POVERTY REDUCTION POLICIES IN LESOTHO: THE CASE OF SELF-HELP PROJECTS

by

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NOVEMBER, 2011
Declaration

I sincerely and solemnly declare that this thesis submitted in fulfillment of the requirements for the degree

PHILOSOPHIAE DOCTOR

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS AND DEDICATIONS

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Lesotho has grappled with poverty reduction since independence 1966. Poverty reduction initiatives include a variety of policies and strategies including self-help projects. The self-help projects purport to reduce poverty particularly in the rural areas where the majority of the poor people live. However, despite the wide application of these projects, evidence suggests that poverty is increasing in Lesotho both in absolute and relative terms. This study focused on the performance of the self-help projects and argues that the self-help projects do not reduce poverty because they are deficient in terms of both their design and implementation. Specifically, the study sought to establish:

- Whether the self-help projects in Lesotho are geared to poverty reduction; and
- Whether political dominance of self-help issues hampers poverty reduction.

The study used two approaches to address the research questions namely, a literary search and an empirical investigation. The literary search involved a theoretical analysis of poverty reduction policies, programmes and strategies in Lesotho. Government documents and reports as well as reports by donor agencies were helpful in this regard. An analysis of the policy making process in Lesotho was also undertaken with the view to establish the extent the policy process impacts on poverty reduction policies including self-help projects. At the empirical level a survey of the participants in self-help projects and the government officials involved in the administration of self-help activities was undertaken. Data was collected through personal interviews.

Evidence from the two approaches suggests that development activities that have a poverty reduction focus are highly politicized. Such activities are marked by direct and intense involvement of self serving political figures. More often than not affiliation to the
ruling party has been a requirement for people to participate in development activities. This practice has excluded many of those in need.

It has also been established that the self-help projects are defective in their design as they offer a modicum of benefits that do not support the lives of the beneficiaries on a sustainable basis. Further, implementation of the projects is politicized turning them into instruments for enhancing political interests. For these reasons the projects fail to reduce poverty in the rural areas.

Thus, the thesis explains the nature and content of the self-help projects in Lesotho, establishes the reasons for the failure of the self-help projects as instruments for poverty reduction and provides recommendations thereof.
OPSOMMING

Lesotho is sedert sy onafhanklikheidswording in 1966 in ‘n stryd teen armoede gewikkel. Inisiatiewe om armoede te verlig sluit ‘n verskeidenheid strategieë in, onder andere selfhelpprojekte. Die doel van die selfhelpprojekte is veral om armoede in plattelandse gebiede te verminder, waar die meerderheid van die armes woon. Ten spyte van die wye toepassing van hierdie projekte, is daar bewyse dat armoede in Lesotho in beide absolute en relatiewe terme toeneem. Hierdie studie fokus op die prestatie van die selfhelpprojekte en voer aan dat die selfhelpprojekte nie armoede verlig nie, aangesien dit, wat betref die ontwerp en implementering, nie doeltreffend is nie. Die studie het spesifiek probeer om die volgende te bepaal:

- of die selfhelpprojekte in Lesotho tot die verligting van armoede in staat is, en
- of die politieke dominansie van selfhelpvraagstukke die verligting van armoede verhinder.

Die studie gebruik twee benaderings om die navorsingsvrae aan te spreek, naamlik ‘n literêre ondersoek en ‘n empiriese ondersoek. Die literêre ondersoek het ‘n teoretiese analise van armoede-verligtingsbeleide, -programme en -strategieë in Lesotho behels. Hiervoor is regeringsdokumente asook verslae deur skenkingsagentskappe gebruik. ‘n Analise van die beleidsmakingsproses in Lesotho is verder onderneem om te bepaal wat die omvang is van die beleidproses se uitwerking op die armoede verligtingsbeleide, insluitend selfhelp-projekte. Op empiriese vlak is ‘n opname gedoen oor die deelnemers in die selfhelprojekte, asook oor die betrokke regeringsamptenare in die administrasie van selfhelpaktiwiteite. Data is deur middel van persoonlike onderhoude ingesamel.

Bewyse uit die twee benaderings suggereer dat politieke ontwikkelinge met ‘n fokus op armoede verligting, grootliks verpolitiseer is. Sulke aktiwiteite word deur direkte en intense betrokkenheid van selfsugtige politieke figure gekenmerk. Affiliasie met die regerende party is meer as dikwels ‘n vereiste vir mense om aan
ontwikkelingsbedrywighede deel te neem. Deur hierdie praktyk word baie mense wat in nood verkeer, uitgesluit.

Daar is ook vasgestel dat die selfhelpprojek-ontwerp defektief is, aangesien dit baie in voordele bied wat nie die lewens van die bevoordeeldes op ‘n volhoubare basis ondersteun nie. Die implementering van die projekte word verder gepolitiseer, deur dit in instrumente te verander om politieke belange te verbeter. Weens hierdie redes het die projekte daarin misluk om armoede in die plattelandse gebiede te verminder.

Die verhandeling verduidelik derhalwe die aard en inhoud van die selfhelpprojekte in Lesotho, bepaal die reders vir mislukking van die selfhelpprojekte as instrumente vir armoedeverligting, en doen voorstelle daaroor aan die hand.
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ABBREVIATIONS

AGOA: African Growth Opportunities Act
ATC: Agreement on Textiles and Clothing
BASP: Basic Agricultural Service Programme
BCP: Basotho Congress Party
BNP: Basotho National Party
BEDCO: Basotho Enterprise Development Corporation
BWI: Breton Woods Institutions
CBL: Central Bank of Lesotho
CCPP: Cooperative Crop Production Project
CS: Construction Supervisor
CIDA: Canadian International Development Agency
COLETU: Congress of Lesotho Trade Unions
COSC: Cambridge Overseas School Certificate
DA: District Administrator
DDC: District Development Committee
DE: District Engineer
DFID: Department for International Development
DRWS: Department of Rural Water Supplies
DS: District Secretary
DSSA: Development Society of Southern Africa
DSW: Department of Social Welfare
EFA: Education for All
FNCO: Food and Nutrition Coordinating Office
FPE: Free Primary Education
FPTP: First-Past-The-Post
FSSP: Food for Self Sufficiency Project
FDI: Foreign Direct Investment
GDP: Gross Domestic Product
GOL: Government of Lesotho
HDI: Human Development Index
HYS: High Yielding Varieties
HIPC: Highly Indebted Poor Countries
IDA: International Development Agency
IEC: Independent Electoral Commission
IMF: International Monetary Fund
ILO: International Labour Organisation
KNPR: Knowledge Network for Poverty Reduction
LCA: Lesotho Communications Authority
LCD: Lesotho Congress for Democracy
LCN: Lesotho Council of Non-Governmental Organisations
LDCs: Least Developed Countries
LEC: Lesotho Evangelical Church
LFCD: Lesotho Fund for Community Development
LHRF: Lesotho Highlands Revenue Fund
LHWP: Lesotho Highlands Water Project
LNDC: Lesotho National Development Corporation
MFP: Mxarema-Tlou Freedom Party
MP: Member of Parliament
MMP: Mixed Member Proportional
MDG: Millennium Development Goals
MFA: Multi Fibre Arrangement
MLG: Ministry of Local Government
NEPAD: New Initiative for Africa’s Development
NGO: Non Governmental Organisations
NUL: National University of Lesotho
OSTI: Organisation for Social and Technical Innovation
PAP: Public Assistance Programme
PRGF: Poverty Reduction Growth Facility
PRSP: Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
PSLE: Primary School Leaving Examination
UNDP: United Nations Development Programme
UOF: University of the Free State
USAID: US Agency for International Development
RCC: Roman Catholic Church
RSA: Republic of South Africa
SACU: Southern African Customs Union
SADC: Southern African Development Community
SAP: Structural Adjustment Programmes
SHD: Sustainable Human Development
SIDA: Swedish International Agency for Development
SNF: Safety Net Fund
SSN: Social Safety Net
STO: Senior Technical Officer
UNDP: United Nations Development Programme
**USA:** United States of America
**VAO:** Village Affairs Officer
**VDC:** Village Development Committee
**VIP:** Ventilated Improved Pit Latrine
**WB:** World Bank
**WFP:** World Food Programme
**WSSP:** World Summit for Social Development
**WTO:** World Trade Organisation
CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1 WHAT IS POVERTY?

Poverty is an illusive concept. Neither the social scientists nor those who are considered to be in poverty agree on what it is. Poverty affects people’s lives in different ways, at different times and in different places. “Definitions of poverty and its causes vary by gender, age, culture, and other social and economic contexts” (World Bank, 2000:32). Confirming the multidimensional nature of poverty is Townsend, 1979; Ferge and Miller, 1987; Alcock, 1993; The United Nations, 1998 and the World Bank, 2000. In particular, Ferge and Miller observe that:

Poverty…is hard to grasp in a scientifically manageable way. It has many meanings and many facets. It is composed of a variety of individual and collective experiences, changing in structural significance and features (Ferge and Miller, 1987:15).

The World Bank (2000:32) in its millennium call for renewed strategies against poverty reiterates the multidimensional nature of this social phenomenon. In terms of the World Bank, poverty reduction Strategies should address deficiencies in areas that include: material well being, food security, employment, psychological well being, power and voice, cultural and social norms, state provided infrastructure, physical, human and social capital, assets, environment, and the list goes on. This being the case, “poverty consists of multiple and interlocking dimensions”, hence the lack of a universal definition.

Despite their divergent nature, the definitions of poverty have one common element. They converge on the point that poverty is about non-fulfillment of human needs. They differ on the point of emphasis. Some definitions stress material needs, others focus on social needs while others are inclined towards emotional and/or political needs. Two points are worth noting here. First, regardless of which definition one goes by, poverty still means misery and suffering for all those concerned (Ferge and Miller, 1987:9). It limits people’s choices. It paralyses human capability. That is why Robert McNamara,
the former President of the World Bank, defines absolute poverty as “a condition of life so limited as to prevent realization of the potential of the genes… a condition of life so degrading as to insult human dignity…” World Bank, 1975: ∞). Even more explicit and poignant is the definition of a poor woman, Moldova 1997: “Poverty is pain; it feels like a disease. It attacks a person not only materially, but also morally. It eats away one’s dignity and drives one into total despair” (World Bank, 2000:2).

Second, each definition leads to a different form of action depending on its point of emphasis. That being the case, it is important that each venture, either to study poverty or to reduce it, be preceded by an explanation of which type of poverty is under focus. In that way intervention can be focused and evaluation facilitated.

Different types of poverty are identified in the literature. Alcock (1993:8) notes three types. These are destitution, subsistence poverty and relative poverty. Destitution refers to a situation of extreme hardship or misery associated with starvation which at times may go with homelessness. Borrowing from Rowntree (1991) Alcock defines subsistence poverty as not having enough to get by, or not having enough to meet one’s basic needs. Relative poverty is a problem of inequality in a society whereby certain proportion of the society may have its basic needs met but many other social expectations cannot be met, resulting in exclusion of the people concerned from the customary standard of living in that society.

In terms of the World Bank (1975); Scott (1981); Ferge and Miller (1987) and The United Nations (1998) poverty comes in two forms namely, absolute poverty and relative poverty. Absolute poverty, as identified by the four sources, is similar to Rowntree’s subsistence poverty. It means the inability of individuals or families to maintain a minimal or acceptable standard of living in a society because of lack of resources. In other words, it is concerned with non-fulfillment of basic material needs commonly cited as food, clothing and shelter. However, it is important to note that basic needs may vary between and within societies over time, depending on the level of development of the society. For example, in 1901 Rowntree in Alcock (1993:60) identified tea as basic to a
British diet. Incidentally, tea is considered as a luxury for an ordinary Lesotho citizen. In a subsequent study, forty years later, Rowntree extended the list of basic items in a British diet thus indicating that basic needs are not static but evolve with society. Relative poverty, just like in the case of Alcock (1993) is an aspect of social inequality. It means that part of the society is lacking the resources to permit a full social membership in a given society, or at least allow living conditions customary in the society.

Without in any way downplaying other types of poverty, this study focuses on reduction of absolute poverty in the rural areas of Lesotho precisely because about 83% of Lesotho’s population lives in the rural areas (Mensah, 1999:17). A large portion of these (65%) are considered to be poor, constituting 90% of the total number of people under poverty line in Lesotho (UNDP, 1997:17 and Sechaba Consultants, 2000:10). Thus, the need for renewed strategies against poverty, particularly in the rural areas, need not be emphasized.

The study seeks to answer a number of questions concerning the realities of poverty and poverty reduction in Lesotho focusing on “self-help” policies. What is the nature and content of self-help policies in Lesotho? Has self-help achieved any significant results in terms of reducing absolute poverty for the participants? What factors affect the performance of self-help policies? How can the policies be improved? These and other questions will be addressed.

1.2 BACKGROUND

Since independence, 4th October, 1966, Lesotho has consistently implemented poverty reduction policies. The bulk of these policies are in the form of self-help policy projects. Over time, each successive government varied the nature and content of self-help policy projects while at the same time accusing the preceding government of using ‘self-help’ as a political weapon.
The people who participate in self-help activities are remunerated with food items like maize meal, cooking oil, powdered milk and other food items. At times the package comes with a stipulated sum of money. A common complaint has been that participation in self-help activities is based on party politics. The activities have also been seen to precede the elections operating at full capacity as and when the election date approaches. Moreover, the self-help activities are controlled by the ruling party village committees and not the village committee development committees.

Indications are that self-help policies have achieved little, if any success, in terms of reducing poverty. In spite of them being in place for more than 30 years a large proportion of the rural population in Lesotho is poor (Government of Lesotho, 1996:iii; United Nations Development Programme, 1997:7; Mensah, 1999:225; Sechaba Consultants, 2000:10 and Government of Lesotho, 2000:18). In particular, Sechaba Consultants provide a progressive statistical scenario of Lesotho’s households “below poverty line”. The poor households made up 49% of the population in 1990, 71% in 1993 and 65% in 1999. Although the figures fluctuate, nevertheless the level of poverty is considerably high. Even more disturbing is the indication that 54% of the rural population is poor (UNDP, 1997:17 and GOL, 2001: iii). And, as mentioned earlier, the rural population makes up 90% of the poor in Lesotho. Needless, therefore to say that rural poverty in Lesotho is, and should be cause for great concern.

An alternative but reinforcing explanation of Lesotho’s poverty level, is its high Gini coefficient of 0.60 in the period 1986/7, increasing to 0.66 during 1994/5 (Kingdom of Lesotho, 2005:9). The Gini Coefficient is derived from the Lorenz curve and it is an indirect measure of poverty in the sense that it indicates the level of inequality in society. Its values range between 0 and 1, where zero represents perfect equality and 1 the highest level of inequality. Thus, countries with a Gini Coefficient of 0.50 and above are considered by the economists to have high levels of inequality. In that way, a Gini Coefficient of 0.66 suggests that a large proportion of the Basotho (people who live in Lesotho) is unable to meet its basic needs, implying at the same time high levels of poverty. Needless to say that it is the rural areas that suffer more the incidence and
severity of poverty, given that 83% of Lesotho’s population, as said earlier, lives in the rural areas. Hence, the focus of the study.

1.3 PROBLEM STATEMENT

The persistence of poverty, particularly in the rural areas of Lesotho, raises a number of questions. Does poverty persist because of the failure of policies that try to improve the functional distribution of income such that relative factor prices reflect relative factor scarcity? Is it the failure of redistributive policies such that they do not transfer a sizeable proportion of the national savings and investment to the lower income groups? Is it the inaccessibility of quality education to the rural communities that compounds the problem of rural poverty? Is it the failure of land reform measures? These and other questions can be asked indicative of the fact that not a single policy but a cluster of policies have been implemented in Lesotho to counteract poverty. However, the study focuses on ‘self-help’ policies which constitute a direct attack on poverty in the rural areas of Lesotho since independence. Specifically, the study is an attempt to explain the reasons for the limited performance of the self-help policies in reducing poverty.

1.4 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES

The aim of the study is to analyze critically the self-help projects as instruments for poverty reduction in post independence Lesotho. Specifically, the study seeks to:

- establish the nature and content of post-independence self-help projects in Lesotho;
- establish the extent of political influence in self-help;
- describe the performance of self-help; and
- establish reasons for the limited performance of self-help.
1.5 HYPOTHESES

The study is guided by the following major hypotheses:

- If the nature and content of self-help policies were geared towards poverty reduction, poverty would be reduced;
- Political dominance of self-help issues hampers poverty reduction.

1.6 METHODOLOGY

1.6.1 Research Design

This study is a kind of ex-post evaluation (see section 1.10). It is an assessment of the outcome of self-help projects which the government of Lesotho implemented since independence, 1966. The study seeks to establish whether self-help projects reduce poverty in the rural areas of Lesotho by enabling the participants to meet the basic needs of food, clothing and shelter on a sustainable basis.

Several research designs were contemplated for this thesis. First, is the pretest-posttest approach (Tripodi, 1985:251 and Babbie, 1993:246). In this design, the researcher would compare the living standards of the participants ‘now’ with what they were some time in the past, preferably just before Lesotho’s independence, 1966. Then, an attempt would be made to trace through the causes of improvement, if any, throughout the application of self-help projects. The exercise would no doubt be very demanding and even go beyond the resources made available for the study. However, the greatest obstacle has been the lack of base-line data.

The second alternative is the contrasted group approach (Tripodi, 1985:251 and Babbie, 1992:246) whereby the living standards of the participants ‘now’ would be compared with those of the non-participants ‘now’ and then the causes of the differences
established. The major consideration was whether it would be possible to identify the differences in the living standards of the two groups and to separate the causes of the noticeable differences. The exercise appeared cumbersome for two reasons. First, the two groups would be substantially different even before the commencement of the self-help projects, thus putting to question the very basis of comparison. Second, it would be difficult to separate the causes of the differences given the multitude of factors that play a part in determining one’s standard of living, some of which may be temporary while others may be permanent.

The third alternative and the one which the author finally settled for, is a mixture of two approaches namely, a literary study and a survey of the beneficiaries of self-help projects. Thus, the study uses secondary and primary data. Secondary data come from government files and documents, project records, newspapers, books and other relevant written material. Secondary data helps explain various aspects including the nature and content of the self-help projects, the actors and importantly the political driving forces behind poverty reduction initiatives. Primary data is used to assess the performance of the self-help projects in reducing poverty in the rural areas of Lesotho. Focus is on the ability of the projects to enable the participants to satisfy the basic needs of food, clothing and shelter on a sustainable basis.

A mixture of these approaches was preferred for two reasons. First, each of the approaches is practicable and each has the potential to produce credible results on its own. Second, multiple lines of evidence frequently provide better evidence and are more credible than any single design (Mayne, 1992:213 and De Vos et al, 2002:363).

The selected approach may be less accurate than using a baseline study which was specifically designed to facilitate a later evaluation. However, direct involvement of the target group also enhances the credibility of the results of the investigation. The claim is based on the believe that most of the beneficiaries are conscious of the evolution of their situation and, to a certain extent, are able to identify the factors that overtime have improved or aggravated their conditions of life. In other words, they can attach some
value to the role of self-help projects in influencing the indicators of poverty adopted in this thesis.

1.6.2 Measurement

The study will conclude that the self-help projects have failed to reduce poverty if the majority of the beneficiaries are of the view that the self-help projects do not help them access food, clothing and shelter on a sustainable basis. This measurement criteria is supported by Riddell (1992:127) The author indicates that for projects that have a social component the issue should neither be the nature, accuracy and ‘objectivity of quantitative data nor the ‘subjectivity’ of qualitative data. Rather of concern should be “the level of consensus over whether objectives have been reached” [emphasis original].

To be sure, what Riddell means is that a project with a social component should be judged by the extent to which a particular judgement about attainment of the objectives is shared by the different relevant actors. For the purpose of this thesis the relevant actors are the beneficiaries of self-help projects in the rural areas of Lesotho.

1.6.3 Data collection

The study combines qualitative and quantitative approaches. Although such a combination is discouraged by De Vos (2002:364) it could, however not be avoided because of the dual nature of the research problem. First, the study seeks to establish whether self-help is used as a political weapon by the political elite. Second, the study is an assessment of the performance of self-help projects in reducing poverty. As it is, the two research problems lend themselves to two different research methods, a literary search and a survey of the target population respectively. While the two may seem to be clearly separate studies the connection lies in the extent politicization influences the performance of self-help as a poverty reduction strategy.
1.6.3.1 Triangulation

In conducting the study several data sources were used. These include literary search, survey of the participants in self help projects and a survey of the government officials involved in the administration of the projects. The process of combining several sources of information in one study is referred to as triangulation (Babbie, 1992:109; Welman and Kruger, 1999:192 and Mills, 2009:43). Triangulation is regarded as a valuable research strategy because it enables researchers to test the same finding using different research methods. It is a strategy for improving the validity and reliability of research findings (Lefoka, 2011:42).

- **Literary search**

The literary search comprises two levels. The first general level provides a framework for chronological phases in the development as well as the conceptualization and application of self-help. Sources come mainly from the main library of the University of the Free State (UFS), the main library of the National University of Lesotho (NUL), the library of the Ministry of Planning and Economic Development in Maseru, the United Nations library in Maseru, the Transformation Resource Centre in Maseru, and the State Library-Lesotho.

The second level focuses on policy making and poverty reduction in Lesotho. Data come from the Ministry of Planning and Economic Development in Maseru, the main library of the National University of Lesotho, the National Archives, the Institute of Southern African Studies in Roma and selected government ministries that identify with poverty reduction.

- **Survey Research**

Primary data was collected through a sample survey. A major reason for sampling is feasibility (Sarankatos, 1999:139). A comprehensive coverage of the population is
prohibitive both in terms of time and resources, let alone the complexity of processing, analyzing and interpreting the data (Strydom, and Venter, 2002:199).

Structured interviews were used to collect the data. To this effect, questionnaires comprising open-ended and closed-ended questions were administered with the help of research assistants who hold a Bachelor of Arts Degree. Closed ended questions solicited the background of the respondents while the open-ended questions dealt with substantive matters. Open ended questions enabled the respondents to express their views and opinions on the role of self-help in improving their conditions of life. They also helped avoid researcher bias.

Focus groups were held wherever possible. These provided supplementary data.

1.6.4 Sampling techniques

Multistage cluster sampling was used to select the district and the villages to be included in the study. Purposive and snowball sampling were used to select the beneficiaries of self-help projects in the selected villages.

- **Multistage cluster sampling**

Multistage cluster sampling is appropriate where it is not possible to list the individuals in the population and, therefore, impossible to get to the population directly (Babbie, 1992:218 and Fowler, 1993:18). The approach is based on probability sampling and as such it enhances the representativeness of the sample, hence the generalizability of the results.
The process of choosing the respondents proceeded in three stages as explained below.

**Step 1**

The first stratum comprised the ten districts of Lesotho. One district was chosen through the use of random numbers table.

**Step 2**

The second stratum comprised the villages in the selected district. Through use of the *1996 Lesotho Population Census Village List* published by the Bureau of Statistics-Maseru, five villages were selected from the chosen district. The procedure for selecting the villages is described below.

**Step 3**

The third stratum comprised the villagers in the selected villages. From each village twenty people who participated in self help activities were selected into the study. Such people were identified with the help of the chief in each village. Self identification was also allowed to ensure that the right people were included in the study.

Originally, the researcher intended to select five villages from the chosen district through use of random numbers table. However, for economic considerations a slight modification was made to the procedure. Only one village within the district was randomly selected. Then within an estimated 10 kilometer radius of the randomly selected village, a list of villages was prepared with the assistance of an official in the Department of Land Survey and Physical Planning. From the resultant list of surrounding villages, four villages were randomly selected through use of random numbers table, thus, bringing to five the number of villages in the district, to be included in the study. The modification aimed mainly at reducing travel costs within the district.

The above modification enjoys the support of Strydom and Venter (2002:198) who note that, in cluster sampling the researcher can concentrate the field study in a specific section of the greater geographical area and thus save costs and time. However, the
authors caution that, in order to maintain credibility of the results, a researcher, in attempting to retain areas that are naturally grouped together should ensure that variations between clusters are small. Indeed, in this case the variations are small because all the villages selected into the study obtain in the rural areas where conditions of living are comparable and self-help projects are prevalent.

It is also worth noting that in steps 1 and 2 above probability sampling was used. In that way each district and each village had equal chance of being selected into the study. However, in step 3 use of probability sampling was not possible because not all villagers participate in self help projects. Thus, a combination of purposive and snowball sampling was used.

The multistage cluster sampling described above produced the results as in Table 1.1 below. Berea district was randomly selected from the ten districts of Lesotho. From the district five villages were randomly selected into the study.

Table 1.1: District and Villages included in the study

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Villages</th>
<th>Berea District</th>
<th>Constituency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Khotsis*</td>
<td>21</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nokong</td>
<td>20</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ha Mokhath</td>
<td>23</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khafung</td>
<td>23</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Majaheng</td>
<td>23</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: * Denotes a village that was randomly selected. A number next to the village represents the constituency in which the village obtains. The constituencies suggest that the villages may not necessarily have the same political orientation.

Figure 1.1 below is a location map of Lesotho showing its ten districts and highlighting the district that makes the study area.
Figure 1.1: Location map of Lesotho showing its ten districts and the district that makes the study area.

Source: Adapted from Mashinini, (2000:74).
Purposive and snowball sampling

Purposive sampling was used to select the villagers into the study whereby the village chief was asked to provide the names of the villagers who participate in self-help projects. In the cases where people identified by the chief were not available for interview, the respondents were asked to suggest alternative names of participants.

1.6.5 Sample size

A sample of 100 respondents was worked upon. Admittedly the size of the sample is not based on any rigorous calculations. While this would have been desirable the controversy surrounding the sample size constitutes the first major problem. In fact, marked “differences of opinion exist with regard to the minimum number of respondents that should be involved in an investigation” (Strydom and Venter, 2002:200). Some writers suggest 10%, others suggest a range of percentages from 1% to 100% depending on the size of the population (Ibid: 2002:201 and Fowler, 1993:33). Some little comfort for the selected sample size is provided by Fowler who writes:

A sample size of 150 people will describe a population of 15,000 or 15 million with virtually the same degree of accuracy, assuming that all other aspects of the sample design and sampling procedures were the same (Fowler, 1993:33).

Economic considerations also influenced the sample size. Even if the researcher were to use the lowest of the suggested sample sizes, that is 1%, the calculations would result in a sample size, the analysis of which would exceed the time and the resources available for the study. More so because over 80% of Lesotho’s population of 1.8 million lives in the rural areas, the study area for this thesis.
1.7 EXPLANATION OF TERMS

**Poverty** – for the purpose of this study poverty is taken in its absolute sense. It means the inability of an individual to satisfy the basic needs of food, clothing and shelter.

**Political influence** – the extent to which government intervention is seen to satisfy an identified political need, for example, mobilizing support, winning the elections or legitimizing the government’s position.

**Self-help** – refers to a government intervention that purports to assist the poor to get out of poverty largely through their own efforts.

1.8 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY

The study is a critical analysis of post-independence self-help policies in Lesotho. Hopefully, based on the findings Lesotho is conscientized towards reviewing its poverty reduction policies and related structures. If the views and aspirations of the rural poor, as expressed during the survey, are taken into account, no doubt, such a review will create clearly identifiable pathways out of poverty such that the rural poor are no longer tied into a scheme of dependence on government intervention.

1.9 SCOPE OF THE STUDY

As indicated earlier, poverty is generally defined as a non-fulfillment of material, social and emotional needs. In practice, each type of poverty requires a different form of counter action. Despite the multidimensional nature of poverty, the study focused on material poverty without in any way implying that the other forms of poverty are less significant or less damaging to human potential. The study examined the realities of material poverty and reduction of same in post-independence Lesotho, particularly in the rural areas. It sought to establish the extent self-help activities enable the participants to meet the basic needs of food, clothing and shelter on a sustainable basis. It did not
investigate the extent social and emotional needs of the participants have been satisfied. No doubt, these other types of poverty are prevalent in Lesotho and definitely warrant investigation to determine their scope, severity and possible counter measures.

1.10 LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY

The study sought to establish the performance of self-help policies at the national level and to explain the reasons for their modest success, if any. Ideally, such a study should have had a wider coverage and a bigger sample in order to enhance the extent the results can be generalized. However, due to financial and time constraints the study used multistage cluster sampling to select a sample of 100 participants drawn from a randomly selected district, and five randomly selected villages out of an estimated 1500 villages in Lesotho. Multistage cluster sampling, in itself, enhances the representativeness of the sample as it deploys probability sampling (see section 1.5.4). In that way, the findings can safely be generalized to the population of the rural people in Lesotho who participated in self-help activities.

1.11 REASONS FOR EVALUATING SELF-HELP PROJECTS

Like all other policy initiatives, self-help projects are experimental in nature and most often, their primary concern is to test full scale production technology and to organize effective delivery systems for disseminating results or distributing outputs (Rondinelli, 1992:21). If that is so, there is need to determine whether projects do achieve their objectives. In the event they do not meet their objectives, the need is to establish the factors that affect their performance. On the other hand, if they achieve their objectives, lessons for replication are drawn. Evaluation makes all these possible.

Evaluation is a process that involves “systematically collecting, analyzing and reporting information about a program, service, or intervention for use in making decisions” (Hudson in Hudson et al, 1992:129). It is an information generating technique which provides a broad range of knowledge to meet specified needs. Generally, it provides
information on program delivery, program direction, common knowledge, and accountability. In the words of Mayne and Hudson (1992:2) “evaluation is more than just an analytical activity; it is an organizational learning process for reviewing, assessing, or reconsidering programs” [emphasis original]. Thus, evaluation can be used by agencies, governments and donors to ascertain the plausibility of their interventions in society, and to make decisions thereof.

The literature suggests three broad categories of evaluation namely, ex-ante, on-going and ex-post evaluation. The categorization is based on the time period in the life cycle of a project as in Figure 1.2 below. Ex-ante evaluations are carried out in the preparatory stages of the project. They form part of the planning process. In their various forms, ex-ante evaluations assess the pre-project situation and generate information concerning the need for intervention, the feasibility and appraisal of the proposed project activities, processes and procedures, inputs and outputs (Mashinini, 2000:64). In short, ex-ante evaluations provide information that enables policy-makers to make informed decisions on whether or not to implement a project and what type of activities can help achieve the desired objectives.

**Figure 1.2: Types of evaluation based on the life cycle of a project**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category of evaluation</th>
<th>Ex-ante</th>
<th>On-going</th>
<th>Ex-post</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Needs assessment</td>
<td>Monitoring implementation evaluation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feasibility</td>
<td>Efficiency</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appraisal</td>
<td>Impact</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


On-going or monitoring evaluations occur during the life of a project. Broadly, on-going evaluations answer two major questions. The first is whether implementation of a project conforms to the design of that project (Nutter, 1992:161). This question is necessitated by “the number and complexity of actions required to convert policies into viable field
operations that correspond reasonably well to original plans and intentions” (Mayne and Hudson, 1992:14). The second is whether the project activities achieve the expected results (Nutter, 1992:161). This latter question arises from the observation that most of the time projects benefit groups other than the intended target group or take some direction not originally envisaged. Thus, information from on-going evaluations can be used to improve the implementation process or to discontinue a project if that appears to be the best alternative.

Ex-post evaluations focus on the assessment of outcome measure and determination of how well these measures achieve the project objectives (Grinnell, 1986:439). Primarily, they address the efficiency and effectiveness of a project, where efficiency refers to the cost at which the objectives are met and effectiveness focuses on the degree to which objectives are attained through the project efforts. Thus, ex-post evaluations inform decisions on whether a project can be continued, replicated elsewhere or discontinued altogether.

1.12 THE STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS

This thesis comprises the following chapters:

**Chapter one – Introduction**

The chapter introduces the study through a discussion of the concept of poverty, background, problem statement, research objectives, hypotheses, significance of the study, scope of the study, limitations of the study and the need for evaluating self-help projects. The chapter also presents the scientific research methodology followed in conducting the study.

**Chapter two - An overview of poverty reduction strategies: A global perspective.**

The chapter presents a global perspective of the development strategies that were adopted in the developing world since the 1960s when the bulk of the LDCs attained independence. The discussion shows that, for various reasons, the strategies failed to improve the living conditions of the majority in these small countries with resultant
increase in poverty. The chapter proceeds to examine the concept of self-help, how it emerged and gained popularity as a ‘development’ strategy.

Chapter three - A theoretical perspective of poverty reduction policies and strategies in Lesotho

The chapter is an attempt to establish the elements and the coherence of the poverty reduction policy framework in Lesotho. In particular, the chapter discusses the evolution and the distinctive features of the poverty reduction framework in Lesotho. The purpose is to establish whether Lesotho has a clearly identifiable poverty reduction policy framework that effectively guides development initiatives, at least, at the theoretical level.

Chapter four – An analysis of the outcomes of poverty reduction policies and strategies in Lesotho

Chapter four examines the practice of poverty reduction through a discussion of the policies and strategies adopted and implemented in Lesotho to reduce poverty. The discussion highlights the problems and the challenges of policy implementation which help explain why poverty reduction policies in Lesotho achieve mixed results.

Chapter five - The dynamics of policy making in Lesotho.

The chapter is an analysis of the policy process in Lesotho. It is based on the assumption that the nature and content of public policy in Lesotho can be understood, at least in part, by trying to understand the distinctive features of the policy process itself. The chapter, therefore, discusses the policy institutions, the key actors in policy making and the power relations between the actors with the view to answer the question of where power lies in Lesotho, and implications thereof.
Chapter six – Presentation of the research results.

In chapter six data is analyzed with the view to establish the extend the self-help projects contribute towards the improvement of the condition of life of the participants and thereby reduce poverty in Lesotho. It also seeks to establish the extent political factors influence the performance of self-help activities.

Chapter seven - Conclusion and recommendations.

Chapter seven, which is also a concluding chapter, is a summary of the findings of the study. It also proceeds to make recommendations which, if adopted, can hopefully enhance the performance of the poverty reduction policies and strategies in Lesotho, with emphasis on self-help projects.

1.13 CONCLUSION

Chapter one has introduced the study by providing a deeper understanding of poverty and its manifestations in different contexts. It has shown that poverty is increasing in Lesotho despite government’s efforts to improve peoples’ living conditions thus, prompting the need to explain the causes of this dilemma. The chapter went further to outline the scientific methodology to be deployed in investigating the causes of the mixed performance of the poverty reduction policies and strategies in Lesotho, with focus on self-help projects.
CHAPTER 2

AN OVERVIEW OF POVERTY REDUCTION STRATEGIES: A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE

2.1 INTRODUCTION

We are witnessing in countries throughout the world the expansion of prosperity for some, unfortunately accompanied by an expansion of unspeakable poverty for others. This glaring contradiction is unacceptable and needs to be corrected through urgent actions, in partnership with all actors of civil society and in the context of a multidimensional and integrated approach (United Nations, 1995:5).

It was in recognizing the escalating levels of poverty that the United Nations (UN) called the largest gathering yet of world leaders in March 1995, in Copenhagen – Denmark, under the umbrella of the World Summit for Social Development (WSSD). The largest gathering yet because for the first time in history, 117 heads of state and 14,000 participants met to pledge their commitment towards reducing and eventually eliminating poverty (United Nations 1997:2), the root cause of most social ills (UNDP, 1998:3). It was at this gathering where the world leaders “pledged to make the conquest of poverty, the goal of full employment and the fostering of stable, safe and just societies their overriding objectives (United Nations, 1995: viii).

Even though it was only towards the close of the 20th century that the UN visibly and markedly reacted to world poverty, the fight against poverty dates back to the 1950s. This was the time when the formerly colonized countries gained independence and vigorously pursued development with the view to improve the standards of living of their people who had been neglected and marginalized by the colonial administration. Worth noting is that “…until recently many countries have been led to assume that economic growth would eventually eliminate poverty – indeed that ‘development’ and ‘poverty
reduction’ were the same thing (UNDP, 1998:22). Thus, earlier development initiatives, at least at a theoretical level, were conceived to be poverty reduction strategies. Consequently, this chapter is an overview of poverty reduction strategies and unavoidably examines development initiatives up until the 1980’s when the fallacy between development and poverty reduction was systematically demystified by empirical evidence. Such evidence showed that most of the developing countries realized the UN target growth rate of the Gross National Product (GNP) ranging between 5-7 percent (World Bank, 1979:3; Todaro, 1982:95 and World Bank, 1984:11). However, in almost all of those countries inequality and the number of people living on less than $1 a day were also increasing (World Bank, 1984:47; World Bank, 2000:4 and World Bank, 2003:1). In other words, poverty was increasing despite attainment of the impressive economic growth rates in the developing countries. Thus, development theorists and practitioners realized that development and poverty reduction were not synonymous.

The chapter is divided into six sections, including the Introduction. Section 2 is a discussion of the era of economic growth or overall growth. Section 3 presents the experiences of sectoral growth. Section 4 discusses what may be referred to as a multifaceted approach. This approach is largely grounded in the lessons of experience from the two preceding periods namely, the eras of overall growth and sectoral growth. The three sections, read together, also attempt to show that the definition of development, at any given time, had and continues to have a profound bearing on the nature and content of development strategies or poverty interventions. Sections five and six focus on the concept of self-help, which is one of those development approaches that purport to attack poverty at its roots.

2.2 THE ERA OF ECONOMIC GROWTH OR OVERALL GROWTH

In the 1950’s and early 1960’s development was defined in strict economic terms. It meant the ability of an originally stagnating national economy, to generate and sustain an annual growth rate of the GNP of about 5-7 percent or more (Rostow in Todaro, 1982:88). A closely related measure of development was the per capita GNP which
measured the ability of a nation to expand its output at a rate faster than the growth of the population (Todaro, 1982:95). This latter definition implied that if a country increased the rate of production of goods and services faster than the population growth, then consumption and investment would be adequately serviced.

Following directly from the above definitions of development in economic terms, development strategies of the 1960s-1980s centered around stimulating the GNP through rapid urban industrialization and development of infrastructure (Gaitskell, 1976:59; Todaro, 1982:199 and Moyo, 2009:14, 16). The approach had two underpinnings. First, it was grounded in the experiences of the Marshall Plan named after its advocate, the US Secretary of State of the time, George C. Marshall. The plan provided a rescue package of up to US$20 billion (over US$100 billion in today’s terms) for the reconstruction of the ravaged European economies after World War II (Arkes, 1972:3; Todaro, 1982:88 and Moyo, 2009:12). The reconstruction of Europe was rapid and straightforward precisely because the money was “… going into already existing physical, legal and social infrastructures which simply needed fixing” (Moyo, 2009:11). The experiences of the Marshall Plan inspired the development process of the formerly colonized nations that attained independence in the 1960s. To be sure, the development theorists believed that injection of financial and technical assistance into the economies of the emerging new states would lead to development in the same way as it happened in Europe (Todaro, 1982:88 and Moyo, 2009:13).

Second, the approach was influenced by the ‘linear growth models’ advocated by prominent economists of the time notably Rostow (1960) and Lewis in Todaro (1982:209). These economists drew lessons from the industrialization process of Europe and held that a developing economy passes through a series of stages ranging from traditional to a stage of high mass consumption (the current stage of development of the developed countries). The conclusion was based on the observation that the economies of the European countries were once primitive. However, by investing in industry, the countries continuously absorbed labour from the rural areas and increased production of goods and services to reach their current high levels of development. The linear growth
models converge on the point that movement from one stage to another is determined by the level of savings and investment in an economy. Consequently, the economies that could not generate savings, such as those of the newly independent nations of Africa, Latin America and Asia, required injection of capital from foreign sources, if they were to develop. Noteworthy is that during the era of economic growth, poverty reduction was not explicitly stated because by then, theorists and practitioners alike, viewed development and poverty reduction as one and the same thing.

Based on the experiences of the Marshall Plan and the influence of the ‘linear growth models’, foreign aid and technical assistance became the pillars of development. The developed countries and the international organizations such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) actively mobilized foreign aid with the view to assist the new states to enhance their rate of economic growth. Focus was on building roads and railroads, factories, power stations, airports, banking institutions and increasing production through mechanization (Gaitskell, 1976:59). The approach was based on a genuine conviction that the ‘invisible hand’ would ensure that the benefits of such practical initiatives would ‘trickle down’ by way of increased job opportunities and, thus, raise the standard of living of the poor.

However, the development oriented literature provides overwhelming evidence to the effect that foreign aid contributed little to development, even less to poverty reduction. If anything at all, decades of official aid to the developing countries have largely entrenched privilege and through the debt crisis, increased impoverishment leaving the poor increasingly marginalized and disregarded (Bunting, 1976:36; Griffin, 1979:361; ICAI, 1987:31; Clark, 1995:25 and Coetzee, 1996:140). In Clark’s own words: “The failures of mainstream development have been brought into sharp relief in recent years by the waves of famine in Africa, by unfolding environmental disasters and by the debt crisis…(Clark, 1995:4).

Even more specific is Bunting who notes that:
Though many of the poorer countries may well point with pride to the substantial rates at which their economies have grown, [but]… it has become abundantly plain that poverty cannot automatically be cured by economic growth as such, essential as that is in all the poor countries (Bunting, 1976:39) [my emphasis].

The search for an alternative approach to development gave rise to sectoral growth the explanation and discussion of which follow in the next section.

2.3 THE ERA OF SECTORAL GROWTH

Despite the fact that the UN declared the 1960’s and 1970’s ‘development decades’ because of the attainment of 6 per cent economic growth rate in most of the developing countries, problems of poverty, disease, rural-urban migration, squalor and destitution were on the increase (Todaro, 1982:95). The gap between the rich and the poor countries increased. Similarly, the gap between the poor and the rich in the developing countries widened (Rondinelli, 1990:10 and UNDP, 2003:46). By the mid-1970’s it had become abundantly plain that poverty cannot automatically be cured by economic growth as such, especially because few, if any, of the poorer countries had sufficient mechanisms for the economic or social redistribution of the proceeds of growth (Bunting, 1976:39). Thus, towards the end of the 1970’s the GNP lost popularity as a measure of development (Clark, 1995:24; Todaro 1982:95; Rondinelli, 1990:7-8).

All of the above were cause for concern amongst the development activists. This general discontent led to a re-thinking of the meaning of development. Following debates between world economists and policy makers in different forums, the term came to be “…re-defined in terms of the reduction or elimination of poverty, inequality and unemployment within the context of a growing economy” (Todaro, 1982:95). This latter definition of development implies that economic growth was to be pursued but along with it should be the betterment of the human condition. By implication, there was need for a development approach that could serve both the need for economic growth and the need to reduce poverty.
The new school of thought gave rise to what can be referred to as sectoral growth which implied focusing development efforts in a specific sector on the assumption that the development of one sector would automatically lead to the transformation of others (Bunting, 1976:33). This represented a departure from the era of overall growth wherein development efforts focused on building infrastructure and industrializing across the economy. For purposes of sectoral growth a choice was mainly between the agricultural sector and the industrial sector, the two sectors whose levels of productivity determine the welfare of a society. The relevance of the two sectors is confirmed by Meier (1976:5) in noting that the relevant economic question for the poor countries was whether agricultural development or industrial development was the appropriate strategy for accelerating their economic development. Indications are that agricultural development took precedence over industrial development for a number of reasons. First, and perhaps most important, the bulk of the poor in the developing countries lived (and still live) in the rural areas where they derive a living from subsistence agriculture (World Bank in Meier, 1976:562). That being the case, improving agricultural productivity implied improving the living standards of the majority and thereby reducing poverty. Second, development of agriculture would transform the economy in a number of ways: a surplus for non-agricultural populations would emerge; raw materials for industry would be produced within the domestic economy; and imports would be substituted while exports would increase (Bunting, 1976:33 and Meier, 1976:563). Thus, an agriculturally biased development strategy embraced improvement of the living standards of the rural poor on the one hand, and the aspects of a growing economy on the other.

Despite the promises held by an agriculturally biased strategy, it was not long before reality showed that agriculture had the tendency to increase inequality (Bunting, 1976:37; Griffin, 1979:361; Clark, 1995:21). A number of reasons were advanced for the poor performance of agriculture in promoting development and reducing rural poverty in the developing countries. First, the lack of social or political regulation led to a situation whereby new technology favoured the more enterprising, the more resourceful, the more industrious and the more wealthy farmers (Bunting 1976:37). Second, agricultural
extension services favoured the larger farmers, credit schemes benefited the already wealthy, and food aid was siphoned off by government officials (Clark, 1995:21). In addition, Griffin (1979:361) in a study of the rural areas of Asia, noted that the rate of agricultural output bears little relevance to rural poverty. The author established that hunger and impoverishment have more to do with the quality of economic growth in a developing economy, that is, allocative and redistributive efficiency, than with the growth of the agricultural sector. That is why, for example, in the rural areas of Asia average incomes increased noticeably with improved agricultural productivity, but the majority of the rural population experienced a decline in their standard of living (Griffin, 1979:370). Similarly, the introduction of advanced agricultural technology “helped turn countries such as India from being food-deficient to food exporters, but there are [in India] more hungry people than ever before” (Clark, 1995:4).

Lele (1976:262) provides additional reasons for the ineffectiveness of agriculture in improving the living standards in the rural areas. Amongst these can be mentioned land policies which favoured a few, substitution of basic crops by export crops, urban biased pricing and marketing policies which lowered the food crop prices as against non-food crop prices. A cumulative effect of these measures, the author concluded, was increased rural poverty.

The widespread discontent with the performance of agriculture in reducing rural poverty placed in doubt the adequacy of sectoral growth as a development strategy, and stirred a clamour for a new approach. This also put to test the concurrent meaning of development and prompted the need to link the development process with elimination of poverty, misery and disease. Thus, in the late 1980’s development came to be viewed “…as a multidimensional process involving changes in structures, attitudes and institutions as well as the acceleration of economic growth, the reduction of inequality and eradication of absolute poverty (Todaro, 1982:96).

This latter definition represented a significant departure from the ‘trickle down’ rhetoric, embodied in the overall growth and sectoral growth approaches, to more focused...
activities against poverty. A clear direction was to be given by Robert S. McNamara, the
then President of the World Bank, who unequivocally highlighted the areas of focus of
the renewed strategies. Amongst other things, the new programme was to include rapid
land and tenancy reform, better access for the poor to credit, expansion of potable water
supplies, extension of technical assistance to subsistence farmers, greater access by the
poor to public services. Most critical, such a programme was to be characterized by
emergence and support of rural institutions and organizations that would “…give as much
attention to promoting the inherent potential and productivity of the poor as is generally
given to protecting the power of the privileged” (McNamara in Rondinelli, 1992:10). In
short, McNamara called for an approach that embraced all aspects of meaningful human
survival.

No doubt, by virtue of being the President of the World Bank, McNamara influenced a
major shift of emphasis at both the national and international levels, giving rise to a
proliferation of activities the common thread of which was “direct attack on poverty”.
The sum total of these activities translated into what can be referred to as a ‘multifaceted
approach’, the tenets of which are discussed below.

2.4 THE MULTIFACETED APPROACH

At a general level, the ‘multifaceted approach’ can be defined as a development strategy
that seeks to improve the conditions of living of the poor and the underprivileged by
removing the economic, social and political constraints that perpetuate their predicament.
Thus, it embraces all aspects of human well-being.

The ‘multifaceted approach’ derives its contents from two theoretical underpinnings.
First, it is derived from the various meanings of development that emerged during the late
1980s to early 1990s. Contrary to earlier definitions of development that focused on
economic growth as an indicator of development, the emergent definitions laid emphasis
on the well being of the people as a measure of development. The shift of emphasis at a
theoretical level translated into renewed development strategies that embraced the new
thinking. Second, ‘the multifaceted approach’ is derived from the experiences of past
development strategies which were implemented during the eras of overall growth and
sectoral growth as highlighted in Sections 2.2 and 2.3. Such strategies concentrated on
improvement of the physical structures and material objects and neglected the people. As
a result, poverty increased. An important lesson from those strategies was that
development is a multidimensional process which can be achieved only through
implementation of a variety of strategies that address the various factors underlying
poverty and human suffering. The ‘multifaceted approach’ recognizes this truism.

2.4.1 Factoring in the ‘human element’ in development

As indicated earlier, by the 1980s it had become clear to development activists that the
development strategies adopted in the developing countries since the 1960s were not
achieving expected results. To be sure, poverty was increasing despite achievement of
significant economic growth by most of the developing countries. Thus, in the late 1980s
to early 1990s the meaning of development was questioned from various quarters (Clark,
1995:23; Chambers, 1993:168; Coetzee, 1989:40; Leroke, 1996:222, and UNDP,
1998:14). The fundamental re-thinking of development was largely stirred by the
apparent failure of growth strategies that focused on the improvement of structures and
material objects thus making human beings a secondary priority. Disturbed by this
anomaly Leroke (1996:222), amongst others, questioned the wisdom of improving the
structures and material objects, which quite often, have very little influence on the quality
of life of the ordinary people. According to Leroke, meaningful “…development is for
the people and by the people. From all directions development [should] be seen as driven
by the interests of human subjects.” The author concluded.

Reinforcing the human aspect in development, Clark broadly defines the term as a
process that seeks to improve the society. Since society is made up of the people, the
author argues, improving society means “…enabling people to achieve their aspirations”
(Clark, 1995:26).
Equally stressing placement of human beings at the center of development is Coetzee (1989:40). Concerned about the modest performance of past development strategies, Coetzee deeply reflected on the meaning of development and concluded that:

…development has to be **firmly based in human well-being, the quality of human life and a great deal of esteem**. It has to focus on the aspirations and needs of the people as defined by the people themselves (Coetzee, 1989:40) [my emphasis].

A common thread in the definitions of development in the late 1980s to early 1990s is their specific focus on the people – in particular, people’s aspirations – people’s self-determination. This is what Chambers (1993:188) refers to as “…a new professionalism of putting the last first”, where ‘putting the last first’ refers to placing the poor peoples’ well-being as a primary objective of development efforts and acknowledging other associated benefits of development such as economic growth, as a secondary priority. This new professionalism contradicts the principles of development strategies that emphasized economic growth and gave less priority to the peoples’ well being.

Another intriguing feature of the definitions of development in the 1990s is their recognition of the term as a process of change that should go beyond mere satisfaction of the commonly referred to basic needs of food, clothing and shelter. The definitions describe development as a process that enables people to take charge of their own destinies and realize their full potential, as well as a process that should build up peoples’ confidence, skills, assets and freedoms (Coetzee, 1989:40; Clark, 1995:26 and Leroke, 1996:222) that contribute towards improvement of the quality of life. Thus, towards the close of the millennium, development came to be conceived of as a complex process that seeks to achieve a cluster of goals including: reduction of poverty, promotion of economic growth, improvement of health and education facilities, enhancing social security, dignity, personal freedom and respect for the poor, which are all the components as well as indicators of an improved quality of life for individuals and communities.
It is the re-examination and re-ordering of priorities within the meaning of development that, amongst others, prescribed a multifaceted approach to development, an approach that seeks to improve all aspects of human well-being. An approach, the success of which is measured not only by the GNP statistics, but also by the extent that individuals and communities are in charge of their future in a free and enabling environment. Not only did the redefinition of development impact on the current development initiatives but the experiences of past development strategies also had a significant influence on the multifaceted approach. The next section discusses the influence of these strategies on the multifaceted approach.

### 2.4.2 Experiences of past development strategies

Decades of experience revealed different aspects of development that reflect its complexity and uncertainty (Rondinelli, 1992:10). At this point interest is on the conditions that need to be fulfilled if development is to be achieved. Reality showed that development was, indeed, a function of three variables namely, capital, internal and external structures. In other words, for development to take place capital was necessary, but along with it should be an “appropriate” set of internal and external structures. According to the Institute of Cultural Affairs International (1987:31) internal structures include redistributive policies, policies that promote popular participation; society’s respect for democracy and policies that empower and protect the interests of the weaker groups in society. On the other hand, external structures refer to conditions in the international environment in as far as they affect the ability of the developing countries to reduce poverty and improve the standard of living of the poor. Of these can be mentioned international financial arrangements, terms of trade, debt and debt management, conditions for aid and sharing the benefits of global technology (ICAI, 1987:31; Rondinelli, 1990:10 and UNDP, 2003:146).

Internal structures are appropriate if they emphasize and support involvement of the people whose lives are affected by development initiatives. Such structures should promote sustainable livelihood by facilitating access to opportunities and services for the
disadvantaged. Further, the structures should empower the disadvantaged through organization and participation in all aspects of political, economic and social life with emphasis in planning and implementation of policies that affect them (United Nations, 1995:58). Put differently, internal structures are appropriate if they foster and strengthen self-determination of the poor, if they create clearly identifiable pathways out of poverty. Most importantly, if these structures help the poor people succeed in their own efforts, they thereby promote sustainable livelihoods, that is, they enable the poor to improve their standard of living by themselves and on an on-going basis.

External structures, on the other hand, are appropriate if they are sensitive and accommodative of the needs of the developing countries. Sensitivity and accommodativeness, need not be emphasized in view of the fact that previous international arrangements were not only ineffective in promoting economic progress but also reinforced those arrangements in the international economic system that worked to the disadvantage of the poor countries (Rondinelli, 1990:10). To use the author’s own words, the external environment “…was designed to attain the economic and political objectives of rich countries rather than to alleviate poverty or promote growth in developing nations” (Rondinelli, 1990:10). Imperative, therefore, is the need for fundamental changes in the external structures. Such changes, to mention a few, could include a review of the financial arrangements between the International Financial Institutions and the poor countries, as well as between the rich and the poor countries; emergence of international trade terms that favour the poor countries and management of debt such that the economies of the poor countries are not squeezed.

It seems helpful to substantiate the relationship between capital, internal and external structures. The UNDP provides such evidence from a study by the Knowledge Network for Poverty Reduction (KNPR) which is a global grouping of economists coordinated by the Social Development and Poverty Elimination Division of the UNDP. According to the UNDP (1998:42), the KNPR conducted a study of 38 countries, in 1996-97, to examine the relationship between economic growth and the proportion of people living in poverty. Two issues emerged from the study. First, in all those countries where
economic growth declined, poverty increased. Unexpectedly, in those countries where economic growth increased two scenarios emerged. In half of these countries poverty was declining and in another half, poverty was increasing. A further examination of the situation showed that those countries that reduced poverty, amongst them Tunisia, did not only pursue economic growth but, in addition, actively put in place a complementary set of policies, to ensure that the benefits of growth reach even the very poor. In other words, Tunisia made a deliberate attempt to put in place ‘appropriate’ internal structures. In the case of Tunisia, the internal structures included lowering inflation while increasing economic growth, investing in human development, promoting labour intensive technologies and funding a broad range of programmes to assist the needy (UNDP, 1998:45). Moreover, these countries rigorously tapped domestic capital sources to finance development.

The second group of countries, Ghana included, enjoyed a long period of economic growth. However, in Ghana, unlike in Tunisia, poverty remains widespread. The reasons for the persistence of poverty in Ghana are twofold. First, the country did not have an accompanying set of ‘appropriate’ internal structures such as redistributive policies. Thus, growth benefited a selected few, that is, the rich who were able to take advantage of emergent economic opportunities. Second, Ghana relied heavily on external borrowing and that kept the country deeply in debt (UNDP, 1998:43). Consequently, debt servicing absorbed a greater part of the generated wealth. Moreover, unlike Tunisia, Ghana relied on foreign direct investment, which unavoidably is capital intensive and thus, creates relatively few new jobs. Conclusively, failure to reform internal structures and heavy reliance on external structures, explain the prevalence of poverty in Ghana despite the country’s impressive economic growth rates.

