Conceiving global culture: Frantz Fanon and the politics of identity

First submission: 11 April 2017
Acceptance: 14 June 2018

The article introduces Frantz Fanon’s notion of cultural humanism as a new way of conceiving global culture and, simultaneously, models a new framework for understanding the ethics and politics of identity today. Drawing critical insights from Fanon’s ‘Racism and Culture’ and The Wretched of the Earth as well as the work of several other non-essentialist thinkers, the article develops an anti-essentialist theory of (global) culture, asserting that culture and its values constitute a contested universal that all human beings are equal claimants to its appropriation, such that a particular putative culture is neither the basis of any individual or group identity, nor the grounds for treating anyone unjustly.

In problematising global culture, the article foils Fanon’s cultural humanism against a tradition of essentialist conceptions of culture in the thoughts of prominent Euro-American writers, from Immanuel Kant to Samuel P. Huntington. These other authors are usually thought of as developing theories of global culture, but evidently ended up with narrow/nationalistic, and racist and essentialist, notions of culture. At the same time, we choose Fanon and his theory of global culture as company throughout the article not only because his work and activism aimed to undo one of the most
egregious consequences of false conceptions of (global) culture, colonialism, but because his work has continued to be relevant in many contemporary liberation/humanistic discourses, even as he has sometimes been narrowly read as defending cultural nationalism.

Keywords: Cultural humanism, Frantz Fanon, global culture, identity, politics, racism

1. Introduction
The article introduces Frantz Fanon’s notion of cultural humanism as a new way of conceiving global culture, and simultaneously, models a new framework for understanding the ethics and politics of identity in the current world where what might be conceived as social and political subjectivities ramify rapidly through travel, commerce, (violent) conflicts, natural disasters, information technology and inter-acculturation. Fanon’s notion of global culture – cultural humanism – speaks to how culture or its values may be said to be important for making sense of the world we live in, without, at the same time, over-determining or under-determining individual or group identity or potentials on the basis of a particular putative culture. Cultural humanism, on the one hand, departs from extant ‘conceptions of the new global culture as a kind of ‘third’ culture, one that is seen as built above or built against national cultures’ (Buell, [1987] 2003: 162). Again, as an approach to critiquing cultural essentialism, cultural humanism is unconvinced about the place of human agency in both the radical poststructuralists’ worldwide system-created cultural heterogeneity, as well as the ‘memoryless’, ‘context-less’ and ‘anaesthetised’ conceptions of global culture like that of Anthony Smith (1990: 179 – 180; Buell, [1987] 2003). At the outset, cultural humanism is sympathetic to questions to do with how we can forge societies that are truly pluralistic yet possess a shared sense of belonging, and importantly for Fanon, a radical humanistic politics of recognition (Gordon 2015: 12; Isar 2006: 374; Taylor, [1992] 1994).

On the other hand, the article presents Fanon’s cultural humanism as foiled against a tradition of essentialist conceptions of culture in the thoughts of prominent Euro-American thinkers, from Immanuel Kant to Samuel P. Huntington. These other authors are usually thought of as developing theories of global culture, or at least, we want to take them seriously as attempting to provide theories of global culture – since at certain points in their writings, they each attempted to say something about culture that they want us to understand to be universally true of human groups and societies – but evidently ended up with narrow/nationalistic, and racist and essentialist, notions of culture. We choose to contrast Fanon’s cultural humanism with the views of these other
authors because they are influential figures, their writings and public utterances evidently providing the impetus for the kind of anti-humanistic deeds/situations that cultural humanism counters. At the same time, we choose Fanon and his theory of global culture as company throughout the article not only because his work and activism aimed to undo one of the most egregious consequences of Eurocentric essentialism, colonialism, but because his work has continued to be relevant in many contemporary liberation/humanistic discourses, even as he has sometimes been narrowly read as defending a variant of cultural nationalism. Cultural nationalism here refers to the view that every individual member of a nation, ethnic group or religious followership necessarily shares a unique culture, a language and a proud identity, which are thought of as elements needed for defending a people’s interests at all times.

Specifically, Fanon’s cultural humanism, which derives ultimately from his theory of culture in ‘Racism and Culture’ and The Wretched of the Earth, contends that every individual person or group lives by what ought to be understood as global culture. According to Fanon, there are no essential elements of culture that can be said to be uniquely shared by a people. That is why it can only yield retrograde outputs to insist on a unique cultural identity that needs to be revived or reclaimed during a people’s struggle for emancipation, justice or national greatness (Fanon, [1963] 1961: 206 – 268; Fanon, [1964] 1967: 29 – 44; cf. Pithouse 2013: 91 – 98). For ‘a national culture is not a folklore, nor an abstract populism that believes it can discover the people’s true nature;’ rather, it is the whole body of thought and action through which a people creates, liberates and keeps itself in existence (Fanon, [1963] 1961: 233). Fanon’s cultural humanism recognises the importance of a ‘national identity’ insofar as this is ultimately an expression of the collective efforts of an oppressed people’s revolutionary struggle for liberation, and that is always open to renegotiation. Consequently, cultural humanism undermines beliefs in the redemptive and taxonomic capacity of culture, conceived in binary, totalising or essentialising terms.

