

# **Coalition politics a new political landscape in South Africa**

Submitted by

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## **DECLARATION**

I, **JOHANNES MOKHOBLO MOSHODI**, hereby declare that the mini-dissertation that I herewith submit for Masters of Arts in Governance and Political Transformation at the University of the Free State, is my independent work, and that I have not previously submitted it for a qualification at another institution of higher education. I also declare that all reference materials used for this study have been properly acknowledged.

.....

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## ABBREVIATIONS

ACDP	African Christian Democratic Party
AIC	African Independent Congress
ANC	African National Congress
APC	African People's Convention
APR	African Peer Review
CP	Conservative Party
CDU	Christian Democratic Union
CDP	Christian Democratic Party
COSATU	Congress of South African Trade Union
COPE	Congress of the People
BC	Before Christ
BCM	Black Consciousness Movement
DA	Democratic Alliance
DP	Democratic Party
DUP	Democratic Unionist Party
DR	Democratic Revolution
EFF	Economic Freedom Fighters
EISA	Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in Africa
FF	Freedom Front
GNU	Government of National Unity
GP	Green Party
HSRC	Human Science Research Council
ID	Independents Democrats
IDP	Integrated Development Plan
IEC	Independent Electoral Commission
IFP	Inkatha Freedom Party
IJR	Institute for Justice Reconciliation
INC	Indian National Congress
IP	Independent Party
IRP	Institutional Revolutionary Party

JA	Jubilee Alliance
JP	Janata Party
KANU	Kenyan African National Union
LD	Liberal Democrats
LGN	Local Government Negotiations
LGNF	Local Government Negotiating Forum
LGTA	Local Government Transition Act
LP	Liberal Party
MDC	Movement for Democratic Change
MEC	Member of Executive Council
MPNP	Multi-Party Negotiating Process
NAP	National Action Party
NARC	National Rainbow Coalition
NDI	National Development Institute
NDM	National Democratic Movement
NDP	New Democratic Party
NNP	New National Party
NFP	National Freedom Party
NEPAD	New Partnership Development
NP	National Party
NNP	New National Party
PFP	Progressive Federal Party
PP	Progressive Party
PA	Patriotic Alliance
PAC	Pan Africanist Congress
PR	Proportional Representation
RDP	Reconstruction and Development Plan
SACP	South African Communist Party
SDP	Social Democratic Party
TRC	Truth and Reconciliation Commission
UCA	United Citizens Alliance
UDM	United Democratic Movement
UFEC	United Front of the Eastern Cape
UKIP	United Democratic Independence Party

UK	United Kingdom
UPP	Ulster Unionist Party
UN	United Nation
UNDP	United Nation Development Programme
US	United States

## **CHAPTER 1**

### **RESEARCH PROPOSAL**

#### **1.1 Background**

South Africa is a country deeply divided by ethnic, class, social, race, linguistics and religious cleavages. For this reason, based on its diverse population, it is significant for voters to be adequately represented by available parties.

The third wave of democratisation, as it is termed, is believed to have been successful in bringing democracy. Bam (2006:2) argues that the accomplishment of the 2006 municipal elections projected an encouraging picture to the people of South Africa, especially at a time of the African Peer Review (APR) process of New Partnership Development (NEPAD). South Africans proved that democracy has inculcated in their way of life.

South Africa's four local government elections experienced increases in the numbers of parties contesting elections at all levels, while the African National Congress (ANC) remained undefeated and support for opposition parties has progressively declined and diminished (Taderera & Pothier, 2011). The 2011 local government election is a clear example where the majority of electoral support went to the ANC, while the remainder of votes were shared among opposition parties. Nevertheless, none of these opposition parties, with the exception of the Democratic Alliance (DA), were able to win more than 4 percent of the local votes (Booyesen, 2012).

One of the problems of South Africa's democracy is therefore the inability of opposition parties to provide a viable challenge to the ANC (Moses, 2014).

In February 1990, government changes unbanned the ANC and other anti-apartheid political parties, followed shortly by the release of Nelson Mandela. This set in motion the official multi-party negotiations, referred to as the Multi-Party Negotiating Process (MPNP). It proved to be central to the transformation of a non-racial South Africa and paved way for the first June 1994 democratic elections (Stanton, 2009).

The early 1990s were characterised by a series of local government negotiations together with a number of legislative reforms. Hence, in 1991 the Interim Measures for a Local Government Act (128 of 1991) by the white minority parliament indicated a move towards a more democratic system of local government (Van Vuuren, Wiehahn, Rhoodie, & Wiechers, 1999). In order to bring about fundamental change of the apartheid urban system, the Local Government Negotiating Forum (LGNF) came into effect in 1993. It comprised statutory and non-statutory organisations both represented equally. The LGNF produced recommendations which were included in the 1993 interim Constitution and the Local Government Transition Act (LGTA) of 1993 (Pillay, Tomlinson and du Toit, 2006).

The Local Government Transition Act of 1993 (LGTA) initiated a three-phased local government transformation process with the pre-interim phase being the completion of the first local democratic election in December 1995 (LGTA, 1998). The 1996 constitutional democracy then implemented a decentralised system of government in South Africa (Stanton, 2009). South Africa's first democratic Constitution, Act 108 of 1996, officially established Local Government as a constitutionally protected sphere of government (SCA, 1996). From the Constitution as the sovereign rule of law, emerged a number of local government acts of legislation and policies setting up the legislative framework for this sphere of government (Stanton, 2009). Pre-1994 local government existed with a deeply biased outlook to serve the interests of a particular group, especially the whites. In essence local government in South Africa moved from relatively obscurity into the limelight following the advent of the new political dispensation (Siddle and Koelble, 2016).

The local government election in 1995 was a culmination of the pre-interim phase and the 2000 elections were the culmination of the interim phase in the local government transition (Pillay, Tomlinson and du Toit, 2006). Hence, in late 2000 a number of fundamental local government Acts were authorised, of which the Municipal Electoral Act (Act 27 of 2000) bears reference. For one thing, the Act provides for citizens to choose their local council through regular, competitive local elections as well as the election procedures for municipal councils, including the requirements for parties and ward

candidates to contest the elections as well as general procedures, to regulate municipal elections (MEA, 2000).

Nevertheless, temporarily established in December 1993 to administer South Africa's first non-racial elections, the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) only became a permanent body in 1996, following the adoption of a new and permanent Constitution, Act 108 of 1996. In other words, the IEC was established by a constitutional stipulation – Chapter 9, Section 194 – as one of the “state institutions supporting democracy” (HSRC, 2009). According to the Electoral Commission Act, 51 of 1996, as assented to on 27 September 1996 and commencing on 17 October 1996, provision is made for its establishment as independent body, exercising its powers and perform its functions without fear, favour or prejudice (Juta Law, 2014).

Subsequent to its political transition, South Africa successfully held five local government elections, in 1995, 2000, 2006, 2011 and 2016. Besides, the IEC announced that 121 parties contested the local government elections in 2011 compared to 97 parties in 2006 and 79 in 2000. The 2011 elections also saw an increase in small community-based parties and independents. In addition, independent candidates increased from 663 in 2006 to 754 in 2011, which represents a 14 percent increase since the 2006 local elections (Africa & van Rooyen, 2012). The last local government elections in 2016 experienced a contestation between 205 political parties. The three big players, however, were the ANC, the DA and Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF), which hold by far the largest slices of the South African political terrain (SACBC, 2016:1).


To this end, there was a significant increase in the number of parties contesting elections. The ANC has emerged victorious since 1994, earlier mentioned remainder of votes were shared by the opposition parties (Booyesen, 2012). One of the problems of South Africa's democracy is, therefore, the inability of opposition parties to provide a viable challenge to the ANC (Moses, 2014:1).

## **1.2 Local Government Election between 1995 – 2016**

The first local government elections were held on 1 November 1995, with the exception of Kwazulu Natal and some parts in the Western Cape due to boundary disputes

(Mpumalanga News, 2017). These two provinces held their elections on 31 March 1996 and besides these elections, there was a 60 percent voter turnout (Hoosian, 2014). The ANC won 686 councils and further won the majority of seats in 387 councils. The National party (NP) won a majority of seats on 45 councils. Conversely, the Freedom Front (FF) controlled one local council whereas independent candidates got the majority on 42 councils (ANC website, 2018). Likewise, over 11 000 seats were contested and the ANC obtained 58.2 percent, 6 035, of the seats. The NP achieved 18.2 percent of 1 814 seats, and the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) and Democratic Party (DP) won 8.73 percent and 3.48 percent, respectively (Lodge, 2002:117). Adapted from the local government Elections Task Group (1996:231), the table below presents the 1995/6 election results, with votes per party and with those that received more than 50 percent of votes.

**Table 1.1**



**Source:** EISA

Source: Adapted from LG Elections Task Group (1996:31)

The table below outlines the voter turnout in percentages for each province. Interestingly, the highest voter turnout rates were experienced in the Western Cape, with two-thirds of the electorate voted (Deagan, 2011).

**Table 1.2**

<i>Province</i>	<i>Turnout of eligible voters</i>
Western Cape	60
Northern Cape	55

Eastern Cape	35
North West	38
Free State	38
Gauteng	36
Northern Province	38
Mpumalanga	36
Total	38

Source: Adapted from IDASA 1996, No.6

The second local government elections took place in 2000 and were administered in terms of the Local Government: Municipal Electoral Act, 27 of 2000, read with the Electoral Regulations issued by the Electoral Commission. The Electoral Commission Report of December 2000 states that of the 61 parties registered nationally, 48 percent participated in the 2000 municipal elections. Of the parties registered municipally, 91 percent contested (IEC, 2000). In that year, Mckinley (2004:8) observed that 48 percent of all registered voters turned out to vote. The report further declares that 672 independent candidates contested in the elections, with the Eastern Cape registering the highest proportion at 20 percent and Northern Cape the lowest, at 4 percent (IEC, 2000). Variations of party performances in these elections reflected demographic shifts. In Cape Town, the DA retained the metro, with 53.49 percent, followed by the ANC, with 38.54 percent. The Johannesburg results were illuminating; the DA established a significant presence in a few black neighbourhoods with 33.71 percent, as compared with 59.23 percent. In general the DA won comfortable victories in the suburbs and the ANC attracted massive majority in township and rural districts. Displeasure with the ANC was mostly expressed through former supports staying away from the polls, though in certain areas the civic rebellion had a discernible impact (Lodge, 2002:119).

The table below presents the results for five metropolitans in the 2000 elections, indicating performance of parties.

**Table 1.3: IEC Results, 2000**

Area	ANC	DA	IFP	PAC	UDM	ACDP	Other
------	-----	----	-----	-----	-----	------	-------



Cape Town	38.54	53.49	0.28	0.46	1.45	3.83	1.91
Durban	46.94	26.14	17.4	0.6	0.16	1.19	8.47
East Rand	56.73	31.35	3.18	2.45	0.62	1.1	4.57
Johannesburg	59.23	33.71	3.57	1.24	0.61	0.41	1.23
Tshwane	56.31	35.06	0.36	1.06	0.51	2.23	4.37
Total share	53.98	34.73	4.18	1.16	0.92	1.64	3.39

The third local government elections held on 1 March 2006 represented important milestones in development of the South Africa's democracy (Tlakula, 2006). This is confirmed by Mckinley (2006:1), stating that these elections represented a fledgling democracy in South Africa. The 2006 elections experienced a tremendous increase of parties and candidates. More than 21 million voters appeared on the voters' roll, and 97 political parties with 663 independent candidates and 21 498 party list candidates registered with the IEC (Bam, 2006:2). The DA, in these elections in the national share, attracted a 24.08 percent increase in its share of the electorate, and received 16.24 percent of votes, while the ANC remained the leading party, with 64.82 percent of the votes (Ryklief, 2016).

The fourth local government elections took place on 18 May 2011. These local government elections will be remembered for the surge in contestation by independent candidates. There were 29 570 ward candidates, 754 of whom were independents. Thus, there was a 14 percent increase of over 667 candidates, above those who had registered for 2006 local government elections (BBC, 2016; Booysen, 2012:199). A significant growth in the number of opposition parties partaking at local level is noted, as compared to previous elections. However, none of them, with the exception of the DA, made significant inroads. The final results indicated that the ANC and DA were the two leading parties, with the IFP third, followed by Congress of the People (COPE) in a distant fourth (Moses, 2014). The DA increased its electoral support by mere 2.94 percent nationally, obtaining 23.94 percent. It got a slender plurality foothold in a second metropole besides Nelson Mandela Bay, while 61.95 percent fell in the courtyard of the ANC (Ryklief, 2016; BBC. 2016).

Comparing the 2006 and 2011 local government elections, there were 3 505 412 more PR votes cast in 2011 than in 2006, being a 35.38 percent increase. The ANC secured 1 936 009 more votes, a 29.93 percent increase. Its share declined from 65.67 to 62.93 percent due to greater increase in the number of PR votes won by DA. The DA increased its number of PR votes from 1 608 154 to 3 216 006, a total increase of 1 607 852, which is 99.8 percent. Its share of the vote increased from 16.32 percent to 24.08 percent. It is important to remember that the DA had incorporated the Independent Democrats (ID) before 2011 election, and as a result, the ID never contested the poll. Accordingly, the DA and ID received 1 825 915 PR votes, combined, in 2006, which is 18.53 percent. The DA thus secured 1 390 091 more votes in 2011 than the number that the two parties had received separately in 2006, and it achieved a 76.13 percent increase. The DA's share increased by 5.54 percentage points (Politicsweb, 2011).

The table below reflects the change of support between 2006 and 2011, specifically focusing on PR ballot. The table further provides information on the increase and decrease in total votes, and the decreases in percentage points per parties.

**Table 1.4: Change of support between 2006 and 2011 LGE on PR ballot**

Party	2006		2011		Increase	Decrease
	Total Votes	%	Total Votes	%	Total Votes	% points
ACDP	128,990	1.3	78,737	0.59	-50,253	-0.72
ANC	6,469,420	65,67	8,405,429	62,93	1,936,009	-2,74
APC			54,332	0.41	54,332	0.41
AZAPO	30,321	0.31	26,300	0.20	-4,021	-0.11
COPE			296,624	2.22	296,624	2.22
DA	1,608,154	16.32	3,216,006	24.08	1,607,852	7.76
ID	217,761	2.21	0	0	-217,761	-2.21
IFP	744,486	7.56	475,621	3.56	-268,865	-4.00
MF	42,530	0.43	53,042	0.40	10,512	-0.03
NFP			318,352	2.38	318,352	2.38
PAC	109,816	1.11	54,846	0.41	-54,970	-0,70
UCDP	62,459	0.63	25,971	0.19	-36,488	-0.44
UDM	129,074	1.31	84,623	0.63	-44,424	-0.68
FF+	94,140	0.96	53,931	0.40	-40,209	-0.56
Other Parties	214,975	2.18	213,697	1.60	-1,278	-0.58
<b>Total</b>	<b>9,852,099</b>	<b>100,00</b>	<b>13,357,511</b>	<b>100.00</b>	<b>3,505,412</b>	<b>0.00</b>

Source: [www.politicsweb.co.za/news-and-analysis/2011-election-national-results](http://www.politicsweb.co.za/news-and-analysis/2011-election-national-results)

South Africa's August 2016 local government election saw some unanticipated and rather momentous results, with a new high point of electoral competition. These local election signalled change, for the first time in the country's democratic era since 1994 with opposition parties' increase in votes obtained. The DA was certainly "salivating" at a chance to gain ground beyond the Western Cape (Spector, 2014). Unsurprisingly a municipality named after ANC liberation hero and South Africa's first democratically elected president, Nelson Mandela Bay with many leaders of the struggle against apartheid coming from this area. The DA took 46.5 percent compared to the ANC's 41 percent (BBC, 2016).

The DA's electorate increased to 27.02 percent in 2016, as compared to 2006 and 2011 (Ryklief, 2016). Paret (2016:16) asserts that the DA and Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) notably gained substantial ground in 2016. This was when change happened in four of the country's major metropolitan municipalities: Nelson Mandela Bay in the Eastern Cape, and the City of Johannesburg, City of Tshwane, and Ekurhuleni in Gauteng. The dominating parties in these elections are represented in the table below.

**Table 1.5**




Table 5 Source: BBC [www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-36985339](http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-36985339)

### 1.2.1 Voting patterns and comparison of voting outcomes

In the 2000 local government elections, the DA performed beyond expectations, and it attracted a large portion of the white vote, following its alliance with the New Nationalist Party (NNP). The alliance did not last; nevertheless, this separation haunted the DA during 2006 elections, where it shed 5 percent of its votes. The ANC achieved its highest support growth at national level, at 0.51 percent in the Western Cape and 13.57 percent in Kwazulu-Natal. The DA registered an upbeat growth, which was the biggest setback for the ANC in Nelson Mandela Bay, a new battleground for COPE and DA (Russon, 2011:83). The voter turnout for the 2011 municipal elections was high at 65 percent. Despite the high turnout, the ANC's support declined between 2011 and 2016, as it dropped just over with 200 000 votes. More than 700 000 votes went to the EFF and DA, combined, in 2016.

The table below illustrates how the ANC votes in 2011 dropped from 60 percent to 46 percent in 2016 (Gotz, Khanyile & Katumba, 2016). The ANC's support dropped in the

big metros, with 50 percent threshold being obtained in Nelson Mandela Bay, Tshwane and Johannesburg metros (Dufour & Calland, 2016:3). Support for the DA stood at 33 percent in 2011 and increased to 37 percent in 2016. Newcomers to the South African political scene, the EFF, claimed 11 percent of the votes in 2016 elections (Gotz, Khanyile and Katumba, 2016).

**Table 1.6: Total Valid Votes per Party**

<b>Item</b>	<b>2011</b>		<b>2016</b>	
<b>Total Valid Votes</b>	3 068 363		3 551 447	
<b>ANC</b>	1 855 613	60%	1 637 585	46%
<b>DA</b>	1 031 973	33%	1 321 432	37%
<b>EFF</b>	NA	NA	400 335	11%
<b>Total votes</b>	3 107 134		3 602 786	
<b>Registered voters</b>	5 592 676		6 234 739	
<b>Turnout</b>		56%		58%

Table 6 Source: Gauteng City-Region Observatory 2019

In a survey sample report conducted by the University of Johannesburg scribed by Paret (2016:8), aiming to understand 2016 electoral results in South Africa, projected the findings based on 11 sites across South Africa. It projected that ANC and EFF voters were over-represented while the DA voters were under-represented. In fact, 57 percent voted ANC, compared with 3 percent who voted EFF, according to respondents in the survey who indicated their votes in the PR (Proportional Representation) ballot. Conversely, the surveyed respondents demonstrated that 13 percent voted for the DA and 7 percent for other parties (Paret, 2016:8).

In the City of Cape Town metro, the contested battleground was fierce in 2016. Significantly, control of the metro had changed hands between political parties in the period 2000 to 2007 between various ANC-led and DA-led coalitions at different points (Berkowitz, 2016).

In 2011, the DA in the Nelson Mandela Bay metro augmented their position significantly in the both national and local elections (Berkowitz, 2016), whereas in Cape Town, with its

majority vote, it cemented its viable, stable coalition. In the Cape Town metropolitan, the turnout of voters, in both the 2011 and 2016 local government elections, gave the DA just more than 64 percent (Potgieter, Berkowitz & Fakir, 2016).

