Continuity and change in China’s foreign policy towards Africa: The cases of the two Sudans, the DRC and Nigeria

By

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Submitted in fulfilment of the requirements in respect of the

Master's Degree in Political Science

in the Department of Political Studies and Governance

in the Faculty of the Humanities

at the University of the Free State

December 2018

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DECLARATION

I, Katleho Letube, declare that the Master’s Degree research dissertation or interrelated, publishable manuscripts/published articles, or coursework Master’s Degree mini-dissertation that I herewith submit for the Master’s Degree qualification Master’s in Political Science at the University of the Free State is my independent work, and that I have not previously submitted it for a qualification at another institution of higher education.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

To say that this was the most challenging goal I have ever had to accomplish so far in life would be an understatement. As I laboured through my journey in 2018, I had to juggle full time employment with my commitment to completing this dissertation. It has been really difficult, but with the help of my supervisors, family and friends, I made it to the finish line. I would like to give all thanks and credit to God, for He not only gave me the strength to get this far, but He also placed the right people, at the right time in my life.

This dissertation would not have seen the light of day were it not for my outstanding supervisors, Prof. Theo Neethling and Dr Eben Coetzee. Their tireless efforts and constructive criticism are the reason I succeeded in producing this work. I would also like to thank my parents, Motlagomang “Sheila” Ramatiisa and Morobe Letube, for supporting me not just emotionally, but also financially throughout this journey.

To my best friend, Goarabetswe Molatedi and my new friend and colleague, Robyn von Ruben, thank you for the continuous cheering and unconditional support.

Katleho Letube

In Loving Memory

Of

Molefi Mothabe & Dithare Anna Tau
ABSTRACT

The relationship between China and the African continent dates back to the Ming Dynasty (1368-1644) but has grown rapidly and intensely from the early 1990s. This study provides significant insight to the relationship between China and the two Sudans, the DRC and Nigeria. Specifically, this study explores aspects of continuity and change in China’s foreign policy towards African states using these countries as case studies. The dynamics of China’s changing foreign policy are based on the problem statement that there is evident change in China’s foreign policy, despite China’s refusal to admit this. This study uses primary and secondary sources for deductive reasoning on foreign policy approaches, and the case study approach to establish the consistency of China’s foreign policy in a constantly changing world. Finally, the study concludes that despite notable changes in China’s foreign policy towards Africa, specifically in the two Sudans, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Nigeria, continuity largely prevails. At the same time, it should be noted that the findings emanate from only three case studies, China’s foreign policy behaviour in other cases could differ to some extent from the discoveries on the African context in this study.
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<tr>
<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>BBC</td>
<td>British Broadcasting Company</td>
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<tr>
<td>CCECC</td>
<td>China Civil Engineering Construction Corporation</td>
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<tr>
<td>CEMAC</td>
<td>Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CFPA</td>
<td>China Foundation for Poverty Alleviation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNPC</td>
<td>China National Petroleum Company</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPA</td>
<td>Comprehensive Peace Agreement</td>
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<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
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<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States</td>
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<tr>
<td>FDI</td>
<td>Foreign direct investment</td>
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<tr>
<td>FNLA</td>
<td>National Liberation Front of Angola</td>
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<tr>
<td>FOCAC</td>
<td>Forum on China-Africa Cooperation</td>
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<td>FPA</td>
<td>Foreign Policy Analysis</td>
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<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross domestic product</td>
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<tr>
<td>GNPOC</td>
<td>Great Nile Petroleum Operating Company</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICT</td>
<td>Information and communication technology</td>
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<tr>
<td>IGAD</td>
<td>Intergovernmental Authority on Development</td>
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<td>LTA</td>
<td>Leadership Trait Analysis</td>
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<tr>
<td>MNC</td>
<td>Chinese Multinational Company</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-governmental organisations</td>
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<td>Abbreviation</td>
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<tr>
<td>NIF</td>
<td>National Islamic Front</td>
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<td>OCA</td>
<td>Operational Code Analysis</td>
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<tr>
<td>PLA</td>
<td>People’s Liberation Army</td>
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<td>PRC</td>
<td>People’s Republic of China</td>
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<td>RFR</td>
<td>Right of first refusal</td>
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<tr>
<td>ROC</td>
<td>Republic of China</td>
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<tr>
<td>SPLA</td>
<td>Sudan’s People’s Liberation Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>SPLM</td>
<td>Sudan People’s Liberation Movement</td>
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<tr>
<td>SSA</td>
<td>Sub-Saharan Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UNSC</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>United States of America</td>
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<tr>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>Union of Soviet Socialist Republics</td>
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<tr>
<td>ZTE</td>
<td>Zhong Xing Telecommunication Equipment</td>
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CHAPTER 1: GENERAL INTRODUCTION AND ORIENTATION

Africa’s bilateral relations with China have been growing rapidly since the early 1990s. Although China-Africa relations date back to the Ming Dynasty (1368-1644) when a series of expeditions reached East Africa under the command of Admiral Zheng He, the intensified contemporary relations between the two can be traced to the end of the Cold War in 1991 (Alden & Wu, 2017: internet). Since then, although China has had both economic and political fluctuations, its rapid economic growth has led to China being a global actor.

China’s economic growth has averaged 9.5% over the past two decades (OECD Observer, 2017: internet), mainly due to the economic reforms that it started 25 years ago. This remarkable transformation is behind China being labelled an emerging superpower. China also has the second-largest economy in the world (OECD Observer, 2017). This places it right behind the United States of America (USA), which challenges the status of the USA as the dominant player in international affairs. Although China has attained remarkable results in its quest for global recognition, its economy has outgrown its available natural resources and it has not made the transition to a service economy. China as a heavily industrialised country places significant limitations on the Chinese economy and forces the country to look to Africa, who has an abundance of natural resources. China needs Africa as an ally to achieve and maintain its desire to be a superpower and strip the USA of its dominance and economic status..

China’s approach to foreign policy and diplomatic activity has been in transition since 2004. This transition was stimulated not only by continuous change in the domestic affairs of the state, but also by China’s response to the current shift in the global environment (Clapham, 2006; Hess & Aidoo, 2010). China considered itself a responsible international actor in that it operated under five principles of peaceful coexistence which, according to Friedmann (2011), were:

- mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity
- mutual non-aggression
- non-interference
equality
mutual benefit and peaceful coexistence.

These principles had been the key tenets of China’s foreign policy for close to half a century. Their main aim was to promote foreign relations and cooperation.

Current Chinese President Xi Jinping uses these principles as the foundation of his “Asian dream” policy, which is the official worldview of the current Chinese leadership. Central to this policy is the new Silk Road Economic Belt, a development initiative that focuses on infrastructure development and investments in Europe, Africa and Asia. The “Asian dream” policy has relevance to China’s engagement with Africa; for example, China is currently encouraging its citizens to move to Africa and to enter the African strategic marketplace for business.

The fact that Sino-African relations grew rapidly over the last two decades proves that Africa is of strategic interest to China and will remain so in the near future. Approximately 50 countries were represented at the last Forum on China-Africa Cooperation in December 2015 (FOCAC, 2015). The outcome of the summit was a new declaration and plan of action for 2016-2018 (Explore Government, 2016). Of the 54 African countries, only four were not represented at the summit, which shows that only a small minority on the African continent do not have relations with China. This is largely because these African countries did not comply with the one China policy in that they did not recognise China as a single sovereign state; instead, they maintained relations with Taiwan. China’s influence has demonstrably spread to almost the entire African continent, which makes it imperative that the relationship between the continent and China is closely studied and monitored.

However, the implementation of China’s five principles has been questioned, especially the principle and implementation of its non-interference policy in parts of Africa and other parts of the world. China’s non-interference policy refers to the deployment of economic aid and investments that follow the ‘no strings attached’ principle (Clapham, 2006; Hess & Aidoo, 2010). It is important to note that these ‘strings’ – as applied by Western actors – are not always bad. Some of them relate to good governance as they encourage and pressurise governments to be responsive to their citizens’ needs (Jacobs, 2012: 140). Other strings include transparency,
which minimises corruption. However, many African leaders do not wish to adhere to these strings; as a result, they find the Chinese approach better (Iyasu, 2013).

It is also very important to note that China’s involvement in Africa has given rise to contrasting remarks and arguments. While some perceive this emerging relationship as exciting, others see it as rather concerning and unsettling. The former allude to economic growth and opportunities, pointing out that this is a good way to intensify south-south cooperation. The latter cite exploitation and neo-colonialism as main concerns that should not be ignored. Other factors that elicit concern are the environmental and social implications of China’s less restrictive stance. This is important particularly because of Africa’s colonial past. To achieve the desired objective analysis, it is crucial for this research to consider both these arguments.

This study analyses the continuity and change in China’s foreign policy towards Africa, focusing on the two Sudans, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Nigeria. Although China has consistently backed the composition of its non-interference policy, its implementation has had to change in some respects. When Sudan was a unified state, China’s non-interference policy was unshaken and therefore consistent. This changed with the emergence of political instability within the country due to the conflict between the central Sudanese government and the Sudan People’s Liberation Army. As this conflict worsened, China, as the mediator, pressured Sudan into accepting the United Nations (UN) peacekeepers to stabilise Sudan. However, the peacekeepers did not assist in any way and a referendum saw 98.83% of the population consent to the independence of South Sudan (Sudan Issue Brief, 2007).

After the country divided into Sudan and South Sudan on 9 July 2011, the two Sudans were plagued by civil and ethnic strife (Large, 2011). The conflict had its roots in the exploitative leadership of the government of Sudan and the unequal distribution of power and wealth among the Sudanese population. In addition, with its succession and independence from the formerly unified Sudan, South Sudan retained roughly 70% of the total oil output of unified Sudan (Zhou, 2014). This resulted in a change in China’s foreign policy: China interfered by sending more combat troops to assist in stabilising the two states. China represented 18% of South Sudan’s gross domestic product (Zhou, 2014). However, the political and security
risk that evolved from the conflict between the two Sudans resulted in China’s interests as a majority investor in South Sudan, and particularly its oil exports, being endangered.

The DRC has natural resources in abundance and, as with many other African countries, its bountiful natural resources resulted in a growing consumer base. However, this rosy outlook did not reflect the domestic shortcomings of the country. The DRC suffered from deteriorating infrastructure, a shortage of skilled labour and a lack of innovation in the business environment (Wilson, 2016: internet), which made foreign direct investment a high risk. China, on the other hand, maintained a high rate of economic growth and was rich in human resources, proven by its large workforce of skilled labour. However, a weakness in China’s economy – its shortage of natural resources and raw material – created a particular problem for China: it needed such resources to fuel sustained growth. As a result, China found itself having to increase its relations with the DRC.

The DRC was a conventional ally of the USA until the end of the Cold War. However, this relationship became strained when the USA became more critical and ungenerous as the DRC experienced political instability. Again, China was seen as a less restrictive and more generous alternative to the West in terms of financial assistance (Utomi, 2014). For these reasons, China became a viable alternative trade partner for the DRC. Historically, China had supported the Belgian Congo’s independence movement for complete and immediate independence from Belgium (1959-1960).

Although China made important contributions to UN peacekeeping in the DRC, it would be naïve to assume that China was the sole contributor. Both the West and the UN played a critical role in such missions. China first contributed troops to the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUSCO), renamed MONUC in 2001, in an attempt to bring political stability to the DRC (LSE, 2014: internet). Seven years later, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) contributed 234 of the 1 487 military personnel contributed worldwide (UNSC, 2015). China continued to sell military equipment to the DRC until 2008, after which no major deals were recorded. In 2009, China and the DRC declared that their relations would intensify (Utomi, 2014).
In 2012, China’s Exim bank pulled out of the trade deal due to the sanctions imposed on Chinese companies Huaying Trading and Congo Minerals and Metals (Wilson, 2016: internet). However, even with this souring of relations China’s investments in the DRC’s mining sector grew. According to the London School of Economics (2014: internet), China’s investment in the DRC grew from 10% in 2005 to 50% by mid-2013. Between 2014 and 2017, the risk in the DRC increased due to political instability, triggering the West’s sudden withdrawal from certain mines in the DRC. However, China’s ties with the DRC continued to grow as it expanded its copper control while Western miners retreated (Wilson, 2016: internet).

Sino-Nigerian relations have grown from limited to extensive and sophisticated over the last 10 years. Similar to the cases of South Sudan and the DRC, Nigeria saw China as an alternative to the West. As indicated earlier, China was perceived as a partner with a model that reflected a no strings attached approach. As in the other cases, China’s representatives in Africa have been quick to reject claims that China’s motives in Nigeria are neo-colonialist and exploitative (Wagner & Cafiero, 2013: internet). China prides itself on helping to shape the Nigerian textile manufacturing industry through investments in the 1960s (Ogunkola et al, 2008). Nigeria also supported the ‘one country, two systems’ policy formulated by Deng Xiaping in the 1980s (Ogunkola et al, 2008). Trade between Nigeria and China only saw rapid growth in 1993, when China became the second-largest exporter of crude oil worldwide. According to Wagner and Cafiero (2013: internet), the volume of trade increased rapidly from 1.3 billion to 8.6 billion Nigerian Naira.

The relationship between the two countries rekindled and matured between 2000 and 2006, coinciding with the establishment of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC). By 2014, many Western investors had become reluctant to continue investing in Nigeria. However, China invested $10 billion in Nigerian hydrocarbons (The Diplomat, 2014: internet). Moreover, in 2014 Chinese Premier Li Keqiang was widely reported to have promised Nigerian officials that China would support their country’s fight against terrorism (China Insider, 2014; The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2014). This was a significant shift from China’s traditional stance of non-interference in political or security matters. On 1 July 2016, Nigeria
commemorated the 95th anniversary of the founding of China’s ruling Communist Party by holding a major conference in Abuja (The Diplomat, 2016: internet).

1.1 Problem statement

The dynamics of China’s changing foreign policy are based on the problem statement that while there is an evident change in China’s foreign policy, China’s leadership does not want to admit this. Moreover, to date China is regarded as an emerging superpower and strives to be perceived as a responsible actor in international affairs. However, China’s ambition should not justify it deceiving the international community by refusing to admit and recognise that its foreign policy has changed due to its evident need to adapt to a constantly changing world.

1.1.1 Domestic problems

Internally, China began to run out of natural resources such as petroleum and oil. It therefore had to import these scarce resources from other states, including the unified Sudan, DRC and Nigeria. When South Sudan became independent, China continued to import oil from the oil fields that were now in South Sudan’s territory. However, the conflict between Sudan and South Sudan endangered China’s imports as the oil had to be transported through Sudan from South Sudan. China was therefore forced to interfere as the mediator in negotiations between the two Sudans, not only because China wanted to see peace between the two states, but also because this conflict had a major impact on China domestically.

The DRC presented a similar case of evident growth in its relationship with China. Many Western investors retreated from their investments, especially in the mining industry. This gave China the opportunity to expand its influence and extend its control in that area, especially in copper mining. China needed copper to enhance its building construction industry and telecommunications, for power generation and transmission, to produce industrial machinery and to create transportation, just to
mention a few (Bloomberg Markets, 2016: internet). All these vital factors contributed to China’s economic growth and its sustenance. Their importance, and the fact that China lacks the natural resources and raw material to produce them, resulted in China intensifying its relations with the DRC. However, the DRC’s internal political instability threatened China’s strategic economic interests and led to China softly interfering in the country’s domestic issues.

Nigeria-China relations followed a slightly different approach as China’s foreign policy behaviour reflected a relationship dominated not just by economic interests, but also by cultural exchanges with Nigeria. Between 2000 and 2010, annual Nigeria-China trade increased nine-fold. According to HuffPost (2014: internet), this was represented by growth in trade from $2 billion in 2000 to $18 billion in 2010. By 2014, many Western investors had become reluctant to continue investing in Nigeria because of the political instability caused by the Boko Haram insurgency. In the West's retreat, China saw an opportunity to increase its access to Nigeria’s economy by investing $10 billion in Nigerian hydrocarbons (The Diplomat, 2014: Internet). In June and July 2016, Nigeria celebrated the founding of the Chinese Communist Party in a commemoration held in Abuja and established a Chinese Cultural Research Centre (The Diplomat, 2016: internet). This resulted in China pledging to establish an Igbo language institute in China and continuing to emphasise the importance of cultural diversity (The Diplomat, 2016: internet). China also established a connection with the Nigerian Television Authority, which is the largest television network on the African continent.

Another of China’s domestic challenges was its conservative regime and population. This meant that China was closely linked to the desire to conserve; to respect established customs and institutions that had endured through time (Heywood, 2013: 48-50). The conservative view was that the accumulated wisdom of the past, and institutions and practices that have stood the test of time, should be maintained as they promote stability and security and give a sense of belonging. Since the five principles of coexistence that guided China’s relations in the international community had always been well received by China’s citizens, continuing the established foreign policy was important for China. Admitting that these principles had changed would have been a challenge because both the state and its population had a culture of
rejecting change and preserving the status quo. Given this conservative culture, boldly welcoming foreign policy change would have been a problem.

1.1.2 International/external problems

In recent years, the rise of China led to its rise in global influence. The world saw China’s global influence spread extensively, resulting in several challenges and breakthroughs, especially in its foreign policy. Post-2012, China’s agenda was dominated by several changes in certain areas of its foreign policy. The world witnessed China’s institutional change when it established a new National Security Commission led by Xi Jinping, who was also the general secretary of the Communist Party. This commission aimed to strengthen the coordination and integration of China’s foreign policy in terms of its internal and external affairs.

Many notable changes occurred within Sudan and South Sudan. The two states did not agree on the ownership of Abyei and other regions along their disputed 2 000 km border, resulting in ongoing conflict on their border and within areas of Darfur. China had to modify its policy of non-interference to adapt its foreign policy to local conditions. This was a challenge to China’s rhetoric of non-intervention used as its guiding principle when engaging with states, particularly with African states. It was therefore important to understand the impact of political instability in the two Sudans to understand the changes in China’s foreign policy and its relationship with the two Sudans. This understanding also assisted to establish a comprehensive conclusion on China and the positions that it may take in international relations.

In the DRC, China’s foreign policy evolved from a single aid relationship, particularly from China to the DRC, to a win-win partnership. However, China and the DRC are highly uneven and unequal, not just in terms of politics and economics, but also in terms of finances and military might. Kabemba (2016: 5) states that China used its economic and financial strength to create an image of an alternative to the West, which explains its efforts in the DRC and other African states. China also changed its emphasis from the importance of ideology in its relationships to the importance of cultural diversity and exchanges. This was seen in its recent interaction with Nigeria and its efforts to strengthen diversity through media proliferation.
The primary research question of this study is: What are the characteristics and direction of China’s foreign policy dynamics in Africa? The primary question generated three subsidiary questions: Firstly, what are the characteristics and direction of China’s foreign policy globally? Secondly, what can be learned from the characteristics and direction of China’s foreign policy towards Africa, specifically continuity and change in the two Sudans, the DRC and Nigeria? Lastly, what are the political and economic implications of the characteristics and direction of China’s foreign policy dynamics regarding these case studies? This study covers a time frame from post-1959 to 2017. The rationale was that in 1959, Sudan became the fourth country to recognise the PRC (Sudan Issue Brief, 2007). Nigeria and the DRC soon followed suit. Their recognition of the PRC was a prerequisite for relations with China as the PRC and the Republic of China (ROC) (Taiwan) were in an intense conflict as claimants to being the government of China (Wu, 2012: 3).

To answer the research question, it was necessary to first reflect on the current literature on China’s foreign policy and how it works, to understand how other scholars had approached it and to comprehend their research. Equally, before embarking on this journey, reflection was needed on the challenges to accomplishing this task. The main challenge was that although there was ample research on China-Africa relations, not much had been written on the change in its foreign policy, especially using contemporary studies. Most research was on the economic perspective of the relationship, the gains and losses, and China’s quest for Africa’s natural resources. This study focuses on how China’s foreign policy works and China’s foreign policy towards Africa, using the case of the Sudans, DRC and Nigeria as points of reference.

1.2 Significance of the study

This study is significant because it provides insight into the relationship between China and the two Sudans, the DRC and Nigeria. It also offers insight to how the relationships provide conflict variables. The growing relationships were sparked by challenges. For China, the challenge was finding a way to secure its interests in
Africa generally and the Sudans in particular, given its rapidly changing circumstances. This has been a major challenge for China because of the security and political risks on the African continent. China needs to protect its investments and interests in Africa; therefore, what affects African countries affects it directly as the main investor in countries like South Sudan, the DRC, Mozambique and many others (The Economist, 2015). In addition, China’s domestic issues have had a significant impact on the evident change in its foreign policy.

The Financial Times (2016: internet) quoted President Xi as saying, “hegemony and militarism is not in the genes of the Chinese”. Such misleading statements are the reason that more scholars need to analyse China’s changing foreign policy. China cannot want to maintain a clean image at the expense of being seen as a better option than the West. In addition, this analysis shows that the change is not all bad; in most cases, China did try to develop the state in many African countries. Although no country on the African continent is on an equal footing with China, it has made an earnest effort to ensure that the relationships are worthwhile for Africa. This analysis is also vital to the international community because it assists the two popular perceptions (neo-colonialism vs developmental partnership) to re-evaluate their stances. Moreover, because China is a rising superpower that uses its relations with Africa to gain more influence on international platforms, the international community can use these scholarly findings as checks and balances to keep China accountable and to monitor its approach generally.

China’s foreign policy change was a mere effect; therefore, this study had to investigate the factors leading to continuity and change. As foreign policy is an important contributor to a state’s progress or downfall it is important to regularly check and review its effects. China’s foreign policy played a huge role in its position as an emerging superpower. Nigeria’s, the DRC’s and the two Sudans’ foreign policies could facilitate a better future for their respective states. Therefore, this research into China’s changing foreign policy is significant as it opens a space for scholars to raise critical questions and concerns that require international attention.

The growing demand for research on the changes in China’s foreign policy justifies the need for effective evaluation and critical analysis. Thus, scholars who have criticised China and its intentions on the African continent will be able to assess the
validity of their criticism and conclusions on the outcomes of China’s foreign policy. Scholars will also be able to intensify their arguments and criticisms in this regard.

This study provides scholars with guidance on the aspects that should be emphasised when referring to China’s changing foreign policy and its commitment to the five principles of coexistence. For the researcher, the study helps to uncover critical areas of the non-interference policy, which many researchers have not been able to explore. Thus, this study leads to a deeper understanding of China’s changing foreign policy towards the African continent, focusing on the two Sudans, the DRC and Nigeria.

1.3 Aims and objectives

The main aim of this study is to critically analyse China’s changing foreign policy using the cases of the two Sudans, the DRC and Nigeria. China, as an emerging superpower, distanced itself from the approach of the West in its relations with states, especially vulnerable ones such as on the African continent. Therefore, it is vital to ensure that African scholars regularly evaluate China’s foreign policy interests in Africa and continuously reflect on its promises.

The study has the following objectives, namely to:

- provide an overview and conceptual orientation of continuity and change in China’s foreign policy in general and on the African continent in particular;
- analyse continuity and change in China’s contemporary foreign policy dynamics using the two Sudans, the DRC and Nigeria as case studies; and
- evaluate the political and economic implications of change and continuity in China’s contemporary foreign policy towards Africa.
1.4 Literature review

The study makes use of both primary and secondary sources.

1.4.1 Literature on China’s foreign policy

The study used works such as Michael D. Swaine’s *China’s domestic change and foreign policy* (1995) and *Chinese strategic culture and foreign policy decision making* by Huiyun Feng (2007). Another academic source was Mark Lanteigne’s *Chinese foreign policy: An introduction* (2009). These sources provided an in-depth analysis and explanation of China’s foreign policy. Swaine (1995) was an important source as it “reports on the analysis of the implications of political-military, social and economic developments within China for the evolution of Chinese foreign policy over the next 10–15 years”. Feng (2007) was significant as an academic source as it presents a theory of strategic culture that examines the historical roots of China’s foreign policy. Lanteigne (2009) unpacks the main issues and challenges facing China in the realm of foreign policy.

1.4.2 Literature on China’s foreign policy towards Africa and the two Sudans

The literature reviewed on China’s policy of non-interference included *China’s foreign policy and its non-interference principle: Farewell or renewal* by William Callahan (2012), David Shinn’s *Africa tests China’s non-interference policy* (2014) and *China – The balance sheet: what the world needs to know about the emerging superpower* by authors C. Fredbergsten, Gates Gill, Nicholas Lardy and Derek Mitchell (2006). These academic works were very important as they provide insight to Chinese foreign policy with specific reference to the policy of non-interference, and clarity on the nature of China’s foreign policy change and its policy of non-interference, while also questioning its consistency to a certain extent. They also explore the challenges created by China’s foreign policy and the initial idea behind China’s commitment to the policy of non-interference.
1.4.3 Literature on China’s changing foreign policy towards the DRC

This study used many methods of investigation to effectively analyse how China’s changing foreign policy affected its relationship with the DRC. Claude Kabemba’s (2016) article on China-DRC relations focuses on the reality of the idea of a win-win cooperative relationship between China and the DRC. This article was important because it raises awareness of the feasibility of a win-win situation between unequal partners. It was important for this study because it explains extensively how China’s foreign policy on the DRC changed from being beneficial to one that speaks to developmental cooperation. Another important source was an article published on the American Interest website, authored by Kushner (2014). It was important for this study because it attempts to clearly explain why the poorest state would want to embrace Chinese investment over Western aid.

To understand China’s foreign policy change, one also has to look at external factors that affect the change and those that force the change to intensify or at least remain constant. China’s approach is seen as an alternative to the West's approach to relations with Africa. It is important for China to maintain distinction from the West. Kabemba (2012) was useful because it analyses the three phases that China and the DRC went through regarding Chinese investment in the DRC’s mining sector. This was important because China expanded its copper control in the DRC as the West retreated. This was reiterated in an article by Wilson (2016).

1.4.4 Literature on China’s changing foreign policy towards Nigeria

China-Nigeria relations are a clear case of a soft power approach and foreign policy change from China. China not only imports crude oil and hydrocarbons from Nigeria, but also started to emphasise cultural diversity through its cultural exchanges with Nigeria. The Diplomat (2016), in its article China-Nigeria relations: A success story for Beijing’s soft power, analysed the factors that contributed to China’s foreign policy change in Nigeria. It also showed that China changed from emphasising ideological considerations to focusing on pragmatic considerations. Daniel Wagner
and Giorgio Cafiero (2013) bring up popular contrasting arguments. This source was important as it shed light on whether these relations reiterate neo-colonialism, south-south solidarity or both.

1.5 Research methodology

This study analyses the change and continuity in China’s foreign policy dynamics focusing specifically on Sudan and South Sudan, the DRC and Nigeria. In doing so, it reflects on whether China’s foreign policy is still driven by the five principles of coexistence. The study used case studies to establish the consistency of China’s foreign policy in a constantly changing world. A case study is an in-depth study of a particular situation rather than a sweeping statistical survey. It was used in this study to narrow down a very broad field of research into one easily researchable topic. A descriptive approach is used to depict issues of foreign policy between China and the international community, focusing specifically on the two Sudans, the DRC and Nigeria. This study describes the changes in implementing China’s foreign policy and events that led to this inconsistency.

Qualitative research is primarily exploratory research and is therefore more flexible than other research techniques (Neuman, 2003). It uses existing literature that, in this study, focused specifically on China’s foreign policy to gain an understanding of the underlying reasons, opinions and motivations that explain change and continuity in China’s foreign policy dynamics. As change and continuity in China’s foreign policy dynamics had been evident for the past two decades, most of this literature is by contemporary scholars. This study also uses the comparative method to compare the continuity and change of China’s foreign policy in the three cases identified. China’s foreign policy towards these three states was scrutinised with reference to its agencies, structural design and implementation.

The study followed a more inductive research approach. It looked at concepts such as foreign policy, national interests, win-win partnerships and active engagements. The inductive approach is also known as inductive reasoning. According to Bernard
(2011), an inductive approach “involves the search for patterns from observation and the development of explanations for these patterns”. The approach is pertinent because this study analysed the consistency in China’s foreign policy using existing information and investigated concepts such as foreign policy, national interests, win-win partnerships and active engagements. An inductive approach is also concerned with generating ideas, expectations and arguments through a lengthy process of information collection. This information is collected through academic literature that varies in terms of time and theory. Academic literature used includes books, journal articles, newspaper reports and organisation charters. This study used both primary and secondary sources to collect data. Leaders’ statements, sourced from exclusive interviews and newspapers on the internet, were used as empirical evidence for deductive reasoning on foreign policy approaches. However, it is important to allude to the limitations of the study. The information collected was limited as it derived mostly from Western scholars. Chinese scholars had not published much literature on these topics.

Furthermore, the study used relevant macro theories of International Relations to explore continuity and change in China’s foreign policy with reference to the three cases identified. These theories are realism, liberalism and constructivism, with each providing different points of departure. Each of these theories is further examined in Chapter 2 of this study.

1.6 Outline of the study

Chapter 1 introduces the study of China’s policy and the five principles of peaceful coexistence, and provides a general orientation that consists of a problem statement, literature review, research methodology and the outline of the study.

Chapter 2 focuses specifically on explaining foreign policy change and reflects on theories relating to the study using the models of foreign policy analysis (FPA). It also uses all the relevant International Relations theories to construct its theoretical concept.
Chapter 3 uses the case of the two Sudans to reflect on the growing relationship between the Sudans and China. It follows their historic relationship to make sense of their current growing relationship, and subsequently deals with the events that led to China’s change of heart in terms of China’s non-interference policy.

Chapter 4 analyses China’s relationship with the DRC. It starts by discussing their initial relations and further explains how the ongoing conflict in the DRC led to China’s change in foreign policy due to its soft interference.

Chapter 5 deals with the final case study. Here the relationship between China and Nigeria is analysed in depth. This chapter reflects on the recent changes in China’s foreign policy in its relations with Nigeria, looking specifically at the fact that their relationship is not dominated solely by economic exchanges, which makes Nigeria a special case in this study.

Chapter 6 provides a synthesis of the preceding four chapters and critically explains why the change occurred. It does so by providing an evaluation of the study and a conclusion.
CHAPTER 2: CONTINUITY AND CHANGE IN FOREIGN POLICY– A CONCEPTUALISATION

2.1 Introduction

To critically analyse foreign policy with the intention of finding foreign policy change, the concept of foreign policy has to be clarified to ensure that the idea that underpins the concept is solid, and to articulate the arguments and contribution to the study. This chapter uses various sources and contributions by scholars in the discipline of International Relations to define and conceptualise foreign policy. It further interprets the concept through the theories of realism, liberalism and constructivism to create a solid foundation through the lens of an International Relations scholar. The chapter subsequently uses the FPA model to articulate the factors influencing the change in China’s foreign policy.

This chapter has two main aims. Firstly, it aims to provide a clear conceptual orientation of foreign policy in International Relations. This not only consists of a clear explanation of the concept, but also focuses on explaining how foreign policy works, who the role players are and what influences foreign policy. Secondly, the chapter aims to explain how change in foreign policy occurs through the critical analysis of what influences the change and how states and the international community account for change in foreign policy.

The various International Relations subfields such as FPA and the theoretical framework play a fundamental role in achieving the aims of this study. In this sense, they are also important.

2.2 Conceptualisation of foreign policy

Various scholars in International Relations define and interpret concepts differently over time. This is particularly problematic as it leads to vagueness and ambiguity (Du
Plessis, 2006: 120). Hill (2003: 2) highlights the importance of scientifically accounting for and explaining foreign policy to avoid generalisations. As such, this study offers a detailed and evidence-based explanation of foreign policy, thereby avoiding a narrow or specific interpretation of the concept.

The concept of foreign policy is made up of two terms: foreign and policy. It is vital to understand both to make sense of the study and of foreign policy as a concept. Words such as outside, unfamiliar, strange and distant come up when one thinks of the term foreign. This is because foreign means something that is beyond the borders of the state. Policy is defined by Vargas-Hernandez, Noruzi and Ali (2011: 4) as the provision of principles that dictate actions. These principles may be proposed and adopted by a state or individuals as they are binding to all who are subjected to them. These two terms together provide a definition of foreign policy as those principles and plans that guide the relations between a state or an actor and other unfamiliar states or actors in the international community.

According to Heywood (2011: 115), foreign policy is defined as a concept that can be related and linked to tasks of governments. This means that governments are constructors and engineers of foreign policy; consequently, governments are expected to direct and regulate events in the international community. Thus, foreign policy is an intermediary used by governments to set targets beyond their borders to fulfil and achieve their desired goals. Domestic politics in this sense play a bigger role in foreign policy than is often credited. This is because the desired goals of governments beyond their borders are, in certain instances, derived from the domestic settings of a state. In this way, the state seems to play an integral part in the flow of foreign policy. The theory of realism terms this approach state-centric. The distinction between domestic politics and international politics is still relevant, although some scholars have recently opined differently. Brighi and Hill (2012: 153) highlight that some scholars assert, “in conditions of globalisation, all politics has become foreign policy in one way or the other”. Even if one acknowledges this point, which this study does not aim to do, the FPA tools used in conceptualisation and methodology are still useful to analyse non-foreign policy decisions. This means that FPA tools, to a certain extent, assist in analysing general human decision making
irrespective of the substantive focus. FPA is used later in the chapter and explained extensively.

Foreign policy should be seen primarily as a commitment in a continuous process of action, reaction and subsequent action at various levels, and involves several actors that are different (Hudson, 2013: 5). This means that foreign policy decision making is perpetual in that it attracts continuous action from both sides involved. Furthermore, it is common for foreign policy decisions to be modified over the years, which requires the sequence of foreign policy decisions to be constantly examined.

In addition, a clear distinction should be made between foreign policy decisions and foreign policy actions, and a further distinction between foreign policy decisions and foreign policy outcomes (Hudson, 2013: 6-7). The distinction between foreign policy decisions and foreign policy actions is important for two reasons: firstly, the foreign policy decisions taken by the actors involved do not always result in action. In other words, those decisions taken to influence the foreign policy process are not always put into practice and executed. Secondly, foreign policy decisions may be executed in a way that does not disclose the true nature of the decisions taken. This means that the actual reasons behind the actions taken may not be fully disclosed or may be distorted for the benefit of the actor’s foreign policy. This is very common in foreign policy.

The second distinction is between foreign policy decisions and foreign policy outcomes. There are three reasons for this: firstly, it is public knowledge that foreign policy decisions are meant to fulfil specific aims and objectives; however, as with any situation, those decisions will not always – in fact, almost never – result in complete success. Secondly, the foreign policy decision may have an undesirable outcome. To this effect, the foreign policy decision may provoke quite the opposite reaction to the one the decision maker had hoped or intended. This means that the decision or the outcome of the decision may not in all cases be well received in foreign policy. Lastly, those involved in foreign policy decision making should know that they do not have full control over the outcome and the consequences that come with, or follow, the outcome of the foreign policy decision.
Saiva (2005: 145) states that people/citizens do not play a significant role in foreign policy. This would be correct to a certain extent, because citizens do not understand the complexities of foreign policy and, as such, it becomes the duty of the state and various other actors in the international community. Those citizens that understand foreign policy understand it in a state-centric manner. This means they understand foreign policy as something orchestrated by the state and based on interactions between and among states. This kind of analysis can be related to the theory of realism.

Foreign policy can be understood in different ways in terms of the variety of theories in International Relations. Theories of foreign policy aim at explaining what states seek to achieve beyond their immediate borders and what factors cause them to pursue certain actions (Rose, 1998: 145). One theory that normally dominates to explain foreign policy in International Relations is the theory of realism. Viewing foreign policy through the lens of realism results in foreign policy being perceived as a means to an end (Heywood, 2011: 115). In this sense, states develop their foreign policy to advance their power in a world that is perceived by realists as anarchic. Where anarchy is simply due to the lack of central authority, states are required to fend for themselves (Heywood, 2011: 115). When relating the theory of realism to foreign policy specifically, realism is based on three core assumptions of how the world works (Wohlfforth, 2012:36). These three assumptions are:

- **Groupism**: Individuals face each other mainly as members belonging to a group. People need the sense of unity and solidarity to survive and keep up in the international spectrum. This sort of cohesion can only be afforded to individuals in a group setting. However, this very in-group solidarity has the potential to precipitate conflict with other groups.

- **Egoism**: Realism is centred on the notion that political behaviour, especially pertaining to foreign policy, is driven by the need to preserve self-interest. This means that egoism is deeply rooted in individuals even in in-group settings. When states are put in a difficult position and faced with the dilemma of having to choose between collective or self-interest, it is definite that states will allow self-interest to triumph. Realists generally argue that
states normally take actions to satisfy their self-interests. This is their explanation for the events that take place between and among states.

