China and India’s foreign policy interests in Africa: partners in development or national self-interest?

by

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Supervisor: Prof. TG Neethling
Co-supervisor: Mr. PA Schoeman
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Ambrosé Ray du Plessis
DECLARATION

I, Ambrosé Ray du Plessis, declare that the dissertation, China and India’s foreign policy interests in Africa: partners in development or national self-interest?, hereby submitted for the Magister Artium degree in Political Science at the University of the Free State, is my own, independent work and has not previously been submitted at another university or faculty. All sources that I have used have been duly specified and acknowledged as complete references. I further cede copyright of the dissertation in favour of the University of the Free State.

Signature: ......................................
A.R. du Plessis
02 February 2015
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<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AIFS</td>
<td>Africa-India Forum Summit</td>
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<tr>
<td>ASSOCHAM</td>
<td>Associated Chambers of Commerce and Industry</td>
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<tr>
<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>BRICS</td>
<td>Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>CII</td>
<td>Confederation of Indian Industries</td>
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<tr>
<td>CMC</td>
<td>Central Military Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td>CPA</td>
<td>Comprehensive Peace Agreement</td>
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<td>CPC</td>
<td>Communist Party of China</td>
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<td>DAC</td>
<td>Development Assistance Committee</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>FDI</td>
<td>Foreign Direct Investment</td>
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<td>FICCI</td>
<td>Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry</td>
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<td>FIEO</td>
<td>Federation of Indian Exporters Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>FNLA</td>
<td>Frente Nacional de Liberta Ção de Angola</td>
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<tr>
<td>FOCAC</td>
<td>Forum on China-Africa Cooperation</td>
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<td>FPA</td>
<td>Foreign Policy Analysis</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
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<td>GLF</td>
<td>Great Leap Forward</td>
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<td>GNP</td>
<td>Growth National Product</td>
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<td>GNPOC</td>
<td>Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Company</td>
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<tr>
<td>HDI</td>
<td>Human Development Index</td>
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<td>IFS</td>
<td>India’s Foreign Service</td>
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<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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<td>IR</td>
<td>International Relations</td>
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<td>IT</td>
<td>Information Technology</td>
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<td>ITEC</td>
<td>Indian Technical and Cooperation Programme</td>
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<td>ITES</td>
<td>Information Enabled Services</td>
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<td>MDGs</td>
<td>Millennium Development Goals</td>
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<tr>
<td>MEA</td>
<td>Ministry of External Affairs</td>
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<td>MFA</td>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs</td>
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<td>MNC</td>
<td>Multinational Corporations</td>
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<td>MOFCOM</td>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Commerce</td>
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<td>MPLA</td>
<td>Movimento Popular de Libetação de Angola</td>
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<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>NAM</td>
<td>Non-Aligned Movement</td>
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<td>NEPAD</td>
<td>New Partnership for Africa’s Development</td>
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<td>NGOs</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organisations</td>
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<td>NSA</td>
<td>National Security Advisor</td>
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<tr>
<td>ODA</td>
<td>Official Development Assistance</td>
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<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>OVL</td>
<td>ONGC Videsh Limited</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PIO</td>
<td>People of Indian Origin</td>
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<tr>
<td>PLA</td>
<td>People’s Liberation Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>PSC</td>
<td>Politburo Standing Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>SADC</td>
<td>Southern Africa Development Community</td>
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<tr>
<td>SCAAP</td>
<td>Special Commonwealth Assistance for Africa Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>SOE</td>
<td>Stated-owned Enterprises</td>
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<td>TEAM-9</td>
<td>Techno-Economic Approach for Africa-India Movement</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UNITA</td>
<td>União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola</td>
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Chapter One: Introduction

1.1. Orientation and Significance of the Study

China and India’s relations with Africa have grown rapidly in recent years. Thus, for both China and India, the continent is of strategic interest. As a result, competition for the continent’s natural resources and political support has also increased. China and India’s recent interests in Africa has, on the one hand, been a cause for excitement and opportunity, but on the other, a cause for concern and even possible exploitation (Van Rooyen and Solomon, 2007; Alden, 2007; Prabhakar, 2009; Lammers, 2007: Internet; Taylor, 2010 and Naidu, 2010). Contemporary China-Africa and India-Africa relations started at the end of the Cold War, which saw an increased engagement of China and India in Africa. China and India are continually growing in stature as dominant political and economic powers. China has the second largest economy and India the fourth largest. Moreover, China and India’s desperate need for natural resources and Africa’s abundance of this valuable commodity makes the continent an important and attractive global partner. Abdoolcarim (2011: 32) points out that the contemporary world has changed and global economic growth is increasingly moving in the direction of China and India, which caused a shift in the political and economic landscapes as we knew it (traditionally dominated by the West). Moreover, with the current economic woes the West is finding itself in, the rest of the world and especially Africa are showing greater interest in China and India. The European Union is in turmoil, their debt crisis is eminent and both China and India are looking more and more attractive as potential alternative economic partners. In view of this, it seems that both China and India are spearheading the global economic growth. Their ascendance as superpowers and their foreign policy interests in Africa have been observed by a number of scholars and observers across the globe, which gave rise to many important scholarly questions (Van Rooyen and Solomon, 2007; Alden, 2007; Prabhakar, 2009; Lammers, 2007: Internet; Taylor, 2010 and Naidu, 2010).
Historically, China, India and Africa have more in common than is often realised. For decades Western powers have exploited them, specifically in the form of imperialism. Moreover, as Alden (2007:14) points out, India and China have been instrumental in Africa’s quest for independence. The Bandung Conference of 1955 is a point in history where China, India and Africa developed collective sympathy with one another as all of them were victims of imperialist domination. The British Government designed its policy towards China and India in such a way as to expropriate economic benefits from them. Since 1858 and until its independence in 1947, the economic and political affairs of India were under complete British control (Pierce, 2009: Internet).

China’s history with the British crown was no different. In the 19th century, the British used Hong Kong as an economic stepping-stone in order to expand their trade and economic opportunities (Tay, 1995: Internet). Moreover, China played an anti-colonial role in supporting a number of African countries in their fight against imperialism (Aing and Lecourte, 2009: 40). India’s role in Africa, with regard to imperialism or colonialism was quite similar to that of China (Naidu, 2010: 113). China and India shared the same sentiment towards a decolonised Africa. However, a number of historical events drew China and India closer to Africa.

Firstly, the event that took place at Tiananmen Square in 1989 must be noted. During this event, Chinese troops killed a large number of innocent civilians, which resulted in the West questioning China’s ability to maintain and respect human rights (Van Rooyen and Solomon, 2007: 7). China began to realise that it needed political allies against Western powers and focused its attention on Africa for vital diplomatic support (Lammers, 2007: Internet). According to Muekalia (2004: 7), the end of the Cold War marked the change of China’s role as a socialist Cold War rival to a counterbalancing power to the United States as well as a representative of the developing world (which includes Africa). The end of the Cold War era saw an increased engagement of China in Africa. During the 1990s, China emphasised its engagement with Africa, which varied from bilateral engagement in terms of political, economic, trade, and military issues, to strategic partnerships with more than one
country (Muekalia, 2004: 7). As China, India’s relations with the continent also went through a number of historical periods.

In 1962, India looked to Africa for help with regard to its border dispute with China. The continent provided India with little help if any. This led New Delhi to realise the importance of having allies in Africa and it began to forge closer ties with the continent. India started to increase its material support to Southern Africa’s freedom resistance movements and expanded its economic cooperation and participation with the Indians living in Africa (Indian diaspora). As part of the British Empire, Indian workers were imported as cheap labour in parts of Africa and encouraged to form part of the African society (Beri, 2003: 217). Colonialism ignited India and Africa’s relations, but it was only during the Cold War that their relations as political comrades reached unprecedented heights. India emerged as a champion of a decolonised Africa and fought against racism, not only in Africa, but in global institutions as well. The Bandung Conference not only solidified India-Africa relations, but it paved the way for future diplomatic, economic and political affairs through the creation of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), which endorsed and strengthened Asian-Africa unity. The Cold War made India realise that their future was linked with that of Africa if they were to live in a more equitable world order. The collapse of communism in 1990 and the dramatic spread of the free market system had a marked influence on India. India had to reconsider its domestic economic interests, in the realisation that Africa could become a potentially important future partner. The free market system was no longer up for debate and India realised that it needed to take advantage of new export markets and attract foreign direct investments (FDIs), together with technological capabilities (Naidu, 2010: 112-117).

There are two schools of thought on the motives for China and India’s presence in Africa. On the one hand is a discourse arguing that both China and India are seeking ways to forge a mutually beneficial partnership with Africa. On the other, is a second school of thought that argues China and India’s relationship with the continent is primarily self-serving and that they are simply seeking to exploit Africa, for its natural resources.
In addition, China and India’s need for natural resources have shaped their economic history with the continent in rather unique ways. In both China and India, high and rapid economic growth, induced a need for natural resources, which Africa could supply and which both countries sought to gain access to. China’s rapid economic growth, (in terms of its export market, which grew from 1.1 percent in 1981 to just below 10 percent in 2011) has resulted in its increasing dependence on outside resources (Van Rooyen and Solomon, 2007: 4, Censky, 2011: Internet). Similarly, India’s spiralling economic growth (commencing at 8 percent in 2003 to just over 9 percent in 2005) prompted its need for Africa’s natural resources (McCormick, 2008: 75). This desperate need of natural resources and Africa’s abundance of these resources, made the continent an important and attractive global partner to both China and India. It is important, therefore, to highlight China and India’s contemporary economic interactions with the continent individually.

As a point of departure, Amosu (2007: Internet) argues that contemporary China-Africa economic interaction was at a low ebb in 1991, with Chinese direct investment amounting to less than five million dollars a year. Moreover, China’s trade with Africa rose from $12 million in the 1980s to a high of $55 billion in 2006. As with China, India’s economic dealings with the continent started sluggishly, totalling $967 million in 1991 but rose significantly to well over $9.5 billion in 2005 (Naidu, 2010: 120). During 2006 and 2007, India’s trade with the continent amounted to $16.3 billion, with exports increasing to $6.6 billion, at the same time imports almost doubled to $9.7 billion. The apparent failure of the Western model of development in Africa resulted in Africa’s increased engagement with China and India (Alden, 2007: 12). Furthermore, the rise of the free market system of the 1990s, resulted in the United States, Europe, and parts of Asia obtaining state-of-the-art technology which were intertwined with high levels of economic production. States in the developing world, and especially Africa, have been excluded from these processes (Shrivastava, 2009: 126). As a result, a number of countries in Africa are increasingly looking to both China and India because they are providing alternative models for development (Melber and Southall, 2009: xxii).
The Chinese and Indian models for development have no prerequisites attached such as respect for human rights, democracy, and good governance (Hanson, 2008: Internet; Alden, 2007:14-15). Thus, 2006 marks the signing of the so-called “Beijing consensus” (meaning the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation or FOCAC) which involved more than 40 African states (Lammers, 2007: Internet). Consequently, China’s model for development caused the Indian Government to experience a sense of urgency to construct their own model for development with the African continent. Similar to China, India’s model accentuates the need for a partnership with mutual benefits. Like China, India’s Forum on India-Africa relations was established in 2008, and was attended by 15 African states (Alden, 2007:14-15). Thus, both China and India’s foreign policies are uniquely designed with Africa in mind, in order to gain political and economic support.

China and India’s relationship with Africa in the contemporary era is the subject and focus of the research – which is certainly of much importance in the international community and to the discipline of International Relations. China and India are deepening their dealings and relations with the continent and given the emergence of these two powers as major role-players in the international community and especially in South-South relations, a comparative study between these countries and their relations with Africa merit attention. By comparing China and India’s foreign policy interests and dynamics in Africa, their differences and similarities can be explored and uncovered in a contemporary context. The findings will help clarify regional and international dynamics on China-Africa and India-Africa relations in a scholarly context, specifically on the question whether China and India’s foreign policy footprint and political-economic interests in Africa can best be associated with the ‘partners in development’ approach or the pursuit of national self-interest.

1.2. Problem Statement

The cooperation amongst states in the ‘Global South’ began to have an impact in the arena of development studies during the late 1990s. Melville and Owen (2005:1) argue that developing countries might experience a sense of solidarity with one another, because they share a political and economic history. According to Taylor
(2010:71) and Naidu (2009:116), both countries continue to view Africa as a
continent with great economic potential and made it an integral part of their foreign
policies in order to gain access to raw materials and markets for their manufactured
goods. As a result, the continent experienced an influx of Chinese and Indian
dignitaries to achieve the latter. This is evident in both China and India’s African
foreign policy principles, in the way they stress the need for greater economic
cooperation, equality and mutual benefit and peaceful co-existence. It is further
highlighted by the signing of both the 2006 Forum on China-Africa Cooperation
(between China and over 40 African countries) and the Forum on India-Africa
Cooperation (between India and 15 African states) (Lanteigne: 2009:11; Beri,
2003:216, Lammers, 2007: Internet; Alden, 2007: 14-15). In view of this, China and
India seem to have positioned themselves in a supportive role towards other
developing countries, both politically and economically. At the same time, their
foreign policy interests in Africa have been met with both criticism and praise from
academics across the globe.

It is therefore important to understand these two countries’ foreign policies because it
forms the foundation on which their relationship with Africa are built. In other words,
their foreign policy principles serve as a guide to engage the world, but specifically
African countries. This engagement makes it necessary to unpack each of India’s
and China’s foreign policy principles during the course of the study as these
principles lie at the heart of a comparative approach to the study. Both China and
India’s foreign policies towards Africa is built on certain core principles respectively.
On the one hand, Chinese foreign policy stresses the importance of “mutual respect
for each other’s territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, mutual non-interference
in each other’s domestic issues, equality and mutual benefit and peaceful co-
existence” (Lanteigne, 2009:11). On the other hand, India’s foreign policy principles
are firmly based on “promoting economic cooperation, engaging the people of Indian
origin, preventing and combating terrorism, preserving peace and assisting the
African defence forces” (Beri, 2003: 216). Thus, the study will attempt to answer the
question whether China and India’s foreign policies towards Africa demonstrate
sincere intentions associated with a partnership in development, or whether their
intentions could be interpreted as selfish promotion of their own national self-interest
with no benefits for Africans. Moreover, after examining these two views (national interest and partnership in development), a clear case can be made for whether the one or the other or even both of them together are dominant.

Therefore, scholars (Alden, 2007; Deen, 2009, Muekalia, 2004; Lammers, 2007: Internet) that favour the partners in development debate are of the opinion that China and India provide the continent with much needed opportunities to diversify their economies. In their view India, like China, has been instrumental in forging strategic partnerships with the continent, which emerged as tangible political and economic benefits for both. For this reason, Balaam and Dillman (2011:324) point out that China and India’s voracious hunger for natural resources to stimulate their growing economies has resulted in higher commodity prices, which proved to be beneficial to the continent. Morrissey and Zgovu (2011: 19) highlight the fact that Africa has seen a surge in FDI, especially from China and India. In a nutshell, Muekalia (2004: 9) argues that China and Africa seek to develop a number of remedies that will improve the latter’s financial management, agricultural sector, natural resources and energy, as well as education. Deen (2009: Internet) asserts that India, in comparison with China, is not far off the mark in finding solutions for the continent, in terms of providing training and education, advisory services, cultural exchanges and disaster support initiatives. At the diplomatic level (and since China and India shared common sentiments for a decolonised Africa) these countries continue to propagate the need to improve their cooperation in terms of multilateral institutions such as the United Nations (UN), the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (Muekalia, 2004: 10; Naidu, 2010: 116). China and India also seem to believe that they can with the help of Africa shift the balance of power (developed vs. developing) in favour of developing countries. Thus, China and India’s relations with the continent – in terms of their being partners in development with Africa – may be interpreted to fall within the parameters of a liberal/idealist perspective. While scholars in favour of the partners-in-development debate have argued that China and India’s intentions are good, others argue that China and India are merely seekers of their own interests at the expense of the African continent.
According to Kim (2011: Internet), China and India have been labelled across the African continent as exploiters only interested in satisfying their own resource needs. As stated by Brookes (2007, 4) and Naidu (2009: 116), both China and India’s foreign policies towards Africa are uniquely designed in accordance with their national interest, to obtain both markets and natural resources for their own survival. For this reason Jodha (2009: Internet) points to the case of Sudan where neither, China nor India, was willing to sacrifice their national oil interests in Sudan, in spite of that government’s abuses of human rights. Even after the separation of South Sudan from Sudan, China and India continue to collaborate in order to safeguard their respective national energy interests within Sudan (Kim, 2011: Internet). Bribery continues to hamper Africa’s ability to fight poverty (Kasita, 2009: Internet). As a result, Chinese and Indian firms are more than willing to exploit the continent in terms of their corrupt dealings with some African states (Haglund, 2008: 554; Naidu, 2010: 131). India has been strategic in securing its national interest by using multilateral institutions such as SADC (Southern African Development Community), AU (African Union) in its quest to gain markets, natural resources as well as support for a permanent seat in the UNSC (United Nations Security Council). India’s influence in South Africa provides it with the perfect opportunity to satisfy its national interest, since South Africa is considered to be the gateway to Africa. Like India, China’s importance in the above-mentioned multilateral institutions is undeniable, since it is a permanent member of the UNSC. For this reason, Prabhakar (2009: 4) states that China is using its veto power in the UNSC to further its own interests. Thus, both China and India’s foreign policies may be perceived from a realist perspective, which implies the survival of the state regardless of the consequences another state may suffer. China and India’s willingness to pursue their national self-interest at the expense of some African states may be explained from a realist perspective.

In view of the above, the research question posed is whether the relationship which China and India, forged with Africa on their own terms, is mutually beneficial or whether it is selfish, one-sided and therefore largely beneficial to Chinese and Indian interests respectively.
1.3. Aims and Objectives

The main aim of the study is to investigate whether China and India’s foreign policy interests in Africa are mainly serving their own national interest or whether these interests are mutually beneficial to and impacting positively on all partners or role-players in terms of development.

More specifically the study has the following objectives:

- To offer a conceptual clarification of foreign policy, national interest and partners in development;
- To discuss China and India’s respective contemporary approaches towards Africa, including their historical development;
- To examine both China and India’s foreign policy interests and ideas in Africa;
- To provide key arguments in favour of the ‘partners in development approach’ as well as the school of thought, that argues that China and India are merely seekers of self-interest;
- To focus on China and India’s relations with countries such as Sudan, Angola and Nigeria, to determine the nature and outlook of China and India’s foreign policy interests in Africa.
- To compare and appraise whether China and India’s engagement in Africa is largely associated with national self-interest or rather with partnering in development for mutual benefit, or whether it comprises a combination of both these viewpoints.

1.4. Research Methodology

Research methods refers to the way in which information are gathered and examined. This process allows the study to arrive at specific conclusions and generalisations based on the data collected. Research methods are used to gain insight on a specific phenomenon or a problem under investigation. Reasoning and argumentation are necessary skills, in order to synthesize the researchers work with
those of others. In order to support the findings of the study the researcher will make use of specific evidence or examples (Halperin and Health, 2012: 2).

The study follows a deductive approach. It starts by exploring the conceptual framework, which consists of three key concepts namely foreign policy, national interest and partners in development. The study then proceeds with a generic discussion and develops towards a more specific discussion. The research makes use of the comparative method, by comparing China and India’s foreign policies towards Africa. China and India’s foreign policies are scrutinised with regard to their agencies, structural design and implementation. It then funnels the analysis down to a particular focus in order to answer the question whether China and India are ‘partners in development’ or pursuers of national self-interest. Recognising that China and India’s foreign policies are influenced by domestic and external factors, the researcher will be required to look at foreign policy formulation and implementation by the respective state institutions of these countries. As a result, it will be possible to analyse their interests, dynamics and foreign policy behaviour in Africa (and the international community at large), to determine whether their foreign policy behaviour is based on and informed by national interest or a ‘partners in development’ approach.

The study is of a qualitative and descriptive nature and seeks to investigate and analyse the foreign policies of China and India in the African context. Thus, the study will be grounded in the foreign policy analysis (FPA) approach to IR. FPA follows an actor specific approach, in that all that happens between nations and across nations is grounded in human decision makers acting individually or collectively. This approach is a useful tool in studying IR, especially with regard to the theoretical, substantive and methodological aspects of the discipline. FPA also forms an integral part of all social sciences and policy fields related to IR. For this reason, the study will include a multiplicity of information concerning China-Africa and India-Africa relations. By examining multiple variables at all levels of analysis (internal and external), the researcher will be able to make sense of the decision-making process in both China and India’s foreign policies, respectively. Moreover, the FPA approach links IR with domestic politics, in order to determine the influence on decision
makers, as well as, the outcome of their decisions or actions on a particular event (Hudson, 2005: 2). Furthermore, the information used to undertake the study is based on existing literature comprising books, scholarly journals, reports, newspaper articles, and primary sources such as the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation and India-Africa Cooperation agendas, as well as other relevant official documents. However, limitations to the study must be acknowledged. The study relies predominately on Western interpretations of China-Africa and India-Africa relations. There is little primary information used from Chinese or Indian scholars.

1.5. Literature and Data Review

Both primary and secondary sources have been consulted, which led the researcher to demarcate the study into three categories. The first deals with the theoretical orientation and provides the foundational level for the study. Using unanalysed data or primary sources such as the *Forum on China-Africa Cooperation* (2006), *the Forum on India-Africa Cooperation* (2008), *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China*, *Ministry of External Affairs Government of India*, and others. These sources are used to provide an understanding of China and India’s foreign policy interests and ideas in Africa.


The third and final category consists of secondary sources that deal with the two schools of thought — those who believe that China and India’s relations with the continent are mutually beneficial and those who argue that China and India’s relations with Africa, is a way of satisfying their own national self-interests. Thus, works by *Van Rooyen and Solomon* (2007), *Alden* (2007), *Jacques* (2012),

Based on the literature review, both China and India’s foreign policies have been altered and adapted over the years. China went from confrontation to collaboration, from revolution to economic improvement, and from international exclusion to international participation (Muekalia, 2004: 5). Like China, India went from conflict with the West to consensus, from severe protectionism to modest economic liberation and development, and from global exclusion to global participation (Balaam and Dillman, 2011: 334-336).

In terms of the above discussion and with regard to the attention that has recently been given to the topic it seems as if India’s dealings with the continent are being treated with kid gloves, while the bulk of criticism and praise is directed towards China. In simple terms, China has therefore received most of the attention when it comes to interaction with Africa, whilst India seems to be regarded as a newcomer and still less significant than China. It is therefore only by comparing China and India’s foreign policy interests and ideas in Africa, that their differences and similarities can be uncovered more effectively and objectively.

1.6. Outline of the Research

Because states are still regarded as major actors in foreign policy, this study seeks to describe and analyse the ideas and interests of China and India’s foreign policies in Africa from the point of view of two perspectives: Those believing that this is the way China and India satisfy their own national interest, and those who believe that it is mutually beneficial to all partners involved. The study is outlined as follows:

**Chapter 2:** Deals with a theoretical orientation (conceptualisation) of foreign policy-related concepts such as “foreign policy”, “national interest” and “partners in development”. It also seeks to clarify and contextualise China and India’s foreign policies within the decision-making approach of foreign policy analysis.

**Chapter 3:** Contextualises Chinese and Indian foreign policies by looking at their respective domestic development goals and challenges.
Chapter 4: Provides an overview of China-Africa relations after the Cold War. It also examines China’s foreign policy interest and ideas in Africa and discusses whether this can be associated with national interest or partners in development.

Chapter 5: Investigates India’s foreign policy relations in Africa and whether their intentions can be regarded as a partnership with mutual benefits or rather as an exercise which only serves their own self-interest.

Chapter 6: serves as a summary of the most significant findings of the study. This sections deals with the findings and provides a critical evaluation of the comparison between China and India’s foreign policies in Africa and whether their relations can be associated with national interest or partnership in development or whether it is a combination of both of these viewpoints.

1.7. Conclusion

The post-war economies of China and India have grown rapidly in recent years. Moreover, the emerging power status of these countries has made them important role-players in global affairs. Both China and India have sought to use the African factor in their respective foreign policies. As their relations evolve, a number of issues such as terrorism, security, social, political and economic matters will come to the fore. Given the complexities of China-Africa and India-Africa relations and the continuing nature of world politics, this study will essentially focus on the period between 1989 and 2013. Therefore, this study attempts to answer the question whether China and India’s foreign policies towards Africa are a case of national self-interest or of partners in development.
Chapter Two: Conceptual and Theoretical Orientation underlying the Study

2.1. Introduction

Scholars in the social sciences often define concepts differently over time. Different interpretations of a single concept often lead to ambiguity and leave the original concept mired in complexity. For this reason, it is imperative to operationalise and contextualise all concepts dealing with a specific phenomenon. Östman and Yrkeshögskolan (2007: 1) define the process of conceptualisation as “the collection of objects, concepts and other entities that are assumed to exist in some area of interest and the relationship[s] that hold among them”. For this reason, McGowan and Nel (2002: 15) argue that concepts are used as basic tools to “describe, explain, interpret, predict and make normative judgments”. In other words, concepts are used to provide an understanding of any topic under discussion. Simply put, conceptualisation is the process of identifying and clarifying an issue by using specific terms. The latter is often grounded in a theoretical framework.

According to Hudson (2005: 1) a ‘ground’ is “the conceptualization of the fundamental or foundational level at which phenomena in the field of study occur”. She continues to argue that International Relations, is not that different from the social science. The former and the latter, seek to understand how people (states) view and respond to the world they live in. Decision-makers performing unilaterally or collectively are central to the study of both the social sciences and IR.

The main goal of this Chapter is two-fold; first, it seeks to provide a conceptual orientation regarding key concepts often assumed to be part of foreign policy. More specifically, it will focus on concepts such as “foreign policy”, “national interest” and “partners in development”. Second, it seeks to provide the theoretical foundation on which the study is built. Hence, it will proceed by focusing on the different theories that underpin foreign policy. It will also provide the theoretical framework for analysing China and India’s foreign policies. The various foreign policy theories, as
well as the theoretical framework play a fundamental role in clarifying China and India’s foreign policies modus operandi. This paves the way for China and India’s foreign policy principles to be discussed. Finally, the Chapter will focus on the main actors in both China and India and how they influence their respective foreign policy processes, with regard to formulation and implementation.

2.2. A conceptualisation of Foreign Policy

Before attempting to elucidate foreign policy, it is important to note that the concept is rather controversial among commentators, officials and scholars. The concept is often over-simplified or narrowly interpreted and even broadly associated with global governance. For this reason, foreign policy needs to be liberated from sweeping generalisation in order to provide a scientific account of what it entails (Hill, 2003: 2). The idea of the study is not to provide a specific, narrow, or single interpretation of foreign policy; instead, it seeks to offer a comprehensive, reliable, and detailed account of what the concept entails.

Numerous and different interpretations of foreign policy have entangled the concept in a web of ambiguity, vagueness and a lack of definitional clarity (Du Plessis, 2006:120). For this reason, Heywood (2011:129) provides a generic definition of foreign policy, arguing that the concept can be linked to the tasks of governments. Thus, governments are the architects of foreign policy and they are expected to administer or influence events beyond their borders. In light of this, foreign policy is a tool used by governments to reach desired goals. The latter, emanates from the domestic setting of a country. Domestic politics plays a significant role in the formulation of foreign policy. Bhalla (2005: 205) reiterates this by arguing that the developmental goals and growth prospects of states emerged from their domestic settings, i.e. from what government desires for its citizens and from what its citizens need from government. For example, India’s shift from a dominant political party system to a more fragmented, multi-party system has influenced its foreign policymaking. Furthermore, India’s electorate continues to force the governing parties to reprioritise their national goals (Mazumdar, 2011: 171-172). China,
similarly to India, does not escape the influence of domestic politics on foreign policy. The rapid industrialisation of the country brought about a new political and economic ruling class that impinges on the country’s growth policies. This has manifested in a collective economic agenda between, the Chinese citizens and the governing elite on the various levels of government. The emerging elite of the Republic of China has not been excluded in the formulation of foreign policy; instead they play an integral role (Bhalla, 2005:207). However, as Souva (2005:145) points out, because foreign policy is the duty of the state and citizens normally do not understand the complexities of foreign policy, the people of a country do not play a significant role in foreign policy. As Hill (2003:1) points out, citizens generally understand foreign policy as something constructed by the state and based on what takes place between states. This is a rather state-centric approach to the study of foreign policy and may be explained within the framework of realism.

According to Waever (1990: 337) foreign policy can be understood in various ways with regard to different ideologies in international relations. Theories of foreign policy seek to explain what states try to achieve in their external realm and what factors cause them to pursue certain actions (Rose, 1998: 145). Realists view foreign policy as a means to an end. States therefore construct their foreign policies to maintain and advance their power in an anarchical world. A world without central authority requires states to fend for themselves (Heywood, 2011:115). Waever (1990: 337) therefore interprets foreign policy as actions undertaken by a state and executed by government officials on behalf of the nation state. It is aimed at direct objectives, conditions and actors, which are situated outside the borders of the sovereign state. Realists contend that states are rational actors in world politics. Waltz, as cited by Donelly (2000: 7), argues that states normally take actions to satisfy their own self-interest. States, therefore, create policies to interact with other states because of the absence of an international government to regulate competition among states. Policies are created to serve the interest of the state. As a result, states view their policies as a means to preserve and strengthen the interest of the state (Donelly, 2000: 7). Idealists contest the realist paradigm on foreign policy, arguing that states are not the only actors in foreign policy.
Hill (2003:1) asserts that it will be unrealistic to claim that states are the only actors in foreign policy. The world is just too complex to limit foreign policy to the activities of states. Issues such as trade, debt relief, conflict, politics of development, foreign aid and others are global in nature and affect state and non-state actors (Du Plessis, 2006:122). Idealists argue that the world functions and interacts as a unit, resulting in a web of transnational interactions with numerous benefits and opportunities for all the partners involved (McGowan, Cornelissen and Nel, 2006: 33). Partners or actors in foreign policy include non-governmental organisations (NGOs), multinational corporations (MNCs) and international governmental organisations (INGOs). In the midst of multiple interactions of state and non-state actors, it becomes difficult to distinguish between foreign and domestic policies (Heywood, 2011:128). And in order to free the concept of the latter uncertainty, it is important to untangle “foreign” from “policy”.

“Foreign” emanates from the Latin word ‘foris’ meaning ‘outside’. A policy created by a given state is foreign to another state. Therefore, each state consists of clearly defined borders and distinct societies, as well as conceptual borders that divide domestic and foreign policy. The latter serves as a guide to engage foreigners beyond the borders of the state (Hill, 2003:3). Policy involves tactics undertaken by a state to achieve desired priorities, interests and objectives in a competitive anarchical world. In light of this, foreign policy is a dual-purpose tool used by government to foster closer ties with other states or to serve as a way for asserting the governments’ interests (Du Plessis, 2006:122).

Another key misconception that some scholars generally make is to equate foreign policy with diplomacy. To highlight this, Kubálkova (2001: 16-17) conceptualises foreign policy as a multilayered process which is linked with diplomatic visits to foreign states. This process includes decision-making, bargaining and strategies of engagements and choices. States, therefore, utilise this process (diplomacy) in such a way as to engage the global environment or the domestic factors of foreign policy. Du Plessis (2006: 123) opposes the above-mentioned view, by arguing that foreign policy and diplomacy are not synonyms. He continues to argue that diplomacy is one of many tools used by governments to implement foreign policy. To equate foreign
policy with diplomacy limits the former concept to the activities of diplomats and state officials and leaves out important issues in international politics (Hill, 2003:3).

In light of the conceptualisation of foreign policy, the following sub-section seeks to provide the theoretical foundation that underpins the study. More specifically, it provides the tools (foreign policy theories) for analysing China and India’s foreign policies, followed by the stages in the foreign policymaking process, in order to provide a comprehensive understanding of how the former concept is formulated and executed. Furthermore, foreign policy theories together with the stages in the foreign policymaking process are intrinsically linked to the actors responsible for foreign policymaking and implementation. As a result, it provides a comprehensive understanding of foreign policy.

2.2.1. Foreign Policymaking: A Theoretical Framework

Foreign policymaking may be explained through the decision-making process of governments, which relates to the goals that political officials pursue beyond their borders and the tools used to obtain them (Kegley and Raymond, 2010: 59). However, it is important to note that even though governments are the architects of foreign policy they are not the only actors. Foreign policymaking theories seek to explain how governments arrive at a particular policy or policies (Heywood, 2011: 129). A number of theories surrounding foreign policymaking have been advanced, but for the purpose of this study and its limited scope, emphasis will be placed on the rational actor models, bureaucratic models, cognitive processes and belief-system models and the pluralist-interdependence model. The above-mentioned models are selected because of their ability to provide snapshots of the foreign policymaking process. In other words, a single model will limit the study to a specific aspect of the foreign policy process. The idea is to follow a comprehensive approach in analysing foreign policy. It is important to note, however, that there are other foreign policy models such as the dependency model, the world society model and incremental models. The aim therefore was to select specific foreign policy models that best explain both China and India’s foreign policies.
The rational actor model is concerned with the ability of foreign policymakers to make sound judgements on critical issues concerning the foreign policy of a country (Russett, Starr and Kinsella, 2000: 147). Foreign policymakers generally make decisions that will advance the interest of the state. Foreign policy is considered to be successful when the rewards outweigh the penalties in economic terms (Heywood, 2011: 129). To achieve this, the rational actor model provides the following criteria. The first phase deals with problem identification. During this phase decision-makers clarify their goals and objectives and place them in a hierarchical order from very important to less important. In the second stage decision-makers identify all the possible options or alternatives to achieve the goals and objectives as set out in the former phase. The third phase evaluates the advantages and the disadvantages of choosing a particular option or alternative. More specifically, the options or alternatives to attain the goals and objectives are measured in terms of costs, consistency, successfulness and so forth. Finally, decision-makers select the best possible options or alternatives to secure the desired outcome (Heywood, 2011: 129; Russett et al., 2000: 147). In light of the above-mentioned criteria, the rational actor model assumes that decision-makers will always have clear-cut objectives to work from and as a result, they will be in position to reap maximum benefits from any situation that might occur (Heywood, 2011: 129). Kegley and Raymond (2010:74), as well as Herbert Simon (cited by Russett et al., 2000: 148), contest rationality on the basis that decision-makers tend to select the first available solution or option that meets the minimal requirement. Therefore, they do not follow the above-mentioned criteria by reviewing all the alternatives to reach the best possible outcome. The rational actor model becomes wishful thinking in that decision-makers convince themselves that they have taken the most rational course of action (Rourke and Boyer, 2010: 56).

To escape the problems associated with the rational actor model, Holsti (1995: 266) states that the bureaucratic model may complement the former by bringing vital facts to the table that the latter has overlooked or ignored. These facts or information is found in the machinery of government, which includes the head of state, the minister of foreign affairs, the ministry of foreign affairs, the departments of defence, trade and others that have an impact on foreign policy formulation. The rationality behind
this argument is that different government agencies generally deliberate on key issues concerning their departments. As a result, these departments or agents provide decision-makers with specialised knowledge of different issues confronting a country (Du Plessis, 2006:127). However, decisions that come to pass transpire from the bargaining and compromises of the various actors involved in foreign policy formulation. Thus, from a bureaucratic point of view different government departments are always in pursuit of maximising their own interests or priorities over those of other organisations. Contrasting views, opinions and policies pursued by various departments or actors make it difficult for decision-makers to reach the objects and goals as set out in foreign policy (Hudson, 2005: 8).

The third model is the cognitive processes and belief-system models. According to this model, all decision-makers have predetermined views or ideas about the world (Heywood, 2011: 133). Rourke and Boyer (2010: 67) term it “political culture”, which is closely associated with the state’s foreign policy. They continue to argue that political officials and society share common values. Therefore most people in a country are patriots, in the sense that they consider themselves to be distinct from other nation-states. For example, the Chinese and Americans have convinced themselves that their cultures are superior to those of the rest of the world. However, it is only through the application of their cultures that a clear distinction can be made. As a result, most people in the United States (81%), asked in a survey, believe that the world would be a better place if it adopts their style of government, which includes democracy and the free-market system (capitalism). The Chinese on the other hand, do not seek to impose their culture on others; instead, they would want to lead by example (Rourke and Boyer, 2010: 67-68). Furthermore, Nathan (2010: 58) asserts that in the midst of political uncertainty and government’s inability to clearly define and maximise their interests, ideas play a pivotal role in guiding the behaviour of governments. In other words, foreign policy decision-makers’ “ideas” about the world, whether political or economic, influence their foreign policy approach (Kegley and Raymond, 2010: 65). Heywood (2011: 134) writes “ideas and identities determine interests”.
The above-mentioned models emphasise the importance of government officials in foreign policymaking. The “pluralist-interdependence model” concedes that government officials are the architects of foreign policy, but refuse to accept that they are the only actors in foreign policy formulation. Foreign policy is pluralistic in nature, in that it is the product of continued interactions of numerous role players such as states, MNCs, bureaucrats, individuals and others. What it amounts to is that non-state actors contribute towards the goals and objectives of foreign policy (Holsti, 1995: 8). As mentioned earlier, all the above models of foreign policymaking are used together, in order to explain various components of both China and India’s foreign policies.

