theses, dissertations and journal articles. These play a pivotal role in the formulation of an analytical framework for this study. Oral semi-structured interviews represent the most important source of information for the thesis. Because this study is dealing with relations among farmers, it was important for me to understand their perceptions and experiences first hand. In-depth individual interviews with new farmers, as opposed to

¹²³ A. Hartnack, “Transcending Global and National (Mis) Representations through Local Responses to Displacement: The Case of Zimbabwean (ex) Farm Workers”, *Journal of Refugee Studies*, 22, 3 (2009), 351- 377.

¹²⁴ G. Magaramombe, “Rural Poverty: Commercial Farm Workers and Land Reform in Zimbabwe.”

¹²⁵ S. Moyo and W. Chambati, *Impacts of Land Reform on Farm Workers and Farm Labour Processes* (Harare: African Institute of Agrarian Studies, 2004), 137- 140.

¹²⁶ *Ibid.*

focus group interviews, were thus predominantly used as they gave the researcher access to what Sharleen Nagy Hesse- Biber and Patricia Leavy refer to as “people’s ideas, thoughts and memories in their own world.”¹²⁷ I did my fieldwork in January 2017 to June 2017 and October 2017 to February 2018. It was easy to access the area because I also did my M.A research on another aspect of FTLRP, in one of the commercial farming area called Matepatapa in the province.¹²⁸ I used my prior contacts to get accesses to officials and new farmers. In this study I used a systematic random sampling method which falls under the probability sampling techniques. Babbie and Mouton describe systematic random sampling as a technique that allows for the population to be evenly sampled.¹²⁹ Farmholdings in Mashonaland Central Province were randomly settled. I had no criteria that I used to select my interviewees. Using systematic random sampling for my thesis allowed me to have an evenly sampled population especially given the manner in which the new farmers were settled. I carried on with the process of random sampling until I had 260 households as my study sample. The aim of this study was to try to be representative as possible of the new farmers in Mashonaland Central Province and systematic random sampling therefore allowed me to randomly select study participants that would represent the population without considering any characteristics.,

In collecting data, I also triangulated data collected from narratives and in-depth interviews with the same group of people. Narrative interviews entail retelling of stories from the informant’s point of view; that is, the reconstruction of social events from the informant’s perspective. Participants get to tell their stories without the researcher controlling the topics and issues they wanted to discuss. By narrating their stories, informants recall what has happened, putting those experiences into sequence and finding possible explanations for them.¹³⁰ Narrative accounts go beyond the listing of events. They do not consider stories or events in isolation but rather attempt to link them with time and meaning. This method of collecting data was therefore relevant for the study since it gave participants the opportunity

¹²⁷ S. N. Hesse-Biber and P. Leavy, *The Practice of Qualitative Research* (Los Angeles: Sage Publications, 2011). For more details on the nature of interviewees, see the Appendix Section.

¹²⁸ See also, J. T. Kufandirori, “Fast Track Land Reform in Matepatapa Commercial Area, Bindura District: Effects on Farm Workers, 2000- 2010” (M.A, University of Free State, Bloemfontein, 2016).

¹²⁹ R. E. Babbie, and J. Mouton, *The Practice of Social Research*, (Oxford University Press: Cape Town,2001) 200.

¹³⁰ S. Jovchelovitch, and M. W.Bauer, M. W, *Narrative Interviewing*, (London: LSE Research Online) Available at: <http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/2633>, 2000, accessed 3 January 2019.

to tell stories from their own perspectives. Moreover, it allowed me as a researcher to familiarise myself with the participants and their experiences before we started the one-on-one interviews which was my main data collection method. Using interviews in my study allowed me to have a two-way dialogue in which I posed questions to the interviewees who then gave responses. In the event that the response given were not clear, I followed them up with probes thereby eliciting further information from the interviewee. Through this social relationship, I was able to establish trust with my interviewees.

I made an attempt to give voice to my interviewees as much as possible in this research. As such, it raised another methodological problem with regards to quantitative data. In discussing issues of productivity, most of my interviewees did not have appropriate figures but would only make inferences as to their production figures. As such, they only talked about a decrease in production without giving figures to account for that claim. This is why there is a dependency in this thesis on production figures from other scholars in order to complement the claims made by the new farmers and even officials in the Ministry of Agriculture. I also conducted interviews with officials from the Ministry of Agriculture, the Ministry of Land Reform and Resettlement and local leadership in Mashonaland Central Province. Additionally, I designed a structured household questionnaire to collect socio-economic and production data pertaining to A1 and A2 farms. Issues covered by the formal household questionnaire included geo-physical information, socio-economic data, land tenure regimes, and levels of interaction with neighbouring farmers. Oral interviews gave me a chance to explore more information concerning the relations amongst farmers and with other stakeholders. However, a major challenge was that, given the political sensitivity of the study, some new farmers were unwilling to divulge information for fear of victimisation and even some of the new farmers were not cooperative. This lack of support stemmed, in part, from the fact that these farmers are very much aware of the polarised political landscape.¹³¹ I have used pseudonyms for my interview subjects in order to protect them from possible victimisation given the political nature of the topic. All this was done taking cognisance of the University of Free State ethical clearance policy.

The value of interviews was enhanced by physical visits to different farms under investigation. Close observation helped me to minimise problems associated with selective

¹³¹ All the names of the interviewees in this thesis are anonymised. Each interviewee has a pseudonym to avoid any possibility of victimisation.

memory and exaggerations. Moreover, interviews together with physical visits helped me to have a better account of facts concerning the new farmers. This is, however, not discounting the inherent weaknesses of interviews especially for work which is emotionally sensitive like this one. I, therefore, tried to seek corroborative evidence to support the claims and statements made by the interviewees either by comparing evidence of one interview against the other, and where possible, using other sources like newspapers. Transect walks also enabled me to view the fields that new farmers have been allocated and observe different land use and their boundaries and areas of contestations.¹³² I spent a total of nine months in the resettlement areas and this enabled me to get first hand interactions between new farmers and impressions on how the land was being utilised. Of the nine months, I spent a few months in the field familiarising myself with my study area as well as getting to know my potential interviewees. I also had a privilege to attend some dispute meetings during my field work. The meetings were chaired by the chair person of the Committee of Seven and they involved a wide range of disputes like boundary disputes, disputes over the sharing of tobacco barns, workshades and farm worker compounds.

Additionally, parliamentary debates and legal statutes were also used in this study. These sources helped me understand how the state had debated the fate of new farmers after the program. The Parliamentary debates were accessed at the University of Zimbabwe and the Parliament of Zimbabwe libraries. Legal statutes were also useful in establishing the position of the state concerning during or after FTLRP. These statutes include among others, the *Land Acquisition Amendment Act No.6 of 2002*, *Statutory Instrument 273 A in 2003* and *The Acquisition of Farm Equipment Act of 2004*.¹³³

Media sources were also consulted. I used a wide range of newspapers and periodicals, including, *Zimbabwe Independent*, *The Chronicle*, *Financial Gazette*, *The Herald*, *Newsday*, *African News*, *The New Farmer*, *Tribune*, *Daily News*, *Sunday Mail*, *Manica Post* and *The Standard*. Most of these newspapers and periodicals are available at libraries of Media Houses and the National Archives of Zimbabwe. They helped me to create a clear picture of events since they contain detailed reports of daily, weekly and monthly proceedings. I am,

¹³² A transect walk is a systematic walk along a defined path (transect) across the community/project area together with the local people to explore the conditions by observing, asking listening and looking.

¹³³ All these statutes give legal provisions that restricted the movement of agriculture property from farms by white farmers during the FTLRP.

however, aware of the major weakness of these newspapers especially given the political interference in media sources in Zimbabwe mainstream newspapers which causes them to be biased and sometimes misrepresent issues. “In the media discourse all news is socially constructed, a newspaper decides which event is important to report and by choice information is both excluded or included.”¹³⁴ For example, the national paper, *The Herald* serves the interest of the ruling party. It provides the most public presentation of ZANU PF ideology and policy that is accessible.¹³⁵ Independent newspapers were useful, but they tended to concentrate on national issues and influential figures in society, neglecting issues that have to do with the everyday contestations on the farms. Therefore, these sources are included with caution and are used in corroboration with other sources. After 2000, documentaries such as *Mugabe and the White African*, *Last White Man*, Ian Scoones series; *Zimbabwe’s Land Reform: Voices from the Field* and *House of Stones* were produced to show how the land reform in Zimbabwe unfolded. Some of these depicted the lawlessness and anarchy surrounded the FTLRP. Documentaries have their own weaknesses; most of them were not produced for academic purposes hence the need to use them together with other sources.

Government Publications and NGO reports, including works from the Commercial Farmers Union, Justice for Agriculture, the Research Advocacy Unit, the Farm Community Trust, United Nations Development Program, Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum and Human Rights Watch were also used. They have produced many reports regarding the process, direction, successes and failures of the FTLRP. However, these reports should be treated with caution because most of them are written by political activists who may have their own political biases occasioned by their political leanings. I therefore tried, where possible, to complement the analysis attained from these reports with other sources.

1.7. Structure

The thesis is divided into six chapters including this introduction and background, which forms **Chapter One**. **Chapter Two** focuses on the legacy of contestations on land and foregrounds the origins of the nature of the relations that emerged amongst the new farmers and others. It identifies and traces participants of the FTLRP and examines the methods, and character of the land seizures in Mashonaland Central. The chapter also analyses, in detail,

¹³⁴ W. Willems, “Peasant Demonstrators, Violent Invaders, Representations of Land in Zimbabwe Press”, *World Development*, 32, 10 (2004), 1767.

¹³⁵ R. Pilosof, “For Farmers, By Farmers”, *Media History*, 19, 1 (2013), 34.

the many facets of the seizures and its nuances, focussing specifically on the transformative changes to the agricultural landscape in the province. It also assesses the political forces and context for land tenure reform that had a huge bearing on the “new farmers” relationships with each other, which correspondingly had a huge impact on their approaches to property and land use. The chapter uses the literature on the land question in Zimbabwe to develop a post-independence trajectory of land reform in Zimbabwe. The chapter also argues that there have always been historical tensions surrounding land use and property ownership, which had important bearing on the outcome of the approaches to land and property use in the post land reform era. Furthermore, Chapter Two emphasises the centrality of the new relations that emerged out of the alterations of the agrarian landscape and argues that new spaces of authority have found expression in the new lines of everyday relations amongst new farmers and others.

Chapter Three examines the land tenure policy gaps that confronted the state and the new farmers and discusses how they contributed to worsening new farmer relations. It assesses the tenure changes due to the FTLRP and investigates how this affected property and land use. Additionally, it examines the key issues of exclusion and inclusion in the FTLRP and discusses how these had a bearing on access to land and the meaning of rights to land and property. The chapter also assesses the politics of land reform with regards to land rights and evaluate what informs government policy towards use and ownership of farm land and the property on it. This chapter also investigates how new farmers are still insecure in their new farms and how they are still haunted by same anarchy which affected the former white farmers during FTLRP.

Chapter Four examines relations in the newly resettled areas in the context of everyday struggles between the new farmers. These struggles are investigated by situating them within the many settings of control and contestations instigated by the FTLRP. The chapter, therefore, explore farmers’ everyday interactions and how such exchanges affected their approaches to land use. In essence, the chapter assesses the different expressions of conflict amongst the new farmers as a result of the conditions and circumstances created by the nature of farm occupations.

Chapter Five deals with new forms of cooperation that have emerged amongst new farmers. It examines how the new farming patterns and demands has called upon the new farmers to

conjure up new ways of relating amongst themselves especially in the context of limited finances and lack of government support to carry out farming effectively. The chapter acknowledges the fact that relations amongst the new farmers have not only been hostile but have also been characterised by many instances of cooperation as farmers share such equipment like tractors, harvesters and tobacco barns. They also exchange cattle for ploughing purposes and in some instances have learnt to share their labour.

Finally, **Chapter Six** concludes by reconciling the thesis findings against its stated objectives.

Chapter Two: Land Reform and Land Use in Zimbabwe c1980- c2002.

Introduction

This chapter focusses on the land question in Zimbabwe from 1980 to 2002. It provides the context for the violent land appropriations of 2000 and beyond. The chapter carries out an assessment of the land question in post-independence Zimbabwe and divides the discussion into three periods. Since independence, three phases of land reform debate can be identified: the early independence years from 1980 to about 1989, the period of the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) and afterwards from 1990 to 1999, and the Fast Track phase which commenced in 2000.¹ The first is the period from 1980 to 1990, which assesses the state led resettlement program, which was characterised by a slow, market led reform strategy that, mostly, delivered peripheral, low output land. The section traces the attempts by the post-colonial government of Zimbabwe to deal with the land issue within the context of the Lancaster House Constitution (LHC), which protected property rights, prescribing land reform within a market oriented governance framework.² The second period is from 1990 to 2000 which was dominated by ESAP and without the LHC conditions that had bound the Zimbabwe government from 1980 to 1990. The third phase is the period from 2000 to around 2002 marked by the beginning of the FTLRP in 2000, which was characterised by tense and often violent land seizures. Additionally, the chapter identifies and traces participants of the FTLRP and examines the methods and character of the land seizures in Mashonaland Central. It analyses in detail the many facets of the seizures and their nuances, focussing specifically on the transformative changes to the agricultural landscape in the province. In this chapter, I argue that although the LHC was a major constraint to the redistribution of land, there was a complex interaction of factors that contributed to the nature and pace of land distribution from 1980 until the FTLRP of 2000. This chapter ends in 2002 because the 2002 presidential election continued the highly politicised context that shaped the emergence of the land occupations that led to FTLRP.

¹ L. Sachikonye, From “Growth with Equity” to “Fast-Track” Reform: Zimbabwe’s Land Question”, *Review of African Political Economy*, 96 (2003), 227-240.

² S. Moyo, “Land Policy, Poverty Reduction and Public Action in Zimbabwe”, in A. Haroon Akram, *et al* (eds), *Land Poverty and Livelihoods in an Era of Globalisation: Perspectives from developing and Transition Countries* (London: Routledge, 2005).

2.1. A Post- independence Trajectory of the Land Question in Zimbabwe

The injustices and disparities of Zimbabwe's division of land have long been recognised and extensive literature on the subject is available.³ Indeed, Alexander argues that repossessing the land in the name of the nation has been cast by Mugabe as the singular, unwavering goal of Zimbabwe's "three *chimurengas*."⁴ As such, the nationalist political parties, ZANU and Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU), cast themselves as being committed to radical land reform on achieving political power. However, such far-reaching transformation did not occur at least in the first 20 years of independence. Such radicalism only materialised around 2000 in varied forms of land occupations, which were central in shaping the nature of relations amongst new farmers. This is, however, not to say that there were no attempts at land reform at 1980.

2.2. State led Resettlement Programs; 1980- 1990.

The progress and nature of Zimbabwe's land resettlement program since 1980 was extremely varied. Moyo has argued that from 1980 to 1990, the pace of the market led reform strategy was slow, delivered marginal, low productivity land and led to the overburdening of an already financially constrained state.⁵ The war of liberation had ended in 1979 with the signing of the Lancaster agreement and land was central to the negotiations.⁶ Indeed, the land issue was one of the most difficult to resolve. The whites, backed by the British government, insisted that land rights be entrenched in a bill of rights in the new constitution.⁷ The leaders of ZANU and ZAPU, temporarily united under the banner of the Patriotic Front were equally

³ See the bibliography in Palmer, *Land and Racial Domination in Rhodesia*, Among the more important works published since that book are: R. Riddell, *The Land Problem in Rhodesia* (Gwelo: Mambo Press, 1978); R. Hodder-Williams, *White Farmers in Rhodesia, 1890-1965: A History of the Marandellas District* (London: Macmillan, 1983); P. Mosley, *The Settler Economies: Studies in the Economic History of Kenya and Southern Rhodesia 1900- 1963* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983); Moyana, *The Political Economy of Land in Zimbabwe*; Ranger, *Peasant Consciousness and Guerilla War in Zimbabwe* and Phimister, *An Economic and Social History of Zimbabwe 1890-1948*.

⁴ J. Alexander, "The Historiography of Land in Zimbabwe: Strengths, Silences, and Questions", *Safundi: The Journal of South African and American Studies*, 8, 2 (2007), 183.

⁵ S. Moyo, *The Land Question* (Harare: SAPES Books, 1995), 48; Moyo and Yeros, "Land Occupations and Land Reform in Zimbabwe: Towards the National Democratic Revolution."

⁶ It is important to note that Africans did not take the appropriation of land lightly and land was a key grievance of the second *Chimurenga/ Zvimurenga*. To appreciate the part played by land alienation in the liberation struggle see, Ranger, *Peasant Consciousness and Guerilla War in Zimbabwe* and Moyana, *The Political Economy of Land in Zimbabwe*.

⁷ A. R. Chamunogwa, "Political Economy of Analysis of Fast Track Land Reform in Zimbabwe" (MA, University of Sussex, 2012).

under pressure from the countries that hosted their guerrilla armies to end the war and come to a settlement. They were appeased by promises of international aid in the acquisition of land and the Patriotic Front accepted significant limitations on the future government of an independent Zimbabwe. The LHC prevented compulsory acquisition of land in the first ten years of the country's independence. After independence, therefore, the restrictions of the LHC as well as government's decision to pursue a policy of "moderation and reconciliation" left much of the Rhodesian state and economy intact. In Zimbabwe, therefore, the post-independence trajectory of land reform was outlined in terms of resettlement schemes, of which a number of models were developed in the early 1980s.

Another factor that was critical to the pace and direction that the land reform of post-independence Zimbabwe took was the stipulation in the Lancaster House Agreement to the effect that, "European" land could only be acquired if the owner was compensated in foreign currency.⁸ In this regard, the British Government agreed to assist financially, in order to promote "political stability" and allow people "to normalise their lives as quickly as possible."⁹ The costs of resettlement, as it was envisaged, would involve both the purchase of land from white farmers and the development of the necessary infrastructure to help the new beneficiaries establish themselves.¹⁰ In terms of targets to be reached, the Zimbabwean Government proposed in 1980 that some 18,000 households be resettled over five years. The number multiplied by three the following year to reach 54,000 families, and, in March 1982, it multiplied threefold again to reach 162,000 households. The government hoped to resettle this number by 1984.¹¹ However, the resettlement program quickly fell short of its planned targets. As Herbst argues, resettlement targets, notably the figure of 162,000 families, were "ideological statements" devoid of detailed plans and budget allocations.¹² By the end of June 1989, only 52,000 families, or some 416,000 people, had been resettled, which was 32 percent of the notional 162,000 family target. By the same time, a total of 2,713,725 hectares had been bought for resettlement, representing about 16 percent of the area owned by the white commercial farmers at independence.¹³

⁸ For more details see, J. Davido, *Peace in Southern Africa: The Lancaster House Conference on Rhodesia*, (London: Westview, 1984).

⁹ R. Palmer, "Land Reform in Zimbabwe, 1980-1990", *African Affairs*, 89, 355 (1990), 165.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*

¹¹ *Ibid.*

¹² J. Herbst, *State Politics in Zimbabwe* (Berkeley: University of California, 1990), 45.

¹³ Palmer, "Land Reform in Zimbabwe, 1980-1990", 165.

It is important to note that land acquisition and resettlement proceeded more rapidly in the first three years of independence. This was because the government acquired much of the land that was abandoned during the war. As such, over 70 percent of all land purchases up to 1989 were made between 1981 and 1983.¹⁴ The initial upsurge in buying between 1981 and 1983 included almost all the farms that had been abandoned during the war years, mostly in the war zones of the North-East, plus the farms belonging to those who had feared persecution from the new black government and decided to sell and leave just before or just after independence. However, not all the land purchased at this time was suitable for resettlement. After this brief “boom”, very few entire farms or blocks of land became available. There was also an increasing trend by the white farmers who stayed on after independence to hold onto the productive pieces of their farms and to offer for sale only the most fringe parts that they were happy to dispose of, “especially when land prices steadily began to rise as a result of political stability.”¹⁵

The government gave its own set of reasons to explain the failure of the resettlement program to meet planned targets. Firstly, it blamed political conflict in Matabeleland, which it argued posed a serious challenge. Secondly, the government blamed the economic constraints imposed by the world recession and drought. After 1981, Zimbabwe suffered a severe balance of payments and debt crisis, inflation, and declining growth.¹⁶ Thirdly, the land grew increasingly scarce and expensive and fourthly, the government complained that it had insufficiently trained staff for planning and implementing resettlement, and that it faced problems coordinating the many ministries and NGOs involved in the program¹⁷

However, it should be noted that outside of this government endorsed narrative of the slow pace of land reform, other factors contributed to the lack of transformation. For example, the government’s reluctance to press for further land distribution was influenced by the political clout of the Commercial Farmers Union (CFU). The CFU consistently claimed that large scale land redistribution or land acquisition outside the “willing buyer, willing seller” format

¹⁴ S. Moyo and T. Skalnes, *Zimbabwe’s Land Reform and Development Strategy: State Autonomy, Class Bias and Economic Rationality* (Harare: Zimbabwe Institute of Development Studies, 1990), 45.

¹⁵ Palmer, “Land Reform in Zimbabwe, 1980-1990”, 165.

¹⁶ J. Alexander, “State, Peasantry and Resettlement in Zimbabwe”, *Review of African Political Economy*, 12, 61 (1994), 335 and also see Government of Zimbabwe, *First Five Year National Development Plan*, 1, (Harare: Government of Zimbabwe Printers, 1986).

¹⁷ L. Cliffe, “Policy Options for Agrarian Reform: A Technical Appraisal”, Report Submitted to Food Agriculture Organisation for the Consideration of the Government of Zimbabwe (February 1986).

would undermine commercial farmers' confidence in government. Thus the government chose not to foreclose on commercial farmers who became heavily indebted to the parastatal Agricultural Finance Corporation (AFC) as a result of drought in the mid-1980s.¹⁸ More importantly, the Land Acquisition Act of 1985, which was intended to allow the government to acquire more land for resettlement in blocks near to communal areas, was scarcely used. Ironically, the act aided in the accumulation of land by the ruling elite. Many farms offered to the government were refused and went onto the private market. According to Palmer, "a significant number of farms, totalling well over one million hectares, changed hands in this way, many to senior members of the government and the new black ruling elite."¹⁹ In 1986, Moyo estimated that 300 blacks had joined roughly 4,000 whites as commercial farm owners and as members of the CFU.²⁰ By 1990, it was estimated that there were about 500 black commercial farmers and many of them were connected to the ruling party.²¹

It should also be noted that the government itself did not push for land reform as rigorously as it might have. It was content to make noises about the need for land reform during periodic general election campaigns but allowing the matter to lapse thereafter.²² Thus, for the better part of the first decade, calls for the need to redress past land distribution inequalities remained mainly rhetorical and not much was done to push for more radical land reform. The silence on the part of government could also be attributed to the fact that commercial farmers were doing extremely well in the first decade of independence. Rural dislocation caused by the war, meant that at the time of independence in 1980 the white commercial farmers were producing most of the country's marketed food requirements.²³ By 1980 major crop sales from commercial farms amounted to Z\$350 million (US\$580 million) and by the end of the decade it stood at Z\$1,650 million (US\$1,155).²⁴ For Rutherford, white farmers were taken as key cogs in the economic machinery of the country.²⁵ This situation was reinforced by the

¹⁸ C. Stoneman, "The Economy: Recognising the Reality", in C. Stoneman (ed), *Zimbabwe's Prospects: Issues of Race, Class, State, and Capital in Southern Africa* (London: Macmillan, 1988), 45.

¹⁹ Palmer, "Land Reform in Zimbabwe, 1980-1990", 170.

²⁰ Moyo, "The Land Question", 188.

²¹ Pilosof, *The Unbearable Whiteness of Being: Farmer's Voices from Zimbabwe*, 28.

²² A. Mlambo, *A History of Zimbabwe* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 224.

²³ *Ibid.*, See also, Selby, *Commercial Farmers and the State: Interest Group Politics and Land Reform in Zimbabwe*, 115.

²⁴ Pilosof, *The Unbearable Whiteness of Being: Farmers Voices from Zimbabwe*, 27.

²⁵ B. Rutherford, "Settlers and Zimbabwe: Politics, Memory and the Anthropology of Commercial Farms during Time of Crises", *Global Studies in Culture and Power*, 11, 45 (2005), 543.

strong advice that the new Zimbabwean Government received from its neighbour, Mozambique. Mozambique had experienced a mass exodus of Portuguese settlers before and immediately after independence, with disastrous consequences for its economy – especially agriculture. The advice that the newly independent government was given, therefore, was that it should strive hard to retain white expertise and skill, notably on the land.²⁶ This also worked well together with the policy of national reconciliation, which Mugabe started to preach to Zimbabwe on the eve of independence. It, therefore, followed that the white farmers, who only a few months earlier had been the targets of guerrilla attacks because of their secondary role as a crucial part of the regime's security forces, had suddenly become “almost a protected species.”²⁷ Alexander is of the view that the colonial myths of African farmers as subsistence-oriented and inefficient, in contrast to market-oriented European farmers, persisted even after independence.²⁸ For her, this distinction took on a symbolic weight in the designation of former Tribal Trust Lands (TTL) as “communal areas” and former European land as “commercial areas.”²⁹ As such, government was, therefore, reluctant to upset the status quo, which seemed to be working and to be bringing the much-needed foreign currency.

In summary, therefore, the speed at which resettlement from 1980 to 1990 could be implemented was affected by a multitude of factors. They included constitutional conditions imposed at the 1979 Lancaster House agreement which brought an end to the war and set up elections. The market price stipulation of the agreement imposed huge financial constraints on the government. Another constraint was the very effective lobbying of the (mostly white) CFU. The CFU argued that changes in land-use from large-scale private farms to small-scale peasant farms with communal tenure were likely to be economically disastrous. Other equally important factors include the fact that the government failed to purchase much of the land that was offered for land resettlement, even when it met its criteria for resettlement.

²⁶ *Ibid.*

²⁷ Selby, “Commercial Farmers and the State: Interest Group Politics and Land Reform in Zimbabwe”, 116.

²⁸ Alexander, “State, Peasantry and Resettlement in Zimbabwe”, 332.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, 331- 332; TTLs had been created by the colonial government in Southern Rhodesia which delineated the country into five distinct farming regions that corresponded roughly to rainfall patterns. Land ownership in these regions was determined by race under the terms of the Southern Rhodesian LAA of (1931), which reserved Regions I, II and III for white settlement. Region V and a segment of Region II, which possessed greater rainfall variability, were organised into the TTLs, reserved solely for black African ownership and use. For more on the location of these regions, see: Kay, *Rhodesia: A Human Geography*.

Alexander also argues that the shortage of trained staff to implement the resettlement process was in part a self-imposed constraint, which reflected the government's unwillingness to adopt less elaborate methods of redistributing land, notably the option of extending the resource base of communal areas under local control.³⁰

2.3. The Economic Structural Adjustment Period and the 1990- 2000 Land Reform

A new opportunity to redress the persistent land imbalance occurred after 1990 when the Lancaster House restrictions ended. President Mugabe stated that perhaps 50 percent of remaining commercial farming areas would be purchased for resettlement and the government passed the Land Acquisition Act (LAA) of 1992 to facilitate the purchase of farms.³¹ For the government, the Act was intended to speed up the land distribution program through land designation and compulsory land acquisition.³² The LAA was a legal instrument by which the state could intervene. Farms targeted for acquisition were those that were judged to be substantially underutilised or those belonging to absentee owners or to people who had more than one farm. Compensation would be in local currency at a price that was considered by the government to be fair and would be paid by the government within a "reasonable" time.³³

However, despite passage of the LAA in 1992, the process of land resettlement remained very slow. The government claimed that it did not have money to pay for the exercise. In the early 1990s, the British government had continued to help fund the resettlement program, with aid specifically earmarked for land reform reaching £44 million by 1996.³⁴ The same year, however, saw the formal withdrawal of Britain's support of the resettlement program as it was perceived as a poor investment on the part of the British government in an ineffectual and shoddily implemented program.³⁵ The British government was also concerned with the corruption and mismanagement of funds and resources by the Zimbabwean government.

³⁰ Alexander, "State, Peasantry and Resettlement in Zimbabwe", 335.

³¹ "Why Mugabe is right- Zimbabwe's Land Reform", *Daily Mirror*, 15 December 2006.

³² According to the principles of LAA, the government sought to facilitate the acquisition of land for resettlement process and amending the Section 16 of the LHC. See, S. Coldham, "The Land Acquisition Act, 1992 of Zimbabwe", *Journal of African Law*, 37, 1 (1993), 82- 88; *Parliamentary Debates* (12 March 1992), Col. 4405, Kumbirai Kangai.

³³ Moyo, *The Land Question in Zimbabwe*, 56.

³⁴ https://web.archive.org/web/20040501103309/http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/africa/land/gp_zimbabwe.html. accessed 17 June 2017, *Land Redistribution in Southern Africa?*

³⁵ Selby, "Commercial Farmers and the State: Interest Group Politics and Land Reform in Zimbabwe."

Nevertheless, a major factor was that, despite the new legislation, the government lacked the political will and momentum for land reform. This had much to do with “the huge shift in government ideology from socialist leanings to a more or less full blown commitment to the market, in line with global trends.”³⁶ Another important influence was that by the 1990s many important political figures had become major landowners and members of the CFU, and thus the pressure from the top for land reform was largely dissipated.³⁷ Bill Kinsley argued that the 1992 LAA’s initial uses seemed to have responded to an altogether different set of political dynamics, most importantly the desire of a black elite to use access to the state to accumulate land.³⁸ He observes that much of the land initially acquired under the Act went “not to the land hungry ... but was leased to members of the ruling elite, including the former Minister of Lands.”³⁹

In the 1990s land redistribution was very different from the expectations of the land hungry Zimbabweans. The following statement by a war veteran who assessed the situation in 1991 succinctly summarises the period and the state of land reform.⁴⁰ He claimed that “the government lied when they said our ideology was socialism” because “the land we fought for was not there.”⁴¹ He went on to say that during the armed struggle people were told that the “white farms would be taken and the wealth of the country distributed equally among the people. Apparently it was not us *povo* that were meant but ministers and party chefs because

³⁶ D. Potts and C. Mutambirwa, “The Government Must Not Dictate”: Rural-urban Migrants Perceptions of Zimbabwe’s Land Resettlement Programme”, *Review of African Political Economy*, 74 (1997), 552.

³⁷ *Ibid.* For more on this, see what are popularly known as the “Dongo List”, which revealed that the government indeed gave a lot of ZANU officials’ farms instead of the landless people. The list shows the allocation of commercial farms up 1999. The list was later republished by Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions, *Land, Housing and Property Rights in Zimbabwe* (Geneva: Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions, 2001), Annex 2.

³⁸ B. H. Kinsey, “Land Reform, Growth and Equity: Emerging Evidence from Zimbabwe’s Resettlement Programme”, *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 25, 2 (1999), 173.

³⁹ *Ibid.*

⁴⁰ A war veteran is a veteran of the liberation war. The term carries significant political and social status. The term in Zimbabwe is contested and politically charged, because, during the land seizure, others have appropriated the term to capitalise on the perceived right of war veterans to claim farm land. In some instances, individuals with no military background and some even too young to have fought in the liberation struggle claimed to be war veteran. It should be noted that war veterans are not homogeneous and their behaviour is also not static. There are highly fluid depending on time, space as well as situation. Their status is also depended on a number of factors that include their previous positions in the liberation struggle, their economic statuses, education and even degree of participation and visibility during the FTLRP. For more on this subject see: Sadomba, *War Veterans in Zimbabwe’s Revolution: Challenging Neo-Colonialism & Settler & International Capital*.

⁴¹ “Land Hungry Zimbabweans Lament Delays in Land Reform”, *Moto*, March 1991.

just after independence chiefs distributed land among themselves.”⁴² The majority of these elite lacked farming experience and did not derive their livelihoods from land. Again, state land was made available to them at very low prices. This was the immediate background against which donors began to insist concertedly on transparency in any future land reform program. For example, an international conference with donors organised by the Zimbabwe Government in 1998 stressed that such a program should be implemented in a transparent, fair and sustainable manner, with regard to respect for the law, and broadened stakeholder as well as beneficiary participation, and that it should be affordable, cost-effective and consistent with economic and financial reforms.⁴³

Any strong inclination to follow up on the provisions of the LAA was also complicated by the adoption of the ESAP in accordance with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) policy, as well as the significant entry by black businessmen, senior army officials, civil servants and politicians into the market for large-scale farms.⁴⁴ Indeed, the political pressures for land reform in the early and mid-1990s were less intense than before. ZANU PF had comfortably won the 1990 and 1995 elections, sweeping about 95 percent of the parliamentary seats and President Mugabe had been re-elected by a wide margin in the 1996 election.⁴⁵ Opposition parties were fragmented and weak, and thus unable to mount a credible challenge to the incumbent party. Until 1997, there was little organised pressure from peasants, war veterans and the landless.⁴⁶ It is important to recall that the masses had their attention during this period directed towards surviving the biting effects of the ESAP, which was a turn towards neo-liberal economic policies underwritten by the World Bank and IMF.⁴⁷

However, despite the seeming comfort enjoyed by the government during this period, there were murmurs for land redistribution – especially from the war veterans. Government responded by designating 1,471 for compulsory acquirement in 1997.⁴⁸ The year 1997, therefore, saw a comprehensive designation of large-scale commercial farms and a belligerent promise by President Mugabe that the mass expropriation of land would be concluded before

⁴² *Ibid.*

⁴³ Sachikonye, “From Growth with Equity” to “Fast-Track” Reform”, 233.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 231.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*

⁴⁸ “Zimbabwe’s Land Reform, Africa’s First Step to Slavery Reparations”, *Daily Mirror*, 15 December 2006.

the end of 1998. Important to note is the fact that most of these farms were contested in the courts and not taken. According to Pilosof, “a total of 1, 300 challenges were lodged by landowners and only 109 of the 14,171 farms were obtained.”⁴⁹ In 1997, the then British Secretary of State for International Development in the new Labour Government, Clare Short wrote a letter addressed to Minister of Agriculture and Lands, Kumbirai Kangai. The letter explicitly stated that the British government held “no special responsibility to meet the cost of land purchase in Zimbabwe.”⁵⁰ What is however of crucial importance is the fact that these developments brought the land question in Zimbabwe to the fore, nationally and internationally, leading to the 1998 Donor Conference.⁵¹ The conference was held in order to establish the legal process for future land acquisition, identify stakeholders and determine the extent that donors would provide funds to pay for the land reform. Unfortunately, it did not yield much positive results and the major agreement was on the need to formulate the Inception Phase Framework Plan.⁵² However, donors were not keen to finance the Inception Phase because of scepticism that the government could not be trusted to implement a transparent land reform programme.⁵³

Concurrently, Mugabe’s ruling ZANU PF government faced the threat of dissent within its structures as war veterans demanded support from the government after the collapse of the War Veterans Compensation Fund. According to Moyo, this indicated a class split between ZANU PF’s elite and those in the lower echelons of the party.⁵⁴ The demands from the war veterans also took radicalised nationalist undertones forcing the government to disburse large compensation packages, a decision which some have attributed for the beginning of the

⁴⁹ Pilosof, *The Unbearable Whiteness of Being: Farmer’s Voices from Zimbabwe*, 34.

⁵⁰ The British government appeared to have reneged on its earlier responsibility to fund land reform in Zimbabwe. The letter was reported to have been badly received by the Zimbabwean government.

More of this letter see;

<https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2003/aug/11/freedomofinformation.zimbabwe> accessed 15 September 2018.

⁵¹ “Land Reform Shapes Zim”, *Daily Mirror*, 15 December 2006.

⁵² More about this phase see, United Nation Development Programme (UNDP), “Zimbabwe Land Reform and Resettlement: Assessment and Suggested Framework for the Future”, Interim Mission Report (Harare: UNDP, 2002) and Moyo and Yeros, “The Radicalised State: Zimbabwe’s Interrupted Revolution”, 103- 21.

⁵³ *Ibid.*

⁵⁴ Moyo, “Land Policy, Poverty Reduction and Public Action in Zimbabwe.”

spiralling down of the economy since the national currency crashed and dropped by 73 percent.⁵⁵

From 1997 onwards, President Mugabe and his supporters changed their rhetoric to rationalise their land policies. They argued that the peasants needed the land, the war of liberation was fought for the land, and that Zimbabweans were only taking back the land that was originally stolen from their ancestors.⁵⁶ Nevertheless, throughout this period, Zimbabwe's government mostly used the land issue to rally political support. An observer described Mugabe's attempted "land grab" as "a crude attempt to deflect attention away from growing opposition and mounting, often self-inflicted economic problems."⁵⁷ By 1999, however, President Mugabe and his party were faced with escalating unpopularity and seriously deteriorating economic situation, all of which came to a head when voters rejected a proposed new constitution in the February 2000 Referendum.⁵⁸ The proposed new Constitution rejected in a referendum held on 12- 13 February 2000 was notable for giving power to the government to seize farms owned by white farmers, without compensation, and transfer them to black farm owners as part of a scheme of land reform. There was, however, little progress made on the land question between 1998 and 2000. National politics took a dramatic turn with the formation of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) in 1999 and its successful lobbying, in alliance with the National Constitution Assembly, against the draft constitution that proposed massive land redistribution.⁵⁹ Moyo has attributed the euphoria surrounding the formation of the new party and impending elections in 2000 for government's support of widespread land occupations and the formalisation of the process into the FTLRP between 2000 and 2002. The referendum was also seen as a proxy for Mugabe and ZANU PF's popularity amongst the electorate. The failure of the constitution to sail through was unexpected and was taken as a personal rebuff for President Robert Mugabe and a political triumph for the newly formed opposition group, the MDC.

⁵⁵ Mlambo, *A History of Zimbabwe*, 201.

⁵⁶ W. H. Shaw, "They Stole Our Land": Debating the Expropriation of White Farms in Zimbabwe", *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 41, 1 (2003), 75.

⁵⁷ R. Palmer, "Mugabe's Land Grab in Regional Perspective", Paper Presented at the Conference on Land Reform in Zimbabwe -The Way Forward (University of London at School of Oriental and African Studies, 11 March 1998), 1.

⁵⁸ Hammar, Raftopoulos and Jensen (eds), *Zimbabwe's Unfinished Business: Rethinking Land, State and Nation in the Context of Crises*.

⁵⁹ MDC was formed out of Zimbabwe trade unions and civic movements. The party was launched in September 1999. It is the only opposition party operating in Zimbabwe politics and perceived as a threat to ZANU PF.

Therefore, the government's promises of resettlement depended, to a great degree, on its political vulnerability. From the first year of independence, in as much as there was a genuine hunger for land amongst the Zimbabwean rural farmers, resettlement was cast as a means of establishing political stability. Thus, the revival of promises of land in the late 1980s and early 1990s were a response to an upsurge in organised demands for land. These demands were also a result of the pre-election insecurity which ZANU PF felt when faced with disaffection over corruption and the economic consequences of structural adjustment, as well as the challenge posed by new opposition parties.⁶⁰

2. 4 “Land is the Economy and the Economy is Land: The Land Invasions and the FTLRP; 2000 and Beyond.”

Zimbabwe embarked on the FTLRP in the year 2000. The program was rolled out under a tense and often violent political climate as well as worsening socio-economic crisis. Most importantly, it emerged in an environment of waning support for the ruling party, which was facing enormous challenge from an emerging and vibrant opposition and civil society.⁶¹ By 2000, over six million indigenous black people still lived in Zimbabwe's marginal rural lands, also known as the communal areas. These areas are characterised by poor soils and unreliable rainfall.⁶² This unequal distribution of resources meant that 4,500 mainly white, large-scale farmers dominated Zimbabwe's predominantly agrarian economy. Such conditions were a result of a historically narrow racial and class monopoly over land that was consolidated through extra market processes for decades up to the year 2000.⁶³ Three inter-related developments brought a new but unprecedented intensity to the land question in early 2000. These were, renewed agitation for land from peasants in a number of districts where congestion had reached more critical levels, the lack of progress in donor support for a new phase in land reform, and finally, the rejection of the new constitution in the referendum.

A precedent had been set in mid-1998 when there were a series of spontaneous occupations of commercial farms adjacent to overcrowded communal areas in Svosve in Mashonaland

⁶⁰ Alexander, *The Unsettled Land, State Making and the Politics of Land in Zimbabwe*, 117.

⁶¹ Chamunogwa, “Political Economy Analysis of Fast Track Land Reform Programme in Zimbabwe”, 17.

⁶² *Ibid.*

⁶³ S. Moyo, “The Political Economy of Land Acquisition and Redistribution in Zimbabwe, 1990-1999”, *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 26, 1 (2000), 5- 28.

East province, and in several districts in Masvingo province.⁶⁴ By 2000, therefore, these short-lived occupations became a reminder to the government that a new impetus should be given to land redistribution. However, what distinguished this spurt of occupations from later ones was that they were largely peaceful and spontaneous, and thus not orchestrated or directed by state institutions. The government attributed the lack of progress on FTLRP to funding but there were doubts as to the government's commitment to transparency in the proposed reform.⁶⁵ Even so, in 1999, the World Bank and a number of governments (the Netherlands, Sweden and the United States) had agreed to provide technical support amounting to about US\$6 million in the preliminary phase of the program. The absence of any indication of more substantive support, and the referendum defeat, clearly irked the Zimbabwean government, which was experiencing a deep economic crisis. With general elections expected in mid-2000, this was a conjuncture that created apprehension within the ruling elite and government. There was anxiety that the election outcome would mirror the referendum result. In sum, the conditions were set for a major drama in Zimbabwean politics.⁶⁶ Given that its predominant political base was largely confined to the rural electorate, the resolution of the land question became an immediate political imperative.

However, as the ZANU PF led government became embroiled in the 2000 and 2002 election campaigns, there were some developments during this period that had huge repercussions on the land reform. Immediately after the referendum on the new constitution in February 2000, the pro-Mugabe Zimbabwe National Liberation War Veterans Association (ZNLWVA) organised several people (including but not limited to war veterans, many of them were their children and grandchildren) to march on white-owned farmlands, initially with drums, song and dance. Between 2000 and 2002, therefore, the predominantly white farm owners were forced off their lands along with their workers. According to Human Rights Watch, by 2002 the War Veterans Association had "killed white farm owners in the course of occupying commercial farms" on at least seven occasions, in addition to murdering "several tens of [black] farm workers."⁶⁷ Phimister demonstrates how, "thousands of white commercial

⁶⁴ Sachikonye, "From Growth with Equity" to "Fast-Track", 234. For more on these invasions also see, "Zimbabwe Squatters: Land Claims on White Farms", *The New York Times*, 22 June 1998 and M. Nyandoro, "Zimbabwe's Land Struggles and Land Rights in Historical Perspective: The Case of Gowe-Sanyati Irrigation, 1950-2000", *Historia*, 57, 2 (2012).

⁶⁵ Sachikonye, "From Growth with Equity" to "Fast-Track", 234.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*

⁶⁷ *Ibid.* Several NGOs documented reports on violence after 2000; Justice for Agriculture (JAG) and General Agriculture and Plantation Workers Union of Zimbabwe (GAPWUZ), *Destruction of*

farmers and almost a million black farm workers and their families were brutally displaced from land.⁶⁸ In this first wave of farm invasions, 110,000 square kilometres of land had been seized.⁶⁹ Mamdani referred to this as “greatest transfer of property in Southern Africa since colonisation and it has all happened rapidly”.⁷⁰ “In social and economic – if not political – terms, this was a democratic revolution”.⁷¹ However his critics, among others prominent academics, challenged his argument. They contended that, Mamdani systematically underplays the level of violence deployed by ZANU PF and military against its opponents, especially in the rural areas.⁷²

In this period, legal challenges to land acquisition or to eviction were not successful as the land question acquired new dynamics with the government aiming to settle “once and for all” this social and economic issue. New legislation was brought in to supplement the original laws providing for the fast track program and to legalise processes that were formally illegal at the time they were begun. The Rural Land Occupiers (Protection from Eviction) Act of June 2001 protected from eviction for a period of twelve months (originally six months) those who had occupied land up to February 2001 without following the proper procedures, and suspended the application of court orders for eviction.⁷³ In November 2001, President Mugabe used his “presidential powers” to amend the Land Acquisition Act, with retroactive effect to May 2000.⁷⁴ The new provisions meant that ownership of designated land was transferred immediately, irrespective of any court challenge, to the acquiring authority and served as a ninety-day eviction notice for the previous owner (penalties for noncompliance

Zimbabwe’s Backbone Industry in Pursuit of Political Power: A Quantitative Report on Events in Zimbabwe’s Commercial Farming Sector since the Year 2000 (Harare: JAG and GAPWUZ, 2008); Research and Advocacy Unit (RAU), *Reckless Tragedy: Irreversible? A Survey of Human Rights Violations and Losses Suffered by Commercial Farmers and Farmworkers from 2000 to 2008* (Harare: RAU, 2008; Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum, “*Monthly Violence Reports, 2001-2008*” (Harare: Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum, 2008) and GAPWUZ, RAU and JAG, “*If Something is Wrong? The Invisible Suffering Commercial Farm Workers and their Families due to Land Reform* (Harare: GAPWUZ, RAU and JAG, 2008).

⁶⁸ Phimister, ““*Rambai Makashinga* (Continue to Endure)”: Zimbabwe’s Unending Crisis”, 113.

⁶⁹ Human Rights Watch, “Fast Track Land Reform in Zimbabwe” (Harare: Human Rights Watch, 8 March 2002).

⁷⁰ Mamdani, “Lessons of Zimbabwe.”

⁷¹ For more see, J. Alexander, *et al*, “Letters to Mamdani”, *London Review of Books*, 30, 24 (2008).

⁷² *Ibid*.

⁷³ G. Ruswa, “A Study on the Impact of Governance on Land Reform in Zimbabwe” (M.A, University of the Western Cape. 2004).

⁷⁴ *Ibid*.

include imprisonment for up to two years).⁷⁵ At any time after the serving of a “section 8” notice under the amended act, the government had the right to stop farming operations on the farm affected. The CFU also adopted a two-track approach in responding to the fast track land reform process and land occupations. On the one hand, the union challenged the new laws and policies in the courts.⁷⁶ In December 2000, the CFU was successful in obtaining an interdict from the Zimbabwe Supreme Court barring further land acquisitions on the grounds that the fast track program was unconstitutional, because it was being carried out in a violent and haphazard manner. The government criticised the courts generally for standing in the way of land reform and repeatedly failed to abide by court orders; including this one. In November 2001, the same court overturned the interdict, on the grounds that the government now had a lawful program of land reform.⁷⁷ The judgment accepted the government’s argument that new legislation had retroactively legalised occupations that had been carried out in violation of what were then the legal procedures. Between the two judgments, several judges on the court, including the chief justice, had been forced to retire and replaced with individuals perceived to be loyal to ZANU PF.⁷⁸ It should also be noted that at this juncture a certain “siege mentality” was also developing within the ruling elite, especially the political leadership. The suspicion was directed at large-scale commercial farmers who were accused by the government of supporting the MDC opposition party and mobilising farm workers to ensure the referendum defeat. It was also directed towards the donor community, particularly Britain, for dragging their feet over financial support for the proposed land reform program.⁷⁹

February 2000, therefore, heralded a dramatic change in the physical and political landscape in rural Zimbabwe as a large number of farm “invasions” occurred across the country. This was not the first time these had happened since independence, but this time they were more large-scale, violent and widespread.⁸⁰ To justify these invasions, Justice, Legal and

⁷⁵ Ibid.

⁷⁶ Ibid.

⁷⁷ *Minister of Lands, Agriculture and Rural Resettlement and Others vs. Commercial Farmers’ Union*, Judgment No. SC111/2001.

⁷⁸ See, “International Bar Association, Report of Zimbabwe Mission 2001” (London: International Bar Association, April 2001) for a discussion of the government’s assault on independence of the judiciary (hereafter “IBA report”).

⁷⁹ Human Rights Watch, “Fast Track Land Reform in Zimbabwe.”

⁸⁰ Chaumba, *et al*, “New Politics, New Livelihoods: Agrarian Change in Zimbabwe”, 588. For more on the violence of the FTLRP see also D. McDermott Hughes *Whiteness in Zimbabwe: Race,*

Parliamentary Affairs Minister, Patrick Chinamasa, quoted Section 8 of Land Acquisition Act as giving the government the right to acquire land. For him, “this is the law we inherited from Ian Smith that on a compulsory acquisition ownership immediately vest in the state and it gives the governments the power to evict.” He thus argued with conviction that, “there is no Zimbabwean who should be apologising for taking land from the people who stole it.”⁸¹ In this period, therefore, the accelerated land reform was suddenly seen as necessary to get over the “last unjust remnant of the colonial days.”⁸²

The term “land reform” in this era, became by means of propaganda and repetition, the battle cry of the ZANU PF government in its fight to retain political power.⁸³ The government, through the state owned newspapers, radio stations and television, went to great lengths to advertise land hunger amongst the people.⁸⁴ Some political commentators in the so-called independent press interpreted this as a deliberate ploy by the government to avoid the real problems faced by the people such as the desire to “free themselves from poverty and drudgery that subsistence farming imposes upon them.”⁸⁵ Indeed, some commentators saw the prevailing racial imbalance in large-scale agriculture as a situation “deliberately maintained by ZANU PF government as a weapon in its reelection war chest.” For them, “reigniting old resentments and whipping up anti-white feelings was a cheap and easy way by ZANU PF of bringing in votes.”⁸⁶ The majority of land hungry peasants who participated in the land invasions, however, saw this as an opportunity to quench their thirst for land that they had been looking forward to since the dawn of independence. Almost 80 percent of the new farmers who had participated in the invasions that I interviewed attest to this fact.

In many of his public speeches, Mugabe supported the land invasions and rallied the country against the former coloniser, Great Britain, accusing its successive governments of blocking any peaceful solution to the land issue. The land invasions were dubbed “the third *Chimurenga*” by the government to link the endeavour with the other two *Chimurenga*

Landscape, and the Problem of Belonging (New York: MacMillan, 2010) and M. Meredith. *Mugabe: Power, Plunder and the Struggle for Zimbabwe* (New York: Public Affairs, 2007).

⁸¹ *Zimbabwe Parliamentary Debates*, (8 May 2002) Col. 4647, Patrick Chinamasa.

⁸² “Land: Central to Liberation Struggle”, *Sunday Mail*, 18 March 2007.

⁸³ “ZANU PF, Manipulated Land Issue to Hold on to Power”, *Zimbabwe Independent*, 13 July 2007.

⁸⁴ The state run Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation (ZBC), broadcast repetitive liberation war documentaries that presented ZANU PF as a sole deliverer of land.

⁸⁵ “ZANU PF, Manipulated Land Issue to Hold on to Power”, *Zimbabwe Independent*.

⁸⁶ *Ibid*

wars.⁸⁷ However many scholars have considered the return of the land issue prior to the 2000 general elections and the subsequent invasions as a last-ditch attempt to regain support from a disappointed electorate, and an attempt to destroy the rural base of the opposition party MDC.⁸⁸ According to Rutherford, land invasions and FTLRP enabled the regime to curry favour with much of the electorate by “playing the anti colonial race card.”⁸⁹ Indeed, while the land question had remained on the national agenda since independence, the government revisited it with some determination and desperation. The tactics it employed went beyond mere political rhetoric. It repackaged the land question and made it the central issue in the June 2000 parliamentary and March 2002 presidential elections for example one of the main slogans of ZANU PF for the June 2000 parliamentary elections was, “Zimbabwe Will Never be a Colony Again.” The government coined a number of slogans to portray land as the key issue in Zimbabwe.⁹⁰ Propagandists claimed that “the land is the economy and the economy is the land.”⁹¹ Given how the events unfolded David Moore argued, “land is politics” for him “it would seem that the imperative for speedy resettlement did not come from an aroused peasantry but in the politics of regime facing crises”⁹² Faced with an electorate that was losing faith in the nationalist project, the ruling party resurrected the land issue with some creativity. Central to its argument was the cry that whites had stolen the land from blacks. It actively supported the invasion of farms owned by whites by groups of ruling party supporters and black peasants. In the political pronouncements made by ruling party officials,

⁸⁷ For more details see, Hammar, Raftopoulos and Jensen (eds), *Zimbabwe's Unfinished Business: Rethinking Land, State and Nation in the Context of Crises*; A. Hartnack, *Ordered Estates: Welfare, Power and Maternalism on Zimbabwe's (once white) Highveld* (Harare: Weaver Press, 2016), 114.