To be sure, cultural differentiation and cultural mystification as tools of social and political ordering are, of course, only introduced to bolster existing conditions of power, domination and inequality, especially in racialised, theocentric and patriarchal societies for example. Needless to say, therefore, minority groups and those without power, capital and other instruments of social control are those that frequently absorb the brunt of essentialist notions of culture. Very often, certain minorities suffer egregious harm or even face the reality of annihilation based on the rather weighty accusation that they are inferior humans because they allegedly belong to an inferior culture, a culture of laziness, savagery or weak rational capacity, or do not have a culture at all. People in a position of weakness are sometimes pressed to grave mental lows as a result of how others
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perceive them or even because of how they perceive themselves or have been forced to perceive themselves based on alleged cultural inferiority. Enslavements, colonialism, genocide, apartheid, xenophobia, ethnic and religious bigotry, cultural racism, nativism, as well as certain forms of intolerance exemplify how the tendency to essentialise culture has at least constituted a major rationalising factor for denying justice and subverting human rights (see Gibson 2015: 5–6). For this reason, cultural essentialist/prejudice has had, and if unchecked, will continue to have serious implications on social and political ordering the world over.

London’s treatment of the Irish famine of the 1840s was a clear case in history where the theory or ideology that determined the fate of a people was in large parts rooted in a deep-seated cultural prejudice anchored in a ‘chance correlation’. Amartya Sen writes that while poverty in Britain was typically explained in terms of the vagaries of economic factors, Irish poverty was widely viewed in England as being caused by the Irish culture of ‘laziness, indifference and ineptitude’. To make a very bad situation even worse, the Irish were blamed for their centuries-old taste for potatoes – as this was considered one of the calamities which the natives had, in the English view, brought on themselves. In the end, the ultimate victory for cultural prejudice in this case, was that while the Irish died in their thousands, Britain’s mission was not seen as one to alleviate Irish distress but “to civilize her people and to lead them to feel and act like human beings” (Sen 2006: 104 – 105; Donelly, 1998)

The above worrisome reports are not, of course, the only instances in history where cultural prejudices have carried the day and beclouded human reason, leading to very disastrous consequences and the denial of both humanity and justice. Prior to Pearl Harbour and the United States of America’s eventual entry into World War II, a Japanese Prime Minister had to resign from office because the then President of the United States of America, Franklin D. Roosevelt would not deign to negotiate a peaceful resolution of the escalating conflict with the lowly rated Japanese ‘animals’. Similarly, Harry Truman (US president after Roosevelt) who, after publicly describing the Germans and the Japanese as barbarians and beasts that needed to be treated as such, proceeded to unleash the gratuitous terrors of fire-bombing major Japanese cities. This was followed with the equally unnecessary invasion of Japan and the ultimate horrors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 6 and 8 1945 (Duus 1998: 231 – 44; Rawls 1999, 98 – 102, consider esp. n26 on p. 102).

At the 1992 Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro, former American president George Bush Sr., when tasked by representatives of developing nations to put on the agenda the over-consumption of resources by developed nations, retorted, ‘the American lifestyle is not up for negotiation’. The simple point being made
by Bush here is that he couldn’t care less if any cultural pattern of his country or others like his were a serious obstacle to global environmental security and global justice. What mattered most to him was that the American culture and that of the Global North, which he construed as completely distinct from the rest of the world, be protected and preserved at all cost. We need not recount past unprintable ills of the other ‘isms’ mentioned above in order to underscore the damaging consequences of cultural prejudice.

Indeed, the rhetoric and narratives of the electioneering campaigns that brought Donald J. Trump to power and made Brexit a reality (and ultimately igniting a new phase of revanchist conservative populism globally) at once underscore the urgency and necessity of a critical reexamination of the role that culture and cultural valences play or should not play in human societies. Beyond the burgeoning Trumpite nationalism and the faltering Brexit exceptionalism, culture and its valences have continued to define social and political realities globally, in ways that Fanon would describe as chauvinistic, ultra-nationalistic and ultimately racist. In problematising and interrogating global culture therefore, this piece takes into account, as would be Fanon’s wish, how attitudes towards culture and notions of (global) culture have directly or indirectly impacted and may continue to have an impact on social and political life today. We begin with a cluster of by no means easy questions: what really is culture and what does it mean to theorise global culture?

2. Problematising Global Culture

Many people – scholars and commentators alike – have used the term ‘culture’ to refer to a large number of unrelated categories (Williams 1983: 87 – 93). But there is at least one thing everyone seems to be in agreement about human culture: culture is not nature, even though it may be said to augment the latter; it is something learned. Indeed, we have been successful in developing a discursive opposition between culture and nature. Culture, as Fanon would say, is the product of human interaction with nature and our relationship with fellow humans. Also, culture does not exist in the same way a people’s art, music, dance

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1 Undoubtedly, the idea of global culture is galvanised by globalisation; or the growing interdependence of all human societies as a result of advancements in (information) technology. But, to isolate IT (information technology) or globalisation as the sole driver of the shrinking of our contemporary world along cultural lines, and the consequent desire for a global culture is mistaken. Historically, travel, commerce, religion, enslavement, immigration, wars/conflicts, constituted the organic drivers of world cultural mix. IT rose to become both an organic factor and a catalyst of inter-culturality – in that it simultaneously expanded the scope of these other organic drivers of human diversity.
and idioms may be said to exist. All the items in the preceding list may be part of culture, but it is a mistake to think that we can point to the ghost in the machine, an independent entity called ‘Culture’ that can exclusively be owned or belong to nations, groups or individuals. Instead, culture ‘refers to customary behaviour and beliefs that are passed on through enculturation [or] cultural learning’ (Kottak 2008: 294). Culture is supposed to help individuals to make sense of their environment and thus be able to live the good life. This is because cultural resources are required, even unavoidable, for creating a sense of entitlement and self-love (Alcoff 1998: 18). ‘But equally,’ in the words of renowned anti-colonial writer and postcolonial activist Amilcar Cabral, ‘in some respects, culture is very much a source of obstacles and difficulties, of erroneous conceptions about reality, of deviation in carrying out duty, arid of limitations on the tempo and efficiency of a struggle that is confronted with the political, technical and scientific requirements...’ ([1970] 1973: 53). At all events, some people believe that culture fundamentally controls economic and political development in every human society in every epoch in human history. Yet, curiously, no one knows from where culture comes; even as what may be regarded as the contents of culture and its relationship with religion, politics and ideology, for example, have also remained controversial (Roskin, Cord, Medeiros and Jones 2007: 10 – 11).