Before providing the framework of analysis, it is important to stress that all the above-mentioned models are linked with one another in order to provide a comprehensive understanding of both China and India’s foreign policies. Kegley and Wittkopf (1999:46) argue that the following three levels of influences must be considered (as a framework of analysis) when analysing foreign policymaking processes:

- **External environment**: Foreign policymakers are influenced by external factors. External influences are all the activities that take place beyond the borders of the state. Thus, external factors become part of the decision-making process in foreign policy formulation, in that it shapes how states act or react towards outside actors. These factors may include political instability in other states or the extent of economic interdependence among states.

- **State or Internal influences**: Foreign policy decision-makers in a state, is continually influenced by its citizenry, the type of government, the level of economic development and military capabilities. These factors may determine the foreign policy approach that a state adapts.

- **Individual influences**: The final category focuses on the individual traits of the leader or the head of state. In other words, the beliefs, values and personality of the leader are taken into account when analysing foreign policy.

It is important to note that the real world is always in motion; the above-mentioned influences therefore function as valuable inputs in explaining foreign policy. As a
result, it becomes pivotal to consider these influences simultaneously, including the issues and conditions at the time of the decision. Thus, decision-makers responsible for foreign policy formulation and implementation, generally pursue a systematic way of arriving and executing foreign policy. For this reason, the following sub-section deals with the inter-related, yet distinctive stages of foreign policy formulation.

2.2.2. Stages in Foreign Policymaking

Heywood (2011:129) notes that foreign policymaking involves numerous decisions, that are central to the policy formulation process. These decisions involve a number of acts of initiation, decision implementation, and the making of conclusions. Moreover, foreign policymaking is a rather complex process, which involves a variety of actors each with their own understanding of what it entails. For this reason, Rourke and Boyer (2010:66) emphasise the importance of foreign policymakers obtaining empirical data and understanding the conditions under which foreign policy is made. They argue furthermore that the nature of the circumstances (crisis or non-crisis) has a serious influence on the policy process. Knecht and Weatherford (2006: 711-712) identify the following five stages in foreign policy formulation:

- Stage 1. *Agenda-setting/Problem Presentation*: During this stage, political officials responsible for foreign policymaking, identify and establish the core issues on the list of items and determine what should be included in or excluded from the agenda. Problem presentation is concerned with the risks involve for choosing a particular policy.

- Stage 2. *Option Generation*: All the policies identified in the previous stage are placed on the table, and weighed up against each other to determine the strengths and weaknesses of a particular policy or policies. Thus, a list of options is compiled by critical deliberations, from which decision-makers may select.
• Stage 3. *Policy Decision:* The foreign policy choice emerges for a specific case concerned. In this stage, information is gathered and stated in an organised fashion in support of the policy, as decided by the decision-makers.

• Stage 4. *Implementation* The implementation phase is concerned with strategies and tactics to carry out policy decisions. This stage is normally characterised by trial and error. Implemented policies need to be flexible so that they can be monitored. This allows decision-makers to control and minimise the risks associated with a given strategy or tactic.

• Stage 5. *Policy Review:* After the implementation of a policy, policymakers are left with the task of continuing, modifying or abandoning a given policy.

With the above-mentioned stages in mind it is important to note that policymakers are continually confronted with the complexities of the international environment. Events in the contemporary era, occur without warning and this requires decision-makers to respond in due time and with accuracy (Renshon and Renshon, 2008:511). George (1993:20) argues that since each stage in foreign policy formulation does not take place in a vacuum, foreign policymakers should be aware of all the political factors associated with adapting, deciding or even discarding a particular policy. This argument is an indication that these foreign policy stages frequently overlap.

### 2.2.3. Foreign Policymaking: Who are the Actors?

According to Williams (2004: 911), foreign policymaking is a rather complex procedure. As a result, decision-makers are constantly confronted with both domestic and external pressures. And after foreign policy has been formulated, decision-makers are left with the task of interpretation and implementation. Thus, in order to analyse foreign policy, academics are generally required to take cognisance of the role players responsible for foreign policymaking and execution (Bailes, 2011: 40). To explain the complicating task of policymaking and the need for several role players, Rourke (2008: 78-79) points out, that it will be impossible for one individual
(prime minister, autocrat or the president) to take control of the entire policy process. He continues to argue that “... states are too big and too complex for that to happen, and thus secondary leaders (such as foreign ministers), bureaucrats, interests groups, and other domestic elements play a role in even very authoritarian political systems....”. In democratic states the process is no different, although it might include a greater number of role players such as the media, legislators, public opinion, NGOs, businesses and multiple opposition parties (Bailes, 2011: 35). Against this backdrop, this section does not seek to provide a detailed discussion on all the role players in China and India’s foreign policies frameworks. Instead, it seeks to focus on the major role players and how they influence their respective foreign policies. Moreover, due to the complexities associated with both countries’ foreign policies, this section will proceed with the major foreign policymakers in China, followed by those in India. But before discussing China and India’s foreign policy actors, it is important to draw a clear distinction between “partners in development” and “national interest”.

2.3. “Partners in Development” and “National Interest”

China and India’s foreign policy interests in Africa have led to a number of debates with regard to the impact that these countries have on the continent. Hence, commentators around the globe continue to describe or interpret China and India’s foreign policies in light of either national interest or partners in development. For this reason, it is vital to draw a clear distinction on what these terms signify, since it forms the backbone of the study and will be dealt with in chapters 3, 4 and 5, building from the problem statement of whether China and India’s interests may be viewed as national self-interest or partnerships in development.

Before attempting to explain “partners” and “development”, it is important to provide a brief historical overview of these concepts. The term partnership is deeply imbedded in “development cooperation”, since the mid 1980s. The latter concept paved the way for terms such as “partnership”, “cooperation”, “solidarity” and “aid”. But it was the former, which became known as the “new big idea” in development (Bailey and Dolan, 2011: 31-32). By the end of the Cold-War two dominant
definitions of “partnerships” emerged from neo-liberal scholars and aid donors from the West. The first group of scholars asserted that partnerships might be interpreted as the relationship between aid donors and recipient countries. This normally took place in the global arena between the developed North and the developing South. Neo-liberals contested the narrow state-centric interpretation of partnership, arguing that the term encompasses a number of role players such as the private and public sectors, together with ordinary citizens (Unwin, 2005:13). Moreover, trust and sharing forms an integral part of the term partnership. It is important not to confuse partnership with terms such as “aid” and “charity”, since the latter forms part of an unequal partnership where the relationship is dominated by one partner, with little if any participation from the other partner(s). The foundation of an equal partnership is based on equality, respect, reciprocity and ownership (Bailey and Dolan, 2011: 33).

As with most other concepts in the social sciences, the term “partnership” does not escape controversial connotations and various interpretations. Partnerships are determined by those who form relationships based on specific issues, making it difficult to free the concept from ambiguity. Le Ber and Branzei (2010: 603) reiterate this by arguing that partners prioritise their relationship based on values and mutual-benefits. From a generic point of departure, Mohiddin (as cited by Bailey and Dolan, 2011: 33) defines “partnership” “as the highest stage of working relationships between different people brought together by commitment to common objectives, bonded by long experience of working together, and sustained by subscription to common visions”. Unwin (2005: 11) articulates the view that partnerships should incorporate development practices that will be conducive to the social well-being of society as a whole. For this reason, Lister (1999: 3) and Unwin (2005: 9-10) identify the following core elements essential for a flourishing partnership:

First, mutual trust, exchange of information, collective decision-making; second partners must be goal orientated, all partners involved must have an equal share of responsibility and objectives must be executed to achieve the latter; third leaders must give guidance and serve as an inspiration, in order to achieve a specific purpose or cause as set out by the partners; fourth, activities undertaken by partners must be sustainable; fifth, a collective understanding of reciprocity; sixth,
transparency and accountability with regard to financial and other matters of importance to all partners.

Lister (1999: 3-4), Bailey and Dolan 2011: 33) elaborate these views by stating that the real world is based on a power structure and then continue to argue, that those who control the resources or capital in any partnership, normally set the rules, terms and conditions for engagement. Thus, the concept “partnership” may result in an unequal relationship, used as a tool by the dominant partner to achieve his or her self-interests at the expense of the other partner(s) involved (Lister, 1999:4). Furthermore, the inability of partners to work together may lead to mistrust, conflict and ultimately to the failure of the partnership. In the international arena, the word “partnership” is frequently used by states as a strategic and a political term in order to cooperate with other states (Bailey and Dolan, 2011: 33).

Cameron and Yongnian (n.d.: 4) define a strategic partnership as a “long-term commitment by two important actors to establish a close relationship across a significant number of policy areas”. They also acknowledge that partners are not necessarily homogeneous regarding their capabilities, but that the actors involved understand the significance of their commitment and are willing and able to find a consensus whenever feasible. Furthermore, Chao (2009: Internet) and Alden (2007: 14-15) argue that China-Africa and India-Africa strategic partnerships can be understood in regard to the signing of both the “Beijing Declaration of the Forum on China-Africa Strategic partnerships, as well as the India-Africa cooperation accord. China, India and Africa reached an agreement that their strategic partnership will be based on political and economic equality and mutual benefits, as well as cultural exchanges”, respectively. They further stress the importance of coordinating their activities concerning sustainable development (Deen, 2009: Internet; Prabhakar, 2009: Internet). For this reason, the study will describe both China and India’s partnerships with the continent in chapters 4 and 5 respectively. Against this backdrop, it is also important to understand the meaning of the concept “development”.

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Development, like partnership(s) is a contested concept. From a generic point of departure, development was usually interpreted as the transition of becoming modern, like the West (Parpart and Shaw, 2006:374). Historically development as a term has been advance on numerous occasions by academics across the globe. In the 1950s and 1960s the concept of development emerged with the emancipation of most developing countries that were in a state of distress and poverty (Kukreja, 2008: 309-310). Against this backdrop, development frequently acquired the connotation of being a distinction between rich and poor states. Thus, experts from the developed North assisted the newly formed nations in the developing South (Africa and Latin America) to develop, but to no avail. Instead, it paved the way for dependency theorists to argue that the South’s inability to develop is because of the interference of the developed North (Parpart and Shaw, 2006: 375).

Scholars in the 1960s continued to advance narrow interpretations of development, equating it with economic growth or more specifically, the growth of national income per capita. A country may therefore experience economic growth but still be underdeveloped in terms of health, education, nutrition and human development (Szirmai, 2005: 6-7). For these reasons, Blignaut (2007: 7) and Szirmai (2005: 6) acknowledge that economic growth is one of many prerequisites for economic development. As a result, they continue to argue that economic development is concerned with the empowerment of the people, such as the provision of good education, improved health and nutrition standards, the eradication of poverty, a safer environment, mutual benefits, individual emancipation, and the enhancement of a prosperous cultural and spiritual wellbeing. The social upliftment view of development is closely associated with the alternative or critical alternative approach to development. It follows a bottom-up approach and it is aimed at the citizens of a given country. This has been preferred by African states, as well as International NGOs (Parpart and Shaw, 2006: 375).

Roodt (2001:307) maintains that one cannot talk about development, without mentioning sustainability. Sustainable development was coined by the World Commission on Environment and Development in 1987. The commission defined sustainable development as development that “meets the needs of the present
without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs” (Hewat, 2010: Internet). Barbour and Snowman (2004:6) argue that sustainable development “sets out to achieve a balance between economic, social and ecological objectives”. What it adds up to is that sustainable economic and social development is dependent upon the well-being of the ecological system. More specifically, sustainable development encompasses a number of environmental concerns, which include climate change, as well as social issues such as access to water, sanitation, income, and biodiversity. Pinkse and Kolk (2012: 179) conceptualises sustainable development as the activity concerned with rectifying social inequalities and the eradication of poverty. Moreover, if sustainable development were to be successful it must include those who are affected by these issues to improve decision-making and implementation (Roodt, 2001:307).

On the other hand, sustainable development is not as straightforward as mentioned above. The environment, specifically climate change, may hamper development in certain countries. Developed and developing states are confronted with the dilemma of on the one hand, sustaining the environment but then on the other, of running the risk of having sluggish growth. This predicament makes it difficult for both the former and latter countries to adopt the idea of sustainability whole-heartedly. The problematic nature of sustainability is further aggravated when states fail to find consensus on key issues such as the removal of trade barriers, subsidies and the utilisation of limited and renewable resources (Sharma and Kearins, 2010:169). To escape the complexities of sustainability, Johannesburg (Johannesburg Plan of Implementation) (as cited by George, 2007: 103) defined sustainable development “as three distinct processes of economic development, social development and environmental protection – as interdependent and mutually reinforcing pillars”. However, the environmental interpretation falls short of explaining economic development, because the concept is ambiguous, and does not address the challenging issue of trying to implement the three pillars simultaneously (George, 2007: 103). Even though development may be viewed as vague or contested, it does not make the concept irrelevant.
In 2000, 189 states signed the UN Millennium Declaration, under the auspices of the UN and committed themselves to reduce the world’s poverty by half in 2015. As a result, the notion of “development” enjoyed centre stage in global forums (Gaiha, Imai and Nandhi, 2009:215). More specifically, the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), which form the basis for global equality, stability and peace among states, was adopted as a comprehensive approach to development (Fues, 2007: 23). It is important to note that the MDGs is based on eight goals, eighteen targets and forty eight indicators, but because of the limited scope of the research, attention will only be given to the former. For this reason, the China-Africa and India-Africa partnership may be evaluated within the framework of the MDGs. Although the MDGs do not constitute a specific partnership agreement between the China-Africa and India-Africa countries, the goals remain a common ideal for development. Collishaw (2010: 52) and Nayar and Razum (2006: 318) identify the eight MDGs as follows:

First, to eradicate extreme poverty and hunger; second, to achieve universal primary education; third, to promote gender equality and empower woman; fourth, to reduce child mortality; fifth, to improve maternal health; sixth, to combat HIV/Aids, malaria and other diseases; seventh, to ensure environment sustainability; eight, to develop a global partnership for development.

Keeping these goals in mind, Gaiha, et al. (2009: 216) argue that the MDGs are interdependent and that their success depends on the ability of countries to implement them holistically. They acknowledge that it will be hard to achieve success in any one of these goals, without making progress in the other goal(s). By means of illustration, education is an essential goal for eradicating or reducing poverty. Moreover, in economic terms, a healthy workforce generally leads to higher productivity and essentially to higher income, which in turn results in better services and healthcare facilities (Nayar and Razum, 2006:319). Gaiha, et al. (2009: 217), refer to the miracle economies of East Asia (Thailand, Indonesia and Hong-Kong) and argue that the key to the reduction of poverty in the aforementioned East Asian states was sustainable economic growth. To achieve sustainable growth requires stability and security, since instability and conflict generally act as a deterrent against investment. The last goal necessitates greater cooperation among all states. Since
the global economy is interdependent, a collapse in one state could result in the collapse of other states (Gaiha, et al. 2009: 217). Against this background, “national interest” may now be considered.

Scholars across the globe continue to grapple with the term “national interest”. This concept has been defined and interpreted differently by scholars and commentators over a period of time, often leading to confusion. Academics in particular, have often questioned the reliability of the term. Reliability becomes an issue of concern when there are several definitions or interpretations and all of them claim to be legitimate. Heywood (2011:130) reiterates this by arguing that national interest is a highly debated concept. For this reason, he argues that the concept may be linked to foreign policy goals or objectives, (by equating foreign policy with ‘public interests’) and that they accordingly serve the interests of the public in general. At the same time, Stolberg (2007:3) articulates the standpoint that foreign policy goals are established by a specific state (actor) to further its national interest. Thus, national interest in this sense means that foreign policy goals are design to have a favourable impact on the state as a collective.

The state as a whole encompasses a number of individual, collective and universal interests, which all constitute the national interest of a state. Individual interests can be equated with national interest, in the sense that a country consists of individual citizens and all these citizens form an integral part of the state. For example, if an individual from a particular country loses money in another country through unfair competition, this can be seen as an economic loss for the country – from where the individual originated – as a whole. Shembilku (2004:18) explains individual interests within the framework of the ‘common good,’ which is achieved when individuals seeks to promote the development of society as a whole. However, not all individual interests can be associated with national interest. For example, if an individual betrays his or her country through espionage then that is not in the national interest of that country. Espionage is not the only individual interests that do not constitute national interest; other interests such as education and marriage may not affect a country’s national interest.
The second key component in national interest is collective or group interests that may incorporate an entire social class or only citizens confined to a specific region. It can also entail people working in a specific industrial unit or factory, or employees working for a certain company. When foreign states or investors negatively affect a country’s group interests, it will also impact negatively on its national interest (Xuetong, 2002: 17-18). For example, in 1990, India was confronted with the demand of opening its markets to foreign investors while protecting its upcoming industries. These infant industries were necessary for India’s national interest to develop economically sound businesses that could compete on the domestic, as well as the international stage (Balaam and Dillman, 2011:332). More specifically, in the 1980s, China was confronted with a similar challenge with regard to its infant motor industry. China’s dilemma was that if its automobile industry (Tianjin Xiali) could not compete with foreign car manufacturers (such as Japanese companies like Nissan and Toyota) in terms of quality and prices, it would run the risk of losing an important portion of the market share. Another risk that China faced from importing cars is that it would have discouraged the upgrading and growth of its own automobile industry and by so doing, compromise its national interest. However, it is important to note that group interest, like individual interests, cannot simply be linked to national interest. Group interests are not similar to national interest, when it does not affects a country’s international relations, when its realisation is not in line with a country’s national interest, or when it exercises no influence on the national interest of the state (Xuetong, 2002: 18).

For this reason Oli (n.d.: 1), argues that foreign policy emanates from national interest. He goes further by articulating that national interest can only be attained if a country operates in harmony with the international environment. Therefore, states in the contemporary era share some common domestic concerns regarding terrorism, economic survival, environmental issues and so forth, but through cooperation these anxieties can be resolved (Xuetong, 2002:22). Examples such as 9/11, the 2008 economic meltdown of the United States and parts of the world, and the 17th Conferences of the Parties (Cop 17) (the states that signed the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) since 1995 and recently held in 2011, serves to illustrates how states secured or attempted to safeguard their national
interest by working together. Moravcsik and Vachudova (2002:4) point to the European Union (EU) as an illustration of how states came together to maximise their national interest. In this sense, they equate the security and economic interests of the EU to national interest. This view of national interest embodies the classical idealist school of thought in international relations. States in pursuit of their self-interest should not be viewed as a zero-sum game. Instead, it is a complementary process where all states can reap the benefits (political, economic, security and others) by working together (Heywood, 2011:62). However, it is important to note that national interest is not only confined to states. Deng (1998:318) asserts that non-state actors such as transnational corporations and international companies, as well as domestic dynamics, including “the individual choices and values”, play a formidable role in national interest. Apart from cooperation to safeguard national interest, Xuetong (2002: 16) posits that states generally pursue their individual national self-interests.

Morgenthau (1952: 964) a formidable realist scholar defines national interest as power. He posits that political leaders think and act in terms of power. Thus, the political leader asks, “[W]ill this step improve or weaken my power?” In other words, if political officials make policies that will preserve and advance the power of the state, then such policies are rational (Shembilku, 2004:15). According to Daddow (2009:89) the world is caught up in a web of power politics where states, as well as people are only interested in maximising and preserving their interests. These interests are played out in both the domestic and international settings, where their different needs and wants will collide. In accordance to other states in international relations, the national interest of a state comes first (Adar, 2006:111).

According to Gilpin (2001:16) national interest is the product of the elite. Since national interest can be equated to the interests of the elite, it follows that the state is largely the product of the ruling class, because the governing elite and pressure groups within society construct its interests and policies. Deng (1998: 312) therefore argues that national interest can be associated with two traits namely the “ruling class” and the “nation”. National interest can be viewed from both the domestic and international settings. Domestically, the interest of the state belongs to the ruling
class and on the international level national interest is equated with the interest of society as a whole both the governing elite and its citizens.

The above discussion confirms that national interest is a highly contested concept. Different scholars have advanced different interpretations on what national interest is. Idealist scholars have advanced a broad interpretation of national interest, which encompasses non-state actors. Realist scholars continue to assert that their explanation of national interest is the most scientific, since their unit of analysis is firmly based on the power of the state and rationality. Against this backdrop, it is important to understand both China and India’s respective contemporary foreign policy principles, since they form part of the broader explanation of foreign policy formulation and implementation.

2.4. China and India’s Foreign Policy Principles in Africa

It is not the aim of this section to provide a historical overview or extensive detailed account of China and India’s foreign policy principles. Instead, it seeks to unpack the contemporary foreign policy principles of these countries. The foreign policy principles of a country become a significant point of departure, if one seeks to understand why states behave as they do. Furthermore, this section will attempt to explain how both China and India’s foreign policy principles relate to Africa. Shelton (2006: 104) argues that the foreign policy principles of a state generally functions as the criteria by which it operates.

2.4.1. China’s Africa foreign policy principles

Before attempting to clarify China’s foreign policy principles towards Africa, it is important to note that it is not a new phenomenon. China has advanced core principles for engaging Africa as early as the 1960s. According to Shi (1993: 43) the Chinese Government has been consistent in applying its foreign policy principles towards Africa. What distinguishes China’s contemporary foreign policy principles
however, is the fact that it has moved away from ideology or values to economics (Shelton, 2006: 108; Shi, 1993: 43-44). It will be a mistake, however, to disregard ideas such as imperialism that influenced China’s foreign policy principles. Both China and the African continent were victims of imperialism. Consequently, anti-imperialists sentiments shared by both Africa and China are deeply imbedded in China’s foreign policy principles and continue to shape and influence their contemporary relations. It is therefore important to understand the anti-imperial sentiments behind China’s principles. China’s demand for a world order built on equality among states, has led it to base its foreign policy on the notion of non-alignment and non-interference in state sovereignty (Naidu and Mbazima, 2008: 751). With the support of Africa, China, therefore strongly favours a world order in which all states are equal regardless of their political and economic power. In 1990, the then Prime Minister Li Peng explained China’s foreign policy stance as follows:

“The new order of international politics means that all countries are equal and must mutually respect each other….regardless of their differences in political systems and ideology. No country is allowed to impose its will on other countries, seek hegemony in any regions, or pursue power politics to deal with other countries. They are not allowed to interfere in the internal affairs of the developing countries or pursue power politics in the name of human rights, freedom and democracy” (Naidu et. al, 2009: 91).

By reason of Li Peng’s policy statement, the views on China’s Africa foreign policy principles as expounded by Kholi (2009, 1-2), Shelton (2006: 107), SAGE (2007: 377-378), Shi (1993: 43-44) and Wenping (2007: 27) can be synthesised as follows: 

Sincerity, Friendship and Equality: The Chinese Government adheres to the principle of peaceful-co-existence and encourage African states to find political and economic solutions to suit their own interests and conditions. As a result, China respects and supports each country’s framework for development and is in favour of a united continent. China continues to emphasise the importance of “equality” in its relations with Africa. Thus, all states are equal regardless of their political ideology, military and economic capabilities. In other words, all states are independent and no state has the right to interfere in the domestic affairs of any other state. Furthermore, the
principle of “non-interference” means that, when China provides the continent with aid (economic or technological) there should be no strings attached.

**Mutual benefit, reciprocity and common prosperity:** China supports Africa’s quest for economic development and seeks to cooperate with the continent in key institutions such as the AU and regional organisations such as SADC and others for the benefit of all the parties involved. More specifically, China and Africa have established the “Beijing-Consensus” as a comprehensive agreement to enhance the prosperity of both China and Africa.

**Mutual support and close coordination:** China is committed to strengthening its relations with the continent in multilateral institutions such as the UN, the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and others to advance the interests of both partners. Thus, with greater coordination China and Africa will be in a position to convince the international community to pay close attention to key issues such as peace and development challenges facing the continent. This principle stresses the importance of China aligning itself with the developing world, particularly with Africa against Western domination. Thus, China would never seek superpower status.

**Learning from each other and seeking common development goals:** China and Africa will learn from one another, concerning issues such as good governance, development, as well as committing them to greater cooperation and exchanges in culture, education, science and health. As partners in development, China will assist the continent in capacity building and ensuring that joint ventures takes place within the framework of sustainable development.

Subjacent to the aforementioned principles is the “one China” principle that functions as the political foundation that upholds the main beliefs in the principles discussed (SAGE, 2007: 377). The Chinese Government is still in pursuit of the ideal of making Taiwan part of the greater China. They continue to argue that Taiwan is a province of China and therefore do not regard it as a sovereign state. As a result, the Chinese Government is opposed to any state that has formal diplomatic ties with Taiwan (Shi, 1993: 44-45). China’s stance on Taiwan and other issues have led its foreign policy principles to be labelled as contradictory. Its notions of “non-interference”, “sovereignty” and “peaceful-coexistence” are eroded when it punishes countries that deal with Taiwan. Glaser (2010: 307) argues that China is upholding the status quo
in the United Nation’s Security Council (UNSC). China’s opposition to the expansion of the UNSC membership, stems from its fear that the Security Council will erode its international influence. Thus, China’s belief in a world order of state equality may be viewed with greater scepticism. Xinbo (2001: 297) points out, that China has opted for pragmatism to satisfy its own interests at the expense of its principles. For example, when Iraq invaded Kuwait, China strategically chose not to utilise its veto power in the UNSC based on its principles of “peaceful-coexistence” (non-violence means) and “non-interference” in order to better its relations with the United States and to end the occupation of Kuwait (Xinbo, 2001: 297). Furthermore, how China uses its principles on the continent may assist the study in determining the outcome of China-Africa relations. Against this backdrop, India’s foreign policy principles, and how it relates to Africa can now be considered.

2.4.2. India’s Africa Foreign Policy Principles

In view of the fact that there is no official documentation available on India’s contemporary foreign policy principles towards Africa, this sub-section will not attempt to speculate on how exactly these principles have been formulated. Neither does it seek to work within Beri’s (2003:219) framework of suggested principles for “India’s Africa foreign policy, which she formulated as “promoting economic cooperation; engaging the People of Indian Origin (PIO); preventing and combating terrorism; preserving peace, and assisting the African defence forces”. It will instead attempt to look at the evolution of India’s foreign policy principles and how policy relates to the continent. India’s earlier foreign policy principles towards the continent had deeply rooted ideological connotations. Ideas associated with imperialism or colonialism was criticised by both India and Africa (Alden, 2007: 14). From 1947 to 1964, India’s Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, adopted an anti-imperialist foreign policy and championed the cause for a decolonised Africa as well as non-alignment (Mazumdar, 2011: 165-166).

Mohan (2006: Internet) asserts, however, that it is not meaningful to view India’s foreign policy for the period from 1947 to 1964. The world has changed and so has India’s foreign policy. The shift in India’s foreign policymaking can be explained in
five transitions. First, India’s Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, was in favour of a socialist India, but with the collapse of the Soviet Union, India was transformed into a capitalist society. Second, India moved away from politics to economics. Given its deepening relations with Africa and other actors, India realised that it needed FDI (foreign direct investment) and access to markets in both the developed North and the developing South. Third, India realised that it could emerge as a great power, given its phenomenal economic growth figures in the 1990’s. The fourth transition required India, to drop its “anti-Western” sentiments as it began to forge closer ties with the West, particularly the United States. The fifth and final transition required India to move away from idealism to realism, in order to satisfy its national interest. Thus, India’s rapid industrialisation and modernisation requires it to focus on its domestic interests (Mazumdar, 2011: 169; Mohan, 2006: Internet; Naidu, 2009: 111-135). In light of the above transitions, India’s foreign policy remains a work in progress and this explains why the country lags behind China in formulating a comprehensive strategy for engaging the continent.

As a result, the country’s contemporary foreign policy principles are still shaped by the key principles adopted by Nehru, although modified to fit the conditions and events as it unfolds in the modern world, and particularly in Africa. According to the *India-Africa Forum summit* (2008) and the Institute for Defence studies and Analysis (IDSA) (2011: Internet) India’s foreign policy principles towards Africa are as follows:

*Equality, mutual respect and mutual benefit*: Like, China the Indian Government emphasises the need for “equality”, “mutual respect” and “mutual benefit”. The latter is a result of the two partners’ colonial history. However, as the colonial period faded, India continued to view itself as the bridge between the developed North and developing South. This is evident in its rhetoric on greater South-South cooperation and its need for an equal world order (Pollio, 2010: 233). India is therefore committed to forge relations with African countries regardless of their political ideology, and economic and military capabilities. Moreover, India seeks to cooperate with the continent in a number of social and economic fields that will further their interests on a mutual basis. In order to attain mutual benefits, the Indian Government has engaged African countries through technical assistance, trade and training (Beri,
To further strengthen their ties with the continent India is committed to support the AU and NEPAD (New Partnerships for Africa’s Development) (Desia, 2009: 417-420).

*Mutual non*-interference in domestic affairs, *mutual non*-aggression and *peaceful coexistence*: Like, China, India strongly believes in sovereignty and a policy of “non-interference” in the developing world (Mawdsley and McCann, 2009: 88). In addition, it also emphasises the importance of providing economic aid with no strings attached. Thus, India has provided the continent with economic and diplomatic support regardless of whether they have respect for human rights, are democratic or uphold the principles of good governance (Alden, 2007: 14-15). On mutual non-aggression and peaceful coexistence, India has been in the forefront of promoting peace on the continent and in the world. India has provided military support to both the UN and the AU, in order to help achieve peace on the continent (Beri, 2003: 227-228). Like, China, India has used its foreign policy principles to engage Africa and the world at large, but as is the case with China, India is also faced with the challenging task of operating within these principles.

Xinbo (2001: 297) argues that states generally find themselves in a dilemma of choosing between either national interest or moral principles. For example, on the one hand, both India and China are faced with challenges of operating within their moral or idealistic principles such as “equality, mutual benefit”, “peaceful coexistence” and their stance on “South-South” cooperation, and on the other hand, they must seek to advance their respective individual, national interest. In the case of India, national interest seems to prevail (Solomon, 2012: 66-68). As Solomon (2012: 66-68) points out, India’s role in the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) was not based on South-South solidarity, but focused on its own security concerns regarding its border dispute with the Chinese. Mawdsley and McCann (2009: 89) point out, that contemporary India-Africa engagement has also not been about “South-South” cooperation or promoting the cause for an equality-based world order. The key driver in India’s foreign policy is its need for natural resources and markets for its manufactured goods in order to maximise its national interest (Naidu, 2009: 116). Furthermore, Solomon (2012: 67) asserts that India is quite happy with the current state of affairs (a world dominated by the North), in that it is against any international
institution that seeks to challenge Western dominance. India has also used public rhetoric for an equal world order in international institutions such as the UNSC, together with its nuclear weapon status in a Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty, as a pragmatic way to increase its influence on the global stage (Mawdsley and McCann, 2009: 89). It is important to note, regardless of how the debate may sway, ideas such as “South-South” cooperation and the cause for an “equality-based world order” have remained important. India, like China may use its public rhetoric, on “South-South” cooperation and the need for an equal world order, either for a genuine cause or as means to manipulate other states. In consideration of this, policymakers in both India and China continue to see the importance of normative ideas in foreign policy. How this may affect their future relations with the continent depend on how they implement their principles and norms.

As in the case of China, India’s notions on “non-interference”, “mutual non-aggression” and “peaceful coexistence” were eroded when it forcefully invaded Goa, in 1961, to end Portugal’s 500-year reign (Solomon, 2012: 66). In view of this, tension between principles and reality becomes a difficult task for foreign policymakers to manage. Thus, both China and India’s foreign policymakers are expected to function within the framework of their foreign policy principles. For this reason, it becomes pivotal to consider the actors involved in foreign policy formulation and implementation in both China and India.

2.5. Foreign Policy Actors in China

According to Jacobson and Knox (2010: 2) contemporary China possesses a variety of foreign policy actors both official and non-official. This, however, does not mean that the country is becoming more democratic or pluralistic in nature. It remains authoritarian, with the Communist Party of China (CPC – hereafter also the Communist Party) at the helm of decision-making. Nonetheless, there is a host of other actors responsible for China’s strategic choices in its foreign policy and with the country’s emergence as a superpower, there has been an increase of activities and goals of a variety of Chinese actors, that seek to influence the foreign policy process (formulation and implementation). For this reason, this sub-section does not
seek to discuss all the actors in China’s foreign policy machinery. Instead, it will focus on the most important actors responsible for foreign policy formulation and implementation. However, attention will also be given to those actors on the margins, such as civil society, who plays a formidable role in influencing China’s foreign policy.

2.5.1. The Communist Party of China: The Politburo and the Politburo Standing Committee

China’s foreign policy machinery has transformed when Hu Jintao came to power, in 2002 at the 16th National Congress of the Communist Party of China. He replaced party steward Jiang Zemin. The country’s foreign policy process is increasingly becoming multifaceted, in terms of the number of institutions, agencies, departments, and individuals (Cao, 2007: 436). Before attempting to clarify the role of the CPC, it is important to note that some of the officials involved in the foreign policy process do not hold any official public office, and that some of the duties, authorities and even personnel frequently overlap (Jacobson and Knox, 2010: 4). The CPC is probably the most powerful decision-making body in the People’s Republic of China (PRC – henceforth China), with regard to foreign policymaking and implementation. As a means of illustration, Paltiel (2010: 2) asserts that the CPC has the power to employ, endorse and revoke any administrative official at every level of government. To further indicate the dominance of the Communist Party in foreign policy formulation and execution, Jacobson and Knox (2010: 2) point out that all CPC organs, government agencies and People’s Liberation Army (PLA) departments, universities, research organisations, state-owned enterprises, media organisations and citizens are subordinate to the Communist Party. Thus, in order to make sense of the CPC and its influence on foreign policy, attention needs to be given to the Politburo and the Politburo Standing Committee (PSC) of the Communist Party.

The Politburo is one of the most significant institutions in China, because of the political power that it wields. The Politburo functions as a supply chain to the CPC, in that it trains and educates future senior political officials. It is situated at the top of
China’s formal foreign policy machinery, despite the fact that it is not publicised as such. It is characterised by informality and has an immense membership, living in regions or provinces other than Beijing. However, its composition makes it difficult to respond to urgent foreign policy matters (such as war or peace) (Kaplan, 2005: 5). As a result, the PSC is entrusted with the highest foreign policy decision-making authority in China. Its organisational make-up includes nine members, the majority of whom are retired public officials such as the Premier and the executive deputy Premier of the State Council, the Chair of the National People’s Congress and the Chair of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, as well as a United Front responsible for coordinating policies with non-Communist political elites (Paltiel, 2010: 2).

In addition, the president of the People’s Republic of China, Hu Jintao, is the Secretary General of the Communist Party, Chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC) and the head of the Foreign Affairs Leading Small Group (Alexandroff, 2012: Internet). These prestigious positions held by the president make him an important role player in foreign policy formulation and implementation, but since all decisions take place within the framework of the CPC, it makes it difficult for him to operate unilaterally. For this reason, Paltiel (2010: 2) argues that the president of China, manages foreign policy through his party structures, which includes compromise and consensus. Therefore, any power exercised by the president should be viewed through the lens of the CPC and its members, specifically the PSC.

Jacobson and Knox (2010: 4) also assert that more often than not, the PSC is the final arbiter in foreign policymaking, and approves all policies that have been deliberated on by other agencies. In other cases, the president is left with the task of making the final decision. The CPC’s search for consensus, often delay the decision-making process. Their desire for efficient and effective decisions is restricted by extensive negotiations and bargaining among party members (Alexandroff, 2012: Internet). As noted by Jacobson and Knox (2010: 17), “…even Hu Jintao must seek consensus in the name of collective leadership –despite his supreme position as a leader of the CPC, state and military –to maintain CPC unity or at a minimum,
enough harmony among the various CPC factions and other elites to ensure loyalty...". In view of this, the State Council will function in the background, which will pave the way for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), the Ministry of Foreign Commerce (MOFCOM) and the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to be discussed as some of China’s official foreign policy actors.

2.5.2. The State Council of the People’s Republic of China

The State Council is led by China’s Premier (Wen Jiabo), who is also a formidable player in foreign policy formulation and implementation. The council is composed of Vice-Premiers and State Councillors together with 28 ministries and commissions under it (People’s Daily Online, 2012: Internet). The State Council is the highest governmental decision-making body in terms of state power and administration. Its core function is to represent China in bilateral relations (Jacobson and Knox, 2010: 7). As a result, it is responsible for implementing both the principles and policies of the CPC, as well as scrutinising policies and laws passed by the National People’s Congress. It is further entrusted with the task of handling issues such as China’s domestic politics, diplomacy, national defence, finance, economy, culture and education (People’s Daily Online, 2012: Internet). In light of this, the MFA may now be considered as one of the major role players in China’s foreign policy.

2.5.3. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China

In recent history, the MFA played a significant role in foreign policy decision-making. It was unquestionably the most notorious institution when it comes to foreign policy formulation and implementation. The MFA’s role was important for two reasons. On the one hand, it dealt with “tactical” aspects of foreign policy decision-making; on the other hand, it provided credible “funnelled” information to the final or key decision-makers (Kaplan, 2005: 10).