⁸⁸ This is a view that was not only being deployed by scholars only but also by many critics of the land reform program. See; M. Hove and A.Gwiza, “The Fast Track Land Reform Programme and Food Insecurity: A Case of Zimbabwe from 1992 to the Present”, *American International Journal of Contemporary Research*, 2, 8 (2012); E. Chigumira, “My Land, My Resource: Assessment of the Impact of the Fast Track Land Reform Programme on the Natural Environment, Kadoma District, Zimbabwe,” *Livelihoods after Land Reform in Zimbabwe*, Working Paper Series 14 (Institute of Development Studies, 2010); Matondi, *Zimbabwe's Fast Track Land Reform* and Hammar, Raftopoulos and Jensen (eds), *Zimbabwe's Unfinished Business: Rethinking Land, State and Nation in the Context of Crises*.

⁸⁹ B. Rutherford, “Conditional Belonging: Farm Workers and the Cultural Politics of Recognition in Zimbabwe”, *Development and Change*, 39, 1 (2008), 78.

⁹⁰ E. Chitando, ““In the Beginning was the Land”: The Appropriation of Religious Themes in Political Discourses in Zimbabwe”, *Africa*, 75, 2 (2005), 223.

⁹¹ See, ZANU PF Election Manifesto, 2000; R. G. Mugabe, *Inside the Third Chimurenga: Our Land Our Prosperity* (Harare: Government of Zimbabwe, 2001) and Moore, “Is the Land the Economy and the Economy the Land?” *Primitive Accumulation in Zimbabwe*.”

⁹² Moore, “Is the Land the Economy and the Economy the Land?”

land invasions by peasants and war veterans were portrayed as part of the crusade to regain lost ancestral land.⁹³

2.5. Fast Tracking the Land Reform: Strategies, Processes and Key Players

The FTLRP was officially announced by the government of Zimbabwe in July 2000. It should, however, be noted that it involved a number of processes, among them, land invasions or occupations, the formulation of the required policies, land identification, designation and gazetting of land, the demarcation and pegging of land, beneficiary mobilization and selection and screening, land allocation and the resettlement of beneficiaries. According to official records, by January 2002, 7,300,000 hectares on 3,074 farms had been pegged by the Ministry of Lands, Agriculture and Rural Resettlement and 114,820 household had already been resettled on 4.37 million hectares.⁹⁴ In the period covering June 2000 to February 2001, government gazetted 2,706 farms for compulsory acquisition.⁹⁵ In the same year, the Ministry of Lands announced that 114,830 households had settled and occupied 4, 370 000 hectares. In January 2002, the government cited up to 6,481 farms for acquisition with 918 being removed from the list as they were counted twice and 689 after mitigation and negotiation.⁹⁶ On the other hand, commercial farmers in Zimbabwe stated that more than 1,600 commercial farms were occupied by war veterans and government supporters in the course of 2000.⁹⁷ Makamure mentions that in October 2001, the government announced its intention to hold 4,558 farms (8,800,000 hectares) for acquisition.⁹⁸ Statistics vary between sources. Hartnack estimates that by 2011, around 145,775 A1 farms and 16,386 A2 farms had been allocated on a total area of close to 9, 000,000 hectares, with two thirds of this going to A1 farmers.⁹⁹

The post-referendum situation spurred an increased role for the “war veterans” under the leadership of Chenjerai Hunzvi. An important factor to note was the general composition of

⁹³ Chitando, ““In the Beginning was the Land”: The Appropriation of Religious Themes in Political Discourses in Zimbabwe”, 223.

⁹⁴ Utete, *Report of the Presidential Land Review Committee on the Implementation of the Fast Track Land Reform Land Reform Programme, 2000- 2002*.

⁹⁵ *Ibid.*

⁹⁶ G. Makamure, “The Socio-Economic Outcomes of the Fast-Track Land Redistribution Programme: With Special Reference to Kippure-Iram, Resettlement Scheme in Masvingo Province, Zimbabwe”, (M. A, University of Limpopo, 2014), 10.

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*

⁹⁹ Hartnack, *Ordered Estates: Welfare, Power and Maternalism on Zimbabwe’s (once white) Highveld*, 109.

the land occupiers. They largely consisted of war veterans, peasants, youth mostly belonging to ZANU PF, but also members of the elite including army and police officers and politicians. The issuance of court orders barring the land invasions by Zimbabwean courts did not halt the invasions and they continued to happen up to and after the 2000 election.

It is also very important to highlight the connections made by the land occupants to the liberation war. It became not only fashionable but convenient for participants, including local and national leadership to remind citizens that the main motivating factor behind the liberation struggle was “land”; the restoration of ownership of land expropriated by colonial settlers.¹⁰⁰ Indeed the notion that the liberation struggle had mainly been about land gained widespread currency not least amongst the war veterans’ but also amongst the rest of the land occupiers as well. According to this perspective, the liberation struggle was not primarily about building “democracy” and the institutions and values that sustained it, but about land. Sachikonye attributes the prevalence of this belief as a contributory factor in explaining the violence and authoritarian values that accompanied the land reform process.¹⁰¹ Mugabe and ZANU PF resorted to liberation war tactics of name-calling, referred to enemies as sell-outs and traitors.¹⁰² Indeed such nostalgic replays of *Chimurenga* values explain the nature of occupations that dominated the initial phases of the land invasions.¹⁰³

¹⁰⁰ Sachikonye, From “Growth with Equity” to “Fast-Track” Reform”, 228.

¹⁰¹ *Ibid*, 229.

¹⁰² The ruling party and Mugabe divided Zimbabweans into “patriots and sellouts”. The opposition MDC, Britain and the Western World and the civil society together with all those who opposed land seizures in support of human rights were labelled as sellouts. The distinction between “patriots and sellouts” has its origins in late 1950s urban politics and has been a continuous theme in nationalist politics since. For more see; T. Scarnechia, *Fighting for the Underdog: Rhetoric, Violence and Gender in Zimbabwe Nationalism, 1940-1964* (New York: Rochester University Press, 2008) and Chitando, ““In the Beginning was the Land”: The Appropriation of Religious Themes in Political Discourses in Zimbabwe”, 226, See also J. Alexander and J. McGregor, “Elections, Land Politics of Opposition in Matabeleland”, *Journal of Agrarian Studies*, I, 4 (2001), 510-533; Tendi, *Making History in Mugabe’s Zimbabwe*, 2, Hammar, Raftopoulos and Jensen (eds), *Zimbabwe’s Unfinished Business: Rethinking Land, State and Nation in the Context of Crises*, 28 and E.Worby, “The End of Modernity in Zimbabwe? Passages from Development to Sovereignty” in A Hammar, B. Raftopoulos and Stig Jensen (eds), *Zimbabwe’s Unfinished Business: Rethinking Land, State and Nation in the Context of Crises* (Harare: Weaver Press, 2003), 74.

¹⁰³ *Chimurenga* came from the name of a legendary *Shona* ancestor *Murenga Sororenzou*, who was known for his fighting spirit and prowess. In the nationalist discourse it refers to war or struggle against any form of oppression. For more details see, M. T. Vambe, “Versions and Sub- Versions: Trends in Chimurenga Musical Discourses of Post Independent Zimbabwe”, *Africa Study Monographs*, 25, 4 (2004), 167.

The War Veterans Association and ZANU PF deliberately echoed the language and symbols of the liberation war, including slogans, night vigils, *mujibhas* (youth auxiliaries), *mwana wevhu* (son of the soil), *chimbwibo* (women supporters/cooks), and the creation of a new cadre of youth brigades in the agrarian landscape. Even some of the guerrilla tactics, such as arson and stock theft and mutilation, were revived on the occupied farms.¹⁰⁴ During the liberation struggle, ZANU composed songs that sought to outline the history of dispossession in the country. The “songs of struggle” were particularly effective as a mobilization tool and these songs were revived and replayed during the land occupation.¹⁰⁵ Mugabe was portrayed by the government as a man who stood against Western imperialists and as acting in accordance with not only the demands of the ancestors but also in accordance with the major cause of the liberation struggle.¹⁰⁶ The radio and television were effectively used by government to buttress the connections between the liberation war and the land occupations. The same media was also utilised to portray land occupiers as freedom fighters who were acting decisively to return the land to its rightful owners. Likewise, the government labelled members of the opposition and civil society as British puppets and numerous media program and campaigns were dedicated to that. Numerous new songs were composed while some liberation songs were reworked to celebrate the seizure of white farms and to demonise the opposition. With the support of the then Minister of Information and Publicity, Jonathan Moyo, the ZBC broadcast repetitive liberation war documentaries and played jingles that called upon Zimbabweans to remain dedicated and to rejoice upon the recovery of lost ancestral lands. One of the jingles, “*Rambai Makashinga*” (Remain Resolute), was released in 2003 and it projected a prosperous future for the country because of the agrarian revolution.¹⁰⁷ The likes of Dickson Chinx Chingaira, Brian Mteki and Mbare Chimurenga choir recorded songs that castigated the British and supported the land distribution.

¹⁰⁴ Chaumba, *et al*, “New Politics, New Livelihoods: Agrarian Change in Zimbabwe”, 596.

¹⁰⁵ See, A. J. C, Pongweni, *Songs that Won the Liberation War* (Harare: College Press, 1983).

¹⁰⁶ The response to western imperialism is captured in Mugabe’s, *Inside the Third Chimurenga: Our Land Our Prosperity*, which is a collection of speeches and writings by Mugabe.

¹⁰⁷ Chitando, ““In the Beginning was the Land”: The Appropriation of Religious Themes in Political Discourses in Zimbabwe”, 233. It is important to note that the reawakening of wartime language and terminology was not just peculiar to the African land occupiers. Pilosof talks about the use of “highly loaded and negative terms that came into prominence within the white farming community.” The use of such words like, “*gook*,” “*terr*” and “*mujiba*” which were words used during the liberation struggle. See: Pilosof, *The Unbearable Whiteness of Being: Farmer’s Voices from Zimbabwe*, 2.

2.6. Land Occupations in Mashonaland Central.

The land invasions were violent in Mashonaland Central. In fact, the province was notorious for having experienced the most episodes of violent encounters. In the early stages of the land occupations in Mashonaland Central, movement onto the farms was perceived as a risky thing to do. To begin with, there were cases of farm invaders being attacked or having their huts burnt by white farm owners and their employees.¹⁰⁸ *Daily News*, reported that; a commercial farmer, his son and two of their workers were arrested for allegedly beating up and injuring a new farmer.¹⁰⁹ Thus, the fear of retaliation by well-armed farmers continued to detract some invaders from occupying farms. Initially, occupiers with assets were wary about moving too many of their assets to the newly occupied areas for fear of losing them in retaliatory attacks or because of the uncertainty that surrounded the whole movement. The occupiers, therefore, established base camps at which most of them congregated and settled and it was from these base camps that they organised occupations and made initial informal designations of farm land. From the base camps, occupiers conducted their own survey and allocated plots. As one commander (title given to the base camp leaders) put it; “we had to go ahead with allocations to ensure that we immediately started farming and to give a sense of ownership to our fellow comrades.”¹¹⁰ Another war veteran claimed that the occupations and the subsequent pegging of plots were intended to ensure visibility to the government.¹¹¹

A majority of these base commanders were war veterans and local political leaders. War veterans were commandeered and organised by their national Association, the Zimbabwe National Liberation War Veterans Association (ZNLWA). Through this Association, war veterans at a local level were able to make use of their associational hierarchy and structures which went down to district level to organise and influence the resettlement process. They exerted a lot of influence, not just over plot allocation, but also over the precise location of plots. Indeed, the war veterans worked hand in hand or overrode Arex officials in the plot allocation and demarcation exercise. The volatile situation on the ground demanded that the Arex officials follow the orders of the war veterans or they risked angering them. Chaumba cites a similar scenario prevailing in Chiredzi and he quotes one Arex official who argued

¹⁰⁸ This is also sentiment that is raised by about 40 percent of the new farmers that I interviewed.

¹⁰⁹ “New Farmer Attacked: White Farmer, Son on Attempted Murder Charge”, *Daily News*, 5 June 2005.

¹¹⁰ Interview with war veteran Norman Mahachi Bindura, 17 May 2017.

¹¹¹ Interview with war veteran Hungwe Bindura, 17 May 2017.

that they “were just following behind the war vets”, because “they were in charge not us.”¹¹² He also cites another official who argued that, “Fast-track is not planning, and its guided by war vet commanders. We tend to ratify existing plots. We do not have time to deploy criteria of land use. Arex will go as a team with the plan, but the base commander will be in the same vehicle.” For this official, “early occupations were just to be demonstrations, and then planning would follow. But in practise people have found land and put up structures. Planning then must work around this. Often pegging is simply confirming what the occupiers have allocated to themselves.”¹¹³ This was the scenario prevailing in almost all the districts in Mashonaland Central and the government, through Arex officials, was forced to only rubber stamp a system ran and organised by the war veterans and local political leadership.¹¹⁴

By February 2002, the Parliamentary Committee on Land Reform was informed by a taskforce in charge of land reform that in Mashonaland Central province the FTLRP was divided into two, the official FTLRP and informal FTLRP.¹¹⁵ One thousand four hundred and fifty one households were formally resettled on 43,992 hectares of land, while 5,108 households were informally settled on 15,701,144 hectares of land.¹¹⁶ The committee further learnt that even some farms that had not been listed for designation had been taken over by invaders.¹¹⁷ An example of Dawnhill Farm in the Bindura District of the province was highlighted by the taskforce were about 150 informal occupants had taken over the farm and allocated each other 12 hectares. Dawnhill farm represented three vital issues that were prevalent in the rest of the province. Firstly, the informal occupants informed the committee that they were concerned about strained relations with the owner of the farm and were considering taking the remaining 72 hectares of a banana crop they had allowed the farmer to retain. Secondly, the farm owner lamented the disruption of farming activities on the farm. Thirdly, the farm workers informed the committee that they had been prevented from utilising the land that is normally allocated to them by the farm owner to grow crops for their

¹¹² Chaumba, “From Jambanja to Planning: The Reassertion of Technocracy in Land Reform in South Eastern Zimbabwe”, 546.

¹¹³ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁴ Interview with an Arex official, 23 February 2017; Wilbert Sadomba as a participant in the land invasions gave a reference to Mazowe and Matepatepa in his work, he cites that, “the whole thing was spontaneous, no central organising platform that gave any direction, nobody told us what to do.” Sadomba, *War Veterans in Zimbabwe’s Revolution: Challenging Neo-Colonialism & Settler & International Capital*, 88.

¹¹⁵ *Parliamentary Debates* (3 February 2001), Col. 4548.

¹¹⁶ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁷ *Ibid.*

subsistence.¹¹⁸ These three scenarios at Dawnhill farm were common in the province and as such, the initial stages of farm occupations in Mashonaland Central were very tense.

At another farm in Shamva district, Macumbiri farm, the committee interviewed some of the occupiers and learnt that initially relations between them and the farm owner were cordial and the two parties agreed to preserve the environment in their respective properties. The parliamentary committee was therefore perturbed to learn that after the occupiers had cultivated their land, the farm owner ploughed down some of their crops and planted his own. There was also a case of a white farmer, Mr Dickson, of Lawrencedale 14 Farm who allegedly burnt pasture to stop the new dairy farmer from occupying the farm.¹¹⁹ The committee sought to establish from the farmer the reason behind this unfortunate incident, which soured the relations between the two parties but it was informed that the farmer was unaware of the burnt pasture. The Committee also interviewed the farm workers who alleged that they had negotiated for resettlement and paid some money, but they were surprised when outsiders were allocated land ahead of them.¹²⁰ However, the committee could not confirm this claim as no receipts were produced to show that farm workers paid to be allocated land. At another farm, Toplands Farm, the invaders had allocated themselves plots of varying sizes pending proper planning and allocation by the relevant officials. The Committee also learnt that in the Bindura and Shamva area, 22 out of 42 farms experienced similar problems as Dawnhill farm.¹²¹ A group of new occupiers also harassed a farmer in the Bindura District. Denver who owned a farm in the area was held hostage for two weeks by the occupiers who shared the farm with him. They demanded the entire property but Denver had resisted the pressure because he was arguing that he was legally entitled to remain there.¹²² These examples were largely representative of the situation that was happening across Mashonaland Central province at the time.

The issue of insecurity was a major factor that affected the occupants in Mashonaland Central, even in cases where they had been given offer letters by the government. Most of the farmers lived in fear of eviction despite government's assurances. The new beneficiaries were also affected by the lawlessness that had confronted the previous white owners who they

¹¹⁸ *Ibid*, Col. 4550.

¹¹⁹ *Ibid*.

¹²⁰ *Parliamentary Debates*, (3 February 2001), Col. 4555.

¹²¹ *Ibid*.

¹²² "Dinha Calls for Co-existence on Farms", *The Herald*, 21 April 2010.

were removing from the farms. Like the white farmers who lacked recourse to go to the courts or the police to complain, the new beneficiaries faced the same predicament on the farms. Thus, the same process of *jambanja* that haunted the white farmers followed the new farmers.¹²³ Even the participation of government in attempts to regularise the land reform process did not completely eradicate the lawlessness and the accompanying lack of recourse for new farmers. In fact, the legal institutions remain weaker as before the land reform was formalised. Sachikonye argues that the start of *jambanja* in February 2000 clearly represented a new phase in the “land crisis” where the concepts of sanctity of private property and rule of law were spurned and drastically revised.¹²⁴ This shift in thinking about land rights, property rights and compensation was orchestrated to provide justification for the land occupations that took place in 2000 to 2003.¹²⁵ White commercial farmers had pointed out that the land acquisition process from 2000 was implemented in a lawless and disorderly manner with illegal occupations, interruptions of production operations, theft of property and human rights violations.¹²⁶ These same kind of concerns continued and they affected the new farmers who were now at the receiving end of conditions that had assisted them in getting access to land. The new farmers, therefore, could not make long-term plans because they feared that the possibility of being replaced by a new and political powerful occupant with a new offer letter from government. One farmer lamented that they were tired of “these occupations and being moved from one farm to the other, leaving less time to be productive.”¹²⁷ He argued that, because of these uncertainties, they continued to be “new farmers who were under constant harassment from those with a lot of political muscle.”¹²⁸

Three cases in the province can be used to illustrate the above-mentioned scenario. The first case involved Newton Janhi who was originally allocated a plot about nine kilometers from

¹²⁴ L. M Sachikonye, “The Promised Land: From Expropriation to Reconciliation and Jambanja”, in B. Raftopoulos and T. Savage (eds), *Zimbabwe: Injustice and Political Reconciliation* (Capetown: Institute for Justice and Reconciliation, 2004), 9.

¹²⁵ *Ibid.*

¹²⁶ Commercial Farmers Union, *The Status of Commercial Farming in Zimbabwe* (Harare: Commercial Farmers Union, 2003), Also see many of the documentaries produced to provide insights on how events played out in the countryside after 2000. For example, Mugabe and the White African, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9KpliA-oWAWU>, accessed on 10 November 2017; Last White Man, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=to4ZAXUJStw>, accessed 26 November 2017, Mugabe’s Violent Farm Invasions, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aufyjQC98dE>, accessed 26 November 2016.

¹²⁷ Interview with farmer Muzondo, Bindura District, 17 May 2017.

¹²⁸ *Ibid.* This issue will be discussed in more detailed later.

Bindura Town, along the Harare, Bindura Highway.¹²⁹ Janhi had the misfortune of having his new plot attracting the attention of one of the province's senior politician who ordered him to vacate his plot. Janhi produced evidence of his offer letter to prove to the politician that he was the rightful owner of this plot.¹³⁰ The politician disregarded this gesture and sent party youths to occupy the farm and cut down his 56 hectare maize crop that was almost reaching maturity. Janhi approached the Bindura police for assistance only to be told that this was a political matter that needed the help of the province's political leadership and Ministry of Lands' jurisdiction. His attempts to seek help from both the Ministry of Lands and from the political leadership did not yield any results as they both refused to accept responsibility to deal with the matter. Janhi eventually lost his plot, a whole season's crop of maize and other farm equipment. He was located to another plot in Bindura district.¹³¹

A second case involved Reuben Denenga of Guruve district. In October 2002, Denenga was allocated a 134-hectare plot that was very close to Guruve Centre. Unfortunately for Denenga, his plot was invaded by war veterans from the area, his crops destroyed and his family beaten up.¹³² Any attempts to seek intervention from the local police were in vain as he was accused of sympathising with the opposition MDC party. Denenga lost his plot and he was allocated a smaller plot in the same district. A third case involved Jackson Bakasa, a Headmaster from Madziwa Communal area who was allocated a plot in Shamva District in 2001.¹³³ Bakasa's 165 hectare plot was invaded by a senior military officer who threatened him and his family with death if he did not immediately vacate the land. Like Denenga and Janhi, Bakasa lost a whole season's crop, the plot and some farm equipment. He could not get help from any law enforcement department in the district.¹³⁴ These three cases represent many such cases where new beneficiaries were at the receiving end of the lawlessness that had affected the previous white owners and which they themselves had originally benefitted from. As illustrated by one commentator on the plight of Manzou farm, it was "*jambanja*

¹²⁹ Interview with Newton Janhi, Bindura District, 27 November 2017.

¹³⁰ Ibid.

¹³¹ Ibid.

¹³² Interview with Reuben Denenga, Guruve Centre, 29 November 2017.

¹³³ Interview with Jackson Bakasa, Shamva Town, 5 December 2017.

¹³⁴ Ibid.

going in; its *jambanja* going out.”¹³⁵ This illuminates the continuities of violence and lawlessness in the post FTLRP period that will be explored in more detail in later chapters.

The province witnessed many cases of violent confrontations between new recipients and original invaders.¹³⁶ Many farms that were first seized by war veterans were diverted to the political elite but they largely remained derelict.¹³⁷ There were many occasions in the province where several peasant families and war veterans who had initially occupied land with the support of the government were forced off the same piece of land to pave way for senior government officials.¹³⁸ All this led to rampant looting of infrastructure on farms in the province. In 2002, the President of the CFU estimated that billions of dollars’ worth of infrastructure had been looted or vandalised.¹³⁹

To avoid loss of property and land, some white farmers in the province went into “private arrangements” with influential persons. These arrangements were meant to protect the white farmers from further harassment and the possibility of losing their land in future. In return, the white farmers were expected to render assistance to their “protectors” by providing equipment to cultivate, plough and plant their fields. There were also reported incidences where these white farmers were expected to make cash payments to would be protectors. Such arrangements, however, only benefited a minority of the white farmers, because in the long run, these farmers lost their farms despite the promises of protection. Indeed, during interviews many farmers reported a major extortion ring in the province that involved war veterans and party officials who extorted huge amounts of money from white farmers with the promise that they would protect them from harassment. An interesting case was that involving the former owner of Marston Farm who lost a substantial amount of money through an extortion ring allegedly run by Elliot Manyika who was Minister without Portfolio and the National Political Commissar for ZANU PF.¹⁴⁰ Another popular ring involved Nicholas Goche who was then Minister of State, National Security, and Augustine Chihuri, the former

¹³⁵ Quoted in A. Mseba, “Land, Power and Social Relations in North Eastern Zimbabwe from Pre-colonial Times to the 1950s” (Phd, University of Iowa (2015), 265.

¹³⁶ *Ibid.*

¹³⁷ “Land Grabs Continue Unabated”, *Zimbabwe News. Com*, 13 August 2003.

¹³⁸ *Ibid.*

¹³⁹ *Ibid.*, 13 August 2003. See picture of a vandalised building in the appendix.

¹⁴⁰ Interview with Jotham Munhangu, Marston Farm, 21 October 2017.

Police Commissioner General of the Zimbabwe Republic Police. These two were alleged to have operated mostly in Shamva and Mazowe Districts.¹⁴¹

Another group that staked out a claim in the land occupation process in Mashonaland Central was traditional leadership. To spread the influence of traditional leaders in the province, especially into the newly resettled areas, traditional chiefs appointed village heads at most resettled farms.¹⁴² The government did, however, not formally recognise the village heads and the tendency was usually to appoint village heads from the ranks of war veterans. These heads were mostly responsible for cultural and religious events in the area, including the appeasement of local ancestors.¹⁴³ The appointment of war veterans as village heads by the chiefs helped to ingratiate a majority of the chiefs with the very powerful war veterans' leadership who occupied the base camps and the abandoned farmhouses. As the spectacle of farm occupations unfolded in the province, some communities led by self-styled traditional leaders seized the opportunity to reclaim the land they argued their ancestors had lost during colonisation. This, for example, happened when a group of occupiers from Dande settled around the Mazowe district claiming that this was their traditional and religious land once occupied by the *Korekore* spirit medium, Nehanda Nyakasikana.¹⁴⁴ The group's claims, however, were quickly quashed because the prime nature of the land meant that it drew the attention and interests of many political heavyweights.

Important to note is the fact that there were a range of different dynamics at play in the province. The occupiers in the different districts of the province represented a broad spectrum of people of varying ages, ethnicities and degrees of wealth. They included men and women, communal area farmers and urban employees, Christians, party functionaries, senior government officials and spirit mediums, all with contrasting motivations for being there. As

¹⁴¹ Interview with Kudakwashe Munyoro, Shamva Town, 12 December 2017; Charles Laurie in his book discuss the short and long term extortion fees paid by white farmers in exchange of protection. See, Laurie, *The Land Reform Deception: Political Opportunism in Zimbabwe's Land Seizure Era*, 207-216.

¹⁴² Interview with Headman Farai Mtombeni, Bindura District, 17 May 2017. Historically, Chiefs had no jurisdiction over commercial farmland in Zimbabwe. Their authority was restricted to communal areas by pre and post-independence legislation. However, from the 1990s chiefs were maintained in an ambiguous position in new resettlement areas. After negotiations between chiefs and the state in the 2013 constitutional referendum, the constitution was amended to state that Chiefs could be granted the authority in new resettlement areas if it was granted by the Minister of Lands by notice in Gazette. See; Traditional Leaders Act, 1997 and 2013.

¹⁴³ Interview with Headman Farai Mtombeni, Bindura District, 17 May 2017.

¹⁴⁴ Ibid.

was the norm in Mashonaland Central, war veterans and party members tended to have first choice of plots.

2.7. The Government and the Politics of Post 2000 Land Occupations

The role of the state in the land occupations and reform process was punctuated by a lot of shortcomings, both in terms of the policy framework and the implementation of the policy. Chaumba argues that, the massive ambition and expected speed of the fast-track land process inevitably brought about a conflict between political imperatives (the need for speed, large numbers and evidence of production) and technical procedures.¹⁴⁵ Because of political pressure, therefore, the government's desire to resettle people fast meant that allocations were being made even before the legal process of acquiring land had been met. Another factor that hampered proper planning by the government was the lack of funding for the reform process. However, despite this lack of funding, the government was bent on seeing through the reform process because of the political implications the program had. Gabriel Chaibva, an opposition Member of Parliament for Harare South, directly attributed the decline in agriculture production during this period to the "chaotic and haphazard manner in which this government has been carrying out the land reform."¹⁴⁶

The land occupations were in most cases masterminded and executed by institutions operating at sub district level. The government, through the Ministry of Lands, then intervened in order to ensure orderly process. This meant that quite often the Ministry had to resort to the development and implementation of policies in retrospect, a situation that made government appear as if it had lost control and was trying to catch up.¹⁴⁷ The passing of the Rural Land Occupiers Act, which sought to regularise land occupations that had taken place prior to the launch of the FTLRP, is a good illustration of the implementation of policy in retrospect.¹⁴⁸ From the onset therefore, the government lacked clear policy guidelines on the ownership, management and utilisation of the infrastructure that was inherited on the resettled farms. The absence of such guidelines and relevant structures created a free for all

¹⁴⁵ Chaumba, "From Jambanja to Planning: the Reassertion of Technocracy in Land Reform in South-Eastern Zimbabwe", 545.

¹⁴⁶ *Parliamentary Debates* (8 May 2002) Col. 4654, Gabriel Chaibva.

¹⁴⁷ Sunga, "Institutional Coordination Framework for the Land Reform and Resettlement", 14.

¹⁴⁸ *Ibid.*

kind of environment. This became the source of serious conflict amongst the new farmers competing for access and utilisation of infrastructure.

Besides the lack of funding and political pressure, another serious weakness that hampered the program was the endemic corruption that was in the government regarding land allocation. An MDC MP, R Gasela, raised this issue of corruption in parliament in 2003. He argued, “instead of occupying just land, chiefs are now taking personal property.” He cited incidents where “irrigation equipment, tractors and everything” had been looted by “ZANU PF officials ... like Mutinhiri, Mumbengegwi and Reward Marufu who had hijacked some of this moveable property.”¹⁴⁹ Another MDC MP, Coltart, claimed, “farmers have been forcibly evicted from the farms and some forced to leave literally with suitcases” while “tractors, trailers, combine harvesters and other movables have been unilaterally, arbitrarily, illegally seized by high ranking people.”¹⁵⁰ ZANU PF officials, however, defended the grabbing of farm equipment by arguing that the property rightfully belonged to them. ZANU PF legislator Chigwedere argued “no cent was paid for our land, it was seized from us and we were driven away.” He further contended that even “the cattle which are now in the hands of white farmers where cattle seized from them” so they were now “rectifying the situation, recovering our cattle and land.”¹⁵¹ Mugabe himself vowed that his government would continue to ignore court rulings, declaring seizures of white owned land illegal.¹⁵² On the other hand, war veterans went around giving white farmers eviction notices and taking over equipment and livestock.¹⁵³

Instances of corrupt land allocations involving senior government officials were widespread. Sachikonye cites the endemic corruption associated with the program and argues that while the A1 model was primarily aimed at the poor and landless from the communal areas, it was common knowledge that some of the beneficiaries are people in urban areas including others holding jobs. As for the A2 model, he argued that it was “clear that well-connected members of the ruling elite are taking advantage of it to acquire commercial farm.”¹⁵⁴ This was despite the fact that the model was meant to accommodate those with farming skills, experience and

¹⁴⁹ *Parliamentary Debates* (8 May 2003), Col. 4653, Renson Gasela.

¹⁵⁰ *Ibid*, Col. 4654, David Coltart.

¹⁵¹ *Ibid*. Aneus Chigwedere.

¹⁵² “Mugabe Adamant with Land Grabs”, *The Zimbabwean*, 10- 16 April 2008.

¹⁵³ *Ibid*.

¹⁵⁴ Sachikonye, From “Growth with Equity” to “Fast-Track” Reform: Zimbabwe’s Land Question”, 235.

start-up resources. Indeed, newspapers in this period were littered with stories of a hysterical scramble for such land by cabinet ministers, governors, senior army and police officers, top civil servants, war veterans and others connected to this elite.¹⁵⁵ Flora Buka's report documented displacement amongst the landless peasants from farms they had been allocated, following the replanning of A1 and A2 model farms.¹⁵⁶ She cited many officials who occupied land in Mashonaland Central – for example, Mayfield farm in Mazowe District – that was allocated to war veterans' leaders Chris Pamire and Mike Moyo. As a result 36 farmers were displaced following recommendations by the Mashonaland Central Provincial Committee's withdrawal of their offer letters. Telecel boss, James Makamba, ZANUPF legislators, Edward Chindori Chininga and Saviour Kasukuwere, Airforce of Zimbabwe Commander Perence Shiri and Defense Minister Sydney Sekeramayi are named in the report as having displaced A1 beneficiaries from the properties they were allocated.¹⁵⁷ The Presidential Land Review Committee, which was headed by the Minister of Land Reform, Flora Buka and the Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on Lands, Agriculture, Water Development as well as the Rural Resources and Resettlement Minister, Didmus Mutasa, also highlighted major shortcomings of the program in various areas, including weak institutional arrangements and how certain individuals had manipulated some elements of the program to their advantage.¹⁵⁸

Largely, the government policy on infrastructure allocation, use and management in the initial stages of land occupation had serious shortcomings. The Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on Lands, Agriculture, Water Development, Rural Resources and Resettlement cited weak and inadequate provincial and interprovincial coordination mechanism, as well as coordination at national and subnational institutions as some of the major challenges that faced the land reform exercise especially in its infancy.¹⁵⁹ This resulted in conflicting messages, confusion and various other problems. These loopholes allowed a multiplicity of ownership of farms in different provinces, and cases where some individuals were allocated land under both schemes within the same province. The lack of coordination also opened the

¹⁵⁵ "Senior Party Officials Scramble for Farming Land", *The Zimbabwe Independent*, 14 March 2006.

¹⁵⁶ "Govt Denies Existence of Land Audit Report", *The Sunday Mirror*, 2 March 2003.

¹⁵⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁵⁸ D. Mutasa, *Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on Lands, Agriculture, Water Development, Rural Resources and Resettlement* (Harare: Government of Zimbabwe Printers, 2004).

¹⁵⁹ *Ibid.*

system to interference from political players especially with respect to listing and delisting of farms.¹⁶⁰

Indeed, the government had to institute several land committees to investigate irregularities in the land reform process mainly because of the shortcomings of government policy and participation in the land reform process. First to be appointed was a committee led by the then Minister of State and Land Reform, Flora Buka, which unearthed gross irregularities and multiple farm ownership in land distribution.¹⁶¹ Another review committee, the Presidential Review Committee, observed that the FTLRP was not matched by the provision of critical basic infrastructure on the new farms and that the District Development Fund (DDF) and AREX had resource constraints that hampered service delivery. It observed that the shortage of infrastructure was one of the reasons for the dual ownership of land in the communal and resettlement areas.¹⁶² A legislator, D. M. Ncube of Zhombe, argued that the major weakness of the land reform was “its implementation aspects” which had “far reaching ramifications for the agricultural sector.”¹⁶³ Another legislator, Mr Mazikana, also maintained that nothing was done to make sure that infrastructure that was left on the farm was maintained and utilised.¹⁶⁴

Conclusion

In October 2002, Zimbabwe’s FTLRP launched two years earlier drew to a close. By any standards, the land redistribution program of 2000 to 2002 was impressive in scale. It brought the total amount of land acquired from the white commercial farming sector since independence to 14,500,000 hectares, out of the 15,500,000 they owned in 1980. The program, however, had many irregularities. Firstly, the lawlessness that had haunted the white farmers also reared its ugly head and continued to trouble the new beneficiaries. Even after the formalisation of the FTLRP, the government did not make any efforts to reform their legal institutions.¹⁶⁵ Like, the white farmers, a majority of the new beneficiaries could not

¹⁶⁰ *Ibid*, 13.

¹⁶¹ F. Buka, *A Preliminary Audit Report of Land Reform Programme* (Harare: Government Printers, 2002) However because the report implicated many senior officials, the government denied its existence but eventually the report leaked and it has featured in different media sources for example, *Africa Confidential*, *London News* and *The Sunday Mirror*.

¹⁶² Utete, *Report of the Presidential Land Review Committee on the Implementation of the Fast Track Land Reform Programme*.

¹⁶³ *Parliamentary Debates*, (17 December 2003) Col. 2129, Daniel Ncube.

¹⁶⁴ *Ibid*, Col. 2165, Paul Mazikana.

¹⁶⁵ More on this will be discussed in the next chapter.

resort to the recourse of the law to protect them. They became vulnerable to new invasions by politically powerful groups who either displaced them or had them relocated to other less attractive pieces of land or to the less “affluent” scheme, the A1 scheme. In many instances, the new beneficiaries suffered loss of property like their white predecessors and some had their crops destroyed. Thus, largely, the same environment of *jambanja*, which had been the burden of the previous white commercial farmers, became the burden of the new black beneficiaries. The lawlessness had a huge impact on the new farmers’ ability to produce. They had to contend with teething problems of starting a new venture as well as deal with the uncertainty surrounding their occupation of the new farms.¹⁶⁶ This will be investigated in depth in the following chapters, while Chapter 5 will show the cooperation strategies adopted by the new farmers to combat the effects of lawlessness.

Secondly, the so-called war veterans rode roughshod over the implementation process and access to land in the new resettlement areas was highly politicised. To benefit, one had to have shown his or her unwavering support for ZANU PF. Membership to an opposition party especially the MDC limited one’s chances of getting access to land. The argument that compensation was never given to the Africans for land that was unlawfully taken by the Europeans in the first place was used by the government to dismiss all cries for compensation emanating from the white farmers and their sympathisers. Largely, the land discourse that was successfully paraded by ZANU PF was one that emphasised the land reform as about returning land stolen by whites to “the people.” The relationships that made up the commercial farms as socially bound entities under the rule of white farmers were severely dismantled by FTLRP and new communities constituted of people from different backgrounds who had to create new ways of relating to each other were created. How the program was carried out had varying implications on the nature of relations that emerged in the new agriculture landscape, as the next chapter will reveal.

¹⁶⁶ Such uncertainties emerged because of different contestations for land that still continued. White farmers still had claims to land and a majority had pending court cases.

Chapter Three: Cementing Lines of Disagreement: The State, the “New Farmer” and the Acquisition of Land Rights c2000 to 2015.

Introduction

This chapter examines the land tenure policy struggles that confronted the state and the new farmers and discusses how these laid the foundations for the nature of relations that were to emerge amongst new farmers. It assesses the revolutionary changes on land tenure due to the FTLRP and how this affected new farmers’ attitude towards property and land use. The chapter investigates the different ways that new claimants to land utilised to formalise their claims to it and how this process became a new source of conflict over land and property use. Such claims included party loyalty, participation in the liberation war and levels of involvement in the land grabs. These claims moulded important political and informal approaches through which the new land owners pursued legitimacy for themselves and negotiated the methods of converting the land they had occupied into their “new farms.”

The chapter is divided into four main sections. The first section unpacks the complexities of relations in the land occupations. It is further subdivided into two subsections. The first subsection looks at the issues of interference from war veterans, traditional leadership and political leadership and how such interference shaped relations in the newly resettled areas. It examines the key issues of exclusion and inclusion in the FTLRP and how this had a bearing on access to land and the meaning of rights to land and property. The second main section is concerned with the new politics of land reform with a specific focus on government policy and the state led demarcations of plots and formalisation of the reform process. It analyses how new farmers were caught up in the “politics of survival” by the ZANU PF government and how such politics affected their relationships with each other. The third section focusses on government policy on farm infrastructure and property. It evaluates what informed government policy towards use and ownership of farm land and the property on it. The fourth section is concerned with the state administration of land at the local level, involving authorities such as the Rural District Councils. It assesses the nature of interactions between these authorities and the new farmers and analyses how such interactions created a specific kind of platform on which new farmers had to interact amongst themselves.

In essence, the chapter investigates how the politics of land reform, especially with regards to how land was used as a political tool by the ruling government in the initial stages of the land reform process, created the environment and the different scenarios in which farmers had to

relate to each other. The chapter is premised on the recognition that there is a lack of substantial empirical works on how new farmer relations were shaped by the dynamics that prevailed during the early stages of the FTLRP and how such relations have impacted on the nature of productive activities.

3.1 The Struggle for Control and Relevance: Unpacking the Complexities of Relations in the Land Occupations in Mashonaland Central Province.

In Mashonaland Central, there was a complex range of motivations for the farm occupations, ranging from the political to the sacred.¹ Alexander, argued that claims to new resettlement land carry different meanings for different people ranging from historical, political, need-based and ancestral claims.² There were also major intricacies determined mainly by interference from the war veterans and political leadership, and ethnicity, which had a big influence in shaping the nature of relations as well as the land occupations. These land occupations were accompanied by considerable violence and disorder.³ The occupiers/new farmers in these areas represented a broad spectrum of people of varying ages, ethnicities and degrees of wealth. They included men and women, communal area farmers and urban workers as well as those who claimed to be spirit mediums of their different localities, all with contrasting motivations for being there.⁴ According to Alexander, land beneficiaries

¹ B. M. Tendi, *Making History in Mugabe's Zimbabwe, Politics, Intellectuals and the Media* (Bern: Peter Lang, 2010); J. Fontein talks about the sacred motivations for the occupations in his study on Masvingo Province in his article; J. Fontein, "Graves, Ruins, and Belonging: Towards an Anthropology of Proximity," *Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute*, 17, 4 (2011), 708. Also see Mujere, "Land, Graves and Belonging: Land Reform and the Politics of Belonging in Newly Resettled farms in Gutu, 2000- 2009", 217- 233.

² Alexander, *The Unsettled Land: State-Making and the Politics of Land in Zimbabwe 1893- 2003*. There is also substantial literature that looks at how and why farmers got land, see, N. Marongwe, "Interrogating Zimbabwe's Fast Track Land Reform and Resettlement Programme: A Focus on Beneficiary Selection" (PhD, University of the Western Cape, Capetown, 2008); Scoones, *et al*, *Zimbabwe's Land Reform Myths and Realities*; Sadomba, *War Veterans in Zimbabwe's Revolution: Challenging Neo-colonialism & Settler & International Capital*; Moyo and Yeros, "Land Occupations and Land Reform In Zimbabwe: Towards the National Democratic Revolution" and Matondi, *Zimbabwe's Fast Track Land Reform*;

³ Most works have been produced on Zimbabwe's land reform have alluded to the widespread violence and disorder. Some of these scholars include P. Zamchiya, "Synopsis of Land and Agrarian Change in Chipinge District, Zimbabwe", *Journal of Peasant Studies*, 38, 5 (2011), 1094; Commercial Farmers Union, *The Status of Commercial Farming in Zimbabwe* (Harare: Commercial Farmers Union, 2003); Hammar, *et al*, "Zimbabwe's Unfinished Business: Rethinking Land, State and Nation"; J. Alexander and J. McGregor, "Hunger, Violence and the Moral Economy of War in Zimbabwe", in V. Borch-Due (ed), *Violence and Belonging: The Quest for Identity in Post-Colonial Africa* (London: Routledge, 2005) and Derman, *After Zimbabwe's Fast Track Land Reform*.

⁴ Chaumba, *et al*, "New Politics, New Livelihoods: Agrarian Change in Zimbabwe."

came from a variety of different places and had little “shared history.”⁵ These land occupiers mainly consisted of war veterans, peasants and youth mostly belonging to ZANU PF, as well as members of the elite including army and police officers and politicians.⁶

3.2. Interference from War Veterans, Traditional Leadership and Party (ZANU PF) Officials.

At the centre of the land occupations, were party officials and war veterans. Their participation was mainly through the Provincial War Veterans Association, which led a systematic sequence of land occupations in tandem with regional land claims and campaigns by local politicians.⁷ Within the structures, the war veterans represented an important institution that operated in every facet of the land reform at a local level. The war veterans, who wielded considerable power and who made up a sizeable number of the original land occupants, to some extent continued to be a disruptive element especially with regards to how new farmers conducted themselves in the resettlement areas. They, caused a lot of conflict in the newly resettled areas because, even though there were legal frameworks that tried to reduce conflicts in such areas, the war veterans had a tendency to ignore them. In most cases in the province, they controlled local activities as witnessed in Bindura, Shamva, Muzarabani, Mazowe and Guruve Districts. Since war veterans were not a recognised official structure, their activities were sometimes difficult to control. The war veterans also got the first choice in land allocations during the pegging, as 20 percent of the land was officially reserved for them, followed by those who had shown their allegiance by being present in the demonstration phase.⁸

In Muzarabani district, war veterans used their positions of influence to determine who was to be settled and where. Philip Nyathi, a farmer in Centenary who was also the Chairman of the Muzarabani Rural District Council, described the exercise of plot allocation in the district, which involved the picking of bottle tops (known in Shona as *zvivharo*) or cards to determine plot number.⁹ Interestingly some farmers still have these bottle tops or cards, and they always flaunt them to other new farmers to show they were pioneer beneficiaries. The war veterans and other party officials in the Lands Committee would write down numbers inside bottle

⁵ Alexander, *The Unsettled Land State-Making and the Politics of Land in Zimbabwe, 1893–2003*, 191.

⁶ Sachikonye, *The Situation of Commercial Farmers after Land Reform in Zimbabwe*.

⁷ Interview with Enias Moyo, Centenary, Muzarabani district, 15 October 2017.

⁸ Chaumba, *et al*, “New Politics, New Livelihoods: Agrarian Change in Zimbabwe”, 596.

⁹ Interview with Philip Nyathi, Muzarabani District, 21 October 2017.

tops or the cards, which were supposed to represent and correspond with available plots in a particular farm. Those who were due for land allocation were then made to pick these bottle tops or cards from the hat and they were subsequently allocated the plot that matched the number inside the bottle top or cards that they would have picked.¹⁰ This seemingly transparent process was, however, manipulated by the war veterans and party officials working in cahoots with officials from the Ministry of Lands. The Ministry of Lands officials would only put numbers on their farm maps after they were in the know about who had picked which number. That way, plots endowed with infrastructure like farm houses, barns, sheds and irrigation facilities would be allocated to war veterans, party officials or those who would have paid bribes to be allocated such plots.¹¹ During my fieldwork, more than 50 percent of the new farmers I interviewed recalled this practice. New farmers in Bindura, Shamva and Guruve Districts also reported the same practice and confirmed the involvement of Ministry of Lands officials in these underhand dealings.¹² In fact, in June 2005, four land allocation officers were arrested for allegedly demanding bribes from aspiring farmers applying for land under the A2 resettlement scheme in Mazowe district.¹³ The officers reportedly demanded Z\$15 million from each applicant in return for land in the district.¹⁴ It was reported in the press that, by the time of their arrest, these officers had taken bribes for the allocation of A2 model plots to prospective farmers at Mondynes and Kuvina farms.¹⁵

In Guruve District, for example, war veterans who had occupied Kambada Farm, refused to let Lands Committee Officials give part of the farm to some new claimants who were not on the list that war veterans had submitted to the Committee.¹⁶ This is just one example of many such cases where war veterans successfully defied Lands Committee officials. During my fieldwork, I encountered a total of 23 cases; 12 in Mvurwi, seven in Bindura and four in

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Laurie's work also alludes to the fact that the elite or those who had access to patronage networks tended to get the best land and the most agri- property. See; Laurie, *The Land Reform Deception: Political Opportunism in Zimbabwe's Land Seizure Era*, 187.

¹² In interviews, I conducted in Bindura, Shamva and Guruve, almost 80 percent of my respondents confirmed the existence of this practice.

¹³ "Four Allocation Officers Arrested", *The Herald*, 24 June 2005.

¹⁴ In July 2007, an article on the Aljazeera news network titled: *Tracking the economic problems faced by Zimbabwe's economy in the last ten years*, reported that the rate of the Zimbabwe dollar to the US dollar was 1 USD = 77,965 ZWD.

<https://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2007/03/200852519429760702.html>,

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Interview with Sam Mubayi, Kambada Farm, Guruve District, 22 October, 2017.

Shamva.¹⁷ In some instances, farms that the Lands Committees had designated as either A1 or A2 had to be given a new designation after war veterans successfully resisted decisions made by the Lands Committees. Two such cases are Ceres Two farm in Shamva and Fairways Farm in Mvurwi. The two had been designated A1 farms but the respective Lands Committees had to reverse that designation after war veterans in the area had resisted.¹⁸ In both cases, for the duration of the stand-off, no farming activities went on. In Fairways Farm, for example, Nobert Chirwa, one of the seventeen farmers who were affected by the reversal in the designation of the farm, recounts how he had encountered huge financial losses due to the relocation.¹⁹ Nobert lamented how the war veterans were so inconsiderate by making them “move in total disregard of the few financial commitments we had made on our plots.” He even recalled the loss of social connections they had started to build up on the farm due to this relocation, as “overnight, our village was disbanded just to accommodate some greedy war veteran.”²⁰

In a climate of relative laxity for law enforcement, several war veterans and party officials plundered, stole and sold some of the resources belonging to the previous commercial farmers, including farm implements. A newspaper reported a farm equipment looting orgy throughout the country.²¹ It exposed that high profile politicians were forcing farmers to leave all moveable implements and had started invading garages and workshops that repaired and housed farming equipment from displaced farmers. In his book, *The Land Reform Deception: Political Opportunism in Zimbabwe's Land Seizure Era*, Laurie argues that in as much as farm invasions were fuelled by a desire for land, they were also instigated by a desire to get access to the “valuable agri- property, the movable and thus easily saleable, farm assets such as tractors and other equipment.”²² Laurie gives examples of senior government officials who seized agro machinery. The nature of farming practises in Mashonaland Central Province made it a favourable spot for looting.²³ The province was mostly an intensive farming

¹⁷ It is interesting to note that, even by 2017 when I conducted my fieldwork, such incidences are still discussed in hushed tones by the new farmers as they fear reprisals from the war veterans’ community. This just demonstrate the fear that this group commands in the resettlement areas.

¹⁸ Interview with Peter Nkiwane, Mvurwi Town, 12 December 2017 and with Joel Bhiza, Ceres Two Farm, Shamva, 17 October, 2017.

¹⁹ Interview with Nobert Chirwa, Fairways Farm, Mvurwi, 14 November, 2017.

²⁰ *Ibid.*

²¹ “Supreme Court Judgement Triggers Equipment Looting”, *The Zimbabwe Independent*, 9 October 2007.

²² Laurie, *The Land Reform Deception: Political Opportunism in Zimbabwe's Land Seizure Era*, 158.

²³ *Ibid.*

province dominated by highly mechanised farming techniques characterised by high value agri-property.²⁴ Such equipment included tractors, backhoes, balers, ploughs, harrows, seed drills, cultivators, irrigation systems and combine harvesters. As a result, the province attracted a lot of interest from senior war veterans and party heavyweights. A majority of them allocated to themselves immense powers to decide plot allocation, resource access and infrastructure utilisation that it became paramount for some of the ordinary new farmers to relate well with them if they were to entertain any thoughts of accessing these essentials services.²⁵ In Shamva District, for example, one new farmer was removed from a plot he had been allocated which had a borehole and a shed because he did not endear himself well to the chairman of the local war veterans committee.²⁶ Such instances of farm reallocation were also present in Bindura District where Edmore Mbeya, a plot beneficiary, was reallocated to a different plot that was on the fringes of the farm where his farm acted as a buffer against the wild pigs because he had a disagreement with one of the war veterans leaders.²⁷ Public Service, Labour and Social Welfare Ministry Permanent Secretary, Ngoni Masoka, cited cases where war veterans in the lands committees as well as land surveyors from the ministry were accused of conniving to shift boundaries from the original plans.²⁸ He accused the committees of removing some new farmers in order to give land to their friends or relatives at the expense of those on the ground.²⁹

War Veterans also acted as vigilante groups who monitored the new farmers. In the worst case scenarios, they would determine who the new farmers would relate to and who they would not and the terms of reference of such relations. In one such case in Concession in 2009, new farmers at Hartley Farm were instructed not to fraternise with the two neighbouring white farmers because “the two farmers were in the radar of the local war veterans’ leadership who intended to occupy their farms.”³⁰ They were only saved from such occupation because they allegedly enjoyed the protection of the two most senior politicians in the province, the then Vice President, Joyce Mujuru and the Minister of Transport, Nicholas Goche. This instruction to the new farmers mainly affected Japhet Manenji, a new farmer in

²⁴ For more on this, refer to chapter one which give a brief description of the province.

²⁵ Laurie, *The Land Reform Deception: Political Opportunism in Zimbabwe’s Land Seizure Era*, 158.

²⁶ Interview with Jacob Munetsi, Careers Rest Farm, Shamva, 19 November 2017.

²⁷ Interview with Edmore Mbeya, Foothills Farm, Bindura, 22 November 2017.

²⁸ “Land: Central to Liberation Struggle”, *Sunday Mail*.

²⁹ *Ibid.*

³⁰ Interview with Japhet Manenji, Hartley Farm, Concession, 9 November, 2017.

the area, because he had a long standing relationship with one of the white farmers as he used to be his farm manager before getting his own plot. He was, on many occasions, therefore, reprimanded by the war veterans for borrowing equipment like tractors and irrigation pipes from the white farmer.³¹ His daughter, who had a very close relationship with the white farmer's daughter, was prohibited from visiting and fraternising with her.³² The war veterans were also in the habit of monitoring attendance of new farmers to ZANU PF meetings and other such activities connected to the Party, such as Independence celebrations. Percy Guvamombe of Leed Farm in Bindura District almost got himself into trouble with the war veterans' leadership in the area who accused him of not contributing financially to Party and national functions like Independence Celebrations. The war veterans accused him of not appearing "in the register of regular contributors" and absenting himself, too often "from ZANU PF meetings in the area."³³

In many instances, the Committees of Seven or the Headmen could only make a decision in consultation with the war veterans' leadership in the area; in such cases the will of the war veterans usually prevailed. In Bindura District, two beneficiaries were hounded out of the district by the war veterans' leadership because they were deemed to belong to the opposition party, the MDC. In September 2001, Roderick Musvinu and Rodney Musvinu, two brothers, had participated in the occupation of Orange Groove farm, just seven kilometres out of Bindura town along the Bindura Mt Darwin road.³⁴ When the Lands Committee finally officially demarcated boundaries on the farm in 2003, the brothers were each allocated a piece of land. In 2006, however, they were moved from the farm to another one in Mvurwi because the war veterans in the area had questioned their loyalty to ZANU PF.³⁵ In fact, before they were finally moved to another area, the two were excluded from any activities that the other farmers were undertaking as the war veterans made it a point that they were isolated by the other neighbouring new farmers. It reportedly became risky for the new farmers in the area to be seen socialising with the two brothers and for those three years, their continued existence on these plots was lonely and isolated.³⁶

³¹ Ibid.