In the 2016 elections, the DA, ANC and EFF shared over 94 percent of the vote, with the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) polling about 4 percent. The ANC lost the Western Cape in 2011 and also lost the key Cape Town metro (Russon, 2011). The ANC experienced a decline in its electoral support base in 2016, and the DA and EFF gained control, with their support increasing in the three major Gauteng municipalities of Johannesburg, Tshwane and Mogale City (Gotz, Khanyile & Katumba, 2016). In the Nelson Mandela Bay metro, the EFF managed to win 4.3 percent (Potgieter, Berkowitz & Fakir, 2016). The ANC won 35 wards, while the DA won 81 wards, out of 116. The EFF factor had a direct bearing on this loss by the ANC. In fact, the EFF, although it performed below 15 percent, did outstandingly in the ANC strongholds (Berkowitz, 2016).

Arguably, the results experienced in the 2016 local government elections can be attributed to a number of issues, ranging from heightened levels of competition in the changed political landscape, to the formation of the EFF (SACBC, 2016:1).

### **1.3 Problem Statement**

#### **1.3.1 Democracy**

This subject is intended to set the tone of discussion, focusing on two developed countries, namely the United State of America (US) and the United Kingdom (UK). This study shall further provide a theoretical background of democracy, according to its definition and its origin. In a more precise manner, the character of democracy shall be examined, focusing on political parties that contest in the process of forming a government. Lastly, the evolution of political developments in the South African context will be examined, especially regarding the party system.

### **1.3.1.1 US and UK democracy**

Political parties in an organised modern sense first emerged in the United States (US) as a consequence of specific constitutional arrangements and laws that provided for or organised competitive elections (Sadie, 2006:203). Britain extended the suffrage, and groups were organised to contest elections (Salih, 2003; Matlosa, 2005). A daunting prospect for Westminster is that democracy is expected and institutionalised in a coalition government. Therefore, coalition is a far more common form of government in most parliamentary systems than single-party governments in the US and UK (Hazell & Yong, 2012). The position currently in Britain and America is winner-takes-all, first past the post democracy. Whichever single candidate gains the most votes wins the constituency, and votes for other parties are ignored, even if the winner only won by a couple of votes (Newman, Sather & Woolgar, 2014:45). Similarly, political parties in Africa became a prominent feature of post-colonial political contestation in the late 1950s and early 1960s (Salih, 2006). Post-colonial rulers banned political parties for decades in the 1960s and parties were only unbanned in the 1990s with the independence of African states (Mozaffar, 2005; Carbone, 2007).

### **1.3.1.2 Theorising Democracy**

According to Holden (1988:5) the term 'democracy' was "first used in the fifth century BC (Before Christ) by Greek historian Herodotus. It combined the Greek words *demos*, meaning 'the people' and *kratien*, meaning 'to rule'". Etymologically the definition of democracy is "the rule of the people" (Sartori, 1962:17). Similarly, O'Neil (2007) states that the word democracy comes from the Greek words *demos* – meaning 'the common people' and *kratia* – meaning 'power' or 'rule'. Therefore, the basic definition of democracy places the people at the centre and focuses on the participation of the people in the state activities. In simple terms, democracy is the rule of the people, by the people, for the people (Birch, 1993; Kiiza, 2005). There are conditions for democracy, viewed by different scholars, and these include: elected officials, free, fair and frequent elections; freedom of expression; alternative sources of information; association autonomy;

inclusive citizenship; political competition; and institutions that ensure a horizontal division of powers to hold government accountable (Krouse,1982:447).

### **1.3.1.3 Understanding political parties and democracy**

The term 'political party' represents a structurally organised group of people with at least roughly similar political aims and opinions that seek to influence public policy by getting its candidates elected into public office. Political parties are seen as groups or organisations seeking to occupy decision-making positions of authority within the state (Sadie, 2006). Their aim is to control the resources and personnel of government (Heywood, 2002). They constitute an organised association of people working together to compete for political office and promote agreed-upon policies, writes **Maliyamkono and Kanyangolo (2003:41)**. Salih (2008:20) points out that political parties provide ideologies that represent social, economic and political interest. Indeed, political parties are significant for democracy (Rosenblum, 2000). Hence, another scholar, Makara (2009:10) further argues that political parties are central to the democratisation of any state. Equally so, Matlosa (2007:10) writes that a democracy is unthinkable without competing parties.

### **1.3.1.4 Understanding citizens and democracy**

Democracy is designed in a way that permits citizens to have the right to be part of the collective decision-making affairs (Moses, 2014). It is important that the citizens understands that their rights are intrinsic to that of democracy, thus implying the right to continue and to exist, irrespective of the party power (Patel, Sadie, Graham, Delany & Baldry, 2013). However, the progressive South African Constitution guarantees political rights, such as the right to vote (Daily Maverick, 2013). Hence, it is noted that voting behaviour is a form of political behaviour that characterises exercising the right to vote, especially using ballots to achieve things people care about (Butler & Stokes, 1974). In this regard, people vote to make things better and it is their democratic right. Similarly, others vote so that their party can win, as they have trust in their party, are satisfied with their party, and wish to prevent other parties winning and displacing the party takes care of them (Patel, Sadie, Graham, Delany & Baldry, 2013). Political parties in a democracy perform many important tasks in society. Generally, political parties are expected to fulfil



two fundamental roles in the political process, namely to form government, or to serve as an opposition. The table below outlines the primary functions of political parties (Moses, 2014).

**Table 1.7:**

<b>Structure</b>	<b>Interest Articulation</b>	<b>Interest Aggregation</b>	<b>Recruitment</b>
<b>Government</b>	Implement policies	Sustains electoral support for government	Fills government positions
<b>Opposition</b>	Develop alternatives	Gains electoral support for a chance in government	Builds pool of competent candidates

Source: Adapted from Moses (2014)

The first role of political parties is to seek to control governing apparatus for their proposed candidates, voted according to the voting behaviour. Equally, government and opposition are at the centre of selecting and recruiting candidates. The second key function of the governing party and opposition is to articulate the interests of the electorate. They are commonly duty bound to convert people’s demands, notes Moses (2014), aggregating such into political ideas and programmes (Weissenbach, 2010). Thirdly, political representation guarantees that institutions of the state, such as parliament, express the will of the people. In this regard, political parties are viewed as a linkage mechanism, to pass public opinion from the electorate on to government officials (Moses, 2014). To this end, representation is all about accountability; hence, a political party becomes accountable for the way it acts in the name of the voters’ voice (Friedman, 2005).

### **1.3.1.5 South African multiparty system**

The South African system has evolved into a dominant party system in which the majority of opposition parties are fragmented and unable to effectively compete for power. However, there are various types of party systems (Matlosa, 2008) and these are: one-party systems, two party systems, dominant party systems, and multiparty systems. In the case of South Africa, a multiparty system is therefore more desirable for democracy

in this era (Doorenspleet, 2003). Competition of more than two political parties is a feature of multiparty systems. Sadie (2006) explains that in these systems, popular support is divided among several political parties contesting for power. A classic example is Germany where two major parties, the Social Democratic Party (SDP) and the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) have ruled the country through political coalitions which also involve smaller parties.

#### **1.4 The concept coalitions and formations of coalitions**

Coalition politics is a time-tested idea in modern democracy (Pani, 2009). The dominance of governments is not a recent development. Since the Second World War, coalitions have accounted for about 70 percent of European government (Marshall, Kaiser & Kessmeier, 1997). In the 1980s, America at a point had a multiparty coalition in government (Eduardo & Tsebelis, 2011). In the 1990s, India entered into the age of coalition politics. However, it got a taste at the state level; governments of coalitions existed once or twice during the period 1996–1999 (Pani, 2009). Democratic politics in multicultural societies is essentially an exercise of coalition (Rather, 2009). The simple definition of coalition government is a marriage of convenience between two or more political parties to form the government body (Ka-Ndyalvan, 2017). Basically it means seeking combination of parties in government which will command majority (Rose, 1974). Coalitions and alliances are usually formed between parties in order to maximise their chances to achieve a desired goal or more commonly, to increase their electoral support. The objective of opposition parties to form coalitions is to exploit electoral dominance of the incumbent party (Matlosa, 2008). In this regard, coalitions provide parties with an opportunity to form an alternative leadership. In a sense Britain is always governed by a coalition, for the Conservative and Labour parties inevitably to combine politicians with contrasting points of view (Rose, 1974). Amutabi and Nasong'o (2013) argue that coalitions serve to strengthen opposition parties at the same time in the environment of dominant party systems. Coalitions therefore have something to offer. Coalitions, however, face challenges as the parties may not hold similar political interests and views on policy issues. Organising coalitions between parties consequently can be difficult. Factors such as race and ethnicity may be a problem, as some parties prefer to work with certain ethnic groups (Moses, 2014). Nevertheless, Doherty (2004) elaborates on three reasons to form a coalition, which are (1) to secure majority; in opposition, (2) to

create a credible alternative to government; and during elections and (3) to consolidate electoral support and maximise results.

#### **1.4.1 Shortfalls of coalitions**

South Africa tested coalition politics in 2016. It was an experience of political parties combining up against the ruling ANC, or the ANC dividing smaller parties to form coalitions. Political parties made friends or lost friends during the political marriages of convenience (Mashabela, 2016). The difficulty in the sense of working together in a coalition rests at the national level which is essential in order to appreciate the seemingly insurmountable problems of creating an effective coalition government. In fact, to the existing difficulties, these are competing national interests – politics, sensitivities – personalities, and less unified political objectives. Normalisation of coalition government in Western parliamentary democracies is longstanding and comprehensive. In the European Union, in December 2011, 20 of 27 governments were coalitions (Marshall, Kaiser & Kessmeier, 1997). Around the world, coalition governments remain controversial. In Kenya, both President Uhuru Kenyatta and Deputy President William Ruto compete for dominance with the Jubilee Alliance (JA) government. The Liberal Democrats (LD) in the United Kingdom still suffer punishment by the voters for propping up the last Conservative government. In Brazil, Dilma Rosseff redistributed power within her coalition in an effort to protect herself against impeachment (Cheeseman, 2015). Small parties with negligible electoral support create governments that are at the mercy of whims, and hold larger parties to ransom (Newman, Sather & Woolgar, 2014). The tension between compromising identity and government participation enable an open bargaining process and encourage parties with even conflicting preferences to join. This likely to be characterised by multiple veto options, with minimum member majorities following segmented policy options (MacMillian, 2002). Where political parties lure electorates on the basis of ideologies, such an arrangement does not only amount to opportunistic betrayal of the masses, but it also inherently prone to instability given the extreme divergence of policy positions (Ka-Ndyalvan, 2017).

### 1.4.2 Effectiveness of coalition

Spector (2014) writes that, Nick Borain, a political analyst, has observed argumentatively that 2014 election was a perfect result because it set up a really good contest for the 2016. Faull (2011) alluded that the turnout dynamics for the local government elections favoured the DA. This was particularly because local government issues were usually felt in urban areas where the DA does better. For example, residents care about traffic lights, rubbish collection and service delivery issues. On the other hand, Schulz-Herzenberg (2014) says, “urban areas are where there people are more exposed to political competition via the media. Political competition seems to be strengthening, perhaps only in urban metropolis.” A coalition government does not have to result in instability, this means strength of government is simply the minority steamrolling their views over the majority (Newman, Sather & Woolgar, 2014:45). A very effective coalition rests on the following essentials ingredients (1) the coalition must be beneficial to all its constituents, (2) there must be mutual respect and understanding on the point of views, (3) a willingness to compromise, and (4) a sense of partnership, irrespective of ideology and size of the party. For instance, the rainbow coalition in Ireland was composed of three parties: one large, one medium, and one small – as result, positions were divided on a 3:2:1 ratio (Doherty, 2004).

Pre-electoral alliances and post-election coalitions of political parties became an increasingly significant feature of contemporary African politics (Kadima, 2013:1). In his opinion piece, Maserumule (2016) states that South Africa is meeting with chaotic times as coalitions take shape to unlock hung municipalities following the 2016 local government elections. Therefore, the purpose of the research proposal is to examine the importance of coalition as a new political landscape in South Africa.

Given that the ANC has the largest majority of support and the operation of the electoral system of proportional representation (PR), opposition parties generally disinclined to form coalitions (Booyesen, 2014). Moreover, in this study, it is important to state that there is a reasonably high chance of an election results bringing about hung councils, without a clear winner of a 50 percent majority of seats (Callard, 2016).

### 1.4.3 Case studies

The ANC's majority rule was pulverised by the DA and EFF coalitions during the August 2016 local government elections. The EFF, known as pro-black in support of the poor, have taken the political landscape in South Africa by storm with their leftist rhetoric, and their notable ability to mobilise young people. More so, the EFF's entire leadership consists of young people who seem to be relatable to the youth. It's identified radical policy positions are regarded as being a contributing factor to their ability to attract young people. A major party in outlying parts of the South Africa, the DA, also representing a clear position on the youth its leader, Mmusi Maimane, who is fairly a young person and might have attracted some of the vote (Mabika, 2017; SACBC, 2016:3). Precisely without abounding these factors their coalition would be the birth of new government in 2019 (Mabika, 2017). Clear examples of the political marriages are seen in the Tshwane, City of Johannesburg and Nelson Mandela Bay metros, where coalition politics signifies a new political landscape. The situation that emerged in South Africa is new, although two-thirds of European Union countries are coalition run. Therefore, South Africa should take this into consideration, to experiment in coalition politics as a new political landscape. Given the EFF and DA's steadfastness to get the ANC out of power, the coalition councils are likely to take advantage of the governance framework to influence professional bureaucracy (Maserumule, Vil-Nkomo and Mokate, 2016). The political landscape of South Africa has gradually changed. The voting pattern in Gauteng has drastically shifted. Of significance is this new landscape, where South Africans can no longer be taken for granted, no party is invincible, the voice of the masses shall be listened to by governing parties, a party defending the indefensible is bound to lose support base, and voters' loyalty is not permanent (Mashego, 2016).

From 1948, the NP ruled the country, imposing apartheid. After 1994 the release of Nelson Mandela brought the ANC to power with little opposition (NewStatesman, 2016). The proposal is concerned about, and therefore wants to comprehend, the significance of coalition politics as a new political landscape in South Africa. Further triggered by opposition parties, a question is whether the DA is calling and lobbying for coalition to bring change in South African politics (Aytimur, 2014). DA leader Maimane, in a positive move, commented that "we need to pull our energies into saving South Africa. And I am prepared to work with all parties that share this goal" (Business Tech, 2017).

In the main, South African political parties have discussed coalition options for several major cities, namely Nelson Mandela Bay, Greater Johannesburg and Tshwane (Mahr, 2016). In the South African case, what would genuine coalition mean? Basically to keep a combination of parties in government this will command the majority! Rose (1974) cites the example that Great Britain is, in a sense, governed by a coalition. The research proposal would examine such a prospect to be feasible for the South Africa's 25 years of democracy. An academic and author, William Gumede, says, "there is a sense of a new beginning. It's almost a renewal of democracy." Former South African President, Jacob Zuma, positively agreed with Gumede that South Africa is a thriving democracy where differences of political opinion and diverse political preferences are allowed to flourish (Mahr, 2016).

Inevitably, combined politicians with contrasting viewpoints, of which one is to reconcile the party leadership outlook of differing factions and tendencies. The other is to gain entry to office, which might be a unifying force or which might break the coalition (Rose, 1974).

Another element Mr Gumede relates is that the ANC, DA and EFF will have to confront a practical reality. Mahr (2016) elaborates further, to the effect that they have their ideological differences, which could make for unstable alliances. According to the NewStatesman (2016), the EFF leader, Malema, initially refused a formal alliance with the DA – as he has put it – a question of choosing between the better of "two devils". The DA policies are free-market and capitalist. Malema's EFF has repeatedly called for nationalisation of mines and the repossession land without compensation. To the contrary, the DA, EFF and other opposition parties are united and loathing for the ANC quagmire of corruption and nepotism that has dragged the country into. Given the current political landscape in South Africa, certain communities are governed by coalitions. The reality is that a new responsibility has become apparent and requires the DA to demonstrate tact, skill and extraordinary diplomacy to hold its relationship with a party like EFF.

Professor Lesiba Teffo of the University of South Africa had this to say, embracing the era of coalition government such may continue for the next ten years, noting that

coalition is not an equal partnership, and rather a marriage which requires compromise (ANA, 2016). The scholars, Powell and Whitten (1993) and Karagul (2014), clarified the point that an opposing effect for coalition government is on policy.

### **1.5 Research aim and objective**

The theoretical and ideological stances of research, most of the time, are reflected in the ways in which research questions are posed and the manner in which a researcher endeavours to ask questions that explore political process and ideological issues that affect the topic in hand (McLeod, 2004; Hall, 2010).

With regard to the above, the aim of the research proposal is to investigate and contextualise South Africa's experience on coalition politics as a new political landscape. The proposal shall provide evidence that measure. It shall be supported by debates and various perspectives of politicians, individual citizens and political parties and academic institutions. The secondary research assessment is formulated in the following way, in line with the objectives:

- <[List Paragraph]>To reflect on the ideological party political preference before and beyond elections
- <[List Paragraph]>To assess the challenges encountered during the political alliances
- <[List Paragraph]>To determine what prompts bigger parties to abuse coalition marriage by bullying small parties
- <[List Paragraph]>Suggest possible solution on how to manage a successful coalition.

### **1.6 Research methodology**

The research methodology is an important aspect, being concerned with data, especially on basic research to investigate and use theories to explain a specific phenomenon (Plooy-Celler, Davis and Bezuidenhout, 2014:289). The study shall be a qualitative and investigative assessment of coalition politics as a new political landscape in South Africa. Qualitative researchers rely on interpretative social science. They use a transcendent

perspective, apply “logic in practice” and follow a non-linear path. According to Babbie and Mouton (2006:335), there is a need to present authentic interpretations that sensitive to specific political historical contexts. Inglis (2009) states that investigative studies are most typically executed for three purposes:

- <[List Paragraph]>To satisfy the researcher’s curiosity and desire for a better understanding;
- <[List Paragraph]>To test the feasibility of undertaking a more careful study; and
- <[List Paragraph]>To develop the methods to be employed in a more careful study.

The research proposal shall endeavour to analyse the characteristics of coalition politics and seek to identify the casual effect that specifies the relationship between identity politics, with the core analysis of coalition politics as a new phenomenon in South Africa.

### **1.6.1 Research design**

The research design is a plan or blueprint of how the researcher is conducting the research (Mouton, 2001:65). In Bogdan and Biklen’s (2007) words it is the “researcher’s plan of how to proceed”. Creswell (1998) asserts that a number of qualitative research designs are recognised today. From a qualitative research perspective, these are often regarded as strategies of inquiry. This research proposal shall be desktop based and will employ qualitative methods to assess coalition politics as a new political landscape in South Africa. Applying qualitative methods will introduce qualitative methodology to the study of coalition politics. The approach will include an analysis of relevant items of empowering legislation, journal articles, reports, and newspapers articles. The researcher will further do an in-depth review of coalition politics literature, through the examination of relevant textbooks, dissertations, speeches and seminars.