Today, however, it functions as a mere “publicist” for the state. As stated by a director of a research institution (cited by Jacobson and Knox, 2010: 8) “ministries
are merely managers. They do not make policy, they implement it”. This view became apparent when examining the MFA’s main responsibilities (as stated on their website (MFA, 2012: Internet). Responsibilities two and three draw attention to the MFA’s “reporting” and “advisory” role to the CPC Central Committee and State Council, with the final decisions resting with the latter and not with the MFA. Responsibilities “one” and “19” highlight the MFA’s implementation role. According to MFA interviewees (as cited by Jacobson and Knox, 2010: 8), the MFA’s secondary role can further be explained by two factors. First, globalisation resulted in the increase of issues and it required China to include more institutions or agencies in its foreign policy process. Thus, the MFA is not only dependent on other institutions for information or expertise; it is in a constant battle with them for influence. Second, since 1998 the minister of the MFA Mr. Yang Jiechi, is always fifth or sixth in protocol, when China is visited by heads of states or other important foreign dignitaries.

Although, the MFA may be relegated to a secondary position, it remains an important role player in China’s foreign policy. Its major role is to protect China’s core interests in state-to-state relations. For this reason, Paltiel (2010: 5) is of the opinion that “…..while the MFA has little discretion to push diplomacy in particular ways, it has every incentive to raise China’s prestige and to act pre-emptively to forestall incidents that might offend or embarrass top Party and State leaders...”. In view of this, the MFA remains one of many role players in China’s foreign policy process. However, China’s need for natural resources has resulted in the proliferation of power or influence in the MOFCOM (Jacobson, 2008: Internet). As a result of this, the following sub-section seeks to discuss the role of the MOFCOM in China’s foreign policy formulation and implementation.

2.5.4. The Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China

China’s entrance on the global stage (particularly in the World Trade Organisation) (WTO), has propelled the MOFCOM to become a significant player in foreign policy formulation and implementation. The MOFCOM has been dubbed a “superministry” by Paltiel (2010: 5) for a number of reasons. First, the ministry is responsible for both
internal and external commercial activities, which include investments and aid related policies. Second, it supervises China’s intellectual property legislation, which includes trademarks, patents and copyright protection. Finally, it is responsible for regulating the activities of Chinese enterprises in foreign states. It is important to note, although the MOFCOM is not responsible for banking, finance or foreign exchange, it spearheaded China’s “go out” strategy in other countries (Paltiel, 2010: 5; Jacobson and Knox, 2010: 10). As a point of illustration, Davies, Edinger, Tay and Naidu (2008: 2) argue that the MOFCOM played a significant role in establishing the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation. Consequently, the ministry is directly responsible for coordinating and implementing China’s trade policy towards Africa.

The influence of the MOFCOM is further strengthened because of its executive power over the Department of Foreign Aid. The fact that the Department of Foreign Aid is located within the MOFCOM emphasises the importance of the MOFCOM in China’s foreign policy process (Corkin (2011: 67). According to Lengauer (2011: 40), this authorises the ministry to “formulate and implement China’s foreign aid policies and plans, facilitate the reform on foreign aid provision modalities, compile foreign aid programs, select foreign aid projects and organize their implementation”. In view of this, the MOFCOM is certainly a pivotal actor in China’s foreign policy machinery. This paves the way for the PLA to be discussed as an influential role player in China’s foreign policy process.

2.5.5. The People’s Liberation Army of China

The PLA continues to play major role in China’s foreign policy process, specifically with regard to security and defence matters (Hui, 2011: 3). However, scholars such as Hui (2011: 3); Jacobson and Knox, (2010: 12) and Paltiel (2010: 3) concede that the PLA does not wield any significant political power because of China’s institutional reforms. The PLA operates within the confines of the CPC or more specifically it is subordinate to the Central Military Commission (CMC) of the Communist Party. This, however, does not make the PLA less significant, since its power may be equated with that of the State Council and it outranks all other ministries in China (Paltiel, 2010: 3). As mentioned earlier, the PLA specialises in military related issues and as
a result, it is a key decision-maker when it comes to arms control and non-proliferation. It is also responsible for protecting the borders of China and its territorial integrity against internal or external threats (Swaine, n.d.: 4).

Internationally, the PLA has played both a positive and a negative role regarding China’s foreign relations with other states and international institutions. On a positive note, the PLA has been at the forefront in supporting the UN peacekeeping operations in Africa (Jacobson, 2008: Internet). Furthermore, China has outperformed all the other permanent members of the UNSC in contributing the highest number of military peacekeeping forces to the UN. The PLA is also increasingly active in fighting piracy, terrorism, as well as providing disaster and humanitarian assistance. As a result of this, the PLA has its own spokesperson and an agency that compiles China’s white paper on defence (Paltiel, 2010: 3-4).

On the negative side, the PLA appears to act unilaterally in some instances, in that it often pursues strategies or goals that are different from that of the CPC. For example in 2011, Hu Jintao, who is also the commander in chief of the PLA, was visited by the United States Defence Secretary, Robert Gates, to strengthen US-China military relations. And at the same time, the PLA experimented with its new stealth fighter jet, which made the visit confrontational (Hui, 2011: 4). In view of this, there is still a lack of coordination between the Communist Party’s CMC and the PLA (Paltiel, 2010: 4). Nevertheless, the PLA remains a pivotal role player in China’s foreign policy process. In addition, China’s foreign policy machinery is no longer immune to influences emerging from society.

2.5.6. China’s Civil Society

The importance of civil societies in the 21st century is undeniable. Even China as an autocratic government acknowledges the importance of civil society in foreign policy formulation and implementation (Hui, 2011: 4). Parpart and Shaw (2006: 373) define civil society as any non-state actor within society including NGO’s, businesses, think-tanks, financial institutions, energy companies, media and others. More specifically, civil society includes private enterprises, intellectuals, journalist and Chinese
Academy of Social Sciences. Furthermore, the Chinese Government has been instrumental in engaging civil society through electronic and other media outlets to discuss foreign policy issues (Paltiel, 2010: 9). Jacobson and Knox (2010: 24) assert that all the above-mentioned actors might not be official foreign policy actors, but they provide valuable inputs to the foreign policy process. For example, Jacobson and Knox (2010: 24) point out that China’s foreign policy is particularly shaped by its commercial interests. Thus, it is in the interests of China to protect its financial institutions and business (private or SOE) in other countries. These actors influence China’s foreign policy because they are of strategic importance. Against this backdrop, India’s foreign policy role players may now be discussed.

2.6. Foreign Policy Actors in India

Unlike China, contemporary India does not have a clear-cut bureaucracy in terms of foreign policy formulation and implementation. This has left a number of academics baffled as to who the main role players are. Is it the Prime Minister, the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA), parliament, provinces or others? In looking for answers, attention needs to be drawn to the evolution of India’s domestic politics from which a clearer picture will hopefully emerge about India’s contemporary foreign policy role players. It will further explain the ability or inability of India’s foreign policy role players to act or react to domestic, as well as global issues confronting the country.

Two critical historical periods explains India’s contemporary foreign policy. The first was Nehru’s dominance in the foreign policy front, and the second was the collapse of the dominant party system in the 1990s. Not only was Nehru the “mastermind” behind India’s foreign policy, but he also controlled all aspects of it with an iron fist (Mazumdar, 2011: 166). As stated by former US president Harry Truman (1945-1952), “the President makes foreign policy” (as cited by Le Pere and van Nieuwkerk, 2006: 285). This is exactly what Nehru did. He controlled all ministries responsible for foreign policymaking and implementation. He was his own foreign minister and his personality, convictions and his stance on non-alignment became deeply imbedded in India’s foreign policy. He proceeded by turning India’s parliament into a rubberstamp, since most foreign policy powers are accorded by parliament. As a
result, India’s foreign policy bureaucracy was non-existent. Nehru was indeed the “alpha” and “omega” of India’s foreign policy and no one, not even parliament challenged him (Chaulia, 2002: 217). However, in 1962, India’s border dispute with the Chinese witnessed the systematic decline of Nehru’s popularity. And with his death in May 1964, Nehru’s Congress party continued to lose support among the Indians and paved the way for a multiparty system (Harshe, 2007: 33-34).

The 1990s saw the collapse of the dominant party system under Nehru’s Congress Party and the transition to a multiparty system. More specifically, the period between 1989 and 1999, gave rise to coalition governments in India. Foreign policy was no longer the sole responsibility of the prime minister or of a dominant party. A host of other political parties and their leaders came to the fore to influence the foreign policy process (Mazumdar, 2011).

Thus, the two historical eras’ explain India’s inability to design an effective bureaucracy that deals with foreign policy. The dominance of Nehru in all ministries of foreign affairs explains India’s weak institutional arrangements regarding foreign policy formulation and implementation. For example, India’s contemporary Ministries of External Affairs and India’s Foreign Service (IFS) remain small and incapable of developing and implementing India’s national interest effectively (Markey, 2009: 77). Moreover, the rise of coalition governments made it difficult for India’s political elite to design a grand strategy for foreign policy (Mohan, 2009: 2). For this reason, Mazumdar (2011: 166) reiterates the viewpoint that India does not have a grand strategy that will ensure India’s success in advancing its national interest to their full capacity. By a grand strategy he means “the coordinated and integrated use of the political, economic, military, social and cultural instruments of power available to a country to advance its national interests...”. In addition, Chaudhuri (1993: 457) asserts that even the Prime Minister is caught up in the dilemma of accommodating various interest groups (such as party coalitions, the country’s federal states or provinces, institutions and others) in parliament and achieving a utilitarian consensus with regard to foreign policy. In view of the above-mentioned arguments, India’s foreign policy is increasingly multifaceted and unstructured. The following subsection therefore deals with India’s parliament, coalition governments and the nature
of its federal system, institutions and civil society as valuable inputs in India’s foreign policy.

2.6.1. Parliament and Foreign Policy

From a constitutional point of view, India’s parliament is unquestionably a pivotal role player in the foreign policy process. India’s constitution formally confers the power to govern foreign policy on parliament. According to Article 246 of the Indian Constitution (as cited by Chaulia, 2002: 216 and Sridharan, 2008: 16), parliament has undisputable law-making authority over aspects such as the defence of India, war and peace, atomic energy, foreign affairs, diplomatic and consular representation, United Nations representation, foreign jurisdiction, foreign loans and trade and commerce with foreign countries. Chaulia (2002: 216) elaborates the argument by stating that parliament also exercises supreme supervisory authority over the functions (formulation and implementation) of executive foreign policy officials in the MEA and other ministries involved in the foreign policy process. Moreover, parliament is in control of the budgetary allocation process and therefore decides which government institutions should receive funds and how much (Sridharan, 2008: 16).

Regardless of parliament’s constitutional power, Singh (2010: Internet), Malone and Mukherjee (n.d.: 12) report that its influence on foreign policy has declined over the years, for a number of reasons. First, India’s weak foreign policy institutional arrangements (with regard to the MEA, IFS and others) make it difficult for parliament to play an effective role, because of its dependence on the former institutions for information or expertise regarding foreign policy. Second, parliament does not amend or make foreign policy; instead, it follows it. For this reason, Sridharan (2003: 468) argues that parliament may be “Constitutionally strong but it has become politically weak...". The third and probably the most important reason that explains parliament’s weakness is the proliferation of small and coalition governments. Power in India is divided between central government and the state governments that have jurisdiction over internal affairs and other state issues, which resulted in the increase of autonomy of the individual states, as well as the number
of political parties (Sing, 2010: Internet; Malone and Mukherjee, n.d.: 12). In spite of how India’s parliamentary power may have declined, it remains central to understanding its foreign policy machinery. In the midst of crises, the country’s parliament has always been a formidable player in foreign policymaking (Sing, 2010: Internet). In light of this, India’s coalition governments, as well as its federal system may now be considered.

2.6.2 Coalition Governments and Federalism in India’s Foreign Policy

As mentioned earlier, the collapse of the dominant party system paved the way for a more inclusive governing system with regard to foreign policy. More specifically, coalition governments influence India’s foreign policy, both nationally and internationally. Because most of India’s foreign policy powers is vested in parliament, where numerous coalition governments coexist, it became difficult for the political elite to agree on various foreign policy issues (Chaudhuri, 1993: 457). Furthermore, ideological opinions held by parties such as the Congress Party (with some still believing in non-alignment), the Communist Parties (with their hostility toward the United States and their pro-China stance) and the national Bharatiya Janata Party (with its principle of preserving India’s national interest and realist orientation) are all constraints to India’s foreign policy process (Mazumdar, 2011: 172; Chaudhuri, 1993: 448).

In addition, it is important to note that the parties’ political ideology, as well as their size in parliament function as key variables when it comes to understanding the influence they exercise on India’s foreign policy process (formulation and implementation). The size of the Dravida Munnertra Kazhagam (DMK) party (with its sympathy with the Tamils in Sri Lanka) and its importance to the coalition government played an important role in shaping India’s actions towards Sri Lanka, when the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam wanted to secede from the former. The Indian Government was caught up in the dilemma of trying to solve the humanitarian crisis in Sri Lanka and to maintain good relations with its alliance partner. This made the coalition government to be reactive in its response to Sri Lanka, given its peculiar predicament (Maini, 2011: 2; Malone, n.d.: 7).
More recently, in 2005, the Congress-led coalition government, under the leadership of the Dr. Manmohan Singh, could not reach an agreement with the United States concerning its civil nuclear proliferation. The reluctance of their alliance partners – the communist parties – to work with the United States, made them cast a vote of no confidence in parliament. This made it impossible for the Congress Party to enter into an agreement with the United States, but because they found support from an outside party, and managed to trounce the no-confidence vote, they finally consolidated the agreement in 2008 (Mazumdar, 2011: 173). Maini (2011: 2-3), points to another example of how one of the party’s (the People’s Democratic Party) in the coalition government had pressurised the BJP-led government to open its borders with Pakistan, in spite of the national government’s hostility towards the Pakistanis. And in 2005, Dr. Manmohan Singh signed an agreement with the Pakistani Government, to allow a bus route between the two countries. These examples serve to show that the states coalition governments play a significant role in India’s foreign policy and may hinder the Indian central Government’s ability to formulate and implement its foreign policy. Moreover, India’s federal system has made it possible for individual states to engage in bilateral agreements with other states and international institutions.

The influence of India’s individual states on the country’s policies is not a new phenomenon, especially in the international realm (Maini, 2011: 3). Mazumdar (2011: 174) argues that in 1996, the state government of West Bengall, acted as an instrumental mediator in settling a water-sharing treaty between Bangladesh and India. Moreover, state governments, such as Jammu, Kashmir and Punjab played an important role in influencing India’s foreign policy towards Pakistan especially in respect of issues such as terrorism and trade. Equally so, do state governments such as Sikkim and Arunachal Pradesh, play a diplomatic role in India’s negotiations with China concerning their border dispute (Mazumdar, 2011: 174).

On the economic front, India’s individual states have been formidable role players in obtaining FDI. India’s central Government has given states permission to proceed in conducting bilateral agreements with both state and non-state actors (Dossani and
Vijaykumar, 2009: 5). Moreover, with India’s central Government having granted chief ministers of individual states permission to negotiate for both trade and funds (Sridharan, 2003: 476-474), the Indian states have increasingly become prominent role players in international institutions such as the World Trade Organisation (WTO). Dossani and Vijaykumar (2009: 5) argue that India’s states are actively seeking out opportunities for foreign investments to enhance their social and economic well-being. The agreement that the state of Maharashtra entered into with the Enron Corporation of the United States to improve its electricity supply, serves as an example in point. Karnataka that negotiated directly with the World Bank for a loan, serves as another example. It is important to note, however, that the involvement of India’s individual states in the international arena does not erode the country’s federal system (Sridharan, 2003: 477). It serves as a clear indication of how states influence India’s foreign economic policy process (formulation and implementation). Against this background, India’s foreign policy institutions may now be considered.

2.6.3. India’s Foreign Policy Institutions

Although India’s foreign policy bureaucratic machinery is mired in complexities, it does not make them irrelevant. Thus, the aim of this sub-section is not to provide a detailed discussion on India’s foreign policymaking institutions, because of the challenges identified in pursuing such an approach. However, it does seek to broadly identify them and the role they play in India’s foreign policy. According to Malone (n.d.: 11), India’s official foreign policymaking machinery generally incorporates the legislature, the Prime Minister’s Office, the MEA, the IFS, the Ministry of Defence (MoD), Cabinet and others.

In view of the above-mentioned institutions, the MoD used to play an important role in foreign policy implementation, especially in a time of crisis (Malone, n.d.: 11) But, just as in the time of Nehru, foreign policy formulation and implementation remains in the hands of the elected few. During Vajpayee’s term as Prime Minister (1998-2004), foreign policy was the task of both the National Security Advisor (NSA) and the Prime Minister’s Office. Still today, the NSA and the foreign secretary to the MEA’s
report all foreign policy matters to the prime minister. As a result, the MEA is increasingly relegated to a secondary position. Moreover, India’s contemporary Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh actively pursued to reach an agreement with the United States, regarding India’s civil nuclear proliferation, in spite of parliament’s’ and the MEA’s outcry not to (Mazumdar, 2011: 176).

In addition, Markey (2009: 77) points out that the MEA and the IFS suffers from severe institutional deficiencies. On the one hand, the MEA is not only one of the smallest ministries, but it lacks career diplomats that can deal with complex foreign policy issues. According to the 2010 MEA annual report (as cited by Mazumdar, 2011: 177), the MEA has less than 750 professional diplomats and 2700 non-diplomatic staff. The IFS, on the other hand, is also crippled by staff shortages. As noted by a US diplomat (as cited by Markey, 2009: 77) “…the IFS may be right-sized for Malaysia but is certainly not for a country with India’s global aspirations”. In view of this, India’s foreign policy institutions remain weak and hinder the country’s capability to implement its foreign policy priorities. However, civil society in India’s vibrant democracy continues to play an important role in the country’s foreign policy.

2.6.4 India’s Civil Society

The role of India’s non-state actors in foreign policy formulation and implementation, have indeed blossomed over the years, specifically after 1989, which saw the collapse of the dominant party system and the liberalisation of the economy (Chitalkar and Malone, 2011: 82). In recent times, however, foreign policy actors such as business or multinationals, the Indian diaspora and the media, have become prominent role players in India’s foreign policy environment. India’s pro-business outlook has propelled the country’s private sector onto the global stage (Kapur, 2009: 203). Businesses have become an integral part of India’s foreign policy. It is no surprise that each time the Prime Minister (Dr. Singh) visit foreign states, he is accompanied by a business delegation (Mohan, 2009: 9).

Additionally, businesses have increasingly taken it on themselves to build trade relations with other states. This is evident of Indian businesses such as the
Confederation of Indian Industries (CII), the Associated Chambers of Commerce and Industry (ASSOCHAM), the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FICCI) and the Federation of Indian Exporters’ Organisation (FIEO) who identified Africa as a new and viable destination for increased investment opportunities (Desai, 2009: 422). In view of this, India’s businesses, such as Tata Motors and Mittal Steel Corporation, are positively spreading their wings to new frontiers (Malone and Chaturvedy, 2009: 9). Kapur (2009: 204) concurs, stating that Indian businesses have become one of the key components in India’s trade foreign policy.

India’s need to engage the Indian diaspora has shaped the country’s foreign policy. In 2002, the government established a high ranking committee to engage the diaspora in all parts of the world (Beri, 2003: 225). The diaspora’s intermediary status has made them to be of strategic importance to the Indian Government (Naidu, 2009: 131). However, India’s approach regarding its diaspora has become a controversial issue, in the sense, that it mostly benefits the people living in Europe and America rather than those in Africa (Beri, 2003: 225-226).

Like all other liberal democracies, the Indian Government does not escape the pressure of the media. The media is the principle actor in shaping the country’s foreign policy. It provides the inputs for intellectual debate regarding foreign policy issues (Chitalkar and Malone, 2011: 82). Kapur (2009: 204) describes the role of the media in India’s foreign policymaking and implementation as “…influencing media economics; the increasing influence of the middle class and big business on the media, which in turn is influencing the media’s thinking on foreign policy; and a gradual erosion of the domestic political consensus on foreign policy, giving the media the role of an arbiter and an independent analyst of contending political views”.

Mazumdar (2011: 177) reiterates the standpoint that the media has a critical role to play, because of India’s incompetent think tanks, universities and other social research institutions, of providing in-depth foreign policy analysis. He continues to argue that the government neglects the social sciences and that this explains India’s
weak research institutions and the country’s inability to design a grand strategy for its foreign policy. Even well-known think tank such as the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA), Indian Council of Research on International Economic Relations (ICIER), Indian Council of World Affairs (ICWA) and others, are not drawn on to enhance the country’s foreign policy machinery (Mazumdar, 2011: 177). Nevertheless, it can be concluded that civil society plays an important role in India’s foreign policy.

2.7. Conclusion

The main goal of this chapter was to provide a conceptual orientation, as well as the theoretical framework that underpins the study. It is made up of two major parts. The first part dealt with the conceptualisation of key concepts in the study of IR. This included terms such as “foreign policy”, “national interest”, “partners” and “development” which were defined and grounded in two theoretical IR theories, namely realism and idealism. The above-mentioned concepts were elaborated upon by giving relevant examples. As with most concepts in the social sciences and specifically in IR, concepts do not always carry clear-cut definitions. Many of the concepts are caught up in a web of ambiguity and contention. For this reason, the study provides various explanations associated with the key terms. As a result, “foreign policy” has been interpreted in both realist and idealist paradigms. Realists argue that states create foreign policy, as a means to maximise their national interest; and that foreign policymaking is the task of governments. Liberalists contest this state-centric definition of foreign policy and posit that it would be unrealistic to claim that states are the only actors in foreign policy, since the world is made up of both state and non-state actors.

“National interest”, as the second key concept was placed under scrutiny by various scholars, questioning the scientific nature of the term, various explanations have left a number of scholars puzzled as to what the concept entails. Partnership, generally means a relationship built on trust and sharing, but this does not necessarily imply equality. Development, like all the other concepts, does not escape ambiguity and contention –it is sometimes referred to as the process of modernisation, as
sustainability, or economic growth, and more recently the term has been accepted by 192 states and framed within the United Nations MDGs (Millennium Development Goals) to bring all people to a minimum accepted standard of human development by 2015.

The second major part of this chapter includes the theoretical framework, as well as the major actors in both China and India’s foreign policies. It proceeded by providing various foreign policymaking theories that explains how government arrives at specific policies. More specifically, it focused on the rational actor model, bureaucratic models, cognitive processes and belief-system models and the pluralist-interdependence model. The foreign policymaking framework of analysis was also discussed, based on the external, internal and individual influences. It described how foreign policymakers are influenced by events (political or economic) that take place beyond their borders and in their country. Individual influences are associated with the traits of the individual leader or head of state. Against this background both China and India’s foreign policy principles were discussed. The criteria for engaging other states, particularly Africa, was stated and the study; also showed that both countries are frequently caught in a dilemma of choosing between pragmatism and principles.

Both China and India’s foreign policies are influenced by a variety of actors official or unofficial. Given the close relationship between party and state in China, government policymaking is very much influenced by the CPC Politburo and the Politburo Standing Committee, which are at the helm of foreign policymaking.

The State Council is the executive administrative arm of government in China and the highest governmental decision-making body, in terms of state power, which also includes foreign policy formulation and implementation. Within this framework the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is specifically tasked with foreign policy implementation and enhancing China’s image abroad, while the Ministry of Foreign Commerce spearheads China’s foreign trade policies and regulates China’s general commercial activities, both at home and abroad. The People’s Liberation Army deals with military related issues and is a key decision-maker in arms control and non-proliferation, as
well as defending China’s territorial integrity. It continues to play an important role in international institutions such as the UNSC. However, it often pursues policies that are different from those of the CPC’s Politburo Standing Committee, but remains an important role player in China’s foreign policy. Civil society as an unofficial role player that provides valuable inputs in China’s foreign policy, since some of these role players are of strategic interest to the country. These include China’s Exim Bank private and state-owned enterprises, universities and others.

Unlike China, India’s contemporary foreign policy includes a host of actors that do not operate within a clearly demarcated bureaucratic structure. Even parliament’s power gets eroded during the foreign policy process. India’s parliament does not make foreign policy, but remains a pivotal actor during crises. The country’s foreign policy institutions remain weak and frequently overlap, making it difficult to analyse them. This is a result of historical circumstances during the Jawaharlal Nehru tenure of government when India’s foreign policymaking machinery became the personal domain of the prime minister. The problem was intensified with the collapse of the dominant party system in the early 1990s and the emergence of coalition governments. This hampered the country’s ability to design a grand strategy for foreign policymaking. And India’s governing elite continues to use foreign policy as a football to be kicked around. This became evident when discussing India’s federal system. The involvement of India’s states has fragmented foreign policy. India’s individual states generally conduct bilateral relations to advance their interest. This does not mean that India’s federal system is non-existent or that it has collapsed.

Furthermore, India’s weak institutional arrangements have ensured that foreign policymaking and implementation remains in the hands of the few, namely the National Security Advisor and the Prime Minister’s Office. This has led to the relegation of the MEA’s to a secondary position. Unlike, China’s civil society, India’s civil society is at the forefront of foreign policy, in terms of direct influences in the making and implementation of policy.

Businesses in India have taken it on themselves to engage foreign states. More specifically, previously mentioned private businesses, industrial and exporter
organisations such as the CII and FIEO, and the different Chambers of Commerce and Industry (ASSOCHAM and FICCI), initiated India's foreign trade policies towards the continent. The media is also a principle actor in shaping foreign policy. By functioning as an intellectual arena that influences the middle class, as well as the political elite concerning foreign policy issues. The strategic importance to the country of the PIO initiative (People of Indian Origin) has shaped India's foreign policy in a number of ways. The country is biased towards the diaspora, and Indians living in Africa and other developing countries have become a controversial issue. Given the limited scope of this study, not all of the actors or their influence in India and China's foreign policymaking echelons of business and the public sector were discussed. Emphasis was placed on the key players of both countries who helped to forge foreign policy.
Chapter Three: Contextualising Chinese and Indian foreign policies: Pursuing domestic development goals and challenges

3.1. Introduction

“The domestic needs of the state define national interests and lay out the boundaries for potential policy choices (Mingjiang, 2009: 36)”. Evans (2009: Internet) supports the aforementioned notion by arguing that “foreign policy is primarily generated from within”. Most scholars dealing with China and India’s foreign policies towards Africa sometimes tend to underestimate, even neglect, the domestic settings of these countries (Beri, 2003; Deen, 2009; Lammers, 2007). Such approaches tend to divorce Chinese and Indian foreign policies from the impact of internal or domestic factors. Putnam (1988: 430) argues that foreign policy cannot simply be viewed from either a domestic setting (inputs) or from an external environment (outputs). In order to advance a holistic understanding of foreign policy, scholars need to find a balance between internal and external factors. Hussain (2011: 1) states that the fundamental function of any foreign policy is to consolidate both internal and external goals. However, China and India’s foreign policies are viewed simply as outputs (their actions in Africa). One needs to be clear that domestic politics provides significant inputs in explaining a country’s foreign policy motivations towards other states or the world. With this in mind, and the theoretical framework for analysing foreign policy, adopted in chapter 2, it is of utmost importance to consider the internal influences on foreign policy. This will allow the study to contextualise both China and India, in terms of the relevant factors that might have an impact on the formation and conducting of foreign policy in the two countries under review. In other words, a number of pressing questions needs to be considered: What are the domestic development needs and challenges of Chinese and Indian foreign policies and how does this interfere with their foreign policy behaviour? This is key to understanding major international developments in relation to contemporary Chinese and Indian foreign policies. The aim of this chapter is to explore the aforementioned questions. This chapter, however, is by no means an attempt to neglect China and India’s
external behaviour (especially in Africa), which it will seek to provide the basis for in chapters 4 and 5, respectively.

This chapter is set out as follows: The chapter commences with China and India’s rise with specific reference to their domestic development challenges. Sub-section 2 focuses on the political and economic reforms in China adopted by Deng Xiaoping. Sub-section 3 highlights the needs and challenges of contemporary China. Sub-section 4 deals with the political and economic reforms adopted by India since the early 1990s. Sub-section 5 discusses the needs and challenges of contemporary India as inputs in explaining their foreign policy. The final section focuses on the rise of Africa and its strategic importance in international relations. This is followed by both China and India’s economic needs and their respective contemporary relations with the African continent.

3.2. The Rise of China and India: Domestic Development and Challenges

In order to understand the rise of both China and India, one needs to take cognisance of their domestic political economies. The post-World War II economies of China and India have developed quite rapidly throughout the years. Each country has advanced unique ways for enhancing their economic development. On the one hand, China has been industry orientated with regard to natural resources. On the other, the Indian economy has looked to services or markets for their economic development (Gelb, 2005: 202; Mund, Brandt and Hansakul, 2005: 1). The distinction between China and India’s paths of development can only be comprehended, if one highlights the historical background (focusing on development) of both these countries (Baek, 2005: 486). China and India’s economic growth is not a recent phenomenon. Both these countries undertook a number of reforms, which gave birth to their remarkable economic growth rates, respectively.
3.2.1. China’s Political and Economic Reforms after Mao Zedong: The Emergence of Deng Xiaoping

After claiming the leadership of the Communist Party in 1949, Mao attempted to revitalise the Chinese economy. He initiated both the Great Leap Forward (GLF) (1958-60) and the Cultural Revolution in 1966, to stimulate and grow the Chinese economy (Lanteigne, 2009: 2-6). Mao’s attempts were short-lived. The GLF, an approach to industrialise the local economy through intensive labour and people’s communes, amounted to famine and cost the lives of millions. Unlike the GLF, the Cultural Revolution of 1966-1976 not only managed to create a sound industrial base, it succeeded in dispersing wealth more equally amongst the people of China. However, the impact of the Cultural Revolution was minimal, in that the standard of living continued to be low as a result of a rapidly growing population. Moreover, the ability of the CPC to govern under the Cultural Revolution became increasingly difficult and unstable. It was also a time, in which the CPC realised the importance of controlling the national political economy, in order to prevent social unrests. The death of Mao, in 1976, marks the end of the Cultural Revolution and the re-awakening of the CPC under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping (Salem, 2012: 157; Dillman and Balaam, 2011: 338-339).

According to Naughton (1993: 500) “…the entire reform period is legitimately seen as the era of Deng Xiaoping”. From 1978 to 1990, economic reforms undertaken by Deng led to China’s outstanding GNP, averaging about 9.5 percent (Chen, 1995: 22; Chow, 2004: 127). This makes Deng undeniable the mastermind behind China’s contemporary economic development. So much so, that his ideas concerning socialism with Chinese characteristics (a hybrid system that contains features of both socialism and capitalism) continue to shape the policies of contemporary China. Contemporary Chinese presidents from Jiang Zemin to Xi Jinping propagated the significance and attainment of the reforms adopted by Deng (The Economic Times, 2013: Internet; Tisdell, 2008: 1-2). The economic reforms that led to China’s remarkable economic growth, however, could not be accomplished while Deng made no changes to the political system. This became evident when he noted that (as cited by Naughton, 1993: 505) “whenever we move a step forward in economic
reform, we are made keenly aware of the need to change the political structure…. So unless we modify our political structure, we shall be unable to advance the economic reform or even to preserve the gains we have made so far”. A purely communist system, as it was under Mao, could no longer sustain the grip that the Communist Party had over the state. This resulted into greater scepticism towards Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought. The above-mentioned ideologies were directly responsible for China’s dire political and economic situation. Socialism was not only in a state of crisis, it was incapable of resolving China’s immediate economic challenges (Chen, 1995: 27-28). According to Mingjiang (2009: 37) ideology became redundant and the survival of the CPC was directly dependent on economic growth. The latter parts of the 1950’s and early 1960’s (which gave way to the ideological debate) saw Deng together with Liu Shao-chi, propagating among CPC members the need for “using economic methods to handle economic affairs” (cited by Salem, 2012: 157). It is no surprise when Deng, in 1978 as leader of the CPC, opted for pragmatism rather than ideology (Dillman and Balaam, 2009: 339; Salem, 2012: 158).

Deng’s pragmatism can be found in his popular assertion (as cited by Chen, 1995: 28), “White cat or black cat, the cat that catches mice is the good cat”. By this he meant that China should use whatever means necessary to satisfy its socio-political goals, which include economic development and party leadership. According to Deng (as cited by Chen, 1995: 28) these goals were only attainable, if China adopted a system that can accommodate “socialism”, “capitalism” and the “separation of party and state”. In other words, for China to be rich and politically stable it needed to increase the wealth and livelihoods of its people (Mingjiang, 2009: 38). The solution to China’s prosperity was not found in ideology but in practice. Deng's emphasis on the latter, led him to the following conclusion (as cited by Chen, 1995: 28) “…Practice is the only criterion of truth”. In short, China “should dare to practice without being constrained by any predetermined ideological principles…”.

China’s socio-political realities compelled Deng to foster peaceful relations with other states, in order to meet the country’s domestic needs (Mingjiang, 2009: 38).
In 1978, during the Third Plenum of the Chinese Communist Party’s Eleventh Central Committee, Deng put forward a number of economic reforms to boost the Chinese economy. The Chinese economy was not only growing sluggishly at a rate of 2.5-3.0% GNP (Growth National Product), it was in desperate need of foreign capital, skills and technology. During the 1980s Deng returned to the “four modernisations” (agriculture, industry, science and defence) to develop the Chinese economy, advanced by Zhou Enlai in 1964. This led Deng to the adoption of an “Open Door” (kaiyang zhenze) policy, under the auspices of the central committee, to modernise the Chinese economy (Chen, Chang and Zhang, 1995: 692). But before China could modernise its economy, it needed to establish favourable conditions to facilitate the free-market system (Lim, 2013: 4; Mingjiang, 2009: 38). More specifically, China needed to attract foreign direct investment (FDI) to bolster its economic development (Chen, et al., 1995: 692; Cohen, 2007: 699). And the only way Beijing could do it, was to be seen to be practicing capitalism within its borders.

Instead of liberalising the Chinese economy completely, Deng adopted systematic economic reforms through experimentation (Chen, et al., 1995: 692; Lim, 2013: 4). Deng believed that the only way individual households in rural areas could prosper, was by giving them greater responsibility over the means of production. Rural economic reform led to less party involvement in economic matters. Deng’s approach to increase entrepreneurial intuition had a direct impact on the role of local party leaders. The latter’s power to administer and manage the affairs of the peasants declined rapidly, leading to a surge in productivity. Rural economic reform provided the basis for urban economic reform, which also led to greater decentralisation of power from party secretaries to unit managers (Chen, 1995: 23; Tisdel, 2008: 4). The handing over of power was not only key in transforming the Chinese economy from a command to a more market orientated one, it provided the spark that led to China’s remarkable economic growth rates (Hussain, Stern and Stiglitz, 2007: 54-55). To enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of the Chinese economy, Deng highlighted the importance of opening up the country’s economy to FDI.
Like the above-mentioned reforms, China’s “Open Door” policy was systematically adopted to advance the economic interest of the country. It emerged out of China’s need to gain access to foreign information and capital, in order to make the Chinese economy more productive and competitive (Lanteigne, 2009: 7; Cohen, 2007: 699). In 1979, the CPC during the Fifth National People’s Congress passed the “Law of the People’s Republic of China on Joint Ventures Using Chinese and Foreign investments”. This law was a direct attempt by the CPC to both attract and safeguard FDI. It also serves as important means to lowering trade barriers and making Beijing part of the global economy (Balaam and Dillman, 2011: 339). To highlight the significance of FDI, Salem (2012: 158) points out that China’s infant industries were in desperate need of foreign skills and technologies. In 1980, the Chinese Government created four special economic zones (SEZs) alongside its southeast coast, which include Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Xiamen and Shantou. The Chinese Government selected these zones not only for attracting FDI, but to realise two other noteworthy domestic and foreign policy goals. First, it would allow the country to experiment with social and economic reforms. Second, it was chosen because of its strategic locations. In other words, Shenzhen being adjacent to Hong Kong, Zhuhai neighbouring Macao, and the other two in front of Taiwan, would lead to the amalgamation of China (Chen, et al., 1995: 692).

FDI became an integral part of China’s development strategy (Mingjiang, 2009: 40). Although the former started off slowly in 1979, totalling only $679 million, it provided the building blocks for the country’s rapid economic development (Chen et al., 1995: 692-693). From 1979 to 1993, China managed to attract $60 billion in FDI. More importantly, the entire reform era saw China accumulate over $800 billion in FDI for its economic development. Foreign capital not only led to the employment of millions of Chinese, it spearheaded China’s trade relations with the outside world (Mingjiang, 2009: 39). For example, cheap labour led to greater productivity and massive profits for foreign companies, which allowed the latter to export its goods on an unprecedented scale. Exports, labour and FDI became increasingly intertwined in China’s economic development strategy (Balaam and Dillman, 2011: 339-340).
Even though FDI brought significant financial and technical resources to China, it led to uneven development. The way in which FDI took place, together with the establishment of special economic zones was directly to blame for the discrepancies within China. Inequality was further exaggerated when Deng famously stated (cited by Naughton, 1993: 501) the importance of letting “some people get rich first”. The logic behind his assertion was that China could curb poverty and inequality in the long run through economic growth. To illustrate the unequal distribution of FDI starting from 1979 to 1987, Chen et al. (1995: 693-694) made a comparison between coastal and inland provinces. They discovered that Guangdong, a coastal province, accounted for 51.8 % or $9.1 billion of all FDI, while interior provinces were left reeling at a mere 11.3 % or $2 billion. This not only created major social-economic gaps between China’s provinces, it also led to the unequal distribution of wealth between rural and urban areas. Thus, cheap labour would come from rural areas to work in factories in urban locations. As a result, wealth was mainly concentrated in the latter.