³² Ibid.

³³ Interview with Percy Guvamombe, Leed Farm, Bindura District 23 December, 2017.

³⁴ Interview with Roderick Musvinu, Mvurwi Town, 21 October, 2017

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ Ibid.

It should, however, be noted that besides party loyalty, other issues were at play in this case. Firstly, there was keen interest on the farm by some war veterans who had been allocated land elsewhere because of the farm's close proximity to a major road and to the provincial town of Bindura.³⁷ Secondly, infrastructure on the farm had been largely intact and not vandalised, especially its elaborate network of irrigation pipes and overhead sprinklers. Thirdly, when the farm was occupied, it had more than 540 acres of citrus trees and these drew the interest of many occupiers on the farm.³⁸ Sadly, however, due to constant bickering and petty conflicts, almost three quarters of the citrus trees were burnt down in March 2006.³⁹ The remainder of the fruit trees died from neglect.

War Veterans considered themselves custodians of “discipline, loyalty and order” in the new farming areas.⁴⁰ In many instances, their word was law and new farmers stood to benefit if they cultivated good relations with the war veterans in their area. This would ensure that they would be favoured in the allocation of important government sponsored inputs programmes. In almost all of the districts of Mashonaland Central, war veterans played a central role in the allocation and distribution of farming inputs. In many cases too, would war veterans use their influence in the allocation of the inputs to punish fellow farmers who had not cultivated warm and cordial relations with them. In an extreme case of abuse of authority by the war veterans, in Centenary District, the war veterans' leadership was notorious for making other farmers pay a protection fee in order to guarantee protection of tenure and access to key inputs.⁴¹ Onismo Phiri, who had unfortunately resisted paying this protection fee, lost his plot, which had access to one of the houses that belonged to the previous owner's farm manager and was relocated to another plot on the fringes of the farm where he had to construct makeshift accommodation for his family.⁴²

At the centre of the teething problems that the FTLRP faced, especially during the early 2000s, was a weak and inadequate provincial and interprovincial coordination mechanism, as well as coordination at national and subnational institutions.⁴³ Because of these weaknesses, conflicting messages, confusion and other problems found themselves filtering to the ground

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰ Interview with Godfrey Mugari, Guruve, 4 December, 2017.

⁴¹ Interview with Onismo Phiri, Corner Store Farm, Centenary, 3 December 2017.

⁴² Ibid.

⁴³ Sunga, *Institutional Coordination Framework for the Land Reform and Resettlement*, 13.

and tremendously affected relations amongst new farmers and others linked to farming. Ishmael Sunga mentioned instances where national level structures reversed decisions that had been made by lower level structures without consultations thereby undermining their confidence in decision making.⁴⁴ It was from such glaring loopholes that vices like corruption, multiple ownership of farms and abuse of other farmers and stakeholders found fertile ground. In the main, therefore, this lack of coordination opened the system to interference from political players especially with respect to listing and delisting of farms, as well as who should be settled on certain properties.⁴⁵

In almost all districts of Mashonaland Central, there was interference from political leadership and war veterans who determined plot allocations outside District Land Committee (DLCs) structures. Indeed, some DLCs were controlled by certain war veterans and politicians, rendering some committees dysfunctional. Sunga cites a confidential memo that observed that some district and provincial officers had given the war veterans and party officials' excessive powers to make concessions to farmers without referring such decisions to the Minister of Lands who was vested with such authority.⁴⁶ This point is buttressed by a former member of the Bindura District Lands Committee, Didymus Kachere, who argued that the committee had virtually abdicated all responsibility for land allocation and anything remotely connected to the reform program in the district to the war veterans and party officials.⁴⁷ There were various cases in the province where politicians and war veterans in the various structures were accused by many of the new farmers of using their positions of influence to manipulate the system to their advantage. War veterans were, therefore, an important constituency, especially at the local level in the land reform program in Mashonaland Central.⁴⁸ A majority of the activities in Bindura, Shamva and Centenary Districts were coordinated and managed by them. The fact that they were not an official structure, however, made their activities difficult to control.

Interaction between technocrats, war veterans and politicians who were outside government structures was tense as the political leadership gave directives to committees that were

⁴⁴ *Ibid*, 13.

⁴⁵ *Ibid*.

⁴⁶ *Ibid*, 10.

⁴⁷ Interview with Didymus Kachere, 14 November 2017.

⁴⁸ Interview with Tatenda Moyo, Bindura, 10 May 2017.

outside their mandate.⁴⁹ In October 2002 in Guruve, the lands committee clashed on a number of occasions with the war veterans' leadership over their desire to delist some beneficiaries because they were accused of having connections with a headman who were seen as sympathetic to the opposition MDC.⁵⁰ Another case occurred in Shamva district where, around June 2003, Ministry of Lands officials had to request police protection in order to do their job. This was after they had refused to consider the removal of thirty-one A1 farmers from a farm to make way for five war veterans.⁵¹ Some of the clashes were a result of personality differences in interpretation of policy. A Ministry of Lands official in Bindura was accused by the war veterans in the area of taking sides with one beneficiary accused of being a member of the opposition MDC who had a dispute with a war veteran. The war veteran wanted a team led by war veterans to mediate in the dispute whilst the Ministry official argued that such a team would not be properly constituted.⁵²

Participation in political activities of and affiliation to ZANU PF, therefore, became an important determinant of land rights. Thus, access to land in Mashonaland Central was highly politicised. For the majority, the only key to gaining land, was "to be seemingly ZANU-ised" as land was "not for opposition supporters."⁵³ In some instances, potential land beneficiaries were required to produce a ZANU PF membership card and some were even vetted to see if they had a history, connections or sympathies with the opposition party, MDC.⁵⁴ During my research in the province, I heard of numerous cases whereby politicians and war veterans in the various structures were accused of using their positions of influence to manipulate the system to their advantage.⁵⁵ Such reports included cases in which party officials canvassed support by orchestrating land takeovers and redistribution. In 2004, a prominent ZANU PF official at the time was accused by the surrounding new farmers of having coordinated the

⁴⁹ The tension between the technocrats and politicians was not unique to Mashonaland Central alone. The government's own land reform audits confirm that in all provinces, many politicians forced themselves into farms causing many tensions between them and technocrats. See; Government of Zimbabwe, *A2 Land Audit Reports for Manicaland, Mashonaland Central, Mashonaland East, Mashonaland West, Matebeleland North, Matebeleland South, Masvingo, Midlands*, (Harare: Ministry of Lands, Land Reform and Resettlement and The Informatics Institute, 2006).

⁵⁰ Interview with Joram Mukwende, Arex Official, Guruve Centre, 19 October 2017.

⁵¹ Interview with Jephta Nhundu, Farmer, Careers Rest Farm, Shamva, 12 November 2017.

⁵² Interview with Maxwell Danga, Marston Farm, Bindura, 23 December 2017.

⁵³ Ibid.

⁵⁴ Ibid, Hammar, *et al* argued on the problem of perceiving occupations as if they were an all ZANU PF supporters' affair. For him, in real sense, there was nothing could stop the opposition opportunist who took advantage and masqueraded as ZANU PF supporters in order to get free land; Marongwe, "Farm Occupations and Occupiers in the Politics of Land in Zimbabwe", 180.

⁵⁵ This seemed to be a common problem that was highlighted by most of the farmers.

occupation of Ceres Two farm in Shamva where he “resettled” 90 supporters from his constituency.⁵⁶ This was despite the fact that this farm was originally designated for A2 resettlement with ten beneficiaries already in possession of offer letters.⁵⁷ The occupation of the 90 supporters on the farm subsequently led to clashes with the ten beneficiaries who had to take the matter before the courts.⁵⁸ The common narrative by people in the area is that this prominent figure tried to manipulate a Ministry of Lands official to give his supporters offer letters but was not successful. These supporters continued to stay on the farm without offer letters up to May 2007 when they were successfully evicted by the court.⁵⁹ Elliot Manyika, the former governor of Mashonaland Central, was also reported to have transported about 54 people from his rural home to occupy a farm in Matepatepa commercial farming area that had been designated for five other beneficiaries. It is reported that the move was meant to thwart one of the beneficiaries who was an upcoming competitor in ZANU PF primary elections for his Bindura North Constituency Seat.⁶⁰ The move by Manyika also serves as an example where land was used as a political campaign tool and a method to dislodge political enemies, including those within ZANU PF.

One of the issues that had a big influence in shaping the nature of relations amongst farmers was the various motivations behind land occupation. One such motivation was the nationalist land discourse expounded and vigorously promoted by ZANU PF. The discourse emphasised land as a symbol of sovereignty, and land reform was seen as a restitutorial process that returned land stolen by whites to “the people.” This discourse was meant to enable any black Zimbabwean to claim land anywhere in Zimbabwe and was meant to be particularly useful to those claiming land in an area in which they had no specific historical claim.⁶¹ Indeed, a majority of land occupiers in the province utilised such discourse to justify their claim.

⁵⁶ Interview with Gloria Chari, Ceres Farm, Shamva, 22 November 2017.

⁵⁷ Ibid.

⁵⁸ Interview with Cephas Muponda, Ceres Farm, Shamva, 22 November 2017.

⁵⁹ Unfortunately, all my efforts to get access to the court documents for this case were to no avail although almost all the people I spoke to seemed familiar with this case.

⁶⁰ Interview with Norman Mahachi, Leed Farm, Bindura, 13 October 2017.

⁶¹ Self provisioning was not a new phenomenon after 2000. There were earlier spontaneous self-resettlement on state land in the frontier districts. Earlier works on this see; A.O Chimhowu “Extending the Grain Basket to the Margin: Spontaneous Land Resettlement and Changing Livelihoods in Hurungwe District, Zimbabwe, *The Journal of South African and American Studies*, 28, 3 (2003), 551- 573 and P. Nyambara, “The Closing Frontier: Agrarian Change, Immigrants and the “Squatter Menace” in Gokwe, 1980-1990s”, *Journal of Agrarian Change*, 1, 4 (2001), 534- 549.

On the other hand, some new farmers led by traditional leaders utilised the restitution discourse. This discourse emphasised returning “home” to particular pieces of land that were symbolically important to them as a group or as individuals and reoccupy such areas. The areas included sites at which ancestors were buried that “are still landscapes of meaning and memory and are the location of traditional ceremonies such as rainmaking.”⁶² Joseph Mujere argues that the return to ancestral lands has been at the centre of the land reform rhetoric in Zimbabwe. He contends that this argument is premised on the fact that many communities were displaced from their ancestral lands during the colonial period.⁶³ Joost Fontein also explores how during the FTLRP, people from Mutirikwi ought to reclaim their land and return to the graves and ruins of the past lives.⁶⁴ Innocent Dande and Joseph Mujere discusses the land claims made by chieftaincies in Makoni district.⁶⁵ Chief Bushu in Shamva and Chief Negomo in Muzarabani successfully led groups from their rural homes to occupy land in the two districts of Shamva and Muzarabani respectively.⁶⁶ Chief Bushu claimed that the traditional rainmaking shrine for his clan was called Chongwena and was in Careers Rest Farm in Shamva. He, therefore, used such claims to have his “people” allocated the farm where he resumed to carry out traditional rainmaking ceremonies.⁶⁷ The two chiefs therefore utilised entitlements of “home” to successfully lobby the Ministry of Lands officials to validate their land rights. In Mazowe District, peasants from Dande claimed a farm which they identified as housing the spirit medium Nehanda Nyakasikana’s shrine.⁶⁸ Their assertion was, however, not successful because the farm in question was taken up by the former First

⁶² Chaumba, *et al*, “New Politics, New Livelihoods: Agrarian Change in Zimbabwe”, 594.

⁶³ Mujere, “Land, Graves and Belonging: Land Reform and the Politics of Belonging in Newly Resettled Farms in Gutu, 2000–2009”, 1123. See also Fontein, “Graves, Ruins, and Belonging: Towards an Anthropology of Proximity”, 708 and J. Fontein, ““We want to Belong to our Roots and we want to be Modern People”: New Farmers, Old Claims around Lake Mutirikwi, Southern Zimbabwe”, *African Studies Quarterly*, 10, 4 (2009), 1–35. The need to return to ancestral lands was not a new phenomenon in post-200 Zimbabwe. There are many historical claims nationwide, for example, Tangwena people claims over Kairezi in Manicaland, after independence. For more see, Moore, *Suffering for the Territory; Race, Place and Power in Zimbabwe*.

⁶⁴ Fontein, *Remaking Mutirikwi: Landscape, Water and Belonging in Southern Zimbabwe*.

⁶⁵ I. Dande and J. Mujere, “Reclaiming Ancestral Lands: The Fast-track Land Reform Programme and Boundary Politics in Makoni District, Eastern Zimbabwe, 2000-2011”, in Zifikile Makwavarara, Ruby Magosvongwe and Obert Mlambo (eds), *Dialoguing Land and Indigenisation in Zimbabwe and other Developing Countries Emerging Perspectives* (Harare: University of Zimbabwe Publications, 2015).

⁶⁶ Interview with Tendai. Mukota, Centenary, 15 December 2017.

⁶⁷ Interview with Jephtha Nhundu, Farmer, Careers Rest Farm, Shamva, 12 November 2017.

⁶⁸ Interview with John Chokuwana, Farmer, Mazowe District, 23 November 2017. It is important to note that although the government down played the restitution claims in its land reform policy, it awarded such claims in the province.

Lady, Grace Mugabe. Interestingly, at a political rally in Bindura on 9 September 2017, Grace Mugabe claimed to have been representing the spirit medium, Mbuya Nehanda, who she argued was the rightful owner of that piece of land.⁶⁹

Land occupations that were spearheaded by traditional leadership were not peculiar to Mashonaland Central. *The Sunday News* of 20 December 2009, also reported of a land row pitting Chief Solomon Jahana Khumalo of Insiza North at Debshan Ranch, Matebeleland South, which had turned violent with those involved resorting to physical fights and destruction of each other's crops.⁷⁰ The chief and his descendants only came in 2006, more than four years after the official start of land redistribution, claiming that it was their land. An aide to Chief Jahana Khumalo, John Dhodlo told *Sunday News* that the farm belonged to them as they were evicted from the land by the colonial Rhodesian government in 1965. He said that they were forced to settle on dry lands in Gokwe and had come back to claim their land.⁷¹ Ushewedu Kufakurinani and Wellington Bhamu argue that restitution claims gained currency in the post 2000 period.⁷² In another article, *Land-related Conflicts in Insiza North, 2000-2013: Towards Integration and Reconciliation*, Kufakurinani uses the concept of *rukuvhute*, which literally translated, means umbilical cord.⁷³ In the Zimbabwean context and/or African philosophical lore, the *rukuvhute* concept signifies birthright attachment to the land. The concept is also associated with the place of origin to which one gets permanently attached. In the Insiza case, Kufakurinani argues that *rukuvhute* acted as a strong justification for the Jahana people to return to their motherland.⁷⁴ In as much as the land conflicts in the area have also assumed an ethnic dimension as the area is located in Matebeleland and, therefore, expected to be occupied by people from Matebeleland, Chief Jahana appropriated

⁶⁹ <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=15bwtuCswo>, Grace Mugabe attack Mnangagwa and she said she is representing mbuya nehanda, accessed 17 September 2018.

⁷⁰ "Land Row Turns Violent Recently in Insiza", *The Sunday News*, 20 December 2009; U. Kufakurinani and W. Bhamu's book chapter, "Resettled Yet Unsettled? Land Conflicts and food (in) security in Insiza North, Zimbabwe 2005-2013", in Z. Makwavarara, R. Magosvongwe and O.B. Mlambo (eds), *Dialoguing Land and Indigenisation in Zimbabwe and Other Developing Countries: Emerging Perspectives*, have a very interesting account of Chief Jahana's land struggles in Insiza District, Matebeleland South.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*

⁷² Kufakurinani and Bhamu, "Resettled yet Unsettled? Land Conflicts and Food (in) Security in Insiza North, Zimbabwe, 2005-2013."

⁷³ U. Kufakurinani, "Land-Related Conflicts in Insiza North, 2000-2013: Towards Integration and Reconciliation", in N. Bhebhe, T. Mashingaidze and G. Mazarire (eds.), *Historical Perspectives on Violence, Conflict and Accommodation in Zimbabwe* (Harare: ONHRI, 2016), 149.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*

the *rukuvhute* concept and restitution claims to lead his people back to their “ancestral home.”

These leaders and others, who also seized the opportunity to reclaim the land they had been “dispossessed” were responsible for the allocation of land and continued to take a lead role in the administration of the new schemes, including the resolution of conflicts through headmen they appointed in the resettlement schemes.⁷⁵ Thus, in order to spread the influence of traditional leaders in the newly resettled areas, the majority of the chiefs in Mashonaland Central appointed village heads at almost every resettled farm – especially those farms under the A1 scheme. These village heads are, however, not formally recognised by the government. Although they have no official mandate, they are responsible for matters to do with culture and tradition. There has also been a tendency to appoint village heads from the ranks of war veterans, a situation that has helped manage the tension between the traditional and political leadership.⁷⁶ It is important to note that although these village heads are not legally recognised, they play an important part in the politics of belonging that play themselves out in the resettlement areas.

3.4. The New Politics of Land Reform: Government Policy on Land, State Led Demarcations and the Formalisation of the Reform Process.

It is important to note that the policy framework of the FTLRP was vague. It was not like the previous legally constituted Land Reform and Resettlement Program (LRRP) that specified processes involving designation of farms, with the possibility of appeal, and the payment of full value compensation.⁷⁷ In a bid to bolster the government’s position on rural land occupation, to legalise farms occupations that were taking place and to close all possible avenues that could be used by the white farmers who lost their farms through the FTLRP, the Government of Zimbabwe enacted a number of amendments to the laws governing land

⁷⁵ Interview with Amos Mapfumo, Farmer, Mazowe District, 15 December 2017.

⁷⁶ Sunga, *Institutional Coordination Framework for the Land Reform and Resettlement*, 10.

⁷⁷ In June 1998, the Zimbabwe government published its “policy framework” on the Land Reform and Resettlement Program Phase II (LRRP II), which envisaged the compulsory purchase over five years of 50,000 square kilometres from the 112,000 square kilometres owned by white commercial farmers, public corporations, churches, non-governmental organisations and multinational companies. Broken down, the 50,000 square kilometres meant that every year between 1998 and 2003, the government intended to purchase 10,000 square kilometres for redistribution. For a much more comprehensive discussion of the LRRP see, L. Cliffe, J. Alexander, B. Cousins and R. Gaidzanwa, “An Overview of Fast Track Land Reform in Zimbabwe: Editorial Introduction,” *The Journal of Peasant Studies*, 8, 5 (2011).

reforms.⁷⁸ Such amendments included the changes to the Land Acquisition Act of 1992, which were enacted in 2000 under the Land Acquisition Amendment Act in a bid to accelerate the velocity at which the land was being acquired by removing the so-called land acquisition “bottlenecks” as well as facilitating the FTLRP.”⁷⁹ This was followed by the amendment to the Rural Land Occupiers Act 13 of 2001, which protected people from being evicted from the white farms they had invaded.⁸⁰ In September 2002, the Land Acquisition Amendment Act (No.2) of 2002 removed substantive requirements from the Act that had given the administrative court an advantage to intervene meaningfully in the acquisition process.⁸¹ Finally, in September 2005, a ZANU PF dominated parliament passed a constitutional amendment that “nationalised farmland acquired through the fast-track process and deprived original owners of the right to challenge in court the Government’s decision to expropriate their land.”⁸² Bertus De Villiers argued that, “these amendments were aimed at legalising the expropriation of land without compensation in the hope that the land reform process could be faster, cheaper, less complicated and less legalistic.”⁸³ It is important to note that in as much as the government kept on changing some of the statutes and constitution it did not make enough effort to formulate other statutes to protect the new farmers from evictions and many other forms of vulnerabilities similar to those suffered by the previous white owners.

As late as 2015, the state was still struggling with how to handle boundary issues and fresh farm invasions. On 17 March 2015, the Commercial Farmers Union wrote a letter raising its concerns regarding this issue. The letter raised concerns “with the problems that continue taking place on the farms related to boundaries, double allocations and fresh occupations,” which have seen farmers “spending a lot of time at the lands offices instead of being

⁷⁸ Refer to appendix on statutes and legislations.

⁷⁹ Human Rights Watch (HRW), Fast Track Land Reform in Zimbabwe, 2002, Available at: <http://www.hrw.org/reports/2002/03/08/fast-track-land-reform-Zimbabwe> (Accessed: 27 October 2018); See also Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment (No.16) Act 5 of 2000.

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*

⁸¹ *Land Acquisition Amendment (No 2) Act, 2002-* a review available at <http://www.kubatana.net/html/archive/legisl/0209191aa2note.asp?sector=LEGISL> (accessed 15 September 2018).

⁸² The Tobacco Institute of Southern Africa (TISA) Zimbabwe, 2011 Available at: <http://www.tobaccosa.co.za/browse.php?catid=105&sub=268> (Accessed: 27 October 2018); Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment (No. 17) Bill, 2005.

⁸³ B. De Villiers, *Land reform: Issues and Challenges: A Comparative Overview of Experiences in Zimbabwe, Namibia, South Africa and Australia* (Johannesburg: Konrad Adenauer Publications, 2003), 18.

productive on the farms.”⁸⁴ It urged the government to tackle the problem “without delay so that farmers can concentrate on productivity” as there had been “endless fights on the farms over boundaries and in some cases, double allocations where some corrupt land officers deliberately move boundaries and allocate occupied land.”⁸⁵ The CFU encouraged the Ministry of Lands and Rural Resettlement to deal with this matter “decisively as some lands officers, working in cahoots with greedy resettled farmers, shift the boundaries in favour of those greasing their hands.”⁸⁶ It reported many cases of such complaints lodged with the ministry that had remained unresolved and had thus impacted negatively on agricultural production. It also encouraged Lands officers to shun corruption and ‘work for the good of all resettled farmers.’ The CFU further highlighted how it “boggles the mind that over a decade after the successful implementation of the land reform program, lands officers visit some farmers today to shift the boundaries.” More importantly, it maintained that such actions caused “fights among the farmers, which is not good for land reform.”⁸⁷ Rather the CFU preferred a scenario where farmers would;

expend their energy on production and doing their level best, barring drought, to produce and ensure national food security. This they cannot do if they spend time shuttling between the farms and the lands offices for arbitration over the boundaries and double allocations.⁸⁸

The farmers’ body encouraged finality to the issues of boundaries, double allocations and fresh occupations so that farmers would concentrate on agricultural production. The CFU discouraged any further cases of boundary shifting as they would only lead to disharmony and hatred among the farmers, something not good for productivity.⁸⁹

With regards to government policy towards land reform, between 2002 and 2014, the Government focused on the redistribution of the farms acquired through the FTLRP from 2000–2002. From 2014 the Government moved away from the chaos and violence and adopted a different approach whereby, the government allowed the new farmers to undertake different forms of partnerships and agricultural contracts with the once expelled white

⁸⁴*Boundary disputes affect production*, <http://www.cfuzim.org/index.php/newspaper-articles-2/land-issues/5199-boundary-disputes-affect-production>, 17 March 2015, accessed 23 October 2018.

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*

commercial farmers.⁹⁰ During my field research, I noticed an influx of white farmers in the commercial farms and most of them have lease agreements of five years and others are involved in sharing arrangements with the new farmers. However, the statistics of white farmers involved in these arrangements could not be ascertained partly because some of the arrangements are private while some new farmers are used as fronts. As a result, some of the new farmers were not willing to divulge such kind of information.

From the onset, the possibility of success of the land reform program in Zimbabwe was jeopardised by the aspect of insecurity of tenure, which has made it difficult for farmers to make meaningful investments on their land.⁹¹ Planning aspects expected of a land reform, including tenure security, were put aside to ensure that, first and foremost, people were on the land and any problems that may arise as a result were to be addressed later.⁹² The major cause of the new farmers' insecurities emanated from the evictions that persisted even as late as 2015. In that year, three interesting cases of such evictions in the Province deserve to be highlighted. In October 2015, four farmers were evicted from Grange Farm in Shamva District. The four farmers were alleged to be very close to the former Deputy President, Joyce Mujuru who had been ousted from government and the party in April 2015.⁹³ They were accused of belonging to Mujuru's "Gamatox" faction.⁹⁴ Other A1 plot holders who were accused of sympathising with Mujuru in Shamva were also threatened with eviction. In December 2015, two A2 farmers were also evicted from their plots in Matepatepa commercial farming area in Bindura on similar charges as the ones mentioned above.⁹⁵ Dereck Kunzi and Tapera Marovha were both evicted from their plots in Zvakwana Farm after the local war veterans leadership accused them of fomenting factionalism and campaigning against the then President, Robert Mugabe.⁹⁶ The two farmers approached the Ministry of Lands offices to no avail, as they was no officer willing to come and deal with their "politically charged case."⁹⁷ The war veterans in the same district also demonstrated

⁹⁰ Gutu, MDC vindicated over land issue, 2015, <http://nehandaradio.com/2015/01/05/mdcvindicated-land-issue/>, accessed, 29 September 2018.

⁹¹ E. V. Jowa, *Food Security in the Context of Fast Track Land Reform*, No. 3 (Harare: African Institute for Agrarian Studies, 2005) 9.

⁹² Matondi., *Zimbabwe's Fast Track Land Reform*, 16.

⁹³ Interview with Melody Pagarasei, Grange Farm, Shamva District, 5 December 2017.

⁹⁴ Gamatox was a name derisively used against a ZANU PF faction linked to former Vice-President Joyce Mujuru that was accused of plotting to oust President Robert Mugabe.

⁹⁵ See one such example of a letter cancelling an offer for land in the appendix.

⁹⁶ Interview with Ben Gondo, Zvakwana Farm, 23 December 2017.

⁹⁷ Ibid.

against six other new farmers in the area who they accused of ferrying farm workers to attend a Mujuru party meeting in Shamva.⁹⁸ These farmers were only saved from eviction after the intervention of a senior party official.

Tenure insecurity was thus a big drawback for most farmers in Mashonaland Central Province and this was further compounded by a lack of a clear-cut position on the part of government regarding tenure. Under the FTLRP, the land was nationalised and A2 farmers who met the requirements were issued with 99 year leases.⁹⁹ However, by June 2007, only 125 new farmers nationally had been issued with 99-year leases over the previous seven years, yet more than 15,000 people were resettled under the commercial farm scheme.¹⁰⁰ A1 farmers were given permits. However, by 2005, a majority of the farmers only had offer letters which neither provide them with security nor enabled them to secure loans from formal credit institutions and banks.¹⁰¹ In October 2006, ZANU PF Masvingo South Member of House of Assembly, Walter Muzembi, lamented the lack of a clear and firm position with regards to land tenure as banks were not forthcoming with loans when there was no collateral.¹⁰² This was mainly because most of the title deeds for the 6,700 acquired farms were still in the hands of the original owners and it was not clear how the transfer of property rights would take place especially since the issue of compensations was not resolved.¹⁰³

Many of the new beneficiaries also considered a lease as an important document that would guarantee security of tenure. Robson Gato, a very successful holder of an A2 plot in Guruve and a former manager at a commercial farm in the area argued on the importance of a lease, as it “gives a farmer title to the land he holds and also enabled him or her to obtain loans from financial institutions.”¹⁰⁴ For him, “proving security of tenure was one of the key measures that the government could do to boost the agriculture sector.”¹⁰⁵ Former head of the technical team on the Presidential Land Review Committee, Moyo, told the media that 99-year leases would increase the confidence of new farmers, which in turn would lead to high productivity.

⁹⁸ Ibid.

⁹⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰⁰ “Government to Expediate Issuing of Land Leases”, *The Chronicle*, 11 June 2007.

¹⁰¹ Jowa, *Food Security in the Context of Fast Track Land Reform*, 9.

¹⁰² *Parliamentary Debates*, 28 October 2006, Col. 680- 681, Walter Muzembi.

¹⁰³ Ibid.

¹⁰⁴ Interview with Robson Gato, Guruve Centre, 2 November 2017.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid.

He argued that many new farmers falling under the A2 scheme perceived having leases as a reason to feel more secure.¹⁰⁶

The position of new farmers with regards to tenure security is captured vividly in a newspaper article in the *Zimbabwe Independent* of 1 December 2007. It reported that the farmers were beginning to “wake up to the limitations of the new lease documents they received from the government on November 16, 2007.”¹⁰⁷ The report claimed that a close reading of the document showed that “it neither fully guarantees security of tenure nor can it be used as collateral to get loans from the banks.”¹⁰⁸ The newspaper report went further to seek expertise from financial risk specialists who argued that the lease document was full of vague and loose legal statements that posed a potential risk to any financial institution that may want to accept it.¹⁰⁹ Crucially, the article claimed that the lease eroded tenure security by a provision in its section 23, which stated that “government shall not be obliged to pay or compensate the farmer for improvements that it has not approved.”¹¹⁰ Such a provision was interpreted to mean that a farmer could be booted out from his allocated plot with nothing.¹¹¹ Indeed the government’s declaration at the end of the lease agreement that the lessee could use the lease as collateral in securing agricultural financial assistance from any financial or agricultural institutions was not enough to allay the insecurities amongst farmers nor did it make the lease acceptable to lending institutions.

Sentiments by one of the land beneficiaries, Shadreck Mandaza, from Mazowe District also help to put the security of tenure issue into perspective. He argued that;

Confidence in the fairness and predictability of the system is what is required for a farmer to take on the risk of planting hundreds of hectares of a crop. She or he must have confidence that if they plan carefully and work hard and if the weather cooperates, they have a good chance of reaping the fruits of their labour and of their willingness to take risk. But in Zimbabwe a farmer has so much more to worry about. How do you know that if you do really well you will not simply be opening yourself up to being a victim of some greedy government or ruling party official jealous of your success? If that official decides they want your crop, livestock or property we now

¹⁰⁶ “WFP and FAO Slam Zimbabwe Fast Track”, *Sunday Mail*, 15 June 2007.

¹⁰⁷ “Loopholes Need to be Closed on Lease policy”, *Zimbabwe Independent*, 1 December 2007.

¹⁰⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁹ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁰ *Ibid.*

¹¹¹ *Ibid.*

have, what can we do? I have definite evidence over several years that there is simply nothing you can do to stop it all being taken away from you.¹¹²

Quite often, the government developed and implemented policies in retrospect, a situation that made government appear as if it had lost control and was trying to catch up.¹¹³ The passing of the Rural Land Occupiers Act is a good illustration of the implementation of policy in retrospect.¹¹⁴ The Act, passed in 2001, was meant to protect certain occupiers of rural land from eviction. This was mainly directed at protecting such occupiers who had occupied land in anticipation of being resettled by an acquiring authority on that- or any other land for agricultural purposes.¹¹⁵ There were cases whereby some properties were delisted after people had already been formally settled on them, as well as instances whereby settled A1 farms had to be re-planned into A2 farms thereby displacing the A1 farmers.¹¹⁶ Thus the government's desire to resettle people fast meant that allocations were made even before the legal process of acquiring land had begun. This created scenarios of future boundary disputes and multiple plot allocations.

The nature of the land reform process itself was a cause of conflict among the newly resettled farmers. Conflicts soon emerged over boundaries, infrastructure and other basic everyday necessities. Numerous cases in the province over boundaries and infrastructure have gone to court over boundary disputes and while others have led to violence and deaths among the farmers.¹¹⁷ Klaus Deininger suggested that the allocation of farms with highly developed and productive infrastructure has often proved difficult, creating the basis of conflict among beneficiaries.¹¹⁸ Rampant corruption, bureaucracy, and heavy-handed policies aimed at maintaining central control of the land beneficiaries' lifestyles have all been responsible for this conflict.¹¹⁹ Over 70 percent of my respondents cite vices such as corruption, bureaucracy

¹¹² "New Farmers Raise Concerns over Security of Tenure", *The Financial Gazette*, 11 November 2006.

¹¹³ Sunga, *Institutional Coordination Framework for the Land Reform and Resettlement*, 14.

¹¹⁴ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁵ <http://www.parlzim.gov.zw/acts-list/rural-land-occupiers-20-26>, accessed 25 October 2017.

¹¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 15.

¹¹⁷ Detailed narratives of such conflict will be laid in Chapter 4. Here the issue is only being mentioned to explain the political context that determined everyday relations amongst the new farmers. It is important to note that, early years of land reform, boundary issues were quite prominent because farmers were still consolidating their claims. As years go by, they become less than the initial stages.

¹¹⁸ K. H. Deininger, *Land Policies for Growth and Poverty Reduction*, A World Bank Policy Research Report, (Washington DC: World Bank, 2003), 149.

¹¹⁹ This is a sentiment echoed by a majority of my respondents.

and heavy handed state policies as being at the centre of the conflicts amongst new farmers in the resettlement areas. To further compound the situation, there were glaring mistakes made at implementation in terms of details such as design of settlements. While the A1 model was primarily aimed at the poor and landless from the communal areas, it is common knowledge that some of the beneficiaries were people in urban areas including others holding jobs.¹²⁰ Indeed, at least 15 percent of A1 farm beneficiaries I interviewed, especially in Shamva and Muzarabani, were civil servants from nearby Centenary, Mvurwi, Bindura, Concession, Glendale and Shamva towns. Buka also reported the fragrant violation of maximum farm size policy in Mashonaland Central Province as per A2 model stipulation.¹²¹

Moyo cited evidence of what he terms the “provincialisation” of land allocation, which indicates that this process was not universal for A2s, but was a predominant tendency in A1 that tended to favor people who originated from given communal areas within the province.¹²² Clear patterns of concentration of land allocation between A1 and A2 schemes were discernible in relation to location, such as nearness to communal areas, which provides social and physical relocation advantage or to peri urban areas which provided market and commuter advantages. Those A1 schemes nearer communal areas were mostly allocated to communal area people, while in peri urban areas A2 schemes were mainly populated by people coming from the urban areas. In Bindura district for instance, in an A1 scheme near the communal areas, 93 percent of the beneficiaries I interviewed were from the adjacent communal lands like Musana and Madziwa, while 49 percent of the beneficiaries on A1 farms near to the town were from urban areas.

As far as the A2 model is concerned, well-connected members of the ruling elite took advantage of it to acquire commercial farms, although the model was meant to accommodate those with farming skills, experience and start-up resources.¹²³ There is growing evidence that the ruling elite allocated to itself some of the best land. Cases of multiple ownership of farms in Mashonaland Central are widespread amongst influential politicians like Paddington Zhanda, Nicholas Goche, Joice Mujuru, Elliot Manyika, Saviour Kasukuwere to mention but

¹²⁰ Sachikonye, From “Growth with Equity” to “Fast-Track” Reform: Zimbabwe’s Land Question”, 235.

¹²¹ Buka, *A Preliminary Audit Report of Land Reform Programme*

¹²² S. Moyo, *Overall Impacts of the Fast Track Land Reform Programme*, No.1 (Harare: African Institute for Agrarian Studies, 2004), 5.

¹²³ “State to Repossess Underutilised Land”, *Daily News*, 6 September 2002

a few.¹²⁴ Newspapers and NGOs carried stories of a scramble for such land by cabinet ministers, governors, senior army and police officers, top civil servants, war veterans and others connected to these elites. Thus, privileged members, through patronage or clientelism, became beneficiaries of a process that should have been largely aimed at poverty reduction through decongestion of communal areas.¹²⁵ However, some scholars have found a broad range of beneficiaries, in both the A1 and A2 models ranging from senior government officials to rural peasants.¹²⁶

One of the most famous cases in the province where the political elite used their position to acquire land was a case that involved the former First Lady, Grace Mugabe, in Mazowe District. She was linked to a move to evict 12,000 newly resettled farmers from Mazowe Farm to make way for a “new game park.” *The Standard* newspaper reported of how “confused farmers” were given less than a week to vacate the farm a few days after “Mrs Mugabe toured the area accompanied by Transport Minister Nicholas Goche and ZANU PF spokesperson, Ephraim Masawi and officials from Ministry of lands.” The occupiers insisted they were told that orders to evict them had come from the highest office and their last day on the farm was supposed to be 11 December 2009.¹²⁷ The farmers who were served with eviction notice had been allocated plots on the farm and had been living there for over nine years. ZANU PF Mazowe Ward Chairperson, Christopher Hahachi, recalled how “they were told that even if they appealed the order would not be reversed because it came from the top.”¹²⁸ Martin Dinha, the Governor of Mashonaland Central Province, commented on this

¹²⁴*Ibid.*

¹²⁵ Sachikonye, From “Growth with Equity” to “Fast-Track” Reform: Zimbabwe’s Land Question”, 236. Other scholars also pointed to the use of land reform as a tool for political patronage, see; Hammar, Raftopoulos and Stig Jensen (eds), *Zimbabwe’s Unfinished Business: Rethinking Land, State and Nation in the Context of Crises*; Alexander “Squatters’, Veterans and the State in Zimbabwe” and Marongwe, “Beneficiary Selection in the Fast Track Land Reform Programme in Goromonzi District, Zimbabwe.”

¹²⁶ There are scholars who shared a consensus that the majority of farmers who appeared in A1 model are “ordinary” Zimbabweans and most of them communal farmers, however political connections work in some instances. Among others see, Zamchiya, “Synopsis of Land and Agrarian Change”, 1101; Scoones, *et al*, dismisses the myth that all land was taken by cronies, see, Scoones, *et al*, *Zimbabwe’s Land Reform Myths and Realities*; Moyo and Yeros, “The Resurgence of Rural Movements under Neo-liberalism.”

¹²⁷ “Grace Mugabe linked to Farm Eviction”, *The Standard*, 20 December 2009.

¹²⁸ *Ibid.*

situation, arguing that the farmers who were evicted were illegally settled on the farm. He also accused them of degrading the environment.¹²⁹

Interestingly, *The Herald* newspaper reported that the government was “relocating 941 families from Manzou (Anorold fram) area in Mazowe to nearby farms to resuscitate Manzou Game Park and establish the Nehanda National Monument.”¹³⁰ It described the evicted farmers as invaders who had settled illegally on the former Manzou Game Park at the start of the land reform in 2000.¹³¹ Indeed, Martin Dinha stated that contrary to claims that the families were being moved to make way for Grace Mugabe’s farming ventures, the relocation was necessitated by the need to resettle the families properly.¹³² However, contrary to such claims by Dinha, *The Standard* newspaper reported of heavily armed police evicting people to make way for the “First Lady, Grace Mugabe.”¹³³

It, therefore, meant that personal progress within such a system became dependent upon political patronage and the nurturing of “good relations” with other influential members within the farming fraternity, rather than upon resourcefulness, good management and hard work. Another newspaper reported succinctly on the conundrum that farmers found themselves. The *Zimbabwe Independent* noted that although fixed assets of some value could be built with money loaned by a bank, the separation of land reform from the improvements on the land made the recovery of the debt almost impossible if the borrower defaults.¹³⁴ This was because the farmer’s right to remain on the land was conferred, not by business procedure supported by market forces but by a political act that the bank could not change.¹³⁵ By and large, therefore, financial institutions were reluctant to finance farmers because of tenure issues. This left the farmers dependent on other sources of capitalisation and other means of getting by, which, in turn, depended mainly on the cultivation of “good relations” with other players who were either well-resourced or politically well positioned.¹³⁶

With regards to the issue of impromptu takeovers of their designated plots, the new farmers hoped to find solace in President Mugabe’s assented Gazetted Land (Consequential

¹²⁹ *Ibid.*

¹³⁰ “Government Relocates 941 Families in Mazowe”, *The Herald*, 14 February 2012.

¹³¹ *Ibid.*

¹³² *Ibid.*

¹³³ “Grace Mugabe Linked to Farm Eviction”, *The Standard*.

¹³⁴ *Zimbabwe Independent*, 15 September 2006.

¹³⁵ *Ibid.*

¹³⁶ This will be discussed in full detail in chapter 5.

Provisions) Bill of 2006, which repealed the Rural Land Occupiers (Protection from Eviction) Act that shielded invaders.¹³⁷ The enactment of the law meant that it was now punishable by law to hold, use or occupy a piece of land that was gazetted for resettlement purposes without lawful authority in the form of an offer letter.¹³⁸ These land invaders were sometimes used by war veterans and powerful politicians to dislodge a legitimate claimant to a piece of land. However the Consequential Provisions Bill of 2006 did not help the victims in any way because evictions did not stop and even those with offer letters sometimes suffered the consequences.¹³⁹ As late as 2010, *The Standard* reported a tussle between a Central Intelligence Organisation operative and a Harare woman for the control of a plot parceled out during the land reform program, which had spilled to the courts.¹⁴⁰ Charles Dondo, from the President's office and Elina Dzipangwe both claimed that they were given offer letters for a plot at Maryville farm in Marlborough by the former Lands Minister, Didymus Mutasa. The fight over the piece of land reportedly started when Mutasa withdrew the offer letter he had given to Dzipangwe in August 2007. Dzipangwe refused to leave the property, arguing that she was still the legal owner of the plot and Mutasa had no right to withdraw the letter.¹⁴¹ The new farmers were allocated land and after occupation, no title deeds were issued to them. There was no attempt whatsoever to have their "rights" registered and publicised in the deeds registries office. It, therefore, meant that these new farmers could not prove ownership, and their title was highly vulnerable and as a consequence, the allocated owners experienced a lack of certainty and security of tenure.¹⁴² To compound the situation, the farmers were told not to build permanent shelters by the government and the offer letter clearly stipulated that the Ministry has a right to withdraw the offer.¹⁴³ Such government directives barred the new farmers from construction of permanent structures, made a majority of the new farmers to feel insecure in terms of tenure.

The land reform was less sensitive to issues of social differentiation, and therefore selection of beneficiaries, and to issues of equity particularly in relation to the interests of the poor,

¹³⁷ *Ibid.*

¹³⁸ *Ibid.*

¹³⁹ "Farm Invaders Lose Protection", *Zimbabwe Independent*, 10 November 2006

¹⁴⁰ "Land Offer Spills in Court", *The Standard*, 9 May 2010.

¹⁴¹ *Ibid.*

¹⁴² Makamure, "The Socio- Economic Outcomes of the Fast Track Land Redistribution Programme: with special reference to Kippure- Resettlement scheme in Masvingo Province, Zimbabwe", 34.

¹⁴³ Interview with farmer John Samaita, Bindura, 23 November 2017. See example of offer letter in appendix.

women and farm workers. This phenomenon is very visible in Mashonaland Central Province. Only a handful of farm workers got access to land, partly because in as much the FTLRP policy emphasised the need to distribute the land to landless peasants, followed by other groups in need of land and a certain quota to be allocated to war veterans, farm workers were neither listed as targeted land beneficiaries nor was a specific quota allocated to them in the policy.¹⁴⁴ A majority of these farm workers were managers in their previous occupations or had participated during the invasion.¹⁴⁵ A few women also benefitted, especially those who joined the multitudes of people in the farm invasions. In the main, however, the few women who are in possession of land got it through their husbands who are now deceased or took advantage of their political connections to get land. Others benefitted by virtue of being war veterans. There is an interesting case in Shamva where a husband to a war veteran took advantage of his wife's war history to get land. The family is now in possession of two plots, an A1 plot and A2 plot.¹⁴⁶ However this is one of such few cases I encountered. Only a relatively small proportion of women were resettled under FTLRP and from my fieldwork in Mashonaland Central, women who got land in their own right were less than 8 percent.¹⁴⁷ Mutopo in her study in Mwenezi also argued that only a few managed to secure land individually as most of the women accessed via their husbands through marriage or cultural contacts.¹⁴⁸ For, Moyo, only 14 percent of women benefitted nationwide.¹⁴⁹

3.5. Farm Infrastructure, Property and Government Policy

In the early period of the FTLRP one of the major crises related to farm infrastructure and property. This was mainly because limited security during the ownership transfer period led to vandalism and theft of infrastructure like irrigation facilities and equipment. Some departing white farmers also took their equipment with them, either for safe storage in

¹⁴⁴ Many scholars discussed the reason why farm workers lost out during FTLRP, See, S. Moyo, B. Rutherford and D. Amanor-Wilks, "Land Reform and Changing Social Relations for Farm Workers in Zimbabwe", in *Review of African Political Economy*, 84 (2000) and Matondi, *Zimbabwe's Fast Track Land Reform*.

¹⁴⁵ Interview with an Agriculture Extension Officer, Bindura Town, 12 November 2017. See also, "Fast Track Land Reform in Matepatapa Commercial Area, Bindura District: Effects on Farm Workers, 2000- 2010."

¹⁴⁶ Interview with Dexter Pazvakavambwa, Shamva, 13 October 2017.

¹⁴⁷ For further critical reflections on how the land reform failed to harness the gender inequality in Zimbabwe, see S. Jacobs, "Democracy, Class and Gender in Land Reform: A Zimbabwean example", *Research in Rural Sociology and Development*, 9 (2003), 203-28 and Goebel, *Gender and Land Reform in Zimbabwe Experience*.

¹⁴⁸ Mutopo, "Women's Struggles to Access and Control Land and Livelihoods after Fast Track Land Reform Programme in Mwenezi District, Zimbabwe."

¹⁴⁹ Moyo, "Three Decades of Agrarian Reform in Zimbabwe: Changing Agrarian Relations."

anticipation of returning to farming or to put it up for sale. To stop white farmers from doing this, Parliament passed the *Acquisition of Farm Equipment or Material Act* in 2004.¹⁵⁰ The Act called for the acquisition of material or equipment not currently being used for agriculture purposes. It also stipulated that farmers were not allowed to move out of acquired properties with any movable assets that were meant for agricultural purposes. Moreover, the act highlighted that damage or impairment to property was punishable through criminal proceedings, and a fine payable in the equivalent of the amount of damage done to such property.¹⁵¹ The white farmers attacked the Act, claiming that it permitted the executive to acquire the equipment for private as opposed to public use and to sell it for commercial advantage. However, the Zimbabwe Farmers Union (ZFU), Mashonaland Central chairman, Garikai Msika, argued that a lot of “this equipment was bought in Zimbabwe with money generated from farming operation carried out on Zimbabwe land.”¹⁵² The government tried to protect both moveable and unmoveable infrastructure from being taken or destroyed by the departing white farmers in order to ensure that new land beneficiaries could benefit from its use. It, however, failed to implement policy guidelines with respect to the ownership, management and utilisation of this equipment and infrastructure that was inherited on the resettled farms. In the absence of such guidelines, relevant structures found it difficult to effectively manage these facilities and to deal with conflicts that arose among some beneficiaries regarding access and utilisation of such infrastructure.¹⁵³

Moyo rightly argues that the A2 lease fails to grant plot holders without infrastructure on their plots any right of control, access, or use of any infrastructure not located on their farms.¹⁵⁴ Indeed, with respect to A2 farms, immovable infrastructure used in the processing of agricultural commodities is controlled by the beneficiary of the plot, who is expected to allow other farmers access to the infrastructure on cost recovery bases.¹⁵⁵ Such immovable

¹⁵⁰ Government of Zimbabwe, *Acquisition of Farm Equipment or Material Act 7* (Harare: Government of Zimbabwe, 2004), this act was later amended, see Government of Zimbabwe (*Acquisition of Farm Equipment or Material Act 6* (Harare: Government of Zimbabwe, 2005).

¹⁵¹ *Ibid.*

¹⁵² “Challenge against Equipment Acquisition”, *Zimbabwe Independent*, 9 November 2007.

¹⁵³ Sunga and Moyo, *Productive and Social Infrastructure in Models A1 and A2 Resettlement Schemes*. Again, narratives highlighting conflicts emanating from access and utilisation of infrastructure will be dealt with in Chapter 4.

¹⁵⁴ S. Moyo, *Emerging Land Reform and Tenure Issues*, No. 3 (Harare: African Institute for Agrarian Studies 2006).

¹⁵⁵ Sunga and Moyo, *Productive and Social Infrastructure in Models A1 and A2 resettlement Schemes*, 4.

infrastructure include, for example, tobacco barns and cattle handling facilities. The letters of offer stated that the plot holders on whose plots the infrastructure is located are the custodians of the infrastructure. Thus, the many instances of conflict that arose from everyday interactions amongst new farmers that are dealt with in Chapter Four are as a result of the loophole in this stipulation which works on the assumption and expectation that the beneficiary of a plot with infrastructure would share it with other plot holders. This is because the stipulation was not based on any form of policy guideline. It mainly relied on goodwill and the maintenance of cordial relations, which could not be guaranteed. Again, the custodianship was not defined, nor was there a mention of the access and use rights of other new farmers on the same farm. In fact, the lease gave authority to such plot holders to sublet infrastructure to other new farmers. It also did not give any entitlement to plot holders who do not have infrastructure on their plots to any right of control, access and use of any infrastructure not located on their plots.

In A1 areas, social infrastructure is treated as state property to be used for the public good, while productive properties such as irrigation equipment and barns are regarded as state assets to be utilised on a shared basis. The policy recognises infrastructure shortages and hence seeks to increase capacity utilisation through sharing mechanisms.¹⁵⁶ However, the practicality of this policy should be put to question. For example, irrigation equipment was vandalised as the new beneficiaries competed to make use of it. Some farmers resorted to unsavory tactics such as hiding the equipment to deny others usage.¹⁵⁷ Indeed, it should be noted that the infrastructure that existed in the large scale commercial areas prior to the FTLRP was meant for fewer commercial farmers and the expectation that this larger pool of farmers would still be able to use this infrastructure effectively was misplaced.¹⁵⁸

In some cases, government appointed “caretakers” to look after the infrastructure left on the farms. The exact terms and conditions of the caretaker were, however, not clear.¹⁵⁹ The letters

¹⁵⁶ B. Maguranyanga and S. Moyo, *Land Tenure in Post Fast Track Land Reform Programme: Zimbabwe Key Strategic Policy Development Issues*, No. 6 (Harare: African Institute for Agrarian Studies, 2006), 5.

¹⁵⁷ Like all cases involving conflicts amongst new farmers that emanated from, among other things, poor implementation of policy by the state, narratives of conflicts arising from utilisation of irrigation equipment will be given due attention in Chapter 4.

¹⁵⁸ See, in appendix, example of map showing subdivisions of plots under the A2 model.

¹⁵⁹ Sunga and Moyo, *Productive and Social Infrastructure in Models A1 and A2 Resettlement Schemes*, 4. Caretakers were new farmers assigned to manage infrastructure on farms. In most cases, those farmers on whose plots most of the infrastructure was located were given these roles.

of offer stated that the plot holders on whose plots the infrastructure is located are the “custodian” of the infrastructure. The letters did not define custodianship or mention the access and use rights of other beneficiaries on the same farm. This infrastructure ranges from productive facilities such as agricultural processing units, tobacco curing barns and grading sheds, off and on farm dams and irrigation infrastructure and associated water rights, dip tanks and cattle spraying facilities, to social infrastructure such as schools, clinics and residential facilities (farm homesteads and farm worker compounds). Government policy on infrastructure allocation, use and management varies between the A1 and A2 settlement schemes. In A1 areas government policy treats social infrastructure (schools, clinics etc.) as state property to be used for specified public purposes, and productive properties (irrigation, barns etc.) as state assets to be used on a shared basis through various sharing mechanisms. In general, the infrastructure policy concerns in A1 schemes pertain more to the efficacy of ‘sharing’ mechanisms and the adequacy of infrastructure capacity utilisation. The policy pronouncements on the allocation and utilisation of A2 farm infrastructure are found in various sources: the conditions stipulated in the letters of offer; in verbal and in written statements made by Governors, local government and other government officials to beneficiaries on particular farms, in farm subdivision plans which either site or do not site such infrastructure on particular beneficiary plots. The different scenarios of custodianship of infrastructure lead to varied experiences of the control, use, maintenance and distribution of access to infrastructure among the new farmers.¹⁶⁰

For Sunga and Moyo, strategies for the sharing of existing infrastructure was limited because of various factors, including the monopolistic tendencies of some “custodians”, the fear that some farmers would turn out to be free riders and because new farmers had uneven capacities to commit to infrastructure maintenance and improvement cost.¹⁶¹ This is especially true given the different social and economic background of these farmers. An interesting case occurred in Mazowe District where one of the beneficiaries had to work as a tractor driver for his neighbour in order to pay for his share of the upgrades on the tobacco barns.¹⁶² Such instances go a long way to illustrate the income differences amongst the new farmers, which not only militated against cooperation but shaped the nature of relations as well.

¹⁶⁰ Such cases from the province will be highlighted in Chapter Four, which focuses on everyday relations and struggles amongst new farmers.

¹⁶¹ Sunga and Moyo, *Productive and Social Infrastructure in Models A1 and A2 Resettlement Schemes*, 9.

¹⁶² Interview with Nobert Mandizha, Maguire Farm, Mazowe District, 22 October 2017.