### **1.6.2 Data collection**

The use of qualitative methods of research is particularly important when attempting to gain insight into social discourses. This means that research methodology is usually not fixed or self-contained within words or phrases that can be quantified – through content analysis. An activity and the assessment of it is profoundly a qualitative issue. Therefore,



the gathering and analysis of discourses and case studies regarding coalition politics within the new political landscape in South Africa, utilising qualitative methods, is viewed as being most effective for the study (Hall, 2009). The researcher shall regard the information of the recognised institutions and published sources as essential in view of the scope of the dissertation. The primary tools shall be structured on existing studies and surveys conducted, in particular, the case studies of Tshwane, City of Johannesburg and Nelson Mandela Bay.

## **1.7 Layout of study**

The study proceeds along the following structure:

Chapter 1: Background and Introduction

Chapter 2: Theoretical framework and conceptualisation of the terms: Coalition politics a significant phenomenon in South Africa's political landscape

Chapter 3: Coalition politics in South Africa's metros, its character, elements and challenges

Chapter 4: Develop a strategy of sustaining coalition in South African metros.

Chapter 5: Recommendations and conclusion.

## **CHAPTER 2**

### **THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND CONCEPTUALISATION OF THE TERMS: COALITION POLITICS A SIGNIFICANT PHENOMENON IN SOUTH AFRICA'S POLITICAL LANDSCAPE**

#### **2.1 Introduction**

This chapter seeks to provide a theoretical framework to analyse the concepts that build towards an understanding of coalition politics. Coalition politics develop through a process within institutions that embody systems. The study of coalition politics falls within the framework of democracy theories, focusing on elections.

Given the historical background of South African politics, it is important to highlight the eventual advent of full democracy as a starting point. The South Africa of today emerges from three phases, namely the pre-colonial phase, the colonial phase, and finally, the post-colonial phase that commenced in 1994, which brought democratic change.

Hence, this study intends to provide an analysis of coalition politics in South Africa as a new emerging phenomenon, using the theoretical framework of democracy, focusing on elections and the rise of coalition politics. Democracy theory, as viewed by different scholars and authors such as Diamond and Morlino, Levitsky, Herbst and Huntington, will be used as a framework for the study and as a final mark to promote free and fair elections that permits individual parties to consolidate and institute coalition.

#### **2.2 Democracy**

This part intends to provide theoretical understanding of democratic models with a correct classification of the South Africa's representatives – concentrating of democracy. South Africa is a constitutional democracy. The constitution is the highest law. No person can go against it, not even the president. Parliament cannot pass laws that go against it. The courts and the government must also make sure that what they do is constitutional. Imperative is that the constitution guarantees democracy through giving every person over 18 years the right to vote and ensuring one voters' roll for all adult citizens, regular elections, and multiparty-system of government.

South African society posture to democracy was observed in July 2000 as preferable to any kind of government. The outcomes of research were such that 60 percent of South Africans preferred democracy with 30 percent just unwilling to serve under democracy (Mattes, 2002:30). Political participation is mutually supportive to the representative democracy of South Africa as far as democratic engagement is concerned. In the two landmark cases the Constitutional Court held parliament to enforce public participation in the legislative process (le Roux, 2015:259). Being a watchdog and an activist Constitutional Court stated that classical political rights are such that political society play the electoral game and allow the representativity. From rational basis point of view the South African Constitution limit voter's control over their elected representatives, although for obvious reasons the electoral system provides a high degree of collective representation. However, sufficiently public influence over government can still be secured by holding free and fair elections (Mattes, 2002:23-25). Undoubtely, election plays a critical role in the nurturing and consolidation of democratic governance in South Africa (Matlosa. 2002:7). Suggested Callard & Seedat (2015:261) relatively is South Africa's democracy with two electoral systems in the world's democracies. These are constituency-based systems and proportional representation systems outlined underneath:

- In a constituency-based systems voters in a demarcated area (constituency) elect a candidate.
- In a proportion representation systems electorate vote for political parties.

The underneath table source from Jackson and Jackson slightlymarginally

**Table 2.1 Types of Electoral Systems and Representation**

Electoral System	Constituency Representation	Party Representation
<b>Single-Member Plurality</b>	Maintains traditional link between representative and constituents Representatives often elected on a minority of total votes (wasted vote thesis)	Distortion of votes/seats ratio Minor parties disadvantaged unless support is regionally concentrated Discourages multiplication of parties; tendency to

		two-party system; one party; dominant party system
Single-Member Majoritarian (a) Alternative Vote (AV)  (b) Second ballot	Both maintain traditional link between representative and constituent  In both cases representatives unusually elected by majority	Distortion of votes/seats ratio Wasted vote thesis does not apply small parties survive even if unsuccessful Tendency toward multi-party system
Proportional Representation (PR) (a) Party List  (b) Single Transferable Vote (STV)	Individual representatives usually owe elections more to party than to voters  Representatives forced to compete for "first preference" votes	Approximate congruence between vote shares and seat allocations Minor parties usually gain "fair" representation; easy entry for new parties Tendency toward multi-party system
Mixed plurality/PR = Mixed Member Proportionality	Maintain traditional link between representative and constituents	Approximate congruence between vote shares and seat

		allocation Minor parties usually gain “fair” representation
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- Source: Jackson and Jackson. 1997

**Roux le. W. 2015** Editorial: The Current State of Democracy in South Africa  
[https://wiser.wits.ac.za/sites/default/files/VRUE%2003\\_2015pdf](https://wiser.wits.ac.za/sites/default/files/VRUE%2003_2015pdf) >

### 2.2.1 Explanation and meanings

Since this chapter deals with democracy, the underlying fact is that, ultimately, democratic theory is about understanding the workings of government (Giannetti and Benoit, 2009:70). Democracy is not an easy concept, argue Chhotray and Stoker (2009: 9). Nevertheless, democracy is a concept not everyone agrees with, and is a universal value. The concept of “Fair is foul, foul is fair” comes from the last lines of Act 1, scene 1 of the play *Macbeth*, and this notion permeates throughout the play by the renowned 17th century English playwright and poet, William Shakespeare. His expression is what usually spring to mind, each time democracy is discussed (Brima, 2015:11).

Democracy is a political system in which citizens exercise their authoritative right through government interventions to improve their own living conditions (Achieng, 2013:10). However, the appearance of a democracy in any society is tested and observed through various features, namely greater social pluralism, a strong and autonomous bourgeoisie, a more market orientated economy, higher levels of economic well-being, greater influence by the society of existing democratic states a diversely tolerant culture, and the absence of extreme inequalities in wealth and income (Huntington, 1999:214). Many academics, scholars and authors have different perspectives on democracy, and it remains a contested terrain of learning. Hence, a scholar like Lindberg is of the viewpoint that a discussion on democracy is proper (Brima, 2012:14).

Many ideas of democracy are either etymologically, historically, or logically based (Katz, 1997:5). Nevertheless, democracy, by definition, is predicated on three basic criteria, according to three scholars, Diamond, Linz and Lipset, cited by Khan (2009:2), as follows:

- <[List Paragraph]>First is the regular holding of free and fair elections in an arranged legitimate platform, allowing for political parties to engage meaningfully and extensively through competition to gain power in government, without intimidation.
- <[List Paragraph]>Second is an acceptable level of participation by citizens, which is broad, for selecting leaders and developing policies in a social manner that broadly represents organised formations for exercising their citizenship rights.
- <[List Paragraph]>Thirdly, the liberties categorised as civil and political are secured through political equality under the rule of law, which adequately ensures the right to formulate and advocate the perspectives and aspirations of the people.

In contrast, Jones (2015:15) argues that a set of conditions often found in any democratic state are free, fair, competitive, multiparty elections, public participation and freedom of speech and will. Democracy represents governance by political leaders, whose entitlement to govern arises from a very restricted decree given by the participatory actions of the voters, which is their fundamental right during the elections. Therefore, an institutional arrangement is a catalyst to reach political resolutions in an environment where individual power is decided by means of a vote (Schumpeter, 2003:250). Another political scholar, Biegon (2008:16), asserts that democracy is a cornerstone in the political field of elections. According to Katusiimeh (2000:6), democracy is far greater than an established procedure of closing the existing choice through voting.

Naturally, democracy is methodical in politics. A statesman and lawyer who served as the 16th President of the United State of America (USA), Abraham Lincoln considered democracy as 'government of the people, by the people and for the people' (Christopher, 2006:31). In so far as Schumpeter (2003:247) is in accord with Lincoln, he argues that ideas of democracy are founded on the three legal theories, which are outlined below.

- <[List Paragraph]>Firstly, in a democracy lies infinite wealth of ruling or influence or control that exclusively describes government by the people.
- <[List Paragraph]>Rule by the people centres on what would provide a definition of democracy in an ideal form of government.
- <[List Paragraph]>Arblaster (1984:264) and Schumpeter (2003:247) express the same idea that the will of the people or sovereign power of the people is the most acceptable theory of what stands as the ultimate authority. Schumpeter (2003:247) emphasises that people have an opportunity to accept or refuse who rule them. Article 21 (3) of the 1948 Declaration of Human Rights states “the will of the people, as expressed through genuine and period elections (inserted) shall be the basis of the authority of the government” (Rakumbe, 2010:4).

The degree of political freedom enjoyed by the citizen is reflected in the quality of democracy that citizen enjoys. Academics, such as Diamond and Morlino (2004:20), define the quality of democracy as an aspect that delivers and allows the citizens to enjoy a high degree of freedom, political equality, and popular control over public policies and policy makers, facilitated through legitimate and well-established institutions.

Dahl (1998:85) and Lindberg (2006:30) conclude that political participation is of equal importance for driving a process of decision-making, and legal provision to that regard is reflected by the equal distribution of sovereignty and equal political shares, which constitutes as an essential attribute of democratic elections. Brima (2012:19) then suggests that a final attribute of democracy is a legal framework that signals popular legitimacy through elections. Hence, democracy is the end result of good governance. Therefore, the genuine meaning of democracy relatively impacts on elections being held, based on an electoral system designed by a respective government (Katz, 1997:3).

In a democracy, political systems accept fundamental norms, that are divided into three (3) categories:

- <[List Paragraph]>The people’s electoral will and choice reflects their government; hence, regular elections are to be provided for in the constitution. This is undertaken through secret ballot, party representatives at least two parties.
- <[List Paragraph]>Fundamental individual freedoms are to be considered by government. These range from freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, to freedom of association and religious freedom.
- <[List Paragraph]>In fact, the rule of law characterises the doctrine that power is exercised in line with procedures, principles and constraints contained in law. De Wet (2013:8-10) adds that the concentration of democracy is placed on the nature of government.

### **2.2.2 Democracy in South Africa**

The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, requires democracy to be representative. Celebrating 25 years of democracy in 2018, the Republic of South Africa’s Constitution has laid the foundation for the design and implementation of policies to consolidate democracy, competitive multi-party participation, and citizen participation. The framework established in the Constitution positions South Africa as a sovereign democratic state, founded on:

- <[List Paragraph]>Human dignity, the achievement of equality, and the advancement of human rights and freedoms;
- <[List Paragraph]>Non-racialism and non-sexism;
- <[List Paragraph]>Supremacy of the Constitution and the rule of law; and
- <[List Paragraph]>Universal adult suffrage, a national voters’ roll, regular elections, and a multiparty system of democratic government, to ensure accountability, responsive and openness.



## 2.3 Elections

Promoting democracy and elections rests in the core mandate and role of the United Nations (UN), in general, and the UNDP in particular (Rukambe, 2012:3). Since 1989, the United Nations has steadfastly located the interest of providing international support and expertise in the conduct of democratic elections (Rich, 2004:14).

The first nation that experienced the workings of a ballot box was Australia, and elections became family festivals (Sawer, 2001:1). Elections characterise institutions of modern democracy (Katz, 1997:3). According to Ojo (2008:6), elections are widely known as a process of choosing and selecting leaders through voting. A scholar, Katusiimeh (2000:6), portrays elections as a final slide in democracy. In the inclusive project of democracy, elections occupy a significant role, both technically and socially (Biegon, 2008:16). Raunak *et al.* (2006:2) attest that the foundation of democracy is comprised by elections. Free and fair elections are held in an environment accepted by political parties and candidates (Khadiagala *et al.*, 2010:52). On the other hand, Sisk (2008:16) argues that the concept of what is free and fair relates to both the political and administrative spheres; as administrative measures incorporate members of society in a complete law of citizenship and of voter registration.

Moreover, there are three (3) indicators that are used to assess the degree of the free and fairness characteristic of elections, namely participation, competition and legitimacy, which Lindberg (2006) and Brima (2012) outline.

### 2.3.1 Participation

Lindberg (2006:30) clearly sketches the indicators of participation during elections, as follows:

- <[List Paragraph]>Voter turnout is explained as a percentage of the electorate that participates in elections. The higher the voter turnout is, the more acceptable the outcome will be.
- <[List Paragraph]>Opposition participation and meaningful participation of all parties would signal a credible outcome.

- <[List Paragraph]>Alteration normally known as the hand-over of power from one party to another, has to be smooth and include the total hand-over of the administration.

### **2.3.2 Competition**

Brima (2012:21) outlines the three (3) indicators for competition, as follows:

- <[List Paragraph]>The winner of a large share of votes occupies more seats, implying that the larger the winner's share of votes is, the lower the level of competition will be.
- <[List Paragraph]>The second party's share of seats indicates the power or weakness of the opposition.
- <[List Paragraph]>The third is about power turnover, as mentioned above under the indicators of participation.

### **2.3.3 Legitimacy**

This last indicator demonstrates how well the losing political parties might accept the results. This indicates that the loser accepts the results as political practicality, which reflects the credibility of the elections. Tolerance, no intimidation and absence of violence during campaigns, and on the election day, legitimise the process (Lindberg, 2006:51).

## **2.4 Pre-Election**

Dutton (2014:18) provides criteria, as defined by the United Nations, to assess how successful an election could be. These criteria have been adapted to standards to better incorporate both the electoral process and governing process.

The criteria are:

- The right of all voters to participate in the electoral process, without hindrance. Timmer (2012:25) concurs that for an election to be free, voters should be able

exercise the right and opportunity to choose a political party and candidate of their choice.

- Freedom to campaign for all political parties. For instance, Ceciro's brother advised him to avoid grandstanding during the campaign, for fear of making enemies. However, Ceciro commenced his campaign a year in advance, targeting friends and clients as campaign tool (Katz, 1997:17).
- Secrecy of the ballot and reasonable speed in the counting of ballots. In the report, *Promoting Free and Fair Elections*, Tlakula (2011:3) points out that to be fair, an election must have an honest counting.
- Accountability and openness of the electoral process to the competing parties. Timmer (2012:25) notes that citizens must be given a reasonable opportunity to stand and register to participate in elections.
- Acceptable electoral laws. Tlakula (2011:3) states emphatically that political parties and individuals must be given an opportunity to register, and also to register their disputes and grievances before and after Election Day.

Election Data (2007) elaborates standard, key multi-step processes for political party registrations, qualifying ballots and election campaigns. These are outlined in the following subsections.

#### **2.4.1 Political Party Registration**

In any democracy, political parties are central characters, as they allow citizens to assemble and campaign for public office. According Janda (1980:19), there are legislated steps and requirements that serve as guidance in registering for elections. Among other things, applicants must submit a party name, symbol, officers, and list of members, as well as enough members. However, in Zimbabwe a leased of opposition party was forced to register the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) as a fully-fledged political party. This was subsequent to a splinter group led by Thokoxani Khupe over the use of MDC-T name and logo (news24, 2018). Manzoni (2010:14) attests that published manifestos constitutes the policy statements for political competition.

## **2.4.2 Political Campaign**

In the pre-election phase, a question arises as to whether political campaigns matter. Of course, electoral campaigns constitute a common element of political competition, as referred to earlier. According to Brady (2002:2), during this phase, the election date is known, which not only defines the conditions for a campaign, but also the end date of the campaign. Election campaigns relate to political parties and individuals registered to prepare and present their thoughts and positions to the voters.

Nevertheless, political parties campaign to mobilise the votes of the registered voters. Given the current South African predicament in this era of coalition governments, every voter counts, as do the areas where they live, which determine where all citizens eligible to vote have to register. The IEC, in court papers, has said that the addresses of 3.4 million voters were considered to be incomplete as of May 8, 2018, and a full extension was sought to the 29 November 2018 (Pretorius, 2018).

## **2.4.3 Voter Education**

Voter education is a fundamental electoral process that is undertaken during pre-election periods. Its primary role is to educate the registered voter (Katusiimeh, 2000:5). In a contrasting view, Corneliusson (2015:41) states that the significance of voter empowerment is relevant in relation to political awareness and turnout. Jackson (1995:294) argues that voter education provides a sense of civic duty, political awareness, and political efficacy in affecting the voter turnout. Overall, elections, as treasurable occasions, provide an opportunity to celebrate democracy, and stress the meaning of all doing their civic duty (Corneliusson 2015:41).

## **2.4.4 Balloting**

Jacobs (2007) argues that the election process should safeguard transparency and verifiability. Although the methods employed by the Dutch election system are not 100% secured, they are accepted. There are five (5) balloting methods used at Dutch polling stations, namely voting using paper ballots at polling stations, postal voting, internet voting, voting by telephone, and voting by proxy.

## **2.5 After the Elections**

Under the South African model (de Vos, 2016), ballots are counted after every election, whether manually or electronically. With regard to coalitions, the legality of a political party to gain control of a municipality rests on the majority of votes cast in the ward and PR. The Local Government Systems Act makes provision that a municipal council must meet within 14 days to elect a new council. Noting that the presiding officer is the municipal manager, a person designated by the member of executive council (MEC) to preside over the speaker. During this phase, for example if a political party obtains 60 percent, combined, of the total number of votes cast for their ward candidates and for their political party list, they end up with more or less 60 percent of the seats (Local Government, 2000).

## **2.6 Coalition politics**

This section intends to provide an explanation of coalition, and the types of coalitions and opportunities that arise when parties come together to form a coalition. However, Kadima (2006) states that theories of coalitions emanate from European experiences. Their relevance to the African context is always relevant. The theory might be known as office seeking or office orientation. Masipa (2017:40) advocates this theory, which was advanced by Bazazel and Deeman (1989); Warwick (1994); and Kadima (2006). The hypothesis advanced is that the formation of government is win-lose.

### **2.6.1 Coalition Theory**

This theory has developed considerably since the pioneering works of Riker (1962) and De Swaan (1973). The studies of these political scientists centred on theoretical approaches of coalition behaviour. This might arise where coalitions are achieved through cooperation and optimal outcome (Herman & Pope, 1973:192).

Coalition theory can be explained through two types of theories, namely rationalist theory and closed minimal range theory. These are outlined as follows:

### **2.6.2 Rationalist Theory**

This theory gained acceptance rapidly as it began to dominate in coalition politics (Rogowski, 1978:296). According to Ambrus (2009:3), coalition rationality is a set of strategies that are consistent with every player and is a common certainty that every coalition is rational. Once political parties enter into a coalition agreement, the stipulated sets and subsets of strategies define the rationality behind every player being certain in every coalition approach.

### **2.6.3 Closed minimal range theory**

Riker (1962:32) explains the minimum-winning coalition as a size principle. This is described in this manner; for example, to form a coalition comprising no more than 201 members in a 400-seat parliament. The hypothesis is that in a 400-member parliament, a coalition comes into effect that comprises two equivalent powerful parties. Thus, combining the 60 percent of seats is ideal to a coalition. This model is motivated by a game of numbers, implying that the larger the coalition is, the less each member receives in the payoffs.