However, in 1989, China’s spiralling economic growth came to a standstill, due to political unrest in Tiananmen Square. A prodemocracy movement demanded that economic reforms be extended to the political sphere. This brought Deng and his cronies to rude-awakening, earlier reforms have contributed to the weakening of local political parties. The latter was in no position to stabilise the volatile situation. Deng called in the military and launched a major crackdown on those in Tiananmen Square, causing a massacre that made the West distrustful of China’s human rights record. Western countries began to sanction Beijing, which led to a decline of China’s economic growth (Cohen, 2007: 700; Chen, 1995: 29). The 1989 event brought Deng to the conclusion, that the survival of the CPC could only be maintained through long-term economic growth. China’s dependence on the West in terms of FDI and trade, made it essential for Beijing to foster peaceful relations with its external environment, specifically with the West. Beijing set out to restore its reputation in world politics. And after years of isolation, China started to have diplomatic and economic relations with its external environment (Mingjiang, 2009: 38). Li (2008: 12) points out that China’s relations with the outside world were vital, if it was to maintain the domestic reform program.
In light of the above-mentioned arguments, it comes as no shock, when Mingjiang (2009: 36) points out that the major goal of the reforms adopted by Deng was to grow the Chinese economy and ultimately ensure the emergence of China in world politics. The reforms adopted by Deng were essential for China’s contemporary economic development.

3.2.2. The Needs and Challenges of Contemporary China: Impetus in Explaining its Foreign Policy Strategy

Cohen (2007: 700) postulates that contemporary Chinese leaders are not going to deviate from the economic reforms advanced by Deng. Economic growth and political stability will continue to be a top priority for the CPC (Economy, 2010: 4). According to Jiang (2009: 37) China’s need to modernise its economy will not subside; nor will its hunger for natural resources recede to sustain its rapidly growing economy (Mthembu-Salter, 2012: 5). Indeed, it would be a mistake to simply view China’s development through the lens of Deng’s 31-year reforms, given the fact that the world has changed, and so has China. Contemporary Chinese leaders are confronted with new and complex challenges in their quest to developing the country. Nonetheless, the reforms adopted by Deng remains a significant point of departure for contemporary Chinese presidents. As a result, both Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao have continued to advance the economic reforms adopted by Deng. The only difference being is that they have applied Deng’s reforms to fit the changing economic situation in China (Tisdell, 2008: 8). For example, the recently elected Chinese president, Xi Jinping, has called on party members (cited by English.news.cn, 2013: Internet) “to deepen reform and opening up, make discoveries, innovations and progress”. This philosophical assertion is in line with what Zhou Enlai and more specifically Deng Xiaoping propagated during the reform era (Tisdell, 2008: 8).

To fully understand China’s foreign policy behaviour, it is important to focus on its internal development (Jiang, 2009: 36). Beijing is in desperate need of natural resources to sustain its economic growth (Lanteigne, 2009: 51). Its economic
development strategy has been resource-intensive. And with a booming population, together with a lack of sufficient natural resources to sustain its rapidly growing economy, the country cannot help but to look to other parts of the world to satisfy its needs (Jacques, 2012: 51).

China’s developmental approach has been characterised by heavy industrialisation projects, labour and capital-intensive manufacturing, export-orientated growth and low labour cost (Jiang, 2009: 37). This approach has not only led China to becoming the largest consumer of energy, it has negatively affected the country’s ailing environment (Ncube, 2013: 88). China’s own natural resources such as water and arable land are incapable of keeping up with the country’s rapid industrialisation process. China also went from being a self-sufficient country in the oil sector to becoming a net importer of oil in 1993 and petroleum in 1996 (Lanteigne, 2009: 50). In recent years, China has surpassed all other countries in the buying of copper, and has become simultaneously the second and third largest buyer of iron ore and alumina, respectively. It also consumes approximately a third of the world’s coal, steel, cotton, as well as half of the globe’s cement. To further highlight China’s energy consumption, Beijing’s coal usage in 2005 was equivalent to that of the United States, Russia and India put together, and in 2004, China used almost 40 percent of the world’s oil supplies (Jacques, 2012: 199). Ncube (2013: 88) and Kuijs (2012: 4) point out that China’s demand for natural resources is driven by its domestic investment intensive development model, which focuses on heavy industrialisation growth. Kuijs (2012: 5) asserts that the Chinese Government has been instrumental in mobilising financial resources to specific industrial sectors, which includes infrastructure development. For example, the Chinese Government has invested over 40 percent of its GDP in infrastructure development, consecutively for nine years (Rabinovitch, 2012: Internet).

In less than 30 years, China has managed to transform a number of its Third World cities and provinces into First World ones, especially in the field of urbanisation (Plott, n.d.: 104). The building of roads, airports, factories and residential blocks has become an integral part of China’s development path (Rabinovitch, 2012: Internet). For example, provinces such as Anhui, Hunan and Jiangxi together with many other
cities are developing rapidly due to an influx of Chinese businesses (Jacques, 2012: 188). Urbanisation is also one of the major factors responsible for China’s rapid economic growth (National Intelligence Council, 2012: 21). Thus, urban areas account for almost 80 percent of China’s economic growth. It is expected that China’s urban population will grow to at least 276 million in 2030 (Neethling, 2013: 7). This rapid increase of China’s urban population intensifies the country’s need for consumer goods, energy resources and transportation networks. Rapid urbanisation has also increased the country’s demand for agricultural products and water (National Intelligence Council, 2012: 49). According to Jacques (2012: 199) China accounts for only 8 percent of the globe’s arable land of which it needs to feed 22 percent of the world’s population. For this reason, the country is increasingly looking to Africa to satisfy its demand for food (Ighobor, 2013: 7).

Manufacturing combined with cheap labour, as one aspect of China’s development strategy, lies at the heart of the country’s economic boom (Balaam and Dillman, 339). China’s modernisation drive has led to it becoming the “factory of the world” (Jiang, 2009: 37). For example, China’s Guangdong province is renowned for its manufacturing capabilities. In 2007 the province labour force was bigger than that of the entire manufacturing industry in the United States. Guangdong produces many products ranging from kiddies toys to computer motherboards (Balaam and Dillman, 2011: 339-340). To further highlight China’s manufacturing output, Jacques (2012: 186) asserts that China overtook the United States in 2011 as the biggest manufacturing state in the world. China’s massive manufacturing industries are directly responsible for the country’s growing demand for energy (Jiang, 2009: 37). This process is often coupled with cheap labour, the majority of which, emanates from China’s internal provinces. It is estimated that at least 250 million people are migrating internally to China’s economic hubs (coastal areas) in desperate need for higher standards of living (National Intelligence Council, 2012: 24). As a result, the country has managed to uplift 250 million people out of poverty (Jacques, 2012: 186). More importantly, China is also home to one of the fastest growing middle-class populations in the world. This rapidly growing middle-class will inevitably lead to an increased demand for consumer products such as cars, houses and others, which in turn, will overburden the country’s ever-dwindling natural resources. For
example, both Europe and the US middle-classes have had the same impact, when they were developing (National Intelligence Council, 2012: 10).

As was the case during the administration of Deng, FDI continues to be at the forefront of China’s rapid economic development. FDI reached unprecedented levels when China became a member of the WTO in 2001. The year 2003 saw China eclipse the United States as the largest beneficiary of FDI (Jacques, 2012: 182 and 218). The abundance of cheap labour, together with low tariffs made China a lucrative destination for foreign firms, wishing to exploit global markets. Inexpensive input costs, specifically in the manufacturing sectors have allowed multinational corporations (MNC’s) to gain a comparative advantage by flooding global markets with cheap products. Foreign companies played a significant role in boosting the country’s trade relations. Foreign companies have accounted for the majority of Chinese exports and imports (Mingjiang, 2009: 40). More importantly, China’s foreign trade accounts for 75 percent of its GDP (Jacques, 2012: 189). An increase of FDI together with China’s export strategy has allowed the government to pile up massive U.S. dollar reserves (Balaam and Dillman, 2011: 339-340).

Apart from FDI, China has experienced a surge in its outward FDI. The latter, totalled merely $4.5 billion in 1990, but skyrocketed to $96 billion in 2007 (Athreye and Kapur, 2009: 210). Mingjiang (2009: 40) points out that “the rationale for much of China’s overseas investment is to secure a stable supply of various energy resources and raw materials to sustain Chinese manufacturing”. Against this backdrop, the Chinese Government has embarked on a “going out” strategy. This strategy is led predominately by the country’s state-owned enterprises (SOEs). In 2002, the assets held by SOEs stood at 60.9 % of all the largest industrial companies (Baek, 2005: 487). Chinese SOE’s such as China National Petrol Corporation, China Shipping, China Mobile, China Telecom and Shanghai Baosteel and others have been significant players on the global stage attempting to satisfy the country’s domestic needs, especially in Africa. Although, the majority of China’s “going out” strategy is conducted by its large SOEs, the government has become a staunch supporter of non-state enterprises (Athreye and Kapur, 2009: 210). International firms have made it difficult for local Chinese businesses to prosper
within the country (Jacques, 2012: 218). Consequently, the government has encouraged non-state enterprises to seek new markets in both the developed and developing world. SOEs and private firms have been keen to embark on international ventures in order to benefit from existing knowledge or technological expertise. The majority of Chinese firms are lagging behind companies stemming from the West who possess advanced technological skills. For this reason, Chinese firms have made use of strategic acquisitions in order to gain strategic assets, such as new technologies and brands. For example, Lenovo, a Chinese computer company has bought IBM’s computer software (Lanteigne, 2009: 44; Athreye and Kapur, 2009: 213). Against this background, it is evident that China has been strategic in satisfying its national interest. However, as the country develops it is confronted with a number of challenges.

China’s current strategy of development is increasingly looking shaky. The country’s integration into the global economy has made it extremely vulnerable to external shocks. The 2008 economic recession serves as a case in point. Declining demand for Chinese products, especially from the West negatively affected the country’s economic growth. During 2009, China lost almost 50 % of its trade surplus. This caused a domino effect in the country’s employment industry. Consequently, the country shed 20 million jobs in its manufacturing sector (Balaam and Dillman, 2011: 340). In an attempt to avert the negative impact, the country introduced a massive stimulus package of $580 billion between 2009 and 2010. Realising that its export-orientated strategy was in jeopardy, the country began to focus on domestic consumption to boost the economy (Jacques, 2012: 190). However, China’s domestic spending remains low due to a lack of social security. For China to sustain its development, it must encourage consumerism within its borders. If not, the country runs the risk of falling into the “middle-income trap”. The latter occurs when a country’s per capita income stagnates and never reaches the levels of highly developed countries (National Intelligence Council, 2012: 43). Nevertheless, Jacques (2012: 191) argues that China is still capable of bailing out its economy, if Western countries were to go into another deep recession or near-zero growth. Stimulating the Chinese economy is a short-term solution. China needs to introduce
long-term measures to sustain its economic growth. How Beijing is going to do this, remains to be seen.

In conclusion, China’s need for natural resources is a reflection of its modernisation drive. China’s rapid economic growth has compelled Beijing to look for natural resources elsewhere, especially in Africa. Thus, China is undergoing what most Western countries went through when they were developing. As the country develops, it is confronted with a slowing economy. Before linking China’s development model with Africa, it is vital to discuss India’s internal development. This will allow the chapter to contextualise both China and India’s foreign policy behaviour within Africa.

3.2.3. India’s Political and Economic Reforms

Before discussing, India’s political and economic reforms, it is vital to indicate that the latter is still in its infancy stage. Unlike China, contemporary reforms adopted by India only emerged in the early 1990’s. Kuijs (2012: 12) points out that India is at least a decade behind China in terms of its reform and development process. It may be argued that reforms in India remain work in progress. Like China, the Indian economy grew sluggishly, totalling a mere 3.5 % GDP per year, before the reform period. This was largely due to Nehru’s scepticism towards Western capitalism. Although Nehru viewed FDI as a necessity for certain industries, he believed in protecting India’s infant companies against global competition. Protectionist policies did not lead to great economic success; it only served as a major obstacle to India’s development (Balaam and Dillman, 2011: 334-335). India realised that it needed to remove the restrictions from certain sectors of its economy. During the 1980s India began to reduce tariffs on selective imports and it also allowed foreign companies to conduct business in the country on the basis that they should have Indian partners (Sodhi, 2008: 323).

In 1991, however, the Indian economy was engulfed in what some would call a “perfect storm”. It could no longer grow along the line of its protectionist policies. Inflation was at an all-time high; its foreign currency reserves plunged to nearly $1
billion; its fiscal deficit was growing rapidly and became untenable; investment confidence was low and often coupled with outward capital flight (Goel and Satapathy, 2012: 49). India’s crisis, in 1991, was further intensified with the end of the Cold War. The Soviet Union, which was then India’s biggest trading partner, collapsed and with that, India’s trade relations declined rapidly. Like China, India came to realise that socialism was not the answer to India’s development. Since India’s independence, the country experimented with socialist policies. The latter, however, was directly to blame for India’s dire economic situation (Aiyar, 2011: 3, Sengupta, 2000: 4485). As a result, India’s governing elite was left with no choice but to engage Western institutions such as the World Bank and the IMF for a loan worth $6 billion to salvage the domestic economy. But before India could obtain the loan from these institutions, it needed to make a series of reforms to its domestic economy (Balaam and Dillman, 2011: 335).

Like China, India did not open its economy completely. Opening up the Indian economy was a slow process (Siraj, 2011: 62). Reforms was confined to the industrial, trade and financial sectors. Similarly to China, the Indian economy was opened to gain access to skills, technology and resources (Goel and Satapathy, 2012: 49; Sengupta, 2000: 4485). India’s then finance minister, Manmohan Singh, instigated a number of reforms and started by devaluing the rupee, removing state controls and licences, reducing the number of SOEs, provided lucrative deals for FDI, and encouraged joint ventures on the basis that MNCs will have 51 percent of the share (Balaam and Dillman, 2011: 335; Sengupta, 2000: 4485). Singh continued to push the reform process by lowering the import duty from 300 percent to 150 and allowing 100 percent foreign ownership (Coan and Kugler, 2012: 31). Thus, he created an environment conducive to FDI (Aiyar, 2011: 3). By 1991, after the successful implementation of the aforementioned reforms, the Indian economy began to flourish. In just five years, India’s economic growth skyrocketed to 6.7 percent GDP on average. This was largely due to a significant influx of FDI. In the same way as China, foreign companies viewed India as a lucrative destination, given its massive population size of over 1 billion people (Balaam and Dillman, 2011: 335; Coan and Kugler, 2012: 31).
Although FDI was less than $100 million in the early 1990s, it increased rapidly to $3.6 billion in 1997, and in 2007 the amount stood at a lucrative $19.5 billion. From 1991 to 2001 FDI grew at a rate of 44 percent per annum (Beena et al., n.d.: 131). Goel and Satapathy (2012: 50) identify a number of sectors that have benefited from FDI. These include electronics (18 percent), telecommunications (10 percent), transportation industry (9 percent) and the service sector that accounts for 13 percent. Similarly to China, the distribution of FDI in India has been highly unequal. Consequently, India's southern and coastal states have been the major beneficiaries of FDI. 55 percent of all FDI is confined to six Indian states (Siddharthan, n.d.: 3). According to Coan and Kugler (2012: 35), the federal state of Maharashtra has received the bulk of India’s FDI that contributed to it becoming India’s commerce and industry hub. However, other states in India received little if any foreign investment. Inequality in both rural and urban areas is on the rise. On the one hand, states such as Bihar, M.P., Orissa and U.P. account for 49.8 percent of rural discrepancies. On the other, urban inequality in Bihar, Karnataka, M.P., Maharashtra, Rajasthan and U.P. went from 61.6 percent in 1983 to 76 percent in 2004 (Sodhi, 2008: 327-328). Rapid growth of inequalities between states have had severe political ramifications in recent times.

Democracy in India has not led to equal opportunity for development. Even though poverty declined from 38.2 percent in 1987 to 23.6 percent in 1999, it remains a cause for concern (Torri, 2011: 31). As noted by Aiyar (cited by Abdoollcarim, 2011: 34) “India’s poor [have] a vote,”… but this [does] not always equal a voice”. Twenty years after the reform period, 60 percent of Indians continue to live below the poverty line. Abdoolcarim (2011: 34) continues to argue that “India even has its own Tibet: I don’t mean Dharamsala but Kashmir”. The latter, has been the major loser in India’s economic growth. More specifically, in 2010, the Kashmiri youth who often feel alienated from Delhi have intensified calls for secession from India. As a result, the inhabitants of Kashmir have been subjected to military, paramilitary and police brutality in an attempt by the central government to curb social unrest. Furthermore, the lack of equitable development has intensified insurgencies in India (Chitalkar and Malone, 2011: 79-80). Unequal development is largely due to the country's development model, which will be discussed next.
3.2.4. The Needs and Challenges of Contemporary India: Inputs in Explaining its Foreign Policy Behaviour

Spiralling economic growth in India proves to be resilient, even in the midst of challenging circumstances. From 1997-1999, the Indian economy managed to avert the Asian financial crisis, and continued to grow, at a rate of well over 5 percent per annum. Between 2000 and 2002, the country managed to withstand two major famines. India’s 2001 economic recession only temporarily succeeded in stifling the country’s economic growth rates. After 2003 growth surged to nearly 9.5 percent per year on average, just before the great economic recession of 2008 (Aiyar, 2011: 4-5). India’s economic model defies the conventional wisdom that a developing country should look at manufacturing and not services to boost its economic growth (Siraj, 2011: 67) as it was, and still is, with both the East Asian Tigers (South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore and Malaysia) and China. Unlike China, India’s development approach has been characterised by capital and skill-intensive industries (Sally, 2011: 5), much of which, are derived from India’s private sector. Balaam and Dillman (2011: 335) point out that India’s top 100 firms accounts for over $1 billion of the market share. They continue to argue that firms such as Infosys Technologies, Reliance industries, Tata Motors, Wipro and Jet Airways have become international brands. Sectors such as computer software, engineering, biotechnology, pharmaceuticals, media, entertainment, medical services and information technology (IT), feature prominently in India’s development strategy (Kapur, Ramamurti and Moitra, 2001: 20).

India’s skill sector has made inroads internationally and has become the preferred outsourcing destination for many Western companies. To illustrate this, Jack Welck, chief executive officer (CEO) of General Electric (GE) (cited by Kapur et. al., 2001: 20) rightly indicates that “the real treasure of India is its intellectual capital. The real opportunity of India is its incredible skilled work force. Raw talent here is like nowhere else in the world.” Consequently, India has emerged as a leader in “frugal engineering”. The latter, is the ability to design and manufacture products that are comparably 50-90 percent cheaper than Western goods. For example, Tata Motors has manufactured the cheapest automobile, the Nano, valued at $2,500. In 2011,
Bajaj Auto was not only on the verge of manufacturing a car worth $3000, the car’s fuel efficiency was estimated at 90 miles per U.S. gallon. India is also home to the cheapest telecom industry globally, with call rates of only two cents per minute. Medical tourism in India is also on the rise, given the country’s comparably low prices for surgical procedures (Aiyar, 2011: 5).

India’s service sector has been at the pinnacle of the country’s remarkable economic growth rates. In contrast with China, in 2005 India’s service exports were more than three times larger than that of the former (Siraj, 2011: 64). Between 2005 and 2010, the service sector accounted for 56 percent of overall labour productivity (Melka, 2013: 38). More specifically, communications, businesses, commercial, education, medical and hotel services were responsible for 50 percent of the economic growth in 2000-2008 (Eichengreen and Gupta, 2011: 7). Information technology (IT) and information enabled services (ITES), however, has been the main engine of India’s growth (Balaam and Dillman, 2011: 335). IT and ITES have emerged as the economic hub of contemporary India. To demonstrate the importance of the IT and ITES, Sodhi (2008: 326) points out that the latter is responsible of employing 10 million people. More importantly, the IT sector market share grew substantially from 51 percent in 2009 to 58 percent in 2011. In terms of the GDP, IT and ITES accounted for nearly 19.2 percent of the total growth in 2011. India’s exports have predominately been led by its IT services, which is responsible for 56.4 percent of its export returns (ASA & Associates, 2012: 3 and 7). IT software has been at the vanguard of India’s IT sector development. In 1999, India produced 41 percent of the world’s software. By the year 2000, the software sector had grown significantly accounting for $8 billion in terms of productivity and in the export sector it registered a huge $6.2 billion. In the same year, 200 out of a 1000 Fortune software firms were outsourcing to India (Kapur and Ramamurti, 2001: 23). Thus, between 2010 and 2011 India’s domestic software market stood at $17.2 billion, recording a growth rate of well over 18 percent (ASA & Associates, 2012: 3).

Like China, outward FDI feature prominently in India’s development approach. In contrast to the former, India’s private sector has taken the lead in its outward FDI. Before the 1990s, India’s outward FDI was a mere $222 million. But in 2004, India’s
outward FDI grew considerably to $6.6 billion. Similarly to China, Indian firms have made used of strategic mergers and acquisitions (M&A) to gain access to already existing knowledge, technologies and brands (Urata, 2011: 8; Pradhan, 2005: 2). According to Athreye and Kapur (2009: 210), India’s M&A have taken place across a range of sectors such as steel, pharmaceuticals, IT, services and retail. For example, India’s Tata group has taken over both Jaguar and the Anglo-Dutch company Corus who specialises in steel. IT is not only the economic engine of India’s domestic economy; it has also emerged as the largest outward foreign direct investor. Between 1994 and 2001, the IT sector accounted for 29 percent outward FDI in both developed and developing countries. By 2003, the IT sector had made numerous acquisitions in the United States. Thus, companies such as Osprey Systems, Data Executives International (DEI) and Cognitive Arts have come under Indian control. India’s pharmaceutical companies are also becoming world leaders in the manufacturing of drugs. Specifically, Ajanta Pharma has become the second largest FDI, accounting for 18 of such activities. The company has made use of intensive-skill investments with regard to research and development (R&D) to gain a comparative advantage in a number of niche products. This includes products such as Ocugold, Rufage, Livoplus and Carofit. The latter product was patented in both the United States and South Africa. Ajanta Pharma has generated 45 percent of its revenue from exports and joint ventures exports. Outward FDI had become an integral part of the bulk of India’s corporation strategy to improve their competitiveness and to gain access to international markets (Pradhan, 2005: 16-17). Like China, the Indian economy is not immune to external shocks and as a result the latter country is faced with several challenges.

China, in 2008, had to salvage its domestic economy by pouring in a massive $580 billion stimulus package. The impact of the 2008 financial crisis on India appears to be minimal, given that the country only had to introduce a package worth $60 billion (Sally, 2011: 4). Although the global recession managed to slow India’s growth to 6.8 percent between 2008 and 2009, by 2010 the economy began to blossom again and reached 8.0 percent. In 2011, economic growth stood at an impressive 8.5 percent. In the same year, India’s savings rate went up to 34 percent, which allowed investment to surge to almost 37 percent. India’s reliance on domestic savings
instead of foreign capital enabled the country to withstand the global recession better than China could (Aiyar, 2011: 5). Based on this, India’s protectionist policies in some sectors have isolated the country more successfully from the impacts of international markets (Balaam and Dillman, 2011: 338).

However, the sentiments of international markets will have to remain significant if India wants to maintain a growth rate of at least 8 percent to sustain its growth model and to create the necessary jobs that will bolster the economy. As a point of illustration, Sing (2013: Internet) points out, that investor sentiments had significant ramifications for the Indian economy. The Indian economy grew at a rate of barely 5 percent in 2012. This was largely due to investors withdrawing $7.4 billion from India’s stock and bond markets. This had a domino effect, which saw the rapid depreciation of the rupee, which lost nearly 20 percent against the dollar in 2013.

India is also faced with a growing account deficit, which now stands at almost $90 billion, given that it imports more than it exports. In a new turn of events, Indian companies have become increasingly indebted because of a lower consumer demand for their services and goods. More specifically, consumer expenditure grew sluggishly at a rate of merely 1.6 percent during the first quarter of 2012-2013 (Sing, 2013: Internet; Mishra, 2013: Internet). India’s economic outlook is expected to remain bleak, according to the World Bank (2013: Internet) which projects the country’s growth rate at 4.7 percent for 2013-2014.

Another key challenge to India’s economic development is not it being overly dependent on global markets, but its lack of an Industrial Revolution (Sally, 2011: 5). According to Alessandrini (2009: 11) “the Indian economy seems to have skipped the phase of industrialization, jumping directly from agriculture to services in less than two decades”. India’s unorthodox growth model has had a negative impact on the country’s overall development. Thus, for India to become a formidable player globally, it needs to industrialise its economy by manufacturing more goods for international markets (Balaam and Dillman, 2011: 338). Against this backdrop, China and India’s economic growth models may now be linked to that of Africa, in order to
contextualise their foreign policy behaviours. But first, attention needs to be drawn to the rise of Africa and its importance in global affairs.

3.3. The Rise of Africa and Its Strategic Importance in Global Affairs

Africa is rapidly moving to the centre of world politics (Makwerere and Chipaike, 2012: 311). A sense of optimism is beginning to spread throughout the continent. Africa is no longer viewed as a hopeless case or as a beggar standing in front of the doorstep of Western powers. A new era is beginning to unfold as the continent is seemingly on the verge of development and breaking the chains of despair. This does not mean that issues such as poverty, conflict, HIV/ Aids and corruption have miraculously disappeared from the continent. It simply means that the these issues cannot be seen as the sum of African politics (Quinlan, 2013: Internet, Cornelissen, 2011: 5). A host of actors are beginning to take note of Africa’s strategic importance. The United States for one, views Africa as its first line of defence in the war against terrorism. For this reason, Africa has become an integral part of the U.S. national security network (Moss, 2013: Internet; Volman, 2009: 17). Russia’s Foreign Ministry (as cited by Fidan and Aras, 2010: 53), in 2007, explicitly stated in its policy document that the country will pursue a “policy of developing friendly relations with Africa and cooperation on mutual interest provided the opportunity to use the African factor in such a way as to make progress on our international interests and reach our economic goals”. Continuing on the economic front, countries such as Turkey, Brazil and India see the continent as a viable business destination (Mills, 2012: 43). The BRICS nations (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa), which are on the verge of eclipsing Western countries, as the continent’s leading trade, investment and to a lesser extent aid partner), are pouring billions of U.S dollars into the continent (Kimenyi and Lewis, 2011: 19).

Multinational corporations, especially those from the West, are also engulfed in Africa’s newfound economic aura. For example, Wal-Mart has approximately 300 businesses operating in 14 African states. General Electric is another MNC that seeks to penetrate the continent, in order to raise profits (Quinlan, 2013: Internet). The influx of actors has helped with the diversification of many African states, which
are often characterised as single-product economies (Kimenyi and Lewis, 2011: 20). In view of this, one cannot help but to ask why the continent is so important to these and other economic actors?

Africa is reaching unprecedented economic growth figures, totalling 5.2 percent for Middle East and North Africa and 4.8 percent in the Sub-Saharan region. The continent has emerged as one of the globe’s fastest growing regions (Quinlan, 2013: Internet). According to Cornelissen (2011: 5) Africa’s six most rapidly growing economies have been dubbed by pundits around the globe as ‘lion kings’, as well as ‘The African Miracle’. She adds that the World Bank has joined the hype by referring to Africa as a new economic frontier for emerging markets. Africa’s blossoming GDP figures appear to be sustainable in some African countries. Quinlan (2013: Internet) points to the following social factors that stresses Africa’s sustainable trajectory:

- From 2000-2008, the number of pupils entering secondary school has increased to almost 50 percent;

- Africa is beginning to make inroads in its fight against malaria and HIV with the rate of new infections having been reduced to 30 percent and 74 percent respectively;

- Cell phones are becoming increasingly accessible, since three out of four Africans have access to the former;

- Africans are progressively moving up the economic ladder, and in Sub-Saharan Africa alone, it is expected that the middle class will grow from 355 million people in 2010 to an impressive 1.1 billion by 2060;

- Africa’s population is also estimated to grow from 900 million in 2013 to a staggering 2.1 billion people in 2050.

In view of the above, a key question that keeps coming up is: What are the main drivers of Africa’s economic growth? In an attempt to unravel this question, Mills (2012: 40) points to Africa’s booming commodity prices as one of the most obvious factors. From 2002 to 2006, emerging economies’ hunger for Africa’s natural resources has led to a surge in commodity prices, reaching nearly 90 percent.
However, emerging economies are not the only players in need of Africa’s precious metals. In 2010, the United States imported nearly 2.3 million barrels of oil per day from Africa. In Sub-Saharan Africa alone, the United States was responsible for approximately 80 percent of all energy commodities (Mills, 2012: 43-44).

Escalating commodity prices, however, represent only a third of Africa’s economic growth. Between 2000 and 2008, natural resources produced only 32 percent of the continent’s GNP. Non-commodity sectors such as retail, transport, telecommunications and manufacturing generated a remarkable two-thirds of Africa’s GDP growth. These non-commodity sectors are driven by Africa’s booming middle-class, who has helped to make the continent a significant consumer market for multinational actors. More specifically, it is projected that 18 of Africa’s biggest economies will control a joint consumer market worth $1.3 trillion by 2030. Moreover, African countries are becoming increasingly more urbanised. Urbanisation is often equated with greater productivity. In other words, workers are no longer looking to agricultural work only to boost their income because they are increasingly moving to cities, which offer a wide range of employment opportunities due to economic diversification. Urbanisation in many African states has led to the construction of roads, buildings and other infrastructure projects. As a result, Africa has experienced a boom in its infrastructure sector, averaging $19 billion between 2006 to 2008 (Leke et al., 2010: 1 & 4). Against this backdrop, Africa’s economies are becoming increasingly more diversified and offer a range of opportunities for both local and international actors. In this respect, Africa’s diverse economies have become more compatible with China and India’s economic growth models as mentioned above. On the one hand, China is looking to Africa for natural resources to boost its economic growth, and on the other, India views Africa’s new emerging consumer markets as a lucrative destination for many of its companies.

3.3.1. China’s economic needs and its contemporary relations with the African continent

As mentioned earlier, China’s contemporary growth model is based on heavy industrialisation. As a result, the country is increasingly becoming more dependent
on natural resources in order to sustain its economic growth. More specifically, China is currently in what is known as the mid-phase of industrialisation. This phase is mineral and energy-intensive (Drysdale and Hurst, 2012: 16). Ncube (2013: 88) argues that China’s hunger for Africa’s natural resources will not subside. Natural resources will have to form an integral part of China’s economic growth if it wants to maintain political stability and ultimately ensure the survival of the CPC (Zweig and Jianhai, 2005: 25-26). The Chinese Government has advanced a comprehensive strategy to gain access to Africa’s natural resources. In view of this, Makwerere and Chipaike (2012: 314) explicitly states that “both private and state run companies are part of Beijing’s Africa strategy, and it has deployed powerful mechanisms to promote this expansionism”. China’s expansionism in Africa is reflective of its domestic economic needs. The continent offers the country a wide range of natural resources such as iron ore, cobalt, gold, platinum, construction materials, crude oil and others (Corkin, 2013: 149). These resources has led China to prioritise the continent in its foreign policy strategy (Makwerere and Chipaike, 2012: 315). As a result, China has embarked on a resource-seeking mission in Africa (Lanteigne, 2009: 52).

In 2003, top Chinese dignitaries began to foster close relationships with a number of African oil-producing countries as part of Beijing’s foreign policy strategy. Countries such as Algeria, Egypt, Gabon, Angola, Nigeria and Sudan featured prominently in Beijing’s foreign policy (Zweig and Jianhai, 2005: 29). China’s interest in African oil is expected to reach unprecedented levels in 2030, amounting to 13.1 million barrels per day. Sudan being a specific case in point, already exports 60 percent of its oil to China (Makwerere and Chipaike, 2012: 315). Against this backdrop, India’s economic needs in Africa may now be considered.

3.3.2. India’s economic needs and its contemporary relations with the African continent

Like China, India’s domestic development model with the private sector at the fore, is reflective of its international relationship with Africa. According to Gopaldas (2013: Internet) “… India views Africa as a place where it can reproduce the business
models it has refined at home and replicate …[their] … success in building vibrant manufacturing and service sectors". Indian companies has led the foray into Africa (Taylor, 2012: 780). For example, India's MNCs such as the Tata group, Bharti Airtel, HCL and others have invested heavily in Africa. In 2005, India’s MNCs invested $16bn in Africa. And in terms of trade, the figure doubled from $24.98bn in 2006 to $52.81bn in 2010 (Gopaldas, 2013: Internet).

Gelb (2005: 202) points out that the majority of Indian companies have invested immensely in the continent’s market sector. New markets, especially in the developing world are of vital importance for India's growth model. According to Nunnenkamp et al. (2012: 8), the major motivating factor behind India’s outward FDI is to get markets for its services and goods. For example, India’s IT sector has already looked to foreign markets for potential customers to boost their growth rates (Athreye and Kapur, 2009: 215). Even though the majority of Indian companies have exported their goods and services to the United States totalling $25.7 billion (Balaam and Dillman, 2011: 335), Africa is fast becoming the preferred destination for many Indian firms. Mauritius, in particular, has emerged as the Indian gateway to Africa. The majority of Indian firms have used Mauritius strategically in order to penetrate sub-Saharan African markets. Promotion of Mauritius’s membership of African organisations such as the AU and the Southern African Development Community (SADC), is therefore an important purpose for many Indian firms (Adullatif, 2012: 8; Pradhan, 2005: 8). As a result, the National Institute of Information Technology Ltd. (NIIT) has exported the majority of its equity shares to Mauritius, accounting for $33 million or almost 64 percent of its total outward FDI (Pradhan, 2005: 16). Against this backdrop, one can now conclude that both China and India are playing out their domestic development models in their foreign policy behaviour strategies in Africa.

3.4. Conclusion

This chapter’s main goal was to investigate the domestic development needs and challenges of both China and India. These countries’ foreign policies cannot simply be viewed as outputs. In order to advance a holistic understanding of foreign policy one needs to take cognizance of China’s and India’s political economies in order to
fully grasp their external behaviour. Thus, by focusing on their respective domestic conditions their foreign policy motivations could be uncovered. China and India’s surged to economic stardom cannot be explained by simply brushing through their phenomenal economic growth rates. Underlying questions needed to be considered: What were the underlying factors that paved the way for China’s and India’s contemporary economic growth rates? While pondering on the aforementioned question, it became apparent that in order to understand China and India’s foreign policies, emphasis needed to be placed on the historic evolution of the latter. As a result, this chapter proceeded by discussing the major reforms that took place in both China and India.

In the case of China, Deng emerged as the founding father of the country’s contemporary growth rates. In other words, if it wasn’t for Deng, the reforms in China would have never taken place. Realising that socialism, as it was under the leadership of Mao, could no longer satisfy the country’s domestic development interest. Deng started by introducing free market policies in China’s rural areas in order to increase productivity. After being successful in the rural areas, reforms were later extended to urban areas and then to the economy as a whole. This, however, could not be achieved without making changes to China’s political system. Political officials, especially in local areas would no longer be the final arbiter on economic decisions. Entrepreneurs were allowed to take responsibility of their own produce, but within the confines of national government. The latter under the leadership of Deng wanted to modernise China’s economy through rapid economic development.

Deng was of the opinion that if the CPC wanted to stay in power it needed to maintain high economic growth rates in order to keep the masses satisfied. This was reflected in China’s foreign policy behaviour when it adopted an “open door” policy to fulfil its domestic needs. The logic behind China’s open door policy was to intensify the country’s modernisation drive. China needed skills and new technologies for their own economic development and created an environment conducive to FDI. The way in which FDI took place, however, was that it was confined to China’s coastal areas creating inequalities within the country. Nonetheless, FDI stimulated China’s economic growth. In 1989, the event that unfolded in Tiananmen Square brought the
country’s growth rate to a halt. Western countries sanctioned China because of its human rights abuses during the former year. China realised the importance of foreign capital in order to maintain its domestic reform program.

Contemporary Chinese leaders are not going to deviate from Deng’s approach. One may argue that it is a continuation. Economic growth and the survival of the CPC will continue to be a top priority for China. More importantly, China’s modernisation drive has not subsided under contemporary leaders. China’s development model is still characterised by rapid industrialisation. China is fast becoming the major consumer of natural resources globally. Rapid urbanisation has also placed a major strain of the country’s ever dwindling natural resources, especially with the availability of water and arable land. China has become the manufacturing hub of the world and its goods are highly dependent on natural resources. Because of the country’s lack of natural resources, Beijing has strategically devised its foreign policy to satisfy its national interest. China’s SOE’s have been at the forefront in seeking natural resources to sustain the country’s growth model. Thus, Beijing has emerged as a major outward FDI, especially in Africa.