The Presidential Land Review Committee of 2000 made a number of observations regarding the infrastructure in the resettlement schemes. The issue of tenure security was noted to be of great concern as uncertainties negatively affected investment on allocated land and hence productivity.¹⁶³ What it, however, did not note was the extent to which access to farm infrastructure molded relations among the new farmers. It was not good for business for a plot holder to antagonise a neighbour on whose plot essential infrastructure was located. This was mainly because many of the beneficiaries in A1 and A2 schemes were new farmers who did not have their own stocks of farm equipment. To make matters worse, the displaced white farmers sold their equipment, had their equipment stolen during invasions, or exported it. In addition, the prevailing macro-economic conditions characterised by high inflation, high interest rates and lack of foreign currency made it difficult for new farmers to acquire machinery. To cope with these hardships, farmers were sometimes forced to shift from high value crops such as tobacco, paprika and other horticulture crops towards low value crops such as maize and groundnuts.

Faced with a plethora of challenges regarding farm infrastructure, stakeholders who attended the National Agricultural Planning Conference in Harare in May 2006 urged the government to amend the Land Acquisition Act to ensure that apart from land, the infrastructure and equipment on any farm acquired for resettlement is transferred to the ownership of new farmers to ensure maximum production.¹⁶⁴ The stakeholders identified loopholes in the legislation, arguing that the procedure for the identification, acquisition and utilisation of equipment and other infrastructure on the farm was cumbersome and militated against production.¹⁶⁵ They also noted that such problems had resulted in farmers failing to fully utilise the land as they were barred by other powerful farmers from utilising the existing farm infrastructure and equipment on other plots.¹⁶⁶ The stakeholders also highlighted some cases where farmers had fought over the use of equipment and infrastructure found on farms as it was not clear who should be in control of such facilities. The participants at the conference also stressed how the allocation of equipment and infrastructure to farmers after demarcation of plots was done haphazardly. They noted how, in many cases, equipment ended up being given to one farmer when several new farmers would have been allocated plots following the

¹⁶³ Utete, *et al*, *Report of the Presidential Land Review Committee on the Implementation of the Fast Track Land Reform Programme, 2000- 2002*.

¹⁶⁴“Goveremnt Urged to Amend the Land Acquisition Act”, *The Sunday Mail*, 21 May 2006.

¹⁶⁵ *Ibid*.

¹⁶⁶ *Ibid*.

subdivision of farms.¹⁶⁷ They rightfully pointed out how this led to squabbles and fighting among new farmers as they all wanted to make use of infrastructure and equipment left on farms.¹⁶⁸ The *Sunday Mail* quotes Mr Marirangwe, a University of Zimbabwe lecturer in the faculty of Rural and Urban Planning, who argued that the process of allocation of equipment and infrastructure should be quick and fair to promote the prompt utilisation of land.¹⁶⁹ He also emphasised the need for frameworks for the management and utilisation of the acquired equipment to avoid conflicts, underutilisation or over utilisation.¹⁷⁰

A description by the *Zimbabwe Independent* newspaper of 2 February 2007 aptly summarises the situation regarding farm infrastructure in most of the province and elsewhere in Zimbabwe. It reported how “world class tobacco curing facilities were falling apart with no one taking care of the multibillion dollar investment at Donnington Farm in Concession.”¹⁷¹ It further highlighted how the farmhouse “resembled a shell from a ravaged war zone and all window panes gone and paint peeling off as a result of seven years of neglect.”¹⁷² The author noted that part of the farm house had been turned into a “*shebeen* and the rest had been divided into barbershop, a carpentry shop and a cobbler’s shop” while the farm compound had “been burnt down and deserted.”¹⁷³ The story gave a vivid image of neglect and vandalism which made its author conclude that the “dereliction of most farms makes any right minded person question whether the people were driven by hunger for land or by greedy and racial hatred.”¹⁷⁴ More importantly, the article concluded that the almost collapsing pole and dagga and stunted maize suggest that the new farmers were dumped on land, without necessary equipment, knowledge or financial backing to prepare them to take over from the fleeing whites. The farmers are failing to utilise the land as the previous owners. Not only farms and farm houses have been targets of vandalism or neglect but also facilities that had been put up and maintained from farmer’s contributions.¹⁷⁵

It was in this environment of neglect and rampant destruction of farm infrastructure that the then governor of the Reserve Bank, Gideon Gono, lashed out at new farmers for failing to utilise their pieces of land and destroying infrastructure that had been put in place by former white farmers.¹⁷⁶

The state perpetuated conflict and struggle among the new farmers due to the way it distributed support, in the form of inputs. While the state sponsored numerous loan schemes

¹⁶⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁶⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁶⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁷⁰ *Ibid.*

¹⁷¹ “Settlers have Nothing to Show for their Land Hunger”, *Zimbabwe Independent*, 2 February 2007.

¹⁷² *Ibid.*

¹⁷³ *Ibid.*

¹⁷⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁷⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁷⁶ “Gono calls for Law and Order on farms”, *The Sunday Mirror*, 21 June 2005.

and tractor donations, few farmers benefited from them. Instead, what such attempts have managed to do is to perpetuate conflict among the new farmers as they jostle for favourable positions especially in the eyes of those powerful individuals who can guarantee them access to such inputs and schemes. Zamchiya emphasised the inequalities in farmer's access to state disbursement of fertilizer, farm equipment and seed.¹⁷⁷ In an effort to assist the new farmers to get their operations off the ground, the government provided new farmers with inputs such as tractors, fertilizers, seeds and other inputs. Access to such inputs have, however, remained very difficult. Indeed, the then Minister of Local Government and Rural Development, Ignatius Chombo, whose Ministry was at one time in charge of overseeing the distribution of such inputs was accused of plundering the inputs and tractors for use on his own farms.¹⁷⁸

The state favoured the top ranked ZANU PF members' farmers and their connections. Alexander and McGregor argued that these inputs were highly politicised and mediated by partisan bureaucracy.¹⁷⁹ A majority of the farmers were forced to buy fertilisers and other inputs from the black market especially during the economic crisis. This was because parastatals like the Grain Marketing Board (GMB) could not provide them especially those who were not politically connected. This only tilted the power relations in favour of those farmers who were politically connected. In Centenary, many of the farmers blame the GMB officials who they accuse of being very corrupt in the manner in which they distribute inputs.¹⁸⁰ The same accusation is also levelled against the GMB officials in Bindura and Guruve.¹⁸¹ Despite attempts by government to avail a farm mechanisation scheme in 2007, code named "*Operation Maguta*" in an attempt to boost agricultural production in the country, because of corruption, farmers continued to struggle to get access to government supplied inputs. The scheme was championed by the then governor of the Reserve Bank of

¹⁷⁷ P. Zamchiya, "The Role of Politics and State Practices in Shaping Rural Differentiation: A Study of Resettled Small-Scale Farmers in South-Eastern Zimbabwe", *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 39, 4 (2013).

¹⁷⁸ This was found on the list of assets that the Minister had, which appeared in a report in a local daily on the proceedings of a case in which the Minister's wife was pursuing her husband for matrimonial assets as agreed in a post-nuptial agreement. See, "'Cde Minister', Chombo in Bitter, Messy Divorce", *Zim Daily*, 20 November 2012.

¹⁷⁹ J. Alexander and J. McGregor, "Introduction: Politics, Patronage and Violence in Zimbabwe", *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 39, 4 (2013).

¹⁸⁰ Interview with Hector Sango, Centenary, 23 December 2017.

¹⁸¹ Interview with John Dondo, Bindura Town, 12 November 2017 and Fred Phiri, Guruve, 15 November, 2017.

Zimbabwe, and it targeted the country's newly-resettled farmers who were helped with farm implements on a rent-to-buy basis.

The new farmers were faced with the double tragedy of non-capitalisation and operating at a time when Zimbabwe was put under economic sanctions by the West. This, combined with rampant corruption that pervaded the country at the time, meant that supplies of seed, fertilizer, water, electricity and diesel were at best erratic and at worst non-existent. Even when efforts were made by the state to provide farmers with these crucial agricultural supplies, ruthless abuse, opportunism and profiteering by those with access to power sabotaged their effectiveness.¹⁸² Mavis Kabwe of Waterloo Farm, Shamva, had the misfortune of a whole crop of maize being affected by lack of fertiliser. This was despite her making numerous visits to the provincial GMB in Bindura in search of the product where she witnessed “politically connected farmers carry away tonnes and tonnes of compound D fertiliser.”¹⁸³ Mavis described how these politically connected farmers would unashamedly sell the fertiliser at exorbitant prices on the black market in Bindura Town, “less than five kilometres away from the GMB Depot.”¹⁸⁴ Robson Gwaze, a new farmer who was allocated more than 350 hectares in Guruve, recounted how he used to spend countless hours in Bindura trying to solicit for fuel from the black market because the allocation he got from government was never adequate.¹⁸⁵ He recalled how the majority of the fuel dealers were new farmers who would be selling their allocation of fuel because they needed cash immediately instead of using it to work on their fields and wait to sell their produce to GMB where they would have no guarantee of receiving payment on time.¹⁸⁶

The relations between the new farmers and the rural district councils have also been equally bad. New farmers in Mashonaland Central generally cited very low interaction between them and the rural district councils and at worst, no interaction at all. The key representative official of the rural district councils in the resettled farms is the councillor, an elected official with a five-year mandate. In Bindura District, a majority of elected councillors are also new

¹⁸² *Ibid*, 244.

¹⁸³ Interview with Mavis Kabwe, Shamva District, 6 November 2017. Even in 2017 when I was carrying out interviews, many new farmers expressed disgruntlement over state led initiatives. The common sentiment amongst the farmers was that the popular Command Agriculture of 2016 favoured certain members of ZANU PF.

¹⁸⁴ Interview with Mavis Kabwe, Shamva District, 6 November 2017

¹⁸⁵ Interview with Robson Gwaze, Guruve District, 21 November, 2017

¹⁸⁶ *Ibid*.

farmers. At Marston Farm, for example, the councillor is a local farmer and a war veteran. The new farmers complained about how he tended to politicise all issues that affected his ward and how he favoured other farmers, especially his fellow war veterans.¹⁸⁷ Another councillor in Mazowe District was also suspected by the new farmers of disrupting their farming activities because of his habit of constantly calling “for endless political meetings, sometimes in the middle of the planting season.”¹⁸⁸ Madison Moyosvi, a councillor in a ward in Centenary District, was severely assaulted by new farmers who accused him of dishonesty and unfair dealings. This was in connection with his handling of negotiations, on behalf of the new farmers, with the Chinese Tobacco Contractors, Tian Ze.¹⁸⁹ It was alleged that Moyosvi was misrepresenting the farmers in a bid to get the contractor to give him irrigation equipment which was meant for an irrigation scheme in the area.¹⁹⁰ In Shamva, one councillor was accused of spending too much time at his other plot which, unfortunately, was outside Shamva. He was, therefore, blamed for not being in touch with the everyday realities that the farmers in his ward faced.¹⁹¹ Such were the most common interactions between the Councillors and the new farmers in the province. The relations were mostly antagonistic with farmers accusing the councillors of politicking at the expense of representing them.

The rural district councils have also rebranded themselves in the aftermath of the land reform as they have directly participated in farming. This has made the nature of their relations with the new farmers more complex, as they have, in many instances, become competitors for labour and other needs. The Centenary Rural District Council, for example, embarked on a gum tree farming project in 2007.¹⁹² The council acquired two farms in the District and proceeded to plant gum trees. The idea behind the project, the council argued, was to eventually grow enough trees to provide local tobacco farmers with firewood for tobacco curing. The farms, however, became another arena of conflict between the new farmers and the council. The new farmers accused the Council of taking their labour by offering farm workers higher wages which the new farmers could not possibly compete with. What this meant was that the already scarce labour in the area would rather prefer to sell their labour to

¹⁸⁷ Interview with Rodney Zhanda, Marston Farm, 12 November, 2017.

¹⁸⁸ Interview with John Makusha, Mazowe District, 10 December, 2017.

¹⁸⁹ Interview with Herbert Masawi, White Mountain Farm, Centenary, 30 November, 2017.

¹⁹⁰ Ibid.

¹⁹¹ Interview with Moses Biri, Ceres 1 Farm, Shamva, 21 November, 2017.

¹⁹² Interview with former Chairman of Council of Centenary Rural District Council, 30 November, 2017.

the council farms.¹⁹³ The council also attempted to make the farmers in the area adjacent to its two farms contribute to the purchase of diesel for the repair of the road. This initiative was also met with a lot of resistance as the farmers claimed that it was the duty of the council to provide such services to them. The acquisition of the farms by the council has thus made the new farmers deal with the local council at two levels. Firstly, as a competing farmer. Secondly as a local authority. This has, therefore, created different layers of conflict between the new farmers and the Centenary Rural District Council.

Another local authority, Guruve Rural District Council, also acquired two farms in 2004 for tobacco production. Again, the acquisition of such farms meant that the local authority started to compete for labour with the new farmers. The council was accused of diverting key service providers like Arex officers and the District Development Fund (DDF) to its farms at the expense of the other farmers. Morgan Kashiri claimed that the council started to monopolise activities provided by the government like field days.¹⁹⁴ He claimed that in 2011 alone, a record nine field days were held at the council farms, an opportunity that could have been given to other equally “competitive farmers like Gwaze.”¹⁹⁵ The fact that the council is now involved directly in farming has meant that the new farmers relate to it differently. Many of its attempts to implement policy on behalf of government has been met with a lot of suspicion and anger by the surrounding farmers who accuse the council management of using the council farms for their own personal aggrandisement.¹⁹⁶

The relations between councils and new farmers also further deteriorated with the policy decision by government to give the responsibility of collecting rentals and land development levies to rural district councils. This policy was temporarily stopped in 2015 and the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Resettlement gave the green light to the Lands Ministry to take over the collection of land rentals and unit tax from all A1 and A2 farmers following reports that some Rural District Councils (RDCs) were abusing the money.¹⁹⁷ The RDCs then hit back by saying that providing the Central Government with the responsibility was going to cause some administrative bureaucracy that would retard development in newly resettled farms. The government later rescinded its earlier decision, giving the responsibility back to rural

¹⁹³ Ibid.

¹⁹⁴ Interview with Morgan Kashiri, Guruve Centre, 24 November, 2017.

¹⁹⁵ Gwaze is a farmer who owns more than 326 hectares of land and his tobacco growing ability is legendary in the province.

¹⁹⁶ Interview with Morgan Kashiri, Guruve Centre, 24 November, 2017

¹⁹⁷ “Ministry given Greenlight over Land Rentals”, *The Herald*, 31 December 2017.

local authorities. With regards to the payment of levies the new farmers are not keen on paying them to the rural district councils. They argue that they are not producing enough and they were not given this condition during the FTLRP when they were given offer letters. Many of them are, therefore, owing the councils levies that date back to 2008. The farmers are always threatened by the councils with evictions for failure to pay the levies. More than half of the farmers I spoke to have at one time or another received follow up letters through the messenger of court. A1 farmers were expected to pay \$15 per year for the land they have. Under the scheme, \$10 was land rental while \$5 was unit tax that goes to RDCs.¹⁹⁸ The A2 farmers paid land rentals of \$3 per hectare per annum and \$2 unit tax per hectare, resulting in the farmers having forked out \$5 per hectare per year. The Ministry argued that the money would be channelled towards compensation of former white farmers and improving infrastructure in the resettlement areas. However, new farmers claimed that there has not been any attempt to improve the infrastructure like roads, dip tanks, bridges and drains despite the rural district councils having some money from paying farmers.¹⁹⁹ The insecurity caused by the lack of planning by the government that continued to affect the new farmers had a huge impact not only on their relations but on their productivity as well.

The Committees of Seven were also responsible for the security and management of infrastructure that was inherited upon occupation. It, therefore, meant that members of the committees were very powerful as they determined access to essential resources as well as guaranteeing, to a degree, tenure security. Although the committees of seven were not formally recognised in the context of the FTLRP and thus carried no official mandate, they were considerably powerful and influential due to their connections with the ruling party. Due to their composition, they were highly politicised and often made populist decisions, some of which compromised the ideals and objectives of the program²⁰⁰ For instance, some committees allocated land when they had no mandate to do so. Other members of the committees were accused by beneficiaries of abusing their powers. For example, accusations emerged from within the ranks of beneficiaries that some members of the Committees of Seven allocated themselves farmhouses and other facilities.²⁰¹ This is a very popular sentiment in the province and indeed some of the former members of the Committees alluded

¹⁹⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁹⁹ Most of the interviewees echoed this sentiment with regards to use of levies.

²⁰⁰ Sunga, *Institutional Coordination Framework for the Land Reform and Resettlement*, 16.

²⁰¹ Interview with Henry Chivandire, Committee of Seven Member, Bindura, 21 October, 2017.

to the fact that they only naturally took advantage of being members of the committees and allocated themselves, relatives and friends equally well-endowed plots.

The problem of abuse of power by land committees became so bad that the government had to issue a directive to all district and provincial land identification committees to stick to their recommendation role and stop unilateral allocations and eviction of resettled farmers.²⁰² Speaking in Rusape on 3 November 2005, the then Minister of National Security, Lands, Land Reform and Resettlement, Didymus Mutasa, said that his ministry had the legal obligation for final allocation or repossession of land. He lamented that the ministry's power had been usurped by the district and provincial land committees that had taken over the allocation and eviction of beneficiaries on farms.²⁰³ Mutasa further argued that the duty of the Ministry had "been reduced to that of merely signing offer letters."²⁰⁴ He identified many problems emanating from this, which included double allocation of plots, unilateral evictions of beneficiaries, multiple farm ownership and allegations of corruption.²⁰⁵ One of the farmers in Muzarabani District, Usheunesu Mupenya, argued that the practice of unilateral farm evictions "began first against the unpopular white farmers but then even a ruling party official had to worry about a bigger fish in the structure being able to displace him or her by sheer force."²⁰⁶ He claimed that the police or army did "not come to your aid, courts were compromised, helpless and mostly unheeded by their political controllers."²⁰⁷ The *Financial Gazette* of 26 January 2006, reported many cases of communities displaced from land they had been allocated to make "way for some big fish."²⁰⁸ The then Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe Governor, Gideon Gono, decried unfortunate occurrences where a farmer borrows, tills the land, plants and, before harvesting, "someone pitches up with an offer letter taking over the crops and equipment, refusing to inherit the liabilities leaving the farmer and the lending bank in a predicament."²⁰⁹ The same kinds of evictions that had affected the white farming communities were the same kind that also affected some of the new farmers. The battle had

²⁰² "Ministry Powers Usurped", *Manica Post*, 4 November 2005.

²⁰³ *Ibid.*

²⁰⁴ *Ibid.*

²⁰⁵ *Ibid.* In a short writing from Bulawayo, Cathrine Buckle castigates the corruption prevalent in the handling of the land reform. see, "Politics of Land Inspired Authors", *The Herald*, 18 September 2007.

²⁰⁶ Interview with Usheunesu Mupenya, Muzarabani District, 4 December 2017.

²⁰⁷ *Ibid.* In the course of my fieldwork most of my informants regarded the question on eviction as highly sensitive because of fear of victimisation by the people who may have tried to evict them and who still possess some degree of power in the political arena.

²⁰⁸ "Government Pledge to Stop Farm Invasions", *Financial Gazette*, 26 January 2006.

²⁰⁹ *Ibid.*

turned into black on black affair as top party and state officials displaced the new beneficiaries, especially those who had occupied what was deemed prime land. Two cases of that nature happened as late as 2013 in Bindura and Guruve. The Bindura case involved 22 farmers who were evicted from a farm which had been designated an A1 scheme.²¹⁰ A senior official in the office of the Mashonaland Central Provincial Governor was at the centre of instigating these evictions. The 22 farmers were reallocated other plots dotted around the province.²¹¹

Another case in 2013 involved ten A1 farmers in Guruve District who were evicted from Bandamhawe Farm at the instigation of a former GMB senior manager who was also politically connected.²¹² The ten farmers tried to put up a fight against the evictions by involving the Ministry of Lands and using their offer letters to contest the evictions. This was to no avail as the official tasked to look into their case claimed that there had been an error made on the offer letters as the farm rightfully belonged to the ex- manager. Such instances of farm evictions are also highlighted by Sadomba, who discussed how “revolutionaries” were dispossessed in order to give the land to ZANU PF elite, senior civil servants and relatives of those “in the system.”²¹³ Indeed, such instances of corruption and land disputes are part of the reasons the government used to motivate for the setting up of various commissions to conduct land audits.²¹⁴ Even during the negotiations for a Global Political Agreement (GPA) in 2008, which culminated in the Government of National Unity from February 2009, a land audit was called “for the purpose of establishing accountability and

²¹⁰ Interview with Godfrey Magora, Marston Farm, 12 October 2017.

²¹¹ Ibid.

²¹² Interview with Jeffrey Moyo, Guruve Centre, 17 December 2017.

²¹³ For more insights see, Sadomba, *War Veterans in Zimbabwe's Revolution: Challenging Neo-colonialism & Settler & International Capital*.

²¹⁴ Utete, *et al*, *Report of the Presidential Land Review Committee on the Implementation of the Fast Track Land Reform Programme, 2000- 2002*; Buka, *A Preliminary Audit Report of Land Reform Programme*; Ministry of Land and Rural Resettlement/ Scientific Industrial Research and Development Centre (MLRR/SIRDC), *A2 Land Audit Report*, (Harare: Government of Zimbabwe, 2006); Ministry of Land and Rural Resettlement/ Scientific Industrial Research and Development Centre (MLRR/SIRDC) *Mashonaland Central Province: A2 Land Audit Report* (Harare: Government of Zimbabwe, 2007) and Ministry of Land and Rural Resettlement/ Scientific Industrial Research and Development Centre (MLRR/SIRDC), *Consolidated: National Land Audit Report* (Harare: Government of Zimbabwe, 2008).

eradicating multiple farm ownership”²¹⁵ However, even though these audits were carried out, they were not followed by practical actions.

In Guruve, a majority of the A1 farmers described how they were initially insecure on their farms “living in fear of eviction despite government’s assurances that the farm occupations were over.”²¹⁶ They argued that they failed to make long-term plans because they were afraid that any day someone was going to “wake up with an offer letter to take over the farm.” They described how during the early 2000s they were tired of occupations and “being moved from one farm to the other, leaving less time to be productive.” For them, they had remained “new farmers because of the movement” and what was most disturbing was how farmers, who were not active during land resettlement, were perpetrating harassment.²¹⁷

Chaumba has argued succinctly that the axes of authority in the resettlement areas accommodated and tempered each other, but there were “also tensions and fractures evident in the way these power bases” interacted.²¹⁸ Indeed such tensions and fractures determined the nature of relations amongst the new farmers and they found footing in the initial stages of farm occupations. War veterans, ZANU PF politicians, chiefs, businessmen and government administrators all came into conflict with each other at various stages and the origins of their conflicts can be traced back to occupation as different players were preoccupied with the politics of survival and relevance. The tension between the new political authority of the war veterans and the old political authority of the chiefs and ancestors that was born out of the FTLRP was also central in shaping relations in the resettlement areas.²¹⁹ It is evident that war veterans, chiefs, new farmers, civil servants and the party were bound up in complex

²¹⁵ The GPA was the 2008–2009 Zimbabwean political negotiations between the opposition Movement for Democratic Change (led by Morgan Tsvangirai), its small splinter group, the Movement for Democratic Change – Mutambara (led by Arthur Mutambara), and the ruling ZANU PF (led by Robert Mugabe) were intended to negotiate an end to the partisan violence and human rights violations in Zimbabwe and create a framework for a power-sharing executive government between the two parties. These negotiations followed the 2008 presidential election, in which Mugabe was controversially re-elected, as well as the 2008 parliamentary election, in which the MDC won a majority in the House of Assembly. For more insights see; Global Political Agreement, *Agreement between the Zimbabwe African National Union- Patriotic Front and the Two Movement for Democratic Change Formations, on Resolving the Challenges Facing Zimbabwe* (Harare: Government Printers, September 2008) and B. Raftopoulos (ed), *The Hard Road To Reform: The Politics of Zimbabwe’s Global Political Agreement* (Harare: Weaver Press, 2013).

²¹⁶ Interview with Wilfred Zvomuya, Guruve District, 24 November 2017.

²¹⁷ *New Farmer*, Vol.12, No. 6, November (2006).

²¹⁸ Chaumba, *et al*, “New Politics, New Livelihoods: Agrarian Change in Zimbabwe”, 601.

²¹⁹ The culmination of such relations will be dealt with in more detail in Chapter 4, which deals with everyday interactions amongst the new farmers.

interwoven relationships created during the land occupations. A thoroughly politicised landscape in which beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries had to negotiate relationships with each other, therefore, emerged in the resettlement areas.

Conclusion

The radical changes on tenure brought about by the FTLRP impacted heavily on property and land use. Farmers had to manage new set of problems that required major rearrangements in relations. The nature of the land reform was central in the configuration of these relations not only amongst the new farmers but also with other stakeholders connected to the new farming landscape. Situations changed rapidly during the first years as set of rules were changed constantly. This often happened in a contradictory manner creating a new set of relations based upon the new facets of power brought by the FTLRP. The FTLRP gave certain groups such as war veterans and party officials and functionaries, power to determine key factors like location of desired plots and their size. They exercised this power through the very visible Lands Committees which in many instances overstretched their mandates and took advantage of the lack of clear cut policy and direction by the government regarding the program. The nature of such relations and the conflicts that stemmed from them were not static but changed over time and space from 2000 to 2015 in reaction to the different political and economic pressures prevailing at different times. Such everyday struggles will be highlighted in the next chapter.

Chapter Four: Narratives of Everyday Conflict among New Farmers

Introduction

This chapter examines relations in the resettled areas in the context of everyday struggles for space and power among the new farmers. It examines these struggles by situating them within the many landscapes of control and contestations initiated by the Fast Track Land Reform Program (FTLRP). In as much as other scholars have pointed to the effects of factors such as sanctions, the polarity of the political environment, political patronage, the poor training and inadequate resources of new farmers and tenancy uncertainty to account for reduced production after the FTLRP, a complete appreciation of the Zimbabwean agricultural crisis must also include the issue of daily relations amongst new farmers.

This chapter investigates the day to day expressions of the significant tussles amongst the new land occupiers as occasioned by the nature of occupations discussed in Chapter Three. The chapter, therefore, explores farmers' interactions and how such interfaces affected their approaches to land use. By so doing, it explores hitherto neglected reasons for the reduction in agriculture production after FTLRP – namely the impact of everyday relations on the new farmers' attitudes towards production. The chapter carries out a comprehensive and empirically-rich treatment of the engagement of new farmers and how such relations had the power to determine the pace, direction and nature of their farming activities. Areas of struggles that the chapter focusses on include; boundaries and contestations around infrastructure, war veterans and conflict between A1 and A2 farmers, politics of “othering” and non- state actors as determinants of relations. The chapter thus assesses the different expressions of conflict amongst the new farmers as a result of the conditions and circumstances created by the nature of farm occupations. It unpacks these sites of struggle amongst many new farmers and how they emerged in different forms, sometimes culminating into violent confrontations.

4.1 Negotiating New Landscapes of Agricultural Territory

As demonstrated by Chaumba *et al*, the land reform in Zimbabwe “dramatically altered the physical landscape”, and brought about a complex “new political terrain” that “created new livelihood opportunities and new spaces of authority.”¹ As a result of these dramatic alterations, areas of struggle involving new actors as well as the old were opened up amongst

¹ Chaumba, *et al*, “New Politics, New Livelihoods: Changes in the Zimbabwean Low veld since the Farm Occupations of 2000.”

the new farmers. All tried to negotiate and find solid footing in the new farming landscape and create new identities as well as new networks in the new power matrix. A combination of factors, rooted in the nature of the FTLRP characterised by speed, chaos, violence and a vagueness of policies, opened gaps that could only be filled up by a tremendous amount of power manoeuvring. It was these fissures, shortcuts and ambiguities that created a ripe environment for the emergence of conflict among new farmers.

The FTLRP ushered in a new phase in Zimbabwe's agricultural history, creating arenas of conflict as the new farmers related to each and battled for survival. The new farmers had to adapt to the large tracts of land they now owned as well as to the different and new ways of farming. More importantly, the FTLRP brought together people from diverse backgrounds into new communities in the former commercial farming areas who had to find ways of relating to each other under very difficult circumstances. The formation of new communities meant that, often, there were new and therefore unfamiliar families living next to each other.² The newly resettled areas of Zimbabwe are made up of black farmers (A1 and A2), former farm workers and new farm workers, with a few remaining white-owned farms alongside redistributed farms.

4.2. Boundaries and Everyday Conflict amongst New Farmers.

With regards to boundaries, the disruptions brought about by the government of Zimbabwe's attempt to regulate and monitor patterns of ownership should not be underestimated. As discussed in Chapter Three, the process of government intervention to implement some semblance of order through the official demarcation of plot boundaries created space for serious conflict amongst the new farmers. It introduced new, "legitimate" land owners who had to replace those that had originally occupied the land.³ In as much as other original claimants of land remained, they had to abide not only to new boundaries but also to the respect of "private property". Most of this land had, in many instances, been communally owned by the farmers in their previous localised settlement patterns. A good example is that of Marston Farm in the Bindura District. In 2001, the farm was invaded by a group of 36 A1 farmers and war veterans who, as a group, had gone on to occupy the four houses that made

² Chiweshe, "Farm Level Institutions in Emergent Communities in Post Fast Track Zimbabwe", 1.

³ "Legitimate owners" refer to those farmers who were given offer letters by government as permission to occupy the land as opposed to those occupants who had just occupied pieces of land without any form of legitimisation from government.

up the previous farm owner's living quarters.⁴ They subsequently proceeded to demarcate plots amongst themselves. The Lands Committee responsible for land allocation in the area later designated the farm as an A2 scheme in 2004 and allocated it to only five beneficiaries. It, therefore, meant that the remaining 31 occupants had to vacate the farm. The 31 eventually did vacate the farm but not before putting up a protracted two-year long fight against the Land Committee's decision to move them.⁵ Malcolm Manyetu, one of the 31 beneficiaries, recounted how this border dispute had divided them into two main rival camps. These opposing camps were in the habit of frustrating each other's attempts at farming. He recounted that during the 2005 farming season, they were in protracted meetings "almost every particular day, for the whole season, to solve accusations and counter accusations of sabotage and destruction of each other's crop."⁶ The situation at the farm was so bad between 2004 and 2006 that a total of six farmers had to temporarily relocate at different times after receiving threats of arson from either side of the rival camps.⁷ For those two years up to 2006, hopes of producing crops were temporarily put aside as the boundary dispute raged on.

When the other 31 farmers eventually relocated in 2006, the remaining five occupants were engaged in an even more vicious struggle for boundaries right, a feud that lasted until 2012. The five had continued to "share" accommodation until early 2007, when one of the farmers, Alfred Pfimbi, attempted to fraudulently claim land beyond his officially demarcated piece of land by moving the pegs that had been put by the Lands Committee officials.⁸ He then argued that they had made a mistake with the boundaries and reasoned that the error had jeopardised him not only of land but of two of the four houses as well. This new conflict raged on from 2008 up to 2012 only to end up at the Bindura Magistrates Court where Pfimbi lost the case. In those four years, Pfimbi enlisted the help of war veterans who attempted to kick out his opponent and even resorted to blatant sabotage of the other farmers' operations.⁹

At Tomlison Farm in Guruve District, four A2 farmers were involved in a nasty dispute over boundaries from 2004 right up to 2008.¹⁰ The nature of the dispute was such that it shaped the way these farmers related to each other on a daily basis. The dispute began when two of the

⁴ Interview with Batsirai Mbewe, Marston Farm, 12 November 2017.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Interview with Malcolm Mnyetu, Marston Farm, 12 November 2017.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Interview with Promise Kambanje, Marston Farm, 12 November 2017.

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ Interview with Maxwell Mpeno, Tomlison Farm, Guruve District, 23 November 2017.

four farmers claimed that one of their fellow beneficiaries, Maxwell Mpeno, a local Headmaster from one of the Secondary Schools in the area had fraudulently gotten his boundary extended from the original plan and map they had all received when they occupied the farm in January of 2004.¹¹ They accused Maxwell of encroaching into land which had originally been designated for them. This encroachment, they argued, gave Maxwell claim to a dam on one side of the plot and three tobacco barns on the other. As retaliation for what they considered to be “daylight robbery,” the other two farmers would not allow Maxwell’s workers to stay in the farm compound that had been built by the previous white owner for farm workers. He had to convert one of the work sheds on his plot to accommodate his workers.¹² Maxwell, in turn, fenced off the dam and would not allow his neighbours’ livestock to use it. For over three years, these two farmers had to use some rudimentary ponds dug out on their plots to provide water to their livestock.¹³ These ponds would only provide water between the months of November to April at the height of the rain season but would be dry for the rest of the year. At such a time, they had to travel for more than thirteen kilometres to have their livestock access drinking water at another plot in the same district. For over three years, these farmers were not on proper and cordial speaking terms with each other, with such few moments characterised by serious outbursts that many times almost degenerated into fists fights.¹⁴

In another boundary dispute that shaped how two farmers related to each other for over five years, Artwell Mafusire, an A2 farmer from Kingsdale Farm in Shamva, accused his neighbour of taking advantage of the rains that had destroyed the official pegs that had been put up by Ministry of Lands officials to illegally extend his plot by over three hectares.¹⁵ Munyaradzi Murwira, Artwell’s neighbour, accused Artwell of sending his farm workers to slash his tobacco seedlings in 2005 because he accused him of putting the seed beds on land that was not his. Ever since the culmination of this misunderstanding, these two farmers did not share anything. Their farm workers were not even allowed to interact and a break of that rule especially for Mafusire, results in instant dismissal. Mafusire was compelled to build his own tobacco barns on the portion of his own plot to avoid continuously crossing into Murwira’s portion of the plot where the barns, constructed by the previous white owner, are

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² Ibid.

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Interview with Artwell Mafusire, Kingsdale Farm, 25 September, 2017

located. He even expressed discomfort in allowing his chickens, which roam freely around his plot, to cross into Murwira's part of the farm. This was because, according to Mafusire, in 2006, Murwira had threatened to kill any such chickens.¹⁶ The issue of boundary conflict was not peculiar to Mashonaland Central. In August 2011, *Newsday* reported a dispute over a plot boundary that nearly cost a village headman, Timothy Hungwe of Plot 58 Eden Farm in Beatrice, his life after he was severely assaulted by five men from two different families. A Chitungwiza court heard Hungwe was lucky to escape with his life after the men – who were armed with hoe, machete, axe handle and a hosepipe – allegedly bashed and left him for dead.¹⁷

In a baseline survey conducted by the African Institute for Agrarian Studies in 2005 to 2006, disputes pertaining to farm boundaries were mentioned as the major land conflict in Mashonaland Central Province.¹⁸ According to the baseline survey, boundary conflicts accounted for 10.2 percent of all land conflicts in the province.¹⁹ The survey observed that these conflicts were more pronounced in cases where more fertile soils, water sources and forests were involved and neighbours and former workers of commercial farmers were identified as the major participants in land conflicts.²⁰ The availability of gold deposits in some of the farm plots also worsened boundary disputes in the Province as some farmers attempted to expand their boundaries in order to include what they perceived to be gold bearing land. Thus, access to and control of good-fertile areas, and those assumed to have gold deposits, were identified by many of my interviewees as the drivers of boundary conflicts– especially in Shamva, Bindura and Mazowe districts. In more than eight cases in Shamva, neighbours fought over boundaries when they expanded boundaries to include the other's land because of the potential for the discovery of gold. In Bindura District, I encountered more than five such similar reports, and in the Mazowe district, six.

4.3. Contestations around Infrastructure

One of the challenges that faced the new farmers regarding infrastructure had to do with nature of farm occupations. A majority of the farmers congregated around the farm house and

¹⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁷ "Boundary Dispute Turns Nasty for Headman", *Newsday*, 20 August 2011.

¹⁸ S. Moyo *et al*, *Fast Track Land Reform 2005/2006 Baseline Survey in Zimbabwe: Trends and Tendencies* (Harare: African Institute for Agrarian Studies, 2009).

¹⁹ *Ibid.*

²⁰ T. Tom, "Post Zimbabwe's Fast Track Land Reform Programme: Land Conflicts at Two Farms in Goromonzi District", *IOSR Journal of Humanities and Social Science*, 20, 10 (2015), 87.

the built-up areas of the farm and for some time they operated from there. In some instances, they actually allocated each other rooms in the farm house or any other nearby buildings. As such, it was popular and common among the first group of land occupiers not to declare outright individual ownership of the property and land, but rather to claim ownership of it as a group. Such instances of property and land use were common place especially in the initial stages of the FTLRP. They even collectively made use of the farm infrastructure and this was all done with some elements of comradeship. Things got complicated when the government offered farmers offer letters that properly demarcated the plots. Some of the farmers could not be compelled to move from built up structures to their new plots where they had to build new dwellings. This situation led to serious conflict amongst the new farmers, especially when government took over the official demarcation of plot holdings. Key infrastructure like tobacco barns, houses, farm compounds which had been communally used became the sole property of individual farmers. It, therefore, meant that the farmers had to renegotiate access and such processes were a source of serious struggles and conflict. Those farmers who had hitherto accessed key infrastructure outside the boundaries of their plot holdings no longer had guaranteed access to such infrastructure. This became the centre of constant squabbles and animosity among the new farmers. In 2010, on Ceres One farm in Shamva, for instance, the bickering resulted in a case of attempted murder as one of the plot holders, a soldier, shot and injured a fellow plot holder after conflict over access to one of the houses and irrigation implements on the farm.²¹ Even up to the time of doing fieldwork in the area in 2017, they were still simmering tensions on the farm despite the uneasy peace settlement brokered by the ZANU PF provincial leadership.

In 2011, at Hilton Farm in Concession, after a protracted court case in which one of the plot holders was eventually kicked out of one of the three available houses and banned from using tobacco barns and shelling shades. He responded by denying access to farm workers of his fellow farmer and opponent access to employee houses which are located on his plot.²² The affected farmer had to quickly build makeshift, pole and dagga houses for his workers on his own plot. In the process, the affected farmer, John Musango, lost four of his workers who were not comfortable with the new accommodation structures he had built for them.²³ At Serwood farm, there was also serious conflict over the use of tobacco barns which are located

²¹ Interview with James Bwerazuva, Ceres Farm, 23 November 2017.

²² Interview with John Musango, Hilton Farm, Concession, 17 October 2017.

²³ Ibid.

in one of the farmers' plots named Gurupiro.²⁴ The other neighbouring farmers had access to these barns before the official demarcation of plots but Gurupiro immediately cut such access when he was officially allocated the plot. This affected a number of farmers who were stuck with tobacco that was ready for curing but could not access barns to treat their crop.²⁵ One farmer, Gilbert Mukono, reportedly lost his whole season crop of tobacco because he could not cure it on time.²⁶ Gilbert had to eventually sacrifice money intended for planting tobacco on about 35 hectares on his plot in order to construct new tobacco barns.²⁷

The unequal access to farm infrastructure and equipment that has been provided by the government of Zimbabwe and those that were established by the white commercial farmers also led to conflicts among the land beneficiaries. Irrigation equipment, tobacco barns, houses and tractors were among the contested assets. Equitable use of these was not guaranteed at all the farms. At Bromley Farm in Bindura, about 34 farmers occupied the farm during the invasions and they settled in four houses that were part of the previous white commercial farmer's dwellings.²⁸ However, when the government subsequently divided the farm into an A2 scheme, only ten of the 34 initial occupants benefited. The rest were allocated A1 plots on nearby farms. These farmers moved but the biggest crisis remained with the remaining ten beneficiaries. They took it for granted that as far as the infrastructure on the farm was concerned, they would continue to collectively utilise it. To make matters worse, this infrastructure was mostly located on just two of the seven plots. Serious problems then ensued when the two owners of the plots with the infrastructure requested that the other plot holders relocate and settle on their own plots. The dispute took almost two years to settle and it ended up involving the Bindura magistrate's court. It was littered with very nasty episodes of violence and sabotage and the Committee of Seven, war veterans' leadership and Ministry of Lands officials, all failed to come up with an effective solution to the dispute.²⁹ This was mainly because, each of these institutions were not properly guided by clear-cut policy.

²⁴ Interview with Shadreck Pasi, Serwood Farm, 12 November, 2017.

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ Interview with Gilbert Mukono, Serwood Farm, 12 November, 2017.

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ Interview with Mathew Gora, Broomley Farm, Bindura District, 7 December 2017.

²⁹ Ibid.

The practicality of shared infrastructure compromised farmer relations.³⁰ In Montgomery farm, for example, 48 A1 farmers were allocated plots on the farm.³¹ Problems were bound to arise given that all the 48 plot holders were to utilise the farm infrastructure that was originally meant for one farmer. The 48 farmers made their own arrangements to give each other time slots in the utilisation of tobacco barns but this plan did not work because of the logistical challenges occasioned by the inadequate barns.³² Takesure Marowa, one of the 48 farmers at the farm, recounted the numerous occasions when the farmers clashed over the use of the barns because a majority of them could not stick to the given timetable.³³ The following recollection by Takesure helps put the relations in this particular farm in their proper perspective:

The problem we all seemed to have was agreeing to a working timetable to using the barns. In some instances, at the time allocated for me to use the barns, I was not ready to do so either because I did not have enough labour for the process or my crop just was not ready. The other farmers would not take it lightly if I then gave my time to another farmer who was ready. They would question my choice and many other unnecessary things. At the same time, if I left the barns empty at the time I was supposed to use them to treat my tobacco, the other farmers would scramble to put their tobacco arguing that the barns were empty and thus open to anybody to use. The whole thing was just a mess and it complicated things for us every day. Some people have not been talking to each other for over three years now because of these barns.³⁴

Equally, irrigation equipment was vandalised as the new beneficiaries competed to make use of it. Some farmers resorted to unsavory tactics such as hiding the equipment to deny others usage. In November 2014, at Serwood Farm, one farmer was reportedly found with irrigation equipment that he had hidden in a thicket on his plot. As punishment, the other farmers took all the irrigation equipment from him and also reported the matter to the police.³⁵ Indeed, it should be noted that the infrastructure that existed in the large-scale commercial areas prior to the FTLRP was meant for fewer commercial farmers and the expectation by government that this larger pool of farmers would still be able to use this infrastructure effectively was misplaced.

³⁰ The government policy on infrastructure is discussed in more detail in Chapter Three. Here the focus is on its operationalising as an everyday reality for farmers.

³¹ Interview with Patrick Magaya, Montgomery Farm, 21 October 2017.

³² *Ibid.*

³³ Interview with Takesure Marowa, Montgomery Farm, 21 October 2017

³⁴ *Ibid.*

³⁵ Interview with Tanatswa Moyo, Serwood Farm, Bindura District, 15 December, 2017.

The vagueness of the duties of caretakers of farm infrastructure also caused conflict amongst new farmers.³⁶ In some instances, the caretakers took advantage of this ambiguity to make unilateral decisions that affected relation amongst farmers. In 2008, at Polset Farm in Shamva, one such caretaker, who was the village head appointed by Chief Bushu, had to make a decision to convert the tobacco grading shades into classrooms for Early Child Development (ECD) classes after failing to handle the logistics involved in the collective use of the barns by the farmers.³⁷ This decision did not go down well with some of the other farmers who felt deprived of access to the barns. They accused the caretaker of making a unilateral decision to convert the barns because he had shifted from tobacco production to concentrate on maize and thus no longer needed the barns.³⁸ The matter was only finally resolved through the intervention of an Arex official who decided to subdivide the barns to accommodate both the classes and the barns.³⁹ In another case in Guruve, at Mbada Farm, the caretaker was taken before the courts after he was accused by neighboring farmers of taking off roofing material from the existing tobacco barns to use in building his own separate barns on his plot.⁴⁰ The fact that caretakers had the power to allocate infrastructure to other farmers further complicated relations. There were instances where the caretakers were accused of favouritism in the allocation of infrastructure. One such case was at Elroy Farm where the caretakers was accused of allocating a work shed to a widowed farmer in the area.⁴¹ The caretaker was alleged to be dating this farmer, hence the accusations of favouritism from other farmers. More than 20 percent of new farmers I interviewed complained about the behavior of caretakers and blamed them for creating tensions among new farmers.

The allocation and use of social infrastructure, especially farm worker compounds, was also an area of serious conflict amongst the farmers. The allocation of worker compounds on farm subdivisions gave their custodianship to plot holders on whose farm they are located. This stipulation caused problems, especially when such plot holders did not allow farm workers dwelling in the compounds to sell their labour to other plot holders. At Leed Farm in Bindura, farm workers were denied the opportunity to sell their labour to three other neighboring

³⁶ This policy has been discussed in the previous chapter.

³⁷ Interview with Headman Chikomba, Polset Farm, Shamva, 14 October 2017.

³⁸ *Ibid.*

³⁹ *Ibid.*

⁴⁰ Interview with Joseph Gwaze, Mbada Farm, Guruve District, 20 October 2017.

⁴¹ Interview with Davison Muza, 2 November 2017.

farmers because they had denied the plot holder access to barns, the dam and the dip tank.⁴² This was despite the fact that the plot holder with the farm compound could not even fully utilise the available labour in his compound. At Nyamaropa Farm in Mvurwi, one farmer converted the compound into private residential facilities and demanded that the neighboring farmers should pay rent for their employees if they wanted them to continue staying in the compound.⁴³ This had a huge effect on the farmers' relations as they in turn, denied their counterpart access to infrastructure on their plots.

Prior to the FTLRP, most commercial farms had access to electricity for household and production purposes. A lot of this infrastructure was extensively damaged or neglected during the farm occupations. As a result, a large number of farms got cut off from power, resulting in fights amongst the farmers who accused each other of sabotage. At Mupandenyama Farm, one of the war veterans' leaders cut off the power grid for eighteen A1 farmers whom he accused of vandalising electricity when they moved into the farm because they "wanted to sabotage his crop."⁴⁴ In some cases, diesel generators were removed by the former owners, and in others where generators were inherited by the beneficiaries, responsibility for maintaining them became another source of conflict. As late as July 2013, at Foothills Farm in Bindura District, two plot holders cut off electricity for the other five beneficiaries whom they accused of not contributing in the maintenance of the a reserve generator and electricity bills.⁴⁵ The plot holders, Taurai Mhere and Cuthbert Masimba, claimed that they had carried the burden of maintaining the generator and paying the bills for the other farmers for too long and felt that switching off the electricity for them was the only way they could compel them to also meet its maintenance costs.⁴⁶ It is interesting to note that as late as October 2017 when I was conducting fieldwork, the other five farmers were still cut off as they had not bothered to pay for the maintenance of the generator and the electricity bill. One such farmer, a widow named Nyarai Kurwaisimba, maintained that she could not afford the luxury of paying for the maintenance of the generator "which was old and always in need of constant repairs."⁴⁷

The control of infrastructure in the newly resettled farmers thus became one of the ways that farmers could tilt power relations in their favour. This meant that new farmers who hoped to

⁴² Interview with Dickson Choto, Leed Farm, Bindura, 14 December 2017.

⁴³ Interview with Nochias Chemhere, Nyamaropa Farm, Guruve District, 17 December, 2017.

⁴⁴ Interview with Darlington Mhandu, Mupandenyama Farm, Centenary, 5 November, 2017.

⁴⁵ Interview with Taurai Mhere, Foothills Farm, Bindura District, 23 October 2017.

⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁷ Interview with Nyarai Kurwaisimba, Foothills Farm, Bindura District, 23 October, 2017.

optimise their land use and production processes had to negotiate power relations with either those who were responsible for the allocation of plots in order to get access to infrastructure or they had to endear themselves to custodians of such infrastructure. Control and or access to infrastructure thus became a major determinant of the nature of relations in the new resettlement schemes almost everywhere in the province. Access to this infrastructure was not necessarily matched by the capacities of farmers to make use of them. Rather, it significantly tilted power relations in their local farming terrain in their favour. Those in control of the infrastructure got into various arrangements to avail the infrastructure to others which benefitted them and went a long way in contributing to improve their vantage position in relation to other farmers. In some cases, plot holders who were custodians of infrastructure refused to share its use while they were not fully utilising the infrastructure themselves.

In other cases, infrastructure was never used since occupation and it became dysfunctional. At Montgomery Farm in Guruve, tobacco barns and other work sheds were never used by the new farmers.⁴⁸ This was because at occupation, these barns had been a serious source of conflict amongst the occupiers and the local war veterans gave a directive to shut them down.⁴⁹ There were many cases where new farmers had to build new structures in order to wean themselves away from the stranglehold of patronising fellow farmers who had access to resources. This was mainly because they were frustrated with having to play local politics in order to get access to infrastructure. Anthony Wendera of Thompsons Farm took the risk of building two tobacco barns six months after occupying his plot because he could not handle being ordered to “unnecessary and useless night meetings” in order to be given access to the available barns by a “loud mouthed and obnoxious war veteran.”⁵⁰ This proved to be a worthwhile investment as he claimed to have managed to produce his tobacco at his “own pace and time” without having “to wait for permission from someone.”⁵¹

An A2 farmer from Concession in Mazowe District was allegedly attacked and unlawfully evicted from his farm by neighbours at the height of a dispute over his allocation of the land. The farmer, Mernard Mafuta, told *The Herald* that his neighbours accused him of vandalising property at the farm yet the infrastructure was already damaged when he was allocated the

⁴⁸ Interview with Tafadzwa Matsveru, Montgomery Farm, Guruve, 12 December 2017.

⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁰ Interview with Anthony Wendera, Thompsons Farm, 17 December 2017.

⁵¹ Ibid.

property which once belonged to Mr Dennis Pascal.⁵² He also accused the A1 farmers of sabotaging production on his farm as an A1 farmer had built a house on top of irrigation lines on the farm.⁵³ Mafuta further narrated how the A1 farmers had been withholding a sixty horse power water pump, which drew water from the nearby river for irrigation since 2002, just to frustrate his projects on the farm.⁵⁴ He also reported how his neighbours were conniving with some top officials in the district who wanted to take over the farm. Mr Mafuta alleged that in 2003, he lost rabbits, guinea pigs and property valued over millions of Zimbabwe dollars after a fire mysteriously started on his farm. He suspected the fire to have been started by his neighbours.⁵⁵

The situation upon occupation for most farmers forced them to abandon the crops that were suited not only to the existing infrastructure but also to the climate. This was because they had acquired plots that had no such infrastructure as it had been given to other plot holders. Some farmers in Mashonaland Central had abandoned growing tobacco because access to tobacco barns on their neighbours' plots was an arduous affair. Kennedy Munemo of Forrester Farm in Guruve had to quickly shift from tobacco growing to grow soya beans because he could not handle "the politics around the tobacco barns" in his farm.⁵⁶ Of interest is the fact that, for Munemo, the tobacco barns were not on his plot but he just could not handle the bickering that surrounded their usage and he decided to have nothing to do with them. The barns were eventually taken over by one of his neighbors who was in the army and had used his position to threaten Munemo and his family.⁵⁷ Indeed, such cases where new farmers were not able to produce certain commodities like tobacco and wheat because they did not have access to relevant and existing infrastructure, are common in the province. Elsewhere, Chiredzi North Legislator, Magret Pote, referring to her constituent said, "It is not a secret that infrastructure and equipment at most of the acquired farms, has been the centre of many disputes and this has no doubt affected production on the farms."⁵⁸ At some farms in Bindura District, highly sophisticated tobacco barns and other infrastructure was never used

⁵² "No Space for Land Criminals", *The Herald*, 21 June 2010.

⁵³ *Ibid.*

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵⁵ *Ibid.* It is important to note that almost half of my respondents in Mashonaland Central Province have, in one way or another, been affected by similar disputes that have turned to sabotage and destruction of infrastructure. A majority of them claimed that no assistance was forthcoming from any officials in the province as they were left to fend and take care of themselves.

⁵⁶ Interview with Kennedy Munemo, Forrester Farm, Guruve District, 19 December 2017.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*

⁵⁸ "Resuscitate Projects on Acquired Farms", *The Herald*, 1 June 2006.

by the A1 farmers who were allocated plots in those farms. The infrastructure fell apart, while the electrical wiring was either stolen or vandalised.

4.4. The Politics of “Othering” and Conflict among New Farmers

A significant source of conflict amongst the new farmers has been the politics of “othering”, especially othering based on ethnicity and religion.⁵⁹ The Committees of Seven were one key institution that was cited as guilty of perpetuating divisions along ethnic lines by almost 25 percent of the new farmers I interviewed.⁶⁰ While their roles included listening to the people’s grievances, addressing problems and leading communities they were regularly accused of ethnic bias. A notorious case of such occurred in Centenary where the Committee of Seven of one area was accused of outright tribalism. The committee was notoriously known for being against any land beneficiary with *Karanga* origins.⁶¹ As if to confirm such accusations, one farmer who was also a member of the Committee of Seven expressed his disgust at the invasion of the province by “people from Masvingo” who “think they are better educated than us.”⁶²

Indeed, in some instances, the land reform brought conflicts between those who viewed themselves as the autochthons and those they viewed as outsiders or strangers. The dominant *Korekore* have continued to express misgivings about the *Karanga* whom they refer to derogatorily as *maVhitori*.⁶³ They accuse them of being disrespectful of traditional authorities in the area because they hail from different areas and, therefore, do not have a sense of belonging in the resettlement area. The resentment towards the *vaKaranga* expresses itself in many facets of farm life and in the process perpetuates conflict amongst the farmers. For example, most of the new farmers of *Karanga* origin have expressed concern about being treated unfairly when it comes to things like distribution of farm inputs. They have also complained of being isolated and not made to feel as part of a community.