Indeed, the results of the KNPR study are merely a confirmation of decades of experience which showed that development is, in fact, a function of a tripartite relationship between capital, internal and external structures. That is, for development to occur a country
Figure 2.1: The Development triad

Mobilization of Capital | Internal Structures | External Structures
--- | --- | ---
Structural adjustment | Redistribution policies | International arrangement
Public sector reforms | Popular participation | Terms of Trade
Privatization | Democratization | Debt and debt management
Lending. | Empowerment. | 

Source: Adapted from Institute of Cultural Affairs International, 1987, p.31.

should establish ‘a right mix’ of the above three components. Deducing from the KNPR study, the right mix appears to be domestically derived capital, a set of redistributive policies including specific programmes that each targets a specific disadvantaged group and lastly, reduced reliance on external structures. Thus, the rate, quality and pattern of development are determined, not only by the level of investment but also, by the way a country shapes its internal structures and the way it interacts with the outside world. Figure 2.1, above is a schematic representation of this emergent development triad.

The rest of the chapter is devoted to self-help, one of those internal structures widely adopted by the developing countries in their efforts to attack poverty at its roots.
2.5 THE CONCEPT OF SELF-HELP

This section defines self-help, identifies the different types of self-help and the relevance of each for development.

2.5.1 Defining self-help

Self-help is an open concept, that is, it is liable to different interpretations by different authors. As such, there is lack of consensus in its actual meaning. However, by and large, authors regard it as a voluntary group activity aimed at satisfying a specific identified social need (Katz and Bender, 1979:19; Mossmann, 1994:205; Freedman, 1985:136; Hughes, 1985:60; Clinard, 1968:203; Adams, 1993:1; and Ward, 1982:7).

Katz and Bender (1976:9) describe self-help groups as voluntary small group structures that are formed by peers with the aim of achieving a specific goal, accomplishment of which overcomes a common problem or brings about desired change in the lives of the individuals and/or the community in which they live. The authors share the view that self-help is a group effort. They also raise the important point that self-help is purposive. This means that it is always aimed at achieving a specific goal/objective. If that is so, self-help can be evaluated to ascertain the extent it achieves its goal. Hence an attempt by this study to assess the performance of self-help projects in Lesotho.

The authors further hold that self-help, in its original form, is endogenous. That is, it originates from within a group that feels the need for change. The desired change is in favour of the individual members and/or the group as a whole.

Hughes (1985:60) views self-help as a form of participatory institution used for the planning and implementation of community improvement projects. Like Katz and Bender, Hughes views self-help as a purposive and endogenous group effort. It is implied in this definition that when groups plan and implement community improvement projects they, in fact, seek their own improvement as individuals. The deduction is based
on the observation that self-help groups often seek to improve the communities which they originate from. If that is so, when communities improve, by implication, the individuals within them improve in one way or the other.

Hughes’ (1985:60) definition also suggests a link between self-help and community improvement/development. If such a link exists, then self-help, if appropriately designed, can be an effective instrument in community development. By implication, when communities develop, a country develops. Therefore, self-help, if given serious attention by politicians and development practitioners, it can turn out to be a viable national development strategy particularly where development is defined in terms of poverty reduction. To be sure, self-help can be a pathway to sustainable livelihoods, a situation whereby people have well established means of earning a living on an on-going basis.

Without attempting to exhaust the long list of definitions of self-help, it is helpful to consider the contributions of Mossmann (1994:205) and subsequently that of Adams (1993:1) who both add some salient points about self-help. Mossmann, while agreeing with the previous authors that self-help is a purposive group effort, goes on to note that “[t]he willingness to participate [in self-help] is most often present when individual interests are taken into account and responsibility is accepted accordingly…”(Mossman, 1994:205). If this is the case, it can be concluded that willingness to participate in self-help is enhanced where individual interests are given priority over mutual benefits, therefore, even if an activity benefits the whole group, individuals should perceive the potential for personal benefit/improvement. If not, the activity is most likely to lose support. For example, in Lesotho mothers from disadvantaged groups do not take children to the clinic for immunization if by doing so the mothers are not given food packages. This happens despite repeated official statements that immunization contributes to building a healthy nation. On the contrary, in the heydays of foreign food aid, mothers who took children to the clinic for immunization were given generous food packages and the clinics were overwhelmed with the numbers. Ideally, therefore, individual benefit should be prioritized in self-help with the view to promote willingness
to participate. In turn, willingness to participate is an important issue in self-help because it enhances sustainability of self-help activities.

Last but not least, Adams (1993:1) offers the following helpful definition of self-help:

Self-help may be defined as a process, group or organization comprising people coming together or sharing an experience or problem, with the view to individual and/or mutual benefit. As empowerment commonly means ‘becoming powerful’, self-help may thus be viewed as one form of empowerment (Adams, 1993:1).

Adams subscribes to the characteristics of self-help as advanced by the previous analysts. However, the author goes further and brings in the recently popularized concept in development, that of ‘empowerment’. According to Adams empowerment is “…a process by which individuals, groups and/communities become able to take control of their circumstances and achieve their own goals, thereby being able to work towards maximizing the quality of their lives” (Adams, 1993:43).

The crucial question is why people would aspire to empower themselves, as a group and as individuals. The answer is not hard to find. Wealthy people have power to determine their lifestyle and decide on their own destiny. The disadvantaged, the poor and the disorganized do not have any power, they are denied this fundamental right of self-determination by social and structural constraints. Thus, their lifestyles and their destinies are shaped by forces beyond their control. That is why self-help, becomes their desperate attempt to gain some power, however marginal.

Each of the foregoing definitions highlights some essential features of self-help. These features provide a basis for a working definition of self-help. Self-help is seen as a strategy used by the marginalized groups in a society to achieve personal and/or social goals, the primary goal being survival and eventually freedom from domination by the powerful groups. The next section presents the types of self-help.
2.5.2 Types of Self-help

In 1969 John F.C. Turner in collaboration with the Organization for Social and Technical Innovation (OSTI) conducted a survey of existing self-help and mutual-help housing programmes in the United States (Harms, 1982:28). In their report three types of self-help are identified. These are independent, organized and employed self-help. The classification is based on the degree of independence of the selfhelpers from outside aid. This classifying characteristic assumes success when external assistance is minimized and when independence of the self-helpers is maximized.

2.5.2.1 Independent self-help

Independent self-help refers to activities that are carried out by individuals and/or groups without external sponsorship, supervision or financial support except as solicited directly by the self-helpers themselves. The self-helpers design and implement their programmes at their own time and own pace. Independent self-help as it can be seen, affords self-helpers freedom of choice. That being the case, the self-help activity is designed to meet the specific needs as originally identified. Hence, demotivation leading to withdrawal is unlikely.

2.5.2.2 Organized self-help

Organized self-help is found where an activity is sponsored or supervised or supported or all three by agents such as the donors or the government. In this case the self-helpers do not initiate the effort. Their part is the decision to join the programme.

A major problem with organized self-help is that the programme as designed by the outsiders, may not meet the specifications and expectations of the participants in self-help projects. Indeed, empirical evidence on “harambee” (self-help in Kenya) confirms that “[t]here is a fundamental conflict in any community development program between the policies identified by governmental or other funding agencies and the needs felt within a
community” (Asiachi, 1979:65). This inherent difference of interests becomes an issue because if self-help is to succeed it “…should be accompanied by a feeling of ownership, sponsorship or involvement on the part of the group. It should instill a sense of personal pride on achievement” (Clinard, 1968:202). Clearly, in organized self-help all these basic requirements for success may be seriously lacking. First, the outsiders design the activities without involving the potential participants hence the latter fail to accept the activities as belonging to them. Second, the outsiders have no inside knowledge of the needs and priorities of the self-helpers, as such conflict of interests leading to demotivation is most likely.

2.5.2.3 Employed self-help

The third type is employed self-help. This type is found in situations where people participate in a programme initiated and run by one or more organizations. The people are employed for cash wages even though they are the beneficiaries of the programme. A case in point would be where an organization or government agency initiates and finances the installation of a village water supply system or a village recreational centre and invites the villagers to work as paid labourers in the programme.

The difference between organized and employed self-help is that in the latter, the decision to join the programme is partly influenced by the wage. In the same way as stated under organized self-help (Section 2.5.2.2), employed self-help may yield little or no commitment to the programme and thus the long-term success of the programme is compromised. For example, in the case of a village water supply system or the recreational centre, cited above, the villagers may not feel obliged to carry out maintenance activities if such efforts do not attract wages. Confirming the lack of commitment in employed self-help is Mashinini (2000:186) who notes that in Lesotho “communities refused to participate in the maintenance of feeder roads constructed by themselves for their own use and human development” because participation in construction attracted food rations and small financial payments, while participation in
maintenance had no rewards. What remains to be established scientifically is whether this would be case in all similar situations.

Using a social work perspective, Adams (1993:34) also provides a helpful classification of self-help. Table 2.1 below shows that self-help comes in three types namely, integral, facilitated and autonomous self-help. Adam’s classification is based on the degree of resourcing, leadership and support that comes from the sponsoring organization.

**Table 2.1 Types of self-help**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of self-help</th>
<th>Resourcing by sponsor</th>
<th>Leadership by Sponsor</th>
<th>Support by Sponsor</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Integral</td>
<td>Much or all</td>
<td>Direct/indirect</td>
<td>Regular</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Facilitated</td>
<td>Some</td>
<td>Indirect</td>
<td>Intermittent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Autonomous</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Adapted from Adams (1993:34).

It seems that Adam’s classification can better be understood by way of a continuum, the poles of which are integral and autonomous self-help.

The continuum, as in Figure 2.2 below, implies that self-help ranges from being heavily or fully sponsored to being independent/autonomous of outside help. The degree of assistance/support by a sponsoring organization situates a self-help activity on a specific point on the continuum such as \( SH_1 \) and \( SH_2 \). \( SH_1 \) denotes a self-help activity that enjoys a very high level of donor or government support while \( SH_2 \) stands for an activity that gets very little support from outside.

The above analysis is helpful particularly in conducting a comparative study of self-help activities. For example, one such study may seek to establish the extent to which external
Figure 2.2  Self-help as a continuum

Integral Facilitated Autonomous

Source: Own computation

Support influences the performance and sustainability of self-help activities. This can be achieved by comparing the performance of activities with a given level of external support with those that get little or no support. The information generated in that direction can highlight and inform policy alternatives for states and organizations that believe in self-help as a development and/or poverty reduction strategy.

- Integral Self-help

Integral self-help is initiated by a sponsoring organization and the degree of leadership and support by such an organization is high. This type may appear to contradict the very concept of self-help given the minimal role of the self-helper. However, there are cases where those in distress, those in poverty may not be in a position to start any meaningful self-help activity to address their predicament. For example, in the rural areas the old, the HIV/AIDS orphans, the sickly, the mentally ill and the physically handicapped cannot do much, if anything at all, about their poverty, their hunger. The predicament of these social groups is aggravated by the fact that social ties, the only ‘insurance’ of the underprivileged is fast declining mainly due to economic dislocation and political changes that cause conflict at household, community, regional and national levels (World Bank, 2002:7). Thus, without some form of intervention by the donors or the government, the plight of these people may be increased to inhuman levels. Hence, the imperative need for integral self-help in such cases.
According to Adams (1993:34), integral self-help can further be broken into two types, permanent and transitional. It is permanent where the people who are assisted cannot cope in life without the support of the initiating organization. Thus, the helping activity becomes the permanent responsibility of the sponsor. Transitional self-help refers to cases where the people who are assisted eventually gain some degree of independence or become independent all together.

**Facilitated Self-help**

Facilitated self-help occurs where an organization or government actively brings people together and sells to them the idea of self-help and subsequently supports them in self-help activities. Unell, 1987 in Adams, (1993:51) provides a number of ways in which an organisation or government can facilitate self-help:

- direct provision of practical resources;
- provision of access to resources elsewhere;
- creation of opportunities for people and groups to meet and to keep in touch;
- promotion of the idea of self-help; and
- giving new groups specific help.

Two situations represent facilitated self-help. First, is the case where the self-helpers themselves seek advice and some level of support in setting up or monitoring a self-help activity. In this case the members will have identified a problem and the activity to resolve same. The members are normally motivated to ensure the long-term success of the activity because they have a feeling of ownership which in turn breeds a sense of pride on achieving the goal. Second is the situation where an organization or government initiates a self-help activity, the potential participants of which have the requisite knowledge, skills and resources to run the activity on their own, provided they are given support during the initial stages. In order for the activity to succeed, the initiator may need to guard against demotivation of the self-helpers mainly by ensuring that individual benefit becomes the first priority.
The analogy applied in classifying integral self-help is applicable in facilitated self-help. Thus, there is permanent facilitated self-help and transitional facilitated self-help. Permanent facilitated self-help occurs where a self-help activity continues and is expected to continue throughout with the level of support from an organization or the government basically unchanged. An example would be a case where the government provides part of the resources and/or creates opportunities for groups to meet and keep in touch throughout the life of a self-help activity. Such on-going involvement of the government would have the effect of motivating the members and thus safeguarding the life of the activity.

Transitional facilitated self-help refers to a situation where an organization or government gradually withdraws its support for a self-help activity until a point where the self-helpers take full responsibility. In order to enhance the success of the facilitated self-help activity, Adams (1993:53) advises that, at the time of withdrawal, the sponsor needs to ensure that:

- the simple operational rules and procedures are well established;
- the requisite level of commitment has been built;
- effective leadership has emerged; and lastly
- the participants have acquired the necessary resources, skills and confidence.

Autonomous self-help

Autonomous self-help is similar to independent self-help identified earlier by Harms (1982:28) in sub-section 2.5.2. It refers to self-help activities that are initiated and implemented by the self-helpers without external sponsorship or supervision or financial support except where solicited by the participants themselves. Autonomous self-help is possible where the participants have the resources, skills, courage and confidence to carry out an activity that improves the quality of their lives. Often the participants will have been unhappy about an existing service or are marginalized one way or the other in the mainstream.

Autonomous self-help is of two types. It can be a substitute or an alternative to an existing service. However, the categorization is not rigid because an activity can have the effect of substituting a service while at the same time providing an alternative to an existing service. Use of examples in the next subsection will help clarify the two aspects of autonomous self-help.

2.5.3 Self-help and development

Adams (1993:34) concludes a classification of self-help with an interesting analogy which can usefully be applied to all other areas of self-help including employment, welfare, churches, medical services and infrastructure (Hake 1977 in Ward 1982:7), and education (Asiachi, 1979 and Keino, 1980) as well as development. The analogy identifies three scenarios each representing a different type of self-help. In the case of integral self-help the professional social workers drive the car. In facilitated self-help the social workers accompany the self-helpers who drive for themselves, while in the case of autonomous self-help the self-helpers are on their own and drive without the help of the social workers.

In the paragraphs below, the analogy is applied to the rural setting where the poor and their perceived helplessness have given an impetus to this study. The application of this
analogy to the rural setting gives rise to three scenarios explained below. These are integral self-help and development, facilitated self-help and development and lastly, autonomous self-help and development.

2.5.3.1 Integral self-help and development

In the rural setting in Lesotho, the case of integral self-help is found where the local agencies or the government or the international organizations, design and implement self-help activities, in the form of rural development projects, and require the rural people to join at the very last moment. Left with no choice, the poor have always signed in quickly and without question. Development oriented literature such as Rondinelli, 1990 and Chambers, 1993, suggest that during the 1960s to 1980s, this type of self-help formed the basis of rural development, not only in Lesotho, but in most of the less-developed countries.

Mashinini (2000:193) highlights some of the effects of development projects that exemplify integral self-help as an approach to development in Lesotho. The author argues that if anything at all, the projects stifled the initiative of the self-helpers – the rural poor – and increased their dependence on official handouts. Table 2.2 below presents a brief summary of some of the integral self-help projects adopted in Lesotho during the 1970s to 1980s. Even though the selected projects focused on improving agricultural production, it needs to be noted that integral self-help penetrated other activity areas such as education, construction of rural feeder roads and bridges, clinics, school buildings as well as village water supplies. It also characterized activities in health improvement including nutritional levels, home gardening and sanitation. It is availability of data that largely determined the selection of the projects included in Table 2.2.
The projects were in fact experiments that, if successful, would have been replicated throughout the country. All the projects used block farming approach whereby the participating farmers were asked to pool their individual small fields together so that they could be farmed as one block. The donors and the Government of Lesotho (GOL) argued that this approach facilitated mechanization and economies of scale (Mashinini, 2000:114).

Table 2.2: Essential features of integral self-help projects in Lesotho

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of Project</th>
<th>Start</th>
<th>End</th>
<th>Duration in years</th>
<th>Reasons for ending</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Leribe Pilot Project</td>
<td>1970</td>
<td>1975</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Costly to government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thaba-Bosiu Rural Development Project</td>
<td>1973</td>
<td>1977</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Lack of support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senqu River Agricultural Project</td>
<td>1974</td>
<td>1976</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Lack of support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khomokhoana Rural Development Project</td>
<td>1975</td>
<td>n.a</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Lack of support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basic Agricultural Services Project</td>
<td>1977</td>
<td>1981</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Disagreement among donors, lack of support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cooperative Crop Production Project</td>
<td>1977</td>
<td>1979</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Lack of support, technology not affordable to farmers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food self-sufficiency Programme</td>
<td>1981</td>
<td>1985</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Technology not affordable, lack of support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thaba Tseka Rural Development Project</td>
<td>1976</td>
<td>n.a</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Lack of support</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources:  
(a) Compiled from Mashinini (2000:112).  
(b) Kingdom of Lesotho (1976:36).

As it can be seen, the projects had a short life span ranging from 2 to 5 years. Moreover, over 80% of the projects suffered from lack of support by the participants. Twenty five percent of the projects died for reasons of both lack of support and technology being unaffordable to the small farmers.
The main question that arises is why the farmers withdrew their support for the projects. Two major reasons can be stated. First, the farmers were frustrated by virtue of being excluded from decisions that affected their lives. Non-involvement of the farmers in decision making is confirmed by Ngqaleni in Mashinini (2000:115) who contends that the sponsors of the projects did not solicit the participation of farmers “…in key decision making, planning and implementation of farming activities, choice of crops, ploughing, seeding, weeding and harvesting times and technology”.

Second, conflict of interests between the farmers and the sponsors of the projects made the former withdraw their support. As Asiachi (1979:65) rightly points out, there is always conflict of interest in the projects that are designed for the communities by the sponsoring agents. Such conflict is apparent in the integral type of farming projects in Lesotho. For, the small farmers normally produce for subsistence, and in the case of Lesotho small farmers produce staple foods like maize and sorghum. On the contrary, the projects sought to change the farming system by introducing new technology and replacing staple foods with high value crops such as potatoes and asparagus meant for sale (Ngqaleni in Mashinini, 2000:114). No doubt, the small farmers could not go a long way in support of projects that radically and abruptly changed their way of life without them having concerted.

Given the above situation, it is not surprising that these integral self-help projects achieved mixed results. What needs to be emphasized is that, integral self-help and ‘top-down’ approach to development seem to be twin sisters given that the two approaches are grounded on the same principle of subjugating the poor and their interests to officialdom. ‘Top-down’ approach refers to situations whereby the planners, the bureaucrats and the experts plan and design development strategies without involving the lower levels (Rondinelli, 1990:30). By implication, therefore, it is the officials who have the knowledge it takes to achieve development and of late, to reduce poverty.
In the same way, under integral self-help the sponsoring agents or the government plan and design the activities without involving the people whose lives are affected by the decisions, the poor. By implication, the poor have no direction, they muddle along the subsistence margin and as such they will readily abandon their ways if the messiah comes and marvels at their backwardness. The dismal failure of agricultural development projects in Lesotho, emanating mainly from the lack of support by the peasant farmers, suggests that integral self-help does not always achieve the intended results. What remains to be established scientifically though, is whether integral self-help yields the same results in all similar situations.

The second part of Adams’ analogy is that of a facilitated self-help situation.

**2.5.3.2 Facilitated self-help and development**

In the facilitated self-help situation, the agency or government or international organization works with the self-helpers who, having felt the need for change, mobilize part of the resources amongst themselves and solicit additional resources and/or technical know-how from the former. This approach helped rural communities in Lesotho mostly to establish clean water supply systems and to a limited extent, to obtain electricity. During the 1960s the Colonial Government, unwilling to provide free services, organized public campaigns to mobilize villages to raise funds through individual household contributions for provision of community water supplies. Villages were also required to provide labour during the construction process. The government matched the funds and provided technical expertise. The communities that contributed the requisite funds acquired clean water in this way (Sechaba Consultants, 1995:85). However, at independence in 1966, the practice stagnated because people expected and, in fact, were promised free benefits by the politicians. By the mid 1970s it was clear that free benefits were somehow not part of the independence package. And, indeed, there was a backlog of over 700 requests for water systems waiting for attention (Sechaba Consultants, 1995:85).
Compelled by the worsening shortage of clean water supplies, rural communities, this time on their own accord, revived the fund matching approach of the early 1960s and pressurized the GOL for supplementary finance and expertise towards provision of water supplies. “The government used the requests from villages as a shopping list with which to solicit foreign financial and technical assistance in this area” (Mashinini, 2000:178). Thus, by the end of 1983, some 564 additional village water supply systems were constructed (Kingdom of Lesotho, 1984, Appendix 3) comprising gravity-fed water supply systems, hand pumped and pumped water systems (Sechaba Consultants, 1995:87).

A variant of facilitated self-help is where the sponsor identifies the need for action and initiates an activity that is designed to help the participants change their situation largely through their own efforts.

This mode of facilitated self-help was used by the GOL to improve rural sanitation facilities. Estimates showed that, by 1980, only about 13% of lowland rural population and 3% of the mountain population had access to sanitation facilities (Sechaba Consultants, 1995:88). The disturbing situation prompted the GOL to initiate and actively promote construction of ventilated improved pit latrines (VIP) in the villages, proper use and maintenance of same, appropriate and hygienic disposal of children’s waste and maintenance of clean personal and domestic hygiene (Sechaba Consultants, 1995:89). To effect this programme, the Ministry of Rural Development emphasized self-help and facilitated easy loans with the Lesotho Bank for those who wanted to construct VIP latrines. The Ministry also provided technical expertise and trained people on construction and maintenance of VIP latrines. Although the situation is still far from adequate, a significant improvement in rural sanitation has been realized through facilitated self-help. By 1999, at least 51% of the rural population was recorded as having access to a sanitation facility (Sechaba Consultants, 2000:93).

The cited cases suggest that facilitated self-help has the potential to change the socio-economic situation for the better. Below are some of its perceived advantages.
Advantages of facilitated self-help

Based on its main features and the mode of operation, facilitated self-help is seen to have the following advantages:

- It reduces the dependence of the self-helper on the outsiders particularly in those cases where the activity is initiated, designed and implemented by the self-helper with minimal outside help.

- It enhances capacity building at the grassroots level by exposing participants to negotiation and decision making skills.

- It fosters peace and social stability in that the participants work together for a common goal; make compromises and eventually develop common interests that form an essential base for social stability.

However, it needs to be stated that facilitated self-help tends to squeeze the meager resources of the self-helpers and in this respect may, at times, add to their suffering. It also retards the necessary structural changes and provides an escape route for governments that do not want to take responsibility for the development of rural areas, particularly those areas that are dominated by the opposition.

2.5.3.3 Autonomous self-help and development

The third case, that of autonomous self-help, is found where neither an agency nor the government nor an international donor is involved in a self-help activity. The self-helpers initiate, design and implement an activity all by themselves. As stated earlier, independent or autonomous self-helpers are often displeased by the existing situation or are marginalized in one way or the other. A supporting example is that of women’s associations in Lesotho amongst which Matobo (1988:58) pinpoints the ‘money-lending
Christmas Clubs’. The clubs work such that the members make specified monthly contributions to a special account held with a bank. The level of contributions and number of members differ between clubs. The level of the contributions in each case is determined largely by the level of income of the group members. The members are entitled to borrow from the fund with predetermined interest rates. At times, non-members are given loans from the fund but on more stringent terms. At the end of the year all the money is drawn from the account and shared equally amongst the group members. Matobo refers to them as ‘Christmas Clubs’ because the money that is invested is withdrawn and shared by the members during the festive season. These clubs are, in fact, self-help initiatives that provide investment and credit opportunities, mostly for women. They function independent of government or any other sponsor.

The formation of these ‘money-lending Christmas clubs’ has economic and cultural reasons. As Matobo (1998:58) points out, one of the reasons is to provide members with cash to meet the obligations of the festive Christmas season and to be able to pay for uniforms and school fees at the beginning of the new year. However, the greatest motivating factor for their formation appears to be the marginalization of women in the mainstream. In terms of the Constitution of Lesotho, 1993 (Government Notice No. 28 of 1993), a married woman is a minor. Consequently, a married woman has no legal standing, therefore, she cannot enter into a contract with whosoever. In that way, registered financial institutions are effectively barred from giving loans to married women except with the written consent of the husband. Given the unpredictable nature of family relations, most women are disadvantaged by their lack of contractual powers.

Conclusively, it is this legal constraint that instigated the formation of money clubs that provide investment and credit facilities for women without any hassles. No doubt, these money-lending clubs constitute an independent autonomous type of self-help.

Three aspects are worth noting about women’s money-lending clubs. First, they constitute a self-help activity that substitutes a discriminatory form of a service in the mainstream. Considered from another angle, the clubs provide an alternative for a group
that is marginalized by the society. But most importantly, they offer a critique of the Constitution, with a note to say ‘if women can independently and successfully run their financial matters, why are they marginalized in the formal sector?’

Having defined, identified and applied the various types of self-help there is need to address the questions of why and when people resort to self-help. What are their motivations? Do the motivations of the self-helpers and those of the government or sponsors converge? The ensuing sections attempt to deal with these questions.

2.6 RATIONALE FOR SELF-HELP

In attempting to establish the rationale for self-help it seems helpful to develop a new categorization scheme that distinguishes between self-help by the self-helpers for the self-helpers themselves, and self-help that is sponsored or organized or facilitated by the sponsors. On this basis two categories emerge. The former can be referred to as endogenous self-help because the ideas and the activities originate from within the group and serve the needs of individual members and/or the group as a whole. The latter, can be referred to as exogenous self-help because the activities are orchestrated outside the group often to meet the unspecified goals of the organizers and to a very limited extent the needs of the self-helpers. Limited because:

… in grassroots self-help programs, local initiatives do not always coincide with the aims of assisting institutions, both public and private. There is a fundamental conflict in any community development program between the policies identified by governmental or other funding agencies and the needs felt within a community (Asiachi, 1979:65).

Keino (1980:45) also confirms the existence of a discrepancy between the aspirations of the organizers and those of the self-helpers. The author writes:

To the grassroots population… central planning always leaves development gaps. These gaps may be a failure to meet immediate
local needs, or insufficient resources for specific development. The gaps in development could become serious sources of frustration… (Keino, 1980:4).

Below is an attempt to establish the rationale for self-help dealing with each type, endogenous and exogenous, separately.

2.6.1 Rationale for endogenous self-help

As a general rule “any group is organized… because it will be useful for its organizers, for those who become members, or for others” (Zander, 1990:36). Of interest, at least for endogenous self-help, is the emergence of a group and group activity that benefits the individual members and/or the group. This group is what Zander (1990:37) calls a ‘self-centered unit’ because it is inward looking. This means that the group activity benefits participants only as individuals and as a group. The author further notes that self-centered units are more often prompted by displeasing conditions. Situations that trigger self-centered units are related to poverty, deprivation, illness, marginalization and discrimination. The willingness to participate in the group activity comes from the realization that it is only through group effort that change can be effected. Second, motivation is based on the desire for personal improvement and achievement.

Endogenous self-help can serve either political or economic aspirations or both. In political terms, self-help that is initiated, implemented and controlled by the marginalized groups “can be a tool in the class struggle from below, with considerable potential for increasing self determination” (Harms, 1982:20). The significance of self-determination in development and in poverty reduction need not be emphasized. Suffice it so say that self-determination of the poor is the ultimate goal of participatory development, empowerment and sustainable development, the buzz-words of the 1980s to 1990s.

In economic terms, endogenous self-help can be initiated individually or collectively by those who are unable, for various reasons, to eke a living through employment either in
the public or private sector. A case in point is found in the informal sector in Lesotho where the street vendors who face financial difficulties preventing them from buying desired quantities of stock resort to self-help initiatives.

In an attempt to resolve the on-going financial problem, the vendors belong to what may be called “vendors associations” where they form groups of six or eight members. Three times a week members contribute M10, in other groups M15 and in others M20. The contributions are loaned out to members in turn. There is unanimity amongst vendors as regards the usefulness of the scheme in helping them meet family obligations and/or increase their stock (Ralebese, 1991:38).

Still in economic terms, endogenous self-help can be initiated and be helpful to those who, for various reasons, cannot access some opportunities available in a society. The case of women’s money-lending clubs in Lesotho, cited under sub section 2.5.3.3 provides an appropriate example.

By way of a summary, endogenous self-help occurs in situations where either the public sector or the private sector is unable or unwilling to provide goods or services, yet the people so affected feel the need for change. Precisely because such people share a similar problem, they collectively use their resources to improve their situation or solve a particular problem.

The foregoing reveals endogenous self-help as advantageous in several ways:

(a) it enables the self-helpers to satisfy their needs as originally identified;
(b) it is associated with a high level of motivation because of the desire for personal improvement and achievement; and
(c) it promotes capacity building because the self-helpers learn as they go by planning and implementing their projects.
2.6.2 Rationale for exogenous self-help

The literature suggests that exogenous self-help is quite often used by governments as a policy instrument to resolve crises or deal with undesirable situations arising in society. Confirming this view is Harms (1982:18) who notes that self-help is “…a policy solution by established powers and governments…[it] plays a role in the political and ideological struggle between progressive structure-changing practices and the integration or containment of conflict and dissent”.

Using a historical perspective Harms shows that exogenous self-help occurs under revolutionary conditions, has structural causes and its actors have specific motivations. The author employs cases from Latin America, United States, Puerto Rico and Germany to show that self-help activities emerged in various forms during crises times in those countries. Further, the author shows how self-help has been used to avert crises in capitalism. Below a few country cases are borrowed for illustrative purposes, particularly because they give substance to the researcher’s claim that, the nature and content as well as the regularity of self-help projects in Lesotho, are determined largely by political motivations of mobilizing support and/or winning the elections, hence the reason for their low performance in reducing poverty.

➢ Self-help in Latin America

In Latin America, the catalyst for sponsored or exogenous self-help activities was the successful Cuban Revolution of 1959 and its strong influence towards socialism in the Americas. “The United States government was afraid of, and tried to contain, further revolutionary movements developing as a result of social problems extending” (Harms, 1982:22). In response to this threat, the United States hastily forged an agreement referred to as an ‘Alliance for Progress’ between itself and the Latin American states. The agreement purported to enhance national development laying emphasis on land reforms and housing programmes based on self-help techniques. The United States lavishly supported the activities embodied in the agreement whereby individuals were given loans
that had to be repaid by mortgage commitments. As envisaged by the sponsor, the process individualized potential gains, separated people from each other and impeded collective and solidarity actions (Harms, 1982:49).

Self-help, in this case, was part of the class struggle from above, and it achieved two major objectives:

(a) it diffused a potentially explosive situation by individualizing discontent and making sure that the beneficiaries were incorporated into the main consumption stream through mortgage payments; and

(b) it served as an inexpensive policy for housing provision without changes in resource allocation and structural arrangements.

Self-help in Puerto Rico

Harms (1982:55) further shows how in Puerto Rico, self-help activities were used to facilitate a major restructuring of agricultural production in which labour intensive methods were gradually being replaced by capital intensive methods of production in favour of the United States big agricultural business. The resultant masses of unemployed and landless farm labourers constituted a politically dangerous situation that warranted the immediate attention of established powers. As a pre-emptive measure, the Unites States quickly proposed and actively supported a token land distribution programme for self-sufficiency and self-help housing for the disillusioned Puerto Rican farm labourers. Under the programme, the labourers were each given a barren plot and were assisted to put up a house and produce on their own. Thus, they would become farmers in their own right, the official campaign emphasized.

Indeed, the calculated self-help activities calmed the situation and prevented riots because the farmers took time off to rejoice and celebrate their first experience of individual
property rights. Regardless of its unfulfilled self-sufficiency promises the self-help process achieved two objectives:

(a) it pacified a potentially militant work force thereby preempting collective action and solidarity; and

(b) it peacefully integrated a militant group into the existing order, thus helping maintain stability.

➢ Self-help in Kenya

Keino (1980:237) subscribes to the view that exogenous self-help is often used by governments primarily to achieve their own goals. The author notes that in Kenya the government used ‘harambee’ (self-help) for the construction of small-scale rural infrastructure with the intention of raising the general standard of living among the rural population. “This strategy … was adopted by the government as a solution to its inability (due to lack of resources) to meet the public demand for certain social services (Keino, 1980:237) [my emphasis].

Worth noting is that persistent failure by the state to meet public demand can be, and in fact is, a threat to social stability. If the situation is ignored, over time it can brew from a crisis to a revolution. No established power wants to be caught in a revolutionary situation. This explains why the Government of Kenya, noting its inability to meet public demand for services actively and loudly promoted the idea of self-help amongst the rural population. In so doing “the Government’s concern was to find an alternative source of resources for rural development to supplement its own” (Keino, 1980:243). And, indeed, in ‘harambee’, the government found a cheap method of expanding its services, a cheap method of enhancing its political image. Second, through self-help the government found a way of shifting responsibility for rural development from the center to the people.
An interesting aspect of ‘harambee’ in Kenya is that the government took over, whenever a self-help project approached or reached maturity (Keino, 1980:239). The irony of this is that on government takeover, the self-helpers lost control and with control a significant portion of the benefits. This is so because once a project was taken over by the government, it added to the provincial/national pool and the initiators competed for benefits in the ordinary way. The behaviour of the Kenyan Government is clear testimony of an authority that uses self-help for its own ends with little consideration of the benefit for the self-helpers.

Worth noting is that Keino (1980:243) does not provide a specific reason for government take over when self-help projects reached maturity. However, the author notes the government motive of using self-help to supplement its own resources needed for improving the standard of living of the population. If the standards of living improved, so would the government’s image. From this it can be deduced that by increasing the provincial/national pool, the government sought to improve its political image on a wider scale and, thereby, win favour with the electorate at provincial/national level instead of confining political gains to the community level.

The cited incidents of exogenous self-help epitomize the way self-help is used in most activity areas, particularly in the less developed countries where governments have made it a priority to cement the ruling party’s rural and peri-urban support (Pule, 1991:15). Self-help techniques purporting to help the rural poor meet their need for food are the most popular.

2.7 CONCLUSION

A number of reasons why different actors take an interest in self-help have been established. The actors come in two broad categories, the self-helpers and the sponsors (agencies, governments, international organizations). First, it has been established that the self-helpers engage in self-help in order to satisfy their needs, particularly in areas where the public or the private sector should, but is unable or unwilling to provide
service. The self-helpers come together on the realization that it is only through group effort that change can be effected and their personal and collective needs met. It has also been established that in endogenous self-help (self-help by the self-helpers) both motivation and chances of sustainability are high because there exists a direct link between the problem and the self-help activity.

On the other hand, it has been established that the sponsors use self-help as a policy instrument mainly to avert social crises. Self-help has been used to prevent collective action and to integrate dissenting groups. Governments have also used it to tap supplementary resources for development from the impoverished rural masses. However, this should not be interpreted as an outright dismissal of exogenous self-help since it has helped develop some communities in the Third World (Mashinini, 2000:51) and with the right policies and resources it could become an effective instrument (Adams, 1982:133) in development particularly in the fight against poverty.

This study seeks to establish the extent self-help in Lesotho has been used as a political weapon. Specifically, it seeks to establish whether self-help projects are used by politicians in Lesotho as an instrument to perpetuate their stay in power or to legitimize their position while purporting to help the poor to meet their basic needs.

These questions are pertinent for two reasons. First, the self-help projects are widely spaced. They are concentrated near and immediately after the elections. Second, self-help projects are not designed to address the multiple causes of poverty in the rural areas, thereby commit the folly of treating the rural poor as a homogeneous group, while the opposite is true. In fact, the rural poor can be differentiated on the basis of landownership, socialization, production orientation (crop farming, livestock farming, poultry, etc), literacy and others. Based on this differentiation, any development initiative that ignores this truism will have limited chances of success and sustainability.

The next chapter presents a theoretical analysis of poverty reduction policies and strategies in Lesotho.
CHAPTER 3
A THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE OF POVERTY REDUCTION STRATEGIES IN LESOTHO

3.1 INTRODUCTION

Slavery had first to be eradicated in hearts and minds and on paper before it could be eradicated in society, and poverty, unemployment and social exclusion too will first have to be banned from the range of acceptable arrangements before a serious effort to reduce them if not to eradicate them altogether can even be envisaged (United Nations, 1995:28).

Evidence suggests that poverty facilitates political and military hegemony whereby the rich countries in the world shape the policies and strategies in the poor countries such that the interests of the former prevail. Likewise, poverty enables the rich people, both individuals and groups, particularly the political elite in many, if not most of the countries of the world to dominate and shape the social structure such that the status quo is maintained, whereby the rich remain rich and even get richer. The status quo is maintained through two types of policies. First, there are policies that protect the interests of the rich. Second, there are those that maintain law and order. The effectiveness of protective policies is reflected in the widening gap between the rich and the poor. However, persistent social unrest, escalating levels of crime and the intensifying burglar proofing of the homes of the rich as well as business premises, in poverty stricken countries, indicate that legislative provisions are not a sufficient condition for peaceful co-existence between the rich and the poor.

The relationships between the rich and the poor countries as well as between the rich and the poor people suggest that poverty, albeit covertly, is an acceptable social arrangement, at least to the majority of those who claim to be fighting it and have the power to do so. In fact, the expenditure patterns of most countries as well as some international agencies confirm a substantial degree of tolerance to poverty. If poverty is to be eliminated or even reduced to any level, the United Nations warns, it first has 'to be banned from a range of
acceptable social arrangements’. If all else remain the same, poverty reduction will continue to be mere rhetoric in many countries of the world, Lesotho included. Indeed, if all else remain the same, by the year 2015, the United Nations Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) will be a mockery of the world’s poor, just like the once vibrant world slogan of ‘Health for all by the Year 2000’ has been mere rhetoric for the majority of the world’s underprivileged.

Although it is outside the scope of this work, but for reasons of sounding a warning to the main actors and the practitioners involved in the drive towards the achievement of MDGs, it is helpful to comment, though briefly, on the rhetoric of the world health slogan of the 1990s. The literature provides overwhelming evidence to the effect that by the year 2000, the target year for ‘health for all’, only marginal progress was made towards the achievement of the goal. As a result, the developing world was and continues to be characterized by extreme and acute pockets of ill-health. In many of the developing countries, under-five mortality rates, malnutrition, maternal deaths and communicable diseases are increasing. That being the case, the health status of the poor in the developing world is at a greater disadvantage than it was the case before 2000. In the same way, if the expenditure patterns of the rich countries, more so, the expenditure patterns of the poor countries do not change to reflect restraint, modesty and bias towards the interests of the poor, the majority of the poor countries will not meet the MDGs, Lesotho included. For the poor and the disadvantaged, the MDGs will turn to be yet another talk show that failed to bring benefits to the world’s underprivileged.

In order to understand Lesotho’s vicious circle of poverty, it is befitting to give a brief account of the country’s geographic, demographic and socio-economic aspects that underlie this escalating social problem.
3.2 BACKGROUND

Lesotho is 30,350 square kilometers in size. Three quarters of the land space is rugged mountain terrain with an altitude ranging from 2000 meters to 3500 meters above sea level (Chakela et al, 1986 in Mashinini, 2000:80 and Bureau of Statistics, 2000:1). The mountainous region is sparsely populated, while the bulk of the population is concentrated in the low lands and foothills. As at 1991, arable land constituted only 9 percent of the total land space and each year arable land is lost through soil erosion, land degradation and human habitation (Kingdom of Lesotho, 1992:79). Under the circumstances, arable land is expected to decrease even further. However, a disturbing new development is revealed by the Bureau of Statistics whereby marginal lands are being brought into cultivation. To this effect, the 1999/2000 inter census results showed arable land as having increased to about 13 percent “… because marginal land that was initially not cultivated is being used” (Bureau of Statistics, 2000:1). This new development compounds further development and environmental problems of the country as these marginal lands so incorporated into crop production have very low yields but are susceptible to soil erosion and rapid degradation. The use of marginal lands, which for time immemorial, were considered a risky agricultural resource, is indicative of seriously declining livelihoods in the rural areas of Lesotho.

At independence, 1966, the population of Lesotho was close to one million, 969,600 persons. The then population growth rate was estimated at 1.97 percent (Mashinini, 2000:82). The 1996 population census, which came thirty years after independence, showed that the population had doubled to 2 million (Kingdom of Lesotho, 1997:93). By then, the population growth rate had risen to 2.6 per cent (Kingdom of Lesotho, 1997:192). The rapid population growth and the environmental degradation increased pressure on the available resources and relegated more people to poverty. Another census was conducted in 2006. As projected by several international population studies, the population of Lesotho has experienced a negative growth rate of -0.35 percent due to AIDS (Bureau of Statistics, 2007:2), and malnutrition (Food and Nutrition Coordinating Office, 2007:10). The population has declined from 2 million to 1.88 million. Despite the
decline in population, poverty is increasing and service delivery disappointingly low (Kingdom of Lesotho, 2006: iv).

Lesotho’s economy is predominantly agrarian. Agriculture is a complementary economic activity to migrant work in the South African mines. However, in the face of degradation of the ecology and fast declining employment opportunities in the South African mining industry (Central Bank of Lesotho, 2008:17), many households in the rural areas are on the brink of destitution. Indeed, the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) confirms that during 1994/95, 58 per cent of the population was considered poor while 38 percent was extremely poor (GOL, 2003:18). This represents a rapid decline in livelihoods given that in 1986/87 about 54 percent of the rural households were considered to be poor (GOL, 1996:9), and incidences of extreme poverty were not mentioned either because they were negligible or non-existent.

For decades the Government of Lesotho (GOL) has grappled with the deteriorating socio-economic situation. Various strategies have been adopted amongst which can be mentioned the Green Revolution strategies, community development, foreign direct investment, integrated rural development projects, rural industrialization, rural roads and infrastructure through self-help, decentralization, the Lesotho Fund for Community Development, Free Primary Education and the social safety net for the most vulnerable. However, the effectiveness of these strategies has been negligible, at best, propping the need to explore alternatives, or a critical evaluation of the options selected (Lekhesa and Selinyane, 2001:45). An analysis of the outcomes of the poverty reduction strategies adopted by the Government of Lesotho over time follows in the next chapter.

This chapter is a theoretical analysis of poverty reduction strategies in Lesotho since independence, 1966. It seeks to establish, at least in theory, the existence and coherence of a policy framework for poverty reduction in Lesotho. The chapter is divided into five sections including the introduction. The present section is the background. Section 3 discusses the origins and the evolution of the poverty reduction policy framework both at
the local level and the national level. Section 4 deals with local government and issues thereof. Section 5 is the conclusion.

3.3 POLICY FRAMEWORK FOR POVERTY REDUCTION IN LESOTHO

The World Bank places Lesotho amongst the world’s poorest countries. At the same time, the latest UNDP Human Development Report (2005) ranks Lesotho 149th out of 177 countries on the Human Development Index (HDI), a composite measure of human well being (UNDP, 2005:225). Lesotho’s HDI has dropped considerably given that the country ranked 127th out of 174 countries in 1998 (UNDP, 2000:159). A drop in HDI signifies a decline in human well being which in turn translates into an increase in poverty. In fact, Lesotho is a classic example of a country where poverty defies authority by increasing at an alarming rate despite persistent efforts launched by the Government, local organizations and international agencies to reduce the number of those living in poverty. Increasingly, the rural areas are characterized by starvation, insecurity, powerlessness, exclusion and servitude. Child malnutrition, child and maternal mortality are increasing. Moreover, transport, health and educational facilities are inadequate (Kingdom of Lesotho, 1994:40; UNDP, 1997:20; Food and Nutrition Coordinating Office, 2007:17; Kingdom of Lesotho, 2003:187; Kingdom of Lesotho, 2006:iv and Kingdom of Lesotho, 2007:17).

Poverty in Lesotho increases despite the economic boom of the 1990s when the country implemented the Lesotho Highlands Water Project (LHWP). The LHWP is a large project that transfers water to South Africa earning for Lesotho R250 million per annum (Kingdom of Lesotho, 2006:30). Poverty again increases despite adoption and implementation of programmes that purport to reduce poverty. The disturbing situation gives rise to a number of questions. Are the poverty reduction programs equal to the task? Are the programs targeted to the right groups? Do the target groups benefit? Does Lesotho have a coherent policy framework that guides and coordinates poverty reduction activities? If Lesotho is to succeed in her efforts to reduce poverty, there is need to provide answers to these questions. There is also need to ensure that policies are not only
based on valid theories but are also focused and implemented as planned. The rest of the chapter, indeed the thesis, seeks to provide answers to these questions, one at a time.

3.3.1 Evolution of the policy framework for poverty reduction in Lesotho

Lesotho’s First Five Year Development Plan (1970-75) made only a cursory reference to poverty reduction while emphasizing two major objectives, economic development and economic independence. The former referred to an annual economic growth rate of 5 per cent during the plan period. The latter referred to reduction of Lesotho’s dependence on foreign countries, in particular, the then apartheid South Africa, on which Lesotho relied heavily for employment, incomes and sheer survival. The plan, therefore, emphasized import substitution and job creation within a growing economy. The GOL envisaged that achievement of these objectives would directly and indirectly contribute towards poverty reduction.

In assessing the First Development Plan, the Ministry of Planning and Development indicated that the major objectives of the plan, namely, economic development and economic independence, were barely achieved. However, it was difficult for the planners to say to what extent the objective of economic development was achieved given that the estimates of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) were available only for the first year of the plan period (GOL, 1975:10), that is, for 1970 only. In spite of the paucity of data, it was clear that the conditions of life for the ordinary person in the street were deteriorating. Evidence to this effect was the unexpected increase of 36 per cent in the number of able-bodied Basotho men who migrated to work in the South African mining industry. In addition, an estimated 70,000 Basotho crossed the border to work in other sectors of the South African economy (GOL, 1975:14). On average, migrant labor from Lesotho to South Africa increased by about 50 per cent during the first plan period, 1970-1975.

The significance of labor migration as an indicator of deteriorating economic conditions in a society has been established by Akokpari (1999) in a study on the political economy
of migration in sub-Saharan Africa. Having examined several factors, the author concluded that “[I]n much of contemporary Africa voluntary migration has been spawned by economic reasons, and has been towards more economically viable countries such as the Republic of South Africa and Botswana” (Akokpari, 1999:78). The author further observed that international migration in Southern Africa was dominated by labor migration from the “labor reserve” countries, particularly Lesotho and Mozambique which failed to respond urgently to economic factors following independence. Akokpari’s findings, therefore, confirm that in the first five years of independence, Lesotho failed to achieve economic development which was one of the major objectives of the First Five Year Development Plan.

Regarding the second objective of economic independence, the performance was worse as imports into Lesotho increased by over 240 per cent between 1969 and 1974 (GOL, 1975:12). The dramatic increase in imports suggested a malfunctioning of the import substitution development strategy that aimed at reducing Lesotho’s dependence on South Africa. On the other hand, the rapid increase in labor migration signaled the non-absorptive capacity of Lesotho’s economy and, therefore, the deteriorating conditions of life for the majority of the people. These economic signals, read together, highlighted an urgent need for the GOL either to explore alternatives or critically evaluate the options selected. However, none of the two possibilities was pursued by the GOL. Indicative of this is the fact that in the Second Five Year Development Plan ‘the national aims’ remained unchanged from those of the First Plan. Economic growth was to be pursued even more vigorously. Economic independence was to be strengthened by further diversification of the sources of external assistance and active participation in international organizations (GOL, 1975:21).

It is noteworthy that the development approach pioneered by Lesotho’s First and Second Development Plans was in line with the linear growth models of the 1970s which focused on development of the infrastructure with the view to inject growth of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP). The assumption was that the benefits of a growing economy would trickle down and benefit the poor in society. Thus, by rigorously pursuing
economic growth, the GOL consciously or unconsciously neglected the welfare of the people. The omission created a fertile ground for an increase in poverty as evidenced by the rapid increase in labor migration.

Second, the development approach of the first and the second plans suggests that the GOL did not (and unfortunately still does not) view heavy reliance on external sources for financing development as a problem in itself. To the GOL, reliance on external sources was a problem only if assistance came from a single source, more especially an unfriendly neighbour, the then apartheid South Africa. That is why the GOL, instead of seeking to reduce dependence on external sources, sought only to diversify the sources of assistance (GOL, 1975:22). Diversification of sources of assistance, in practice, increased Lesotho’s dependence and indebtedness to the outside world. Consequently, debt servicing absorbed the bulk of generated wealth and socio-economic progress stalled. The result was a decline in livelihoods as evidenced by the phenomenal increase in labor migration (GOL, 1975:23) and the persistent internecine wrangling and recrimination amongst the Basotho (Mashinini, 2000:86; Pherudi, 1996:100; Pherudi, 2000:13 and Work for Justice, October, 2006:4), with the view to gain control of state resources.

The contribution of the Second Plan to the formation of the policy framework for poverty reduction is, at best, minimal. However, unlike the first plan, the second plan laid a foundation for poverty reduction by establishing a link between agricultural development and rural development (GOL, 1975:71). The move to link agriculture with rural development evolved from three distinct scenarios. First, at the international level, it was influenced by the Green Revolution. Green Revolution refers to development strategies of the 1970s which emphasized use of High Yielding Varieties (HYVs) to promote productivity of agriculture. The HYVs developed from intensive research in wheat and rice in Latin America and Asia respectively. They led to tremendous improvement in crop yields and crop disease resistance (Mashinini, 2000:48). Despite their limited social benefits the Green Revolution strategies had and still have a strong appeal to planners and policy makers in the developing countries, Lesotho included. Second, at the national level, agricultural productivity was linked to rural development following the realization
that 95 per cent of Lesotho’s population, at that time, lived in the rural areas (GOL, 1975:71). That being the case, improving agricultural productivity implied improvement of the livelihoods of a greater proportion of the population. Third, in 1976 the then apartheid South Africa closed the South Eastern border with Lesotho. The unilateral closure of the border followed Lesotho’s refusal to recognize the nominal independence of the Transkei Bantustan Homeland (GOL, 2001:25). The blockade caused extreme hardships for the affected mountain areas, which, like the rest of the country, relied heavily on South Africa for their day to day basic requirements. The need to improve food security, not only for the affected areas, but for the country as a whole, spurred the GOL to intensify its interventions in agriculture. Indeed, in the Third Plan period the GOL paid particular attention to agriculture as evidenced by the document “Agricultural Development - A Blueprint for Action (1980)”. The document provided broad guidelines for the transformation of the rural sector through development of agriculture.

Unfortunately, focusing on agriculture as a means of transforming the rural sector had little impact. First, the Green Revolution was capital intensive and only a few rich farmers afforded it. The majority of the farmers who were poor could not afford the technology and for them the yields remained low (Mashinini, 2000:48). Secondly, participation in agricultural development projects was biased and based on political affiliation. The political bias was prompted by the fact that the government owned machinery was entrusted to the ruling party members of parliament in their constituencies. The members of parliament worked with their party constituency committees instead of the multi-party constituted village development committees which were the official local institution entrusted with the duty to oversee development at the village level (Mashinini, 2000:163).

By the end of the Second Plan period the GOL was fully aware of the inability of agriculture to transform the rural sector and of the escalating levels of rural poverty. That is why the GOL introduced the ‘felt needs’ approach (GOL, 1980:136). In this approach the communities identified their needs and put their requests to the GOL through village
development committees. The requests were approved only if they were accompanied by an undertaking to contribute cash and labor towards the implementation of an identified project. The communities were motivated and participated actively in the ‘felt needs’ approach. The reasons are not hard to find. First, the approach gave the communities the opportunity to identify and prioritize their needs. Second, the approach allowed each community to determine its destiny. In sum, the ‘felt needs’ approach represented ‘facilitated self-help’ whereby the self-helpers identify their projects and implement them with minimal assistance from outside. (See Chapter 2, Section 2.5.2 for types of self-help and their potential in development).

Sadly, the GOL quickly abandoned the ‘felt needs’ approach and replaced it with centrally designed rural development programmes. The main reason was that the ‘felt needs’ approach produced a demand far in excess of GOL’s capacity to implement programmes” (Kingdom of Lesotho, 1980:136). To make the situation worse, in those cases where the cash contributions were already made, the funds were not returned to the communities, thereby engulfing communities in endless conflict and lack of trust.

In passing, it is worth noting the lack of political commitment to development on the part of the then Basutoland National Party Government. For, if indeed, the ‘felt needs’ approach to development stimulated so much enthusiasm and active participation in development issues, a committed political leadership would have opted to mobilize resources from near and afar, in order to maintain the participatory spirit of the rural people. By abandoning the ‘felt needs’ approach and replacing it with centrally planned programmes, which in most cases did not address the needs of the people, the GOL dampened the enthusiasm and active participation of the rural people in development activities. Unfortunately, the legacy lives on, as many communities remain divided, disgruntled and helpless while faced with lack of clean water supplies, poor sanitation facilities and absence of other life improving amenities.

In order to improve the performance of centrally designed programmes, the GOL developed a policy and an institutional framework for rural development. In theory, the
policy had good intentions in as far as poverty reduction is concerned. To be sure, the basic tenet of the government’s policy was to design programs that would ensure that the economic and social benefits reached the poorest of the poor and that government’s intervention enabled the poor to help themselves (GOL, 1980:128).

3.3.2 The tenets of the emergent rural development policy

The Third Plan identified four tenets of a rural development policy that would ensure that the social and economic benefits reached the poor and that government action assisted the poor to help themselves. These were co-ordination, consultation, decentralization and land reform.

- **Co-ordination**: The preceding periods had revealed to GOL the lack of co-ordination at three levels namely, the central, the district and the community/village levels. Lack of co-ordination at the various levels led to delays, duplication of effort as well as inter and intra institutional conflicts. Establishment of channels of communication between and within the various levels would, hopefully, enhance development activity in the rural areas.

- **Consultation**: Consultation, according to the Third Plan, meant making the target groups aware of the objectives of centrally designed programmes and what benefits people could expect from a particular programme. Worth noting is that consultation, in this context, did not mean giving the target groups a chance to determine the nature and content of a programme because that would imply a return to the “felt needs” approach which the GOL had just abandoned for reasons stated earlier.