- **Power-centrism**: Power is also a very important attribute of politics, including foreign policy decision making. Inequalities of power are always great in international affairs, especially in terms of social and resource control. Social control or influence relates to the fact that in interactions between and among states, an individual or group always has more power over another in politics. Resource control refers to the fact that some states always have the upper hand in material terms. They use this power to get what they want out of interactions regarding foreign policy.

When one thinks about foreign policy in this way, it leads to an easily identifiable approach to foreign policy by realists. It addresses the fact that the focus is always on the most powerful groups (the ones with social and material controls) at any given time (currently, this means major powers such as China and the USA). Issues that critique the intentions of states’ foreign policies also emerge. Realists are sceptical about the main objectives of foreign policy other than the self-interest of the state. As far as China and Africa is concerned, China’s conception of its own national interests in the realist paradigm is what drives Chinese foreign policy, as this study shows in terms of its relations with the two Sudans. China imports 66% of oil produced in the two Sudans and, as such, it becomes very important for China to act in critical situations to preserve its interests (CNN, 2012).

Liberals do not agree with this stance. They do not see the state as the sole and significant actor in International Relations. Liberal internationalism creates international institutions to regulate interactions between states and international law to guide those interactions and relations (Dunne, Kurki & Smith, 2012: 95). Issues of terrorism, drug trafficking, human rights, environment, technology and finance are as important as security issues according to the theory of liberalism. In fact, liberals focus on norms, regimes, economic interdependence and international organisations. There is also no distinction between high and low politics, i.e. matters that are more important than others to securing the survival of the state. The liberal theory also alludes to there being an important connection between domestic structures and processes, and international politics. Liberalism in foreign policy
emphasises an ongoing peace amid liberal states (Doyle, 2012: 59). Liberalism also highlights the fact that there has been an increase in the amount of liberal states after the Cold War. This realisation has led theorists of liberalism to believe in the possibility of a global peace that is self-enforced without the establishment of a central government or a world state (Doyle, 2012).

Liberal policies also stress human rights. This, however, is particularly problematic for authoritarian governments in developing countries, especially in Africa, as authoritarian leaders do not always support these policies. Liberal foreign policy analysis centres on individual rights, governments that are representative of their people, international perceptions and the notion of private property. These are seen as factors that influence, and have a significant impact on, how foreign policy is shaped. According to Nel (in McGowen, Cornelissen & Nel, 2007), liberalism also features the importance of social and economic interdependence. This leads to a mixture of both conflict and cooperation. Liberalism establishes incentives that allow for more cooperation than conflict and, in this sense, economic interdependence is not necessarily dependent on security-motivated restrictions (Doyle, 2012: 68). The liberal community also uses what they call positive duty in circumstances where there is discrimination and intolerable oppressions. This means that states can, in grave circumstances, override the sovereignty of other states only to save fellow human beings from oppressions such as genocides and ethnic cleansing. However, this should not be the first reaction to conflict. Liberals believe in first mitigating and negotiating to inspire peaceful conflict resolution; the call for interference is only allowed when all other options have been exhausted and it is necessary to do so. This means it should be in the best interests of the human beings.

In the case of China, it has increasingly had to consider human rights concerns with regards to internal affairs in the two Sudans. This is directly linked to the fact that China is a rising power; as such, it must take on the role of international responsibility, which ultimately means that China has to engage in humanitarian actions. This is exactly what liberalism alludes to. It also applies as China realised that security matters and interests were not the only issues on the main agenda; humanitarian needs also had to be addressed. This will be fully unpacked in the chapters that follow.
In treating the international system as a macro-level social sphere, the proponents of constructivism, make the following assumptions (Flockhart, 2012: 81-82; Tamaki, 2015: 14):

- Meanings are important in the international system just as human interaction is within communities and societies.
- Belief that reality is rooted in the construction of the society, which makes social facts important in analysing foreign policy.
- It is not just norms and rules that play a role in foreign policy analysis.
- Mutual constitutiveness of agents and structures are as vital as the focus on practice and action in the international system, especially pertaining to foreign policy.
- Actors are assumed to be intentional and rational. This means that actors have identities and use symbolisms in their interactions.
- Actors could be states, groups, or individuals, thereby opening the way for an even more complex analysis of the international system.

Constructivism is a theoretical approach in which actors’ perceptions, ideas, images, and symbols are of great importance and should be treated as such. Constructivism is concerned with the social context of the international system and assumes that meaning is socially constructed (Björkdahl, 2002: 22; Hill, 2003). Wendt (1992, 396-7) states:

"a fundamental principle of constructivist social theory is that people act toward objects, including other actors, on the basis of the meanings that the objects have for them."

Therefore, the idea of meaning is vital to understanding the theory of constructivism. This study also relies on constructivist concepts such as identity, norms, cognition, images and beliefs to study Chinese foreign policy changes. According to Björkdahl (2002: 15), the view of constructivism is that norms in the international system are part of the justification for the meaning of state and individual interests. This is because norms affect the way actors link not only what they prefer to policy choices, but also to what affects their interests. This means that states, cause-effect relationships and patterns rely to a certain extent on the webs of meaning that
complement and constitute them (Hurd, 2008). This study highlights the point that although meanings, according to the theory of constructivism, may sometimes be secure, they are never rigid and, as a result, should never be mistaken for perpetual or everlasting objects. The international system changes over time and space; this is also the case for norms.

2.3 **Who are the actors (role players) in foreign policy?**


By this, Slantchev (2005) means that to attempt to make sense of any issue in the international community, start by engaging and dealing with the individuals who are involved in decision making. It is impossible for International Relations scholars to ignore this. This study uses the term actors to address these individuals. These actors evaluate options, they have the option of choosing between available alternatives (if there are any) and they subsequently implement their decisions or not, depending on what their true intentions are. As a result, the study aims to know how people analyse the different courses of action and how they make their choice among these, given a specific environment with options, constraints and information (Slantchev, 2005: 1).

It is important for this study to consider the role players that are responsible for foreign policy making and implementation. This is imperative in the quest for an adequate analysis of any foreign policy (Bailes, 2001: 40). Foreign policy making is a complicated procedure (Williams, 2004: 911) and therefore requires critical analysis. This section aims at providing a brief discussion on the different role players in the foreign policy process. The role players are identified by Breuning (2007: 28-48) as:
2.3.1 Individual actors

Actors that are identified as individuals in foreign policy making are prime ministers, autocrats, foreign ministers or presidents. They are distinguished as they are ranked the highest in the hierarchy of governance within a state. Thus, their importance grants them the ability to have the greatest influence in decision making in the foreign policy and any other foreign policies of the state (Breuning, 2007: 41). However, it is important to note that different types of governments determine the likelihood of the president, autocrat or the prime minister having influence. An individual actor may have a different kind of influence on foreign policy making in an autocratic type of government than they would have in a democratic type of government (Bailes, 2001: 40). The different types of governments determine the dominance in influence of the individual actor on foreign policy making.

Individual actors do not influence the foreign policy behaviour of the state under all circumstances. This is because in certain circumstances they are left with few options and alternatives, while in other circumstances individual actors either have, or create, the freedom to construct and build foreign policy within their states. Breuning (2007: 41) also states that the human emotions of these individual actors have an influence on foreign policy making, while pointing out that not much is known about the impact of emotions on foreign policy decision making. In the case of China’s foreign policy, the single party and institutional dominance of the Chinese Communist Party result in reducing the importance of the individual decision maker’s personality or emotions.

2.3.2 Secondary actors

Secondary actors as leaders and influencers in foreign policy making are as important, and to a certain extent more important than individual actors in that they do the ground work. Secondary actors include foreign ministers, bureaucrats and interest groups. They are important actors in influencing foreign policy making because it is impossible for individual actors (prime ministers, autocrats or presidents) to take charge of the entire policy process (Rourke, 2008: 78-79). Secondary actors are also important in foreign policy making because in most cases,
they provide knowledge and skills. The fact that they have this particular skill makes them obvious to lead foreign policy. Thus, they play a role that cannot be ignored and the individual actors depend on them to make informed decisions. This is the case even in highly authoritarian political systems. China’s secondary actors who play a major role in Sudan and South Sudan include China’s Ambassador to South Sudan Ma Qiang, and the Special Representative of the Chinese Government on African Affairs Zhong Jinhau (China.org, 2017). Their role is influential in that they are deployed to represent China in diplomacy between the two states and, because they are cognisant of what is happening in Sudan and South Sudan, they are able to assist in making the right decisions regarding actions by China.

2.3.3 Other actors and role players

Democratic states provide a platform for more role players to be brought to the stage in foreign policy making. These role players are equipped in different fields and are therefore significant contributors. Other role players in foreign policy making are the media, legislators, public opinion, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), businesses and multiple opposition parties (Bailes, 2011: 35). In the case of China, the military also serves as a role player in foreign policy decision making. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has been a well-oiled military machine that continues to have a notable role in making decisions on the politico-economic-social life and foreign relations, and plays the role of a very influential pressure group in the network of Chinese foreign relations and in making Chinese foreign policy. (Grieger, 2015; Priya, 2017).

The media plays an important role in making foreign policy as it has an accelerant effect. This is because the media acts as an influencer in government decision making because the 24-hour media environment leads to a constant flow of news and information (Frizis, 2013). The media also plays an important role through its input perspective as the media can potentially act as agenda setters. This is based on the prestige paper theory, which states that “in each major power, one newspaper stands out as an organ of the elite opinion,” (Cohen, 1963: 136). This means that the media can maintain influence through its role as the main public provider of
information. China is not influenced by the media within its country due to media censorship. However, the publicity that it gets from international media platforms remains of great significance in that China is a rising global power and it cannot ignore threats to its image.

Legislators are also role players as they are given the authority to establish a set of laws for the government and its population (Grimmett, 1999:15-17). Foreign policy makers and role players work within this framework of laws, which makes legislators essential. These laws assume the role of orchestrators because they give direction to how far the individual and secondary actors can take measures when formulating foreign policy. China's legislation is inclusive of the legislation of the National People's Congress and its Standing Committee, the State Council and its relevant departments that make regulations, as well as the legislation of ordinary localities, ethnic autonomous regions, special economic zones and special administrative regions (China.org, 2017).

NGOs and businesses are also role players in foreign policy making (Bailes, 2011: 35). Businesses are significant in that they add economic pressure to the state. Privately-owned enterprises such as the Zhonhao Overseas Construction Engineering Company that entered South Sudan in 2006, and state-owned companies such as the China National Petroleum Company (CNPC) and China Overseas Engineering Group, also play a role in influencing China's foreign policy decision making, although they do not carry much weight in this regard (South Sudan Civics, 2014). The state cannot ignore the business sector. What happens beyond and within state borders affects businesses directly and, if the impact is negative, it will result in the state’s economy suffering. Therefore, the two need to work together to ensure that domestic factors such as the economy are not negatively affected by what happens in the international community.

NGOs are always well-informed on issues that they vouch for. This makes them important as their opinions are not just opinions; they are opinions that are backed up by data. They work on issues that affect the international community such as gender inequalities, global warming and food insecurities. According to Hsu (2016), the China Foundation for Poverty Alleviation (CFPA), which is a Chinese NGO, played a role in China’s foreign policy by pressurising it to realise the need for infant
and maternal care in Sudan. The CFPA built the China-Sudan Abu Ushar Friendship Hospital in an attempt to assist in this regard. This hospital was welcomed as a “model for international cooperation” by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Sudan (CFPA 2011: 19) because of the great interplay between international investors, including a further $600 000 in donations from the CNPC.

2.4 Explaining change in foreign policy

Cases of foreign policy change are rare. The dominance of the USA in a unipolar world during the early 1990s encouraged debate and a readjustment of national foreign policies in light of the evolution of both national societies and the international system of the preceding decades (Le Pestre, 1997: 251). When a state goes through a transition or restructuring of its foreign policy, it can have a profound impact on not only the state political system, but also the international political system. This change can destabilise and cause destruction within a state; it can even lead to warfare. This underscores the importance of studying the underlying causes of foreign policy change. This study attempts to further understand the causes of foreign policy change.

This study uses Kal Holsti’s model (1982) as the framework for this research project. There are three reasons that justify this decision. Firstly, Holsti considers variables that influence decision making such as leadership, personality and perceptions. Holsti’s model also stands out because it is broad and absolute, allowing for foreign policy to be analysed from a wider and thorough range by emphasising the external, domestic and cultural factors. Lastly, Holsti emphasises interactions between political and economic factors, between internal and external determinants and between traditional values and current events. Holsti’s model also directs its focus to sudden and radical changes of foreign policy. Holsti’s model is therefore important to this study because it provides a distinct and different approach from empirical approaches that focus on observation as opposed to the causes of state action.
Holsti’s analytical framework consists of three independent variables: domestic factors, external factors and cultural factors (Holsti, 1982). These independent variables are the determinants of foreign policy change. To understand how and why change occurs in foreign policy, the focus is divided among all three variables, although any one of them could have more influence than the others, depending on the different cases. This benefits the study because the scope of analysis is not narrow and more than one factor is unpacked to provide reasons for change in China’s foreign policy. Holsti (1982) states that a change in foreign policy is often a response to a threat. The threat, however, does not relate to a military threat. Holsti’s framework of analysis is imperative for this study as it includes cultural, economic and informational threats (Zhang, 1993). The study therefore uncovered domestic political crises, economic vulnerability and the state's development strategy as having a vital influence on foreign policy change in the case of China.

2.4.1 Domestic factors

Domestic factors comprise internal threats, economic conditions and political fractionalisation. Putnam (1988: 427) argues that domestic and international politics often affect each other. An analysis of this statement concludes that domestic politics does affect international politics and vice versa. Domestic factors are very important when studying changes in foreign policy. Hagan (1995: 117) and McGowan et al (2007) emphasise that government leaders (individual and secondary actors) are required to deal with pressures and challenges from domestic political sources as well the international political system. Domestic factors play a vital role in pressuring and redirecting governments into changing foreign policies when deemed necessary. This means that legitimate decision makers need to consider domestic factors when deciding foreign policy because they depend on domestic support to assume and maintain power. China’s need for oil and the need for its economy to survive are directly linked to its relationship with the unstable Sudan and South Sudan. In this sense, China’s oil needs and its economy’s survival are domestic factors that influence its foreign policy. China needs oil for it to sustain its economy, which results in its citizenry remaining employed and continuing to provide for their families. Unlike other countries, China does not always kill or threaten its people for the
Communist Party to remain in power; instead, China seeks economic gains to ensure that its citizens are catered for and that the Communist Party retains the people’s support (Moyo, 2012). However, this study remains cognisant of the events of Tiananmen Square in 1989 where the Chinese government used violence and intimidation to stop the protest.

Breuning (2007: 120-134) mentions quite a few domestic sources of change in foreign policy. In this study, the focus will be on five domestic sources that influence change in foreign policy: agencies that make up government bureaucracy, the domestic audience, the media, interest groups, the State Council, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China and political parties. Government bureaucracy influences foreign policy making. To understand the significance of government bureaucracy in foreign policy change the term bureaucracy needs to be comprehensively understood. Eidenfolk (2006: 3) defines bureaucracy as a system of government in which most of the important decisions are made by state officials rather than by elected representatives. These state officials, according to Breuning (2007), can be idea- or interest-based, which means that their ideas may account for their influence on foreign policy change, or this change could be a result of an interest that is to their benefit at a given time. Government bureaucracies that influence foreign policy making in China are those that were alluded to as individual actors and secondary actors. These are ambassadors, the PLA, diplomats, special representatives of the Chinese government and the prime minister of the country.

Breuning (2007: 122) also mentions that domestic audiences may have an influence on foreign policy making. Domestic audiences are the population within a given state that legitimises the state (Heywood, 2009: 29). In this light, they are highly significant. Citizens influence change in foreign policy both in democratic and non-democratic states (Hagan, 1995). The only difference is that their influence on foreign policy change varies due to the different political systems in democratic and non-democratic states. Domestic audiences may be passive or active influencers of foreign policy change because public activeness changes across the lifespan of a foreign policy (Breuning, 2007: 123). This means that the public’s activeness may vary depending on the different crisis or non-crisis situations. China’s domestic audience is seen through its think tanks and public opinion (GW Libraries, 2017).
However, public opinion can be misleading as China’s censorship shapes and directs its citizens’ views. Nevertheless, the domestic influence continues to play a role although it is rather passive. In terms of political parties, in the case of China, there is only one that has an influence, and that is the Communist Party of China.

2.4.2 External factors

This study also probes the influence of external factors in foreign policy change by examining the changing character of the international system. Current international politics is about the interaction between states, institutions and non-state actors. They interact on different levels; thus, international politics has been proclaimed a complex system. Aside from actors, norms, power and institutions are also important factors to study when examining the effects of international factors on foreign policy decision making.

According to Jackson and Sorenson (2013: 66-67), realism has four basic ideas and assumptions that can be used to explain events and actions in International Relations. States are pessimistic and are always suspicious of each other, anarchy in international politics reigns supreme, power distribution remains the struggle of international politics and states are the main actors in International Relations (Jackson & Sorenson, 2013: 66-67). However, the realist theory is not the only theory of value and does not always account for various events and actions in international politics. The complex interdependence theory was established as a counter-theory to the realist theory to fill the gaps and make more sense of events in global politics (Keohane & Nye, 2001: 20-22). This study uses both these theories to explain the international factors influencing foreign policy decision making.

The external factors discussed are non-state actors and global, regional and bilateral factors. Changes in the international political system have an impact on states’ foreign policies. An example would be the end of the Cold War. There were efforts by the USA, the Soviet Union/Russia, China, Japan, Germany, France, the United Kingdom (UK) and many other states to align themselves with the transformation in international politics after the Cold War (Le Pestre, 1997: 251-261). International institutions such as the UN accepted that norms and goals such as the decision to
expand democracy to other states, the establishment of the doctrine of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) and climate change may also have a great impact on foreign policy changes (Breuning, 2007: 149-152). Therefore, a shift in the global political system, a shift in internationally accepted norms and goals, and changes to international institutions would lead to changes in foreign policy. China is a global power and a growing superpower. To a certain extent, it can be argued that China’s rise has threatened the USA’s dominance of the global system. As a result of its growing international status, China has had to adapt to the prerequisites of the international system such as undertaking humanitarian actions. This, in turn, led to China’s foreign policy change.

Events may also have a regional as opposed to global impact (Breuning, 2007: 156). An example would be the outbreak of Ebola in 2014 in West Africa. The impact of the outbreak was more regional than global or even continental. Foreign policy makers within the region may have been affected in terms of their foreign policy making, which would have resulted in foreign policy change. Regional institutions may also have an impact on the change in states’ foreign policy within the region. An example would be China accepting the call from regional bodies such as the Economic Community of West African State (ECOWAS) and the Economic Community of Central African States. China accepted the call to interfere in the ongoing conflicts in the DRC and the two Sudans to avoid being condemned for impeding the African Union’s (AU) work (Nashipa & Kiprop, 2014: 14). Accepted norms in regions are normally influenced by traditions, culture and the background of the region, and could influence foreign policy change. Another example is the international community reaching consensus on the genocide in Darfur and the need for the secession of the south from the north in Sudan.

Bilateral factors and non-state actors also influence changes in the foreign policies of states in international politics. States may use their bilateral relations to their advantage in getting things done. A state may influence other states by using its leverage as their ally or through economic threats to reject or adopt changes in foreign policies. This was the case where China’s aid and assistance on the African continent led to most African countries voting in solidarity with China. Transnational actors also emerged as shapers and influencers of foreign policy. Their influence
cannot go unnoticed by policymakers. This highlights the contribution by Keohane and Nye (2001: 20-22) that states are important actors in international politics, but they are not the most important actors as claimed by the theory of realism.

2.4.3 Cultural factors

Zhang (1993: 33) states that traditional cultural values and historical legacy, which form a state’s perception and attitude towards the outside world, are other determinants of foreign policy change. In the same vein, ideologies that direct states into relations and governance are also important when accounting for change in foreign policy (Zhang, 1993: 34). States’ cultural values may change and the importance of certain traditions may shift with time, which influences the way states interact with other states in terms of foreign policy and on the international platform. Previously, China was more focused on preserving its culture and ensuring that its way of doing things was not influenced by Western ways. This resulted in China being isolated in the international community and being heavily criticised by scholars and actors in the international community. As an emerging power, China’s culture has had to alter, as seen by its interference in South Sudan’s domestic issues. Even though it recognises that South Sudan is a sovereign state, China now also considers people’s livelihoods and their safety.

Different generations see different things as important: this influences the consistency of foreign policy and could be linked to leadership within a state. As cultural changes occur within a state, different prime ministers or leaders could be forced to change with them. In some instances, this is when changes in foreign policy begin to occur. Ideological factors should also not be neglected. They play a significant role in foreign policy changes and continuity.
2.5 Foreign policy analysis (FPA)

The FPA is regarded as a subfield of International Relations. It is an important subfield as its main aim is to explain not just foreign policy, but also foreign policy behaviour. The FPA does so using the theoretical grounds of human decision makers, whether acting alone or in groups, and foreign policy decisions and outcomes. Smith, Hadfield and Dunne (2012: 14) highlight several hallmarks that the FPA assumes:

- Seeks to look beneath the nation-state level of analysis to actor-specific information.
- Commits itself to constructing an actor-specific theory that will integrate actor-general theory and the complexity of the real world.
- Pursues multiclausal explanations spanning multiple levels of analysis.
- Uses theory and discoveries across the spectrum of social science.
- Views the process of foreign policy decision making as imperative as its output.

As this study highlighted earlier, the study of the FPA has an actor-specific focus. Put simply, it is the study of the foreign policy process, the analysis of the causes and effects of decision making in foreign policy, and the study of the outcomes of foreign policy decision making. FPA models use a comparative analysis approach or are case-specific. Its roots are based on the notion that an individual acting as a group or within a group ultimately causes change in the international system. The FPA also stresses the importance of the interplay among multiple factors that arise not only from the international system, but also from the domestic system. According to Hill (2003: 82), the FPA has the capacity to indicate the extent to which the nature of the decision-making process determines the outcomes of foreign policy in terms of both the intrinsic quality of a decision and its effective execution.

It cannot be emphasised enough how important the idea of understanding the individuals central to the process of decision making is when attempting to understand the concept of foreign policy. Many scholars in the field of International
Relations and Political Science in general have highlighted the importance of the state as an actor when trying to study foreign policy from its roots. However, this study is of the view that this is not the complete picture. There are important questions that this study aims to ask within the subfield of the FPA, such as ‘who, when, why and what?’ It is also very important to note that individuals differ; as a result, the decision(s) that they make will also differ to a great extent. This is because the factors that play a role in those decisions may differ depending on time and circumstance. Other factors also exert an influence, such as how the individual was brought up, their past occupations and experience, their different advisors and even how the venue where decisions are made is laid out. Sequeira (2014) supports this, stating that some studies have proven that decision making may be affected by the colour of the room in which the decision is being made. These various factors are called ‘explanans’. They have an impact on, and influence not just the decision maker, but also the decisions being made.

For instance, it is important when analysing foreign policy decisions to look at the time at which the event occurred, who was entrusted with decision making and why that specific decision had to be made. Doing this objectively and accurately makes the process of trying to understand how foreign policy decisions were made easier. The FPA goes beyond studying the state; it also studies the individual leaders, bureaucracies and institutions involved in the process of foreign policy (Breuning, 2007; Hudson, 2007). Hudson (2007) states that the FPA as a subfield of International Relations can be accounted for by three pragmatic works published in the 1950s and 1960s. As this is a contemporary study, it uses contemporary approaches that have been developed and divided into literature that focuses on the individual, nation-state and systemic level of foreign policy. Each one is discussed in detail by focusing on the assumptions that they hold and the importance of these levels of analysis.

### 2.5.1 Individual actors

Those who are entrusted with the role of foreign policy decision maker are individual actors. This means that they too are led by the human mind. Individuals are not
programmed like robots; they possess characteristics of individual decision makers such as beliefs, emotions and inceptions of the self, nation and, of course, others (Breuning, 2007). These characteristics may, in many instances, have a striking impact on the foreign policy decisions made in the international community. The effect may be higher or lower depending on the circumstances at the time the decision is made. For example, the effect of foreign policy decision making may be higher under crisis circumstances as the individual entrusted with the duty of foreign policy decision making may be affected by factors such as stress, the pressure of time and the possibility of having limited information due to unforeseen circumstances (Stern, 2003).

Research on the characteristics of individuals as leaders are derived mainly from the discipline of psychology. Scholars studying individuals support the notion that studying political leadership provides a lot of explanations about foreign policy and its processes. Although there are many relevant studies on the characteristics of decision makers, this study uses the Operational Code Analysis (OCA) and the Leadership Trait Analysis (LTA) approaches.

2.5.1.1 Operational Code Analysis (OCA)

The OCA necessitates studying the core belief system of a leader as an individual. This includes the individual leader’s belief about the political world and approach to political action (George, 1969). Renshon (2011) defines beliefs as “what we hold to be true”. Nykanen (2016: 26) reiterates that ideas are based on the proposition of beliefs. As such, this study also defines ideas. In this sense, ideas are “mental constructs held by individuals” and “sets of distinct beliefs, principles and attitudes that provide broad orientations for behaviour and policy”, but they also have a strong social component (Hirschman, 1961: 3; Tannenwald, 2005: 15). This study examines the importance of bringing leaders back in by reassessing their operational code beliefs to see whether there is a connection between their policy decisions and the external material and ideational worlds. It argues for this being one of the most important approaches to understanding the nature and policy of states in the international world, and is significant as the study assumes the task of analysing continuity and change in China’s foreign policy. This study maintains that the beliefs
of a leader reflect, to a certain extent, the kind of country the state will be in the international system.

Kai and Huiyun (2013: 217) use two notable examples to explain this more simply. If a state leader has ambitions that are revisionist in their nature and sees the international system as anarchic and conflictual, the state is more likely to redirect its system into a more revisionist one. Similarly, if a state leader’s goals and ambitions are to harbour cooperation across the world and does not have a lot of security-oriented goals, it is more likely that the state will be a status quo power within the international system. The OCA is based on the discipline of psychology and suggests that there are two worlds that play a crucial role in trying to explain foreign policy decisions. Kai and Huiyun (2013: 218) share the sentiment that there is an external world of events and internal world of beliefs. This study focuses on linking these two worlds using Xi Jinping’s operational code beliefs.

2.5.1.2 Leadership Trait Analysis (LTA)

It is important for scholars to continue studying the personal characteristics of individuals in leadership positions. This is because their preferences and the things they believe in and work towards have a direct influence on the lives of many. The one way that we can learn about leaders’ personalities and, specifically, their style of leadership is by analysing what they say. This is a task that can be accomplished without the need for their cooperation. This study examines the content of Xi’s utterances using spontaneous material such as speeches and interviews with the media to acquire some knowledge about the image that he portrays to the public. Although primary sources such as leaders’ speeches are not composed by the leader, they are written by a member of the leader’s staff. However, a leader cannot be fully prepared for an interview through the intervention of staff members. Interviews are more spontaneous and require a leader to think independently and provide off-the-cuff responses. Therefore, answers to questions normally require leaders to fend for themselves, which reveals their true image more than a speech would. What leaders are like in person is more likely to have a great influence on the nature of their answers and how their responses are worded in a give-and-take interview setting. Although it could be argued that leaders are to a certain extent prepared for general questions and the direction the interview is assumed to take,
their responses are spontaneous because they are alone when faced with the interviewer. Individuals play a huge role in the foreign policy process, but there are other role players and factors that influence foreign policy and that should be studied. Next, this study pursues a state-level analysis to prove this point.

2.5.2 State-level analysis

Foreign policy is formulated by the government and not the nation in its entirety. Consequently, what matters is not national power but state power. State power is that portion of national power the government can extract for its purposes and reflects the ease with which central decision makers can achieve their ends (Zakaria 1998: 9). According to this argument, the Chinese nation may be conservative when it comes to its political culture, but foreign policy does not rest on this; instead, it relies heavily on the government for planning and execution. This means that foreign policy is what matters to the state, in this case China, and not the power of the nation.

Analysing foreign policy from a state-level perspective is important as it improves our understanding of foreign policy (Hudson & Vore, 2003; Singer, 1965; Tamaki, 2015). State-level analysis emphasises the attributes and features of states, how states make foreign policy decisions and how these chosen decisions are implemented. Making foreign policy when looking at this level of analysis, depends largely on three variables: the type of government within the state, the situation or current circumstances within the state and the policy itself (Rourke & Boyer, 2015; Spiegel, 2005).

The first variable, which speaks to a state’s type of government, could easily be understood by gaining some insight to the two most popular types of regimes in the world – authoritarian or democratic regimes. When it comes to foreign policy in an authoritarian state, it is obvious that the foreign policy decision making ultimately lies with the head of state or president. This simply means that the one person on whom the authority of the state rests, is the one in charge of international relations as well as everything else within the state. On the contrary, in a democratic state, there are various interfaces that come into play. This means that not just the government or
the president is entrusted with making decisions in terms of the state’s foreign policy, but also the public, interest groups and the business sector. Democracy is coupled with characteristics such as transparency and inclusivity, so for a democratic state to display democracy as the essence of foreign policy, it is important that the foreign policy procedure be transparent and inclusive of all stakeholders that should be involved and that play a huge role in the state. Although the belief is that in an authoritarian regime the one entrusted with authority makes all the decisions, it is impossible for this to be entirely true. Spiegel (2005: 79) emphasises the fact that states are too big and complex for an entire government to be under the thumb of one person. This is also true when it comes to foreign policy. A president or head of state may be authoritarian, but there are other actors involved that play a major role in advising on, and actually implementing, the foreign policy.

The second variable that comes to the fore is the situation within the state when making foreign policy decisions (Hudson & Vore, 2003). Here, this study focuses on two factors that play a role when it comes to foreign policy decision making, as identified by Spiegel (2005: 78-79). These are crisis and non-crisis situations. A crisis situation is defined by the Business Dictionary (2017) as a:

a critical event or point of decision which, if not handled in an appropriate and timely manner (or if not handled at all), may turn into a disaster or catastrophe.

A non-crisis situation is the complete opposite, meaning that it is a situation that is not considered to be a crisis. In terms of decision making, Brecher and Wilkenfeld (1997; cited by Spiegel, 2005: 79), state that crisis situations occur in three ways.

Firstly, a crisis situation occurs when decision makers are faced with an unexpected or astonishing event. In the case of China, for instance, the conflict that broke out in the unified Sudan was unexpected, especially after China had started intensifying investments in oil exports there. After Sudan split in 2011, China thought that the conflict would rest; however, civil and ethnic strife emerged as another factor (BBC News, 2014). The decision by China to interfere in the domestic issues of the two Sudans was motivated by the crisis situation.
Secondly, a crisis situation occurs when decision makers feel threatened (Springtide Resources, 2017). The subtle interferences by China in the DRC proves this. The ongoing conflict in the DRC, due to war economies and an illegitimate president, were a great threat to China’s investments in the DRC. China had contributed to the UN peacekeeping missions in both the DRC and the two Sudans (Huang, 2017). The foreign policy decision makers in China constantly felt threatened by instability in these states and, as a result, made decisions based on the threat to stabilise the situation and ensure that China’s presence in those states was not in vain.

Lastly, a crisis situation occurs when decision makers feel or realise that they only have a limited time to react to a situation (Springtide Resources, 2017). This was the case in both unified Sudan and after its split into the two Sudans. The ongoing conflict and China’s image in the international community played an important role in China’s change of heart on its non-interference policy (BBC News, 2014).

The more each of these three variables intensifies, the more severe and critical the situation or crisis becomes.

On the other hand, a non-crisis situation does not influence decision makers as heavily as a crisis situation. In most cases, non-crisis situations do not have a dramatic effect on foreign policy and there is often more time to think and strategise before making foreign policy decisions (Spiegel, 2005:79). Moreover, there is no pressure in decision making; even where pressure is applied, it would not be as intense as in crisis situations.

The last variable that this study uses for foreign policy making is the policy and foreign policy process. This simply refers to the issue about which a foreign policy decision is made. If the issue has little or no impact, or if its impact is obvious and clear-cut, the decision makers are not faced with a conundrum. In such cases, decisions are easier, faster and do not necessarily require a wide or broad range of decision makers. Normally, in cases where the issue is not dramatic, a narrow group of actors engage in decision making with little to no internal interference by the opposition. At times these decisions are made without the media noticing and the public does not have much to say in this regard.
However, if the opposite is true then the public becomes opinionated. If the issue arouses attention and the outcome of the foreign policy decision is obscure, then a narrow range of decision makers will not be sufficient for the decision-making process. Considering the above, it is safe to argue that a state’s domestic factors have an influence on its international actions (Spiegel, 2005; Rourke & Boyer, 2015).

2.5.3 System-level analysis

All states are sovereign according to Heywood (2011). This means that states have supreme power and authority. In simple terms, sovereignty means that one state cannot go into another state and tell it what to do. Therefore, in theory, when it comes to matters of foreign policy states have the freedom to make any foreign policy decision that they deem fit. However, in reality this is not the case. A state is rarely left with the option of exercising complete sovereignty. This is because the world is interconnected due to the emergence of globalisation (Rourke & Boyer, 2005). For a state to carry through a fruitful foreign policy, it has an obligation to make foreign policy choices that are sensible and rational, taking into consideration the realities of the international community and the international system. To make sense of this level of analysis, one has to first grasp and contextualise system-level analysis.

System-level analysis considers all the interactions that take place in the international system and its environment (Singer, 1961: 22). This means that the system-level analysis approach tends to focus on external limitations and restrictions that have an impact on foreign policy making. System-level analysis is a typical top-down approach to international affairs that considers the social, economic, political and geographic characteristics the international system assumes, and how these characteristics subsequently influence the actions of states and other actors involved in the international system (Moore & Lanoue, as cited by Rourke & Boyer, 2005: 91). In this level of analysis, the international system is the cause and state behaviour the effect (Newmann, 2017). This means that what characterises the international system is the direct cause of certain actions and reactions exerted by states in the international community. Subsequently, change in the international system will result
in a change in state behaviour. The key variable in the international system is the distribution of power within the system (Newmann, 2017).

Many factors regulate the nature of any given system. In the case of system-level analysis, this study uses the following systematic factors: structural characteristics, power relationships, economic realities and norms of behaviour as highlighted by Rourke and Boyer (2015: 91-98).

2.5.3.1 Structural characteristics

The first structural characteristic is the organisation of authority. In this lies two structures: the horizontal and vertical structure in the international system (Dolley, 2012: 609-611). A horizontal structure refers to anarchy in the international system and its environment. Anarchy in the international system refers to the “state of disorder due to the absence or non-recognition of authority or other controlling systems” (Hill, 2003). A vertical structure recognises some sort of authority based on hierarchy that tends to control interactions in the international system. This means that the subordinate states are regulated by the levels of authority that are of a higher level than the subordinates. When relating the two structures to theories in International Relations it is evident that the structure of anarchy, which is also known as the horizontal structure, relates to the theory of realism. On the contrary, the vertical structure, which alludes to hierarchy and the rule of law in global affairs, relates to the theory of liberalism. In the international system there are few power authorities, and even with those few authorities their power is fragmented (Dolley, 2012: 630).

The second structural characteristic identifiable in the system-level analysis is the scope and level of interaction among the actors in the international system. The current system of international affairs has become increasingly interdependent (Brown, 1997: 103). This is because the international community has witnessed a rising number of interactions between actors. These interactions differ in terms of intensity and scope since the issues that confront actors differ significantly, and there are a range of issues. For example, in the case of China in Africa, at first the relations were based on the notion of non-interference. This has started to change because of domestic issues both within China and African states. As a result, both
China and African states’ foreign policies have had to change to adapt to the ever-changing international system and environment. Economic interdependence is also a very critical issue when faced with the reality of the growing interactions among states (Rourke & Boyer, 2015: 92-93). Economic interdependence has emerged as a result of globalisation. States, both poor and rich, depend on each other to sustain their economies. It would be naïve to assume that the dependence is mutual, as poorer states are more dependent on their relations with richer states than vice versa (Moore, 2011). However, because of globalisation, what affects the one affects the other, be it economically or politically (De Feyter, 2017). As a result, states have been left with no choice but to interact with each other for the benefit of both. This view is highly state-centric, especially pertaining to economies.