According to the proposition of Luebbert (1983:237), the theory of minimum-winning coalition applies irrespective of its size; hence, a fixed payoff is shared according to the political parties' strength of resources –which are the votes brought into the coalition. The main thrust is that the largest possible share lies in the benefits of winning, for example in a metropolitan municipality, power is exercised in the municipal mayoral committees, and at national level, power is exercised in the ministries.

According to two scholars, Giannetti and Benoit (2009:71), the office seeking or size principles are focused on the best idea to provide solutions for political parties. In the normal non-crisis politics of coalition, the centrality is how the political parties involved planned to enter in a coalition. Luebbert (193:237) suggest two variables to form a coalition government, namely (1) a generalised priority willingness to bargain, and (2) information certainty. These are explained in the following subsections

### **2.6.3.1 Willingness to bargain**

This occurs when all parties are willing to consider entering into a cabinet coalition or council coalition with all other parties. Giannetti and Benoit (2009:71) argue that in these situations, there is a coalition-like type of bargaining by both the majority political party and minority political party.

### **2.6.3.2 Information certainty**

This variable suggests that the focus concerns two things: weights and prior moves. Weights relate to the considerable number of legislative votes that parties control, while prior moves concerns bargains, offers, counteroffers (Hotz, 1963:297).

## **2.7 What is coalition?**

The term 'coalition' was first used in 1604, tracing its origin to Latin word *coalescere*, and in simple words can be defined as a cooperative arrangement under distinct political parties (Ogg, 1961:600). The definitions of coalitions in politics are specific and suitable for the particular political systems and political cultures in which they operate (O'Day, 2004).

The traditional definition of coalition arises from the notion of a group of individual actors coming together with an immediate aim to secure payoffs. This would be obtained once the combined masses and resources reached a threshold (Ennsner-Jedenastik, 2012:15). Coalition formation is a process of organising parties collectively in pursuit of common goals (Karume, 2003). Coalition is defined as being a structure of parliamentary government where two or more parties cooperate and share the mandate of authority obtained through vote (Chander, 2004).

According to Biegon (2008:18), coalition actions entail pooling of resources en masse in pursuit of a goal, communication about a goal, forming binding commitments concerning this goal, and an agreement to achieve the goal.

## **2.7.1 Typologies of Coalitions**

African democracies, especially South Africa as it enters the world of coalitions. It is worth taking time to discuss coalition types that are based on European electoral systems. There are four types of coalitions, which will be discussed later, namely (1) electoral alliances, (2) coalition governments, (3) grand coalitions, and (4) legislative coalitions, (5) rainbow coalition and (6) confidence and supply.

### **2.7.1.1 Electoral alliance**

In this type of coalition, parties agree to improve electoral outcomes, and as such, they rally behind common candidates in other elections. The end result is to attain a majority to form government (Masipa, 2017:42). Kadima and Owour (2012) cite a lived example during the 2002 Kenyan election, where opposition leaders from fourteen parties merged their votes to defeat the Kenyan African National Union (KANU). They arrived at an agreement that was signed to form a coalition called the National Rainbow Coalition (NARC). Similarly, during the 2017 election in the UK (Barnes, 2017), Liberal Democrats, the Green Party (GP), the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP), the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), and the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) agreed on a cooperation among themselves. This entailed standing aside in at least one constituency.

### **2.7.1.2 Coalition governments**

Coalition governments come into effect when there is no clear majority victory. For this reason, the largest party will strike an agreement with the other party to form a cabinet. Based on the agreement, the cabinet is made up of representatives from different parties (Jaffrelot, 2014). Masipa (2017:43) points out that India was ruled for three decades by the National Democratic Party (NDP) and the United Progressive Party (UPP). In Norway, the Conservative Party (CP), the Progressive party (PP), the Christian Democratic Party (CDP), and the Liberal Party (LP) extended a leave to each other and formed a coalition (Dagenborg, 2013).

in another example in the UK, immediately after Theresa May's Conservative Party failed to secure more than 325 seats to gain a majority, the Conservatives, numbering 318



MPs, joined hands with 10 DUP MPs, and agreed in confidence and supply agreement to form a coalition government (Hunt, 2017).

### **2.7.1.3 Grand coalition**

This form of coalition arises when the main political parties unite to form a government (Mason, 2015). The typical, traditional rivalry always makes it difficult for these parties (Barry, 2014). Furthermore, Sanner (2013) contends that grand coalitions are normally established during national political crises. For instance, the German parliament between 1966 and 1969 was constituted by 95% of seats after the Social Democrats (SD) and the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) came together to form a coalition government. In 2017, a historical repeat was seen in Germany when Ms Angela Merkel's Christian Democrats partnered with the CDU and the SP to form a grand coalition. The thrust was to amass financial services from the UJ after Brexit (Chazan, 2018).

According to Malaba (2017), in a quest to unseat President Robert Mugabe, the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) and splinter parties suggested forming a grand coalition. This was to be a reunification to form the MDC Alliance, which was subsequently renamed the United Citizens Alliance (UCA).

### **2.7.1.4 Legislative coalition**

Coalitions in essence play a very central role in the legislatures, cabinet formation in parliamentary governments, international agreements, and many other political and collective action settings (Baron, 1989:1048). Such settings are critical and of political importance, with diverse policy preferences (Dragu & Laver, 2016:2876). Giannetti and Benoit (2009:71) suggest that policy preference in a coalition is the most important determinant of combination, and is definitely more applicable.

This type of coalition is all about the pursuit of legislative goals, without dividing the cabinet or executive responsibilities (Ruin, 2000). The Institutional Revolutionary Party (IRP), the National Action Party (NAP) and the Democratic Revolution (DR) in Mexico

agreed on a common legislative agenda. The agreement was known as the Pact for Mexico (Masipa, 2017:43).

Legislative coalitions have two minimum strategy methodologies. One, leaders usually endeavour to form an approximation of the number of prospective participants, and then build a coalition which equals 50 percent plus 1 of that number. Two, where estimates are impossible, the leadership may decide to form the smallest coalition that is assured of accomplishment (Koehler, 1975:30).

According to the NDI (2015), the building of coalitions presents opportunities, identified as follows:

- The ability to bring together resources and strengths, thus allowing parties to increase their influence and achieve goals.
- Parties broaden their charm and intensify their vote share through the combination of forces. This generates an opportunity to secure the necessary legislative seats.
- Coalition-building is admirable and always seeks compromise.
- Parties in coalition enter a learning curve to consolidate their membership.
- Participation in government broadens and provides opportunities.

#### **2.7.1.5 Rainbow Coalition**

The concept of a Rainbow Coalition was experienced in 1966, when the Black Panther Party responded to the identity politics being experienced in Illinois. The Illinois Chapter mobilised and organised various organisations of dissent into one enormous political body called the Rainbow Coalition. James (2008) notes that the Black Panther party of Illinois and the Young Lords Organisation were the leaders. The very interesting fact is that poverty was the common unifier (Williams, 2015). According to Mason (2015), the Conservatives and Liberal Democrats in the UK entered into a Rainbow Coalition in 2010 and committed themselves to collective responsibility. Lynch (2016) notes that during the

Brexit fallout, the Green Party responded quickly by making a proposition for a progressive alliance that would include all the opposition parties that campaigned for Remain. The essence of their aim was to unify the Remain vote to combat the Brexit proposition.

### **2.7.1.6 Confidence and Supply**

This type of pact is a looser arrangement, meaning that the political party in the minority commits to voting with the government on key issues, such as budgets and speeches (Mason, 2015). These principles are prevalent in, and have been successful in, Scotland and New Zealand. For instance, the BC Green caucus had agreed to support the stability of a BC New Democratic Party (NDP) minority government, thus pledging to vote on confidence motions, namely budgets and speeches, twice a year (Greens of British Columbia, 2017). In their 2017 confidence and supply agreement, both parties among others agreed on budget and confidentiality. Regarding budget, the agreement states that the BC New Democratic Government would ensure the BC Green Caucus is afforded meaningful and consultation on provincial budget priorities, in advance. With regard to confidentiality, the agreement read that briefings and consultations would be provided in respect of legislation, policy and budgetary matters, noting that all shall be confidential (BC New Democrats & BC Green, 2017)

In an agreement between the Conservative and Unionist Party and the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), the confidence and supply agreements read that the DUP agreed to support the Government on all motions of confidence, on the Queen's speech, the Budget, finance bills, money bills, and supply and appropriation legislation and estimates (Williamson & Donaldson, 2017).

Travis (2017) argues that the confidence and supply arrangement falls short of a full-blown coalition. The reason is that the following are excluded an agreed five year programme of policies and the exclusion of minority party from holding ministerial office.

## 2.8 The transition to coalition government: Key questions

Table 2.1 below has been adapted from Seyd (2002:13) and outlines in summary the specific key questions and more general thematic issues associated with coalition government.

**Table 2.1**

<b>Stage of the governmental process</b>	<b>Specific issue</b>	<b>General thematic question</b>
Election	<p>How do voters know, when casting the ballot, which post-election coalition options are likely?</p> <p>How can voters identify policy responsibility when government involves two or more parties?</p>	How can prospective and retrospective accountability be provided for under coalition conditions?
Formation and termination	<p>By what rules do governments form, hold and lose office?</p> <p>Under what rules should the negotiations be concluded?</p> <p>What role does the Head of State, or other external agent, play in government formation and termination?</p> <p>What status does a caretaker government have?</p>	<p>How can the constitutional rules be fair across the parties and also allow for an effective formation process?</p> <p>Should parties be constrained in the way they are allowed to negotiate to form a government?</p> <p>Are additional safeguards needed to ensure the stability of coalition governments?</p>
Negotiations	What are the key features of the negotiations process?	What timescales and resources are needed for

	Should there be time constraints on government negotiations?	parties to conduct effective policy negotiations?
Agreement	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• What level of detail is usual in a coalition agreement?</li> <li>• To what extent does the agreement shape the subsequent activities of a coalition?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• What kind of agreement most effectively underpins stable and effective coalitions?</li> </ul>
Coalition management	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• What balance should be struck between informal and formal coordination mechanisms?</li> <li>• How far can portfolios be used as a tool of coalition management?</li> <li>• Within the constraints of collective responsibility, what arrangements are made for party differentiation?</li> <li>• What role does the junior partner play?</li> <li>• What resources does it require?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• How can two or more parties sharing office coordinate their business so that they can operate as a unified government?</li> <li>• How far is collective responsibility maintained under coalition conditions?</li> </ul>
Minority government	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• What strategies do minority administrators use to gain support in the legislature?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Are minority governments prone to instability? How far is the identifiability of government maintained under minority government conditions?</li> </ul>

Source: (Seyd, 2003:13)

## 2.9 Constitutional context of state and government of the UK, US and SA

In so far as the three countries are concerned it is essential before discussing about the coalition in their state political state of affairs. It shall be proper appropriate to make a concise observation pointing out similarities and differences on their state and government systems.

The U.K. have democratic parliamentary government, headed by monarch and prime minister. The U.S. is federal in nature embracing federal constitutional republic with three governmental branches sharing powers. A similarity of the two countries is a dual-house national legislature and prominent political parties (Wandrie, 2018). According the Foreign Policy New (2017) in contrast the United Kingdom monarchy gives royal monarch consent for economical and political facts. The Queen as head of the executive has power and plays an integral role in the legislation.

United State of America democracy

**Foreign Policy News, 2017** United but difference: Differences and similarities between the US and the UK Available at <<https://foreignpolicynews.org/2017/08/04/united-but-different-differences-and-similarities-between-the-US-and-the-UK>>[accessed on the 29 May 2019]

**Wandrie, K 2018** Similarities & Differences Between the U.K. & U.S. Political Systems. Available at <<https://classroom.synonym.com/similarities-differences-between-the-uk-us-political-system>> [accessed on 29 May 2019]

## 2.10 History of coalition in the US, the UK and India

At the present moment, advanced democracies like Japan, the United Kingdom and Australia, to name a few around the world, have coalition governments in place. This section will concentrate on the coalition politics in the United States (US), the United Kingdom (UK) and India. Focus shall also be given to providing explanations of examples

and of how coalition politics are established, as well as their important roles in the democracies of these countries. Therefore, coalition politics provide a dynamic conceptualisation of governments, based on the number of parties that contribute to a coalition to strengthen governance (Karagul, 2014:40). Anglo-Saxon countries observe coalition politics as an aberration, while European countries see it as normal (Chander, 2004:3).

Before going further, it is noted that Muller and Strom (2000:4) have advanced four general fundamental ideas which underpin the theoretical agenda of coalition politics. These are as follows:

- *Coalition politics is strategic.* The justification behind coalition politics is that it is inspired by the choice of tradition which persuades the political actors. These actors are steered by beliefs derived from the objectives, and at the same time, these are pursued to anticipate interface.
- *Coalition politics manifest itself as a game between political parties.* The political party leadership constitute the main role players, as they define the coalition content. Another point which defines the manifestation of coalition politics is the relationship between party leaders and followers.
- *Coalition politics is institutionally conditioned.* It is significant to pay attention to the institutional environment during the coalition game. In this regard, causes and effects of challenges underpin the role that institutions play.
- *Coalition politics is governed by anticipation.* There is a belief that parties and internal actors remain strategic; hence, electoral performance and allocation of portfolios run parallel.

### **2.10.1 The United States**

According to Forbath and Duke, writing in the *New Deal Constitution in Exile*, it is arguable that in the United States of America (US), political history and cross-party coalition has constituted a phenomenon. Cross-party coalition was experienced in the

mid-twentieth-century House of Congress. The Southern Democrats and conservative Republicans leaders controlled the Congress in this type of coalition (Tushnet, 2013:964).

Throughout its history, the US has experienced intra-party and inter-party coalitions. There are two accounts to explain this, as follows:

- <[List Paragraph]>A degree of heterogeneity within US political parties has a constant with government.
- <[List Paragraph]>The US congressional voting procedure and means of elections, intra-party variances more challenging to apprehend, given its parliamentary system.

Polarisation and increased party-line voting have become manifest in the last three decades. Examples are set out as follows:

- The legacy of the administration of President George W. Bush of the 2001 and 2003 was often referred to as “Bush tax cuts”, but the evidence suggests that nothing improved in economic growth. The dire result was seen when the US found itself under deficit and debt, which contributed to income inequality (Horton, 2017).
- On 22 September 1993 President Bill Clinton gave a speech to the Congress and nation calling to fix America's health care system that had badly broken, by giving every American health security (Eckholm, 1993:301-314). In the year later, the Clinton health care system descended into shambles and collapsed. This led to electoral upheavals of November 1994, when voters punished the Democrats. At the same time, the Independents and supporters of Ross Perot similarly showed their disappointment, because they had believed in the proposition for a large government as the solution to health care reform (Skocpol, 1995).
- Another example is the \$900 billion stimulus package, introduced in the initial stage of the Obama administration (Maisel & Berry, 2010:12). A Professor of Economics at Harvard University has described the fiscal stimulus package of 2009 as a mistake and a bad deal (Barro, 2010).



Despite the above-mentioned factors, Schwalbe (2014) advances five US political party realignment phases when the electorate divided on issues that could not be disregarded. These issues are economic and cultural in nature, and promote racism, and examples are set out as follows:

- The first party realignment period was experienced when the Secretary of the Treasury Alexander Hamilton supported by President George Washington designed the Treaty of Amity. This major issue was federal funding which split the political parties. In addition this was hotly contested by the Jeffersonians in each state, hence the 1800 federalist-controlled House of Representatives chose Thomas Jefferson to be president.
- A second party realignment was experienced in the mid-19th century. In 1856, the Whig Party garnered majority votes in a single state. By 1856, John C. Fremont had obtained 114 electoral votes as the first presidential nominee. During this period, the issue of slavery was on the rise and resulted in great numbers of political parties pushing the electorate in different directions. Abraham Lincoln, leading the Republicans, called for the abolishment of slavery as the party's strong stance on any platform. The Democrats experienced a loss in 1860.
- The third party realignment was experienced at the end of the 19th century, when Republicans dominated US politics from 1860 to 1896. The 1873 depression, the scandal of the Grant administration, a drop agricultural production in 1884, and economic depression of 1890 harmed the political fortunes of the Republicans. The 1896 presidential election faced ideal realignment, where big businesses constituted an integral party in the funding of elections.
- The fourth party realignment, in 1929, experienced the crash of stock market, the great depression in 1930, and the rise to presidency by Franklin Roosevelt in 1932. The Democratic Party's dominance was largely attributed to the vast numbers of people who had been served in new deal policies.
- The fifth party realignment was observed in 1960, arising from the civil rights movement. Initially, the South was Democratic prior to 1964, and later that year it

swung to the Republicans. Furthermore, gains were enjoyed among blue-collar Catholics on conservative issues. In 1968, the Vietnam conflict discouraged President Lyndon Johnson from running for re-election.

Interest groups in the US are very active and influential. Hence, coalitions in the US are mainly formed from interest groups with an objective to influence the House of Congress. By nature, coalitions are actually institutions – for instance the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights founded in 1950 had by then 190 membership of interest groups. It has staff and offices, with a well-developed mode of network theory. Coalition, as understood by interest groups in the US, is straightforward, as is seen when a particular bill or item of legislation is approached. These interest groups go to the extent of lobbying Congress committees, staff, and leaders individually (Maisel & Berry, 2010: 52).

### **2.10.2 The United Kingdom**

Coalition governments have been customary in the Western world. In fact, a number of conventions and mechanisms have been formulated to accommodate coalitions. They have been a feature of British politics. Their establishment could be seen during wartime, economic crises, and in the ‘month of May’ (Lee & Beech, 2011:3).

During the First World War, in May 1915, the Liberal Party formed and led a coalition until 1916 (Morgan, 1978:25). In 1940, Winston Churchill established a Coalition National Government, which lasted until the May 1945 General Elections (Taylor, 1978:85). During the course of the 1929 financial crisis, British politics returned to coalition politics (Lee & Beech, 2011:3).

The electoral support bases of the two main parties have diminished sharply since 1974. The Conservative victories were outright in 1979, 1983, 1987 and 1992, while the Labour party enjoyed victory in 1997, 2001 and 2005 (Matthews & Flinders, 2017:5). The UK has had fairly extensive experience of coalition government in the twentieth century (Seyd, 2002). The impression that other parties have dispersed parliamentary seats was confirmed in 2010. The votes cast in 2010 revealed that 3.72 percent of other parties had actively expanded their ground. One of the strange developments was seen in the period

2010–2015, with the emergence of the United Kingdom Independence party (UKIP) as a vital political force (Goodwin & Ford; Curtice, 2014:2).

However, the election outcomes of 1999 left the Labour Party with an option to enter into coalition with in Scotland. The outcome of the votes had no impact, especially on constitutional issues. The Blair party had won 17 seats in the new parliament, which forced it to form a coalition with the Scottish administration. The Liberal Democrat leader became the deputy first minister. In 2000, National Assembly of Wales was established on a coalition (Norton, 2016:159).

On 12 May 2010, following the general election, talks ensued with the Conservatives and Liberal Democrats. Both party leaders published a Coalition Agreement for Stability and Reform. The Conservatives believe in strong government, formed on a single majority, and are naturally unionist. The Liberal Democrats, on the other hand, promote a federal principle of power sharing (Loughlin & Viney, 2015:1).