- **Decentralization**: The GOL established District Development Committees (DDCs). The DDCs were composed of heads of government departments in a district, chiefs, political parties and prominent citizens (GOL, 1980:132). Their role was to plan and implement programmes in a district subject to approval and finance by the central administration.
- **Land reform**: Through the Land Act 1979, the GOL introduced a lease system of tenure replacing the communal mode of land ownership. The system allowed a lessee exclusive right to use and occupy leased land for a period of 99 years. It was envisaged that security of tenure would promote investment leading to development of agriculture.

Over and above clarifying the tenets of the policy, the GOL developed an institutional framework that would enhance implementation of rural development programs.

### 3.3.3 Institutional framework for rural development

Lack of co-ordination brewed a chaotic scenario in the rural areas whereby each ministry carried out its activities without regard to what other ministries were doing or were about to do. For instance, in a typical case, the Ministry of Works would repair the roads and only a couple of months later the Department of Telecommunications would dig the roads to insert telephone cables. Likewise, the Department of Water and Hydrology would cut the roads to install water pipes, most of the time not restoring the road to its original condition. The social cost of lack of coordination of government activities was considerable. The resultant confusion urged the GOL to develop an institutional framework that, hopefully, would foster co-ordination and instill order in rural development activity.

In 1976 the Ministry of Rural Development was established by upgrading the Department of Community and Rural Development of the Ministry of Interior. The District Secretaries (DSs) and the District Development Committees (DDCs) were transferred from the Ministry of Interior to the newly formed ministry. In addition, positions of District Development Officers and Community Development Assistants were established. The former were heads of rural development at the district level while the latter worked with communities at the ward level. The organization of the newly formed Ministry of
Rural Development is illustrated in Figure 3.1. The institutional framework was beset with serious logistical problems.

**Figure 3.1 Organization of the Ministry of Rural Development in the 1980s**

1. **District Administrator (DA)** – not featuring in Figure 3.1- who was the most senior government official in the district and was responsible for all government activities at the district level. The DA was also chairperson of the District Development Committee (DDC), a body which, as said earlier, comprised heads of government departments at the district level, chiefs, and political parties. Both the DA and the chiefs were responsible to the Ministry of Interior. Meantime, the District Secretary and the

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1 The District Administrator does not appear in Figure 3.1 because it was a position in a different ministry, the then Ministry of Interior, currently referred to as the Ministry of Home Affairs.
District Development Officers reported to the new Ministry of Rural Development as in Figure 3.1 above. As if the confusion was not enough, the heads of departments in the districts were each responsible to their different ministerial headquarters. Thus, the members of the DDC in a district reported to different authorities at the central level. Under the fragmented arrangement the DDCs were dysfunctional mainly because the ministries bypassed the DA (head of administration in a district) and often gave conflicting instructions to their field staff. This caused delays and conflicts.

Second, the DAs as well as the heads of departments were transferred time and again mainly for political reasons. These officials, therefore, could not develop local knowledge in order to be familiar with the communities’ needs and priorities in development (Van de Geer and Wallis, 1984:37). Third, the DDCs did not have a final say in district matters but sent shopping lists to the centre for approval and finance (Van de Geer and Wallis, 1984:41). Forth, the DAs were political appointees who, more often than not, lacked the requisite qualifications for heading district administration.

Last but not least, the institutional rural development structure, by virtue of the composition of the DDCs, precluded popular participation. The result was that the few projects that filtered through were imposed on the communities meeting either with apathy or outright resistance. Socio-economic development stalled, labour migration increased and poverty escalated.

In 1986 Lesotho slipped into military rule following a military coup d’etat. The change of government brought some changes in the newly established institutional framework for rural development. First, the Ministries of Interior and Rural Development were merged to form a Ministry of Interior, Chieftainship Affairs and Rural Development. The new arrangement placed under one ministry the key actors in development at the district level namely, district secretariat, chiefs and development committees. Second, the Military Government replaced the District Development Committees with the District
Development Councils, the members of which were to be elected by the people, at least in theory. In practice, however, the members of the development councils were selected by the chiefs. Third, the councils were chaired by the Principal Chiefs and no longer by the DAs. A serious setback in the structure came when the government of the day established the positions of District Military Officers. The latter had the final word on district affairs and were responsible to the Military Council at the centre (Rembe and Mapetla, 1989 in Mashinini, 2000:94). The change increased control of local affairs by the centre. The return to civilian rule in 1993 did not bring any changes to district administration; it only helped restore the prominence of the DA by doing away with the District Military Officers and removing the Principal Chiefs as chairpersons of the DDCs.

It is interesting to note that rural development never gained a permanent place in terms of its location within the government machinery. Initially, it was a department in the Ministry of Interior. In 1976 it became a full-fledged ministry. In 1985 it was demoted to a department in the Ministry of Agriculture, while in 1986 it became a department in the Ministry of Interior. In 1993 rural development became a department in the Ministry of Home Affairs. At the time of writing this thesis rural development is a department in the newly formed Ministry of Local Government. The frequent change of place of rural development in the government machinery explains in part why intervention in Lesotho’s rural sector is characterized by discontinuity of policy and strategies (Mashinini, 2000:106). It further explains why despite repeated failure of development projects and programmes in Lesotho, there has always been someone ready to try again with yet another project (Ferguson, 1994:8). Most importantly, it explains in part why the rural areas in Lesotho suffer neglect and lack progress because each time the Department of Rural Development changed its location in the government machinery, it had to adjust its policies and practices to the whims of ministerial authorities.

3.3.4 The national poverty reduction policy framework

The Fifth Development Plan was geared to effect rural development within an unchanged institutional framework despite the GOL acknowledging problems of an institutional
nature in the implementation of programmes in the preceding periods (GOL, 1992:36). Not surprising though because in the same period a change of strategy was witnessed when the GOL issued the first ever action plan against poverty, the *Pathway out of Poverty: An Action Plan for Lesotho, 1996*. While acknowledging the high incidence of poverty in the rural areas, the action plan outlined a comprehensive approach to poverty reduction. The approach is comprehensive in the sense that it identified pathways out of poverty for the nation as a whole without reference to urban or rural poverty. It is comprehensive again in the sense that the identified paths cut across almost all the sectors of the economy. In terms of GOL (1996:vi) the broad themes of the action plan are the following:

(i) **Fostering labor intensive growth** – in agriculture, small business, export oriented light manufacturing, tourism and infrastructure;

(ii) **Investing in human resources** – by improving the health status of the poor, accessibility of safe water, sanitation services and education;

(iii) **Strengthening the social safety net** – by lowering the consumer price of basic food commodities, expanding labor intensive public works and providing free food supplements to vulnerable groups; and lastly,

(vi) **Enhancing institutional capacity** – through civil service reform, decentralization and implementing a transparent poverty reduction programme of investments.

Although the position of the *Pathway out of Poverty* is unclear and the document does not appear to have been adopted by the Government (May et al., 2001:11), and in fact, its recommendations were never implemented (GOL, 2001:6), its themes have had considerable influence on subsequent documents that have a poverty focus. The Sixth Development Plan (1996/97-1998/99), which is also the last available plan at the time of
writing this thesis, adopted the theme of Sustainable Human Development (SHD). The broad definition of SHD

...is based on the premise that the principal aim of development is the creation of an enabling environment in which all people in the nation may enjoy healthy and creative lives. The concept of human development encompasses the objectives of enabling people to: (a) lead long and healthy lives; (b) acquire knowledge; and (c) have access to resources needed to accommodate acceptable levels of human needs (Kingdom of Lesotho, 1997:70).

In terms of the definition above, SHD is broad in its approach, it does not differentiate between urban and rural development. SHD enforces the direction of the Pathway out of Poverty which also advocated improvement of livelihoods countrywide. The broad approach of successive documents may suggest that by the mid 1990s, the GOL had already decided to leave rural development to local government structures which were later promulgated by the Local Government Act No.6, 1997. A discussion of local government follows in Section 3.4 below.

In order to attain the goals of SHD, the Sixth Plan advocated eight strategies five of which derive their form and content from the Pathway out of Poverty. Three additional strategies included macroeconomic management, private sector development and regional economic integration (Kingdom of Lesotho, 1997:57-59). The Sixth Plan envisaged that the implementation of the above strategies would not only invigorate the economy but would also improve the livelihoods of the majority. Like the preceding plans, the Sixth Plan failed in its major objective of poverty reduction. That is why later the government declared that although “…the common theme of consecutive plans, that is the fourth (1986/87- 1990/91), fifth (1991/92- 1995/96) and the sixth (1996/97-1998/99) plans, had been poverty reduction, on the contrary, poverty had been increasing in Lesotho” (GOL, 2003:1).

As indicated earlier, the Sixth Development Plan is the last available in the series. Twelve years have gone by without a subsequent plan. Given that development plans are no longer a requirement for foreign aid or financial assistance by the donors, it may safely be
concluded that five year development planning is something of the past. New conditionalities for foreign assistance, as will be seen later, have come into place.

Recent documents with a poverty reduction focus include the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, 2003 (PRSP) and the National Vision 2020 publicized in 2004. The PRSP followed from the negotiations for debt cancellation for the Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC). A good PRSP, as approved by the Breton Woods Institutions (BWIs)\(^2\), would qualify a HIPC for debt cancellation. However, noting that abject poverty was not a problem for the HIPC only, but was equally a problem for the Least Developed Countries (LDCs), the BWIs extended the PRSP initiative to the latter as well, Lesotho included. For the LDCs, however, a good PRSP would only help them access grants and concessional loans from the donors (GOL, 2003:1). Lesotho, in particular, adopted the PRSP process for two reasons. First, the government “adopted the PRSP process in 1999 as part of the requirements by the IMF and WB to access the Poverty Reduction Growth Facility (PRGF) concessional lending facility” (DFID, 2004:13).

Second, though not a HIPC, Lesotho prepared the PRSP with the expectation of debt cancellation as evidenced by consecutive budget speeches by the Minister of Finance, those of the fiscal years 2005/2006 and 2006/2007. According to the Minister, it is “…difficult to understand how countries that are bigger and richer than Lesotho and that face less vulnerabilities than Lesotho have been forgiven their debts while every penny is being exacted from [Lesotho]” (Budget Speech, 2006:4), [emphasis original]. Despite the Minister’s concerted efforts to persuade the UK and the G8 countries for debt forgiveness, Lesotho’s debts still stand. As at September, 2008 Lesotho’s external debt was about M5.5 billion (Central Bank of Lesotho, 2008:41), an uncomfortable indebtedness level for a country that is struggling to reduce poverty.

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\(^2\) Breton Woods Institutions include the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. The Institutions were established at a Conference held in Bretton Woods, New Hampshire in 1944 by countries that participated in the alliance against Germany in World War II. The institutions were mandated to regulate and manage the post war international monetary system. For further details read Chapter 40, Lipsey et al (1976), Economics, 2\(^{nd}\) ed.
Even though the PRSP has not earned Lesotho debt forgiveness, the document remains not only a major policy paper for the GOL but also an indicator of political commitment to poverty reduction as and when there is need to pledge dedication to eliminating poverty. The document identified nine national priorities for poverty reduction. In order of importance they are: employment creation, food security, deepening governance, safety and security, infrastructure development, promoting access to quality and essential health care, improving quality of and access to education, combating the HIV/AIDS pandemic, environmental preservation and improvement of public service delivery (GOL, 2003:32). The PRSP ended in 2007 with not much to its credit (Budget Speech, 2010:5).

Worth noting is that the PRSP set the priorities on the basis of community consultations (GOL, 2003:32), while the *Pathway out of Poverty* prioritized activities on the basis of whether they were short or medium term policies (GOL, 1996:50). Except for combating HIV/AIDS pandemic, the priorities in the two documents converge. No doubt, these priority areas are relevant and perhaps adequate for any serious attempt to reduce poverty. However, it is discouraging to note that in Lesotho priorities in the area of poverty reduction remain unchanged for almost a decade. That is, activities that were identified as priorities in 1996 still carry the same label in 2003. From this it can be deduced that little or no progress is made towards reducing poverty. In fact, non-achievement and lack of social progress is confirmed by the Minister of Finance in the 2006/2007 budget speech in saying that “[g]ood plans have been prepared in the past, good policies approved by Cabinet and allocation of resources made by Parliament. But results on the ground have been poor due to weak performance; follow up and feedback [emphasis original] (Budget Speech, 2006:6).

The PRSP goes on to identify the sets of activities that should be undertaken in order to realize each of the priorities for poverty reduction. However, the document does not identify the actors, and does not set either time frames or measurable targets. This omission weakens the position of the PRSP as a policy document and raises doubts on the extent the programme can be implemented and evaluated with success. The omission also
invalidates the assertion that “the PRSP is a vehicle which will be used to implement some parts of the National vision 2020” (GOL, 2003:2). Questioning similar situations the UNDP asks, “[w]hat good is a plan if it has no achievable and measurable goals? … Whatever the goal, if it is formulated as a target, there is a basis for meaningful monitoring and evaluation of progress” (UNDP, 2000:33). In fact, if a goal is set as a target, it becomes easy to identify the actors, the requisite sets of activities, the required resources and the relevant time frames that can facilitate achievement of the goal.

Perhaps it is the lack of ‘achievable and measurable targets’ in the PRSP that led to a low response from Lesotho’s development partners thereby making the program achieve little, if any, success. Commenting on the performance of the PRSP the Minister of Finance had this to say: “While the Strategy achieved much of its objectives, it did not receive anticipated resources from our development partners and could therefore not be effectively implemented” (Budget Speech, 2010:5). The mixed results of the PRSP have also come to the notice of the planners. Asked about the effectiveness of the PRSP, an official in the Ministry of Finance and Development Planning, on grounds of anonymity, is of the opinion that “…the position of the PRSP is not clear, neither is its implementation. In my view, the PRSP is an end in itself and not a means to an end” (Interview with a Senior Planner, Ministry of Finance and Development Planning, 15th July, 2009).

The PRSP runs con-currently with National Vision 2020. The latter provides “a long–term perspective within which national short to medium–term plans could be formulated” (Vision 2020, 2004:1). In terms of Vision 2020, by the target year 2020 Lesotho shall be a stable democracy with peaceful, prosperous, healthy and well-developed inhabitants. Its economy will be strong, its environment well managed and its technology well established (Vision 2020, 2004:4). Thus, by 2020 Lesotho shall be a land of ‘milk and honey’.
A description of the components of the vision reflects concerns on governance, political stability, peace and good neighbourliness, protection of human rights, human resource development, provision of basic services within a growing economy, environmental preservation and livelihoods development. Most of these concerns are not new they were expressed in previous documents. What is new is the grand strategy for the vision and it emphasizes political commitment, high levels of investment and strengthening development management capacity (Vision 2020, 2004:29). Thematic strategies have also been identified including the key actors, the indicators of performance, means of verification, time frames as well as targets. (See Matrices 5.1 – 5.10 and 6.2 Vision 2020 for details). In this way, monitoring and evaluation can be undertaken with greater chances of success than it is the case with the PRSP.

Conventionally, a long term perspective plan, such as Vision 2020, maps out a national strategy, identifies the resources available to the nation and shows how they can be put to good use to attain development goals. Then, medium term plans, usually 5 years, cascade from the perspective plan. These can be thematic or sectoral plans which indicate the specific strategic actions that can facilitate implementation of the perspective plan. At the same time, the medium term plans identify the activities that should be undertaken, their sequence, the actors, timeframes and targets. At the third level are the short term plans, 1 to 2 years, which in turn cascade from the medium term plans, providing details of implementation of specific activities of the former. The chronological steps in the planning process facilitate measurement of progress towards achieving long term goals. To be precise, short term plans measure progress towards achievement of the goals of medium term plans, while the medium term plans measure progress towards achievement of the long term perspective plan. Temporal planning as above provides check points in the implementation process and facilitates timeous detection of anomalies and prompt inception of corrective measures. Sectoral plans which identify the actors, the means, time frames and targets have a similar effect. Now the question comes. To what extent does planning for development (poverty reduction) in Lesotho reflect the principles of conventional planning?
Examined from the conventional planning perspective, planning for poverty reduction in Lesotho can best be described as a trial and error process, if not a case of “muddling through” according to Lindblon in Dunsire (1975:124). This view stems from the observation that in Lesotho, the long term perspective plan, that is, the National Vision 2020 came only in 2004, almost four decades after the country’s independence. By then fragmented temporal and sectoral plans had been implemented and produced mixed results.

The Fourth Development Plan came out in 1987 (Mashinini, 2000:125), and unlike the preceding plans it had a four year period and was scheduled to end in 1990/91. The Fifth Development Plan came out as scheduled and ran for five years. Then in 1996, Lesotho shifted to three year rolling plans and produced the Sixth Development Plan 1996/97 – 1998/99. At the time of writing this thesis, this is the only rolling plan to have been produced. The vacuum was filled in by yet another donor driven document, the Pathway out of Poverty: An Action Plan for Lesotho. As indicated earlier, the action plan is open ended, it has neither time frames nor targets. Perhaps correctly so because according to the document the strategic actions proposed were “not meant to be prescriptive. They [were] meant to provide a basis for democratic debate and policy formulation” (GOL, 1996: iii). Subject to correction, the understanding from this statement is that the Pathway out of Poverty is not a policy paper as such, rather it is a policy proposal aimed at stimulating debates which would eventually lead to policy formulation in development and poverty reduction, in particular. Such debates, however, were not held until six years later when the BWIs urged Lesotho to hold nationwide consultations as part of the PRSP process. Five years later, Lesotho produced a PRSP, a document which as stated earlier, was a conditionality for the LDCs to access grants and loans from development partners, and for the HIPCs a conditionality for debt relief. The PRSP, like the rolling plans, was scheduled to run for three years and it ended in 2007. The expectation would be that the PRSP would have been rolled to close the vacuum or a second PRSP be prepared instead. None of the two alternatives is in place.
A recent document with a poverty reduction focus is the National Vision 2020, produced in 2004. It is a long term perspective plan, the implementation of which demands a series of strategic medium and short term plans. Like all other documents with a poverty reduction focus, the national vision is donor driven. In case of doubt, the following brief serves to clear the position. In May 2002, the Technical Working Group (TWG) of the PRSP “carried out intensive community based consultation on the PRSP and the National Vision” (GOL, 2003:3). The exercise followed a joint evaluation of the Interim PRSP by the GOL and the World Bank/IMF. Following the evaluation, the World Bank/ IMF required the GOL to produce a full PRSP that was participatory, all inclusive and locally driven (GOL, 2003:3). The community consultations, so imposed by the BWIs, gave rise to the National Vision 2020, which regardless of raison d’être represents the aspirations of the Basotho on the future of Lesotho.

As the foregoing suggests, planning for poverty reduction in Lesotho is fragmented. It is marked by discontinuity, inconsistency and, above all, it is donor driven. At best, little can be said about its conformity with conventional planning, which, though not a panacea for societal progress, has helped many countries to transform their socio-economic structures for the better. At this point, two major issues arise. First, there is need to find out why poverty reduction initiatives in Lesotho are uncoordinated, haphazard and thereby achieve mixed results. Second, there is need to establish whether Lesotho has a coherent poverty reduction policy framework or a clearly identifiable poverty reduction strategy.

3.3.4.1 Lack of coordination of poverty reduction initiatives

Commentators inside and outside of Lesotho agree that, to date, most poverty elimination policies in Lesotho have been uncoordinated and haphazard, and have failed to make a significant impact on the lives of the poor (UNDP, 1997: Book pages not defined).

The view that poverty reduction strategies in Lesotho are uncoordinated and haphazard is a stark reality. It is for this reason, amongst others, that the projects failed to achieve
expected results. That is why poverty persists and remains a major threat to the country’s
political stability. But, why is it that poverty reduction policies and strategies in Lesotho
are uncoordinated, haphazard and ineffective? An attempt to answer this question comes
in two parts. First, is an examination of the political environment within which poverty
reduction policies and strategies are conceived with the view to establish how political
factors impact on policy. Second, is an attempt to establish the existence or otherwise of a
poverty reduction framework which effectively guides action in this policy field.

- **The political factor and policy**

Just like a person’s attitude determines a person’s altitude, in the same way a country’s
political stability determines the rate of its socio-economic progress. Evidence to support
this view comes from two African countries, Botswana and Mauritius which have stable
democracies and are renowned for their remarkable socio-economic progress. Further
confirming this view are Van der Geer and Wallis who argue that “[a]n essential
prerequisite to successful development is a favourable political climate” Van der Geer
and Wallis, 1984:149). An analysis of the political environment in Lesotho, therefore, can
explain, at least in part, whether the country is apt to and is likely to achieve meaningful
socio-economic progress.

Lesotho’s road to independence was rocky. The fight between political parties to be the
first government in independent Lesotho was intense and ruthless. Three political parties
contested for this position namely, the Basutoland Congress Party (BCP), the Basutoland
National Party (BNP) and the Marematlou Freedom Party (MFP). The details of the bitter
The BNP under the leadership of Chief Leabua Jonathan won the elections and became
the first government in independent Lesotho. However, the BNP won the elections with a
very narrow margin taking only 31 seats of the then 60 parliamentary seats (Pherudi,
Contrary to expectation, the BNP government upon assuming power focused more on mobilizing political support, openly abusing state power and resources to entrench itself in power. The abuse of state power and the emergence of corruption, patronage and nepotism in the public sector soured the relations between the BNP and other political parties and further distanced the electorate. In fact:

Between 1966 and the second national election in 1970 [the political environment in Lesotho] was marked by degrading verbal exchanges unleashed against one another by the three parties. At times physical violence with loss of life took place such as during the Rothe massacre in 1966 of BCP cadres, and, the Thaba-Bosiu political inferno (Leeman and Moleleki in Mashinini, 2000:86).

It was in that heated political environment that Lesotho went for its second national elections, in 1970. The BCP led by Ntsu Mokhehle won the elections. Not accepting defeat, the Prime Minister Leabua Jonathan annulled the elections, imposed a curfew, declared a countrywide state of emergency and ruled the country by force with the support of the paramilitary unit (Pherudi, 1996:62, Molomo, 1998:134, Mothibe, 1998:47 and Mashinini, 2000:87), thereby laying a “strong foundation for continued conflict and endemic violence in Lesotho” (Pherudi, 1996:63).

In the ensuing 17 years, Lesotho witnessed “an iron-fisted despotism marked by cross violation and denial of human rights where intimidation and abuses of kinds to the opposition became entrenched (Mashinini, 2000:86 and Work for Justice, October, 2006:3).

By 1986, the BNP had been in power for a total of 23 years. During the first five years of legitimate and constitutional rule, 1966-1970, the BNP focused on mobilizing political support because the party had won the elections with a very low margin. Moreover, most of the BNP government’s energies went into repressing and vilifying the opposition as well as the Monarchy (Pherudi, 1996:72). Following the loss of the second national elections in 1970, the self-imposed BNP government focused on rooting out the opposition by whatever means. The resilience of the opposition attracted even more force
and brutality in the persecution and destruction of opponents countrywide. Understandably, the BNP could not serve well the two competing alternatives, that of entrenching itself in power on the one hand, and on the other hand that of serving the development needs of the population, let alone poverty reduction which requires paying attention to details. Clearly, the BNP government opted for the former alternative thereby compromising social progress. As Work for Justice puts it, during the BNP one-party rule, the Basotho as a nation “were too much embroiled in internecine wrangling and recrimination and brutality that there wasn’t any room left for [them] to utilize [their] energies to moving the country forward” (Work for Justice, October, 2006:4).

It was in those circumstances that the international community, acting on benevolence intervened massively in an attempt to alleviate the plight of the Basotho. Each donor came with a different program that attempted to improve the lives of the ordinary people. Donors’ priorities, motives and beliefs in what works and what does not work, differ. Thus, development policies, programs and strategies pioneered by a plethora of donors were bound to be uncoordinated and haphazard simply because they originated from different sources. Thus, development initiatives during the BNP rule were bedeviled by lack of coordination and chronic political instability.

The one-party rule was followed by yet another dictatorship, the military rule. Contrary to belief, “the same security establishment upon which the BNP party based its one-party iron rule turned against the same party dislodging it from state power and grabbing power on its own behalf” (Work for Justice, 2006:3). The military ruled Lesotho for seven years, 1986 -1992. As the Basotho always joke about it – only the jockey had changed, the horse was still the same. Indeed, during the military rule, there was no agreed constitution, just like it was the case under the preceding BNP government. In both cases there was a fairly well developed culture of intolerance to opposition whereby those in power acted vigilantly to criticism and dissent (Machobane, 1998:385).

Thus, just like the BNP government, the military government met its critiques with force and untold brutality as evidenced by the murder of two ex ministers and their wives at
Lekhalong -la- Baroa in November, 1986 (Pherudi, 1996:140; Machobane, 1998:387 and Work for Justice, October, 2006:7). In addition, through Order No. 4 of 1986 the military government placed a moratorium on political party activity. Therefrom, the military government under Major General Metsing Lekhanya belaboured, not the return to civilian rule, but entrenchment of the military in power. In fact, the Military Government concentrated on establishing effective governance and enhancing political legitimacy while at the same time vilifying the BNP for maladministration and violation of human rights throughout its rule (Machobane, 1998:386).

Repeated incarceration and killings of the BNP cadres stirred animosity between the military government and the country’s political activists in general. Once again the Basotho as a nation were embroiled in internecine wrangling and recrimination and brutality that left them too exhausted to pursue societal progress (Work for Justice, October, 2006:4).

It is not surprising, therefore, that the military government, just like its predecessor, the BNP government opted to belabour political legitimacy and perpetuate its stay in power. By so doing, the Military government sidelined return to civilian rule, political development and economic progress. The situation went near chaotic when the military brass itself became embroiled in fierce internal struggle for power and alliance with the King, who at the time, was bestowed with legislative and executive powers, for the first time ever (Machobane, 1998:394,399 and Mashinini, 2000:88).

In the meantime some development programs that were initiated during the BNP rule lost the support of the donors as some of them withdrew aid as a reaction to the coup (Work for Justice, October, 2006:5). Other policies fell into disfavour as the embittered military regime would not want to ensure the success of policies that would be identified with the antagonistic BNP. However, even if the opposite were true, the military government had the least capacity, if any, to direct governance and rebuild the torn socio-economic fabric of post BNP dictatorship Lesotho as “[e]ducationally, the military rulers had no university education. A significant number of them boasted of exploits during their
arduous tasks as miners in the South African gold and colliery pits” (Machobane, 1998:385). Their experience, though valuable elsewhere, was not relevant to their newly acquired task of healing a sick nation and redirecting its energies to achieving socio-economic progress. The result was political confusion of a kind attended by factionalism, corruption, accumulation, patronage and associated ills. The international community as usual rekindled their projects and introduced more other projects some of which anticipated a return to civilian rule. Interviewed by Work for Justice, one senior civil servant in Maseru (the capital) confirmed the resultant confusion whereby there were too many projects which could not be managed or monitored effectively given that the donors including Canada and the USA as well as the international agencies (IMF, World Bank and the UN) were each trying to reorganize the country in different ways (Gay, 2006:80).

This far, it is evident that during the military rule, the second period of authoritarian rule in Lesotho, the rulers, just like during the BNP rule, pursued their self interests and once again subjected the nation to fear, poverty, exclusion and misery. There was no coordinated effort by the centre to establish and promote linkages between the different sectors of the economy and between development projects in order to build a solid foundation on which socio-economic growth poles could emerge and thrive. Thus, with the centre preoccupied with personal/political interests, development efforts pioneered by various actors in the international community remained uncoordinated, haphazard and seriously ineffective. Thus, socio-economic progress stalled, poverty increased.

In 1991 Colonel Phisoane Ramaema took control of the military rule, Major General Metsing Lekhanya and other 20 senior soldiers having been toppled by other soldiers. Colonel P. Ramaema, assisted by the international community and the Basotho themselves worked the country back to democratic rule through the March 1993 general multi party elections The Basutoland Congress Party (BCP) enjoyed a landslide victory winning all the 65 constituencies (Molomo, 1998:135, Mashinini, 2000:89; Pherudi, 2000:121 and Work for Justice, October, 2006:8). The results of the elections were a
clear indication by the Basotho that they were tired of the iron-rule they had been subjected to for more than two decades. They aspired for democracy and for peace.

Despite a clear mandate by the Basotho, on 17th August, 1994, King Letsie III toppled the BCP government for alleged incompetence and replaced it with an appointed council. However, faced with inconceivable pressure from the international community and the Basotho themselves, the King restored the BCP government within a few months (Work for Justice, October, 2006:7). Worth recalling is that the Basotho were denied their civil rights ever since independence as they moved from one iron-rule to the other. Unfortunately, the taste of the long awaited freedom sparked a wave of labour unrest breeding a series of strikes by the soldiers, the police, the teachers, the nurses, taxi owners and parastatal employees, thus paralyzing the BCP government machinery. In fact, “[t]he emergence of the Basotho Congress Party as a ruling party in 1993 was marked by their deplorable failure to govern effectively. They struggled from one crisis to another with no firm action taken to resolve those crises once and for all” (Pherudi, 2000:33).

In fact, the internal conflicts and the struggles for power constituted the worst paralysis for the BCP system of governance. For, the struggles resulted in the split of the party into two factions and ultimately led to the emergence of a splinter group, the Lesotho Congress for Democracy (LCD). The Prime Minister, Dr Ntsu Mokhehle, continued to rule with the LCD and declared the BCP as the opposition (Matlosa, 1998:174, Molomo, 1998:140 and Mashinini, 2000:89).

Indications are that the BCP government never enjoyed any stability for the four years of its rule, 1993-1997. In fact, the political mishaps the party faced in those four years were a heavy burden for a fragile political party which had been in exile for over twenty years, and was in the process of making amends with the internal and external wings. Even more debilitating was dealing with the rebellious security forces which were formed along party lines in the 1980s, by the BNP. The security forces were partisan and loyal
only to the BNP as if no other party would ever come into power. Day by day the BCP government was becoming afraid of the army (Pherudi, 2000:25).

Consequently, the BCP government, just like its predecessors, found itself paying less attention to development issues, poverty reduction in particular, and instead concentrating on resolving conflict within its ranks, mediating endlessly between the employers and the workers, and tiptoeing by the army which could not be trusted. In the circumstances, initiation and support of most development projects remained largely the responsibility of the international community. As stated earlier, the international community comprises of the actors who have different motives and beliefs in what works and what does not work. Such differences are reflected in the development projects which they initiate resulting in lack of coordination and poor performance. For the same reasons, therefore, projects in Lesotho remained uncoordinated, haphazard and ineffective.

At the time of writing this thesis the LCD party is still in power. Like its predecessors, the LCD has gone through a series of political shocks and allegedly is facing intense internal conflicts and struggles for party leadership. For now suffice it to say: Good luck to the LCD.

The analysis would not be complete if the role of other countries in Lesotho’s political instability is not highlighted. Of particular interest is the role played by South Africa, Lesotho’s only neighbour. First and foremost, it is worth noting that “…in all the different aspects of life in Lesotho, from economics to social life to politics to religion…South Africa is always present, always dominating the scene” (Gay, 2006:126). Thus, South Africa is deeply involved in Lesotho’s socio-economic affairs. However, for illustrative purposes suffice it to mention two political scenarios in which South Africa visibly contributed to Lesotho’s political instability. These are South Africa’s changing relations with the BNP government under Leabua Jonathan, 1965-1986, and South Africa’s role in the 1998 military intervention in Lesotho. The significance of the selected scenarios is that the former relates to the then apartheid South Africa while the latter relates to the post apartheid South Africa.
In the pre-independence election campaign the contest for power was between three political parties namely, the BCP, BNP and MFP. The BCP which had won the 1960 elections was visibly set to win the 1965 elections, and thereby become the first government in the independent Lesotho. The BCP was antagonistic to the West and unequivocally opposed to apartheid, while the BNP was conservative and nurtured the relations with South Africa. South Africa and some Western countries including Germany and Britain found it befitting to support the BNP’s election campaign materially and financially. In addition, South Africa provided 100,000 tonnes of maize meal to be distributed to the poverty stricken rural population in Lesotho (Matlosa, 1998:172, Pherudi, 2000:10 and Mashinini, 2000:87). The generous support by the West and South Africa enabled the BNP win the elections and become the first government in independent Lesotho (Molomo, 1998:134 and Gay, 2006:76). As could be expected, the BNP government worked hand in hand with the apartheid South Africa.

In 1970, the BNP lost the elections. Not accepting defeat, Prime Minister Jonathan declared the elections null and void and ruled by force (Matlosa, 1998:173, Molomo, 1998:134, Mothibe, 1998:47 and Mashinini, 2000:87). Notwithstanding widespread condemnation of Jonathan’s coup, John Vorster, the then Prime Minister of South Africa, padded Jonathan on the shoulder and declared that despite the coup, South Africa was going to maintain the good relations with Lesotho (Pherudi, 2000:14). Thus, to the dismay of the international community, South Africa and Lesotho continued to be close allies even in the aftermath of Leabua’s 1970 coup.

The political fortunes changed in the 1980’s when Prime Minister Leabua Jonathan denounced apartheid and also gave refuge to ANC and PAC cadres. Further, Jonathan took a bold step and established friendship with the Eastern block of communist countries including the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), China and Korea (Mashinini, 2000:87 and Pherudi, 2000:34). In retaliation, South Africa gave refuge to BNP’s arch-rivals, the exiled BCP supporters and openly supported the Lesotho Liberation Army (LLA) which was a liberation movement established by the exiled BCP.
leader, Dr Ntsu Mokhehle (Pule, 1998:15). Operating from the South African soil, the LLA greatly destabilized the BNP government, persistently hitting BNP targets and tourist attractions (Pherudi, 2000:16 and Work for Justice, 2006:7). For its part, South Africa was pressurizing the BNP government to hand over the refugees identified with the banned South African movements, the ANC, PAC and the PAC (Mashinini, 2000:87). Following Lesotho’s refusal to comply with South African demands, the latter imposed border blockades on New Year’s Day, 1986 (Work for Justice, 2006:7). For Lesotho’s fragile economy, it took only a few days for essential commodities to diminish and for tensions to rise across the board. Confrontations between the Prime Minister Leabua Jonathan and the head of the Paramilitary Force, Major General Metsing Lekhanya were reported. In an effort to resolve the impasse Major General Lekhanya visited Pretoria and on his return he led a bloodless coup against Jonathan (Molomo, 1998:135, Mashinini, 2000:88, Pherudi, 2000:16 and Work for Justice, 2006:7). Thus, South Africa played a decisive role in the rise and fall of Leabua Jonathan. In the process Lesotho experienced immense political instability. Of interest is that in the aftermath of the 1986 military coup “…South Africa ‘pressed home its advantage’ and ‘developed a harmonious relationship’ with the military government (Matlosa in Molomo, 1998:144).

Not only the apartheid South Africa was involved in Lesotho’s affairs but the post-apartheid South Africa seems to be towing the same line. Some evidence comes from the controversial 1998 military intervention in Lesotho. Having returned to civilian rule in 1993, Lesotho held another general election in 1998. Twelve political parties contested the elections. The Lesotho Congress for Democracy (LCD), a breakaway party formed through floor-crossing in parliament in 1997 won the elections (Sekatle, 1998:42, Molomo, 1998:136 and Pherudi, 2000:239). The opposition cried foul whereupon the supporters of three main parties, BCP, BNP and MFP, camped at the palace gates asking the King to dismantle the LCD government, establish a government of national unity and call for new elections. Government threats through use of the police and the army failed to drive away the protesters (Mashinini, 2000:90). Worth stating is that subsequent recounting of the ballots by a newly formed Task Team revealed serious irregularities in the May, 1998 elections (Star in Makoa, 1998:90 and Pherudi, 2000:242).
The country gravitated to a brink of civil war rendering the LCD government helpless. Eventually, Prime Minister Pakalitha Mosisili was forced to solicit military intervention by the Southern African Development Community (SADC). The request was sent to President Nelson Mandela, the then head of SADC (Pherudi, 2000:249). At the time President Mandela was out of the country and the Acting State President, Mangosuthu Buthelezi acted on the request. Without letting the SADC machinery deliberate Prime Minister Mosisili’s request for military intervention (Molomo. 1998:145), South Africa dispatched its troops to Lesotho on 22nd September, 1998 while Botswana Defence Force (BDF) joined on 23rd September, 1998 (Molomo, 1998:134 and Pherudi, 2000:134).

Although, in some quarters, the Lesotho military intervention is labeled as a SADC operation by virtue of BDF having joined a day later, indications are that South Africa acted swiftly to protect its own interests. Confirming this view is Botswana Guardian in Molomo (1998:145) in stating that “…Botswana’s intervention only served to legitimize what would otherwise have been dubbed a South African invasion of Lesotho”. Botswana’s participation, however, does not hide completely South Africa’s strange set of circumstances in supporting military operation instead of negotiations as a solution to Lesotho’s 1998 political problem. First, President Nelson Mandela, the then President of South Africa, is by all means, and for all intents and purposes, a peace loving African Leader who spent a lifetime showing humankind the value of negotiations. If that is so, why were negotiations not given first preference in solving Lesotho’s political problem? Second, the Lesotho government had to pay for all the expenses incurred by the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) in Lesotho while Botswana paid the bill for its operations. If this was a SADC operation why did SADC not pay for the entire operation from its coffers? (Molomo, 1998:145).

All these said, indications are that South Africa gets involved in Lesotho’s affairs in ways that enhance its own interests regardless of how damaging the measures deployed may be on Lesotho’s well-being. Even though South Africa argued that it intervened to protect democracy in Lesotho (Makoa, 1998:84), the fact is that South Africa “…wanted to
protect its interests, like the Lesotho Water Highlands Project” (Pherudi, 2000:252). The military intervention was not only costly in terms of destruction to life and property, but it also derailed Lesotho’s fragile democracy.

An examination of the political environment in Lesotho over time shows that all successive governments starting with the BNP 1966-1986, the Military government 1986-1993, the BCP government 1993-1997, and the LCD to date, each had its own bedeviling political mishaps. The situation was compounded by South Africa jealously guarding its interests and acting vigilantly to protect same. Consequently, due to persistent political instability, different governments in Lesotho gave inadequate attention to issues of socio-economic progress. The result is that the modicum of concentration required to spearhead social progress has been lacking in Lesotho. Conclusively, the unstable character of politics in Lesotho has had a significant impact on the nature and content of poverty reduction policies and strategies in the country. Poverty reduction policies and strategies were and are still donor driven. That is why they remain uncoordinated and haphazard reflecting the differences, priorities and varying perceptions of the donors.

- **The administrative factor and policy**

A second explanation of why the poverty reduction policies and strategies in Lesotho are uncoordinated, haphazard and ineffective comes from an examination of the key government documents with a poverty reduction focus. Common to all these key documents is that they were not a result of GOL’s own initiative at any given time but, each was produced because the GOL was reacting to some external pressure or stimulus. The list below confirms this view.

- *The Five Year Development Plans* (six in all) - Like in all the developing countries, five year plans were a requirement by the developed countries and donor agencies for them to give out foreign aid (GOL, 2003:33);
- *The Strategic Economic Options Report* (1997) - The document was initiated and sponsored by the World Bank (GOL, 1997:11);
• **Pathway out of Poverty: An Action Plan for Lesotho (1996)** - The action plan was produced by the Lesotho Council of NGOs with the support of the GOL, the World Bank and other donors (GOL, 1996:v and Sechaba Consultants, 2000:32);

• **Declaration of the Workshop on Approaches to Rural Poverty Alleviation in SADC Countries (1996)** - The Paper was presented at a Workshop organized by The Southern African Development Community (SADC), and Lesotho was only a participant (GOL, 2001:21);

• **Poverty Reduction Within the Context of Good Governance (1997)** - The paper was drawn for the 8th Round Table Conference in Geneva which was initiated and coordinated by the UNDP (UNDP, 1997: Book pages not defined, and Sechaba Consultants, 2000:32);

• **Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (2003)** – The document was a conditionality by the World Bank and IMF for the LDCs to access grants and loans from development partners (GOL, 2003:2 and Sechaba Consultants, 2000:32) while for the HIPC’s it was a requirement for debt relief (Budget Speech 2005/2006);


While the above list of documents is not exhaustive, however, it comprises the key official documents in the contemporary poverty debate in Lesotho. As it can be seen, for these documents to be produced, there had to be some form of external stimulus prompting the GOL into action. Indeed, the background of each of these key documents suggests that the GOL reacts to widespread poverty in Lesotho as and when conscientized and urged to do so by development agents and events in the outside world. As already stated elsewhere, development agents have their own priorities and perspectives of what works and what does not work, and these are often reflected in the programmes they support. Consequently, Lesotho’s documents with a poverty focus, and the resultant development programmes, are largely designed to meet the specifications of the sponsoring agents while overlooking the basic and salient issues about poverty, its causes
and the possible counter measures that take into account the livelihoods and the heterogeneous characteristics of the poor. It is not surprising, therefore, that poverty initiatives in Lesotho are uncoordinated, haphazard and unsustainable (UNDP, 1997: Book pages not defined).

Despite the insinuated haphazard reaction to poverty, some observers including the UNDP and Sechaba Consultants note the GOL’s commitment to poverty reduction (UNDP, 1997: (Book pages not defined), and Sechaba Consultants, 2000:32-33). However, the UNDP contents that “…forty years of independence have not seen Lesotho develop a clearly articulated vision of poverty reduction based on fiscal and expenditure priorities as well as an income distribution goal” (UNDP, 1997: Book pages not defined). This observation, subject to correction, may be interpreted as a reflection of some doubt, on the part of the UNDP, regarding political commitment to poverty reduction in Lesotho. For their part, Sechaba Consultants note with concern that resource allocations do not reflect the importance of the social sectors that are key to poverty reduction such as health given that the budget for these sectors has been declining over time (Sechaba Consultants, 2000:33). Clearly, Sechaba Consultants also do not wholly believe in the GOL’s commitment to poverty reduction. Thus, the GOL’s commitment to poverty reduction is highly debatable.

From the foregoing it can be deduced that Lesotho lacks a clear vision for poverty reduction. Strong evidence comes from the GOL’s expenditure priorities and patterns which reflect “…multiple, repeated, and unrelenting assaults on the virtues of restraint and modesty required by the National Vision 2020” (Public Eye, August, 2005). Official statements, declarations and actions, many and varied, further confirm that Lesotho does not have a clear vision for poverty reduction. Of these can be quoted the question asked by the Prime Minister Pakalitha Mosisili in parliament during March, 2009. In an attempt to influence the legislators to seriously consider if agriculture remained a priority in Lesotho, the Prime Minister asked the question “Why should we be pumping money into agriculture when it is evident that we are not getting our money’s worth?” (Public Eye, March, 2009).
The irony of the Prime Minister’s position is that government documents in Lesotho, many as they are, acknowledge that around 80 percent of the population lives in the rural areas and derive a livelihood in agriculture. Moreover, it has been established in the preceding chapter that 90 percent of the poor lives in the rural areas. If that is so, supporting agriculture implies enabling a large proportion of the population to earn a living, thereby reducing poverty. Consequently, to a political leadership that is committed to and upholds a vision for poverty reduction, if any, supporting agriculture should not be optional, but should be obligatory. Perhaps the appropriate question to ask would rather be: Why is the GOL’s support in agriculture not effective? Answers to such a question are likely to discern problem areas, thus leading to solutions.

On the contrary, Botswana, a successful democracy in Africa, with renowned strides in socio-economic development (Monyake and Mapetla, 2008:157), places emphasis on agricultural productivity. To this effect Botswana has developed a New National Master Plan for arable Agriculture and Dairy Development (NAMPAADD). This bold initiative seeks to raise agricultural productivity and output through commercialization, modern crop and animal husbandry techniques, and improved infrastructure and extension services such that the country attains national food security (Botswana MDGR, 2004:3).

Just like Botswana, nations of the world, rich and poor, view agricultural productivity as a determinant of a country’s sovereignty and a basis for the very existence of a society. That is why persistent efforts by the World Trade Organization to discourage countries from subsidizing farmers go unheeded with resultant unfavourable trade balances for the developing countries. Lesotho, therefore, should not be an exception.

Lack of a clear vision for poverty reduction is again affirmed by Lesotho’s Gini Coefficient, the measure of inequality, which has been increasing and reached a high of 0.66 in 1994/1995 thereby making Lesotho one of the countries with the most unequal income distribution in Sub-Saharan Africa (GOL, 2003:15 and CARE Lesotho, 2001:23). Although this is the last available figure for Lesotho’s Gini Coefficient, the chances are
that it has reached even higher levels given the turbulent economic environment and the absurd government expenditure priorities which clearly favour the elite. Though GOL’s extravagant policies are many, suffice it to mention the recent sale of 3-year-old luxury vehicles to ministers and senior government officials for only 1 percent (1%) of their market value. In 2006 the ministers bought the C-Class Mercedes Benz for R3, 000 and the senior officials bought Toyota Camry cars for R1,700 (Shale, 2008:182 and Monyake and Mapetla, 2008:161). Despite unparalleled outcry by the civil society and strong objections by the opposition parties in parliament, the scheme went ahead because LCD commands the majority of parliamentary seats and boasts an exceptionally powerful executive (Shale, 2008:182).

The drop in HDI, a United Nations composite measure of human well being, as established in Section 3.3 above also provides additional evidence towards the lack of a guided vision for poverty reduction in Lesotho. The above economic anomalies persist because poverty as a social problem and poverty reduction as a goal, are not an integral part of daily political and administrative decisions in Lesotho. They are merely part of the daily political and administrative rhetoric, thus confirming Chambers’s observation that in many countries “…a gap yawns between the rhetoric of poverty-orientation and the realities of resource allocation and effective use of resources” (Chambers, 1993 in Sechaba Consultants, 2000:33).

Based on the foregoing, it is safe to conclude that poverty reduction policies and strategies in Lesotho remain uncoordinated, haphazard and ineffective not only due to political instability as established in the preceding sub-section, but also due to an administrative shortfall whereby the country lacks a clear vision for poverty reduction. Lack of a clear vision for poverty reduction breeds an undesirable situation whereby each actor in development determines and designs its poverty interventions without taking into account what the other actors have done, are doing or are about to do. This lack of coordination is one of the factors that negate the performance of poverty interventions thereby nurturing the persistence and increase of poverty.
3.3.4.2 The coherence of the poverty reduction policy framework

Noteworthy is that all the documents with a poverty focus concur that poverty in Lesotho is a painful reality and a national disaster. The extent, distribution and nature of poverty and its upward trend are extensively documented (Sechaba Consultants, 1991, 1994, 2000; GOL, 1996, 2001, 2003; UNDP, 1997). Over the years the GOL ranked poverty as “enemy number one” in Lesotho (May *et al*, 2001:10). It lost its position in 2006 when the Minister of Finance announced that “[t]he Government has…declared HIV and AIDS enemy Number One” (Budget Speech, 2006:3). However, even as a lesser priority poverty cannot be significantly downplayed for two reasons. First, poverty and HIV/AIDS reinforce one another. The GOL, therefore, cannot risk addressing HIV/AIDS completely separate from poverty or vice versa. There is need for policies that address the two social problems concurrently, at least in the case of Lesotho where an estimated 58 per cent of the population is considered poor and 38 per cent is ultra poor (GOL, 2003:14). Second, Lesotho’s national goals are consistent with the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) (Budget Speech, 2006:4), and under the MDGs Lesotho is obliged to halve the number of those living in extreme poverty by 2015. Thus, the consensus on poverty as a national disaster and one of the greatest challenges that face Lesotho remains intact.

Despite the consensus on the extent and the upward trend of poverty, the key documents provide somehow differentiated emphasis on poverty reduction strategies. The First and Second Development Plans, as mentioned earlier, referred to poverty and poverty reduction only in passing. The Third and the Fourth Plans emphasized poverty reduction through rural development, in particular, development of agriculture using the project approach. The Sixth Plan, which is also the last available development plan, adopted Sustainable Human Development (SHD) as its theme. The plan recognized poverty reduction as a major component of SHD. The theme emphasized creation of an enabling environment where all people in the nation could realize their full potential. Areas of focus included improvement of social services, macroeconomic management, privatization and regional integration. The *Pathway out of Poverty*, while providing a
detailed view of how to reduce poverty, prioritized labor intensive growth and investment in human resource development. The measures were labeled practical suggestions which were not meant to be prescriptive. Rather, they were meant to provide a basis for democratic debate and policy formulation (GOL, 1996: iii). The implication here is that additional input was envisaged on the Pathway out of Poverty before it could become a policy document that guided decisions and actions. That is why government agencies could freely opt for non-observance of the provisions of the document, something which they actually did (GOL, 2001:11).

Another document is Poverty Reduction Within the Context of Good Governance. The paper was submitted to the 8th Round Table Conference in 1997, and it stressed good governance as an underlying imperative for the achievement of all developmental goals. Given Lesotho’s long history of political instability and its concomitant social problems (GOL, 2003:79), good governance was and remains one of the challenges the country faces. What is striking, however, is the difference in emphasis between the policy papers that are not widely spaced.

The PRSP, for its part, provided an array of sectoral strategies while emphasizing those that create employment and provide food security. However, unlike the Pathway out of Poverty, employment creation was to be pursued through foreign direct investment (FDI), capacity building in the private sector, increasing support to small, medium and micro enterprises, developing the mining industry as well as tourism. Food security focused on short term relief measures to fight hunger and on long-term approaches which mostly encourage transition from subsistence to commercial farming (GOL, 2003:34). Lastly, the National Vision 2020 grounds thematic strategies on an overall grand strategy, the pillars of which are sustained political commitment, sustained high levels of investment and enhanced development management capacity (Vision 2020, 2004:29). Noteworthy is that these documents which enjoy an equal standing in Lesotho’s poverty debate provide a diversity of development options with varying degrees of emphasis.
Worse still, each document comes into the debate in its own right, and correctly so because none of them is designated as a tool for implementing another. Little wonder, therefore, that attempts to implement the variety of strategies in these documents lead to an uncoordinated and haphazard development activity with very little impact. The diversity of documents as well as strategies leaves the government agencies with the liberty to implement some strategies and not others and in the order of their choice. In that way, development initiatives in Lesotho will continue to be uncoordinated, haphazard and unsustainable. On the basis of the foregoing, it can be concluded that Lesotho is yet to develop a coherent poverty reduction strategy with clearly identifiable policy options. Until then, poverty reduction in Lesotho will continue to be mere rhetoric.

A new development at the time of writing this thesis is that the GOL, after a lapse of twelve years, intends to resume the five year development planning approach which was abandoned in the 1990s. As envisaged, the first plan should be in operation by April, 2011. Hopefully, the new Five Year Development Plan and others to follow will cascade from the National Vision 2020. Hopefully, the envisaged development plans will attract resources from donors unlike the PRSP which the GOL claims “…did not receive anticipated resources from…development partners and could therefore not be effectively implemented” (Budget Speech, 2010:5).

At this point, it is worth turning to local government which also features prominently in Lesotho’s efforts to attain socio-economic progress and thereby reduce poverty, particularly at the local level.

3.4 LOCAL GOVERNMENT

The rural development institutional structure discussed in Section 3.3.3 failed to produce tangible results in the rural sector. Not only did the structure fail to enhance rural development, but it also lost popularity because it precluded popular participation by virtue of denying the communities membership of the District Development Committees. The need to enhance popular participation prompted a search for alternatives. This led the
GOL to opt for a fully-fledged local government, a system of government that had remained largely dormant since the abolition of the District Councils in 1968. The BNP government abolished the District Councils because they were dominated by the opposition making it difficult for the ruling party to penetrate the rural areas (Van der Geer and Wallis, 1984:19 and Mashinini, 2000:94).

The origins and historical development of local government in Lesotho up to 1968 are well documented elsewhere (Van der Geer and Wallis, 1984; Rembe and Mapetla, 1989; Sechaba Consultants, 1995 and Mashinini, 2000). For the purpose of this paper interest is on local government since 1968 with the view to establish the adequacy of the emergent structures as instruments of popular participation and service delivery, hence poverty reduction.

Evidence shows that a fully-fledged local government system remained dormant between 1968 and early 1993. In the period 1968 -1993, Lesotho experienced autocratic governments that adopted various versions of local government tailored to legitimize their otherwise controversial rule, while holding on to stringent central control measures (Van der Geer and Wallis, 1984:19, 24; Mapetla and Rembe, 1989 and Mashinini, 2000: 94).

First, the BNP government that was democratically elected in 1966 lost the elections in 1970, only to usurp power through untold repression and persecution of the opposition countrywide (Khaketla, 1971 and Pherudi, 1996). For 16 years of its unlawful rule, the BNP did not go to the polls. Instead, through the enactment of the Development Councils Order No. 18 of 1981 and the Urban Act of 1983, the BNP government purported to devolve power to the people while, in fact, it created structures of domination by the centre. Referring to this period Mashinini (2000:94) observes that during its term the BNP government did not do much in effecting local government except holding token national conferences and making by-laws, and creating positions and institutions that centralized instead of decentralizing administration.
Second, Lesotho slipped into military rule in 1986 when the army toppled the BNP government which was led by Prime Minister Leabua Jonathan. Although the coup d’etat was a cause for jubilation for the majority of the Basotho, the mood changed when it became clear that the military was in power to stay (Machobane, 1998:384). A clear message of intent by the Military Government was sent to the nation through Order No. 4 of 1986 that barred political activity in Lesotho indefinitely. In an effort to quell the emergent political agitation, the Military Government enacted Order No. 13 of 1992. The order purported to devolve power to the people while, in fact, it was just one of the several measures aimed at legitimizing military rule, at the same time ensuring that the center remained in full control of local affairs. Through establishment of District Military officers who were responsible for government activity at the district level, the Military government maintained tight control over local activities.

Democracy was restored in Lesotho in 1993. Credit goes to Colonel P. Ramaema who successfully rolled back the army and facilitated the installation of the Basutoland Congress Party (BCP) in power through a democratic process. In compliance with the pre-election party manifesto, the BCP government established a White Paper – Government Notice No. 45 of 1996. The White Paper recommended repeal of all existing legislation pertaining to local government, while presenting a comprehensive new legislative framework for the establishment of democratic local authorities. One day facilitated debates were held in all the ten districts of Lesotho wherein the people and the chiefs participated through representation (Ministry of Local Government, 1996:4). The political commitment and policy justification in the White Paper gave renewed hope for a better life to the frustrated masses and the disillusioned development practitioners in the districts. As stated therein, the government was committed to:

(i) Deepening and widening access to the structure of government in Lesotho, and giving the electorate greater democratic control over development planning processes and making public institutions more accountable to elected representatives.
(ii) Moving decision making, resource allocation and district level planning and local development and public services physically closer to the people.
(iii) Distributing the GOL’s human, institutional and infrastructural resources and capacity across the country (The White Paper, Section 101, Government Notice No. 45 of 1996).

The consultative process culminated in the publication of *Local Government Act No. 6 of 1997*. This act was later amended by *Local Government Amendment Act, 2004* which amongst other changes gave concession regarding the inclusion of chiefs into the local councils. The chiefs are to be nominated by other chiefs instead of being elected by the people as was originally the case. In 2005 local government elections were held. A critical examination of the *Local Government Elections Analysis Report-2005* reveals a record low turnout of around 7 percent in the majority of cases. However, despite this anomaly, the LCD government sanctioned the elections and put local authorities in place.