2.5.3.2 Power relationship and military capabilities

States are restrained and limited in terms of their actions and reactions in the international community, primarily due to the power relationships within the international system. According to Rourke and Boyer (2015: 94), the way actors in the international system conduct themselves is heavily influenced by the scrutiny and review of power, such as the number of powerful actors and the context of power in the international system. International systems are characterised by how many great powers each system possesses. For example, during the Cold War, the international system was bipolar in that the power in global affairs rested largely on the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and the USA.

The point of departure of this study is the view that currently, there is no hegemonic force to shape and construct the global system and no obvious agreement on what type of new world order should be entrenched. However, there is a greater sense of competitiveness for influence and compelling ideas. Many scholars are convinced that the world is heading towards a more multipolar world order (Guerrero, 2013; Herd, 2010; Project Guru, 2017). There is no single state that has complete dominion over others, as it would in a unipolar system. Although the international system did have a unipolar system immediately after the Cold War period, which saw the USA as the single power that projected influence across the world and to a certain extent forced other states to conform to its resolutions and desires, this is no longer the case. The international system is also not bipolar as two clearly dominant
states are not evident. Instead, global affairs today are designated by the power relationships of the USA, China, Russia and Europe.

The context of power is also very important. No state is an island. This means that for a state to emerge as a power it must act responsibly as its military capabilities and everything else plays a role (Rourke & Boyer, 2015). An emerging power needs to understand the importance of being able to evolve and leverage systemic capabilities to take advantage of opportunities in the international community. For instance, China is considered an emerging power due to its economic, political and military capabilities. However, China has also had to evolve its foreign policy to adapt to the changing realities of the international system and its external changes. In the cases of the two Sudans, the DRC and Nigeria, China had to evolve its approach to relations by contributing to peacekeeping in the two Sudans and the DRC and assisting Nigeria in its fight to end terrorism in the country (Huang, 2017). China does have power, but because states are so interdependent, China cannot overlook the domestic issues of the states it engages with. For all its power, China has had to use it wisely due to this interdependence.

2.5.3.3 Economic realities

The system-level analysis highlights the fact that the economic realities of the international system contribute significantly to the direction that states tend to take in making decisions based on the choices they are faced with. This means that the international system has what Rourke and Boyer (2015) call the "economic facts of life", which help shape the behaviour of states in global affairs. As mentioned earlier, states are not islands and their economies rely on other states’ economies to prosper and grow sustainably. China is also a victim of this despite maintaining good economic growth. A good gross domestic product (GDP) is nothing if it cannot be sustained. To sustain its economy, China has to ensure that all its investments actually pay off, which means facing the economic reality of having to adapt its foreign policy to the challenges that face African states, such as ongoing conflict, by softening its policy of non-interference. The production and the consumption pattern of natural resources also greatly influence how the international system operates (Singer, 1961; Hudson & Vore, 2003). This speaks to the significance of oil in the prosperity of China. China has had to recognise the longer-term benefits of
interfering in the domestic affairs of the states with which it interacts achieve mutual prosperity.

2.5.3.4 Norms

The truth is that what happens in international affairs is largely regulated and restrained by norms and, regardless of the occurrence of occasional breaches, there are no indications that most states are willing to abandon those norms (Bluth, 2004: 24). This is highlighted by Rourke and Boyer (2015), who state that norms play a heavily influential role in the international system by determining actions within the system. A comprehensive definition is provided by Björkdahl (2002: 13), who states that international norms are “generalised standards of conduct that delineate the scope of a state’s entitlements, the extent of its obligations, and the range of its jurisdiction”. Values and norms do exist and are becoming increasingly significant in the system. They are also becoming uniform to a certain extent, irrespective of there being nothing that comes close to universally accepted standards of behaviour. Norms are important as they establish some sort of predictability in terms of what happens in the international system by determining evident patterns in behaviour of actors in the system (Rourke & Boyer, 2015: 98). Current ongoing changes in global affairs have resulted in a situation where states depend more on soft power ideas, norms and values than they do on the distribution of power. This means that recent changes have led to state behaviour being informed and motivated more by norms than realists would want to admit. International institutions such as the UN and regional institutions such as the AU play a critical role in embodying norms, values and principles. As a result, it is becoming increasingly clear that the preference of the policy of non-interference in the domestic affairs of other states is weakening because of the international system’s transition in the post-Cold War period. This change is a result of constantly emerging conflicts that dominate at a sub-state level (Björkdahl, 2002: 14). Most states are part of the international society through membership and their foreign policies are constructed in a world of norms. This means that the actions of these states must be informed by the norms prescribed by these international institutions of which they are a part. China is also a part of this society; as such, China’s foreign policy must form part of the general vision and direction of international society. The continuity and change in China’s foreign policy
towards the two Sudans, the DRC and Nigeria is largely accounted for by these norms in the international system, which will be analysed in the following chapters.

2.6 The development of Sino-African relations

It is important for this study to briefly uncover the emergence of China’s relations with Africa before focusing specifically on the two Sudans, the DRC and Nigeria. The background of these relations is important as it forms the foundation of today’s Sino-African relations. Alden et al (2016: 1) states that China-Africa relations date back to the Ming Dynasty (1368-1644), when Admiral Zheng ordered a series of expeditions that reached East Africa. However, this is not as well documented as Africa’s links with other countries and continents. In the modern era, relations between China and Africa have been ongoing since the founding of the new China (the PRC) in 1949. The five principles of peaceful coexistence, which has already been mentioned above, were established by the Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai in cooperation with India’s Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru in 1954 (Alden et al, 2006: 1; Panda, 2014). These principles became popular in 1955 at the Bandung Conference and have since, to a certain extent, formed the basis for Sino-African relations.

China also played a remarkable role in supporting African states and their liberation movements from the colonial era (Aning & Lecoutre, 2008: 40; SA History, 2014). This support was seen in countries such as Mozambique and Zimbabwe. China backed the Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU–PF) and the Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO) to ensure that these liberation movements were successful in their struggle against colonialism (Shinn & Eisenman, 2009). This led to China also playing an influential role in the reconstruction and reshaping of these newly independent states (Alden & Alves, 2006: 52). In addition, during the Cold War the countries backed by China implemented Maoist policies in full support of China’s regime, which led to increased support from China (Aning & Lecoutre, 2008). During 1956, Egypt became the first country on the African continent to establish official diplomatic relations with the PRC (Alden et al, 2016: 3).
Currently, China maintains official diplomatic relations with 54 African states, with South Sudan being the most recent addition. This growth in diplomatic relations between China and African states has benefitted the Chinese government in various ways, including gaining its permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council in 1971 (Aning & Lecoutre, 2008). This was partially made possible by the 26 African states that voted in favour of this motion, which equated to 34% of votes in the UN General Assembly (Zoubir & White, 2016: 331).

Deng Xiaoping launched the “opening up reforms policy” during late 1978 (Alden et al, 2016: 3). This was followed by visits from Premier Zhao Ziyang to various states on the African continent between December 1982 and January 1983. These visits aimed at reconstructing and reshaping relations between China and Africa to ensure mutual interest for the development of both China’s and Africa’s economies (Shinn & Eisenmann, 2009). The four principles of Sino-African economic and technical cooperation were also announced during these visits (Alden et al, 2016: 3). Contemporary relations between China and Africa led to the establishment of FOCAC in October 2000. FOCAC is a platform for collective dialogue for cooperation between Africa and China, basically speaks to the issue of south-south cooperation and development (FOCAC, 2017). However, FOCAC is also problematic to a certain extent. It consolidates Chinese hegemony and its dominance on the African continent as China gets to interact with Africa as a whole while Africa’s interaction with China is mediated by FOCAC.

2.7 Conclusion

The main aim of this chapter was to conceptualise foreign policy, examine foreign policy change through the use of the FPA and to provide the study with a theoretical concept by using macro theories. It is important for the study to conceptualise foreign policy because concepts in International Relations are not always clear and are often ambiguous. This chapter also indicated that foreign policy can be understood in different ways in terms of the variety of theories. The first theory used was the theory of realism, which purports that states in global affairs develop their foreign policy to
advance their power in a world that is seen as anarchic. This theory also highlighted three assumptions: groupism, egoism and power-centrism. The other two macro theories that are used in this chapter are liberalism and constructivism. Liberal foreign policy analysis centres on individual rights, representative government, international perceptions and private property. For this reason, liberalism is often seen as a domestic theory. Constructivism on the other hand, defines foreign policy as an agent-level activity that is performed by different policymakers with internal and external environments. This means that policymakers are responsive to both of these.

The chapter also unpacked foreign policy actors. It identified them as individual actors, secondary actors and other actors and role players such as the media, legislators, public opinion, NGOs, businesses and multiple opposition parties (Bailes, 2011: 35). The study also states that in the case of China, the military (PLA) plays a significant role in decision-making processes in terms of its foreign policy. This chapter further explained foreign policy change through Kal Holsti’s model (1982) as a framework. The framework consists of domestic factors, external factors and cultural factors. Domestic factors are those local elements that influence foreign policy, while external factors are those international elements that have an impact on a state’s foreign policy. Cultural factors are those traditions, values and historical legacies that form the views and attitudes of a state’s foreign policy. All three of these factors play a vital role in shaping and constructing the foreign policies of states. They also provide explanations and motivations behind foreign policy change. They are imperative in the quest to examine foreign policy change in China’s foreign policy.

This study has mentioned that government leaders (Individual and secondary actors) are required to deal with pressures and challenges from domestic political sources as well the international political system (Hagan, 1995: 117; McGowan et al, 2007). This study highlighted China’s need for oil and the need to ensure that its economic growth is sustained as two of the many other domestic factors that have played a huge role China’s change in foreign policy. The well-being of China’s economy is directly linked with citizen satisfaction to a large extent. The more the economy grows or at least maintains some sort of balance, the more opportunities there are
for the Chinese people. Happy citizens often lead to a stable state. External factors have also played a huge role in China’s foreign policy change. The external factors that this chapter highlighted were non-state actors, and global, regional and bilateral factors. China is seen as an emerging power, which has forced it to assume the role of a responsible leader in international affairs (Clapham, 2006; Hess and Aidoo, 2010). This means engaging with states and ignoring their domestic turbulence is off the table for China. China has had to softly neglect its non-interference policy to adapt to the circumstances in African states, particularly the two Sudans, the DRC and Nigeria, where conflict has remained a constant reality. If China can do with investments and economic gains from African states, it also has to assist in dealing with domestic challenges. Non-interference could be seen as a culture within China’s foreign policy and, as has been the case with some of their values and norms, it has had to see subtle changes in as much as there is continuity in many aspects.

The last section of this chapter focuses specifically on the analysis of foreign policy using a vital model that serves as a subfield in International Relations. This chapter used the FPA model, which analyses states by highlighting the state and the system. These explain not only foreign policy but also foreign policy behaviour. They are vital for this study as they assist in the attempt to analyse the evident change and shift in China’s foreign policy.

Contemporary approaches such as individual actors, and state- and system-level analyses have been used as a framework to assist this study in analysing China’s foreign policy change in the chapters that follow. The individual level of analysis focused mainly on individuals led by human minds. This study asserts that decision making in foreign policy may be fractured in circumstances led by crisis (Stern, 2003). This is because factors such as stress, time pressure and limited information affect these individuals. The OCA and LTA are also used in this study. The former is used to analyse the belief system of the individual while the latter analyses a leaders’ personal characteristics (Hermann, 1980; 2002; 2005; Kai & Huiyun, 2013: 216-218). State- and system-level analyses are important as they improve how foreign policy is comprehended. State-level analysis accentuates the characteristics and features of the state. This level of analysis looks at the three variables when making foreign policy: the type of government, the situation and circumstances, and the policy itself.
Domestic politics play a significant role in analysing foreign policy based on the state level. This is because domestic factors have an influence on a states’ international actions (Rourke & Boyer, 2015; Spiegel, 2005). The system-level analysis looks at all the interactions in the international environment (Singer, 1961: 22). It considers external limitations as they also have an impact on a state’s foreign policy. This study is of the view that there is an increase in interdependence in the current international system and that interactions vary in terms of intensity and scope. The system-level analysis also highlights the importance of economic realities in foreign policy decision making in the international environment. Economic facts of life, as mentioned by Rourke and Boyer (2015), help shape state behaviour in global affairs. In the case of China, a good GDP is not beneficial if it cannot be sustained. As a result, China has had to adapt to external challenges to cater for its economic needs. In view of the above, Chapter 3 will discuss China’s foreign policy towards the two Sudans.
CHAPTER 3: CONTINUITY AND CHANGE IN CHINA’S FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS AFRICA – THE CASE OF THE TWO SUDANS

3.1 Introduction

To understand the aspects discussed in this study, the background of events and relations that prevailed between China and Africa must be taken into consideration, especially in the cases of Sudan and South Sudan, the DRC and Nigeria. This is because the changes that had occurred and are currently occurring are under scrutiny in this study. The discussion on the China-Sudan relationship post-1959 follows in greater depth as it is the main case study in this chapter. This discussion unpacks how the relationship between the two states developed through continuous engagements between leaders of both states and through trade, economic grants, interest-free loans, soft loans and assistance in technological advancements. This study further discusses China and Sudan developments post-1990. This is because relations increased as oil cooperation was introduced. It is during this period that China started to face challenges in terms of satisfying both the West and Sudan. To maintain and better the interests of the country, China had to strike a balance between the two states.

Sudan witnessed a great deal of conflict before the independence of South Sudan from Sudan in July 2011. China played a huge role in mediating and seeing through the split of the two Sudans. It was in China’s interests to do so as China’s interests in oil increased. The independence of South Sudan from Sudan saw an increase in relations as China invested just over 70% in South Sudan’s oil. China thought that the split would be the answer to conflict, but it was not. South Sudan continued to go through civil strife post-independence. It is important to note that China was not directly involved in the third civil war, but it played a significant role in the mediation of peace processes. This was done through soft interferences such as shuttle diplomacy and development-first diplomacy. The introduction of Chinese combat troops to the conflict in South Sudan raised many eyebrows in the international
community. This chapter discusses China’s approach to conflict resolution in South Sudan and considers whether the security situation there is improving. This chapter also attempts to uncover the reality of continuity and change in China’s foreign policy in Africa using the two Sudans as a case study.

3.2 Sino-Sudanese relations post-1959

China established relations with Sudan in 1959 when Sudan became the fourth country on the African continent to acknowledge the birth of the PRC in 1959. Sudan first engaged in diplomatic relations with China on 4 February 1959 (Large, 2008: 1). China maintained a long-term and fairly positive relationship with the parliamentary and military governments of an independent Sudan (Chun, 2014). During January 1964, Premier Zhou Enlai made a visit to Khartoum. According to Large (2008: 2), the meeting between Premier Zhou and the Sudanese government was not successful. This was despite Sudan having backed the Chinese government’s entry to the UN in 1961.

In 1971, a communist coup attempt was suppressed by Prime Minister Gaafar Nimeiri (Sudan Issue Brief, 2007). Despite the PRC’s political and ideological orientation, China fully supported this motion, which provided a basis for good relations between China and Sudan. China backed Nimeiri because the coup was backed by the USSR during the Sino-Soviet split (1960-1989) (Ylönen & Záhorík, 2017). China and the USSR had different interests and different interpretations of Marxism-Leninism. This split led to warming relations between China and the USA, which was another reason that China could not support a Soviet-backed coup.

China also assisted to train Sudan’s armed forces and offered to supply Sudan with military equipment in 1972. These reportedly included eight MIG-17 fighter aircraft and 10 modern tanks (Sudan Issue Brief, 2007). As relations increased during the 1970s, Sudan continued to seek assistance from China in several areas and, according to Moro (2012: 23), at some stage China was not technologically equipped for certain requests such as oil prospecting. However, trade and assistance between
Sudan and China continued to increase in several other respects. Sudan continued to benefit from economic grants, interest-free and soft loans, and assistance in technological advancements. Sudan Issue Brief (2007) states that China invested a significant amount of aid in different projects following the 1972 Addis Ababa peace agreement, which ended the first Sudanese civil war. China showed forethought as this helped to secure its position as the next oil investor in Sudan. The conflict in Sudan left American and European companies scared and, as a result, these companies withdrew their investments. This move by American and European companies ushered China right into Sudan’s oil refineries (Large, 2008; Ylönen & Záhorík, 2017).

The economic and trade exchanges became frequent and the engineering cooperation between the two countries started to develop rapidly as well. The Chinese government started to help Sudan develop its basic industries (Guardian Africa Network, 2014). For the Sudanese government this was to ensure economic development and prosperity in general for the country. For China, this would allow it to benefit from oil exports as the development of oil machinery meant easier access to the resource (Large, 2011). During the 1980s, China continued to make long-term interest-free loans available to Sudan to build infrastructure such as bridges and roads (HuffPost, 2016). As much as these loans benefitted Sudan immediately, they may have cost them in the long term. It is inconceivable that Sudan will be able to service some of these infrastructure developments effectively and efficiently and still be able to repay this debt, even if its economy grows steadily. Settling this debt has become a burden for Sudan. However, China does not see this as a problem. China’s past experiences taught them the importance of economic positions as leverage for political gains, which will be much more important in the long term (Crisis Group, 2017; Enough Project, 2017).

Chinese companies also assisted to construct Sudan’s ports, water conservancy and electricity (Hui, 2015: 1). In fact, the more frequently these economic and trade exchanges occurred, the more China assisted Sudan in terms of development. This proves the point made in Chapter 2 regarding China’s domestic issues and its national interests. The more China became involved with Sudan, the more it needed to involve itself in Sudan’s development, as this development was directly linked to
its uninterrupted access to oil. Development initiatives were strategic and in key areas of Sudan that had oil. The development of infrastructure such as roads and bridges meant that China benefitted by ensuring that the process of oil production and importing became easier.

In the meantime, Chevron started to plan pipelines from the Unity oil fields to Port Sudan. The oil was supposed to reach international markets by 1986; however, these facilities were attacked by the Sudan’s People’s Liberation Army (SPLA), which was a guerrilla movement (Moro, 2012: 25). These actions had a positive effect on China’s relations with the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) as China stepped into the breach as the incoming investor. Nimeiri was subsequently overthrown in 1985, which marked a new era for the Sudanese government.

Ali (2006: 8) distinguishes between two periods in the history of Sino-Sudanese relations. The first is the period before the oil and the second is the period after the oil. The division is significant in that it captures the important contrast in China’s economic relations and involvement in Sudan before and after the 1990s. Before the oil, which is before the 1990s, China played a less involved role in Sudan and was a much less significant economic partner of Sudan. This was because China was also at a developmental stage.

The USA and Europe were dominant in terms of their involvement in Sudan before the 1990s, but when conflict started, the USA withdrew from its relations with Sudan. This left the way open for China (Wilson, 2016). In addition, the trade between China and Sudan was much less important and the Sudanese government posed no serious threat to China. Although trade continued between the two countries, there was not much effort made to ensure that the trade increased and the business expansion between the two countries was limited. The before the oil phase was significant for the relations between Sudan and China as it created a foundation of trust for future relations. China was a significant ally to Sudan as an alternative to the USA and Europe’s approach to relations (Fabricius, 2014). China maintained the principle of non-interference in domestic affairs while the West did the opposite. This meant that China considered Sudan’s sovereignty and its potential to resolve its issues. This did not make the Chinese any better, it just meant that this approach worked well enough for China’s strategic interests at the time. The oil sector
development in the 1990s, the growing economic relationship and the geopolitical environment in which it occurred, resulted in a new historically significant era (Crisis Group Africa Report, 2012: 3).

China invested in Sudan’s promising oil production because it needed to access foreign oil reserves. China’s oil fields were predicted to have a shortfall of about 50 million tons of crude oil (accounting for 30% of its oil needs) in 2000 (Human Rights Watch, 2003). China’s growing need was a result of its drastic development, and it had to rely on imported oil from foreign oil reserves. In December 1996, the China National Petroleum Corporation (CPNC) bought 40% of the 75% that Arakis sold in Sudan’s oil consortium in Khartoum (Human Rights Watch, 2003; Patey, 2007). China also developed the consortium by building new pipelines to pass through different blocks and a refinery near Khartoum.

Advancing modernisation, achieving national reunification and safeguarding world peace was at the top of China’s list of priorities (Heath, 2016). Modernisation relates to economic development, which China regarded as a vital task to achieve a strong nation. China’s success as a strong nation was imperative for its reunification and peaceful development in cooperation with all the actors in the international community. It is understood that China’s immediate interests were more important than its cooperation with the two Sudans. Sudan’s oil and China’s self-interest were the main driver of the strong and growing Sudan-China relations (Heywood, 2011; Rose, 1998). On the other hand, Sudan’s oil was the main driver of its economy, so the more investment that it received in its oil reserves, the more it gained economically. China also supported the Sudanese government with low-cost item exports and armaments from China. Again, it was in China’s interests to support the Sudanese government and create incentives as oil exports played a huge role in these relations. China did not want to come across as a taker and not a giver. These incentives served as a response to preconceived ideas of China as a neo-colonialist (Wagner and Cafiero, 2013).

The relations between China and Sudan after the oil maintained this continuity in foreign policy until Sudan’s conflict started to affect China’s investments. China was desperate for foreign oil reserves and it had invested heavily in Sudan. To protect its interests, China had to act. This, however, meant that China had to change its
foreign policy. Oil played a very important role in explaining China’s change in foreign policy and its inconsistencies with the long-held non-interference policy.

As can be seen, post-1990s relations between Sudan and China developed very differently, with huge consequences for foreign policy and politics. Developments between China and Sudan are discussed in greater depth in the following segment.

3.3 Sino-Sudanese developments post-1990s

The development of relations between China and Sudan accelerated because of the introduction of oil cooperation (Patey, 2007). As was stated in the previous segment, it is as important to study Sino-Sudanese relations post-1990 as it is to study their relations before the introduction of oil cooperation. Both are important in framing relations and in expressing the language of interaction between the two states. The role of identity in Sino-Sudanese relations also cannot go unnoticed. China and Sudan identify with each other for two reasons: both China and Sudan regard themselves as developing countries and both these states have a shared colonial history (Miller, 2015). The fact that these two states share commonalities makes it inherently easier for them to engage with each other effectively and efficiently (Flockhart, 2012: 81-82; Tamaki, 2015: 14). The Chinese government’s involvement in Sudan is rather short historically; however, relations between the two states became more extensive and progressive after the 1990s to reach its current status, mainly because of oil. China’s involvement in Sudan has, in this sense, changed significantly as China is now a lot more involved in issues and aspects of the state that are not just economic- and development-based. This is part of the reason for its involvement becoming an increasing challenge to the Chinese government.

Sudan’s National Islamic Front (NIF) seized power in 1989 (Global Security, 2017). This shaped a new era in international relations and domestic politics in Sudan. The NIF’s political agenda was a clear Islamist government that endorsed the development and advancement of a domestic project of Islamist social transformation (Large, 2008: 2). The NIF also renewed its war against the SPLA,
which was based in the southern part of Sudan (Sudan Issue Brief, 2007: 3). Relations between Sudan and China cooled for a period after the Islamic coup by the NIF in 1989. The NIF was closely linked to terrorism and, as such, faced international isolation. Unilateral USA economic sanctions followed (Crisis Group Africa Report, 2012: 2). The NIF regime had no choice but to look to China for assistance as China had faced the same isolation for its violent suppression of student protests in 1989 (Sudan Issue Brief, 2007: 3). This is another commonality that made relations easier between the two states. Sudan’s growing support for terrorist groups across the globe resulted in further isolation, meaning that its status as an international pariah also grew. China’s support for Sudan was a challenge of balancing its relations with the West and its continued support of Sudan (Iyasu, 2013). China’s attempt at balancing these two opposite parties was to preserve, maintain and strengthen Chinese interests.

Sudan’s shift towards China was also fuelled by its relationships abroad crumbling, and the NIF felt immense pressure from the West in particular (Crisis Group Africa Report, 2012: 2). The NIF regime looked to China for assistance in developing its oil sector (Large, 2008: 2), and China was more than willing to assist. Again, it was in China’s interest to take advantage of the USA’s shortfall. This was because China was running out of oil due to its excessive oil consumption in the industrial era. Sudan’s political and economic instability resulted in an unstable investment climate, which gave China the chance to take advantage of Sudan’s vulnerability by enjoying easy and favourable entry into Sudan’s relatively unexplored oil market (Telegraph, 2011). The fact that some of these oil fields had not been heavily explored worked in China’s favour to address its strategic interests. Other Chinese enterprises and companies followed and relations between Sudan and China took on greater importance (Crisis Group Africa Report, 2012: 3). Chinese enterprises and companies serve as secondary and other actors that play an important role in implementing China’s foreign policy strategies, as was mentioned in Chapter 2. Although China as a state showed economic interest in its relations with Sudan, it was important for private and state-owned companies to chip in for investment deals. This not only sealed firmer deals with Sudan, but also ensured that domestic issues were addressed as China’s deals also benefitted its citizens’ investments in Sudan.
In this sense both external and domestic factors were addressed as they both influenced foreign policy decision making.

In 1992, American company Chevron severed its relations with Sudan due to SPLA threats and economic sanctions posed unilaterally by the USA government (Moro, 2012: 24). The USA officially banned all engagements by American companies with any interest in Sudan’s oil sector in 1997 as it accused the Al-Bashir-led government (1989) of abusing human rights within Sudan and of advancing and supporting terrorism. On the other hand, China’s relations with Sudan started to show growth. Al-Bashir walked the same path as his predecessor Nimeiri and sought China’s assistance in developing Sudan’s oil sector (Moro, 2012: 24). The difference was that China was well equipped technologically and Sudan’s requests met China’s interests. China’s industrial revolution had dried up its resources, resulting in China having to rely heavily on raw material and resource imports from other countries. Sudan’s request favoured China, which could now develop untapped oil markets in Sudan and sustain its economic growth to meet its strategic interests.

Moro (2012: 24) states that in 1993, China had gone from being a net exporter of oil to a net importer. The government of Sudan invited China to develop the oil sector in 1994 and, as this coincided with China’s interests, the CNPC took this opportunity to survey the area (Sudan Issue Brief, 2007: 1). At that point, it was clear that the CNPC as an actor in China’s foreign policy only went into Sudan to establish relations because this coincided with China’s interests. In 1995, President Al-Bashir visited Beijing to secure an agreement for a low-interest loan to Sudan. This was followed by an agreement by China to finance oil developments (Sudan Issue Brief, 2007: 2). Later in 1995, the CNPC set up offices in Khartoum and began exploring Sudan and participating in petroleum bidding (Hui, 2015: 373). This led to the formation of the Great Nile Petroleum Operating Company (GNPOC). The CNPC then obtained a 40% stake in the GNPOC, which resulted in the construction of the 1500-kilometre GNPOC pipeline from blocks 1 and 2 to the Red Sea in 1998. This was done by the CNPC’s construction arm in cooperation with the China Petroleum Engineering and Construction Corporation (Hui, 2015: 373). The infrastructure development benefitted both China and Sudan. For the latter, it meant that their
infrastructure was being developed for their long-term benefit, and for the former access to Sudan’s oil was made easier to meet their immediate interests.

In 2002, Sudan surpassed other African countries to become the leading supplier of oil to China. It provided 40% of China’s oil imports from the African continent (Sudan Issue Brief, 2007: 3). China also maintained major stakes in Sudan’s oil consortiums. Sudan Issue Brief (2007:3) stated that the CNPC owned a 40% stake in the GNPOC and 41% in the Petrodar Operating Company, Sinopec owned 6% of Petrodar and the CNPC owned 95% of Block 6. The CNPC also owned 35% of Red Sea Petroleum. High-level meetings from 2002 to April 2007 in Beijing and Khartoum gradually resulted in strengthened military relations between Sudan and China (Large, 2008: 3). China and Sudan also established good political relations. This was seen in 2003 when Sudan’s ruling National Congress Party developed an official cooperative agreement with the Communist Party of China and signed it.

July 2007 saw President Hu visit Khartoum, where he gave Sudan an interest-free loan and cancelled over $70 million of Sudan’s debt (Sudan Issue Brief, 2007: 4). In the same year, the then vice president of Sudan, Salva Kiir Mayardit, made a public visit to China. An agreement followed between President Hu and Salva Kiir Mayardit to ensure the entry of Chinese companies into Juba. This direct engagement by both states’ primary actors of foreign policies was fruitful. According to the Crisis Group Africa Report (2012: 3), China then opened a consulate in Juba in September 2008, with only three staff members.

China’s interest shifted towards South Sudan when it became clear that it would gain its independence, as South Sudan has more oil reserves than northern Sudan. China’s main need is oil, so China maintained relations with the parts of Sudan that had what it needs. Pre-independence bilateral exchanges took place between China and Juba from September 2010 to mid-2011. It is no coincidence that these exchanges intensified as South Sudan drew nearer to its independence from a unified Sudan. Again, China acted in its own interests. These exchanges included engagements on issues such as agricultural advancements and cooperation, the effects of South Sudan’s secession on the overall stability of old Sudan and maintaining strong relations between China and Sudan. There were also discussions on pledging Sudan’s energy and the overall concerns regarding the security of oil
investments made by the Chinese government, and Chinese enterprises and companies in Sudan. South Sudan achieved its independence on 9 July 2011 (Hui, 2015: 374). Several conflicts followed, which saw a change in China’s foreign policy. This will be discussed in the section that follows.

3.4 China’s further involvement in South Sudan

China’s foreign policy saw a clear shift in its principle and policy of non-interference in 2014. The PRC announced on 25 September 2014 that it would deploy 700 peacekeepers and combat troops to South Sudan for a peacekeeping mission facilitated by the UN Security Council (Reuters, 2014). Two reasons accounted for the change in China’s foreign policy.

Firstly, China had to adapt to its role as a powerful player in the international realm (Clapham, 2006; Hess and Aidoo, 2010). This means that China had to adapt to changes in the global system to reinforce its positioning in the international community. Chapter 2 explored Holsti’s analytical framework, which provides external forces as a determinant of foreign policy change (Holsti, 1982). China has had to adapt to norms and ideas that it did not align with initially as a direct result of influence by external forces. Internally, China did not want to change and did not relate to interference. The Chinese government’s view was that a state has the capacity to deal with its own problems. However, as China plays a significant role in the international community as a rising power, it has had to act responsibly (Kabemba, 2016:5). Responsibility in the international community requires China to shift its foreign policy and, as a result, the policy of non-interference was compromised.

Secondly, the growth of China’s role in the international realm, and China’s growing need for natural resources, including oil, led to China being dependent on Sudan, South Sudan and many other countries that supply these natural resources (Large, 2008; Moro, 2012). China’s dependence and its need for oil was the reason behind its sudden change in foreign policy, especially regarding the policy of non-
interference. China had to step out of its comfort zone to preserve its interests. Standing strongly behind the longstanding policy of non-interference threatened the smooth running of the process of importing oil from Sudan and South Sudan. This means that had China’s oil production and imports not been harmed by the instability in South Sudan and Sudan, China would not have changed its view on interference and state sovereignty. China’s actions were directly linked to its need for oil.

Although the announcement to deploy combat troops was made during 2014 to aid the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), the mission was only to manifest in January 2015 (China Military Online, 2015). China’s combat troops were tasked with protecting civilians and contributing to humanitarian staff, patrolling and guarding missions. This was not the first time that the PRC participated in UN peacekeeping missions; it started participating in 1989. However, it had deployed ‘enablers’ (Choedon, 2015: 1), which are forces that have no band, meaning that they are deployed when they are needed and their deployment depends on the situation at hand. This meant that the PRC had not directly participated in combat troop missions. China had also been heavily involved with conflict mediation in South Sudan (Crisis Group Africa Report, 2012). For these reasons, China’s foreign policy changed in the international community.

3.5 China’s relationship with South Sudan intensified

China had always been resolute in maintaining its principle of non-interference when encountering other states (BBC News, 2014; Iyasu, 2013). This was supported by its respect for state sovereignty and strong belief in a state being given the space to deal with its own domestic issues without the interference or intervention of other states or other international actors. This is problematic because, in principle, the non-interference policy is de facto support for the regime. The principle of non-interference applied in the same way to China’s engagement with South Sudan.

It is important to note, however, that China only started engaging with South Sudan’s People’s Liberation Movement in 2005, after the Comprehensive Peace Agreement
(CPA) was signed (Crisis Group, 2017). As South Sudan had not yet become an autonomous government, the PRC used the system of ‘one state and two systems’ to engage the two groups (Large, 2012: 6). This meant that even though South Sudan was striving for its independence and autonomy from the Sudanese government, technically it had not gained this independence and, as such, was subject to the sovereign framework of Sudan. Essentially, China was an ally of Khartoum; however, China shifted its support drastically towards South Sudan after it gained its independence in 2011. This was mainly because Khartoum lost more than half of its wealth and resources to South Sudan (Crisis Group, 2017). It can therefore be concluded that China followed natural resources and oil over maintaining loyalty in its relationships.

Post-2005, the then president of China, Hu Jintao, met with Vice President Salva Kiir Mayardit of Sudan in 2007, which led to the first Chinese consulate being opened in southern Sudan in 2008 (Sudan Tribune, 2010). Many Chinese companies already operating in Sudan saw this as an opportunity to enlarge and broaden their business horizons by opening representative companies in Juba (Large, 2013: 6). The execution and implementation of the CPA was important to those new companies that had just started investing in South Sudan and to sustain stability in Sudan generally. The importance of the two regions of Sudan adhering to this agreement was also seen in the case of the Chinese government’s special interests in Sudan, particularly in Darfur (Crisis Group, 2017).

The international community had its reservations and was quite dubious about China’s role in Sudan, especially considering China’s strong support of the Khartoum government (Crisis Group, 2017). However, in its defence, China announced publicly that it supported the full implementation of the CPA and that it would work together with the USA to advance and promote this agreement (Large, 2012: 5). It is important to note that China’s belated support for the CPA and its eagerness to work with the USA was a direct result of human rights organisations heavily criticising China for its proximity to a human-rights-abusing regime in Khartoum. The PRC also gave the CPA its full support because China was looking to achieve stability in both countries so that it could reap rewards in South Sudan, as South Sudan has more oil than Sudan (Iyasu, 2013). The Chinese and American special envoy ambassadors
worked together to fulfil the goal of a more stable Sudan. Lui Guijin, China’s special envoy ambassador and Princeton Lyman, America’s special envoy ambassador, had more than five engagements that centred on the independence of South Sudan (Dawn, 2011). They aimed to promote economic growth and assist the states to respond to security issues effectively and efficiently. Both the American and Chinese special envoys acted within their respective positions as secondary actors in foreign policy in an attempt to make things better. In this case, it was the two Sudans that had to submit to the collective good by giving up a share of their sovereignty. In January 2011, South Sudan officially gained its independence and China believed that it had done its best to ensure that both parties were happy and satisfied (Large 2012: 4). However, this was not the case. One would be forgiven for assuming that Sudan and South Sudan are at each other’s throats after the divorce. The two states still have unresolved issues. These range from border demarcation to oil resources (Sudan Tribune, 2012). The ongoing issues prove that both parties were not as happy about the outcomes as China assumed.

After South Sudan’s independence, China committed itself to development-first diplomacy in South Sudan (Hang, 2014). Development-first diplomacy meant that China focused on alleviating socio-economic issues in South Sudan through economic and social development initiatives, both for the benefit of China and South Sudan. China benefitted extensively through its foreign direct investments and, in turn, South Sudan gained intense development (Hang, 2014). This development also benefitted China as the infrastructure built was mostly situated in oil-rich areas, allowing China to import oil without difficulties. According to the PRC, development-first aimed to decrease insecurity and improve the livelihoods of citizens in the newly independent South Sudan. Many criticised this, believing that South Sudan’s political economy and security risks were just too great to be ignored, and that simply developing South Sudan economically and socially would result in limited outcomes (Large, 2013: 4).

It was very evident that China’s involvement was not just centred on energy, but also on ensuring that South Sudan developed to a certain extent. This was proven by Chinese initiatives such as the provision of humanitarian aid and the building of the new international airport in Juba. The humanitarian aid amounted to $12 558 869.70
(SDG 80 million) in April and August 2014 (Large, 2012: 11). China was also involved in most processes of the progress of South Sudan and Sudan, hoping that both Sudans would stabilise their states not only for their citizens, but for stability and peace in the region. According to the Chinese perspective, South Sudan and Sudan had to establish a culture of collaboration and do away with the culture of confrontation. That way both states would see sustainable national development (Chun & Hardy, 2015: 4-5).