But the critical question is: does culture really matter? If yes, to what extent? To what extent, if any, would a theory of global culture help in the resolution of conflicts orchestrated by attitudes towards culture, especially the vexatious issue of cultural identity? As Uchang Kim says, ‘the resolution of frictions brought about by the assertion of... [a particular] identity cannot be found simply in improving the fairness of legal processes or softening the expression of cultural dominance of the host culture over the subaltern immigrants’ (2014: 44). The diverse solutions needed to overcome the inclemencies and frictions of identity, Kim continues, go beyond the ‘world-historical trend’ of a politics of (collective) identities: ‘if we are to hope for a flourishing global human community, a true global culture will eventually have to evolve’ (2014: 44). But how may we conceive global culture?

Inspired by Fanon, at the outset, we view global culture as a way of conceiving culture such that culture is understood as the ever-changing human-created and humanistic framework – philosophies, agreements, practices and values – through which human experience is enriched and the world made sense of. The Fanonian notion of global culture counters and transcends the Eurocentric model and thus is not the outcome of universalising a particular putative culture or the allegedly core values of one or two imagined discrete civilisations; it is, in general, the aggregate outcome of trans-cultural or cultural freedom (Cf Sen 2006; Sardar 2008: xvi and Fanon, [1963] 1961: 215). The transcultural world Fanon prefigures and seeks to create is one in which human beings – individuals and
groups – are allowed what can be called multiple costumes of identity and suffer no harm or injustice as a result of cultural mutation or counter-acculturation. Transculturation, for Fanon, would midwife a contested and contestable universal where cultural barriers and liminalities have been transcended or have become irrelevant for thinking about and acting on the weighty subjects of justice and humanity. The transcultural world is, as Fanon expounds in *The Wretched of the Earth*, the harbinger of a new humanity that has literally resurrected from a bloody *European colonial moment* and has come to fashion out new concepts to live in a new world away from the terrifying past of ‘the nation’ (Fanon, [1963] 1961: 309 – 311). A close reading of Fanon reveals that this does not necessarily mean the loss of what some people might understand as their national or cultural identity. As a matter of fact, an individual is capable of, and often embraces, cultural values other than those into which he or she is nominally born. People may also and often do repudiate or reject customs, traditions, beliefs or practices embedded in the paraphernalia of the putative culture into which they were born. The general contention here is that, thinking through Fanon, we do not see that unique cultural identities exist, or that having a culture necessarily implies belonging to a cultural identity. Identity and culture are not coterminous. Indeed, as Sanya Osha has argued, *identity* can be maintained (separately) even in the face of multi-cultural dialogue (2005: 88). We believe that if unique cultures or cultural identities are thought to exist, then they are perpetually in a flux and expanding.

Conversely, cultural essentialists of the Eurocentric mould, for example, conceive world history as governed by hierarchised autarkic cultures. Eurocentric essentialists are also cultural racists and often deny that some human beings have or live by culture, or sometimes, as Fanon saw in the context of the colonial situation, essentialists work hard to inhibit members of a particular putative culture (Fanon, [1963] 1961: 238). Immanuel Kant and GWF Hegel are some notorious examples of cultural racists whose assumptions rest on the affirmation of Eurocentrism and or the elevation of patterns of (national) culture in Europe. The Kantian-Hegelian kind of cultural essentialism/prejudice avers that Europe or, at least, some countries in Europe and their purported cultural heritage are not only superior to those of other climes, but are definitive of the *ideal human civilisation*. Together with Hegel, Kant and several other philosophers of the Enlightenment era laid the groundwork for anti-Semitism, Nazism and the colonial misadventure (Sherratt 2013).

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2 For example, it would be erroneous to move from the very fact that many Brazilians have a football culture, to say that all Brazilians belong to a Brazilian footballing culture or as a matter of necessity, that all Brazilians are lovers of the round leather game.
Kant in particular holds that some human groups and peoples have no culture, and that a lack of ‘national culture’ takes away from individual persons’ character, as well as actual and possible achievements. He further places peoples in a hierarchical order according to which societies, groups of human beings and countries possess a comparatively or even, sometimes, ontologically higher cultures (Kant, [1764] 2007a; [1775] 2007b; [1785] 2007c; and [1788] 2007d). Kant seems to encounter no difficulty in ordering countries and human groups according to those that could be said to have attained his ‘universalist-humanoid abstraction’ and those that must be treated as rebels against the ‘fundamental principles of human nature’; those that could be said to possess a ‘national character’ and those that could not; those whose civilisations are the most advanced, and those that could never hope to escape a lowly civilisational status (2007e, 7:319; Eze 1997: 130 – 131; Cf. Allais 2016). In all of these Kantian categorisations, Africa and Africans frequently came out the worst.