**Figure 3.2: Lesotho Local Government Structure as in 2005**

![Diagram](image)

The enabling Act provides for a three tier local government structure comprising community councils, urban/municipality councils and district councils. On each council two places are reserved for gazetted chiefs. The structure of local government is presented in Figure 3.2 above.

The LCD local government structure has three unique features which are likely to influence its performance in several ways. First, the structure glaringly marginalizes the traditional authorities. Chiefs become members of local councils only on being nominated by other chiefs in the area. In addition, only two positions are reserved for chiefs on each council. The arrangement leaves many chiefs ignorant of the decisions made at the local level particularly because there is no forum where the nominated chiefs can consult and/or inform their counterparts about councils’ decisions. The marginalization of chiefs poses a problem at the practical level because chieftainship is, has been, and is likely to continue to be an integral part of local administration in Lesotho. The Basotho, particularly in the rural areas, continue to proudly identify with their chiefs, for example, it is common to hear people say: *Nna ke seoli, ke motho oa Masupha* or *Nna ke nare ea ’M’a Mosa le Molapo* (I belong to Masupha - chief of Berea District or I belong to Molapo - chief of Leribe District). Most notably, at each and every Basotho funeral the chief is always given a chance to talk, and as a last person for that matter, thereby acknowledging the authority bestowed in that position. Affirming this view is Quinlan in noting that “the rural population regards [chiefs] as a heritage of ideas to be used and reinterpreted in different ways to define their place and world instead of seeing them as an obstacle” (Quinlan in Shale, 2010:6). Thus, the prominence of chieftaincy and how deep rooted it is in the Basotho culture is indisputable. If that is the case, an administrative structure that sidelines the chiefs sows the seeds of its own destruction. Indeed, the LCD government seems “to underestimate the residual power of chiefs which when evoked can render the much taunted local government structures ineffective” (Shale, 2010:6). As Kapa rightly points out, “[i]t would do no harm to anybody if the chiefs participated in all local government structures on an ex-officio basis as has always been the case in the previous model” (Kapa, 2009:15).
Second, the LCD local government structure sets aside a third of the community councils’ seats for women. A move to eliminate gender based discrimination, no doubt, is commendable because it enhances the participation of women in social development. In fact, “meaningful development cannot take place without creating a congenial condition for women to realize their full potential” (Thomas-Emeagwali in Modo and Ogbu, 1998:41). Moreover, the policy is in line with international declarations that advocate elimination of discrimination against women, in particular, the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action which conscientized the world about “feminisation of poverty” (World Bank, 1995:18). However, it is important to note that good policies can be marred by the implementation process. Thus, the determinant factor for the success of a good policy is its implementation process. In fact, while the policy of women empowerment is good in itself, it can be negated by the implementation process. Supporting this view is Anderson (1979:92) who opines that “… the content of policy and its impact on those affected, maybe substantially modified, elaborated, or even negated during the implementation stage”.

The act of suddenly setting aside a third of the community councils’ seats for women, without having gradually exposed women to the harsh realities of politics in Lesotho, and without having institutionalized local government training at all possible levels of the educational system, amounts to a revolutionary approach which may compound the problem further by putting in place people who are not equal to the task. In the event the policy is filtering in people who are not equal to the task, the local government system in Lesotho will produce unaccountable local councils that are incapable of influencing national policy making and resource allocation, to the detriment of social progress at the local level. Reiterating this view is Cornell who argues that: “Successful rural development is closely associated with vigorous locally accountable institutions…” (Cornell in Van der Geer and Wallis, 1984:148).

Third, the LCD local government system undermines the principle of participatory democracy in that it “…has introduced a system of ‘recentralisation’ within decentralization (Kapa, 2009:16). What this means is that the system, instead of
devolving power fully to the lowest unit of society (the village), it has devolved power from the central government to the community council. In terms of the Local Government Act, No. 6 of 1997, a community council lumps together a group of villages as it is made up of 9 to 15 electoral stations. Decisions affecting the villages, therefore, are taken by the councilors at the community council level. This denies the ordinary villagers an opportunity to participate directly in decisions that affect their lives. Moreover, decisions at the community level are likely to tilt in favour of villages that are represented by relatively more skilled, eloquent and outspoken councilors. This defeats the basic principle of local government that of popular participation and improved service delivery for the ordinary people (Kapa, 2009:15). Unless the democratic right of participation is taken back to the people at the village level Lesotho’s local government sustainability is questionable.

The three main features of the current local government system in Lesotho do not augur for an impressive performance of the system. Marginalization of the traditional authorities is a recipe for conflict, filtering in candidates who are not equal to the task, regardless of gender, is a recipe for mediocrity, while precluding participation at the grassroots level is a recipe for apathy. Whichever comes first has the potential to render the local government system dysfunctional.

The local authorities have been in place for five years with the second local government elections contemplated for June 2011. Indications are that this “[l]ocal government structures are devoid of financial and institutional capacity to discharge their duties (Kapa in Monyake and Mapetla, 2008:161). First and foremost, the local authorities do not raise their own revenue neither do they prepare annual budgets. Instead they function on disbursements dished out by the centre at irregular intervals. Without annual budgets and with no clear accounting procedures the funds are liable to misuse (Mooki, 2010:34). Second, an overwhelming majority of the councilors have a low educational background, predominantly primary education (Melamu, 2007:36). Not surprising though because people with tertiary education flee the poverty stricken rural areas in search of better conditions of living. It can be deduced that the councilors, with their low level of...
education, can hardly grapple with the administrative requirements of planning, budgeting and organizing for local development. Instead, as it will be seen in Chapter 6, the councilors spent their time tip-toeing around MPs of the ruling party and offering secretarial services for the self-help projects initiated by the former in collaboration with the Ministry of Forestry and Soil Conservation and the Ministry of Local Government. In those constituencies in which the MPs are from the opposition, for example Berea No. 28, the two ministries liaise with the councilors and the village committees of the ruling party. Thus, the community councils have little, if any initiative at the local level. In fact, “…the local authorities have [been] reduced to political turfs instead of functioning as catalysts for accelerated and sustainable local level development” (Chiasinga, 2008:281).

Indeed, in most, if not in all the constituencies, during “…the five years of the institution’s existence there is really nothing material that can be claimed to have been achieved” (Mooki, 2010:34). Consequently, the majority of the people at the local level hold that local government has not changed their lives (Melamu, 2007:30 and Mooki, 2010:30). To be sure, the rural areas continue to be characterized by inaccessible villages, poor service delivery, low educational facilities, poor health facilities, chronic malnutrition and destitution. Local government in Lesotho is yet to undergo drastic changes before it becomes a viable policy option for poverty reduction.

3.5 CONCLUSION

The chapter has established that poverty increases in Lesotho despite concerted efforts by the government and development agencies to reduce the number of those who live in poverty. Attempts at transforming the rural sector through rural development projects also achieved minimal results due to defective institutional arrangements and non-existence of a coherent poverty reduction framework.

In addition, planning for poverty reduction is marked by discontinuity, inconsistency and is heavily influenced by external factors. This is one of the reasons why poverty reduction policies, programs and strategies in Lesotho are uncoordinated and haphazard.
The policies are also ineffective because they lack the common thread, ‘attack on poverty’

The lack of coordination of poverty reduction initiatives has also been addressed. The conclusion reached is that the poverty reduction interventions are uncoordinated and ineffective mainly due to the country’s persistent political instability and administrative deficiency. The two factors negate the poverty reduction initiatives both at the local and national levels.

The role of local government in improving the lives of the ordinary people has also been examined. It has been established that for the most part decentralization in Lesotho amounts to window dressing, precisely because the different versions of local government adopted between 1968 and 1997 purported to decentralize power to the lower units while in fact they were instruments of ‘recentralization’. In 1997 an elective system of local government was introduced, for the first time since independence. However, along with it came new debilitating problems in local government including lack of institutional capacity and the marginalization of traditional authorities, the bedrock of local governance in Lesotho.

The next chapter is an analysis of the outcomes of the poverty reduction policies, strategies and programs in Lesotho, with emphasis on the contemporary poverty interventions.
CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS OF THE OUTCOMES OF POVERTY REDUCTION POLICIES, STRATEGIES AND PROGRAMMES IN LESOTHO

4.1 INTRODUCTION

The previous chapter examined the theory of poverty reduction in Lesotho and concluded that, at least in theory, Lesotho appears not to have a coherent poverty reduction policy framework that serves as a guide to policy makers and policy implementers. Resultantly, poverty reduction initiatives in the country are uncoordinated, haphazard and seriously ineffective. It is important, therefore, to link the theory and the practice of poverty reduction in Lesotho with the view to substantiate this theoretical assertion. This is what the chapter sets out to do.

Essentially, in analyzing the outcomes of the poverty reduction policies and strategies in Lesotho, this chapter seeks to show that the factors that negate the performance of self-help projects pervade the entire development activity in Lesotho. In other words, in the same way as the self-help projects are not geared to poverty reduction and are highly politicized, other development policies and strategies reflect and, indeed, suffer from the same defects. To be sure, Chapter 3 dealt mainly with the defects of poverty reduction policies at the theoretical level while the present chapter is concerned with the practice and/or implementation of poverty reduction initiatives and outcomes thereof. The differentiation is important because in some cases the design of a policy embraces the notion of ‘direct attack on poverty’ but the political factor immediately sets in and cripples the implementation process. A typical case is the Lesotho Fund for Community Development (LFCD). The design of LFCD embraces popular participation, capacity building and sustainability of poverty reduction activities at the local level. However, the programme achieved mixed results mainly due to the political factor. Thus, the chapter is structured such that at the end of it the reader should appreciate the extent the political factor affects the performance of poverty reduction policies and strategies in Lesotho,
either directly or indirectly. Therefrom, it can be deduced that the political factor that affects the performance of poverty reduction policies in Lesotho, necessarily affects the performance of self-help projects.

4.2 POVERTY REDUCTION POLICIES AND STRATEGIES

Since independence, 1966, Lesotho consistently grappled with poverty reduction. Interventions included policies, strategies and programmes which focused on sectoral transformation as well as those that sought transformation of the national economy. Included in the discussion are the Green Revolution strategies, community development, foreign direct investment, the Lesotho Fund for Community Development (LFCD), Free Primary Education (FPE) and the social safety net (SSN). The Green Revolution strategies focused on increasing agricultural productivity. Community development concentrated on providing and improving the social and physical infrastructure in the rural areas. Foreign direct investment focused on attracting private investors in manufacturing and textile industry with the view to create jobs. The LFCD is a special fund established in 1999 for the purpose of reducing poverty amongst the targeted poorest in Lesotho through social, economic and environmental projects based on a community-led approach (GOL, 2001:55). FPE is an educational programme launched in 2000. Its overall objective is to contribute to poverty reduction through provision of sustainable, improved and quality education for all (Kingdom of Lesotho, 2005:42). The social safety net includes old age benefits, programmes for the destitute and support to orphanage homes. The next sections explore the extent the policies, strategies and programmes identified above have contributed to poverty reduction.

4.2.1 Green Revolution strategies

The importance of agriculture to Lesotho’s development was acknowledged in the Second Five Year Development Plan which stated that “Lesotho possesses little industry and with the vast majority of the population living in the rural areas, rural development
with agricultural focus is the most immediate, necessary and sensible means to increase nationally produced wealth” (GOL, 1975:71).

Following the realization and acceptance of agricultural development as a pre-requisite to Lesotho’s economic growth, the GOL intensified its efforts aimed at improving the sector’s productivity. The optimism about an agriculturally biased development strategy was based on the recognition that Lesotho’s agriculture once performed exceptionally well, to an extent that in the late 1800s grain exports represented the most important source of income for Lesotho, as indicated in Table 4.1 below. The growth of grain exports and the ensuing prosperity of the Basotho was a concern to the colonizers and the missionaries. The former postulated that if the Basotho relied on the produce of their land for subsistence they would not make their labour available to white owned farms and industries while the latter were concerned about non-evangelization (Murray, 1981:22).

For a common purpose the two parties joined forces and undermined Lesotho’s prosperity. First, the colonial administration imposed tariffs on grain imported from Lesotho to South Africa, the then Lesotho’s largest trade partner. Later grain imports were prohibited and instead, grain was imported from Australia and the United States of America (Murray, 1981:23 and Maloka, 2004:10). Second, hut and poll taxes were imposed on every adult Mosotho man and payment was by cash only. The need to pay taxes in cash forced most of the farmers into wage labour in the South African mining and agricultural industries (Maloka, 2004:79). In addition, the wages were quite low and

Table 4.1: Structure of Lesotho’s Exports in 1880

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Product</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Grain</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wool and other produce</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour remittances</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Kimble, 1976 in Murray, 1981:12
rigidly controlled by the Chamber of Mines such that by 1969 the earnings of the black mine workers were not different from the wages paid in 1911 (Wilson in Murray, 1981:26). The low wages ensured continued dependence of the migrants on wage labour. Third, through the Aliwal North Treaty signed in 1869, the Basotho lost the fertile lands in the Free State which they used for grain and livestock production. The Treaty fixed the present borders which left the Basotho with mountains and foothills, thus, reducing substantially the land for agricultural production (Murray, 1981:4). These measures and others caused a steady decline of agricultural productivity to the extent that by the end of the 19th century, Lesotho was a net importer of grain and an impoverished labour reserve for the South African economy (Murray, 1981:10 and Maloka, 2004:12). It is against this background that the GOL embarked on Green Revolution strategies with the view to restore agricultural productivity.

With a fervent hope for agricultural recovery, the GOL, in the First and Second Five Year Development Plans emphasized agricultural development using area-based projects. The projects were treated as experiments which, if successful, would be replicated countrywide. The common objective of these projects was to expose the farmers to improved farming practices and to demonstrate that increased benefits could be realized through proper use of fertilizers and high value crops (GOL, 2001:37). Hopefully, the use of fertilizers would improve the productivity of the infertile and marginal land available for farming.

Contrary to GOL’s aspirations of food self sufficiency, and despite the scarcity of land for farming, the area-based projects focused on production of high value crops including asparagus, potatoes, paprika and vegetables. The main reason behind this contradiction was that the GOL was not able to fund the implementation of its policies and relied heavily on external donors for funds (Gill and Ntsekhe, 1999:30). Experience has shown that donors have their own and sometimes conflicting priorities. Thus, each donor believed that Lesotho has a comparative advantage in the production of a given high value crop (Ngqaleni, 1991 in Mashinini, 2000: 108), and that income derived from exports of the high value crops would enable the farmers to buy food and other
necessities. A large number of the area-based projects were implemented in various parts of the country but the most important of these projects, in terms of size, are identified below.

In the North of Lesotho two area-based projects were implemented. The Leribe Pilot Project started in 1970 and operated for five years. It covered 2,000 hectares involving 1,034 landholders. The project provided for the testing of the impact of a package of modern technology inputs on production. If successful, the experiment would be replicated in other parts of the country. The GOL bore all the farming costs but shared the produce with the landholders on a 1:1 basis. The Khomokhoana Rural Development Project started in 1975 and ended in 1980. The project was financed by the Swedish International Agency for Development (SIDA) jointly with the GOL. It covered an area of 19,000 hectares with an unspecified number of households involved. In the central area was the Thaba-Bosiu Rural Development Project which operated from 1973 to 1977, covering 121,000 hectares and involving 17,000 households. The project was funded by several agencies including the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), United States Agency for International Development (USAID), International Development Agency (IDA), some of the commercial banks in Lesotho as well as the GOL. In the South was the Senqu River Agricultural Extension Project which covered the entire catchment of the Senqu (Orange) river. The project started in 1974 and ended in 1976. It was financed jointly by the UNDP and the GOL, but the bulk of its finances came from the former. The Thaba-Tseka Rural Development Project was implemented in the mountain area in 1976 under the auspices of the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) (Garaba, 1980 in Mashinini, 2000:113).

The above area-based projects used the block farming approach whereby those who participated were asked to pool their individual small fields together so that they could be farmed as a block. Block farming, according to the sponsors, facilitated mechanization and enhanced economies of scale (Mashinini, 2000:112-114).
It was not long before the GOL realized that the overall sectoral needs of agriculture could not be fulfilled by the replication of area-based projects (GOL, 2001:37). There were several reasons for the limited performance of the projects. First, they each covered a limited space and as a result they had little impact on production. Second, the projects concentrated aid in their areas of operation with virtual neglect of other areas, thereby accentuating social differentiation. Third, the projects were highly politicized in the sense that affiliation to the ruling party, the Basotho National Party (BNP), was a requirement for farmer participation. Moreover, the location of the projects was politically determined such that the projects operated in those areas where support for the ruling party was clearly demonstrated (Johnston, 1996 in Mashinini, 2000:115). These conditions jeopardized the sustainability of the projects.

The failure of area-based projects in solving the problems of the poor in general and rural poverty in particular, called for a new approach to the problem (Sechaba Consultants, 1991:79). That is why the Third Five Year Development Plan emphasized improvement of agriculture through rural development. The new approach implied use of national programmes as against area-based projects. Of the national programmes implemented, the most important include the Basic Agricultural Services Programme (BASP), the Co-operative Crop Production Project (CCPP) and the Food for Self Sufficiency Project (FSSP).

4.2.1.1 Basic Agricultural Services Programme (BASP)

The BASP was informed by a decade of post-independence experience in area-based projects which revealed major shortfalls in the quality of farming services (Van de Geer and Wallis, 1984:93-94). The shortfalls included shortage of agricultural inputs, inadequate marketing facilities for the farmers, lack of feeder roads to enable farmers to get their produce to marketing points, lack of credit facilities for farmers and inadequate extension services. BASP aimed at removing these basic service constraints.
BASP differed from the area-based projects in a number of ways. First, unlike the area based projects it covered the entire lowlands and the nearby foothills (GOL, 2001:37). Second, it focused on production of staple foods including maize, sorghum, beans and peas (Mashinini 2000:116). Third, it sought a gradual incremental improvement in farming practices and yield (Kingdom of Lesotho, 1975:86), as against the area-based projects which attempted a rapid transformation of agriculture. Fourth, the programme had two phases. The first phase focused on development of infrastructure including roads, houses, stores and workshops. Phase two concentrated on agricultural development through improvement of credit, extension and marketing facilities. Lastly, BASP did not use block farming but emphasized capacity building by working with individual farmers and forging close work relations with the Ministry of Agriculture with the view to improve rural administration and to train indigenous manpower (Van de Geer and Wallis, 1984:94).

For purposes of management BASP was broken down into six farming blocks each servicing 35,000 households. Each block was financed by a different donor. Consequently, the programme had a contingent of expatriate personnel all coming from different countries. Coordination became very difficult because the blocks used different management styles, operations and technology imparted by the personnel of varying backgrounds (Van de Geer and Wallis, 1984:95).

BASP did not last long. It operated from 1977 to 1980. A number of factors led to its short life and its limited performance. First, the parent Ministry of Agriculture did not have the capacity to coordinate the plethora of activities under the programme, some of which were way out of the ministry’s area of competence, for example, development of physical infrastructure. A high level of co-ordination was further necessitated by the fact that each spatial block was financed by a different donor and each “viewed the block they financed as their independent project. As a result each donor practiced in its block, its own methods of administration, management, budgeting and disbursement procedures” (Mashinini, 2000:117). Second, the programme had an acute shortage of skilled local staff and relied on expatriate personnel who could not cover the entire area of operation.
Third, BASP was unpopular amongst the farmers as they had got used to area-based projects which incurred all the farming costs and shared the produce with the field owners (Ngqaleni, 1991 in Mashinini, 2000:116).

Last, BASP failed to reach the bottom needy farmers because in most farming blocks the extension agents recruited “contact farmers” who were trained and expected to transmit knowledge to their communities. The selection criteria “…emphasized that such farmers should possess basic farm implements, oxen, be influential and acceptable, be neither rich nor too poor, be a full time farmer and be a decision-maker on his land” (Van de Geer and Wallis, 1984:99). As it can be seen, the criteria for recruiting the “contact farmers” was biased against the poor and it also excluded women farmers who, by tradition, are minors and do not make decisions on the land they farm. Unfortunately for BASP, women farmers are in the majority and any development programme that marginalizes them has little chance of success.

4.2.1.2 The Co-operative Crop Production Project (CCPP)

The limited performance of BASP prompted the GOL to continue with its exploration of alternatives for improving agricultural productivity. The search led to the establishment of the Co-operative Crop Production Project (CCPP) in 1977 under the Prime Minister’s Office. Along with BASP it sought to increase production of food grains but its focus was production of wheat (Kingdom of Lesotho, 1980:27). BASP and CCPP complemented one another in the sense that the former focused on production of summer food crops and the latter on production of wheat, which is a winter crop. Thus, the two projects promoted continuous use of the land thereby seeking to maximize productivity.

Under CCPP the GOL entered into some kind of Sesotho share cropping with the participating farmers. However, unlike in a traditional Sesotho share cropping where the parties share equally both the expenses and the produce, under CCPP the GOL bore all the costs of farming but shared the produce with the farmers on a 50:50 basis (Ngqaleni 1991 in Mashinini, 2000:119).
Unlike other projects, CCPP was funded solely by the GOL. In that way, the project could be operated any way the government saw fit without having to negotiate with a sponsor. That is why the programme covered only the districts which were the strongholds of the ruling party, the BNP (Ngqaleni 1991, in Mashinini, 2000:119). The location of CCPP raises the suspicion that the project was used as an instrument to cement party relations in the chosen districts of Leribe, Berea, Maseru and Mafeteng. The need to consolidate party support was occasioned by the fact that, at the time the CCPP was implemented, the BNP was ruling the country without a mandate from the people. Prime Minister Leabua Jonathan had violently usurped power and nullified the 1970 elections in which the BCP emerged a winner.

According to Ngqaleni (1991), in its first year of operation, the CCPP used R723, 676.06 in operating costs while the returns after harvest amounted to R423, 467.92. Thus, in its first year of operation, the project incurred a loss of 42 per cent (42%). This huge loss was a signal to the GOL that the project was not financially sustainable. Moreover, it was clear that the project stifled farmer initiative and promoted laziness as the farmers did not participate in decision making and implementation of CCPP activities. Their role was just to submit their fields for block farming and later share in the produce. However, despite the noticeable stated anomalies, the project continued for three years because of its populist political flavour to the BNP government (Mashinini, 2000:120). The design of the project suggests a political purpose of mobilizing support for the BNP at the grassroots. First, those who participated were strictly members of the BNP given that farmers had to produce a BNP membership card in order to register their fields. Second, participation was sanctioned by the Village Development Committees (VDCs), the members of which were nominated by the BNP and thus, comprised of the ruling party stalwarts (Johnston, 1996 in Mashinini, 2000:120).
4.2.1.3 The Food Self Sufficiency Project

With BASP and CCPP having failed to improve food security in the country, the GOL went further to establish a new project, the Food Self Sufficiency Project (FSSP). A number of reasons compelled the GOL to establish FSSP. First, Lesotho faced a renewed need to reduce its dependence on South Africa for the supply of food grains because, during the early 1980s, the relations between the two countries were at their lowest ebb. That was the time when Prime Minister Leabua Jonathan sought political friendship with the communist countries including Cuba, China, North Korea and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). These countries were arch enemies of the apartheid South Africa. In retaliation, South Africa gave refuge to the exiled BCP and its military wing, the Lesotho Liberation Army (LLA) which struck BNP targets operating from South African territory (Mashinini, 2000:87 and Pherudi, 2000:281). It was also in the 1980s that South Africa was under intense pressure by the international community to democratize rule. Pressure came by way of economic sanctions and exclusion from international activities. With the view to compel the neighbouring states to talk against the sanctions, South Africa adopted destabilization tactics against them. The tactics included closure of borders, retrenchment of mine workers as well as intermittent military aggression (Mashinini, 2000:81). Lesotho was the hardest hit given its geo position of being surrounded by South Africa. The country’s unique location made it hard, at times impossible, to get help from other sympathetic countries. Second, the retrenchment of mine workers dealt a double blow on Lesotho’s economy. It aggravated the unemployment situation in the country and severely reduced earnings from migrant labour remittances. Thus, Lesotho was put under pressure to increase its food security. In response to this pressure the GOL established an inter-ministerial task force to address the development of agriculture.

Under the direction of the Ministry of Agriculture, the task force developed a plan document – *Blue Print for action on Agricultural Development (1980)*, which was to guide agricultural activities during the Third Plan period 1980-1985. FSSP became an implementation strategy of the blue print and its central objectives were to reduce
Lesotho’s dependence on South Africa for the supply of food grains (GOL, 2001:38), and to demonstrate the advantages of the use of advanced technology in agriculture (Mashinini, 2000:122).

Contrary to expectation, FSSP was answerable to the Prime Minister’s Office and not to the Ministry of Agriculture. The project used block farming and it covered the entire lowlands as well as the foothills. It operated in three distinct phases. During phase one the GOL bore all the farming costs. However, the produce was shared on a ratio of 50:50. In phase two the GOL and the participants shared the costs equally and the produce on a 33:67 basis, with the participants taking a larger share. In the third and the last stage, the farmers were on their own for both the costs and the produce (Mashinini, 2000:122). The planners had envisaged that by then the farmers would have assimilated the modern farming techniques and raised sufficient capital to enable them to produce on their own.

For a number of reasons, FSSP did not have impressive results (Huisman, 1994 in Mashinini, 2000:124 and Government of Lesotho, 2001:38). First, when the government withdrew from the project participation declined because the farmers were used to projects that incurred all the farming costs and only invited them to share in the produce. Second, FSSP was dependent on South Africa for finance, inputs, tractors and technical expertise and yet, as explained earlier, the relations between the two countries deteriorated for political reasons (Mashinini, 2000:81). As a result inputs and machinery were often delayed beyond the cropping season. Third, like preceding projects, FSSP was highly politicized and as such participation was limited to members of the ruling party. In fact, BNP party affiliation was the pre-condition for participation given that the participants had to be politically screened and cleared by the village development committees which were appointed by the BNP. If a farmer was not a member of the BNP but wished to participate in FSSP, such a farmer had to join the BNP first. Thus, the FSSP was used as a populist political strategy meant to increase BNP membership (Mashinini, 2000:123).
The politicization of FSSP is further confirmed by its location. Its placement under the Prime Minister’s Office, and not under Agriculture, suggests that it was not only a strategy to enhance national food security but was largely an instrument for serving a political end, the accomplishment of which the PM could not entrust to any one of his cabinet ministers.

In conclusion, the Green Revolution strategies comprising the area-based projects and the national development programmes had little impact on agricultural productivity. Production continued to decline to the extent that by 1999, “…agricultural activities including sale of animals, crops, vegetables, animal products and wool and mohair, contributed altogether only 5.2% of the national income (CARE Lesotho, 2001:53). The reasons for the limited performance of the projects are many and varied as already stated. What needs to be added is that the projects failed largely because poverty reduction and sustainable livelihoods were not the underlying motives in the planning and implementation of the development strategies in agriculture. Two main arguments confirm this view. First, if the initiatives genuinely sought to reduce poverty, then the government would have ensured neutrality in the implementation of same, such that participation was open to all the needy farmers regardless of their political affiliation. Second, if poverty reduction and sustainable livelihoods mattered, then the design of the interventions would have maximized farmer participation in the decision making and implementation of the programmes with the view to enhance sustainability of the activities when the sponsors withdrew their support. But, because the short-term political interests dominated the planning, the design and the implementation of projects, “fine rhetoric [was] not matched by equivalent action” (Chambers, 2000:12). Consequently, the Green Revolution strategies failed to improve the living standards of the rural poor who derive a living from agriculture. With the failure of the Green Revolution strategies the GOL directed its efforts to community development.
4.2.2 Community Development

Community development involves “a process during which people in the small community first thoroughly discuss and define their wants and then plan and act together to satisfy them” (Batten, 1971, in Van de Geer and Wallis, 1984:102). Community development is, therefore some form of collective action aimed at improving the material and/or the spiritual well-being of a community or promoting community coherence. Understood and effected in this way community development has the potential to satisfy people’s basic needs and thereby reduce poverty.

At independence, Lesotho was well positioned to effect community development, as defined above because the country already had effective and efficient District Councils. The councils were statutory bodies established by the colonial government in 1948, primarily to facilitate popular participation, to serve as electoral colleges for representation at the National Council and to advise the National Council in matters concerning local affairs. The councils were vested with extensive powers to make by-laws, manage local finances and carry out various responsibilities related to agriculture, livestock, bridle paths, roads, fisheries, public order, health and regulation of trade (Mapetla and Rembe, 1989:22). The height of the councils’ success came when they mobilized vast numbers of people into local diamond digging and a large number of Basotho men returned from the South African mines to work at home. In fact, in the late 1960s to early 1970s local diamond digging was growing rapidly and became a viable economic activity that gave employment to 3,600 workers (Kingdom of Lesotho, 1970: 133). However, the activity lacked the support of the BNP government because the diamond diggers were drawn from the opposition. Untold ruthlessness was seen during March 1970 when the diamond diggers were forcefully removed from Kao, their huts burned down and many of them brutally killed by the police (Khaketla, 1971: 280).

Instead of using the District Councils to effect rural development, the BNP Government, abolished them on the allegation that they complicated lines of communication between the central government and the districts. However, Kotze in Van de Geer and Wallis
(1984:18) notes that the councils posed a threat to the government because they were dominated by the opposition party, the BCP. Even more compelling was the fact that, the BNP had just won the elections by a very narrow margin of 31 to 29 seats for the opposition combined (Khaketla, 1971:12). Thus, the party faced a challenge of consolidating support at the grassroots level. Clearly, in the face of opposition dominated structures, mobilizing party support would be extremely difficult for the ruling party, hence the decision to abolish the District Councils.

The abolition of the District Councils saw an end to participatory development at the local level. Some limited administrative powers were delegated to the field representatives who, at the same time, were directly responsible to the headquarters of their line ministries (Mapetla and Rembe, 1989:23). The result was centralized administrative and planning machinery ill equipped to effect community development. Since then participatory development in Lesotho has been mere rhetoric. The introduction of local authorities following the local elections of 2005 is yet to prove itself as a corrective measure. Even then, the benefits of the new dispensation will take time to develop due to emerging bureaucratic rivalry, competition and obstructionism as the government representatives, traditional leaders and the elected officials strive for power and recognition.

By the time of the Third Five Year Development Plan the adverse effects of centralization were clear to the government, development stalled and poverty increased. That is why the Third Plan pledged Government commitment to a policy of decentralization with the view to encourage popular participation in local affairs and in government programmes (Kingdom of Lesotho, 1980:130). In terms of the policy new institutions were established in the urban and rural areas with the view to reactivate people’s participation in development. Of direct relevance to community development in the rural areas are District Development Committees (DDCs), Village Development Committees (VDCs) and Constituency Committees (CCs). The composition and functioning of the DDCs and the VDCs have already been dealt with in Section 3.2.3. As for the CCs, they were mandated to mediate between the DDCs and the VDCs. However,
the CCs died a natural death as they were often bypassed resulting in direct links between the DDCs and the VDCs (Kingdom of Lesotho, 1980:135). It has already been stated elsewhere that the VDCs lacked the capacity and the skills to identify and formulate development projects. In the same way, the DDCs lacked the capacity, the skill and the finances to effect development at the district level. The malfunctioning of the newly established institutions at the district and local levels perpetuated the “top-down” planning of district and local level development. It is within this context that community development was effected using mainly two approaches namely, self-help and food-aid (Sefali in Mashinini, 2000:177).

Community development involved provision of basic social services and physical infrastructure such as water supplies, nutrition and gardening, health, energy and construction of feeder roads and bridges in the countryside (Kingdom of Lesotho, 1970:38). By the nature of the activities, effective community development strengthens what Sechaba Consultants refer to as the “web of life” for the rural communities. The “web of life” is defined as a cluster of survival strategies that yield a variety of services/products that combine to sustain a livelihood (CARE Lesotho, 2001:35). A cluster of such survival strategies promotes capacity building, empowers the communities and enables them to take charge of their livelihoods. The case of provision of rural water supplies illustrates the significance of community development in the rural areas.

4.2.2.1 Water supply

Traditionally, rural water supplies in Lesotho comprise four types including gravity-fed systems, pumped systems, water point systems and hand-pumped systems (Hall, 1995:6). However, a recent service improvement permits house connections from communal supplies provided the water sources are adequate and the applicants pay for such connections (Interview with the Senior Village Affairs Officer, 18th November, 2006).

Provision of clean water supplies to the rural communities is the responsibility of the Department of Rural Water Supplies (DRWS) in the Ministry of Natural Resources.
DRWS was established in 1998 with the assistance of Helvetas Swiss Development. Before 1998 provision of water to rural communities was the responsibility of the Department of Community Development. By then, provision of services depended on the initiative of the communities. The practice followed from a long established procedure whereby in the 1960s, the colonial government in collaboration with the District Councils, organized countrywide campaigns encouraging villages to raise development funds through household contributions. Those communities that managed to raise funds and were prepared to offer free labour, were met halfway by the colonial government by providing financial and technical expertise for provision of clean water supplies (Mashinini, 2000:178). At independence the procedure was inherited and the government used requests from villages as a basis for soliciting financial and technical assistance from donors. The GOL discontinued the practice in the 1980s when faced with a huge backlog suggesting that the demands were far beyond the government’s implementation capacity (Kingdom of Lesotho, 1980: 136).

The establishment of DRWS in 1998 brought order to an otherwise loose arrangement. DRWS introduced branches in all the districts of Lesotho. Each branch is headed by a District Engineer (DE) who is responsible for rural water supply activities in the district. The DE controls two production teams each comprising a Senior Technical Officer (STO), A Village Affairs Officer (VAO) and a Construction Supervisor (CS). The STO is responsible for the technical aspects. The VAO deals with the social aspects including mobilization of villagers and helping them establish water committees. The VAO also attempts to cultivate positive behaviour and attitudes amongst the villagers with the view to promote community ownership of water systems. This is achieved through holding a series of *pitsos* (traditional public gatherings of all adults in a village/community) arranged with the assistance of the chief (Interview with the Senior Village Affairs Officer, 18th November, 2006). All in all, the role of the VAO is to enhance sustainability of water systems given that the countryside is littered with white elephants due to sabotage and lack of maintenance (Sechaba Consultants, 1994:37 and Hall, 1995:16).
For water provision services, the District Engineer divides a district into constituencies which may not necessarily coincide with the national elections constituencies. A production team, mentioned earlier, is assigned a constituency to work in for a certain period. The VAO identifies villages within the constituency which do not as yet have clean water supplies. Through a series of *pitsos* (traditional gatherings of all adults in a village/community) the VAO mobilizes the community into contributing a fee of R10.00 per household towards provision of water services. The VAO also helps the village/community to establish a water committee and sets the rules for the after care strategy. When the three conditions have been met the village/community satisfies the DRWS ‘readiness criteria’. The STO then takes over the technical aspects of establishing potential water sources and the possible ways of accessing same. When the technical criteria are also met the VAO again helps the village/community to make informed choices about the suitable type of service and the requisite maintenance procedures (Interview with the Senior Village Affairs Officer, 18th November, 2006).

Evidence shows that a steady progress has been made in the provision of water supplies. During the term of the Second Development Plan, 1975, only 16% of the population had access to clean water supplied by systems of varying types (Kingdom of Lesotho, 1970:87). In 1986, this figure had increased to 38.2% and by 1990 50.3% of the rural population was serviced (Sechaba Consultants, 1991:84). A study carried out five years later, 1995, revealed that about 57% of the rural population was served by improved water supply systems (Mashinini, 2000:179). A subsequent household survey carried out in 1999, revealed that about 60% of the rural population in the mountain areas have access to clean water (Sechaba Consultants, 2000:92).

Progress was made in the provision of clean water for a number of reasons. First, the Village Development Committees, despite their lack of capacity and skill for identifying development projects, were unequivocally clear about their need of clean water. Thus, they afforded the government unusual cooperation in matters of water supply. Second, the communities willingly contributed to the construction of the systems by way of cash
and labour and that facilitated completion of many water supply projects (Van de Geer and Wallis, 1984:120).

In an interview held on 18th November, 2006, the Senior Village Affairs Officer revealed some new arrangements in the provision of rural water supplies. The arrangement is that from 1st October, 2005, DRWS district staff was transferred to the Ministry of Local Government and are now answerable to the newly elected local authorities. However, the headquarters staff remains with the Ministry of Natural Resources. The officer noted that the transfer was not only hasty but was also not negotiated with the stakeholders as the letters of transfer were directed to individuals in the field by the Ministry of the Public Service without prior knowledge of other interested parties. One thing that is clear, beyond doubt, is that the new arrangement has disturbed the otherwise smooth running of DRWS activities. For, communication from the DRWS headquarters to the field staff, and vice versa, is now routed through the Ministry of Local Government causing delays and unwarranted conflicts. Another poverty reduction strategy that enjoyed much attention by the GOL is foreign direct investment.

4.2.3 Foreign Direct Investment (FDI)

In 1967, a year after independence, the GOL established the Lesotho National Development Corporation (LNDC) which became a major instrument for attracting foreign direct investment (FDI) in commercial, industrial, mining and tourist sectors. LNDC concentrated on promotion of foreign owned business and left promotion of local business to its subsidiary Basotho Enterprise Development Corporation (BEDCO). As such, the conditions for foreign and local business differed drastically and continue to do so. Foreign business enjoys high recognition and nurturing by the government. Privileges include tax holidays, training grants and purpose built infrastructure (Government of Lesotho, 2001:63 and Mashinini, 2000:166). Local business is largely on its own facing stringent tax and trade policies. The conditions severely retard the growth and expansion of local business to the detriment of job creation, hence poverty reduction.
LNDC focused on development of manufacturing and textile industries. Evidence shows that by 1986 12 manufacturing companies, excluding textile factories, had located in the various sectors of the economy. By 2000 six of the companies were defunct, five of them functional but privatized and only one was still operational in its original form. The active company was the Kolonyama Candle Company at Kolonyama, the home of the former Prime Minister, Leabua Jonathan (Mashinini, 2000:166-174).

The major weakness of the manufacturing companies attracted by LNDC is that most of them did not have economic linkages as they used inputs imported from outside the economy. Only four of the companies referred to above used local inputs. Loti Brick and Highland Ceramics used local clay to manufacture bricks and tiles, respectively. Lesotho Fruit and Vegetable Canners and Maluti Dairy used local farm produce. Of the four companies that had economic linkages, only Loti Brick and Maluti Dairy are still functional but have been sold to companies of South African origin. Due to absence or weak economic linkages the multiplier effect realized from the manufacturing sector remains disappointingly low.

In the late 1980s to early 1990s the GOL paid less attention to agriculture and concentrated on FDI as a major development strategy. Shift of focus was expressed in the Pathway out of Poverty when the Government declared that “[m]any observers have all but written off broad-based agricultural growth as a viable economic strategy for poverty reduction in Lesotho, pointing to its limited and increasingly degraded natural resources” (Kingdom of Lesotho, 1996:1).

With this declaration, the GOL, through the LNDC, intensified its development efforts in manufacturing paying particular attention to the textile industry. By 2004, 50 clothing factories were established in four industrial areas namely, Maseru industrial area and Thetsane industrial area both in the Maseru district, Maputsoe industrial area and Ha Nyenye industrial area both in the Leribe district (Mashinini, 2000:166 and Mutume, 2004:19). In intensifying expansion of the textile industry, Lesotho was also taking
advantage of the liberalization of trade within the textile sector whereby the World Trade Organization (WTO), in 1994, set up the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (ATC), providing for a phased removal of all quotas in the sector within 10 years (Mutume, 2006:18). Not only Lesotho, but all the developing countries viewed removal of quotas in the sector as an opportunity to improve trade by maximizing the textile and clothing exports. Consequently, Lesotho’s manufacturing sector began to grow faster than other sectors of the economy, reaching its peak in 1996 when a growth rate of 14 per cent was registered and employment soared to 56,000 workers (Central Bank of Lesotho, 2005:1 and Mutume, 2006:19), thus making the manufacturing sub-sector the largest employer (Central Bank of Lesotho, 2005:5).

Growth in the textile industry was further stimulated by the African Growth Opportunities Act, 2000 (AGOA) which was introduced by the United States of America with the view to promote adoption of market-based economic policies, political pluralism and elimination of barriers to USA trade and investment (Mutume, 2006:19). AGOA provided duty and quota free access to the USA market on selected products from Africa including textiles. The relaxed labour laws and the country’s preferential access to the USA market under AGOA made Lesotho a good place to do business for the textile industries (Sechaba Consultants, 2000:22). This led to an influx of Asian investors who, in their home countries, faced tightly restricted quotas in the European Union and USA markets under the Multi-Fibre Arrangement (MFA). MFA was a quota system introduced in 1974 by the industrialized countries to protect their indigenous clothing and textile industries so as to maintain employment in the sub-sector (Mutume, 2006:18).

AGOA expired in 2004 and MFA in January, 2005 with grave impact on Lesotho’s economic mainstay, the textile industry. The expiration of MFA led to removal of all restrictions in world trade in textiles and garments making the world’s greatest textile producer, China, flood the USA market (Mutume, 2006:19). Sadly, the USA was formerly Lesotho’s largest trading partner (Central Bank of Lesotho, 2005:5). At the same time, with AGOA ended, foreign investors found it easier and cheaper to manufacture in China and India and decided to close some subsidiary factories in
Lesotho. Other factories, unable to meet international competition, also closed down and about 14 per cent of the workers were left without jobs and terminal benefits. The surviving firms faced with shortfalls in export orders, placed about 10,000 workers on short-term work and used them only when needed (Central Bank of Lesotho, 2006:5 and Mutume, 2006:19). The situation spelled doom, not only for the manufacturing industry, but for Lesotho’s economy, which for more than two decades relied heavily on the textile sector. The gravity of the situation was highlighted by the King in his speech delivered on the occasion of Lesotho’s 40th independence, 4th October, 2006. He warned that reliance on the textile industry is fatal as indicated by the rapid decline in the industry due to the appreciation of the Rand and the expiration of AGOA. The King further emphasized the need for diversification of economic activities in order to avoid similar catastrophic effects on the economy (TV Lesotho, 4th October, 2006).

GOL responded to the economic shock by a number of policy reviews and pledged to revise some outdated legislation. First, producers whose exports were destined beyond the South African Customs Union (SACU) region would benefit from zero per cent company tax on income. Second, company tax was reduced from 35 to 25 per cent. Preferential tax rate for manufacturing and agriculture was also reduced from 15 to 10 per cent with the view to retain existing investors as well as to attract new ones (Budget Speech, 2006:9 and Central Bank of Lesotho, 2006:6).

It is still early to assess the effect of these counter measures as they took effect in April, 2006. However, indications are that the textile industry has not recovered because Maseru city still misses the long queues at the banks and the grocery stores, as well as the festive mood that characterized the textile factory workers’ pay days.

Even if the textile industry were to recover, Lesotho’s reliance on the sector remains fatal. An assessment by the Central Bank of Lesotho reveals that foreign direct investment in the textile industry is not particularly beneficial for Lesotho. This is so because, according to the Bank, only 10 per cent of Lesotho’s export earnings are repatriated and that minimizes benefits that accrue to the country from the growth of
exports in the textile and clothing industry (Central Bank of Lesotho, 2006:3). Not surprising though, because “not all FDI enhances national welfare. The record of FDI in Africa is one associated with transnational capital coming into Africa and benefiting from long-tax holidays, subsidies and benefits of repatriation of dividends and profits” (Moyo, 2002:195). Thus, it can be deduced that with a 10 per cent reduction in company tax and a zero per cent on income for some companies, as concluded by the Budget Speech 2006/2007, the contribution of the textile industry to Lesotho’s economic growth, hence to poverty reduction, has declined even further.

A further decline in Lesotho’s textile industry came with China’s concerted efforts to enhance its dominance of world trade in the textile and garment sector through an ambitious plan that pours tens of billions of US dollars into the sector. Observers note that the country uses free capital, direct and indirect subsidies and a host of other incentives to drive competitors out of the market. The plan aims at creating an environment wherein no country in the world can compete with China in world markets (Johnson quoted in Mutume, 2006:19).

Based on the intensity of China’s activities, analysts at the international level estimated that by the year 2008, 27 million jobs would have been lost in the small textile producing countries when the full impact of the end of quotas would be realized. These jobs would “instead move to more competitive producers such as China and India” (Mutume, 2006:19). In braving for the inevitable economic catastrophe, Lesotho responded as follows:

Instead of joining the chorus of voices of those who want to restrict textile exports from the People’s Republic of China, Lesotho has invited China to be a partner in solving the problems and generating jobs; in forming joint ventures; in training our people in quality assurance; and in financing and construction of Knitted Fabric Mills to anchor these textiles (Budget Speech, 2006:6).

Lesotho was being very naïve to expect China to undermine its well calculated multi-billion dollar plan of capturing the world market by diverting attention to some small
producers like her. In fact, indications are that Lesotho’s call for clemency went unheeded by China because the textile industry is currently reeling from the loss of a market in the United States as declared by the Minister of Finance during 2010. The Minister revealed that the exports to the USA, Lesotho’s largest textile market, declined by about 50% between 2007 and 2009 (Budget Speech 2010/2011, 2010:10).

The significant decline in exports translates into a loss of jobs in the textile sector, as originally envisaged, hence an increase in the incidences of poverty. The continuing decline of the textile industry gives substance to the view that economic recovery based on diversification of the activities, as urged by the King on 4th October, 2006, on the occasion of Lesotho’s 40th year of independence, is the next best alternative (TV Lesotho, 4th October, 2006). In the event diversification opportunities are limited, then healthy bilateral relations leading to greater economic and political integration with South Africa may be advisable. In fact, the GOL is aware of, but persistently waters down the debates around the recommendation made by Sechaba Consultants, following their poverty survey in 2000, to the effect that Lesotho should pursue complete economic integration with South Africa as the most effective poverty reduction strategy (GOL, 2001:69). The recommendation by Sechaba Consultant’s carries more weight especially when it is considered against the background of the Lesotho Highlands Water Project, a massive project that transfers water from Lesotho to South Africa. By virtue of its size and its socio-economic implications, the project has, no doubt, significantly enhanced economic integration between the two countries.

4.2.4 The Lesotho Fund for Community Development

Lesotho Fund for Community Development (LFCD) was established by Legal Notice No.16 of 1999. Currently the LFCD is the main instrument with which the GOL hopes to reduce poverty (GOL, 2001:55). In order to be able to understand the structure and functioning of the LFCD, it is helpful to come to terms with the operations of its forerunner, the Lesotho Highlands Revenue Fund (LHRF).
4.2.4.1 The Lesotho Highlands Revenue Fund

The LHRF was established by Legal Notice No. 91 of 1992, as a conditionality for the World Bank lending to the GOL in support of the Lesotho Highlands Water Project which, when completed, would sell water to South Africa. The Bank compelled the GOL to start this rural development fund to be financed from the duties levied on the project related imports (Lekhesa and Selinyane, 2001:49) and the royalties from the sale of water to South Africa (Mashinini, 2000:186). The establishment of the fund pre-empted the wasteful use of the project related revenues by the state. However, this measure, as it will be seen later, had very little success, if any.

The enabling legislation provided for a management structure comprising three levels namely, the Management Board, the Secretariat and the Development Committee. Table 4.2 below presents a précis of the structure of LHRF.

The Board of LHRF comprised three senior government officials including the Principal Secretary for Finance, and two persons appointed from the private sector by the Minister of Finance. The Executive Secretary was a member of both the Secretariat and the Development Committee. Reports show that for more than two years the structure did function because the then Minister of Finance appointed himself as the Executive Secretary, a position which made him chairperson of the Secretariat as well as the Development Committee. Other members of the management team, fearing retribution in the event they questioned the minister’s self appointment, deliberately stalled the process (Lekhesa and Selinyane, 2001:51). Consequently, the fund lay idle for about three years due to artificial management problems. In the mean time, poverty was increasing.
Table 4.2: Précis of the Structure of the Management of Lesotho Highlands
Revenue Fund

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Management Board</th>
<th>The Secretariat</th>
<th>Development Committee</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>▪ Principal Secretory for Planning (Chairman)</td>
<td>▪ Executive Secretary</td>
<td>▪ Executive Secretary (Chairperson)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ Principal Secretory for Finance</td>
<td>▪ Development Director</td>
<td>▪ Budget Controller</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ Governor of the Central Bank</td>
<td>▪ Finance Director</td>
<td>▪ Development Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ Two persons appointed by the Minister of Finance from the private sector</td>
<td>▪ Such employees as could be seconded or appointed by the Secretariat</td>
<td>▪ Two private sector members appointed by the Board and approved by the Minister of Finance</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The self appointment of the Finance Minister as Executive Secretary raises two fundamental questions. The first touches on the quality and the integrity of the political leadership. Based on the functions of the organs of LHRF as in Table 4.3, the Board makes policies and determines the conditions and functioning of the Secretariat as well as the Development Committee. This being the case, it is difficult to understand how a minister, if not for unscrupulous reasons, would opt to report to an organ (the Board), the incumbents of which are his employees. In particular, the chairperson of the Board was the Principal Secretary for Finance, the minister’s immediate subordinate. The second question is about GOL’s commitment to poverty reduction. It is again difficult to understand how a government can loudly proclaim poverty as ‘enemy number one’ of the nation, and yet lay idle for years, a rural development fund while witnessing an alarming increase in poverty, not only in the rural areas, but countrywide.
Table 4.3 Functions of the Lesotho Highlands Revenue Fund (LHRF).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The Board</th>
<th>The Secretariat</th>
<th>Development Committee</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>▪ Establish policies strategies and procedures of Fund objectives</td>
<td>▪ Management of the Fund in accordance with Board decisions</td>
<td>▪ Carrying out such duties as may be given by the Board</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ Determine the powers of the Development Committee and the Investment Committee</td>
<td>▪ Arrangement of Board meetings and provision of regular briefing to the Board</td>
<td>▪ Selecting projects to be funded and authorizing expenditure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ Evolve general guidelines for the Secretariat and the Development Committee</td>
<td>▪ Liaising with government departments in its work</td>
<td>▪ Deciding the preparation of projects and provision of facilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ Approve the annual budgets and projects referred by the Development Committee and the Investment Committee</td>
<td>▪ Monitoring projects and investments performance</td>
<td>▪ Submitting and monitoring reports to the Board, and seeking approval of Board where need arises</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ Appoint staff to serve on the Secretariat</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Adopted from Lekhesa and Selinyane, 2001:51

The neglect of the fund suggests that, contrary to popular believe, official statements about political commitment to poverty reduction are mere rhetoric.
Three years later the World Bank put forward the operationalization of the fund as a condition for continued support to the Lesotho Highlands Water Project. Cabinet’s quick response was an instruction to the Ministry of Planning to resuscitate the fund (Lekhesa and Selinyane, 2001:51). In doing so, the Ministry of Planning did not comply with the legislation but revived only two organs of management, the Board and the Development Committee. The role of the Development Committee was to receive proposals from the constituencies and submit them to the Board for approval. The committee worked hand in hand with the Members of Parliament (MPs) all of whom were members of the ruling party, the Basutoland Congress Party (BCP) and later the Lesotho Congress for Democracy (LCD). The MPs assumed the role of project promoters and dominated the selection and implementation of projects. They worked through Constituency Committees which originally were general elections committees of the ruling party. In this set up the MPs fostered a dictatorial top-down approach in selecting and implementing projects in accordance with their personal preference and that of the party instead of the communities (Mashinini, 2000:188). Whatever a project was proposed by an MP, funding was made available as the budgets of the constituencies were open-ended, that is, there was no ceiling to the amount that could be allocated for any particular project. The financial extravaganza was justified on the grounds that “Fato-Fato” (the nickname for LHRF public works) was a learning and experimentation process where the costs and needs of the works could not be foreseen (Lekhesa and Selinyane, 2001:55).

Despite its haphazard and dictatorial approach the LHRF had some impact, though negligible, on the rural socio-economic infrastructure. After five years of operation estimates show that 1,070 km of roads were built, including 2 bridges, 60 footbridges, 2 clinics, 20 conservation works, 20 gullies filled and 32,328 trees planted (Work for Justice in Mashinini, 2000:187). Moreover, some employment opportunities were made available even though the labourers lay idle for considerable periods given that they rotated every three months (GOL, 2001:54).
The little that the LHRF achieved was offset by the problems and long-term effects of its activities. First, many of the roads constructed were of poor design and quality and quickly got destroyed by thunderstorms (Mashinini, 2000:187), thus, contributing to soil erosion and environmental degradation. The poorly constructed roads also raised the problem of on going maintenance which, to date, the GOL has been unable to fulfill (Gill and Ntsekhe, 1999: 30). Second, the dictatorial approach fostered by the MPs defeated the principle of participatory development which aimed at empowering the rural communities by letting them initiate and implement projects for their own community development (GOL, 1997:32). Third, due to direct involvement of the elected officials, employment was based on membership cards of the ruling party, the BCP and later the LCD, such that members of other parties were excluded from LHRF activities (Work for Justice, 1997/98 in Mashinini, 2000:188). In that way, the LHRF was used as an instrument for mobilizing political party support. Fourth, party-based employment created tension, social animosity and deep divisions amongst villagers and communities traces of which continue to bedevil participatory development activities at the grassroots level. The cases of two HIV/AIDS Support Groups that obtain in Naleli, a village in the outskirts of Maseru city, provide a classic example. The first support group was established in the early 1990s when the effects of HIV/AIDS began to be felt across the nation. Group membership is open to all who are willing to work without pay. The group mobilizes its own resources and struggles to make ends meet. However, it is making a difference by supporting the HIV/AIDS orphans, giving them food packages, paying for their school fees and providing emotional support. The second support group comprises members of the ruling party, LCD. It enjoys the support and assistance of the MP in the constituency who also happens to be a minister. A member of one group once lamented that the politically related gossiping and mimicking that characterize the two support groups draw them further apart and make it impossible for them to work together in supporting the HIV/AIDS victims. As a result, the victims assisted by the MP supported group are more advantaged. The extent of political divisions in the villages and the communities and implications thereof warrant further investigation.
Last but not least, LHRF activities were characterized by embezzlement and misappropriation of public funds by the politicians. Funds allocated for individual projects were in the range of R150,000.00 and on several occasions, these sums of money disappeared in the custody of MPs. The amounts were quickly replaced in order to pay the labourers, but no legal action was taken against any of the concerned MPs (Mashinini, 2000:188). At the same time, coordinators in some constituencies repeatedly claimed wage bills in excess of the constituencies’ requirements but they were never reprimanded. In other cases the MPs made disbursements to some retail stores that supplied large quantities of the same items of equipment (wheelbarrows, spades, shovels, picks) without clear documentation of need, delivery and use of items (Lekhesa and Selinyane, 2001:53-54).

The foregoing anomalies confirm the view that preemptive measures taken by the World Bank against wasteful use, by the state, of the royalties from the sale of water to South Africa, were in vain. Moreover, poverty reduction through empowerment and participatory involvement of the communities in the initiation and implementation of projects was not realized. Instead, due to mismanagement and politicization of LHRF activities only a selected few benefited from its activities. Indeed, the real beneficiaries of LHRF activities were the ruling party politicians and their rural elite allies who embezzled funds and influenced decision making in their favour (Lekhesa & Selinyane, 2001:55 and Gill & Ntsekhe, 1999:29).