⁵⁹ Othering is a phenomenon of viewing or treating (a person or group of people) as intrinsically different from and alien to oneself.

⁶⁰ Chaumba, *et al*, “New Politics, New Livelihoods: Changes in the Zimbabwean Low veld since the Farm Occupations of 2000”, 20.

⁶¹ Interview with Cuthbert Chivandire, Centenary, 20 October 2017.

⁶² Interview with Conrad Mhiripiri, Centenary, 20 October 2017.

⁶³ The term *Vhitori* is used to derogatorily describe the *Karanga* from Masvingo. The name is derived from the old colonial name of Masvingo which was referred to once as Fort Victoria. The notion of *Karanga*s as unwanted outsiders is a dominant viewpoint expressed by the majority of new farmers in the province especially in Guruve, Muzarabani and Bindura district. See the context of *Karanga* focus as discussed in Chapter 3.

There seemed to be a mutual and popular feeling that the province had been “invaded” by “outsiders”. Such outsiders mainly referred to non *Korekore* and *ZeZuru* dialects speakers, especially the *Karanga*.⁶⁴ In fact, local politicians reportedly signed a secret document called the Musengezi Declaration in which they agreed to reduce the number of the *vaKaranga* who could get access to land in the province. The declaration also vowed to make life for the *vaKaranga* who had already been allocated land as unbearable as possible.⁶⁵ The authors of the Musengezi Declaration argued that the *Karanga* had “invaded” Mashonaland Central during the war of liberation when a majority of the combatants operating in the area were predominantly *Karanga*. According to the *Musengezi* declarants, these combatants had subsequently settled in the province after the war and had deliberately filled up influential positions in the province with *vaKaranga*.⁶⁶ The removal of restrictions on the movement of people to any part of the country after independence and cotton boom in the 1980s also prompted people from South Eastern part of Zimbabwe to migrate from their congested communal areas to Northern Zimbabwe.⁶⁷ Although such claims of *Karanga* dominance cannot be substantiated, the effect that this widely held belief had in shaping relations amongst the farmers cannot be underestimated. Again, given this background, discrimination in beneficiary selection based on ethnicity cannot be entirely dismissed. This is mainly because no records of deliberations of the reasons for selection or rejection were kept, and there was no provision for appealing rejected applications.

A dispute that involved former Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe Governor, Kombo Moyana, who in 2012 was embroiled in an acrimonious land dispute with other new farmers at Calgary Farm in Mazowe District, well illustrates how central ethnicity was in land allocation. New farmers who had benefitted from the land reform from 2006 to 2008 alleged that Moyana had sold his farm for residential stands and was now encroaching on to their farms. They also

⁶⁴ Interview with Edson Zvomuya, Centenary, 27 December 2017.

⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁶ There is literature that discusses the presence of *vaKaranga* in Mashonaland Central and how these migrants added to complexities of the land reform in the province during the earlier land reform schemes. See; M. J. Spierenburg, *Strangers, Spirits and Land Reforms: Conflicts about Land in Dande, Northern Zimbabwe* (Leiden: Brill, 2004) and A. O. Chimhowu, “Livelihood Dynamics in Planned and Spontaneous Resettlement in Zimbabwe: Converging and Vulnerable”, *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 28, 3 (2002),

⁶⁷For more on these restrictions see the Communal Lands Act, 1982 and for more insights see respectively, Chimhowu, “Livelihood Dynamics in Planned and Spontaneous Resettlement in Zimbabwe: Converging and Vulnerable”, 552; W. Derman, “Changing Land Use in the Eastern Zambezi Valley: Socio- Economic Considerations”, CASS/WWF Joint Paper (Harare: 1996).

alleged that Moyana was a beneficiary of what they called double allocation of farms by officials from the Ministry of Lands. In his defence, Moyana argued that the new farmers were only refusing to move because he was from Manicaland Province and that the issue had nothing to do with farming but with his ethnicity. He claimed that the other farmers he was in dispute with did “not want anyone from another province in their area.”⁶⁸ He accused politicians from Mashonaland Central of tribalism and “being egocentric” claiming that this was against the “spirit of nationhood.”⁶⁹

The Committee of Seven and the traditional leaders (village heads) were the main structures that existed at the grassroots level, especially in A1 schemes. This Committee of Seven was established by ZANU PF and its main role related to the continued political mobilisation and sensitisation of the new farmers. In districts like Muzarabani and Shamva, for example, there is evidence of marked anti *Karanga* sentiments amongst most of the members of the committee.⁷⁰ Even war veterans who are *Karanga* were not preferred as committee members. Given the fact that these committees acted as conduits of information to and from ZANU PF and the District Administrator, it is possible that they spread the anti *Karanga* sentiment to the rest of the new farmers. Again, as committees responsible for conflict management and dispute resolution among the beneficiaries, as well as the general peace and security of the schemes, their influence in shaping ethnic relations was substantial in that regard.⁷¹

The youths were also hugely affected by the politics of othering. A significant number benefited from the political muscle that the politicians offered them. They used such muscle to acquire power, which they used to dictate the way they engaged and related with other farmers in the area. The description by one such youth, Malvern Dora, captures the power matrix at play on the farms. He describes how they always “claimed they were the ‘Police Commissioner’s boys’ in order to get access to facilities [they] desired in the neighbourhood” and “intimidated the remaining farm workers to provide their labour for a song.”⁷² The same “Police Commissioner’s boys” describe how, during the early phase of the land reform, they had to work hard to establish their political identity to the war veterans by contributing to

⁶⁸ “Ex- Reserve Bank Chief, New Farmers Clash”, *The Herald*, 25 April 2012.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*

⁷⁰ In interviews with members of the Committee of Seven in these districts, such sentiments were dominant.

⁷¹ A much comprehensive analysis of this issue will be carried out in chapter 4, which focusses on everyday relations amongst new farmers.

⁷² Interview with Malvern Dora, Marston Farm, Bindura District, 12 October 2017.

rallies and the intimidation of anyone who was deemed to be an enemy of the land reform program.

New farmers in Guruve, Shamva and Centenary also talked of the existence of youth terror gangs in their respective areas who were notorious for intimidating and terrorising them. One such gang was allegedly bankrolled by a senior ZANU PF official, in Shamva.⁷³ In return for doing his errands, the youths enjoyed free reign in the district and they used the freedom to acquire plots and farm equipment for themselves, which they mostly sold to other farmers in the area.⁷⁴ Matondi describes how the youth were used as “shock troopers” by senior political officials.⁷⁵ The narrative of youth’s involvement in the land reform has largely been that of violence and theft, which characterised the way the process was conducted. However, except for their participation in violence, there was no youth presence at the formulation of agrarian policies and allocation. That terrain was mostly dominated by black political elites and war veterans who had power to allocate land.

It should, however, be noted that the politics of “othering” was not only limited to ethnicity and age. For example, former farm workers who were beneficiaries of the FTLRP have continued to bear the brunt of discrimination as they were “othered” as *maBhurandaya* who were foreign and therefore undeserving of the land.⁷⁶ This is because most of them are of Malawian, Zambian and Mozambican descent. A majority of farmers saw them as socially inferior and as potential labourers. This was especially dominant among A2 farmers. The new farmers also blamed the former farm workers for influencing other farm workers to make unfavourable labour demands. At the same time, the former workers turned farmers also accused other new farmers of being arrogant and patronising. They did not appreciate the manner the new farmers continued to see them as potential labour as they prefer to be treated as equals.⁷⁷

Some conflicts were a result of “othering” in the context of religion. Farmers of different religious backgrounds subscribed to different belief systems which put them on a collision

⁷³ Interview with John Ndumwe, Shamva Town, 23 November 2017.

⁷⁴ Ibid.

⁷⁵ Matondi, *Zimbabwe’s Fast Track Land Reform*, 25.

⁷⁶ *Mabhurandaya* is a derogatory term used to describe people of mostly Malawian and Zambian origin. For more on this see: A. Daimon, “Mabhurandaya”: the Malawian Diaspora in Zimbabwe: 1895 to 2008”, (PhD, University of Free State, Bloemfontein, 2016).

⁷⁷ Interview with Rodney Banda, Bindura District, 7 November, 2017.

course with each other. Some were victims of many labels which emanated from their belief system. Use of descriptions like *maZion* and *maPositori* were used as metaphors of exclusion.⁷⁸ In that context they were accused of failing to adhere to commonly adhered to sacred *chisi* holidays and preferred observing religious days such as the Sabbath or Sundays.⁷⁹ Due to the same reason some new farmers also did not respect the sacred sites nor did they participate in traditional rituals such as rainmaking ceremonies.⁸⁰ Such a scenario brought the beneficiaries from different religious persuasions into conflict with a different religious belief. This was especially true for those who adhered to traditional belief systems of *vadzimu* (spirit mediums) who claimed direct links with original owners of the area and thus felt to be custodians of the land, sacred places, and ancestral graves.⁸¹

In one farm in Guruve, three members of the Zion Christian Church (ZCC) were victims of constant persecution from other fellow plot holders because they were accused of not adhering to *chisi*. These members were put in a very difficult position because they observed a different day for *chisi* rather than the one set aside by the local chief. In reaction to their perceived defiance, a group of farmers organised their farm workers to destroy their crop because they had worked on their fields on a sacred day. They believed that these people working on the day designated as *chisi* were the ones causing drought.⁸² Zhou, the ZCC member who was a victim of this harassment, argued that he could not afford to lose two precious days of work especially during the busy planting season, because that was what he would be forced to do if he was to observe the area's sacred day as well as his church's.⁸³

Othering was based on being pioneers of the land occupations. Indeed, those who initiated the land invasion movement also utilised that pioneer notion to lay claim not only to property and infrastructure but to authority as well. In many instances, they blatantly refused to

⁷⁸ *MaZion* and *maPositori* are members of the different Apostolic and Zion churches in the country.

⁷⁹ *Chisi* is a day designated by either traditional leadership or church leadership as a day of rest in which followers or subjects are not allowed to do any physical work especially in the fields. This day is observed as a day to honour for the ancestors who gave them rain and other things in life. The specific day on which *chisi* is observed day differs from area to area but in most parts of Mashonaland Central, Friday is observed as *chisi*.

⁸⁰ C. Chakanyuka, "Heritage, Land and Ancestors: The Challenges of Cultural Heritage Management in the Face of the Fast Track Land Redistribution Programme in Zimbabwe 1999-2007" (MA, University of Zimbabwe, 2007).

⁸¹ J. Mujere, "Land, Graves and Belonging: Land Reform and the Politics of Belonging in Newly Resettled Farms in Gutu, 2000-2009", *Livelihoods after Land Reform in Zimbabwe*, Working Paper 9 (2010), 19.

⁸² Interview with Mathias Zhou, Furries Farm, Guruve, 13 December 2017.

⁸³ *Ibid.*

recognise government drawn boundaries making claims to the right to occupation because of being the “original people who dared to confront the headstrong white owners.”⁸⁴ They, therefore, continued to forcibly get access to infrastructure outside their borders and, in extreme circumstances, denied access to farmers, in whose plots the infrastructure was located because they were relative new comers and “cowards who only rushed for rich pickings after they had done the dirty work for them.”⁸⁵ In another case in Guruve District, six new farmers at Leopardville Farm were involved in a serious battle over the use of grading sheds inherited from the previous white owner.⁸⁶ Two of the farmers accused the other four of conniving to cut them from accessing the barns. They claimed that they deserved equal access to the barns since they had occupied the farm at the same time as the others.⁸⁷ Ministry of Lands officials who were contacted to resolve this dispute, found it difficult to resolve it. They could only appeal to the farmers’ good nature and sense of cooperation, but they did not have a proper policy guideline they could use to assist the farmers.⁸⁸

4.5. A1 and A2 Farmer Relations

Matondi is of the view that the A2 model was designed for the elite and the A1 Model for the masses.⁸⁹ As such, he views a beneficiary’s asset base, position in society, wealth and related social standing as critical elements in their placing on the social ladder and therefore their access to land. Indeed, the A2 farms, averaging around 100 hectares in extent, are the areas where the political-military elite scrambled for land. Most of them, like Matondi suggests, had a similar social and economic profile: urban connections, business people, retirees, and they were also often well-connected politically. This is because in multiple cases, there was a well-documented pattern of corruption and patronage, especially around election times, when politically- and military-connected elites grabbed farms in the A2 sector.

The composition of this elite class, therefore, shaped the characteristics of emerging groups, the relationships within those groups and the relationships that they had with their A1 counterparts, service providers and traditional leaders.⁹⁰ Sadomba argues that the A2 farmers

⁸⁴ Interview with Conrad Mhiripiri, Centenary, 20 October, 2017

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*

⁸⁶ Interview with Daniel Mbeu, Leopardville Farm, Guruve District, 9 December 2017.

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*

⁸⁸ Interview with Tarisai Moyo, Arex Officer, Guruve Centre, 9 December 2017.

⁸⁹ Matondi *Zimbabwe’s Fast Track Land Reform*.

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*

influenced communities in various ways during “*jambanja*,” with some of them going as far as providing resources to land occupiers.⁹¹ Prominent A2 beneficiaries in Mashonaland Central Province, like Nicholas Goche, Joyce Mujuru, Ephraim Masawi and others were well known for doing that especially in the early stages of the occupations.⁹² The relationships that emerged at the time of farm occupations had evolved over the years and had created specific relationships among A2 farmers, as also between A2 and A1 farmers, that were determined by the spaces in which they lived and farmed.⁹³

It is important to note that the relationships between A1 and A2 farmers were mostly acrimonious and were greatly determined by the political circumstances under which they ended up on the farms. This was because a majority of A2 farmers saw themselves as a better class of farmers and people than their A1 counterparts. On the other hand, the A1 farmers were well aware of the A2 farmers’ notions of superiority. However, while resentment of A2 farmers by A1 farmers recurred at different forums, the A1 farmers realised the political weakness of their bargaining power. Moses Mbeta, an A1 farmer in Concession, recalled how from 2004 when he moved onto his new piece of land until around 2011, he had to take time to invest in building a “working relationship” with his A2 neighbours because they seemed to be financially stable.⁹⁴ He, however, became disillusioned by the “patronising and commandeering attitudes” of the A2 farmers and he made a decision to cut off any ties with them in May 2011. Another A1 farmer in Guruve, recalled how he felt wronged by his A2 neighbours who treated him like he was just an ordinary farm worker. James Ndomba remembers how one of the farmers was in the habit of always asking him “to drive his tractor to cultivate the fields or his truck for errands in Bindura or Harare.”⁹⁵ What seemed to irritate James the most was the total disregard demonstrated by the A2 farmer who appeared not to care for the fact that he also had his own piece of land to take care of.⁹⁶ Thus a majority of the

⁹¹ W. Z. Sadomba, “Peasant Occupations within War veterans-led Occupations: Grassroots Conflicts and State Reaction in Zimbabwe”, *Journal of Peasant Studies*, 36, 2 (2009).

⁹² In the numerous interviews I had conducted the province, evidence of these and other A2 farmers providing such critical resources are abound.

⁹³ Matondi, *Zimbabwe’s Fast Track Land Reform*.

⁹⁴ Interview with Moses Mbeta, Harold Farm, Concession, 7 October 2017.

⁹⁵ Interview with James Ndomba, Kurima Farm, Guruve, 13 November 2017.

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*

A1 farmers become calculating in terms of defending their spaces through passive and active political tactics.⁹⁷

Relationships between the A2 farmers and farm workers were also a key issue in shaping the nature of relations between A2 and A1 farmers. In most cases, A2 plot holders were better placed, financially, to meet the costs of labour as compared to their A1 counterparts. Thus, in times of labour scarcity, the A2 farmers would offer better remuneration than that offered by the A1 farmers. Kudakwashe Gwenzi, an A1 farmer in Shamva, lost three workers to his A2 neighbours because they had offered them better wages and incentives such as “work suits, safety shoes and raincoats” which he could not afford.⁹⁸ The A2 farmer had even given his workers better accommodation next to the farm house, which did not compare with the compound huts that Kudakwashe was offering.⁹⁹ The A2 farmers, who had amassed assets from the previous owners, were financially capable of investing their off-farm income to make their farms habitable and were modelling themselves as the new *varungu* (new white bosses) to demonstrate their class elevation.

During the first few years, there were numerous problems of theft on the fast track farms. Most of these thefts, especially on A2 farms, were blamed on either farm workers or the A1 farmers. Cases of theft of produce, housebreaking and poaching of natural resources were widespread in the resettlement areas. In fact, cases of thefts were central amongst the issues that were brought up by the farmers during the interviews and almost seventy five percent of my respondents reported being victims of theft and of the things stolen, farm produce accounted for about 40 percent of goods reported stolen and farm equipment about 30 percent.¹⁰⁰ Other things that were stolen included livestock, food and household goods. In fact, the most common types of theft were thefts of farm equipment, especially irrigation equipment, fences, gum poles, livestock and crops and breaking into shops and stealing groceries. Such cases of theft were a major cause of friction between A1 and A2 farmers. One of the issues that led to theft to become a central problem amongst the new farmers was the fact that the general environment of lawlessness that had characterised the land invasions continued after the FTLRP. As such, vices like theft and plunder which affected the white

⁹⁷ Matondi, *Zimbabwe's Fast Track Land Reform*.

⁹⁸ Interview with Kudakwashe Gwenzi, Mountainview Farm, Shamva, 15 October 2017.

⁹⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁰ These statistics are from personal calculations from reports of goods reported to have been stolen by the farmers I interviewed.

farmers during displacement had continued largely unabated after the FTLRP. The police and other law enforcement agencies continued to treat the resettled areas with the same indifference they had treated them during the land invasions. Thus, the new farmers complained of disruptions of their farming activities due to thefts which were rampant because the general lawlessness on the resettled areas gave malcontents responsible for the thefts free reign to cause havoc and disruptions.

Another major hindrance to the development of positive relations between the A1 and the A2 farmers was the fact that new farmers have limited scope for networking especially as some of them were permanently employed elsewhere. In Mashonaland Central Province roughly some seventy percent of A1 farmers are fulltime farmers and most of them resided on their plots, compared with about only 25 percent full time farmers in the A2 model.¹⁰¹ Matondi cites a farm in Mazowe, where the village head indicated that there were problems with people who were not resident on the farms because they did not attend community meetings that are designed not only to foster relations but to improve production as well.¹⁰² The A2 farmers rarely met and tended to be individualistic and aloof in many ways. In Mazowe, there were typical cases of A1 farms sharing a farm with an A2 farmer. Such cases were riddled with conflict between the two classes of farmers. On many new farms, social infrastructure that could help in cultivating social capital at a local level were limited. Therefore, associational life in the newly resettled areas was divided along class and gender lines.¹⁰³

By and large, however, A2 farmers tended to shun cooperating amongst themselves or with A1 farmers.¹⁰⁴ The major reason for this was the nature of residence in which A2 farmers lived alone on their plots, while A1 farmers were grouped together in a village. Indeed, in most of the resettlement areas in the province, A2 plots were slowly becoming no go areas for A1 farmers who were accused by A2 farmers of all sorts of petty and major criminal activities that included theft of livestock, crops and farm equipment.¹⁰⁵ In turn, A1 plot holders accused A2 farmers of being arrogant, patronising and selfish. Takesure Togarasei, an A1 farmer in Mvurwi, was of the view that A2 farmers “think they are better off than all of

¹⁰¹ Matondi, *Zimbabwe's Fast Track Land Reform*.

¹⁰² *Ibid.*

¹⁰³ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁴ Chiweshe, “Farm Level Institutions in Emergent Communities in Post Fast Track Zimbabwe: Case of Mazowe District”, 151.

¹⁰⁵ Interview with Muchaneta Phiri, Leed Farm, Bindura District, 5 October 2017.

us and they think that their money makes them special.”¹⁰⁶ Ranganai Mugora of Ceres 1 Farm in Shamva accused his neighbouring A2 farmers of bullying them and taking advantage of most of the poor A1 farmers and abused them as cheap labour. He described a situation in which one of his A2 farm neighbours was in the habit of getting some of the poorer A1 farmers work on his farm in exchange for “chicken intestines and chicken heads.”¹⁰⁷

Chiweshe, in his study based on the Mazowe district in Mashonaland Central similarly alludes to cases of non-cooperation between A1 and A2 farmers. He also refers to cases in which A1 farmers believed that A2 farmers were arrogant and acted as if they were superior to everyone else.¹⁰⁸ Chiweshe cites one farmer at Arda Farm who commented that “*maA2 farmers ndovatove varungu vacho, havatedzeri zvese zvechisi kana mitemo yamambo*” (A2 farmers are now like the white farmers. They do not follow the traditional chief or traditional rules).¹⁰⁹ Some A1 farmers in Shamva resented A2 farmers as they believed they were the ones causing drought, because of the belief that rains would not come if the people did not observe *chisi*.¹¹⁰ This was partly because some of the farmers found in the A2 models came from other parts of Zimbabwe, or urban areas where *chisi* was not recognised as an important day unlike the majority of the A1 farmers who came from neighbouring communal areas and had a better understanding of their tradition.

Non-state actors like banks, contractors and NGOs were also important determinants of power relations in the resettled areas, especially among A1 and A2 farmers. The majority of the A2 farmers were much more conversant with the workings of the banks, and thus had an advantage in their dealings with the banks because they understood the language as well as the workings of the banking system. A majority of them also had better financial backgrounds and could provide collateral needed to borrow from the banks. Such farmers had, therefore, become important conduits for the spread of financial advice to the rest of the farming community but again, in some instances, they abused their privileged position to negotiate concessions from their neighbours. Most contractors had developed a love-hate relationship with the farmers because of the manner they drew up contracts with them.

¹⁰⁶ Interview with Takesure Togarasei, Leebury Farm, Mvurwi, 6 December 2017.

¹⁰⁷ Interview with Ranganai Mugora, Ceres 1 Farm, Shamva District, 23 September 2017.

¹⁰⁸ Chiweshe, “Farm Level Institutions in Emergent Communities in Post Fast Track Zimbabwe: Case of Mazowe District”, 151.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid, Matondi highlights instances where A2 farmers mimic white commercial farmers, see, Matondi, *Zimbabwe’s Fast Track Land Reform*, 12.

¹¹⁰ This was the common sentiment shared by most A1 farmers in the province.

Indeed, in Mashonaland Central, because of tobacco growing, contract farming had become a key avenue through which farmers could circumvent the problems of financing their farming. However, access to these contractors was sometimes determined by the overbearing war veterans and party functionaries who used it to either punish competitors or whip uncooperative farmers into line. A tobacco contractor in Centenary used the Committee of Seven, which was dominated by war veterans, to get access to farmers whom they signed tobacco growing contracts with.¹¹¹ The war veterans in the Committee were accused of using their access to the contractors to control and manipulate other farmers.

4.6. Later Beneficiaries of the Land Reform Program and Conflict.

It is important to note that the occupations happened during different times over the period under study and this led to conflicts in the resettlement areas. Those who were settled during the early phase of the FTLRP were in most cases in conflict with those who came later. For example, there were some beneficiaries who were allocated plots as late as 2014. Popularly known as *maA5*, most of them occupied land that was previously designated as grazing lands for A1 farmers. Their occupation of these grazing lands became a subject of speculation amongst the pioneer occupiers who accused them of paying bribes to Ministry of Lands officials in order to get land.¹¹² In 2013, Harold Takawira, a teacher in one of the primary schools in Bindura was allocated 8 hectares of land in one of the A1 farmers' grazing lands. The original beneficiary, Morgan Kombo, accused Takawira of bribing the Ministry of Lands officials and in the process depriving his livestock of much needed grazing. Kombo actually claimed that he was forced to limit his stock because he no longer had enough space for grazing.¹¹³ Tendai Zhanda, a farmer in Bindura District had to adopt the use of hand sprays to treat his livestock. This was in response to his failure to access the dip tank at the farm as some other neighbouring farmers had continued to deny him access to the dip tanks because he was regarded as a new comer.¹¹⁴ Zhanda was also a teacher in the local area who only got allocated a plot in 2012 after Ministry of Lands officials, in one of many visits to the area, had observed his farming ability on a five hectare piece of land he was leasing from one of the plot holders. Zhanda once lost eight cattle in 2014 after they were reportedly poisoned by

¹¹¹ Interview with Robert Gwaze, Centenary, 5 October 2017.

¹¹² Interview with Newman Mupazi, Guruve Centre, 22 November 2017.

¹¹³ Interview with Harold Kombo, Guruve Centre, 22 November, 2017.

¹¹⁴ Interview with Tendai Zhanda, Marston Farm, Bindura 23 December, 2017.

one of the neighbours.¹¹⁵ He, however, did not report the case to the police as he feared that doing so was just going to worsen the toxic relations with his neighbours.¹¹⁶ He also claimed that besides being a new comer the other farmers hated him because he was a teacher who received a salary and “on top of that had used connections to get the farm.” More importantly, Zhanda also made the claim that most civil servants who were new farmers in the area were in the same predicament as his.¹¹⁷

In Centenary, more than 700 such “late comers” reportedly occupied the former A1 grazing lands in 2014 alone.¹¹⁸ This is the same scenario in Shamva District where more than 900 “late comers” reportedly occupied farms, specifically A1 grazing lands, between 2012 and 2015.¹¹⁹ What is important to note is the fact that a majority of these “late comers” did not have official offer letters. Again, most of them stayed at the instigation of local politicians who had found a new political constituency. They, therefore, encouraged them to stay and came to them with promises of acquiring, on their behalf, offer letters to formalise their stay in exchange for their vote.¹²⁰ This phenomena is not unique to Mashonaland Central. In 2006, the then Minister of Industry and International Trade and also a Member of Parliament for Bubi- Umguza constituency, Obert Mpfu, was reported to be against the move to evict more than 300 villagers in Matabeleland because that would slash his support base. For him that would be costly in the future elections.¹²¹

The presence of the so called A5 farmers is itself testimony of the lawlessness and instability that has generally characterised the FTLRP. A majority of these new comers are beneficiaries of rampant corruption within the state bureaucracy as they have paid Land officers money to get access to land.¹²² Unfortunately, most of this land was taken from land that would have been already allocated to someone thus further perpetuating animosity amongst the new farmers. In worst case scenarios, some of the A1 and A2 farmers were no longer comfortable to have visits from officials from the Ministry of Lands because of the possibility of these officials identifying “available” land which they could allocate to new beneficiaries. As such,

¹¹⁵ Ibid.

¹¹⁶ Ibid.

¹¹⁷ Ibid.

¹¹⁸ I visited three such farms on which these late comers have settled, and they number more than 150 in those three farms alone.

¹¹⁹ Interview with Headman Nyamidzi, Ceres 1 Farm, Shamva, 4 November, 2017.

¹²⁰ Ibid.

¹²¹ “Farm Evictions Threaten Minister’s Support Base”, *The Standard*, 13 August 2006.

¹²² This is a common perception amongst the earlier land beneficiaries I interviewed.

the new farmers avoided asking for help from the government officials even when they needed it because of fear of having their land identified and parceled out to someone as available land. Jefter Komichi of Zvakwana Farm in Bindura district summarised these fears much more succinctly. He was of the view that calling government officials for any kind of help was “only opening yourself up to trouble as the officials will only come to your farm and identify unutilised land which they themselves gave to us as grazing land and give it to someone who would have paid them.”¹²³

4.7. Gendered Struggles

These everyday struggles also had gender dimensions as women conflict with their male counterparts in the resettlement schemes. This was made worse by the fact that some men do not believe that woman can own and till land in their own right. Fatima Marange of Mbada Farm, Guruve recalled how every time she attended a farmers’ meeting or any other farmers’ activities in her district, she was constantly reminded to go and call “her husband”, the supposed owner of the farm.¹²⁴ She cited the many instances when at such meetings, the men did not give equal prominence to her opinion as they did to her male counterparts.¹²⁵ Men, the majority of who were in positions of authority, used their power and authority to deny women access to vital infrastructure, state led input schemes and labour. Matondi cites cases where farmworkers would prefer to work for a male farmer as opposed to selling their labour to female farmers. Such dominance of the patriarchal system amongst land beneficiaries created platform of struggles which pit women against their male counterparts.¹²⁶ Almost all the women beneficiaries I interviewed, in the province cited attempts at denying them access to inputs and infrastructure as a major source of their unending conflicts with their male counterparts.

Still haunted by patriarchal customary values, the Zimbabwean farming arena, like elsewhere in Africa, has tendencies of treating women not as capable, self-made individuals but as part of a male household. The women, in the FTLRP were, therefore, expected to benefit as proxies and not as owners.¹²⁷ As a result of the challenges they faced because of the gender

¹²³ Interview with Jefter Komichi, Zvakwana Farm, Bindura District, 12 December, 2017.

¹²⁴ Interview with Fatima Marange, Mbada Farm, Guruve, 8 December, 2017.

¹²⁵ *Ibid.*

¹²⁶ Matondi, *Zimbabwe’s Fast Track Land Reform*, 196.

¹²⁷ *Ibid.*

motivated prejudices, a majority of women in the fast track farms tended to shift from labour intensive crops like tobacco to other crops like maize and groundnuts. Almost eighty five percent of the women beneficiaries in the province had at least more than three hectares of land dedicated to crops traditionally associated with women such as groundnuts, round nuts, sorghum, millet and rapoko.¹²⁸ Based on the sample size I interviewed, almost 75 percent of the women were original participants in the land invasions, 20 percent were politically connected, and the remaining five percent got their land through the formal application process. That shift also made them avoid the possible confrontations over use of barns, access to firewood to treat tobacco and the constant attention that it demanded, given that they had to also concentrate on running their households.¹²⁹ In as much as some women benefited from the FTLRP, its fundamental failure was always its inability to create a conducive environment for women to compete with their male counterparts. It also failed to address the key challenges that women faced in their struggles over access to resources.¹³⁰

The majority of the women who got land in the resettlement areas were those who participated in the farm invasions.¹³¹ That process, by virtue of its characteristic lawlessness, made the women who participated in it get perpetual stereotypes as women of loose morals. As such, other married women in the farming landscape viewed them as prostitutes who could snatch their husbands. Normal contacts with other farmers from which they could have useful information on their farming activities was, therefore, discouraged and viewed with suspicion. Other men in positions of authority also attempted to make use of the women's vulnerable position and made sexual advances in attempts at sex for favours. A case in point involved Wendy Marovha of Donnington Farm in Guruve who reported to the Committee of Seven in her area of constant harassment from one of the war veterans' leaders who continued to make sexual demands arguing that "it was the role of women to provide such in the struggle."¹³² Another woman in Bindura District, Nyaradzai Mutuke, reported how she was constantly patronised by one of the farmers in the area. She described how the man was always in the habit of offering her unsolicited help on her plot and then later demand for sexual favours.¹³³ She recalled how in July 2008, the man's wife together with her two

¹²⁸ These percentages are calculations made from the sample of 20 women respondents I interviewed.

¹²⁹ Interview with Gamuchirai Kapoto, Guruve Centre, 8 December 2017.

¹³⁰ Matondi, *Zimbabwe's Fast Track Land Reform*, 204.

¹³¹ Statistics based on personal interviews.

¹³² Interview with Wendy Marovha, Donnington Farm, Guruve District, 8 December 2017.

¹³³ Interview with Nyaradzai Mutuke, Bindura District, 12 December 2017.

sisters, came to her plot accusing her of having an affair with her husband and threatening to beat her up.¹³⁴ She also recalled how that year, she avoided frequenting places where there was a possibility of meeting up with the woman's husband. Nyaradzai recollected how she even had to forego important farmer meetings were they were organising inputs in fear of having a confrontation with the woman and her sisters.¹³⁵ What is more important in Nyaradzai's case is that any attempts to have the matter resolved by the Committee of Seven did not yield immediate results.

Conclusion

This chapter has provided a nuanced and in-depth description and understanding of everyday conflicts as well as revealed how specific forms of interaction amongst new farmers emerged as a response to the various dilemmas facing the farmers in Mashonaland Central province. It has proven that despite the focus by most of the literature on Zimbabwe on the broader political economy of the country in their analysis of the impact of the FTLRP on productivity, the manner in which farmers interacted amongst themselves had the strength of determining not only the quantities to be produced amongst their individual plots, but the choice of crop and farming activities as well. These everyday interactions, like many other factors that have been considered elsewhere by other scholars were equally important for a wholesale examination of the new farmers.

The different people, brought together by the land reform initiative with fundamentally different social and economic backgrounds, thus greatly determine the nature of relations that existed in the new resettlement areas. This was especially important when things like financial ability and political connections or background were used as elements to outmuscle other beneficiaries and deny them access to either their pieces of allocated land, important inputs farm equipment and infrastructure. Thus, everyday struggles for survival were an enduring legacy for a majority of the farmers, and such struggles largely culminated into conflict or were a response to conflict. The presence of conflict in the resettled farms was, however, not to discount the presence of cooperation amongst new farmers. These cooperation dynamics will be discussed in Chapter Five.

¹³⁴ Ibid.

¹³⁵ Ibid.

Chapter Five: “New” Forms of Cooperation

Introduction

This chapter deals with forms of cooperation that emerged amongst the new farmers in the resettlement areas. It acknowledges the fact that relations amongst the farmers were not only been hostile but also characterised by some instances of cooperation. It examines how the new farming patterns and demands called upon the farmers to conjure up innovative ways of relating to each other, especially in the context of the fragility occasioned by the lawlessness that pervaded the period. It also looks at these forms of cooperation in an environment of limited finances and lack of government support to carry out farming effectively. The farmers shared equipment like tractors, harvesters and tobacco barns. They also exchanged cattle for ploughing purposes and in some instances learnt to share their labour. Some of the farmers even transplanted the concept of *nhimbe* from their traditional rural farming landscapes and utilised this concept of communal work in their new plots in the face of serious labour shortages.¹ Furthermore, the chapter examines the gender dynamics of cooperation in the resettlement areas. It surveys the many ways that the government, through the Ministry of Agriculture, found ways to enhance cooperation amongst farmers. It looks at the workings of such concepts as the Master Farmer model and use of field days in which the farmers congregated around one plot supervised by Ministry of Agriculture officials to learn new farming techniques and other ideas.² The chapter also assesses the different farmer organisations.

¹*Nhimbe* is a word from the Shona people of Zimbabwe referring to the residents in a community working together to help each other in daily life, for example, during harvest time. *Nhimbe* is therefore communal work, done as part of a group. It is also sometimes referred to as *jakwara*. For a more comprehensive discussion of the concept, see: P. S. Mangwanindichero, “Community-based Development: A Study of *Nhimbe* Practice in Zimbabwe”, (PhD, University of the Witwatersrand, 2014).

² The Master Farmer training scheme was introduced in the 1930s as a way to develop competent farmers. In pre-independence Zimbabwe, most extension agents’ efforts to improve smallholder agriculture followed this approach. The objective of Master Farmer training was to spread modern, scientific farming techniques in communal areas. Master Farmer certificates and badges were awarded to communal farmers who adopted and practised improved methods. This extension approach was based on the “trickle-down” theory of extension, in which a few progressive farmers receive extension and information, which they are expected to pass on to other farmers through farmer-to-farmer dissemination and demonstration. For more on this see: J.T. Chipika, “Food Security and Nutrition: The Experience of Zimbabwe since Independence in 1980”, A Paper presented for the Food Systems under Stress Project, September 1993 and C.T. Gadzirai and N. Mafuse, “Comparative Analysis of Farmer Participatory Extension Approaches: Case of Farmer Field Schools and Master Farmer

5.1. Operational Environment that Prompted Cooperation

Historical, social as well as economic elements shaped and instigated the forms of cooperation that emerged amongst farmers. Social organisation in the context of the post-FTLRP was mainly based on the agency of farmers trying to survive with little or no government support.³ In order to survive and prosper during and after the land reform, the inhabitants of the new villages had to use collective action to solve various problems related to agriculture, land management and unfavourable access to inputs.⁴ The FTLRP precipitated economic and political crisis in Zimbabwe characterised by a rapidly devaluating Zimbabwean dollar, inflation and high unemployment figures.⁵ This economic crisis affected new farmers who found it increasingly difficult to afford inputs and access loans. In the House of Assembly, the Joint Committee on Lands, Land reform, Resettlement, Agriculture and Public Service reported that, farmers were complaining about general shortage of inputs on the open market, especially fertilizer and chemicals.⁶ The committee also informed the house that they were having problems in accessing bank loans due to lack of collateral security. As a result, the banks provided them small loans that did not cover their full operations.⁷ In short, the economic and political situation post-2000 in Zimbabwe required more collective action as new farmers battled to cope with various challenges. In response to these challenges, the new farmers formed social networks taking the form of farm level institutions such as farm irrigation and health committees.⁸ Unlike in the communal areas, most new farmers (in resettlement areas) could not depend on kinship ties for help: hence the reason for resorting to these social networks.

Training in Mashonaland Central Province of Zimbabwe”, *Asian Journal of Agricultural Extension, Economics & Sociology*, 4, 4 (2015), 317-324.

³ Chiweshe, “Farm Level Institutions in Emergent Communities in Post Fast Track Zimbabwe: Case of Mazowe District.”

⁴ Matondi, *Zimbabwe’s Fast Track Land Reform*, 210.

⁵ A lot of scholarship on the Zimbabwe crisis exist. See for instance, B. Raftopoulos, “The Crises in Zimbabwe, 1998- 2008” in B. Raftopoulos and A. Mlambo (eds), *Becoming Zimbabwe: A History of Zimbabwe from the Pre-Colonial Period to 2008* (Harare: Weaver Press, 2009); Bond and Manyanya, *Zimbabwe’s Plunge: Exhausted Nationalism, Neoliberalism, and the Search for Social Justice*; B. Raftopoulos and I. Phimister, “Zimbabwe now: The Political Economy of Crisis and Coersion”, *Historical Materialism*, 12, 4, (2004) and R. Primorac and S. Chan (eds.), *Zimbabwe in Crisis: The International Response and the Space of Silence* (London: Routledge, 2007).

⁶ *Parliamentary Debates*, (8 March 2007), Col.1678, Joint Committee on Lands, Land Reform, Resettlement and Agriculture and Public Service.

⁷ *Ibid*, 1676.

⁸ Chiweshe, “Farm Level Institutions in Emergent Communities in Post Fast Track Zimbabwe: Case of Mazowe District”, ii.

Due to several factors, the FTLRP was not given adequate financial support by the government. This lack of support included the fact that most of the newly resettled peasants had largely failed to secure loans from commercial banks because they did not have title deeds over the land on which they were resettled, and thus could not use it as collateral. Therefore, with no security of tenure on the farms, banks were reluctant to extend loans to the new farmers, many of whom did not have much experience in commercial farming, nor assets to provide alternative collateral for any borrowed money. As such, the new farmers struggled to get inputs, access to tools, labour and access to information about agriculture. As a coping mechanism, farmers came up with ways of mitigating the impact by sharing productive tools and information and by pursuing any available avenues of cooperation amongst themselves.

New farmers in Mashonaland Central Province were mostly from the communal areas in the province but a sizeable number were also from urban centres like Harare and Bindura. A common denominator amongst these farmers were serious agrarian problems in terms of production and marketing as well as social issues such as theft and illness. Consequently, they tried to address these challenges through the formation of informal organisations such as farmer groups. Chiweshe cites the example of A1 farmers in the province who “have resisted processes of dehumanisation by a state which has had negligible means to provide support, a private sector which was highly sceptical of their farming capacities and a donor community which did not recognise their legitimacy at all.”⁹ For him, the community of A1 farmers in the province “exist under pronounced social, political and economic marginalisation.”¹⁰ A regional think tank reporting in *The Tribune* newspaper declared that “the land is now in the hands of new small scale farmer occupants, there are no support measures to help them get going and there is no rural development program or any kind that will provide an adequate framework for this kind of small scale agriculture.”¹¹ In this light, the new farmers had to devise ways of making sense of their crises and created their own spaces to survive within a hostile environment characterised by lack of services and social infrastructure, droughts and a national political and economic crisis.

⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰ *Ibid.*

¹¹ “Agrarian Experts to Discuss Poverty Reduction”, *Tribune*, 24 May 2003.

5.2. Cooperation as Rooted in Communal Farming Traditions

Cooperation in the new farming landscape should also be understood as having roots and a long historical tradition from the communal farming sector. Thus, mutual assistance and cooperation amongst new farmers should not be seen as an idea that is completely alien to the new farmers but simply a rejuvenation of a system that is prevalent in the communal areas. Cooperation was also known to the cultural values of most of the new farmers and though foundations of help might have differed from communal areas, they were a continuity of what they had done in their areas of origin.¹² This was more so in the context of the challenges that they faced, which necessitated mutual cooperation. Thus, a majority of the new farmers were able to make use of the concept of *nhimbe* to deal with tasks that needed cooperation in their new farms.

In Muzarabani District, three farms, with about 115 beneficiaries' made effective use of the concept to deal with demands of tobacco harvesting and processing from 2013.¹³ The Committees of Seven of the three farms were able to pool together labour utilising a modified version of the *nhimbe* concept and they made use of an effective roster to make sure that all the people involved in the concept were adequately catered for.¹⁴ This proved to be very effective as the beneficiaries of the three farms were able to cultivate and harvest their fields on time and effectively because labour was available and well-coordinated. Little Fox Farm in Shamva, which was designated as an A1 scheme, also successfully adopted and made use of the *nhimbe* concept in 2012. Initially, they however, limited the utilisation of such labour to only three hectares per farmer and only on tobacco fields.¹⁵ By so doing, the new farmers were able to take care of their tobacco crop and eliminated the hassles of labour acquisition.¹⁶ Henry Muziva, one such beneficiary of this system in Little Fox Farm, maintained that ever since they introduced *nhimbe* from 2012, he had averted the difficulties of searching for labour which he experienced in the four previous years since he had started growing tobacco.¹⁷ He actually claimed that, because of the huge successes the Little Fox farmers

¹² Chiweshe, Farm Level Institutions in Emergent Communities in Post Fast Track Zimbabwe: Case of Mazowe District, 50.

¹³ Interview with Tendai Rugare, Muzarabani District, 23 November 2017.

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Interview with Godfrey Phiri, Shamva, 28 October 2017.

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ Interview with Henry Muziva, Little Fox Farm, Shamva District, 9 December, 2017.

realised from the concept, they expanded the acreage they used such labour from 3 hectares to 6 hectares per farmer in 2015.¹⁸

Edknowledge Mandikwaza maintains that *nhimbe* has boundless potential to promote sustainable peace and community cohesion-building as well as promoting the process of working together and developing a sense of family and community.¹⁹ He also argues that “societal conflicts, tensions and problems are diffused, and some conflicts are resolved as people participate in *nhimbés*.”²⁰ Indeed, in the two cases cited above, the *nhimbe* concept managed to improve relations amongst the new farmers. Although there were reports of minor disputes arising amongst them, what is important is the fact that the majority of farmers involved agree that there were improvements in their conflict resolution abilities and production.²¹

5.3. Kinship Ties and Cooperation

Some forms of cooperation in the resettlement areas in Mashonaland Central Province became long lasting relationships borne out of the need to share farming resources. More broadly, Moyo *et al* noted that there were various types of associative networks that were emerging from within the newly redistributed areas, while others already existent in communal areas were also being replicated on A1 farms. Such organisations included farmers associations, women’s organisations and religious (church) groups.²² The villagised system of residence for A1 and subdivision of big farms in to A2 model meant constant interaction of people, unlike before when farmers lived on their farms alone. Hence most of the new farmers are forced by circumstances to interact, so relationships have mutated and evolved among them. In her thesis, Sinclair observed that after living more than ten years, neighbours spoke over the fences, in the evenings or visited one another.²³ In most cases, these relationships arose out of the need for people to unite for a common cause such as building a

¹⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁹ E. Mandikwaza “Utilising a Traditional Practice in Community Peacebuilding”, <https://accord.org.za/conflict-trends/nhimbe/>

²⁰ *Ibid.*

²¹ About three quarters of the farmers in the two respective areas attest to this. The increased acreage of land utilising such labour is also testimony to its success.

²² Moyo, *et al*, *Fast Track Land Reform Baseline Survey in Zimbabwe: Trends and Tendencies, 2005/06*, 151.

²³ L. Sinclair-Bright, “This Land: Politics, Authority and Morality after Land Reform in Zimbabwe” (PhD, University of Edinburgh, 2016), 95.

clinic, or the sharing of everyday implements. The households on these farms turned from being strangers to neighbours over the past years. The loss of old kinship support meant that people are forming new relationships based on friendship and trust.²⁴

In Guruve, Bindura, Mazowe, Shamva and Centenary, there is ample evidence of totemic connections that were utilised effectively to ensure cooperation.²⁵ In three farms in Guruve; Hilton Farm, Codelberry Farm and Berries Farm, about 17 new farmers who identify themselves with the *Nzou Samanyanga* (elephant) totemic group, formed a marketing and producers association group called Mhukahuru Producers Association.²⁶ The group had three major responsibilities. The first was to assist its members of the *Nzou* totem to market their produce by pooling together resources for transportation. The second was to assist each other with labour in times of demand. The third was to assist each other in times of misfortunes especially bereavement.²⁷ The group met regularly to update each other on any relevant news pertaining to their farming activities and they made effective use of social media platforms like Whatsapp where they had a very active Whatsapp group.²⁸

Almost all members of the Mhukahuru Producers Association attested to the usefulness of their association in aiding their farming operations. Mavis Katsvere, who was in her final year of teacher training at Morgan Zintec Teacher Training College, recalled an interesting story regarding the role played by the Association in her life and farming activities. Her husband, who belonged to the association, passed away in October 2013. The association took care of all the funeral arrangements and expenses and they assisted her with all the outstanding work on her plot and minor operational debts that her husband had accrued.²⁹ She

²⁴ Chiweshe, “Farm Level Institutions in Emergent Communities in Post Fast Track Zimbabwe: Case of Mazowe District”, 126.

²⁵ Totems (*mutupo*) have been in use among the Shona and Ndebele to identify the different clans. Up to as many as 25 different totems can be identified among the Shona. People of the same clan use a common set of totems. Totems are usually animals and body parts. Examples of animal totems include *Shiri/Hungwe* (Fish Eagle), *Mhofu/Mhofu Yemukono/Musiyamwa* (Eland), *Mbizi/Tembo* (Zebra), *Shumba* (Lion), *Mbeva/Hwesa/Katerere* (Mouse), *Soko* (Monkey), *Nzou* (Elephant), *Ngwena* (crocodile), and *Dziva* (Hippo). Examples of body part totems include *Gumbo* (leg), *Moyo* (heart), and *Bepe* (lung). People of the same totem are the descendants of one common ancestor (the founder of that totem) and thus are not allowed to marry or have an intimate relationship. The totems cross regional groupings and therefore provide a wall for development of ethnicism among the Shona groups.

²⁶ Interview with Roderick Mhasvi, Guruve Centre. 12 November, 20017. Most of the people in Mashonaland Central are identified with elephant totem.

²⁷ *Ibid.*

²⁸ *Ibid.*

²⁹ Interview with Mavis Katsvere, Guruve Centre, 12 November 2017.

was also made a member of the Association in place of her husband and the Association lent her money to pay for her college fees.³⁰ Thus in Shona culture and tradition, in the absence of blood relatives, a person with the same totem can play important roles in ceremonies related to illness, marriage, death, mutual assistance and emotional support. Totemic relations were very important in building social networks among new farmers. Matondi cites how over the few years the issue of totems has become a powerful signifier of identity for people in the resettlement areas.³¹ According to *Shona* custom, people sharing the same totem see each other as relatives; they are socially connected and are obliged to help each other. At Leed Farm, the Chairperson of the Committee of Seven confirmed to having a group of six A1 farmers who were of the *Shumba* (lion) totem assisting each other in the preparation of fields and in planting.³² Michael Kangi also highlighted how he felt the obligation to assist the widowed neighbouring A2 farmer, Rudo Gwarwirwa because she shared the same totem as his late mother, who was of the *Shava* totem. He indicated how he shared a bond with her that was so strong that it obliged him to assist her whenever the need arose. In the many resettlement areas in Mashonaland Central, in the absence of blood-based kinship ties, totemic relations became important in strengthening relations in the farms.³³

There were also key kinship relations that were nurtured and cultivated during the land invasions, and these have provided farmers with sources of social support in the new areas they inhabited. In such instances, farmers coming from diverse backgrounds found themselves in the middle of a very violent and unstable situation. They were thus compelled by such situations to find strength in each other. In many instances, these relations mutated into very strong bonds that have survived the violent period and have become important bases on which to build social networks. Four farmers in Shamva district occupied an abandoned farm house during the land invasions in 2001. The four of them came from very different backgrounds. One is a war veteran from Bindura, the other a headmaster from Mount Darwin, a soldier from Harare, and another a peasant farmer from Chiweshe. During the land invasions, they shared everything from food to basic commodities like blankets and even offered each other moral support in times of great difficulties.³⁴ The four have created a very

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ Matondi, *Zimbabwe's Fast Track Land Reform*, 57.

³² Interview with Nicholas Bhinya, Leed Farm, Bindura District 23 December 2017.

³³ Chiweshe, "Farm Level Institutions in Emergent Communities in Post Fast Track Zimbabwe: Case of Mazowe District", 75.

³⁴ Interview with Conrad Nzveru, Shamva, 12 November 2017.

strong bond that culminated in the formation of a well constituted and registered partnership based on mutual cooperation.³⁵ The partnership called Kuwirirana Farmers Trust, focussed its attention on sunflower and groundnuts production. The four partners each had a cooking oil-extracting machine and they extracted and packaged cooking oil from the sunflower and groundnuts. They even developed their own registered brand of cooking oil, which they sold mostly to shops in the province.³⁶ Indeed, Matondi concludes that participation in *jambanja* fostered close relationships, and this shared history continued to shape interactions.³⁷

Another important point is the fact that the origins of most new farmers helped in fostering relationships. For example, those from urban areas tended to quickly foster associations because of common origin and they had the same way of life and same way of doing things. Those from communal areas also used their common relationships to foster interactions.³⁸ In Shamva District, for example, new farmers who came from Rushinga, a rural area in Mashonaland Central Province, identified themselves with an organisation called Rushinga Plot Owners Association. As the name suggests, a farmer had to originally come from Rushinga in order to belong to this group.³⁹ Like other groups in the province, the group also offers support in information dissemination and technical support in times of need. In Centenary, new farmers from Masvingo also congregated around one informal group whose common denominator was having originally come from Masvingo province. In 2015, the group had about 89 active members in the district all of whom were either A1 or A2 plot owners.⁴⁰ These new farmers assisted each other in terms of ploughing and sharing knowledge and transport, especially transporting produce. These relationships were being fostered based on their shared existence and their desire for a successful agricultural production.⁴¹

Religion has become a key element around which farmers nurtured cooperation amongst themselves. Religion is a strong basis for social relationships and social networking as it offers people a rallying point and a common foundation to start relating with each other, especially when they are strangers. Scoones *et al*, have noted that “religion and church

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ Matondi, *Zimbabwe's Fast Track Land Reform*, 224.

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ Interview with Moreblessing Pasi, Shamva, 24 November, 2017.

⁴⁰ Interview with Gilbert Hove, Centenary, 2 November, 2017.

⁴¹ Matondi, *Zimbabwe's Fast Track Land Reform*, 225.

affiliation have emerged as a vital component in the construction of social relations and networks on the new resettlements.”⁴² As some new farmers were generally resource poor, they ended up creating or joining various institutions that offered a better sense of belonging, including religious groups. Murisa, in his case study of Goromonzi District in Mashonaland East, showed that approximately more than 50 percent of A1 land beneficiaries belonged to a farmers group.⁴³ Religion was critical in building social capital among newly resettled farmers and mainstream churches such as Roman Catholic, Methodist and Anglican, existed alongside numerous apostolic churches in the resettled areas of Mashonaland Central province. The role of the church can be critical in promoting peace and good relations, which may minimise cases of intolerance and violence.⁴⁴ Despite their theological differences, they played an essential role in promoting cohesion among the newly resettled households.⁴⁵ Church affiliation was an important source of labour, as farmers pooled labour based on it. In Concession, the Apostolic Church tended to dominate amongst the new farmers in the area. They used them effectively as outposts of effective sharing of agriculture ideas as well as providing each other with support in times of need. Their shared beliefs also made management of sacred days much easier. Matondi notes that, in Mazowe district, religious groupings offered social networking space in which most A1 farmers in the resettlement areas belonged to a church or loose religious grouping called apostolic faith churches, which greatly influenced and aided social relations and cooperation.⁴⁶ The dominance and use of the Apostolic Churches as key organisations to promote cooperation amongst the resettled farmers was also observed in Mvurwi, Shamva and Centenary Districts.