China’s economic development model has been confronted with a slowing domestic and global economy. China can no longer simply rely on massive manufacturing for exports to the outside word. Consumerism needs to be encouraged if it wishes to sustain its phenomenal economic growth rates and development progress. Against this backdrop the second major part of this chapter can now be considered.

Reforms in India began as a slow process. This was largely due to Nehru’s scepticism towards Western institutions. Although he began by opening certain sectors of India’s economy to the outside world in the 1980s, it was only in 1991 that major reforms in India were introduced. The main reason for adopting reforms was because of the collapse of the Indian economy, in 1991. Consequently, India had no choice but to look to the World Bank and IMF for a loan worth $6 billion to salvage the domestic economy. Like China, the opening up of the Indian economy was and still is a gradual process. Instead of completely opening up the Indian economy, the governing elite chose a strategic path in order to gain access to foreign skills,
resources and technologies. Reforms proved to be beneficial and India’s economic growth began to rise after three years of opening up the economy. It also led to significant influx of FDI. Similarly to China, the distribution of FDI was confined to coastal states with the exclusion of the majority of India’s internal and northern states. In the political arena, democracy in India has not led to equitable development. India’s poor remains marginalised. Kashmir serves as an excellent example of how the poor has been left out of the country’s economic growth.

India’s contemporary growth model appears to be resilient, given the number of challenging circumstances the country had to withstand from 1997 to 2003. Unlike China, India has looked to services to boost its economic growth rates. Capital and skill-intensive industries have come to dominate India’s development model. India’s private sector, especially companies such as Infosys Technologies, Reliance industries, Tata Motors, Wipro and Jet Airways have shot to international prominence. India’s skill sector has become a major attraction for many Western companies. India has come to dominate a number of niche markets, given its skills ability, in a range of sectors stretching from engineering to pharmaceuticals. India’s service sector accounts for the majority of the country’s economic growth rates. Like China, India’s outward FDI plays a major role in the country’s development strategy. Indian companies have made use of strategic M&A in a number of sectors ranging from steel to pharmaceuticals. In contrast to China, Indian companies have looked for markets, instead of natural resources to boost their growth rates. Although the bulk of India’s goods and services have been exported to the U.S. Developing countries is increasingly becoming important in India’s development approach, given the economic slowdown in Western countries. Mauritius as the “gateway” to sub-Saharan Africa serves as a case in point.

Like China, India’s political economy is confronted with a number of challenges. In contrast to China, it appears that the 2008 economic recession had a minimal impact on India. Even though the country’s economy grew sluggishly during the recession, its growth rate is back where it was before the crisis. However, in 2012 the Indian economy had hit another speed bump and began to grow at a rate of just 5 percent. This is because investor confidence is at an all-time low and India’s consumers
appear to be incapable of reviving the Indian economy. The latter is not helped with the grim outlook of the World Bank, who expects the Indian economy to grow at 4.7 for the 2013-2014. Another key challenge to India’s economic growth is its lack of industrialisation.

The final part of the chapter attempted to link both China and India’s economic growth models with that of Africa. The latter is beginning to grow in stature and has become of strategic importance to the rest of the world. The U.S., the BRICS nations and others view the continent as a strategic frontier for a number of issues, ranging from terrorism to economics. With specific reference to the latter, Africa is home to six of the fastest growing regions in the world, a vibrant consumer market and is blessed with an abundance of natural resources. This has become compatible with both China and India’s economic growth models. First, China is in desperate need of natural resources, which Africa has in abundance, to boost its economic growth. Second, the Indian economy is in need of consumer markets for its goods and services in order to grow its economy and the continent is viewed as an emerging market.

The following chapter deals specifically with China’s foreign policy strategy in Africa. China is providing the continent, in terms of aid and trade with an alternative “model of development”. The post-Cold War era marks the re-awakening of China-Africa relations. China’s role as an emerging power became evident in terms of it providing aid and development assistance to Third World countries, especially to Africa. China’s new found “emerging power” status makes it an invaluable partner to Africa. Even in the midst of a global financial crisis, China-Africa relations continue to move from strength-to-strength.

Chapter 4 will attempt to answer part of the research question as set out in chapter 1 of whether China-Africa relations can best be classified as national-interest(s) or as a strategic partnership.
Chapter Four: China’s Foreign Policy towards Africa: History, Partnerships and National Interest

4.1. Introduction

The post-Cold War era marks the re-awakening of China-Africa relations. China’s role as an emerging power became evident in terms of its provision of aid and development assistance to developing countries, especially in Africa. China’s new-found status as an “emergent power” makes it an invaluable partner to Africa. Even in the midst of a global financial crisis, China-Africa relations continue to move from strength to strength. Various scholars have attempted to make sense of China and Africa’s contemporary relations, with most reaching premature or sweeping conclusions (Jacques, 2012: 431). According to Jacques (2012: 432) “one of the problems of much Western commentary on China’s relationship with Africa has been the temptation to describe it in terms of a new colonialism. Given that China has no history of colonialism, this deserves the label of a lazy, Western-centric stereotype”. Another challenge to the study of China-Africa relations is the temptation to focus on economic explanations, disregarding the complexities that the relationship has to offer. For example, China’s foreign policy ideas have often been relegated or overlooked when dealing with the complexities of China-Africa relations (Alden and Large, 2011: 22). This chapter sets out to follow a holistic approach to the study of China-Africa relations. The main aim is to address part of the research question as outlined in chapter 1: whether China-Africa relations can best be classified as either a strategic partnership or as a way for China to advance its national interest. Section 1 begins by discussing China and Africa’s historical relations. Section 2 focuses on the Forum on China Africa Cooperation (FOCAC). The third section seeks to discuss China’s African aid policy. Section 4 briefly sets the scene for China and Africa’s relations within the two schools of thought. The final sub-section focuses on China’s relations with specific African countries such as Angola and Sudan.
4.2. Historic Relations between China and Africa

China and Africa’s relationship is not a new phenomenon, but can be traced through specific historical periods. Thus, China and Africa have engaged with each other over the years and for a number of reasons. These engagements were usually spurred on by events that took place across the globe. It is therefore pivotal to illustrate how China and Africa’s relations came into being in the contemporary era. The main goal of this section is to provide an overview concerning China-Africa relations. The first part of this section will focus on the post-Cold war period, specifically, the political and economic factors that led China and Africa to further cement their relations. It also seeks to illustrate China’s rise as a superpower, as well as China and Africa’s increased importance in global affairs. The second part of this section will highlight the key event that drew China and Africa closer together. Here attention will be given to the events surrounding Tiananmen Square. The final part of this section will highlight China and Africa’s contemporary relations. It will therefore focus on China and Africa’s institutionalised relationship with specific reference to the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation.

The end of the Cold War saw China and Africa engaging each other for a number of reasons. China’s role as an emerging power became evident in terms of providing aid and development assistance to Third World countries. The post-Cold War era marked an increased uncertainty of Africa’s position in world politics. Therefore, most African countries had to consider how they would transform their governments into democracies, which, at that time, was the order of the day. Another key uncertainty was that Africa received little or no financial assistance from the West during and after the Cold War. As a result, Africa began to realise the importance of China as a vital economic partner (Naidu et al., 2009: 90). More importantly, the post-Cold War era saw China emerge as a counter-balancing force to the United States and a leader of the Third World (Muekalia, 2004: 7). The post-Cold War period cemented China’s strategic position in both the United Nations (UN) and developing countries (particularly in Africa). China’s strategic position provided it with the opportunity to influence both developed and developing countries (Van Rooyen and Solomon, 2007: 8). In view of this, China not only emerged as a vital political partner but also
began to function as an alternative to the Western model of development. Therefore, the 1990s marked China’s increased involvement in individual African states, not only for political and economic trade and military issues, but also multilateral concerns (Muekalia, 2004: 7). Thus, both China and Africa were concerned with the undisputed power that the United States had in global affairs. For this reason China and Africa worked together to oppose the United States as a leader and were more in favour of an equal world order (Naidu et al., 2009: 92).

The 1989 political crisis in China, which saw riots in the Tiananmen Square, caused the “West” to be concerned about the way in which China seemed to abuse the human rights of its citizens (Taylor, 2006: Internet). Therefore, China’s credibility as a sovereign and legitimate state was brought into question. For this reason, China began to rethink its foreign policy interest and viewed Africa as a possible strategic, diplomatic partner against the West (Van Rooyen and Solomon, 2007: 7). According to Naidu et al. (2009: 89) the events of 1989 therefore drew China closer to Africa, because most African countries, like China faced a common threat from Western domination in their domestic affairs. These events also pointed the finger to a number of African states whose human rights records were poor and who supported the Chinese Government. Consequently, both China and most African governments were being questioned by the West on their poor human rights records. African governments supported China because of a number of infringements by the West on their sovereignty. In response, the period between 1989 and 1992 saw an increased commitment by China to promote and strengthen its relations with Africa. The then Foreign Minister Qian Qichen travelled to fourteen African states to strengthen diplomatic ties between China and the continent (Taylor, 2006: Internet).

On the other hand, the 1990s also highlighted China’s individual rise as a superpower, both politically and economically. China has experienced economic growth of between 9 and 10 percent over the last decade (Lanteigne, 2009: 10). China’s economy achieved astonishing figures between 1981 and 1991. Its export market grew at an average rate of 13 percent per year, which resulted in further growth after 1991, reaching 18 percent per annum. Moreover, China’s export markets have increased from 1.1 percent in 1981 to just below 7 percent in 2005.
This resulted in China becoming the third largest exporting country in the world (Van Rooyen and Solomon, 2007: 4). With specific reference to Africa, the year 2009, saw China surpassing the United States as the continent’s leading trade partner (Akugizibwe, 2012: Internet). China’s economic boom comes with huge demands for natural resources to sustain this economic growth. Africa is blessed with an abundance of unexploited natural resources, making the continent an ideal economic partner for China (Marysse and Greenen, 2009: 375). China’s demand for natural resources and Africa’s supply thereof, have transformed the continent from the slowest to the fastest-growing region in the world. With the current financial catastrophe that the West is finding itself in, China’s economy continues to grow and remains a beacon of hope for the continent (Van Beek, 2012: 396).

On the flip side, Michael Pettis (as cited by Mills, McNamee and Jennings, 2012: 7) expects China’s economy to slow down over the next decade, reaching a mere 3.5 percent per year. The World Bank (as cited by China Daily, 2012: Internet) downgraded China’s GDP to 7.7 percent in 2012 and expects the country to grow at a rate of 8.1 percent in 2013. China’s economic growth is further hampered because of its border dispute (the Diaoyu islands) with Japan. And if tensions between the world’s second and third largest economies persist, it may lead to yet another global financial setback (Junmian, 2012: Internet). This may well have a negative effect on Africa’s commodity-based economies. However, China’s approach towards the continent is becoming increasingly more diversified and includes manufacturing, infrastructure projects, business enterprises and others (Mills et al., 2012: 7). Africa’s trade relations with China is also not stagnant and according to a senior commerce official (as interviewed by China Daily, 2012: Internet) the continent will bypass both the EU and the United States in the next three to five years, as China’s leading trade partner. Even with China’s systematic economic decline, McDonald (2012: 6) asserts that Africa’s future economic prospects may not be “doom and gloom”, given the fact that other emerging economies such as Brazil, India, Russia, Turkey and Korea are looking with great interest to invest in Africa. The IMF (as cited by Sulaiman, 2012: Internet) anticipates that the continent will grow at a rate of 5.7%, in 2013. However, as indicated earlier China remains Africa’s leading trade partner.
China and Africa’s contemporary relations are based on the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), which was signed in 2000 to strengthen their strategic partnership (Naidu et. al., 2009: 93). In that year, China and Africa adopted both the “Beijing Declaration” and the “Program for China-Africa Cooperation in Economic and Social Development”. In other words, FOCAC functioned as a channel through which China and Africa’s relations were communicated and manifested in a formal document. In addition, FOCAC was aimed at improving cooperation and mutual benefits between China and Africa and more importantly to increase their political and economic influence on the global stage (Muekalia, 2004: 8). Although FOCAC played a vital role in consolidating China and Africa’s relations, 2006 marked the year in which these relations were firmly cemented. The 2006 Beijing Summit of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation was held where over 40 African states were in attendance, highlighting the biggest engagement ever between China and Africa (Lammers, 2007: Internet). The FOCAC institutionalised China and Africa’s relations and, therefore, functioned as the ideal mechanism to manage contemporary China-Africa relations. Against this backdrop, the FOCAC may now be considered.

4.3. Forum on China-Africa Cooperation

In order to understand China and Africa’s contemporary strategic partnership, the FOCAC becomes a significant point of departure. As mentioned earlier, FOCAC came into existence in 2000 and was followed by a second ministerial conference in 2003, which adopted the Addis Ababa Action Plan (2004-2006) (Taylor, 2010: 72). But it was the year 2006 (with its third ministerial conference), which framed China-Africa relations as a “new type of strategic partnership”. More specifically, the White Paper on China’s African Policy was adopted under the auspices of FOCAC (Linhua, 2006: 24). This paved the way for the fourth ministerial conference held on 8 and 9 November 2009, in Sharm El Sheik, Egypt. And in mid-July 2012, the fifth ministerial summit conference took place in Beijing (McDonald, 2012: 4). It is important to note that each FOCAC meeting adopted a three-year action plans in order to realise their goals. However, the year 2000 did not produce a concrete action plan. It simply provided the ideological premises and a broad framework for future China-Africa relations. Before unravelling the FOCAC action plans (2004-2006, 2007-2009 and
2010-2012), it is necessary to comprehend China’s foreign policy ideas with regard to FOCAC.

Alden and Large (2011: 22) contend that it will be a mistake to limit China’s foreign policy interest in Africa to economic explanations. They elaborate, arguing that the latter approach limits China-Africa relations to resource-diplomacy. Such an approach excludes the ideological element of China’s foreign policy, with specific reference to FOCAC. By focusing only on the economic sphere of China-Africa relations, the study will fail to explain the initial FOCAC meeting held in 2000, which was deeply imbedded in China’s foreign policy ideas for an “equal world order” and its resentment towards Western dominance (Taylor, 2010: 72). It is important to highlight that China’s foreign policy ideas in Africa are not used to downplay the significance of natural resources. The role of ideology in China’s foreign policy signify an element that is so often overlooked by academics focusing on China-Africa relations (Alden and Large, 2011: 22). Mullins (1972: 501) points out that “ideas” may be described as either “ideology” or “utopian”. Ideas are utopian when they unrealistically try to alter power relationships or practices. This may be categorised within the North-South (particularly Africa) divide, in which the South (with China at the fore) try to forge an equal and a new economic world order (Gazibo and Mbabia, 2012: 61). An ideological idea, on the other hand does not seek to induce change, but rather to maintain the status quo (i.e. a world dominated by the North).

Khadiagala (2010: 381) postulates a simple thesis, namely that “ideas are inextricably linked to social contexts”. This thesis holds true regarding China’s foreign policy strategy to obtain diplomatic support from Africa, against increased attempts by the West to infringe on its sovereignty. China established the first FOCAC to counter Northern hegemony in world affairs, through multilateral cooperation with Africa (Taylor, 2010: 72-73). For this reason, Gazibo and Mbabia (2012: 54) point out that FOCAC as a structure, functions as the ideal mechanism to unite developing countries (China and Africa) on an equal footing. The Beijing Declaration (adopted in 2000) under the guidance of FOCAC stipulates that “countries, that vary from one another in social system, stages of development, historical and cultural background and values, have the right to choose their own
approaches and models in promoting and protecting human rights in their own countries”. It went further to reiterate that, “the politicisation of human rights and the imposing of human rights conditionalities on economic assistance should be vigorously opposed as they constitute a violation of human rights” (FOCAC, 2009a: Internet).

On the other hand, Khadiagala (2010: 376-378) observes that Africa experienced similar challenges from the West. African states, since Pan-Africanism, had a desire to manage their own affairs without the influence of imperial powers. Like China, Africa developed greater hostility to hegemony of the developed North, who so often sets the rules of engagement and determines the ideology that shapes the international landscape. The Ugandan president, Yoweri Museveni (as cited by Jacques, 2012: 429), publicly stated that “the Western ruling groups are conceited, full of themselves, ignorant of our conditions…” and China on the other hand, is “business-like”. In view of this, the initial FOCAC, in 2000 did not emerge out of China’s concern for Africa’s economic development (Caniglia, 2011: 170). Instead, it was a deliberate attempt by China to garner external diplomatic support from Africa to offset Western dominance in international institutions such as the UN, the World Bank and the IMF. This resonated with Africa and paved the way for China’s rhetoric on South-South cooperation with mutual-benefits (Beri, 2007: 300).

According to Mullins (1972: 504), ideology is deeply imbedded in “historical consciousness”. By this he means, “how the future is conceived will be greatly influenced, of course, by how the present and the past are understood”. The “historical consciousness” is being used strategically by China as a dual-edged tool to either manipulate or influence African perceptions about the world and itself (Mohan and Power, 2008: 4). This explains why China is so quick to remind Africans about the colonial ordeal (past) and the unequal global order of the present. In 2003, during the FOCAC, Wen Jiabo (as cited by Beri, 2007: 300) cautioned Africa that “hegemony is raising its ugly head”, with specific reference to the United States. Moreover, China is persistent in highlighting the apparent failure of the Washington Consensus and the negative impact (debt burden and conditionalities) it continues to
have on the continent (FOCAC, 2009a: Internet). For this reason, China is providing the continent, in terms of aid and trade with alternative “model of development”.

Unlike, the Washington Consensus, the so-called Beijing Consensus does not require “good governance”, “democracy” and respect for “human rights” (Mohan and Power, 2008: 13). The “Beijing Consensus” should, however, not be compared to the Washington Consensus. In 1989 the latter provided clear cut economic policies and rules, which was later advanced by the World Bank and the IMF. The former, however, was never even discussed by the Chinese Government, nor is it part of China’s foreign policy (Rebol, 2010: 12). Based on this the study does not seek to frame or categorise China-Africa relations as a “Beijing Consensus”, but simply draws attention to it. The word, “Beijing Consensus”, was first coined by Joshua Cooper Ramo in 2004 to depict China’s fast growing economy as a new model of development based on a coherent set of political and economic ideas (Dirlik, 2006: 2). Dirlik (2006: 2) contested Ramo’s analysis and discovered many discrepancies in his approach centred upon “development”. For this reason he argues that the Beijing Consensus is best viewed as “...a pole in the global political economy which can serve as a gathering place for those who are opposed to Washington”. China is also downplaying its rise as a superpower, by introducing itself as the “biggest developing country” to FACAC members (Gazibo and Mbabia, 2012: 64; Taylor, 2010: 72).

Hu Jintao (as noted by Taylor, 2010: 72), in 2007 stated that “Africa is the continent with the largest number of developing countries,” and “China is the biggest developing country”. In view of the latter, Snow (as cited by Mohan and Power, 2008: 6) points out that Beijing is using “camouflage techniques” with regard to its FOCAC partners. China’s public rhetoric on “South-South cooperation”, “Third World countries”, “poor friends”, “victims of imperial powers” and others highlights the political image China wants to sell to the continent. Deng Xiaoping (as cited by Johnson, Paik and Larsen, 2011: 112), in 1991, cautioned Chinese foreign policy officials to always “observe calmly, secure our time. Be good at maintaining a low profile, never claim leadership”. China is committed to holding on to its status as a developing country even if it surpasses the United States as the world’s largest economy (Eckl and Weber, 2007: 9). This poses a serious challenge for academics
or scholars who simply view the world through the lens of the North-South divide, with specific reference to China (Rebol, 2010: 9). Although, the country has reached the upper middle-income bracket in 2011, it still scores low with regard to its Human Development Index (HDI). Poverty, massive inequalities and environmental degradation are some of the issues that stresses China’s developing image (the World Bank, 2012 Internet). On the other hand, China continues to hold the record for the most US dollar reserves and with a seat in UNSC, the country bears the characteristics of the developed North (Balaam and Dillman, 2011: 346; Godement, 2012: 25; Rebol, 2010: 11). China has without a doubt one foot in the developed North and another in the developing South (Gazibo and Mbabia, 2010: 64). And in light of the above-mentioned arguments, it may now be concluded that political ideas in China’s foreign policy towards Africa plays a central role in its quest to forge closer relations with FOCAC members. China may either use its foreign policy ideas for a genuine cause or as a means to further its national-self-interests with regard to FOCAC and the rest world. Against this backdrop, the FOCAC Action Plans (2004-2006, 2007-2009 and 2010-2012) may now be considered.

Before unravelling China and Africa’s Action Plans, it is important to indicate that the latter function as a desired outcome between these countries. The aim, therefore, is not to highlight all the details captured in these documents, because of the limited scope of the study. And given the time span (1989-2013) upon which this study is conducted, it will not attempt to analyse China-Africa relations beyond 2013, with specific reference to the 2013-2015 Action Plan. Nevertheless, it does seek to examine all these Action Plans in order to identify similarities and differences. Making it possible to not only summarise these FOCAC Action Plans, but capturing the crux upon which these documents are based.

After examining the FOCAC Action plans, it became apparent that, the Action Plan adopted in 2006 (for 2007-2009) is of utmost importance. It deeply embodies China and Africa’s “new type of strategic partnership”. What makes it more significant is that all the Action Plans after 2006 are quite similar in their approach and focus (MFA, 2006: Internet; FOCAC, 2009b: Internet). The earlier, Addis Ababa Action Plan (2004-2006), however, differs with the more recent (starting from 2006) Action
Plans in three important aspects. First it does not allow for increased exchanges between political parties, legislatures and local governments. Second it does not incorporate “consular and judicial cooperation”. The final shortcoming is that it makes no room for “climate and environmental protection” in both China and Africa (China.Org.Cn, 2012: Internet). Regardless, of the latter differences China and Africa’s cooperation and collaborations in various fields may be summarised in six major points, as set out in the mid-July 2012 FOCAC Declaration (FOCAC, 2012: Internet):

- Emphasising African political affairs and governance, “on such issues as sovereignty, independence, security, unity, territorial integrity and national development, so as to increase trust and strategic consensus between China and Africa”.
- Promoting peace and security in Africa, as well as in the international arena through multilateral cooperation in organisations such as the UNSC and other institutions;
- China seeks to increase cooperation with regional organisations such as the AU, NEPAD and others to ensure sustainable development in these organisations;
- Cooperate and improve each other’s comparative advantages in key sectors such as trade, investments, poverty reduction, infrastructure, capacity building, human resources development, agriculture, hi-tech industries and others;
- To further and strengthen relations in non-traditional sectors of cooperation including people-to-people exchanges in culture, education, sports, tourism and other fields, and to build closer relationships between young people, women, non-governmental organisations, media organisations and academic institutions, as well as environmental aspects;
- Increase cooperation in international affairs to safeguard “each other’s legitimate concerns and aspirations” and to promote the democratization of international institutions.
In light of the above-mentioned points, the main goal of the FOCAC is without doubt based on greater cooperation and equality between partners. It also serves as the ideal institution to coordinate China-Africa relations. These deepening relations are increasingly becoming more diversified, since it includes a number of role players from both China and Africa. Local, provincial and national governments, multinational companies, individuals, entrepreneurs and workers are all propelled onto the global stage and function under the framework of FOCAC (Gazibo and Mbabia, 2010: 57-58). MacDonald (2012: 9) asserts that China is not only presenting the continent with financial gains, but it also seeks to strengthen Africa’s often marginalised institutions in international affairs (such as NEPAD and the AU). Because of China, Africa may have a stronger influence in international affairs. FOCAC is presenting the continent with an opportunity to voice its concerns. China’s economic interest, however, is what sparked its contemporary relations with the continent. This became evident when the former premier of China Zhu Rongji stated that future China-Africa relations will be centred on “economic interaction” (Shelton: 2006: 109).

In 2006, the Beijing Summit on the FOCAC outlined the principles on which China and Africa’s economic and political relationship was to be governed. The Summit acknowledged that Africa’s natural resources would form the core of the strategic partnership. Thus, the Beijing Summit concluded that: “The Chinese Government encourages and supports competent Chinese enterprises to benefit and common development to develop and exploit rationally their resources, with a view to helping African countries to translate their advantages in resources to competitive strength, and reliable sustainable development in their own countries and the continent as a whole” (Naidu et. al., 2009: 96).

Eckl and Weber (2007: 8) argue that China-Africa relations are not one of equals. As a result, Mohan and Power (2008: 5) articulate that China’s strategy towards the continent was always based on its national or geo-political interest. It is important to note that FOCAC was initiated by China and not by Africa. China is unquestionably the most powerful (economic and political) member in FOCAC. This presents it with the perfect opportunity to both influence Africa and advance its national interest. More importantly, the Beijing Declaration, as well as the FOCAC Action Plans
highlights the commitments China is making towards the continent and not the other way around. China in comparison with Africa possesses most of the technical, financial, intellectual and other skills to achieve the outcomes as set out in the FOCAC Action Plans. Africa on the other hand, plays the role of a passive partner. While the rules of the game are being engineered by Beijing, the continent is left reeling. Africa not only lacks a strategy of engagement, it is incapable of finding the political will that will lead to greater cooperation in their approach towards China (Gazibo and Mbabia, 2010: 67).

MacDonald (2012: 8), however, argues that South Africa, in the 2012 Beijing Summit started to pressurise Beijing for a more equitable partnership. He points to Jacob Zuma’s public rhetoric, in which the latter stated that contemporary China-Africa economic relations are unsustainable. McDonald in his (2012: 8) analysis stated that Africa is starting to exercise greater leverage over China. On the contrary, Landsberg (2010: 289) would dispute McDonald’s analysis as pre-mature and “wishful” at best. The Zuma Government still struggles to define South Africa’s national interest and to assume that SA’s public rhetoric “on better equality between China and Africa” will transpire into pragmatic ways that will level relations are premature. If MacDonald (2012) is correct in his analysis he needed to pinpoint to detailed plans and budgets engineered by SA or Africa (which is non-existent), on how promises made by China will transpire into tangible benefits (Sohn, 2011: 82). Landsberg (2010: 284) convincingly argues, the “presumption” that FOCAC “would be an automatic trickle down to serve the national interests of SA and broader interests of Africa may be just that: a presumption”. FOCAC may be unequal, but China has been true in its aid pledges towards the continent (Taylor, 2010: 73). Aid forms an integral part of the FOCAC. For this reason, the following section deals with China’s African aid policy.

### 4.4. China’s African Aid Policy

Before clarifying China’s aid policy towards the continent, it is important to note that this section does not seek to evaluate the institutions responsible for the distribution of aid. Nor does it seek to provide precise figures of China’s aid towards the
continent. The reason being, as Davies et al. (2008: 2) and Lengauer (2011: 40) point out, a lack of accurate aid data coupled with the inefficiency of various ministries (the MOFCOM, MFA’s and others) in China to coordinate aid activities have made it difficult to provide any detailed account on China’s aid to Africa. There are a number of reasons on why China does not want to disclose its aid figures. First, it does not want to portray an image of favouritism towards a specific African country with regards to the amount of aid it is giving. Second, the country still faces serious domestic constraints concerning poverty and many other social ills and by exposing the amount of aid the country is giving to Africa, it may transpire into social unrests (Samy, 2010: 81). This predicament makes it necessary for China not to disclose its precise aid figures, because it not only threatens the political survival of the CPC, it may also hamper its long-term interest (political and economic) within the continent. The Chinese conception of “aid”, however poses serious challenges for academics, who wishes to evaluate the impact the former has on the continent.

China has been reluctant to present itself as an “aid” donor to the continent and see itself as a developing country working with other developing countries (particularly Africa) (King, 2007: 338). The country’s reluctance has led to vague and ambiguous definitions of “aid” (Davies et al., 2008: 1). Lengauer (2011: 35) posits that foreign aid is generally referred to as development assistance. According to the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) under the auspices of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (2012: Internet), aid refers to grants or loans given to developing countries by government agencies (of the developed North) to uplift their economic development and welfare as their main objective, at concessional financial terms of at least 25 percent. China’s aid to Africa, however, cannot be seen in light of the aforementioned interpretation of aid. The country is not only providing the continent with monetary assistance, but with technical skills, infrastructure development, education, healthcare, people-to-people cooperation and exchange. The latter aid initiatives may not require grants or loans in the conventional sense (Davies et al., 2008: 1; King, 2007: 338). Davies et al. (2008: 1) rightly indicate that China’s foreign aid policy covers a range of issues, making it prone to ambiguity. To further complicate China’s aid foreign policy, some Chinese officials see it as “cooperation” and others view it as “Official Development
Assistance” (ODA). The former involves FDI and contracts undertaken by Chinese businesses. The latter, constitutes concessionary loans, debt relief, grants and trade concessions. Moreover, it is important to note that “Humanitarian Aid” does not fall within any of the above-mentioned definitions of aid and China’s 2006 “Aid Policy”. It is simply provided in unprecedented catastrophes such as famine, natural disasters and others to curb the suffering of those affected (Davies et al., 2008: 2). In view of this, China is without a doubt struggling to formulate a clear definition of aid. Nonetheless, this does not mean that aid is given without purpose or intent to advance the country’s national interest.

Konings (2007: 346); Mohan and Power (2008: 5) argue that China has been strategic in its aid allocations. The country’s aid disbursements are in line with its foreign policy objectives. According to Konings (2007: 346) China is providing foreign aid to satisfy its own political, strategic and economic interest. For example, China used its aid towards the continent to counter the influence of the West and the former Soviet Union, as well as wielding diplomatic support away from Taiwan by supporting liberation movements in Africa. China’s aid to Africa is carefully orchestrated, in order to gain support on a number of international issues, as well as bolstering its international standing in institutions such as the UN, the WTO and others. For instance, in 1971, China received overwhelming support from 26 African states to gain a seat in the UNSC, at the expense of Taiwan. The year 1989, with specific reference to the events surrounding Tiananmen Square, saw China increase its aid towards the continent in order to gain diplomatic support, to offset Western dominance in its domestic affairs concerning human rights (Samy, 2010: 79). It will be a mistake, however, to view China’s aid to Africa as a zero-sum game.

China’s African aid policy is closely linked to its foreign policy principles, which stresses the importance of sincerity, equality and mutual benefit, solidarity and common development (SAGE, 2006: 377). These principles are complemented by “Eight Principles for Economic Aid and Technical Assistance” concerning the country’s aid relations, particularly with Africa. These principles are not new. They were first adopted in 1964, under the leadership of Zhou Enlai in Mali (Konings, 2007: 346). According to the Chinese Government’s Official Web Portal (2012: 346),
First, China is committed to giving aid on the basis of equality and mutual benefit; second, China respects the sovereignty of recipient states and does not seek to impose conditionalities on aid (except for the “One China” policy); third, economic aid is given with low or no interest rates coupled with flexible repayments to lessen the burden on-aid receiving states; fourth, aid should not be used as a tool to keep recipient countries dependent on China – instead it should function as a means that will make these countries economically independent and self-reliant; fifth, China is in favour for the speedy completion of projects that will give way to quicker returns in terms of income and capital for the recipient states; sixth, China guarantees to supply recipient countries with top-quality equipment and materials manufactured in China at international prices. And if these goods are not up to standard, the Chinese Government will replace and refund them as specified. Seventh, when China provides any type of technical assistance, it will ensure that the people of recipient countries master the technological skills. The final and eight principle highlights the fact that Chinese experts should not expect preferential treatment over experts living in recipient countries. In light of the aforementioned principles, China seems to be genuinely seeking to advance the interest of recipient countries and itself, making it a positive sum-game. This is evident of China’s aid pledges to Africa in 2006, when President Hu Jintao (as cited by Jacques, 2012: 414) announced the following:

China pledged to double aid to Africa by 2009 to approximately US$ 1 billion; to establish a US$ 5 billion China-Africa development fund to encourage Chinese businesses to not only invest in the continent, but to support its African counterparts; provide US$ 3 billion in preferential loans and US$ 2 billion in preferential buyers’ credits to African states; cancel all debt arising from Chinese interest-free government loans that matured at the end of 2005 for the 31 heavily indebted, poor and least-developed states in Africa who have diplomatic relations with Beijing; to expand China’s market to products stemming from Africa’s least developed states by increasing from 190 to 440, the number of products to China that will receive zero-tariff treatment; to develop Africa’s human resources in various fields by training
15 000 African professionals, and by doubling the number of scholarships awarded to Africans to 4 000 annually and to send 100 senior agricultural specialists and 300 youth volunteers to the continent; to build a number of infrastructure facilities such as the AU conference centre, 30 hospitals, 30 malaria treatment centres and 100 rural schools.

In view of these aid pledges that China made to Africa, Meibo and Xie (2012: 13-15) as well as Sohn (2011: 81) point out that the Chinese Government has been successful in most of its commitments towards the continent. They highlight the fact that China managed to double aid in 2009. This saw the country provide the US$ 3 billion preferential loans, as well as the zero-tariffs on African goods. China also reached all its debt relief commitments as set out in FOCAC one, two and three. It delivered on its infrastructure development projects by completing the Addis Ababa AU Conference Centre in 2012. By the end of 2009, China had built over 500 infrastructural schemes, which include over 20 000 km (kilometres) of railways, over 3000 km of roads, 11 bridges, dozens of hydro-electrical powers stations, ports, 107 schools, 54 hospitals and trained over 30 000 Africans in a number of fields (such as economics, public administration, agriculture, science, technology and others). These figures not only seem to attest to China’s trustworthiness in terms of promises made to the continent, but it also seems to stress China’s genuine concern for Africa’s development.

Viewed from a different perspective, China’s positive contributions are frequently overshadowed by its secretive dealings with Africa. Even though China’s aid commitments are made multilaterally through the FOCAC, bilateral aid relations remain the order of the day (Mohan and Power, 2008: 13). For a number of reasons China’s bilateral aid relations pose a serious challenge for evaluating the impact (either positive or negative) that aid has had on the continent as whole. First, as mentioned earlier, China is reluctant to disclose the exact nature of its aid to Africa (statistics, coupled with the inability of its various aid institutions to manage aid). Second, it appears that individual African states are either unwilling or incapable of informing its FOCAC counterparts on the amount of aid they receive from China. This highlights a major grey area in China-Africa relations, since there is no effective
and efficient mechanism in place from either China or Africa to determine both the flow and the impact of aid. It therefore comes as no surprise when Davies et al. (2008: 4) conceive of China’s aid to Africa as marked with low levels of transparency. Naim (2007: Internet) adopts a more radical approach by arguing that China’s aid to Africa is non-democratic and non-transparent and that this leads to the marginalisation of ordinary citizens. China’s aid to Africa comes with no conditionalities such as respect for human rights, good governance and democracy. China’s deputy foreign minister, Zhou Wenzkong (cited by Konings, 2007: 350) told an interviewer “... Business is business and politics is politics”. For example, in Darfur China ignored the human rights abuses or genocide committed by the Sudanese Government and continued with business as usual with the Sudanese regime. In light of the above-mentioned example, together with a lack of transparency of China’s aid to Africa, one often sees the governing elite benefiting and not the people (Samy, 2010: 77; Naim, 2007: Internet).

China’s willingness to act in its own self-interest is reflective of its realist tendencies. For this reason, it may be argued that the Chinese Government has placed the country’s economic interests before any moral principles that would benefit African states. Yet, the Chinese elite have also come to realise that it cannot simply pursue a policy based on maximising its national interest and that the international arena is not simply a place where states advance their individual interests at the expense of others. Kegley (cited by Weber, 2001: 43) declares that states should preserve “a place for morality in foreign policy”. In accord with this view, Weber (2001: 43), argues that the “moral goals that lead to a better way of life for people and states are as much in states’ individualistic national interests as they are in their collective interests”. For this reason, China has cooperated with African countries in achieving their goals as set out in FOCAC one, two and three. More importantly, a number of non-state actors have been incorporated in China’s foreign policy framework that stresses the country’s liberal institutionalism.

It is important to indicate that a lack of transparency and China’s ‘no strings attached’ policy in the allocation of aid cannot simply be equated to a lack of development. The lack of transparency and no-conditionalities-approaches may lead to gross
generalisations of the impact that China’s aid has on the continent (Mohan and Power, 2008: 12). Such an approach may easily frame China’s aid to Africa as negative or even as a way to stifle development on the continent. If one were to consider China’s Action Plans and the follow-up actions, meaning the successes in various sectors, it becomes difficult to label China’s aid to Africa as a way of advancing only its own national self-interest. Indeed, China’s aid to Africa is in line with its foreign policy objectives, but this does not imply that Africa is not benefiting from the Chinese in terms of development. Moreover, Samy (2011: 85) points out that China’s aid to Africa is not selective. China has given aid to countries that have little or no strategic resources, like Kenya, Ghana and Tanzania. Because of their geo-political and market worth, China provided them with grants, loans and infrastructure. On the other hand, countries such as Sudan, Nigeria and Angola that have significant amounts of natural resources also receive high levels of aid and investments (Mohan and Power, 2008: 12). As a result, China’s aid to Africa contains elements of both development and national interest. The country’s aid to the continent functions as one of its many foreign policy objectives. Thus, it becomes pivotal to consider other forms of cooperation. This includes the political, security, social and economic dimensions of China-Africa relations (Samy, 2011: 80). More specifically, the following section seeks to draw a distinction between the two schools of thought within specific case studies, which describe China-Africa relations as either national interest or partners in development, respectively.