The general discontent amongst the communities and the World Bank and perhaps along with embarrassment on the part of the GOL, led to the establishment of a revised social fund, the Lesotho Fund for Community Development (LFCD).
4.2.4.2 Structure of the Lesotho Fund for Community Development

The main objective of the LFCD was to reduce poverty amongst the targeted poorest in Lesotho through social, economic and environmental projects based on a community led approach (GOL, 2001:55, Gill and Ntsekhe, 1999:29 and Lesotho Television, 07-05-2006). Specifically, the LFCD aimed at correcting the deficiencies of LHRF by “providing effective management of the Lesotho Highlands Water Project water royalties allocated to it for community driven projects intended for poverty alleviation” (Legal Notice No. 16 of 1999).

The enabling legislation provided for a management structure comprising the board, the management unit, district level operations and the local community level operations. The management structure is presented in Table 4.4 below. Deserving special mention is the composition of the Board. Originally, the board comprised four cabinet ministers, two representatives from the private and non-governmental sector, one from the parastatal sector and two from the local committees. By Legal Notice No.112 of 2000, the GOL increased the number of ministers on the Board from 4 to 6. The incoming ministers were drawn from Agriculture and Environment.

As it stands, the LFCD Board is more of a cabinet committee than a board of a public entity. The ministers outnumber the representatives from other sectors. This being the case, politically charged decisions cannot be averted, not even by a vote. Noteworthy is that a board of a public institution normally comprises senior civil servants and representatives of the civil society. In that way, appeals against the board’s decisions and complaints, if any, against the institution can be referred to the minister. But in the case of LFCD, where ministers themselves are on the board, it is clear that such an appeal mechanism does not exist. If it exists, then such appeals can be made to the Prime Minister whose tight schedule may be prohibitive. Second, even if the Prime Minister were to be available, he/she would risk his/her political career by reversing decisions made jointly by six of his/her Cabinet ministers.
Table 4.4: Management Structure of the Lesotho Fund for Community Development (LFCD)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The Governing Board</th>
<th>Management Unit</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6 Cabinet ministers drawn from Planning, Works, Local Government, Natural Resources, Agriculture and Environment;</td>
<td>Executive Director</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 representatives drawn each from the private and non-governmental sectors;</td>
<td>Other staff as may be approved by the Board</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 representative from the parastatal sector; and</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 representatives from local communities.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District Level Operations</th>
<th>Local Community</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>District Secretary (who is an administrative head of the district);</td>
<td>The Community Project Sub-Committee (elected by the community and responsible for planning and implementing LFCD projects;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District Development Coordinating Committee (comprising District Secretary and all heads of line ministries at district level);</td>
<td>The Community Council (represents the residents within its jurisdiction, and is responsible for development programmes of those residents; and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District Management Team (comprising all heads of line ministries at district level as well as NGO and private sector representatives);</td>
<td>The Community (a group of households within neighbouring villages that share the same basic need that is identified and expressed as a project for funding by LFCD).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Area Teams (comprising field operators of line ministries at the grassroots level).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Legal Notices No. 16 of 1999 and 112 of 2000.
Lekhesa and Selinyane, 2001:58.
The management unit of LFCD comprises the Executive Director, Administration Manager, Finance Manager and Projects Manager. At the time of writing this thesis the Executive Director and Projects Manager had resigned their positions. Although the positions had been vacant for more than a year no arrangements were in place for their replacement (Interview with the Acting Executive Director of LFCD, 21st September, 2006). Initially, LFCD had an establishment of 82 workers. By the board’s decision, the establishment was reduced to 47. The reduced staff compliment negatively affected the workloads and the performance of workers and resulted in a high labour turnover. Thus, the Fund has an on-going acute shortage of staff since it started its operations in 2000 (Interview with the Executive Director of LFCD, 21st September, 2006).

Contrary to expectation, LFCD is not independent. It falls under the Ministry of Finance and Development Planning. By virtue of being the chairperson of the Board (Legal Notice No. 16 of 1999), the Minister of Finance is also in the chain of command of LFCD. The dual responsibility of the Finance Minister impairs the proper functioning of LFCD in a number of ways. First, the arrangement sidelines the Principal Secretary who, as the chief accounting officer, has the responsibility for the administration of the departments and agencies that fall under the Ministry of Finance, including the LFCD. Thus, the arrangement leads to an uncomfortable situation whereby the Executive Director of LFCD is answerable to the Minister who, more often than not, may, for political reasons, compromise the management, financial and human resource principles that normally contribute to the effectiveness and efficiency of an organization. Second, the dual responsibility of the Minister jeopardizes the possibility of an appeal for any one who is aggrieved by the decisions of the LFCD Board or by the operations of the Fund itself. This being the case, the GOL may want to reconsider the inclusion of the Minister of Finance and all other Ministers on the LFCD Board.
4.2.4.3 The Operations of LFCD at District and Local Levels

Figure 4.2 below presents the organization structure of the LFCD including the district and local level operations. The figure also indicates a simplified version of the route followed by a project proposal from the initiating community up to the stage the project is financed by the Board. The link arrows show that a project proposal originates from the local level which could be a village or group of villages. From the local level a proposal goes to a community council, the members of which are elected every five years under the local government elections. The community council then forms a project sub-committee that examines the project in detail before onward transmission to the district office. Within the district office there are different authorities including the District Development Coordinating Committee, the District Management Team and the District Planning Unit. All these actors play a role in the processing, prioritization and sifting of project proposals. Noteworthy is the unfortunate situation whereby the local communities only agree on project proposals in their respective areas and pass them to the district office. However, the communities themselves are not represented at the district level. They can only be co-opted by sympathetic institutions as and when the latter establish the need to do so.

According to the undated working papers of the LFCD and as confirmed by the Acting Director- LFCD, there is no established link between the district office and the LFCD given that project proposals approved at the district level are first submitted to the Ministry of Local Government (MLG). At this point, the arrangement seeks to harmonize activities with agents like the Department of Rural Development and the District Development Fund which are under the MLG. From the MLG it is then that the project proposals go to the Management Unit of the LFCD – Executive Director. The latter examines project proposals and those that are approved are referred to the relevant sectors at the central level for further scrutiny and approval. For example, a project that deals with road construction is forwarded to the Ministry of Works while a project that deals with provision of water is sent to the Ministry of Natural Resources. When the
projects have been approved by the sectors in the different government ministries, they are then returned to the Executive Director of the LFCD for onward transmission to the

**Figure 4.2: Organization of the Lesotho Fund for Community Development**

Sources: Adapted from Legal Notice No. 16 of 1999; and Internal Working Papers of LFCD, undated.
LFCD Board for approval of funding (Internal Working Paper, LFCD, undated). Worth stating is that a project proposal passes through a minimum of 8 stages before it reaches the Board for financing.

No doubt, the above procedure for the selection of projects is cumbersome and time consuming. Its greatest disadvantage is that the bulk of the Fund resources are siphoned off by the administrative process, thus reducing the resources to be used for the development projects. However, the institutionalized process has helped the LFCD to marginalize the confused and partisan role of the politicians in the selection and implementation of local development projects. Indeed, the new arrangement brought to a halt an undesirable situation whereby the “…MPs could come up with any programmes whatsoever and still be able to secure funding for them (Lekhesa and Selinyane, 2001:60). The process has also promoted the participation of the rural communities in the activities that affect their lives. However, the need to streamline the procedure cannot be overlooked.

4.2.4.4 The Outcomes of the Lesotho Fund for Community Development

The LFCD has had to address a number of challenges that precipitated the demise of its forerunner, the LHRF. The first challenge was that of depoliticizing the selection and implementation of development projects at the local level. This challenge, as shown in the preceding section, was effectively dealt with by institutionalizing a procedure that ensures the participation of the local communities in the selection and prioritization of projects.

The second challenge that faced the LFCD was that of political bias in the recruitment of wage labourers. In order to address this problem, the LFCD requires the Village Development Council (VDC) in collaboration with the chiefs in the project area to organize a pitso (a traditional public gathering of all adults in a village/community) whereby all the willing and able-bodied persons register for employment. The LFCD and the Community Project Sub-Committee hold copies of the list. Recruitment is done on
the site in the presence of LFCD officials who ensure that recruitment is based strictly on the order of available lists. If the project is oversubscribed the community members take turns, each group working for 20 days. According to the Acting Executive Director, the procedure has effectively barred political bias and is gradually re-kindling the spirit of cooperation amongst and within the communities (Interview with the Acting Executive Director, 21-09-2006).

Effective management of the allocated funds also posed a challenge for the LFCD. In addressing this challenge, the LFCD has fixed a maximum of R 300 000.00 per project. Then for each project, the community elects a Project Sub-Committee which is required to open a bank account. At the start of a project, the LFCD deposits 40% of the approved funds into the relevant bank account. Additional amounts into the account are deposited only when the LFCD is satisfied with the disbursement of funds and progress of work on the site. Progress of work on the site is monitored through inspections conducted by LFCD officials. The procedure has enabled the LFCD to keep control of the funds and to complete projects within the allocated funding (Interview with the Acting Executive Director, 21-09-2006). Most importantly, the new arrangement has put to rest an anomaly whereby the MPs from the ruling party, LCD, took control, embezzled and misused funds destined to pay wage labourers during the LHRF era.

While the LFCD has taken the necessary counter measures to guard against the major pitfalls of its forerunner, its major impediment is lack of financial resources. As per a three year agreement between the World Bank and the GOL, effective 2000, the LFCD should have been allocated the following amounts: R 40 million in 2000/1, R 75 million in 2001/2 and R 100 million in 2002/3 (Interview with the Acting Executive Director, 21st September, 2006). The GOL’s actual allocations to the Fund since its establishment are shown in Table 4.5 below. As it can be seen, the allocations declined year after year to a low of R5m in 2006/7. Assuming that at the end of the agreement with the World Bank, the GOL had continued to allocate to the Fund a constant amount of R 100 million annually (indicated by brackets in column 2), then the difference between the actual and the expected amount is as shown in column 4.
The continuing decline in the annual allocations to the LFCD has some implications for GOL’s commitment to poverty reduction. In Chapter 3 it was demonstrated that the GOL reacts to poverty in Lesotho only when it is urged or directed to do so by the international community. It was also shown that the GOL lacks the requisite restraint and modesty that befit a country that is committed to poverty reduction. By failing to maintain the envisaged financial allocations to the LFCD, the GOL confirms the present writer’s argument that poverty reduction initiatives in Lesotho achieve limited results mainly due to lack of political commitment.

Table 4.5: Annual Allocations to Lesotho Fund for Community Development from 2000/1 to 2006/7 (In millions of Rands)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Amount agreed on</th>
<th>Actual allocation</th>
<th>Discrepancy (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2000/1</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001/2</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>-60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002/3</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>-70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003/4</td>
<td>(100)</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>-86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004/5</td>
<td>(100)</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>-70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005/6</td>
<td>(100)</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>-85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006/7</td>
<td>(100)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>-95</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Lesotho Television, 7th May, 2006.

Internal working papers of LFCD consulted during an interview with the Acting Executive Director, LFCD, 21st September, 2006.

Notes: The brackets indicate the fictitious amounts based on the assumption that the Government of Lesotho allocated to the LFCD an amount of R100m in the years subsequent to 2002/3, the year when the agreement with the World Bank expired.
Due to financial difficulties the LFCD suspended some projects in 2005/2006. It was not possible to resume work in most of the suspended projects in 2006/2007 because the financial situation went from bad to worse when the GOL made its lowest ever allocation of R 5 million to the Fund. At the same time it was not possible to start any new projects. However, despite the tight financial situation and the high vacancy rate, the LFCD, in its 7 years of operation, completed 90 projects comprising roads construction, conservation schemes, bridges, footbridges, water supplies and one school extension (Interview with the Acting Executive Director, 21-09-2006).

As it can be seen, the LFCD focuses primarily on infrastructure type of projects, conservation schemes and small public works. By constructing roads the LFCD has improved transportation network in the rural areas. Thus, it has alleviated the plight of communities that were originally cut off from service providing centers particularly during the rainy and snowy seasons. Through conservation works such as the filling of the gullies, building small dams and planting grass and trees, the LFCD contributes to reduction of soil erosion which is one of the debilitating environmental problems in Lesotho. Last but not least, the LFCD projects are labour intensive and generate employment for rural communities.

4.2.5 Free Primary Education

In 2000 the GOL introduced Free Primary Education (FPE). FPE was influenced, to a large extent, by Lesotho’s participation in some regional and international forums that focused on how best to improve education service provision. At the regional level Lesotho participated in the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) Protocol on Education and Training as well as the New Initiative for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) Human Resource Development Initiative. At the international level FPE was guided by Education for All (EFA) and the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). EFA is a worldwide initiative aimed at improving basic education on the understanding that education is a human right. The goals and targets of EFA were adopted at the World Education Forum held in Dakar in 2000. Goal 2 specifically refers to primary education
and reads as follows: “Ensuring that by 2015 all children, particularly girls, children in
difficult circumstances and those belonging to ethnic minorities, have access to and
complete free and compulsory primary education of good quality” (Kingdom of Lesotho,

FPE is also a response to MDGs which, amongst other things, urge the countries of the
world to focus on eradication of extreme poverty and hunger as well as achievement of
universal primary education by 2015 (World Food Programme, 2003:4 and Kingdom of
Lesotho, 2005:23). At the national level FPE fulfills Section 28 of the Constitution of
Lesotho, 1993 which stipulates that Lesotho should make education available to all and
ensure full development of human personality. To this effect, Lesotho adopted a policy of
free and compulsory primary education, the overall goal of which is to contribute to the
reduction of poverty in Lesotho through provision of a sustainable, improved and quality
assured education (Kingdom of Lesotho, 2005:42).

Moreover, a 2001 review of poverty and livelihoods in Lesotho revealed that 40 per cent
of heads of poor and ultra-poor households have no formal schooling, compared to a low
23 per cent of non-poor households (World Food Programme, 2003:4). These categories
of households have many and varied characteristics. However, an oversimplified
categorization based on availability of food suggests that the poor households are those
that have two meals a day, the ultra-poor households have one meal a day while the non-
poor households have three meals a day (Sechaba Consultants, 2000:149). This
categorization does not take into account the quality of food. All in all, FPE in Lesotho is
a response to regional, international and national aspirations about improvement of
education with the view to reduce poverty. That is why the primary goal of the GOL’s
“…policy for basic education is to contribute to the reduction of poverty in Lesotho
through provision of a sustainable, improved, quality assured, universal free and
compulsory primary education” [emphasis original] (Kingdom of Lesotho, 2005:42).

In implementing the policy on basic education, the GOL abolished school fees by one
grade per year starting from 2000, such that all grades would be free by the beginning of
2006 (World Food Programme, 2003:5). Indeed, by 2006 primary education was free for all grades. In order to encourage enrolment, school feeding programmes were and are still used as an incentive to pull and retain children in school (Carr-Hill et al., 2003:2 and World Food Programme, 2003:3). Thus, FPE has two components, a long term indirect attack on poverty and a short term direct attack on poverty. Long term effects are envisaged to spin off from increased primary schooling for the poor who previously could not attend school because the parents could not afford to pay school fees. However, it is doubtful if the expected long term effects of FPE on poverty will be realized. This pessimistic mood arises from the conclusions of a study conducted in Ghana which revealed that “…increased primary schooling for the poor does very little to improve their immediate chances of escape from poverty. Most of the economic benefits of education do not kick in until students reached at least middle school level” (Tsikata in Harsch, 2006:18).

Although the socio-economic conditions in Ghana and Lesotho may be different, it is likely that increased primary schooling in Lesotho will have little, if any, effect on poverty. Four reasons explain this view. First, a certificate in primary education does not offer the holder an opportunity to any gainful employment either in the formal or informal sector. Second, primary education itself does not impart skills that enable the students to venture into viable and sustainable economic activities, nor does the programme include lifelong skills. A curriculum review to correct the situation has been proposed in the Lesotho Education Sector Strategic Plan: 2005-2015 (Kingdom of Lesotho, 2005:51). Given that the benefits of the proposed curriculum changes will take time to develop, meantime increased primary schooling will continue to have minimal, if any, impact on poverty. Third, an evaluation of the feeding programmes in 2003 revealed that a considerable number of pupils just come to school to eat and leave while others leave their study material at home (Carr-Hill, 2003:87). Fourth, the drop out rate is high, as indicated earlier. Thus, a considerable number of those who start primary schooling do not complete the programme.
4.2.5.1 Outcomes of Free Primary Education

According to the *Lesotho Education Sector Strategic Plan -2005* some key indicators of the performance of FPE are the enrolment rate, pupil teacher ratio, repetition rate and the drop-out rate (Kingdom of Lesotho, 2005:40-41). For the purpose of this analysis only enrolment rate and drop-out rate are considered as they relate directly to the stay of the pupils in the programme. Another additional outcome of FPE that needs to be considered is the nutritional effect of the meals provided in schools.

- **Free Primary Education and enrolment**

Table 4.6 below indicates that FPE initially led to increased primary enrolment. An increase of 12.5 per cent was realized in 2000, the first year of operation of FPE. However, in 2001 and 2002 enrolment increased slightly and at decreasing rate given that in 2001 the rate of increase was 1.1 per cent while in 2002 the rate of increase was 0.9 per cent. An improvement in enrolment came in 2003 perhaps because in selected pilot areas, family rations of fortified maize meals were provided to families of orphans and herd boys only against evidence that the children were enrolled in school and attended regularly (World Food Programme, 2003:9). However, the rates of increase in subsequent years were much lower than the rate of 12.5 per cent realized in the year 2000.

**Table 4.6: Enrolment numbers in primary school, 1999-2003**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Enrolment numbers</th>
<th>% change in enrolment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>364,951</td>
<td>-1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>410,745</td>
<td>12.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>415,007</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>418,668</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>429,720</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Adapted from Kingdom of Lesotho, 2005:40.
The decline in enrolment is attributed to rising levels of poverty in Lesotho. Many poor households send children out to work simply to survive. Hiring boys as herders is a common survival mechanism. Girls are increasingly removed from school to care for siblings while both parents look for work (World Food Programme, 2003:5). As a survival strategy of the last resort, children are removed from school to go begging from tourists and residents in the urban areas. Alternatively, children loiter in the car parks purporting to guard over people’s cars and ask for a fee in return. An emerging trend is whereby young boys establish unofficial toll gates whereby they claim to have filled the potholes in some roads and ask the drivers to pay for using such roads.

- **Free Primary Education and the drop-out rate**

Drop-out rates in primary education in Lesotho are high, ranging between 10 to 15 per cent per grade (World Food Programme, 2003:4). As indicated in the preceding sub-section, the underlying cause of pupils dropping out from school is poverty which currently incapacitates about 68 per cent of the population (World Food Programme, 2003:4). The prevalence of HIV/AIDS estimated at 31per cent depresses further an already troubled situation. Due to high drop-out and repetition rates, only 30 percent of primary school pupils enter secondary education (Kingdom of Lesotho, 2005:41 and World Food Programme, 2003:4), a high wastage indeed.

The examination results of the first graduates of FPE in 2006 indicated that only 36 per cent of the candidates qualify for entry into secondary education (Examinations Council of Lesotho, 2006 PSLE Pass List). Given that secondary education is not free and has always been more expensive than primary education, not all of those who qualify will go into middle level education. Thus, an estimated 70 per cent of the pupils who sat for the primary school leaving examinations in 2006 may have hit the rock.

The poor performance in primary school leaving examinations in 2006 is not an isolated case. In providing the overall picture in high school education, the *Lesotho Education Sector Strategic Plan: 2005-2015* indicates that only 36 per cent of those who proceed to
middle level education (Junior Certificate) pass the examination. Of those who enter high school education only 8 per cent obtain the Cambridge Overseas School Leaving Certificate (COSC), meaning that “for every 1,000 pupils that enter secondary education, only 92 complete Form E [high school education] and pass their COSC, giving a phenomenally high overall wastage” (Kingdom of Lesotho, 2005:42). The statistics confirm that FPE is only the beginning of a long journey and not an adequate measure towards a poverty free Lesotho.

FPE is further plagued by inadequacy of trained teachers. As at 2003, the ratio of pupils per qualified teacher was 69:1, and the number of the teachers without requisite qualifications constituted about 50 per cent of the total teaching staff (Kingdom of Lesotho, 2005:42). While the Ministry of Education strives to improve the quality of education by upgrading the qualifications of teachers through in service training programmes, the efforts are diluted by the high labour turnover resulting from retirement, resignations and death. The high pupil teacher ratio also contributes to the limited performance of FPE.

Based on all of the factors above, it seems that FPE, in its present form, is not likely to have any impact on poverty. Instead, fundamental changes are required in Lesotho’s education sector if at all education is to serve as an avenue for many of the poor to escape poverty.

• **Free Primary Education and nutrition**

Besides its long-term expected effects, FPE is structured such that it embraces the aspect of direct attack on poverty by virtue of it having a component of school feeding programme. No doubt, school feeding is particularly helpful in alleviating hunger for the children who come from disadvantaged families and children who are orphaned by HIV/AIDS and care for themselves. Such children are ensured of at least one meal each school day. An additional short term direct effect of FPE on poverty is associated with the nutritional effect of the meals provided in school.
Three types of feeding programmes are operated in Lesotho’s primary schools namely, World Food Programme (WFP) assisted school feeding, Government financed school feeding programme under FPE and school feeding under self-reliance (Carr-Hill et al, 2003:3). It is worth highlighting the differences between the three types of feeding programmes. WFP supports feeding in FPE schools that are situated in the mountain areas of Lesotho. Grain and cereal foodstuffs are transported to schools on a quarterly basis. The GOL pays the people who cook the food for the children. The FPE primary schools in the lowlands are on a government financed feeding programme. In this programme the government uses caterers who are given a menu to implement for the five days of the week. The determinant factor of which programme a school falls under is the terrain of the country which makes some schools difficult to reach on a daily basis. At the same time the government operates a self reliance feeding programme for all FPE primary schools regardless of their location. The programme supplements the food sources under both WFP and GOL’s feeding programmes. This is achieved by assisting schools to produce their own food by engaging in poultry, piggery, dairy farming and production of vegetables. In so doing, the GOL is braising for the muted withdrawal of WFP from the feeding programme in Lesotho (Interview, Chief Education Officer, 19th August, 2011).

Sadly, though, an evaluation of the feeding programmes conducted on behalf of the Ministry of Education established that, contrary to belief, school feeding programmes have shown little evidence of impact on nutrition or health status of the pupils. This is mostly because the amounts of food provided through school feeding programmes are typically small, relative to daily requirements (Carr-Hill et al, 2003:2).

Not only the quantities of food provided through the school feeding programmes are course for concern, but the nutritional value as well is questionable. Even though there is a Food and Nutrition Co-ordination Office (FNCO) attached to the Prime Minister’s Office and charged with the responsibility of determining the technical aspects of food, the nutritional value and variation of the food served, under the Government financed
programme, is severely limited due to the relatively low amount of R 3.50 (US$ 0.45) which the Government pays to the private caterers for the purchase, preparation and serving of food per day, per child. Third, the delays in the payment of caterers’ fees adversely affect the purchase of foodstuffs and consequently the feeding programme as more often the caterers feed the children with whatever foodstuffs they can lay their hands on (Carr-Hill et al., 2003:6). School feeding under self-reliance is financed by the schools together with the parents. Often the resources are limited and the schools hardly produce the required amounts of food. All in all, while the feeding programmes may ‘pull’ children to school, but the food served does not have the expected nutritional benefits.

4.2.6 Social Safety Network

Official safety net is mandatory in Lesotho for a number of reasons. First, traditional support mechanisms are no longer able to maintain the increasing number of destitute households. For example, traditional share cropping, mafisa\(^3\) and matsema\(^4\) which enhanced availability of food for the poor have declined drastically. Second, the number of households able to assist poorer relatives and neighbours is in sharp decline. This is largely due to persistent retrenchment of Basotho mineworkers in South African mines (Gay, 2006:188) and rising levels of unemployment in Lesotho (Gay, 2006:168). Third, the market driven economy is failing to distribute wealth to the poor as evidenced by the rapidly growing gap between the rich and the poor as well as the growing levels of poverty (Sechaba Consultants, 2000:4). Lastly, the HIV/AIDS pandemic is wiping out the productive age group leaving behind hundreds of thousands of orphans in the care of elderly household heads. In 2005 the number of orphans was estimated to be 180,000 (UNICEF in Ministry of Education and Training, 2008:7), a relatively large figure for a

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\(^3\) A traditional practice whereby an individual (often a poor person) keeps an animal that is owned by someone else. The individual freely uses the products from the animal, for example, milk in the case of a cow. The practice improved the living conditions of the poor. For further details see Sekese Azariele, Mekhoa ea Basotho, 1983, p.70.

\(^4\) Matsema (singular – letsema) are work parties that functioned on an assumed contractual obligation that stipulates that letsema is a communal bond that rotates from family to family for mutual help particularly in farming activities. The work parties enabled the villagers to work their fields and produce food. See Matooane, J. L., 1994. Counselling: Building Bridges not Walls, p.55.
population of 1.8 million. As and when the aged household heads die, the orphans take refuge in shanty dilapidated buildings under the care of ‘Good Samaritans’ that have nothing to offer except love and sympathy.

Currently, the social safety network (SSN) comprises the pension scheme, the public assistance programme administered by the Department of Social Welfare and the Social Net Fund under the Ministry of Development Planning.

4.2.6.1 The Pension Scheme

Noting the deteriorating socio-economic situation, the *Pathway out of Poverty (1996)* advocated the strengthening of the social safety net as a direct attack on poverty. To this end, the 1996/97 Budget Speech referred to establishment of a pension scheme to cover senior citizens, ex-servicemen and the disabled (Budget Speech, 1996:4). Indeed, in the year 2000, the pension scheme materialized and the senior citizens aged 70+ and the ex-servicemen each received a pension of M150.00 a month (1Loti = R1). Six years later, 2006, the amount remained the same and proved grossly inadequate to help the pensioners to meet their basic needs. At the 2006 commemoration of Armistice Day, the World Wars veterans expressed their unhappiness about the “peanuts” given to them by the government. One of them is recorded as having said: “It has been a long time since we were promised compensation in the form of pension but we are only given a set of uniform every year…[we] only receive M150 [equivalent to R150.00] monthly, which is equivalent to a local parliamentarian’s daily lunch” (Public Eye Newspaper, 17th November, 2006).

At the same commemoration event another veteran lamented, “We had hoped that we would get at least M300 per month as our pension, but we get nothing” (Public Eye, 17th November, 2006). Worth noting is that not only the ex-servicemen describe the pension as mockery, but the senior citizens as well. In an unstructured interview with some senior citizens at Ha Mabote in the district of Maseru, one old woman had this to say:
It is difficult to understand how any one is expected to live on M150.00 for 30 days of the month. Who would live on that amount anyway? I buy half a bag of maize meal, a liter of paraffin, a box of matches and a candle to light my house — and alas!!! M150.00 is finished. It is only God who knows how we [pensioners] survive (Interview with a senior citizen, 12th October, 2006).

The Congress of Lesotho Trade Unions (COLETU) also registered support for the pensioners’ grievances. On 17th November, 2006 the members of the union petitioned the government on a number of issues. Ranking high on the list was an “increase of old age pension from M150.00 to M500.00 per month” (Public Eye Newspaper, 17 November, 2006). These outcries suggested that the amount of pension paid by the GOL was very low and, therefore, not providing relief for the pensioners. Perhaps for these and other reasons the government revised the old age pension to be M200.00 per month in 2007, and two years later the grant was increased to M300.00 (Mahlelebe, 2010:20). Although the grant has increased by 100% from its initial value nine years ago, the fact is that the grant still cannot support a meaningful life for the elderly given the escalating cost of living. In fact, some recent studies including Mahlelebe (2010) and Sootho (2010) have established that the elderly are able to buy basic food items with the grant, but not in sufficient quantities to last for a month. At the same time, they are not able to buy clothing or meet any other human basic needs because the value of the grant is very low. Moreover, the economic situation of the pensioners is worsened by the fact that, due to the prevalence of HIV/AIDS, the elderly have become caretakers of their sick children and the orphans (Mahlelebe, 2010:27 and Sootho, 2010:18). Worth noting is that, unlike in South Africa, the old age pension in Lesotho is not legislated to include annual or inflation linked increases, nor even periodic reviews. Instead, it is reviewed at the discretion of the Minister of Finance and Development Planning (Pelham in Mahlelebe, 2010:20).

4.2.6.2 Public Assistance Programme

Another component of the social safety network is the Public Assistance Programme (PAP) administered by the Department of Social Welfare (DSW). PAP assists the destitute including the orphans, the severely disabled with no relatives, the severely ill
and the elderly aged 65 to 69. At the age of 70, the PAP beneficiaries are transferred to the old age pension scheme discussed in the preceding section. Assistance from PAP comes in the form of a monthly allowance of M100= R100, free medication at government health clinics and burial where necessary (Internal Working Paper, DSW, 2005:5). As at 2006, the programme assisted about 4,500 destitute people countrywide. While destitution and poverty are on the increase, the number of those assisted is quiet low due to the woefully limited resources availed to the department (Interview with Assistant Director, 4th December, 2006). Referring to the pathetic situation, Sechaba Consultants (2000:22) note that “[i]n its present form it [Department of Social Welfare] does not have the capacity to contribute more than a proverbial drop in the ocean of need”.

As it is, the PAP offers an allowance that is 67% lower than the old age pension. Given that the old age pension itself does not afford its recipients a minimal standard of living, nothing more needs to be said about the PAP allowance. Suffice it to say that it is shameful. The level of the allowance reflects the uncaring attitude of the GOL and its lack of commitment to societal welfare. The GOL can only demonstrate its commitment to poverty reduction, and in particular, to making PAP an effective instrument for reducing destitution, by regularly reviewing the allowance such that it affords the beneficiaries the basic needs of food and clothing, assuming that they have shelter.

The administration of the PAP allowance adds to the misery of the recipients. The allowance is payable in Maseru only. This means that the recipients travel from all over the country to receive their meager allowance. Many of the recipients from outside Maseru are said to accumulate the allowance for several months so that when they borrow money for transport to Maseru to receive the allowance, they can be able to pay back the loans and have something left for their own use. However, there is some light in the tunnel, as the DSW is contemplating getting into an arrangement with the Post Office to effect payment of the PAP allowances at its branches (Interview with the Assistant Director, 4th December, 2006). When this is concluded, the arrangement will ease the plight of the PAP beneficiaries because the Post Office has branches even in the remotest
areas. Not yet time to rejoice though, because due to the bureaucratic red tape, the beneficiaries may still have a long way to go, given that during September 2010 such an arrangement was still not in place.

4.2.6.3 The Safety Net Fund

The Safety Net Fund (SNF) is the third component of the social safety network in Lesotho. The SNF was established in the 1990/1991 financial year “with the objective of mitigating the impact of structural adjustment programmes on vulnerable groups” (Sechaba Consultants, 1999: iii). The Fund was necessitated by widely acknowledged effects of World Bank/IMF structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) which, while improving the macro economic conditions of a country, disadvantage the underprivileged groups. In Lesotho SAPs included a freeze in employment in the public sector, early retirements and across the board retrenchments of daily labourers. The situation was aggravated by simultaneous retrenchments and falling employment levels of Basotho migrant workers in South Africa and the overall result was slackening economic growth, rising poverty and increased unemployment (ILO in Sechaba Consultants, 1999:1-2).

The SNF is located in the Ministry of Development Planning. It operates at four levels. At the lowest level is a range of stakeholders including NGOs and agencies that work at the grassroots level. The stakeholders identify and submit project proposals to a Technical Committee, made up of officials from seven ministries including Development Planning and Finance. The committee reviews applications for assistance. Selected projects are referred to the Task Force Committee, made up of the Governor of the Central Bank of Lesotho and the Principal Secretaries from four ministries of Planning, Finance, Agriculture and Public Service. The Task Force refers selected projects to Cabinet for approval.

Once the projects are approved by Cabinet, the funds are disbursed from the Fund to the requesting organizations. It is these organizations that deal directly with the beneficiaries. The beneficiaries are varied ranging from secondary school children whose parents do
not afford school fees, the disabled, the retrenched mine workers, and the malnourished children under five years of age. The services of the Fund were extended to cover rehabilitation of political returnees from Botswana and South Africa, as well as to support some income generating projects for the disadvantaged groups in society (Sechaba Consultants, 1999: v).

The SNF is not without problems. First, the target groups are poorly defined thus making it difficult for the officials to know who should be assisted. ‘Vulnerable groups’ is too broad a term, to be useful. Thus, much of what the officials approve depends solely on their discretion (Interview with the Director, 19th November, 2006). Second, the Fund is loosely arranged, that is, it does not have any legal standing, does not have written rules and procedures, annual budget allocations to it are discretionary and it is not properly gazetted. It is for these reasons that observers recommend incorporation of the SNF under the Lesotho Fund for Community Development because the latter has a legal standing and well established procedures. But most importantly, LFCD supports projects that empower the communities through building capacities to manage local development projects and those that improve basic services, managed and sustained by the communities (Sechaba Consultants, 1999: 37).

According to the Director of Development Planning, the SNF died a natural death in 2003 when no budget allocations were made to it. However, no communication was ever made to the members of the committees that facilitated the work of the Fund. “These things never die ceremoniously” the Director said (Interview with the Director, 19th October, 2006).

4.3 CONCLUSION

The chapter has attempted to establish a link between the theory (Chapter 3) and the practice of poverty reduction in Lesotho. The policies and strategies discussed include Green Revolution strategies, community development, foreign direct investment, Lesotho Fund for Community Development, Free Primary Education and the social safety
benefits. The discussion has revealed that it is not only the self-help projects that are bedeviled by defective policy design and politicization, but that the whole development spectrum in Lesotho is impaired by the same defects.

The Green Revolution strategies sought to change the lifestyles of the peasant farmers through use of modern farming techniques. Strategies comprised area-based projects and national programmes. The strategies achieved limited success for two major reasons. First, modern farming techniques were expensive and inaccessible to the majority of the poor farmers. As such, when the donors withdrew their support the projects died. Second, the location of the projects and farmer participation were highly politicized. Those who wanted to participate had to produce membership cards of the ruling party, first the BNP and later, the BCP/LCD. Consequently, many of the poor farmers were excluded from the projects and for them production remained low.

Community development was characterized by top-down planning methods which denied the local people a say in the activities that affected their lives. The centrally planned development activities were implemented within a highly centralized administrative system. Attempts to decentralize did not give any decision making powers to local institutions. In particular, the District Development Committees had no decision making powers and had no finances. They send shopping lists to the centre and many of the items were not approved. As such, district planning and development were impaired.

Foreign direct investment became a major development strategy of the 1990s with the textile industry taking the lead. By 1996 the textile industry employed 56,000 workers and became the largest employer, followed by the public sector. The record growth was stimulated by the introduction of the African Growth Opportunities Act, 2000 (AGOA) which gave Lesotho preferential access to the USA market. AGOA made Lesotho an attractive country to investors in the textile industry. The expiration of AGOA in 2004 brought untold misery to Lesotho when many textile factories deserted without even paying the workers. Those that remained placed workers on short term work using them only when needed. Even though the government left no stone unturned in an effort to
bring back live in the textile industry, there are no signs of recovery yet. With a declining textile industry, declining miners’ remittances, declining agricultural production, declining Southern African Customs Union (SACU) payments and a feeble private sector, Lesotho’s economic mainstay becomes the sale of water to South Africa, a gloomy picture indeed.

Lesotho Fund for Community Development (LFCD) is another contemporary strategy for reducing poverty. The Fund was established with the encouragement of the World Bank and with the view to pre-empt wasteful use of the proceeds from the sale of water to South Africa. While the Fund has well established legal and administrative procedures, its major impediment is shortage of human and financial resources. The Fund has had to suspend some of its projects from 2005 to date due to lack of finances. Unfortunately though, because the Fund has the potential of reducing poverty as it uses a participatory approach in the identification and implementation of projects. In this way, it supports sustainable projects that meet the self identified needs of the participants.

Lesotho introduced Free Primary Education in 2000 under the influence of several international organizations. In order to enhance enrolment, the government attached the school feeding programme to FPE. Initially enrolment increased significantly but thereafter increased at a decreasing rate. FPE faces the challenges of reducing the high people teacher ratio, reducing the high drop-out rate and maintaining the enrolment rate. Perhaps the greatest challenge of them all is the long overdue revision of primary school programme such that it imparts life long skills to its graduates. As it stands, the programme has little chance of helping the poor escape poverty.

The social safety net comprises three elements namely, the pension scheme, the public assistance programme and the safety net fund. It has been established that the pension grant of M300.00 = R300.00 as at 2010, does not accord the pensioners a respectable standard of living. In the same way, the Public Assistance Programme that targets the destitute awards very little benefits which make an insignificant difference in the lives of the recipients. The safety net fund which was accessed by the organizations that deal with
the underprivileged in society has, since 2003, been discontinued. Thus, the Lesotho social safety net can best be described as a symbolic policy by virtue of it offering a modicum of support to the poor and the destitute.

The next chapter discusses the dynamics of policy making in Lesotho. The main purpose is to describe the nature, the content and the performance of policies in Lesotho through a critical examination of the policy process itself.
CHAPTER 5

THE DYNAMICS OF POLICY MAKING IN LESOTHO

5.1 INTRODUCTION

Indeed the most obvious question to ask of any country’s politics seems to be ‘where does power lie?’ Certainly, this is an important question to ask and to attempt to answer, but it may be argued that even an apparent answer to this will, in fact, give only part of an answer, or possibly an entirely misleading one (Ponton and Gill, 1983: 50).

In the developed countries the population is generally literate, informed and mature both socially and politically. Thus, the electorate is aware of the political system and how its operations affect people’s lives individually and collectively. Further, the electorate in the developed countries is conversant with the institutions, structures and processes in the political system and how these can be deployed to force those in power to take account of the interests and wishes of the electorate. For fear of retribution, therefore, those bestowed with political power place the electorate at the centre of their thinking and exercise power meticulously and within the confines of the law. This explains in part why public policy changes in the developed countries are incremental and derive from widely expressed and evaluated need. It further explains why political systems in the developed countries generate stable policies that represent, to a large extent, the will of the people. Conclusively, in the developed countries the electorate has power and gives direction to the political system. In other words, in the developed countries power lies with the people. Some stereotypical examples include Canada, United Kingdom, United States and European countries.

Meanwhile, in the developing countries the bulk of the population is illiterate and lives in the impoverished rural areas where people are generally pre-occupied with basic economic survival. Pursuit of fundamental human rights is an unaffordable luxury for the rural inhabitants. In addition, communication in the rural areas is very poor due to lack of infrastructure. These factors complement one another to effect low political awareness
and apathy amongst the inhabitants in the rural areas. Second, it is common practice for
the states in the developing countries to repress dissent and severely punish
dissentients. More often than not, the opposition, civil society organisations and the
media are closely monitored by government agents and dissuaded from criticizing the
government or bringing to public notice some dubious government activities. Repression
and eradication of political opposition are carried out under the guise of
constitutionalism. As it is, repression by the state inculcates fear and helplessness
amongst the sectors of the population that are aware of the political system and its
operations. Due to the above factors that characterize the developing countries, African
countries in particular, citizens play a minimal role, if any, in the policy process.
Consequently, the political elite exercise unbridled power in public policy decisions. That
is why the lowly developed political systems in the developing countries frequently
generate abrupt policies that, more often than not, are geared towards protecting the
interests of the ruling elite and maintaining the status quo whereby the rich remain rich.

The two scenarios of policy development in the developed and developing countries
suggest that the policy process and the power relations amongst the policy institutions
determine the nature and content of public policy. That is why policies in democratic
polities have fundamental differences with policies that are developed in dictatorial
polities. Such policies differ in terms of their content and goals. At a general level,
policies in the former are inclusive and generally seek to enhance human personality by
creating an environment that supports self-development and enhance collective
advancement. In the latter case policies are largely dictatorial and tend to support and
perpetuate personal rule. Such is the situation in most of the developing countries.

In the circumstances, one of the challenges that face the developing countries, Lesotho
included, is that of developing policy making systems that derive power from the people
and function on the basis of shared power. In that way, policy making systems will
generate policies that enhance socio-economic stability and promote social welfare based
on shared growth. The notion of shared power rests on unfettered participation in the
policy process by the stakeholders including civil society, the private sector and the
media. In other words, shared power implies that all sectors of the society have equal chance of participating in policy making with the government playing a facilitative and not a domineering role.

The challenge is even greater for Lesotho for a number of reasons. A few of these are cited for illustrative purposes. First, Lesotho is a small country of 1.8 million people in terms of the 2006 census. Sadly, evidence shows that more than 60 per cent of the population is considered to be poor. Further, overwhelming evidence shows that poverty is increasing. On the contrary, since independence, successive governments adopted policies and expenditure patterns that glaringly perpetrate the situation. The result is that the wealth generated by the economy is consumed by the government in ways that enhance and protect the interests of the privileged.

Second, a review of the policy making machinery in Lesotho is mandated by the prevalence of coups that go along with marked defiance and arrogance of political leaders. For, despite its renowned ethnic homogeneity, Lesotho celebrated its forty years of independence, in 2006, having witnessed 6 coups and 2 attempted coups indicative of a deep lying political riddle. The deteriorating socio-economic conditions and the persistent political instability suggest two things. First, there is lack of a common understanding about the future of Lesotho amongst the political leaders. Second, there is lack of open communication between the rulers and the ruled. Consequently, the rulers fail to gauge the level of dissatisfaction amongst the populace while at the same time the ruled, in the absence of well established structures for dealing with grievances and resolving conflict, resort to unlawful means of surmounting political hurdles.

The above socio-economic anomalies emphasize the need for Lesotho to establish a coherent policy making system that embraces clearly discernible checks and balances such that key policy institutions possess the ability to constrain one another’s powers. Unless a new dispensation is worked out soon, the case of Lesotho is a time bomb, a disaster in the making as poverty escalates, corruption exacerbates, service delivery
collapses, brain drain increases and resentment amongst the populace tends towards explosive proportions.

This chapter attempts to demystify the policy making process in Lesotho with the view to answer the question, ‘Where does power lie?’ Put differently, the questions are: ‘Where does policy in Lesotho come from, and what are the distinctive features of the policy process? How do the distinctive features of the policy process affect the nature and content of policies?’ In attempting to establish where power lies in Lesotho, the writer takes cognizance of Ponton and Gill’s warning cited above that an attempt to answer the question may provide only part of an answer or even provide an entirely misleading one. In the event the present work provides only part of an answer, then the challenge for policy scholars is to fill the gap. On the other hand, if the answer is a misleading one then, hopefully, the work will stimulate policy debates that will provide the necessary leads to the core issue of improving public policy making in Lesotho such that peace and prosperity return to Lesotho. Whichever way, the risk is worth taking because the effect of not attempting to answer the question is detrimental in the sense that, if nothing is said, nothing is done, and positive change will never be realized.

Before providing an outline of the chapter it seems befitting to indicate how this chapter links in with self-help projects which are the focus of the study. Self-help in those countries that have it is a policy decision by those who have political power. In this sense self-help is a policy instrument adopted and implemented by governments with the view to achieve specific objectives. In the case of Lesotho, for example, self-help is a policy instrument that seeks to reduce rural poverty. Thus, self-help falls within a family of public policies that seek to reduce poverty in Lesotho. Like all other policies, these poverty reduction policies derive their nature and content from the policy process and are influenced by the institutions and the actors that formulate them. If this truism is anything to go by, then the nature and content of self-help projects in Lesotho can be understood, at least in part, by establishing the key features of the policy institutions, the power relations amongst those institutions as well as the role of the stakeholders like the general public and people’s organisations. Hopefully, at the end of the chapter, the reader will
appreciate the unique features of the policy-making process, the power relations amongst the policy institutions, the role of the stakeholders and the extent these factors explain the nature of poverty reduction policies including self-help projects in Lesotho.

The chapter comprises five sections including the introduction. Section two discusses the institutional/legal framework in public policy making in Lesotho. The section helps the reader understand why public policy in Lesotho takes its form and content. Section three examines the essential elements of the 1966 Constitution and the 1993 Constitution with the view to determine the gains and losses for the policy process. The fourth section examines the role of civil society, the media and the private sector as unofficial actors in policy making.

5.2 ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK

The chapter proceeds on the premise that:

[i]n any modern democratic state there is a policy framework (written or unwritten constitution) that spells out the broad principles and/or values that will enable policy makers to set up guidelines and procedures for the management of public affairs (Cloete et al, 2006:v).

At the same time, in any such democratic state there are various types of policy actors. These can be classified into official policy actors and unofficial policy actors (Anderson, 1979:34; Hanekom, 1995:21 and Cloete and Meyer in Cloete et al, 2006:112). The official policy actors have the legal authority to act in policy formulation. These include the legislators, the executive, administrators and the judges. Each of these actors performs functions somehow different from those performed by others.

The official policy actors can further be classified into primary and secondary/supplementary policy actors. The primary policy actors have direct constitutional authority to formulate policies. They do not depend on any other authority in their policy making function, that is, they can initiate and decide on policy on their own, for example, Parliament and Congress. The supplementary policy actors which
include government agencies are dependent on Parliament or Congress in their policy making function (Anderson, 1979:35 and Hanekom, 1995:21).

The unofficial policy actors which include individuals, the media, civil society organizations, the private sector and political parties, do not have the legal authority to participate in policy making. Although not legally designated, the unofficial policy actors have an important role in shaping public policy by way of monitoring government activities, providing information, advocating policy and performing oversight activities. It is often through the contribution of the unofficial actors that policies are directed towards meeting the needs of the minority and the underprivileged. In other words, the unofficial policy actors are the voice of the voiceless. In many countries the unofficial policy actors have fought against abuse of power, crime, dictatorship, corruption and many other social anomalies (Balule, 2008:131; Molomo, 2008:121 and Mokomane, 2008:158).

Like in any group effort, the different policy actors contribute to the policy process in different ways. In the event one of the policy actors dominates the policy process, policies tilt in its favour. An ideal and hence a desirable situation is one where there is a balance of power between the policy actors. A balance of power between the policy actors encourages a careful consideration of alternatives, a process which, in itself, yields incremental policies that balance interests in society.

The balance of power between policy actors is, in fact, a major distinguishing feature between the policy processes of the developed and the developing countries. It is, therefore, a major explanatory factor of the differences in the nature, content and efficacy of public policies in the two worlds. Thus, in order to establish the nature of policies as well as the dynamics of policy making in individual countries – particularly African countries, it is helpful to first establish the dominant actor in the policy process. In other words, to answer the question of – ‘where does power lie?’ There from, it becomes possible to delve into the ramifications of policy content and impact with the view to say
whose interests policies reflect in a given polity. Without claiming to be exhaustive in its approach, this is what the chapter sets out to do.

5.3 THE POLICY MAKING FRAMEWORK IN LESOTHO

The legal policy framework in Lesotho has three components including the traditional, the modern and the local administrative systems. Figure 5.1 below presents the tripartite institutional policy framework.

5.3.1 Traditional administration

Traditional administration in Lesotho traces its origin to the early 1800s. At the time, Moshoeshoe the Great, a charismatic and renowned founder of the Basotho nation, merged the remnants of the tribal fragments forced to flee during the Lifaqane - a series of conflicts that affected the Southern and Central parts of Africa (Pherudi, 1996:7; Mashinini, 2000:84 and Pherudi, 2000:1). Moshoeshoe I guaranteed survival and security to the fleeing clans thereby increasing his following. When the conflicts of Lifaqane subsided Moshoeshoe formed a Basotho state the government of which was dominated by his sons (Pherudi, 2001:2 and Mahao, 1993:156). Moshoeshoe further allowed the tribal fragments to retain their chiefs for reasons of stability and integrity of his state. The process gave rise to a hierarchical chieftainship structure that was responsible for all governmental functions including policy formulation, administration of land and justice (Van de Geer and Wallis, 1984:12 and Mashinini, 2000:92). Entry into the aristocracy was by birth (Lloyd 1975 in Van de Geer and Wallis, 1984:12), and continues to be so.
Succession is based on the principle of primogeniture. In passing, and with due respect, it can be noted that the mode of succession is unfortunate because it does not take into account the capabilities of an individual. The arrangement runs counter to the Basotho saying that: *Bohlale ha bo ahe ntlo e le ’ngoe* (the intelligent are not necessarily born in one house/lineage). That being so, the mode of entry into the aristocracy denies Lesotho a much needed opportunity of being ruled by charismatic and talented individuals from other lineages. Affirming this assertion is Mahao in noting that “contemporary society highly values a leader’s personal abilities and competence because much of its progress or lack of it can depend on it” (Mahao, 1993:159). It can be argued, therefore, that by clinging to aristocracy based on primogeniture, the Basotho nation may have denied itself much needed progress.
Moshoeshoe the Great categorized the chiefs into three levels namely, the Principal Chief, the Ward Chief and the Headman / Village Chief. The structure later found its way into the Constitution of Lesotho and represents levels of chiefs as they obtain today.

In its early years, chieftainship as an institution was highly responsive to the needs and aspirations of the people. Popular participation and transparency formed the pillars of the strength and the very existence of the institution (Van de Geer and Wallis, 1984:12; Pherudi, 1996:12 and Sets’abi, 2010:42). Participation in policy making was ensured through the pitso (traditional gathering in which adults participated openly and freely in policy decisions) and the khotla (traditional gathering for men only). The chiefs were guided by and respected public opinion (Pherudi, 2000:168, Pherudi, 2001:3; Gay, 2006:76 and Sets’abi, 2010:42), hence the saying Morena ke morena ka batho- a chief is a chief by the people. According to Jingoes, a renowned writer about Basotho customs, ‘a chief is a chief by the people’ meant “that the chief and the people served each other; they stood to gain by their relationship” (Jingoes, 1975:171). In fact, “chieftaincy was the bed-rock of government which bequeathed the Basotho with their security, growth, and success” (Lerotholi in Mahao, 1993:153).

It is worth highlighting the significance of the adage Morena ke morena ka batho because, in practice, the saying was a source of inspiration for chiefs to do things right and to compete amongst themselves for good governance. One of the indicators of good governance was an increase in the number of people moving to establish home within a given chief’s jurisdiction, while the opposite signified poor governance (Interview with Nkhono Ntolo Letsie, 3rd March, 2010). Indeed, for fear of the subjects leaving his area of jurisdiction, a chief had to respond quickly to individual and collective needs of his people, he had to include them in decision making, be transparent in his dealings and respect public opinion. In this respect Pherudi notes that:

Chieftaincy was important to Basotho in many respects. The Chief would call a pitso (sic), in which the concerns and the problems of the community would be discussed. Every Mosotho was free to express his views. Thereafter, flowing from the discussion, on the basis of general consensus, the chief would be able to read the wishes of the majority, and if the mood of the majority was good, then legislation would be formulated and adopted on the spot. Therefore, the
consultation and involvement of the villagers was important. The chief was not a dictator, instead he was guided by the whims of the people (Pherudi, 2000:169) [emphasis added].

The above measures contributed effectively towards good governance in the days of Moshoeshoe 1, the founder of the Basotho nation. Sadly, evidence suggests that similar principles of good governance are seriously lacking in modern day administration of Lesotho, hence governance is characterized by elitism, poor service delivery, self-aggrandizement and corruption (Pherudi, 1996:127; Mashinini, 2000:89 and Mothibe, 1998:299).

With the advent of colonialism the powers of chiefs diminished. Contrary to custom, colonial administration recognized chiefs only if they were gazetted. Thus, during colonialism, chieftainship became a statutory institution such that chiefs no longer derived their power and authority from tradition and custom, but from statutes (Mashinini, 2000:92; Pherudi, 2000:6 and Sets’abi, 2010:43). In the same way, the authority of the King (then Paramount Chief) was determined by statutes as approved by the High Commissioner (Van de Geer and Wallis, 1984:14). The power of chiefs diminished further after independence with the establishment of Land Allocation Committees, District Development Committees and the Village Development Committees. The new structures encroached into the functional jurisdiction of chiefs fundamentally reducing their role in governance. In fact, “[s]uccessive governments of Lesotho have generally taken the modernization path of development wherein they have all moved to gradually and indirectly do away with the chieftainship” (Sets’abi, 2010:51). The worst came in 1997 when the Local Government Act No. 6, 1997, pioneered by the LCD government, established local authorities which compete for residual power with the chiefs. Not surprising though because the LCD, a break away faction of the Basotho Congress Party (BCP), and the chiefs are long time adversaries (Pherudi, 1996:46 and Kapa, 2009:11).

Chieftainship, albeit in a changed form, has stood the test of time. Evidence is the College of Chiefs which is provided for by Sections 104 (1) of the Constitution of
Lesotho. The body is made up of the 22 Principal Chiefs and is bestowed with power to designate both the successor to the King and the Regent, a prestigious function indeed. Further, Section (55) of the Constitution provides that the Principal Chiefs shall be members of Senate, the upper house in parliament. Second, the Local Government Act No. 6, 1997, regardless of the controversial mode of inclusion in councils and circumvented participation, upholds the need for the involvement of chiefs in local administration of Lesotho.

Third, the sustained prominence of chieftainship is affirmed by Kimane and Ntimo-Makara who note that the indigenous system of governance in Lesotho is deeply rooted. The authors write:

This system is cushioned in the customary, social and legal fabric of the Basotho, and central to it is the chieftaincy, which is why modern democratic governance has failed to end it. Hence, the two systems operate parallel to each other. The indigenous system of rule continues to be highly cherished. The Basotho pay allegiance to it since it is responsive to their needs in many different ways and thus cannot simply be wished away (Kimane and Ntimo-Makara, 2008:238).

Thus, despite the pressures, challenges and waning powers of the chiefs, chieftainship, as an institution, remains a force to content with in the policy process in Lesotho. Moreover, despite the suspicion that abounds in the relationship between the central government and the chiefs, no government, so far, has been bold enough to repeal the Chieftainship Act No.22 of 1968 which specifies the powers and functions of chiefs.

5.3.2 The modern administrative system

At independence in 1966, Lesotho, having been a British protectorate for almost a century, adopted the Westminster parliamentary system modeled on the British system. King Mosheshoe II became a constitutional monarch and Head of State (Maqutu, 1990 in Mashinini, 2000:86 and Gay, 2006:77). He is succeeded by his son Letsie III who was installed King on 12th November, 1990 (Pule, 2002:192).
In line with the Westminster model, key policy institutions include the King (The Monarch), the Legislature, the Executive and the Judiciary. Each of these institutions is guided by a set of rules and procedures which determine its powers and scope of action. Without prejudice to other policy institutions the ensuing sections focus on the role of the King (Monarch), Parliament and the Executive, with focus on the Prime Minister. Two reasons determine this bias. First, the functioning of parliament as well as the powers and power relations between the King and the Prime Minister influence the performance of other policy institutions and policy actors. Second, Lesotho’s predicament of escalating poverty and persistent political instability can be traced back to the absence of or weak checks and balances in the policy making system as well as the perceived lack of a common understanding between the Monarch and Head of Government overtime. Figure 5.2 below presents the organizational structure of the modern administrative system in Lesotho.