3.6 The role of China during Sudan’s 3rd civil war

China’s approach of development-first diplomacy and their emphasis on focusing on collaboration rather than confrontation in the two Sudans failed (Chun & Hardy, 2015: 9). After Sudan and South Sudan signed the CPA, many hoped that the instability and destruction would finally end. However, the sad reality is that it did not. There were some violent outbreaks, such as when:

- fighting broke out in a South Sudan barracks in March 2014;
- hundreds were killed in South Sudan’s ethnic attack in April 2014;
- Sudanese warplanes bombed South Sudan border zones in November 2014;
- gunmen opened fire on civilians sheltering inside a UN base in Malakal, South Sudan in February 2016, after the agreement was signed; and

China had to start learning how to react quickly and more actively towards outbreaks of critical situations (Barber, 2015). This was also fuelled by its experience during the crisis in Darfur. China came to realise that it needed to focus more on assisting and mediating between the two Sudans for conflict resolution rather than being reactive, and that it had to develop long-term solutions to combat conflict in the two Sudans (Barber, 2015). The prevention of instability in the two Sudans, and ultimately within South Sudan, needed more than just collaboration and socio-economic
development. More strategic measures needed to be taken for China to reconcile the two Sudans and domestic issues within the two countries (Chun & Hardy, 2015: 6).

The conflict in South Sudan in 2013 is known as South Sudan’s first civil war and cost many lives. It was a conflict between the forces of government (SPLM) and the opposition (SPLM-in-opposition) (The Guardian, 2013). The fighting broke out as the president accused his deputy, Riek Machar, of attempting a coup d’état. These allegations were rejected by Machar and the tension that followed led to Machar fleeing the country. He also called for President Kiir Mayardit to resign. Fighting broke out between the SPLM and SPLM-in-opposition, which ignited the civil war. This conflict killed as many as 50 000 people in two years and continues despite all the peace deals (Aljazeera, 2016). The conflict proved that China was not as experienced as it had thought it was. The vacuum caused by a lack of policies, strategies and experience in operations of conflict prevention could clearly be seen, and this made China’s presence in South Sudan a daunting task.

Currently, the PRC is part of the mediation process, but this has been limited to the governmental level of South Sudan (Barber, 2015). After the outbreak of the civil war in South Sudan, China continued its efforts to mediate between the two groups in dispute (Large, 2013: 4). The first effort was seen directly after 24 December 2013, when a violent conflict emerged between the two groups. Zhang Ming, the vice foreign minister of the PRC, tried to meet with diplomatic envoys to China from South Sudan, Ethiopia, Somalia, Sudan, Uganda and Kenya. These are also member states of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). The agenda for this meeting was to engage on issues pertaining to the outbreak of violence in South Sudan and how it could best be managed (Gowan, 2016). Diplomatic envoys are full ‘Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary’; basically, they are second-tier diplomats ranked between the level of an ambassador and a minister resident (Wrinston, 1960). As international and regional mechanisms were being put into place, these secondary actors of their respective foreign policies were aware that it was up to countries within the region and the continent to ensure that agreements were ultimately effective. This could only be done by information sharing and implementing policies (Chun and Hardy, 2015). It was clear that all the efforts and
peace agreements were toothless without proper implementation and remedial efforts by domestic influencers.

Another effort was made by China’s special representative ambassador, Zhong Jianhua, who initiated the process of shuttle diplomacy between Sudan, South Sudan, Uganda, Ethiopia, the UK, the USA, IGAD and the AU (Xinhau, 2016). All these efforts show that the PRC did not want to act unilaterally to sort out domestic issues in South Sudan (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, 2016). There is a significant connection between domestic structures, regional structures and international politics (Heywood, 2011; Nel, 2006). This means that the processes that domestic and regional structures normally use contribute greatly to international politics.

China acted wisely in ensuring that it did not publicly dominate the processes and issues of Africa, particularly in the case of the two Sudans. The importance of cooperation between and among states cannot be ignored, nor can the importance of international institutions (Doyle, 2012). China worked with the USA and UK in these processes, even though they are not great allies, to succeed in its mediation processes. Although realists continue to question the issue of state sovereignty in such matters, a pragmatic realists’ foreign policy allows for this kind of cooperation to achieve prescribed goals. Realist concerns regarding external influences in foreign policy highlight the fact that, because states are supposed to be sovereign entities, they are entitled to work on their own issues in their own ways (Jackson & Sorenson, 2013). However, due to the emergence of globalisation, what affects one state affects the other; hence cooperation between states is important to resolve issues.

Shuttle diplomacy is a process of negotiations conducted by a mediator, who then travels between two or more parties involved in a conflict as these parties would be resistant to holding direct discussions with each other (Xinhau, 2016). This means that Ambassador Jianhua, as a representative of the Chinese government, was a driver and link between these reluctant parties. His mediation aimed at promoting a peaceful solution and a way forward for South Sudan and Sudan after the outbreak of violence in South Sudan. Ambassador Jianhua visited South Sudan several times and even accomplished the task of putting both the rebels and the government of
South Sudan in one room at the same time to negotiate a peaceful future for the two Sudans and to settle their disputes and differences (Gowan, 2016).

Having both the rebel groups and the government representatives present in conflict resolution discussions was an important development for China and its role as mediator in South Sudan’s civil war. However, this development contradicted China’s principle and policy of non-interference and was unusual for China’s foreign policy. During July 2014, the government of the PRC invited James Wani Igga to visit China to unpack issues pertaining to the crisis in South Sudan (Chun & Hardy, 2015). James was the vice president of South Sudan and the deputy chairman of the SPLM. During this meeting Li Kequiang, the premier of China, directly emphasised the need for South Sudan to establish stability and to enforce reconciliatory measures as soon as possible. In the same vein, the government of China committed to playing a supportive and reconstructive role to ensure that South Sudan achieved the objective and goal of peace, stability and development (Chun & Hardy, 2015).

Two months after this meeting, in September 2014, the chairman of the external relations committee of the SPLM-in-opposition, Dr Dnieu Mathok, also received an invitation to visit China (Sudan Tribune, 2014). The SPLM-in-opposition is an anti-government movement and a rebel group whose members had parted ways with the SPLM (SPLM/SPLA, 2016). The meeting consisted of many high-ranking foreign policy leaders in China and expressed the same sentiments and expectations as articulated to the South Sudanese government regarding peace and stability in South Sudan (Sudan Tribune, 2014). The call was clearly for the proper settlement of the South Sudanese civil war.

Although in the midst of negotiations after the outbreak of the civil war, the PRC did not stop its projects and investments aimed at developing the country and alleviating socio-economic issues, and it made a handsome profit as well (Chun & Hardy, 2015: 8). China continuously increased its economic support to South Sudan, hoping to set some sort of standard for South Sudan after the civil war for the country to begin to reconstruct itself (Gowan, 2016). It is very important to note that even though South Sudan was rated high-risk for investment and associated with high instability, China did not use this to stop its involvement in the country.
In December 2014, China publicly announced that it would begin work on the Juba-Terekeka-Ramciel-Yirol-Rumbek road (Sudan Tribune, 2014). It was imperative for China to build the road and rail networks to move oil to the ports and to China, which needed these oil imports. Moreover, in November 2015, China donated $10 million to aid those hit by the ongoing conflict in South Sudan (Xinhau, 2016). This was welcomed with both hands by the UN World Food Programme as part of its ongoing emergency response towards the deteriorating food security challenge in South Sudan (Xinhau, 2016). China’s generosity in the case of South Sudan did not go unnoticed and came at the most crucial time (Large, 2013: 5). China’s involvement in South Sudan was not just for investments and economic gains for China – it is understood that China is dependent of South Sudan’s oil to a certain extent – China also played a very critical role in terms of responsibility and support in South Sudan. China also signed two agreements with South Sudan in November 2014 based on the agreement that 97% of exports made by South Sudan to China would be privileged to a zero tariff. This means that those exports were not exposed to tax and there were fewer restrictions on exports (Chun & Hardy, 2015). In August 2016, China pledged another $10 million in aid to South Sudan (Xinhau, 2016). This money was to address immediate humanitarian needs as they increased due to the ongoing conflict and instability.

3.7 China’s deployment of combat troops to South Sudan

China had been quietly contributing troops towards UN peacekeeping missions, but it had not contributed combat forces until recently in Mali and South Sudan. China had been deploying engineers, logistical units, transport functionaries and medical units (Neethling, 2015: 9). This was to keep UN peacekeeping operations in Africa going. However, as China’s interests in Africa diversified and increased, its policy and principle of non-interference was threatened (BBC 2014; Crisis Group, 2017; Iyasu, 2013). This is particularly interesting as the main reason that China became an alternative to the West for the majority of African states in terms of intense relations and trade, was because China presented itself as a partner that engaged in
relations with no strings attached, as opposed to the West (Clapham, 2006; Hess & Aidoo, 2010). The relevance of the idea that China is an alternative has come under heavy scrutiny.

The UN had more than 11,000 peacekeepers in South Sudan, 700 of which were the infantry battalion contributed by China (Reuters, 2014). Of these 700 peacekeepers, 121 were officers and 579 were soldiers (Guardian Africa Network, 2014). The deployment of combat troops by China marked a significant shift in China’s foreign policy in Africa as it was the first time that the Chinese infantry battalion had taken part in a UN peacekeeping mission. This study emphasises that the deployment of combat troops by the Chinese to the UN indicates a change in China’s approach to foreign policy.

As China embarked on the journey of becoming a global power, it did so by assuming the task of being perceived as a responsible leader. This meant that it had to assume greater global responsibility, including conflict resolution on the African continent (Neethling, 2015: 25). China also had to consider and protect its national interests and, in doing so, had to alter its stance on its non-interference policy in Africa.

South Sudan was not the first state where China broke ties with its non-interference policy. It first did so in Mali in mid-2013 to serve in the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Mali. According to The Diplomat (2014), Wang Yi, China’s foreign minister, did admit that China saw a shift in its foreign policy. Neethling (2015) and The Diplomat (2014) also mention that the head of the UN Association of China, Chen Jian, considered this shift to be:

[a] major breakthrough in our participation in peacekeeping… with this our contribution will be complete. We will have policemen, medical forces, engineering troops and combat troops.

The contribution of combat troops to South Sudan was significant in that it assumed the task of trying to bring stability and peace to avoid the destabilisation of the flow and production of oil in the state. It was in China’s interest to ensure that the flow of oil continued without impediment and that China continued to generate profits from its oil investments in South Sudan. South Sudan’s peace and stability is still very
important to China’s foreign policy because its failure will result in China struggling to harvest from its investments in the country. Moreover, it is in China's interest, as has been mentioned, to maintain an image that is reflective of a responsible leader in the international community. China playing a role in stabilising the security challenge in South Sudan will assist in achieving this.

3.8 China’s approach to conflict resolution in South Sudan

China had never really been exposed to conflict resolution as it was in the case of the two Sudans (South China Morning Post, 2017). This was mainly because China saw this sort of engagement as contrary to the state’s sovereignty; hence their pride in their policy and principle of non-interference. However, as China became a growing power in the international community a lot of things had to change. It was forced to act in a responsible manner internationally to gain credit as an accountable leader on the path to becoming a great power. As such, China learnt through doing in the case of South Sudan and Sudan. The conflict in the two Sudans presented China with the opportunity to learn about conflict mediation even though it redefined the proud stance that distinguished China’s approach to relationships with other states from the Western approach (Fabricius, 2014). China therefore made the unusual decision to act with three interrelated objectives:

- protect Chinese economic interests and its citizens;
- support an end to the war; and
- serve humanitarian aims and objectives (Crisis Group Interviews, 2016).

China’s approach to conflict resolution had some notable characteristics. China used an approach that continued to develop South Sudan, irrespective of the ongoing situation there. The fact that the conflict destroyed a lot of infrastructure did not threaten China’s development-first diplomacy. China tenaciously clung to development-first diplomacy and did not even think about terminating its agreements on development processes that were already underway (Hang, 2014). In fact, as mentioned above, China committed even more support to the development of South
Sudan, as it strongly believed that for a state to be stable and secure, it first needed to develop both economically and socially. Clearly China believed that the continuation of development projects created a concrete foundation on which post-conflict reconstruction could take form (Chun & Hardy, 2015). In addition, the continuation of these development projects served as a long-term strategy that strived to address the fundamental issues that were the main reasons for the conflict.

Development in South Sudan would not only benefit the country, but also its citizens. However, it is important to keep in mind that South Sudan was not the only one that would reap benefits. China would benefit extensively as South Sudan quenched China’s thirst for oil (OECD Observer, 2017; Zhou, 2014). China believed that the more it assisted in mediating the ongoing conflict and in developing the country, the greater the chances that the country would stabilise. This was important for China as the instability threatened China’s interest, which was South Sudan’s oil. China had invested a lot in South Sudan and could not afford to be idle while things got out of hand.

At the same time, China realised that its approach of development-first towards the civil war outbreak had evident shortcomings (Hang, 2014). China thought that development would erase all the challenges and issues facing the two Sudans, particularly South Sudan. However, the progress of this initiative was not as easy as anticipated. The idea did, to a certain extent, make sense; but when the risks and shortcomings involved in the South Sudanese case were considered, the idea clearly was not going to work as envisaged (Hang, 2014). As a result, China became more aware of this plan’s shortcomings in terms of its viability. After the outbreak of the civil war in December 2013, China realised that simply developing a country’s infrastructure did not take away its problems (Barber, 2015). China became more aware of important aspects such as conflict resolution, mediation and security (Chun & Hardy, 2015). In South Sudan, these were very important components to consider as China attempted to help South Sudan.

South Sudan also realised that a more realistic development, which included an emphasis on security and conflict resolution through mediation, was vital to a more stable future (Fabricius, 2014). This was also proven by China’s efforts, which cannot be ignored, particularly regarding conflict resolution. China faced a lot of
pressure from the business sector to shift its focus from development to security and mediation between the warring parties in South Sudan (Chun & Hardy, 2015). China did play a much bigger role in terms of conflict resolution; however, it also continued to invest in more development projects that would benefit South Sudan’s livelihood and economy in the long run. It is quite evident that in China’s efforts to achieve stability and security in South Sudan, it did not lose sight of development-first diplomacy, which was aimed at development for a better future for South Sudan and creating a foundation for South Sudan’s post-conflict reconstruction. This foundation would benefit China significantly as it would establish solid ground from which to build once the conflict has been resolved. The fact that it would have seen South Sudan through its worst would mean that China would be best positioned to dominate investments in continuing reconstruction in the country. China’s current support of South Sudan is directly linked to South Sudan’s political prospects.

In addition, China tried to avoid unilateral action to avoid further contradicting its non-interference principle and policy (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, 2016). As a rising power, China needs to prove that it can work with other states to find solutions rather than dominate. As this study pointed out earlier, China would also be directly and publicly deviating from its non-interference policy if it singlehandedly interfered in South Sudan’s domestic issues (Xinhau, 2016). Working with international institutions and other states meant that China was intervening for its own interests, but also in the interest of South Sudan and the region.

Its involvement in South Sudan’s conflict created a dilemma for China, which it tried to avoid. The dilemma was the possibility of actively being part of conflict resolution in South Sudan without losing sight of the principle of non-involvement in South Sudan’s internal issues. Although China did eventually fall victim to this, it tried not to by participating in collective engagements with regional bodies such as IGAD and the AU Peace and Security Council (Chun & Hardy, 2015). In this way, China avoided taking part in unilateral public engagements without the help and support of the various stakeholders that play a critical role in the region and in Africa at large. The interconnectedness of states due to the rise of globalisation led to states being aware that they could no longer unilaterally react to threats and that it is only through regional, continental and international regimes that responses could be synchronised.
to deal with challenges and threats. To realise peace and security in South Sudan would need more than just China’s learning and doing approach (Fabricius, 2014). It would require more intellectual input and more actors being actively involved. In this way, China would not be negatively associated with the conflict, as was the case with the Darfur crisis.

On 12 January 2015, China made another effort to realise stability in South Sudan. It engaged with IGAD and the two warring parties in South Sudan (Sudan Tribune, 2015). This was a consultative process that took place in Khartoum, Sudan. China also took several measures to ensure that it created formal links with various African institutions including the AU (Sudan Tribune, 2015). For example, China established the Proposal for the Initiative for the China-Africa Cooperative Partnership for Peace and Security in 2012 (Xuenjiang, 2012). This was proposed by the Chinese government at the 5th FOCAC in Beijing. The initiative resulted in China sending its troops to Mali for the first time in 2013, and 700 troops being sent to South Sudan as part of UNMISS in 2014 (Reuters, 2014). China also supported IGAD, both politically and financially, in ensuring that mediation efforts continued to bear fruit (Chun & Hardy, 2015).

More recently, China sent nearly 1 000 peacekeepers to serve alongside African and other national detachments in the 12 000-strong UN peacekeeping mission to South Sudan (Rotberg, 2016). These troops continue to serve as medical and logistics personnel, and a battalion of troops. In 2015, President Xi Jinping offered to send 8 000 more Chinese soldiers to help enforce peace and stability in South Sudan. However, this offer has not yet been accepted by the UN and South Sudan (Rotberg, 2016). Despite this offer being on the table, in 2016 Fox News reported that China had sent another 120 army peacekeepers to South Sudan. This continued effort by China to assist the troubled state shows China’s commitment to upholding its promise of being proactive in settling matters in South Sudan.
Is the security situation in South Sudan improving?

The UN has praised South Sudanese authorities on the improvement of the state’s security situation in the Wau province, north-western South Sudan (eNCA, 2017). This has been welcomed by the South Sudanese leadership as praise is rare in the international community pertaining to security improvements in conflict situations. The Wau province has also allowed refugees that were forced to flee the state to return because of the improvement of security in the area. “I am pleased to see that the local authorities, the police and national security have worked to improve the security environment,” the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General to South Sudan David Shearer said while visiting Wau (UN News Centre, 2017). Shearer also noted that the number of people that were displaced and consequently residing in United Nations Missions in South Sudan has decreased from 38 000 to 32 500 since July 2017. China has lent a helping hand and should form part of the celebration of the slight accomplishment in the area. China’s fifteenth peacekeeping force also achieved various objectives. This included its engineers helping to upgrade the Wau Airport in north-western South Sudan by improving security and passenger capacity (Danni, 2017).

Over 20 Chinese peacekeeping engineers constructed a 1 500-metre-long, 2.66-metre-high wall that serves as protection at the airport to help prevent potential dangers, as the airport is close to the country’s main road known for constant criminal activities (World News Network, 2017). The peacekeeping engineers also built two safety houses that can be occupied by 120 people, and repaired and widened a 50 000-square-metre apron (Danni, 2017). The project started in March and ended in April 2017. This is a milestone worth noting as China not only assisted South Sudan to reconstruct their state, but also did so swiftly. These efforts by the Chinese have been recognised internationally as Chinese peacekeepers to South Sudan were awarded UN peace medals in July 2017 (Xin & Zhongfeng, 2017). The above pertains to infrastructure building, but also says a lot about the sustainable peacebuilding process and political prospects in South Sudan in terms of China’s strategic interests. It is in the interest of both South Sudan and China for the war-tarnished South Sudan to realise harmony within the state. This means that violent
conflicts should cease in the near future and people should have freedom from fear of violence. It is important, however, to note that peace does not necessarily only pertain to the absence of violent conflict, but also to the presence of positive and respectful cultural and economic relationships. The vision of putting an end to war and violent conflict is not sufficient. The peace process needs to be sustainable for it to increase social harmony and peace within a state. China is hopeful about the realisation of sustainable peace in South Sudan and will continue to contribute towards this. This is because China sees a probability of advancement in the state. South Sudan’s positive outlook for the future will benefit China greatly in terms of its investment outputs.

However, despite these developments in 2017, conflict continues to be a huge concern in South Sudan. A month later, the Sudan Tribune (2017) reported on clashes between the Waat and Ayiel, which are two ethnic groups that are part of South Sudan’s Dinka Gok tribe, resulting in 27 citizens being killed. On 19 September, DefenceWeb (2017) reported a further 25 citizens killed due to these ethnic clashes. China continues to pledge humanitarian assistance and perpetual mediation efforts in South Sudan. China also uses these platforms to demand protection for its assets and economic investments (Hodzi, 2017).

3.10 Evaluation and conclusion

Sino-Sudanese relations have come a long way since their establishment in 1959. China and the two Sudans have been able to maintain a fairly long-term and developmental relationship. There have been various visits between and among the leaders of China and the two Sudans. China trained Sudanese armed forces. This also led to China supplying Sudan with military equipment in the early 1970s. Although during this period there were certain technological challenges standing in the way of development pertaining to Sudan’s oil fields, Sudan benefitted significantly from China’s economic grants, interest-free loans and soft loans. The peace agreement in 1972 led to China investing significantly in various projects in Sudan. Added to this was the fact that the USA and European companies could not
see their relations with Sudan through the trials and tribulations caused by the emergence of conflict. All these factors contributed towards China claiming its spot in Sudans’ oil refineries and attaining its position as a significant importer of oil from Sudan.

This chapter also emphasised the importance of being able to distinguish between before and after oil relations. Before oil relations were limited and China played a less significant role in Sudan’s development. On the other hand, after the introduction of oil, China started playing a more significant role in the development of Sudan. However, this development was mainly in oil areas and areas that allowed the free flow of this natural resource. This shows that although China started playing a more supportive role in the development and growth of Sudan, it was in China’s interest and immediate benefit to do so. Sudan’s unstable investment climate led to China further investing in Sudan. In 1993 China moved from being a net exporter to being a net importer of oil, which saw Sudan surpassing other African states to become China’s leading supplier of oil on the continent. As has been mentioned several times, China’s strategic interests played a huge role in its relations with the two Sudans.

After a lot of conflict, 9 July 2011 marked the independence of South Sudan from unified Sudan. China played a significant role in seeing the two Sudans through this. China developed stronger ties with South Sudan after its independence. This comes as no surprise as South Sudan acquired 70% of the oil, which left Sudan with a mere 30%. It was once again in China’s interest to establish stronger ties with a state that has more oil because China needs oil to drive its economic growth or to at least maintain a good GDP. This in turn shows the significance of oil in China’s relations with the two Sudans. The relations might be developmental for the two Sudans to a certain extent, but for China they are interest driven.

Continued conflict in the newly established South Sudan led to China being forced to change its principle of non-interference. The ongoing conflict led to instability in terms of oil production and flow. This was particularly problematic for China as the disruption of oil imports hindered its economy. The fact that China’s stance on the policy of non-interference has had to be altered and softened proves that oil interests are much more important than upholding the terms and conditions that led to China
being perceived as an alternative to the West. In this case, it was easier for China to go back on its word to sustain its economic growth as opposed to keeping its word and subsequently losing out on investments. The fact that China wants to be perceived as a responsible emerging global power accounts for China’s graceful acts. It should not be ignored, however, that China’s grace is imparted mostly in areas that ensure the production and free flow of oil. This shows that their courtesy is conditional; the condition is that whatever is being developed should be developed to fast track benefits to China.

China’s deployment of combat troops to South Sudan and China’s efforts in mediation processes through shuttle diplomacy and development-first diplomacy do benefit South Sudan to a certain extent, but it is important to note that they benefit China as well. As mentioned, South Sudan’s stability was initially not as important to China and only became important as part of the process of China achieving its economic goals and objectives. The final part of this chapter addressed the question: Is the security situation in South Sudan improving? Research proves that although efforts are being made to ensure stability in South Sudan, clashes continue to break out in the state. There is still a long way to go for the young state, but with continued effort the state will eventually see sustained stability. From a Chinese point of view, Xi Jinping will have to continue to ensure that China’s foreign policy adapts to changes in the international community to survive and address a laundry list of its long-term goals and objectives.

In concluding on this chapter, it is important for the study to reflect on some of the events and findings discussed in the chapter through a theoretical lens and in accordance with the theoretical framework selected. Realism is an important theory to use in explaining the continuity and change in China’s foreign policy towards the two Sudans as realism speaks highly of states being self-interested (Heywood, 2011; Rose, 1998). This study has indicated that self-interest plays an integral part in Sino-Sudanese relations. This study has also indicated various reasons for its strong view that China’s self-interest was the main driver of Sino-Sudanese relations.

Firstly, as economic and trade exchanges became frequent between China and Sudan, China began to develop Sudan’s basic industries. This benefitted China far more than Sudan as China benefitted not only from the trade, but also from Sudan’s
transition into development. China’s assistance in Sudan’s development was directly linked to its uninterrupted access to oil as, for instance, the development of oil machinery meant easier access to the resource. This study highlights the view that the development of infrastructure was strategically planned to ensure that it benefitted areas where China had invested in oil refineries. The development of structures such as roads and bridges resulted in oil production and its transportation becoming an easier process.

Secondly, this study distinguished between two periods of relations between China and Sudan. The first period before the 1990s is labelled before oil and the second period after the 1990s is labelled after oil. The difference between the two periods is important in explaining the connection of interests in Sino-Sudanese relations. Before the introduction of oil relations between the two states, Sudan was a less significant economic partner to China and China was less involved in Sudan. However, there was a significant change with the introduction of oil relations. China’s growing need for oil due to its intensive development resulted in it having to rely on foreign oil reserves. In the case of the underdeveloped Sudan, it was in China’s interests to do much more than just import Sudan’s oil; China had to assist in the development of Sudan as well. This study is of the view that China’s immediate interest, which is oil, was far more important than its relations with the two Sudans. The difference between China’s involvement with Sudan before and after the advent of oil relations is reflective of this truth. The introduction of oil relations was the main reason for this involvement growing in strength and intensity.

Thirdly, as South Sudan drew closer to attaining its independence from the unified Sudan, China also grew significantly closer to South Sudan. This strategic move was in China’s interest as most of Sudan’s oil was situated in the south. As a result, China had to develop and maintain relations with the parts of Sudan that served its interests. This also came with a significant shift in China’s foreign policy, particularly its principle of non-interference. The ongoing conflict in South Sudan made it virtually impossible for China to maintain its distance from these internal acts due to its respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity. China’s policy of non-interference threatened its uninterrupted access to South Sudan’s oil, which meant that its investment returns were also threatened. China deployed troops to try and assist in
efforts to stabilise the state. As this study has mentioned, China had to step out of its comfort zone to preserve its interests.

Lastly, Sino-Sudanese relations were clearly aligned to the idea of a means to an end when talking about foreign policy and state actions (Heywood, 2011: 115). In the case of China in Sudan, China’s actions were solely to secure its oil interests. ‘Means to an end’ refers to something that is not important, but is useful to achieving a goal or an objective. In this case, Sudan was not necessarily important to China, but its oil was highly useful in ensuring that China continued to grow and develop its economy to meet its national interests. In this sense, this study argues that both China and the Sudans acted to satisfy their self-interests. China’s involvement was to preserve its access to the oil in the two Sudans. On the other hand, Sudan and South Sudan also benefitted by securing much-needed investments, infrastructure development projects and various other aid despite the instability in the countries. This is because in the case of both Sudans, what pushes other states such as the USA and UK away brings China closer, which continues to benefit the Sudans in many ways.

Despite the dominance of interests in relations between China and the two Sudans, there are also aspects that speak to the theory of liberalism. As liberalism would have it, domestic factors play a huge role in the execution of China’s foreign policy (McGowen, 2006; Nel, 2006: 31 & 71). Advancing modernisation, achieving national reunification and safeguarding world peace is at the top of China’s list of priorities (Heath, 2016) and are very liberal notions. Moreover, when speaking of domestic factors playing a huge role in the decision-making process of foreign policy executions, one cannot shy away from this being the case in China’s foreign policy. China’s actions and reactions globally are a direct reflection of its domestic needs. For instance, China seeks foreign oil reserves largely because its industrialisation period stripped it of this natural resource domestically. In addition, oil is very important for China to sustain its good economic status. This means that all China’s foreign policy outputs are due to its domestic need to ensure that its economy continues to thrive and to sustain a low unemployment rate.

China continuously highlights the notion of the advancement of peace and stability in global affairs to justify its foreign policy actions, especially in instances where it
seems to defy its principle of non-interference. For China and the Sudans to achieve peace and combat instability, the states need to work together even if it means yielding a share of their sovereignty to create integrated communities. The success could, to a certain extent, promote economic growth and assist the states to respond to security issues effectively and efficiently. A case in point is where both the American and Chinese special envoys acted within their respective positions as secondary actors in foreign policy to make things better. In this case, the two Sudans had to submit to the collective good by giving up a share of their sovereignty. China’s involvement in the progress of processes between the two Sudans was important not just for stability in these states, but for the larger liberal perspective of stability and peace in the region, as the instability had caused an overspill.

Liberalism highlights the importance of cooperation between states for objectives, interests and goals that are of the same nature. This study highlights the cooperation between China and the two Sudans as their interactions were strongly associated with matters such as financial assistance in the form of soft loans, grants, joint ventures and debt relief, as well as health diplomacy and humanitarian aid. In the 1980s China availed long-term interest-free loans to Sudan to develop infrastructure such as roads and bridges. China also went into joint ventures with Sudan as it built ports, water conservancy and electricity. In 2007, China gave Sudan a further interest-free loan and cancelled over $70 million of Sudan’s debt. After South Sudan achieved its independence, China committed to development-first diplomacy, which reflected on cooperation that would result in economic and social development initiatives. China also provided the newly independent state with humanitarian aid of over $12 million. In 2015, China further donated $10 million to assist those affected by the ongoing violent conflict in South Sudan. These initiatives highlight the matter of cooperation between China and the two Sudans.

This study argues that there is a significant connection between domestic structures, regional structures and international politics (Heywood, 2011; Nel, 2006). In other words, the processes that domestic and regional structures normally use contribute greatly to international politics.

China’s main interest in the two Sudans was heavily influenced by China’s being able to benefit and pursue its own economic gains. Both realism and liberalism
emphasise the importance of cooperation in terms of foreign policy. The difference is that according to realism, states cooperate to ensure that their own interests are advanced, while liberalism paints a utopian picture of an international system that cooperates for the greater good. China acted wisely in ensuring that it did not publicly dominate the processes and issues of Africa, particularly in the case of the two Sudans. China worked with the USA and UK in these processes, even though they are not great allies. Events in the case of the two Sudans highlight the importance of cooperation between and among states, as well as the importance of international institutions (Doyle, 2012). China used this approach for success in its mediation processes. Although China shifting from its principle of non-interference in the domestic affairs of other states continues to challenge the issue of state sovereignty, its relations with South Sudan have shown that cooperation is important to achieve prescribed goals.

In stating that China and the two Sudans are sovereign states with absolute power over their domestic affairs, this study is of the view that they are entitled to work on their own issues in their own ways (Jackson & Sorenson, 2013). However, due to the emergence of globalisation, what affects one state, affects others; hence cooperation between states is important to resolving issues. In this case, the instability in the two Sudans hampered China’s investment in their oil, especially in South Sudan as it has most of the oil. China also had an image to uphold as a responsible leader, while the underdeveloped two Sudans wanted development. To achieve all these goals, the states needed to work together. China needed to invest not only in the Sudans’ oil, but in their security as well. Cooperation in this sense resulted in the win-win situation that China tries to reinforce in its relations. This is because in investing in security in the unstable states, China secured profits from its investments while also maintaining its responsible image in international affairs. For the Sudans, these relations resulted in security to bring stability and infrastructure grants, aid and more investment to boost their struggling economies.

The traits of constructivism also play a significant role in trying to make sense of relations between China and the two Sudans. Constructivism as a theory in International Relations relays identity as an important aspect in relations between states, especially in foreign policy. According to constructivism, the fact that these
two states share commonalities makes it inherently easier for them to engage with each other effectively and efficiently (Flockhart, 2012: 81-82; Tamaki, 2015: 14). China and Sudan’s friendship and relations continued through the decades because of the many traits that they had in common, such as the fact that they were both developing countries. There were advantages to both their economies and they both had very strong economic complexities. China and Sudan also shared a colonial history and the events that involved Charles George Gordon, also known as General ‘Chinese Gordon’ ensured the possibility of a connection between China and Sudan and, according to Large (2008: 3), it would continue so for generations to follow. However, it is false to assume that China’s motivation for the relationship was solely based on past events and historical connections, as China is not romantic about the past or nostalgic; China and Sudan are highly pragmatic states (Crisis group, 2017). Their commonalities just made it easier for these engagements to unfold. One cannot ignore the fact that China was also desperate for foreign oil reserves and that Sudan could help them with this. However, their colonial past and their solidarity with as developing countries did play a role in constructing their shared identity. China and Sudan also faced the same issue of international isolation. This reinforces the idea that having faced the same issues and challenges made it easier for the two to approach their unstable relations and build stronger ties.

China’s rise in global affairs has proven that the international system changes over time and space; this applies to norms as well. It was a norm for China to not interfere in the domestic issues of states with which it engaged in trade relations. However, as the system changed, so did China’s belief on its norms. Society imbues a norm with a web of meaning, and society itself can change that meaning. This was the case for China. It was a norm for China to relate to states by respecting and acknowledging their right to govern their territory; however, this had to change for the Chinese as its respect for domestic issues was at the expense of its civil society. For China to be perceived as a responsible leader in international affairs, its view on non-interference had to constantly be altered to fit this position.

4.1 Introduction

The search for continuous opportunities to benefit both China and the DRC was the primary reason behind the significant growth in relations between the two states over the past 25 years (Hellendorff, 2011). This growth and development were accounted for by the increase in China’s investment to the DRC as well as exports from the DRC to China. This helped strengthen and develop relations between not just the two states, but also certain sectors (Morake, Ojakorotu & Oduaran, 2016). Although Sino-DRC relations date back to the Qing Dynasty of 1887, contemporary relations between the two states can be traced back to 1971 when the DRC recognised the PRC as a sovereign state. During this time, the DRC was known as the Republic of Zaire (Kabemba, 2016). In the 21st century, China-DRC relations grew to be more sophisticated and professional. They also grew significantly in terms of trade and investments.

Since 1990, relations between the two states have expanded both their political and diplomatic ties (Stockton, 2017). The 1990s saw China assisting the DRC by supplying large quantities of weapons (Kabemba, 2016). In this period, the DRC military, which included Laurent Kabila’s son Joseph, also received training in China. All of this and more played a huge role in China’s quest for expanded economic links with the DRC.

China has a range of interests in the DRC, stimulated by the DRC’s geographic position, its abundant and arable land, its vast forest reserves and its bulky natural resources (Kabemba, 2016). All this may make the DRC seem like a wonderland; however, its internal weaknesses pose a threat to China’s multifaceted investments. These internal weaknesses range from a corrupt leadership to the ongoing conflict.
that has claimed many lives. China maintains its policy of non-interference in the case of the DRC, which has not benefitted the DRC in the least. However, on weighing its options, China sees the DRC’s internal weaknesses as a risk worth taking, considering the investment returns China could potentially make in the long term.

This chapter starts by unpacking the history of Sino-DRC relations from 1960. It shows that these relations escalated in the late 1990s and further matured in the 2000s through the establishment of the sicomines deal. This chapter subsequently deals with China’s multifaceted interests in the DRC and their significance in the continuity of the relations between the two states. Although the DRC has a lot to offer China, the upshot of their relations is that the DRC poses quite a threat through its political instability. As a result, the DRC’s internal weaknesses and factors that continue to contribute to its instability are discussed. Furthermore, the continuity and change in China’s foreign policy of non-interference in the DRC are observed. Lastly, a theoretical framework consisting of realism, liberalism and constructivism is used as an analytical tool for these growing relations.

4.2 The Congo’s relationship with the Republic of China (ROC) and the People’s Republic of China (PRC)

It was in October 1960 when the ROC, now commonly known as Taiwan, was officially recognised by the then Republic of Congo (Leopoldville) (China.Org, 2017; Harnet-Sievers, Marks & Naidu, 2010). Later, Leopoldville, now known as the DRC, had a sudden change of heart and reversed its recognition, and in February 1961, officially recognised the PRC as a sovereign state (Harnet-Sievers et al, 2010). This change came as no surprise as an overwhelming majority of states that were Western allies during the Cold War, the UN and other related organisations brought their relations with ROC to an end and instead fully aligned to the PRC (Kabemba, 2016). However, in another about turn less than a year later, the DRC under the leadership of Antoine Gizenga reversed its PRC recognition and again recognised the ROC. China decided to recall its embassy and suspend its relations with the
DRC in retaliation for the Congo’s diplomatic relations with the ROC (Chinese Foreign Ministry, 2006). China’s bargaining tool for establishing relations with newly independent African states with untapped natural resources was based merely on recognising Beijing over Taipei (Eleanor, 2017). China was not open to compromise on this and, if African states did not comply, China did not think twice about dissolving relations.