The 12 May Coalition Agreement laid down general terms. In their foreword to the document titled *the coalition: our programme for government*, Cameron and Clegg (2010:7) expressed the following:

- Despite the dissimilarities, there is a common ground,
- The period of big government has perished,
- Progress shall be achieved by working together to make a better life,
- A motivation is to dispense power and opportunity to the people; and
- Build the free, fair and responsible society.

In so far as Westminster politics of coalitions are concerned, certain gains and drawbacks are elaborated, as follows:

- Coalition did seek a repatriation of powers to Westminster and countless constitutional advances expanded the rationale of regionalisation (Bogdanor, 2009: 271).
- Coalition endeavours to accomplish its triumph on Westminster, such as 'English votes for English laws', echoed the lack of uniformity to reform the agenda (King, 2007:351).
- Coalition desired to achieve 'meta-constitutional' issues such as electoral reform and Scottish independence aiming to cement an arrangement of constitution-by-consent (Matthews, 2015:329).
- Coalition acceded to a referendum to deliver a fair test and influential expression of the Scottish people's views and outcomes that everyone will honour. Consistently, coalition had been on the winning side (Matthew & Flinders, 2017:13).

In conclusion, the UK type of coalition is distinctive in nature, especially as to how it approaches employment relations. Coalition policy interventions were mainly encountered during the Thatcher and Major administrations. These governments encourage a flexible labour market, support for employee share ownership and the marketisation of the public sector and privatisation. For instance, in Wales and England, a progressive policy was implemented to increase the teachers' pay scales, based on performance rather than length of service (Scott & Williams, 2014:3). To this end, the Conservative-led coalition government shielded pensioners from housing tax, with no penalties being incurred (Lund, 2016:270).

### **2.10.3 India**

The emergence of coalitions in India primarily came about as a result of the Congress Party losing its majority and the opposition parties then negotiating for a coalition (Singh, 1981:93). The coalition system was dubbed as the 'Congress System' from the first general elections of 1951–52, when the country was faced with self-rule that outlined the shapes of electoral struggle and political discussion (Ruparelia, 2015:45). At the same time, the system was characterised by one-party dominance that created a contested

terrain of smaller parties existing and competing for influence, ascendance and control (Wallace & Roy, 2011:23).

By 1950, the Indian National Congress (INC) had begun to grapple with the instability. During this period of 1952–1967, the erstwhile State of Travancore-Chochin became the first to form coalition governments. Eight states followed suit to form coalition governments. By 1997, the number of coalition governments had risen to fourteen (Chander, 2004: 16). However, these developments were preceded by the 1967 elections when the Congress Party dropped down from 48 percent to 41 percent of votes, while their seats decreased to 284 (Wallace & Roy, 2011:24). It never stopped there, and from 1967 to 1984, the Congress Party experienced an unbalanced array of gains and losses. Out of 517 seats, the Congress Party secured 415, and thereafter registered a steady decline as it struggled to recapture its lost dominance. In 1989, the Congress Party suffered a brutal, massive loss (Roy: 2005:192). In this phase of a new political environment, India saw first an emergence of state and regional parties, and second the state enjoyed autonomy (Wallace & Roy, 2011:24).

From the beginning of 1970, India's national government was characterised by the dominance of one political party. Under the rule of the Indian National Congress (INC), the country experienced multiparty experiments. Between 1977 and 1980, India experienced the birth of Janata Party (JP), formed by four parties. This came as a result of the disastrous experiment with authoritarian rule instigated by Indira Gandhi. The amalgamation of parties into the Janata Party pledged to reinstate three fundamentals namely, parliamentary democracy, the end to mass poverty through constitutional reforms, political decentralisation and small-scale cooperative development (Ruparelia, 2015:1).

Narain (1996:29), informed by the characteristics constructed on variables and sub-variables, formulated a typology of the coalition governments in 1967, as described in Table 2.2 below.

**Table 2.2**

1.	By the time sequence of coalition: pre-election or post-election	1.	(a)	Electoral alliance-turned governmental coalition
	By mutual strength of coalition		(b)	Post-election governmental coalition
2.	By mutual strength of coalition partners	2.	a.	One-party dominant governmental
			(b)	Majority-party dominant governmental coalition
3.	By strengthen of coalition partners <i>vis-à-vis legislative strength</i>	3.	(a)	Majority governmental coalition
			(b)	Minority governmental coalition
4.	By ideological orientation of coalition partner	4.	(a)	Ideologically homogeneous governmental coalition
			(b)	Ideological heterogeneous governmental coalition
			(a)	Leftist governmental coalition
			(b)	Rightist governmental coalition
			(c)	Centrist governmental coalition
			(d)	Ideologically neutral governmental coalition
			(a)	Multi-party governmental coalition
			(b)	Two-party governmental coalition
			(c)	Few-party governmental coalition
5.	By number of coalition partners	5.	(a)	Infrastructure-dominated coalition
	By interaction of infrastructure and politics	6.	(b)	Secular coalition

Source: Narain (1996:29)

Chander (2004:27) maintains the proposition of Narain (1996:26), as cited by Pandey (2004:29), regarding the Indian landscape that has progressed through developmental stages of coalition politics:

- From 1967 to 1969, this phase coalition politics were in the sphere of anti-Congress non-ideological politics.
- The second phase saw the advent of anti-Congress programmatic politics, which reared its head in 1969, in the middle period of a Congress split.
- Politico-programmatic coalitional politics became evident from 1969 to 1970 as towards the Congress split and later.
- The re-emergence of the anti-non-Congress coalitional politics stood at number four.
- The last phase represents opportunistic coalitional politics.

However, over the past two decades, no party has been able to gain a majority, and this has become a frequent feature. This setback resulted in the formation of alliances within the developmental stages, as mentioned above (Wallace & Roy, 2011:27).

## **2.11 Conclusion**

The objective of this chapter was to examine what, why and how coalitions are formed. The typologies of coalition experienced have been such that coalitions differ in their making, and also have a historic prevalence for being formed in certain countries.

The factors that underpin the definition of coalitions have been given in light of the historical context of the UK, the US and Indian politics of coalition.

Coalition politics have had a very direct influence on the South African political landscape. Although this might be viewed as a new phenomenon, what is essential is the manner in which certain political parties in South Africa have taken positions against the ANC. These political parties took a hard line against the ANC, with the view that all the

metropolitans were their targets; hence, the EFF and DA were able to enter into a coalition.

Of course, a favourable situation was first experienced when the ANC was able to provide a sense of unity in early 1994 when it came into government. What resulted was a government of national unity, in a sense being a coalition government.

Before making a conclusion regarding coalition politics, whether new in South Africa or not, the review of global historical context given above provides the opportunity to learn what parties in India and UK are doing, and have been doing, in coalition politics.



## **CHAPTER 3**

### **COALITION POLITICS IN SOUTH AFRICA'S METROS, ITS CHARACTER, ELEMENTS AND CHALLENGES**

#### **3.1 Introduction**

A weak government is a risk, according to McKellar (2010:10), as it has the potential to create instability in a political system. One of a weak government's features is unprofessionalism, with negligent leadership and management.

Therefore, it is instructive to investigate what motivates and stimulates opposition parties to consider entering into a political system of coalition. In a research report of the Institutes for Justice and Reconciliation (IJR) (Lefko-Everett, 2013:1), it was revealed that 49.8 percent of South Africans have demonstrated a lack of trust in government institutions. Among others is a lack of confidence, especially in local government. A very disconcerting factor is that South Africans do not trust South African leaders. Lefko-Everett (2013:22) says that 50 percent of South Africans believe that "leaders are concerned with the people 'like me', and they are in no way public officials serving the public". The IJR report says that 43.3 percent of South Africans attribute the lack of trust to the inability of local government to deliver services, while 61.5 percent believes that government is not doing enough to combat corruption.

Arguments by opposition parties, in particular the DA, (Schwella, 2015: 245) support the finding of a lack of trust, based on the following:

- Political interference, which is defined by the DA, quoting the Dinkoneg scenarios, as being the politicisation of senior public sector appointments and this undermines the constitutional provisions that provide for impartial public service.
- Regarding a lack of accountability by the NDP, the DA cites its view that an active erosion of public accountability is being encountered in the governance system of South Africa.

- Corruption and maladministration regarding taxpayers', money amounting to R30 billion.
- Lack of capacity as a result of cadre deployment, which results in poor performance in the public sector.

These viewpoints of the DA are shared by other opposition parties such as the EFF, the ACDP and COPE, who desire to bring change to local government. As such, their logic stimulates and inspires them to strengthen and develop strategies to influence the political arena. The reasons and motivations raised by the DA, and shared by other opposition parties, impact negatively on the image of South African governance at all spheres, but mostly in the local government sphere.

The South African perspective harboured by the DA and other opposition parties are premised on how the late Nelson Mandela stated that the relationship between good governance, rule of law and leadership are the cornerstone of good governance (Schwella, 2013:67). Chhotray and Stoker (2009) recognise the fact that good governance is a state character and capacity is important in a democracy. The World Bank (1992:1) identifies three policy areas of public administration and the public sector – accountability, legal framework, and transparency – as being part of the basis of good governance. These are outlined as follows:

- Accountability is rendered in financial instances to the citizens, who hold officials accountable. All power tends to corrupt; absolute power corrupts absolutely. There is a need to hold those in power to account for their actions (Schwella, 2015:36; Chhotray & Stoker, 2009:104).
- Legal frameworks relate to the laws, rules and customs, which are unbiased and fairly applied to all and create a likelihood of prospering in social life. In this instance, the state should act legally within the legal limitations of the law, rules and customs (Schwella, 2015: 36, & Chhotray & Stoker, 2009: 104).
- Leftwich (1994:372) records the necessity for an open government to enhance accountability and limit corruption, which relates to transparency.

Instability reveals itself as a persistent, serious challenge to the legitimacy and longevity of government (Kellar 2010:65). A question is posed as to what happens in the event that good governance fails and bad governance becomes widespread, multiplying under the rot of corrupt politicians and miss-management. Rotberg (2000:1) supports this question in regard to the South African government and makes observations of factors that are widely expressed and shared by opposition parties in the country. These factors include roads falling into disrepair, corruption growing as funds are looted for personal use, security deteriorating as crime accelerates, and services delivery weakening and collapsing.

The aim of this chapter is to discuss the underlying factors that lead to coalitions becoming a more common feature in South African politics. The South African political arena has been dominated by ANC. This situation has resulted in various complications for South Africa, which in the end have harmed its democracy. It is therefore important to gain an understanding of how opposition parties consolidate their support base towards forming coalitions in a specific metropolitan municipality, which will be discussed below.

## **3.2 The emergence of coalitions in South Africa**

### **3.2.1 The path to coalition politics**

In Europe, several governments are run by coalitions (Siddle, 2016:5). A healthy track record was recently observed when Germany's Angela Merkel secured her fourth term in office by entering into a coalition deal with the Social Democratic Union party to sustain power sharing (Baloyi, 2018). The South African democratic system does provide room for political parties to mobilise the support of the voters from the general public. Political parties engage in more critical methods, as they present their alternative policies during election campaigns. A space for competition does encourage every party to enhance its policies (Masipa, 2017:43). The 3 August 2016 signalled the fifth round of municipal elections in South Africa, which experienced a turning point in the political history of elections when opposition parties increasing their votes. In addition, certain preceding

by-elections demonstrated a waning ANC, with a chunk of voters abstaining or voting for other political parties (Schreiber, 2018: 32).

Overall, the ANC vote dropped to below 60%, and it managed to retain Ethekewini, Mangaung and Buffalo City. Painfully, it lost the South African economic powerhouse, the City of Johannesburg; Tshwane, the home of the executive capital; and Nelson Mandela Bay, its heartland. These outcomes provided an opportunity for the opposition parties to engage in coalition (Siddle, 2016:5).

**Table 3.1**

No.	Place	ANC	DA	EFF
1	Johannesburg	44.99%	38.4%	10.94%
2	Tshwane	41.48%	43.10%	11.64%
3	Ekurhuleni	48.44%	34.13%	11.10%
4	Ethekewini	59.11%	27.54%	3.63%
5	Nelson Mandela Bay	41.5%	46.66%	5.03%
6	Buffalo City	59.86%	23.45%	8.25%
7	Mangaung	56.77%	26.20%	8.84%
8	Cape Town	24.52%	66.75%	3.12%

Source: Siddle (2018:5)

The South African voting trends have been well identified by people voting for a party rather for an individual candidate. The following factors, as speculated on by researchers and various newspapers, were eminent and are outlined as follows:

- Dissatisfaction about service delivery and concern about corruption among all groups, including Africans, led to the decline of the ANC support among Africans (Alexander, 2010; Bassett and Clarke, 2008; Bond and Mottiar, 2013; Etzo, 2010).

- DA efforts to Africans would have been increasingly successful and it was able to enter ANC stronghold areas (Nuijit, 2013; Southall, 2014).
- Better-off Africans – the middle class – opted to vote for the DA, or vote for another party and abstain without even thinking of voting for the ANC (Schulz-Herzenberg, 2009; Nuijit, 2013).
- The ANC moved from the non-racial objective by casting aspersions that labelled the DA as a white party and for white interests (Langfield, 2014; Southern, 2011).
- The political views of young people prompted them to make different political choices, as compared with older people (Harris, Wyn & Younes, 2010; Henn & Foard, 2012).
- The emergence of the EFF indicated a political shift by its strong showing in the 2014 national elections (African Globe, 2015; Engler, 2014; Southall, 2014).

### **3.2.1.1 ANC falling short due to its dominance**

The ANC dominance as a political party was observed in the 27 April 1994 election results, where the ANC under its leader, Nelson Mandela, won the election with 62.68 percent of the votes. The dominance of the ANC was evident from 1994 until the masses confirmed their support when the ANC obtained 70 percent in the election. The implication of one-party dominance in a multi-party government is to promote democracy and change attitudes to democracy. However, dominant parties always fall into the trap of being undemocratic, and gain a tendency to dishearten and weaken political opposition (Kearsey, 2007:95). The ANC has dominated polity and policy-making because of its electoral dominance. Its authority might be seen as fixed; however, it is being evaluated on its current performance, and its struggle history no longer ensures its support. The ANC has had challenges which prescribed a new terrain for it, which has impacted on its recession, thus devastating its support base among the masses (Koekemoer, 2017:37).

There are many factors which have led to the ANC falling short. As the 2014 elections approached, the South African media characterised South Africa as a nation in crisis

(Poplak, 2014.ix). The ANC had been upsetting its constituency, and South Africans in general, by failing to deliver on its election promises (Twala, 2014. 1991). Another factor that has been dragging the ANC down is its immoral and unethical path that includes many corruption scandals, service delivery protests, the unpopular e-tolls, Nkandla and Marikana (Poplak, 2014: ix; Butler, 2012:12).

These dissolute and unprincipled five challenges are elaborated as follows:

- Corruption scandals: the 1999 multi-billion rand military acquisition project had allegations of large scale bribery and biggest corruption ever. In a telephonic interview, the then chairperson of the ANC's parliamentary public accounts committee Andrew Feinstein, as senior ANC MP, described the arms deal and both corruption in the deal and efforts to cover up corruption as being the point at which the ANC had lost its moral compass (Corruption Watch, 2014).
- Service delivery protests constitute a catch-all term in the South African media, (Chen, Dean, Frant & Kumar, 2014). The ANC support was extremely affected negatively by demonstrations in the African residential areas expressing dissatisfaction with water and sanitation and with electricity provision (Nhlapo, Anderson & Wentzel, 2017:11). The EFF leader has argued that the ANC should stop blaming apartheid for not delivering the services to the people to cover its own incompetency (Enca, 2016). Sdumo Dlamini, a COSATU leader, did not mince words when accepting that the ANC is to be blamed for poor service delivery (Whittles, 2016). The ANC's fourth National Policy Conference accepted that the cadre deployment policy has exacerbated the poor state of service delivery, as the latter continues unabated and with little change (ANC, 2012:3 & Reddy, 2016).
- The unpopular e-tolls have caused much outrage and consternation (Wiener, 2015). E-tolls, a Gauteng freeway project, has caused sharp divisions between the ANC and its key alliance partners, the trade union umbrella body COSATU and the SACP, and blame has been directed at the ANC (Molele, Letsoalo & Pietersen, 2012). COSATU leader, Bheki Ntshalintshali, has said that no-one else is to blame but the ANC itself (Kekana, 2016).

- Nkandla: According to corruption watch news, Newham (2014) argues that the central problem lies in the failure to account for maladministration and corruption. The actions were encountered by the continuing impunity on the part of the politically and financially powerful. However, the problem commenced with President Jacob Zuma; for example the Gupta wedding saga and president's private Nkandla residence, a scandal that cost the public purse R215 million.
- Marikana: A leader of the Association of Mineworkers and Construction Union (AMCU) Joseph Mathunjwa was adamant that ANC was culpable and only wanted to appease foreign investors by killing 34 people (news24.com, 2018). Minto (2012) penned an open letter, saying that President Jacob Zuma and the ANC have blood on their hands, and that the massacre of the striking mine workers was a betrayal of the struggle for freedom, hope and dignity.

South African citizens have been critical of the ANC, claiming that it has changed from being a party that does not ignore the interests of the people. Furthermore, it has changed from being a party that does not portray arrogance and taking the South Africans voter for granted (Newman & De Lannoy, 2014; McKaiser, 2014). Many feel that that they can no longer support the ANC, because of the lack of performance and growing distance between the organisation and its ideals (McKaiser, 2014: 5 - 7). Originally a party of the masses, the ANC has since created a space between itself and its masses through its style of manipulation and in not understanding that its supporters are better in the know than in 1994, and expectations have not been accomplished. The ANC of today is characterised by periods of rebellion against the leadership; and debilitating success battles (Butler, 2012: 12-13). Its confidence was so overbearing that its former president Jacob Zuma claimed that the ANC will rule until Jesus comes. This statement weakened its bond with the people and created opportunities for opposition parties (Yung, 2014: 1 - 141; Butler 2014, 4 -7). No matter how any person may observe the situation, Booysen (2015:7) argues that "decline and decay is evident in the ANC".

### **3.2.1.2 DA as an official opposition**

The DA is a child of coalition politics. This was seen with the earlier successful coalition in the Western Cape between the National Party and the Democratic Party (Joubert, 2018:82). The DA was founded in 1989, when Independent Party (IP), the National Democratic Movement (NDM) and Progressive Federal Party (PFP) came together (De Jager, 2013:165). By 1994, none of the DA black members were in parliament, while its opposition public relations was historically white, and it retained its stigma as a white political party (Villa-Vicencio & Soko, 2012:77; Pressly, 2013; McKaiser, 2014). South African liberalism had complexities in that it had to adapt to the legacy of apartheid. In this regard, the DA had to call for an equal and fair society to address apartheid inequalities (James, 2013). Its performance since the 1994 polls steadily increased until 2014, when the DA obtained 22.2 percent. The DA focused on the contemporary, visible essential backlog in service delivery, the allegations of corruption and unanswered hopes of the people. These ANC failures positioned the DA to become a credible opposition party (Newman & De Lannoy, 2014: 205 – 211).