In accordance with Figure 5.2, the King (Monarch) is the highest authority on the land. In practice, however, power lies elsewhere. Indeed, observers note that in Lesotho the King is under such powerful constraints that he cannot even perform a healing role in times of crisis (Akokpari, 1998:76 and Gay et al, 2006: 101). The role of the King in the policy process is looked at in sub-section 5.3.2.2 below while, for reasons of logic, the next section examines the role of parliament in the policy process.
5.3.2.1 Parliament

In Lesotho Parliament comprises of two houses, the Senate and the National Assembly. The discussion is ordered such that issues pertaining to each house are dealt with separately. For ease of reference, Senate is the equivalent of the House of Lords while the National Assembly is the equivalent of the House of Commons in the British parliamentary system.

(a) Senate

Senate comprises of 22 Principal Chiefs and 11 other Senators nominated by the King with the advice of the Council of State (Constitution of Lesotho, 1993, Section 55). In terms of Section 80 (1) and (3) of the 1993 Constitution, Senate has neither veto nor delaying powers. Thus, amendments by Senate, if any, are not binding on the National
Assembly. It is the latter house that has a final say on bills that are presented to the King for assent. By deduction, Senate, in Lesotho, is more of an honorary statutory body than an effective legislative instrument even though the body is patterned on the House of Lords in Britain (Gay, 2006:77). Noteworthy is that the House of Lords has both veto and delaying powers. Of significance is that the House of Lords has successfully used these powers to contain proposed dramatic legislation by both Labour and Conservative governments (Brazier, 1990:217). Further, the House of Lords overtime has used its delaying powers to force different governments “to take time to think again and further justify [their] plans” (Brazier, 1990:218).

Lack of veto and delaying powers on the part of Senate translates into lack of (or weak) checks and balances in parliament and this has not been to the advantage of Lesotho. History has it that weak checks and balances in parliament has enabled successive governments in Lesotho to pass ‘draconian’ pieces of legislation and, on many occasions, to breach the rule of law in pursuit of party political interests. It is worth citing some few of the many cases for illustration. First, in 2006, the LCD Government sold at token prices high value government vehicles to its members and the incumbents of statutory and senior positions in government. The cost to the tax payer was formidable as the market value of each vehicle later came out to be M256, 000.00 and yet the beneficiaries bought them for a mere M3, 000.00 representing 1 percent (1%) of their market value (Shale, 2006:181). This government action stirred much agitation amongst the enlightened sectors of the electorate with the Law Society taking the lead. Following unprecedented public outcry and failure of the attempts by the government ministers and officials to defend the notorious decision, the government quickly sanctioned the decision by pushing through parliament a new law, Government of Lesotho Vehicle Scheme, that legalized retrospectively, the giving away of government vehicles to party loyalists. Attempts by the opposition to thwart the legitimization efforts also failed. If there were effective checks and balances in parliament the chances are, the law would not have passed or at the least, could have been delayed to give chance to the courts to decide the legality of the government’s action.
In the second case, during 2007, the LCD Government sought an amendment to the Constitution to facilitate appeals to electoral disputes. After the LCD dominated National Assembly had passed the bill, the Government sent a delegation to convince the Senators of the need to adopt the bill at once. Precisely because the current procedure of enacting laws in Lesotho makes mockery of the input by Senate, the Government delegation told the Senators, “even if Senate [did] not approve, the government would still go ahead since the amendment [had] successfully passed in the National Assembly” (Public Eye, March, 14 2008). While observers noted that there was nothing wrong in such a legal provision, the problem was that the amendment preempted a ruling to a court case in the High Court of Lesotho, wherein the Marema-Tlou Freedom Party (MFP) challenged the distribution of the 40 proportional representation compensatory seats in parliament following the 2007 general elections. Worth noting is that an unfavourable court ruling to the case would immediately unseat the LCD as a ruling party. It was in reference to the motive behind the bill that the Principal Chief of Thaba-Bosiu, Khoabane Theko, in airing his views on Harvest FM referred to the amendment as a “draconian piece of legislation” (Harvest FM- “Rise and Shine” 7th March, 2008). Further, in his capacity as chairperson of the College of Chiefs and senator’s whip Khoabane Theko did not mince his words in responding to the government delegation, “We work here for justice and peace, so we cannot afford to support people who want to abuse their power” (Public Eye, 14th March, 2008). However, despite the Senate not approving, the bill was passed. Thus, Senate is a toothless dog in as far as its role in the policy process is concerned.

The literature provides many illustrative cases to show the minimal role of the Senate in the policy process in Lesotho. The discussion of these need more space than can be allotted in this chapter. However, the cases cited confirm that a National Assembly dominated by a single party especially in a polity where there is no respect for political life, the body becomes an instrument for advancing political party interests under the guise of public interest. The incidents further suggest a need for Lesotho to reconsider the role of Senate in the policy process, if, in fact, legislating is taken to be policy making. Just like the House of Lords in Britain, Senate in Lesotho can provide the necessary checks and balances in the policy process if it has veto and delaying powers. However, in
reconsidering the role of Senate, it is also important for the nation to examine the composition and the mode of attaining membership in Senate. Essentially, the body should represent diverse interests as against at present where it is dominated by the 22 Principal Chiefs and the 11 additional members represent political interests as they are appointed by the King, but under the direct influence of the Prime Minister.

(b) The National Assembly

At independence the National Assembly comprised 60 members elected from constituencies (Pherudi, 1996:42). In the 1993 elections constituencies increased to 65 thereby increasing membership of the National Assembly to same (Mashinini, 2000:89). For the May, 1998 general elections the constituencies increased to 80, thereby increasing the membership of the National Assembly (Mashinini, 2000:90). In 2001 Lesotho adopted the mixed-member proportional electoral model which increased the size of the National Assembly to 120 members, 80 elected from the constituencies and 40 representing political parties (National Assembly Elections (No.1) (Amendment), 2001). Thus, in 2001 the membership of the National Assembly doubled the original number that existed at independence, thus making Lesotho’s parliament relatively large compared with the small population and the fragility of the country’s economy.

It has been established in the preceding sub-section that Senate has neither veto nor delaying powers, it is advisory in nature. By implication, therefore, it is the National Assembly that determines the content and the order of the bills that are passed to the King for assent. At this point it should be noted that, in the event the King refuses to give assent to legislation, his refusal cannot change the thinking of the government or delay government’s action. For, in the event the King does not give assent to a bill or does not act in accordance with the advice of any person or authority stated by any provision, the Constitution empowers the Prime Minister to act. In this regard Section 91 (3) of the Constitution is worth quoting at length. More so because Section 91 (3) determines the power relations amongst other policy actors including the National Assembly, the Senate and the Executive.
Where the King is required by this Constitution to act in accordance with the advice of any person or authority other than the Council of State, and the Prime Minister is satisfied that the King has not done that act, the Prime Minister may inform the King that it is the intention of the Prime Minister to do that act himself after the expiration of a period to be specified by the Prime Minister, and if at the expiration of that period the King has not done that act the Prime Minister may do that act himself and shall, at the earliest opportunity thereafter, report the matter to parliament; and any act so done by the Prime Minister shall be deemed to have been done by the King and to be his act (Constitution of Lesotho, Section 91 (3)).

By virtue of Section 91(3) of the Constitution of Lesotho, therefore, the King’s powers in the legislative process are severely curtailed. For, the refusal of the King to give assent to legislation can neither change the direction the government wants to take nor make the government to think again. If, at the same time, Senate has neither veto nor delaying powers, it goes without saying that, in practice, the National Assembly enjoys unchecked powers as a law making body in Lesotho indicative of cosmetic checks and balances in parliament.

Lack of checks and balances in parliament poses a danger for Lesotho where, more often than not, the National Assembly is dominated by a single political party and where the political environment is highly volatile. While dominance of a law making body by one political party may, in itself, not be a serious problem for democracy as, perhaps, exemplified in Botswana, but in Lesotho the situation is precarious precisely because “political parties … have long behaved in ways akin to tribes” (Pule, 2002:211). Since independence, successive ruling parties have been seen to treat their opponents with suspicion, hatred and untold vengeance (Pherudi, 1996:66, 83; Mashinini, 2000:87; Pherudi, 2000:13 and Gay, 2006:77). Moreover, in Lesotho “competition for control of the state and access to resources controlled by the state has been bitter and without respect for any of the rules governing competition for political life” (Pule, 2002:211). To be sure, in Lesotho the “battles for the control of the state are issues of life and death” (Sekatle, 1999:6). Thus, “Lesotho politics have been without a single unifying (national) vision…[and as a result] successive governments and their opposition found it difficult to co-exist, with suspicion of subversion abounding on all sides” (Pule, 2002:208). In such a tumultuous and erosive political environment, therefore, a National Assembly that is
dominated by a single political party, and is without effective checks and balances, becomes nothing but an instrument for projecting and furthering party political interests. In fact, the animosity between political parties, the non respect for the rules governing competition for political life and absence of checks and balances in parliament are some of the explanatory factors of Lesotho’s political crises, one after the other. As indicated in sub-section 5.3.2.1 (a) above, the self serving political elites (Kadima, 1999:81) have successfully passed laws and entrenched practices that legitimized controversial government activities and advanced political interests while at the same time repressing the opposition with no regard for the rule of law.

Dominance of the National Assembly by a single political party pervades Lesotho’s political history. Putting aside periods of dictatorship and taking note of democratically elected governments, it is only in the period 1966-1970 when the National Assembly was free from dominance by a single political party. In this period the ruling party, the BNP had 31 seats in parliament, the BCP had 25 seats and the MFP occupied 4 seats (Pherudi, 1996:42). For 23 years, 1970-1993 Lesotho went through different forms of dictatorship where public policy making was personalized. In 1993 the Basutoland Congress Party (BCP) took all the 65 seats in parliament having had a landslide victory in the general elections under the first-past-the post electoral model (Pule, 2002:208). In 1998 the Lesotho Congress for Democracy (LCD) won 79 out of 80 constituencies (Sekatle, 1999:31). By then Lesotho still operated on the first-past-the post electoral model, hence the LCD occupied 79 seats while the BNP had one seat in parliament (Sekatle, 1999:31). In 2002 Lesotho adopted the mixed member proportional electoral model. The LCD won 77 out of the 118 contested seats while the Lesotho People’s Congress won 1 seat. The rest of the compensatory seats were allocated proportionally to contesting political parties (Gay, 2006:109). However, the arrangement did not break completely the dominance of the National Assembly by one political party. A similar situation recurred in the 2007 elections where, through an election pact between the LCD and the National Independent Party (NIP), the LCD (ruling party) enjoyed a comfortable majority of 82 MPs out of 120 MPs whenever there was voting in the National Assembly (Shale, 2006:179). Thus, the dominance of the National Assembly by a single political party is a prominent feature of
the policy process in Lesotho. This, therefore, explains in part why policies viewed at the
general level tend to advance the personal interests of the political elites rather than
national interests.

Mwakyembe (1998:254) confirms the view that a country’s legislature, which is
dominated by the ruling party, is in fact, a hurdle in democratic development. In support
of this assertion the author notes that in 1993 the legislature in mainland Tanzania was
dominated by the ruling party. The legislature amended the constitution to disqualify
independent candidates from contesting presidential and parliamentary races. A political
activist challenged the amendment on the grounds that it contravened some parts of the
constitution. The High Court agreed with the complainant and clearly stated the reasons
for the verdict. The verdict made it lawful for independent candidates to contest
presidential, parliamentary and local council elections. “Immediately after this bold
decision, a constitutional amendment was rushed through parliament to… override the
High Court’s generous and purposive construction of the constitution (Mwakyembe,
1998:55). Indeed, this specific case confirms that a legislature that is dominated by a
ruling party is a threat to a country’s policy development, more so, in African countries
which are characterized by a self-serving and a power hungry political leadership.

Besides dominance by a single party, the law-making (policy making) process in the
National Assembly in Lesotho is impaired by internal procedural requirements as stated
in the National Assembly Standing Orders (NASO) 2008. Sets’abi (2010) provides a
detailed account of how some provisions in the document reinforce the parliamentary
power position of the ruling party. Of these can be mentioned the mode of voting which
makes it difficult for both the members of the ruling party and the opposition parties to
vote against “party line” in parliament whenever the house is divided. The author notes
that in the event any matter is subjected to a vote, an alphabetical roll call is made. At
being called out, the MP is required to stand up and declare his position with a “yes”, a
“no” or an abstention (Sets’abi, 2010:5). No doubt, this manner of open voting has
ensured that MPs do not vote according to their own individual conscience but instead
vote through peer pressure of towing the party line. This constitutes a hurdle in policy
development in Lesotho as it promotes policies that reflect political elite preferences as against national interests. It has also contributed to “…the apparent inability of Parliament to hold the Executive accountable” (Sets’abi, 2010:2).

On the basis of the above arguments it can be concluded that, if law making is seen as policy making, then policy development in Lesotho has been impaired by three factors namely, by the ruling parties abusing their parliamentary majority, weak checks and balances in parliament as well as some defective parliamentary procedures.

5.3.2.2 The Monarch

Before examining the role of the King/Monarch in the policy process, it is helpful to draw a distinction between the 1966 Constitution of Lesotho adopted at independence, and the prevailing Constitution of Lesotho which came into effect in 1993, that is, 27 years after independence.

At independence Lesotho adopted a Constitution which was drawn with the assistance of Britain, the former colonial master (Mashinini, 2000:86 and Gay, 2006:77). Herein, for ease of reference, this document is referred to as the “1966 Constitution”. As it were, the 1966 Constitution did not last long. In January 1970 Lesotho held the first general elections after independence. The ruling Basotho National Party (BNP) which had been in power for only five years lost the elections. Not accepting defeat, the Prime Minister Leabua Jonathan acted unilaterally, declared a state of emergency and suspended both the Constitution and political activity (Van de Geer and Wallis, 1984: 20; Pherudi, 1996:63; Machobane, 1998:393; Matlosa, 1999:172 and Mothibe, 1999:47). Contrary to belief, for the twenty three years that followed, that is 1970 to 1993, Lesotho was ruled without a constitution.
Three years after suspending the constitution, Prime Minister Leabua Jonathan established an Interim National Assembly which was specifically mandated to draw a new constitution. As late as 1986 the new constitution was not forthcoming when Major General Metsing Lekhanya toppled the BNP government in a bloodless military coup. The military government facilitated the drawing of a constitution which came into force in 1993, the year in which the military handed back power to the civilians. This latter document is hereafter referred to as the “Constitution of Lesotho”. Some essential differences in the above two documents help explain the changing role of the monarch in the policy process in Lesotho.

Section 32 (1) of the 1966 Constitution designated the King as a constitutional Monarch and a Head of State. In that capacity the King had wide ranging functions which can be classified into two categories. First, there were those functions which the King could carry out on the advice of his Privy Council or some other officer or authority designated by the Constitution or any other law in Lesotho. Second, there were those functions which, in terms of Section 76 (2) of the same Constitution, the King could “act in accordance with his own deliberate judgment”. The King could act in accordance with his own deliberate judgment in the following areas:

(a) in the exercise of the powers relating to the appointment of Senators;
(b) in the exercise of the powers relating to the dissolution of parliament;
(c) in the exercise of the power relating to the appointment of the Prime Minister;
(d) in the exercise of the power relating to the removal of the Prime Minister;
(e) in the exercise of the power to designate members of the National Planning Board; and in the exercise of the powers relating to land (Constitution of Lesotho, 1966 Section 76 (2). See Addendum…. for a full version of Section (76) of the Constitution of Lesotho, 1966.

By allowing the King to act in his own judgment in certain critical areas, the 1966 Constitution facilitated intervention by the King in public affairs as and when the situation demanded. Such interventions would be particularly called for when some political players failed to observe the rules of the game or, if they behaved outrageously in ways that endangered peace, stability, and democracy. The King’s powers were equivalent to what Brazier (1990:150) refers to as the ‘Queen’s reserve powers’ in
Britain. Amongst the Queen’s reserve powers can be cited dissolution of parliament, refusal of assent to legislation and dismissal of a government. In Britain, however, it can be deduced that the political elite is mature and disciplined because Brazier notes only one case where Royal assent to legislation was withheld, and that was in 1707. Otherwise, no government ever behaved outrageously or illegally to warrant intervention by the Sovereign (Brazier, 1990:150). On the contrary, since independence, Lesotho has witnessed many political upheavals whereby, if the 1966 Constitution was upheld, intervention by the King would have been called for, provided the King himself had maintained the requisite neutrality to act impartially. Indeed, in playing such a mediatory role the monarch would not be setting a precedent given that in several other countries including Japan, Thailand and Sweden the monarchs have at various points facilitated the resolution of conflicts among political players in their respective countries (Akokpari, 1998:76). However, in Lesotho political developments made the mediatory role of the monarch unthinkable. Below is a brief account of the post-independence events that gradually circumscribed the role of the monarch in the policy process.

As indicated earlier, Lesotho was ruled without a constitution for more than two decades. The period between 1970 and 1993 was marked by a series of autocratic rules each defining for the King a different form of participation in the policy process. The first autocratic period, from 1970 to 1986, was under ‘the strong man’ Prime Minister Leabua Jonathan. Following the loss of the general elections by the BNP in 1970 and the subsequent suspension of the Constitution, Leabua Jonathan formed a Council of Ministers bestowed with legislative and executive powers. In the same period Leabua Jonathan forced the King to abdicate and go into exile to the Netherlands for an unspecified period (Pherudi, 1996:73). The reason was that the two parties had different interpretations of the political and economic situation in the country hence different aspirations for the future of Lesotho. The King wished a no party state while Leabua aspired for and consolidated support towards building a one party state (Machobane, 1998:393). The disagreements at the political level led to a situation whereby incessantly, the Prime Minister accused the King of aligning himself with anti-government forces, hence a unilateral decision to send the latter into exile.
In December 1970 the King was allowed back home from the Netherlands on condition he signed the “New Order of the King” as outlined in Order No. 51 of 1970. (See addendum … for a full version of the New Order of the King). The King undertook under oath to refrain from all political activity and to allow his movements to be restricted and subjected to the approval of the government. This was not at all new for the King as he had already signed the notorious “Suicide Clause” of 1967 which similarly restricted his movements as well as his thinking (Pherudi, 1996:74). Pherudi further observes that this new order of the King successfully reduced the monarch to “a domesticated and manipulated ruler”. The government thought for him and no critical or independent thought was encouraged. In the circumstances, throughout Leabua Jonathan’s dictatorship the King watched helplessly as the BNP government brutally entrenched itself in power and killed many of its opponents. The regime was also marked by high levels of corruption and nepotism to the detriment of service delivery (Mashinini, 2000:91).

Indeed, because he had signed the new order, the King remained silent as Leabua Jonathan’s government using Lebotho la Khotso (The Corps of Peace), The Youth League and other similar establishments committed terrible acts of violation of human rights, inflicted immeasurable pain on ordinary Basotho, exploited and ruthlessly murdered political opponents in the name of consolidating the ruling party’s position in power (Pherudi, 1996:83; Mashinini, 2000:86 and Gay, 2006:77). Conclusively, during Leabua Jonathan’s rule, the King had no role, whatsoever, in the policy process. Instead, the King always appeared with the Prime Minister on formal occasions “and read the speeches prepared by the BNP’s cabinet and wore official uniform designed by the government and gave every visible indication of being reconciled to the rigidly circumscribed symbolic role” (Pherudi, 1996:73).

The second period that helps to establish the role of the King in the policy process runs from 1986 to 1993. During this period Lesotho was under military rule. In January 1986 Leabua Jonathan’s government was toppled in a bloodless military coup led by Major
General Metsing Lekhanya. The coup was welcomed not only by the majority of the Basotho but the King as well (Machobane, 1998:384). Of course the King had reason to celebrate the coup because for more than two decades he was at pain reconciling with a rigidly circumscribed symbolic role serving the political ends of the ruling party, the BNP. The King’s tacit approval of the coup was implied in him labeling his military kingdom the “New Lesotho” (Pherudi, 1996:126 and Machobane, 1998:384). The new Lesotho became a pleasant reality for the King when Major General Metsing Lekhanya bestowed all legislative and executive powers in his Majesty (Mothibe, 1990:243). Lesotho Order No. 2, 1986, Section 9 stated that “The executive and legislative authority in Lesotho is vested in the king and may be exercised by him either directly or through the Military Council or the Council of Ministers or other officers or authorities of the Government of Lesotho”. However, the military government cautiously set limits on the powers of the King in that sub-section 2 stated that in the exercise of his functions under the Order or any other law, the King would act “in accordance with the advice of the Military Council”. Thus, under the watchful eye of the Military Council of Lesotho, “the King assumed his historic role of an unprecedented exercise of political power, since independence, with tenacity and sense of mission” (Machobane, 1998:383).

Unfortunately, the alliance between the King and the Military Council did not last long. Three reasons explain the impasse. First, the King had a long established vision for the future of Lesotho. It is this vision that severely tarnished his relations with Leabua Jonathan, the leader of the BNP government (Pherudi, 1996:52). With his office bestowed with legislative and executive authority, the king seized the opportunity to put his model of governance into place. Essentially, the King envisaged a participatory democracy whereby all strands of society, farmer associations, chamber of commerce, chiefs and all other groups, could easily participate in the political process directly, through their representatives, and not through political parties (Machobane, 1998:392). The King “apparently wanted to do away with political parties and introduce chieftainship councils in the districts and parliament and himself at the apex as the rightful organ through which to rule the country” (Mashinini, 2000:88). By implication, the military would revert back to its traditional role in society. Of course, that was not
what the soldiers, who had just acquired state power and were starting to enjoy the benefits of same, were willing to go by. Thus, lack of a shared vision on the future of Lesotho and divergent personal interests signaled the beginning of a gradual breakdown of the monarchy-military political marriage.

Second, the King and the Military Council had a different interpretation of Lesotho’s foreign policy, particularly as it concerned Lesotho’s only neighbour, South Africa. Major General Lekhanya favoured a close and collaborative relationship with the then apartheid Republic of South Africa and pledged to do all that was humanly possible to achieve that objective (Sejanamane in Pherudi, 1996:130). It is true that good relations with the RSA were vital for the survival of Lesotho. However, close collaboration with an apartheid regime vulgarized the image of Lesotho internationally as the international community was up in arms against apartheid. Moreover, observers noted that the military government, due to political naivety, compromised far too much by even allowing the RSA to have a say in domestic and foreign policies of Lesotho. For instance, immediately after the coup, the military government expelled the South African refugees from Lesotho, and also rushed to make a unilateral agreement to sign the Lesotho Highlands Water Treaty (Mashinini, 2000:88). The same treaty had been in abeyance for almost two decades as the civilian government in Lesotho held that some of its provisions severely compromised the interests of the Basotho.

Contrary to Major General Lekhanya’s foreign policy, the King, Moshoeshoe II, a learned and an internationally well connected statesman, aspired for a sound foreign policy that would enable Lesotho to continue to play its role in international affairs. The King “maintained that Lesotho’s foreign relations should be geared towards defending a sovereign independent and non-aligned state, and projecting her image as an active member of the community of nations” (Pherudi, 2000:71). Thus, to the King the emergent Lesotho’s foreign policy, of becoming a facsimile of a South African Bantustan, was a complete embarrassment. The King’s efforts to spearhead and define an alternative foreign policy for the country did not appease the military council. The different perceptions on the country’s foreign policy further soured the relations between
the King and the soldiers who aspired for a personal control of Lesotho’s foreign relations, in particular, Major General Lekhanya (Machobane, 1998:395).

Third, factionalism reaped the military council apart. Essentially, the military council comprised two factions, the Letsie faction - the royalists and the Lekhanya faction - the commoners (Machobane, 1998:399). “The royalist faction had a hidden agenda against Maj Gen Lekhanya. It wanted to see the monarchy in total control of the government…” (Pherudi, 2000:70). For this reason the royalists persistently collaborated with the King to undermine Lekhanya’s authority as Chairman of the military government. Of the incidences that support this view can be cited the incident of the graduation ceremony at the National University of Lesotho in October, 1988. As a norm, the King, as the Chancellor, speaks on such occasions. However, in October, 1988, to the amazement of many, and disbelief of Major General Lekhanya, the King ceded his exclusive role of the speaker of the day to Colonel Joshua Sekhobe Letsie, a royalist member of the Military Council. Observers noted that, if at all it had to be, the King should have given such a place to his ‘senior minister’, Major General Lekhanya (Machobane, 1998:394). The animosity, rivalry and hostility between the royalists and the commoners in the Military Council manifested itself in many other ways (Machobane, 1998:399; Pherudi, 2000:72 and Mashinini, 2000:88). Determined to deal with the defiant royalists, on 21 February, 1990, “Maj Gen Lekhanya announced that the powers of the Head of State, King Moshoeshoe II, would “for the time being”, be invested in himself” (Pherudi, 2000:80). Even in the self-empowered position the Chairman of the Military Council was not able to normalize the relations with the monarch. On 10th May, 1990, the situation tended to a boiling point and Lekhanya sent the King into exile. Sixth months later, Lekhanya went further and dethroned the King (Pherudi, 2000:81). This marked the end of a political marriage between the military and the monarch and the beginning of a process that led to the resumption of multi-party democracy in Lesotho in 1993. Thus, even under the military rule the King did not play any role in the policy process, his stay at the helm of power was hectic, was short and ended unceremoniously.
The role of the King in the policy process was not eroded by historical events only but even by the legal instrument in the form of the 1993 Constitution of Lesotho. As indicated earlier, following the demise of the monarch-military alliance, the military government speeded up the review of the constitution by the Interim National Assembly. The review brought in drastic changes in institutional power relations.

Section 76 (2) of The 1966 Constitution of Lesotho, which enabled the King to use his judgment in specified circumstances was omitted in its entirety. Instead, Section 91 (3) of the 1993 Constitution of Lesotho - quoted at length under Section 5.3.2.1 (a) - gave absolute powers to the Prime Minister to the detriment of social order and development of a coherent policy framework. In brief, the section empowers the Prime Minister to act in place of the King if the latter delays some legal action beyond the time frames stipulated by the Prime Minister. In the event this happens, the Prime Minister’s act is deemed to have been done by the King and to be his act (Section 91(3), Constitution of Lesotho, 1993).

Section 91 of the Constitution, therefore, reduced the role of the King in the policy process while at the same time significantly empowering the politicians. This has enabled political leaders, one after the other, to exercise unbridled power in making political and policy decisions which enhanced their course. That is why Lesotho has gone through a series of autocratic rules where different governments personalized power and clung to it as long as it was possible. Different governments used state assets to enrich their members, and to entrench themselves in power through repressive measures imposed on the civil society (Mashinini, 2000:91). Consequently, when Lesotho celebrated its 40th independence in 2006, it had witnessed 6 coups and 2 attempted coups (Pherudi, 1996:2; Mashinini, 2000:88 and Pherudi, 2000:19) thus, making Lesotho one of the most unstable polities in Southern Africa.

An attempt to reduce the severity of Section 91 (3) on the role of the King in the policy process comes under Section 92 which requires the Prime Minister and other Ministers to consult and to inform the King on all matters pertaining to the government of Lesotho. Evidence suggests that, in practice, the provision serves little purpose as it has, on several
occasions, been overlooked by those concerned, often with grave consequences for the society at large.

From the foregoing analysis it can be deduced that the monarch in Lesotho cannot make the government rethink its position and cannot mediate between warring political factions. Further, refusal to assent to legislation can only cause embarrassment for the monarch as the Constitution empowers the Prime Minister to act on his behalf. Thus, even though the monarch is portrayed as the highest authority in the land, as in Figure 5.2 above, power and authority lie elsewhere.

5.3.2.3 The Prime Minister

According to Brazier (1994:64) in a parliamentary democracy the strength and authority of the Prime Minister is derived from four sources identified below.

- The electorate’s choice
  The Prime Minister is elected by the people either directly or indirectly. Thus, respecting the Prime Minister implies respecting the people.

- Power over ministers
  The Prime Minister appoints, reshuffles and discards ministers at his own discretion. The Prime Minister, therefore, is respected for his ability to place ministers away from and near centres of authority.

- Highest profile, patronage and dissolution
  The Prime Minister holds the highest profile compared to his/her ministers. He is responsible for appointing incumbents of statutory and senior positions in government. He also has power to dissolve government.

- Direction of departments
  As head of government the Prime Minister has a natural right to intervene at any time in any one department to ensure that decisions are carried out or to prevent certain undesirable undertakings by the department.
For all these reasons the Prime Minister is the centre of government. All government activity revolves around his office. That is why Brazier (1990:91) concludes that “his [Prime Minister’s] authority can make him, in theory, an elective dictator”.

In resemblance to other parliamentary democracies, the Prime Minister in Lesotho derives his powers from the same sources. However, reality shows that in Lesotho the Prime Minister derives increased powers and authority from two additional sources namely, parliamentary majority and the Constitution itself.

- **Parliamentary majority**

Lesotho has had three Prime Ministers since independence. These are Leabua Jonathan-BNP, Ntsu Mokhehle-BCP and Pakalitha Mosisili-LCD. Of the three, it is only Leabua Jonathan who treaded a tightrope in parliament during 1966-1970, the period of BNP’s legitimate rule. For, the BNP occupied 31 seats in the National Assembly, BCP had 25 seats while MFP had 4 seats (Pherudi, 1996:42; Matlosa, 1999:171 and Molomo, 1999:134). Thus, for Lesotho’s first Prime Minister, the low margin in parliament constituted a weakness that worked against adoption of BNP government’s legislation. Supporting this view is Brazier in noting that a “Prime Minister who has a small or no majority in the House of Commons will necessarily appear feebler than one with a comfortable majority… partly because he will have no guarantee that his government’s legislation will pass” (Brazier, 1990:90).

On the contrary, the second Prime Minister of Lesotho, Dr Ntsu Mokhehle could have been the most powerful head of government had it not been for the debilitating internal power struggles within the BCP, given that the BCP swept all the 65 seats in the 1993 general election. The BCP’s landslide victory created a *de facto* one party state/government in which government legislation would pass without any hurdles (Mamasheka, 1993:194; Mwakyembe, 1998:254 and Pule, 1999:2). Thus, parliamentary majority would have the effect of consolidating the power and authority of the Prime Minister.
The third Prime Minister, Pakalitha Mosisili, also benefited immensely from a legislature dominated by the ruling party. For three consecutive terms the LCD had a comfortable majority in the National Assembly (Matlosa, 1999:175; Sekatle, 1999:41 and Makoa, 2005:176). This has made it possible for the LCD government legislation to pass without hindrance, even the most controversial legislation including the government vehicle scheme, the appeal on electoral disputes and the new land bill that will allow foreigners to acquire land. If these, and other controversial law cases, are anything to go by, then, dominance of the legislature by the ruling party adds to the strength and authority of the Prime Minister in Lesotho.

- Prime ministerial constitutional powers

The Prime Minister also draws additional authority from the 1993 Constitution of Lesotho. As already stated in the previous sections, Section 91 (3) of the Constitution provides for the conditions under which the Prime Minister may act in place of the King and yet, the act so done by the Prime Minister be regarded as an act done by the King. This being the case, power and authority rest with the Prime Minister. To be sure, the Prime Minister exercises the highest authority on the land. The Prime Minister is the decisive authority in decision making, hence in policy making, thus, confirming the view “…that the growth of prime ministerial powers has effectively turned prime ministers into quasi-presidents” (Heywood, 2002:343).

In the circumstances, it is important to note that the Prime Minister, as a political office-bearer is not impartial. “He has to promote the interests of his political party, with the result that his actions could be influenced by what is of importance to his career and to the political party to which he belongs – in other words, what is politically best for him and his party” (Hanekom, 1995:23).

In this situation, the only check on the powers of the Prime Minister would be his political party and the courts of law. However, the ability of the ruling party to check on
the Prime Minister’s actions can only be wished, it can never become a reality, at least in Lesotho. First, the political parties that have been in power since independence including the BNP, BCP and LCD, all without exception, have been engulfed in on going internal power struggles that eventually ripped the parties apart culminating in a highly fragmented political system now consisting of 20 political parties for a small population of only 1.8 million. It cannot be overemphasized that for a political party to control its leadership, it must first itself practice internal democracy and be a coherent and principled organization. Without these attributes a political party can hardly check and balance the actions of its leadership. Thus, the leader is susceptible to becoming a dictator.

Second, the carrot and stick principle pervades African politics, Lesotho included. To be sure, some commentators note that “Parliamentary leaders cannot long survive without cabinet support. That is why Prime Ministers in most of the developing world offer huge benefits to ministers regardless of the fragility of the economies” (Heywood, 2002:347).

Evidence suggests that in Lesotho, it is not only the ministers who reap huge benefits from the state coffers but parliamentarians at large. At the tip of the iceberg can be identified the hefty salaries and huge constituency allowances for MPs, the generous government vehicle scheme and advance gratuity for MPs. Thus, for an MP to act in a manner that would cause him/her to loose these huge benefits amounts to nothing but ‘economic suicide’ as exemplified by the expulsion of four cabinet ministers in 1996 for not seeing eye to eye with the party leader, Dr Ntsu Mokhehle (Pule, 1999:6). Then, the question arises: How many more politicians would dare seriously critique the party leader or party policies and be reduced to dust? The likely answer is ‘none’ precisely because in Lesotho, proximity to the center of power is the most reliable and critical vehicle for accumulation by the political elite, given the weak economic base of this social stratum.
In a democracy the courts normally counterbalance the powers of the executive. Whether this is the case in Lesotho is a topical issue that warrants more space than can be allotted in this chapter. Suffice it to note that a judge in the High Court of Lesotho writes:

The future of judicial independence in Africa may look rather bleak and dim. In a worst scenario, judicial independence will give way to judicial accountability (responsibility). Judges may in the future be appointed by the executive and legislature perhaps for the parliament’s life-time to function as judges and then retire, and this looks the future trend in Africa…Great caution must be taken to regress (sic) to Montesquieu’s joined arms of government (Peete, 2010:33).

However, even without a conclusive finding on the independence of the courts, the evidence that has transpired so far leads one to conclude that, in Lesotho, power lies in the Prime Minister- the Executive.. Thus, in theory, the progress of the nation, the nature, content and effectiveness of public policy very much depend on the willingness and the ability of the Prime Minister to separate political party interests from national interests. It also depends on the Prime Minister’s readiness to take on board a variety of stakeholders in policy making. That is why in Section 5.3 below an attempt is made to establish the extent to which a variety of interests - unofficial policy actors - partake in policy making in Lesotho.

The preceding analysis of the role of the Monarch and the Prime Minister in the policy process in Lesotho has brought to the fore the glaring absence of ‘face-to-face talk’ between these key political players. Thus, before discussing the role of the unofficial policy actors, it is befitting to expound on this issue and its implications thereof.

5.3.2.4 The Missing Link

It has been established that the policy process in Lesotho is substantially impaired by the lack of or weak checks and balances in parliament. At another level the policy process is affected by the powerful constraints that limit the role of the King.
Over and above the identified weaknesses the policy process suffers from the lack of communication between the Head of Government and the Head of State. In fact, it is lack of communication between the two figure heads that has, from time to time, plunged Lesotho into untold political turmoil. Just like a healthy relationship between a husband and wife is crucial for the stability, coherence, integrity and progress of a family, a healthy relationship between the Head of Government and the Head of State is vital for the survival of Lesotho and the Basotho nation. In other words, a healthy relationship between the Head of Government and the Head of State is basic for the consolidation of democracy, the healing of the nation as well as the socio-economic development of the country.

Sadly, the relationship between the Head of Government and Head of State is, at best, tenuous. It is the missing link in the policy process. With the view to substantiate this assertion and with the view to demonstrate the importance of ‘face to face talk’ between the Head of Government and the Head of State, selected incidents that occurred under successive governments in Lesotho are deemed helpful. Indeed, if the Head of Government and the Head of State in Lesotho were compelled in one way or the other, to have ‘face to face talk’ about governance, the system of governance and contemporary challenges that face the society, Lesotho would have long reached the ends of the National Vision 2020 which postulates that by the year 2020 Lesotho shall be a stable democracy, an affluent and peaceful nation. It shall have a healthy and well-developed human resource base, a well managed environment and a sound technological base (Vision 2020, 2004:4).

The assertion may seem as being too uncertain, but a number of examples suggest that it is fundamentally correct. For, if the Head of Government and the Head of State engaged each other in meaningful talks from 4th October, 1966 - Lesotho’s independence, the nation would have been spared the many political upheavals that have directly and indirectly led to the country’s high levels of poverty and stagnant socio-economic development.
Important to note is that the British system on which Lesotho’s system of governance is modeled, places great value on ‘face to face talk’ between the Head of Government and the Head of State. To this effect Brazier is worth quoting at length. The author notes that the Sovereign and the Prime Minister have a:

…weekly audience (at which the two are alone and no formal record is kept) – but in strict confidence, and in the end [the Sovereign] normally deferring to any contrary view persisted in by the Prime Minister. Any public revelation of disagreement could be damaging to the existing and future relationship between head of government and head of state, for obviously if it became known that the Queen had criticized government policy, she might be taken to be biased against that government and to be in favour of another (Brazier, 1990:149).

Using biographies, Brazier further provides examples where the Sovereign and the different Prime Ministers resolved disagreements amicably through the medium of constitutional weekly ‘face to face talk’ sessions. Unfortunately, as it will be seen later, in Lesotho disagreements between the Head of Government and Head of State are prolonged and become issues for public consumption, a situation which worsens the relationship even further.

At this point, though at the risk of sounding repetitive, it is opportune to highlight some of the political mishaps that Lesotho could have avoided if purposeful and meaningful “face to face talk” prevailed between the Head of Government and the Head of State overtime. For brevity but without sacrificing clarity, one incident per regime is selected for illustration.

- **BNP Rule (1966-1986) – The King in exile**

Moshoeshoe II was inaugurated King on 12 March, 1960, six years before Lesotho’s independence, amidst opposing views of the Regent Mantsebo and her advisors that included Leabua Jonathan, who later became Lesotho’s first Prime Minister (Pherudi, 1996:34 and Mashinini, 2000:86). Moshoeshoe II was a learned statesman, “an internationally traveled statesman, urbane and internationally well connected” (Machobane, 1998:394). On the contrary Prime Minister Leabua Jonathan had attained
standard six (Rensburg in Pherudi, 1996:37), by then a completing grade for primary education. For all intents and purposes, this represented a serious mismatch of education and international exposure between the head of government and the head of state. No wonder the two figure heads differed widely in their thinking and theorizing about the future of Lesotho.

Shortly after independence Moshoeshoe II claimed legislative and executive powers. In particular he wanted to be in charge of defence, foreign affairs and internal affairs. Leabua Jonathan’s reply was short and abrupt to the effect that the king should “resign his monarchical position and join the political wagon” (Pherudi, 1996:35). There from Lesotho’s politics became very degrading characterized by demeaning verbal exchanges amongst political parties and between head of government and Head of State (Leeman and Moleleki in Mashinini, 2000:86).

The political environment degenerated very quickly such that within three months of independence Lesotho witnessed massive blood shed at Rothe and Thaba-Bosiu (Mashinini, 2000:86), emanating from clashes between government forces and the people who attended a *pitso* (public gathering) called by the King. The Prime Minister placed the king in the centre of all these political mishaps. In an attempt to cool the heated political environment Prime Minister Leabua Jonathan placed the king under house arrest and later made him to sign an agreement commonly referred to as the “suicide clause” of 1967. The agreement compelled the king to abandon his campaign for greater political powers and made him act only at the discretion and prior approval of the government. The king was silenced and he could not defend himself from the wide ranging accusations made by the Prime Minster on state radio and at political gatherings (Pherudi, 1996:57).

In 1970, five years after independence, the Basotho went to the polls. The BNP lost the elections (Pherudi, 1996:66; Work for Justice, 2006:5 and Mashinini, 2000:87). Prime Minister Leabua Jonathan did not accept the defeat. He declared the elections null and void, suspended the constitution, declared a country wide state of emergency, dealt ruthlessly with the opposition and ruled the country by force imposing on the Basotho the
The Prime Minister further blamed the king for the defeat of BNP at the polls and accused him openly on public broadcast and at political gatherings for hindering Lesotho’s development. The king could still not defend himself against these accusations as the ‘suicide clause’ was still in force.

The hatred between the Prime Minster and the king escalated to an extent that in February 1970, former forced the latter into exile to the Netherlands for an unspecified period. Observers note that:

It was probably true that Moshoeshoe II, through his demand for extra executive powers, estranged himself from the prime minister, but more than anything else, lack of communication, face to face talk, was not a tradition of the Basotho leaders. Each pulled in his own direction, hence the escalation of the political crisis [emphasis added] (Pherudi, 1996:61).

The assertion here is that if the Prime Minister Leabua Jonathan and Moshoeshoe II engaged in purposeful, meaningful and regular “face to face talk”, the chances are high that the political crisis that saw the head of state in exile could have been averted. With the king in exile, factionalism tore the nation apart and created deep divisions in society, while emergent policies of the time clearly served political interests and not the interests of the majority.


When the military took over power in 1986, a marriage of convenience was forged between the Military Council and the monarch, King Moshoeshoe II. The honeymoon was short lived mainly because the two parties held different views on the mode of governance and also because the two parties jealously guarded each other’s jurisdiction in the fight for supremacy.

Of the many incidents that threatened the alliance, the decisive one came on 23rd December, 1988 wherein the Chairman of the Military Council, Major General Lekhanya shot dead George Ramone, a student at the Agricultural College in Maseru (Pherudi,
The shooting of a student by the head of government and on college grounds caused an uproar whereby the political parties, some royalist members of the Military Council and the King demanded that Lekhanya should resign or step down while the incident was being investigated. Major General Lekhanya refused and clung to power. Most notably, “Major General Lekhanya embarrassed the monarchy defying the King’s Order to resign and subsequently refused to meet him when asked to come to the palace and explain what had happened (Moeletsi oa Basotho in Pherudi, 2000:68).

Besides Ramone’s episode, Major General Lekhanya and King Moshoeshoe II disagreed openly and extensively on many counts including Lesotho’s foreign policy and the mode of governance (Machobane, 1998:391). None of the disagreements was resolved amicably precisely because “none of the two figure heads were prepared to compromise, let alone talking to each other for an everlasting solution of the democratic crisis in Lesotho” [emphasis added] (Pherudi, 2000:71).

Once again lack of communication, in fact, lack of ‘face to face talk’ between the two figure heads in government brewed another national catastrophe whereby “Major General Lekhanya [announced] in 1990 that, the Military Council had granted the King study leave in Britain to do Ph.D. studies. In actual fact, it later turned out that the King had been exiled because of his involvement in political affairs of the country” (Mashinini, 2000:88). Thus, for a second time in the history of Lesotho, the King was sent into exile to the detriment of nation building, social development and national integrity. The worst came when Lekhanya went further and dethroned Moshoeshoe II in favour of his son, Letsie III (Molomo, 1998:138).

It may be argued, and reasonably too, that even if ‘face to face talk’ was an established principle in the policy process in Lesotho, the military government would not observe any such civil practice. Suffice it to note that the military government went by and operated on many BNP norms and practices. After all, the soldiers were just a bunch of disgruntled BNP followers.
• BCP Rule (1993–1997) - The royal coup

When the BCP took over power in 1993, after decades of BNP dictatorial rule in Lesotho, the BCP government had to deal with the monarchical problem which was not of its own making. King Moshoeshoe II had been sent into exile by the military government led by General Metsing Lekhanya. Upon BCP take over, Moshoeshoe II pressed for reinstatement. His son, Letsie III, who had just been crowned king, was willing to step down in favour of his father. However, the BCP government and Moshoeshoe II were long time adversaries as the former had been aspiring for the abolition of the monarchy, while the latter persistently demanded for more executive and legislative powers as part of the new dispensation, that is, his return to Lesotho (Pherudi, 2000:100).

The pro-monarchists actively supported the reinstatement of Moshoeshoe II. As pressure mounted the BCP government opted to form a commission of inquiry which would investigate all the activities of Moshoeshoe II, as a pre-condition for reinstatement. The terms of reference as they appear in Legal Notice No. 81 of 1994 are elaborate and would leave no stone unturned in the life of Moshoeshoe II. The proceedings would be held in camera, an issue that caused much agitation amongst the political parties and the pro-monarchists as that provision opened room for doctoring of the report.

Important to note is that King Letsie III had not been consulted about the establishment of the commission of inquiry into the activities of his father (Pherudi, 2000:181). In so doing, the BCP government violated Section 92 of the 1993 Constitution of Lesotho which stipulates that the King shall have the right to be consulted by the Prime Minister and the other Ministers on all matters relating to the government of Lesotho. Further, the Prime Minister should keep the King abreast of all the developments in government and provide the information the King may demand in relation to governance.

In his letter of 4th August, 1994 addressed to the Prime Minister, King Letsie III clearly stated his position. The King expressed his dismay at not being consulted on the establishment of a commission of inquiry into the activities of his father, King
Moshoeshoe II. Letsie III further noted that the manner in which the matter was handled and the terms of reference of the commission were a clear indication of the government’s intention to conclude a political vendetta against his father (Pherudi, 2000:182).

The BCP government ignored Letsie III’s concerns. Resultantly, on 17th August, 1994 the latter took a bold step, suspended some parts of the constitution and dissolved a democratically elected BCP government (Molomo, 1999:139; Mashinini, 2000:89 and Pherudi, 2000:179). Letsie III’s action constituted one of the many coups Lesotho had already witnessed. However, the reaction to the coup was different. Despite their soft spot for the King, the Basotho vehemently denounced the royal coup. The Basotho themselves, with the assistance of the regional leaders and the international community, ensured the restoration of the BCP government (Molomo, 1999:140 and Mashinini, 2000:89). However, the democratic process had already suffered a big dent.

It is the researcher’s view that, if ‘face to face’ purposeful and meaningful talk existed between the Prime Minister, Dr. Ntsu Mokhehle of the BCP and the Head of State, King Letsie III, the chances are that the political blunder –the royal coup- could have been avoided. The King’s political blunder has had a high social cost as it created new divisions in the society and deepened the old ones. It also weakened the trust the Basotho need to have in the monarchy if national unity and stability are to be enhanced.

- **LCD Rule (1997- to date) - External Military Intervention**

The LCD is a breakaway faction of the BCP. It is a product of a parliamentary coup instituted by Prime Minister Ntsu Mokhehle in June 1997. To the disbelief of many, the newly born LCD won the May 1998 general election. The opposition cried foul. The ruling party remained adamant about its victory and the legitimacy of its rule.

Lack of response from the ruling party led to formation of an alliance between three major political parties namely, BCP, BNP and MFP. The supporters of the three political parties kept vigil at the palace grounds requesting, amongst other things, that the King
should dissolve the LCD government (Mothibe, 1999:55 and Molomo, 1999:141). The self-serving nature of the Lesotho political elite (Kadima, 1999:81) immediately came to the fore as each political party sought an option that would best ensure its own gains. The BCP held that the King should dissolve the LCD government and restore the BCP government which was toppled in a parliamentary coup. On the other hand, the BNP and the MFP saw an opportunity to sit in parliament, thus they wanted the King to dissolve the LCD government and form a government of national unity and also to postpone the 1998 election (Matlosa, 1999:178). The common denominator, however, remained the dissolution of the LCD government.

For reasons of the powerful constraints that circumscribe his powers, the King remained silent for days, for weeks. The number of demonstrators who camped at the palace grounds continued to increase (Mashinini, 2000:90). The LCD remained adamant and arrogant. “The political situation in Lesotho deteriorated from bad to worse, the rule of law was reduced to a bare minimum and anarchy set in (Molomo, 1999:141). “Confusion reigned and the police and army became factionalised...protestors confiscated government vehicles, forced people to boycott work, and closed down government offices” (Mashinini, 2000:90). In an attempt to defuse the situation the King was asked to address the nation and call on the crowd camped at the palace grounds to disperse. Incidentally, the King ‘forgot’ to read out the part where he was to call on the crowd to disperse. Instead, he asked for more powers to deal with the situation (Mmegi in Molomo, 1999:141). The LCD government did not give the King the powers requested for. By then the system of government was completely paralyzed. Thus, “[b]ereft of any hope of controlling the situation, Prime Minister Pakalitha Mosisili requested SADC states to intervene and restore law and order in Lesotho” (Molomo, 1999:142). The legitimacy or otherwise of the resultant military intervention is widely debated elsewhere. For example, see Sekatle, 1999; Matlosa, 1999; Molomo, 1999; Makoa, 1999 and Thetela, 1999).

The arrival of the South African troops in Lesotho on 22nd September, 1998 seemed like adding petrol on fire. The country became a dangerous place for human life as it quickly
gravitated to the precipice of a civil war (Matlosa, 1999:189). The destruction and
looting of businesses, factories and homes resulted in massive unemployment and
increasing levels of poverty. To date, Lesotho has not fully recovered from the socio-
economic depression of the 1998 political crisis as some business premises are still in
ruins. Pule (1999:58) succinctly points out the consequences of the 1998 external
military intervention thus:

This SADC intervention, as we now know, brought untold suffering to Basotho in
terms of precious lives lost, injuries sustained, total destruction of the business
districts of Maseru, Mafeteng and Mohales'Hoek and the resultant loss of jobs,
loss of national political and territorial integrity and enormous polarization and
hatred among Basotho (Pule, 1999:58).

Many writers offer different causes of the 1998 political turmoil in Lesotho including
electoral fraud, defects of the electoral system- first past the post-winner-take all,
ystemic factors and structural and institutional paralysis. To this list, the present author
adds the historic absence of ‘face to-face talk’ between the Head of Government and the
Head of State. Prior to 1998, this missing link had already plunged Lesotho into untold
political and economic devastation. It did so once again in 1998. This view is confirmed
in part by Matlosa in noting that “…on the surface the 1998 election appeared the cause
of the conflict while in fact the conflict derived its form and intensity in the institutional
crisis and constitutional disorder in Lesotho since independence” (1999:170). In the same
way, Molomo (1999:133) expresses an opinion that “…the political and civil strife that
manifests itself in Lesotho’s political process was a culmination of deep seated tension
that has been brewing since independence”. It is true, therefore, that the 1998 political
upheaval is a complex phenomenon that cannot be explained by a single factor such as an
election (Matlosa, 1999:191), but by a host of factors amongst which lack of ‘face-to-face
talk’ between head of government and head of state ranks high.

The absence of ‘face-face talk’ between the head of government, Prime Minister
Pakalitha Mosisili and the Head of State, King Letsie III contributed significantly to the
1998 political crisis in Lesotho. First, the demonstrators including leading political
figures camped at the palace grounds. If this is taken as an indication that the protagonists
had faith and trust in the King and that they regarded him as the arbiter of the last resort,
then, it can be argued that the Prime Minister failed to take an opportunity as it presented itself, that of engaging the King in ‘face-to-face talk’ about the prevailing situation, with the view to convince him of the need to disperse the crowd and go to the negotiation table. Instead, the King was asked to read out a speech to the nation, the contents of which were the sole contribution of the government. No wonder, then, that the King ‘forgot’ to read out the part where he was required to call on the protestors to disperse. Second, the King was not consulted about the decision to invite foreign military intervention (Makoa, 1999:92 and Molomo, 1999:142). Whether rightly or wrongly is one thing, but the fact is that invitation of the foreign forces into Lesotho without the knowledge of the King, has further tarnished the relationship between the Head of Government and the Head of State. It has also set a dangerous precedent.

The foregoing analysis highlights the importance of institutionalizing regular ‘face-to-face talk’ between the Head of Government and the Head of State. It has worked for Britain; it should be made to work for Lesotho. Despite the demonstrated lack of respect for the constitution, the effort is worth undertaking with the hope that it may have a bearing on the thinking of the political leadership in the making, the youth. For, regardless of which regime was in power, Lesotho has suffered untold political misery and uncalled for socio-economic devastation due to the distant relationship between the head of government and the Head of State. The situation has been compounded by the Lesotho politicians who have visibly advanced their personal interests and relegated national interests to the back of their minds.

5.3.3 Local administration

Some theoretical aspects of local administration in Lesotho have been discussed in Chapter 3. In that chapter it was established that successive governments in Lesotho adopted various versions of local government that purported to devolve power to the people while, in fact, the structures so created perpetrated control by the center. It was further established that a serious attempt to decentralize power came with the Local Government Act No. 6 of 1997 whereby the LCD (break away faction of the BCP)
government, in compliance with the 1993 BCP manifesto, established an elective local government system operational from April, 2005. An analysis of the emergent local government system structure established by the LCD government revealed three major weaknesses namely, marginalization of the traditional authorities; filtering into local councils people who are not equal to the task and precluding popular participation at grassroots level. These weaknesses, it was argued, do not augur well for the success of local government system in Lesotho. What remains to be established is the extent the local government system is poised to contribute to national policy formulation.

At this point it should be stated that the BCP envisioned a local government system that could effectively improve governance at the local level and at the same time contribute to national policy development. To this effect the 1993 BCP manifesto reads:

The BCP is convinced that true development and good governance require grassroots involvement in both planning and decision making. To that extent, the BCP government shall (a) ensure the establishment of councils at district, constituency and village levels (b) facilitate a democratic relationship between the central and local government (BCP Manifesto, 1993:7).

However, the version of the local government system that was eventually introduced by the LCD government appears to have relegated to the rear the need for a local government system that contributes to national policy development. The assertion is based on a number of observations. First, despite strong resistance by the opposition parties in parliament, the LCD government, taking advantage of its parliamentary majority, adopted first-past-the-post (FPTP) model for local government elections (Kapa, 2005:213). This is contrary to the mixed member proportional (MMP) model adopted for the national elections since 2002. It can be argued that this portrays local government as distinct and completely divorced from the national rubric while activities at the two levels should be seen as complementing each other in the strive towards good governance and consolidation of democracy.

Besides, Lesotho abandoned FPTP largely because this electoral model was viewed, at all levels, as one of the major contributing factors to the country’s chronic political instability. That is why Southall in Melber (2003:124), in reference to MMP, proclaimed
that proportional electoral system promised to provide Lesotho with a modicum of badly needed political stability. The author further noted that “[t]he road to reach this point had been littered with obstacles of Basotho politicians own making”. Thus, by mounting local government elections on FPTP electoral model, the LCD has in place a good recipe for conflict at the local level. Confirming this view Kapa opines that by adopting FPTP electoral model for local elections, LCD government has boxed the “country into the conflict-prone situation that the introduction of the MMP was specifically designed to end” (2005:213). Clearly, a local government system that is besieged by conflict, as indeed, overwhelming empirical evidence suggests, cannot effectively contribute to policy formulation at the national level, at the least, by providing a base for testing policy experiments.

Second, local government in Lesotho operates within the parameters that are jealously guarded by the modern administrators on one hand and the aristocrats, on the other. The local authorities depend on the central government for finance. Moreover, in terms of the Local Government Act No.6 of 1997, the by-laws should be approved by the minister. At least during 2010, none of the by-laws have been approved (Lenepa, 2010:20). On the other hand, some local authorities have not submitted any by-laws for approval presumably due to lack of capacity as some studies have established that the low educational capacity of the majority of the councilors is a bedeviling factor in local government (Lenepa, 2010:23). Thus, five years after the establishment of the local authorities the councils operate more like extension services of the central government.