In Bindura and Mazowe Districts a lot of women in the resettlement areas utilised the church to form micro finance schemes. These schemes were essentially a type of informal credit-rotating association in which a group of people entered into an agreement to contribute a fixed amount of money to a common pool on a weekly or monthly basis or as frequently as

⁴² Scoones, *et al*, *Zimbabwe's Land Reform: Myths and Realities*.

⁴³ Murisa, “Local Farmer Groups and Collective Action within Fast Track Land Reform in Zimbabwe”, 243.

⁴⁴ Matondi, *Zimbabwe's Fast Track Land Reform*, 230.

⁴⁵ M. W. T. Chibwana, “Social Policy Outcomes of Zimbabwe's Fast Track Land Reform Programme: A Case Study of Kwekwe District” (PhD, University of South Africa, 2016), 202.

⁴⁶ Chiweshe “Farm Level Institutions in Emergent Communities in Post Fast Track Zimbabwe: Case of Mazowe District”, 104.

the members agreed upon.⁴⁷ Most of these schemes are organised around people of the same class who share similar challenges, making them a platform for solidarity and shared learning. One such scheme in Bindura District, created by women who are members of the Roman Catholic Church, was so successful that they initiated a scheme to import for each member, a second hand truck from Japan to alleviate the perennial problems of transporting their produce.⁴⁸ Another initiative was started by women belonging to the Evangelical Church of Zimbabwe in Shamva who used the church's wide network to recruit more than 87 women into a micro finance scheme called the Ebenezer Women's Foundation.⁴⁹ The members used the financial resources they pooled together to buy inputs as fertilisers and seed, especially in times when the government failed to do so.⁵⁰ The financial resources from this group also enabled some members of the scheme to acquire livestock, household groceries and other productive assets. In Mvurwi District, a groundnut growing and peanut butter making project was started by the Roman Catholic Church for women in the district in 2013. It had 39 members drawn from both A1 and A2 schemes in the district.⁵¹ The church provided the women with groundnut seeds and one small peanut butter making machine per member, plus 200 empty containers each for the packaging of the peanut butter. They were also provided with information on the market and other expertise needed in the production of groundnut by an expert hired by the church.⁵²

Dekker and Barr argue that despite official insistence on maximising production, the immediate concern of many resettled households was to forge new social relations. For the two, this is because the social composition of the "communities" in which the new farmers found themselves in was "markedly different from communal areas, in that kinship relations were largely absent, and settlers also lacked access to organisations with a broader mobilising platform such as the ZFU."⁵³ They cite majority cases, were people who are strangers to one another, in the absence of pre-existing ties and forms of traditional leadership, invested in

⁴⁷ In a number of interviews I conducted in these districts, seems more than half of women are affiliated to these schemes.

⁴⁸ Interview with Beatrice Maredza, Bindura Town, 17 November 2017.

⁴⁹ Interview with Mary Mukunda, Shamva Town, 7 November 2017.

⁵⁰ Ibid.

⁵¹ Interview with Mildred Moyo, Mvurwi, 4 October 2017.

⁵² Ibid.

⁵³ M. Dekker, "Sustainability and Resourcefulness: Support Networks During periods of stress", *World Development Journal*, 32, 10 (2004), 1735-51 and A. Barr, "Forging Effective New Communities: The Evolution of Civil Society in Zimbabwean Resettlement Villages", *World Development*, 32, 10. (2005), 1753-1766.

new social relations by creating new local organisations.⁵⁴ The social synergies thus created were utilised to improve production capacity, share risks and attend to other social obligations such as mobilising support during funerals and weddings.⁵⁵ These were key conclusions made by the two, and they applied to many instances of cooperation in the Province.

Poor social service provision from Rural Development Councils (RDCs) created a platform for cooperation among new farmers. After the FTLRP, RDCs stopped fulfilling their mandate of service provision in resettlement areas. This was partly due to the economic crisis. Thus, most of the roads in farms were in a bad state. In districts like Guruve and Centenary, some of the farms were not easy to access because of the poor state of the roads. In Bindura District, some new farmers raised concerns about the road network which, they argued, reduced marketing opportunities because transporting farm produce to the main markets was difficult. Large scale buyers who intended to buy at source found the farms inaccessible. The state of the road also limited potential public transport operators who might have interest in servicing the people on the farms. Some new farmers complained that the RDCs collected levies but did nothing to improve infrastructure in resettlement areas. It is because of such challenges that some new farmers took the initiative to cooperate in fixing the roads that serviced their areas.

Even in school related projects, there was some level of cooperation among the new farmers. At Zvakwana Farm during the hyperinflationary period, new farmers used to pool money for the upkeep of their teachers.⁵⁶ Officially, new resettlement schools were referred to as Fast Track schools. They were also referred to as “satellite” schools as they were attached to or regarded as extensions of already established nearby schools for administrative purposes. In all cases, the schools were unregistered, and therefore had limited access to official support.⁵⁷ Where no such infrastructure existed, new farmers erected pole and dagga, grass-thatched

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*

⁵⁶ Interview with Tendai Mwale, Zvakwana Farm, 7 November 2017.

⁵⁷ O, Mavhundutse, “Emerging Teacher Education Needs as a Result of Land Reform in Zimbabwe: A Focus on New Resettlement Areas”, *Academic Research International*, 3, 2 (2012), 299.

classrooms.⁵⁸ Districts like Bindura, Shamva, Guruve and Muzarabani had such schools constructed by the new farmers.

5.4. Gender and Cooperation in the new Farming Landscape

Women in Mashonaland Central Province negotiated their own spaces to meet, organise, share and discuss challenges they encountered in the new agriculture landscape. A majority of these forms of cooperation emerged as a result of the gendered nature of struggles that women encountered which have been discussed in Chapter Four. What is important to note is the fact that these forums were not only gendered (women only) but also class-based. A very good example was that of Malvern Farm in Bindura where there is a women's club called Maoko Kushanda that had more than 27 members most of whom were either land beneficiaries or wives of plot holders. Farm workers or wives of farm workers were however, not allowed to be members of this group.⁵⁹ There were also a number of women's clubs in the province such as the Chimurenga Women's club in Shamva, the Imbamukadzi Cooperative in Guruve and the Fieldstone Cooperative in Concession, that were organised by the ZANU PF Women's League. The Chimurenga Women's Club in Shamva was officially launched in October 2013, with a membership of 34 women.⁶⁰ It was responsible for the promotion of market gardening among the women land beneficiaries as well as wives of A1 and A2 farmers in the area. The idea was conceived by Nyarai Besa, the wife of Henry Besa of Wildale Farm, one of the A2 farmers in the area.⁶¹ The club also enjoyed the patronage of the then Vice President, Joyce Mujuru, who provided it with starting capital of US\$9,600. The club promoted the production of half an acre of butternuts, half an acre of cabbages, and a portion of other crops like tomatoes and carrots. The women were also provided transport to the market, mostly Mbare Musika and Hatcliffe Market by another A2 farmer who was paid a token fee for the services.⁶² The club, however, collapsed with the ouster of Joyce Mujuru

⁵⁸ P. J. Mavhunga and C. Mazodze, Quality of Educational Provision in Fast Track Resettlement Schools in Zimbabwe: A Case Study Chiwodza Primary School, *European Scientific Journal*, 1, 21 (2014).

⁵⁹ Interview with Melody Pachedu, Bindura Town, 23 December 2017.

⁶⁰ Constitution of the Chimurenga Women's Club, accessed from one of the former members, Moria Murisa, Shamva, 12 December 2017.

⁶¹ Interview with Moria Murisa, Shamva, 12 December 2017.

⁶² Ibid.

from ZANU PF and government at the end of 2015. The club only managed to linger for six months until eventual collapse in March of the next year.⁶³

The Imbamukadzi Cooperative in Guruve was another women's cooperative group started in 2012 for the purposes of groundnut production.⁶⁴ It had a membership of 13, made up of seven A1 farmers and six wives of A1 plot owners. The cooperative had three machines for the processing of the groundnuts into peanut butter and made use of one of the work sheds on one of the plots at Kanjiri Farm in Guruve as its workshop.⁶⁵ All the 13 members cultivated groundnuts on one and half acres of land per member and took turns to process and package the peanut butter.⁶⁶ In September, 2014, the cooperative also acquired a new cooking oil processing machine and its members embarked on sunflower production during the next cropping season in 2015. The cooking oil was mostly sold at Guruve Centre in one of the members' small shop and the individual members would also sell them at their own plots. Plans to package the oil were not successful due to cash flow problems.⁶⁷ Elsewhere in Mashonaland East, another prominent farmer, Samuel Karimazondo, urged resettled farmers to form clubs and he assisted women in resettlement to embark on groundnut farming.⁶⁸ A group of women in Guruve were contracted by Delta Breweries to grow millet in 2011.⁶⁹ This shows the gendered nature of crop choices that were allocated to women groups because traditionally these crops have largely been grown by women on small pieces of land usually adjacent to the family's main fields.

Outside of agriculture and active political mobilisation, these clubs were also involved in activities such as sewing and cooking classes. Among the important issues that they involved themselves in were sexual education, condom use, and maternal health and HIV issues. Chiweshe describes such a focus on these issues as being informed by "patriarchal definitions of what women are supposed to be doing" as they do not "question gender relations as they mutate within the fast track farms" but rather concentrate on improving the "wife by

⁶³ Ibid.

⁶⁴ Interview with Jocelyn Chiga, Guruve Centre, 12 October 2017.

⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁶ Attempts to get the approximate quantities of peanut produced by this cooperative were not successful as there is no record of production kept by the cooperative.

⁶⁷ Ibid.

⁶⁸ "Marondera A2 farmers to Meet", *The Herald*, 26 January 2005.

⁶⁹ Focus group interview, Guruve Centre, 3 November 2017.

enhancing her household skills.”⁷⁰ While gender relations were rarely directly contested, women found ways to carve out spaces without necessarily upsetting the prevailing patriarchal system.⁷¹

However, gender was an important organising element in the resettlement areas and women effectively participated in cooperative schemes that also aided production. They were, however, marginalised by a patriarchal system that relegated their role and efforts to the margins and thus undermining their contribution on the farms. Women tended to be side-lined to nominal positions such as secretaries. For example, the Committees of Seven were mostly made up of males with a few females included who were supposed to cater for women’s issues. By and large, women were regularly side-lined to women’s clubs and not farm management structures. They were thus few cases of women who were actively involved in farm management.

5.5. Assessing Associations/ Organisations of Cooperation amongst New Farmers

It is of paramount importance to note that the majority of the farmer groups and associations that were created in Mashonaland Central Province emerged in a context of very thin agricultural markets, a constrained state and isolation from the wider networks of civil society such as the larger farmer unions. Many of them focused not only on enhancing their productive capacity, but also, of necessity, engaged in complicated processes of negotiating for resources and support from state institutions. Although they significantly contributed towards easing farm production constraints through sourcing of inputs, pooling together labour and savings, they still face major challenges in establishing sustainable systems of production.⁷²

In the province, during the land occupation phase, fast track farms essentially became militarised zones as war veterans and youth groups controlled the movement of people in and out of the farms. Essentially, a majority of the war veterans had considerable authority, and this was projected mostly through the Committees of Seven, which undertook reconnaissance

⁷⁰ Chiweshe, “Farm Level Institutions in Emergent Communities in Post Fast Track Zimbabwe: Case of Mazowe District”, 209.

⁷¹ Ibid.

⁷² Murisa, “Local Farmer Groups and Collective Action within Fast Track Land Reform in Zimbabwe.”

on the farms. In addition, party meetings were held frequently and thus the politicisation of the newly resettled areas meant that all forms of associational life were based on or related to the party. The strong grip of ZANU PF on the fast track farms meant that farm level institutions were in the main being influenced by the party.⁷³ These local farmer groups tended to be somewhat isolated, and most of them were not linked to the larger associations operating at district, provincial and national levels. At least for the first ten years since the commencement of the FTLRP, most of these groups and associations still remained isolated from the national smallholders' farmers union, ZFU, national and international NGOs and other networks of civil society comprising a complex web of networks.⁷⁴

A key focus of most of these farmer groups was securing access to inputs such as seeds and fertilisers, which were in short supply as a result of the wider economic crisis in Zimbabwe since 2000. A majority of these farmer institutions and groups were composed of members who were voted into power, but this required a certain level of support among the plot holders. Those voted into various committees had control over certain power resources such as respect, more voice at meetings, meet visiting delegates from government and other organisations and ultimately control of farm assets (including farm equipment and even group finances of which they could take advantage). The leaders were given a collective voice to speak on behalf of the scheme or institution. In this way power inequalities were institutionalised and legitimised in the name of the common good.⁷⁵ Some groups organised the collective production of specialised crops such as wheat, while others arranged for the pooling of labour for certain key farming tasks, the shared use of farm assets such as tobacco curing barns, the hire of tractors and other equipment, and cooperative marketing. As mentioned earlier, motivations for the formation of these local farmer groups included defending newly acquired land rights in a context where the land tenure regime remained poorly defined.⁷⁶ More importantly, the farmer groups were formed in a context where not only the lineage framework was largely absent, but also where non-state actors such as NGOs

⁷³ Chiweshe, "Farm Level Institutions in Emergent Communities in Post Fast Track Zimbabwe: Case of Mazowe District", 147.

⁷⁴ Murisa, "Local Farmer Groups and Collective Action within Fast Track Land Reform in Zimbabwe."

⁷⁵ Chiweshe, "Farm Level Institutions in Emergent Communities in Post Fast Track Zimbabwe: Case of Mazowe District", 49.

⁷⁶ Murisa, "Local Farmer Groups and Collective Action within Fast Track Land Reform in Zimbabwe."

were hesitant to support these new farmers.⁷⁷ Most civic organisations were sceptical to offer help in the resettlement areas because they viewed them as “contested terrain.” Left to organise themselves, beneficiaries formed farmer groups and engaged in various collective action strategies aimed at gaining access to external resources and support, enhancing their productive capacity, and defending their newly acquired land rights.⁷⁸

Moyo cites a household survey of FTLRP beneficiaries in 2005/06, which found that approximately 26 percent of resettled A1 households belonged to local farmer groups.⁷⁹ Moyo also argues that these local associational forms served a variety of purposes and assumed a multitude of roles but were mostly formed in response to the negative effects of state policies and market penetration. In his view, collective action by farmers was most common where both the state and market had a strong presence, and least common where both were weakly represented.⁸⁰ Scoones *et al* make the observation that “social networks replicating those found in communal areas have emerged in various forms ... and these include work parties, funeral assistance and religious based interactions.”⁸¹ It is important to establish here that the scenario in Mashonaland Central Province, largely concur with Moyo and Scoones’ conclusions.

It is important to also acknowledge the influence of government officials like Agriculture extension officers in the creation of most of the farmer groups in the province. In Bindura District, for example, one such organisation at Bernridge Farm, Chimurenga Tobacco Growers Group, was formed at the instigation of Henry Musiiwa, the local extension officer from Bindura.⁸² Musiiwa assisted the group with registration and with the opening of a joint savings account with the Bindura branch of Agribank. Apart from focussing on acquiring farm inputs, the groups also introduced a savings scheme and successfully applied for a short term loan from their bank.⁸³ Another group, Madziwa Farmers Trust, in Shamva, was also assisted to process its registration by the local extension officer of the area. Its existence was, however, short-lived as it fell victim to hyperinflation which harmed its savings accounts it

⁷⁷ K. D. Helliker, “Dancing Around the Same Spot? Land Reform and NGOs in Zimbabwe – Case of SOS Children’s Villages”, *African Sociological Review*, 13, 2 (2009), 118.

⁷⁸ Murisa, Local Farmer Groups and Collective Action within Fast Track Land Reform in Zimbabwe.”

⁷⁹ Moyo, *et al*, *Fast Track Land Reform survey: Trends and Tendencies, 2005/06*.

⁸⁰ Murisa, “Local Farmer Groups and Collective Action within Fast Track Land Reform in Zimbabwe.”

⁸¹ Scoones, *et al*, *Zimbabwe’s Land Reform: Myths and Realities*.

⁸² Interview with Lloyd Mambo, Bernridge Farm, Bindura District, 23 November 2017.

⁸³ *Ibid*.

had maintained with Agribank.⁸⁴ Of importance, however, is the fact that funds from these initiatives were effectively used by members for several social functions and farm investments. Agrippah Phiri, from Chimurenga Tobacco Growers Group, was able to buy a water pump and irrigation equipment, while Maureen Mutenda of Madziwa Farm Trust was able to successfully pay for her three daughters' university fees.⁸⁵

Murimimunhu Association in Guruve emerged out of the need to harness the requisite skills required in tobacco growing for its 24 members.⁸⁶ The association organised the hiring of specialised labour for activities such as the treatment and transfer of seedlings and the curing of tobacco on behalf of its members. It also coordinated the joint use of productive assets such as tobacco curing barns and grading sheds.⁸⁷ The group, formed in 2006, had a deal with a contracting company from where its members received tobacco farming inputs. The establishment of the association was also led by the Extension Officer of the district and he encouraged them to make effective use of an irrigation system that was left by the previous white farmer with the capacity to irrigate 550 hectares of the 630 hectares within the farm.⁸⁸ The association was successful in its operations and most of its members acquired new tractors, built new tobacco barns and constructed houses for their workers. They also managed to construct a two block primary school in the area.⁸⁹

The Green Acres Irrigation Scheme Cooperative in Centenary was formally established in 2005, and was mostly made up of beneficiaries on the former large-scale farm of Green Acres. Unlike the three associations discussed above, this cooperative was established at the urging of the first occupants of the farm. Initially it was called First Occupiers Irrigation Scheme, to identify itself with the first occupants of the farm who were its members, but it later changed its name to Green Acres as it admitted other members who were not necessarily first occupants of the farm.⁹⁰ The constitution of the cooperative states that its mandate was “to improve the lives of the members by increasing production at the farm through the

⁸⁴ Interview with Denford Banda, Shamva Town, 18 December, 2017.

⁸⁵ Interview with Maureen Mutenda, Shamva Town, 18 December, 2017 and Interview with Agrippah Phiri, Bernridge Farm, Bindura District 23 November, 2017.

⁸⁶ Interview with Moses Chendambuya, Guruve Centre, 6 November, 2017.

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*

⁹⁰ Interview with Bernard Mukupe, Centenary, 7 December 2017.

effective use of the irrigation system.”⁹¹ Manfred Danga, a member of the cooperative, stated that the creation of the scheme was motivated by the need to ensure fair access to irrigation equipment.⁹² Danga further asserted that their cooperative enabled them “to maximise production and to effectively make the best use of the meagre resources available to [them].”⁹³

In 2003, the A1 beneficiaries at Willdale Farm in Concession came together to form Zuvarabuda Farmers’ Cooperative to ensure fair and prime usage of inherited irrigation equipment through joint production of tobacco.⁹⁴ Although the cooperative faced various operational challenges emanating from “weak leadership, limited participation of the members in the daily affairs of the group and weak government support,” it managed to restore the heavily damaged irrigation equipment on the farm and to reconstruct the derelict tobacco barns.⁹⁵ By 2007, almost all of its members had managed to secure at least a new tractor and truck. In 2010, the cooperative also entered into contract with a local tobacco contractor which was still operational in 2017.⁹⁶ The biggest challenge that faced the cooperative outside of the economic challenges like the hyperinflationary environment between 2005 and 2008 was jostling for positions amongst the members. This was accompanied by accusations of embezzlement of funds. The Secretary of the cooperative was also accused of being a member of the opposition MDC in a protracted battle with one of the cooperative members. This accusation resulted in him resigning from his position in 2015.⁹⁷ Thus the cooperative was on the receiving end of a fair share of political interference from the local war veterans and ZANU PF leadership. It also did not escape the scrutiny of the provincial party leadership who, in 2015, initiated a wholesale reshuffle of its committee.⁹⁸

At Careers Rest Farm in Shamva District, 32 A1 farmers started an irrigation scheme, which went a long way to resuscitate the irrigation network on the farm.⁹⁹ Their efforts were, however, derailed when a neighbouring A2 farmer and ZANU PF bigwig, Nicholas Goche,

⁹¹ The Constitution of Green Acres Irrigation Scheme Cooperative, p.1

⁹² Interview with Manfred Danga, Centenary, 23 October 2017.

⁹³ Ibid.

⁹⁴ Interview with William Ndongwa, Concession, 4 December 2017.

⁹⁵ Ibid.

⁹⁶ Ibid.

⁹⁷ Ibid.

⁹⁸ Ibid.

⁹⁹ Interview Nyamidzi, Careers Rest Farm, Shamva District, 7 November, 2017.

forcefully fenced off the dam from where the irrigation scheme was accessing its water.¹⁰⁰ The scheme stopped operating for over a year and was only resuscitated after successful intervention by another politician from the province.¹⁰¹ Three other farmers in the area of Shamva also had a thriving irrigation scheme from where they had put over four hectares each for the production of butternuts and green mealies. Their only perennial challenge was to find markets for their products as they mostly depended on selling their produce in Mbare Musika in Harare or in the back of an old truck on the streets of Shamva town.¹⁰² A key denominator among most of these irrigation schemes is how they organised field days. They utilised them as critical spaces for sharing knowledge and information, showcasing the latest farming technology, comparing farmer production, performance trends, rewarding hard working farmers and encouraging those lagging behind.

Politics of patronage also went a long way in influencing the manner in which new farmers in the province cooperated amongst themselves. As Mkodzongi observes, ZANU PF patronage networks operated in complex ways while being influenced by a plethora of factors such as ethnicity, class and intra-party factional politics.¹⁰³ He further posit that the relationship between ordinary people and ZANU PF structures was dynamic and influenced by prevailing factional politics pitting ZANU PF politicians against each other.¹⁰⁴ In Mashonaland Central province, the key manner in which ZANU PF politics played themselves out was in the factional battles that involved one of the province's most senior politicians, the then Vice President, Joice Mujuru, which subsequently resulted in her ousting from the party. She had formed strong networks at grassroots levels, and her ouster split the party as she had loyalists at every level. More than half of the cabinet ministers who were aligned to her were either suspended or ousted with her. Against these intra party conflicts, the farmers in Mashonaland Central had to align themselves appropriately so that they would access inputs for agriculture. This saw the reconfiguration of relations as some of the new farmers tried to distance themselves from well-known Mujuru allies. Even some associations which had been created at the instigation of Joice Mujuru had to reconfigure themselves or face collapse. In

¹⁰⁰ Ibid.

¹⁰¹ Ibid.

¹⁰² Interview with Enock Kamutsenza, Corner Farm, Shamva, 8 November 2017.

¹⁰³ G. Mkodzongi, "I am a Paramount Chief, this Land Belongs to my Ancestors": The Reconfiguration of Rural Authority after Zimbabwe's Land Reforms", *Review of African Political Economy* 43, 1 (2015).

¹⁰⁴ Ibid.

Matepatepa commercial farming area, under Bindura District, more than six farmer organisations that had been created with the help of the Member of Parliament, Musanhi, a well-known Mujuru ally, collapsed.¹⁰⁵ In Shamva, two irrigation schemes that had been initiated by Nicholas Goche, also collapsed when he was expelled from ZANU PF.¹⁰⁶

The major reason for the collapse of many of the groups and schemes that were formed or supported by politicians was the fact that there were explicitly political institutions at the farm level that mainly acted as the vanguard of ZANUPF within the fast track farms.¹⁰⁷ For example, party cells began at grassroots level and were very active in almost all the resettled areas of Mashonaland Central province. These party structures were not initiated by farmers but formed an important part of their lives within the farms. To further compound the situation, the farmers felt that they owed their possession of land to ZANU PF and, unfortunately, the party was forever reminding them of this, especially during elections. The party thus imposed in these areas strong party structures that ensured that they maintained their rural support base.¹⁰⁸

A key focus of collective action by local farmer groups on these farms was to improve the productive capacity of the land reform beneficiaries. This was not, however, the sole objective of these local farmer groups and cooperatives – they also defended the land rights of their members, and attempted to remain visible to government departments, their main source of material support.¹⁰⁹ Farmers in the province were also actively involved in labour pooling. However, labour-pooling remained poorly managed and female members saw themselves as contributing more labour than their male counterparts contributed. The failure to coordinate this activity effectively caused rifts in the groups and loss of production capacity.¹¹⁰ Although there were obvious advantages of cooperation within local farmer groups, a number of challenges were experienced by FTLRP beneficiaries in these cases. Although local farmer groups emerged on almost every A1 settlement, they were not

¹⁰⁵ Interview with Clever Chimusoro, Marston Farm, Bindura District, 23 December 2017.

¹⁰⁶ Interview with Gregory Mutema, Shamva Town, 17 December 2017.

¹⁰⁷ Chiweshe, “Farm Level Institutions in Emergent Communities in Post Fast Track Zimbabwe: Case of Mazowe District”, 157.

¹⁰⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁹ Murisa, “Local Farmer Groups and Collective Action within Fast Track Land Reform in Zimbabwe”, 1162.

¹¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 1164.

necessarily an adequate response to the constraints faced by the newly resettled farmers.¹¹¹ However, it should be acknowledged that they played a significant role to operations by the new farmers especially under the difficult economic circumstances that bedevilled the Zimbabwean economy. Their emergence was a critical intervention in the survival of the newly resettled communities. In most cases, the local farmer groups contributed to improving the accessibility of inputs and reduced the cost of individuals visiting the local distribution centres. The synergies derived from collective action made it easier for those who otherwise would not have been able to afford the numerous visits to such centres. Members indicated that belonging to a group lessened the burden of individually obtaining inputs, although they still faced delays in terms of access to the inputs.¹¹²

5.6. Role of the State in Promoting Cooperation

The role played by the state in promoting cooperation amongst and with new farmers can be understood better if due regard is given to how the state perceived the new farmers. By and large, the state considered the new farmers as a potential electorate that could help ZANU PF to stay in power against opposition parties. The new farmers were, therefore, seen by the ruling party as a political weapon to thwart any possible opposition to its rule, which it rhetorically regarded as “representatives of the colonial order.” At least in the eyes of the government, such representatives were the opposition parties, especially the MDC led by Morgan Tsvangirai.¹¹³ To some extent, the new farmers were largely seen as political players and not economic ones and that shaped the manner in which the government dealt with them. Most of the interactions between the state and the new farmers were managed through ZANU PF cell and ward structures and, given the grip that the party had in the resettlement areas, this also became another conduit through which cooperation amongst new farmers was also facilitated.

Through such structures, many of the new farmers contributed towards rallies and organise national events such as Independence Day Celebrations. These events were highly politicised after 2000 and these structures were active during the period before elections. Such interactions tended to extend beyond the political arena into the farming domain where the

¹¹¹ *Ibid.*

¹¹² Murisa, “An Analysis of Emerging Forms of Social Organisation and Agency in the Aftermath of “Fast track” Land Reform in Zimbabwe”, 279.

¹¹³ Refer to chapter two for more discussion on this subject.

farmers utilised the party structure to manage cooperation with each other.¹¹⁴ Thus the new farmers dealt with the state as actors' conscious of the relationship and networks that benefitted them in social, economic and political ways. For example, for a majority of the farmers, voting ZANU PF was perceived as a political investment guaranteeing continued residence on the farms. This was because of the widespread belief (propagated and supported by ZANU PF itself) that, if they lost power, white farmers would return to the farms.¹¹⁵ The new farmers were also largely resource poor and conscious of their dependency on the state and thus found it difficult to be productive if they worked in isolation from it. In many instances there were patronage tendencies when distributing government support and institutions like Arex and GMB after 2000 began to behave like an extended political arm of ZANU PF. Thus, collective action towards political and economic goals by the new farmers must be understood in relation to their insecure status concerning land. The way the new farmers related to the state was "in most cases not a by-product of high levels of trust amongst farmers but a necessary investment to keep their land."¹¹⁶

The ZANU PF party since 2000 successfully used the threat of farm eviction to ensure that new farmers voted for it and were largely compliant in the way they engaged with the state. However, new farmers sometimes had their own ways of manipulating the system and took advantage of it. A majority of the farmers were aware of the fact that the government needed them, especially during elections. As such, they utilised such periods to make collective demands. For example, a group of 81 A1 farmers was settled at a farm in Bindura district since 2000. Up to the time of fieldwork in 2017 none of them had offer letters. For the group, the Ministry of Lands would not take steps to evict them because "their issue is known by the chiefs who also want us to vote for them."¹¹⁷ The politicians therefore, saw these farmers and their families as a potential electoral base. This is, however, not to say that all these farmers would vote for ZANU PF. During an informal discussion with one new farmer, he indicated that, when it came to voting, a majority of them were wise enough to exercise free will. He

¹¹⁴ However, this doesn't necessarily follow that they all end up voting for ZANU PF. Matondi shows some trends of voting patterns in resettlement areas. In his findings, he discovered that the votes had swung to the opposition party MDC. For more see, Matondi, *Zimbabwe's Fast Track Land Reform*, 80.

¹¹⁵ This has been the word spread by ZANU PF, especially the period around elections.

¹¹⁶ Matondi, *Zimbabwe's Fast Track Land Reform*, 80.

¹¹⁷ Interview with Moses Muropa, Bindura Town, 23 November 2017.

even indicated how some of the farmers in the area had not even registered to vote just to spite some of the ZANU PF candidates who thought they could easily use them.¹¹⁸

The state thus also engaged with the new farmers at national, provincial and local level and its involvement in promoting cooperation should also be seen at those levels. At a local level, state organs played a huge role in promoting cooperation. One of the most important of such local state organs was the Headman and his subordinate committee. Their duties amongst many other things included resolution of conflicts and village development. Since his installation, the village headman was engaged in resolving social conflicts among the land beneficiaries, the most common of which were marriage disputes and land boundary disputes. Village Headmanships were, therefore, introduced in the resettled areas and were meant to replicate the traditional duties that they played in the communal areas. In Guruve district, the many offices of the headmen mobilised the community of resettled farmers to engage in the maintenance and building of small roads and bridges within the former large-scale farming area. The headmen were also utilised as an effective means of ensuring communication between the resettled farmers and other organs of government like the Lands and Agriculture Ministries when the farmers were in need of their intervention or assistance.¹¹⁹

Furthermore, the village headman came in handy as an effective conduit of communication between the new farmers and the local spirit mediums. In Shamva District at Careers Rest Farm, the Headman, Nyamidzi, was the direct link between the farmers and the local spirit medium whose shrine was located close to a river on the farm.¹²⁰ The rest of the new farmers at Careers Rest Farm, therefore, pooled their resources together in times when they wanted to perform traditional ceremonies and these were led by the Headman in consultation with the spirit medium. The Headman also enforced traditional practices like *chisi* and other rainmaking ceremonies.¹²¹

It is interesting to note that the A1 villages that emerged out of the FTLRP were not organised according to any transplanted authority from the communal areas. This meant that

¹¹⁸ My second segment of research was carried out in 2017 when the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC) officials were moving around farms registering people to vote for 2018 elections. Although party politics was discussed in everyday talk, respondents were not comfortable discussing it openly.

¹¹⁹ Interview with Headman Masvora, Guruve Growth Point, 20 December 2017.

¹²⁰ Interview with Headman Nyamidzi, Careers Rest Farm, Shamva, 9 October 2017.

¹²¹ Ibid.

the village authorities under the leadership of the village head were not socially rooted among the communities and lacked the authority of organising communities for production and consumption that their counterparts within customary tenure areas possessed.¹²² There were visible attempts at control by the introduction of traditional authority and importation of culture from customary areas into the newly resettled areas, despite the fact that the land beneficiaries came from different areas with unique cultural practices. Such attempts were visible in areas such as Shamva, Guruve and Centenary where attempt were made to locate Headmen who were traditionally linked to the lineages and customs of the areas. Otherwise, in many resettlement areas in the province, such “traditional” offices were created in a context where there was limited existence of the lineage based relations. The rules of belonging within these emerging social formations varied from purely voluntary towards state based directives to do so. In many instances the newly resettled farmers joined local farmer groups freely after weighing the costs of non-belonging or after being instructed to do so by the extension officer.¹²³

The Master Farmer concept was also resuscitated by the state after the FTLRP and became another avenue through which cooperation amongst new farmers was enhanced. In one such activity on 7 April 2011, the then Vice President, Joyce Mujuru, attended a field day at Mapunga Farm in Bindura where she encouraged new farmers to take farming seriously.¹²⁴ Officials from the Ministry used the day to demonstrate how the owner of the farm, Dickson Mafios, a senior politician in the province, had maximised production on his 369 hectare farm. Demonstrators from seed companies like Seed Co also took the opportunity to show new farmers attending the event, good “farming practices.”¹²⁵ It was on such platforms that the new farmers congregated and shared ideas and network. Important social media groups were formed as a means to advise each other on farming. The idea of hosting field days, however, seemed to be much more limited to A2 farmers.

5.7. The Fragile Nature of New Farmer Relations and Cooperation

To account for cooperation after the FTLRP, it is important to understand that the fragility that characterised relations amongst the new farmers shaped the nature of the different forms

¹²² Murisa, “An Analysis of Emerging Forms of Social Organisation and Agency in the Aftermath of “Fast track”, 89.

¹²³ *Ibid*, 291.

¹²⁴ “Vice President Mujuru Attends Field Day”, *The Herald*, 8 April 2011.

¹²⁵ *Ibid*.

of cooperation amongst them. The land reform program involved the movement of large groups of people into the formerly sparsely populated commercial farming areas. This movement established a new sort of farmer who had limited resources and technical skills, from a diverse range of ethnic, religious and educational backgrounds who shared a common experience of the resettlement areas.¹²⁶ The resettlement program randomly brought land beneficiaries from different classes, belief systems and backgrounds to be neighbours. Dekker and Kinsey observed that, besides living as neighbours, “the new inhabitants had to solve various problems of collective action together relating to natural resource management, inputs for agricultural production and the management of risk and uncertainty.”¹²⁷ In Mashonaland Central, it is worth noting that the majority of the land beneficiaries came from the communal areas not only within the province but within the districts they resided in. The majority of land beneficiaries in Bindura District came from rural areas like Musana communal area. In Shamva the majority were from Bushu and Madziwa communal areas. The same also applies for Guruve where quite a number came from neighbouring communal areas.¹²⁸ Mazowe, however, presents a different scenario because of its location as it attracted many urbanites, mostly from Harare although there were also many A1 farmers from Chiweshe communal area.

The fact that these beneficiaries were mostly from the same areas should not be misconstrued to mean that they knew each other or had social relations. Some of the relations which became the basis for many forms of cooperation amongst the new farmers were cobbled together as a result of the lawlessness that characterised the FTLRP. What emerged, in most cases, were fragile relations that became the basis of cooperation. In his work on land reform, Grasian Mkodzongi noted that the relationships at first were not so rosy among what has been called the “land occupation movement”, and, even after fifteen years, the relations were not

¹²⁶ Chiweshe, “Farm Level Institutions in Emergent Communities in Post Fast Track Zimbabwe: Case of Mazowe District”, 148.

¹²⁷ M. Dekker and B. Kinsey, “Contextualising Zimbabwe’s Land Reform: Long Term Observations from the First Generation”, *Journal of Peasant Studies*, 38, 5 (2011) 995-1019.

¹²⁸ Interview with Ministry of Lands Official, Bindura, 12 December 2017. I, however, could not get hold of statistics to ascertain this point and could only depend on the information provided by the Ministry of Lands official. Nevertheless, I was able to corroborate this during my fieldwork in the districts. For a much more comprehensive reading of the statistics in the province, see: L. Musemwa, “Economics of Land Reform Models used in Mashonaland Central Province of Zimbabwe,” (PhD, University of Fort Hare, 2011) and L. Musemwa and A. Mushunje, “Factors Affecting Yields of Field Crops and Land Utilisation amongst Land Reform Beneficiaries of Mashonaland Central Province in Zimbabwe,” *Journal of Development and Agricultural Economics*, 4, 4 (2012) 109-118.

characterised by solidarity and camaraderie.¹²⁹ As an assertion of the fragility of the different forms of cooperation that emerged amongst the new farmers, Mkodzongi cites such issues as competition and more complex issues like witchcraft, political polarity and conflict of values amongst the resettled farmers as key factors hindering cooperation among them.¹³⁰ Indeed, in my interaction with the land beneficiaries, the issue of witchcraft kept coming up. Denford Denga of Bernridge Farm recounted how he almost abandoned his plot because of his “neighbour who was bent on bewitching his family.”¹³¹

In as much as the relationships that emerged at the time of farm occupations evolved over the years, they had an enormous impact on the nature of cooperation amongst the new farmers. Such relations were products of spaces that the new farmers found themselves in. Firstly, the violence and destruction that was associated with the program shaped the way in which the new farmers related and cooperated with each other and with other groupings. Again, the property destruction that accompanied this violence caused a serious shortage of usable farm equipment and infrastructure and this together with the added numbers of new farmers, put pressure on the available resources hence necessitating cooperation. Mashonaland Central was one of the worst provinces affected by violence and the inevitable property destruction.¹³² Tobacco barns, were rendered unusable, work sheds had their roofs taken down, irrigation equipment was destroyed and thus cooperation was viewed as one of the available options to safeguard the remaining usable infrastructure be shared and exchanged amongst the new farmers.¹³³ Indeed, Chiweshe describes the communities that emerged from this state of affairs as “sociologically intriguing.”¹³⁴ Such a description is poignant because it demonstrates important insights into how the new farming communities, borne out of conflict, sustained themselves through various forms of cooperation. Moreover, in Mashonaland Central, there were very few cases of resettled whole communities on their

¹²⁹ Mkodzongi, ““I am a Paramount Chief, this Land Belongs to my Ancestors”: The Reconfiguration of Rural Authority after Zimbabwe’s Land reforms”, 43.

¹³⁰ Chibwana, “Social Policy Outcomes of Zimbabwe’s Fast Track Land Reform Programme: A Case Study of Kwekwe District”, 188.

¹³¹ Interview with Denford Denga, Bernridge Farm, 12 November 2017. See chapter 4 where these issues are dealt with more comprehensively as part of conflict amongst new farmers.

¹³² Zimbabwe Human Right NGO Forum, *The Unleashing of Violence: A Report on Political Violence in Zimbabwe, Update to 26 May 2000* (Harare: The Forum, 2000).

¹³³ During fieldwork, there was evidence of infrastructure and equipment that was extensively vandalised and rendered useless. Both Charles Utete and Florence Buka land audits made similar observations nationwide.

¹³⁴ Chiweshe, “Farm Level Institutions in Emergent Communities In Post Fast Track Zimbabwe: Case of Mazowe District”, 5.

ancestral lands.¹³⁵ Unlike South Africa's land reform program, which included the restitution of land rights, the FTLRP in Zimbabwe was not officially framed in terms of land restitution.¹³⁶ This meant therefore that new forms of relations that could necessitate cooperation had to be forged.

At Landberry Farm, Mazowe District, the majority of the land beneficiaries were war veterans who were allocated a quota, on average, 20 percent of the plots on farms.¹³⁷ The new farmers at the farm cooperated at three different levels. Firstly, in 2013, they established a tobacco seedbeds scheme that converted four hectares of undesignated farm land into a common seed preparation portion.¹³⁸ On the plot, they made use of irrigation equipment salvaged from the farm and an electric- and diesel pump to pump water from a nearby dam for irrigation of the seedbeds. At the beginning of each tobacco season, the 27 farmers divided equally amongst themselves the financial costs of managing the seedbeds for the season. They then allocated each other tasks, ranging from watering and tending to the seedbeds to the acquisition of any material that might be required for maintenance of the seedlings.¹³⁹ Upon full maturity, the farmers shared the seedlings amongst themselves.¹⁴⁰ At the second level, the farmers also pulled their resources together to acquire necessities like diesel and pesticides for use on their different plots. Nobert Murwira, one of the farmers involved in this scheme, maintained that the fact that they came up with this scheme in 2013 enabled them to avert crises of shortages of inputs and other necessary equipment because "they now have the ability to travel as far as South Africa, if need be, to acquire them."¹⁴¹ At the third level, the farmers also pulled together their resources for the provision of transport to the auction floors.¹⁴² What is also important to note is the fact that the farmers in Landberry Farm, who were predominantly war veterans, also coexisted with youths, war collaborators, government workers, formerly unemployed urban dwellers, politicians,

¹³⁵ For more on this, refer to Chapter 3.

¹³⁶ However, some chiefs viewed the FTLRP in terms of restitution of lost ancestral lands. For more details see, Fontein, "'We Want to Belong to Our Roots and We Want to be Modern People': New Farmers, Old Claims Around Lake Mutirikwi, Southern Zimbabwe"; Mujere, "Land, Graves and Belonging: Land Reform and the Politics of Belonging in Newly Resettled Farms in Gutu, Zimbabwe."

¹³⁷ Interview with Nelson Madamombe, Landberry Farm, 13 December 2017. Also, see, Government of Zimbabwe, *Land Reform and Resettlement: Revised Phase 11*.

¹³⁸ Interview with Nobert Murwira, Landberry Farm, Mazowe District, 13 December 2017.

¹³⁹ Ibid

¹⁴⁰ Ibid.

¹⁴¹ Ibid.

¹⁴² Ibid.

women, and ordinary people from all occupations who were plot holders in the farm. Such a community, like many in the province, provided an interesting case of how the new farming communities, made up of people of diverse backgrounds, were able to forge new ways of cooperation to ensure survival. In such cases, new relationships of trust had to be built which allowed cooperation and help in times of need.

It is, therefore, important to note that these new farming communities, especially A1 farmers, made great strides to ensure services provision through their own initiatives. This was mainly because the Government of Zimbabwe never anticipated or had the resources to monitor, let alone, encourage community cooperation. The majority of the new farmers in the province created informal institutions built up through interaction and negotiation, and these had to depend on, among other things, trust, reciprocity and unity of purpose. The Landberry Farm case highlighted above was a product of such lack of government support. One of the benefactors of the scheme, Moven Rwendo, claimed that they had suffered more than “ten years of neglect from the government which made [us] decide to take matters into [our] hands and start the scheme.”¹⁴³ Similar schemes are also cited by Murisa in his study of Goromonzi and Zvimba.¹⁴⁴

The communities of cooperation were however not static. There were products of the ever-changing economic as well as political environment and they shifted to suit the economic and social conditions. For example, these communities of cooperation were shaped by the violence that dominated the initial period of the FTLRP.¹⁴⁵ It was only due to the passage of time that the social relations stabilised, that they were able to go through a process of metamorphosis that enabled them to transform from being mainly groups meant to defend their gains into groups that were much more oriented towards managing production activities. Thus, they were able to engineer new elements of cooperation in many aspects that resulted in the reduction of potential areas of conflict. Even officials at the Ministry of Lands alluded to fewer conflicts after 2010.¹⁴⁶ Three examples from Magomo Farm, Guruve, Little Norfolk Farm, Concession and Zvakwana Farm in Bindura District vividly illustrate this point. In 2004, six A2 farmers at Magomo Farm came together to fight an eviction threat from one

¹⁴³ Interview with Moven Rwendo, Landberry Farm, Mazowe District, 13 December, 2017.

¹⁴⁴ Murisa, “Local Farmer Groups and Collective action within Fast Track Land Reform Programme in Zimbabwe.”

¹⁴⁵ See chapter 2 to understand the nature of relations evolved during the early phase of land reform. This period was time to disperse the white farmer and consolidate claims.

¹⁴⁶ Interview with the Ministry of Lands official, Bindura Town, 22 November 2017.

senior politician in the area.¹⁴⁷ They would put together their financial resources to fund the constant travels to the Ministry of Lands offices in Bindura and to seek the help of a lawyer. At one time in the same year, the six of them approached the office of the governor to collectively raise their issue with him¹⁴⁸ After many efforts, the six farmers were able to successfully fight of the politician's attempts to have them evicted. From this battle, the farmers created a strong bond that culminated in them creating an informal arrangement of cooperation in every sphere of their farming operations.¹⁴⁹ Over the years, this informal arrangement evolved into something bigger when they then put together a well constituted organisation of mutual cooperation in 2011 which they used to negotiate a contract with Mashonaland Tobacco Company in the same year and with the Chinese tobacco company, Tianze in 2015.¹⁵⁰

In 2003, 16 A1-farmers in Little Norfolk Farm came together to fight for access to a nearby dam which a neighbouring A2 farmer was denying them access.¹⁵¹ The A2 farmer made use of guards to prevent the A1 farmers from accessing the dam and this conflict raged on from 2003 until 2010. After successfully making a concerted effort to fight off the A2 farmer that eventually succeeded in 2010, the 16 farmers pulled their resources together and bought irrigation equipment from other neighbouring farmers, which they shared.¹⁵² The third case involved six A1 farmers in Zvakwana Farm who, in 2002, were under constant harassment from the group of youths that were referred to as the "Police Commissioner's boys."¹⁵³ They, therefore, came together to defend themselves against further attacks, a situation that led to the development of a strong connection amongst them, which led them to embark on a goat rearing and selling project in 2014, when things became more stable.¹⁵⁴

An Arex official was of the view that with time, conflicts became fewer amongst the beneficiaries, especially those concerning boundaries and infrastructure sharing. He pointed out that the conflicts they were dealing with were now mostly limited to "cattle grazing maize in other farmers' fields, rather than boundary and infrastructure conflicts like it was before,

¹⁴⁷ Interview with Munyaradzi Hwinya, Magomo Farm, Guruve, 17 October 2017.

¹⁴⁸ Ibid.

¹⁴⁹ Ibid.

¹⁵⁰ Ibid.

¹⁵¹ Interview with Joseph Mhara, Little Norfolk Farm, Concession, 23 December 2017.

¹⁵² Ibid.

¹⁵³ Interview with Henry Vhuramayi, Zvakwana Farm, Bindura District 12 December 2017. This group is discussed in much more detail in Chapter Three.

¹⁵⁴ Ibid.

during the initial stages of the land reform.”¹⁵⁵ What is important is the fact that he attributed this state of affairs to the emergency of community groups mandated with the management of issues of cooperation.

The remaining white commercial farmers were also involved in the matrix of cooperation. Initially they were motivated or compelled to cooperate with the new farmers as a strategy for survival. By cooperating and rendering assistance to the new farmers, the new farmers would in turn, feel duty bound to protect “a helpful and cooperating white farmer” in cases where their farms were under threat of being repossessed by other potential black farmers.¹⁵⁶ Andrew Hartnack is of the view that the FTLRP land reform and the associated economic crisis created an insecure operating environment, politically and economically, for those who continued to farm, which many farmers called “survival mode”. He maintains that these farmers had to find ways to continue farming and one of the strategy was “play the game”, which meant continually agreeing to help local power holders such as chiefs with gifts like diesel and even cattle.¹⁵⁷ In other words, some of the white farmers paid unbudgeted informal taxes to ensure that their operations continued.¹⁵⁸ Thus, in a bid to survive the onslaught that characterised the FTLRP, the white farmers crafted some form of co-existence with the new farmers that was centred on mutual cooperation. In April 2010, Mashonaland Central Governor, Resident Minister Martin Dinha, pointed to the existence of white farmers in Mazowe who supported government’s land reform. He identified farmers like “Nascimento who have been supportive of the newly resettled black farmers.” Dinha maintained that this white farmer had “started a horticulture project which promotes our people” and claimed that this was common with “the remaining white farmers.” He also acknowledged other white farmers like “Brian Townsend and Jordin Manuel” who assisted “the new farmers in Mashonaland Central.”¹⁵⁹

Jim Morrison of Tapson Farm in Bindura District provides a similarly interesting case. In 2002, Morrison started to teach the new farmers tilapia fish farming. He also made available his tractors to new farmers who wanted to cultivate their pieces of land.¹⁶⁰ Morrison

¹⁵⁵ Interview with a Provincial Arex officer, Bindura, 22 November 2017.

¹⁵⁶ Interview with Jim Morrison, Tapson Farm, Bindura District, 23 November 2017.

¹⁵⁷ Hartnack, *Ordered Estates: Welfare, Power and Maternalism on Zimbabwe’s (Once white) Highveld*, 120.

¹⁵⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁵⁹ “Dinha Calls for Co-existence on Farms”, *The Herald*, 19 April, 2010.

¹⁶⁰ *Ibid.*

furthermore repaired roads and availed his labour to repair tobacco barns in neighbouring farms that had been damaged during occupation. By endearing himself well with the new farmers through cooperating and rendering assistance, he was able to avert a possible eviction from his farm, which was orchestrated by the then Vice President, Joyce Mujuru, who was interested in taking over the farm.¹⁶¹ Morrison was able to utilise the relationship that he had cultivated through cooperation with the other new farmers to galvanise their support and avoid eviction.

What is important to note is the fact that such instances of white farmers rendering assistance and cooperating with new farmers was not unique to Mashonaland Central province. In The province of Mashonaland West, some white farmers were promised protection by party stalwarts in return for their “donations.” In one such case, Webster Shamhu, who was running for the Chegutu East constituency Parliamentary seat, received support from white farmers in his constituency towards his campaign in both primary and parliamentary elections. Shamhu was allegedly bankrolled to the tune of a million Zimbabwe dollars to acquire diesel and petrol supplies as well as transport to implement his campaign. In an interview with the *Zimbabwe Independent* on 20 July 2007, a farmer in the Selous area of Chegutu East constituency confirmed that the white farming community in the area had “undertaken to donate diesel and petrol to assist with preparations for the forthcoming elections.”¹⁶² A farmer in Selous and former president of the CFU confirmed the story. He maintained that several other districts contributed in one-way or the other. In return, Shamhu promised to protect the farmer’s properties from “rogue elements that might want to forcibly take them.”¹⁶³ It seems like this was almost a nationwide phenomenon. For example, in Mwenezi, a white farmer was instructed by the politicians to give former President Mugabe a bull so that his farm would not be taken over. He was also told by Masvingo political leadership to give more bulls to Mwenezi chiefs so that he could get unwavering support from the traditional leadership. In the area under study, in 2015, the court heard that Martin Dinha abused his position as Mashonaland Central Governor and Resident Minister as well as chairperson of the Provincial Lands Committee to extort US 60, 000 from Mr Guy Frank

¹⁶¹ *Ibid.*

¹⁶² “ZANU PF Chefs Exposed; White Farmers Forced to Bankroll Campaign”, *Zimbabwe Independent*, 20 July 2007.

¹⁶³ *Ibid.*

Dollar as protection fee against eviction from his Tzoro Farm in Centenary.¹⁶⁴ However, these survival strategies did not necessarily guarantee protection for the white farmers as some of them eventually left.¹⁶⁵

Outside of the politics of survival, common challenges tended to bring farmers together as they tried to manoeuvre around the difficulties of new unfamiliar spaces.¹⁶⁶ Such common challenges included access to finance, proximity to markets, economic challenges and labour shortages. At Crowbow Farm in Centenary, every year from 2010 to 2015, the 34 A1 farmers there would put together their financial resources to fund one or two of their members to travel to Bindura to submit their loan application papers collectively or to enquire on inputs with the GMB.¹⁶⁷ At Marston Farm in Bindura District, the five A2 farmers would hold periodic meetings to discuss and give each other ideas on ways to handle labour shortages and threats like crop pests and the constant thefts mainly blamed on gold panning gangs who camped along the Mazowe River.¹⁶⁸

In some instances, the fact that A2 and A1 plots existed side by side meant that often farmers attempted to establish good neighbourly relationships mainly because of the closeness of their plots. Such relationships were mostly characterised by instances of cooperation. For example, A2 farmers sometimes assisted A1 farmers with farming resources, transport and other equipment. At Donnington Farm in Muzarabani, a very successful tobacco farmer named Frank Muzondiwa assisted his neighbouring 27 A1 farmers with transport to ferry their maize and tobacco. He also offered his many tractors for use to the A1 farmers. All they were required to provide was diesel for use when their fields were being cultivated. In return, the neighbouring A1 farmers would offer their labour during tobacco harvest and planting seasons on Muzondiwa's 345-hectare farm.¹⁶⁹ Walter Chambati and Scoones also observed new agrarian employment trends in their works, where other land beneficiaries also sell their

¹⁶⁴ "Minister in Court for Extorting \$60k from White Farmer", *The Herald*, 3 September 2015.

¹⁶⁵ During my research I have discovered that only a handful of white farmers are left in Mashonaland Central, I could not establish the exact figure. For more on these protection fees see Laurie, *The Land Reform Deception*.

¹⁶⁶ Matondi, *Zimbabwe's Fast Track Land Reform*, 218.

¹⁶⁷ Interview with Golden Tembo, Crowbow Farm, Centenary, 1 December 2017. It should be noted that this was one of the most common forms of cooperation in the province in order to avert the high costs of transport if the farmers were to travel for such enquiries on an individual capacity.