In the same way, following Kant’s culturally racist footsteps (in spite of belated half-hearted efforts to blur them), Hegel provided the ideological basis for the abuse of the peoples of ‘other cultures’, Africans in particular. He chose to disconnect the African continent from world history while inscribing a manifesto sanctioning the enslavement of Africans and the colonial experience. According to Hegel, for any society of people to be seen as such and be treated as important, then it must be part of World History. In the Philosophy of World History, after using many denigrating, if not unprintable, terms to describe Africans, he goes on to argue that the continent was in urgent need of religious and ‘moral education’, citing its primitive and ‘uncultured’ situation. Indeed, colonisation for Hegel became the only way to ‘civilise’ Africans, to make them to imbibe human culture and mores, and ultimately, begin to entertain the hope of the likelihood of becoming fully human thereafter. Holding tightly to an ultra-essentialist and racist anthropology, Hegel writes:

The Negroes display a great strength of body and a highly sensual nature along with affability, but also a shocking and inconceivable ferocity. These peoples have never emerged out of themselves, nor have they gained a foothold in history…. These bands displayed the most frightful savagery and barbarism…. This Africa remains in its placid, unmotivated, and self-enclosed sensuality and has not yet entered into history; its only further connection with history is that in the darker days its inhabitants have been enslaved (Brown and Hodgson 2015: 197).

In yet another atrocious passage, Hegel iterates:
The characteristic feature of the negroes is that their consciousness has not yet reached an awareness of any substantial objectivity – for example, of God or the law – in which the will of man could participate and in which he could become aware of his own being. The African, in his undifferentiated and concentrated unity, has not yet succeeded in making this distinction between himself as an individual and his essential universality, so that he knows nothing of an absolute being which is other and higher than his own self.... Thus, in Africa as a whole, we encounter what has been called the state of innocence, in which man supposedly lives in unity with God and nature. For in this state, man is yet unconscious of himself (Hegel 1984: 177 – 178).

In this way, Hegel’s writings provided the immediate tonic for European expansion and the colonial misadventure (Irele 1996). Looking through Kant and Hegel, it becomes apparent that essentialist standpoints are often rooted in overly romanticised notions of ‘our’ culture that often go hand in hand with stereotypical and prejudiced views of ‘other’ people and ‘their’ cultures.

In general, essentialists of the cultural nationalism bent, like the cultural racists, hold that a particular putative culture and its practices are not merely emblematic of a people’s identity; rather, every individual member of any given society possesses a unique ‘cultural/national identity’. In this hard essentialist thinking, culture becomes an ontologically primary entity, capable of determining and gauging an individual or society’s political, economic and social futures. The cultural essentialists/nationalists also regard culture as a sui generis factor capable of determining the totality and futurity of every single individual or group that allegedly belong to a given putative culture, despite their disparate experiences and exposures. To belong to a culture here begins from being born to parents allegedly from a particular putative culture. If you have a Yoruba, Igbo or Xhosa parent/s, the cultural nationalists tell us, then you belong to a Yoruba, Igbo or Xhosa culture in all circumstances and have acquired an irrevocable Yoruba, Igbo or Xhosa cultural identity. If the cultural essentialist is right, then it would almost be uncontroversial to argue that belonging to a particular putative culture largely determines what we are and what we are likely to become.

Further, cultural nationalists at first assume that culture is an insular analytic and teleological category that interpretes the action and behaviour, as well as the progress or the lack of it, of human groups. Cultural essentialists of the nationalist persuasion frequently imply that we can predict a priori how each member of a human group would act in any given situation; or that we can predetermine the extent of their abilities in all circumstances based on the putative culture
they were presumably born into or necessarily belong. Contemporary Euro-American cultural nationalists like Samuel P. Huntington, Lawrence Harrison and David S. Landes begin from the premise that culture and its values matter and matter greatly for human progress. They further argue that a culturally just world is achieved when every country, nation or nation-state is able to preserve and, perhaps, develop the pristine ingredients of its culture, unadulterated by alien influences. In addition, cultural nationalists contend that a nation’s culture defines, symbolises and authenticates their identity. On the basis of this claim, they arrive at other far-reaching theoretical consequences; (a) since some societies are more successful than others, it follows that some people – their cultures and/or their values – are better than others. As a result, (b) the (purportedly) ‘highly advanced’ and successful culture of Europe and North America should be protected from alien corruption. In *The Clash of Civilizations*, Huntington argues memorably to the conclusion that

Americans cannot avoid the issue: Are we a Western people or are we something else? The futures of the United States and the West depend upon Americans reaffirming their commitment to Western civilization. Domestically, this means rejecting the divisive siren calls of multiculturalism. Internationally it means rejecting the elusive and illusory calls to identify the United States with Asia. Whatever economic connections may exist between them, *the fundamental cultural gap between Asian and American societies precludes their joining together in a common home*, (Huntington 1996: 307).

Thus, in Huntington’s view, if ‘Western civilization’ is to be preserved, Americans should recognise their unique cultural greatness and its enviable European provenance and work hard to protect their national culture from ‘alien corruption’ (Huntington 1996; 2000; Landes 1998, Harrison 2000).