The local authorities also walk a tight rope in local administration because the chiefs are adamant on retaining their original powers and functions. In the midst of a conflict one chief asserted: “I am not governed by the local government act, I am guided by the chieftainship act” (Piti, 2010:22). Another chief “asserted that he does not want local government with its structures and laws that established it. He categorically stated that a councilor will not do anything in his village” (Piti, 2010:23). If, therefore, local government is to contribute to national policy development, it has to be freed from the grip of both the modern administrators and the traditional authorities. This can be
achieved by giving local authorities the requisite resources, power and authority, on one hand, and on the other hand, by clearly separating their functions from those of the chiefs.

5.4 UNOFFICIAL POLICY ACTORS

As indicated earlier the unofficial policy actors include the individuals, the media, civil society and the private sector. Although they are regarded as secondary policy actors they play an important role in society, that of shaping public opinion, safeguarding and consolidating democracy and compelling governments to be accountable. The discussion focuses on the role of the media, civil society and the private sector in policy making in Lesotho.

5.4.1 The Media and the policy process

In democratic societies the media has an important role to play in entrenching and safeguarding democratic principles. It holds governments, institutions and individuals accountable. It blows the whistle when societal affairs tend to the wrong side of the public interest. In addition, “the media also plays a key role in keeping the business sector clean” (Othata and Seleke, 2008:1540). Thus, left to operate freely, the media helps shape, inform and improve public policy.

The High Court of Botswana provides a comprehensive understanding of the role played by the media in a democratic society, hence its role in shaping and improving public policy.

In a democratic society the media plays a very important role. It is normally the media that forms a vehicle of communication between the governed and those that govern. It is usually the press as part of the media that acts against the abuse of power and corruption where it may occur in society. It is through the media that members of the society communicate their ideas and feelings about the way they are governed. It plays the very important role in civil society of informing the public of many matters including the way the organs of the state operate and by giving general information. It is the press, which on many occasions, has been on the forefront in the fight against abuse of power, corruption, dictatorship and
other blatant disregard of the rule of law committed by those that govern in many a number of countries (High Court of Botswana in Balule, 2008:131).

In many a number of the Southern African countries the media does not benefit society as envisaged because of legislative provisions, economic considerations and other state media-unfriendly behavioural and procedural requirements (Maundeni, 2008:142, Selinyane, 2010:36 and Ghandhi, 2010:1).

Legislative provisions constitute a major constraining factor for the media in performing its watchdog, educational and informative roles in most of the Southern African countries. These countries, Lesotho included, have in place outdated pieces of legislation which pose a threat to freedom of expression as they are capable of, and in fact have been invoked at whim by authorities to take to task media practitioners and all those who are seen to be overly critical of the administration (Balule, 2008:138; Ghandhi, 2010:4 and Selinyane, 2010:36). For example, Lesotho has the Internal Security Act, 1984 “which provides wide powers of arrest and detention for the investigation of subversive activity” (Gay, 2006:88). The broad definition of subversive activity, in fact, might proscribe any policy that is not acceptable to the ruling elite. Resultantly, media practitioners are circumspect in their reporting function as they have a choice to work within the system or be thrown out of business (Gay, 2006:78).

Worth noting is that the Internal Security Act, 1984 came into effect in the last years of the notorious iron-rule of Leabua Jonathan, a regime that imposed the worst forms of human rights abuses in Lesotho (Work For Justice, October, 2006). The regime was highly intolerant of the opposition and sought to eliminate all forms of dissention and criticism under the guise of maintaining internal security. Surprisingly, for reasons beyond comprehension, subsequent governments have found it befitting to uphold the provisions of the act.

Freedom of expression in most of the Southern African countries is further threatened by an emergent raft of new legislation and bills which entrench state control of the media. Depending on individual countries, the new pieces of legislation seek to establish media
controlling bodies, enforce pre-publication censorship and even to set up communication ‘interception centres’ to intercept electronic and telephonic communication between citizens (Ghandhi, 2010:4). In Lesotho there is the newly established Lesotho Communications Authority (LCA) whose primary objective is the regulation of the communications sector. The LCA board members are appointed by the Minister thus denying the body the requisite impartiality and professionalism (Selinyane, 2010:36). Although a later amendment to the enabling act provides for the minister’s nomination to be approved by a simple majority of parliament, this has not provided a remedy. For, the current LCA board is composed of close family relations of ministers and principal secretaries and the legal representatives of the state and the ruling party (Selinyane, 2010:36). Thus, the complexion of the board is not hard to establish.

The LCA made its presence felt when it suspended one of the most controversial private radio stations during July-October 2008. The LCA claimed that the suspension was related to a breach of licence conditions (LCA, 2009:12). However, the suspension was widely viewed as just one of the punitive embargos by the state against media houses identified as unfriendly to the system (Selinyane, 2010:37). No doubt, the suspension of Harvest FM sent a chilling reminder to private broadcasters and media houses in Lesotho proscribing a need for self-censorship.

Economic considerations also constrain the media from effectively fulfilling its role in many of the Southern African countries including Botswana, Lesotho and Tanzania (Balule, 2008:138; Ghandhi, 2010:2 and Selinyane, 2010:38). The authors note that leading media houses suffer economic sanctions at the hands of the state for being classified as overly critical of the system and the activities of the ruling elite. The sanctions include denial of government advertising and barring the media from press conferences organized by the state (Balule, 2008:138 and Ghandhi, 2010:2). Advertising constitutes the bulk of media revenues. Thus, based on the need to survive and to remain in business, the media practitioners subordinate their democratic mandate to officialdom.
Over and above applying economic sanctions against media houses, governments in many of the Southern African countries have in place other media unfriendly activities that further compromise freedom of expression and free exchange of ideas amongst the citizens. These include withholding of media licences to aspiring media practitioners, if the latter are seen to identify with dissenting voices (Ghandhi, 2010:3). Alternatively, some Southern African countries, notably Lesotho and Zimbabwe, apply political pressure on the media through mental, legal and physical harassment of journalists (MISA, 2006 in Fourie, 2007:71 and Selinyane, 2010:36).

In a constraint environment such as obtains in Southern Africa, the media cannot fulfill its democratic mandate as earlier succinctly outlined by the High Court of Botswana. A media friendly environment obtains in Britain and the USA, the countries whose media national policies are based on the libertarian theory (for a discussion of the theories of media policies see Fourie, 2008). In terms of the libertarian theory “people are rational beings capable of distinguishing between truth and falsehood and between good and evil” (Fourie, 2008:34). If that is so, the media should freely provide information to the society without state or government control. In that way the media constitutes a free market for ideas and information. Consequently, in these two old democracies freedom of expression is highly valued such that the media acts as a ‘fourth estate’ along with the legislature, executive and judiciary authorities in the governing process (Fourie, 2008:34). That is one of the reasons why these two countries have become the models of democracy. By implication, therefore, a country that aspires for a full-fledged stable democracy, where public policy is informed by public opinion, such a country should give the media its rightful place in governance.

In conclusion and based on the challenges facing the media in most parts of the Southern African region, it can be argued that the media in this region cannot effectively carry out its democratic mandate. However, the situation differs between countries. That being the case, the media plays a minimal role in governance, hence a minimal role in agenda setting, let alone the shaping and improvement of public policy.
In Lesotho it has been established that the media is constrained by antiquated laws, economic sanctions imposed by the state on media houses that are identified as overly critical of the system and, by other media unfriendly techniques which deter the media sector from freely expressing opinions and sharing ideas with the citizenry. Thus, the media in Lesotho can be described as having marginal contribution to policy development.

5.4.2 Civil society and the policy process

Like many other concepts in the social sciences, civil society is difficult to grasp. However, there is consensus that the concept refers to all individuals and a wide spectrum of organizations and associations that are independent of government. It includes community based organizations, trade unions, religious communities, advocacy groups, policy research institutions, human rights organizations and all other non-governmental organizations (Gabriel, 2003:10; Gay, 2006:97 and SADC, 2006:70). As it can be seen, civil society comprises a range of non-governmental organizations established to meet specific needs of the people. These organizations are commonly referred to as civil society organizations (CSOs).

CSOs in collaboration with the media play an important monitoring role. For example, that of improving accountability and reducing incentives for corruption in government (World Development Report, 2003:41), as well as in the business sector. CSOs also play an important role in advocating and promoting legal reforms, increasing legal awareness and enhancing policy and governance transformation. In many countries CSOs have compelled governments to observe human rights and to recognize the vulnerable and marginalized groups including women, HIV/AIDS victims and orphans (Lekorwe in Mokomane, 2006:157). Even at times, a strong civil society has the capacity to initiate, advocate and lobby for policy reform and adoption. If that is so, civil society is an important pillar of democracy as its various activities help shape and inform public opinion.
A number of constraints hamper CSOs from effectively carrying out their democratic mandate. These constraints are internal and external.

- **Internal constraints**

  First, CSOs in the Southern African region are poorly funded and poorly resourced. Most CSOs are funded either by private sources or international donors or the government (SADC, 2006:17 and Mokomane, 2008:16). While external funding stabilizes CSOs resources, it also exposes them to possible external manipulation (Mokomane, 2008:160).

  Second, SADC has conducted a four year study which established that CSOs in the region are generally badly managed and also lack organizational coherence (SADC, 2006:17). From this it can be concluded that CSOs in the region fail to exploit their working environment and thereby effectively meet their democratic mandate. That is why the study by SADC culminated in a handbook aimed amongst other things, at imparting the requisite skills to CSOs in the region.

  Third, CSOs in the Southern African region do not participate effectively in the policy formulation process because they have done very little to develop systematic local research and policy analysis processes (Gabriel, 2003:13). The absence of sufficient activity in this area denies the CSOs meaningful participation in the development, monitoring and transformation of policies, particularly poverty reduction policies and strategies.

- **External constraints**

  There are also external factors that work against civil society engagement in the policy process in the Southern African region. There is a political culture pervading the region whereby parliamentarians hold the view that organized civil society can constitute a
threat to the authority or sovereignty of parliament (SADC, 2006:16). Resultantly, the relationship between parliament and the CSOs is antagonistic and characterized by mistrust. To this effect SADC notes that in most of the Southern African countries “the perspective of parliamentarians and in particular those of the ruling parties, is that public policy activists who are not members of the ruling party are, by definition, political opponents (2006:16). Thus, for fear of being identified with anti-government forces, potential policy advocates coil back to work within the system, thus, defeating the very purpose of their existence.

Recognizing the disturbing engagement gap between parliament and civil society in Africa and in an attempt to instigate a collaborative and collegial relationship between the two institutions, the Honourable Gertrude Mongella, president of Pan-African Parliament remarked:

Civil society and parliaments are all in the business of representing people, of giving voice to the voiceless. Civil society and parliaments do not govern; but they oversee those who govern to ensure that policies are people based. Both parliaments and civil society should help governments to monitor service delivery to the people. The relationship between civil society and governments need not be adversarial but should be complementary (Mongella in Moyo, 2008:196).

In the same vein, SADC is concerned about the lack of parliament public engagement in member states. According to this regional body “[a] core area of parliamentary democracy in SADC countries is the absence of a culture of engagement between parliament and civil society” (SADC, 2006:14). These remarks suggest that African parliaments are nothing other than ivory towers for the political elite, hence parliaments are inaccessible to civil society. The only time the gap between parliament and civil society appears to decline is during the elections. The implication here is that the self-serving political leadership bridges the engagement gap only when it is opportune for them to befriend and use civil society for political ends.

Another factor that impairs effective CSOs participation in policy formulation is that they are not a homogenous grouping. They differ in many respects but most significantly they are divided along political lines that accord with the national party-political spectrum (Gabriel, 2003:10). For example, Lesotho has had a painful history of divisions along
both political and church lines (Gay, 2006:29). The most destructive divisions were seen between the Roman Catholic Church (RCC) and the Lesotho Evangelical Church (LEC), whereby the former aliened with BNP while the latter identified with the BCP. Such divisions have denied the CSOs the requisite neutrality and objectivity in addressing policy issues. Resultantly, they have failed to take a common stand in questioning controversial government policies. Even most destructive is that perpetrators of social injustices have manipulated these divisions to their own advantage.

This analysis of CSOs suggests that in the Southern African region the CSOs are ill-equipped to form partnerships that monitor and contribute to policy formulation on a meaningful sustainable basis. In Lesotho, for example, CSOs are reactive and not proactive, an attribute which does not augur well for on-going support to democratic governance. The CSOs contributed to Lesotho’s return to multiparty democracy in 1993 (Work for Justice, October, 2006). They also ensured the return of the BCP government to power following the royal coup of 1994 (Pherudi, 2000:276). However, the CSOs remain largely fragmented and disorganized for them to maintain the momentum required of them to be able to hold the government accountable, to guard against abuse of power, protect human rights and fight corruption.

Conclusively, civil society in Lesotho and most of the Southern African countries does not contribute meaningfully to policy development. Due to internal and external constraints, CSOs play a minimal role in policy formulation, thus, leaving politicians free to appropriate state power and benefits in ways not founded on societal need but in ways determined by political interests. That is why public policy in these countries has little relevance to social problems like poverty, unemployment, poor service delivery and other social injustices.

5.4.3 The Private Sector and the policy process

Lesotho, like other developing countries, has a nascent private sector that faces formidable challenges that limit its growth and impair its development. The sector, small
as it is, is dominated by the textile industry which was established in 1986. At the same
time, the textile sector itself is dominated by Asian owned companies that have
established in Lesotho but are still linked to their parent companies in Asia (Central Bank
of Lesotho, 2008:2).

The textile industry is the largest employer in Lesotho while the government is the
second largest. During 2005 the textile industry employed about 49,000 workers while
the government employed 37,000 workers (Central Bank of Lesotho, 2005:16). Although
the sector is the stronghold of Lesotho’s economy it is not getting the requisite
recognition by the policy makers. In affirming this view the Central Bank of Lesotho
(CBL) indicates that until today “…there has not been any serious effort on the side of
the policy makers to understand how the sector operates, its strengths, risks and the
challenges it faces” (CBL, 2008:2). There has also been no attempt to ensure that the
sector benefits Lesotho in other ways other than the meager wages paid to the workers.
According to the CBL the current export model described below bears testimony to the
virtual neglect of the textile sector by policy makers.

The model is such that the buyers place orders with the agents, who are based
either in Taiwan, Hong Kong or Singapore. These agents have developed a
support network with financial institutions, raw material suppliers as well as
shipping agents. The implication of these arrangements is that most of the work
involving finances is handled outside Lesotho and hence more value is added in
Asia. The bulk of the proceeds of the sale is transferred to the East to repay loans
and settle accounts with agents and suppliers of raw materials. The operations in
Lesotho are mainly the assembly of finished products for shipment to the US
market. The value added translates into a small portion for payment of labour
costs and utilities (CBL, 2008:2).

As it can be deduced from the export model in the textile industry, the sector is controlled
from outside Lesotho and is, therefore, detached from domestic policy issues. The
employers in the sector may take an interest in domestic policy only in as far as it
threatens to alter the current situation whereby the sector benefits immeasurably from the
cheap and highly disciplined labour.
Another sector worth consideration is the public transport sector which provides considerable employment and until recently was wholly owned by the indigenous people. The situation changed in the aftermath of the 2007 general elections. Following the 2007 general elections, the opposition staged frequent stayaways in protest to the manner in which the government and The Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) dealt with the allocation of seats in parliament. The stayaways succeeded largely because an overwhelming majority of public transport operators withheld their vehicles from the road on the days of the declared stayaways. By so doing they defied government instructions not to identify with the protestors. They also made mockery of government threats to withdraw the licences of the operators who would identify with the opposition. In an interview held on 06th September, 2010, the chairperson of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Mrs Malitlou Morojele, explained the difficult situation in which the transport operators found themselves. The latter were torn between complying with government instructions, on one hand, and on the other hand, protecting their property from possible victimization which the government itself would not be able to avert. Drawing lessons from the past, the operators opted for the latter alternative, which unfortunately, placed them at war with the government. Whatever the reason for their non-compliance, the public transport operators paid a very high price for defying government’s instructions.

During 2008 the government introduced a fleet of 20 buses to serve Maseru city and its suburbs. Asked whether the government had consulted with the stakeholders about the introduction of the buses, the chairperson of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry indicated that the government did not consult with the stakeholders simply because the government introduced the large fleet of buses so that it could have direct control over transport during any future stayaways. Asked whether the introduction of the buses has had any negative impact on business in the sector, the chair indicated that rigorous and dangerously heated negotiations were held with the government and these led to removal of the buses from normal operations in the Maseru city. To be sure, it was agreed, amongst other things, that a few of the buses operate in Maseru city from early morning to 7 a m only to serve the factory workers. The rest of the buses have been deployed in
the remote areas which historically have inadequate transport facilities. According to the chair these arrangements have lessened the negative impact of the buses on business in the sector. Otherwise, many of the operators would have been thrown out of business almost immediately.

Beyond the two identified business activities, the rest of the private sector is fragmented, disorganized and poorly resourced for it to be expected to have any involvement in policy issues, except at the unlikely event that the various units are invited by the policy makers to participate in policy issues that affect them.

At this point it is important to compare the Japanese approach to business with Lesotho’s manner of involving stakeholders in business decisions. To this effect, Lindblom writes:

Japanese industrial planning and finance ministries bring corporate executives into close working relations with government and thereby grant substantial authority to business; yet government uses same relations to exercise greater influence over business investment decisions than occurs in the US and other nations (Lindblom and Woodhouse, 1993:144).

Unlike the Japanese government, Lesotho government tends to marginalize the private sector in policy decisions. This is confirmed by the Central Bank of Lesotho in relation to the textile industry and also by the case of the government’s intervention in public transport which was based solely on political aspirations. In this way, the policy makers in Lesotho deny themselves the opportunity to influence private investment decisions to the detriment of increased economic activity, hence poverty alleviation. Thus, it can be concluded that the private sector, just like the media and the civil society, is seriously marginalized in policy making in Lesotho.

5.5 CONCLUSION

The chapter has attempted to demystify the policy making process in Lesotho, thereby filling the void in policy making research in the country. A number of important issues have come to the fore. First, it has been established that the legal policy framework comprises the traditional administration, the modern administration and local
administration. In terms of policy making, the three institutions form a tripartite relationship in which each contributes to policy making in its own different way.

The argument has been raised that the modern administration dominates the policy process. In particular, the Prime Minister exercises the highest authority in policy making. Without institutional checks and balances in the policy process, and with the Prime Minister being a political figure, public policies are inclined to satisfy political interests while compromising national interests. Consequently, poverty reduction policies including self-help projects are also likely to suffer the same defects both in their design and implementation. It is this latter assertion that makes it necessary to establish the extent political influence affects the nature, the content and the performance of the self-help projects.

It has also been established that lack of “face-to-face talk” between political figures, in particular, the Head of Government and the Head of State, is one of the major causes of Lesotho’s social problems including political instability, poverty and social disintegration. The need for institutionalization of “face-to-face talk” between head of government and Head of State has been emphasized.

The role of the unofficial policy actors namely, the media, civil society and the private sector, in the policy process has also been established. It has been shown that the unofficial policy actors face formidable structural and institutional constraints which make it difficult for them to fulfill their democratic mandate of monitoring government activity and contributing to improvement of public policy in Lesotho. Essentially, the unofficial policy actors are marginalized in the policy process because the government plays a domineering and not a facilitative role in policy making. Hence, policies are skewed towards satisfaction of personal/political and not national interests. That is why there is need to establish whether political interests affect the nature, the content and the performance of self-help projects.
The next chapter examines the extent self-help projects in Lesotho confirm the assertion that poverty reduction initiatives in Lesotho are ineffective largely because they are politicized. The core of the argument is that political interests influence the design and implementation of poverty reduction policies and strategies in Lesotho, including self-help activities. Consequently, self-help activities serve to enhance political interests more than they seek to reduce poverty.

CHAPTER 6

DATA ANALYSIS AND PRESENTATION OF THE FINDINGS

6.1 INTRODUCTION

The chapter presents the research results. It sets off by outlining the procedures and considerations taken into account during data collection, data processing and data analysis.

6.2 THE QUESTIONNAIRES

The study used two data collection methods. These are a literary search and survey research. The former relied on books, government documents and reports as well as the reports by donor agencies. The latter used structured personal interviews. To this effect two sets of questionnaires were constructed. One questionnaire was for the participants in self-help, the other for the government officials in the relevant ministries (See appendices 1, 2 and 2a).

6.2.1 The content of the questions

The conventional methods of questionnaire construction were followed wherein each questionnaire had three distinct parts namely, an introductory note, instructions and the body. The introductory note served to introduce the researcher, the study and its purpose so that the participants could make an informed choice whether to participate or not to
participate in the study. The instructions provided a guideline on how to respond to the questions. The instructions were helpful as some research assistants were employed to collect data.

The questionnaire for the participants in self-help projects focused on the following themes:

- background information:
- participation;
- activities carried out;
- benefits derived from self-help projects;
- implementation of the projects; and
- general comments.

The body of the questionnaire was divided into three distinct parts in line with the three versions of the self-help projects that were applied by different governments in Lesotho. The versions are matso’o-lo-a-iketsetse, boikhollo bofumeng and fato-fato. However, the questions were the same for all the different versions. Thus, for purposes of analysis the versions could be easily lumped together whenever there was need to do so.

The questionnaire for the government officials sought to validate the findings from the participants’ views and thus concentrated on the following areas:

- type of activities undertaken;
- participants’ participation in decision making;
- the key actors;
- the benefits and considerations thereof; and
- politicization, if any.

6.3 CONDUCTING INTERVIEWS
For the two categories of respondents structured personal interviews were used.

6.3.1 Interviewing the participants in self-help

Two research assistants with a Bachelor of Arts degree were employed to assist in interviewing the participants in self-help projects. A two hour training session was held to help the assistants understand their role and uphold ethical considerations.

After conducting interviews in one village the team met to review the experience, identify and resolve emergent problems before going to the next village. This was the most rewarding, enriching and enjoyable part of the study, though at times the emotions ran quite high.

6.3.2 Interviewing the government officials

The study demanded that information be solicited from officials at senior management level in the ministries concerned. As such only five interviews were held and these were conducted by the researcher.

6.3.3 Achieving acceptable quality

Validity and reliability are important in research. Some strategies were employed to enhance both validity and reliability of the research findings. Validity refers to the truthfulness of the research findings (Lutz and Lupson in Sefali, 2011:129) and the extent the findings can be generalized to the population (Babbie, 1999:308). In order to enhance validity probability sampling namely, multistage cluster sampling was used to select the district and the villages to be included in the study (See Chapter 1). Probability sampling
enhances validity by ensuring that each element has equal chance of being included in the study.

On the other hand, reliability refers to the extent a measuring instrument measures what it purports to measure (Welman and Kruger, 1999:143). In other words, it refers to the extent an instrument produces the same results if it is used in other similar situations. In order to enhance reliability the questionnaire for the participants in self-help projects was pre-tested in Ha Ts’osane in the outskirts of Maseru city during February 2011. Seven respondents were interviewed for this purpose. The pre-test led to the re-phrasing of some questions to improve clarity as well as inclusion of new questions to close the gaps in the data. However, the questionnaire for the government officials was not pre-tested because the interviews were to be conducted by the researcher who would be able to explain the questions and probe for additional information where necessary.

Training of the research assistants also added to the reliability hence validity of the research findings. Training focused on three things namely, ensuring that the research assistants understood the questions, that they upheld ethical considerations and also avoided showing inclinations of affiliation to any group or any political party. This helped reduce interviewer bias.

6.4 RESPONSE RATE

Conventionally, interviews have a high response rate because the interviewer has a chance to motivate the respondents (Welman and Kruger,1999:165). The 100% response rate for this study reaffirmed this assertion.

6.5 DATA ANALYSIS

This section indicates the procedures adopted in data processing and analysis. The research design and research procedures were explained in Chapter 1. Data analysis proceeded in phases namely, categorization of data, coding and interpretation.
6.5.1 Categorization

Categories of data were created using the research purpose oriented scheme which uses the initial questions in the questionnaire (Babbie, 1992:380). Based on this scheme the data solicited from the respondents yielded 6 categories including:

- background of the respondents;
- participation;
- benefits;
- activities;
- implementation; and
- general comments (other).

These general categories, at times referred to as code families (Creswell in Lefoka, 2011:59), were further broken down into detailed categories so that variations and patterns in the data could be established. For example, in categories such as ‘implementation’ it became necessary to establish specific categories like ‘administration of the projects, registration of the participants and type of identification used by the participants. In this way, categorization helped organize the data in ways which are more helpful for analysis (Dey, 1993:42).

6.5.2 Coding

Babbie (1992:379) explains coding as a process of translating responses to questions into a language that a computer can read. This is achieved by assigning code values to both the categories and the responses. The exercise leads to construction of a codebook as exemplified in Figure 6.2 below.

Coding as above has the effect of quantifying qualitative data such that statistical operations can be performed (Babbie, 1992:379 and Lefoka, 2011:64). This is the case because assigning codes facilitates counting, a process that helps establish frequencies of
occurrences. Thus counting code frequencies conforms with Riddell’s (1992:127) the measurement criteria for projects that have a social component. The author concludes that for such projects success or failure should be measured by the level of consensus over whether objectives have been reached. Thus, by establishing frequencies the analysis

Figure 6.1: Partial example of the Codebook for the study

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable &amp; Variable No.</th>
<th>Code Value</th>
<th>Level</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Gender</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Female</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Male</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Participation</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Continuous</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Broken</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Explanation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Self-help activities</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Tree planting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Road construction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Dam building</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Gully filling</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Other</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

proceeded to find out the extent the participants agree or disagree on the various aspects pertaining to the self-help projects as instruments for reducing poverty. The researcher had a choice between a manual and a computer based analysis (Royse in Sefali, 2011:129). The former was opted for.

6.6 THE RESEARCH RESULTS

Presentation of the results is ordered on the basis of the categorization scheme explained in sub-section 6.5.1 above.
6.6.1 Background of the respondents – self-helpers

The section captures the background of the respondents on those characteristics considered to be most relevant to the research problem. These are gender and availability of alternative means of earning a living. Gender is relevant in the sense that it shows whether it is mostly males or females who participate in self-help projects. Availability of an alternative means of survival reflects the extent an individual is dependent on the self-help activities for a living. In the event the majority of the poor in the rural areas depend on self-help projects for a living, the need to make the projects a viable poverty reduction option would be even more pressing.

6.6.1.1 Gender

Table 6.1 below presents the gender of the respondents. Incidentally, the number of participants in the two versions of self-help projects is the same, that is, 50 in *mats’olo-a-iketsetse* and 50 in *fato-fato*. The data suggests that females dominate the self-help activities as they constitute 76% of the participants, while the males constitute a low of 24%. However, taking the two versions of self-help separately indications are that women’s dominance in self-help is declining. This is the case because during the times of *mats’olo-a-iketsetse* (1960s to 1980s) the percentage of women worked up to 84% but declined to 68% during *fato-fato* (1990s to 2000s). At the same time the percentage of the male participants increased from 24% to 32%. The situation conforms to reality given that during the times of *mats’olo-a-iketsetse* most of Basotho men worked in the South

| Table 6.1: Gender of the respondents –self-helpers |
|---------------------------------|---------------|-------------|----------|----------|
|                                | Mats’olo-a-iketsetse | Fato-fato   | Total    | Percentage |
| Female                         | 42             | 34          | 76       | 76        |
| Male                           | 8              | 16          | 24       | 24        |
| Total                          | 50             | 50          | 100      | 100       |
African mines. However, with the declining employment opportunities in the South African mines and agricultural industry (Gay, 2006:188), most Basotho men have been rendered jobless and forced to earn a living by whatever means.

### 6.6.1.2 Alternative means of earning a living

The respondents were asked to state whether they have alternative means of earning a living. The results are presented in Table 6.2 below. As it can be seen, a large majority of the participants, that is, 84% are dependent on self-help projects for a living while 16% stated that they are on old age pension. The findings have some implications for the level of poverty in the rural areas of Lesotho. First, dependence on self-help reduces choices which are basic to development of human personality. Second, without the old age pension 100% of the participants would be dependent on self-help for survival indicative of the worsening poverty levels in the rural areas. Third, it is striking that none of the participants stated farming as an alternative means of earning a living. This may suggest a high rate of landlessness which warrants investigation.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 6.2: Alternative means of earning a living</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other means of survival</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No means of survival</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 6.7 PARTICIPATION

The participants were asked to describe their participation in self-help projects based on whether it was continuous or broken. An overwhelming majority of the participants, that is, 97% indicated that they participated on an irregular basis because people work in turns. Only 3% stated that they participated on a continuous basis. These were foremen...
who assumed supervisory responsibilities in all the shifts. Two observations are pertinent. First, these people indicated that they were appointed as supervisors by the MPs in their respective constituencies. The justification is that the MP needs to be updated regularly on the activities carried out. Second, those working on a regular basis are all males suggestive of a possible gender bias that permeates societal affairs.

Based on the foregoing, it is an established principle in self-help projects that people work in turns. The time period in waiting differs from person to person ranging between 6 months to 3 years.

6.8 ACTIVITIES IN SELF-HELP

A question was posed to the respondents to indicate the type of self-help activities that they participated in overtime. The responses would serve two purposes. First, the data would indicate whether mats'olo-a-iketsetse and fato-fato differ in terms of the type of the activities carried out. Second, it would provide an array of activities that make up the self-help activities.

The responses indicate that the types of activities that are carried out under the two versions of self-help projects are identical and they include:

- tree planting;
- road construction;
- dam building; and
- gully filling.

This implies that the same type of activities that were carried out countrywide in the 1960s remain on the agenda five decades later, a slow progress indeed.

6.8.1 Sustainability of the end-products of mats'olo-a-ketsetse
A follow up question was made asking the respondents to indicate which of the outputs of self-help were benefitting communities as at 2010. For purposes of analysis in this question the two versions of self-help are discussed separately. As Table 6.3 below indicates, the participants’ views concentrated on roads and dams as the end-products of mats’olo-a-iketsetse, thus, suggesting the relative importance of roads and dams to communities. Forty eight percent of the participants stated that the dams were no longer useful to the communities because silt has reduced the capacity of water retention causing shortages of water for the animals and domestic use. It is only 12% of the respondent who viewed the dams as still useful. Thirty two percent of the respondents observed that the roads were in a poor condition while 8% per cent held that the roads were still passable.

### Table 6.3 Benefits for society derived from mats’olo-a-iketsetse

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No. of respondents</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Roads passable</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roads poor</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dams useful</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dams silted</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

useful to the communities because silt has reduced the capacity of water retention causing shortages of water for the animals and domestic use. It is only 12% of the respondent who viewed the dams as still useful. Thirty two percent of the respondents observed that the roads were in a poor condition while 8% per cent held that the roads were still passable.

#### 6.8.2 Sustainability of the end-products of fato-fato

The participants in fato-fato also expressed their views on the utility of the end-products of the programme. Table 6.4 below indicates that 36% of the respondents agree that the access roads in the villages are in a poor condition, while 28% noted that the roads were passable.

### Table 6.4: Benefits for community derived from fato-fato activities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No. of respondents</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Roads passable</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roads poor</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dams useful</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dams silted</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
At the same time 32% of the participants observed that the silt reduced the capacity of the dams while a minority of 4% held that the dams were still helpful. Based on the responses to the question, it is reasonable to conclude that the bulk of the dams and the roads constructed under the auspices of *mats’olo-a-iketsetse* and *fato-fato* are not in a good condition.

Asked why the participants do not rehabilitate the dams and repair the roads the general mood was that there are no self-help activities directed at maintenance as such people were not willing to take the maintenance tasks. This reflects a high level of dependency on self-help by the rural communities. This problem will be addressed later in the chapter.

### 6.9 IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SELF-HELP ACTIVITIES

Questions under this section sought to establish three major aspects about the implementation of the self-help projects. These are:

- The major actors in the administration of the self-help projects;
- The registration of the participants; and
- Forms of identification required from the participants.

#### 6.9.1 Administration of the self-help activities

The participants were asked to indicate who administers self-help activities in their areas. Table 6.5 below presents the responses.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>No. of respondents</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Member of Parliament</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chief</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Councilor</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do not know</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
A large majority of the respondents constituting 60% indicated that the self-help activities are administered by the Member of Parliament. The remaining 40% said that they did not know who administered the self-help projects. However, all the respondents agreed that in every shift there is a representative of the MP. By coincidence, the MPs in the constituencies that are included in the study are from the ruling party, LCD. The constituencies are Khafung No. 23, Nokong No. 20 and Bela-Bela No. 21. The constituencies were won by the LCD in the 2007 general elections [http://lcd.org.ls](http://lcd.org.ls). There is, therefore, need to conduct a separate study to establish whether the MPs have equal chance of involvement in the self-help projects regardless of whether they are from the ruling party or from the opposition.

### 6.9.2 Registration of the participants

The respondents were also asked to indicate who registers the participants in self-help projects. Only 78 out of the hundred respondents replied to the question. Table 6.6 presents the responses of the participants.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 6.6: Who registers the participants in self-help projects?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>No of respondents</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chief</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Councilor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Village committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

According to Table 6.6, it is 35.9% of the respondents who state that registration of the participants is done by the chief. Slightly below that is the village committee with 33.3%, while the remaining 30.8% show that it is the MP who registers the participants in self-help projects. However, there is consensus amongst the respondents that regardless of who writes the names down, all the lists are submitted to the MP for preparation of what
is referred to as a master list. Thus, the MP plays a significant role in the registration of the participants. Worth noting also is that the village committees are not development committees but committees affiliated to the ruling party at any given time.

### 6.9.3 Identification of the participants

The respondents were further asked to indicate the form of documentation they produced in order to register for participation in self-help projects. The purpose was to establish the extent political party membership cards were used for registration purposes.

The majority of the respondents which is 92% indicate that they did not use any form of identification for registration. Two percent said they used the voter’s card while the remaining 6% used their passports. The conclusion is that basically there is no established need to require documentary identification of the participants. A number of factors could explain the situation. First, *mats’olo-a-iketsetse* operated at village level. In the Basotho villages people know each other by the first name, they know each other’s circumstances and even each other’s political affiliation, if need be.

Second, even though *fato-fato* operates at ward level, the mode of registration reduces the need for documentary identification. To be sure, the date and place of registration is announced in each village by the councilors in collaboration with the village committees. At the specified time villagers from across the ward congregate at the specified venue. Registration is done village by village in the presence of the councilors and members of the village committees. Given that the villages in the rural areas remain small such that people know each other, need for identification may still be unnecessary even in the case of *fato-fato*. Thus, the use of political party membership cards for registration in self-help activities has not been established.
6.10 REMUNERATION FROM THE SELF-HELP PROJECTS

The respondents were asked to state remuneration packages from mats’olo-a-iketsetse and from fato-fato.

The responses indicate that there is a wide variety of packages awarded to participants in self-help. The packages differ from area to area and from shift to shift in the same area. The implication is that the participants in self help are remunerated with whatever is available except that fato-fato seems to be fixed on cash payments.

Notwithstanding, the remuneration packages have been grouped into three major categories including food packages, money and food plus money. Table 6.7 below presents the frequencies of the different remuneration packages for participants in mats’olo-a-iketsetse and fato-fato.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 6.7: Remuneration from the self-help projects</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mats’olo-a-iketsetse</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>No. of respondents</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Money</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Money plus food</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The immediate observation is that under mats’olo-a-iketsetse the participants are predominantly remunerated with food packages as confirmed by 60% of the respondents. Twenty percent of the respondents received food with some cash.

The food packages, which differed considerably between villages and between shifts in villages comprised an assortment of 12.5 kg maize meal, 12.5kg bread flour, cooking oil 750ml, sardines, beans, tinned fish, powdered eggs, powdered milk, oats, peas and rice. Maize meal and bread flour were basic to each food package while all the other items
were included at random but not exceeding three items per package. Over and above the food package the participants were given an amount of money ranging between R2 and R7.50 which was described as a fee for buying soap.

On the contrary, remuneration under *fato-fato* is by cash only. The respondents indicate varying amounts of money which range between R800.00 and R1040.00 for a 20 days work period. Payment by cash only is not surprising because *fato-fato* coincides with the times of diminishing food aid from the developed to the developed countries.

The above can be regarded as the content of the self-help projects as policy instruments for poverty reduction in Lesotho.

### 6.11 IMPROVEMENT OF THE CONDITIONS OF LIFE

The respondents were asked to indicate whether their participation in self-help projects has improved their condition of life. The responses contained phrases such as “at least the village is accessible”, “at least I was able to buy school shoes for my child” and “at least the family had food for some time”. The responses necessitated a categorization scheme based on whether the improvement relates to the community or the individual. Based on this categorization the improvement pattern as in Table 6.8 emerged.

#### Table 6.8: Improvement of the conditions of life

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Has self-help improved your conditions of life?</th>
<th>Community level</th>
<th>Individual level</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes temporarily</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Thirty percent of the respondents indicated that the self-help projects have improved the conditions of life at the community level. These respondents referred to accessibility of villages which before then were isolated. They noted that because of the construction of
access roads villagers reach medical centres, schools and churches easier than before. Further, some fields which were not accessible by tractor can now be reached.

Forty five percent of the respondents hold that the self-help projects do not improve the living conditions because the benefits do not allow the self-helper to access clothing and other basics in life. Much as they have worked in the self-help projects life is still hard for them, they noted.

The remaining 25% indicated that the self-help projects improve the conditions of living albeit temporarily. The reason they give is that getting work in the self-help projects is only a matter of luck. But when people get a chance to work their living conditions improve as they are able to buy food. With this result there is a promise that with some modifications the self-help projects can effectively address the problem of rural poverty in Lesotho.

6.12 GENERAL VIEWS OF THE PARTICIPANTS IN SELF-HELP PROJECTS.

The respondents were invited to comment generally on the self-help projects. The comments included the problems encountered by the supervisors and suggestions for improving the value of the self-help projects.

The supervisors raised two concerns. First, they indicated that more often remuneration differs between shifts. This, they said, breeds conflict amongst the villagers as they feel that some groups are preferred over others. Second, some people “work in absentia” which means that they register for self-help while being employed elsewhere. They then sent other people to work on their behalf, often the children, the old and the sickly, themselves showing up on the pay day. The supervisors noted that the problem affects the quality of work, breeds dissatisfaction amongst the participants and leads to non-completion of some projects within the specified time periods.
Regarding improvement of the self-help projects there is consensus amongst the participants that people should be employed on a permanent basis so as to create jobs in the rural areas where employment is most needed. Second, the participants would like to see themselves involved in decision making because the self-help projects directly affect their lives.

6.13 THE VIEWS OF GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS

It was also important to solicit the views of the government officials in respect of the modalities of the self-help projects. The views of the officials would help validate the findings emerging from an analysis of the views of the participants in self-help. In particular, the key areas that warranted a cross-check include:

- Participation of the self-helpers in decision making;
- The role of the key actors;
- The benefits derived from self-help; and
- Politicization, if any.

The officials included in the study come from the two ministries that are directly involved with the self-help projects. These are the Ministry of Forestry and Land Reclamation and the Ministry of Local Government and Chieftainship Affairs.

6.13.1 Background of the respondents (government officials)

The purpose of the study and the type of questions asked required that only the officials working in senior management positions be interviewed. The reason is that the senior officials have reliable information about the activities of an organisation than operational staff. Moreover, if there is need for change, these are the right people to be made aware of such a need. Table 6.9 below presents the characteristics of the respondents.

As Table 6.9 below indicates the sample includes five participants all of whom are at the senior management level. Two of the directors and the Chief Conservation Officer come
from the Ministry of Forestry and Land Reclamation while the third director and the Chief Engineer come from the Ministry of Local Government and Chieftainship Affairs. The length of service of the respondents indicates that the officials have served in the relevant ministries for 10 years and more. Further, the respondents are all on Grade J, the last but one notch on the government grading scheme ranging from A to K. The officials, therefore, are decision makers conversant with the operations of their ministries and are in a position to provide reliable knowledge on issues pertaining to the self-help projects.

6.13.2 Local participation in decision making

The participants were asked to indicate whether the participants in self-help projects select the work areas for the projects. The respondents noted that the work areas are selected by the Community Councils in collaboration with the chiefs and the MPs. As stated in Chapter 3, Section 3.4, a community council lumps together a group of villages as it has 9-15 electoral stations. This being the case, the participants in self-help projects, who in essence are ordinary citizens, participate only indirectly in the selection of work areas. Their participation ends with them taking part in the local government elections.

Table 6.9: Background of the government officials

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Years of service in the ministry</th>
<th>Grade</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Director</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>J</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Director</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>J</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Director</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>J</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chief Conservation</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>J</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Officer</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>25</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chief Engineer</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>J</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The participants were asked to indicate whether the participants in self-help projects select the work areas for the projects. The respondents noted that the work areas are selected by the Community Councils in collaboration with the chiefs and the MPs. As stated in Chapter 3, Section 3.4, a community council lumps together a group of villages as it has 9-15 electoral stations. This being the case, the participants in self-help projects, who in essence are ordinary citizens, participate only indirectly in the selection of work areas. Their participation ends with them taking part in the local government elections.
The respondents were further asked whether the participants take part in decision making at any other level. The respondents could hardly identify any other area where the participants take part in decision making. This is the case because once a work area has been identified as stated above the information is communicated to the relevant ministries. The ministries sent out their work teams to examine whether the areas meet the technical criteria. However, the officials further noted that even where the technical criterion is not met they often find themselves bowing to political pressure.

Conclusively, the only decision the participants in self-help projects make is whether to participate or not to participate. Thus, self-help projects in Lesotho are a type of organized self-help (see Chapter 2, Section 2.5.2) whereby the sponsor dominates the decision making process and only invites the participants to join at the last stage of implementation. As established in Chapter 2, organized self-help is not an effective policy instrument for poverty reduction.

6.13.3 The role of the key actors

The respondents were asked to identify the role of the key actors including the MPs, the Councilors, the Chiefs and the Village Committees. The respondents share the view that the MPs and the Councilors have assumed a major role in development activities in general with the Chiefs and the Village Committees having been relegated to the background by the provisions of the Local Government Act No. 45 of 1997 as amended by the Local Government Amendment, 2004. Under the Act most of the functions that were performed by the Chiefs are now performed by the Councilors. As explained in the preceding section, it is the Councilors in collaboration with the MPs who select the work areas and determine the implementation modalities in self-help projects.

6.13.4 Benefits from the self-help projects
The respondents were also asked to state the benefits derived by the participants in self-help projects. As at 2011, the participants in *fato-fato* received R970.74 for twenty days and R1040.00 for twenty days depending on whether the activity is sponsored by the Ministry of Forestry or the Ministry of Local Government respectively.

The respondents were further asked to state whether in their view the benefits enable the participants to escape poverty. The question appeared to be difficult for most of the respondents, if not all. To be sure, no decisive views were expressed on the question. However, one of the respondents stated that “politics and science do not mix. An attempt to mix them is a futile exercise”. Asked about the meaning of the statement, the respondent instead mentioned that “one would rather mix religion and science because there are some similarities between the two”. The researcher’s next thesis may be an attempt to disentangle this parable.

### 6.13.5 Frequency of the self-help projects

The respondents were further asked to comment on the self-helpers’ view that the frequency of the self-help projects increases when the elections approach. Sixty percent of the respondents declined to answer the question. Only 40% responded. Those who responded shared the view that the frequency of the self-help projects increases in the pre-election period. To use one respondent’s own words, “…of course, the pre-election period is the time for the politicians to shine”. Asked to explain the meaning of the statement the respondent indicated that, in the pre-election period, it is opportune for the politicians to engage in and to intensify the activities that enhance their chances of re-election.

Implicitly, the self-help projects are part of the activities that enhance the politicians’ chances of re-election. By virtue of the projects focusing in the rural areas where not only the majority of the population lives but also the majority of the poor lives, the projects effectively enhance the political image of those who visibly administer and allocate the benefits in self-help.
6.14 DISCUSSION OF THE FINDINGS

This section is a discussion of the findings and implications thereof.

6.14.1 The nature and content of the self-help projects.

It has been established that the self-help projects in the rural areas have come under different names but they refer to basically the same activities. What differs, though marginally, is their design and implementation. In the heydays of food aid people worked for food packages the composition of which was wholly donations. This implies that during its reign the BNP government failed to mobilize domestic resources in order to improve the living conditions in the rural areas. Instead, the BNP government relied on donations to appease the rural poor whose immediate need for survival is food. Even then, the food was not made available on an on-going basis as people took turns to work in the projects. Moreover, the BNP government made the rural poor carry out the activities which were otherwise the responsibility of the state.

In the 1990s food aid to Lesotho declined due to donor fatigue and political instability that characterized Lesotho in the 1970s to the late 1980s. Food packages, therefore, lost significance in self-help activities. However, the LCD government gained access to the royalties of the Lesotho Highlands Water Project which made it possible for the participants in self-help activities to be paid in cash amounts of approximately R1000.00.

Under both versions of self-help there is consensus amongst the participants that the projects enable them to access food for certain periods. Under mats’olo-a-iketsetse the respondents were paid in different types of nutritious food items but which lasted for a short while. At the same time participants in fato-fato indicate that their earnings are spent mainly on food because first, the pay is quite low, and second, participation in fato-


It can be concluded, therefore, that the self-help projects in Lesotho provide temporary relief from hunger as they do not make food available on a sustainable basis. Moreover, the two versions of self-help activities have not enabled the participants to access clothing, maintain shelter or meet any other basic human needs.

According to Riddell (1992:127) for projects that have a social component, measurement of the results should neither be based on the nature, accuracy and objectivity of quantitative data nor the subjectivity of qualitative data. Rather of concern should be “the level of consensus over whether objectives have been reached” [emphasis original]. This measurement criterion was predetermined in Chapter 1 wherein it was stated that if there is consensus amongst the beneficiaries that the self-help projects have enabled them to access food, clothing and shelter on a sustainable basis, then it will be concluded that the self-help projects reduce poverty in Lesotho. Based on empirical evidence, therefore, it is concluded that the self-help projects in Lesotho do not reduce poverty in the rural areas. The failure of the self-help projects to reduce poverty can be explained by many factors. However, for the purpose of the study, interest is on the design of the self-help projects and the extent the projects appear to serve political interests.

6.14.2 Issues on the design of the self-help projects

Policy design represents probably the most important stage in the process of policy analysis. Policy design is what government decides to do or not to do in order to counter a perceived policy problem in society. It is therefore the planning and development of policy content (Roux, 2006:126).

If Roux argument is anything to go by, then, it can be argued that the design of a policy determines its success. A well designed policy has increased chances of achieving its objectives assuming that implementation goes as planned. The relevance of self-help projects as instruments for reducing poverty in the rural areas in Lesotho cannot be doubted for any reason. However, the quality of the design and implementation of the projects predict their failure. In other words, the self-help projects are not geared for
poverty reduction, hence why poverty persists in the rural areas despite wide application of these policy instruments.

First, and most importantly, the design of the projects does not embrace sustainability, a key issue in poverty reduction. Projects fail in this respect because the participants are engaged not only for short periods, but they are reengaged, if ever, after a very long time. Thus, while it is true that the beneficiaries of self-help projects access food, one of the basic human needs, it is also true that such access to food is not sustainable. It is also true that the beneficiaries are not able to meet other basic human needs, not even on a temporary basis.

Second, the mode of implementation of *fato-fato* creates more problems than the policy purports to solve. In the first instance, *fato-fato* has removed decision making from the village and centralized it at the ward level and/or constituency level. To be sure, decision making is the domain of elected officials including the MPs and the Councilors. Thus, the villages have become helpless objects of a top-down decision making process which most likely benefits localities with outspoken personalities. At another level, the mode of recruitment to work in *fato-fato* is ill conceived. The hopes of far too many people are raised while the policy makers know that there is nothing in the making. People walk long distances to register their names for employment in *fato-fato*, but many people remain on the waiting list for periods exceeding three years. The recruitment procedure adds to the misery of the rural poor.

### 6.14.3 Politicization

The use of political party membership cards in the registration of the participants in self-help projects has not been established. However, this does not hide completely the politicized nature of the self-help projects.

First, decision making is dominated by the elected officials who without doubt aspire for re-election. That is why selection of the work areas is politically motivated.
Second, the recruitment procedure is such that the rural poor know whose shoes to brush in order for them to increase their chances of working in the self-help projects. Third, the regularity of the self-help projects increases in the pre-election period simply because these activities help the politicians to shine and thus, be re-elected.

6.14.4 The dependency syndrome under a microscope

The problem of the dependency of the rural poor on government handouts was noted in Section 6.8.2 and a promise was made to revisit the issue later. Dependency is therefore the subject of this last but one section.

Evidence suggests that the people in the rural areas will not maintain the roads that have been built by them for their own good if they are not paid. They will not rehabilitate the dams that provide water for their gardens and their animals, unless they are paid. They will not conserve the environment that supports their lives, if they are not paid. The big question is: Why is this the case?

6.14.4.1 Disillusionment

The rural poor are disillusioned by the very self-help projects that purport to help them improve their lives. To this effect, the researcher’s conversation with three teenage boys on entering the village of Majaheng on 30th September, 2010 is worth underscoring. The conversation goes:

“Hello young men”, I said.
“Hello Mama”, they replied with wide welcoming smiles.
“Do you live in this village?” I asked.
“Yes, we do.” They said.

I asked for the directions to get to the village chief. After being given the directions, I went on.
“You are such handsome young men and energetic. Why is it that the road to your village is in such a bad condition? Can’t you do something about it?”

The mood changed. “They do not employ us at fato-fato. Otherwise, this is something we can deal with in a couple of days”, one of the boys said.

Without asking who “they” refers to, I asked. “Why is it that they do not employ you?”

The other replied, “We do not know. Myself I have beenRegistering for fato-fato since I left school in 2006, but my name has never been called out. We register and they take our names to Teyateyaneng (the administrative centre for the district). What happens there we do not know, but our names have never been called out all these years”.

“But, even if they do not employ you, the condition of the road is very bad, it reflects badly on your village”, I commented.

The third boy replied, “Actually, the condition of the road is not as bad as I would want to see it” (Field work, September 2010).

Many questions can be asked. There may be no right answers. Suffice it to say: If the youth are so disillusioned, what then can be expected of the grown ups and the elderly who have borne the brunt of raising children under the fatalities of rural poverty.

6.14.4.2 Protection of self image

In the hard conditions of rural poverty individuals and families do not wash their dirty linen in the open. Each one and each family still wants to pretend that all is fine, that there is food and there is life, while the opposite is true. Thus, it is not uncommon for a family to make fire and just boil water in order to give the neighbours an impression that there is something to cook, while there is not even a crumb of bread in the house.
Protection of self image under conditions of poverty spills over and manifests itself as dependency on government subvention. This view is testified by a forty two year old man at Ha Mokhathi. In an interview, the man pointed to a dam that the villagers built in the days of *mats’olo-a-iketsetse*. He stated that the dam was very helpful because the villagers normally draw water for domestic use from a river that is more than five kilometers away. At the time of the interview the dam had silted up to an extent that it no longer retained water when it rains. Asked why the villagers do not rehabilitate the dam before the rains come, the man replied.

I don’t know about other people. But for me it is difficult to go out there and work. In order to go out there and work with other people I need a lunch box. I do not have it. Right now in my house there is “*papanyana*” (little porridge) for my family to eat, just as it is. Of course, at home you eat whatever you can lay your hands on. But out there you need a lunch box that does not shame you before all your neighbours and villagers. At the least, there should be some vegetable to eat with the porridge (A man at Ha Mokhathi, September, 2010).

The man went further to explain that he last worked in *fato-fato* in 2007 and he has not had a chance to work again. According to him *fato-fato* solves peoples’ problem of hunger. This is so because once they are recruited, it becomes possible for them to get food items from the village stores on account. The storekeepers also readily give out food items on account to people who are in *fato-fato* because they are assured of payment. In this way, people can make decent lunch boxes when they go out to work on development activities. Perhaps what needs to be added is that without *fato-fato* the participants in self-help seem to be too hungry to work. Without *fato-fato*, therefore, the dams cannot be rehabilitated and the roads cannot be maintained.

In passing, it is interesting to note that, in trying to hide their poverty, the rural poor in Lesotho are not being unreasonable, for it happens in other countries, it happens in other cultures. A study by the World Bank established that it is very difficult for people to admit that they are poor. In that study even the people who appeared extremely poor to the interviewers declined to represent themselves as poor. Instead, they preferred to describe themselves as “close to poor” or “underprivileged”.
Thus, people will often try to hide their poverty from their friends and neighbors... People fear that if their true economic status is known it will damage the honor and respect of the family within the community, and hurt the future chances of their children (World Bank, 2000:68).

6.14.4.3 The chiefs loosing the grip

Chieftainship has been the bedrock of Basotho’s nationhood. However, indications are that the rural people are so squeezed as to forget their origins. For, in one of the villages included in the study, the chief narrated that she has been at pains trying to get the villagers to rehabilitate a dam which, according to her, provides invaluable support to the villagers. [The name of the village is withheld for ethical considerations]. The chief lamented:

I call a “pitso” (public gathering), the people do not come. I sent messengers to knock on each and every door, only a few people come. The only time they come out in multitudes is when the councilor announces recruitment for fato-fato. It is frustrating to be a chief (Village chief, September, 2010).

If it is true that chiefs have lost significance to that extent, then only time will tell where Lesotho and the Basotho are going.

The foregoing facilitates an understanding of the situation in the rural areas of Lesotho. The incidents discussed do not only show the complexity of the dependency syndrome in the rural areas but also suggest that dependency is an end product of factors that need further investigation.

6.15 CONCLUSION

The chapter has established that self-help projects in Lesotho are not geared for poverty reduction. First, the projects are deficient in their design. They offer a modicum of benefits and as such they provide temporary relief from hunger for the rural poor. In their design, the projects do not have the least capacity to help the participants to access clothing and other basic human needs.
Second, implementation of the projects is politicized as evidenced by the intensive participation of political figures; the divide between *mats’olo-a-iketsetse* and *fato-fato*; and the mode of recruitment which leaves many questions unanswered. That is why despite wide application of these projects in the rural areas poverty persists and continues to increase in Lesotho.

The next chapter presents the conclusion and recommendations.
CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

7.1 CONCLUSION

The study sought to establish the nature and content of post-independence self-help projects as well as the factors that influence their performance as instruments for poverty reduction. Two major hypotheses guided the study. The first is that the self-help projects are not geared to poverty reduction. If they were geared to poverty reduction, then poverty would not be prevalent and increasing, particularly in the rural areas where these projects abound. The second hypothesis is that politicization negatively affects the performance of the self-help projects. It is for these reasons that the participants in self-help projects remain poor despite them having participated in self-help projects for prolonged periods.

In order to test the hypotheses, the study adopted a two pronged methodology comprising a literary search and empirical investigation. The literary search mainly sought to establish two things. First, whether other development policies and strategies are devoid of politicization. The exercise was necessitated by the need to establish whether it is only the self help projects that are visibly politicized. In the event it was only the self-help projects that are politicized, then, corrective measures would be directed to self-help only. On the other hand, if the development activity is politicized in its entirety, then corrective measures need to embrace that reality.

The literary search also sought to establish the distinguishing features of the policy process in Lesotho. The need stems from the realization that policies derive their nature and content from the political system or the policy making process. Thus, an
understanding of the political system and the policy process of any polity enhances an understanding of the nature and content of policies in that polity.