In essence, the DA was presented with an opportunity to become a viable alternative (McKaiser, 2014: 13; Pressly, 2013:32). However, its emergence as the critical opposition party was as the result of forming an alliance with the Independent Democrats (ID) (Booyesen, 2014:71). An anti-ANC sentiment became a weapon of the DA, rallying all South African races; hence, it pronounced that the people can continue to support the ANC and support the broken promises that resulted in poor service delivery and high unemployment. If the people vote for DA – radical change will be brought by it (Newman & De Lannoy, 2014: 203; DA, 2016:1). McKaiser (2014: 9-12) argues that the DA, as a chosen political party, is popular because of its posture of good governance and service delivery alternatives.

The 2016 local government elections proved a turning point moment for the DA. This political party won back numerous municipalities and seized the opportunity to form a coalition (Joubert, 2018:83).



### **3.2.1.3 EFF – the posture of the second largest opposition**

On its arrival in July 2013, the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF), as a political party, stepped up the struggle against imperialism, capitalism and racism (Koekemoer, 2017:42). The EFF was founded on the principles of redistribution of wealth, and it cast itself as a revolutionary political party (SACBC-PLO, 2014:1). However, the EFF was formed out of a crisis, due to the expulsion of Julius Malema and Floyd Shivambu from the ANC in 2011 (Ford, 2011; Mbete, 2014:38). Shivambu (2014) said that their expulsion was motivated by the ANC government which had become directionless, failed to stand up against corruption, was embroiled in money laundering and fraud, steering South Africa towards a failing state. At a National Conference held in Soweto on 26 and 27 July 2013, the EFF agreed that the ANC had failed to deliver on its ideology, political and historical mandate.

Koekemoer (2017, 43) argues that corruption and related sins of incumbency became a norm in the former liberation movement. As such, the EFF points to the negligence and violence against the people including the abuse of power with a sheer disregard of the masses' voice. The former liberation movement is pushing South Africa to kleptocracy with those connected to political leaders becoming richer and more corrupt (EFF, 2013:2-6). The EFF leadership viewed the EFF as a political party to compete with and pursue economic emancipation through political power. It considered itself as actively pursuing socialism (Economic Freedom Fighters, 2015a; Economic Freedom Fighters, 2015d; Economic Freedom Fighters, 2015b).

The EFF gained 6.4 percent of the national vote during the 2014 national elections. This promoted it to become the second opposition political party in South Africa. It became popular with its political style that can be ascribed to their capability to energise the political scene (Poplak, 2014:166). Its appeal to the people has been characterised by a populist style and its ability to use catastrophe, interruption and intimidation (Mbete, 2014). There are several examples of the EFF's three misdemeanours in parliament.

- The EFF MPs, on their first day in parliament during the traditional photography session outside the National Assembly, refused to give way for senior ANC MPs and

cabinet ministers. This resulted in a standoff of about 10 minutes (Makinana & Underhill, 2014).

- Poplak (2014) illustrates how the EFF leader, Julius Malema, poses a question to president Jacob Zuma, an opportunity which is seized by EFF MPs who use it to cause chaos and disruption. Julius Malema persistently asked President Jacob Zuma about when the [Nkandla] money would be paid back. President Jacob Zuma did not answer such questions, until EFF leader Julius Malema persisted and asked President Jacob Zuma to provide a date. This turned worse when the president said that reports were with the Speaker.
- The Sunday Times (2014) reported Julius Malema as saying, “An unjust law is not a law at all. And that is starting with the dress code”. Despite this, the EFF have been attacked and ejected for wearing overalls (Suttner, 2014).
- The EFF threatened to disrupt the president Jacob Zuma State of the Nation address and threatened court action after cell-phone connectivity was cut, ahead of the president’s address (Letsoalo, 2015; Eyewitness News, 2015).

The actions of the EFF could be described as appealing to certain sections of society. In addition, black youths admire Malema as a hero because of his arrogance, crude defiance, and resentment and aspirations (Du Preez & Rossouw, 2009:6). According to Ford (2011: ix), Malema had filled the gap of disappointment and failure when the ANC, as an old liberation movement had been privatised. Malema faced resentment from the ANC, which in effect later made him influential in South Africa (Du Preez, 2013: 5).

In the 2016 local government elections, the EFF was confronted with a natural challenge of being the third-largest political party in a coalition. It was usually seen as a kingmaker. The EFF opted to stick with the opposition rather than the ruling party and vote the ANC out of power (Joubert, 2018: 109).

There are pointers that prompted the DA, EFF and other parties to make a call on coalitions. These are that the ANC is getting much blame for corruption,

maladministration, its cadre deployment policy, and failure to provide quality service – all these are aggravated to its dominance (Schreiber, 2018:18).

### **3.3 Government of National Unity coalition**

The fact that coalition can be good, bad or broken remains a phenomenon that could change the current South African political environment. The answer to the deteriorating South African political environment problem lies within coalition politics. The April 1994 results meant that the democratic government could be experienced in a three-party coalition.

A grand coalition developed between 1993 and 1994, with hostile party political parties and liberation movements coming together. In fact, the interim constitution made provision for a Government of National Unity (GNU) consisting of the ANC, NP and IFP (Booyesen, 2014:72). This was such that the president came from the ANC, while both the ANC and NP appointed the executive deputy presidents. This coalition distributed 27 cabinet positions among the three parties. All this was guided by the interim Constitution which provided the president with the power to appoint ministers after consultation with executive deputy presidents and the leaders of the participating parties (Schreiber, 2018:174).

However, Mafumadi (2016) pointed out that the security positions led to many disagreements, noting that the NP wanted a single minister in key portfolios of government – security, economy, social and administration. He said, “the group tried work towards consensus, but there was no agreement and it would be the president’s call. This required balance on seeking consensus and deference to the president” (Schreiber, 2018:175).

According to Bitar and Lowenthal (2015), the Government of National Unity (GNU) had to make an agreement based on a common framework. Issues of coordinating policy, resolving disputes and limitation of consensus were among the decisions to be made. The NP formulated a formal coalition agreement with rights and responsibilities. The ANC argued that its policy agenda had already been in existence, namely the interim

constitution and Reconstruction and Development Plan (RDP). This formed the basis of its manifesto, which many South Africans supported and recognised.

The coordination of policy within this coalition, despite the systems that were established, ended up in disagreements. For instance in the GNU, parties would experience a deadlock, which would warrant a break or sometimes cabinet officials referring matters to a negotiating committee. For instance, the death penalty, legalisation of abortion, and the establishment of Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) had to be referred to the negotiating committee due to deadlocks.

A consensus-seeking spirit is significant for a coalition. Despite the lack of power sharing, the NP members voted for the constitution of South Africa in 1994. This was when Nelson Mandela acknowledged the legitimacy of the NP, as it had recognised the young democracy. However, the IFP leader, Mangosuthu Buthelezi, voiced unhappiness, citing the failure of the ANC in that they had not honoured an international mediation pledge taken in June, 1999. Nevertheless, the GNU remained remarkably stable for two years (Schreiber, 2018:186-190).

Coalitions in South Africa have evolved in party politics from 1994 to date. Political party movement extends beyond activities immediately pre- and post-election periods. The main events were observed during the unbanning of various political parties in February 1990, among them were the ANC, South African Communist Party (SACP), PAC and Black Consciousness Movement (BCM) (Booyesen, 2014:71).

Table 3.2 below outlines the typology of party coalitions and alliance, as adapted from Booyesen (2014: 71-72):

**Table 3.2**

Type of formation	Objective or effect	Illustration
<p><b>ALLIANCES</b></p> <p><b>and cooperative formations that may lead to formal pre-electoral alliances</b></p>		
<p>Formal inter-party alliances – with electoral participation and potential representation in Parliament</p>	<p>Consolidate power, rescue dying parties, consolidate cultural identities</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• ANC and NNP into ANC</li> <li>• NNP and DP into DA</li> <li>• DA and ID into DA</li> </ul>
<p>Sub party alliances – channelling participation and representation through the mother party</p>	<p>Historical alliances, channel contestation away from electoral arena, take major issues out of party contests</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• ANC’s Tripartite Alliance governing alliance with SACP and COSATU, SACP formally in government, but over time subsumed into ANC processes</li> </ul>
<p>Occasional inter-party cooperation – on issues and campaign</p>	<p>Restrain governing party, withhold strategic majorities through cooperation agreements</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• DA, Cope and UDM</li> <li>• Collective for Democracy EFF, Sopa and BCP</li> </ul>
<p><b>COALITIONS</b></p> <p><b>Inclusive of co-option to help sustain ANC power in government, or gradually help forge mergers</b></p>		
<p>Governing coalitions – multiparty</p>	<p>Provincial and local government level, in absence of outright majorities</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• ANC, NP and IFP in GNU</li> <li>• ANC and New National Party (NNP) in Western Cape</li> <li>• ANC and IFP in</li> </ul>

		<p>Kwazulu-Natal</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Range of municipalities with diverse actors, e.g., ANC and National Freedom Party (NFP)</li> </ul>
Sub-party coalitions	Generate hegemony, focus power	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• ANC's Tripartite Alliance through ANC and SACP (COSATU members at first did take up formal positions in government)</li> </ul>
De facto minority party into government	Co-option into government	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Mosibudi Mangena (Azapo) as Cabinet member</li> <li>• Mangosuthu Buthelezi Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) as Deputy President</li> <li>• Pieter Mulder (FF+) as Deputy minister</li> <li>• Gavin Woods (IFP) as Scopa chairperson</li> <li>• Themba Godi (African People's Convention) (APC) as Scopa chairperson</li> </ul>

Source: Booysen (2014: 71-72)

Inter-party alliances and coalitions have been a gradually emerging change in South Africa party politics (Booyesen, 2014:67). Alliances are conceptualised by Kadima (2006) as occurring when at least two political parties come together prior to an election.

Therefore, essentially the ANC first of all operates on alliances – the Tripartite Alliance consisting of the ANC, SACP (South African Communists Party) and COSATU (Congress of South African Trade Union). The ANC used this alliance to hold its dominant state power (Booyesen, 2010).

### **3.4 Coalition in Metros, character and challenges**

#### **3.4.1 Character**

The South African Council of Churches has described the local government elections as a changed political landscape (Bateman, Nicolaidis & Kubheka, 2016). The new normal phenomenon of political party coalitions became a feature in the 2016 local government elections. The main opposition party, the DA seized power from the ANC by forming coalitions in three key metropolitan – Nelson Mandela Bay, Tshwane and Johannesburg (Kotze, 2018; Faull, 2016:3). In the Johannesburg and Tshwane metropolitans, the DA formed coalitions that comprised the smaller parties, COPE, ACDP and FF+. Both the metropolitans resulted in minority coalition government. In Johannesburg, the governing minority controlled 41 percent of seats in council, while in Tshwane, this was about 46 percent (Schreiber, 2018). These post-election shifts provided power to the opposition, and they gained immense financial power and responsibility. The incoming DA mayor, Solly Msimanga, in Tshwane banned the blue light escorts. In Johannesburg, Herman Mashaba, the DA mayor, did the same with the metro police. Nelson Mandela Bay metropolitan DA mayor, Trollip, tightened control over municipal law enforcement (Faull, 2016:4).

##### **3.4.1.1 Nelson Mandela Bay**

DA leader Trollip optimistically indicated that the metropolitan would be governed by a multi-party coalition that would pronounce major administrative changes to bring about job security (Whittles, 2016). With 580 000 registered votes in Nelson Mandela Bay, the DA secured the metropolitan city with a sufficient majority (Merten, 2016). This was the most contested city, with 120 seats in council. The DA secured 47.6 percent of the vote and 57 seats. The ANC only secured 50 seats, with 40.9 percent votes, which was a high

drop, as compared with the 2011 local government elections where it had gained 62 seats (Bateman, Nicolaides & Kubheka, 2016; Spies, 2016).

The EFF secured a 5.1 percent vote and 6 seats in the council. The remaining five political parties, African Independent Conference (AIC), UDM, United Front of the Eastern Cape (UFEC), COPE, ACDP and the newly formed Patriotic Alliance (PA), secured one seat each (Mkentane, 2016). The coalition in this metropolitan indicates that four political parties, the DA, UDM, COPE and ACDP, had secured a 61-member council majority, allowing them to enter into the multi-party coalition (Spies, 2016).

Table 3.3 below illustrates the above narrative.

**Table 3.3**

Political Party	Allocation of Seats	Gender Distribution	
		Male	Female
Democratic Alliance	57	43	14
African National Congress	50	32	18
Economic Freedom Fighters	6	3	3
United Democratic Movement	2	1	1
Congress of the People	1	0	1
African Christian Democratic Party	1	1	0
African Independent Congress	1	1	0
Patriotic Alliance	1	1	0
United Front Eastern Cape	1	1	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>120</b>	<b>83</b>	<b>37</b>

Source: Integrated Development Plan-Draft Second Edition 2017/18-2021/22



In any multi-party government, there are negotiation processes. In this regard, the DA, UDM, COPE and ACDP had to have discussions to reach a common ground, which had to be reached in order for them to sign a memorandum of agreement (new24wire, 2016).

The common ground was observed in their manifestos, such as cracking down on corruption, creating jobs and delivering quality services, which were regarded as top priorities. In this regard, the four political parties, the DA, UDM, COPE and ACDP, reached a consensus based on change, good governance and honest government to deliver for all (Bosch, 2016). Furthermore, matters included in the memorandum of understanding related to co-operation and respect for one another to enable the coalition to function properly; (2) to protect the country's Constitution and rule of law, and envisage a non-racial South Africa; and (3) to deliver on quality services to all South Africans (Simelane, 2017). The executive mayor of Nelson Mandela Bay recognised the role played by coalition partners in the 2016 local government elections campaign, pointing out that the political parties in coalition offered a change and a commitment to stopping corruption, growing the economy in order to create jobs and improve service delivery (IDP, 2017).

The metropolitan, in its IDP (2017), recognised the fact that the municipality is governed by coalition government comprised of the DA, UDM, COPE and ACDP. It was on 18 August 2016, according to Straton (2016), that coalition political parties in the first council meeting occupied the following positions:

- **Speaker:** Jonathan Lawack (Democratic Alliance)
- **Executive Mayor:** Ronald Athol Price Trollip (Democratic Alliance)
- **Deputy Mayor:** Mongameli Ellcotte Bobani (United Democratic Movement)
- **Chief Whip:** Werner Senekal (Democratic Alliance).

### 3.4.1.2 City of Tshwane

A two-week round of coalition negotiations concluded with the resolution to enter into a DA-led coalition, while opting for a formal agreement (Faull, 2016:3). This resolution led to the DA and EFF coalition agreement, where the DA secures the mayorship with EFF support, and makes concessions on the pro-poor policies of the EFF (BusinessTech, 2016).

The DA gathered 93 seats out of the 214 seats in the Tshwane metropolitan, meaning it won 49 wards and 54 Proportional Representation (PR) seats. The EFF became a potential kingmaker, with 11.68 percent and 25 seats. The three PR seats went to the ACDP, COPE and PA, with one each, while four PR seats were secured by the FF Plus (Areff & du Plessis, 2016).

**Table 3.4**

<b>Party</b>	<b>%</b>	<b>Wards Seats</b>	<b>PR Seats</b>
Democratic Alliance	43.1%	54	93
African national Congress	41.22%	21	89
Economic Freedom Fighters	11.68%	25	25
Freedom Front Plus	1.99%	4	4
African Christian Democratic Party	0.89%	1	1
Congress of the People	0.89%	1	1
Pan Africanist Congress	0.89%	1	1
<b>Total</b>		<b>107</b>	<b>107</b>

Source: Consolidated Annual Report for the City of Tshwane (2016)

The EFF in the Tshwane metropolitan performed as a kingmaker by deciding to vote with the DA against the ANC. For instance, to pass a budget, the sitting of the Tshwane

council required 108 votes, and in the event, 180 out of the 206 councillors present supported the budget (Mailovich, 2017).

According to Huffpost (2017), since coalition-led DA government took office, it has reversed the ANC irregularities and attained several achievements:

- A mayoral mansion was sold to R5.1 million and the money received was directed to building houses for the poor.
- Of the title deeds that the ANC had filed away for later issue to its beneficiaries, 2804 had been handed over by the coalition-led government.
- 23 000 EPWP work opportunities were created.

### **3.4.1.3 City of Johannesburg**

In this metropolitan, the coalition seems to be holding (Kotze, 2018). In his recent message, mayor Herman Mashaba recognised that the DA-led coalition government accepted that the coalition commitment is to build a city that advances freedom, fairness and opportunity for all the people (IDP, 2017/18).

In the 2016 local government elections, the most significant defeat of the ANC was experienced in the Johannesburg metro. The ANC obtained 44.50 percent of the vote, being nearly six percent more than the DA had obtained. In the Johannesburg council, the DA-led minority coalition government was forged with the ACDP, COPE, FF+ and IFP. Remarkably, these political parties supported the EFF to take charge of the Johannesburg metro (Schreiber, 2018:33-34). The table below describe the allocation of seats per political party.

**Table 3.5**

<b>Party</b>	<b>Percentage</b>	<b>Seats</b>
ANC	44.55%	121
DA	38.37%	104
EFF	11.09%	30
IFP	1.72%	5
AIC	1.5%	4
FF Plus, ACDP, Aljima, UDM, COPE, PA	Less than 1%	1 seat each

Source: Elections'16-News24

The strength of coalition in the City of Johannesburg was seen when the EFF added its votes to official partners IFP and Al Jama-ah during the budget vote. A R55.9 billion budget was passed, despite the counter views of the ANC, AIC and PA (Mailovich, 2017). In this DA-led minority government, the cooperation of political parties was profound (Schreiber, 2018:229). This was attested when an EFF leader said that mayor Herman Mashaba is fond of political cooperation. He demonstrated this when the EFF advised him not increase rates and taxes and the mayor listened (Ndlovu, 2018).

Another extraordinary factor is that the UDM does struggle in coordinating the relationship with the DA. The UDM chairs the Standing Committee on Public Accounts (Scopa) (Joubert, 2018:125). Subsequent to the failure of three council meetings, caused by the ANC the walked out, Herman Mashaba appealed to the EFF, requesting their reconsideration of the decision to not attend the meeting. The EFF's boycott was the result of the protest developments in the Nelson Mandela Bay metropolitan. In support for the DA's call and persuasion, the EFF voted with a show of hands in support of the constitutional review which was intended to reintegrate the city's corporate entities (Mailovich, 2017; Andersen, 2017).

The DA faced two motions of no confidence, which had been initiated by the ANC; however, the motions never succeeded because the AIC and PA voted against the motions, and as a result, Da Gama retained the position of Speaker (Khoza, 2017).

The DA-led coalition government has attained several achievements. An anti-corruption unit was created, which was able to expose R2 billion in corruption activities, ranging from fraud, theft to hijacked buildings in the Johannesburg metropolitan area. The investigation team opened 2469 cases, which resulted in the arrest of 500 suspects, and the suspension of 100 officials. The neglect of the transportation service was seen by the Tshwane metropolitan coalition, which increased the Metrobus capacity by 50 percent, thereby adding new buses and providing residents with greater access to transport (Huffpost, 2017).

### **3.5 Challenges**

There is a great potential for coalition governments to split some political parties, strengthen the dominant players, and generally increase instability (Nicolson, 2016).