To be sure, cultural essentialists, unfortunately, are not to be found only in theoretical writings. Once the seeds of prejudice are sown especially by highly influential people like those we have pointed out above, there could be no way to determine the extent of the damaging consequences on future generations. We can never be certain of how far a prejudicial comment might live on, to say nothing of how a systematic denigration of certain groups by respectable intellectuals could inflect the repertoire of a people’s cultural unconscious. United States’ House Representative Curry Todd’s reference to children of undocumented immigrants as ‘rats’ that ‘multiply’ (in October 2010) is but one more example of
how far prejudices arising from the kind of cultural nationalism already ingrained in the American people’s cultural unconscious (by influential intellectuals like Huntington) can go. For the philosopher Natalie Cisneros, Representative Todd’s comments are the very manifestation of ‘backwards-uncitizensing’, that is, a scenario where there is always-already a normative dichotomy between the sexually pure citizen on the one hand, and on the other hand, the ‘alien’ subject functions as the perverse anticitizen, sexually deviant and threatening to the wellbeing of the state (Cisneros 2013: 290 – 291). Thus, cultural nationalism of the type valued by Huntington and his ilk is not different from racism and proto-nationalism. Fanon’s words have remained historically prophetic, unfortunately: ‘From [cultural] nationalism we have passed to ultranationalism, to chauvinism and finally to racism’ ([1961] 1967: 125).

In the same month of Todd’s outburst in America, in Germany, Angela Merkel publicly chided (Turkish and Arab) immigrants for not doing enough to imbibe the culture of their host communities, complaining that ‘the idea of people from different cultural backgrounds living happily “side by side” did not work’; in short, Merkel concludes, Germany’s attempt to create a multicultural society has ‘utterly failed’ (Weaver and agencies 2010). Echoing and reinforcing Merkel’s views four months later, the then British Prime Minister, David Cameron, openly lamented over what he called the failure of ‘state multiculturalism’ in the UK and the rest of Europe. For a leader who would, five years down the line, stand resolutely against Brexit exceptionalism, Cameron ironically argued [that] the UK needed a stronger national identity to prevent people turning to all kinds of extremism’ (Kuenssberg 2011). Like Todd, Cameron doubts the immigrant’s capability to imbibe certain universal human ideals and sentiments. He queries: ‘Do they believe in universal human rights – including for women and people of other faiths? Do they believe in equality of all before the law? Do they believe in democracy and the right of people to elect their own government? Do they encourage integration or separatism?’ (Cameron in Kuenssberg 2011). Many believe that Merkel’s and Cameron’s comments did much to reignite anti-immigrant debates in Europe in the last seven years, especially in France and the UK, with anti-immigration policies later forming a major plank in the Brexit campaign.

Current events in the United States seem to bear out just how popular cultural essentialist views like those developed theoretically in the writings of Kant, Huntington and Landes, and defended politically by David Cameron and Angela Merkel, may have become in the Northern Hemisphere. Following repeated terror attacks in several cities in Europe and North America in recent times, the then Republican flag bearer for the 2016 presidential elections, Donald J. Trump, was unequivocal about his intention to ensure the safety of Americans and ‘reinstall’ America’s (cultural) greatness and guarantee its national security precisely by
profiling and banning certain groups of people from migrating to his country, under his watch. Within a week after the San Bernardino attacks, the GOP frontrunner was widely reported to have specifically called for a ‘total and complete shutdown of Muslims entering the United States until our country’s representatives can figure out what is going on’ (Berman 2015).

Trump’s forceful proclamations were met with severe criticisms by allies and opponents alike, both locally and internationally; but that did not hamper his chances of winning the White House. If anything, his support base apparently increased following these highly divisive and inciting comments, which saw him clinching the GOP ticket, and to the consternation of many, actually winning the US Presidential election in November 2016. We have also seen Internet articles, live television interviews and polls clearly suggesting that many Americans are indeed behind him in all of this. As a matter of fact, he is not the only well-known politician to have aired essentialist views in contemporary American politics. The erstwhile GOP flag-bearer in the 2012 elections, Mitt Romney, had in July the same year, while on a fund-raising trip to Israel, pointed out the fact that the Israeli GDP per capita was $21 000, while for Palestinians it was $10 000, adding that it was ‘a dramatic, stark difference in economic vitality.’ Echoing Huntington and Landes, Romney concludes, ‘if you could learn anything from the economic history of the world it’s this: culture makes all the difference ... (Abdalla 2012).’ His undefended conclusion was that while the Israelis lived by a culture of thrift, their Palestinian counterparts lived by a culture of laziness. Romney’s claims are of course false. The truth is (as a Palestinian negotiator aptly asserted), ‘everyone knows that the Palestinians cannot reach their full potential given the Israeli restrictions [as supported by the United States and Great Britain] imposed on them’ (Aljazeera 2012). Culture does not explain the disparity in income, wealth and privileges between Israelis and Palestinians; unfavourable, harsh local and international politics do. But are we then stuck in the world of cultural essentialists? Frantz Fanon and several other non-essentialist thinkers suggest otherwise.