The DRC’s recognition of ROC ultimately led to the PRC giving its full support to the rebels fighting the government of the Republic of Zaire (Harnet-Sievers et al, 2010). To assist the rebels in their quest for power, the PRC provided them with material support in the form of arms, which played a huge role in the violent rebellion against the Zairian government (Hellendorf, 2011; Jiang, 2009). This and the assassination of the independent DRC’s first prime minister, Patrice Lumumba, orchestrated the end of relations between the DRC and PRC until 1972. The DRC and the PRC rekindled their relationship on 24 November 1972 when the DRC once again renounced the ROC in favour of the PRC (Hellendorff, 2011; Jiang, 2009). The DRC’s full recognition of the PRC has not changed since then. Instead, their relations saw some growth and development. The PRC established an embassy in Stanville, now known as Kisangani. Kisangani is the third largest urbanised city in the DRC (Chinese Foreign Ministry, 2006).

Eight Chinese leaders visited the Republic of Zaire between 1978 and 1995. Mabutu Sese Seko, the military dictator and president of the DRC (1965-1997), visited the PRC five times, despite their relations not being as significant then as they currently are (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, 2017). These visits could be assumed to have served as a basis for how the foreign policies of both the PRC and the DRC would unfold to benefit both to their maximum potential.

4.3 Sino-DRC relations from 1972-1990

The year 1972 is important for China-DRC relations as it marks the year the relationship between the two states stabilised. The formal renouncement of Taiwan
in this year meant that relations between the two states would finally develop and expand, although this did not happen drastically and at once. Mobutu visited China in both 1973 and 1974 (Mthembu, 2012). This diplomatic move was important for both states as it symbolised a turning point towards establishing a long-term relationship. It was significant because in the past Mobutu had shown signs of hostility towards China. This was because China had supported a rebellion against Mobutu’s rule (Mthembu, 2012).

Mobutu’s two visits resulted in China promising to aid the DRC with a $100 million deal (Deibert, 2013). This deal came with certain terms and conditions in the form of ‘suggestions’. China ‘suggested’ that the DRC used the funds technically to come up with new ideas that would contribute towards a more leftist approach to policy initiatives (Eleanor, 2017). Months later Mobutu went to the political bureau of the ruling political movement in Zaire, the Popular Movement of the Revolution. A radicalisation programme was established that consisted of 10 points. It carried many features that were informed by Mao Zedong, who is popularly known as the founding father of the PRC. These Maoist programmes aimed at paving the way for a stronger and unified DRC.

In addition, the end of the post-Salazar Portuguese dictatorship in 1974 led to Mozambique and Angola fighting for their independence (New African Magazine, 2013). Both China and the DRC played a role in the resultant war in these African colonies. President Mobutu enjoyed good relations with the National Liberation Front of Angola (FNLA), an armed group fighting for power in Angola. In contrast, Mobutu was not on good terms with the People’s Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), which enjoyed the support of the USSR (Mthembu, 2012).

The support for the FNLA and the hostility towards the USSR at the time provided a common ground that strengthened the relations and basic understanding between China and the DRC (SA History Online, 2015). China supported the FNLA by supplying much needed weaponry. This was the basis of Sino-African relations in this period as many African states continued to fight for their independence. The weapons that China provided for the FNLA made their way to Angola through the DRC, and some stayed at the FNLA camps in the then Zaire (De Morais, 2011; New African Magazine, 2013). The collaboration and cooperation between these two
states improved the relations between China and the DRC. However, these efforts were not enough to help the FNLA conquer Angola (SA History Online, 2015). Again, Chinese efforts served its strategic interests. Angola, similar to other African countries, has an abundance of natural resources, which attracts foreign investment. China needed Angola's natural resources to thrive and create an economy that would result in growth and sustainability during and after the industrialisation era (De Morais, 2011).

In the case of China, the DRC and Angola, the end of the Angolan civil war would bear them fruit. A few years after the civil war ended, Angola became China's second-biggest trading partner in Africa (De Morais, 2011). Angola also played a vital role in supporting first Laurent Kabila and then his son and current president, Joseph, since Mobutu Sese Seko was purged 20 years ago (Daily Maverick, 2017). Cooperation between and among these states was, and still is, important for them to reach common interests.

Laurent Kabila, who became president in 1997 following a military takeover that saw little resistance from the Zaire armed forces, spent much of his time in China in the late 1970s. As soon as he became president in 1997, Kabila revived Sino-Congolese relations as he enjoyed political support from China. The bonds created by the leaders of both states were significant, as personal bonds are essential to the Chinese political culture (IDS Policy Briefing, 2015). Between the 1980s and 1990s, China continued to support the DRC with small investments in education, social services and health (Hellendorf, 2011). However, much of the more serious collaborations and cooperation between the two countries emerged during the late 1990s after Kabila, as the new president of the DRC, ensured stronger ties between the Chinese and the Congolese.

4.4 Sino-Congolese relations post-1990

Relations between China and the DRC declined during the early 1990s (Kabemba, 2016). This was mainly due to the increase in political instability and because the
DRC was perceived as a failing state. The two issues are interlinked as you cannot have a capable and proficient state with looming political instability. Politics determines who gets what, when and how, and due to the instability in the DRC, the world witnessed a decline in the Congolese state. Laurent Kabila’s self-acclaimed presidency in the DRC in 1997 saw relations between China and the DRC gaining momentum (Relief Web, 1999). However, considering that political instability was still a huge risk, China had to take things slowly in terms of its relations with the struggling state. As a result, China’s approach of slow penetration in its affairs with the DRC meant that China relied on individual traders from China to interact with Congolese markets. This move by China shows how secondary and other actors play a pivotal role in China’s foreign policy. These individual traders had to buy copper and cobalt directly from miners in the DRC. Most of these purchases were made within the Katanga province in the DRC because the Katanga province is known for its excess in mineral riches (Kabemba, 2016; Mthembu, 2012). The increase in these individual traders resulted in an influx of the Chinese population to the Katanga province from the late 1990s to the early 2000s (Migration Policy Institute, 2016).

This sudden influx occurred simultaneously with the commodities supercycle that prevailed in the 2000s. The commodities supercycle is also known as the commodities boom, which explains the rise and fall of many physical commodity prices such as oil, metal and chemicals in the 2000s (The Economist, 2014). Between 2002 and 2008 there was a significant increase in trade between China and the DRC. This was mainly because of the export of natural resources in their raw form, which increased significantly. Also in 2002, according to the Chinese Foreign Ministry (2006), China had provided scholarships and study opportunities to 21 Congolese students who were given an opportunity to pursue their studies in China. They returned to the DRC upon the completion of their studies to plough back into the country through development initiatives informed by what they had studied in China. China did not give these students money to plan and execute these development plans; China used the approach of enhancing their ideas through sponsoring their education (Brautigam, 2015; The Economist, 2017).
In 2003, it was clear that China was exporting less to the DRC than it was importing (Ambardcus, 2017). According to Jansson (2010), relations between China and the DRC started to develop more decisively in 2004. On 30 July 2006, a pivotal day in the DRC’s history, the country witnessed its first election involving a multiparty system in the 41 years since the DRC’s independence from Belgium. This resulted in the Congo’s President Laurent Kabila being officially declared the victor of the first democratic presidential election. These elections were significant not only to the DRC, but also to the continent and the UN membership as many had hoped that this democratic process would bring stability to the Congo. Immediately after the elections, China took a more proactive approach to its dealings with the DRC as the country’s leadership was officiated (Eleanor, 2017).

This proactive approach to relations with the DRC led to the resources for infrastructure agreement being signed by the two countries in September 2007. This agreement was between the DRC’s state-owned copper producer and two Chinese public-sector construction companies (Njumboket, 2015). The agreement attracted attention to China’s dealings in Africa, particularly its approach in the DRC. The resources for infrastructure agreement meant that China would continue to consistently extract resources from the DRC and increase its export of raw materials from the country. In return, the DRC would benefit from massive infrastructure projects funded by the Chinese to reconstruct the state despite the political instability that still prevailed in the country. The agreement between China and the DRC totalled $9 billion (Eleanor, 2017; Kabemba, 2016). According to the deal, China would use half of the amount to invest in mining in the DRC and the other half would contribute towards infrastructure development (Mthembu, 2012). Infrastructure development meant that infrastructure such as schools, dams, roads, hospitals and railways were developed extensively. The investment in mines meant that China owned shares in these mines and infrastructure relating to the mines and their productivity was also developed to enhance the production of resources for import to China (Forbes, 2012). To date, this agreement symbolises the significance of Sino-Congolese relations. In as much as the DRC stood to gain from the deal considering China’s $30 billion contribution to the development of their infrastructure, China also benefitted quite strategically. China accounts for about 40% of global demand for
copper (Forbes, 2012). Cobalt is also of great significance to China. The relevance of the resource is further unpacked in the sections that follow.

In April 2008, the Sinohydro and China Railway Engineering Corporation (sicomines) struck a deal with the DRC government to grant China access to their minerals (Reuters, 2015). A total of 68% of the mining project would belong to sicomines and the other 32% of the project would be owned by state-owned parastatals in the DRC (Business live, 2017). In 2007, President Joseph Kabila reportedly stated in his state of the nation address, “DRC’s cooperation with China is key to the reconstruction of the state,” (Hellendorf, 2011). The establishment of FOCAC also had an impact on Sino-Congolese relations. Various FOCAC meetings strengthened China’s relations with the DRC as these meetings monitored past, ongoing and future projects (Enuka, 2017). China made use of FOCAC meetings to evaluate gaps in African economies that it could use to advance its interests while assisting various African countries with their developmental projects (Enuka, 2017). Wen Jiabao, China’s premier, also reportedly said that the economies of both China and the DRC were complementary and, as a result, “there is a bright prospect for mutually beneficial cooperation between the two states,” (Herman, 2015). During the fourth FOCAC meeting Premier Jiabao met with Prime Minister Adolphe Muzito in Sharm El-Sheikh, where Jiabao added that “common efforts by both parties would lead bilateral relations to become tighter and more fruitful,” (Herman, 2015). What is important is that China’s leadership constantly gave the impression that their engagements with African states, such as the DRC, were mutually beneficial and required mutual effort. This approach created the impression that China was an alternative to the West. In most cases the West was perceived as very dominant in its dealings with the global south. This approach contributed to the constant growth in relations between China and the DRC.

The year 2001 marked the first time that China contributed to MONUSCO, and in 2008 Chinese military personnel accounted for 234 of the troops contributed to MONUSCO (UNSC, 2015). In 2017, China contributed 2,466 peacekeepers to UN peacekeeping operations, with 219 of the troops being deployed to the DRC. The more China deploys their military personnel, the more experienced they become. This is important for China, as retired PLA colonel Liu Mingfu was reported to have
said that China needs to “take over from the United States as the world’s greatest military power”. To achieve this, China will have to expand its military capacity and acquire the much-needed experience. The DRC’s political instability affords them this opportunity. In October 2009 Charles Mwando, the DRC’s former minister of defence, visited China. He held talks with Ling Guangile, who was China’s minister for national defence at the time, which concluded that China and the DRC would “raise relations between the two armed forces to a higher level,” (Mthembu, 2012). In addition to intensifying relations between China and the DRC, China has continuously used its seat on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) to benefit the Congo. In 2010, it was proposed that a group of experts be sent to the DRC. China vetoed this at the request of the Congolese government. Sino-Congolese relations have, in this sense, had an impact on much of China’s foreign policy decision making. Additionally, the DRC, as an external factor in terms of the foreign policy of China, played a vital role in China finally succumbing to this request. China has also said that if the DRC was to request the removal of MONUSCO from within its borders, China would fully support the demand (Kabemba, 2016).

In 2012, China’s Exim bank, as the financing institution, withdrew its support of the resources for infrastructure project. This delay continued for a full two years, when the project came to a standstill (The Africa Report, 2014). The project resumed in 2014 after various actors in China and the DRC’s foreign policy makers came together to iron out particular uncertainties (Reuters, 2015). For many scholars, especially Western scholars, this was a surprising shift and came as an unexpected revelation. This is because China has always been perceived as a monolithic actor that normally follows through with a carefully coordinated plan. Although the disagreement between the various corporate actors in China’s foreign policy executions was unexpected, it was not the end of the road for the project. While it was not disclosed why the bank reconsidered, many scholars have speculated that the sudden turnaround could have been informed by the adoption of the law protecting the tax exemptions given to sicomines. The DRC parliament adopted this law in February 2014 (The African Report, 2014).

Meanwhile in 2013 the two states, China and the DRC, signed an agreement characterised by economic and technical cooperation. This agreement amounted to
$9 million in total (Jansson, 2011). The deal was not a conventional loan as had been the case with Sino-Congolese dealings. Instead, this amount was given to the Congolese government as a donation to contribute towards development in the DRC. This came as many scholars and actors in the international spectrum raised their concerns regarding the feasibility of the DRC being able to pay back the multibillion-dollar loan provided by China. To many it seemed that the Chinese government made this move to make things better. The donation was made for China to once again come across as a responsible leader and not taint the image that it is trying to create for itself in international affairs. Throughout 2015 and 2016, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi continued to have various meetings with many high-ranking officials from the Congolese government. These leaders ranged from President Kabila himself to Prime Minister Raymond Tshibanda (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, 2016). In 2017, China’s assistant foreign minister for the presidency met with the minister at the presidency for spatial planning and with the delegate-general for major projects Jean Bouya from the DRC. This meeting created a platform for both the DRC and China to exchange views on their relations. It also led to the two states monitoring and evaluating the issues relevant to their bilateral cooperation (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, 2017). Ongoing political instability in the DRC due to pending elections was also an issue frequently discussed. China has urged not only for the elections to proceed as soon as possible, but also for the DRC’s main opposition parties to come to the table and join negotiations with the government to arrive at an informed decision regarding this pertinent issue (CGTN, 2017).

4.5 China’s multifaceted interests in the DRC

Relations between China and the DRC date back decades. However, the intensity in terms of those relations differs significantly between then and now. Currently Sino-Congolese relations are mostly informed by the resources for infrastructure agreement, which literally means that China gains access to the Congo’s natural resources in exchange for Chinese-financed infrastructure development in the DRC.
(Kabemba, 2016). The agreement was informed by the idea of mutual benefit for both states. For China, access to the Congo’s natural resources meant that it could continue to use these resources to produce goods and products that were exported worldwide. The perception that the signed agreement between the two states was mutually beneficial has been put in the spotlight and continues to be questioned (Jansson, 2011). Those that were not sold on this idea held the view that the agreement was not mutually beneficial as China gained more than it actually committed to assist the DRC.

The resources that China imported from the DRC resulted in a fortune for China (Hellendorff, 2011). The DRC exported these natural resources to China, which subsequently converted them into complete products in quantity and made more money from exporting these finished products across the world than it supposedly used to develop the DRC. Although it is not in China’s interest, it would make more sense for China to invest in developing the DRC by assisting it to develop its own factories and firms. These would create a finished product to sell to China, in the same way that the DRC imports finished goods from China, and ensure that China at least maintains a good GDP to sustain its remarkable economic status (Morake et al, 2016). On the other hand, for the DRC the infrastructure built and financed by the Chinese would lead to its progressive development and, ultimately, to the reality of good economic growth and sustenance. Keeping both perspectives in mind, this section aims to unpack China’s various interests in the DRC.

4.5.1 Geographic position

The DRC’s strategic geographic position is of great importance to China on the African continent as it is a significant point of entry into Central Africa (Export.gov, 2017; Kandala et al, 2012). Its geography also led to it being rich in terms of natural resources and minerals. Even within its region, the Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa (CEMAC), it is widely known as the most dynamic economy, which highlights its importance in and for the region (African Economic Outlook, 2017). The Congo River contributes to the importance of the Congo’s geographical position for China’s geo-strategic considerations. The Congo River is
the second-largest river in Africa after the Nile River, and it flows right through the centre of the African continent for approximately 4 700 kilometres (Kandala et al, 2012). The river is vital to the Sino-Congolese relationship because it is the main source of transportation in Central Africa. It ensures about 14 500 kilometres of shipping routes in CEMAC on which a huge amount of goods is shipped daily (Britannica, 2018; Kabemba, 2016).

It is also significant to China as the infrastructure that China is building and developing in the DRC should ultimately lead to the DRC’s independence, with the economic competency to pay back its loan worth billions (Skyscraper City, 2011). However, to accomplish this, the DRC would need to achieve its objective of industrialising to manufacture products that will ultimately be shipped to different countries, not just in the CEMAC region but across Africa and possibly to the world. The DRC therefore has to ensure not only that the industrialisation project commences, but also that the project is effectively and efficiently implemented (Mthembu, 2012). Implementation has, in many cases, been a major problem for the Congolese.

China could do more to hasten the process of development in the DRC. Instead of assisting the DRC with roads, railways and airports, which ultimately just serve China’s own interests, it could invest in building factories and infrastructure that would help the DRC produce its own products using its own natural resources. If the DRC achieves this, then it will be able to grow its economy, gradually pay back the money owed to China and resist the tendency of depending on other states for the growth of its economy (Thrall, 2015). Although this would not be in China’s interests, as it would run the risk of not being able to get as many resources from the DRC as it currently does, China needs to revert to its principles of peaceful coexistence and evolve them to effectively execute the principle of equality and mutual benefit. This would reflect a win-win situation envisaged by both states.

The Congo River is also strategic for China as it is one of the most powerful rivers in the world, and in Africa it is the most powerful. It deposits about 41 000 cubic metres of water into the Atlantic Ocean every second and has around 40 hydropower plants on the river (Britannica, 2017). These hydropower plants use the power of the river to provide energy to Africa. Reuters (2014) reported that China would fund the
DRC’s hydroelectric plant along the Congo River. This is being done to decrease the power deficit of the south-eastern DRC’s copper mining region. Although the dam will displace 60 000 people (The Guardian, 2016), it would produce an amount of electricity equal to 20 large nuclear power stations. The Congo is pushing for this $14 billion project to be executed as soon as possible (Energy Economic Times, 2017; Reuters, 2017). The DRC would have to span one channel of the Congo River, which is inclusive of a dam and a 4 800-megawatt hydroelectric plant, for the project (McDonald et al, 2009; The Guardian, 2016).

The project is important for China as it will have the capacity to generate double the amount of electricity that China’s Three Gorges dam can (Donaldson, 2014). This means that this project would be Africa’s largest hydropower initiative and its implementation would harness the maximum power of the river. Most of the power generated from this dam will be designated for the DRC’s copper mines. China’s investment in the sicomines means that China will, in return, receive a 68% stake of the mine located in the south-eastern region of the DRC (Jansson, 2013). The region was reported to have an electricity deficit of 900 megawatts. The effective execution of this project would allow the mines to cover this deficit and be run to their full potential. In turn, this will result in greater revenue for China’s investment in these mines. The success of its investments in the DRC are of great importance to China, which means that a great deal of effort will be made to ensure that they generate more revenue for China’s economy.

Various foreign policy actors, including NGOs, have raised concerns regarding the legality of the execution of this project. International Rivers, which is based in California, USA, has shunned the project and those that are running it, stating that it may violate not just the DRC’s national laws, but also guidelines that are established on the international spectrum in terms of the development of mega-dams (Reuters, 2017). As mentioned earlier in the section, the project will lead to 35 000 people losing their homes in phase 1 of the project. The second phase of the project will lead to a further 25 000 being displaced (Chun & Wen, 2015). Peter Bosshard, who at the time was the interim director, highlighted these displacements and the fact that the fish species recorded in the Congo River will be severely impacted. However, these concerns should not be alarming to China as it has always been accused of
ignoring environmental concerns and their dangers. China’s government seems to cherish economic development at any cost. This means that economic development would be reached and sustained even at the cost of the DRCs citizens (The Guardian, 2016; Vines, 2016). Environmentalists in China have often shown great concern regarding the country’s leadership and its commitment to challenging these issues. Moreover, China can get away with shifting most of the blame to the DRC as it is the face of the project; even the head of the project has been appointed by the Congolese government.

Bruno Kapandji, the head of the Grand Inga Project, believes that in as much as there are disadvantages to these projects, such as those that have been raised by NGOs and civil society groups, the project is an important objective and goal that needs to be achieved for the greater benefit of the Congo. He states that “it is a choice we have to make, people have no electricity,” (Chun & Wen, 2015). He has continuously emphasised the importance of producing energy despite the consequences. If the project succeeds, it will not just cover the DRC’s need for electricity supply, but Africa’s at large. The success of the project would mean that the DRC would have a lot of energy to export. China, as a funder, would also enrich itself by benefitting from the project.

The DRC has to choose between two of China’s largest dam builders to execute this project. However, since China wants to commit itself to the development of the DRC, it should use any given opportunity to advance the economic growth of the DRC. It is therefore problematic that China wants to use its own builders to execute the project (The Guardian, 2016). If China is serious about the development of the DRC, then in instances like this, DRC state building companies should be given preference to execute these projects. Kapandji has also had to face various civil society groups to explain the feasibility of the project and to argue for it based on studies that found that the project would not necessarily have negative impacts.

4.5.2 Mineral resources

Literature on politics estimates that the DRC has about $24 trillion worth of valuable minerals (Kabemba, 2016). As a result, if one could measure wealth according to
potential, the DRC would rank extremely high. This works out really well for Sino-
Congolese relations as China is attracted to these resources. For China, the Congo
is a major source of mineral wealth as the abundance of the DRC’s minerals makes
China feel secure about its long-term relations with the state. For the DRC, China is
a source of finance to advance its immediate and long-term goals of industrialisation
and maximum development (Vernables, 2016). Therefore, both China and the DRC
perceive this relationship as mutually beneficial and China has termed this a win-win
situation (Alves, 2013). This implies that both states win because they both reap the
rewards of this agreement. However, in international politics, relative gains are much
more important than absolute gains (Pevenhouse & Goldstein, 2017: 39). The
minerals for infrastructure agreement are a true reflection of this win-win situation
according to the Chinese leadership, as it is representative of a win for the DRC
through the flow of foreign direct investment (FDI) from China and China continues
to ensure their strategic interests by securing minerals in abundance (Alves, 2013).
However, the nature of China’s overall relations with most African countries is
resource based. This is particularly worrisome as it makes one wonder what
happens when these resources are no longer significant for China. For now, it
appears there would be no basis for these relations to continue. China uses these
minerals to produce products that are exported worldwide. As a result, China’s
economy has sustained its good GDP after China’s industrialisation era.

For China, copper and cobalt are extremely important. According to Kabemba
(2016), in 2016 67.5% of the world’s production of cobalt relied mainly on
concentrates that were imported directly from the DRC. This puts China in the
position of being a world leader in the industry of electric battery technology as China
assumes 62% of the global cobalt market. With the excessive growth of the
technology industry, the demand for cobalt is expected to increase by two-thirds in
the next decade. This is very important for China as its investment in mines that
produce this resource will mean that China will control the majority of this resource’s
output. China will also benefit directly from this as it is a world leader in the
production of electric appliances and the technology sector.

The two minerals, copper and cobalt, led to China and the DRC establishing the
largest deal in the DRC’s history, the sicomines deal. According to this deal China, in
partnership with the DRC government mining company, is expected to extract 6.8 million tons of copper and 427,000 tons of cobalt (The Africa Report, 2014). China uses cobalt to tap into the electric vehicles boom as cobalt is mainly used in the production of electric batteries for electric vehicles. This is a good opportunity for China’s economy as there is a great demand for these electric cars. Cobalt is also used to build batteries for mobile technology; China provides 60% of this capacity. In October 2017, Bloomberg (2017) reported that copper jumped to a three-year high due to China’s supply cuts. Copper, like cobalt, is used in electrical equipment such as wiring and motors. China also makes use of these minerals to produce other electric products such as radios and televisions. China is one of the most important producers of almost all electrical equipment, which explains the importance of its relationship with the DRC. The Congo has the resources that China needs to continue to produce and export these final products to Africa and the rest of the world at a cheaper price than its competitors. It is important for DRC officials to start negotiating based on China helping them produce some of these products locally for the benefit of the DRC from their own natural resources. In this way, the DRC will also be able to export more finished goods to China.

China has also shown great interest in the DRC’s gold assets (Jamasmie, 2016). This is because China’s production growth of gold in the country is decreasing, considering its potential. China is running out of domestic reserves and production costs are rising. As a result, China is going to invest in the DRC’s gold mines. The Congo’s gold is one of its natural resources that has not been tapped into excessively (Mining Review Africa, 2017). On the other hand, China is also reportedly buying gold from the black market in the Congo. In September 2016, it was reported that one of China’s mining companies was funding armed men in the DRC in exchange for the gold that China would export to Dubai (Global Witness, 2016). The Chinese company allegedly funded these armed groups in the DRC by providing them with AK-47s and cash. Kim Hou, a Chinese mining company, lost up to $17 million worth of gold that was likely smuggled out of the Congo to international supply chains (Winemiller et al., 2016). The emerging systematic corruption relating to Chinese business representatives in the DRC highlights the fact that China is starting to use the ‘whatever it takes’ approach to obtain natural resources from Africa, and in this case, the DRC. This has started to taint China’s foreign policy
reputation, especially pertaining to its status as an emerging responsible leader in international affairs. Considering this, many see the minerals for infrastructure deal and many other investments by China in the DRC’s mineral resources as exploitative in nature. This, however, is not the full truth behind these relations.

Since China started importing minerals from the DRC, mainly copper and cobalt, the DRC experienced significant economic growth, starting between 2010 and 2013. The Congo’s economy went as high as 7.4% in 2013 and in 2014, the DRC registered growth of 8.7% (Trading Economics, 2018). This economic growth was above average on the African continent and suggests that China had a great impact on the DRC’s economic performance. However, the DRC started from a very low baseline. Between 2015 and 2016, the Congo’s economy fell from 6.9% in 2015 to 2.5% in 2016 (Trading Economics, 2018). It is important to note that just because a country has a higher GDP, it does not mean that its citizens are better off than the rest of the world in terms of overall wellbeing. Using just the GDP to determine growth is limiting as it does not consider other aspects that define human wellbeing, such as life expectancy and educational attainment.

According to the African Economic Outlook (2017), the DRC’s economic decline is likely to change as the country’s mineral resource prices are expected to grow. This expected growth could lead to the DRC’s economy rebounding to at least 5.2% in 2018. Despite China having invested in the DRC, there are still minerals that are untapped in this resource-rich country. This on its own is a good enough reason for China to enhance its investments in the country, which should benefit the DRC as well depending on the intensity of negotiations and trade relations. Vernables (2016) estimates that 2.3 million square kilometres of the DRC’s territory contains over 1100 different mineral substances that are still not heavily explored.

China thrives on production through manufacturing products and is likely to invest more into these untapped resources to further develop its own economy by securing the export of final products manufactured using these minerals. As a result, China’s relationship with the DRC is likely to remain important to China as long as it benefits from the DRC’s minerals, both those that have been discovered and tapped into, and those that have yet to be explored. This, as it has been mentioned, brings into question the sustainability of these relations beyond natural resource accessibility.
and availability. It would benefit the DRC to negotiate harder to ensure that China assists it to develop systems to explore some of these resources itself (Winemiller et al, 2016). In this way, the DRC will be able to enhance its capabilities (Kalu, 2012). However, China’s foreign policy is not likely to enable this as it enforces the dependency theory. The perpetuation of the DRC’s dependency means that China always has the upper hand to lead exploration into untapped resources and to further develop its economy. It maintains a necessary gap in terms of economic development to ensure that the DRC always needs China to attain some of its economic prospects (Agbebi & Virtanen, 2017).

4.5.3 Abundant arable land and forestry

Minerals are not the only DRC resource that China shows an interest in. China is also very interested in the Congo’s forests in the Congo basin. These rain forests are the second-largest in the world (Vernables, 2016). Forests continue to be important as they ensure the continuity of the biodiversity of the world, which is extremely important for economic development, diverse life forms, environmental adaptive responses and human livelihood (Global Witness, 2017; Earth Eclipse, 2017). The most important of these for China is that they serve as reserves for genes of biodiversity. This means that plants easily thrive in forests as forests offer extremely enabling environments by supporting biodiversity. Plant forests ensure the provision of wood and timber. This is then used as raw material to produce various products.

China has considerable interest in the DRC’s timber. As such, the DRC has become one of China’s primary sources of wood logs. Specifically, China imports the Congo’s Makula trees in abundance due to its growing domestic and global demand for Chinese traditional rosewood furniture (Yi, 2017). This excessive demand has endangered the Makula tree, which is a rare and slow growing specie found in the forest of the Congo basin (Winemiller et al, 2016). Concerns have been raised about the future of the region’s forests and the well-being of those DRC citizens that are heavily dependent on forest life. In the Congo this natural resource is used for traditional medical purposes while in China it is used in upscale furniture showrooms (Face To Face Africa, 2017). Currently there are no statistics available to account for
the amount of Makula trees that have been felled; however, it is extremely evident that the demand for this tree has increased significantly and, as a result, countries like Zambia have banned the export of this tree.

A ton of the Makula tree wood logs sells for $2,500 and $3,200 in Zhong Jiagang in eastern China (Quartz Media, 2017), which processes the greatest amount of Makula trees industrywide. In fact, Greenpeace estimates that 15,000 tons of the Makula tree wood logs are sold monthly. As a result, the 2012 market of rosewood furniture was valued at a minimum of $15 billion (Yi, 2017). This vast sum shows exactly why this tree is important to China despite its growing demand endangering the forest in the Congo basin. The concerns around the sustainability of this tree and the dangers of its continued export has led to the Congo’s local authorities attempting to restrain and limit the trade from the DRC. In doing so, Quartz Media Africa (2017) reported, the DRC officials arrested 14 Chinese nationals in May. This was because the officials received information that Chinese citizens were logging and exporting the Makula wood illegally. Pan Wenjing, who is Greenpeace’s senior global campaigner, has said that the “extent of illegal logging is shocking” and that China, as the most influential timber market, should continue to attempt to help African countries curb the illegal logging and timber trade. Wenjing is also a Chinese national.

It would be naïve to assume that China would wholeheartedly assist the DRC in curbing the illegal logging and export of the resource as it is evident that Chinese citizens are making money out of this illegal activity. However, as China presents itself to the world as a responsible emerging leader, it should be able to halt the increasing illegal activities of its citizens in states where it is supposedly helping with the development agenda. It is critical that China’s foreign policy continues to present itself in correlation with the five principles of coexistence. This is because the DRC, as is the case with all the other African states, sees China as an alternative in international relations solely based on the fact that it presented itself as guided by these principles. The continuation of illegal logging and export of these wood logs from the DRC by Chinese citizens means that China is contradicting its principle of mutual respect for each other’s territorial integrity.
On the other hand, the Congo’s abundant arable land has great potential, but it has not been heavily explored as only 10% of it is currently being cultivated and used (Global Forest Atlas, 2018). The DRC’s agricultural resources have been estimated at 80 million hectares of arable land; however, as has been mentioned, only 8 million hectares is currently in use (Vernables, 2016). One of the reasons for this is the ongoing conflict in areas of the DRC. Conflict and insecurity, coupled with insufficient infrastructure, machinery and skills domestically, leaves the DRC unable to feed itself and use this land to its maximum potential to benefit its citizens. For China, the Congo’s abundant arable land, coupled with its rich rain seasons, is a potential answer to the food security issues that could face China in the near future. It is reported that China has already obtained 2 800 million hectares of the DRC’s arable land to cultivate palm oil (Quartz Media, 2017). This oil is mainly used for cooking and churning out biofuel. Instant noodles have been rated the second-largest convenient food after bread. China is not just the world’s biggest instant noodles producer; China is also the world’s biggest consumer of this product. Almost all the different oils used to produce instant noodles come from palm oil and, for this reason, cultivating palm oil using the DRC’s land has become increasingly important for China’s economy and its food security (China-Africa Research Initiative, 2010; Institute for the Analysis of Global Security, 2017). China’s efforts at investing in land and agriculture, specifically in areas of the DRC, is to ensure food security for its domestic market first, and then to export these goods to external markets to ensure more revenue for China.

4.5.4 Significance of population

The DRC is one of the most populated countries on the African continent and ranks very high in the world as well. This has many advantages and disadvantages. For China, this seems to be more advantageous than the contrary. On the other hand, China is the most populated country in the world with 1 388 232 693 people within and across its borders. Its expected population by 2025 is 1 301 627 048 (Internet World Stats, 2017). Although this may seem a notable decrease, it is not enough in the case of the overpopulated Chinese state. This amount will still render China the most populated country in the world. As a result, China needs to do whatever it takes
to ensure that decisions made domestically and internationally are to the benefit of this population in the long term. This means that China’s foreign policy should strive to make decisions that have a positive impact on domestic challenges. China’s retreat to Africa is specifically informed by these domestic influences as much as international influences. Domestic influences play a huge role in China’s foreign policy execution (Moyo, 2012). This chapter has addressed China’s interests in the DRC. This scenario is quite representative of China’s relations with other African states. One of the most important elements of China’s relationship with the DRC is the mineral for infrastructure agreement (Jansson, 2013). As much as optimists would like to believe that Africa’s infrastructure development is extremely important to China, many pessimists are quick to point out that China’s long-term strategic interests are primary on its agenda, and the development of the DRC and other African states is secondary, both economically and politically, in terms of China’s success as an emerging world power.

The previous section focused on the variety of China’s interests in the DRC. The section also attempted to unpack reasons for the importance of these specific interests to China’s strategic outputs. The population of both China and the DRC play an extremely important role in the continuity of these relations in the long term. For China, the DRC’s population is important as a target markets for its finished products (Kabemma, 2016). China is known to export products in large quantities to various states at a cheaper price than other exporters. For Africa, this makes it easy for the states on the continent to become subject to relations with China. The fact that China sells finished goods for a cheaper price means that those products are accessible to many of the DRC’s population.

China imports cobalt and copper from the DRC, manufactures and produces final products and goes back to the DRC to sell them to the vast population. This means that the money that leaves the country as loans and aid returns through trade with the DRC and the population buying these products. The manufactured goods and machines from China benefit the DRC’s population as well as having lower product prices. The relevance of China’s population is that China’s foreign policy decisions, especially decisions made to invest in Africa’s resources, ensure that its economy continues to grow and benefit its people in the long term (Hess & Aidoo, 2010). For
example, China is starting to invest more in agriculture in the DRC as the Congo has arable land in abundance. This foreign policy decision is clearly driven by the domestic challenges of food security for future purposes considering its large population. China aims to ensure that its population does not suffer severe food shortages as the population continues to be numerous despite forecasts that it will decrease (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2016).

4.6 Are the DRC’s internal weaknesses a threat to China’s investments?

Political conditions in the DRC, just as in many other African states, are a hurdle in the way of development in the resource-rich country. An unstable state is not just a danger to itself, but is also a risk to FDIs. In the case of Sino-DRC relations, the political situation in the DRC serves as an internal weakness that increases the risks for Chinese investments. The DRC’s main internal weaknesses include high corruption levels, deadly diseases, riots and civil commotion, human rights violations, high military activity and terrorism (Mthembu, 2012). Natural hazards such as periodic droughts, seasonal floods and volcano eruptions also serve as domestic weaknesses of the DRC (Kabemba, 2016). Despite several FDIs over the years, the Congo continues to have weak institutions and infrastructure that ranks below standard. These profound weaknesses stand in the way of the Congo reaping maximum benefits from opportunities that Chinese investments and donations/aid provide. All these weaknesses are a result of poor patrimonial leadership, war and severe state neglect (McFerson, 2009).

According to Aljazeera (2017), the DRC has lost $750 million in mining revenue due to the high levels of corruption among several state officials. This means that the Congo has lost about a fifth of all mining revenue because of mismanagement and corruption. A fraction of this money is reported to have been distributed among corrupt networks linked to President Kabila (Daily Mail, 2017; Global Witness, 2017). These losses continue to rob the state of development to attract more FDI. These losses also mean that the money that China invests in Congolese mines is mismanaged; to a certain extent, China loses revenue and reports about revenues
are faulty. Government officials’ salaries are increased regularly while many poor citizens, especially those in villages, continue to suffer from severe poverty and extreme hunger (BBC, 2017). A disconcerting majority of government officials and agencies belonging to the government of the DRC today participate in corrupt activities, which further fuels poverty and war (Kabemma, 2016). This means that efforts by China in terms of humanitarian aid to combat extreme poverty and ongoing conflict are in vain due to corrupt state officials. China also has the capacity to do more in this regard; however, due to mounting allegations of Chinese citizens in the DRC engaging in corruption concerning illegal exports themselves, it would be difficult for China to point fingers. It has to first deal with its own people before it can call on DRC officials to end these malicious acts.