¹⁶⁸ Interview with Trust Mambo, Marston Farm, Bindura District 23 December 2017.

¹⁶⁹ Interview with Frank Muzondiwa, Donnington Farm, 3 October 2017.

labour to other farmers.¹⁷⁰ There is, however, something patronising about the way the relationship between Muzondiwa and the A1 farmers was shaped. Norman Kure, one of the neighbouring A1 farmers, captures these elements of patronage. Kure described Muzondiwa as their father, mentor and provider, “without who[sic] our very lives would be non-existent.”¹⁷¹ In as much as Kure’s description of their relationship with Muzondiwa could be a depiction of the importance of Muzondiwa to the survival of the A1 farmers, it also highlights the lopsided and patronising kinds of relationships that exists between A1 and A2 farmers and also between the new farmers and the remaining white farmers.

Many factors can be used to account for the farmers’ lack of associational activity, especially in the early years of settlement. A majority of A2 plots are situated far from A1 plot holders who are usually clustered around one farm. This makes periodic visits and interactions cumbersome. As such, most A2 plot holders tend to interact with A1 farmers only when necessary. From another angle, however, claims of arrogance and superiority that are made by A1 plot holders against A2 farmers should not be dismissed. A majority of A2 plot holders indeed see themselves as better off than the A1 plot holders.¹⁷² This is so because, firstly, the A2 scheme tended to favour those with links and connections to either the ruling party, ZANU PF, or to senior government officials. Secondly, there was a lot of corruption involved in the allocation of A2 plots. Those with the means to finance such corruption thus tended to be the ones who would eventually get access to A2 plots. Thirdly, A2 plots were deliberately earmarked for senior war veterans, as well as top government- and party officials. As a result of all these factors, it is the general feeling amongst new farmers that A2 plot holders always have an air of superiority about them as they see themselves not only “as a better class of new farmers but as the more deserving ones as well.”¹⁷³

Another factor that also reduced cooperation amongst the new farmers, especially during the early years of settling, was the fact that most of the farmers were not resident on their

¹⁷⁰ W. Chambati, “Restructuring of Agrarian Labour Relations after Fast Track Land Reform Program in Zimbabwe”, in L. Cliffe(eds), *Outcomes of Post- Fast Track Land Reform in Zimbabwe* (London: Routledge, 2013), 49 and Scoones, *et al*, “Zimbabwe’s Land Reform : Challenging the Myths” in L. Cliffe (eds), *Outcomes of Post- Fast Track Land Reform in Zimbabwe* (London: Routledge, 2013), 69.

¹⁷¹ Interview with Norman Kure, Donnington Farm, 3 October 2017.

¹⁷² This has been captured in Chapter Three.

¹⁷³ Interview with Arex Official, Bindura Town, 4 November 2017. This has also been captured in Chapter 3.

farms.¹⁷⁴ A number of them are professionals, particularly among the A2 farmers, and are involved in other pursuits mostly in the urban areas. They, therefore, occasionally visit their farms to supervise work mostly on weekends or when they take leave of absence from their formal jobs. These are commonly caricatured as “cell phone farmers.” President Robert Mugabe at one point rallied against these farmers, whom he accused of turning formerly productive white commercial farms into weekend braai resorts.¹⁷⁵ Moreover, because of the insecurities around FTLRP as discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, some still maintained their households in the communal areas. Scoones *et al* also ascertained that some farmers were still straddling across two homes, one in the communal area and the other in the new resettlement area.¹⁷⁶ This meant that these farmers spent a lot of time moving in between their new plots and their old homes and never devoted enough time to building networks and relations with their new neighbours.

Genius Kamupezeni, an A1 plot holder, was allocated a plot in Shamva in 2004 and only decided to permanently settle on it in August 2011.¹⁷⁷ During that time of indecision, Genius confesses to not seeing the necessity of trying to reach out to his new neighbours because he was “quite convinced that he was going to lose his plot any time.” He therefore did not see it prudent to invest his time in “building relations that could be severed at a moment’s notice.”¹⁷⁸ Another A2 farmer in Guruve District, Francis Nyamanhindi, who was allocated a plot in 2005, had to resort to paying someone a monthly income for staying on and taking care of his plot until May 2012 while he continued to straddle in between the plot in Guruve and his rural home in Mount Darwin.¹⁷⁹ Francis was uncomfortable to invest his “time and see this place [the plot] as my new home because we continued to be told that we could be evicted at any time.”¹⁸⁰ However, during my fieldwork, farmers said this has started to change from around 2011 as some began building permanent structures and settle on their new pieces of land. This idea of permanency has gone a long way in making them realise that

¹⁷⁴ “Government Set up 7th Land Audit Committee”, *Financial Gazette*, 4 November 2005.

¹⁷⁵ “Cellphone Farmers Warned”, *The Herald*, 22 February 2005.

¹⁷⁶ Scoones, *et al*, *Zimbabwe’s Land Reform: Challenging the Myths.*”

¹⁷⁷ Interview with Genius Kamupezeni, Shamva, 23 October 2017.

¹⁷⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁷⁹ Interview with Francis Nyamanhindi, Guruve Growth Point, 10 November 2017.

¹⁸⁰ *Ibid.*

if they were to make the most of their new homes, they needed each other, and hence some levels of cooperation.¹⁸¹

In some communities the challenges they faced, such as pillaged farms, unreceptive farm workers, lack of government support and eviction by politicians provided the push for them to cooperate. A good example of this occurred in the Bindura district where a group of A1 plot holders successfully resisted attempts by the local Member of Parliament to transfer them to a “less attractive farm that was far away from a good road.” The farmers, led by a fellow plot holder named Muzondo, resisted and even went to the extent of going to the legislator’s business premise in Bindura where they held a demonstration.¹⁸² They were joined by the local War Veterans’ leadership and street vendors and forced the legislator to close down his business for three days and eventually reverse his attempts to take over the farm.¹⁸³ The legislator, however, denied having made attempts to grab the farm and accused his local political opponent of scheming against him.¹⁸⁴ What was impressive was how the group organised themselves, pooling resources so that few members could visit the ZANU PF provincial offices in Bindura and the Ministry of Lands offices to seek intervention. They were also able to put financial resources together to hire a lorry to transport them to Bindura for the demonstration.¹⁸⁵ In another case in Guruve, a group of seven A2 farmers were able to pool their resources together and hire the services of a lawyer to represent them against a prominent political figure in the area who wanted to displace them to another farm where there were bad road networks.¹⁸⁶ In 2014 in Mashonaland West another group of A1 farmers engaged a lawyer against Chief Zvimba who wanted to dispossess them at Lion Kopje farm.¹⁸⁷ The farmers successfully contested their eviction as they argued that they had been there for 10 years and had built homes and had also planted tobacco in seedbeds which was germinating.¹⁸⁸

¹⁸¹ There is evidence of a big houses, tobacco barns and some investment in different infrastructure over the past few years. More than half of the farmers I interviewed in both models have built permanent structures on their plots. However, this contradicts with what is written on the offer letters but seems people have begun to believe that the land reform is not reversible.

¹⁸² Interview with Gerald Muzondo, Bindura District, 24 November 2017.

¹⁸³ *Ibid.*

¹⁸⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁸⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁸⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁸⁷ “Chief Zvimba in a Land Row with 150 farmers”, *The Herald*, 20 August 2014.

¹⁸⁸ *Ibid.*

Most of the A2 farmers were, however, organised at a much higher level through various consortiums, clusters and marketing groups.¹⁸⁹ These groupings had different power bases and influences, and were grounded not only on geographical location but also on ethnicity, political affiliation and class.¹⁹⁰ In Shamva District, for example, A2 plot holders who were involved in market gardening had a very vibrant marketing group called, Musikakuvanhu Producers Association, a 25-member group that disseminates important information about pricing, markets and the general state of the agriculture landscape.¹⁹¹ The group monitored the pricing and markets for such produce as tomatoes, butternuts, green mealies, cabbages and other vegetables. It also coordinated transport to markets like Mbare Musika for its members and had a very strong network of buyers who they interacted with on behalf of their members.¹⁹² Musikakuvanhu Producers Association members also held meetings twice a month in Shamva where the members shared ideas on new varieties of crops to grow as well as preservation methods for their produce, which were mostly perishables.¹⁹³

In Centenary, another group called Nyombwe Black Farmers Association, created in August 2014, had eight A2 farmers as members who paid a monthly fee of US\$5 plus an annual fee of US\$35 at the end of every tobacco season.¹⁹⁴ Like Musikakuvanhu Producers Association the group also monitored the pricing and market green mealies, goats, vegetables pork and beef in different markets in Bindura and Harare. It utilised a Whatsapp group to disseminate information to its members and had meetings at members' houses once a month.¹⁹⁵ Edmore Kwese, one of the members of the group attested to the group's usefulness as it managed to ensure that "vital information is made available to them at the most opportune moment instead of risking a whole supply of vegetables when you would have harvested when the market is not favourable."¹⁹⁶ Members managed to have access to much needed funds to use

¹⁸⁹ Chiweshe, *Farm Level Institutions in Emergent Communities in Post Fast Track Zimbabwe: Case of Mazowe District*, 152.

¹⁹⁰ *Ibid.*

¹⁹¹ Interview with Petros Kurwaisimba, Secretary of Musikakuvanhu Producers Association, Shamva, 7 November 2017.

¹⁹² *Ibid.*

¹⁹³ I had the privilege to attend one of these meetings in Shamva and was fascinated at how organised the farmers were. They also seem to have developed a very strong bond amongst themselves that goes beyond farming as they also assist each other in times of difficulties such as bereavement etc.

¹⁹⁴ Interview with Kenneth Mangachena, Centenary, 24 October, 2017.

¹⁹⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁹⁶ Interview with Edmore Kwese, Centenary, 24 October 2017.

for such things as travelling or to buy other items like pesticides and for repairs of broken down equipment by borrowing from the group's savings.¹⁹⁷

Conclusion

For most of the farmers, therefore, it was this shared characteristic that made cooperation and associational life possible and desirable in most parts of Mashonaland Central Province. Cooperation amongst the new farmers emerged out of the hardship that were encountered by a majority of them. As such, cooperation was seen as one of the most common response that resettled farmers could utilise in order to deal with the challenges they faced on the farms. Local farmer groups, therefore, emerged in this context. A key feature of the cooperation that emerged in the new farming landscape was the rise of a new leadership that mostly emerged during the period of land occupations and during the uncertain period between occupation and the formal subdivision of the farms. This new leadership managed to consolidate its influence within the farmer groups and many of the platforms of cooperation that emerged in the resettlement areas. A majority of the leadership emerged from the war veterans and those with very strong links to the ruling party, ZANU PF. However, other leaders, with no political connections, also emerged. Many such leaders rose because of their better knowledge of farming which was a result of their prior connections to the white dominated commercial agriculture as farm managers, farm foremen or other such positions. Another brand of leaders emerged solely because they were seen as the elders of a totemic group or of people who came from the same rural area.

Paradoxically, the lawlessness that characterised FTLRP also had the strength of enhancing cooperation amongst the new farmers, albeit fragile. They had to find strength in numbers as they congregated together into groups in order to protect themselves against stronger, politically connected adversaries who could use their political connections to displace them. Even the remaining white farmers saw it necessary to utilise such forms of cooperation as a mechanism for protection against possible eviction and violence.

¹⁹⁷ Ibid.

Chapter Six: Conclusion

This study has surveyed the new relations that emerged in the FTLRP areas in Zimbabwe. It offered a wide-ranging account of land use patterns, conflict and cooperation among new farmers. It advanced the argument that the disorderly and violent character of land occupations during the FTLRP and the nature of government intervention or lack thereof caused property and land use conflict in the newly resettled farms. The study has shown that the lawlessness that characterised the FTLRP generally had negative consequences on the nature of relations among farmers. The substantial weakening of the state institutions that characterised the grabbing of land from the previous white commercial farmers, by and large, continued to haunt the new farmers as well. Central to the thesis' argument is the fact that the weakening of institutions by government in order to facilitate the removal of white farmers in an environment of relative lawlessness, created an atmosphere which exposed some of the new farmers to similar forces. In this setting of relative chaos the new farmers came up with ways of relating to each other.

The thesis used the case study of Mashonaland Central Province to understand and explain the role that the weakening of institutions to facilitate the displacement of white commercial farmers played among beneficiaries of the FTLRP. Mashonaland Central thus provided a location from where new farmer relations could be analysed. It was a good case study for the illumination of such because the ecology of the province is mostly suitable for labour intensive, high- value farm infrastructure crops like tobacco and soy beans. The thesis thus contends that Mashonaland Central Province provides an excellent example through which to observe new farmer relations. Narratives and experiences of new farmers in Mashonaland Central were, therefore, effectively used as a window to try and understand the general situation prevailing in Zimbabwe's post FTLRP era.

The thesis also examined the effects of the continuous use and justification of violence in the program. This argument focussing on lawlessness runs through the thesis. As revealed in Chapter Two, the lawlessness that had affected the white farmers continued to seriously affect the new farmers as well. This lawlessness is defined and properly accounted for on page 2 of Chapter One where the definition of lawlessness is accounted for in its proper context. Chapter Two and Three showed how even after the formalisation of the FTLRP, the government did not make any efforts to reform their legal institutions in order to provide the necessary support to the newly resettled farmers. As such, like the white farmers, a majority

of the newly resettled farmers did not have the choice to look for protection from the law when they were confronted with continued chaos and violence. Chapter Two demonstrated how they became defenceless in the face of new invasions by politically powerful groups who either moved them or had them relocated to other less attractive pieces of land. This led to some of the farmers to continue to refer to themselves as “new” farmers because they argued that they were in perpetual movement which rendered permanency difficult to achieve as shown on page 62 of the thesis. The chapter also demonstrated, how, in the face of such continued lawlessness, new beneficiaries suffered loss of property like their white predecessors and some had their crops destroyed. More importantly, the chapter demonstrated how lawlessness had a huge impact on the new farmers’ ability to produce as they had to contend with many problems as well as deal with the uncertainty surrounding their occupation of the new farms.

Indeed, in the context of lawlessness, the new farmers’ productivity was affected in a very significant way especially in the first ten years of the period under study. Relations amongst the farmers were at their worst during these first ten years, there was limited government support and gender relations are also at their worst. Thus, in the 15-year period under study, up until 2010, production plummeted as clearly demonstrated by Table 4 on page 13. Thereafter, it recovered. This was mainly because in the 10 years from 2000 to 2010 as demonstrated in Chapters Two, Three as well as Chapter Four, lawlessness was still very much pronounced. From about 2010, at least in some areas, the relations of cooperation, as shown in Chapter Five of the thesis, mitigated the impact of lawlessness sufficiently to allow some crops to recover. An Arex official alludes to this factor on page 165. This chapter also demonstrated that the attitudes of some of the farmers also changed as they started to feel more secure on their new pieces of land. This recovery is clearly demonstrated on Table 4 which shows the recovery of crops such as maize which showed a significant recovery from a low of 575,000 tonnes in the 2007/2008 season to 1,451,000 tonnes in the 2010/2011 season. The same trend also shows for some crops like groundnuts which recovered from a low of 83,200 tonnes in the 2005/2006 season to 230,500 tonnes in the 2010/11 season. Tobacco also recovered from a low of 69,800 tonnes in the 2007/8 season and to a significant gain of 177,800 tonnes in the 2010/2011 season. It is important to note that, at least for these crops, production continued to improve from 2010 to 2015.

Another central argument provided by this thesis is the fact that the land tenure policy struggles that confronted the state laid the foundations for the nature of relations that were to emerge amongst new farmers. It assessed the effects of the radical changes on tenure due to the FTLRP and how this affected new farmers' attitude towards property and land use. Chapter Two of the thesis carried out a solid assessment of how new land beneficiaries sought to formalise their right and entitlements to it through various means. More importantly, it established how this transformation process became a new site of struggle over land and property use. It carried out a comprehensive analysis of such claims which include, party loyalty, participation in the liberation war and levels of involvement in the land grabs. This is important since such claims moulded critical political strategies through which the new land owners legitimised their claims and worked on converting occupied lands into their "new farms."

The argument of lawlessness was also pursued in Chapter Three. The chapter established the fact that lawlessness also continued to affect the new farmers in the context of loopholes inherent within the government policy on land allocation and resettlement. The land tenure policy gaps that the state was faced with provided an environment of continued anarchy and the new farmers had to navigate this terrain. Section 3.4 on page 84 of this thesis accounts for the new politics of land reform and sets the background for how the farmers manoeuvred around the tenure policy terrain, characterised by a lack of clarity from government contributed immensely in shaping the nature of new farmer relations. In Chapter Three, the study looked at how, from the year 2000 onwards, the government adopted a tactic to acquire land from the white owners by ignoring existing laws that opposed occupations and by legislating laws to safeguard the new land occupiers and also legitimising land acquisitions without compensation.¹ However, this relative lawlessness continued to trouble the new farmers as there was no effort from the government to reconstitute bodies and laws that would secure respect and protection of property. As such, the new farmers became vulnerable to the same chaotic political environment that had been faced by their white colleagues during the farm confiscations, albeit with disastrous consequences on their farming activities. The redistribution, while addressing some past wrongs, may have created new ones and some new farmers found themselves in situations without security of tenure.² Kufakurinani and Bhamu's work, *Resettled yet Unsettled*, demonstrated undertones of insecurity and

¹ Matondi, *Zimbabwe's Fast Track Land Reform*, 21.

² Southhall, "Too Soon to Tell? Land Reform in Zimbabwe."

uncertainty which can be caused by eviction.³ My thesis has tried to capture this in its handling of new farmers after the land reform programme.

Another major finding revealed in the study was the issue of meddling from war veterans, traditional leadership and political leadership and how such intrusions shaped relations in the newly resettled areas. As argued in Chapter Three, the dominant position of war veterans and party functionaries in determining access to government support created different conditions that had a huge bearing on new farmer relations. The thesis also argued that war veterans were not a homogeneous group. Some emerged as powerful individuals in the resettlement areas and they could use their political muscle to control other new farmers while other war veterans were victims of evictions from other senior officials. The same kind of conclusions are also made by Eric Worby who maintains that there were some places where war veterans emerged as powerful power brokers wielding enormous political authority while in others places, the state remained stubbornly in charge.⁴ This interference by war veterans is discussed in detail from page 73 of this thesis where it is analysed together with interference from traditional leadership and ZANU PF party officials.

Other new variables, party positions and personal histories of militancy, which had no connections to one's ability to farm, became important determining factors in regulating access to property and relations to other farmers. This created conditions for the emergence of hierarchies of power, which were strongly tied to differential access to the ruling party, ZANU PF. The thesis thus argued that the FTLRP gave certain groups power to determine key factors like location of desired plots and its sizes and these groups exercised this power through the very discernible Lands Committees. Such Committees, the thesis has established, in many instances went beyond their mandate and took advantage of the lack of clear-cut policy and direction by the government regarding the program.

The thesis thus alluded to the violence that was initially directed towards previous white farmers but was then directed to the new farmers especially after the FTLRP. It discussed, at length, the involvement of physical violence and the violation of property rights of some new farmers by their fellow new farmers, war veterans and other politically powerful groups. Muzondidya, Sachikonye, Hammer, Raftopolous, Savage, Alexander and Pilosof have all

³ Kufakurinani and Bhamu, "Resettled Yet Unsettled? Land Conflicts and food (in) security in Insiza North, Zimbabwe 2005-2013."

⁴ Worby, "The End of Modernity in Zimbabwe? Passages from Development to Sovereignty."

accounted for the presence of violence in Zimbabwe's land reform program as a result of attempts by ZANU PF to consolidate and seek legitimacy amongst the otherwise disillusioned Zimbabwean masses.⁵ This thesis also utilised that line of analysis in unpacking the violence that was present in Mashonaland Central Province. It used oral accounts by new farmers to highlight this violence and demonstrate its impact on their productive capacity. There was also a marked complicity on the part of law enforcement agents to deal with this violence against new farmers mainly because the government had not attempted to rekindle institutions that would curb such violence.

Chapter Four, which discussed the new farmers' everyday experiences, situated this discussion within the context of that lawlessness as well. Similar to Rutherford's findings that "alien" farm workers were used as symbolic vehicles for rhetorical and political battles by the ruling party and government, this thesis also made parallel claims for the majority of new farmers in Mashonaland Central Province.⁶ It highlighted how a majority of new farmers in the province became entangled in this lawlessness, making them vulnerable to the vicissitudes of the political environment as well as the machinations of politically powerful groups.

The thesis also used narratives of new farmer relations to test emerging claims about the success of the FTLRP by looking at every day conflicts amongst new farmers and how these affected their productivity. Scoones (*et al*), *Zimbabwe's Land Reform: Myths & Realities* argued that far from being a disaster, small-scale farmers who benefited from the program began to turn the situation around and were improving the output of the farms they had taken over.⁷ In *Zimbabwe Takes Back its Land*, Joseph Hanlon, Jeanette Manjengwa and Teresa Smart expand this analysis across the rest of the country. Their study is broadly supportive of the Scoones-led approach. They conclude that the ordinary poor people who replaced white farmers have become more productive farmers.⁸ For them, the ordinary people benefitted but their work did not analyse if, indeed, the new farmers have a sense of ownership of the land given their insecurities occasioned by the continued evictions. The thesis thus investigated

⁵ Muzondidya, "Jambanja: Ideological Ambiguities in the Politics of Land and Resource Ownership in Zimbabwe" ; Moyo, and Chambati, *Impacts of Land Reform on Farm Workers and Farm Labour Processes*; Pilosof, *The Unbearable Whiteness of Being*; Alexander, *The Unsettled Lands: State – Making and the Politics of Land in Zimbabwe, 1983-2003*.

⁶ Rutherford, *Working on the Margins*.

⁷ Scoones, *et al*, *Zimbabwe's Land Reform Myths and Realities*

⁸ Hanlon, *et al*, *Zimbabwe Takes Back its Land*.

the FTLRP to see how new farmers in the context of their everyday struggles try to make meaning of their new surroundings. The case of new farmers in Mashonaland Central Province, thus goes contrary to Scoones *et al* and Hanlon *et al*'s claims. It exposed the struggles of new farmers as a direct result of the nature of their relations, which had ripple effects on their productivity. However, given the continued circumstances of anarchy that haunted the new farmers, one would wonder whether indeed Zimbabweans got back their land as the title of Hanlon's book seems to suggest. The thesis offered a nuanced understanding of new farmers' everyday struggles, areas of struggles as well as how specific forms of interaction amongst them emerged as a response to the various dilemmas they faced. In so doing, the thesis gave attention to something that other scholars have only paid scant devotion to, specifically; how these everyday struggles for survival and the everyday interactions amongst farmers had a huge bearing on their productivity. These everyday interactions, like many other factors that have been considered elsewhere by other scholars, are equally important as determinants of productivity by new farmers.

The thesis agrees with Matondi's findings that common challenges tended to bring farmers together as they tried to maneuver around difficulties and unfamiliar spaces.⁹ It upholds the argument that identities shifted over time. It categorically states that the nature of conflicts arising at that time, ethnicity, and factionalism, all determined the relationships in the farming landscape. Sinclair in her work has also made similar arguments and she posits that the nature of people's relationship to each other and to place in which they lived was not fixed but had to be negotiated.¹⁰ In the same context, Chiweshe argues that relations should not be viewed in terms of conflict or cooperation as such a simplistic view hides the different layers of relations that are not easily visible to an outsider. Interest between and amongst groups were constantly diverging thus alliance and networks were continuously shaped and reshaped.¹¹ Rutherford argues that those living in new resettlement area had to engage and negotiate new "modes of belonging" that did not always fit neatly with state definitions of who belonged and who did not.¹² These dimensions given by other scholars, determining nature and

⁹ Matondi, *Zimbabwe's Fast Track Land Reform*, 218.

¹⁰ Sinclair-Bright, "This Land: Politics, Authority and Morality after Land Reform in Zimbabwe", 7

¹¹ Chiweshe, *Farm Level Institutions in Emergent Communities in Post Fast Track Zimbabwe: Case of Mazowe District.*"

¹² Rutherford, "Conditional Belonging: Farm Workers and the Cultural Politics of Recognition in Zimbabwe", 73-99.

character of relations among new farmers in the resettlement areas, were largely observed and accounted for in this thesis.

Gender played an important role in how new farmers related to each other and the thesis has established the fact that gender was an issue in the broader context of the FTLRP. Women land occupiers experienced a greater deal of marginalisation relative to their male counterparts. The dissertation demonstrated that discrimination against women and other human rights violations such as evictions and displacement, negatively affected their capacity to develop sustainable socio- economic and political lives. Chapter Four showed that the conditions of women farmers from Mashonaland Central Province, like most areas of Zimbabwe's farming landscape, were drastic and a number of factors contributed to this unpleasant situation. Key to the factors was the dominance of the patriarchal system that created platform of struggles which pitted women against their male counterparts. A majority of the women farmers interviewed reported many forms of discrimination. Other male new farmers also took advantage of the deeply politicised atmosphere by using their political influence to affirm their power over their "weak" female counterparts. Moreover, the study, as aptly demonstrated under the discussion on gendered struggles from page 134, has established that despite these conditions, a majority of the female farmers stayed and continued to farm under such circumstances. This was mainly because the worsening economic environment did not offer them viable options which they could turn to. Women, especially single and widowed, were the most affected after the FTLRP because of structural bias against women that was deeply embedded in the FTLRP.

The thesis also argued that there were serious elements that determined relations and such elements included ethnicity and age. Evidence in Chapters Three and Four attest to the presence of the ethnic factor in determining relations. It highlights how land conflicts in some districts assumed ethnic dimensions. The two chapters captured vivid illustrations of ethnic based conflicts in the province. Some emerged and were activated by formal structures like the Committees of Seven which, in some instances, promoted ethnic hostility by the deliberate othering of other groups like the *vaKaranga* as shown on page 122.

The thesis provided evidence of how the young, consisting mostly of rural based youths who were much more tied to agriculture and who were targets of a spirited campaign by politicians eager to involve them in the occupations, were mostly motivated by the need for

land as a resource, rather than the need to exercise any historical claim. For these people, gaining good agricultural land with secure tenure was the priority, irrespective of where that land was, although there was an obvious preference for land close to one's communal "home." In turn, the politicians needed these youths to initiate effective occupation and these politicians used the youths to grab more farms. A good example of this is provided on page 124 of this dissertation where there is a discussion of a group famously referred to as the Police Commissioner's Boys who were notorious for harassing new farmers allegedly on the instruction of the then Police Commissioner. The thesis thus provided evidence of narratives from new farmers citing how youths were involved in many different activities in the hope of guaranteeing themselves access to land. It posits that these dimensions determined, in the main, the nature of land claims that the occupants made.

The thesis also advanced the claim that the different social and economic backgrounds of the newly resettled farmers had a huge bearing on how they related to each other and also how they approached and dealt with the use of farm property amongst themselves. Chapter Four and Five of the thesis paid particular attention to these factors. In Chapter Four, the thesis argued that the different people, brought together by the land reform initiative with fundamentally different social and economic backgrounds, informed, in a big way, the nature of relations that existed in the new resettlement areas. The chapter firmly advanced the position that such backgrounds became important when such elements as financial ability and political connections or background were used as elements to prejudice other beneficiaries and deny them access to either their pieces of allocated land or important inputs and farm equipment and infrastructure.

Chapter Four noted that low productivity challenges made new farmers more open and vulnerable to many different forms of relations, some of which were exploitative. The thesis identified the essential concerns that were central to the productivity challenges faced by the new farmers. Such concerns included inherent insecurity that continued to affect the new land holders. A second productivity constraint underlined in the thesis is with regards the general economic and political conditions that have, unfortunately worsened the situation for both the farmers. A third productivity limitation also emphasised in the thesis is the uncertain political terrain which impacted on the attitudes of farmers who did not have security of tenure on the farms. These caused a marked hesitation to invest among those farmers with the ability to invest in agriculture because of the prevailing scepticism about the political economy. Other

productivity restrictions also underscored in the thesis include the poor rainfall which followed the period of 2001-2005, hyperinflation, lack of enthusiasm by new farmers to invest in land and lack of capital to invest in agriculture.

The thesis has also avoided the temptation of presenting new farmers as forever in conflict with each other by also highlighting instances of cooperation among them. First and foremost, it argued that cooperation in the resettlement areas was not static. Its nature changed depending on time, politics and other economic fundamentals that had a bearing on the specific terms of cooperation. In some instances, it was short-lived, lasting only one season and in others, it was more long term and more organised. Cooperation was also determined by the type of project that the new farmers intended to undertake, such as for example, a school building project, road maintenance or any other similar endeavours that required cooperation. Such types of cooperative undertakings would, in most cases disintegrate upon completion of a targeted goal or project. This line of argument is emphasised in Chapter Five, which highlighted how new farming patterns and demands has called upon the new farmers to come up with very creative ways of cooperating amongst each other. More importantly, the chapter argued that these forms of cooperation emerged as a result of an environment of limited finances and lack of government support to carry out farming effectively. The thesis thus showed many instances where the farmers share such equipment like tractors, harvesters and tobacco barns and also exchange cattle for ploughing purposes and in some instances have learnt to share their labour.

Furthermore, Chapter Five demonstrated instances of cooperation and the utilisation by farmers of such concepts like *nhimbe* from their traditional rural farming landscapes in their new plots in the face of serious labour shortages. It also highlighted other areas of cooperation which include provision of transport for farm workers and fellow farmers to nearby service centres and the extension of credit facilities amongst the farmers to meet operational expenses. The chapter also surveyed the gender undercurrents of cooperation in the resettlement areas. It examined occasions where some farmers reawakened and made use of kinship connections like totems to foment interactions, which they exploited successfully in their day-to-day farming operations. Another common background which the chapter also examined is religion and how it also enriched cooperation through common membership to the same religious sect like the apostolic sect. New farmers used these different social capital to survive challenges they faced after FTLRP.

Another element of cooperation also considered by this thesis are instances where white farmers found it useful to cooperate with the new farmers in the hope that this would guarantee them protection from further harassment. The thesis argued that through these new areas of cooperation some of the remaining white farmers successfully defended themselves against threats of further displacement especially from senior government officials. But such instances of cooperation did not guarantee the white farmers complete security from eviction. Most of the white farmers eventually lost their farms despite having made attempts to cooperate in attempt to protect themselves against loss. Laurie also highlights cases of such white farmers who eventually lost their land despite reassurances from neighbouring new farmers that they were protected.¹³ The thesis suggests that the lawlessness that characterised the FTLRP sometimes enhanced cooperation amongst the new farmers, albeit in fragile ways. They had to find strength in numbers so they congregated together in groups in order to protect themselves against stronger, politically connected adversaries who could use their political connections to displace them. However, the thesis has shown that instances of cooperation were very fragile and susceptible to collapse because they were usually products of a lawless and violence ridden environment. These cooperation groups, however, were limited to localised situations and were not implemented at national level. Cooperation was, nonetheless, considered as one of the most common response that resettled farmers could utilise in order to deal with the challenges they face on the farms. The thesis also established the fact that such cooperation improved after years of settling in the new farms and instances of conflict became less and far between.

Chapter Five of the thesis also demonstrated that the different platforms of cooperation set up by the farmers had their own fair share of problems. For example, sometimes small farm groups ended up competing rather than complementing each other. Instead of uniting as a larger group with similar complaints, the various organisations were approaching policy makers, service providers and government as individual farms. In the end they competed for the same audience, and it was those schemes which had politically connected leaders that were more influential than others. In contrast, white farmers through the Commercial Farmers Union were able to offer a concerted voice that was highly influential at national level. Most new farmers remained individualistic, viewing farming as a lone enterprise and avoiding collective action. More importantly, the chapter emphasised the importance of not viewing

¹³ Laurie, *The Land Reform Deception*, 34

these groups only for their ability to mobilise and improve farm production but to also view them from a political angle. It showed how they gave voice to the new farmers who might not have been heard properly had they tried to confront the state as individuals. The groups also became important platforms from which they could handle the influence of the ruling party, ZANU PF, which was pervasive in all forms of social and economic organisation. They were critical especially as farmers tried to be careful not to appear as if they were anti-government in how they operated, a situation that could have compromised their access to critical farming inputs. More importantly, the groups carved out a niche of mobilisation and in the process were shaping local politics based on inclusion with a particular group and the benefits derived from such activity especially from the government. Chapter Five also captured ethnic dimensions where cooperation was instigated by ethnic considerations. It gave examples of formal cooperation groups whose major denominator for members, was belonging to the same ethnic group.

Significantly, the study demonstrated how the farmers have tried, with some degree of success, to make the best of their circumstances and utilised their agency to react as individuals or as groups to the different forms of relations created as a result of the FTLRP. It has illuminated the everyday forms or relations that farmers find themselves facing and the many mechanisms they have invoked in trying to survive and make sense of their new found land. Though many operated on the boundaries and were on the receiving end of ill-treatment from politically powerful groups, they have remained active in negotiating obstacles emerging from the land reform. In order to survive the challenges they have faced, some of the new farmers have been forced into a unique “commercial farm-urban migration.” A significant number of new farmers have gotten into informal occupations like gold panning especially the youth. Others, in order to benefit from government food aid and agriculture inputs, have acquired ZANU PF party cards and have become active in grassroots political structures like cell groups.

This thesis’ discussion of new farmer relations is premised on the argument that such relations were largely a by-product of the lawlessness that equally affected the new farmers as much as it did the white farmers during the land grabs. As such, the legacy of lawlessness had a huge impact in shaping not only the direction of the land reform process but also new farmer relations as well. The forceful acquisition of land during the colonial period was conveniently used by many players and proponents of the FTLRP as justification for

compulsory acquisition of land for redistribution in 2000. Such proponents related the land struggle to a longer and broader history of anti –imperialism and anti-colonial struggles. Likewise, the predicament of the new farmers was also a product of conditions they had helped to create and had benefited from. As highlighted in the introductory chapter, the impact of lawlessness on relations and subsequently on productivity after the FTLRP, should not be underestimated.

To sum up, the thesis argued that the relationships, which evolved, were not static between various actors in the farming landscape. It maintains that the relations that emerged at the time of farm occupations evolved over the years and created specific relationships among A2 farmers and also between A2 and A1 farmers that were determined by spaces in which they lived. It argues that the plummeting of production as a direct result of lawlessness was particularly pronounced in the early years after FTLRP when such lawlessness was most pronounced. It also argues that from 2010 to 2015, in as much as production does not go back to the pre land reform figures, there were significant signs of recovery. As Table 4 shows and as argued from Chapter Two to Chapter Four, production fell dramatically from 2000 but after about 10 years, it began to show signs of recovery. This was partly due to the impact of the different forms of cooperation. The chaos decreased and even though nothing changed in terms of policy, most new new farmers were now settling and their attitude towards farming changed.

More importantly, the thesis build on the argument made by Mseba that “the seizure of large scale commercial farms by powerful politicians not only ignored the property rights of whites, but also ignores the whole web of claims to such land, including those claims that are based on locality or place.”¹⁴ The thesis demonstrates that although the history of land in Zimbabwe has always focused on race and colonial land imbalances, the post-colonial confiscation of land concerned not just the settler community, but the nation as a whole. This is aptly demonstrated by the thesis’ chronicle of continued conflicts over the land 15 years after the FTLRP that dismantled colonially inherited patterns of land allocation. My work has demonstrated that the resettled farmers became the victims of the same insecurity that had affected white farmers during the farm invasions. This caused a lot of uncertainty amongst the beneficiaries and in the same vein affected productivity. While some researchers have

¹⁴ Mseba, “Land, Power and Social Relations in North Eastern Zimbabwe from Precolonial Times to the 1950s,”266.

recorded production increases, they were referring to specific individual cases not the agricultural system as a whole. In Mashonaland Central, they are a handful of successful new farmers as shown by some of the interviews. It adds to the formidable body of literature on the FTLRP and it brings a refreshingly different angle that goes deep to examine every day new farmer relations through a qualitative analysis that utilises the voices of the new farmers to tell their own story. In as much as there are many studies on the land reform program in Zimbabwe the thesis provided a detailed, in-depth, and qualitative analysis of new farmer relations and their impact on production. It utilised the voices of new farmers by chronicling their everyday experiences and provided them an opportunity to tell their own stories by its extensive use of narratives and interviews. Such narratives, though limited to Mashonaland Central Province, provide an important window to the general situation prevailing in the lives of new farmers in Zimbabwe.

Appendices

Appendix 1: Interviews

Officials

- 1 Arex official 1, Bindura Town. He had been working for Arex since 1997. He also owned a farm in the district, under A2 scheme. He was 49 years old. He specialised in soyabeans and seed maize. He had 47 hectares of land.
- 2 Tarisai Moyo, Arex officer 2 and she was based in Guruve. She started working for Arex in 2003.
- 3 Joram Mukwende, Arex officer 3. He was 49 years old. He started working for Arex from 2000.
- 4 Arex officer 4. He was 38 years old. He had been working for Arex since 2008.
- 5 Provincial Arex 5 officer, Bindura. He was aged 40 and he started working for Arex from 2000.
- 6 Tanaka Moyo, Muzararabani District, Ministry of Lands official. He was aged 59 years. He had been working for the ministry since the late 1990s.
- 7 Ministry of Agriculture official, 1. He had been working for the Ministry since 2000.
- 8 Ministry of Lands Official, 5 Bindura. He was aged 55. He started working for the Ministry since the late 1990s. He owned 300 hectares under the A2 mode. He specialized in tobacco and maize.

A2 Model farmers

- 9 Anthony Wendera, Thompsons Farm. Owns 38 hectares of land. He was aged 51. He specialised in tobacco.
- 10 Artwell Mafusire, Kingsdale Farm, in Shamva. He specialised in tobacco, maize and soya beans. He got his piece of land in 2002. He had 110 hectares of land.
- 11 Didymus Kachere, A former member of the Bindura District Lands Committee. He owned 150 hectares. He specialised in maize and tobacco production. He owned 150 hectares of land. He was 57 years old. He was from Mount Darwin.

- 12 Ben Gondo, Zvakwana Farm, He was aged 52. He specialised in gardening, soyabeans and maize. He originated from Musana Communal area.
- 13 Conrad Mhiripiri, Centenary Township. He was former member of the Committee of Seven. He was originally from Muzarabani. He owns 250 hectares of land. He was aged 63.
- 14 Cuthbert Chivandire, Centenary Township. He was a former civil servant and now a full time farmer who owned 33 hectares of land. He was originally from Masvingo. He is aged 69.
- 15 Daniel Mbeu, Leopardville Farm, Guruve District. He owned 48 hectares of land. He was aged 66. He specialised in maize and tobacco.
- 16 Davison Muza, Muzarabani District. He owned 67 hectares. He specialised in sunflower and soya beans.
- 17 Dickson Choto, Leed Farm, Bindura. He owned 107 hectares of land. He specialised in maize seed, tobacco and poultry rearing.
- 18 Former Chairman of Muzarabani Rural District Council. He owned 213 hectares of land. He specialised in tobacco, wheat and soyabeans.
- 19 Gilbert Mukono, Serwood Farm. He owned 87 hectares of land. He specialised in tobacco.
- 20 Henry Chivandire, Committee of Seven Member, Bindura. He owned 107 hectares of land. He specialised in tobacco, maize, soya beans and poultry rearing. He was aged 58.
- 21 Herbert Masawi, Shamva. He owned 90 hectares of land. He specialised in tobacco, maize and wheat.
- 22 Mildred Moyo. She was a former war veteran and also retired from the army. She owned 300 hectares. She was in her late 60s. She specialized in groundnuts, maize and tobacco.
- 23 James Bwerazuva, Ceres Farm. He owned 42 hectares of land. He came from neighbouring communal area. He specialised in wheat, seed maize and soya beans.

- 24 Joel Bhiza, Ceres Two Farm, Shamva. He was a former Lands Committee officer, aged 48. He was also a beneficiary of 68 hectares of land. He specialised in soya beans, tobacco and wheat.
- 25 John Chokuwana, Farmer, Mazowe District. He worked for the Ministry of Lands and he also owned 57 hectares of land.
- 26 John Musango, Hilton Farm, Mazowe District. He owned 54 hectares of land. He specialised in maize and soyabeans.
- 27 Nyaradzai Mutuke. She was a widow and former war veteran. She owned 39 hectares of land. She specialised in maize, groundnuts and soya beans.
- 28 Joseph Gwaze, Mbada Farm, Guruve District. He owned 47 hectares of land. He specialised in tobacco and soya beans.
- 29 Kennedy Munemo. He owned 92 hectares of land. He specialised in soya beans and maize.
- 30 Mathew Gora, Bromley Farm, Bindura District. He owned 107 hectares of land. He specialised in maize, soyabeans, maize and gardening.
- 31 Maxwell Danga, Marston Farm, Bindura District. He was an official from the Ministry of lands and he owned 47 hectares in one of the farms in Bindura District. He is 49 years old. He specialised in sunflower, maize and cattle rearing.
- 32 Maxwell Mpeno, Tomlison Farm, Guruve District. Maxwell Mpeno. He was a local headmaster from one of the Secondary Schools. He owned 171 hectares under A2 model. He specialised in livestock rearing and tobacco.
- 33 Melody Pagarasei, Grange Farm, Shamva District. She owned 150 hectares under the A2 model. She used to be the leader of woman's league in the province. She specialised in maize, groundnuts and horticulture.
- 34 Muchaneta Phiri, Leed Farm. She was a former lecturer from one of the universities. She owned 57 hectares of land under A2 scheme. She was aged 61. She specialised in maize seed, soyabeans, sunflower and tobacco.
- 35 Newman Mupazi, Guruve Centre. He was an A1 farmer and owned 17 hectares of land. He was aged 62 years old. He specialises in maize and pig rearing.

- 36 Newton Janhi, Bindura District. He was popular businessperson in Bindura town who was allocated land in 2002 but lost it to a powerful political figure in the same year. He got another farm in the district under the same model and he owns 48 hectares of land. He specialised in tobacco, soya beans and seed maize.
- 37 Nochias Chemhere, Nyamaropa Farm, Guruve District. He was a farmer, aged 66. He owned 97 hectares of land he specialised in maize, wheat and tobacco.
- 38 Norman Mahachi. He was a war veteran and a former base commander. He actively participated during jamba. He was 65 years old. He specialised in maize, soybeans, tobacco and gardening. He owned about 170 hectares of land.
- 39 Percy Guvamombe, Leed Farm. He owned 45 hectares. He specialised in soya beans, wheat and maize. He worked at Bindura Provincial Hospital as a nurse.
- 40 Peter Nkiwane, Mvurwi Town. He was a former Lands Committee officer, aged 53. He owned 87 hectares. He specialised in tobacco, maize seed and wheat.
- 41 Philip Nyathi, Muzarabani District, farmer in Centenary who was also the Chairman of the Muzarabani Rural District Council in the early 2000s. He was 69 years old. He owned 250 hectares of land in Centenary.
- 42 Robson Gato, Guruve Centre. Was a successful holder of an A2 plot in the district. He was a former manager at a commercial farm in the area. He owned 130 hectares of land and he specialises in tobacco, seed maize and sunflower. He was from Manicaland.
- 43 Robson Gwaze, Guruve District. He used to work for Agribank as a banker but he resigned because he wanted to give farming his full attention. He was a farmer and he owned 350 hectares in the district. He specialised in tobacco, wheat and maize
- 44 Rodney Zhanda, Marston Farm, Bindura District. He owned 47 hectares of land under A2 scheme. He specialised in soya beans and seed maize
- 45 Sam Mubayi, Kambada Farm. He was a former member of Lands Committee. He owned 162 hectares of land. He specialised in cotton, tobacco and livestock rearing.
- 46 Shadreck Pasi, Serwood Farm. He owned 63 hectares of land. He specialised in tobacco and maize.

- 47 Tanatswa Moyo, Serwood Farm. He owned 84 hectares and was a former clerk at the Rural District Council in the area. He was originally from Matebeleland. He was aged 67. He specialised in maize, wheat, tobacco and pig rearing.
- 48 Tatenda Moyo, Bindura. He worked for the Ministry of Lands since 2000. He was aged 44. He did not own his own piece of land but his father a retired senior army official, owned 250 hectares of land in Shamva.
- 49 Tendai Mache, a retired official from the Ministry of Agriculture, Mazowe District. He started working for the ministry since 1995. He owned 200 hectares of land in Mazowe District. He originated from Masvingo.
- 50 Tendai Mukota, Centenary Township, was a former member of Committee of Seven. He also owned 112 hectares. He specialised in wheat, tobacco and maize.
- 51 Martin Hungwe was a war veteran and worked as a clerk at Bindura Rural District Council in the 1990s. He was aged 65. He specialised in maize, gardening and goat rearing. He owned 87 hectares of land.
- 52 Trust Mambo, Marston Farm, Bindura District. He owned 39 hectares of land. He was originally from Mashonaland East. He specialised in wheat, seed maize, maize and nuts.
- 53 Frank Muzondiwa, Donnington Farm. He was aged 55. He owned 157 hectares of land. He quit his job in Harare as a banker to commit to farming venture. He specialised in tobacco.
- 54 Francis Nyamanhindi, Guruve Growth Point. He was an A2 farmer and he owns 63 hectares of land. He was originally from Mount Darwin. He specialised in soyabeans and maize.
- 55 Kenneth Mangachena, Centenary. He owned 103 hectares of land. He specialised in livestock rearing, gardening and maize.
- 56 Edmore Kwese, Centenary, 24 October 2017. He owned 172 hectares. He specialised in livestock rearing, gardening and maize.
- 57 Jim Morrison, Tapson Farm, Bindura District. White Farmer. His farm of more than 2000 hectares was subdivided to other new farmers under the A2 model. He reduced his operations and now specialised in fish farming and pig rearing.

58 Munyaradzi Hwinya, Magomo Farm, Guruve. He owned 38 hectares of land. He is originally from Masvingo and he was a retired police officer. He specialised in tobacco.

A1 Model Farmers

59 Amos Mapfumo, Mazowe. A farmer from Chiweshe communal area. He specialised in maize and soya beans. He owned 5 hectares of land. He is 49 years old. He used to work as a caretaker at Henderson Research Institute.

60 Batsirai Mbewe, Marston Farm. He is a 68-year-old farmer. Occupied his first piece of land in 2001 and relocated to another farm in 2006 after the land was parcelled to A2 farmers. He owns 13 hectares of land. He is war veteran.

61 Brian Bangajena, Ceres Farm. He specialised in maize and tobacco. He was from Bushu communal area.

62 Cephas Muponda, Ceres Farm, Shamva District. He owned 14 hectares of land. He was aged 52 years. He was from Madziwa communal area. He specialised in sunflower, maize and gardening.

63 Darlington Mhandu, Mupandenyama Farm Muzarabani. He was a war veteran. He owned 19 hectares. He specialised in cotton and maize. He is aged 73.

64 Edmore Mbeya, Foothills Farm Bindura, owned 9 hectares of land. He participated in the invasions as a youth, He is aged 40 years. He was not farming on his plot as he had parcelled his land to different gold panners.

65 Fatima Marange. She owned 29 hectares of land. She participated in the land invasions. She specialised in maize, rapoko, millet and gardening.

66 Gamuchirai Kapoto. She owned 17 hectares of land. She specialised in maize, millet and soya beans.

67 Gloria Chari, Ceres Farm, Shamva District. Was a female farmer who owned 12 hectares. She specialised in maize, ground nuts and tobacco.

- 68 Godfrey Magora, Marston Farm. He initially got allocated a plot close to Bindura town in 2003 but he was later evicted in 2008 to pave way for a senior politician in the province. He was later allocated 11 hectares. He specialised in maize, soyabeans and sunflower.
- 69 Godfrey Mugari, Guruve. He was a war veteran and also a beneficiary of 21 hectares. He was aged 73 years. He specialised in maize and soyabeans.
- 70 Harold Takawira, Guruve Centre. He was one of the late beneficiaries. He was a teacher in one of the primary schools in Bindura. He got his plot of 8 hectares in 2013. He specialised in soya beans.
- 71 Farai Mtombeni, was a war veteran and also a headman in one of the farms in Bindura District. He was 67 years old. He owned 17 hectares of land.
- 72 Headman Chikomba, Polset Farm. He was a village headman. He owned 17 hectares. He specialised in maize, sunflower and soya beans.
- 73 Nyamidzi, Ceres 1 Farm, Shamva. He was a headman. He owned 29 hectares. He came from the neighbouring communal lands, Madziwa. He was a former employee at the District Administrators office in the area. He participated actively during the early phase of allocation of land. He resigned so that he concentrate on farming. He was 63 years old. He specialised in sunflower, tobacco and maize.
- 74 Hector Sango, Centenary Township. He was a police officer. He owned 23 hectares. He specialised in maize and soyabeans.
- 75 James Ndomba, Kurima Farm, Guruve. He owned 17 hectares of land. He was aged 59. He specialised in cotton and maize. He came from the neighbouring communal areas.
- 76 Japhet Manenji. He owned 27 hectares of land in Mazowe. He specialised in tobacco, maize and groundnuts. He was a former farm worker.
- 77 Jacob Munetsi, Careers Rest Farm, Shamva. He owned 12 hectares. He specialised in maize and soyabeans. He came from Bushu communal farming.
- 78 Jephta Nhundu. He worked for the Ministry of Lands and he was farmer at Careers Rest Farm, Shamva District. He owned 23 hectares of land and he specialised in maize, tobacco and seed maize.

- 79 John Dondo, Bindura Town. He was a clerk of court at Bindura District office. He owned 12 hectares. He specialised in potatoes, maize and soya beans.
- 80 John Makusha, Mazowe District. He owned 11 hectares of land. He was from Chiweshe communal area. He specialised in maize, soya beans and gardening. He was aged 62.
- 81 Thomas Mangwiro, Bindura District. He was 35 years old, He owned 5 hectares of land. He joined other youths in the land invasions in 2003. He was from Madziwa communal area.
- 82 John Ndumwe, Shamva Township. He was a new farmer and a civil servant. He worked as a clerk at the Rural District Council in the district. He owned 23 hectares. He specialised in maize, soyabeans and goat rearing.
- 83 Jotham Munhangu. He was a former manager at Mastorn Farm. He participated in land invasions and managed to get 5 hectares of land. He specialised in maize and tobacco.
- 84 Mathias Zhou, Furries Farm. He owned 8 hectares. He specialised in maize and market gardening.
- 85 Mary Mukunda, Shamva Town. She was aged 52. She used to work as a domestic worker in Harare's affluent suburbs. She owned 22 hectares. She specialised in ground nuts, maize and millet.
- 86 Fred Phiri, Guruve, 15 November 2017. He was a former farm worker, aged 49. He owned 10 hectares. He actively participated during the invasions. He specialised in maize and gardening.
- 87 Dexter Pazvakavambwa, Shamva. He was a retired teacher in the district. He was 74 years old. He owned 18 hectares. His wife was a war veteran and she managed to secure another plot under the A2 scheme. He specialised in sunflower, maize, and tobacco. He parceled other parts of one of the farms to other people as gold claims.
- 88 Norman Kure, Donnington Farm. He owned 22 hectares of land. He was aged 45. He specialised in poultry rearing and soyabeans.
- 89 Kudakwashe Gwenzi, Mountainview Farm. He owned 27 hectares of land. He specialised in tobacco, maize and poultry rearing.
- 90 Kudakwashe Munyoro, Shamva Township. He was a former farm manager at a farm in Shamva. He owned 6 hectares land.
- 91 Jackson Bakasa, Shamva Township. He was a headmaster for a school in Madziwa Communal area but he originally came from Manicaland. Initially owned 165 hectares

under the A2 model in the district in 2001 but unfortunately, he was dispossessed from that farm by a senior police officer in 2002. He owned 18 hectares and is 55 years old.

92 Malcolm Manyetu, Marston Farm. He owned 15 hectares. He specialised in soyabeans and maize. He participated as a “youth” during the invasions. He used to be a vendor before he got his farm. He is 39 years old.

93 Malvern Dora, Marston Farm, Bindura District. He participated actively as a “youth” during the invasions. He managed to secure his farm of 16 hectares. He was 37 years old.

94 Kudakwashe Gwenzi, Mountainview Farm. He owned 27 hectares of land. He specialised in tobacco, maize and poultry rearing.

95 Kudakwashe Munyoro, Shamva Township. He was a former farm manager at a farm in Shamva. He owned 6 hectares land.

96 Malcolm Manyetu, Marston Farm. He owned 15 hectares. He specialised in soyabeans and maize. He participated as a “youth” during the invasions. He used to be a vendor before he got his farm. He was 39 years old.

97 Nobert Chirwa, Fairways Farm, Mvurwi. He owned 22 hectares of land. He works as a police officer in Mvurwi. He was aged 39. He specialised in gardening and maize.

98 Nobert Mandizha, Maguire Farm, Mazowe District. He owned 16 hectares. He specialised in soyabeans, tobacco and maize. He was aged 49 years old. He originally came from Midlands.