3. Fanon’s Cultural Humanism and the Poverty of Essentialism

Fanon personally battled the colonial situation and the hostile world order that essentialists – Eurocentric essentialists in particular – helped to create. He equally anticipates the damaging afterlives of the tense world situation that would emerge from the crucible of the colonial situation he fought; a world order that would be exacerbated by the new apostles of cultural nationalism and Euro-American supremacists like Huntington and politicians who espouse views similar to his. From the outset, Fanon was acutely aware of the immense difficulty
cultural prejudices have logged in the way of the projects of decolonisation and universal human liberation. In ‘Racism and Culture’, Fanon invites us to treat with suspicion ‘the unilaterally decreed normative value of certain cultures...’ (Fanon 1964: 31). For ‘egocentric and socio-centric’ (that is essentialist) notions of culture are the immediate paradoxical consequences of dividing people into cultural groups possessing unique values: ‘There is first affirmed the existence of human groups having no culture; then of a hierarchy of cultures; and finally, the concept of cultural relativity’ (Fanon 1964: 31). By now, the obvious unhappy consequences of the foregoing, as Fanon points out, are ‘overall negation to singular and specific recognition... [to a] fragmented and bloody history [of humankind]...’ (1964: 31). In order to overcome cultural relativism and cultural racism, as well as all the negations of humanity and bloodiness of human history arising from cultural essentialism, Fanon then goes on to develop a new theory of culture which he outlines systematically in his last and most important book, The Wretched of the Earth. Fanon’s new idea about culture is a humanistic account of global culture: cultural humanism. His genuinely original contribution to the questions of culture, identity and humanity lies in what Lewis Gordon identifies as ‘the development of what he [Fanon] called sociogenic explanations, a form of existential phenomenological social analysis that recognizes both the impact of the social world on the emergence of meaning and human identities... which led him to identify conditions of skewed rationality and reason in contemporary discourses on the human being’ (Gordon 2015: 2). The simple point here is that Fanon realises that harmful attitudes towards (global) culture, arise in the first place because certain people are ignorant of the very fact that humanity and human reason precedes culture, and that identity based solely on a particular putative culture is quite simply, irrational, anti-human.

To be sure, throughout his writing on culture, Fanon, like several other theorists of culture from a globalist perspective, is not as nuanced as we would wish, in that he frequently spoke as if there are unique ‘cultural specificities’ (Fanon 1964:34); and consequently he has sometimes been misread as espousing a version of cultural nationalism. This has happened in cases where Fanon’s view in ‘On National Culture’ is narrowly read or read out of context by postmodernists, especially. For Fanon endorses an oppressed people’s need to defend themselves against colonial cultural imposition.4 But there is more than enough in his oeuvre to demonstrate his non-essentialist convictions. Early on, he predicts the end of race prejudice and the hope of universalism once the colonial or oppressive

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power equations are cancelled out by the rediscovery of our humanity after a revolutionary overthrow of currently oppressive paradigms.\textsuperscript{5} He writes:

\begin{quote}
The end of race prejudice begins with a sudden incomprehension. The occupant’s spasmed and rigid culture, now liberated, opens at last to the culture of people who have really become brothers. The two cultures can confront each other, enrich each other. In conclusion, universality resides in this decision to recognize and accept the reciprocal relativism of different cultures \textit{[sic]} once the colonial status [and all prejudices are]... irreversibly excluded (Fanon 1964: 44).
\end{quote}

So for Fanon, universalism is after all possible, once the unavoidable aporia sets in to dislodge unwarranted beliefs in racial superiority or in the asymmetries of cultural relevance. In short, he diagnoses that the dialectical synthesis of assumed moments of clashing civilisations is an inexorable return to universal humanity. But his idea of universal humanism is to be unpacked carefully. For Fanon seeks to overcome the Eurocentric model, the false belief propounded by Kant, Hegel and others, that there is a universal human culture which Europe has already attained and non-Europeans, Africans in particular, have to work hard to become part of or aspire to improve in order to reach its standard.

In \textit{The Wretched of the Earth}, Fanon urges a contest of the universal in the face of oppression, exclusion and misrecognition. But the emancipatory outcome of this contest must go beyond proto-nationalism and irredentism (Pithouse 2013: 91 – 98). This would be the only way to transcend the insularity and monological discourse of European Manichaeism that held the colonial situation in place (Reyes 2015; Pithouse 2017). In Homi Bhabha’s view, Fanon, at this point, seeks to ‘do battle for the creation of a human world of reciprocal recognitions’ of all human beings, regardless of or in the face of cultural diversity (Bhabha 1994:8; Allesandri 1997). In all, at every point in time, the history of human culture must always be reconceived or altered to accommodate, as it should be, all human groups, especially those previously othered and silenced, and excluded from that history (Fanon, [1961] 1967: 251 – 255; Gibson 2003: 132 – 133; Pithouse 2017).

Continuing, Fanon argues that the Negritudist quest for an authentic black culture was well-intentioned, but would only lead back to the Eurocentric \textit{ad absurdum} that somehow black people are unlike the rest of humanity. To believe that it is possible to create an ‘authentic’ and ‘unblemished’ black culture, he concludes, is tantamount to living in the past and chasing shadows; for ‘there will

\textsuperscript{5} Fanon later spells out the means of overthrowing an unjust system of things in \textit{The Wretched of Earth}. 
never be such a thing as a black culture...’ (Fanon, [1961] 1963: 264). But Fanon is only right in part here. For the Negritudist desire need not be adversarial to Fanon’s quest for cultural humanism and universality in the end. The quest for a unique black culture was clearly not the end desire of Negritude, Pan-Africanism and the Black Consciousness Movement. Like Fanon’s, theirs is a new politics of recognition, inclusivity and dynamism. The terminology may be inaccurate, but the struggle to elevate African culture, African American culture or any other purported unique culture of a minority or oppressed group is itself not a rigid admission of particularity or a desire to be different for the sake of power and domination. Rather, it is a struggle to reclaim socio-political subjectivity while eschewing dehumanisation and exoticisation in the context of a holistic account of human history. Indeed, as Reiland Rabaka clarifies, ‘Fanon offered insights into the dilemmas of the Caribbean diaspora and the ways in which Caribbean history... [contributions and appropriations of global] culture are often ignored, excluded, and/or erased, not only within the world(s) of antiblack racism and Eurocentrism, but also, and quite ironically, within the world(s) of black nationalism, Pan-Africanism, and Afrocentrism’ (Rabaka 2010a: 13 – 23 & 184, Cf. Reyes 2015: 19).