4.5. China-Africa relations: Exploring Two Schools of Thought

The jury is still out on whether China’s relationship with the continent can best be classified as either partners in development or national self-interest. This section sets out to investigate the stated classifications of China-Africa relations within specific case studies. By investigating the two schools of thought separately, the study will provide further perspectives regarding China-Africa relations. It will also allow the study to compare and contrast the two schools of thought. In order to make sense of the above classifications it is necessary to understand both realism and liberalism as important international relations theories for explaining China’s foreign policy strategy in Africa. According to Habib (2009: 145), the aforementioned
theories are essential in explaining a country’s foreign policy strategies and in this case, China is no different. Instead of studying China’s foreign policy strategy through either a realist or liberal lens, both perspectives can be used to explain the country’s foreign policy (Habib, 2009: 145). China has managed to utilise both theories simultaneously. On the one hand, China has managed to establish the FOCAC, which deeply embodies liberal institutionalism. And on the other hand, China has utilised its foreign policy strategy to not only ensure its survival, but to maximise its national self-interest, which is reflective of realism. National self-interest is also reflected in China’s stance on sovereignty and non-interference. However, it is important to note that China-Africa relations are becoming increasingly more diversified. The aim of this section is not to confine China-Africa relations to only one dimension (for instance economics). The latter may be the most dominant factor, but political, social and security issues cannot simply be wished away. Ovadia (2013: 241) states that “...it is necessary to examine China’s military, political, and development cooperation with Africa in order to get a handle on the depth of China’s engagement...”. Thus, in order to make sense of the aforementioned issues Angola and Sudan will be examined as case studies in the following sub-section.

4.5.1. China-Africa relations: The cases of Angola and Sudan

In order to grasp China and Angola’s bilateral relations, it is essential to offer a brief snapshot on their historic relations. Colonialism marks an important point in China and Angola’s relations. During this period, China became frequently embroiled in Angola’s domestic political landscape. As such China assisted all the major liberation movements in Angola’s independence war from Portuguese colonialism during the 1960s and 1970s (Alves, 2010: 5). In the early 1960s, China began to support the MPLA (Movimento Popular de Libetação de Angola), but in the mid-1960s, the Chinese allegiance moved away from the MPLA to UNITA (União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola). The reason for this shift was largely because of China’s strategic calculations. China believed that UNITA would surpass the MPLA as the major liberation movement in Angola, given its surging political support base. However, when UNITA failed to take control of Angola, China opted to support the militaristic liberation movement called the FNLA (Frente Nacional de Libertação de
Angola). Thus between the 1980s and 1990s, China and Angola’s relations were mainly based on military cooperation. This understanding, did not, however, result in the FNLA becoming the dominant movement. Instead, it left China humiliated when it failed to overthrow the MPLA. This chain of events, especially after 1975, created a major dent in China’s bilateral relations with Angola (Malaquias, 2011: 10). Another event that served to stifle the development of China and Angola’s relations was the bloody civil war that took place in the latter country.

Angola’s civil war left the country in ruins. Roads, communication channels, health care services and education facilities were destroyed (Martins, 2011: 1). In 2002, Angola’s 30-year civil war came to an end and the country was in desperate need to rebuild its economy and infrastructure. Initially the governing elite of Angola looked to Western institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank for financial assistance (Jiang, 2009: 47). In 2003, the IMF refused to assist the Angolan Government because of its lack of transparency and adequate macro-economic policies (Corkin, 2013: 5). The IMF’s refusal left Angola in a state of despair. Adding to Angola’s misery, foreign investors and states turned their backs on a country that was viewed as a risk without any investment returns (Corkin, 2011: 170; Martins, 2011: 1). The Chinese refused to accept that Angola was a hopeless case. In fact, businessmen saw the opportunity and began to enter the country a few years before the culmination of the civil war (Jiang, 2009: 47). For example, one of China’s company executive’s stated (as cited by Jiang, 2009: 47) “...to enter Angola a few years before the end of its civil war was a substantial risk but it was also where the opportunity lay at the time. It paid off with large returns in the energy and real estate sectors...”.

In the course of 2002, the Chinese Exim Bank and the China Construction Bank began to extend loans to Angola that they so desperately needed. By 2004, the Chinese issued Angola with a loan worth US$ 2 billion. From 2004 to 2010, China’s loans to Angola stood at a hefty US$ 10.5 billion (Corkin, 2011: 2). Angola would repay these loans with oil and by giving China a share in its infrastructure development projects (Zhao, 2011: Internet). This agreement proved to be mutually beneficial for two reasons. First, it allowed China to satisfy its need for natural
resources, especially oil. Second, Chinese assistance helped to propel forward Angola’s economic growth and development needs (Malaquias, 2011: 6). As a further benefit, the loans from China was payable within 12 years, with a grace period of three years and an interest rate as low as 1.5% (Kiala, 2010: Internet). This is well below what Western countries and institutions ask when they issue loans to foreign countries. The bulk of these loans from China were directed towards Angola’s domestic reconstruction programme (Corkin, 2011: 2).

Reconstructing Angola is a major priority for the governing elite of the country. Angola began to rebuild its ailing water supplies, power grids, health care facilities, education, infrastructure and transportation networks with Chinese assistance. As a result, Angola experienced a boom in its infrastructure sector (Ovadia, 2013: 237). However, the agreement sought by China and Angola is that 70 percent of all infrastructure projects would be completed by Beijing, while the remaining 30 percent would be subcontracted to Angolan firms. From the onset, this appears to be unequal and exploitative at best (Corkin, 2012: 5) but when one considers Angola’s lack of human resources and its illiteracy rate of almost 60 percent it becomes difficult to see how Angolans could have delivered the highly skilled labour that was required (Lynne and Braunschweig, 2003: 25). Thus, the majority of Angolan labourers have been employed in low-skilled work. According to Corkin (2012: 5), there is not enough evidence to indicate that Angolan firms could complete large-scale infrastructure projects. With this in mind, the Angolan Government set out to divert its overdependence on Chinese construction companies by engaging other international construction firms and states. In 2007, Angola received $600 million in construction aid from Spain. The country also managed to seal an infrastructure deal worth $1 billion with Canada’s Export Development Bank. The Brazilian Bank had also already granted Angola with $1.5 billion in construction equipment. These measures show that Angola has successfully managed to avert domination by its international trade partners of any of its internal political or economic interests (Corkin, 2011: 175-176).

China’s increased trade and investment interests in Angola have transformed the country into one of the fastest growing economies in the world. Between 2006 and
2010, Angola’s GDP grew at an average rate of 10.5 percent (Zhao, 2011: Internet). The reason for this phenomenal growth rate is that Angola has become the biggest oil producer in Africa. More specifically, oil exports generate 90-95 percent of Angola’s export earnings. Trade between China and Angola grew from $1 billion in 2002 to 25.3 billion in 2008. China has also managed to surpass the United States as Angola’s top trade partner (Alves, 2010: 8). The bulk of Angola’s bilateral trade with China is centred on oil. By 2009, Angola exported 39 percent of its oil to China. China imports 15.7 percent of its total oil from Angola, making the latter a significant partner to China (Corkin, 2011: 1).

Similar to the way in which Angola safeguarded its infrastructure projects, the country has also not allowed Beijing to monopolise its oil sector. Realising the dangers of overdependence on China, Angola’s governing elite has prevented Chinese companies from purchasing strategic oil blocks. This sent a strong political message to China that Angola would not allow Beijing to dominate its economy, even though the country is dependent on oil revenue for economic survival (Corkin, 2011: 177). In order to avert Chinese dependence, the country set out to strategically diversify its oil partners. ExxonMobil one of the biggest U.S. oil companies in Angola serves as a case in point (Burgos and Ear, 2012: 355 & 356; Carmody, 2013: 194). More importantly, the approach of Western companies towards Angola is becoming more pragmatic, because of the fear of losing out to China (Ovadia, 2013: 237). This has allowed Angola to adopt a more proactive approach in its dealings with the Chinese. Angola has not only managed to level the playing field with Beijing, but in some instances it appears that the country has managed to gain the upper hand over China. Corkin (2013: 5) apprises us of the fact that “…while 40 per cent of Angola’s exports go to China, it is in fact China which is more vulnerable. Twenty per cent of China’s oil comes from Angola.” Against this backdrop China’s strategic partnership with Sudan may now be considered.

In order to fathom the China-Sudan relations, it is important to first unravel the complexities associated with Sudan itself, especially with the formation of South-
Sudan. The latter and its relation to Sudan, if not well understood, can present any scholar with a political minefield, especially when one seeks to address China’s foreign policy with these countries. Given the complexities, this is by no means an attempt to dislodge Sudan from South-Sudan, the reason being that it is almost impossible to understand South-Sudan without mentioning Sudan and vice versa. For example, in 2011, when South-Sudan seceded from Sudan, the two governments never finalised their disagreements concerning borderlines and raw materials, making them interdependent (Francis et al., 2012: 2-3; Woodward, 2011: 9). Bradbury (2012: 370) reiterates this view by stating that “the continued conflicts between North and South Sudan Darfur, and the question of oil production, are all interrelated problems”. Matters are further complicated by fact that the Chinese Government played an integral role in South-Sudan’s independence from Sudan. China’s relations with Sudan are in fact a case study of how Beijing’s foreign policy has evolved over the years (Francis et al., 2012: 2-3). Given the limitation of scope of this study, no attempt will be made to provide an in-depth analysis on South-Sudan, but the latter will be included to make sense of China’s strategic partnership with Sudan.

China and Sudan first established diplomatic relations in 1959. During this period, Sudan became one of the first states to recognise China as the sole representative of the Chinese people and not the Taiwanese Government who also claimed to be representing China. In 1971, the UN recognised the People’s Republic of China as the only lawful representative of China to the United Nations. As a result, China took over Taiwan’s membership position in the United Nations, as well as its permanent seat in the UNSC. During this time, Sudan played an influential role in mobilising support for China in Africa, so that China could be recognised as the representative of the Chinese people and Beijing could take up its seat in the UNSC. In the 1990s, however, their relationship began to incorporate economic matters, especially in the oil sector (Ali, 2007: 172-173). Like Angola, Sudan soon found itself out in the cold when Western states turned their backs on the country that was believed to be supporting terrorism (Large, 2008: 96). Adding to Sudan’s woes, the mid-1990s saw

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1 In January 1956, Sudan formally became independent from Britain. However, in 2011 the south seceded from the rest of the country to form South Sudan.
Sudan’s situation deteriorate rapidly, when the West intensified sanctions because of the country’s ailing human rights records, with specific reference to Darfur. Sudan under the leadership of El Bashir committed genocide to maintain political and economic control over the country (Hurst, 2008: Internet). Sudan’s dwindling economic ties with the West compelled it to look to non-Western states to develop its oil industry (Francis et al., 2012: 5).

In 1995, China emerged as Sudan’s ideal strategic partner because of the former’s emphasis on non-interference, which entailed that each nation state should resolve its own domestic issues. This emphasis has therefore provided China with the perfect opportunity to create an effective relationship with the Sudanese Government, regardless of the country’s human rights abuses (Ali, 2007: 172; Kotecki, 2008: 211). China has therefore become the biggest investor in Sudan. The latter’s energy sector has come to dominate its relations with China, accounting for $8 billion (Sautman and Hairong, 2009: 204). More specifically, Sudanese oil has been strategic commodity that helped cement relations between China and Sudan. Unlike in the case of Angola, Chinese oil companies have managed to monopolise Sudan’s oil sector (Bradbury, 2012: 371; Holslag, 2007: 2). China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) holds a significant share (40 percent) in Sudan’s biggest oil company, the Great Nile Petroleum Operating Company. By 2001, CNPC managed to purchase another 41 percent stake in Sudan’s state-owned company PetroDar (Sautman and Hairong, 2009: 204; Wang, 2012: 11). As a result of this, especially from 1999 onwards, the CNPC has transformed Sudan into an oil-exporting country, of which China claims the biggest stake. For example, Sudan’s trade with China went from a paltry 0, 3 percent in 1998 to a substantial 66 percent of its trade exports in 2004, with oil forming the pinnacle of their trade relations (Ali, 2007: 174). Between 1999 and 2009, China imported 98 percent of Sudan’s oil, making it Sudan’s most important trade partner (Large, 2012: 6). In order to secure its oil interest in Sudan, the Chinese Government has invested vigorously in the country’s infrastructure, with a specific focus on oil extraction.

Unlike in Angola, where infrastructure has been used to foster development, China’s infrastructure projects in Sudan appear to have the opposite effect. Chinese
companies have concentrated their goods and services in the northern parts of Sudan at the expense of the south. Oil infrastructure has led to the marginalisation of the south (Francis et al., 2012: 3; Large, 2009: 614). Hence, the south has become dependent on rail, road and oil pipelines constructed in the north by Chinese companies. For example, the China Petroleum Engineering and Construction Corporation has constructed one of the longest (1500 km) oil pipelines in Sudan, connecting the southern oil fields with Port Sudan. This was followed by another oil pipeline in 2004 connecting Western Kordofan with Kharthoum (Holslag, 2007: 2).

According to Wang (2012: 11) oil infrastructure projects in Sudan are not only built to satisfy China’s oil needs at home, but to allow Beijing to sell oil reserves from Sudan to international markets.

China’s stance on Sudan’s human rights atrocities have been a heated debate in various segments of the international community, especially among human rights groups. The Chinese have turned a blind eye on Sudan’s dismal human rights record, in order to satisfy its oil needs (Manyok, 2012: 3). This is evident of Chinese Deputy Foreign Minister Zhou Wenzhong remarks (as cited by Holslag, 2007: 3) in 2005, “business is business, we try to separate politics from business […] the internal situation in the Sudan is an internal affair”. As a result, the Chinese Government has assisted and protected the Sudanese Government through its veto powers in the UNSC (Francis et al., 2012: 6). China has also protected the Sudanese Government from social unrest through military cooperation. Between 2003 and 2006, China supplied the Sudanese military with $55 million worth of small arms, much of which has been bought from the proceeds of oil sales (Hogan, 2007: Internet). From 1997, Sudan, with the assistance of China, has managed to strengthen its security cluster. Thus, civil society in Sudan has been forced into obedience (Human rights first, n.d.: 1). According to Manyok (2012: 5), the purpose of Chinese military cooperation with Sudan was not to foster peace and security within the country, but to protect its oil interest. Consequently, the Chinese Government has dispatched 400 soldiers to safeguard its oil fields and not the people of Sudan. This clearly contradicts China’s foreign policy principle on peaceful co-existence. China, therefore, does not seek to uplift the people of Sudan, but
rather to secure its own hunger for natural resources. Against this backdrop, China’s emphasis on mutual-benefits to foster development appears contradictory.

However, as the conflict in Darfur intensified, China’s dealings with Sudan started to come under the international community’s critical scrutiny. The country could no longer escape international criticism and it had to refurbish its foreign policy stance towards Sudan (Wang, 2012: 9-10). China’s foreign policy principle on “non-interference” became less viable amidst the Sudanese crisis. In 2007, then Chinese president, Hu Jintao, travelled to Sudan to pressure the Sudanese Government to resolve the Darfur crisis (Hogan, 2007: Internet). Continual calls from the South to secede from Sudan, also compelled Beijing to follow a more proactive approach to the Sudanese question. China essentially had to consider three scenarios with regard to Sudan. First, if Sudan were to fall into a state of utter chaos like Somalia, China runs the risk of losing the benefits linked to its oil shares. Second, if South Sudan with 75 percent of Sudan’s oil reserves secede without Chinese assistance, the latter’s oil interest will also be forfeited (Francis et al., 2012: 3). Third, if China continues to bolster the Bashir Government, it runs the risk of building a negative reputation throughout the world, in which Beijing is depicted as an aggressive exploiter of foreign countries’ scarce resources for personal gain (Wang, 2012: 10). Realising this state of affairs Beijing began to launch a multilateral strategy to address the Sudanese crisis. Thus, it managed to convince the Bashir Government to accept a hybrid peacekeeping force that involves both the African Union (AU) and the UN. This approach won praise for China globally (Large, 2012: 8-9). It also paved the way for Sudan’s Comprehensive Peace Agreement from 2005-2011, and the formation of the newly formed South Sudan after 2011 (Wang, 2012: 10). More importantly, China’s multilateral strategy allowed it to maintain its strategic oil interests in both Sudans. In view of the above-mentioned arguments, China’s bilateral relations with Sudan is a classic example of how Beijing has tried to incorporated both realism and liberalism in its foreign policy framework simultaneously. From a realist perspective, it demonstrates how China has managed to retain its oil and economic interests by protecting the Bashir Government and ignoring the human rights atrocities in Sudan. China has also been strategic in utilising liberal institutionalism in an attempt to resolve the Sudanese crisis. China
has made use of both the AU and the UN in its foreign policy strategy in Sudan, especially with the formation of South-Sudan.

4.6. Conclusion

The main goal of this chapter was to investigate the outcome of China-Africa relations. The chapter set out to address the question of whether China and Africa’s relations can be classified as either a strategic partnership or as national-interest. Thus, the chapter proceeded by uncovering China and Africa’s historical relations and pointed out that the post-Cold War era marks an important point in China-African relations. Having received little or no support from the West after the Cold-War, Africa turned to China for vital economic and political assistance. More importantly, both China and most African countries faced a common threat from Western interference in their domestic affairs. The period after the Cold War saw China’s rise as a superpower and its attendant need of raw materials to stimulate its booming economy (Marysse and Greenen, 2009: 375). Consequently, Africa’s abundance of natural resource deposits and China’s financial capability made them compatible. Although China’s economy is showing signs of fatigue, it has by no means led to a deterioration of its relationship with Africa, which is beginning to move to the centre stage of world affairs. Countries such as Brazil, India, Russia, Turkey and Korea are taking note of Africa’s economic prospects. China, however, has retained its pole position with the continent. Contemporary China-Africa relations are based on the FOCAC which was first signed in 2000 to strengthen their strategic partnership. And in 2006 China and Africa’s relations were firmly cemented, when over 40 African states visited Beijing for a summit conference.

The FOCAC is essential for understanding China and Africa’s strategic partnership. Each FOCAC from 2003 to 2012 adopted a three-year action plan. However, the year 2000 provided the ideological glue that would cement future China-Africa relations. China’s foreign policy ideas in FOCAC are used to counter both the influence of the West and to foster deeper relations with the continent. Thus, historical consciousness features prominently in China’s foreign policy arsenal to either manipulate or to influence African perceptions about the world and itself.
Scholars dealing with China-Africa relations often mistakenly referred to it as a Beijing Consensus, a concept that appears nowhere in China’s dealings with the continent.

China has also been strategic in downplaying its rise as a superpower with specific reference to its African partners in FOCAC. The Chinese continue to portray themselves as a developing country and tend to neglect its prominence in world affairs. The FOCAC has advanced a number of Action Plans from 2003 to 2012 for achieving their goals. The Action Plan adopted in 2006 (for 2007-2009) embodies China’s new strategic partnership with Africa and has formed the blueprint for all the other action plans after it. The Action Plans adopted by FOCAC propound six major points that range from African political affairs and governance to international cooperation that will promote equality among partners and the democratisation of international affairs. The plans also involve a range of actors from officials, local governments to workers to manage the utilisation of Africa’s natural resources, which form the crux of much of Africa’s strategic partnership with China. The latter has utilised its position in FOCAC to advance its national or geo-political interests. While African countries have become passive partners, South Africa attempted to level the playing field in 2012 with Jacob Zuma’s assertion of equal partnerships, but without a strategy of engagement, Africa or South Africa will remain at the receiving end in its dealings with China.

China’s African aid policy has also been used either to forge a strategic partnership or to advance its national interest with regard to Africa. China’s aid statistics and its definitional ambiguities have posed a serious challenge to academics that wish to evaluate the impact of China’s aid on Africa. China’s aid disbursements to Africa are in line with its foreign policy objectives and used to counter Western influence and to foster a strategic partnership based on equality and mutual benefit. This is reflected in China’s “Eight Principles for Economic Aid”. China has also managed to deliver on its aid promises made to Africa. However, China’s aid to Africa has often been clouded in secrecy making it difficult to evaluate the impact both positive and negative. A lack of transparency cannot simply be equated to a lack of development.
When one considers China’s Action Plans and the follow-up actions, it becomes difficult to label China’s aid to Africa as a way to advance its own-national interest.

The final section looked at the two schools of thought with reference to specific case studies that focus on China’s bilateral relations with Angola and Sudan, respectively. In the case of Angola, China played an influential role in the country’s independence struggle. China frequently became embroiled in Angola’s political matters that led to the slackening of their bilateral relations. Angola’s civil war also served to dampen its relations with China. By the end of the war, China emerged as its ideal strategic partner, which led Western institutions to turn their backs on Angola. China began to invest heavily in the Angola’s energy and estate sectors. China’s substantial loans to Angola, amounting to US$ 10.5 billion, helped to transform Angola into one of the world’s fastest growing economies. During Angola’s post-war economic reconstruction, the Angolan Government looked to China to develop its infrastructure, but acted strategically in diversifying the companies that delivered its infrastructure projects. By extending some of the contracts to its own oil sectors, the country prevented Beijing from monopolising the Angolan oil industry, and thereby managed to retain the upper hand over the Chinese.

The second case study that was discussed, is China’s relations with Sudan. Given the complexities of Sudan, especially with the formation of South-Sudan in 2011, no attempt was made to decouple the two Sudans. The parties never settled their disagreements concerning borders and natural resources, making them interdependent. Like Angola, Western sanctions against Sudan forced the country to foster closer relations with the Chinese. China’s emphasis on non-interference allowed it to maintain relations with the Sudanese Government, despite the country’s human rights abuses. This allowed China to supply Sudan with military equipment in order to safeguard its oil interest. Unlike the case of Angola, however, Chinese companies came to dominate the Sudanese economy, especially the oil sector. The bulk of China’s infrastructure in Sudan has been focused on extracting raw materials and satisfying its own national-interests. However, when China realised it could no longer protect the Sudanese Government, by supplying the latter with weapons and protecting it in the UNSC, the Chinese began to launch a multilateral strategy to
resolve the Sudanese crisis. This allowed China not only to safeguard its oil interests, but to win valuable praise for Beijing from the international community.

India has been under the radar in its dealings with the continent. It appears that the international community has turned a blind eye on India’s relations with Africa. For this reason, the next chapter seeks to unravel Indian-Africa relations.
Chapter Five: India in Africa: From Multilateral to Bilateral Relations

5.1. Introduction

India’s relations with Africa are often overshadowed by a strong Chinese presence on the continent. A number of scholars have attempted to make sense of India-Africa relations. India as one of the world’s fastest growing economies, with a booming middle class (numbering approximately 400 million people) forms part of several esteemed international organisations such as the BRICS group (Redvers, 2011: Internet). The country is unquestionably a force to be reckoned with, especially in Africa. But as the world is gravitating towards Beijing, India has subtly slipped into the African continent. The country is best viewed as a sleeping giant of little strategic importance to world politics. As India’s economy continues to grow, so will its footprint in Africa. India may also adopt a more aggressive role in Africa, especially with the inauguration of its new Prime Minister, Narendra Modi, in May 2014. Thus, by neglecting India’s foreign policy the world may face an unexpected future, once India has cemented its place as a re-emerging power. Instead of the West restraining China, Naidu (2010: 49) argues that “India is going to be a harder partner to contain...” In view of this, an investigation in India-Africa relations is definitely warranted.

New Delhi has not been included in the debate of whether it is furthering opportunities by its presence in Africa or whether it is here to exploit and advance its national self-interest. The main aim of this chapter is to bring India into the framework of the research question of this study and to evaluate its foreign policy actions within the aforementioned debate. Instead of seeing India in China’s shadow, it is important to view the country’s foreign policy as being distinctive from that of China and thus to view India as an influential emerging power in its own right. This will allow the study to uncover the true nature of India-Africa relations and to compare India and China as influential external factors on the African continent. By comparing both China and India’s distinctive strategies of engagement, the study will
be able to outline the outcomes of their respective relations with Africa in chapter 6. Section 1 deals with India’s historic relations with Africa. Section 2 sets out to examine the Africa-India Forum Summit. Section 3 highlights the significance of India’s aid to Africa. The final section focuses on India’s bilateral relations with Africa, specifically with Nigeria and Sudan as case studies.

5.2. India-Africa Historic Relations

Any analysis of India’s foreign relations with Africa must begin with Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru. For instance, chapter 2 demonstrated how much Nehru helped to shape India’s modern foreign policy architecture. More importantly, Nehru initiated India’s first ever, African policy. According to Desai (2009: 416), “Nehru laid down a comprehensive Africa policy of building strong relations with African countries which has been more or less followed by successive governments irrespective of the party in power.” After India’s independence in 1947, Nehru became a staunch supporter of the emancipation of all countries (especially African countries) still under colonial control. In 1955, Nehru with the assistance of China’s Zhou Enlai, Egypt’s Gamal Abdel Nasser, Ghana’s Kwame Nkrumah, Indonesia’s Sukarno and Vietnam’s Ho Chi Minh successfully launched the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) (Desai, 2009: 415; Naidu, 2009: 112; Pham, 2007: 342). The NAM also validated the political unification of Africa and Asia. Nehru saw the NAM as an integral part of India’s foreign policy, in which the country could give leadership to newly independent states. He emphasised the importance of creating a just international order. To accomplish this, Nehru propagated the significance of an independent Africa (Mathews, 2011: 40). He believed that India’s independence was bound with that of Africa. In 1946, during an Asian Relations Conference, Nehru’s support for Africa became evident when he encouraged Asian states to support African countries in freeing themselves from their colonial shackles. In his speech Nehru declared (as cited by Mathews, 2011: 39) that “we of Asia have a special responsibility to the people of Africa. We must help them to their rightful place in the human family. The freedom we envisaged is not to be confined to this nation or that or to a particular people, but must spread out to the whole human race.” Apart from colonialism, Nehru was committed to bringing an end to the Apartheid regime in South Africa.
Mahatma Gandhi was one of the first activists to bring racial discrimination against Indians living in South Africa to Nehru’s attention. India under Nehru’s guidance began to break off diplomatic relations with South Africa and instigated a number of sanctions against the country (Desai, 2009: 415). In 1967, India went the full circle in alienating the Apartheid regime by giving formal diplomatic support to the African National Congress (ANC) in South Africa. Indira Gandhi and her son Rajiv Gandhi, completed Nehru’s work by formally recognising Namibia’s South West African People’s Organization (SWAPO), in 1985 (Bhattacharya, 2010: 66).

In 1962, India’s border dispute with Beijing drew it closer to Africa. New Delhi failed to garner diplomatic support from Africa to offset Beijing’s military onslaught. Some of the key reasons why the continent refrained from supporting New Delhi, was that the latter failed to finalise a date for Africa’s decolonisation, arguing essentially that it was unrealistic. Another reason is that India adopted a soft approach towards Africa’s colonial powers. China on the other hand, supported Africa with arms to ensure the continent’s emancipation (Shrivastava, 2009: 124). It was also not in the interest of many African states to become embroiled in India and China’s border war, with the exception of Guinea, Ghana and a number of Francophone countries who compliantly backed Beijing. Nigeria may have been the only African country that supported New Delhi (Kura, 2009: 4). The bulk of African states who awaited decolonisation maintained their neutrality to alienate neither China nor India, since these two countries were supportive of their decolonisation. It might have been detrimental to Africa’s quest for decolonisation if it sided with either China or India. This balance of probability might have led the continent to become a spectator and not an active participant in the conflict. Africa’s political salience brought India to a rude awakening, realising that it did not have the backing it had hoped for from the continent. New Delhi needed to take a proactive approach towards Africa. For India to be successful in its foreign policy endeavours, it needed Africa to become an integral part of its arsenal. Against this backdrop, India began to actively engage the African continent by supplying it with material resources, to help bring an end to colonialism. To further cement relations with African countries, New Delhi established strong economic links with some of the Indians living in Africa (Desai, 2009: 417; Naidu, 2009: 114; Naidu, 2010: 34).
In 1964, New Delhi successfully launched the India Technical and Economic Cooperation (ITEC) programme to foster closer relations with the continent. As a result, ITEC emerged as a political strategy, specifically designed with Africa in mind. The programme was to provide Africa with invaluable technical training amenities, loans and aid that the continent so desperately needed. ITEC became deeply embedded in India’s foreign policy strategy towards the continent, so much so, that it continues to form part of contemporary India-Africa relations (Desai, 2009: 416). However, after Nehru’s death, in 1964, India-Africa relations experienced a major downturn. It was only after the Cold War, that New Delhi began to view Africa with different eyes, especially in the economic realm (Naidu, 2009: 114).

In the early 1990s, India’s Ministry of External Affairs (cited by Naidu, 2008: 117) declared that, “in the future, new relationships based on concrete economic, technological and educational cooperation will assume enhanced significance.” Ideologies such as South-South cooperation, “Third World” countries, and “victims of imperial domination” alone, could no longer sustain India-Africa relations. The end of the Cold War marks an important point in India-Africa relations. India’s foreign policy increasingly moved towards pragmatism and away from idealistic connotations. Democracy, human rights, good governance and other idealistic principles played little if any role in India’s post-Cold War relations with Africa. This is especially true for India’s bilateral relations with Apartheid South Africa and Sudan, where realism centred on national interest, came to dominate idealistic considerations (Solomon, 2012: 73; Beri, 2011: 12). To further outline New Delhi’s pragmatic stance, the Indian Ministry of External Affairs (as cited by Narlikar, 2010: 459) stated that, “India has moved away from Bretton Woods institutionalised principles centred on good governance and conditionalities”. Besides, as Beri (2011: 5) argues, “…India’s foreign policy is designed to promote ‘enlightened national interest’.” Therefore, India would use economic diplomacy to forge closer ties with African countries (Beri, 2011: 5).

India’s economic diplomacy is a reflection of her rise to power after the 1990s, when the country began to liberalise its economy. A boom in India’s domestic economy saw the country reached unprecedented growth in its GDP figures. During the 1980s
and 1990s the latter stood at 5.7 percent. The country's GDP rapidly took off between 2001 and 2007, reaching phenomenal rates of well above 9 percent and cementing its place as an emerging global and regional power (Shrivastava, 2009: 126). India’s trade in terms of goods and service rose substantially from 24 percent in 1995 to a staggering 49 percent in 2009. This allowed the country to become a major recipient of foreign direct investment, ranging from a modest $100 million in 1990 to a mammoth $19.5 billion in 2007 (Balaam and Dillman, 2011: 335). According to Naidu (2009: 120) “…New Delhi is awakening to the reality that Africa is a priority in its global commercial expansion.” India’s economic footprint is spreading rapidly throughout the continent. The country’s trade with Africa skyrocketed from $967 million in 1991 to well above $9.5 billion in 2005 (Naidu, 2009: 120). Just from 2002 to 2007 India’s trade with Africa surged by 226.8 percent (Shrivastava, 2009: 128).

Similarly to China, the Indian economy is beginning to slow down, partly because of the global financial crisis in 2008. The country grew sluggishly in 2009, reaching a moderate 7 percent, but this needs to be seen in light of the global financial meltdown, where the majority of states were hovering around 3 percent in terms of their GDP (Shrivastava, 2009: 129). Unlike in China, the financial crisis had a minimal impact on the Indian economy (Balaam and Dillman, 2011: 337). The country’s economic decline was largely due to domestic constraints such as rising inflation, steep interest rates and an overheating economy (Shrivastava, 2009: 129). To demonstrate India’s economic endurance, in the midst of the global financial crisis in 2008, the country pledged $5.4 billion in credit to the African continent. This was done during the Africa-India Forum Summit (AlFS-I) in New Delhi, where 14 African heads of state were in attendance (Verma, 2011: Internet). Similarly to China, New Delhi used the AlFS as a platform for institutionalising contemporary India-Africa relations (Naidu, 2009: 126). Against this backdrop, the Africa-India Forum Summit may now be considered.
5.3. The Africa-India Forum Summit

Unlike the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, the AIFS is still in its infancy, with the Economist (2011: Internet) arguing that India “is playing catch-up” with Beijing. As mentioned above, India and Africa’s new strategic partnership only came into being in 2008. During the AIFS, India and Africa adopted both a Framework of Cooperation and the Delhi Declaration (Mathews, 2011: 45; Taylor, 2012: 784-785). In 2011, the second AIFS was held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia (Verma, 2011: Internet). The third AIFS would have been held in 2014, but the deadly Ebola disease caused the meeting to be postponed to 2015 (Mitra, 2014: Internet). Before discussing the AIFS it is necessary to indicate the limitations and challenges of studying India-Africa relations, especially within the AIFS framework. A few scholars such as Naidu, 2009; Mathews, 2011; Dubey, 2011; and Taylor, 2012 have attempted to examine the AIFS. Their analysis of the Summit meeting proved to be valuable, but in comparison with the FOCAC, it continues to receive a low profile score. According to Naidu (2011: 53) “…there are very little details reported by the summit in African mainstream media. There is also a dim awareness in international media…”. Another challenge when studying the AIFS is the complexity of the partnership itself. India has taken a continental and regional approach towards the African continent. The Indian Government has aligned many of its institutions with that of the African Union (AU), creating a bureaucratic minefield for any scholar wishing to evaluate the outcome of the AIFS. For example, the AIFS has formulated many of its goals within the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD). Again this becomes problematic, since NEPAD is made up of only 20 permanent African member states in the AU. This could technically result in the AIFS neglecting the development concerns of the 34 African countries that do not form part of NEPAD. In an attempt to address the aforementioned challenge, India set out to form 8 regional partnerships in Africa. However, this complicates matters further from a bureaucratic point of view, when the Indian Government signed a memorandum of understanding with each of the 8 regional communities which includes, the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), the East African Community (EAC), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CENSAD), the
Union of the Arab Maghreb (UMA/AMU), the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) and the Inter-Governmental Authority for Development (IGAD). Given the number of institutions that exists in the AU and Africa’s 8 regional institutions, together with the AIFS, this study will not go into depth in any of the institutions that exist because of the limited scope of the study. Instead, it will focus on India and Africa’s primary documents (the Framework of Cooperation and the Delhi Declaration) that give meaning to the contemporary ‘strategic partnership’.

According to Taylor (2012: 784), “India has copied China’s Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in developing its own Africa-India Forum summit…” Generically, Taylor’s (2012) analysis proved to be correct, when examining both Africa’s and India’s Framework of Cooperation in 2008 and 2011. To affirm the accuracy of Taylor’s (2012) observation, the six major points that define China and Africa’s cooperation as indicated in chapter 4, fits squarely into the AIFS. Africa and India’s Framework of Cooperation (IAFS, 2008: Internet; AIFS, 2011: Internet) may be summarised as follows:

- Strengthening economic cooperation in agriculture, trade, industry, investment, small and medium-scale enterprises, finance and regional economic integration;
- Supporting political cooperation through peace and security, as well as enhancing cooperation between India and Africa’s civil societies and the promotion of good governance;
- Cooperating in science, technology, research and development, including information and communication technology;
- Improving and promoting social development and capacity building through education, health, water and sanitation, as well as cultural exchanges and sports;
- Increasing tourism in both India and Africa, as well as people-to-people exchanges; and
- Seeking to increase cooperation in infrastructure, energy and the environment.

However on closer examination of the AIFS meeting, it is clear that India follows a strong state-centric approach (based on multilateralism) when dealing with Africa.
Unlike China, India has not incorporated political parties, local and provincial governments into its framework of cooperation. Another important distinction between the FOCAC and the AIFS is that India has followed a homogenous approach towards establishing a partnership with Africa. Whereas the Chinese invented FOCAC as a glove-fit approach that would filter down from multilateralism to bilateral relations of individual African states, the AIFS has remained on the multilateral level with little trickling down (Naidu, 2010: 46). The reason for India’s approach towards the continent may be found in the country’s poorly understaffed diplomatic corps. For example, India with a population of over 1 billion has fewer diplomats than both New Zealand and Singapore (The Economist, 2011: Internet). In 2012, India had only 33 embassies, high commissions and consulates-general in Africa out of 54 states on the continent (Taylor, 2012: 784). Without the capacity to engage individual African countries, India has no choice but to follow a multilateral strategy in forging closer ties with the continent.