There is also ongoing political turmoil in the DRC (Jansson, 2013; Vernables, 2016). Despite positive projections pertaining to growth in the mining sector, recent government plans that strive to ensure reforms of the mining codes, which will result in tax increments and royalties, will potentially disrupt forecasts pronounced by BMI Research in 2017. Minister of Mines Martin Kabwelulu announced that the DRC could be doubling tax on cobalt if the drafted law, which has been adopted by the National Assembly, is approved by the Upper House and subsequently signed off by President Kabila (Bloomberg, 2018). This will have a significant impact on China as the primary importer of this resource from the DRC. If signed off, this could possibly mean that just as the world starts to conform to the idea of electric vehicles, China might have to raise the price of the finished products as a double increase in tax means that the cost of battery metal will increase sharply. The increase will go from 2% in 2017 to 5% in 2018 (Business Live, 2018). Although this may seem to deter investment, in the case of China not much is assumed to change. China will still want to secure the supply of this resource as electric vehicles continue to be critical tangible products in the world market.

On the other hand, uncertainty pertaining to the upcoming national elections have led to social unrest. President Kabila certainly did not seem to have any plans to ensure his succession as he had promised elections by December 2017 at the latest. These elections have not been executed and are reportedly postponed to December 2018 (News24, 2017). This led to escalating conflict and violence in the DRC.
Government officials continuously engage in violent confrontations with militia, which has led to a significant amount of deaths in the country across the years (Hewitt et al, 2017). The continuation of these conflicts could lead to foreign aid being cut, the population being discontent with the government and, subsequently, losses for Chinese investment. However, beyond all these uncertainties and risk hazards, China has not been scared off as they continue to spread their presence in the economy of the DRC. There is more to gain for China in the DRC now, and especially in the future considering all the unexplored natural resources (Kushner, 2013). For China, the price that it has to pay for its presence in the DRC is not as significant as the fortunes they stand to make in the future.

Katanga province has the most mining assets, most of which are assets in which China has invested (Kabemba, 2016; Mthembu, 2012). This area stands to be the most at risk of witnessing political turmoil because it has always been entangled in conflict with the central government and its secessionist ambitions are long-held (Moyo, 2012). If it happens that the central government loses its grip and control over the Katanga province, this would lead to a significant risk to a majority of mining operations that are located there. This does not just become a risk likely to affect the DRC significantly, but it will have a huge impact on growth forecasts for the entire Congolese state.

The ongoing instability and corruption of state officials has also contributed to an increase in human rights violations and deadly diseases claiming the lives of many citizens (Daily Mail, 2017). This contradicts China’s moral high ground as China continues to work with an elite group that is corrupt and ignores the upliftment of the citizens of the DRC (Kabemba, 2016). Internal weaknesses of the DRC are an obstacle to Chinese investments, but also offer notable opportunities for the Chinese as well. China exploits these weaknesses to their greater benefit. It works and cooperates with the elite corrupt minority that steal from their fellow citizens. This, moreover, highlights the fact that China’s foreign policy is centred around economic gains at the cost of anything. In as much as China would want to have a say on domestic issues such as corruption in the state, it is much more important for China to ensure that its strategic economic relations with the state continues and grows, despite many other factors that come across as shortfalls. This, however, shows that
China’s condition of non-interference in domestic affairs stands in this case. It will however be important for China to remain consistent with either this principle of non-interference or with its perceived image as a responsible actor. Trying to present both is not consistent and makes it seem that China is not decisive.

4.7 Factors contributing to instability

The common link between the case studies covered in this study, particularly the two Sudans and the DRC, is their rising risk for China’s investments. For the Eastern DRC, the reason for the state’s instability is the issues of ethnicity, greed, economic factors and political factors (Montoya, 2017). The intense tension that exists between the Hutus and the Tutsis is the primary ethnicity issue in the region (Vogel & Raeymaekers, 2016). The Tutsis are, to a certain extent, favourable as a vast majority of them are successful in terms of economic activities. Another reason is that the Tutsis are very conservative. For this reason, they do not marry into other ethnic groups and do not allow themselves to be easily influenced by other cultures. In simple terms, they do not integrate into societies easily. In turn, the Congolese government uses these reasons to disadvantage this ethnic group by denying them citizenship and many other basic rights in the country (Vogel & Raeymaekers, 2016). The role that various DRC government actors continue to play and the actions they choose to exude, add to the antagonism and antipathy between the Hutus and Tutsis because the Tutsis associate themselves with Rwanda and the mass genocide.

Resources in the DRC have not only financed the conflict in the state, but they have in many other cases been the motivating factor for this conflict and the desire to territorialise sovereignty around vast areas with valuable resources and trading networks (Global Policy Forum, 2007). As a result, the post-Cold War period’s armed conflicts are, in most cases, related to geography and the political economy of natural resources. In cases in many countries including the DRC, violence is in these instances used to subjugate the rights of civil society to determine how their environment is used and brutally intensify predation and resource extraction in those
areas. The desire sparked by the widely available natural resources in the DRC and people’s greed, and not necessarily the resources themselves, serve as a predictive indicator of conflict (Montoya, 2017). In these circumstances, violence then becomes the decisive means of resolving disputes. Primary commodities are striking not only to the government elites, but also their main competitors, rebels. This is because a lot of tax is generated from them and this is done easily (Kabemba, 2016; BBC, 2013). Rebels strive towards territorial control because the prize is abundant resources and arable land being available to them without effort. This increases the risk of greed-driven conflicts that further destabilise the DRC as the money made from these primary commodities provide armed rebel groups with loot to buy military equipment, which perpetuates the conflict. The DRC as a case study proves the analysis by various scholars that abundance in natural resources is linked to poor economic growth and poor governance (Montoya, 2017). These two factors are heavily associated with a greater risk of conflict and instability.

Political factors also play a significant role in the instability of the DRC (Haider & Rohwerder, 2015). Despite the Congo being known as the most dynamic and diverse economy in CEMAC and Africa, conflict remains ongoing irrespective of efforts by various actors, including China, to facilitate a peace process. It cannot go unnoticed that the government of the DRC under the leadership of President Kabila has continued to allow the Congo’s capacity to execute the most basic forms of service delivery to deteriorate (Kabemba, 2016). Many government agencies and institutions are captured by Kabila and his camp; hence they are not truly representative and they fail to protect the state from ongoing instability and illegitimate leadership (Haider & Rohwerder, 2015). The institutions available are not effective and efficient because they have failed and continue to fail to channel various challenges in the DRC including war economies and conflict (Autesserre, 2016). This ultimately renders their existence useless because they fail to execute peace processes and resolutions taken to legitimise the leadership of the state.

These factors that contribute to the instability in the DRC continue to pose a threat to China’s investments in the state as they create a possibility and likelihood that a loss could occur at any point, which could lead to the expected returns from these investments being affected (Mthembu, 2012). However, this does not mean that
China is ignorant of this. China is aware of this uncertainty, and is the reason that it continues to play a role by contributing military assistance to the DRC and contributing towards troops in MONUSCO. China's role is limited in this regard as it does not want to expose the fact that its alternative approach of non-interference in domestic affairs is not as stringent anymore. Risk is an integral part of investing and is the counterbalance to return (Carson, 2014). For China, its investment in the DRC has more ways to win than to lose. The popular phrase ‘there is no free lunch’ applies in the Sino-Congolese context and China clearly understands this. China has to endure this uncertainty and assist in as many ways as it can to continue efforts to curb it. China continues to take a measured amount of risk towards its investment expecting to see a number of paths towards rewards that are potentially attractive. These investments will benefit China significantly in the long run despite the continuing instability (World Bank, 2015). China also continues to assist the DRC, but only to an extent where the DRC continues to depend on them.

4.8 Continuity and change in China’s policy of non-interference in the DRC

China has continued to explore ways in which it could play a more critical role in world affairs, especially in relation to humanitarian crises and political instability. This means that China has been able to reshape its policy of non-interference; in the past it did not give much room to improve on this. China’s sudden change of heart is largely due to it slowly but surely integrating into issues of the global political economy (Chin et al, 2016). China has also assumed the task of re-emerging as a responsible partner in international relations and, as such, it has had to be responsible publicly in its engagements with states and actors across the globe. However, until 2018, China had not really been deeply and unilaterally involved in the domestic affairs of states. It had largely participated in political and humanitarian crises through directions given by the UNSC and been involved in the domestic affairs of states in a collective effort with various regional efforts (Jansson, 2010). As a result of growing pressure, China’s foreign policy has had to mature to adapt to evolving conditions in global affairs. This growth continues to pressurise China to
ensure that it balances its conventional ties to its policy of non-interference with its responsibilities as an emerging significant power in global affairs.

In the DRC, in as much as China has contributed troops to MONUSCO and has continued to provide military assistance to the Congolese military, it has been noted that China has not really engaged in deep coercive interference through deep involvement in the Congo’s domestic affairs (Fukase & Martin, 2016). On the other hand, in the past few years, China has offered the Congo various opportunities through investments. However, to date this remains to a certain extent insufficient to assist the Congo on its way to development that is sustainable. Despite a diverse and dynamic economy, the DRC remains a failed state that does not have the capacity to deal with China on an equal footing. The only way that China’s efforts in the DRC will make a difference is if China interferes and presents alternative measures to the DRC’s corrupt elite group on their management of the state and the state’s relations with its society (Kabemba, 2016). In as much as this will be against China’s traditional principle of non-interference, this is the only help that could affect change.

China continues to contradict itself by assuming that its efforts to increase commercial ties in the DRC are aiding the economy. If China continues to ignore serious issues of institutional dysfunction and non-accountability by the Congolese government to its citizens, then all of China’s efforts will continue to be in vain. It is important for China to create a path that helps build these vital institutions and to help legitimise the Congo’s leadership (Montoya, 2017). This is because if China continues to fail to assist in this regard, the DRC will continue to fail in its attempt to make use of its commercial ties with China to seek maximum benefit. The DRC will continue to mismanage the lucrative opportunities that its engagement with the Chinese is supposed to raise to benefit the state. These soft issues that continue to stand in the way of sustainable development in the DRC also undermine China’s approach of a win-win relationship, which is part of the five principles of coexistence that guides China’s foreign policy (Kabemba, 2016). The only time the two partners will create a win-win relationship is when the more established and powerful partner takes it upon itself to empower the less developed and less powerful partner to take part in engagements that are truly meaningful. These meaningful ties should be
constructive and result in stronger ties that truly benefit both partners equally. The DRC’s internal weaknesses are a lack of strong state capacity, a growing corrupt elite group, political instability, poor planning and mismanagement (Mthembu, 2012). All these challenges are due to corrupt state leadership, state institutions and state agencies. China needs to focus not only on investing in the Congo’s resources, but also in trying to root the Congo’s governance in transparency and accountability, and in establishing factories for the DRC to locally produce and export some of these final products.

4.9 Evaluation and conclusion

Sino-DRC relations were unstable from 1960; however, they stabilised in 1972 when the DRC gave full recognition to the PRC, which ultimately led to the growth and stability of relations between the two states. From this period until the early 1990s various visits by state officials from both the DRC and China resulted in millions of dollars in aid being donated to the DRC, mutual support for alliances and China moving from relying on individual traders to interact with DRC markets, to China being at the centre of these interactions. However, in the 1990s these relations declined as a result of increasing political instability. This was also the period when the Congolese state was perceived as a failing state. Not much has changed since then in terms of political instability and risk for China’s investments. What has changed, however, is China’s perception of the situation in the DRC. At first, it seemed that the declining relations were due to China’s anxiety, which at a later stage turned into the fear of engaging with a state that is confronted by escalating political instability coupled with the state not having the ability to take charge or full control of the looming instability to secure investment and a stable state. The evident change is that China has come to terms with the situation and has decided to ignore it to a certain extent.

At first, China’s penetration into the DRC was guided by its alternative approach of non-interference into domestic affairs; however, there has been an evident shift in this approach as China has used soft power to extend its hand of influence in the
DRC. China has called for opposition parties to come to the table to negotiation in an effort to find solutions to the challenges facing the DRC. Aside from the fact that China is painting a picture of itself as an emerging responsible leader in the international community, it has also had to start playing a role in halting the continued instability in the DRC. Insignificant as the role that China is playing in the DRC is, for many of its critics it has only made all those moves to secure its strategic interests.

In September 2007, China and the DRC signed the infrastructure for minerals agreement, which totalled $9 billion. The idea behind this agreement was for China to assist the DRC with much-needed infrastructure in the quest for sustainable development in exchange for access to the DRC’s minerals. This study is of the view that this deal will benefit the DRC in the medium term, due to the DRC receiving large sums of money to facilitate building this infrastructure. However, China stands to benefit more in the long term. The reason for this assertion is that the DRC has been considered a failing state because it does not have the capacity to control or take charge of looming challenges confronting the state. Immature and ineffective as its corrupt leadership has proven to be, it would be naïve to think that all that is expected from this agreement on the side of the DRC and its citizens will be implemented effectively and to maximum benefit. The little revenue that the current economy is generating is highly ineffective and not being used efficiently. DRC citizens are currently facing poverty despite the country being in possession of diverse natural resources in abundance. This agreement will not change the situation; moreover, these challenges will become worse unless there is a change of leadership and the focus is solely on sustainable development in the interest of the nation and not individuals.

China on the other hand, will benefit extensively as it has proven that it will grab any opportunity to maximise benefits and minimise costs (losses). China has the capacity and capability to ensure that all its plans and aims are achieved and effectively and efficiently executed. This deal will result in maximum benefit to China because China will not only be collecting from the DRC’s paying back the debt in the future, but also be generating revenue from its majority shares in most of the mines in the DRC. China’s multifaceted interests in the DRC, which range from its strategic geographic
position to its minerals, forestry, abundant arable land and a vast population, will continue to grow and expand in the coming years. The study is also of the view that internal weaknesses such as high corruption levels, deadly diseases, riots and civil commotion, human rights violations, high military activity and terrorism and many natural hazards are a threat to China’s investment in the DRC. Factors that contribute to the instability in the DRC are issues of ethnicity, greed, economic factors and political factors. However, the study has highlighted that despite the threat and risk to investment being evident, China continues to benefit significantly in terms of its strategic interests. As has been stated, the price China has to pay for their presence in the DRC is not as significant as the fortunes they stand to reap, considering the fact that China is exploring untapped resources in the DRC as well.

The study has highlighted the fact that the DRC needs a new government administration. However, this does not mean that new leadership would be the solution to the challenges facing the DRC. Instead, this study is of the view that this would be a step in the right direction. Despite minor changes in China’s foreign policy, which are significant, China continues to be guided by its principles of peaceful coexistence in its relations with the DRC. This means that continuity surpasses change in China’s foreign policy in this regard. This study also made use of the theories of realism, liberalism and constructivism to reflect on Sino-DRC relations.

One way of explaining China’s foreign policy is through the lens of realism; meaning that power and national interest ostensibly play a role in China’s foreign policy. States exercise power towards each other and use this power to advance interests and also to protect their survival. China’s power lies in the fact that it has a remarkably strong economy, an expanding military force and a growing significance in the international community. This is also called power as capability (Pevenhouse & Goldstein, 2017: 40). In terms of its economy, China did inherently have a strong and stable economy. China’s economic growth is a result of its industrial revolution and continued hard work, domestically and internationally, to ensure its sustenance. However, for China to continue driving its economic prospects through the drastic production and exporting of essential outputs, it has to ensure good relations with states abroad. This is to ensure that it uses those relations to benefit its economy.
Africa is a good partner to China’s quest for resources and the DRC is particularly distinctive in that it has the most diverse sources of raw materials and vast arable land that is not used to its full potential. China’s thirst for resources is largely linked to its industrialising economy and for China to survive, it has to build relations with countries that still have natural resources; and who better than those in Africa?

China’s foreign policy has proven to use its power to attain some of these natural resources and majority shares in some of the mines in the eastern DRC. For instance, China uses its power effectively by exploiting the DRC’s needs to advance its interests. In essence, despite having various natural resources, the DRC does not have efficient infrastructure and its economy is not stable. China used this to negotiate entrance and access to the DRC’s resources. Using the infrastructure for minerals agreement, China gains access to the DRC’s raw materials in exchange for the construction of much-needed infrastructure for the DRC to boost its struggling economy. As Pevenhouse and Goldstein (2017:38) put it, power is the ability of another to get one to do what they would not have otherwise done (or to not do what it would not have done). In this case, as stated, China benefits more from the agreement now and in the long run. Currently, as a result of this deal, China has gained access as a majority shareholder to some of the mines in the east and it is starting to tap into undiscovered minerals such as gold and diamonds in the DRC. China is also expanding its interests into the DRC’s vast arable and unused land to ensure food security as China’s population is large and continues to grow. The DRC might not have negotiated such fair conditions if they had more power than they currently have considering the Sino-DRC relations.

China’s current economy generates good revenue for China and is used to attain deals that benefit the country domestically. It is evident that China’s foreign policy ensures the advancement of national interests and secures survival in the long term. China affects the DRC more than the DRC affects China. That is the role that power plays in those relations. Thucydides proclaims that “the strong do what they have the power to do and the weak accept what they have to accept,” (Pevenhouse & Goldstein, 2017: 39). This is the case in Sino-DRC relations. In as much as interests are at the centre of these relations from both ends, the one maximises its benefits and leads conditions for relations. China has more power than the DRC despite the
DRC’s abundant resources. The international system consists of many powers, each seeking survival (Walt, 1998). This study is of the view that China’s foreign policy behaviour is largely due to its need to survive in the international system.

While realism may differ significantly in terms of theoretical interpretation, in general the theory broadly agrees on states being inherently selfish and the international system being anarchic (Wohlforth, 2012; Heywood, 2011: 408). In the case of China and the DRC, China has shown countless times that it will pursue economic gains despite inherent challenges that the DRC faces. China could do much more to assist the DRC in sustainable development (Jansson, 2013). However, China has been very strategic in how it selects areas of development in the DRC. It is evident that most development initiatives such as infrastructure development are done in areas where China has invested in mines or is benefitting from in one way or another. This development benefits China’s investments and not necessarily the DRC and its people, as China would like the international community to believe. It shows that in most cases, the development achieved is to ensure the smooth sailing of processes and logistics surrounding China’s investment in the DRC.

Power and Mohan (2008:15-16) maintain that China’s foreign policy interests have been driven by energy and various other strategic interests such as copper and cobalt. The emphasis on interests provides evidence that neoliberalism acknowledges many of realisms assumptions – one being, “states are unitary actors rationally pursuing their self-interest in a system of anarchy,” (Heywood, 2013: 408). In the case of China, its development and growth has been reliant on the international community, whether it be for natural resources or for transferring technology. According to Kabemba (2016), China has been reliant for both on the DRC. China imports most of its cobalt and copper from the DRC and uses it to advance its electric and technological capacities. These very same outputs are sold across the world, including in the DRC. The DRC is one of the important states in Africa for China as it has a lot of resources and a huge population. This provides opportunities for China as the DRC does not have the capability to maximise its benefits through producing and manufacturing locally. Although the DRC has a huge population, entrepreneurship is not thriving. As a result, China makes use of this
opportunity to use raw materials to manufacture products and sell them back to this vast population.

Taking into consideration that China depends on cheap labour and does not consider the consequences of its growth (Power & Mohan, 2008), it is evident that China encourages the forces of neoliberalism. As mentioned in the study, China establishes initiatives in the DRC in the name of assisting the DRC in its path to development. However, in doing so, China makes use of its own labour force to build this infrastructure as their labour is cheap, quick and effective. This does not help the DRC in economic development as it would be more effective for China to take this opportunity to employ DRC nationals to impart those critical skills to them. Employing DRC nationals would also assist in combatting issues of unemployment. By not doing so, China is reinforcing the DRC’s dependence on China for these skills. Additionally, in terms of the disregard for the environmental consequences of China’s growth, the DRC is a primary source of wood logs for traditional rosewood furniture. Although there is no empirical data to account for the number of trees that have been felled, it has been reported that the dramatic demand for the wood logs is endangering the forest in the Congo basin (Quartz Media Africa, 2017). Despite these concerns, it has also been reported that DRC officials have been tipped off about Chinese nationals exporting these illegally (Yi, 2017).

Liberalism as a paradigm in International Relations in this sense, is perhaps a less useful source of explanation for China’s involvement in the DRC. China has become an integral part of the global market, resulting it in being interdependent. However, liberalism assumes that this leads to cooperation; this has not necessarily been the case for China and the DRC. When one looks at the relations between the two states, the fact that Sino-DRC relations result in economic interdependence between the two states, one has to be wary of different situations of sensitivity, where one state is reliant on another for the provision of an important good, but can always find other suppliers, and with vulnerability, where there are a few or no alternative suppliers (Pevenhouse & Goldstein, 2017: 74). China is not necessarily vulnerable in its relations with the DRC as the DRC is not its sole supplier of natural resources; however, it is a different story for the DRC. This is because of the heightened instability that consumes the state. It is not easy for the DRC to be seen as attractive
to foreign investment despite its abundance in natural resources; as a result, it is more reliant on its relations with China than China could ever be. This shows that the idea of economic interdependence does not fully work in this case. China has also not cooperated on issues of human rights and constantly uses its status in the UN Security Council to its own benefit.

At the same time, mutual dependence fits Sino-DRC relations. Anshan (2006) emphasises this by stating that “although Africa might need China, China also needs Africa for its development process”. This divulges the necessary commercial nature of China’s relations with the DRC. Power and Mohan (2008: 17) add that Sino-DRC relations have proven to be less about catching up with other development nations, than about the recognition that Africa’s resources are important for the growth of China. They also mention that this is a win-win situation for both parties as per negotiations. This, however, is one argument; there are also many scholars who argue that the relationship is one that benefits China more than the DRC.

Constructivism argues that China wants to be perceived as a responsible leader; as a result, it has had to adapt its policies in order for it to be responsive to the changing international environment. Constructivism emphasises that identities and ideas matter in analysing foreign policy. It also holds that the identities of states are complex and ever-changing. This is a result of states’ interactions with other states (Pevenhouse & Golstein, 2017: 82). One can explain particular aspects of change in China’s foreign policy according to constructivist principles. China has come to value and covet the status and reputation of being a responsible leader, which has led to many inconsistencies in its traditional approach to foreign policy actions. This applies to constructivism as status and reputation are not material concepts, but social concepts (Baylis et al, 2017: 131). Constructivism also highlights attributes such as shared history, shared alliances and shared norms that play a huge role in determining states’ friends and foes (Heywood, 2013:18).

In terms of shared history, China always finds solace in the fact that both African states and China share historical experiences as both China and most Africa were subject to “colonialism by capitalists and imperialists” (Yun, 2014). This meant that both China and the DRC were faced with the same struggle of fighting for independence and as well the liberation that followed. Since 1972 the Sino-DRC
relations stabilised due to the DRC’s formal renouncement of Taiwan, formerly called ROC. There have been several visits to both states by their leaders. China and the DRC also strengthened their relations and basic understanding through their support for the FNLA. This adheres to the idea that common alliances mean a great deal in strengthening relations. As a result, constructivism in the Sino-DRC relations contends that ideas and norms, rather than power and self-interest, drive state behaviour. Taking into consideration all these historical ties, China consistently refutes those who label China-Africa relations as only motivated by strategic interests. In contrast, its public diplomacy continuously suggests that its ties to Africa are stronger and bigger than meets the eye. This suggests that the longstanding relationship between China and Africa has resulted in China appreciating and seeing Africa through the lens of political ties as opposed to economic benefits. Yun (2014) also states that many other scholars, aside from those that criticise China’s interest in Africa, argue that Africa has always been important to China.
5.1 Introduction

China’s development process requires coordinated relationships in the international community. As this was historically not the case due to China pursuing an isolationist approach, the change has resulted in a shift in China’s foreign presence. As China expands its influence on the African continent, it came as no surprise that Sino-Nigerian relations were rekindled. This is because Nigeria is one of Africa’s powerhouses and boasts great economic potential. These relations, as with other African states, aroused much speculation regarding the nature of the emerging partnership model (Narine, 2009). To placate these fears, Hu Jintao reaffirmed China’s sincerity by stating that “China’s development, instead of hurting or threatening anyone, can only serve peace, stability and common prosperity in the world” (Power & Mohan, 2008). Despite Sino-Nigerian relations having grown slowly since the early 1970s, it was in the early 2000s that the relationship steadily matured.

Although both states play a vital role in terms of their influence in their respective regions, Nigeria is still driving a struggling economy while China enjoys the status of the second-largest economy in the world (Agubamah, 2014: 64). Renewed relations between the two states have not only resulted in positive and beneficial developments from the perspective of both states, it has also resulted in China enjoying the confidence of Nigerian citizens and state officials. Shehu Sani, Vice Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs in Nigeria, was quoted extolling the Communist Party of China as “a role model for African political parties to follow,” (The Diplomat, 2016). In as much as Nigeria is regarded as a middle power (Pevenhouse & Goldstein, 2017: 49) and holds great potential to become a greater powerhouse in Africa, it also has certain weaknesses that make it vulnerable to high risk status. Just as with other African countries such as the two Sudans and the
DRC, the risks that come with Sino-Nigerian relations do not outweigh the immediate and long-term benefits that China stands to gain.

This chapter starts by detailing the historical relations between China and Nigeria. It dwells on renewed relations in the 2000s and further evaluates the extent to which Sino-Nigerian relations have grown in terms of interest. This study also discusses risks in Nigeria and factors that contribute to this risk and instability. Additionally, continuity and change is evaluated in China’s foreign policy objectives in Nigeria and, lastly, an evaluation and conclusion is reached to synthesise the discussion.

5.2 Historical background

China and Nigeria’s formal relations can be traced back to 10 February 1971. Nigeria had met the requirement of adhering to the one China policy. However, the first official visit was made by Gen. Yakuba Gowan, who was the military head of state (Agubamah, 2014: 65). This was shortly after the civil war in Nigeria between the oppressive military government of Nigeria and the disgruntled Biafra. The former were the Muslim Husas in northern Nigeria and the latter were Christian Igbo in the region (Adeoye, 2017: 6). Due to their oppressive treatment by the government, the Igbo ethnic group decided it was important that they establish their own state, which would be the Republic of Biafra. The decision was also made because many Igbo lives were lost at the hands of the military government (Nabine, 2009). As a result, thousands of the Igbo population moved to the east of Nigeria where their ethnicity dominated. This was as an attempt to not only develop, but to survive. Many diplomatic efforts were made to unify Nigeria; however, none of those came near success. The division between the north and the south of Nigeria is still evident as the same struggles faced in the early years still prevail (Agubamah, 2014: 67).

Despite several attempts at survival, the Republic of Biafra yielded and surrendered to the military government (Adeoye, 2017:7). This happened after many lives were lost during the civil strife. Subsequently, the brutal actions of the military government led to the international community isolating Nigeria and the West condemning the
military regime of Nigeria. This isolation brought China and Nigeria closer to each other. Another reason for China and Nigeria’s fairly good relations was that Nigeria had profoundly supported China in the bid to remove the ROC (Taiwan) from its UN Security Council permanent seat (Tom-Jack, 2016: 35). This proved Nigeria’s unreserved support for China’s political prospects and showed a loyalty that would result in relations developing between the two states. Chinese leaders visited Nigeria between the late 1970s and mid-1980s. Geng Biao visited in 1978, while Huang Hua and Tian Jiyun visited in 1981 and 1984 respectively. All three of these leaders were vice premiers at the time. Prominent leaders of Nigeria also made visits to China: Head of state, Gen. Yakuba Gowan (1974), Vice President Dr Alex Ekwueme (1983), and Chief of Army Gen. Ibrahim Babangida (1984) (Embassy of the PRC in the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 2018). These visits made by high-level state and military leaders led to military exchanges that started in the 1980s between China and Nigeria (McDowell, 2012: 4). This exchange was important, especially for Nigeria, as the state went through a series of military coups (Egbula & Zheng, 2011: 15). The military coups went on into the 1990s.

Between 1990 and 1996 the volume of trade saw a dramatic increase from $1.3 billion to $5.3 billion (Utomi, 2008). This was because Nigeria experienced a bit of stability considering its staggering past. From 1993 to 1998 the reign of Gen. Sani Abacha saw contact being initiated between China and Nigeria. The increase in relations also led to the establishment of the Nigerian-Chinese Chamber of Commerce (Egbula & Zheng, 2011: 4). The Chamber was aimed at improving trade relations between China and Nigeria. In the year that followed, the Chamber of Commerce led to the establishment of the China Civil Engineering Construction Corporation (CCECC) (Tom-Jack, 2016: 36). This corporation won a contract of $529 million to restructure and renovate Nigeria’s railway system (Tom-Jack, 2016: 37). The establishment of structures such as the chamber was important to Sino-Nigerian relations as it meant that the two states would not just enjoy friendly relations, but would exploit those relations to ensure that they became mutually beneficial. Once again, Nigeria enjoyed visits from Chinese leaders in 1990, 1995 and 1996. The visits were from Vice Premier Wu Xueqian, Vice Premier and Foreign Minister Qian Qichen and State Councillor and Secretary-General of State Council Luan Gan (in that order). Premier Li Peng, Special Envoy of President Jiang Zeming,
and State Councillor Ismail Amat also visited Nigeria in 1996, 1997 and 1999. Nigerian leaders also made two visits to China in the 1990s. Chief of Army Gen. Abdulasalami Abubakar visited in 1997 and in 1999 President Olusegun Obasanjo visited (Embassy of the PRC in the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 2018). In addition, in 1997 an agreement was signed between China and Nigeria as Premier Li Peng visited Nigeria. This agreement focused on power generation, steel and oil (Tom-Jack, 2016: 36). China exported steel in volumes and needed markets for this steel. Nigeria, with its large population and potential market, became a good partner to drive these trade relations. The deal was also important for China as Nigeria had a lot of oil and, at the time, there was still more to be tapped into and discovered. This meant that the oil-dry China would enjoy beneficial relations with Nigeria as a supplier for its dire needs. The Sino-Nigerian relations were particularly important for Nigeria at the time as China had become an alternative source of aid and investment. On the other hand, the contract with the CCECC was not successful as the railway project was not completed until the new administration came into power in 1999. The election of Obasanjo to the presidency in 1999 coincided with the beginning of a positive and renewed Chinese orientation towards Nigeria in 2000 (Egbula & Zheng, 2011: 4).

5.3 Sino-Nigerian relations from 2000 to 2010

During his quest for power, Sani Abacha initiated contact with Chinese state-owned companies. However, it took him officially being elected into office for these relations to manifest. FOCAC was established in 2000 as well (Agubamah, 2014: 64). This led to its first ministerial conference, which took place in Beijing, China. In as much as relations between the two states were intensifying, Nigeria did not send its president; instead, Nigeria opted for the delegation of high-ranking representatives. In the same year, the CCECC was given a tender to construct 5,000 houses for athletes taking part in the eighth All African Games (Izuchukwu, 2014: 2). As opposed to the failed attempt to renovate the railway system, this housing project succeeded. A year later, China and Nigeria agreed to establish a China Investment Development and Trade
Promotion in Nigeria and, in return, in China the Nigeria Trade office was erected (Tom-Jack, 2016: 36). There were various other agreements that were established (see Table 1). These show the extent to which Sino-Nigerian relations matured.

**Table 1 – Major agreements between Nigeria and China (2000-2010)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Agreement</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>Agreement on Trade, Investment and Protection</td>
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</table>
| 2002 | Agreement for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with respect to Tax on Income  
   | Agreement on Consular Affairs  
   | Agreement on Tourism Cooperation  
   | Agreement on Cooperation on Strengthening Management of Narcotic Drugs, Psychotropic Substances and Diversion of Precursor Chemical |
| 2003 | Agreement of South-South Cooperation among China, Nigeria and FAO |
| 2006 | Memorandum of Understanding on a Strategic Partnership |
| 2009 | Agreement against fake products exported to Nigeria from China |
| 2009 | Memorandum of understanding on promotion between Ogun State of Nigeria and Zhejiang Province of China |
| 2010 | Memorandum of understanding on Peace Cooperation |

Source: Egbula & Zheng (2011)

From 2003 to 2007, the relations between the two states deepened further as President Obasanjo was elected president for a second term (Ogunkola et al, 2008:5). Since his last term, there was a personal relationship between Obasanjo’s administration and China, leading to an increase in the number of visits between the two states. Both President Hu and Prime Minister Wen Jiabao made visits to Nigeria and, in return, President Obasanjo made two visits to China. At the same time, high-ranking leadership and ministers were likewise conducting visits between the two states, which allowed them to develop and intensify mutual friendship and familiarity (Embassy of the PRC in the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 2018). Sino-Nigerian relations developed further in 2005 when China passed the Anti-Succession Law. President Obasanjo supported this fully as he believed this measure would “curb Taiwan independence force on the island” (China Daily, 2005). Recognising China over Taiwan made relations with China favourable for any state. Accordingly,
Nigeria’s administration under Obasanjo appeased China, which led to a more trusting relationship between the two states.

Relations pertaining to the non-oil FDI also grew substantially between the two states (Ogunkola et al, 2008: 4). This was important as an economy that relied solely on its oil export revenues came across challenges often, especially when prices fall. If China only invested in oil, this would mean that when the prices weaken, its relations with Nigeria would not serve any purpose. Due to national interests playing a huge role in China’s foreign policy decision making, expanding into other sectors in Nigeria made sense. In 2003 FDI relating to non-oil developments amounted to $0.3 billion. This rose sharply to $1.7 billion in 2005 (Ogunkola et al, 2008: 4). This is important as it was an attempt by Nigeria to diversify its economy so that it did not rely on oil to generate revenue. In 2006, the Intergovernmental Nigeria-China Investment Forum was established (Okonko, 2014: 63). This focused specifically on oil and gas relations. Structures such as the intergovernmental forum were significant to these relations as they ensured that individuals were deployed by states to focus specifically on enhancing oil relations and expanding opportunities. The founding of this structure led to Obasanjo using his influence to secure various major oil blocs for Chinese state-owned companies. This is studied in greater depth in the next chapter. At that stage China also created a government policy towards Nigeria with the aim of:

- increasing China’s presence in Nigeria’s oil sector;
- increasing the Chinese Multinational Company’s (MNC’s) Nigerian share;
- expanding the Nigerian market for Chinese manufactured goods; and
- leveraging its investment in Nigeria as a gateway for entering the ECOWAS market (Tope, 2011:9; Egbula & Zheng, 2011: 5).

China pursued its aims in this policy vigorously and ensured a measured amount of success. China’s oil is sourced from a number of states, with only close to a third of this sourced from sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). Nigeria accounts for 3% of SSA. In addition, of the $10.5 billion in SSA oil commitments that China secured between 2001 and 2007, nearly half (an amount of $4.8 million) came from Nigeria (Okonko, 2014: 64). In terms of its aim of securing more MNC shares, China succeeded as it secured a tender to construct telecommunication power and transport, while the
number of products from China were being exported in high volumes (Tope, 2011: 10). In 2006, during a visit by the Chinese foreign minister, a memorandum of understanding was signed between the two states (Ogunkola et al, 2008: 65). This was based on the founding of a strategic partnership. Here, Nigeria also specified their main targets. These were petroleum, power generation, telecommunication and its manufacturing sectors (Egbula & Zheng, 2011: 4).

In the same year, Obasanjo worked hard to try and change the constitution to secure a third presidential term; however, the failure of this attempt led to Yar’Adua being elected as the new president in 2007 (Okonko, 2011: 65). This new administration had an extensive impact on Chinese foreign policy prospects in Nigeria as the new president reviewed all the oil for infrastructure agreements made between Obasanjo and China, leading to most being suspended or cancelled (Okonko, 2011: 65). Relations between the two states deteriorated. Although the new president had visited China in 2008, there was no clear China policy after Obasanjo. In 2009, many Nigerian officials raised concerns about the quality of Chinese imports (Izuchukwu, 2014: 4). It was also reported that despite 85% of the money for the Chinese military aircraft being paid, the deal was left in limbo as the planes were not delivered (Okonko, 2011: 66). By 2010, Nigeria was China’s fourth biggest trading partner in Africa and also the second-largest exporter destination in Africa (Egbula & Zheng, 2011: 6). The value of trade between China and Nigeria had increased tenfold to $17.7 billion by 2010. This was a result of growth in exports and imports between the two states. However, even with this growth, an imbalance in trade persisted as Nigeria could still not catch up with the growth of exports from China to Nigeria (Tom-Jack, 2016: 24-25).