#### **3.5.1 Nelson Mandela Bay**

In the Nelson Mandela Bay, the coalitions have proved to be volatile and unstable. The metropolitan municipal council found it hard to pass budgets, approve and agree on long-term strategic development plan for the city (Kotze, 2018). Athol Trollip was quick to state that coalition is in danger. James Selfe concurred with Trollip coalition in Nelson Mandela Bay is worrying (Nicolson, 2017). This was after a special meeting of the Nelson Mandela Bay council held on 26 January 2017, could not continue due to a quorum. ANC councillors refused to enter the venue, while the EFF councillors stated that would not attend. A notable deliberate absence of deputy mayor and regional UDM chairperson Mongameli Bobani and UDM councillor Thoko Tshangela (Spies, 2017).

As a result, the DA initiated a motion of no confidence against Bobani, which irritated the UDM's Bantu Holomisa. The vote of no confidence was successful (Mkentane, 2017). Consequent to this, the UDM filed court papers against the DA. The civil application to

the Port Elizabeth High Court was to interdict Bobani's ousting. In an affidavit, the UDM cited among other things the fact that municipal rules and constitutional law were ignored by council stating the majority of council was not present. Despite this attempt, the UDM's urgent application was struck from the roll, and the UDM was ordered to pay the costs (Pather, 2017).

In the metropolitan led by Trollip, a setback was encountered with the withdrawal by the Patriotic Front (PA) in protest over the DA's failure to accede to a demand fill a vacant deputy mayor's position (Enca, 2017).

The coalition of the DA with the EFF, COPE and UDM demonstrated signs of collapse in 2017. This was when a motion of no confidence was tabled against the DA executive mayor, Athol Trollip. DA leader Trollip challenged the decision in court (Kotze, 2018). The vacant deputy mayor's position, previously occupied by regional UDM leader Mongameli Bobani, was the result of the following misconduct observed by the DA: (1) Bobani had been a destructive element in the coalition; (2) his actions served to undermine service delivery, most especially to the poorest and most vulnerable; and (3) he repeatedly voted with the ANC, conduct which was unacceptable and not part of the coalition agreement (Nicolson, 2017).

The two political leader parties which are in coalition make arguments. "Coalitions can work. It is possible to work", says EFF leader, Julius Malema. An argument advanced by the EFF leader Malema relates to perceived DA arrogance. The DA leader, Mmusi Maimane held a contrary view, saying that chaos in the council represents a choice between good governance and corruption (Nicolson, 2018).

In less than 2 years, the Nelson Mandela Bay coalitions were cracking. The ANC, EFF, UDM, AIC, United Front and PA eventually came to a conclusion to remove Athol Trollip through a vote of no-confidence (De Kock, 2018). This comes amid the accusation by Bobani that Trollip is a bully and runs the municipality like a farm. Ignoring the co-governance agreement signed by coalition partners, Trollip hardly consults them. President of the UDM, Bantu Holomisa, emphasises Bobani's arguments, accusing Trollip of taking credit for everything that the coalition government has done (Ndletyana, 2017). The consequence was that the UDM departed and abandoned the coalition, which

is a move signifying the demise of coalition government in the Nelson Mandela Bay. Bantu Holomisa articulated a long-held view that, typically, the DA abandons its partners. He said that “we are done with the DA, sorry” (Municipal IQ, 2016). The very essence of the withdrawal was the UDM’s unhappiness with the sacking of Bobani as the deputy mayor. On 24 August 2017 UDM leader Bantu Holomisa issued a letter titled ‘Nelson Mandela Bay Metro Coalition UDM Participation – Notice to Pull Out’. He had this to say: “UDM NEC will review its decision to be part of Nelson Mandela Bay Metropolitan Municipality’s (NMBMM) coalition. As a result of the DA’s dirty tricks campaign against Bobani and the UDM, Deputy Mayor Bobani was irregularly removed from his post” (de Kock, 2017). The account of Bobani created an opportunity for the UDM leader Holomisa to issue a warning. He said that he would order the two UDM councillors to walk out of the DA, ACDP, COPE, and PA alliance, if the ousted Bobani was not reinstated (du Toit, 2017).

The metro coalition government was subjected to a predicament by the DA taking the removal of Trollip to court. The UDM never enjoyed the victory that it might have expected on Trollip’s ousting. The political parties in the coalition were reminded by UDM leader Holomisa that a three-person commission had identified culpability of both DA leader Trollip and UDM leader Bobani. The commission’s outcome in particular blamed Trollip for undermining and disobeying the coalition partners’ collective, and by implication, his own national leader (Sain, 2018).

### **3.5.2 City of Tshwane**

The EFF staged an unexplained stay away, which led to a walkout by the ANC, and this ultimately collapsed the council meeting in progress. The meeting had to be postponed, because the council did not reach a quorum, as there were only 95 councillors in the council chamber (Ndlazi, 2017). Another collapse was experienced for a second time, when the EFF stayed away. As with the previous boycott, there were no statement from the EFF (Ndlazi, 2017b). This time around, the EFF had referred to tender irregularities that implicated the municipal manager, Mosola. A report was presented that recommended Mosola’s suspension, over an alleged R12 billion tender (Mahlangu, 2018).

The Tshwane metropolitan, representing the second-largest city in South Africa, faced a motion of no confidence, merely because Athol Trollip had been ousted (Kotze, 2018). The EFF came out with the guns blazing, firing come what may, demanding that Solly Msimanga must be voted out. The EFF leader Malema claimed that the mayor had appointed unqualified officials, had favoured white DA members, and irregularly sought to suspend city manager Moeketsi Mosola (Nicolson, 2018). The mayor, Solly Msimanga, faced two motions of no confidence, from the EFF and the ANC (Deklerk, 2018).

Solly Msimanga survived the motion of no confidence due to a technical voting problem procedure. This was when the EFF walked out of the council chambers (Mitchely, 2018).

EFF leader, Julius Malema, after the failure of the motion of no confidence, planned to challenge Tshwane metropolitan Speaker, Katlego Mathebe, in court (Mitchely, 2018; Letsoalo, Bendile & Whittle, 2018). The Speaker is embroiled because of disallowing the motion of no confidence, after DA councillor Randall William had stated that the EFF had failed to submit a written proposal to motivate urgency (Letsoalo, Bendile & Whittle, 2018).

### **3.5.3 City of Johannesburg**

The EFF had a disruptive start during Herman Mashaba's inaugural speech as the mayor; the party mentioned that it needed the house to recognise the complaints of DA activist who had not been paid by the party. EFF maintained its principles to be behind the worker's rights (Eyewitness News, 2016).

Privatisation was never one of the EFF's core principles. In this instance, when Herman Mashaba, the mayor of the ruling coalition, announced the privatisation of the refuse removal entity, Pikitup. This would involve the termination of the Pikitup contract. And tensions then emerged between the EFF and DA (Mbetse, 2016:608).

In anticipation of seizing an opportunity to exploit this weakness of Herman Mashaba, the ANC was confident of persuading the EFF to support a motion of no confidence against the City of Johannesburg's metropolitan mayor (Khoza, 2017). The ANC stridently raised the point that the city's financial administration was in dire straits, stating that it was on



the brink of collapse (Nicolson, 2018). Corruption investigation has made the ANC incredibly nervous says the DA (Khoza, 2017). The ANC levelled an accusation against the Johannesburg metro Speaker Da Gama, saying that “He was biased and failed demonstrate impartiality to hold the city executive accountable.” (Nicolson, 2018). ANC councillor, Sello Lemao, said that “We have seen councillors being suppressed willy-nilly without the application of the rule book.”

In a court battle, the ANC sought an order declaring that a motion of no confidence had to be held in council for a hearing. However, this was refuted by the DA, arguing that the ANC had withdrawn its motion against executive mayor Herman Mashaba and speaker Da Gama (Dlamini, 2017).

Another absurd dilemma was faced by DA leader Herman Mashaba in appointing an acting building officer. The ANC and the kingmaker EFF vehemently opposed the appointment, arguing that it is only the council that can appoint such an official, and not the executive mayor. A strong emphasis was placed on a submission that the executive mayor causes instability in the municipality (Fourie, 2018).

### **3.6 Conclusion**

The DA and EFF have consistently presented the South African voters with solid alternative strategies to counter the erosive ANC. The sustainability of the DA and EFF coalition should always be subject to their close and strict adherence to their agreements. This would transpire into their viability to avoid any fracas in their lifespan.

Another element is the direction that the destructive coalition politics is taking. However, coalition politics will not disappear from South Africa. Although coalition politics might appear to be destructive and unproductive, South African voters adapt to and live with coalitions. An attempted reversing of the electoral gains derived from the 2016 local government elections by DA, EFF, COPE, UDM, ACDP and FF+ has been observed in the several attempts at motions of no confidence, which demonstrate disrespect for the will of the people that was demonstrated in the elections.

The objectives of coalition politics sometimes face the dilemma of one partner being brought before the court by another partner in an attempt to force a motion of no confidence. The practice of forming coalition governments, although difficult, requires more scrutiny as a political strategy and political tactic.

The intractable coalition politics is marred by instability which affects the communities. Instability has a critical bearing on democracy. To prevent unnecessary conflicts arising, a climate that is conducive for cooperation between the political parties in coalition must be realised, with an emphasis on political parties entering into coalition agreements.

## **CHAPTER 4**

### **DEVELOP A STRATEGY OF SUSTAINING COALITION IN SOUTH AFRICA METROS**

#### **4.1 4.1. Introduction**

This chapter concerns the strategies for sustaining coalitions, especially in setting an agenda for building a new political coalition. It intends to invigorate the most workable strategy to sustain coalition. However, the premise of undertaking this chapter shall be cognisant of the new phenomenon of coalition in South African politics.

A successful coalition can be attained through various strategies taken to achieve, rebuild and strengthen the political culture of a society (Tattersall, 2010:2). There are three suggestions at the centre of effective coalition. First, coalitions become prominent once they realise social change. This manifests itself as political parties in coalitions operate in a mode to reinforce organisational capacity. Second, the epicentre of a winning coalition is the strategic choice of coalition participants, whose involvement is informed by their strategic choice. The third is the mainstay of political parties in coalition with the sway of political power. The strength emanates from developing new leaders and being innovative during election campaigns (Tattersall, 2010:3).

It is vital to point out, as Wolford (2015:53) suggests, that building political coalitions entails fundamental trade-offs between increasing the chances of success and making political concessions to secure cooperation of potential partners. Hence, the elements of political coalition correlate with common interest, identity and organisational values. Indeed, this strategy is workable and always brings order and hope in a political coalition strategy (Tattersall, 2010:22).

In coalitions as part of the democratic process such as in India, political parties have adapted to the dynamics of coalition formation and the compromise and power sharing to sustain co-operation (MacMillan, 2002:204). This success is the primary interest of the political parties in a coalition, which mainly refers to winning a specific, external outcome (Tattersall, 2010:22).

In reshaping the political climate to sustain coalition power, it is important to build political party strength. The concept of power is derived from the two combinations of sociological and electorate support (Tattersall, 2010: 23).

#### **4.2 Strategies for sustainable coalitions in a Metropolitan**

The failure of the DA to acknowledge that coalitions exist in the City of Johannesburg and the City of Tshwane means that the DA prefers to survive on expressions of individual power and is not inevitably steered by the propositions of coalition (Mathekga, 2018). An argument is posed by Mashaba (2018) to the effect that Mathekga's suggestions are ill-informed, and that deals are being done to loosen engagements. The coalition in the City of Johannesburg works because the partners make it work.

The case of Ekurhuleni mayor, Mzwandile Masina, involving the failed motion by the DA, implies that Mashaba's arguments are a decoy. This can be derived from the IFP's abstaining from voting and the EFF's not supporting the motion of no confidence (Goba, 2018).

This is evidence that South African political parties are besieged with difficulties when managing the elusive burdens and problems of coalition politics. For instance, the Nelson Mandela Bay metropolitan is testimony to the fact that international experience of coalition politics proves that instability is never far away (Callard & Law, 2018).

#### **4.3 Working strategy to sustain coalition**

Working coalitions become natural as political parties consciously engage in a political process of coalition dynamics (Sinema, 2009:3). One of these dynamics elements is the historical process derived from understanding how to conceive of the management of coalition structures, in an over time-initiating coalition formation and controlling changes in coalition structures (Lieberman, 1975:557). In this regard, coalitions can be useful and effective if they are coordinated perfectly. For instance, opposition parties must consider, among other things, a focused approach that is dedicated to preventing any abuse and bullying of smaller opposition parties (Cohen *et al.*, 2002:1).

Indeed, to ensure stability within a coalition, there is need for it to be managed carefully, on a daily basis, as it involves high stakes regarding interests, ideology and agenda (Stiftung, 2018:27). For example, in Kenya, if a coalition is established it has to form a political party. Its composition has positions such as chairperson, secretary-general and treasurer (Kadima & Ouwor, 2006:209). This ensures the proper management of all the political parties involved, as well as of their interests.

An effectively functioning coalition needs to consider a variety of practical methods for its success and for it to be realisable. There are five approaches for effective functioning: communication and consultation; decision-making procedures; payoffs; coalition size; and coalition disputes (Stiftung, 2018: 28-29).

These approaches are outlined in the following subsections as constituting a working strategy for sustaining a coalition in the South African metropolitan context.

#### **4.3.1 Communication and consultation**

Coalitions must regularly interact to provide a forum for sharing ideas and information. The NDI (2015:22) argues that information is power. There are elements to consider that need to be outlined in party-specific communication and communication among coalition partners.

##### **4.3.1.1 Party-specific communication**

This is a two-fold process. Party leaders interact through two-way communication with their members and provide support by sharing information regarding the coalition's accomplishments and challenges. Party leaders also have to engage through the constant monitoring of the coalition and update members and supporters, thereby keeping the structure vibrant (NDI, 2015:22).

#### **4.3.1.2 Communication among coalition partners**

According to the NDI (2015:22), parties in coalitions should strive to share work fairly to create a sense of involvement of all members. Over and above this, clear guidelines with a stipulated agreement should outline how information is shared, with roles and responsibilities during the execution of tasks being set out.

Kadima and Ouwor (2006:210) argue that a successful coalition depends on regular consultation and engagement. Consensus and compromise are the bedrock of successful coalition. In this instance, parties reach an agreement with clear and accepted methods for resolving problems. When consensus is achieved, parties become comfortable as they see their views reflected in the final outcome. Compromise involves making concessions on a particular issue (NDI, 2015:23). The reason for instability relates to a leadership style, where parties in a coalition are unable to find one another. For example, in the Nelson Mandela Bay metropolitan (NMB), DA leader Athol Trollip finds it difficult to engage in consultations with their coalition partners, and has vowed that he will never consult them (Suttner, 2018).

Successful coalition-building requires political parties to forge a good faith effort to seek and understand each other's viewpoints. This assists during consensus and compromise stages (NDI, 2015:23). For example, being in a coalition means that the power of numbers no longer permits the strongest party, like the DA, to merely proceed as it pleases with policies, without consultation (Suttner, 2017). An advantage can be drawn from an example of an IPC meeting, where each member announced upcoming events, and then those members who had attended the National Safe Kids conference present a report (Cohen *et al.*, 2017:4).

However, there are experiences across the globe that cite the lack of communication as a cause of coalition breakdown. For instance, Kenya's National Rainbow Coalition (NARC) has detailed provisions for holding regular meetings (Kadima & Ouwor, 2006:210). Equally, a Malawi coalition undertook a formal approach of meeting and creating a committee structure for the purposes of coalition agreement. Moreover, interacting informally when in Parliament will in itself have good results for the coalition's stability (Kadima & Lembani, 2006:136).

The NDI (2013:67) outlines the German coalition management structure that revolves around four aspects, namely regular, routine talks; regular coordination meetings between groups; policy working groups; and 'elephant rounds', as explained below. If South African political parties in the metropolitans could study these models, their coalitions would be sustainable.

- Regular routine talks: The group that achieves an agreement through negotiations takes a form of an informal body. Thus allows groups to two meet weekly as includes senior party representatives – total of approximately 12 people.
- Regular coordinated meeting between groups: A total of 12-15 senior party representatives exchange information and coordinate strategies.
- Policy working groups: These centres around policy issues, and allow expertise from parties on technical and complicated issues.
- Elephant rounds: The principals resolve problems, during regular routine talks.

Both Suttner (2017) and Stiftung (2018) suggest that these two cases of Malawi and Germany are easy and convenient for avoiding a threat arising that could induce a breakaway in the coalition.

#### **4.3.2 Procedures on making decision**

The decision-making process comes with great responsibility and commitment in coalition management, especially on policy coordination (Naoto, 1998:105).

A successful coalition, informed by the experiences of coalitions in Germany, is founded on written agreements that aim to establish formal committees for engagements. As such, well-written coalition agreements signify political agreements that oblige partners to adhere to the deal and remain in the coalition (Callard & Law, 2018).

Majority vote, consensus and threshold are key factors in making decisions within a coalition. An augmented feature might comprise a structural pattern that is tantamount to debate (Stiftung, 2018:28). Moreover, Suttner (2018) points out the inability to relate to the style of leadership, which makes coalition unworkable. He emphasises that the ability for the partners of a coalition to work together and find one another is attained through compromise or concession. A typical example is how Herman Mashaba, although he went through criticism, has been able to contain the EFF. This cool diplomacy has earned him appreciation for surviving in a coalition.

Stiftung (2018:28) noted that if party A holds 20 out of 50 seats in a council, and forms a coalition with parties each holding 5 seats, party A then leads with majority in the coalition.

According to Moury and Timmermans (2013: 124), an analysis has demonstrated that coalitions in Belgium have located emphasis on collective decision-making. Stiftung (2018:28) states further that full consensus has to be reached to avoid collapsing coalitions on a particular issue. This should be arranged such that decision-making procedures are required to obtain an outlook between majoritarian decision-making and decision-making by consensus.

In a nutshell, consensus and compromise are the ultimate goals of successful coalition building. Political parties find common ground and become comfortable, as their respective views are being reflected. A win-win scenario involves concessions and is tantamount to being willing to cede essential ground to a partner (NDI, 2015:23)

### **4.3.3 Approaches on making decisions**

Favourable circumstances for sustaining a coalition are crucial and the appropriate style of decision management is in the interests of parties. In the success of policy mechanisms, the strategic ground of attaining coalition is characterised by decision-making approaches. These are outlined in the following subsections.



#### **4.3.3.1 Top-down style**

This approach is predominant in decision-making, as political parties in coalitions make agreements on policy at national level, and then cascade these down to the lower levels.

#### **4.3.3.2 Bottom-up style**

This style is democratic in nature and more transparent, because it is not easy although not regularly will political parties postpone the decisions. This approach prevents controversial, divisive issues from being passed (Naoto, 1998:115).

#### **4.3.4 Payoffs**

A coalition theory is about parties reaping benefits from being in government. According to Browne and Franklin (1973:453), “if a party participate[s] in government, not only do the psychological rewards of wielding power accrue to the party elite and its backbenchers, but also the party is in position to use the power of the state to reward its friends and punish its enemies”.

The two factors of power and patronage should not be ruled out as constituting an important consequence of cohesiveness of government and the policy direction to be adopted (MacMillan, 2002:199). Dual contending models suggest that government offices are first allocated between coalition partners, while the second distribution always reflects the power of bargaining of each partner (Laver & Schofield, 1990).

Therefore, this approach of political parties in dividing office and policy is all about the management of payoffs (Bucur, 2016). Payoffs in coalitions are crucial to a coalition’s stability, argue Demirkaya and Schofield (2014:3). Payoffs are usually negotiated and must be regularly re-examined. How a party bargains may change the coalition’s terms (Stiftung, 2018: 28).