The second AIFS reflects India’s multilateral stance in solving African problems. The Addis Ababa Declaration or the Delhi Declaration is a reflection of India’s multilateral approach towards Africa. It is unlike the Beijing Declaration, which reflects a more direct approach in dealing with Africa’s challenges. The Addis Ababa Declaration tends to place the focus firmly on international institutions. In contrast to China, India is not taking full responsibility for its partnership with Africa. The Delhi Declaration is best viewed as an international document addressing global issues and not India and Africa’s specific concerns. For example, the declaration document focuses on addressing issues of developing countries, which include China, Brazil and other developing countries beyond the continent. Furthermore, the declaration outlines the importance of working within the UN framework. Throughout the Addis Ababa Declaration, international institutions and issues such as the Kyoto Protocol, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, COP17, the G20 and G77, the MDGs, the UNSC, international terrorism and nuclear weapons, seem to enjoy priority in India and Africa’s partnership. However, there is little reference to India and Africa’s domestic concerns for development (AIFS II, 2011: Internet). India’s vague statements such as “unique paths of development” complicate matters further because, there is no specific development path envisaged by either India or
African states. This creates the idea that the responsibility of India and Africa’s strategic partnership is shifted to international institutions.

According to Taylor (2012: 784), India is using the AIFS as a tool to boost its global political image. Mullen and Ganguly (2012: Internet) reiterates Taylor’s observation by arguing that the country is eager to be seen as a great emerging power. Solomon (2012: 67) points out that India’s officials always regarded the country as a great power because of its territorial magnitude, geo-strategic position, population density, and its rich history. Thus India’s former Minister of Defence, Krishna Menon, remarked (as quoted by Solomon, 2012: 67), “Why should we get involved with these third rate powers, our interests lie with great powers”. Thus, the role of India in the NAM was simply a way for the country to satisfy its security interest (Solomon, 2012: 67).

The AIFS may be no different, since India wants to become a permanent member of the UNSC, with the help of Africa. Rhetoric on reforming the UNSC is often found in many of India’s addresses to the continent. For example, during India’s second summit with Africa, Dr Singh, made it clear that India desires a permanent seat in UNSC (The Economist, 2011: Internet). According to the AIFS (2011: Internet) with specific reference to the Addis Ababa Declaration:

India notes the common African position and the aspirations of the African countries to get their rightful place in an expanded UN Security Council as new permanent members with full rights as contained in the Ezulwini Consensus. Africa takes note of India’s position and its aspirations to become a permanent member with full rights in an expanded UN Security Council. We emphasize the need for Member States to exert utmost effort on the United Nations’ Security Council reform during the current session of the United Nations General Assembly.

At face value, the above-mentioned excerpt seeks to promote both India and Africa in becoming permanent members of the UNSC. However, through closer examination the quote greatly reflects India’s interest. A comparison between India
and Africa can easily lead to gross generalisations. It should be clear that Africa is a continent, with over 50 states and India is a country and not a continent (Bhattacharya, 2010: 64). This raises a number of questions. First, which African country best reflects the continent and does such a country hold the interests of Africa at heart? Second, from a hypothetical point of departure, could it be South Africa, Nigeria, Egypt or any other African country? There is no consensus among African states themselves on who will take up the permanent position in the UNSC if the opportunity arises. Sidiropoulos (2011: 3) points out that even South Africa, with its strong African agenda, is not recognised by many African states as the continent’s sole representative on international platforms. However, Africa would unanimously vote for India to become a permanent member of the UNSC (Taylor, 2012: 793). This scenario coincides with Taylor’s (2012: 784) analysis that the AIFS is simply a means for India to boost its international political standing in global affairs. Like China, India’s aid has become an integral part of its relations with Africa.

5.4. India’s Aid Fostering Trade with Africa

As in the case of China, this section will not seek to evaluate the institutions responsible for India’s aid allocation. However, it should be noted that there is no accurate aid data being published by either the Ministry of External Affairs or the Ministry of Finance. The country has no centralised institution in place to regulate and monitor foreign aid (Taylor, 2012: 786; Sinha, 2010: 79). India’s aid to foreign countries is simply done on an ad hoc basis. Similarly, to China, India is downplaying its role as an aid donor for a number of reasons. With over a quarter of the country’s people living in poverty, it is not in the interest of the Indian Government to provide accurate data on the country’s aid distributions. Transparency in India’s dispensing of aid may lead to social unrest among those who believe that the money could be better spent on the country’s social and economic development. A lack of aid transparency also allows the Indian Government to avoid being held to account by voters for not realising their foreign policy goals (Mullen and Ganguly, 2012: Internet).
In the same way as China, India’s aid goals are not clearly defined and do not comply with international standard definitions of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development’s Development Assistance Committee (OECD-DAC) (Ramachandran, 2010: Internet). However, it is important to note that India does not want to be seen through the lens of OECD donors. The OECD countries link aid to conditionalities that are often associated with neo-imperialist hierarchies between donor and recipient (Mawdsley and McCann, 2010: 87). As indicated earlier, India has moved away from the Bretton Woods institutionalised principles. As a result, the country may not wish to carry the negative donor image associated with the West. Like China, India continues to build its strategic partnerships on the pillars of respect for sovereignty and non-interference in each other’s domestic affairs (Mullen, 2013: 7; Beri, 2011: 13). Thus, any attempt to define India’s aid by means of Western criteria would fail. For example, Ramachandran (2010: Internet) argues that India needs to align her aid activities with those of OECD countries for it to be successful. Her analysis is primarily based on transparency; however, she fails to acknowledge the historical context of aid (how the West used aid to keep developing countries dependent) and how it is viewed by developing countries. Keeping this in mind, India established the Development Cooperation Forum, in 2007 where it incorporated both donors and recipients in an attempt to distinguish it from the OECD-DAC (Mawdsley and McCann, 2010: 87). Saran (2014: 2) argues that the Indian Government refers to aid as development cooperation. The reason for this terminology is simply to level the playing field between recipients and donors. India sees its development assistance as a means to forge mutually beneficial strategic partnerships (Saran, 2014: 2). Taylor (2012: 787), however, points out that India’s aid cannot simply be defined as development assistance, because of the fact that the country uses aid as a strategic tool, in order to foster trade and investment opportunities. Consequently, India’s development cooperation should be viewed in the same context as its economic strategy (Sinha, 2010: 77).

In order to establish the true nature of India’s aid, it is necessary to understand the motivation for the country’s aid initiatives. Saran (2014: 2) poses a number of questions to uncover India’s aid to foreign countries. First, he asks how could a country with widespread poverty provide development assistance to other
developing states? Second, should India not eradicate its own poverty before assisting others? According to Mullen and Ganguly (2012: Internet) the answers to these questions are deeply embedded in India’s foreign policy goals. The authors continue to argue that India is using its development assistance to secure energy resources for its rapidly growing economy, and by opening markets for India’s industrial and service sectors. Saran (2014: 4) reiterates this by stating that India’s development assistance is part of the country’s long-term strategy to increase its trade and investment opportunities. As a means of illustration, Taylor (2012: 787) highlights the fact that India’s “credit lines are not aid strictly defined (their purpose is not development but the advancement of Indian trade and investment opportunities)...”. With specific reference to Africa, The Economist (2011: Internet) posits that the Indian Government will only provide preferential loans over three years to those Africans states willing to trade with India.

However, without the financial might to match China’s financial capacity or those from the developed North, India has been forced to look to different avenues to promote its uniqueness as a “donor” (Mawdsley and McCann, 2010: 87). Mahatma Gandhi once stated (as cited by Mathews, 2011: 44) that “The commerce between India and Africa will be of ideas and services not manufactured goods against raw materials after the fashion of Western exploiters.” Although Gandhi’s assertion strongly reflects India and Africa’s trade relations, aid cannot be excluded. Indeed, it can be argued that contemporary India-Africa trade relations are based on manufactured products against the continent’s natural resources (Naidu, 2008: 120). However, Gandhi’s statement may be explained in India’s development assistance. For example, India has projected itself as a “donor” not in monetary terms, but through its skills, services and ideas.

After India’s independence, anti-colonial and anti-Western ideas such as South-South cooperation, victims of imperial domination and others formed the pillars of its development assistance (Mullen, 2013:6-7). Large (n.d.: 29) argues that it is India’s “solidarity founded in its colonial past that acts as a more powerful underlying source of connection, attraction and advantage.” By focusing on its common colonial history with other developing countries, India managed to consolidate its partnerships with
countries of the developing South. This also extended India’s moral influence beyond the donor agencies of the developed North. By tying anti-colonial sentiments to the country’s development assistance, India escaped from being accused by dependency theorists who often link aid from the developed North to the South’s underdevelopment of perpetuating poverty by imposing conditionalities (Mullen, 2013:6-7). Thus, in 1964, ITEC emerged not only to assist developing countries, but also to propagate the significance of South-South cooperation. Naidu (2008: 117) points out that India’s emphasis on South-South cooperation remains relevant in its contemporary foreign policy. Even, ITEC continues to function as the ideal institution to coordinate most of India’s development assistance to developing states (Mathews, 2011: 40).

In Africa, however, ITEC’s sister programme, known as the Special Commonwealth Assistance for Africa Programme (SCAAP), is responsible for India’s development assistance. Unlike ITEC who generally targets developing countries, the SCAAP focuses primarily on the 19 African states that form part of the Commonwealth. These Commonwealth states, however, are not of equal importance to the Indian Government. The presence of natural resources, markets and an Indian diaspora (the spread or dispersion of a community from their home country) has become a strong prerequisite for India’s development assistance. For example, states such as Mauritius, South Africa and Uganda with large Indian diasporas have received the bulk of India’s development assistance (Kragelund, 2010: 10-11). India’s then Minister, Indira Gandhi, called them ‘India’s ambassadors to Africa’ (as cited by Alden, 2007: 15). The Indian Government utilises its diasporas as intermediaries or as commercial agents to advance India’s economic interest (Taylor, 2012: 782). Natural resources have also moved to the centre of India’s foreign policy goals. With only 0.3 percent of the world’s known oil reserves, India has no choice but to look to Africa for its industrialisation prospects (Large, n.d.: 30). Although oil has come to dominate India and Africa’s trade relations, it is not the only resource that the Indian Government have sought after. Other resources such as diamonds and gold in South Africa, coal in Mozambique, uranium in Malawi and Niger have become increasingly important to India (The Economist, 2011: Internet).
As far as ITEC is concerned (as cited by Beri, 2011: 9), India and Africa are natural partners in terms of their geographical, ecological and technological conditions. More importantly, India’s comparative advantage in terms of skills, training facilities, technologies, especially for small and medium companies have allowed it to solidify its partnership with the continent (Verma, 2011: Internet). Almost 60 percent of India’s development assistance to the continent has been in the form of technical support (Taylor, 2012: 788). Improving Africa’s human resources has become a central component to India’s development assistance (Singh, 2011: 26). In 2011, during the Africa-India Forum Summit, Manmohan Singh demonstrated India’s technical commitment by establishing four main pan-African institutions responsible for technical assistance to Africa (Taylor, 2012: 788). These include the India-Africa Institute of Foreign Trade, India-Africa Institute of Information Technology, India-Africa Diamond Institute and the India-Africa Institute of Education, Planning and Administration (Singh, 2011: 26). As a means to build Africa’s capacity, ITEC also offers a range of short-term courses in small-medium enterprises, rural development, agricultural products and processing, textiles and women entrepreneurship. IT and computer literacy have been at the forefront in India’s capacity building programmes (Mawdsley and McCann, 2010: 87).

In 2011, AIFS also saw India promising $5 billion in development assistance to Africa. It also pledged $700 million to create new institutions and training facilities. In terms of infrastructure, India would provide $300 million to the Ethiopia-Djibouti railway project. Education and training would be improved by providing 10 000 new scholarships to the India-Africa Virtual University, together with 2500 training positions in ITEC. From 2011-2014, the Indian Government would provide 22 000 scholarships to Africans willing to study in India (Mullen and Ganguly, 2012: Internet). NEPAD would also be assisted through the Pan-Africa e-network. This network aims to link up Indian institutions in tele-education and tele-medicine with over 50 African states (Sidiropoulos, 2011: 3-4). In 2008, the Indian Government also announced that 34 of Africa’s least-developed countries would benefit from a zero-tariff trade agreement with India (Beri, 2011: 7).
In order to foster trade and investment with Africa, India established both the Focus Africa Programme and the Techno-Economic Approach for Africa-India Movement (TEAM-9) as part of its development assistance (Beri, 2011: 7). Unlike ITEC who focuses on the continent in general, the above-mentioned programmes would serve India’s specific trade and investment interest in Africa (Broadman, 2008: Internet). These initiatives, however, would be tied to India’s national self-interest in Africa. The aim of these institutions is not to address Africa’s genuine development concerns, but to advance India’s economic interest (Mullen and Ganguly, 2012: Internet). First, the Focus African Programme was designed to assist sub-Saharan Africa as a whole, but due to India’s strategic calculations, countries such as Ethiopia, Tanzania, Nigeria, South Africa, Mauritius, Kenya and Ghana emerged as the major beneficiaries. More importantly, these countries makes up 69 percent of India’s trade (Beri, 2011: 7). This also demonstrates India’s selective approach when dealing with Africa (Beri, 2003: 218). Second, the TEAM-9 is no different in that it provides tied aid to eight West African states, namely Burkina Faso, Chad, Cote d’Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Mali and Senegal. Interestingly, all these countries are blessed with an abundance of natural resources. Moreover, these countries will receive credit only if they trade and buy Indian goods and services (Kragelund, 2010: 11).

India’s private sector has become an integral part of its development assistance to Africa. In fact, it was this sector that lured India to Africa. Conglomerations between the Indian Government and its private sector facilitated India’s penetration of the continent and advanced its national interest (Naidu, 2009: 133). For example, the Tata Group (as cited by Taylor, 2012: 790) explicitly stated that “it has aligned ‘business opportunities with the objective of nation building: although it is a private company, it sees a contribution to the broader goal of aiding India’s rise as an intrinsic aspect of its operations”. India-Africa project partnerships function as the ideal channel for India’s private sector.

In 2006, India’s third business conclaves – a platform for networking and the exchange of ideas on business capacity building – saw over 320 delegates in attendance with almost 300 from India, 32 from Africa, together with six financial
institutions and four regional organisations. Before the 2006 business Conclave, Indian companies undertook more than $677 million in projects link to India’s credit lines. Again, in 2008, the Confederation of Indian Industry, together with India’s Exim Bank and the Department of Commerce organised more than 131 projects with their African counterparts. These projects were in excess of over $10 billion and across a range of sectors, which includes agriculture, human resources, technology and energy (Shrivastava, 2009: 128-129; Cheru and Obi, 2011: 99). It is important to note, that the bulk of the projects undertaken by India and its African counterparts was completed by the former country. Comparatively, India possesses most, if not all of the skills and resources in these business conclaves. Besides, Africa with its mammoth size continues to send a small number of business delegates incapable of matching India in terms of skills and resources. Consequently, Indian companies have been involved in a number of projects in Africa. For example, Indian companies like Rites and Ircon have maintained and built railway projects in Uganda, Ethiopia, Algeria, Mozambique, Sudan, Nigeria and Zambia. India’s energy company, Kalapataru Power Transmission Ltd., have also been involved in supplying equipment and electricity to Zambia, Algeria, Kenya, Tanzania and Ethiopia (Naidu, 2008: 124). Against this backdrop, India’s bilateral relations with Nigeria and Sudan may now be considered.

5.5. India’s Relations with Africa: Two Schools of Thought

Unlike China, where the jury is ready to deliver a verdict on Beijing’s actions in Africa, India has managed to escape a similar scrutiny. India’s smaller economic and political footprint in Africa has allowed the country to maintain a low profile. Even Western states have turned a blind eye to India’s dealings with repressive or rogue regimes such as the Democratic Republic of Congo, Sudan, Zimbabwe and Angola (Mawdsley and McCann, 2010: 88). In the following sub-section India and Africa’s bilateral relations will be assessed in terms of national interest or cooperative partnerships as determinants of India’s foreign policy. In this regard, India’s relations with Nigeria and Sudan (currently Sudan and South Sudan) will specifically be analysed as case studies.
5.5.1. India-Africa Relations: the cases of Nigeria and Sudan

Nigeria is no different from many other developing countries that experienced the disadvantages of colonialism. Anti-colonial sentiments became a strong unifying force in its relationship with India. The latter's path to decolonisation, which centred on non-violence and constitutionalism, served as an inspiration for Nigerian nationalists. Non-racialism as proposed by India became a central component of Nigeria's foreign policy at the time. In 1983, Nigeria's President Shehu Shagari (as cited by Kura, 2009: 4) exemplified his admiration towards India by stating the following:

We come to salute India, the largest democracy in the world. We also come to learn from India, as we have been learning, beginning from the example of your [India's] great Mahatma Ghandi, the greatest hero of all colonial peoples, throughout modern history. The moral force of his [Ghandi’s] passive resistance philosophy ultimately led to victory. This has been the source of inspiration to all of us [as colonial appendages] and has guided us in our own strategies to achieve our own freedom from colonialism and exploitation. We also watched with interest the achievement of your republican status within the commonwealth. We followed your example and your model.

Following the Indian example or model became an elusive venture for Nigeria. From 1967 to 1970, the country was engulfed in a brutal civil war that cost the lives of at least 1 million people. To make matters worse, 1966 ushered in a period of military rule. By 1975 democracy temporarily returned to Nigeria, but ended in 1985, when the military, once again, took over up until 1999 when civilian rule resumed. This state of affairs thwarted any meaningful bilateral relations Nigeria could have had, especially with India (Mehrota, 2012: 2; Alao, 2011a: 5). Between 1962 and 2002, the Indian Government assigned little strategic importance to Nigeria (Vasudevan, 2010: 3). However, the revival of democracy in Nigeria, changed India's perception of the country, especially when the United States labelled Nigeria as a strategic state in Africa. A year before the democratisation of Nigeria, in 1998, the Indian Government presented Nigeria with a grant worth $5 million to improve the country's infant companies, including the refurbishment of Nigeria's ailing machine and tools.
company. Other companies that were assisted by the Indian Government to improve and expand their business activities included Nigeria’s paper mills and the railway sector (Vasudevan, 2010: 8).

Instead of India taking the lead in seeking to forge a strategic partnership with Nigeria, it was the Nigerians who initiated the process. In a keynote address during India’s 50th Republic Day Celebrations in 2000, Nigerian President Obasanjo, formally invited Indian entrepreneurs to invest in his country, especially in the oil and gas sectors (Beri, 2010: 905). Nigeria’s foreign policy became highly personalised with Obasanjo, at the helm initiating and enforcing key decisions (Alli, 2012: 23). His decisiveness led to the signing of an oil deal between the Indian Oil Corporation and the Nigerian Petroleum Company, in 2000. This agreement was renewed in 2002 (Beri, 2010: 905). More importantly, Obasanjo, promoted Nigeria as the gateway to West Africa and guaranteed the Indians that their investments would be extremely profitable in the long-term, given the market size of West Africa. In return, he wanted India to invest in a range of sectors such as small and medium companies, engineering, machinery equipment, clothing, pharmaceuticals, bio-gas and steel (Vasudevan, 2010: 8-9). From the outset, this appeared as a win-win strategic partnership. However, both the Indian and Nigerian Governments failed to cement their strategic partnership during the initial stages.

Firstly, India’s BHEL failed to supply electricity to Nigeria after a signed agreement. Even, the Indian foreign minister at the time, Jaswant Singh, promised to renew the railway lines stretching from Lagos to Kano, including to upgrade the Ajoukuata steel plant and to add an additional 110 megawatts to Nigeria’s electricity supply, but this remains to be seen. Consequently, Nigeria and India’s Joint Commission, in 2000, appeared as nothing more than a “talk shop” with few tangible benefits (Vasudevan, 2010: 9). Adding to an already shaky partnership, the Indian parliament emerged as a major obstacle to a number of deals with Nigeria. In both 2005 and 2006, the Indians lost key oil and mining investments to South Korea and China, respectively. The reasons for this loss were twofold. In the first case, the Indian parliament could not finalise its investments in two oil blocks, OPL 321 and OPL 322. In the second case, the Indian parliament pointed to the political risk of acquiring such an
investment (Beri, 2010: 905-906; Naidu, 2010: 37). Calculating what was going to happen next in Nigeria clearly caught Indian investors off-guard, specifically with election of Umaru Yar’Adua as Nigeria’s new state president, in 2007.

According to a South Korean dignitary (as cited by Vines et al., 2009: 4): “In Nigeria we found that a change of government results in a change of business partners.” Thus, many of Obasanjo’s strategic dealings with the Indians were short-lived, after his tenure as state president. The new government, under the leadership of Yar’Adua retracted many of Obasanjo’s decisions to award oil blocks to Indian companies. The Yar’Adua administration pointed to suspicious circumstances, centred on maladministration and corruption, under which the contracts were awarded to India (Beri, 2010: 906; Vasudevan, 2010: 7). Indeed, Obasanjo used his influence in Nigeria’s oil sector to reward loyalist and those in favoured of his third-term as president. In a last grasp attempt, Obasanjo illicitly awarded oil blocks to both local and foreign companies in order to raise election funds that would secure his presidency. He failed, however, and Yar’Adua task was to re-legitimise Nigeria’s oil sector (Vines et al., 2009: 17&20).

A lack of consistency in India and Nigeria’s partnership has not been detrimental to their trade relations. Even, the imminent terrorist threat led by Boko Haram in northern Nigeria appears to have had little if any effect on their ever bourgeoning trade relations. From 2008 to 2009, trade between India and Nigeria stood at a staggering $10.2 billion. Since neither country was immune to the global economic recession at the time, their trade temporarily retracted to $8.7 billion in 2010 to 2011, due to the aftershock of the economic crisis. A change in fortune, however, saw India and Nigeria’s trade grow by more than 50 percent and which was expected to peak at $12 billion between 2011 and 2012 (Alao, 2011b: 14). Oil forms the core of the Nigerian economy accounting for well over 95 percent of the country’s GDP (Mthembu-Salter, 2009: 4). Hence, it was only natural that Nigeria’s trade with India would be centred on this precious resource. In the year 2001 alone, India imported over 80 percent of Nigeria’s crude oil (Alao, 2011b: 5; Kura, 2009: 15-20). Highlighting the prominence of natural resources, in 2007, India’s then Prime Minister stated that energy security would form the core of its strategic partnership
with Nigeria. If recent projections prove to be correct, India will by 2020 import at least 90 percent of its oil, of which Nigeria would be a major exporter (Vines et al., 2009: 11). More importantly, India has emerged as Nigeria’s top trade partner, not only for natural resources but for manufactured goods and services as well (Mehrota, 2012: 9).

The Nigerian economy is growing rapidly, with a GDP average of around 7.6 percent between 2009 and 2011. Rapid urbanisation, a growing population and middle class are all signs of a prosperous economy. Even Standard Bank, a South African company has incorporated Nigeria in a list of the 10 fastest growing economies, called the EM10. Other countries on this list include China, Brazil, India, Indonesia, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, South Africa and Thailand (Enweremadu, 2013: 60-61). India’s multinational corporations have invested heavily in Nigeria’s relatively un-infiltrated consumer market. The bulk of India’s exports to Nigeria has been in the form of value added goods. Some of the main goods exported by India to Nigeria include machinery and tools, pharmaceuticals, IT, electronics and automobile parts. Indian companies have also created the second highest number of jobs in Nigeria (Alao, 2011a: 14). Moreover, Indian companies are not new to the Nigerian economy. Corporations such as RITES, Mecon Ltd, Telecommunications Consultant India Ltd (TCIL) and the National Small Industries Corporations (NSIC) have featured for years in a range of sectors across the Nigerian economy. Nonetheless, the Indian Government has been slow in implementing the Bilateral Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement (BIPPA), as well as, a Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement (DTAA) with the Nigerian Government. The implementation of these agreements would have strengthened Nigeria and India’s trade relations by removing taxations and high tariffs on goods and services, but this remains to be seen as trade barriers persist (Broad, 2008: Internet; Beri, 2010: 906).

In 2007, India and Nigeria’s strategic partnership were firmly cemented with the signing of the Abuja Declaration. This document was supposed to serve as a blueprint for contemporary India-Nigeria relations functioning as an institutional framework for strengthening investments and commerce between the two countries (Beri, 2010: 907). However, when examining the Abuja Declaration it soon became
apparent that trade and investment was slanted in favour of India. The declaration highlights the significance of forming a mutually beneficial trade partnership. Yet, in practice, it prioritised the sectors where India has a comparative advantage over Nigeria. These sectors include infrastructure and transportation, agricultural produce, food processing, small and medium businesses, electricity supply, fertilisers, Information and Communication Technologies, pharmaceuticals, car manufacturing plants, vehicle parts and others that lean towards India’s more developed economy (Ministry of External Affairs Government of India, 2007: Internet). From this perspective, it appears that the “strategic partnership” would be used to penetrate the Nigerian economy, based on the fact that, there is little reference to any Nigerian company entering the Indian economy. In the energy sector the declaration stated (as cited by the Ministry of External Affairs Government of India, 2007: Internet) “...that both governments would continue to encourage further cooperation between their companies in the oil and gas sectors of both countries.” This excerpt seeks to demonstrate that both Nigeria and India are blessed with significant amounts of gas and oil reserves. In fact, the dilemma lies with India, which possesses only 0.4 percent of the globe’s known oil deposits (Sing, 2010: 799; Naidu, 2010: 36). In 2000, the country’s ability to satisfy its domestic oil needs reached its peak. Furthermore, India’s gas outputs are only capable of satisfying 60 percent of the country’s domestic needs (Vasudevan, 2010: 6). In view of this, cooperation in terms of oil and gas explorations, will essentially take place in Nigeria and not in both countries as suggested by the Abuja Declaration. Like the Delhi Declaration, the Abuja Declaration emphasises the importance of cooperating through international institutions such as the United Nations, Kyoto Protocol, G20, G33 and the Doha Round (Ministry of External Affairs Government of India, 2007: Internet). The problem of such a cooperative framework is that the outcome cannot simply be changed or influenced through bilateral considerations. In other words, the above-mentioned organisations are dependent on other countries (which are centred on multilateralism) and it cannot be equated to a partnership between India and Nigeria. India also signed four memoranda of understanding with its Nigeria counterpart. The first two dealt with their Foreign Service institutes and international relations; the last two focused on defence and the protocol for foreign office consultations, respectively.
India will continue to build close relations with its Nigerian counterpart, especially in the oil sector. As India’s demand for oil grows, so will its relations with one of Africa’s biggest oil exporting countries (Nigeria). This is reflected in the remarks of India’s then Union Minister for Petroleum and Natural Gas, Murli Deora, that “Nigeria is our close friend and willing to help us in meeting our growing energy requirements. This is a positive development for securing India’s energy security” (cited by the Hindu, 2010: Internet). Thus, oil and gas will serve as the foundation for India’s strategic partnership with Nigeria. Against this backdrop, India’s bilateral relations with Sudan may now be considered.

As in the Indian-Nigerian relations, the fight against colonialism features strongly in India and Sudan’s relations. During the Bandung Conference in 1955, Nehru, in an unprecedented move gave formal diplomatic status to Sudan by engraving the country’s name on his handkerchief. This symbolic gesture on the part of Nehru continues to be highlighted in contemporary India and Sudan relations (Jager, n.d.: 9). However, soon after Sudan’s independence in 1956, the country became engulfed in a brutal civil war. This was largely due to the country’s colonial inheritance, which led to the marginalisation of the non-Arabic people in the South. By 1972, the Addis Ababa Agreement was signed and with that, peace returned to Sudan, which lasted for only eleven years (Patey, 2007: 4). Similar to the Nigerian situation, this state of affairs thwarted any meaningful bilateral relations Sudan could have had with any country, especially with India.

In 2003, India returned to the former Sudan (1956-2011) after 28 years of absence. India’s then president, APJ Abdul Kalam, entered Sudan primarily in need of new business opportunities, especially in the oil sector (Large and Patey, 2011: 12). In the same year, conflict in Sudan became highly publicised across the globe (Akongdit, 2013: 164). Western companies could no longer ignore the outcry of the international community, concerning the human rights atrocities committed by the Sudanese Government at the time. As a result, Western companies such as OMV
(from Austria) and Talisman Energy (from Canada) had to divest their oil shares from Sudan. This created an investment gap of 25 percent in Sudan’s GNPOC (Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Company) (Beri, 2010: 901). Malaysia and China, immune to Western criticism set out to not only fill the gap, but to increase their oil footprint in Sudan, with each having a 30 and 40 percent stake in the GNPOC, respectively. Instead of allowing the above-mentioned countries to become majority shareholders, the Sudanese Government decreased its dependency on them by giving India the highly sought-after stake (Patey, 2011: 92-93).

State backing from India proved to be the decisive factor in sealing the lucrative oil deal with Sudan. At first, both the Malaysian and the Chinese were against the entering of India in Sudan. However, India’s ministry of external affairs followed a proactive approach in convincing the Sudanese Government (Beri, 2010: 901). The Indian Government began to actively promote its state-owned company (ONGC Videsh Limited or OVL) to Khartoum. It also dispatched a diplomatic lobbying group to Sudan. In 2002, India’s sudden awareness of the arrival of the Sudanese deputy president, Ali Osman Taha, in an unanticipated visit (approximately 6 hours) unfolded in an unexpected meeting where India advanced OVL’s bid to the Khartoum Government. On the part of Sudan, collaborating with India was in fact a diversification strategy, particularly because of the sanctions imposed on Sudan by the West. This wave of events proved to be successful in finalising the deal between Khartoum and New Delhi (Patey, 2011: 92-93).

From 2003, India invested almost $3 billion in Sudan (Zhao, 2012: Internet). OVL spearheaded India’s commercial relations with Sudan. Apart from acquiring the 25 percent share worth $750 million, OVL went on to obtain a 24.1 and 23.5 percent stake, respectively in Block 5A and Block 5B oil fields. By 2010, Sudan’s oil exports to India constituted approximately 2.34 million tons per year (Beri, 2010: 902). According to Akongdit (2013: 164) India’s partnership with Sudan should be seen as a positive sum-game for two reasons. First, both Sudan and India have profited from their joint venture. Secondly, India’s investments in Sudan were its biggest foreign operation between 1995 and 2005 (Akongdit, 2013: 164; Patey, 2011: 94), which made it necessary for both countries to maintain a mutual beneficial strategic
partnership. In 2005, OVL extended its investments beyond Sudan’s oil sector, undertaking to build an oil pipeline linking Khartoum and Port Sudan, worth $194 million (Beri, 2010: 902). As in Nigeria, Indian companies have been involved in Sudan’s pharmaceuticals, agriculture, sugar mills, electricity generation, railways and automobiles sectors. During 2007, the two countries established the Indian Enterprise, Sudan Advantage enterprise fair, estimated to be around $150 million. This agreement would see that Indian small and medium companies, with the support of the Indian Government, would seek to invest in a range of sectors across the Sudanese economy (Jager, n.d.: 12).

Conflict between the present Sudan and South Sudan states, however, cannot be excluded from its bilateral relations with India, because it has a direct bearing on their commercial interests. As pointed out in chapter 4, the idea is not to dislodge South Sudan from Sudan, given their interdependence (Akongdit, 2013: 165). Although South Sudan seceded from Sudan in 2011, it remains economically interdependent. Moreover, unresolved borderlines, debt sharing and South Sudanese living in Sudan still need to be resolved (Ray, 2012: Internet). The signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2005 would ensure peace and the sharing of wealth between Sudan and South Sudan (Beri, 2010: 901). However, this has not materialised and oil has emerged as the major source of conflict in the Sudanese crisis. Conflict has been persistent, bringing India’s oil investments in Sudan to a halt. For example, South Sudan accused Sudan (which possesses the entire oil infrastructure, including pipelines to Port Sudan) of price fixing in its transit charges. The former country argued that Khartoum’s transit fee (at $36 per barrel) is exploitative and well above standard international prices of $1 per barrel. This led South Sudan to shutdown three thirds of Sudan’s oil supply (Ray, 2012: Internet).

Previously, conflict around the former Sudan’s oil refineries has hindered Sudan’s ability to repay loans and credits received from foreign states, especially India. More specifically, the Khartoum Government failed to settle its debt with OVL, after the company completed the oil pipeline in 2005. OVL was also not afforded the opportunity to take oil due to its financial loss. Since oil accounts for nearly 50 percent of Sudan’s GDP, it is only expected that the country would run a budget
deficit. With the secession of South Sudan, agreements between Sudan and India became increasingly unstable, especially when both Khartoum and Juba started issuing oil licenses (Beri, 2010: 902). Based on this, if India wants to secure its oil interest in Sudan, it needs to play a key role in fostering peace between Sudan and South Sudan (Ray, 2007: 106).

In an attempt to secure India’s energy interests in Sudan, the country employed both realism and liberalism. Pointing the finger to India’s realist tendencies, Patey (2011: 89) argues that morality and ethics (concerning Darfur) played no role in India’s decision to invest in Sudan. Even Raja C. Mohan, a prominent Indian scholar, has stated (as cited by Patey, 2011: 89) that investing in Sudan is a “necessary evil”. This fits squarely in Hans Morgenthau’s interpretation (as cited by Rourke, 2008: 22) that “the state has no right to let its moral [views]... get in the way of successful political action, itself inspired by the moral principle of national survival.” Equally, within the structural realism theory of Kenneth Waltz (1979: 91), “states seek to ensure their survival”. This is exactly what India did to secure its energy security. India has maintained that the internal crisis in Sudan, with specific reference to Darfur, should be resolved by the sovereign Sudanese state in accordance with the AU (Zhao, 2012: Internet). Moving towards the liberal perspective, India has worked closely with both the AU and the UN, in resolving the Darfur question. However, both the AU and the UN have failed in their attempts to bring the matter to a close for two reasons. First, the AU does not have the capacity (with only 7000 soldiers) and it is instructed to only monitor the peace process and not to fully engage with armed combatants (this may include the Sudanese Government). Second, the UN’s efforts in Sudan have been paralysed by both China and Russia through their veto power in the UNSC (Ray, 2007: 100-101). Even India is reluctant to bring the conflict to a close and in 2006 the country voted against a UN Human Rights resolution that would have ended the conflict in Darfur (Zhao, 2012: Internet). Consequently, India has followed a parallel strategy in Sudan, which entails engagement with both the UN (through peacekeeping) and its oil interest in Sudan (Large, n.d.: 11; Dash, 2012: Internet; Repnikova, 2011: Internet). More importantly, India’s oil interests have spilled over into the newly created South Sudan in 2011. This predicament makes it necessary for India to maintain good relations with both Khartoum and Juba.
(Chaudhuri, 2011: Internet), if it does not wish to run the risk of losing its oil interest altogether, given the fact that 90 percent of the oil is located in South Sudan and the oil infrastructure that leads to the port (for exports) is located in Sudan (Ray, 2007: 106).

In view of the above discussion, India may not be so different to the Chinese in Africa. Both Nigeria and Sudan presents interesting case studies for Indian engagement in Africa. With India as a latecomer to the continent its strategic partnerships is still in a formative stage and still needs to be concretise through future bilateral engagements. Against this backdrop, a number of conclusions may now be drawn.

5.6. Conclusion

The main aim of this chapter was to examine and contextualise India’s relations with Africa and specifically, to assess whether it can best be described as partners in development or whether it is rather a way for India to advance its national self-interest. India’s relations with the continent can be traced to the colonial ordeal and racism in South Africa. It has been pointed out that the Prime Minister Nehru led the way for a decolonised Africa under the NAM. The death of Nehru and India’s inability to finalise a date for Africa’s decolonisation led to a decline in their relations. In the 1960s the Chinese military humiliated India in their border dispute. The African continent offered India little sympathy. Aware of its lack of standing with the African continent, India began to follow a more proactive approach by supplying Africa with material resources. ITEC emerged as a political strategy to garner diplomatic support for New Delhi from Africa. In the 1990s, India moved away from idealistic considerations such as South-South cooperation to pragmatism that reflected the country’s realpolitik. Accordingly, economics shifted to the centre of India’s foreign policy. A rapid expansion in the Indian economy compelled the country to seek markets and resources in Africa. Even with its slowing economy, India continued to issue loans and lines of credit to Africa.
The year 2008 saw the induction of the AIFS as India and Africa’s new strategic partnership. The second summit took place in 2011 and the third was held in 2014. Poor reporting coupled with bureaucratic complexities, which incorporated NEPAD and Africa’s eight regional organisations, have made it difficult to evaluate the impact of their strategic partnership. Interestingly, it appears that India has replicated the China’s summit meeting in Africa, and similar to China, the AIFS covers issues stretching from economics to infrastructure, energy and the environment. But without China’s large diplomatic corps, the country has been forced to follow a strong state-centric approach centred on multilateralism. Consequently, the Delhi Declaration has focused on international issues such as the Kyoto, COP17, the UNSC and others, making it at best a universal text. Like the NAM, the AIFS has been used by the Indians to boost its international image.

Aid has formed an integral part of India’s foreign policy. Like China, India’s aid suffers from bureaucratic deficiencies and definitional clarity. This has allowed the country to avoid questions from its constituencies and to level the playing field between donors and recipients. India’s aid has also been used as a tool to foster its economic interest in Africa. Unable to match China and the West's spending power, India has looked to skills services and ideas to promote its uniqueness as a “donor”. Apart from ITEC, the SCAAP has been used to target African countries that are part of the Commonwealth. Instead of distributing aid evenly, the SCAAP has been selective by focusing on countries where there is an Indian diaspora, natural resources and markets for Indian goods and services. Through ITEC, India has committed itself to provide the continent with skills and technology. India has also promised to provide Africa with a $5 billion loan and to establish training institutions worth $700 million. Other sectors that received support from India include education, NEPAD and Africa’s 34 least developed states. The Team-9 programme also served to promote India’s trade relations with specific African countries.