Little progress was achieved during the next three years. After Yar’Adua’s death in May 2010, Vice President Goodluck Jonathan assumed the presidency and the relationship with China began to rebound. At the end of 2010 China declared its new plan for a strategic partnership with Nigeria, in which emphasis was placed on political equality, mutual trust, economic win-win cooperation and cultural exchange. The key objectives of the new plan were to:

- enhance political mutual trust to promote strategic cooperation;
• expand cooperation in areas including agriculture, oil, electricity, infrastructure construction, telecommunications and satellite;
• expand cultural exchanges and cooperation in combatting various diseases including malaria and bird flu;
• strengthen cooperation in international affairs to promote world peace, enhance coordination and human rights, anti-terrorism and peacekeeping efforts and promote south-south and south-north dialogues (Egbula & Zheng, 2011: 5).

Relations post-2010 are covered in the section that follows as growth in China’s interest in Nigeria is unpacked.

5.4 China’s growing interests in Nigeria

China’s economy was successfully moving towards a more sustainable growth and was considered one of the top donors in terms of foreign aid programmes. In light of these achievements, China was considered by many, including African leaders, as a great partner for Africa. Contemporary Sino-Nigerian relations centred on the idea of economic recovery and assistance. Moreover, Nigeria was regarded as a middle power. This means that it had a considerable amount of influence based on its market potential. In as much as Nigeria was not necessarily a priority for China’s foreign policy, it played a part in supporting China’s own economic needs. In realising this, China expanded its economic investment in Nigeria.

5.4.1 Oil

Trade and investment in the oil sector grew slowly and were certainly not significant until 1993 (Mthembu, 2016). Growth in this respect was witnessed as China went from being a net exporter of crude oil to becoming the world’s second-largest importer of crude oil. As this study has already argued, this is because China’s wave of industrialisation had led to it having few and scarce natural resources and raw
material. As a result of China’s desperate and vigorous demand for energy, the level of trade and investment between China and Nigeria grew noticeably. Again, Nigeria was important to China in this respect as Nigeria fed China’s booming economy. According to Global Trade Review (2018), China will depend on imported oil for 45% of its energy needs by 2045. This shows the extent to which China’s relations with large exporters of oil, including Nigeria and the two Sudans, will be important to China. Relations with large oil exporters in Africa and the Middle East remain significant to China as oil supplies from respective countries are of relatively low cost (Utomi, 2008: 40). This situation has led to steady growth in terms of trade and investment relations between China and Nigeria. Consequently, China and Nigeria have signed a considerable amount of bilateral trade and investment agreements. These agreements were established in an attempt to offer each other favourable terms.

Around 87% of Nigeria’s exports to China are oil and gas products (Quigley, 2017). As China continued to pursue oil interests in Africa, China signed a deal with Nigeria worth $23 billion under the regime of President Goodluck Jonathan (Tom-Jack, 2016). The significance of this deal was to ensure the construction of three fuel refineries and petrochemical power plants. The building of these refineries was vital as it would lead to double the expected demand of barrels per day (bpd). This would in turn lead to 900 000 bpd from 450,00 bpd within a period of five years. Oil was also important because it helped secure loans from China for Nigeria’s development. African states rank remarkably low in terms of creditworthiness and, as a result, China locks proceeds from oil sales as insurance for loans (Alves, 2013: 8). Oil played a key role in powering the significant growth China’s economy has seen every year for more than 20 years. Oil is a vital source of energy and, as a result, for China oil products are important as they support modern society, mainly supplying energy to power industry, heat homes and provide fuel for vehicles and aeroplanes to carry goods and people all over the world (Energy for Britain, 2018).
5.4.2 Oil for infrastructure

As Sino-Nigerian relations deepened during Obasanjo’s term as president of Nigeria, oil for infrastructure became an integral element of China’s foreign policy towards Nigeria (Ogunkola, 2008). This meant that China would be awarded oil contracts in exchange for infrastructure improvement initiatives and projects. During his term as president, Obasanjo organised auctions where oil blocs would be sold to the highest bidders. However, what was different was the fact that the bidding depended on the commitment to finance major infrastructure projects in exchange for access to these oil blocs. This played right into China’s hands as China uses this approach in reaching most of its deals on the African continent. China’s contemporary relations have largely been centred on infrastructure initiatives in an attempt to assist Africa in its pursuit of economic recovery and development (Tom-Jack, 2016). This means that Obasanjo’s terms and regulations did not move China off track. Nigeria has a severe lack of adequate infrastructure; this deficiency limits Nigeria’s economic capacity.

The World Economic Forum rankings have placed Nigeria’s infrastructure quality near the bottom. In 2006, Nigeria was ranked 132 of a total of 138 states (United State Department of State, 2018). This means that despite it being considered the second-largest economy in Africa, infrastructure challenges hinder the process of sustained development and growth in the country. China took advantage of this and took part in the oil for infrastructure approach as Nigeria seemed to be taking infrastructure investment seriously to create an economic environment that can easily be attractive to private investors. Aside from China’s interest in this investment, Obasanjo was also personally impressed by the infrastructure he saw during his visit to China that year (Mthembu-Salter, 2009).

Another factor that made China a prominent partner for Nigeria was their alternative approach to aid assistance. Obasanjo was not particularly happy with the West’s approach of aid with strings attached. For China, this deal was also significant for Sino-Nigerian foreign policy prospects as it would advance China’s interests stipulated in the government policy towards Nigeria (Tope, 2011: 9). This would increase China’s presence in Nigeria’s oil sector and ensure new construction
contracts for Chinese companies. In the perspective of both states, the deal would be mutually beneficial.

In 2005, the implementation of selling oil blocs under conditions surrounding infrastructure projects was under way (Mthembu-Salter, 2009). Of the 77 oil blocs auctioned, only 44 were awarded. In this process China did not bid, as China was of the view that its negotiations earlier with Obasanjo, which granted it the right of first refusal (RFR), had automatically meant that it had already secured the oil blocs (Tope, 2011). The following year President Jintao visited Nigeria, which resulted in China and Nigeria signing a memorandum of understanding (Okoye, 2014). This memorandum stipulated that China would renovate Nigeria’s railway to install a double track railway line. In return, China would receive oil blocs in the auctions that would follow. Considering what had happened previously, which resulted in China losing out on oil blocs because they relied on verbal negotiations and agreements, it was important that China and Nigeria agree in writing this time. This was to avoid unnecessary misunderstandings.

Nigeria’s promise subsequently manifested as during the next bidding China walked away with four oil blocs. CNPC won two oil blocs in the Niger Delta and another two in the Chad Basin (Mthembu-Salter, 2009). This Chinese company used its privilege of the RFR to attain these blocs. In exchange, China committed to renovating the Kaduna oil refinery by investing $2 billion in the project. However, the expanding and beneficial relations quickly deteriorated as president Yar’Adua became Obasanjo’s successor.

The beginning of Yar’Adua’s rule could be termed the death of the oil for infrastructure deal. As soon as he was officially elected into office, he called for an investigation and reviewed all the deals made by Obasanjo pertaining to the oil for infrastructure deal. All the construction and renovation projects were placed on hold. Additionally, the $2.5 billion loan that Nigeria was supposed to get from Exim bank to finance the Mambila power station was placed on hold (Mthembu-Salter, 2009). This was because the new president vehemently refused to sign the memorandum of understanding required for the project to be executed. Instead, Yar’Adua opted to renegotiate the funding arrangements (Tope, 2011). A major problem that the new Nigerian administration had with the deal was that the Chinese state-owned
companies had negotiated to not only design various infrastructure projects, but to build and supervise these constructions. Nigeria saw this as a real problem, because it meant that Nigeria would not benefit from the process of the execution of the projects (Okoye, 2014). Nigeria has a large population that seeks employment and has skills shortages. Renegotiating would mean that Nigeria would also play a significant role in the process of building infrastructure in an effort to mitigate some of its domestic challenges (Ogunkola, 2008). However, it is clear that this would not serve the national interest of China, but it would benefit Sino-Nigerian relations more in the long run as it would address China’s foreign policy commitment of mutually beneficial relations.

As a result of the new development plans, which took a dramatic turn, China’s state-owned company bought Canada’s Addax Petroleum in 2009 (Mthembu-Salter, 2009). Addax had one onshore oil operation and two offshore operations in Nigeria. This study is of the view that at this point, China became aware that for it to succeed in accessing more of Nigeria’s oil, it must opt for purchasing reserves as opposed to its preferred approach of paying for projects in exchange for access to oil. Despite the fact that it was more viable and cost-effective for China to use the latter approach as opposed to the former, it is clear that interests played a huge role in China adjusting its foreign policy to these new terms. It is in China’s interests to expand its access to Nigeria’s oil at all costs.

5.4.3 Telecommunication

China and Nigeria have a couple of things in common, one of them being a large population. China had proven to have multifaceted interests in Nigeria. As a point of reference, it is very important to shed light on China’s interest in Nigeria’s growing telecommunications market. China had exploited many of Nigeria’s weaknesses to benefit its national interests and economic prospects. For one, Nigeria had a large population coupled with a struggling economy. On the other hand, China manufactured products in large quantities and was always looking for markets in which to dump its products in volumes. As China continued in the quest to sustain its dominance in the telecommunications and information and communication
technology (ICT) industry, Nigeria was one of its biggest markets. The industry became increasingly significant due to ICT and telecommunications supporting various other sectors and, as a result, deciding to a large extent the development of economies.

Nigeria has 91 million internet users, 230 million GSM users and 23 million telecom users. These numbers are reflective of the potential that this industry has in Nigeria (Iwuagwu, 2016). Zhong Xing Telecommunication Equipment company (ZTE) and Huawei, both Chinese-owned companies, are important to Nigeria as they are seen as cheaper alternatives. ZTE prices are reported to be 30-40% cheaper than American and European telecom companies such as Nokia and Ericsson (Austin, 2018). On the other hand, Huawei’s prices are 5-15% cheaper than rivals such as Samsung and Apple (Hseuh & Nelson, 2013). Huawei and ZTE are not just cheap, but they also have excellent technological advancements that compete with other telecom giants as pointed out. ZTE has a factory in Abuja and has enjoyed contracts to expand Nigeria’s wireless communication network, to provide terminals and headsets to Nigeria’s main telecommunications operator (Nitel) and, through financing by China’s Exim bank, ZTE attained a contract to construct a national security communication system (Izuchukwu, 2014: 3).

Huawei has proved to be quite competitive through the delivery of improved network coverage and a wide range of services to its customers. It won the contract from Multi Links, Nigeria’s private telephone operator, to ensure the provision of network capabilities of good quality to benefit Nigerians (Iwuagwu, 2015). Huawei has also received the contract from Umobile, the country’s second-largest mobile operator, to provide GSM base stations worth $80 million (IT Web, 2018). The agreement was also centred on the commitment from Huawei to introduce Nigeria to next-generation network communications technology. In the spirit of a win-win relationship, these Chinese-owned companies also benefit Nigeria’s growth.

Huawei has trained over 3 000 youth in an effort to develop their necessary ICT skills (Hsueh & Nelson, 2013). Both ZTE and Huawei take pride in the fact that a majority of their staff in Nigeria are Nigerians. The chairperson of the Nigeria-China relations committee, Senator Yasuf Buba Yakub, has expressed gratitude on behalf of the state and its citizens for this and continues to encourage Chinese companies to hire
Nigerian nationals in an attempt to share rare skills that are necessary for sustained economic development. Despite this being celebrated as a win-win situation for both China and Nigeria, China is still benefitting more. This is because all of politics is a relative game. China gets market access and only has to sacrifice a small labour force constituting Nigerians and not Chinese. This is hardly a loss for China.

5.4.4 Land and agriculture

Apart from the fact that Nigeria is one of the biggest countries on the African continent, it boasts vast arable land and harbours massive potential in the agricultural sector. Both China and Nigeria reflect major agricultural prospects and they are complementary in the development of the agricultural sector (The Nation, 2017). In Nigeria, agriculture has become a focal point of developing its economy. This is because so far, it is responsible for the employment of about 30% of the country’s population and accounts for 24% of the country’s GDP (Dembele, 2018). China, on the other hand, has become the biggest importer of various agricultural commodities in the world to ensure food security for its massive economy (Gale et al, 2015: 3). It imports the most oil seeds in the world and is also increasing imports of vegetable oil, palm oil, soybean and rapeseed. Considering this, Nigeria has become one of its most important partners in Africa when it comes to agricultural relations. Nigeria is important for China’s food security objectives as it has a distinctively diverse climate. Nigeria has both tropical (coast) and arid areas (north), which are essential for the growth of plants. This makes it highly possible for almost all agricultural products to be grown there.

Behind the plans to assist Nigeria in the transformation of its agricultural sector, China is and will be benefitting as well. In May 2017, China assigned $6.7 billion to assist in the development of Nigeria’s agriculture (The Nation, 2017). This is going to be done through training initiatives for Nigerian citizens for them to achieve food sufficiency. This announcement was made by China’s Economic and Commercial Counsellor Zhao Linxiang, at the China-Nigeria Agricultural Modernisation Cooperation Forum. As has been argued with other aspects of China-Africa relations, China looks for a weakness in a country and negotiates on the basis of
exploiting those weaknesses. For instance, when President Yar’Adua became president, he halted Chinese investment processes and contracts as he was concerned about the fact that China not only received big contracts, but also planned, executed and supervised those contracts. He negotiated to have Nigerian citizens play a bigger role and benefit from these projects. To fill this gap, China is turning a new leaf in presenting perks for their presence and investments. China will not only invest in the agricultural transformation of Nigeria, but it has also considered concerns that were raised about their centrality in projects. As a result, China is now investing large amounts into sharing skills and training Nigerians to execute these projects. This makes it seem that both Nigeria and China are benefitting.

Olawoyin also reported that China loaned Nigeria $4.5 billion to boost its local agriculture. This loan will enable Nigeria to buy tools required for effective farming such as tractors, bulldozers, graders and pumps, among others (Olawoyin, 2017). Accordingly, the loan has to be payed within 20 years and it has a five-year moratorium. This means that in just one year Nigeria had received more than $11 billion from China for agricultural development, which shows how important Nigeria’s agricultural growth is for China’s long-term food plans. China is the world’s largest cassava importer and Nigeria is the world’s largest cassava exporter (Sun, Hunsen & Jewison, 2011). This highlights the importance of Sino-Nigerian relations pertaining to China’s future food plans. Nigeria has been projected to become a net exporter of agricultural products such as rice, ground nuts, cassava and vegetable oil. Most of these are essential for China. This means that Chinese investment in Nigeria is an attempt at long-term import and export relations between the two and to ensure that China’s food security interests are secured.

The fact that Nigeria has an abundant water supply, a favourable climate and insufficient methods of cultivation, poses sufficient reasons for China’s foreign policy decision making pertaining to agriculture in Nigeria becoming so significant. Only 33% of Nigeria’s arable land has been cultivated (Dembele, 2018). This means more than 60% is still available for future cultivation. Considering China’s ravenous economy, China will continue to expand its access to Nigeria’s agricultural sector. In exchange, Nigeria will benefit by increasing its agricultural activity, reduce poverty
and unemployment and continue to strive towards a diversified sustainable economy.

5.4.5 Access to special economic zones

China has recently shown great interest in Nigeria’s economic emancipation. In collaboration with Nigeria, China is in the process of establishing many free trade zones in the country, including the Lekki Free Trade Zone and Guangdong Free Trade Zone (Zeng et al, 2012). To understand the significance of these to China one has to understand the benefits of free trade zones. According to Krohn (2017), free trade zones, also known as foreign trade zones, are areas where finished goods and raw materials can be stored, purchased, manufactured, imported and exported without the barriers being imposed by customs authorities. These special economic zones are usually located near airports, seaports and national borders. The fact that customs authorities do not impose barriers result in businesses, customers, manufacturers, exporters and importers benefitting significantly.

In Nigeria, China has injected large sums of money to get these zones underway. In the Lekki Free Trade Zone, China owns 60% of the venture, resulting in Nigeria owning 40% sharing it between the state (20%) and Lekki Worldwide Investments (LWI) (20%), a private company established by the state (Mthembu-Salter, 2009). The agreement stipulated that China would invest $200 million, while the state contributed land and compensated the citizens that would be affected as they would be displaced. The special economic zone is intended to specialise in telecommunications, textiles, transportation equipment and home appliances, hotels, recreational facilities and real estate (Federal Ministry of Industry and Investment, 2017). A Chinese company has also landed a contract to construct an oil refinery in the area and have hinted at plans to build a seaport and a new airport in close proximity.

As mentioned above, another free trade zone that is in the pipeline is the Ogun Guangdong Free Trade Zone. The joint venture is a collaboration between the Nigerian state and a Chinese-owned company, Guangdong Xinguang International Group. Just as with the Lekki Free Trade Zone, the Chinese company owns an
overwhelming majority of the project, 82%, while the rest of the 18% is owned by the Nigerian state (Mthembu-Salter, 2009). So far, Guangdong Xinguang has contributed $500 million in the first phase, with the First Bank of Nigeria contributing in terms of investment banking, project finance and business advisory services. As opposed to the Lekki free trade area, the Ogun Guangdong free trade area will specialise in construction materials and ceramics, ironware, furniture, timber processing, pharmaceuticals, computers and lighting (Federal Ministry of Industry and Investment, 2017).

In attempting to assist Nigeria in growing its economy, China will continue to benefit more in the long run because, despite these developments being in Nigeria, it is evident that China owns an overwhelming majority of these areas. This fact contradicts the assertion that these areas will benefit locals more. Despite the fact that Nigeria’s economy will benefit and result in better living standards for its citizens, China’s national interests will be served more. For instance, these free economic zones will result in the elimination of import/export duties. This means that China will be allowed to export and imports its goods without paying any taxes. This will benefit China more than Nigeria because, since the dawn of Sino-Nigerian relations, China has led in terms of exports. China exports more to Nigeria and other African countries than they export to China. Again, since China exports in large quantities, it will benefit from lower quota-based tariffs. This means that China will be allowed to ship its goods without worrying about exceeding quotas. In addition, as has been stated, these special economic zones are required to be in close proximity to airports, seaports and borders.

Fortunately, the Ogun Guangdong Free Trade Zone is located near the Apapa seaport and Murtala Mohammed International Airport, both in Lagos. However, the Lekki Free Trade Zone does not have any transportation models in close proximity. Since Nigeria and many other African countries are starting to depend on their relations with China for infrastructure development, China is most likely to land various other contracts to build this infrastructure. As has been stated, there are plans for a deep-water seaport within the zone and a new international airport near the Lekki Free Trade Zone, to be built for convenience. It would be naïve to assume that China will not finance and subsequently build these two infrastructure
developments. Again, China stands to gain through contracts and by ensuring that its products will be able to move more freely for more convenience. This is in order for China to secure its national interests by generating more revenue for its needy economy. It is also evident that China’s investing cash while Nigeria invests material things such as land, banking and advisory services, will result in China owning a majority of these projects. China’s money plays a far more significant role than Nigeria’s natural resources.

However, China cannot be ridiculed and continuously seen as a predator and Nigeria as a victim in these relations just because one seemingly benefits more than the other. Nigeria, through the leadership of Yar’Adua, proved that it has the potential to negotiate for better terms, especially to benefit its domestic needs. This means that it is complicit in its own exploitation. It cannot be China’s fault that Nigeria believes that accepting the terms of China owning an overwhelming majority of free trade areas will result in mitigating Nigeria’s domestic challenges to ensure maximum benefit locally. However, this study is also of the view that despite the fact that Nigeria has agency, the bargaining between the two powers always occurs on unequal terms. For this reason, Nigeria needs to be aware of these dynamics to ensure informed and beneficial decision making.

5.5 **Risks involved in Sino-Nigerian relations**

Nigeria is projected to overtake South Africa as the largest economy in Africa in the near future (Business live, 2017). It has a variety of natural resources and a large population. However, the risks that come with engaging with Nigeria in both political and economic dimensions cannot go unnoticed. Risks involved in the expanding presence in Nigeria include political instability, insecurity, corruption and currency convertibility. Nigeria has a considerably strong state; however, it is often destabilised by tribal authorities. Due to its inherent diversity, it is faced with the challenges of great division in ethnicity, religion and respective regions within the state (Ajayi, 2017). The Yoruba and Igbo are the most dominant ethnic groups in Nigeria among many others. As these two groups hold a majority presence in the
country, the struggle with regards to prominence of leadership is a continuous fight between the two ethnicities. Religion also plays a huge role in who gets to be president and who gets to be in the president’s administration (Izuchukwu, 2014). The two main religions that are in contestation are Christians and Muslims.

Additionally, regional divisions are also evident and are a risk to systemic stability. This is also informed by historic ties, with the Igbo wanting to establish their own state of Biafra. Currently, the north is constantly in conflict, mainly informed by religious divisions. The north of Nigeria is mainly Islamic and, as a result, the fight for territory revolves around the Islamic dominance in that part of Nigeria (Mthembu-Salter, 2009). Political instability has proven to hamper relations between China and Nigeria. This became evident during the transition from Obasanjo’s administration to Yar’Adua’s (Sun et al, 2011). Obasanjo was Christian and Yar’Adua was Muslim. When Yar’Adua came into power, he reviewed all agreements made during Obasanjo’s term and cancelled a majority of those. If religious divisions are not confronted to ensure that they do not affect decision making, they will continue to be a threat to Sino-Nigerian relations and their development.

Another challenge to Nigeria’s stability is currency convertibility (Olawoyin, 2017). When a state commits to trade and investment relations with Nigeria, they are promised that the capital and profits that they generate will be returned to them in foreign currency out of Nigeria. However, there have been inconsistencies in this regard over the past years. The Central Bank of Nigeria has struggled to ensure that investing states and individuals are able to repatriate capital and transfer earned profits from their investments and, as a result of this risk, states and individuals have experienced net losses with regards to total returns when converting the money back to their foreign currencies (Ajayi, 2017). It is not in China’s national interests to take losses due to negligence on the part of Nigeria. It also does more harm to Nigeria’s risk profile. If this challenge is not well managed, it will result in net losses for China.

Security and corruption are also huge risks for China’s investment and presence in Nigeria. Nigeria is faced with the challenge of terror (Reuters, 2014). Boko Haram constantly executes attacks, especially in the northern part of Nigeria. Aside from Boko Haram, it has been reported that more terrorist groups are emerging and, as a result, Nigeria has been listed among terrorist nations (Tom-Jack, 2016). The growth
of terrorism in the potential-bearing country leads to investors fearing death, losing their property and losses on their investments (Ajayi, 2017). China continues to invest in Nigeria despite the growing threat of terror in the state; however, the more China expands in Nigeria, the greater the threat posed to them. China has invested heavily in Nigeria’s oil and petroleum industry and these are constantly attacked or threatened. This leads not just to the loss of lives but also to the loss of profits on investments from China. To respond to the imminent threat, China pledged to help Nigeria locate Boko Haram militants in 2014 (South China Morning Post, 2014). In 2015, China continued to raise its concerns pertaining to Boko Haram attacks and the instability they cause. In the same year, China worked with the USA, Britain and France in an effort to locate these militia (Reuters, 2014). Just as with other unstable African countries, China did not act unilaterally in interfering in domestic challenges in Nigeria. China waited for other developed countries to join the fight. China has also stated that Nigeria would have to indicate where it needs assistance in the fight against Boko Haram. This shows that China wants to assist but does not want to drive the process as this will result in it being seen as interfering in the domestic challenges facing Nigeria. In as much as it would be in the interest of China to do so, it is important that China remains in the back seat and allows Nigeria to be at the forefront of fighting Boko Haram. Nigeria indicates that China is a friendly state, which makes it easier for it to ask for military assistance in this regard. However, China will continue to tread carefully in an attempt to safeguard its longstanding principle of non-interference.

Historical challenges of mismanagement of revenue generated by Nigeria’s economy and corruption continue to affect relations with China. Nigerian leaders are reported to have misused foreign aid and investments (Ajayi, 2017). This reflects badly not only on domestic leadership but also on external leaders who partake in these deals. If a deal is announced in public and is not executed properly, the public, including the international media, holds everyone who partook in the deal accountable for the mishaps, and this reflects badly on the professionalism of both sides. China has assumed the task of maintaining the image of an emerging responsible leader, meaning that being connected with foul play will hinder the process of maintaining a clean image.
5.6 Factors contributing to instability

There are various factors that contribute to instability and growing risks in Nigeria. These include poor policy choices, weakened institutions, the culture of leadership and language and cultural barriers (Ajayi, 2017). Nigeria has policies in place, but these policies are not strong and clear enough to ensure long-term and sustainable economic development. The policies also do not consider Nigeria’s diverse and large population. This means that the current policies do not consider the advantage of having a population that has the potential to explore innovative ideas driven by their diversity. If Nigeria uses its policies to take advantage of its numbers and its diversity, this would result in economic growth. However, policies would have to empower those masses and transfer skills to them, especially the Nigerian youth (Dembele, 2018). Nigeria should not just rely on increased training from Chinese officials, it should also take it upon itself to train and educate its citizens.

Entrepreneurship is the key to any economy with the objective of growing (Utomi, 2008). Despite many individual businesspeople having learnt from and improved on exporting using the Chinese models, there are many who have not been able to do so, largely due to language barriers (Ajayi, 2017). A relatively small group of citizens is afforded a good education and because of the hundreds of languages in Nigeria, a majority of its people are not necessarily fluent in English. As a result, language becomes a barrier in trying to transfer skills, especially critical skills afforded to them by Chinese officials. This leads to the already privileged and educated minority becoming the immediate beneficiaries of development plans, leaving behind a majority that does not have access to these opportunities (Gale et al, 2015).

On the other hand, Nigeria does not have strong state institutions and, as a result, faces challenges in terms of its bureaucracy (Mthembu-Salter, 2009). This has led to limitations and barriers to development in all aspects. However, this particularly constrains growth in infrastructure, agriculture and technology transfers from China (Tom-Jack, 2016). The corruption that comes with these weak institutions has resulted in the unequal distribution of wealth, which is a direct cause of instability in
the country (Ajayi, 2017). Nigeria has a lot of oil and many other resources, but only the minority elite group gets to benefit from these. As a result, those that are faced with the harsh realities of poverty and unemployment take matters into their own hands and render the state ungovernable in an attempt to get a share of the state’s wealth. There are a lot of development projects, mostly funded by China, but Nigeria is in serious need of leadership that has the will to articulate growth objectives and strategies to mitigate domestic challenges.

China’s foreign policy is largely driven by principles of peaceful coexistence, but national interests are at the forefront of decision making. In order for risks to be eliminated in Nigeria to attract more FDIs, Nigeria needs to be aware of these factors and needs to come up with effective ways to not just curb them, but also deter similar ones in the future. China is expanding more into Nigeria’s economy not just because of its natural resources, but because of the potential it bears as many economists have projected. It is in China’s interest for Nigeria to grow past these inconveniences to ensure that China’s investments generate revenue in the long-term to serve its ravenous economy; however, in order for Nigeria to deter instability, China will have to interfere in many of these instabilities as an advisory body. Despite the fact that this is a direct contradiction of China’s foreign policy principles, it is in China’s immediate and long-term interests to do so.

5.7 Continuity and change in China’s foreign policy towards Nigeria

The world is continuously evolving; this means that even what we regard as important and not important go through processes of change. This is evident in China’s relations with Nigeria. In as much as there have been minor changes in how China conducts itself in terms of its foreign policy decision making, there has been more continuity than change. The nature of an emerging partnership model between China and Nigeria is the first evident change. Initially, China’s relations with Nigeria revolved around aid. However, as time went by, these relations matured to ensure that they involve increased trade and investments. Contemporary Sino-Nigerian relations have been centred on the idea of economic recovery and assistance. In
exchange for assistance in terms of its economic growth, Nigeria has had to ensure access to its oil, agriculture and markets for China. China and Nigeria have also established various chambers focusing on trade. These have resulted in growth in imports and exports for both China and Nigeria and have also resulted in favourable investment and trade conditions. As has been evident with the growing challenge of terrorism, China has opted to work with other states such as the USA, Britain and France in assisting Nigeria with this fight. China has also allowed Nigeria to lead attempts at locating militants, assisting only when asked.

China often negotiated terms that ensured that they benefitted not just through obtaining projects and tenders, but also through planning, executing and supervising these projects. As this proved to be problematic, especially for critical skills sharing between China and Nigeria, President Yar‘Adua renegotiated for the greater inclusion of Nigeria in the process of executing these projects to ensure that Nigerians also benefit from the finished product and the process. This is to ensure that in the future Nigeria is able to execute these plans on its own with just a little help where necessary. With regards to oil reserves, China used to rely on the approach of getting them in exchange for paying for infrastructure development or any other critical project; however, China has managed to balance this approach with buying reserves as well. As opposed to when Sino-Nigerian relations were largely centred on the oil sector, China has also expanded into other sectors such as telecommunications and agriculture. Due to China’s growing need for food security plans, it has had to look at Nigeria for agricultural assistance in exchange for technological advancements in that sector in Nigeria. Despite the minor changes that are evident in Sino-Nigerian relations, continuity has still prevailed.

5.8 Evaluation and conclusion

It is important that China continues to coordinate its relationships as its foreign policy presence expands in the international community. Africa’s past pertaining to colonialism has made relations with more powerful states a very daunting task. This is because Africa is not strong economically; however, it has an excessive amount of
natural resources that are important for the continuous development of those states. As a result, going forward, Africa needs to ensure that the relations it partakes in are mutually beneficial and not exploitative as was the case in the past. China continues to assure Africa, with specific reference to the case of Hu Jintao reaffirming that Sino-Nigerian relations are very important to China and China will not hurt or threaten it. Instead, China will continue to serve peace and prosperity across the world.

As it is the case with many other African countries, Sino-Nigerian relations go back as far as the early 1970s. The relationship has had its ups and downs; however, ultimately the two states managed to stabilise these relations. The stability of these relations was dependent on the one China policy, and as soon as Nigeria met this one condition, Sino-Nigerian relations started to take off. Since then, there have been many visits by respective leaders from the two states. These visits were initially centred on political advancements as China supported the isolated Nigeria in its governance and Nigeria backed China to replace the ROC (Taiwan) in the UN Security Council seat. As time went on, these relations matured to focus on both political ties and economic development. This is evident in the significant growth of trade relations between the two states. Between 1990 and 1996, Sino-Nigerian trade grew from $1.3 billion to $5.3 billion (Utomi, 2008).

The growth in numbers in terms of trade development is representative of the maturity in Sino-Nigerian relations. Currently, Nigeria is not only one of China’s biggest trading partners in Africa, but it is also the second-largest exporter destination in Africa. Due to these developments, the trade between China and Nigeria further increased in value to $17.7 billion (Egbulu & Zheng, 2011: 6). This study notes that despite the growth in figures in terms of trade value, an imbalanced trade persists in Sino-Nigerian relations. This means that despite attempts to increase exports to China from Nigeria, Nigeria is still lagging behind in attempting to catch up with the growth of exports from China.

China has expanded its interests in Nigeria. Initially, China focused solely on its oil relations with Nigeria. China started importing a significant amount of oil from Nigeria in the mid-1990s. This was critical for China as its economy was in a transition from a traditional society to one that was reaping the benefits of a diversified economy.
due to industrialisation. Oil became an integral part of China’s economy as it plays a huge role in the manufacturing of various products. Despite the fact that China has started investing in and tapping into other sectors in Nigeria, oil relations continue to dominate Sino-Nigerian relations. According to Quigley (2017), 87% of imports to China from Nigeria are oil and gas products. As a result, China continues to invest in more access to oil blocs in Nigeria and assists in building more refineries. President Obasanjo’s term resulted in more personal relations between himself and China. His approach in these relations led to the establishment of the oil for infrastructure approach in China’s foreign policy towards Nigeria. This simply meant that in order for China to gain access to Nigeria’s oil, it would have to commit to financing the development of infrastructure in Nigeria. This was important for Nigeria as despite it being seen as a powerhouse in Africa, it lacks effective and efficient infrastructure. Obasanjo’s approach failed to find sustainability as his successor, President Yar’Adua, resulted in the death of oil for infrastructure. As soon as his term started, Yar’Adua reviewed all agreements and commitments made in terms of oil for infrastructure and cancelled most of them, while renegotiating those that he decided to go through with.

China’s multifaceted interests in Nigeria include telecommunications, land and agriculture and access to Nigeria’s economic zones. In terms of telecommunications, it is no secret that China has grown significantly in terms of technological advancements. This plays a vital role in development relations between China and Nigeria. Similar to China, Nigeria has a big population and is lagging behind in terms of technology. Its relations with China are important in this regard as China introduced quality technology at cheap prices. For instance, Huawei and ZTE are favourable as opposed to Apple and Samsung in Nigeria. This is because the former is cheaper than the latter while performing the same tasks. China also continues to introduce Nigeria to next-generation network communication technology and commits itself to information sharing. China does this by training thousands of Nigerian citizens in an attempt to developing their ICT skills. These are critical skills considering the information age and globalisation.

Technology has also started coming into play in Sino-Nigerian agricultural relations. China aims to transfer technological methods to enhance land cultivation in Nigeria.
Agriculture is a growing interest in terms of relations between the two states. Nigeria has vast arable land and China has a big economy that is going to need more food as it grows. In realising this, China has started to explore Nigeria’s agricultural sector. Lastly, in partaking in Nigeria’s economic emancipation, China has collaborated with Nigeria to establish free trade zones. Despite the fact that there are many others, this study focuses of the Lekki Free Trade Zone and the Guangdong Free Trade Zone. These have led to a significant growth in trade relations between China and Nigeria.

Even though Nigeria has been projected to be the number one economy in Africa in coming years, it is faced with the challenges of political instability, insecurity, corruption and currency convertibility. These risks are part of the package in establishing relations with the populous and resource-rich country. Considering the dynamics of Sino-Nigerian relations, it is evident that China is aware of these risks, yet the benefits seem to outweigh the risks. This explains China’s growing interests in Nigeria despite its inherent challenges. Poor policy choices, weakened institutions, corrupt leadership and barriers in terms of culture and languages are some of the factors that contribute to instability in Nigeria. As a result of China’s deepening relations with Nigeria, China has had to interfere (indirectly) using soft power to assist in mitigating some of the troubles. The study cannot ignore the fact that China’s growing relations with Nigeria have been met with some change. However, it is of the view that there has been more continuity in China’s foreign policy than changes. Sino-Nigerian relations were initially political in nature; however, they grew inclusive of economic developments as the years went by.

Considering the above, it is important for this study to make use of theories to provide a theoretical reflection on Sino-Nigerian relations. Traditional theories that have been used in the case of the two Sudans and the DRC are used in the case of Nigeria. These are realism, liberalism and constructivism. This study cannot deny the fact that China-Nigeria relations are based on interests (Power & Mohan, 2008). It is strongly of this view as both states interact to ensure their economic growth and development. One theory that easily explains this is the theory of realism. Realism claims that states are selfish and in the quest for their own survival (Heywood, 2011: 407). More specifically, state-centric realism recognises the state as an important
actor while highlighting that states are driven by national interests (Ehizuelen, 2017). This is the case in contemporary Sino-Nigerian relations. These relations are driven largely by trade increases. While China looks at Nigeria for access to markets, energy and food security to sustain its economic development, Nigeria sees China as an alternative partner for its economy, which is in a transitional stage of growth and development. For instance, initially China preferred the approach of buying its access into Nigeria’s oil fields by committing to infrastructure developments in exchange. This made sense as Nigeria needs infrastructure developments desperately to attract investment and grow its economy, while China needs oil and other resources from Nigeria to fuel its ravenous economy. However, with the new development plans for Nigeria, China quickly realised that even though it benefitted more by paying for projects, it was in its long-term strategic interests to buy reserves instead to expand its access to Nigeria’s oil. This study argues that both China and Nigeria can be viewed as self-interested because both states pursue economic and political goals. Despite the allegations of China exploiting African resources, this study points out that Nigeria, just as with various other African countries, chooses to engage with China to mitigate its development challenges because it is in its national interests to do so.

This study has highlighted that China makes use of soft power to advance its interests using ideas, wealth, and political and economic innovation (Pevenhouse & Goldstein, 2017: 38). In realism, power plays a huge role in relations between states (Pevenhouse & Goldstein, 2017: 40). In the case of Sino-Nigerian relations, when power is measured in terms of capability, China surpasses Nigeria by far. China has a good economy and has proven itself capable of transitioning from a weak isolated state to a strong integrated state in the international community. China uses its economic status to negotiate for better priced projects with less interference in domestic affairs; therefore, China is seen as an alternative for Nigeria. Nigeria has internal challenges that range from corruption to terrorism and political instability. Despite these posing a risk for Chinese foreign policy objectives and investments, it is in China’s strategic interests to continue watering its relations with Nigeria. Another project that has been in favour of China’s strategic interests is the free economic zones. This initiative benefits China more as it has been noted that since the dawn of Sino-Nigerian relations, China has led in terms of exports. The fact that
it will be legally allowed to export and import without paying any taxes means that China will be benefitting strategically from these economic zones. This study is of the view that despite Nigeria’s economy and the standard of living of its citizens becoming better, China’s interests will be served more than Nigeria’s.