Theories of coalition are dominated by two types of payoffs. There is a fixed reward of gaining office, and a compromise-flexible reward linked to policy output (Laver, Railings & Thrasher, 1987:502).

#### **4.3.5 Coalition size**

The size and composition of a coalition is relative to its goals, as this influences its effectiveness (Leftwich, 2018). Successful coalitions, as theory suggests, have been formed with the smallest number of parties to consolidate a government majority (Mcmillan, 2002:187). Coalitions that are more successful, according to Tattersall (2010), are normally formed with a few political parties that cooperate in decision-making and sharing resources. An example is the DA-EFF coalition in the City of Johannesburg, comprising only two parties. For instance, the EFF rescued the DA during the motion of no confidence, joining in with the 140 councillors who voted against the Da Gama motion of no confidence. In Mashaba's case, 121 voted out of 140 voting councillors (Gerber, 2017).

This voting support normalises and influences stability in coalition, meaning that a surplus majority coalition can be more stable, to the extent that it survives, notwithstanding its loss of support (Stiftung, 2018:29). For example, Sridharana (2008:19) states that the NDA coalition governed India from 1999 to 2004, with a surplus majority.

#### **4.3.6 Disagreements on coalition**

Conflicts of interest among individuals, organisations and nations are normally resolved when parties form alliances and especially which involve coalitions being formed (Lieberman, 1975:557). Therefore, in any coalition, where the stakes are high, disagreements will arise (Stiftung, 2013:26). The experience at the Nelson Mandela Bay metropolitan began with a rift between the DA and the United Democratic Movement (UDM) over an ousted UDM deputy mayor, Mongameli Bobani (Callard & Law, 2018). The political parties may differ, based on their ideologies, different agendas and/or power objectives (Stiftung, 2013:26). Nevertheless, Callard and Law (2018) argue that parties of opposing ideological positions do work together, although an obvious threat is to

surrender their identity. Stiftung (2013:26), circumventing the debacle, states that power is an immediate reward. There are measures, such as those that could manage the Bobani-type fiasco, which should be put into place to minimise conflict, without compromising the life of coalition.

Callard and Law (2018) attest that the German lesson of managing coalition through a dispute resolution formula or procedure is a viable strategy for a working coalition.

The resolution of coalition disputes is a common internal task, assigned to a specific committee. For example in Mauritius, there are special coordinating committees to manage conflict, although, at times mediators and arbitrators are commissioned to intervene (Sithanen, 2003:11).

#### **4.4 Building trust and confidence**

Trust is a scarce commodity that could enhance a working coalition. There are four areas for sustaining a coalition:

- constant discussion between the actors of different parties
- cooperation between parties on concrete issues
- cooperation with citizens, and
- cooperation at local, provincial and national levels.

Argentina has established a trust and joint initiative in a national congress (NDI, 2015:61).

#### **4.5 Role of the leader**

In any coalition, leaders are obliged to craft an environment of trustworthiness and respect for differing opinions. This extends to the relationship between party leaders, which remains vital. The leaders should possess strong leadership, negotiation and

diplomatic skills in order to maintain cohesion and discipline within the party and coalition (NDI, 2015:62).

#### **4.5.1 Maintain party identity**

Lubbert (1989) proposes that, to preserve distinctive party identities parties should associate with partners of the opposite ideology. This tends to reinforce ideological coherence and emphasises awareness of the unpredictable strategic framework within which parties are contending (McMillan, 2002:190).

For the leaders of the party to maintain party identity. This present a party with an opportunity to at all-time adhere and uphold its original ideas and custom. During negotiation, this must be tabled to form part of an agreement. For instance in Romania, these are set as landmark issues during the tenure of coalition. In the Netherlands, parties in a coalition highlight the political issue they intend to work with in enhancing their programme. The best method is to advance the party's political identity in order to assemble communication means and communication techniques (NDI, 2015:71).

#### **4.6 Conclusion**

It is significant for political parties that participate in a coalition to study how the spheres of national, provincial and local government work. A failure to master the intricacies of the governmental system might constrain the coalition's ability to cope and advance the course of perfectly contributing in a coalition. Smaller parties must recognise that there is a written contract and consensus on how and which issues should be presented to the public domain as a point of difference.

It is imperative for the political parties in a coalition to empower their members to understand that it is reasonable for politicians to differ and to debate and/or dispute, because in the final analysis, the improvement of the lives of the communities is the dominant goal.

In order for a coalition to remain sustainable, the parties to an effective political coalition need to create a very well-founded base. This is base is to allow the initiation of coalition

negotiations before, and not on the eve of, elections, but earlier so that the political parties might begin to find each other. This process of negotiation should be led by a small team of three people, so that it might achieve quality outcomes.

Tolerance, compromise and inter-group dialogue is fundamental in building a workable coalition. It has been positively found that a hardened approach and/or the neglect of coalition agreements will impact severely on coalitions, leading to their demise.

## **CHAPTER 5**

### **RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION**

This chapter shall attempt to provide a set of solutions for a workable political coalition strategy in South African metropolitan councils. A reasonable sense will be established to advance a framework to perfectly improve the life of coalition politics. A perfect coalition would remain solid, as long as political parties initiate coalitions earlier than the set date for elections.

Without a doubt, the emergence of dynamic coalition politics in South will shape its politics. After 1994, South Africa experienced the GNU, which showcased coalitions. Therefore, reasonable recommendations will be elaborated on to set a pace for political transformation, while at the same time South African political parties would be able to draw from the experiences of countries where coalitions are prevalent.

#### **5.1 Recommendations**

While the main core of the study was based on studying and analysing political coalitions, this part of the study focuses on the strategies for sustaining coalitions. Several strategies were explained above, looking at the metropolitan councils, where the DA, EFF and UDM have been critical in coalition building. This chapter shall provide recommendations for political parties for the future, when they reflect on forming a stable coalition. In essence, the working strategy element is found in the historical process of the formation and controlling of a coalition.

- First and foremost, it is essential for a political party to understand its character, where its interest lies, and to identify its organisational values. This would bring stability and hope for a coalition strategy being successful.

- The very essence of an ideal coalition is to have practical coalition management in place. Coalition pact negotiations should commence during the pre-election period. The reason for this is that political party leaders should interface regarding the genuine matters that will shape the direction of the talks. Among other things to settle is their manifesto, which is crafted and intended for use during the election campaign, and serves as a primary departure point. To this end, negotiation is the seed to success.
- In any coalition, large and small political parties stand a chance of benefiting from the coalition. Therefore, the strength of a coalition does not rely only on disagreements, but also on the capability to control them. Given the situation in Kenya and India, as well as in other European countries, the political parties need to have committees to bring small political parties on board and resolve disagreements. The case with the Johannesburg Metro is in point, where the UDM serves on a dispute committee. Overall, a coalition agreement should be precise, providing for the establishment of forums that are dedicated to expressing and resolving grievances.
- In order to keep to a correct direction, the management of a committee must be comprised of political party leaders to objectively restore hope among all involved, thus basically being a point of unification. A standardised method for running committee meetings and firm schedule serve as the primary mechanism. Issues arising from policy disputes should be referred to the formal forums. However, a resolution-conducive platform that would provide a flexible approach is necessary, namely to provide informal methods of disputes resolution. Indeed, coalition forums are critical in a coalition government.
- Looking back at how the GNU was framed, negative views were expressed, but at that time, political party leaders had an option to move positively through cooperation. This led to South Africans having to give regard to the GNU's cooperative work. However, when the three recent challenges experienced by the metropolitans are

examined, it is seen that the conduct of the DA, UDM and EFF coalition pact leaves much to be desired. These parties failed to maintain a working coalition metropolitan council. The UDM leader accused the DA of ignoring the views of smaller parties, while the EFF accused the DA of bullying and being abusive to its leader. The UDM went to the high court over its regional leader, Bobani. A similar case could be attested by Nepal's never-ending deadlock. A suggestion is therefore made to consider avoiding related states of affairs, especially before and after 2019. The political parties that endeavour to form a coalition must foster dialogue and reconciliation in an approach that promotes tolerance and compromise. In fact, the latter must be embedded in the coalition agreement.

- Deal making should not be kept secret, but rather, political parties must always strive to communicate what has led to a compromise being formulated. This would not leave their supporters and the public suspicious. Hence, no political party can remain in a coalition without the buy-in of its members and supporters. The political party style of decision-making needs to be grounded on transparency and accountability. Well-written agreements, as discussed in Chapter 4, constitute a cornerstone of a successful coalition. This would impel partners to stick to their deal and remain in a coalition.
- The strategic framework wherein the political parties operate is reinforced by ideological coherence, thus maintaining party identity. The EFF, for instance, although not in a coalition in the National Assembly, has been able to demonstrate its stance on corruption. This political party forced Parliament to respond and accept certain policy positions which had been neglected, for example the Nkandla scandal. In the Johannesburg metropolitan council, the EFF held to its original ideas, despite its coalition pact with the DA. This suggests that to preserve distinctive party identity, political parties might indeed partner with an opposite ideology.



- A two-pronged communication approach is critical for political parties to keep their members on board, therefore they should share information, as and when necessary. Lastly, the involvement of all members who are in coalition should be tacitly outlined in the agreement, during the execution of the task. Two elements which embrace a good working coalition strategy are communication and consultation, and party-specific communication. These are recommended in this study to objectively overcome challenges and accomplish the best coalition results.
- Patronage and power factors that underpin the lust for coalition. When political parties reaching point of diving office payoffs is crucial to the stability of coalition. However, no rush-rush payoffs must precisely form part of the negotiation and be constantly examined.
- Relative coalition composition, especially at national, provincial and local levels, should be arranged such that smaller parties or two parties agree to consolidate to form a government majority. A typical example is the DA-EFF coalition in the City of Johannesburg.
- A smaller political party in a coalition must not be neglected because of its size and numbers. While this type of party normally comes with the least support and few resources, the junior political party must be allowed to make full contributions, despite its limited capacity.
- A consensus-seeking approach is necessary for healing any rift that might emerge during disagreements. Despite the different ideological outlooks of political parties, especially in fearing the surrender of their identity, a viable strategy for managing a working coalition is presented by a well-crafted dispute resolution procedure. Political parties in Mauritius routinely commission mediators and arbitrators for their disputes.

- Regular discussion between parties in a coalition is significant for establishing trust, as has been experienced in Argentina. Political parties should by all means seek to develop a strategic cooperation at local, provincial and national levels, and that must also be prevalent between political parties when concentrating on issues. The very essence of this scarce commodity, trust, requires that the interests of citizens, who are key participants as voters during elections, must be taken on board at all times.
- A political party, as and when entering into coalition, must ensure that it has capable leadership with the necessary negotiation and diplomatic skills, as well as resilient leadership qualities.
- Original ideas and customs preserve distinctive party identities. Therefore, for parties to enhance their political programme, they must always highlight burning political issues, both external and internal.
- Political advisers in coalition management are key to develop mutually close relations and trust. By the way, a limited pool of advisers is advisable. For instance, in both Ireland and New Zealand, political advisers always maintain dynamism within coalitions and when resolving conflicts. Contrary to the UK, the core team of advisers is evidently required to be larger. Advisers' exclusive duty rests on a detailed policy agreement, which would also ensure the application of the coalition partners' pledges.
- Formal bodies help coalition management in Denmark and Germany. The committees meet frequently and are important forums for political management. The main function of the management committee is to provide communication to the value that political parties enjoy equal standing. Membership is generally related to political

party strength, which is also seen heavily as a key factor during any decline in trust between coalition partners.

## **5.2 Conclusion**

The core of the study centred on the ability of political parties to assemble and manage coalition governments. Chapter 1 is the foremost part of the research proposal, which provides insight into the historical development of local government in South Africa. The local government transition, in being informed by the post-1994 election, is known as the new dispensation. The successful five local government elections held from 1995 to 2016 were elaborated on to indicate that political parties were seen as critical role players. The democratisation process in South Africa today and in the future, was and is underpinned by the democratic nature of the country's legislative framework.

Nevertheless, comparable with European countries the character of democracy in South Africa still has an enormous opportunity to sustain coalition government in the future. In this chapter, the scope of the study is outlined for the development of the entire which centres on coalitions as a significant new phenomenon in the South African political landscape.

Chapter 2 is the embodiment of the study and examined the theory and concept of the term 'coalition politics' in South Africa as a new critical phenomenon. Here, South Africa's historical background was observed, as it emerged from the three phases – the pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial phases.

The fact that democracy is of universal impact has underpinned the flow of the discussion from the perceptive points of various scholars and authors. Ideas of democracy, which are embedded in three legal theories, were explained as government by people, rule by the people, and the will of the people. The character of South Africa since 1996 has been shaped by the key concepts of democracy, competitive multi-party participation, and citizen participation. Moving forward, it was found that in any democracy, elections characterise the system of modern democracy. Hence, democracy could be viewed as an inclusive project that has technical and social roles.

With these three indicators serving as a barometer participation, competition and legitimacy, no country aspiring for a democratic system would rule them out. Under any normal circumstances, the emphasis made by the UN is relevant; in other words, when assessing democracy, the following are rightfully taken in consideration: the right to vote, the free campaigning of political parties, secrecy of the ballot, openness and accountability of the electoral process, and acceptable electoral laws.

The core of Chapter 2 was to discuss the conceptualisation of coalition theory. This was outlined, looking at the levels of rationalist theory and closed minimal range theory. A rational behind is that once coalition agreement was agreed up must remain be the life of coalition. Suggestions were made on a closed minimal range theory in Chapter 3, with regard to two variables, namely generalised priority willingness to bargain and information certainty, as constituting the best approach for non-crisis politics of coalition.

Since coalition is about two or more parties coming together, this involves pooling resources, forming binding commitments, and agreeing to achieve the set goals. Coalition types are eminent in Africa, Europe and Asia. These are electoral alliances, coalition governments, grand coalitions and legislatives coalitions, rainbow coalitions, and confidence and supply agreements. A specific focus was placed on the US, the UK and India to provide a historical analysis of coalition, especially as to how these countries have been able to establish coalition.

Chapter 3 outlined a very in-depth consideration of what motivates and stimulates opposition parties in South Africa in order to imagine a coalition system for the country. South African opposition parties have given the same testimony regarding the ANC's political interference, lack of accountability, corruption, and maladministration, as well as poor performance with regard to governance.

The focus was located in the South African metropolitans and on what the influences are that lead to the formation of coalitions. A focussed assessment was made with regard to the path to coalition politics, the declining dominance of the ANC, the DA as the child of coalition, and the EFF as a kingmaker with an ability to conduct good publicity stunts.

The historical power of the ANC has fallen short due to its attitudes to democracy, to the extent that the 2014 elections were characterised as a period of crisis. The blindfolded ANC was hampered by the following: its failure to deliver on its promises, immoral and unethical conduct that embraced corruption scandals, service delivery protests, and the unpopular Nkandla and Marikana affairs. Being the keyholders of coalition, the DA took coalition politics back to the Western Cape. The many failures of the ANC strengthened the DA to take opportunity to form and call for coalition in South Africa. This political party guided many municipalities back into its fold. The EFF also used the existing opportunity, as its leaders know the ANC's weakest link. This political party appealed to the young people and was capable of energising the political scene. With its populist style, the EFF could hold the South African parliament in a standoff, and also use its skill at intimidation to take the Speaker of the National Assembly to court. The EFF, at local government level, is still an opposition party which wishes to see the ANC moved out of power, totally.

Coalition is a new phenomenon in South Africa, although a little experience could be drawn from the workings of the GNU. The 2016 local government elections became a turning point. Therefore, it was mandatory for this study to make an observation on the character and challenges of coalitions in the metropolitans. These ranged from coalition weaknesses, strengths and opportunities, as well as threats to local government democratisation. A common factor in the three metropolitans of Tshwane, Nelson Mandela Bay and the City of Johannesburg was the inability to adhere to coalition agreements. The UDM in Nelson Mandela Bay took the DA to court. The same happened in the City of Tshwane. The key element that was raised was that the party in the majority, namely the DA, was experienced to be unhelpful when it came to managing coalition. A comparable move was the prolonged and unexplained stay away of the EFF, which nearly collapsed the council of Tshwane. At the onset of negotiation, political parties that enter into coalitions must strive to reach a consensus, in such a way that this type of conduct of the EFF in the City of Johannesburg does not occur again. The EFF disrupted Herman Mashaba's inaugural speech, as it maintained that it supports workers' rights.

Chapter 4 endeavoured to develop a strategy for sustaining coalition politics in South African metropolitans. For effective coalition, political parties must see coalition as the

ultimate catalyst of social change, and the involvement of political parties as being derived from their strategic choice, with coalition strength resting on developing new leaders and engaging in innovative election campaigning. In this regard, a strategy for attaining sustainable coalitions in metropolitans is that a coalition-led governing party should recognise other parties by all means possible.

Given the natural political dynamics of coalitions, the factors that are necessary for achieving effective coalition that is realisable and successful are: communication and consultation, decision-making procedures, payoffs, coalition size, and coalition dispute resolution procedures. Trust is enhanced in a working coalition, and while strong leadership is also important, it is essential to take into account the fact that political parties must maintain their identity in upholding their original ideas and customs. To this end, a failure to master the coalition may constrain its ability to cope with and advance the course of contributing not only to the life of the political parties, but also to society in general

Notwithstanding the ideological differences between the DA and EFF, these parties have demonstrated a willingness for cooperation. When the 2019 general election takes place, this might deepen their relations to engage in a formal alliance, despite the crises that both political parties experienced in Nelson Mandela Bay and City of Johannesburg. A potential is there to experience a recurrence of DA-EFF coalition arrangement, based solely on the political will of the parties.

The 2016 municipal elections established a path for political parties to galvanise their energies for the 2019 general elections. Equally so, the indications are that the 2019 elections will be dominated by coalition pacts and political alliances, heralding in a period when South Africa will enter into a coalition era. The fundamental result would be that South Africa is moving into an era of a coalition-based society.

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## **ACTs**

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Constitution of the Republic of South Africa of 1996 *referred to as the final Constitution to distinguish it from the 'interim' Constitution (Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 200 of 1993) which was in force from the 1994 to 1997 as the framework for the election of a Constitutional Assembly to draft and adopt the 'final' Constitution*

## TABLES AND SOURCES

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Chapter 1	Table 1	Adapted from LG Elections task Group (1996:31)
Chapter 1	Table 2	Adapted from IDASA 1996, No.6
Chapter 1	Table 3	IEC Results 2000
Chapter 1	Table 4	<a href="http://www.politicsweb.co.za/news-and-analysis/2011-election-national-results">www.politicsweb.co.za/news-and-analysis/2011-election-national-results</a>
Chapter 1	Table 5	Source: BBC <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-36985339">www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-36985339</a>
Chapter 1	Table 6	Source Gauteng City-Region Observatory 2019
Chapter 1	Table 7	Adapted from Moses (2014)
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Chapter 2	Table 2	Seyd (2003:13)
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Chapter 3	Table 1	Siddle (2018:5)
Chapter 3	Table 2	Booyesen (2014: 71-72)
Chapter 3	Table 3	Integrated Development Plan-Draft Second Edition 2017/18-2021/22
Chapter 3	Table 4	Consolidated Annual Report for the City of Tshwane 2016
Chapter 3	Table 5	Elections'16-News24