99 Wendy Marovha, Donnington Farm. She was a nurse at a local clinic. She owned 7 hectares of land. She was aged 47. She specialised in maize, groundnuts and gardening.

100 Nyarai Kurwaisimba, Foothills Farm. She was war veteran and she participated actively during the invasions. She was a beneficiary of 21 hectares. She is aged 67. She specialised in maize, groundnuts and soyabeans.

101 Onismo Phiri, Corner Store Farm, Muzarabani District. He owned 11 hectares of land. He specialised in maize, cotton and soyabeans.

102 Patrick Magaya, Montgomery Farm. He owned 29 hectares of land. He specialised in maize and goat rearing.

- 103 Promise Kambanje, Marston Farm. He was a war veteran. He was aged 67 years old. He owned 29 hectares of land. He specialised in maize and poultry rearing.
- 104 Ranganai Mugora, Ceres 1 Farm. He owned 14 hectares of land. He specialised in maize and soya beans.
- 105 Reuben Denenga, Guruve Centre. He was a popular businessperson in the area. He initially occupied land under A2 model in early 2002, with 134 hectares of land but later evicted to A1 model later in the same year, where he now owns 21 hectares of land. He originated from Guruve. He specialised in tobacco, cotton, maize and sunflower.
- 106 Ranganai Mugora, Ceres 1 Farm. He owned 14 hectares of land. He specialised in maize and soya beans.
- 107 Tafadzwa Matsveru, Montgomery Farm. He owned 16 hectares of land. He specialised in maize and soya beans. He was aged 68.
- 108 Takesure Marowa, Montgomery Farm. He owned 19 hectares. He was aged 61. He specialised in maize, groundnuts and soyabeans.
- 109 Takesure Togarasei, Leebury Farm, Mvurwi. He owned 28 hectares of land. He was 56 years old. He specialised in maize and gardening.
- 110 Tendai Muzondo, Bindura District. He participated in the land invasions. He was moved around to 4 farms within the district. He originated from Madziwa communal area. He specialised in maize, sunflower, tobacco and wheat.
- 111 Beatrice Maredza. She owned 27 hectares of land. She was aged 45. She specialised in market gardening.

Appendix 2: Statutes

Land Apportionment Act 1931.

The right of Africans to land ownership was rescinded. This Act partitioned land into European and African reserves and forcibly evicted Africans from fertile land. It reserved 49 million acres for white ownership and left 17.7 million acres of land unassigned to either the white preserve or the Tribal Trust Lands. Another 7.2 million acres were also set aside for sale to black farmers, known as the Native Purchase Areas.

Native Land Husbandry Act

The purposes of the Land Husbandry Act, 1951, were:

1. To regulate conservation measures and ensure good farming practices;
2. to relate the stocking of each area to its carrying capacity;
3. to allocate grazing rights to individuals;
4. to redistribute arable land into compact and economic units, and to register each individual's holding of land.

Land Acquisition Act of 1985

This act gave the government first right to purchase excess land for redistribution to the landless. It empowered the government to claim tracts adjacent to the former TTLs (now known simply as "Communal Areas") and mark them for resettlement purposes, provided the owners could be persuaded to sell.

Land Acquisition Act of 1992

The act empowered the government to acquire any land as it saw fit, although only after payment of financial compensation. While powerless to challenge the acquisition itself, landowners were permitted some lateral to negotiate their compensation amounts with the state.

Land Acquisition Amendment Act (No.2), 2002

The Land Acquisition Amendment Act empowered the President and other authorities to acquire land and other immovable property compulsorily in certain circumstances; to make special provision for the compensation payable for agricultural land required for resettlement purposes; to provide for the establishment of the Derelict Land Board; to provide for the declaration and acquisition of derelict land; and to provide for matters connected with or incidental to the foregoing. Those who wish to contest the acquisition of the land, are expected to lodge a written objection with the acquiring authority within 30 days from the date of publication of the notice in the *Gazette*.

Rural Land Occupiers Act (Protection from Eviction) Act [Chapter 20:26] (No. 13 of 2001).

The act prohibits the contest of all land gazetted for acquisition since 2000 in court. It was also meant protect certain occupiers of rural land from eviction, for example those who occupied such land in anticipation of being resettled by an acquiring authority on that or any other land for agricultural purposes in terms of the Land Acquisition Act and anyone who qualifies for settlement on that or any other land in accordance with the relevant administrative criteria fixed by an acquiring authority for the resettlement of persons for agricultural purposes.

Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment (No.16) Act 5 of 2000.

It stipulates that under colonial domination, the people of Zimbabwe were unjustifiably dispossessed of their land and other resources without compensation therefore the government of Zimbabwe is not liable for any land repossessed under the Fast Track Land Reform Program. The former colonial power instead has an obligation to pay compensation for agricultural land compulsorily acquired for resettlement, through an adequate fund established for the purpose and the former colonial power fails to pay compensation through such a fund, the Government of Zimbabwe has no obligation to pay compensation for agricultural land compulsorily acquired for resettlement.

Gazetted Land (Consequential Provisions) Bill of 2006.

This clause makes it any offence to occupy or to continue to occupy land without lawful authority after it has been gazetted in accordance with section 16B (2)(a) of the Constitution. This clause seeks to make various consequential amendments to the Land Acquisition Act [Chapter 20:10], most significantly, substitutes the term "agricultural land required for resettlement purposes" by the broader category of "Gazetted land". Under this clause all the land declared state land.

Acquisition of Farm Equipment Material Act, 2004. The act allows the government to take over the equipment or material on farms acquired for resettlement or material not being used for agricultural purposes. Moreover, according to the Act, owners or holders of farm equipment or material are not allowed to wilfully demolish, damage, alter or in any other manner impair the farm equipment or material, or cause any other person to demolish, damage, alter or in any other manner impair it, without the permission in writing of the acquiring authority. The Act stipulates that owner or holder of farm equipment or material who contravenes this section of the act shall be guilty of an offence and liable to fine, equivalent to so much of the amount of the impairment caused to farm equipment or material as is ascertainable in monetary terms.

Appendix 3: Pictures

**A MAP OF A DESIGNATED A2 FARM BY THE MINISTRY OF
LANDS**

A WORKSHED DESTROYED DURING THE FARM INVASIONS. Courtesy of author.

FARM SIGNAGE SHOWING SIGNS OF NEGLECT. Courtesy of author.

EXAMPLE OF NEW SCHOOL NAMES BEARING LIBERATION WAR NAMES.

Courtesy of author.

EXAMPLE OF NEW PLOTS BEARING LIBERATION WAR NAMES. Courtesy of author.

AN EXAMPLE OF A WITHDRAWAL OF LAND LETTER.



AN EXAMPLE OF AN OFFER OF LANDHOLDING LETTER.

Bibliography

Primary

a). Official Publications

Buka, F., *A Preliminary Audit Report of Land Reform Programme*, (Harare: Government Printers, 2002).

Global Political Agreement, *Agreement Between the Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front and the Two Movement for Democratic Change Formations, on Resolving the Challenges Facing Zimbabwe* (Harare: Government Printers, September 2008).

Government of Zimbabwe, *First Five Year National Development Plan, 1* (Harare: Government of Zimbabwe Printers, 1986).

Government of Zimbabwe *Accelerated Land Reform and Resettlement Implementation Plan: "Fast Track"* (Harare: Government Printers, 2000).

Government of Zimbabwe, *Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment (No.16) Act 5 of 2000*.

Government of Zimbabwe, *Acquisition of Farm Equipment or Material Act 7* (Harare: Government of Zimbabwe, 2004).

Government of Zimbabwe, *Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment (No. 17) Bill, 2005*.

Government of Zimbabwe, *Acquisition of Farm Equipment or Material Act 6* (Harare: Government of Zimbabwe, 2005).

Government of Zimbabwe, *A2 Land Audit Reports for Manicaland, Mashonaland Central, Mashonaland East, Mashonaland West, Matebeleland North, Matebeleland South, Masvingo, Midlands* (Harare: Ministry of Lands, Land Reform and Resettlement and The Informatics Institute, 2006).

Ministry of Lands, Agriculture and Rural Resettlement, *Agriculture Land Reform and Resettlement Programme: Revised Phase II* (Harare: Government of Zimbabwe Printers, 2001).

Ministry of Land and Rural Resettlement/ Scientific Industrial Research and Development Centre (MLRR/SIRDC), *A2 Land Audit Report* (Harare: Government of Zimbabwe, 2006).

Ministry of Land and Rural Resettlement/Scientific Industrial Research and Development Centre (MLRR/SIRDC) *Mashonaland Central Province: A2 Land Audit Report* (Harare: Government of Zimbabwe, 2007).

Ministry of Land and Rural Resettlement/Scientific Industrial Research and Development Centre (MLRR/SIRDC), *Consolidated National Land Audit Report* (Harare: Government of Zimbabwe, 2008).

Mutasa, D., Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on Lands, Agriculture, Water Development, Rural Resources and Resettlement (Harare: Government of Zimbabwe Printers, 2004).

Utete, C. M. B, *Report of the Presidential Land Review Committee on the Implementation of the Fast Track Land Reform Land Reform Programme, 2000- 2002* (Harare: Government of Zimbabwe, 2003).

Parliamentary Debates, (17 December 2003), Col. 2129.

Parliamentary Debates, (17 December 2003), Col. 2165.

Parliamentary Debates (12 March 1992), Col. 4405.

Parliamentary Debates, (8 May 2002), Col. 4647.

Parliamentary Debates, (3 February 2001), Col. 4548.

Parliamentary Debates, (8 May 2002), Col. 4654.

Parliamentary Debates, (8 May 2002), Col. 4653.

Parliamentary Debates, (8 May 2002), Col. 4654.

Parliamentary Debates, (8 May 2002), Col. 4657.

Parliamentary Debates, (28 October 2006), Col. 680- 681.

b). Civil Society Reports

Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions, *Land, Housing and Property Rights in Zimbabwe* (Geneva: Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions, 2001).

Cliffe, L., “Policy Options for Agrarian Reform: A Technical Appraisal”, Report Submitted to FAO for the Consideration of the Government of Zimbabwe (February 1986).

Commercial Farmers Union, *The Status of Commercial Farming in Zimbabwe* (Harare: Commercial Farmers Union, 2003).

GAPWUZ, RAU and JAG, *If Something is Wrong? The Invisible Suffering Commercial Farm Workers and their Families due to Land reform* (Harare: GAPWUZ, RAU and JAG, 2008).

Human Rights Watch, *Fast Track Land Reform in Zimbabwe* (Harare: Human Rights Watch, 8 March 2002).

International Bar Association, *Report of Zimbabwe Mission 2001* (London: International Bar Association, April 2001).

Justice for Agriculture (JAG) and The General Agriculture and Plantation Workers Union of Zimbabwe (GAPWUZ), *Destruction of Zimbabwe’s Backbone Industry in Pursuit of Political Power: A Quantitative Report on Events in Zimbabwe’s Commercial Farming Sector since the year 2000* (Harare: JAG and GAPWUZ, 2008).

Research and Advocacy Unit (RAU), *Reckless Tragedy: Irreversible? A Survey of Human Rights Violations and Losses Suffered by Commercial Farmers and Farmworkers from 2000 to 2008* (Harare: RAU, 2008).

Sachikonye, L., *The Situation of Commercial Farm Workers after Land Reform in Zimbabwe*, Report prepared by the Farm Community Trust of Zimbabwe (Harare: Farm Community Trust Zimbabwe, 2003).

United Nation Development Programme (UNDP), *Zimbabwe Land Reform and Resettlement: Assessment and Suggested Framework for the Future, Interim Mission Report* (Harare: UNDP, 2002).

Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum, “*Monthly Violence Reports.*” In *monthly Violence Reports* (Harare: Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum, 2001-2008).

Zimbabwe National Statistics Agency (ZIMSTAT), *Census 2012: National Report* (Harare: ZIMSTAT, 2012).

C). Documentaries

Last White Man, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=to4ZAXUJStw>, accessed 26 November 2017.

Mugabe and the White African, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9KpliA-oWAU>, accessed, 10 November 2017.

Mugabe’s Violent Farm Invasions, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aufyjQC98dE>, accessed 26 November 2016.

Zimbabwe’s Land Reform: Voices from the Field <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fspSYJUdvhg>, accessed, 10 November 2017

d). Newspapers and Periodicals.

Daily Mirror

Daily News

Manica Post

Moto

New Farmer

Newsday

Sunday Mail

The Chronicle

The Daily News

The Financial Gazette

The Herald

The New York Times

The Standard

The Sunday Mirror

The Sunday News

The Zimbabwe Independent,

The Zimbabwean

Tribune

Zim Daily

Zimbabwe News.com

e.) Interviews

Interview with Didymus Kachere, 14 November 2017.

Interview Thomas Mangwiro, Foothills Farm, Bindura District, 23 October 2017.

Interview with Amos Mapfumo, Farmer, Mazowe District, 15 December 2017.

Interview with an Arex, Bindura Town, 12 November 2017.

Interview with Anthony Wendera, Thompsons Farm, 17 December 2017.

Interview with Artwell Mafusire, Kingsdale Farm, 25 September 2017

Interview with Batsirai Mbewe, Marston Farm, 12 November 2017.

Interview with Ben Gondo, Zvakwana Farm, Bindura District, 23 December 2017.

Interview with Brian Bangajena, Ceres Farm, Shamva District, 5 December 2017.

Interview with Cephas Muponda, Ceres Farm, Shamva District, 22 November 2017.

Interview with Conrad Mhiripiri, Centenary Township, 20 October 2017.

Interview with Cuthbert Chivandire, Centenary Township, 20 October 2017.

Interview with Daniel Mbeu, Leopardville Farm, Guruve District, 9 December 2017.

Interview with Darlington Mhandu, Mupandenyama Farm Muzarabani, 5 November 2017.

Interview with Davison Muza, Muzarabani District, 2 November 2017.

Interview with Dexter Pazvakavambwa, Shamva, 13 October 2017.

Interview with Dickson Choto, Leed Farm, Bindura, 14 December 2017.

Interview with Edmore Mbeya, Foothills Farm, Bindura, 22 November 2017.

Interview with Edson Zvomuya, Muzarabani District, 27 December 2017.

Interview with farmer John Samaita, Bindura, 23 November 2017.

Interview with Fatima Marange, Mbada Farm, Guruve, 8 December 2017.

Interview with former Chairman of Council of Muzarabani Rural District Council, 30 November 2017.

Interview with Fred Phiri, Guruve, 15 November 2017.

Interview with Gamuchirai Kapoto, Guruve Centre, 8 December 2017.

Interview with Gilbert Mukono, Serwood Farm, 12, Bindura District, 2017.

Interview with Gloria Chari, Ceres Farm, Shamva District, 22 November 2017.

Interview with Godfrey Magora, Marston Farm, 12 October 2017.

Interview with Godfrey Mugari, Guruve, 4 December 2017.

Interview with Harold Kombo, Guruve Centre, 22 November 2017.

Interview with Headman Farai Mtombeni, Bindura 17 May 2017.

Interview with Headman Chikomba, Polset Farm, Shamva, 14 October 2017.

Interview with Headman Nyamidzi, Ceres 1 Farm, Shamva, 4 November 2017.

Interview with Hector Sango, Centenary Township, 23 December 2017.

Interview with Henry Chivandire, Committee of Seven Member, Bindura, 21 October 2017.

Interview with Herbert Masawi, Shamva, 12 December 2017.

Interview with Jackson Bakasa, Shamva Township, 5 December 2017.

Interview with Beatrice Maredza, Bindura Town, 17 November 2017

Interview with Jacob Munetsi, Careers Rest Farm, Shamva, 19 November 2017.

Interview with James Bwerazuva, Ceres Farm, Shamva District, 23 November 2017.

Interview with James Ndomba, Kurima Farm, Guruve, 13 November 2017.

Interview with Japhet Manenji, Hartley Farm, Mazowe, 9 November 2017.

Interview with Jeffrey Moyo, Guruve Centre, 17 December 2017.

Interview with Jefter Komichi, Zvakwana Farm, Bindura District, 12 December 2017.

Interview with Jephta Nhundu, Farmer, Careers Rest Farm, Shamva District, 12 November 2017.

Interview with Joel Bhiza, Ceres Two Farm, Shamva, 17 October 2017.

Interview with John Chokuwana, Farmer, Mazowe District, 23 November 2017.

Interview with John Dondo, Bindura Town, 12 November 2017.

Interview with Mildred Moyo, Mvurwi, 4 October 2017.

Interview with John Makusha, Mazowe District, 10 December 2017.

Interview with John Musango, Hilton Farm, Mazowe District, 17 October 2017.

Interview with John Ndumwe, Shamva Township, 22 November 2017.

Interview with Joram Mukwende, Arex Official, Guruve Centre, 19 October 2017.

Interview with Joseph Gwaze, Mbada Farm, Guruve District, 20 October 2017.

Interview with Jotham Munhangu, Marston Farm, 21 October 2017.

Interview with Kennedy Munemo, Forrester Farm, Guruve District, 19 December 2017.

Interview with Kudakwashe Gwenzi, Mountainview Farm, Shamva, 15 October 2017.

Interview with Kudakwashe Munyoro, Shamva Township, 12 December 2017.

Interview with Malcolm Mnyetu, Marston Farm, 12 November 2017.

Interview with Malvern Dora, Marston Farm, Bindura District, 12 October 2017.

Interview with Mathew Gora, Bromley Farm, Bindura District, 7 December 2017.

Interview with Mathias Zhou, Furries Farm, Guruve, 13 December 2017.

Interview with Maxwell Danga, Marston Farm, Bindura District, 23 December 2017.

Interview with Maxwell Mpeno, Tomlison Farm, Guruve District, 23 November 2017.

Interview with Melody Pagarasei, Grange Farm, Shamva District, 5 December 2017.

Interview with Morgan Kashiri, Guruve Centre, 24 November 2017.

Interview with Moses Biri, Ceres 1 Farm, Shamva, 21 November 2017.

Interview with Moses Mbeta, Harold Farm, Concession, 7 October 2017.

Interview with Muchaneta Phiri, Leed Farm, Bindura, 5 October 2017.

Interview with Newman Mupazi, Guruve Centre, 22 November 2017.

Interview with Newton Janhi, Bindura District, 27 November 2017.

Interview with Nobert Chirwa, Fairways Farm, Mvurwi, 14 November 2017.

Interview with Nobert Mandizha, Maguire Farm, Mazowe District, 22 October 2017.

Interview with Nochias Chemhere, Nyamaropa Farm, Guruve District, 17 December 2017.

Interview with Norman Mahachi, Leed Farm, Bindura, 13 October 2017.

Interview with Nyaradzai Mutuke, Bindura District, 12 December 2017.

Interview with Nyarai Kurwaisimba, Foothills Farm, Bindura District, 23 October 2017.

Interview with Onismo Phiri, Corner Store Farm, Muzarabani District, 3 December 2017.

Interview with Patrick Magaya, Montgomery Farm, 21 October 2017.

Interview with Percy Guvamombe, Leed Farm, Bindura, 23 December 2017.

Interview with Peter Nkiwane, Mvurwi Town, 12 December 2017.

Interview with Philip Nyathi, Muzarabani District, 21 October 2017.

Interview with Promise Kambanje, Marston Farm, 12 November 2017.

Interview with Ranganai Mugora, Ceres 1 Farm, Shamva District, 23 September 2017.

Interview with Reuben Denenga, Guruve Centre, 29 November 2017.

Interview with Robson Gato, Guruve Centre, 2 November 2017

Interview with Robson Gwaze, Guruve District, 21 November 2017

Interview with Roderick Musvinu, Mvurwi Township, 21 October 2017

Interview with Rodney Banda, Bindura District, 7 November 2017.

Interview with Rodney Zhanda, Marston Farm, Bindura District, 12 November 2017.

Interview with Sam Mubayi, Kambada Farm, Guruve District, 22 October 2017.

Interview with Shadreck Pasi, Serwood Farm, Bindura District, 12 November 2017.

Interview with Tafadzwa Matsveru, Montgomery Farm, Guruve, 12 December 2017.

Interview with Takesure Marowa, Montgomery Farm, 21 October 2017.

Interview with Takesure Togarasei, Leebury Farm, Mvurwi, 6 December 2017.

Interview with Tanaka Moyo, Muzarabani District, 15 October 2017.

Interview with Tanatswa Moyo, Serwood Farm, Bindura District, 15 December 2017.

Interview with Tarisai Moyo, Arex Officer, Guruve Centre, 9 December 2017.

Interview with Tatenda Moyo, Bindura town, 10 May 2017.

Interview with Mai Maredza, Bindura Town, 17 November 2017.

Interview with Taurai Mhere, Foothills Farm, Bindura District, 23 October 2017.

Interview with Tendai Mache, Farmer and retired official from the Ministry of Agriculture, Mazowe District, 24 November 2017.

Interview with Tendai Mukota, Centenary Township, 15 December 2017.

Interview with Tendai Muzondo, Bindura, 17 May 2017.

Interview with Tendai Zhanda, Marston Farm, Bindura District, 23 December 2017.

Interview with war veteran Hungwe Bindura, 17 May 2017.

Interview with war veteran Mahachi Bindura, 17 May 2017.

Interview with Wendy Marovha, Donnington Farm, Guruve District, 8 December 2017.

Interview with Wilfred Zvomuya, Guruve District, 19 December 2017.

Usheunesu Mupenya, Muzarabani District, 4 December 2017.

Secondary Sources

a.)Books

Alexander, J., *The Unsettled Land State-Making and the Politics of Land in Zimbabwe, 1893–2003* (Harare: Weaver Press, 2006).

Arrighi, G., *The Political Economy of Rhodesia* (California: Mouton, 1967).

Babbie, R. E. and Mouton, J., *The Practice of Social Research*, (Oxford University Press: Cape Town, 2001)

Bond, P. and Manyanya, S., *Zimbabwe's Plunge: Exhausted Nationalism, Neoliberalism and the Search for Social Justice* (Pietermaritzburg: University of Natal Press, 2002).

Chung, F., *Re-Living the Second Chimurenga: Memories from the Liberation Struggle in Zimbabwe* (Harare: Weaver Press, 2006).

Davidow, J., *Peace in Southern Africa: The Lancaster House Conference on Rhodesia, 1979* (London: Westview, 1984).

De Villiers, B., *Land Reform: Issues and Challenges: A Comparative Overview of Experiences in Zimbabwe, Namibia, South Africa and Australia* (Johannesburg: Konrad Adenauer Publications, 2003).

Deininger, K. H., *Land Policies for Growth and Poverty reduction*, A World Bank Policy Research Report (Washington DC: World Bank, 2003).

Fontein, J., *Remaking Mutirikwi: Landscape, Water and Belonging in Southern Zimbabwe* (New York: James Currey, 2015).

Gann, L. H., *A History of Southern Rhodesia: Early Days to 1934* (London: Chatto and Windus, 1965).

Goebel, A., *Gender and Land Reform in Zimbabwe Experience* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2006).

Hanlon, J., Manjengwa, J. and Smart, T., *Zimbabwe Takes Back its Land* (Virginia: Kumarian Press, 2013)

Hartnack, A., *Ordered Estates: Welfare, Power and Maternalism on Zimbabwe's (once white) Highveld* (Harare: Weaver Press, 2016).

Herbst, J., *State Politics in Zimbabwe* (Berkeley: University of California, 1990).

Hesse-Biber, S. N., and Leavy, P., *The Practice of Qualitative Research* (Los Angeles: Sage Publications, 2011).

Hodder-Williams, R., *White Farmers in Rhodesia, 1890-1965: A History of the Marandellas District* (London: Macmillan, 1983).

Kay, G., *Rhodesia: A Human Geography* (London: University of London Press, 1970).

Lan, D., *Guns and Rain: Guerrillas and Spirit Mediums in Zimbabwe* (Harare: Zimbabwe Publishing House, 1988).

Laurie, C., *The Land Reform Deception: Political Opportunism in Zimbabwe's Land Seizure Era* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016).

Martin, D. and P., Johnson, *The Struggle for Zimbabwe: The Chimurenga War* (Harare: Zimbabwe Publishing House, 1981).

Matondi, P., *Zimbabwe's Fast Track Land Reform* (London: Zed Books, 2012).

McDermott Hughes, D., *Whiteness in Zimbabwe: Race, Landscape, and the Problem of Belonging* (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2010).

Meredith, M., *Mugabe: Power, Plunder and the Struggle for Zimbabwe* (New York: Public Affairs, 2007).

Mlambo, A., *A History of Zimbabwe* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014).

Moore, D., *Suffering for the Territory, Race, Place and Power in Zimbabwe* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2005).

Mosley, P., *The Settler Economies: Studies in the Economic history of Kenya and Southern Rhodesia 1900- 1963* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983).

Moyana, H. V., *The Political Economy of Land in Zimbabwe* (Gweru: Mambo Press, 1984).

Moyo, S. and T., Skalnes, *Zimbabwe's Land Reform and Development Strategy: State Autonomy, Class Bias and Economic Rationality* (Harare: Zimbabwe Institute of Development Studies, 1990).

Moyo, S., *The Land Question* (Harare: SAPES Books, 1995).

Mugabe, R. G., *Inside the Third Chimurenga: Our Land Our Prosperity* (Harare: Government of Zimbabwe, 2001).

Palmer, R. and Parsons, N. (eds), *The Roots of Rural Poverty in Central and Southern Africa*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977).

Palmer, R., *Land and Racial Domination in Rhodesia* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977).

Phimister, I., *An Economic and Social History of Zimbabwe 1890-1948: Capital Accumulation and Class Struggle* (Harlow: Longman, 1988).

Pilosof, R., *The Unbearable Whiteness of Being: Farmer's Voices from Zimbabwe* (Harare: Weaver Press, 2012).

Pongweni, A. J. C., *Songs that Won the Liberation War* (Harare: College Press, 1983).

Primorac, R. and Chan S. (eds), *Zimbabwe in Crisis: The International Response and the Space of Silence* (London: Routledge, 2007).

Raftopoulos B., (ed), *The Hard Road To Reform: The Politics of Zimbabwe's Global Political Agreement* (Harare: Weaver Press, 2013).

Ranger, T., *Peasant Consciousness and Guerilla War in Zimbabwe* (London: James Currey, 1985).

Richardson, C., *The Collapse of Zimbabwe in the Wake of the 2000–2003 Land Reforms* (Lewiston: Edwin Mellen Press, 2004).

Riddell, R., *The Land Problem in Rhodesia* (Gwelo: Mambo Press, 1978).

Rolin, H., *Rolin's Rhodesia* (Bulawayo: Books of Rhodesia, 1978).

Rukuni, M. and Eicher, C. K. (eds), *Zimbabwe's Agriculture Revolution* (Harare: University of Zimbabwe Publications, 1994).

Rutherford, B., *Working on the Margins: Black Workers, White Farmers in Post-Colonial Zimbabwe* (Harare: Weaver Press, 2001).

Sadomba, Z. W., *War Veterans in Zimbabwe's Revolution: Challenging Neo-colonialism & Settler & International Capital* (Harare: Weaver Press, 2011).

Saller, K., *The Judicial Institution in Zimbabwe* (Capetown: Siber Ink CC, 2004).

Scarnechia, T., *Fighting for the Underdog: Rhetoric, Violence and Gender in Zimbabwe Nationalism, 1940-1964* (New York: Rochester University Press, 2008).

Scoones, I., *et al*, *Zimbabwe's Land Reform Myths and Realities* (Harare: Weaver Press, 2010).

Smith, D., *Rhodesia: The Problem* (London: Robert Maxwell, 1969).

Spierenburg, M. J., *Strangers, Spirits and Land Reforms: Conflicts about Land in Dande, Northern Zimbabwe* (Leiden: Brill, 2004).

Tendi, B. M., *Making History in Mugabe's Zimbabwe, Politics, Intellectuals and the Media*, (Bern: Peter Lang, 2010).

b.) Book Chapters and Journal Articles

Alexander, J., "State, Peasantry and Resettlement in Zimbabwe", *Review of African Political Economy*, 21, 61 (1994), 325-345.

Alexander, J. and McGregor, J., "Elections, Land Politics of Opposition in Matabeleland", *Journal of Agrarian Studies*, I, 4 (2001), 510-53.

Alexander, J. and McGregor J., "Hunger, Violence and the Moral Economy of War in Zimbabwe", in V. Borch-Due (ed), *Violence and Belonging: the Quest for Identity in Post-Colonial Africa* (London: Routledge, 2005), 75- 90.

Alexander J., “The Historiography of Land in Zimbabwe: Strengths, Silences, and Questions”, *Safundi: The Journal of South African and American Studies*, 8, 2 (2007), 183-98.

Alexander, J., *et al*, “Letters to Mamdani”, *London Review of Books*, 30, 24 (2008).

Alexander, J. and McGregor, J., “Introduction: Politics, Patronage and Violence in Zimbabwe”, *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 39, 4 (2013), 749-763.

Barr, B., “Forging Effective New Communities: The Evolution of Civil Society in Zimbabwean Resettlement Villages”, *World Development*, 32, 10 (2005), 1753-1766.

Bond, P., “An Exchange between Patrick Bond and Mahmood Mamdani”, *London Review of Books*, 30, 24 (2008), 17- 21.

Chaumba, J., Scoones, I. and Wolmer, J., “From Jambanja to Planning: The Reassertion of Technocracy in Land Reform in South-Eastern Zimbabwe”, *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 41, 4 (2003), 533-554.

Cheater, A., “The Ideology of “Communal” Land Tenure in Zimbabwe: Mythogenesis Enacted”, *Africa: Journal of the International African Institute*, 60, 2 (1990), 188–206.

Chilunjika, A. and Uwizeyimana, D. E., “Shifts in the Zimbabwean Land Reform Discourse from 1980 to the present”, *African Journal of Public Affairs*, 8, 3 (2015).

Chimhowu, A. O., “Livelihood Dynamics in Planned and Spontaneous Resettlement in Zimbabwe: Converging and Vulnerable”, *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 38, 3 (2002), 551 – 573.

Chimhowu, A., O. and Woodhouse, P., “Forbidden but not Supressed “Vernacular” Land Market in Svosve Communal Lands, Zimbabwe”, *The Journal of the International African Institute*, 80, 1 (2010),14- 35.

Chimhowu, A. O., “Extending the Grain Basket to the Margin: Spontaneous Land Resettlement and Changing Livelihoods in Hurungwe District, Zimbabwe”, *The Journal of South African and American Studies*, 28, 3 (2003), 551- 573.

Cliffe, L., Alexander, J., Cousins, B. and Gaidzanwa, R., “An Overview of Fast Track Land Reform in Zimbabwe: Editorial Introduction”, *The Journal of Peasant Studies*, 8, 5 (2011), 1-32.

Cliffe, L., Alexander, J., Cousins, B. and Gaidzanwa, R., “An Overview of Fast Track Land Reform in Zimbabwe: Editorial Introduction”, in L. Cliffe, *et al*, *Outcomes of Post Fast Track Land Reform in Zimbabwe* (Routledge: New York, 2013), 1-32.

Coldham, S., “The Land Acquisition Act of 1992, Zimbabwe”, *Journal of African Law*, 37, 1 (1993), 82-88.

Cousins, B., “The Zimbabwe Crisis in its Wider Context: The Politics of Land, Democracy and Development in Southern Africa”, in A. Hammar, B. Raftopoulos, S. Jensen (eds), *Zimbabwe’s Unfinished Business: Rethinking Land, State and Nation in the Context of Crisis* (Harare: Weaver Press, 2003), 263-308.

Dande, I. and Mujere, J., “Reclaiming Ancestral Lands: The Fast-Track Land Reform Programme and Boundary Politics in Makoni District, Eastern Zimbabwe, 2000-2011”, in Z. Makwavarara, R. Magosvongwe and O. Mlambo (eds), *Dialoguing Land and Indigenisation in Zimbabwe and other Developing Countries Emerging Perspectives* (Harare: University of Zimbabwe Publications, 2015), 250-271.

Dekker, M. and Kinsey, B., “Contextualising Zimbabwe’s Land Reform: Long Term Observations from the First Generation.” *Journal of Peasant Studies*, 38, 5 (2011) 995-1019.

Duggan, W. R., “The Native Land Husbandry Act of 1951 and the Rural African Middle Class of Southern Rhodesia”, *African Affairs*, 79, 315 (1980), 227-239,

Fontein, J., ““We Want to Belong to Our Roots and We Want to be Modern People”: New Farmers, Old Claims around Lake Mutirikwi, Southern Zimbabwe”, *African Studies Quarterly*, 10, 4 (2009), 1–35.

Fontein, J., “Graves, Ruins, and Belonging: Towards an Anthropology of Proximity”, *Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute*, 17, 4 (2011), 706–727.

Gadzirai, C. T and Mafuse, N., “Comparative Analysis of Farmer Participatory Extension Approaches: Case of Farmer Field Schools and Master Farmer Training in Mashonaland Central Province of Zimbabwe,” *Asian Journal of Agricultural Extension, Economics & Sociology*, 4, 4 (2015), 317-324.

Hammar, A., *et al*, “Zimbabwe’s Unfinished Business: Rethinking Land, State and Nation”, in A. Hammar, B. Raftopoulos and S. Jensen (eds), *Zimbabwe’s Unfinished Business: Rethinking Land, State and Nation in the Context of Crises* (Harare: Weaver Press, 2003), 1-48.

Hartnack A., “My Life got Lost”: Farm workers and Displacement in Zimbabwe”, *Journal of Contemporary African Studies*, 23, 2 (2006), 173- 192.

Hartnack, A., “Transcending Global and National (Mis) Representations through Local Responses to Displacement: The Case of Zimbabwean (ex) Farm Workers”, *Journal of Refugee Studies*, 22, 3 (2009), 351- 377.

Herbst, J., “The Dilemmas of Land Policy in Zimbabwe”, in S. Baynham (ed), *Zimbabwe in Transition* (Stockholm: Almquist & Wiksell International, 1992).

Hove, M. and Gwiza, A., “The Fast Track Land Reform Programme and Food Insecurity: A case of Zimbabwe from 1992 to the Present”, *American International Journal of Contemporary Research*, 2, 8 (2012), 282-294.

Jacobs, S., “Democracy, Class and Gender in Land Reform: A Zimbabwean example”, *Research in Rural Sociology and Development*, 9 (2003), 203-28.

Kinsey, B. H., “Land Reform, Growth and Equity: Emerging Evidence from Zimbabwe’s Resettlement Programme”, *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 25, 2 (1999), 173-196.

Kufakurinani, U., “Land-related Conflicts in Insiza North, 2000-2013: Towards Integration and Reconciliation”, in N. Bhebhe, T. Mashingaidze and G. Mazarire (eds), *Historical Perspectives on Violence, Conflict and Accommodation in Zimbabwe* (Harare: ONHRI, 2016), 1-25.

Machingaidze, V. E. M., “Agrarian Change from above: The Southern Rhodesia Native Land Husbandry Act and African Response”, *The International Journal of African Historical Studies*, 24, 3 (1991), 557-588.

Mamdani, M., “Lessons of Zimbabwe”, *London Review Books*, 30, 33 (2008), 17-21

Marongwe, N., “Farm Occupations and Occupiers in the Politics of Land in Zimbabwe”, in A. Hammar, B. Raftopoulos and S. Jensen (eds.), *Zimbabwe’s Unfinished Business: Rethinking Land, State and Nation in the Context of Crises* (Harare: Weaver Press, 2003), 155-190.

Mavhundutse, O., “Emerging Teacher Education Needs as a Result of Land Reform in Zimbabwe: A Focus on New Resettlement Areas”, *Academic Research International*, 3, 2 (2012), 298- 305.

Mavhunga, P. J. and Mazodze, C., “Quality of Educational Provision in Fast Track Resettlement Schools in Zimbabwe: A Case Study Chiwodza Primary School”, *European Scientific Journal*, 1, (2014), 438-448.

Mkodzongi, G., ““I am a Paramount Chief, this Land Belongs to my Ancestors”: The Reconfiguration of Rural Authority after Zimbabwe’s Land Reforms”, *Review of African Political Economy* 43, 1 (2015), 99-114.

Moore, D., “Is the Land the Economy and the Economy the Land?” Primitive Accumulation in Zimbabwe”, *Journal of Contemporary African Studies*, 19, 2 (2001), 253-266.

Moyo, S., “The Land Question”, in I. Mandaza (ed), *Zimbabwe, The Political Economy of Transition 1980- 1986* (Dakar: Codesria, 1986), 165-201.

Moyo, S., Rutherford, B. and Amanor-Wilks, D., “Land Reform and Changing Social Relations for Farm Workers in Zimbabwe”, *Review of African Political Economy*, 27, 84 (2000), 181-202.

Moyo, S., “The Political Economy of Land Acquisition and Redistribution in Zimbabwe, 1990-1999”, *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 26, 1 (2000), 5- 28.

Moyo, S., “The Land Occupation Movement and Democratisation in Zimbabwe: Contradictions of Neo-liberalism”, *Journal of International Studies*, 30, 2 (2001), 311- 330.

Moyo, S. and Yeros, P., “The Radicalised State: Zimbabwe’s Interrupted Revolution”, *Review of African Political Economy*, 34, 111 (2007), 103- 21.

Moyo, S., “Land Concentration and Accumulation after Redistributive Reform in Post-Settler Zimbabwe”, *Review of African Political Economy*, 38, 128 (2011), 257- 276.

Moyo, S., “Three Decades of Agrarian Reform in Zimbabwe: Changing Agrarian Relations”, *Journal of Peasant Studies*, 38, 3 (2011), 493-531.

Mujere, J., “Land, Graves and Belonging: Land Reform and the Politics of Belonging in Newly Resettled farms in Gutu, 2000- 2009”, in L. Cliffe *et al*, *Outcomes of Post 2000 Fast Track Land Reform Zimbabwe* (New York: Routledge, 2013), 217-238.

Murisa, T., “Local Farmer Groups and Collective Action within Fast Track Land Reform in Zimbabwe”, in L. Cliffe, *et al*, *Outcomes of post-2000 Fast Track Land Reform in Zimbabwe* (New York: Routledge, 2013), 239- 259.

Mutopo, P., “Women’s Struggles to Access and Control Land and Livelihoods after Fast Track Land Reform Programme in Mwenezi District, Zimbabwe”, *Journal of Peasant Studies*, 38, 5 (2011), 1021- 46.

Muzondidya, J., “Jambanja: Ideological Ambiguities in the Politics of Land and Resource Ownership in Zimbabwe,” *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 33, 2 (2007), 325-341.

Ndlovu, S. J., “Mapping Cultural and Colonial Encounters, 1880s to 1930s”, in B. Raftopoulos and A. Mlambo (eds), *Becoming Zimbabwe: A History from the Pre-colonial Period to 2008* (Harare: Weaver Press, 2009), 39–74.

Ndlovu-Gatsheni, S. J., “Rethinking Chimurenga and Gukurahundi in Zimbabwe: A Critique of Partisan National History”, *African Studies Review*, 55, 3, (2012), 1-26.

Nyambara, P., “The Closing Frontier: Agrarian Change, Immigrants and the “Squatter Menace” in Gokwe, 1980-1990s”, *Journal of Agrarian Change*, 1, 4 (2001), 534- 549.

Nyamunda, T., “Insights into Independent Zimbabwe: Some Historiographical Reflections”, *Strategic Review for Southern Africa*, 36, 1 (2014), 72-89.

Nyandoro, M., “Zimbabwe’s Land Struggles and Land Rights in Historical Perspective: The case of Gowe-Sanyati irrigation, 1950-2000”, *Historia*, 57, 2 (2012), 298–349.

Palmer, R., “Land Reform in Zimbabwe, 1980-1990”, *African Affairs*, 89, 355 (1990), 163–181.

Phimister, I., “Zimbabwean Economic and Social Historiography since 1970”, *African Affairs*, 78, 311 (1979), 253- 268.

Phimister, I., “Rethinking the Reserves: Southern Rhodesia’s Land Husbandry Act Reviewed”, *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 19, 2 (1993), 225- 239.

Phimister, I., “*Rambai Makashinga (Continue to Endure)*”: Zimbabwe’s Unending Crisis”, *South African Historical Journal*, 54 (2005), 112-126.

Pilossof, P., “For Farmers, By Farmers”, *Media History*, 19, 1 (2013), 32-44.

Potts, D. and Mutambirwa, C., “The Government Must Not Dictate”: Rural-urban Migrants’ Perceptions of Zimbabwe’s Land Resettlement Programme”, *Review of African Political Economy*, 24, 74 (1998), 549-66.

Raftopoulos, B., “The State in Crisis Authoritarian Nationalist, Selective Citizenship and Democracy in Zimbabwe”, in A. Hammer, B. Raftopoulos and S. Jensen (eds), *Zimbabwe Unfinished Business, Rethinking Land ,State and Nation in the context of crises* (Harare: Weaver Press, 2003), 217-242.

Raftopoulos, B. and Phimister. I., “Zimbabwe Now: Challenging the Political Economy of Crisis and Coersion”, *Historical Materialism*, 12, 4 (2004), 55- 82.

Rutherford, B., “Commercial Farm Workers and the Politics of (Dis) placement in Zimbabwe: Colonialism, Liberation and Democracy”, *Journal of Agrarian Studies*, 1, 4 (2001), 626 – 651.

Rutherford, B., “Settlers and Zimbabwe: Politics, Memory and the Athropology of Commercial Farms During Time of Crises, *Global Studies in Culture and Power*, 11, 45 (2005), 543-562.

Rutherford, B., “Conditional Belonging: Farm Workers and the Cultural Politics of Recognition in Zimbabwe”, *Development and Change*, 39, 1 (2008), 73-99.

Rutherford, B., “The Political Economy of Post-2000 Zimbabwe: An Engagement with Recent Zimbabwean Scholarship”, *Labour, Capital and Society*”, 45, 2 (2012), 112-126.

Sachikonye, L. M., From “Growth with Equity” to “Fast-Track” Reform: Zimbabwe’s Land Question”, *Review of African Political Economy*, 96 (2003), 227-240.

Sachikonye, L. M., “The Promised Land: From Expropriation to Reconciliation and Jambanja”, in B. Raftopoulos and T. Savage (ed), *Zimbabwe: Injustice and Political Reconciliation* (Capetown: Institute for Justice and Reconciliation, 2004), 1-18.

Sadomba W., Z. “Peasant Occupations within War veterans-led Occupations: Grassroots Conflicts and State Reaction in Zimbabwe”, *Journal of Peasant Studies*, 36, 2 (2009), 436–443.

Shaw, W. H., “They Stole Our Land” Debating the Expropriation of White Farms in Zimbabwe”, *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 41, 1 (2003), 75 – 89.

Southall, R., “Too soon to tell? Land reform in Zimbabwe”, *Africa Spectrum*, 46, 3 (2011), 83-97.

Stoneman, C., “The Economy: Recognising the Reality”, in C. Stoneman (ed), *Zimbabwe’s Prospects: Issues of Race, Class, State, and Capital in Southern Africa* (London: Macmillan, 1988).

Tendi, M., “Nationalism and the Betrayed Revolution in Zimbabwe”, *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 44, 1, (2018).

Tom, T., “Post Zimbabwe’s Fast Track Land Reform Programme: Land Conflicts at Two Farms in Goromonzi District”, *IOSR Journal of Humanities and Social Science*, 20, 10 (2015), 87-92.

Vambe, M. T., “Versions and Sub- Versions: Trends in Chimurenga Musical Discourses of Post Independent Zimbabwe”, *Africa Study Monographs*, 25, 4 (2004), 167-193.

Willems, W., “Peasant Demonstrators, Violent Invaders, Representations of Land in Zimbabwe Press”, *World Development*, 32, 10 (2004), 1767-1783.

Worby, E., “The End of Modernity in Zimbabwe? Passages from Development to Sovereignty”, in A. Hammar, B. Raftopoulos and Stig Jensen(eds), *Zimbabwe’s Unfinished Business: Rethinking Land , State and Nation in the Context of Crises* (Harare: Weaver Press, 2003), 49-82.

Zamchiya, P., “A Synopsis of Land and Agrarian Change in Chipinge District, Zimbabwe”, *Journal of Peasant Studies*, 38, 5 (2011), 1093-1122.

Zamchiya, P., “The Role of Politics and State Practices in Shaping Rural Differentiation: A Study of Resettled Small-Scale Farmers in South-Eastern Zimbabwe”, *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 39, 4 (2013), 937-953.

c.) Occasional Papers

Chaumba, J., *et al*, “New Politics, New Livelihoods: Changes in the Zimbabwean Low veld since the Farm Occupations of 2000”, Research Paper 3 (Brighton: Institute of Development Studies, 2003).

Chigumira, E., “My Land, My Resource: Assessment of the Impact of the Fast Track Land Reform Programme on the Natural Environment, Kadoma District, Zimbabwe”, Livelihoods after Land Reform in Zimbabwe Working Paper Series (Harare: Institute of Development Studies 2010).

Jowa, E. V., *Food Security in the Context of Fast Track Land Reform*, No. 3 (Harare: African Institute for Agrarian Studies, 2005).

Maguranyanga, B. and Moyo, S., *Land Tenure in Post Fast Track Land Reform Programme: Zimbabwe Key Strategic Policy Development Issues*, No. 6 (Harare: African Institute for Agrarian Studies, 2006)

Moyo, S., *Overall Impacts of the Fast Track Land Reform Programme*, No.1 (Harare: African Institute for Agrarian Studies, 2004).

Moyo, S., and Chambati, W., *Impacts of Land Reform on Farm Workers and Farm Labour Processes* (Harare: African Institute of Agrarian Studies, 2004).

Moyo, S., *Emerging Land Reform and Tenure Issues*, No. 3 (Harare: African Institute for Agrarian Studies 2006).

Moyo, S., *et al*, *Fast Track Land Reform 2005/2006 Baseline Survey in Zimbabwe: Trends and tendencies* (Harare: African Institute for Agrarian Studies, 2009).

Mujere, J., “Land, Graves and Belonging: Land Reform and the Politics of Belonging in Newly Resettled Farms in Gutu, 2000-2009,” Livelihoods after Land Reform in Zimbabwe Working Paper 9 (2010).

Sukume, C., *et al*, *Space, Markets and Employment in Agricultural Development: Zimbabwe Country Report*, No.46 (Cape Town, Institute for Poverty, Land and Agrarian Studies, 2015).

Sunga, I. and Moyo, S., *Productive and Social Infrastructure in Models A1 and A2 Resettlement Schemes*, No.8 (Harare: African Institute for Agrarian Studies 2004).

Sunga, I. D., *Institutional Coordination Framework for the Land Reform and Resettlement* (Harare: African Institute for Agrarian Studies, 2004).

d.) Conference Papers.

Chipika, J. T., “Food Security and Nutrition: The Experience of Zimbabwe since Independence in 1980”, A Paper presented for the Food Systems under Stress Project, (Harare: September 1993).

Derman, B., “Changing Land Use in the Eastern Zambezi Valley: Socio- Economic Considerations”, CASS/WWF Joint Paper (Harare: 1996).

Derman, B., “After Zimbabwe’s Fast Track Land Reform: Preliminary Observations on the near future of Zimbabwe’s efforts to resist Globalisation” (Montpelier, 2006).

Magaramombe, G., “Rural poverty: Commercial farm Workers and Land Reform in Zimbabwe”, Paper Presented at the SARPN Conference on Land Reform and Poverty Alleviation in Southern Africa (Pretoria, 2001).

Moyo, S., “The Interaction of Market and Compulsory Land Acquisition Processes with Social Action in Zimbabwe’s Land Reform”, Paper presented at IMP Trust Annual Colloquium (Harare, September 2000).

Palmer, R., “Mugabe’s Land Grab in Regional Perspective”, Paper Presented at the Conference on Land Reform in Zimbabwe -The Way Forward (University of London at School of Oriental and African Studies, March 1998).

e.) Online Sources

Boundary disputes affect production, <http://www.cfuzim.org/index.php/newspaper-articles-2/land-issues/5199-boundary-disputes-affect-production>, 17 March 2015, accessed 23 October 2018.

Centre for Housing Rights and Evictions (COHRE), *Land, Housing and Property Rights in Zimbabwe* (Geneva: COHRE, 2001). Available at, https://issuu.com/cohre/docs/cohre_missionreport_landhousingprop, accessed 25 August 2016.

Gutu, O., MDC vindicated over land issue, 2015, <http://nehandaradio.com/2015/01/05/mdevindicated-land-issue/>, accessed, 29 September 2018.

<http://www.parlzim.gov.zw/acts-list/rural-land-occupiers-20-26>, accessed 25 October 2017.

http://www.pindula.co.zw/Mashonaland_Central, accessed 3 July 2016.

https://web.archive.org/web/20040501103309/http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/africa/land/gp_zimbabwe.html accessed 17 June 2017, *Land Redistribution in Southern Africa*.

<https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2003/aug/11/freedomofinformation.zimbabwe>, accessed 15 September 2018.

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=15bwtuCswoy>, Grace Mugabe attack Mnangagwa and she said she is representing Mbuya Nehanda, accessed 17 September 2018.

Human Rights Watch (HRW), “Fast Track Land Reform in Zimbabwe, 2002” Available at: <http://www.hrw.org/reports/2002/03/08/fast-track-land-reform-Zimbabwe> (Accessed: 27 October 2018)

Land Acquisition Amendment (No 2) Act, 2002- a review available at <http://www.kubatana.net/html/archive/legisl/020919laa2note.asp?sector=LEGISL>, accessed 15 September 2018).

The Tobacco Institute of Southern Africa (TISA) Zimbabwe, <http://www.tobaccosa.co.za/browse.php?catid=105&sub=268> (Accessed: 27 October 2018).

S. Jovchelovitch, and M. W. Bauer, M. W., *Narrative Interviewing*, (London: LSE Research Online) Available at: <http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/2633>, 2000 (Accessed: 27 October 2018).

www.fao.org/3/a0395e06.htm, accessed 1 January 2019.

f.) Thesis

Chakanyuka, C., “Heritage, Land and Ancestors: The Challenges of Cultural Heritage Management in the Face of the Fast Track Land Redistribution Programme in Zimbabwe 1999-2007” (MA, University of Zimbabwe, 2007).

Chamunogwa, A. R., “Political Economy of Analysis of Fast Track Land Reform in Zimbabwe” (MA, University of Sussex, 2012).

Chibwana, M. W. T., “Social Policy Outcomes of Zimbabwe’s Fast Track Land Reform Programme: A Case Study of Kwekwe District” (PhD, University of South Africa, 2016),

Chiweshe, M. K., “Farm Level Institutions in Emergent Communities in Post Fast Track Zimbabwe: Case of Mazowe District” (D.Phil, Rhodes University, 2012).

Clarke, D., “The Political Economy of Discrimination and Underdevelopment in Rhodesia with Special reference to the African Worker, 1940-1973” (PhD, St Andrews University, 1975).

Daimon, A., “Mabhurandaya”: The Malawian diaspora in Zimbabwe: 1895 to 2008” (PhD, University of Free State, 2016).

Kufandirori, J. T., “Fast Track Land Reform in Matepatapa Commercial Farming Area, Bindura District: Effects on Farm Workers, 2000-2010” (MA, University of Free State, 2015).

Makamure, G., “The Socio-Economic Outcomes of the Fast-Track Land Redistribution Programme (FTLRP): With Special Reference to Kippure-Iram, Resettlement Scheme in Masvingo Province, Zimbabwe” (MA, University of Limpopo, 2014).

Mangwanindichero, P. S., “Community-Based Development: A study of *Nhimbe* Practice in Zimbabwe” (PhD, University of the Witwatersrand, 2014).

Marongwe, N., “Interrogating Zimbabwe’s Fast Track Land Reform and Resettlement Programme: A Focus on Beneficiary Selection” (PhD, University of Western Cape, 2008).

Mseba, A., “Land, Power and Social Relations in North Eastern Zimbabwe from Precolonial Times to the 1950s” (PhD, University of Iowa, 2015).

Mupfuvi, B. M., “Land to the People: Peasants and Nationalism in the Development of Land Ownership Structure in Zimbabwe from Pre-Colonialism to the Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) period” (PhD, University of Salford, 2014).

Murisa, T., “An Analysis of Emerging Forms of Social Organisation and Agency in the Aftermath of “Fast Track” Land Reform in Zimbabwe” (PhD, Rhodes University, 2009).

Ruswa, G., “A Study on the Impact of Governance on Land Reform in Zimbabwe” (MA, University of the Western Cape. 2004).

Selby, A., “Commercial Farmers and the State: Interest Group Politics and Land Reform in Zimbabwe” (D. Phil, Oxford University, 2006).

Sinclair-Bright, L., “This Land: Politics, Authority and Morality after Land Reform in Zimbabwe” (PhD, University of Edinburgh, 2016).

g.)Others

Minister of Lands, Agriculture and Rural Resettlement and Others vs. Commercial Farmers’ Union Judgment No. SC111/2001

ZANU PF, Election Manifesto, 2000.