Earlier in this chapter, it was mentioned that both China and African states experience mutual benefit and economic growth as reflected in GDP rates. This view points towards the theory of liberalism. Liberalism believes in the possibility of a more organised international system and society and highlights cooperation between states as possible (Baylis et al, 2017: 131). Despite the risky relations with Nigeria for China, and the rather exploitative relations with China for Nigeria, both states choose to pursue their relations as cooperation will lead to an increased accumulation of national income, more economic growth and an improved social stability in the international system. Liberalism and state-centric realism agree on the fact that both Nigeria and China choose to engage each other in terms of trade for the same reasons that all the other nations trade with each other. Both theories support the viewpoint that global trade is in both states’ national interests (Nkemjika, 2012).

This study has noted that there has been an increase in the value of trade between China and Nigeria, facilitated by the signing of various trade agreements since 2000. In the spirit of cooperation, the Investment Development and Trade Promotion was established in Nigeria and in China the Nigeria Trade office was erected (Tom-Jack, 2016: 36). All these efforts show that both China and Nigeria have realised that for more successful trade expansion to prevail, economic growth through cooperation and ethical considerations are extremely important.

Liberalism is also often seen as an inside-out approach (Pevenhouse & Goldstein, 2017: 74). This means that in the eyes of liberals, International Relations favour a world in which the internal determines the external. In relation to Sino-Nigerian relations, this means that domestic factors contribute largely towards foreign policy decisions. For Nigeria, a huge population that is uneducated and unemployed is a direct result of its struggling economy. As a result, Nigeria needs to erect good infrastructure to mitigate domestic challenges. For China, its overpopulated state, overproduction and lack of natural resources due to its industrialisation are a direct
result of its prosperous economy. This means that both China and Nigeria’s
domestic factors play a huge role in their foreign policy cooperation. For Nigeria to
grow economically, it needs the economic assistance of China through investments
and aid. On the other hand, the cooperation between China and Nigeria is important
for China as Nigeria’s big population is an opportunity for China to dump its products
in abundance at a cheaper price. In addition, this gives China the opportunity to
negotiate for natural resources in exchange for final products. China strategic
interests also require food security plans to feed its over-populated state. In
exchange for technological advancements in Nigeria’s agricultural sector, China
invests in long-term food security in Nigeria. It is also important to note that China’s
foreign policy being largely driven by its five principles of coexistence in its relations
with Nigeria, highlights the theory of liberalism. This is because those principles are
rooted in the idea of cooperation and ethical standards.

Another theory that reflects on Sino-Nigerian relations is the theory of constructivism.
This theory, at heart, gives recognition to the important role that social constructs,
ideas, identities and shared history play in state behaviour and global affairs
(Pevenhouse & Goldstein, 2017: 82). Both China and Nigeria enjoy ancient
civilisations that encompass rich cultures. This makes it easy for both states to find
similarities in their respective value systems and vast world views. In addition,
because both states find commonalities within their way of doing things, they also
embrace their differences by allowing cultural exchanges to further deepen their
relationship (Baylis et al, 2017: 130). For instance, Nigeria became the first state in
the world to establish a cultural centre in China, and China built one in Nigeria.

Both China and Nigeria identify with the global south, resulting in common south-
south solidarity. Identity matters in International Relations, according to the theory of
constructivism (Pevenhouse & Goldstein, 2017: 82). Despite China sustaining a
good economy, it still identifies as part of the developing world. Although a
powerhouse in Africa, Nigeria is considered a middle power in the international
system. This means that both China and Nigeria are regarded as major developing
states that have shared alliances even in international society. As a result, both
states find it mutually beneficial to some extent to conduct relations with each other.
In these alliances, the most important aspect is ensuring that issues concerning
developing countries are safeguarded. Ideas matter just as much as identities in International Relations (Pevenhouse & Goldstein, 2017: 83). China and Nigeria find mutual understanding in their model of economic growth. They both strongly advise the promotion of diverse economies through the introduction of technological advancements and as well industrialisation. Considering that they have the same ideas of how to facilitate sustainable economies, negotiating and agreeing on conditions of relations becomes an easier process.

Lastly, China and Nigeria have a shared history, not only in terms of colonialism, but also through other political ties. Nigeria stood against external pressures and supported China’s one China policy, which was a prerequisite for starting relations with China. When Nigeria was isolated because of poor governance by its military government, China supported Nigeria. Nigeria, just as many other African countries, supported the motion tabled by China of unseating the ROC (Taiwan) from its UN Security Council seat and as a permanent member of the UN. Because China strongly values loyalty, it will always regard Nigeria as an important partner in its foreign policy.
CHAPTER 6: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

6.1 Summary

The purpose of this study has been to provide an overview of China’s foreign policy towards Africa using the two Sudans, the DRC and Nigeria as case studies. This study did this by evaluating the continuity and change in China’s foreign policy towards Africa by investigating ways in which China conducts its foreign policy in different settings on the continent. To understand China’s foreign policy change, this study made use of various macro theories of International Relations. This means that this study made use of the theories of realism, liberalism and constructivism as well as the FPA model to articulate the factors influencing the continuity and change in China’s foreign policy.

China takes pride in being guided by its five principles of coexistence, namely: 1) mutual respect for each other’s territorial integrity and sovereignty, 2) mutual non-aggression, 3) mutual non-interference in each other’s internal affairs, 4) equality and cooperation for mutual benefit, and 5) peaceful coexistence. This study evaluated China’s stance on these principles as China has been determined to be guided by them to ensure a new and more principled approach to global affairs. In examining China’s consistency in abiding by them, this study indicates that there has been continuity in some instances and changes in other instances.

To facilitate this study, the following research question was formulated: ‘What are the characteristics and direction of China’s foreign policy dynamics in Africa?’ As mention above, China’s foreign policy behaviour is characterised and directed by its commitment to the five principles of coexistence. Additionally, as with any other state, China’s foreign policy is also guided by both domestic and external factors. Domestically, China is faced with the challenge of a huge population that looks up to one party, the Chinese Communist Party, to keep its economy healthy and consistent with survival. This means that China needs to do whatever it takes to not only feed its ravenous economy, but also ensure that the economy is strong and
stable enough to maintain political stability, to continue its path of high economic growth and to keep its conservative regime satisfied. China went through a period of industrialisation, which stripped it of some of its natural resources. These natural resources played a huge role in China being the second-largest economy that it is today. After its period of drought in terms of resources, China needed to explore new possibilities to secure the resources that it needed to sustain its growing economy. This meant that China needed to reach out to other states that have such resources and to make deals that would be beneficial for all parties involved. At that point, the African continent became a plausible option. Africa is well known for its wealth and diversity of resources. These resources have been significant for the development of most states in the world throughout history and continue to play the same role today. This study admits that it would be too simplistic to assume that China’s foreign policy expansion in Africa is solely driven by resources. However, it remains clear that resources are particularly imperative for the growth of Sino-African relations.

It came as no surprise that China rekindled most of its already existing relationships in Africa and used these to negotiate a way into Africa’s resources. In most cases, China’s involvement was received with great optimism as the Chinese government presented itself as an alternative to the West. In doing so, China affirmed to African leaders that in intensifying relations with China, Africa’s requests would not be met with preconditions. This provided an alternative in terms of foreign assistance as the West attached conditions to their assistance to Africa, such as democratising states in exchange for aid and financial assistance. China approached these newly rekindled relations with no strings attached. This attracted African leaders as they bought into the idea, which meant that they would now rely less on the West. Most African countries have been, and continue to be, singled out for human rights violations. This mostly resulted in them being isolated, which risked foreign investment to drive their struggling economies. China’s approach has been a solution to this problem. By assisting these African countries with aid, financial assistance through the form of soft loans, cancelling loan debts and infrastructure development, China has negotiated ways into Africa’s resources. In most cases, China had introduced the infrastructure for resources approach in its relations with the African continent. This approach means that China would finance Africa’s
infrastructure development, which would oversee the overall development of African economies, in exchange for Africa’s resources to feed China’s ravenous economy.

Externally, China’s rise led to its global influence spreading extensively. China is now regarded as an emerging power in the quest to balance the USA’s hegemony in the world. With its growth being met with great recognition, China has presented itself as a responsible emerging power in international relations. This means that China has to maintain an untainted image to be consistent with the notion of a responsible emerging power. China is slowly but surely becoming a leading role player in global affairs and a facilitator for international stability, security and prosperity. This is despite many critiques centred on the fact that China, like the previous great powers, is also exploiting Africa.

The study maintains that despite China enjoying more benefits from Sino-African relations than its counterparts, Africa is also gaining substantially with regards to infrastructure development. As opposed to oppressive measures that great powers used to benefit in their relations with resource-rich Africa, China allows Africa to sit at the table and play an equal part in negotiating terms and conditions. In view of the above, China has made notable contributions in playing a constructive role in international and regional issues and has made a significant contribution to world peace and mostly development. In an attempt to sustain its new identity of being a responsible power globally, China has had to make some changes in terms of its foreign policy actions and decision making. Despite abiding by the five principles of peaceful coexistence to guide its foreign policy, China has had to adapt to the changing dynamics of international relations. For instance, China prides itself on not interfering in the domestic affairs of states. However, for it to achieve an image of being a responsible actor, it has had to rethink ways in which it could assist partnering states in development while protecting human rights in respective countries. In an effort to try and profile itself as responsible, China has had to relook at some of its conventional ways of doing things.

Various scholars of International Relations have also marked China’s presence in Africa from a neo-colonial perspective. This study is strongly of the view that terming Sino-African cooperation new-colonialism means that one has no understanding of the atrocious harm old colonialism did to the African continent. In addition, it is
ignorant of how much better off parts of Africa are that have replaced Western subordination with Chinese cooperation. China has reaffirmed to African leaders and the world that it does not aim to hurt or threaten Africa, but instead to protect its interests along with the developing world and see it prosper. This study is further of the view that while political functionaries frame or articulate their statements in a context of public diplomacy that tends to serve a particular political narrative, their intentions should not be discarded as mere rhetoric and should be carefully considered. Furthermore, the fact that China always tries to justify its presence in Africa means that China cares what the world thinks and will, in some instances, try to ensure that its actions convey that. China has also had to involve itself in resolving global issues. This includes various challenges on the African continent. China has realised that it cannot feed off Africa’s resources without involving itself in Africa’s issues.

These issues do not just affect respective African countries, but also affect China and its investments. China has invested billions on the African continent and leaving challenges, especially security challenges unattended, could see China losing out on investment returns. This means that China attending to issues and challenges affecting African states leads to it not only securing investment returns to sustain its economy both immediately and in the long run, but also maintaining a clean image as a responsible actor in global affairs. In this way, China is killing two birds with one stone. In the two Sudans, this study indicates that China is struggling to coordinate its policy between the actors. China has a complicated relationship with the two Sudans as it has had longstanding ties with Sudan, while also having major investments in South Sudan. As a result, China has found it very difficult to fight controversies surrounding its ambitions of a clean image. This is because Chinese weapons that were sold to Sudan found their way to the rebels in South Sudan.

The study was geopolitically confined to China and Africa. It descriptively analysed Sino-African relations, focusing specifically on the two Sudans, the DRC and Nigeria. The study used an inside-out approach to achieve this by discussing China’s foreign policy processes, and eventually assessing China’s role in the two Sudans, the DRC and Nigeria. From a general point of view, the study examined and portrayed China’s foreign policy towards Africa. This study was descriptive in nature. Its analysis was
based on a literature study that aimed at examining continuity and change in China’s foreign policy and factors that contributed to this. All the data the study relied on was derived from primary resources (state documents), secondary analytical and scholarly sources and literature sources.

The main aim of Chapter 2 was to conceptualise foreign policy, to use the FPA to effectively examine foreign policy and subsequently to make use of macro theories such as realism, liberalism and constructivism, to understand and explain phenomena relating to China’s foreign policy. Realism highlighted the importance of interests in Sino-African relations, while liberalism expanded on the importance of cooperation for mutual benefit. On the other hand, constructivism suggested that foreign policy makers are responsive to both internal and external environments and that ideas and identities matter in the international community. This study also mentioned the importance of foreign policy actors in understanding foreign policy decisions. In identifying all conventional actors, this study indicated that in the case of China, the military (PLA) also played a notable role in foreign policy decision making. Kal Holsti’s model framework was further used to analyse domestic, external and cultural factors that contributed to the change in China’s foreign policy. The OCA and LTA were also crucial in this study as they highlighted the effect that a leader’s beliefs and innate characteristics have in influencing foreign policy.

The main aim of Chapter 3 was to unpack China’s foreign policy towards Sudan and South Sudan. Sino-Sudanese relations date back to 1959 and resulted in various visits between political leaders, and China supplying Sudan with military equipment and training Sudanese troops. Sudan also benefitted from soft loans and economic grants from China since the dawn of their engagements. When the USA and Europe retreated due to the instability in Sudan, China saw this as an opportunity to expand its influence in the state and claim its spot in Sudan’s oil refineries. This was essential to the development of the distinction between the two periods in Sino-Sudanese relations. This study distinguished between before the oil and after the oil relations. Before the intense introduction of oil in Sino-Sudanese relations, China played a less important role in the development of Sudan. This meant that these relations were limited. As China started expanding into Sudan’s oil industry, it also started playing a notable role in Sudan’s development. For this reason, the study
maintains that it is clear that China’s national interests are quite significant to its foreign policy and the theory of realism was used to convey this argument. As it was stripped of its resources as a result of its rapid development, securing oil became an integral part of China’s national interests. Oil as a resource is vital to the sustenance of China’s economic objectives.

As South Sudan gained its independence in 2011, it left with a considerable amount of oil, 70% of unified Sudan’s oil to be specific. This led to China leaning more towards South Sudan, as once again it was evident that China’s main interests was the wealth of oil in the newly formed state. Oil is crucial to China as it fuels China’s economic growth and sustainability. The study also reveals that the relations between China and the two Sudans might be developmental for the two Sudans; however, this study makes an important distinction that for China, they are interest driven. Additionally, China’s interests were threatened as continued conflict plagued the newly independent South Sudan and had a great impact on oil production and flow. This led to China having to soften its grip on its conventional principle of non-interference in domestic affairs. Despite moving China out of its comfort zone, this foreign policy decision by China benefitted not just South Sudan through the development of peace talks and much needed increased security, but also China’s image as a responsible leader in international affairs. Moreover, the shift had an additional effect as it confirmed one of realism’s traditional principles. China’s case in Africa also proves that as states grow in power and interests, so does their involvement in other states’ affairs.

It is also important to note that as trade and economic exchanges increased, China quickly commenced its aims of assisting the two Sudans with the development of basic industries. Again, the study maintains that it was in China’s interests to do so. China served its interests by investing in industries linked to the production and free flow of oil. For instance, infrastructure development focused more on oil machinery refinements than anything else. This study highlighted that China being involved in the development plans of the two Sudans resulted in the uninterrupted access to oil for China. The study also indicated that China’s relations with the two Sudans were linked to the idea of a means to an end with regards to foreign policy actions. This meant that the two Sudans were not necessarily important to China, other than being
useful in achieving China’s economic goals and ambitions. On the other hand, China is important to the two Sudans as it remained loyal to its commitments in the respective countries when other potential trade partners were scared away by continued instability.

Chapter 4 focused on the case of the DRC. Sino-DRC relations stabilised in 1972 and were confronted with challenges again in the 1990s due to the instability in the DRC. Not much changed in terms of political instability in the DRC; however, what changed was China’s attitude towards the adversity. At first, China was scared off by this, but as time went by, China saw opportunities in the DRC despite the inherent challenges. In rekindling its relationship with the DRC, China explored the option of being guided by the alternative approach of non-interference in domestic issues. However, due to China’s growth in the international system, coupled with its new foreign policy ambitions, China had to alter this approach. China did this using soft power by calling on opposition parties and the government to negotiate a peaceful way forward. This study indicated that the soft power was a clear sign of China feeding its ambitions of being perceived as a responsible actor, while securing its strategic interests by advocating for peace and stability to ensure the free flow of natural resources.

In September 2007, China and the DRC signed a deal totalling $9 billion (infrastructure for minerals). This study deduces that the DRC will benefit from this deal in the immediate term through large sums of money for projects by China, but also notes that not much will be achieved to realise development aims since the DRC has been proven to misuse revenue generated from its economy. On the other hand, China is expected to make use of this opportunity to ensure maximum benefit for its economy in the medium and long term. China will achieve this by generating profits from the mines that it had invested in and had access to through the infrastructure for minerals deal, while also collecting debt from all the soft loans it had granted the DRC. This study also indicated that this deal will not do much to change the dire situation in the DRC unless there is a change in leadership that will focus on sustainable development in the interest of the nation and not individuals who have already robbed the state of its riches.
While China’s multifaceted interests are expected to grow in the DRC to serve China’s interests, internal weaknesses such as corruption, hazardous diseases, human rights violations, riots and protests, high military presence and terrorism fuelled by factors such as greed, ethnicity and socio-economic factors are expected to continue to be a risk for China’s investments and presence. Moreover, despite the inherent threat and risk to China’s investments, the study highlighted that China will continue to benefit significantly in terms of its national interest as China continues to explore untapped resources. As this study has suggested, a breed of new leadership is essential for the DRC’s growth, as is the case with many African countries. While this suggestion will not result in solutions for all problems, this study is of the view that this will be a step in the right direction. Despite minor changes stated in China’s foreign policy, it is clear that there has been more continuity than change in China’s foreign policy towards the DRC as China continues to be guided by the five principles of peaceful coexistence.

The main aim of Chapter 5 was to address China’s foreign policy towards Nigeria. Sino-Nigerian relations were established in the early 1970s. Since then, there has been a tenfold growth in terms of trade relations between the two states. Nigeria is currently one of China’s biggest trading partners on the African continent, and the second-largest exporter destination in Africa. Despite the current trade value increasing to more than $17 billion, a trade imbalanced persists in Sino-Nigerian relations. This study indicated that despite Nigeria maintaining efforts to increase exports to China, it continues to lag behind the increase in exports from China.

This study has also indicated that China’s interests in Nigeria have increased significantly. At first, China focused on oil relations with Nigeria. Despite China’s attempts at diversifying its interests in Nigeria, oil and gas products still account for 87% of exports from Nigeria to China. In this light, China continues to invest heavily in oil blocs and oil refineries as this serves its interests. During Obasanjo’s term, Sino-Nigerian relations established the oil for infrastructure agreement. This literally meant that China would assist Nigeria with infrastructure development in exchange for more access to Nigerian oil. This was easily orchestrated by Obasanjo’s personal relationship with China. However, this agreement quickly ended as Obasanjo’s successor, President Yar’Adua arranged for its slow and painful death. This study
coined Yar’Adua’s introduction to Sino-Nigerian relations as the death of oil for infrastructure. This was because as soon as he stepped into office, Yar’Adua reviewed all the oil for infrastructure agreements and cancelled almost all of them. His reasoning was that these were not negotiated to benefit Nigeria to the maximum. This study noted this move as an indicator of great leadership potential and showed that Nigeria can stand against being cornered to advocate for better terms. Yar’Adua went along with agreements that he renegotiated to ensure better benefits for Nigeria.

As has been mentioned, China has also shown multifaceted interests in Nigeria. These have grown to include telecommunication, land and agriculture and the access to Nigeria’s economic zones. In terms of telecommunications, Chinese companies such as Huawei and ZTE, are the most preferred by Nigerian customers because they are cheap and of good quality. Nigeria has also negotiated for China to introduce Nigerians to next-generation network communication technology. This study acknowledges China’s attempts at this through initiatives such as skills sharing in this sector between Chinese companies and Nigerian citizens. Despite this being to the benefit of Nigeria, China will also continue to benefit from these relations. This is because China’s cooperation with Nigeria will leave room for expanded engagements and trade. China is also aware that a beneficial situation for Nigeria will result in easier and far more beneficial relations between the two states.

Technology has also been introduced to agricultural relations between China and Nigeria. China is transferring technological methods to enhance cultivation in Nigeria. Nigeria has vast arable land and that has grown to be China’s interest as China has a huge population that needs to be fed and a ravenous economy that needs to be sustained. In this vein, China has gone further and collaborated with Nigeria to establish free trade zones. This study highlighted the Lekki Free Trade Zone and the Guangdong Free Trade Zone. As with many other agreements, this study indicated that China stands to benefit far more from this deal than Nigeria. This is simply because China owns more shares from both ventures despite the fact that these trade zones are in Nigeria. This is problematic as Nigeria should be aiming to secure more benefits from initiatives such as these considering that they are being planned and executed on their land. This study also acknowledged that China
cannot always be seen as the villain in such situations as Nigeria has proven that it has the capability to negotiate for better terms. Despite the political instability, insecurity and corruption in Nigeria, China continues to see more opportunities than threats. This study indicated that these ongoing challenges are a direct result of poor policy choices, weak institutions, corrupt leadership and barriers in terms of language and culture. Again, China has been forced to interfere using soft power by always advocating for stability in ECOWAS and by promising to assist Nigeria in fighting Boko Haram on condition that Nigeria indicates exactly how it wants to be helped.

Lastly, the study would be incomplete without some final reflections from a theoretical point of view. It can be stated that the dominance of realism in International Relations has played a major role in studies focused on an understanding of China’s newly gained economic and political prominence. However, this study shows that both realism and liberalism offer valuable theoretical insight to interpreting the rise of China and its relations with the African continent or particular continental actors. Realism offers interpretations of China’s rise that focus on its pursuit of power and security in a changing and dynamic international system. Several empirical examples in this paper support the relevance of realism in the topic under review, but not completely. At the same time, evidence relating to cooperation between China and African actors implies that a win-win situation for all actors is a possibility and that conflict does not always underpin state behaviour, as liberalists suggest. In this context, China has been Africa’s largest trading partner in the last decade and this is important because (economic) interdependence is one of the strongest strands in the liberalist argument. Moreover, while realism almost denies or downplays the possibility of cooperation, the notions of interdependence and cooperation underpin the liberalist view. The implication is that in the interpretation of China’s rise, both these theories (realism and liberalism) are of relevance to this particular study and must be used in combination with each other — not as theories in opposition to each other.

Furthermore, constructivism offers a social dimension to International Relations and this also applies to Sino-African relations. Constructivism is useful as a theoretical construct in a study of this kind in the sense that China has some social interests
that have led and consolidated its relations with countries of the global south in general and Africa in particular. After all, China's identity as part of the global south is rooted in a historical interest of ending imperialism. A key argument among constructivists is that identities and interests among states in the international system are not exogenously foisted on states (as realists claim). They are constructed and developed through interaction and are thus endogenous to International Relations. In looking at China and Africa’s relations and interactions, the two entities have been pulled together by historical dynamics as well as a contemporary association and identification with each other around their respective roles in the political dynamics of the global south.

In view of the above, this study argues that a scholarly understanding of China's rise and its relations with Africa or African actors cannot be based on a singular theoretical construct or view, but on a combination of realist, liberal and constructivist considerations and insights (and even some other macro-theories that have not been discussed in this study).

6.2 Conclusion

Regarding the research question, three subsidiary questions were asked:

- Firstly, what are the characteristics and direction of China’s foreign policy globally?
- Secondly, what can be learned from the characteristics and direction of China’s foreign policy towards Africa, specifically continuity and change in the two Sudans, the DRC and Nigeria?
- Lastly, what are the political and economic implications of the characteristics and direction of China’s foreign policy dynamics with regard to the said case studies?

The following conclusions may be made regarding the three subsidiary questions.
6.2.1 What are the characteristics and direction of China’s foreign policy globally?

This study deduces that China pursues an independent foreign policy that is largely centred on national interests. This means that in being labelled as a responsible emerging leader internationally, China commits to not only economic prosperity, but political and social prosperity. Currently, China has expanded its influence on all continents and regions to secure strategic interests, especially in Africa and the Middle East. Over and above the fact that China is at the forefront of modernisation, it continues to protect state sovereignty and national independence. China achieves this by taking pride in the respect that it has for respective state territories. China also takes pride in being a principled actor in the international system. However, it has contradicted this in many ways in an effort to maintaining its traditional foreign policy. In the last two decades China has been criticised for partnering with states that violate human rights, despite it saying it is a principled actor. This has suddenly started to change as China has made efforts to be more responsible in this regard. China’s efforts are minimal, but this study maintains that they are a step in the right direction.

As the study has indicated, despite being criticised for its double standard, China is an advocate of world peace and stability, while continuing to spearhead the notion of common development. China has gone to great lengths to oppose hegemony, the misuse of power globally and aggressive behaviour by powerful states. The fact that China is expanding and consolidating its control in the South China Sea heavily contradicts China’s foreign policy stance globally. At first, China resolutely took pride in the fact that it does not participate in the arms race; this study takes a critical view of China as China has started to expand its military presence internationally and in Africa in particular. Not only is China participating in the arms race, it is becoming the central competitor. China also believes that peace can be maintained by ensuring common development. China not only advocates for common development, but has been proven to execute its these plans, especially in developing countries. Its solidarity with the global south has resulted in the issues and challenges that affect them being safeguarded. However, this is not to say that China is in the forefront of
this mission, instead, this study is of the view that China works hand-in-hand with various developing countries to do this.

China also pursues friendly and cooperative relations globally. Across the years, China has rekindled relations with many states in the hope of cooperating for the greater good. More often than not, this cooperation is aimed at enhancing or serving China’s national interests. China also uses the five principles of peaceful coexistence as a guideline to be consistent with friendly and cooperative relations. China has also started to pull its weight in shaping global governance standards and rules on various issues. In trying to restore China’s former glory as a world leader, China is proving that its one-party state and liberal economic system have been effective and continues to be beneficial for regional and global challenges. Additionally, China opening up its economy to the free market system has provided material achievements internationally to benefit many. This study acknowledges that modernising and integrating China’s economy has also led to the success of China in terms of improving the standards of living domestically. For these reasons, the notion ‘he who helps others, helps himself’ can be greatly aligned to China’s foreign policy globally.

6.2.2 What can be learned from the characteristics and direction of China’s foreign policy towards Africa, specifically continuity and change in the two Sudans, the DRC and Nigeria?

This study has learnt that despite the changes notable in China’s foreign policy, continuity prevails in most aspects. In terms of the change, a major shift that was highlighted was one of its five principles of peaceful coexistence, which is non-interference in the domestic affairs of partner states. This study indicates that China defied this conventional principle by sending in combat troops in an effort to stabilise the ongoing violent conflict in South Sudan. This was an important event in global affairs as China initially presented itself to Africa and the world as an alternative to the West. This indicated that China, as opposed to the West, would continue to assist Africa in terms of development, and not rub its nose in domestic issues. In this sense, China is committed to not involving itself in the internal issues of states as it
prises itself on respecting state sovereignty and independence. However, China also had to alter its position in recent times as it has ambitions of presenting itself as a responsible world leader because it is regarded as an emerging super power. Despite China being a status quo state, which aims at preserving policies and conforming to traditional ways of foreign policy decision making, for China to sustain its image in international relations, it had to relook this position. Over and above China’s ambitions internationally, domestically it remained important for China to get involved in efforts to correct the instability in South Sudan. This is because China has invested billions in the country. For China to ensure that its economy is sustained in terms of its status and to ensure the well-being of its citizenry, China had to act to secure its national interests. The instability in South Sudan interrupted the production and free flow of oil in the state, which affected China’s investments and profits. This was not the only way China involved itself in domestic issues.

China continues to use soft power to involve itself in instability in Nigeria and the DRC. For instance, the study indicates that China has called upon the government of the DRC and various opposition parties to negotiate a better way forward for the sake of peace and stability. China has also assisted Nigeria to fight its inherent challenge of terrorism and committed itself to assisting Nigeria going forward on this issue, depending on the help that Nigeria’s requests. It is important to note that China, however, does not dominate processes despite its contemporary foreign policy of involvement. In South Sudan, China worked with international institutions such as the UNSC, the UK and the USA. This means that China’s shift change has been subtle and cognisant of hegemonic issues. China avoids acting unilaterally in this regard. China’s foreign policy towards Africa has always moved from political ties to ensuring growing economic ties. At first, China and Africa were tied by politics through issues such as unseating Taiwan from the UNSC, supporting China’s one China policy, the notion of being isolationist states, supporting military states, the quest for independence and the influence of ideology. However, currently, they have matured to being centred on pragmatic considerations, trade and investment to ensure common development. Another change that this study has indicated is China’s expanding military and its contributions in terms of troops to various unstable countries in Africa, including South Sudan and the DRC. This study is of the view that this is a strategy for China to strengthen its military engagement as this will add
to Sino-African economic and commercial relations. This study suggests that this development by China complements its already established ventures such as increased peacekeeping contributions and the sale of weapons, while simultaneously ensuring the protection of China’s assets in Africa.

In spite of notable changes in China’s foreign policy towards Africa, there has been more continuity than changes. China continues to abide by most of its principles of peaceful coexistence; even the change where it has occurred has been subtle and not drastic. Common development, peace and stability continue to be at the forefront of China’s foreign policy. China continues to assist Africa’s development through various grants, soft loans, debt relief and joint ventures. In this way, China assists Africa by investing in infrastructure development as this is essential to the development of the continent as a whole. For instance, in Nigeria China has invested in technological transfers to enhance the cultivation of land. This will quicken the progression of economic development in the state as Nigeria currently relies heavily on oil relations for its economic development. China is assisting Nigeria to develop its other sectors as a diversified economy is more beneficial for long-term prospects and objectives. In the DRC, China has invested billions in an effort to boost the DRC’s economy as it has a multitude of resources. Despite this being in China’s interest, China’s investment comes in handy as many other potential investors have opted to withhold their investment considering the political instability in the DRC. In this sense, China is one of the few investors that is willing to bite the bullet and take risks to secure its national interests. In South Sudan, China continues to develop its refineries to result in the free flow of oil and ensure that the country’s economy does not collapse as it relies solely on oil relations for its sustenance.

China continues to not pay much attention to human rights violations amid its investments in various African states. This comes as no surprise as the Chinese political dispensation is not associated with liberal human rights. However, going forward, this study indicates that it will be in China’s interest not to ignore gross human rights violations in African states and – as a responsible world power – to act in accordance with the normative framework of the international community. China continues not to yield to pressure from major power blocs in global affairs concerning decisions made in the UN regarding Africa. China is also expected to safeguard
issues relating to the global south. These issues range from power relations between the global south and the north, to debt relief, poverty and common development. China also continues to pursue friendly and cooperative relations through the continuity of its open policy to advance development through equality and mutual benefit. Despite various scholars criticising China’s interest in Africa, it is evident that it is in the interest of both China and African states to partake in political and economic relations and interactions. After all, both partners choose to partake in such relations and interactions as they are both benefitting even though the benefits are not on the same scale. There are differences from case to case, as will be further explained below.

6.2.3 What are the political and economic implications of the characteristics and direction of China's foreign policy dynamics with regard to the said case studies?

This study is of the view that Sino-African relations are not a total win-win situation in all respects, especially for African states. The reality is that African states are largely in a desperate situation with a dire need for development. As a result, they settle for what they are offered in the hope of better conditions as time goes by. China is succeeding in terms of maximising benefits while minimising costs in Africa. This is seen through initiatives such as the infrastructure for oil and infrastructure for minerals agreements. These agreements benefit China more than they benefit Africa, but the fact remains that Africa benefits too. It is much cheaper for China to plunge contributions to Africa’s development through infrastructure as China uses its cheap labour, machinery and modes of production. In this sense, as the study has previously indicated, China benefits not only from the resources received in return, but from the profits they will continue to generate for years. China also benefits through the process of projects being executed. China does this by using its cheap labour force, which has negative implications for Africa. This approach leaves Africa with high unemployment rates while generous amounts of money escape the respective African states. In addition, this robs Africa of skills-sharing opportunities, which could greatly contribute to economic development on the continent.
China does not just benefit through resource extraction, but also through the acquisition of service contracts for Chinese companies. This means that both the public and private sectors of China benefit extensively from Sino-African relations. The negative implication is that the private sectors of African states are not developed and this will continue to harm development on the continent. Most African states have a severe shortage of strong leadership with the will to defy the status quo. Despite the country having a couple of strong and bright minds, there are limitations in terms of productivity. This makes it easier for China to take advantage of opportunities that have proven to be very fruitful. This also explains why China is investing heavily in Africa when it sometimes seems risky and unwise to do so. The returns have proven to be more beneficial than the risks to the investments.

Finance poses another significant challenge to the development process. Potentially sound and promising business ideas often lack financial support due to the absence of domestic investors. China can take advantage of this and penetrate Africa by employing a few labourers cheaply with little ethical labour practices if any. Often this remains unchecked as African leaders who should be checking turn a blind eye and thus deprive their states and populations of the potential material benefits.

At the same time, China has enriched Africa in terms of technological transfers and innovation. Technology has started to bring hope against many challenges on the African continent. With that said, Africa is becoming the fastest adopter of technology and this has resulted in many young people on the continent slowly but surely becoming developers in this sector. For instance, in Nigeria China has started a joint venture with the state to use technology to enhance land cultivation. This is beneficial for both China and Nigeria. China has food security objectives and no arable land. Nigeria comes in handy as it can plant rice and other goods to be exported to China for consumption. Considering the developments of free trade zones in Nigeria, China will benefit more as it will legally be excused from paying certain levies, leaving Nigeria with limited and restricted benefits. The implication of this is that these developers will pursue greater depths to ensure further innovation. This will in turn assist in closing the gap of poverty and inequality in African states, while also undertaking the task of reducing various risks that stand in the way of investors committing capital to the continent. This study is cognisant of the fact that
free trade will not benefit both parties equally, as Nigeria will remain lagging behind significantly as a result of China owning majority shares in the free trade zones.

In terms of the future direction of Sino-African relations, this study expects China to continue to increase its footprint not just in Africa, but across the world. China is also expected to rebalance many of its relations abroad as it is going through a process of self-correction after being in danger of economically overheating. This study is also of the view that trade relations and FDI will continue to increase while China goes through further industrialisation and structural change. China will attempt to balance its economic objectives by adjusting to being a consumer-based service economy with value-added manufacturing instead of a labour intensive/resource intensive manufacturing economy. This in turn, will generate a lot of trade and economic relations, and rebalance relationships across the world, including on the African continent, to keep China’s economy booming. The Sino-African relations are also expected to continue to change as Africa will undergo a process to develop the capacity to negotiate better deals. This study made an example of President Yar’Adua who managed to push back on a lot of less beneficial deals pertaining to the infrastructure for oil deals. This study is also of the view that there will be more training given to a lot of African countries on technological advancements to ensure common development. As China needs more money to finance its ambitions, it is expected to change its model of financing developing countries. Considering all of this, this study purports that Africa needs to take charge and control the terms of Sino-African relations to ensure maximum benefits while minimising costs. This study is also of the view that both partners stand to gain a lot from these relations in future.

In the final analysis, one can conclude that despite notable changes in China’s foreign policy towards Africa, specifically the two Sudans, the DRC and Nigeria, continuity largely prevails. At the same time, it should be noted that the findings emanate from only three case studies, China’s foreign policy behaviour in other cases might differ to some extent from this study’s findings on the African context.
6.3 Recommendations

The study makes the following recommendations considering the context of the study:

- If China is serious about the promotion of common development, China must assist African states to build a middle class to address the polarisation of the economy.
- China should contribute developing entrepreneurs on the African continent by increasing public-private partnerships.
- Africa needs to take more control of its relationship with China. This means that Africa should invest in growing its capacity to negotiate better terms for its development deals with China.
- China should ensure the allocation of factors of production in Africa with the ambition of coming up with innovative distribution.
- Instead of largely relying on cheap African labour to execute various development projects in Africa, China should develop Africans in critical skills areas to ensure the transfer and sharing of skills to intensify efforts for a more developed Africa.
- As China’s interests expand on the African continent, it cannot be ignored that the extraction of more resources will have an environmental cost. Africa needs to ensure that China takes extra responsibility in this regard.
- China should continue to empower Africa economically considering its global south ambitions, as this will promote political development, which will lead to healthier and mutually beneficial trade relations.
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