Fanon himself had written: ‘Because the inferiorized rediscovers a style that had once been devalorized, what [she or] he does is in fact to cultivate culture. Such a caricature of cultural existence would indicate, if it were necessary, that culture must be lived, and cannot be fragmented. It cannot be had piecemeal,’ in the face of the inexorable dialectics towards universality (Fanon 1964: 41).

More than that, Fanon knows firsthand the risky condition of peoples whose cultural patterns are deemed inferior or outside the ‘core’ of global culture. In fact, part of the allure of his theory of global culture is that he was thinking ahead of his time, when he seeks a means of concrete protection for those human beings (especially postcolonials) who, prominent sociologists like Herbert Schiller was to complain eight years after his (Fanon’s) death, were ‘vulnerable’ in the face of the ‘cultural homogenization’ that ‘threatens to overtake the globe’ (Schiller 1969). Thus, Fanon is aware that the conceptualisation of a new humanism – that leads to the emergence of his treasured new universal humanity – would be well-nigh impossible unless he at first makes the Manichaean world created by colonialism unacceptable. Thus, the main task, as he sees it, is to heed the ‘call to human solidarity, a challenge to both blacks and whites and to all human beings to move away from the inhuman voices of their respective ancestors so that a genuine communication can be born’. In order to arrive at the new humanism, Fanon deploys his existentialist-phenomenological pathway that aims beyond essences

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6 Even though it is rather obvious how this article speaks differently about culture, one can be fairly certain that Rabaka won’t mind the insertions. See Rabaka (2010a; 2010b).
7 Fanon is cited from Black skin, white masks; see Zolatova (2011).
and prioritises human lived experience. This, again, is a justified move, if he is to eschew the ills of Eurocentric humanism. For it is precisely by privileging essences and putting an undue stress on 'a particular concept of education and civilization, [the] cultivation of individual virtues, and the exercise of rational self-control' that European Enlightenment humanism became so exclusivist, inveterate and murderous (Bell 2002: 40). Only by an honest presentation or re-presentation of black-lived experience using his proposed approach would Fanon simultaneously create the all-important scaffolding for a realistic postcolonial and holistic history of the human race.

By eschewing essences, it becomes unnecessary to seek to understand the essence of a people’s culture or the core of their religion in order to be able to trigger a heteronomous consciousness or the empathetic renewal of humanity in both the oppressed Other and the liberated oppressor. But, as we have already noted, Fanon is conscious of the precarious, uneven position of the colonised person. Colonialism had left the colonised and their values in cold, frigid, alienating storage. So, a national culture, or what Nigel Gibson describes as a ‘fighting culture’, becomes the starting point for the reclamation of agency, subjethood and humanity for them that are still dripping with the blood and slime of colonial subjugation (Gibson 2003). But then, the ‘aculturized native’ badly needs to survive in a more complex world than his traditional culture had prepared him for. So, he must try and 'dynamize' his culture, reconceive and grasp it anew from within (Fanon 1964). The entire idea is that while rejecting undue manipulation from the superaltern culture, the wary subalterns must avoid the opposite trap of burrowing too deep into their past culture and tradition. In Homi Bhabha’s Fanon-inspired work, The Location of Culture, he argues persuasively that

the borderline work of culture demands an encounter with ‘newness’ that is not part of a continuum of past and present. It creates a sense of the new as an insurgent act of cultural translation... It does not merely recall the past as a social cause or aesthetic precedence; it renews the past, refiguring it as a contingent ‘inbetween’ space that innovates and interrupts the performance of the present. The ‘past-present’ becomes part of the necessity, not the nostalgia, of living (Bhabha 1994: 7).

In Bhabha’s view, Fanon, at this point, seeks to ‘do battle for the creation of a human world of reciprocal recognitions’ of all human beings, regardless of or in the face of cultural diversity (Bhabha 1994: 8; Cf. Alessandrini 1997: 3 – 8). In all, for Fanon, at every point in time, human culture must always be reconceived or altered to serve broad human interests and never to exult in protecting or extending parochial, monolithic and exclusionary interests. So Fanon’s national/fighting culture is after all a compass of critical engagement
with the ‘outside world’, always requiring reformation and recreation with a view to ‘revolutionary transformation rather than ethnic identity...’ (Gibson 2003: 13). If Fanon’s wishes become a reality, then as Gibson further explains, the fighting culture would be shown to be a struggle to enmesh the traditional culture within the evolving prospects of a dialectical global culture that would ultimately midwife the New Humanity of peoples of multiple identities, in a new world where all cultural prejudices have been obliterated.