India’s private sector has bypassed the country’s foreign policy in some instances in order to do business with Africa. But in other instances, it has managed to advance India’s national interest. This sector with the help of the Indian Government has established a number of business conclaves with their African counterparts. Sectors
that have benefitted from these conclaves are agriculture, human resources, technology and others. The projects, however, have been more advantageous to India, given the country’s comparative edge in skills and resources.

In addition, the final section of this chapter set out to make sense of India’s bilateral relations with Nigeria and Sudan, respectively. India and Nigeria have also used their shared history as victims of imperialism to strengthen their relations. However, political instability in Nigeria has been detrimental to its relations with India. It was not until 1998 that their relations returned to normality, given Nigeria’s strategic importance and the country’s growing oil and consumer market. During 2000, Nigeria took the initiative to foster closer ties with the Indian Government. The latter emerged as a valuable investor and the Nigerians wanted to improve their small and medium enterprises, steel, bio-gas and others with the help of India. However, both the governments of Nigeria and India failed to secure the sustainability of their partnership. First, the Indians not only failed to deliver on key promises made to Nigeria, it responded sluggishly to investment opportunities in Nigeria. Second, a change in the Nigerian Government resulted in a change of partners, especially with the arrival of Yar’Adua. Regardless of the challenges, trade has continued to blossom between the countries with Nigeria supplying natural resources and India manufactured goods and services. The Abuja Declaration of 2007 institutionalised India-Nigeria relations. Instead of being a vehicle to level trade relations, the goals set out by the document tends to favour India. It also serves as a means to advance India’s national interest.

Colonisation acted as a gravitational force that united Sudan and India in world politics. Yet civil war in Sudan since 1956 thwarted the country’s bilateral relations with India. In 2003, India had returned to Sudan for the pursuit of both oil and markets, although it seems that oil has been central to India’s interest in conflict-stricken Sudan. Thus, the country acquired key oil stakes in Sudan. Even Sudan saw the entrance of India as a diversification strategy away from China and Malaysia. Moreover, the Indian Government played an active role through its state-led company (OVL) to secure oil deals in Sudan. As a result, India invested $3 billion and bought $750 million worth of shares in Sudan, which proved to be beneficial to
both countries. Apart from oil, Indian businesses have invested in a range of sectors in Sudan, which include pharmaceuticals, agriculture, railways and others. The secession of South Sudan to become an independent republic in 2011 and continued conflict between Sudan and South Sudan, have also severely hampered the former country’s relations with India, especially in the oil sector. More specifically, Sudan could not repay India’s loans and investment expenditures. India has also turned a blind eye to the conflict in Darfur and has continued its dealings with the Sudanese Government to safeguard its energy interests. Even with the failure of both the AU and the UN to resolve the conflict in Sudan, India has maintained its support for the Khartoum Government. India has strategically forged ties with both the present-day Sudan and the South Sudan Republic in order to secure its oil investments that now lie across two countries.
Chapter Six: Summary and Conclusion

6.1. Summary

The purpose of this chapter is to provide an overview of China and India’s foreign policy interests in Africa and to summarise the main findings of the dissertation relating to a deeper scholarly understanding of China and India’s foreign policies towards Africa. This will be done within the research framework of the dissertation as a whole. In particular, it will discuss the research problem propounded in the introduction: Is it largely a case of strategic partnerships or is simply a way for China and India to advance their national self-interest?

The post-World War II period saw the rapid development of both China and India’s economies. This prompted both countries to look for natural resources and markets to sustain their development. Africa’s abundance of natural resources and new-found economic status has made the continent an important and attractive global partner. Moreover, the apparent failure of the Western model of development in Africa resulted in the continent’s increased engagement with China and India, whose relationships with Africa in the contemporary era have become progressively more important to the international community and to the discipline of International Relations. China and India’s deepening dealings and relations with the continent have led to many important scholarly questions, one of which this study has attempted to address. The significance of the study is that the conclusions reached can serve as a background to inform individual African governments, the AU, the FOCAC, AIFS meetings and business people interested in China-Africa and India-Africa relations about the obstacles, possibilities and existing frameworks of cooperation.

Chapter 1 highlighted the significance of the study with emphasis on both India and China’s foreign policies in Africa. The literature that was examined pointed to the importance of Africa’s natural resources and emerging markets for both China and India’s industrialisation prospects. Two schools of thought could be identified (those
in favour of the partners in development debate and those that view China and India’s foreign policies as a means to advance their national self-interests), especially in the political economic realm of China-Africa and India-Africa relations. When analysing the literature it became apparent that India’s foreign policy in Africa had been neglected. It is only through a comparison with China, that India’s foreign policy and ideas in Africa could be uncovered meaningfully. Two International Relations theories, namely realism and liberalism were used to ground the study. Realism forms the basis for a national interest debate, while liberalism leans towards partners in development argument. The study was executed in a descriptive and analytical manner, based on a literature study and analysis of factual data sources. The study followed a deductive approach and explored the conceptual framework, which consisted of three key concepts namely foreign policy, national interest and partners in development. The study then proceeded with a general discussion and developed towards a more specific discussion. Case studies that were relevant to the topic were analysed as part of the assessment. The primary unit of analysis was countries with which China and India have sought to build strategic partnerships since 1989 until 2013. Some related factors that predate 1989, such as the colonial period and the forming the NAM have been included, since these factors had a direct bearing on China-Africa and India-Africa relations. The level of analysis was predominantly state-centric, although other relevant international, continental and regional factors and role-players were also considered. The data collected to complete the study include primary documents (FOCAC, the AIFS, Chinese and Indian government documents), together with secondary analytical sources dealing with China-Africa and India-Africa relations.

Chapter 2 provided an insight of the key concepts such as foreign policy, national interest and partners in development, as well as the theoretical framework that underpins the study. Various scholars have advanced different interpretations of the aforementioned concepts. Foreign policy can be interpreted from both a realist and liberalist point of view. Partners, generally means a relationship built on trust and sharing, but this does not necessarily imply equality. Development is sometimes referred to as the process of modernisation, as sustainability, or economic growth, and more recently the term has been accepted by 192 states and framed within the
United Nations’ Millennium Development Goals to bring all people to a minimum accepted standard of human development by 2015.

The second major part of chapter 2 focused on foreign policy theories (meaning realism and liberalism) and the theoretical framework adopted for the study. Realists contend that states are the major architects of foreign policy and that “power” and “survival” are key considerations for states. Within this theory, the government and all its machinery move to the centre of politics and especially in IR. Liberals contest this strong state-centric approach and argue that the world is made up of both state and non-state actors. Both China and India’s foreign policies are influenced by a variety of actors, official and unofficial. The investigation showed that foreign policy theories are linked to the behaviour of the actors that make and implement it. In other words, theory informs practice, although not in a systematic manner as outlined in the various theories. Thus, the rational actor, the bureaucrat, the cognitive processes and belief-system, together, with the pluralist-interdependence model were specifically selected in order to provide a holistic account on foreign policy. Different theories contain both strengths and weaknesses and at times may contradict one another. However, the various component parts of each theory inform the foreign policy processes of both China and India, thus serving as a means to strengthen the theoretical foundation of the study. Moreover, the foreign policymaking framework of analysis was also discussed, which demonstrated the importance of external, internal and individual influences on foreign policymaking. Accordingly, attention had to be given simultaneously to influences or inputs stemming from the external, internal and individual level of analysis that informs the foreign policymaking process. Although there are set stages in the making of foreign policy, the stages frequently overlap given the ever-enduring nature of the international political environment.

Comparatively, both China and India have advanced similar foreign policy principles. Particularly, their fight against imperialism or colonialism have informed their specific foreign policies and played out in their external relations, especially in Africa. Foreign policy principles such as “mutual non-interference”, “equality”, “sovereignty”, “cooperation” and “peaceful-co-existence”, appeared in both countries’ respective
foreign policies. Nonetheless, China’s rigid foreign policy structure has made the aforementioned principles easily identifiable, but in the case of India, history (although modified to fit the present situation) needed to be consulted to uncover the country’s foreign policy principles. Nehru’s foreign policy legacy could not be separated from the country’s current foreign policy principles. Furthermore, both countries have struggled to uphold their respective foreign policy principles, especially when their national self-interests were threatened or when they wished to advance it.

The study found that China’s foreign policy machinery to be more structured and rigid than that of India. From a bureaucratic point of view, the CPC Politburo, the Politburo Standing Committee, and the State Council are undeniably the most important actors, serving as a funnelling mechanism in which other actors such as the MOFCOM, the MFA, the PLA and civil society in China’s foreign policy could convey their inputs in the foreign policy process (formulation and implementation). China’s foreign policy machinery is also not immune to the influence of civil society. However, the Chinese Government has established a foreign policy platform for civil society, making it a controlled environment and not a sporadic act as in the case of India. India’s contemporary foreign policy, unlike that of China, includes a host of actors that do not operate within a clearly demarcated bureaucratic structure. Nehru’s autocratic leadership style, together with the collapse of the dominant party system is to blame for India’s almost non-existent bureaucracy. This hampered the country’s ability to design a grand strategy for foreign policymaking. Consequently, India’s governing elite continue to use foreign policy as a football to be kicked around. Even India’s individual states generally conduct bilateral relations to advance their interest. A number of foreign policy actors could be identified in India, which included parliament, civil society, coalition governments and federal states, together, with India’s foreign policy institutions such as the Prime Minister’s Office, the MEA, the IFS and others. Apart from the aforementioned institutions, the foreign policy process continues to be concentrated in the hands of the few such as the NSA and the Prime Minister’s Office. As a result, India’s foreign policy process is increasingly more autocratic or less open to input than that of China. On the one hand, China’s former president (Hu Jintao) managed foreign policy through his party
structures, which includes compromise and consensus. Indian Prime Ministers such as Nehru, Vajpayee and more recently, Dr. Manmohan Sing, on the other, have all acted unilaterally at times, regardless of parliament’s advice not to. India’s weak institutional arrangements have come to hinder the country’s foreign policy, especially in Africa. In other words, the country’s uncoordinated approach has made it difficult to respond to external events. This deficiency may make it impossible for India to become a leader in global affairs. The reason being, the actors responsible for “funnelling” and anticipating behaviours and events beyond India’s borders need to work in tandem as in the case of China. If not, the country may experience gross miscalculations in its foreign policy decisions. This explains why India’s foreign policy strategy in Africa has been less calculated than that of China. An example, of India’s unstructured foreign policy is that the business sector has by-passed the government when dealing with certain African states. In contrast, the Chinese Government has not only spearheaded the country’s business foray into Africa, it has also protected its interests beyond its borders.

The main aim of chapter 3 was to uncover the domestic development needs and challenges of Chinese and Indian foreign policies and how these matters relate to the foreign policy behaviour of the countries under review. The study found that the bulk of the research done on China and India’s foreign policies in Africa has been preoccupied with their external actions in Africa. Few attempts have been made to consider both internal and external factors. This implies that China and India’s foreign policy actions in Africa should not only be analysed during the implementation phase or from the outside. Attention must be given to both countries domestic settings. Looking inwards allowed the study to make more sense and work towards a deeper understanding of both China and India’s foreign policies.

In the case of China, Deng was the driving force behind the country’s contemporary economic growth rates. He strategically adopted a number of reforms that opened up the country for trade and investments. The reforms adopted by Deng will probably continue to be implemented and broadened by contemporary Chinese presidents. China’s growth model has been based on heavy industrialisation, manufacturing as well as, export-orientated and rapid urbanisation. Hence, the study found that
China’s domestic needs for natural resources instigated its relations with Africa. Furthermore, the country’s major challenge is to transform its economy from industrialisation to consumerism. China’s dependence on the global economy for natural resources and markets has had a negative impact on the country’s economic growth, especially during the international economic crisis in 2008 and thereafter. Moreover, Africa will continue to play an important role in China’s foreign policy in the future given the fact that the country is in the mid-phase of industrialisation and that its hunger for Africa’s resources will not abate. China’s SOE’s have been at the forefront in seeking natural resources to sustain the country’s growth model. Beijing has emerged as a major outward foreign direct investor, especially in Africa. Besides, the Chinese economy may weaken if the country decides to change its current course of development over night, away from industrialisation.

Reforms in India, unlike those in China, were not by choice, but due to India’s economic collapse in 1991. Instead of vigorously opening up the Indian economy, a systematic approach was followed similar to that of China. This allowed both countries to gain access to skills and capital from the developed North that was necessary for economic development. It is important to highlight that China’s reforms are part of a long-term strategy, given the continuity of the CPC. In India, the reform process has become a thorny issue, given the democratic nature (the alterations of the political parties in power after Prime Minister Nehru’s dominant rule) of the Indian Government. This makes it difficult for India to free up certain sectors of its economy and to remove protectionist policies by parliament.

In contrast to China, India looked at skills and services to develop the country’s economy. Unlike China, India’s private sector has been responsible for the bulk of the country’s economic growth. IT and other skill-intensive industries are central to India’s economic growth as is reflected in its foreign policy behaviour elsewhere. Unlike China’s state-owned enterprises, the bulk of India’s outward FDI in Africa has been driven by its private sector. Similar to China, the dispersal of wealth throughout the country has become a major challenge. Another challenge to India’s sustainable economic growth rate is the country’s lack of industrialisation. India’s economic growth model, though, has been less prone to global shocks than that of China.
Looking at Africa, the study found that the continent’s contemporary economic growth is extending beyond a mere focus on natural resources on the African continent. New and old players (state and non-state actors) on the African continent, have led to the diversification of many African economies. Apart from economics, the United States’ fight against terrorism, as well as Africa’s voting power in the UN and other international institutions, highlights the continent’s strategic importance in world politics.

The main aim of chapter 4 was to evaluate China’s foreign policy actions in Africa, in order to determine whether it may be associated with a strategic partnership or national self-interest. Historically, relations between Africa and China can be traced over a period of time. Yet, it was at the end of the Cold War that China-Africa relations reached unprecedented levels both politically and economically. China’s rapid economic development and the country’s stature in international institutions such as the UN made it an invaluable partner to Africa. China and Africa have also used their shared history as victims of imperialism to strengthen their relations. China followed a proactive approach by making the continent an integral part of its foreign policy in order to neutralise the West in multilateral institutions. Moreover, the study found that China’s rise to power and its hunger for Africa’s natural resources is also a key element in their relations. Furthermore, China’s dealings with Africa have transformed many of the continent’s commodity-based economies. Thus, a number of countries are seeking to invest in Africa’s new-found economic growth.

Contemporary China-Africa relations are based on the functioning and work of FOCAC. The study found that it was China’s ideas of an equal world order and the country’s resentment of Western dominance in world politics that led it to Africa and not exclusively economics as alleged by some observers. China contains elements of both the developed North and developing South, which allows Beijing to intentionally play the role of a great power and not a superpower in order to garner diplomatic support from Africa. The year 2000 provided the ideological glue for future China-Africa relations, specifically for FOCAC two and three. It was only in 2006 that China and Africa’s relations were labelled as a new type of a strategic partnership under the auspices of FOCAC. The study found that after 2006, all the actions plans
of FOCAC remained similar in their approach and could be summarised in six major points, starting from Africa’s political affairs and governance to China and Africa’s cooperation on international platforms. FOCAC has undeniably brought opportunities to Africa and as long as Beijing is the dominant or driving role-player of the FOCAC, Africa will remain an integral part of China’s foreign policy. At the same time, Africa needs to work in close cooperation in order to at least facilitate the setting of the agenda of FOCAC. This may tip the balance of power in Africa’s favour. As China and Africa’s relations evolve so will FOCAC. As a result, future research on China-Africa relations needs to take cognisance of the complexity of FOCAC itself, which includes a number of factors and role-players.

In addition, the study found that China’s aid policy has been instrumental in advancing the country’s national interest, as well as forging strategic partnerships with Africa. Unravelling China’s aid as an integral part of FOCAC is not an easy task. Without any accurate aid data from either China or Africa, evaluating the impact of aid has become a trying task open to further analysis, especially from a statistical point of view. China’s “aid” or development assistance will continue to suffer from definitional ambiguity, especially when one uses the OECD countries’ interpretation of aid. Instead of looking to the West to solve China’s aid complexities, scholars need to focus on China’s eight principles that put the country’s foreign aid into perspective. Moreover, China has delivered on its aid promises to Africa. Thus, China’s aid to Africa is by no means short-term orientated, but long-term in order to advance the country’s foreign policy goals. Secrecy in China’s bilateral relations with Africa has made it difficult to uncover the true nature of aid. If individual African states were to publish the aid they received from China, Africa may be in a greater bargaining position during their FOCAC meetings. This will also compel Beijing to dispense its aid equally across the continent. Since the study found that China’s strategy is to make the entire continent part of its foreign policy framework and not only selectively favour certain African states, scholars should refrain from assuming that China’s dealings with Africa are inherently immoral due to a lack of transparency and democracy. It would also be unfounded to merely state or assume that Africa is not benefitting from China in terms of development. The study uncovered positive as well as negative aspects in China’s aid to Africa.
Instead of simply focusing on the multilateral level of analysis, the study also focused on the bilateral level of China-Africa relations in order to clarify the problem statement of partners in development or national self-interests as two schools of thought. Many observers of China-Africa relations have come to argue that China’s financial power has allowed it to dominate its strategic partnership with countries on the African continent. Indeed, this may be true on a multilateral level, but in the case of Angola, it appeared that Beijing could not simply bulldoze its way through Africa and expect to emerge as the victor. The case study of Angola showed how African states could level the playing field when dealing with Beijing. Angola may serve as a blueprint or ultimately as an African strategy for engaging China. Thus, the Angolan Government has not allowed the Chinese to dominate its economy, especially its oil and infrastructure sectors. Angola also demonstrated how a strategic partnership with China could propel it to economic stardom. Consequently, Angola served as a classic case of how dependence on China can be transformed to an interdependent relationship, where the risk of the Chinese divesting or leaving supersedes the benefits of maintaining its business links within Angola. Unlike colonialism where the exploiters had a common agenda for Africa, the contemporary era may have provided a major bargaining chip for Africa, as shown in the case of Angola through its diversification of partners.

The study found that China’s relations with Sudan, unlike its relations with Angola, have been dominated by Beijing’s national self-interests. China aggressively secured its oil interests by employing the principle of non-interference and veto power in the UNSC in order to protect the Sudanese Government. The investigation found that China has strategically supplied the El Bashir Government with weapons that would coerce civil society into obedience, especially in Darfur. In contrast to Angola, where infrastructure fostered development, bullying tactics were used in Sudan as a means of extracting resources, predominately oil. When Beijing could no longer hide behind the principle of non-interference, it negotiated with both Sudan and South Sudan and strategically engineered a multilateral strategy that led to a hybrid peacekeeping force that involved both the AU and the UN. This allowed Beijing to safeguard its oil interests in both the Sudans. This also demonstrated that China is conscious of its image in world politics and that it cannot afford to be seen as an immoral power.
whose sole purpose is to secure its national self-interests. Moreover, this illustrated Beijing’s ability to secure its national self-interests through multilateral institutions such as the AU and the UN. It also revealed that China will have to take responsibility for its actions and that it is no longer immune to international criticism, which implies by extension that maintaining a low profile in international affairs will become an increasingly difficult task for the Chinese Government.

The main aim of chapter 5 is to integrate India into the debate: Does the presence of India in Africa create new opportunities for Africa or is it merely for the exploitation and advancement its national self-interests? New Delhi is viewed by some observers as a latecomer with limited strategic importance to Africa. The study has found that India may be just as important to Africa as China. Historically, India played an active role in Africa’s emancipation, although not as aggressively as China did. Similar to China, India has always attempted to make the African factor an integral part of its foreign policy strategy. India’s 1962 border war with China led it to Africa. India also realised that it needed to play a proactive role in Africa; hence, ITEC was established to provide the continent with material resources. Thus, after the Cold-War India’s approach towards Africa was centred on pragmatism, eschewing idealistic considerations. This will continue due to the country’s phenomenal economic growth rate. Many observers have come to argue that the global financial crisis of 2008 has stifled relations between India and Africa; however, few have conceded that India’s future industrialisation prospects may make Africa’s natural resources increasingly significant for the country.

Like China, India has established its own institutionalised strategic partnership with Africa under the AIFS. The investigation also found that India’s approach towards Africa, unlike that of China, is selective and not inclusive in nature. From the onset, the AIFS in 2008 started with 14 African states. The 2011 AIFS meeting started with 15 African states and failed to make the transition and to incorporate the 39 other African states. Hence, India has looked to Africa’s multilateral institutions such as the AU and NEPAD. Even NEPAD with only 20 permanent members has not consolidated the AIFS, in by incorporating all African countries. Unlike FOCAC, where the outcomes can be easily evaluated in terms of the successes and failures,
the AIFS will remain problematic, given its linkages with the AU, NEPAD and Africa’s eight regional organisations. It will be difficult to pinpoint who or what is responsible for the successes and failures. Can it be ascribed to the AIFS or is it because of the AU, NEPAD and Africa’s own capacities of its regional institutions? Without acknowledgement of the role of the AIFS it will be difficult for India to claim responsibility for its achievements in Africa.

The study also found that India has effectively copied China’s African strategy of engagement (FOCAC) when it established the AIFS. However, unlike FOCAC, the AIFS has been centred on the state level of engagement. In contrast to FOCAC, the AIFS, specifically the Addis Ababa declaration, is best viewed as an international document addressing global issues rather than Indian and African concerns. What this demonstrated is that the AIFS is simply a way for India to promote its stature in world politics, especially in the UNSC.

Similar to China, India’s aid has been used as a strategic tool to advance its national self-interests and to forge strategic relations with Africa. Moreover, India like China, has moved away from Western interpretations of aid and has actively sought to differentiate itself from the West in order to avoid imperialistic connotations in their relations with Africa. Unlike China, which seems to choose a more subtle approach in advancing its national interest, India’s aid strategy appeared more aggressive. The study showed how India has tied aid to its economic interests and specifically dealt with African countries rich in natural resources, markets and an Indian diaspora, as reflected in the SCAAP, TEAM-9 and the Focus Africa Programme. ITEC simply served as a continental illusion that would conceal the above mentioned programmes and selective interests in Africa. India is unlike that provided aid to African countries with little if any strategic importance. Resembling China, India has made anti-colonial ideas such as South-South cooperation, imperial appendages and others an integral part of its relations with Africa. This strategically places both China and India on a moral high ground and from an African perspective they are not seen as exploiters only interested in advancing their national self-interests. Without the financial might to compete with China or the developed North, India has utilised its comparative advantage in skills and services to build strategic partnerships with
Africa. This serves as an excellent opportunity for Africa to diversify its economies, especially in the skills and service sectors.

But for Africa to achieve the latter, it needs to actively engage the Indian Government to acquire more skills and workplace experience in India. This may increase Africans’ entrepreneurial capacities and the various skills necessary to instigate development in individual African countries. However, it might not be enough for India to pledge 10,000 scholarships and 2,500 training positions to Africa, given the fact that the continent is made-up of 54 states with diverse development needs. Africa also needs to take cognisance of the promises made by either India or China, since 10,000 divided by 54 equals a 185 scholarships per African country, which are not nearly enough to spearhead development.

The study also found that India’s private sector has at times bypassed the Indian Government by proactively engaging the African continent. The Indian Government has had to play catch-up with its private sector. This may be as a result of the country’s weak foreign policy arrangements as pointed out earlier. Nonetheless India’s business sector has sought to advance the country’s national interest in Africa. The study demonstrated how India’s business conclaves penetrated the continent through projects, services and exploitation of natural resources. At the same time, the disproportionate number of business delegates from India and Africa who attended these conclaves – 300 from India to 32 from Africa – revealed the unequal nature of the partnership.

Similar to China, India’s dealings with Africa were also investigated on a bilateral level and placed within the two schools of thought, which argue for either national interest or cooperative partnerships. With specific reference to India and Nigeria relations, the study found that the Indian Government was reluctant to cooperate with Nigeria regardless of their shared history in colonialism. India and Nigeria’s relations formally took off in the year 2000. However, their strategic partnership has been marked by inconsistencies and gross miscalculations, especially on the side of India. Both countries have struggled to maintain a stable partnership. Unlike China that delivered on its promises to Africa, India failed in a number of sectors in Nigeria.
This may tarnish its trustworthiness and its viability as a reliable partner. Unlike China, which proactively engages the domestic setting of individual African countries by building relations with political parties in order to anticipate political environment, India’s approach in Nigeria appeared largely reactive. The Indian Government lost a number of deals when President Umaru Yar’Adua took office and reversed Obasanjo’s dealings with India. Nonetheless, trade between India and Nigeria has continued to flourish. The study showed that India is more dependent on Nigeria in terms of oil, but that the latter country has failed to capitalise on India’s dependence. Instead India has made Nigeria an integral part of its energy strategy. India has also penetrated the Nigeria economy in a range of sectors. In 2007, India strategically engineered the Abuja declaration to advance its national self-interests in terms of markets and natural resources in Nigeria.

In the case of Sudan, the study found that India’s modus operandi is similar to that of China. Thus, non-interference and blocking a Human Rights resolution in 2006 (concerning the Darfur crisis) featured strongly in India’s foreign policy, in order to secure its oil interests in Sudan (Zhao, 2012: Internet). As in China, morality in India’s foreign policy played an insignificant role in its decision to invest in Sudan. Akin to China, India has used proactive diplomacy to advance its economic interests in Khartoum. Still, the Indians have failed to implement follow-up strategies that would compel the El Bashir Government to repay investments made by New Delhi. This demonstrated that India, unlike China, has little bargaining power over Sudan. Similar to China, India has worked with both the UN and the AU in an attempt to secure its energy security in Sudan. This illustrates that India’s foreign policy goals are often not dissimilar to those of China, although its relations with Sudan is in a formative stage and not as comprehensive as those of the Chinese.

6.2. Conclusion

In the final analysis, the following conclusions may be advanced as part of the research question whether China and India’s engagement in Africa is largely associated with national self-interest or rather with partnering in development for mutual benefit, or whether it comprises a combination of both these viewpoints.
In light of the research findings, it is fair to conclude that China’s foreign policy interest in Africa displays elements of both a strategic partnership and national self-interest. China has attempted to balance its relations with Africa in general or with specific African role-players due to international scrutiny. China also does not want to be seen as an exploiter only interested in advancing its national self-interest. As a result, the country has proactively sought to build a positive image in the minds of the African elites by supporting countries with limited strategic resources. India, however, has been more aggressive in securing its national self-interest in Africa.

India’s AIFS and its aid relations with African role-players have leaned over strongly towards its national interest. Operating in China’s shadow, afforded New Delhi the opportunity to prioritise its national self-interest in Africa. This does not mean that African counterparts are not benefitting from their strategic partnership with India. New Delhi may serve as a counterbalancing force to China and vice versa. Instead of Africa playing the role of a passive partner in both FOCAC and the AIFS, it needs to actively compare and contrast the rewards and penalties in their dealings with China and India. If African role-players were to play up China and India against each other in their bid for trade benefits, it may put the continent in a stronger bargaining position vis-à-vis these countries. Thus, each strategic partnership with African role-players should not be seen in isolation, but rather as a way for the continent to learn lessons and to reap the benefits from such relations. Africa’s comparative advantage rests on its importance in world politics, which it needs to exploit to its advantage. If it fails, it will continue to be remembered as the continent that helped to build Europe, the United States and now also China and India.

In light of the above, it is necessary to examine separately the two schools of thought (national self-interests or partners in development) that form the core of the central research question underlying this study.
First, can the arguments in favour of the national self-interests debate be validated?

Foreign policy is inherently associated with the academic notion of national interest. China’s foreign policy has been designed mainly to secure the survival of the Communist Party and to continue the country’s economic growth. Consequently, China’s national interest is directly linked to its domestic concerns. Unlike some authoritarian regimes that frequently use or threaten violence to subdue their citizens, China has looked to provide its people with economic gains in order to secure obedience and the survival of the Communist Party. Furthermore, China views the West as a constant threat to its political system and subsequently, also to its national self-interest. As a result, China has used its African partners to legitimise its regime, as well as to counterpoise the West in international institutions such as the UN. Likewise, China’s modernisation drive is directly linked to its national self-interest. China’s open-door policy is aimed at getting the country the necessary skills and resources for development. This has made Beijing the manufacturing hub of the world and created its need for natural resources to sustain its development. Based on this, Beijing’s economic stability, which may be equated to its national interest, is highly dependent on natural resources. In 2006, Beijing highlighted the fact that Africa’s natural resources would form the core of its relations. Even China’s outbound policy of providing aid to its partners is in line with its national interest. Thus, Chinese companies would invest in Africa’s emerging markets, where there is little if any competition from developed economies.

Like China, India’s national self-interest has too become an integral component in its relations with Africa. India’s foreign policy has moved away from idealistic considerations to pragmatism centred on realism in order to advance its national self-interest. In the economic realm, India has actively sought to replicate its growth model in Africa to gain access to new markets. As a result, India has prioritised the sectors in which it has a comparative advantage over African states. India’s domestic considerations has similarly to China, informed its foreign policy rather than Africa’s lack of development. In the case of Nigeria, India made it clear that its need for energy security would form the core of their strategic partnership. In the international
political arena, India has proactively sought to become a permanent member of the
UNSC. Thus, the African factor had to be utilised as a means to an end. In particular,
India sought to harness Africa’s voting power in the UN parliament to serve its
ambitions and subsequently, its national interest. In context of the research question,
it may be concluded that national interest is an undeniable feature in both China and
India’s relations with Africa.

Viewed from a different perspective, China and India’s positive contributions towards
Africa are also undeniable features. Noticeable policies and programmes that directly
and effectively deal with China-Africa and India-Africa strategic partnerships cannot
be excluded. This logically brings the second question into play: Are China and
India’s strategic partnerships with Africa mutually beneficial and do they fulfil
Africa’s development needs?

Both China and India have built their respective strategic partnership with Africa on
respect for sovereignty and non-interference in the other’s domestic affairs. Sudan
successfully employed the principle of non-interference in order to prevent China to
acquire further oil deals and by allowing India to invest in its oil sector as a
diversification strategy. Moreover, the almost identical strategies of FOCAC and the
AIFS have afforded Africa the opportunity to voice its concerns in international
affairs. China and India’s strategic alliances with Africa may offset the dominance of
the West in world politics and may lead to a more equitable global order. Africa’s
strategic relations with China and India may also remove the historical or perceived
stranglehold of the West over the continent, with regard to the structural adjustment
programmes and the stringent conditionalities of the World Bank and the IMF. The
case of Angola demonstrated that African countries can develop without the
assistance of their traditional masters, including the above-mentioned monetary
institutions. Both China and India’s partnerships with Africa go beyond financial
assistance and include technical skills, infrastructure development, education,
healthcare and other services necessary for Africa’s development. As a result, China
and India have provided their African counterparts with support in each of the eight
MDGs. Thus, China and India’s foreign policies towards their African counterparts
also demonstrate sincere intentions associated with a partnership in development.
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Abstract

This study explores whether the relationship which China and India forged with Africa on their own terms, is mutually beneficial or whether it is selfish, one-sided and therefore largely beneficial to Chinese and Indian interests respectively. The study descriptively analyses China and India’s foreign policies towards Africa in order to determine whether it is a case of national self-interest or partners in development. The research also makes use of the comparative method, by comparing China and India’s respective modus operandi in Africa. China and India’s foreign policies are scrutinised with regard to their agencies, structural design and implementation. There are two schools of thought on the motives for China and India’s presence in Africa. On the one hand is a discourse arguing that both China and India are seeking ways to forge mutually beneficial partnerships with Africa. On the other, is a second school of thought that argues China and India’s relationship with the continent is primarily self-serving and that they are simply seeking to exploit Africa, for its natural resources.

The study explores the conceptual framework, which consists of three key concepts namely foreign policy, national interest and partners in development. These concepts were then linked to China-Africa and India-Africa relations. The investigation found that foreign policy theories are linked to the behaviour of the actors that make and implement it. In other words, theory informs practice, although not in systematic manner as outlined in the various theories. The study also examined both China and India’s domestic needs and challenges as inputs in their respective foreign policy processes (formulation and execution). Looking inwards allowed the study to make more sense and work towards a deeper understanding of both China and India’s foreign policies, respectively. Therefore, China and India’s foreign policy actions in Africa are based on their domestic considerations. This is especially true as far as China and India’s domestic development “models” are concerned. Both China and India have institutionalised their contemporary relationship with Africa in the form of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) and the African-India Forum Summit (AIFS), respectively. Moreover, China and India’s aid allocations have come to play an integral part in their relations with Africa. Apart from multilateralism, the
study also examined China and India’s bilateral relations with specific African countries, in order to determine whether their relationship can be associated with partners in development or national self-interest.

The study concludes that both China and India’s foreign policy interest in Africa displays elements of both a strategic partnership and national self-interest. Operating in China’s shadow, has afforded New Delhi the opportunity to prioritise its national self-interest in Africa. As a result, India has been more aggressive in securing its national self-interests in Africa. In conclusion both schools of thought (national self-interest and partners in development) could be validated.
Opsomming

Die studie ondersoek die vraag of die verhouding wat China en Indië elk op eie terme met Afrika gesmee het, wedersyds voordelig was en of dit selfsugtig, eensydig en daarom grootliks selfbevoordeelend was van China en Indië se onderskeie belange. Die studie bied 'n beskrywende analise van China en Indië se onderskeie buitelandse beleid teenoor Afrika ten einde te bepaal of dit as 'n aangeleentheid van nasionale eiebelang of as 'n vennootskap in ontwikkeling beskou kan word. In die navorsing is ook gebruik gemaak van vergelykende metodes, waardeur China en Indië se werkswyses in Afrika met mekaar vergelyk is. China en Indië se buitelandse beleid is bestudeer op grond van hul werkzaamhede, structurele ontwerp en toepassings. Daar is twee denkskole oor die motiewe vir China en Indië se teenwoordigheid in Afrika. Aan die eenkant is dit 'n diskoers waarin geredeneer word dat beide China en Indië ten doel het om wedersyds voordelige vennootskappe met Afrika tot stand te bring; aan die anderkant is die argument dat China en Indië se verhouding met die kontinent hoofsaaklik selfsugtig is en dat hul bloot Afrika wil eksploiteer vir sy natuurlike hulpbronne.

Die studie verken die konseptuele raamwerk, wat uit drie sleutelbegrippe bestaan, t.w. buitelandse beleid, nasionale belang en vennote in ontwikkeling. Hierdie konsepte word dan in verband geplaas in die China-Afrika- en Indië-Afrika-verhoudings. Die ondersoek het bevind dat die teorieë oor buitelandse beleid gekoppel kan word met die optrede van die beleidsmakers en -toepassers. Met andere woorde, teorie word voorgelig deur die praktyk, hoewel nie op 'n sistematiese wyse soos uiteengesit in die onderskeie teorieë nie. Die studie het ook die huishoudelike behoeftes en uitdagings van beide China en Indië ondersoek as insette vir die formulering en uitvoering van buitelandse beleidsprosesse. Deur die blik ook na binne te rig, was verhelderend en het bygedra tot 'n beter begrip van beide China en Indië se onderskeie buitelandse beleide. Dit het derhalwe duidelik geword dat China en Indië se buitelandse beleidsoptrede in Afrika op huishoudelike oorwegings geskoei is. Dit kom veral na vore in beide China en Indië se huishoudelike “ontwikkelingsmodelle”. Beide China en Indië het hul eietydse verhoudings met Afrika geïnstitusionaliseer, respektiewelik deur die Forum vir China-
Afrika Samewerking (FOCAC) en die Spitsberaad vir die Afrika-Indië Forum (AIFS). Terselfdertyd het China en Indië se hulpverlening 'n integrale rol begin speel in hul verhoudings met Afrika. Die studie het, afgesien van die ondersoek na multilaterale verhoudings ook China en Indië se bilaterale verhoudings met spesifieke Afrikalande ondersoek om te bepaal of hierdie verhoudinge geassosieer kan word ontwikkelingsvennootskappe of met nasionale eiebelang.

Die studie het tot die gevolgtrekking gekom dat China en Indië se buitelandse beleid en belange in Afrika albei elemente van beide 'n strategiese vennootskap sowel as nasionale eiebelang huisves. Deur telkens in China se skaduwee te opereer, het aan New-Delhi die geleentheid gebied om sy nasionale eiebelang in Afrika voorop te stel. As uitvloeisel daarvan kon Indië meer aggressief optree om sy eiebelang in Afrika te vestig. In die finale analise, kan die geldigheid van beide denkskole (nasionale eiebelang en vennote in ontwikkeling) bevestig word.
KEY WORDS

AFRICA-INDIA FORUM SUMMIT
AID
ANGOLA
CHINA
FOREIGN POLICY
FORUM ON CHINA-AFRICA COOPERATION
INDIA
NATIONAL INTEREST
NIGERIA
PARTNERS IN DEVELOPMENT
SUDAN