In addition, the important Fanonian wish that Nigel Gibson elaborates and Richard Pithouse articulates, is that ‘there is an “unstable, critical, and creative element” at the heart of Fanon’s thought that seeks to move through apparently “absolute irreconcilable contradictions” by working in a critical actional mode for reciprocal critical agency within the “fluctuating movement” against human objectification’ (Pithouse 2004: 239). The important realisation is that in the dialectics of human history, cultural patterns are created, appropriated and deployed by human beings seeking to conquer nature and attain freedom from dehumanisation as we continue to imagine and reach out to a world of universal humanity (Cf. Gordon 2008: 7 – 32). But every cultural pattern is continually exposed to mutation, counter-acculturation and a possible decline in the face of expanding human knowledge or if the particular pattern or aspects of it are now deemed harmful to some persons within or outside the claimants of the cultural pattern. This is precisely what Amartya Sen (2006: 114 – 115) envisions as ‘cultural freedom’. Uchang Kim describes this system of things as necessary and unavoidable if we are to engender a universal ethic that accommodates rights and human values in our globalising world. As he further elaborates, cultural universality or global culture allows the multi-entangled individual to draw upon the ‘multi-centered resources in the various life situations that he or she faces, up to and including beyond the [purported] cultural boundaries of his or her nation or tradition, as a member of humankind’ (Kim 2014: 41).

4. Conclusion

Fanon’s cultural humanism avers that we already live in a transcultural world that it describes; that is, a world where culture no longer matters as a taxonomic principle for partitioning people. Cultural humanism is in keeping with any philosophy which elevates humanity and human values over and beyond allegiances to particularistic comprehensive doctrines, temporal and spiritual; except, of course, in the case where the ontologically higher being serves and extends human and planetary interest. The idea of global culture or universality

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8 This does not mean this author thinks that globalisation is a good thing.
at the heart of cultural humanism is something that we choose to accept because
it extends our freedoms and reinforces our dignity as human persons. Kwame 
Anthony Appiah is right when he argues that ‘I am not alone in doubting the
imperative to respect cultures, as opposed to persons; and I believe we can
respect persons only inasmuch as we consider them as abstract rights-holders’

Cultural humanism consists in transcending the negations of humanity such as
colonialism, neocolonialism, Manichaeanism, cultural prejudice, and cultural racism
of the kind preached by Kant, Huntington and Landes, and implemented through
Nazism, apartheid and structural racism. The struggle for freedom becomes the
driving force behind this urgent demand for change and reason (Gibson 2011: 8 – 9).
For Fanon, anti-colonialism or decolonisation is not all that true humanism calls for: ‘it [humanism] must be filled out and developed into a practice and awareness
of political and social inclusion of the most marginal...’ and, ‘a resumption of [the]
interrupted history’ of the dehumanised, the deculturised and the unrecognised –
the only way the dialogue of humanity may be universally ignited, afresh (Sekyire-
Otu 2011: 45 – 59; Gibson 2011: 9). Thus, the new humanism that we invoke is
a theory of action, of individual and collective participation in the salvation of
our species, even if the struggle to do so may require (some) alleged cultural
deaths and the end of (some) civilisations. Fanon’s real warning is that no nation,
no civilisation should claim the monopoly of an unblemished National Culture.
Rather, we should continuously strive after an inclusive humanism of culture.
For humanism, in the words of Edward Said ‘is the only, and, I would go as far as
saying, the final, resistance we have against the inhuman practices and injustices
that disfigure human history (Said 2003: xxii).’

Human beings need not go into extinction in order to save a particular putative
culture from itself, since culture is not an entity deserving of an autonomous
life in the first place. Once culture is understood as global in Fanon’s sense, it
becomes obvious that we do not need to sacrifice human lives so as to preserve
the purportedly sacred values of ‘our’ culture, religion or civilisation. In the same
way, it would be anti-culture to ostracise or harm people who live among us but
do not share certain aspects of what we might think is exclusively ‘our culture’. Conversely, as guests, visitors or residents, it becomes irrational to vilify our host
because of ‘their culture’. All peoples may retain the right to protect and preserve
the values of culture, religion or civilisation, but this does not make sense as a
unique calling once these values are understood as something anyone else or
group can equally appropriate and claim ownership of. To reiterate, there is
nothing in (global) culture worth killing or dying for. We need not worry if the
putative owners of a particular culture now choose not just to abandon certain
ingredients or values of global culture, but also to borrow from or even migrate to a presumably ‘different’ cultural space for the purpose of survival and flourishing.

Thinking through cultural humanism, it is easy to at least challenge the assumptions of politicians like Cameron, Merkel and Trump when they speak of protecting our values from cultural aliens. The merits, if any, of cultural nationalism or essentialism pale in the face of the very reality of a highly interconnected world order, a world where interdependence characterises technology and commerce, and extends to the environment, politics and culture itself. In the contemporary world, people simply travel; they migrate and mix in large numbers within and between different societies. They also learn together and work together on the same jobs and projects from the same or different locations. Consequently, it is worth stressing that no system of beliefs or aggregate thought is entirely local or unique to any people or civilisation in our world today; what we have is a jambalaya of forms of life continually mixing and intermingling. ‘This is to say that every domain is linked to every other one, and that nothing that goes on in our world has ever been isolated and pure of any outside influence’ (Said 2003: xvii). In all, the frequency at which people marry into societies of supposedly different cultures, or convert from one religion to another or simply migrate to societies that cherish different cultural values, more than underscore the very fact that all human beings are valid claimants to an ever-expanding, capacious and vivifying wellspring of global culture.

Acknowledgements

I would like to acknowledge the following for supporting/funding my research on various aspects of the article:

1. The American Council of Learned Societies (ACLS) via its African Humanities Programme (AHP) 2012.


I would also like to thank Dr. Nathan Suhr-Sytsma of Emory University and Dr. Stephen Ney of the University of British Columbia for reading the original manuscript and making very helpful inputs.
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