At the second level the study involved a survey of the participants in self-help projects. The purpose was to learn from the people with first hand experience in self-help projects. For, it is truly the participants in self-help who have the right and the authority to judge self-help in terms of it eliminating, reducing or providing temporary relief from poverty, whichever applies. Below is a summary of the findings.

The literature has revealed three types of self-help namely, integral, facilitated and autonomous self-help. The categorization is based on the degree of resourcing, leadership and support that comes from the sponsoring organisation. On this basis self-help ranges from being heavily or fully sponsored to being independent / autonomous of outside help. Integral self-help is initiated by the sponsoring organisation and the degree of leadership and support is very high. In facilitated self-help an organisation or government actively brings people together and sells to them the idea of self-help and subsequently supports them in different ways to achieve the goal of the self-help activity. Autonomous self-help refers to self-help activities that are initiated by the self-helpers without external sponsorship or supervision or financial support except where solicited by the participants themselves.

Empirical evidence shows that development activity is dominated by integral self-help whereby donor agencies and governments take charge of decision making and invite the poor to participate in development initiatives at the very last moment. Non-participation in decision making frustrates and alienates the poor such that many development activities achieve mixed results due to lack of support by the intended beneficiaries. The beneficiaries lack the requisite enthusiasm simply because there is always fundamental conflict between the policies identified by the governments/sponsors and the needs felt within communities. On the other hand, facilitated and autonomous self-help demonstrate a higher success rate, more so autonomous self-help. The reason is that these latter types of self-help are associated with high levels of motivation because the activities involved
satisfy the needs as identified and prioritized by the participants. Moreover, these types of self-help promote a sense of ownership and self development which together enhance sustainability. Based on this analysis, self-help projects in Lesotho can be classified as integral self-help because decisions are made elsewhere while the communities are invited to participate only by way of providing labour.

An attempt was also made to establish the coherence or otherwise of the poverty reduction framework in Lesotho. It has been established that poverty increases in Lesotho despite concerted efforts by the government and development agencies to reduce the number of those who live in poverty. First, attempts at transforming the rural sector through rural development projects achieved minimal results due to defective institutional arrangements and non-existence of a coherent poverty reduction policy framework that serves as a guide to decision makers. The incoherence of the poverty reduction framework is exemplified by the fragmented nature of the key government documents that have a poverty reduction focus. Each is motivated by different forces of different origins. The result is that each document introduces a new focus and a new direction for dealing with poverty and poverty related issues. Moreover, none of these documents appears to continue with the line of action introduced by its predecessor.

Lack of a coherent poverty reduction framework manifests itself at the empirical level whereby planning for poverty reduction is marked by discontinuity, inconsistency and is heavily influenced by external factors. Resultantly, poverty reduction policies, programs and strategies in Lesotho are uncoordinated, haphazard and largely ineffective because they lack a common thread, ‘attack on poverty’.

It has also been established that the government appears to be committed to poverty reduction in theory but not in practice. The conclusion is based largely on the painful reality that government expenditures do not reflect restraint, modesty and bias towards the interests of the poor. Moreover, the government visibly reacts to poverty only in response to external stimuli. This further exacerbates the fragmentation, hence the ineffectiveness of poverty reduction initiatives.
The role of local government in improving the lives of the ordinary people has also been examined. Evidence suggests that for the most part decentralization in Lesotho amounts to window dressing, precisely because the different versions of local government adopted between 1968 and 1997 purported to devolve power to the lower units while, in fact, they were instruments of ‘recentralization’. In 1997 the LCD government established an elective local government system, a welcome improvement of local government in Lesotho. However, the LCD version of local government has two emergent problems. First, it marginalizes villages by taking away decision making from the village level to community level. In this way it breeds apathy at the grassroots. Second, it marginalizes chieftainship, an institution that defines the Basotho way of life. This has not only created conflict between the local authorities and the chiefs but has also confused the people in the rural areas. It has also impacted negatively on service delivery.

An attempt has also been made to establish a link between the theory and the practice of poverty reduction in Lesotho. To this end an overview of poverty reduction policies and strategies was undertaken. These include Green Revolution strategies, community development, foreign direct investment, Lesotho Fund for Community Development, Free Primary Education and the social safety benefits. The overview revealed that the entire development spectrum in Lesotho is bedeviled by defective policy design and politicization.

The Green Revolution strategies sought to change the lifestyles of the peasant farmers through use of modern farming techniques. Strategies comprised area-based projects and national programs. The policies were defective in their design in that the modern farming techniques were expensive and inaccessible to the majority of the poor farmers. As such when the sponsors withdrew their support the projects died. Second, the location of the projects and farmer participation were highly politicized. The projects were located in the areas which were seen to support the ruling party and those who wanted to participate had to produce membership cards of the ruling party, first the BNP and later, the
BCP/LCD. Consequently, many of the poor farmers were excluded from the projects and for them production remained low.

Community development which aimed at transforming the rural areas was characterized by top-down planning methods which denied the local people a say in the activities that affected their lives. The centrally planned development activities were implemented within a highly centralized and politicized administrative system. Attempts to decentralize did not give any decision making powers to local institutions. In particular, the District Development Committees had no decision making powers and had no finances. They sent shopping lists to the centre and many of the items were not approved. As such district planning and development became mere rhetoric.

The continued decline in agricultural productivity and the declining employment opportunities in the South African mining industry in the 1980s forced the government to seek alternative development options. Thus, the government diverted its attention to foreign direct investment with emphasis on the textile industry. By 1996 the textile industry employed 56,000 workers and became the largest employer, followed by the public sector. The record growth was stimulated by the introduction of the African Growth Opportunities Act, 2000 (AGOA) which gave Lesotho preferential access to the USA market. AGOA made Lesotho an attractive country to investors in the textile industry. The expiration of AGOA in 2004 brought untold economic misery to Lesotho when many textile factories deserted without even paying the workers. Those that remained placed the workers on short term work using them only when needed. With a declining textile industry, declining miners’ remittances, declining agricultural production, declining Southern African Customs Union (SACU) payments and a feeble private sector, Lesotho’s chances of meeting the UN millennium goal of reducing poverty by 50% by 2015 are indeed very slim.

Lesotho Fund for Community Development (LFCD) is another strategy that the government of Lesotho adopted to reduce poverty. The Fund was established with the encouragement of the World Bank and with the view to pre-empt wasteful use of the
proceeds from the sale of water to South Africa. The Fund has well established legal and administrative procedures but its major impediments are shortage of human and financial resources and a politicized administrative structure. From the beginning of 2005, LFCD has had to suspend some of its projects due to lack of funds. Unfortunate though, because LFCD has the potential to reduce poverty as it uses a participatory approach in the identification and implementation of projects. It also uses a depoliticized recruitment procedure which ensures that all those who are willing to participate in development activities do so without hindrance. In this way, it supports sustainable projects that meet the self-identified needs of the participants.

Lesotho also introduced Free Primary Education in 2000 under the influence of several international organisations. In order to enhance enrollment, the government attached the school feeding program to FPE. Evidence shows that enrolment increased significantly but thereafter increased at a decreasing rate. FPE faces several challenges which include reduction of the high pupil teacher ratio, reduction of the high drop out rate and maintenance of the enrolment rate. However, the greatest challenge of them all is to revise the primary education program such that it imparts life long survival skills to its graduates. This is important because the majority of the children do not make it to higher education. As it stands, the program has little chance, if any, to help the poor escape poverty.

Another strategy for poverty reduction in Lesotho is the social safety net which comprises three elements namely, the pension scheme, the public assistance program and the safety net fund. The first two, although they are good policy initiatives in themselves, they are lacking in their design in that they offer benefits which are too low to help the beneficiaries to lead a meaningful life. Currently, the safety net fund is in abeyance as the government stopped fund allocations to it since 2003 but without officially declaring its termination. Based on these observations, therefore, the social safety net should be overhauled if it is to become an effective instrument for reducing poverty.
The study also attempted to demystify the policy process in Lesotho. The purpose was to establish the extent to which the nature and content of policies in Lesotho can be understood by coming to terms with the policy process itself. In other words, the assumption is that an analysis of the policy process can help explain, at least in part, why the poverty reduction policies and strategies in Lesotho are politicized. To this effect, it has been established that the legal policy framework in Lesotho comprises of the traditional administration, the modern administration and the local administration. In terms of policy making, the three institutions form a tripartite relationship in which each contributes to policy making in its own different way.

A further analysis of the policy process pointed to several interesting issues. First, it showed that the modern administration dominates the policy process. Second, that there are weak, if any, checks and balances in the policy making system. Third, the executive, in particular, the Prime Minister exercises the highest authority in policy making. Without effective institutional checks and balances in the policy process, and with the Prime Minister being a political figure, policies are inclined to project personal/political interests while compromising national interests.

It has also been established that lack of ‘face to face talk’ between political figures, in particular, between the head of government and the head of state, constitutes a major cause of Lesotho’s social problems including political instability, poverty and social disintegration. The need for institutionalization of ‘face to face talk’ between the head of government and the head of state has been emphasized. ‘Face to face talk’ has worked for Britain, it can work for Lesotho.

The study went further to establish the role of the unofficial actors in policy making in Lesotho. Unofficial policy actors do not have a mandate to formulate policies. However, through policy monitoring and advocacy, they influence decision making such that policies reflect the interests of the voiceless - the poor and the disorganized. It was found befitting, therefore, to establish the role of the major unofficial policy actors which include the media, civil society and the private sector. The analysis has revealed that the
unofficial policy actors face formidable structural and institutional constraints which make it difficult for them to fulfill their democratic mandate of monitoring government activity and contributing meaningfully to improvement of public policy in Lesotho. Essentially, the unofficial policy actors are marginalized in the policy process because the government plays a domineering and not a facilitative role in policy making. Hence, policies are skewed towards satisfaction of personal/political and not national interests.

Lastly, the study sought to establish whether the performance of the self-help projects is also influenced by deficient policy design as well as by politicization. To this end a survey of 100 participants in self-help projects was undertaken during August-September 2010. An analysis of the data has led to a number of conclusions.

First, it has been established that the self-help projects can be categorized into two versions namely *mats'olo-a-iketsetse* (do-it-for-yourself campaigns) and *fato-fato* (dig-dig). The former is associated with the BNP government while the latter is associated with the LCD government. While the two versions refer to similar activities, the difference in names is just to suit political aspirations.

Second, the two versions of self-help are deficient in their design. In *mats'olo-a-iketsetse*, the participants were rewarded with food packages which lasted for short periods. Thus, availability of food under these projects was not sustainable. At the same time the participants were not enabled to meet other basic human needs including clothing and shelter. *Fato-fato*, for its part, remunerates the participants with cash which the participants use to buy food. Evidence suggests that the participants buy food and food only. Thus, they do not access clothing and shelter. At the same time, the participants access food for limited periods and not on a sustainable basis. It can be concluded, therefore, that the self-help projects in Lesotho provide temporary relief from hunger for the participants. The projects do not reduce poverty. That is why despite their wide application in the rural areas in Lesotho poverty persists and increases.
Third, the self-help projects are politicized. Evidence is the direct and extensive involvement of the MPs who, in principle should be involved in policy making and not policy implementation. Incidentally, the constituencies in which the study was undertaken belong to the ruling party. What remains to be established is whether in the constituencies not belonging to the ruling party the MPs have the same leverage.

7.2 RECOMMENDATIONS

Based on the findings, three major recommendations are plausible. First, Lesotho should develop a coherent poverty reduction policy framework which effectively guides decision making at all levels. Such a poverty reduction policy framework should focus on guiding government expenditures, ensuring continuity of poverty reduction initiatives and entrenching a participatory approach in development efforts.

Second, Lesotho should review the checks and balances in the policy making process with the view to balance the power relations between the various policy actors. This will ensure that national interests take precedence over personal/political interests in policy making.

Third, administration of the self-help projects in the rural areas should be overhauled, first to give the target group increased decision making powers and second, to improve the sustainability of the benefits derived from these policy initiatives.
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Assistant Director, Department of Social Welfare, Ms R. Tsuinyane, 4th December, 2006.
Director Department of Planning, 19th November, 2006.
Chief Education Officer, Mrs. T. Ntsekhe-Mokhehle, 19th August, 2011.
QUESTIONNAIRE FOR THE PARTICIPANTS IN SELF-HELP PROJECTS

I am a student at the University of the Free State. I am conducting a study as a requirement for my studies. You can assist me by responding to the questions below. The information you provide will be treated as confidential and will be used for research purposes only.

Thank you in advance.

Instructions
Please tick the correct answer where appropriate and answer the questions in the spaces provided.

SECTION 1 – MATS’OLO A IKETSETSE (Do it for yourself campaigns)

1. Sex of the respondent Male [ ] Female [ ]
2. What do you do for a living?-----------------------------------------------

3. Have you participated in mats’olo a iketsetse? Yes [ ] No [ ]
   If yes, did you participate on a continuous basis? Yes [ ] No [ ]
   If no, why was participation broken? ........................................

4. What activities were carried out under mats’olo a iketsetse?
   (a)............................
   (b)............................
   (c)............................
   (d)............................

5. Which of the activities stated above are benefiting the community now?
   Please explain your answer ..................................................
   ..........................................................
6. Who administered the activities of mats’olo a iketsetse?
(a) Village chief [  ]
(b) Member of parliament [  ]
(c) Other (Please specify) [  ] ………………………………………

7. Who registered participants in mats’olo a iketsetse?
(a) Village chief [  ]
(b) Member of parliament [  ]
(c) Other (Please specify) [  ] ………………………………………

8. What kind of identification was required of the participants in mats’olo a iketsetse?
(a) Letter from chief [  ]
(b) Passport [  ]
(c) Birth certificate [  ]
(d) Other (Please specify) [  ] ………………………………………

9. Please describe the benefits you derived from mats’olo a iketsetse.
(a) Food items………………………………………………………
(b) Money (amount) …………………………………………………
(c) Other (Please specify) ……………………………………………

10. Has your participation in mats’olo a iketsetse improved your condition of life? Yes [  ] No [  ].
    If yes, please say how ……………………………………………………
    …………………………………………………………………………………
    If no, why do you think this is the case? ……………………………………….
    ……………………………………………………………………………………

11. General comments on mats’olo a iketsetse …………………………
    …………………………………………………………………………………

SECTION 2: BOIKHOLLO BOFUMENG (Self liberation from poverty)

12. Have you participated in boikhollo bofumeng? Yes [  ] No [  ].
    If yes, did you participate on a continuous basis? Yes [  ] No [  ].
If no, why was participation broken? .................................................................

13. What activities were carried out under boikhollo bofumeng?
   (a) .................................................. 
   (b) .................................................. 
   (c) .................................................. 
   (d) ..................................................

14. Which of the activities stated above are benefiting the community now? 
   Please explain your answer .................................................................
   ........................................................................................................
   ........................................................................................................

15. Who administered the activities of boikhollo bofumeng?
   (a) Village chief                                          [  ]
   (b) Member of parliament                             [  ]
   (c) Other (Please specify)                          [  ] ...................................................

16. Who registered participants in boikhollo bofumeng?
   (a) Village chief                                          [  ]
   (b) Member of parliament                             [  ]
   (c) Other (Please specify)                          [  ] ...................................................

17. What kind of identification was required of the participants in boikhollo bofumeng?
   (a) Letter from chief                                          [  ]
   (b) Passport                                              [  ]
   (c) Birth certificate                                      [  ]
   (d) Other (Please specify)                          [  ] ...................................................

18. Please describe the benefits you derived from boikhollo bofumeng.
   (a) Food items..................................................................................
   (b) Money (amount) .................................................................
   (c) Other (Please specify) ..........................................................

19. Has your participation in boikhollo bofumeng improved your condition of life? 
   Yes [  ] No [  ].
   If yes, please say how .................................................................
   ........................................................................................................
   ........................................................................................................

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If no, why do you think this is the case? ..................................................

20. General comments on boikhollo bofumeng ...........................................
..........................................................................................................................

SECTION 3: FATO-FATO (Dig-Dig?)

21. Have you participated in fato-fato?                                 Yes [ ] No [ ]
If yes, did you participate on a continuous basis? Yes [ ] No [ ]
If no, why was participation broken? ......................................................

22. What activities were carried out under fato-fato?
   (a) ........................................
   (b) ........................................
   (c) ........................................
   (d) ........................................

23. Which of the activities stated above are benefiting the community now?
    Please explain your answer .................................................................
......................................................................................................................

24. Who administered the activities of fato-fato?
   (a) Village chief                              [ ]
   (b) Member of parliament              [ ]
   (c) Other (Please specify)               [ ] ..........................................

25. Who registered participants in fato-fato?
   (a) Village chief                                 [ ]
   (b) Member of parliament                 [ ]
   (c) Other (Please specify)                   [ ] ........................................

26. What kind of identification was required of the participants in fato-fato?
   (a) Letter from chief                      [ ]
   (b) Passport                                       [ ]
   (c) Birth certificate                           [ ]
27. Please describe the benefits you derived from fato-fato.

(a) Food items
(b) Money (amount)
(c) Other (Please specify)

28. Has your participation in fato-fato improved your condition of life?

Yes [ ] No [ ].

If yes, please say how

If no, why do you think this is the case?

29. General comments on fato-fato

THANK YOU FOR YOUR TIME
QUESTIONNAIRE FOR THE OFFICIALS IN THE MINISTRY OF FORESTRY AND LAND RECLAMATION

I am a student at the University of the Free State. I am conducting a study as a requirement for my studies. You can assist me by responding to the questions below. The information you provide will be treated as confidential and will be used for research purposes only.

Thank you in advance.

Instructions
Please tick the correct answer where appropriate and answer the questions in the spaces provided.

1. For how long have you worked in the Ministry of Forestry and Land Reclamation?  

2. What community self-help projects are administered by the ministry?  

3. Do the participants select the areas in which the self-help projects are carried out?  
   [   ] Yes  [   ] No  
   If no, who selects the areas for self-help activities?  

4. Do the participants take part in decision making at any other level?  
   [   ] Yes  [   ] No  
   If yes, please state the areas of decision making by the participants  

5. Please indicate the role of the following actors in self-help projects:
a. Member of Parliament
b. Councilors
c. Chiefs
d. Village Committees

6. Please state the benefits which the ministry gives to the participants in self-help activities.

7. In your view, do the benefits enable the participants to escape poverty on a sustainable basis? [ ] Yes [ ] No
   Please explain your answer.

8. Please comment on the participants’ view that the frequency of the self-help projects increases when the general elections approach.

9. General comments on self-help projects

THANK YOU FOR YOUR TIME
APPENDIX 2a

QUESTIONNAIRE FOR THE OFFICIALS IN THE MINISTRY OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT

I am a student at the University of the Free State. I am conducting a study as a requirement for my studies. You can assist me by responding to the questions below. The information you provide will be treated as confidential and will be used for research purposes only.

Thank you in advance.

Instructions
Please tick the correct answer where appropriate and answer the questions in the spaces provided.

4. For how long have you worked in the Ministry of Local Government? -------------

5. What community self-help activities are undertaken by the ministry? -------------
   ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
   ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
   ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

6. Do the participants select the areas in which the self-help activities are carried out? [ ] Yes [ ] No
   If no, who selects the areas for self-help activities? -------------------------------------

4. Do the participants take part in decision making at any other level? 
   [ ] Yes [ ] No
   If yes, please state the areas of decision making by the participants. ------------------

5. Please indicate the role of the following actors in self-help projects:
a. Member of Parliament
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

b. Councilors
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

c. Chiefs
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--

d. Village Committees
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

9. Please state the benefits which the ministry gives to the participants in self-help activities
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

10. In your view, do the benefits enable the participants to escape poverty on a sustainable basis?  [ ] Yes  [ ] No

Please explain your answer
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

11. Please comment on the participants’ view that the frequency of the self-help projects increases when the general elections approach.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

9. General comments on self-help projects
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

THANK YOU FOR YOUR TIME!
Matrix 5.1
Sustaining Political Commitment and Support

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strategic Action</th>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Means of Verification</th>
<th>Main Actors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 1. Revitalize National Planning Board as an advisory body and inject Vision philosophy into it. | - Amended constitution  
- Regular meetings of the National Planning Board where Vision concerns is one of Agenda items.  
- Implementation rate of decisions | - Minutes of the meetings of the National Planning Board. | Ministry of Finance and Development Planning, and Parliament. |
| 2. Establish Vision Supporting institutions | - Existence of the institutions  
- Implementation rate of decisions | - Hansard Records,  
- Records of meetings  
- Publications  
- Seminars  
- Conferences | Research Institutions, Civil Society and National Assembly. |
| 3. Integrate Vision concerns into plans and programmes of all Government Ministries and civil society organisations | - Guidelines on integration of Jswezo National Vision concerns into sector plans and programmes | - Written directive from the Prime Minister’s Office.  
- Development plan implementation reports  
- Programme appraisal reports | Ministry of Finance & Development Planning, Prime Minister’s Office, Private Sector and Civil Society. |

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## Sustaining High Levels of Investment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Media of Notification</th>
<th>With Action</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Improve and sustain good investment climate</td>
<td>- Evidence &amp; Implementation role of the Investment Policy</td>
<td>- Investment policy statement&lt;br&gt;- Investment climate assessment&lt;br&gt;- Improved business climate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strengthen the Private Sector by building local capacity to attract investment</td>
<td>- Evidence &amp; success rate of Private Sector Partnership Agreements&lt;br&gt;- % of jobs in non-state companies&lt;br&gt;- % of locally owned businesses as % of total investment</td>
<td>- Investment Records&lt;br&gt;- Ministry of Trade and Industry, Cooperatives and Marketing&lt;br&gt;- Private sector, UCDC, LTDC, Cooperatives and Provincial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Explore and exploit investment potential in the service and industrial sectors to ensure comparative advantage</td>
<td>- Research studies&lt;br&gt;- Increased local content range for exports</td>
<td>- Research and investment reports&lt;br&gt;- Foreign trade reports&lt;br&gt;- Research institutions and Ministry of Natural Resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strengthen the provision of infrastructure for the industrial sector</td>
<td>- The number of fully serviced industrial estates&lt;br&gt;- Existence of transportation network facilities</td>
<td>- Infrastructure development plans&lt;br&gt;- Ministry of Natural Resources, Provincial&lt;br&gt;- City authorities and Ministry of Works</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Promote competitiveness and diversification in the industry sector</td>
<td>- Range and quality of products&lt;br&gt;- Number of Market Centers</td>
<td>- Trade statistics&lt;br&gt;- Ministry of Trade and Industry, Cooperatives and Marketing&lt;br&gt;- Private sector, UDC, LTDC, Cooperatives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strengthen investment and trade promotion capacity of the sector</td>
<td>- Evidence of fully serviced and well-established investment promotion institutions</td>
<td>- Trade promotion and investment reports&lt;br&gt;- Ministry of Industry and Trade, Cooperatives and Marketing&lt;br&gt;- Private sector, UDC, LTDC, Cooperatives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Develop and promote backward and forward linkages between foreign and local businesses</td>
<td>- Rate of success of the latest firms</td>
<td>- Trade and investment reports&lt;br&gt;- Ministry of Industry and Trade, Cooperatives and Marketing&lt;br&gt;- Private sector, UDC, LTDC, Cooperatives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diversify export revenues</td>
<td>- Value and adequacy of alternative export markets and agreements the same as ECA</td>
<td>- Copies of new agreements&lt;br&gt;- Ministry of Industry and Trade, Cooperatives and Marketing&lt;br&gt;- Private sector, UDC, LTDC, Cooperatives</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Matrix 5.3

### Strengthening Development Management Capacity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strategic Action</th>
<th>Indicators</th>
<th>Means of Verification</th>
<th>Main Actors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 1. Improve public financial management and Budgeting | - Existence & implementation rate of prudent fiscal strategies  
- Sustainable fiscal policy  
- Integrated financial management systems | - Fiscal reports  
- Auditors reports  
- Data reports | Ministry of Finance and Development Planning  
Public Account Committee (PAC)  
Auditor General |
| 2. Develop an integrated planning and budgeting system | - Existence of the planning system and implementation of the plan  
- Operational efficiency of public expenditure | - Computer packages  
- National reports | Ministry of Finance and Development Planning  
Private Sector and Civil Society |
| 3. Improve human resource management | - Existence & implementation rate of Training & Development Policy  
- Success rate of Performance Management System  
- Relevance of Integrated Human Resource Management Systems | - Training & Development Policy  
- Performance Management Reports | Prime Minister’s office and Ministry of Public Service |
| 4. Decentralize service delivery and empower communities | - Implementation of the Local Government Act  
- No. of trained & empowered local councils and communities  
- Success rate of community development projects | - Local Government Elections records | Ministry of Local Government, Local governance structures and Donor community |
| 5. Strengthen & promote private sector and civil society participation in managing development | - Existence & Implementation of a civil society development plan  
- Existence of enabling environment for the private sector to participate effectively | - Private Sector & Civil Society records | Government Secretary, Civil Society and Private Sector |
| 6. Strengthen aid coordination | - Aid Policy  
- Adherence to Aid policy guidelines in implementation of programmes | - Policy records/Document  
- Programme Implementation and reports | Ministry of Finance and Development Planning  
Donor community |
| 7. Strengthen research capacity in the country | - Quality and number of research reports and publications  
- % of national budget allocation to research | - Published and unpublished reports | Universities, Research institutions, consultants |
| 8. Eradicate corruption and nepotism in all sectors of the economy | - Rate of decrease in corrupt practices | - Court records  
- Audit reports | Anti Corruption Unit  
Ministry of Justice, Human Rights and rehabilitation and of law and constitutional affairs  
General public |
## Matrix 5.4
### A Stable Democracy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strategic Actions</th>
<th>Indicators</th>
<th>Means of Verification</th>
<th>Main Actors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 1. Develop and promote visionary leadership in the country | - Quality of leaders decisions  
- Number of disciplinary cases on breach of conduct  
- Number of leaders effectively trained | Code of conduct  
Evaluation & Monitoring reports | Civil society, Prime Minister’s office and College of chiefs |
| 2. Promote popular participation in national affairs | - % of populace trained in civic education  
- % of voters participating in elections | Training & Evaluation Reports, Campaigns etc | Civil Society, Local Governance Structures, Ministry of Local Government |
| 3. Strengthen governance institutions | - Institutional autonomy  
- Success rate of governance institutions recommendations | Budget, Plans and Records | Prime Minister’s Office |
| 4. Promote speedy dispensation of Justice | - Effective Coordination mechanisms between Police and Courts of law  
- Rate at which cases are decided | Procedures and guidelines Records and reports | Law associations, DCPPI, Ministry of Justice, Human Rights & Rehabilitation & of Law & Constitutional Affairs, Local Authorities |
| 5. Increase media coverage | - % media coverage in country | Survey reports | Media institutions and organisations, and Ministry of Communications, Science & Technology |
| 6. Promote media professionalism and independence | - Existence & Implementation of Media Policy  
- Increased number of trained media practitioners | Policy documents Training Records and code of conduct | Media institutions and organisations, and Ministry of Communications, Science & Technology |
| 7. Consolidate media laws | - Existence of document on consolidated media laws | Hansard reports | Media institutions and organisations, and Ministry of Communications, Science & Technology, Parliament |
| 8. Promote gender equality | - % of women in Parliament, in decision making positions  
- - Revised laws  
- - Labour statistics | | Civil Society, Ministry of Gender, Youth, Sport & Recreation and Parliament |
| 10. Strengthen citizenship as an institution of governance | - Effective local governance structures  
- Opinion Survey results | - Records | Ministry of Local Government and College of Chiefs |
### Matrix 5.5

**A. United Nation**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strategic Actions</th>
<th>Indicators</th>
<th>Means of Verification</th>
<th>Main Actors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Promote national unity</td>
<td>Widespread use of symbols, language &amp; traditions</td>
<td>Newspaper reports and research findings</td>
<td>Civil Society, Ministry of Tourism, Environment and Culture, Tourism Authority and lokale houses</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 2. Promote Cultural Practices | - Evidence and implementation of cultural policy  
- Cultural curriculum development  
- National Culture Days  
- Establishment of Cultural Research Unit  
- Regulated imitation institutions | Records  
- Preserved cultural centres  
- Policy document  
- Curriculum  
- Legal notice declaring cultural day  
- Research Unit and implementation records | Ministry of Tourism, Environment & Culture, Tourism Authority and civil society and Ministry of Education & Training, cultural interest groups |
| 3. Preserve and protect cultural heritage resources | - Number of preserved and protected cultural heritage resources  
- Records  
- Preserved cultural centres | | Ministry of Tourism, Environment & Culture, Tourism Authority and civil society and Ministry of Education & Training, cultural interest groups |
| 4. Instil the spirit of patriotism | - Number of skilled people staying in the country  
- Rate of contribution of exported labour force  
- Rate of participation in cultural practices | Reports on skilled labour retained  
- Amounts and flow of remittances from skilled labour | Private sector, Ministry of Labour and Employment, Recruiters agencies  
- Youth associations |
| 5. Research and document cultural practices | - Number and quality of research reports  
- Research reports  
- Documents on cultural practices | | Research institutions, Private sector, NGOs, Ministry of Tourism, Environment and Culture, Ministry of Education and Training |
| 6. Promote a healthy family life | - Decreasing divorce rates  
- Decreasing domestic violence | Records | Countries, Ministry of Justice, Human Rights and rehabilitation and of law and constitutional affairs |
### Matrix 5.6

**A Nation at Peace With itself and its Neighbours**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strategic action</th>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Means of Verification</th>
<th>Main Actors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 1. Transform & Professionalize security establishments | - Success rate of professional security establishments programmes  
- Coordinated functions among security establishments | - Coordination systems and procedures | Ministry of Defence & National Security  
Ministry of Home Affairs and Public Security  
Ministry of Justice, Human Rights and Rehabilitation and of Law and Constitutional Affairs |
| 2. Combat crime. | - Crime statistics  
- Prisons statistics | - Statistical reports | Ministry of Home Affairs and Public Safety and Civil Society, Ministry of Justice, Human Rights and Rehabilitation and of Law and Constitutional Affairs |
| 3. Create conflict resolution mechanisms at all levels of society | - Success rate of conflict resolution structures  
- Balance of conflict mgmt structures at all levels | - Reports and records structures | Prime Minister's office, Civil Society |
| 4. Promote frameworks of strategic collaboration with neighbouring countries | - Number of bi-lateral agreements and implementation rate of agreements  
- No. of conventions ratified by the country | - Agreements | Ministry of Foreign Affairs |
### Matrix 5.7

#### A Healthy and Well Developed Human Resource Base

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strategic Actions</th>
<th>Indicators</th>
<th>Means of Verification</th>
<th>Main Actors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Formulate and implement Health and Social welfare policy framework.</td>
<td>- Implementation rate of Health Policy&lt;br&gt;- Health policy document and reports</td>
<td>- Health policy document and reports</td>
<td>Ministry of Health and Social Welfare, CHAL, Private Health Institutions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Improve access to health care</td>
<td>- Distance travelled to health care facilities&lt;br&gt;- Financial access</td>
<td>- Records</td>
<td>Ministry of Health and Social Welfare, Private Health Institutions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Improve access and control of pharmaceuticals</td>
<td>- % of local demand met by local supply&lt;br&gt;- Existence and implementation rate of drug policy</td>
<td>- Drug policy documents</td>
<td>Ministry of Health and Social Welfare, Pharmaceutical Co-operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Increase provision of clean, safe drinking water and proper sanitation</td>
<td>- Increased coverage of population with access to drinking water and sanitation</td>
<td>- Public Health Records</td>
<td>WASA and Ministry of Natural Resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Reduce HIV and AIDS infection rate</td>
<td>- Distribution and usage of contraceptives&lt;br&gt;- % of population infected&lt;br&gt;- Awareness campaigns</td>
<td>Awareness campaign reports</td>
<td>HIV and AIDS authority, Community Support Groups, CHAL, all Government Ministries and Private Sector</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Create an HIV competent society</td>
<td>- Rate of change in peoples of change&lt;br&gt;- People equipped with life skills&lt;br&gt;- Rate of decline in HIV and Aids infections</td>
<td>Reports on HIV and AIDS situation</td>
<td>Families, CHAL, Community Support Groups, Private Sector, All Government Ministries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Provide prevention, care &amp; support for the HIV affected and infected</td>
<td>- Social protection policy&lt;br&gt;- Safety nets for AIDS Orphans</td>
<td>Policy document and legislation</td>
<td>Ministry of Health and Social Welfare, Civil Society and Donor Community, Families</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Promote Lesotho as a service industry</td>
<td>- % of skilled human resource exported to other countries&lt;br&gt;- Contribution of income from abroad to GNP&lt;br&gt;- Strategic plan for retention of rare skills</td>
<td>- National income &amp; product accounts</td>
<td>Prime Minister's Office and Ministry of Employment &amp; Labour, Educational and Research Institutions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Measure</td>
<td>Authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Improve Education infrastructural facilities</td>
<td>Number of educational institutions with improved facilities</td>
<td>Church and Private schools, Teachers' Associations and Ministry of Education,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Education Records</td>
<td>Ministry of Education &amp; Training, churches, and private, teachers' associations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Develop educational curriculum responsive to the country's needs</td>
<td>% of graduates absorbed into the labour market</td>
<td>Ministry of Education &amp; Training, churches, and private, teachers' associations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Employment records</td>
<td>Ministry of Education &amp; training, Donor Community, Teachers' associations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Improve institutional management and human resource capacity</td>
<td>Pass rates</td>
<td>Statistical Education records</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>% of qualified teachers</td>
<td>People with Disabilities and Ministry of Education &amp; Training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Promote special education programmes for people with disabilities</td>
<td>Number of equipped special training institutions</td>
<td>Special Education Records</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Education Records</td>
<td>Ministry of Education &amp; Training, churches, and private, teachers' associations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Strengthen vocational training</td>
<td>Number of students in vocational training institutions</td>
<td>Institutions' Reports</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>% Budget allocation to vocational training</td>
<td>Financial reports</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Build sporting facilities and strengthen capabilities</td>
<td>Number and quality of facilities</td>
<td>Reports and sports records</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Number of youth engaging in sports</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Number of medals</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategic Action</td>
<td>Indicators</td>
<td>Means of Verification</td>
<td>Main Actors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>----------------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Improve macroeconomic management</td>
<td>- Existence &amp; implementation of financial systems and procedures&lt;br&gt;- GDP growth rate&lt;br&gt;- Debt service ratio&lt;br&gt;- Fiscal balance</td>
<td>- Software packages and records&lt;br&gt;- Balance of payments accounts&lt;br&gt;- Audit reports&lt;br&gt;- National accounts</td>
<td>Ministry of Finance &amp; Development Planning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Develop Tourism Potential</td>
<td>- Success rate of implementing Tourism Policy&lt;br&gt;- Contribution of tourism to GDP</td>
<td>Plans, records and reports</td>
<td>Ministry of Tourism, Environment &amp; Culture, Private sector and LTDC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Strengthen and Promote SMME</td>
<td>- SMME Policy&lt;br&gt;- Improved licensing procedure&lt;br&gt;- Responsive export finance schemes&lt;br&gt;- Increased number of professional service providers</td>
<td>Policy document</td>
<td>Ministry of Ministry of Industry and Trade, Cooperatives and Marketing, Business associations, Central Bank of Lesotho, Cooperatives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Implement PRSP and the MDG Programmes</td>
<td>- Change in poverty levels&lt;br&gt;- Poverty Index</td>
<td>Plans, records, reports</td>
<td>Ministry of Finance and Development Planning and Donor community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Create growth and employment opportunities in the labor-intensive sectors.</td>
<td>- Employment rate&lt;br&gt;- % of total labour force employed in the manufacturing sector&lt;br&gt;- Number of tourism enterprises owned and run by Basotho people&lt;br&gt;- % of total labour force employed in the tourism sector</td>
<td>- Labour survey documents</td>
<td>Ministry of Finance and Development Planning, Ministry of Employment &amp; Labour and Private sector</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
7. Improve food security and overcome hunger
- Combat wide-spread stock theft
- Diversification into cash crops
- Revision of land tenure system
- Advance irrigation methods and effective extension service.
- ha. of cultivated land and yield
- % of land under irrigation
- Crop diversification
- Number of farmers per extension worker
- Agricultural statistics
- Ministry of Agriculture & Food Security and Private sector

8. Reallocate government resources to expenditure with higher impact on poverty
- Develop and implement a Policy on social security and safety nets
- Develop safety nets for Aids orphans
- Increased budget Social Welfare budget
- Social Welfare and Protection Policy
- Ministry of Finance and Development Planning
- Ministry of Health and Social Welfare
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strategic Actions</th>
<th>Indicators</th>
<th>Means of Verification</th>
<th>Main Actors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Strengthen coordination of institutions responsible for natural resource</td>
<td>No of operational Environmental Units</td>
<td>Environment Reports</td>
<td>Ministry of Tourism, Environment and Culture and LTDC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>management</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Protect air, soil and water quality</td>
<td>Existence &amp; Implementation of legislation and Policy</td>
<td>Policy documents</td>
<td>Ministry of Tourism, Environment and Culture and LTDC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Develop and implement proper land management systems</td>
<td>Successful Implementation of land use plans</td>
<td>Environment Monitoring reports</td>
<td>Ministry of Forestry &amp; Land Reclamation, Ministry of Local Government and CBOs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Preserve and conserve biodiversity and heritage</td>
<td>Number of protected areas</td>
<td>Environment reports</td>
<td>Ministry of Tourism, Environment and Culture and LTDC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Improve institutional capacity to implement the Environment Act</td>
<td>Well resourced ministerial environmental units</td>
<td>Environment programmes and reports</td>
<td>Ministry of Tourism, Environment and Culture, the Private Sector and LTDC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Reduce over-harvesting of natural resources</td>
<td>Existence &amp; Implementation of regulations</td>
<td>Policy documents</td>
<td>Ministry of Natural Resources and CBOs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Improve effluent and solid waste management systems</td>
<td>Effective Effluent management standards</td>
<td>Waste management Standards</td>
<td>City Authorities, WASA and Ministry of Tourism, Environment and Culture and CBOs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Promote use of renewable energy resources</td>
<td>Diverse and environmentally friendly energy resources</td>
<td>Environmental reports</td>
<td>Ministry of Natural Resources and Private Sector</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Matrix 5.10
### Well Established Technology

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strategic Actions</th>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Means of Verification</th>
<th>Main Actors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Strengthen education and awareness on Science and</td>
<td>- S &amp; T expenditure as % of GNP</td>
<td>- National accounts</td>
<td>Educational institutions and Ministry of Communications, Science and Technology.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technology</td>
<td>- Implementation rate of S &amp; T</td>
<td>- Monitoring and evaluation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>policy</td>
<td>reports</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Strengthen research and development</td>
<td>- Existence of S &amp; T information</td>
<td>- S &amp; T reports</td>
<td>Tertiary and research institutions, Appropriate Technology Section and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>centre</td>
<td>- Publications and patents</td>
<td>Ministry of Communications, Science and Technology.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- No. of publications and patents</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Commercialize indigenous technological knowledge and</td>
<td>- Implementation rate of S &amp; T</td>
<td>- Monitoring and evaluation</td>
<td>Ministry of Communications, Science &amp; Technology and Appropriate Technology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>practices</td>
<td>policy</td>
<td>reports</td>
<td>Section, Private Sector</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Develop and implement ICT policy</td>
<td>- ICT policy implementation and</td>
<td>- ICT policy document</td>
<td>Ministry of Communications, Science and Technology, Tertiary and research</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>evaluation</td>
<td>- Monitoring and evaluation</td>
<td>institutions and Private sector</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>reports</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### 6.3.2 Implementation, Monitoring and Evaluation Plan

Matrix 6.2 identifies the key activities for kick-starting the process of implementation, monitoring and evaluation of Lesotho Vision 2020.

Matrix 6.2

**Implementation, Monitoring and Evaluation Plan**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Start Date</th>
<th>Finish Date</th>
<th>Output</th>
<th>Main Actors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Set up Implementation Task Force</td>
<td>Last quarter 2004</td>
<td>End of December 2004</td>
<td>Structure working procedures manuals</td>
<td>Government Secretary’s office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Prepare action plan for attracting FDI</td>
<td>Last quarter 2004</td>
<td>End of December 2004</td>
<td>Action plan</td>
<td>PS Trade, BEDCO, LNDC and Private Sector</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Prepare action plan for sustaining political commitment and support</td>
<td>Last quarter 2004</td>
<td>End of December 2004</td>
<td>Plan</td>
<td>Prime Minister’s Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Establish Vision supporting institutions</td>
<td>3rd quarter 2004</td>
<td>Second quarter 2005</td>
<td>Structure working procedures manuals</td>
<td>Prime Minister’s Office and Parliament</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>Finalise implementation, monitoring and evaluation plan for Lesotho Vision</td>
<td>Last quarter 2004</td>
<td>End of December 2004</td>
<td>Monitoring and evaluation plan</td>
<td>Government Secretary</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
(2) The King may act in accordance with his own deliberate judgment in the performance of the following functions, that is to say—
(a) in the exercise of the powers relating to the appointment of Senators conferred on him by section 41 of this Constitution;
(b) in the exercise of the powers relating to the dissolution of Parliament conferred on him by the proviso to section 68(4) of this Constitution;
(c) in the exercise of the power to appoint the Prime Minister conferred on him by section 72(3) of this Constitution;
(d) in the exercise of the power to remove the Prime Minister from office conferred on him by section 72(4) of this Constitution;
(e) in the exercise of the powers conferred on him by section 75 of this Constitution (which relates to the performance of the functions of the Prime Minister during absence or illness) in the circumstances described in the proviso to subsection (3) of that section;
(f) in the exercise of the powers relating to his Privy Council conferred on him by section 89 of this Constitution other than the power conferred on him by subsection (3)(c) thereof;
(g) in the exercise of the powers to designate members of the National Planning Board conferred on him by section 90(1)(a) of this Constitution;
(h) in the exercise of the powers relating to land conferred on him by Chapter VIII of this Constitution;
(i) in signing his concurrence, for the purposes of section 128(4) of this Constitution, in the appointment of persons to or to act in offices on his personal staff; and
(j) save in so far as Parliament may otherwise provide, in the exercise of any powers conferred on him by or under any law to exercise disciplinary control over Chiefs.

Provided that, except in the cases specified in paragraphs (a), (f), (g), (h), (i), (j) and (k) of this subsection (in which he may act in his absolute discretion), the King shall in the exercise of the said functions act, so far as may be, in accordance with any constitutional conventions applicable to the exercise of a similar function by Her Majesty in the United Kingdom.

(3) Nothing in subsection (2) of this section shall prejudice any other provision of this Constitution under which the King is authorised or required to consult with his Privy Council or any other person or authority before exercising any function specified in that subsection.

(4) Where the King is required by this Constitution to do any act in accordance with the advice of any person or authority and the Prime Minister is satisfied that the King has neglected or declined to do so, the Prime Minister may inform the King that it is the intention of the Prime Minister to do that act himself after the expiration of a period to be specified by the Prime Minister, and if at the expiration of that period the King has not done that act the Prime Minister may do that act himself and shall, at the earliest opportunity thereafter, report the matter to Parliament; and any act so done by the Prime Minister shall be deemed to have been done by the King and to be his act.

(5) No act of the King shall be valid to the extent that it is inconsistent with an act deemed to be his act by virtue of subsection (4) of this section.
ORDER NO. 51 OF 1970

The Office of King Order 1970

ORDER

To provide for the office of King and for related and connected matters.

[Date of commencement: 30th November, 1970] Gazette 87

Made by the Council of Ministers.

1. This Order may be cited as the Office of King Order 1970.

2. (1) There shall be a King of Lesotho who shall be the Head of State.

   (2) The King shall do all things that belong to his office in accordance with the provisions of this Order and of all other laws for the time being in force.

   (3) The person who held the office of King under the Lesotho Independence Order 1966 shall, immediately upon having made and subscribed to the oath of office prescribed in the Schedule to this Order, be recognised and confirmed as the holder of the office of King as from the commencement of this Order.

3. (1) The twenty-two Principal and Ward Chiefs acknowledged by the Offices of Chief Order 1970 (in this Order referred to as the Principal and Ward Chiefs) may at any time designate in accordance with the customary law of Lesotho, the person (or persons, in order of prior right) who are entitled to succeed to the office of King upon the death, abdication or deemed abdication of the holder of that office; and if, upon the death, abdication or deemed abdication of the holder of the office of King, there is a person who has previously been designated in pursuance of this section and who is capable under the customary law of Lesotho of succeeding to that office, that person (or, if there is more than one such person, that one of them who has been designated as having the first right to succeed to the office) shall become King:

   Provided that in the event of the King abdicating or being deemed to have abdicated, the Principal and Ward Chiefs may declare any designation made in terms of this subsection to be null and void and of no force or effect, and may thereafter, subject to the provisions of subsection (2) designate some other person to succeed to the vacant office and the person so designated shall thereupon become King.

   (2) No person may be designated to succeed to the office of King in terms of the proviso to subsection (1) unless that person would have been entitled, under the customary law of

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Lesotho, to succeed to the office of King in the event of the King having died without legitimate issue.

(3) If, upon the death, abdication or deemed abdication of the holder of the office of King, there is no person who becomes King under subsection (1), the Principal and Ward Chiefs shall, with all practicable speed and in accordance with the customary law of Lesotho but subject to the proviso to subsection (1), and to subsection (2), proceed to designate a person to succeed to the office of King and the person so designated shall thereupon become King.

(4) Every designation made for the purposes of this section shall be published in the Gazette.

(5) Where any person has been designated to succeed to the office of King in pursuance of subsection (1), subsection (2) or subsection (3), any other person who claims that, under the customary law of Lesotho, he should have been so designated in place of that person may, by application made to the High Court within a period of six months commencing with the day on which the designation was published in the Gazette, apply to have the designation varied by the substitution of his own name for that of the first mentioned person, but the designation of any person for the purposes of this section shall not otherwise be called in question in any court on the ground that, under the customary law of Lesotho, the person designated was not entitled to be so designated.

(6) Pending the decision of the High Court in any application made to it under subsection (5) of this section, the designation that is the subject of the application shall remain of full force and effect.

The Regent

4. (1) The Principal and Ward Chiefs may at any time designate, in accordance with the customary law of Lesotho, the person (or the persons, in order of prior right) who shall be Regent, that is to say, who shall exercise the functions of the office of King in any of the following circumstances—

(a) when the holder of that office has not attained the age of twenty-one years; or

(b) when the holder of that office (and any person who has been designated as having a prior right to be Regent) is unable by reason of absence from Lesotho or by reason of infirmity of body or mind to exercise the functions of that office;

and if, in any of those circumstances, there is a person who has previously been designated in pursuance of this subsection and who is capable under the customary law of Lesotho of becoming Regent, that person (or, if there is more than one such person, that one of them who has been designated as having the first right to be Regent) shall become Regent:

Provided that in the event of the King abdicating or being deemed to have abdicated, the Principal and Ward
Chiefs may declare any designation made under this subsec-
tion to be null and void and of no force or effect and may
thereafter designate some other person who shall become
Regent.

(2) If, in any of the circumstances specified in subsection
(1) of this section, there is no person who becomes Regent under
that subsection, the Principal and Ward Chiefs shall, with all
practicable speed and in accordance with the customary law of
Lesotho, proceed to designate a person to be Regent and the
person so designated shall thereupon become Regent.

(3) If the Principal and Ward Chiefs fail within a reason-
able time to discharge the duty imposed on them by subsection
(2) of this section, the High Court may, upon the application of
any person, designate a person to be Regent in accordance with
the customary law of Lesotho and the person so designated shall
thereupon become Regent.

(4) Every designation made for the purposes of this section
shall be published in the Gazette.

5. (1) The High Court shall consider with all practicable
speed, every application made to it under section 3 (5) or section
4 (3) and the decision of the High Court therein shall not be
subject to appeal.

(2) The Chief Justice may make rules with respect to the
practice and procedure of the High Court in relation to the juris-
diction and powers conferred on it by or under section 3 (5) and
section 4 (5) including rules with respect to the time within
which application may be made to the Court under those
sections.

6. (1) The King shall have such Civil List as may from time
to time be prescribed by the Council of Ministers under its
power to make laws under the Lesotho Order 1970, as amended;
and that Civil List shall be a charge upon the Consolidated Fund.

(2) A person exercising the functions of the office of King
as Regent shall, in respect of any period during which he exer-
cises those functions, be entitled to such remuneration as may
be prescribed by the Council of Ministers under its power to
make laws under the Lesotho Order 1970, as amended, and the
remuneration so prescribed in relation to any person in respect
of any such period shall be a charge on the Consolidated Fund.

7. (1) The King shall be entitled to immunity from taxation in respect of his
Civil List, all income accruing to him in his private capacity and
all property owned by him in his private capacity.

(2) A person who is exercising or who has exercised the
functions of the office of King as Regent shall be entitled to
immunity from taxation in respect of any remuneration to which
he is entitled under section 6 (2), all income accruing to him.
in his private capacity during any period during which he is exercising those functions and, in so far as the taxation relates to that period, all property owned by him in his private capacity.

(2) The King shall for as long as he holds the office of King be entitled to immunity from the compulsory taking possession of any property held by him in his private capacity and the compulsory acquisition of any interest in or right over any property, being an interest or right owned by him in his private capacity.

8. (1) Whilst any person holds the office of King, he shall be entitled to immunity from suit and legal process in any civil cause in respect of all things done or omitted to be done by him in his private capacity and to immunity from criminal proceedings in respect of all things done or omitted to be done by him either in his official capacity or in his private capacity.

(2) Whilst any person exercises the functions of the office of King as Regent no criminal proceedings shall be instituted or continued against him in respect of anything done by him either in his official capacity or in his private capacity, and no civil proceedings shall be instituted or continued in respect of which relief is claimed against him in respect of anything done or omitted to be done by him in his private capacity.

(3) Where provision is made by law limiting the time within which proceedings of any description may be brought against any person, the period during which that person has held the office of King or exercised the functions of the office of King shall not be taken into account in calculating the period of time prescribed by that law which determines whether any such proceedings as are mentioned in subsection (1) or (2), as the case may be, of this section may be brought against that person.

9. (1) The Person who, under the Lesotho Independence Order, 1966, held the office of King shall take and subscribe the oath for the due execution of his office which is set out in the Schedule to this Order as soon as is practicable after the coming into operation of this Order, and every person who thereafter succeeds to the office of King shall, as soon as is practicable after succeeding to that office and before entering upon the duties of that office (or, in the case of a person who when he so succeeds is below the age of twenty-one years, as soon as is practicable after attaining that age before entering upon the duties of his office), shall take and subscribe that oath.

(2) A Regent shall, before entering upon the duties of his office, take and subscribe the oath for the due execution of his office which is set out in the Schedule to this Order.

(3) The oath referred to in the foregoing provisions of this section shall be administered in public to the King or, as the case may be, to the Regent, by the Chief Justice (or, in the absence of the Chief Justice, by some other Judge of the High Court) in the presence of such of the other Judges, if any, of the
High Court and such Ministers of the Government of Lesotho as are able to attend.

10. (1) Whenever any person is required by the provisions of section 9 to take and subscribe the oath therein prescribed for the due execution of the office of King and such person refuses to take or subscribe to that oath or, having taken and subscribed thereto, thereafter fails or refuses to abide by any of its terms, the Prime Minister may deem that person to have abdicated and shall by Notice in the Gazette declare that he is deemed to have abdicated with effect from a date to be specified in that Notice.

(2) From that date specified in a Notice published under the provisions of sub-section (1) the person named in that Notice shall for all purposes whatsoever be deemed to have abdicated and the Principal and Ward Chiefs shall forthwith designate some fit and proper person to succeed to that office.

(3) Whenever a person has been deemed to have abdicated under the provisions of this section any act performed or anything done by the person so deemed to have abdicated, or by a Regent on his behalf, which purports to have been performed or done in the exercise of the functions of the office of King shall be null and void and of no force or effect.

11. (1) If the King fails, neglects or refuses to do any act in accordance with advice given to him under any law, and the Prime Minister is satisfied that the King has failed, neglected or refused to do so, the Prime Minister may inform the King that it is the intention of the Prime Minister to do that act himself after the expiration of a period to be specified by the Prime Minister, and if at the expiration of that period the King has not done that act the Prime Minister may do that act himself, and any act so done by the Prime Minister shall be deemed to have been done by the King and to be his act.

(2) An act of the King shall be invalid to the extent that it is inconsistent with an act deemed to be his act by virtue of subsection (1) of this section.

12. The King shall have the right to be consulted by the Prime Minister on all matters relating to the Government of Lesotho and in the course of that consultation to encourage and to warn. The Prime Minister shall keep him fully informed concerning the general conduct of the government of Lesotho and shall furnish him with such information as he may request in respect of any particular matter relating to the Government of Lesotho.

13. (1) Any person who commits any act which is calculated to violate the dignity or injure the reputation of the King, Regent or any member of the Royal Family, shall be guilty of an offence and liable on conviction to a fine not exceeding R1,000 or to imprisonment for a period not exceeding 3 years.
(2) Without derogating from the generality of subsection (1) —

(a) any person who, without having been authorised thereto in writing by the Minister, for political or commercial purposes, either personally or by or through an agent or any other person, campaigns or advertises for or on behalf of any political or business organisation of whatever nature, the name of which includes the words “Imperial”, “Royal”, “Crown”, “King”, “Queen”, “Regent”, or any other word or words which import or suggest that such person or organisation enjoys the patronage of the King, Regent or member of the Royal Family;

(b) any person, or political or commercial organisation or member of such an organisation who without having been authorised thereto in writing by the Minister, in any slogan, advertisement or document intended for distribution amongst members of the public, uses the words “Imperial”, “Royal”, “Crown”, “King”, “Queen”, “Regent”, or any other word or words with the intention to import or suggest thereby that such person or organisation enjoys the patronage of the King, Regent or members of the Royal Family; and

(c) any person who, in carrying on the business or affairs of any political or commercial organisation or in furthering or endeavouring to further the interests or to gain public support for such an organisation, in any public speech, slogan or document intended for distribution amongst members of the public, states or implies that the King, Regent, or any member of the Royal Family, is in any way concerned in party or sectional politics or imputes to any other person or organisation disaffection for or disloyalty to the King, Regent or any member of the Royal Family so as to bring that person or organisation into public disrepute,

shall be deemed to have committed an act calculated to violate the dignity or injure the reputation of the King, Regent or members of the Royal Family.

14. (1) When a member, agent or servant of any political or commercial organisation has, in carrying on the business or affairs of that organisation or in furthering or endeavouring to further its interests, committed the offence created by section 13, any person who was, at the time of the commission of the offence, a member of that organisation, shall be deemed to be guilty of that offence, unless it is proved that he did not take part in the commission of the offence, and that he could not have prevented it.

(2) In any proceedings against a member of a political or commercial organisation in respect of an offence mentioned in subsection (1) any record which was made or kept by any member or servant or agent of that organisation within the scope of his activities as such member, servant or agent or any document
which was at any time in the custody or under the control of any such member, servant or agent within the scope of his activities as such member, servant or agent, shall be admissible in evidence against the accused.

(2) For the purposes of subsection (1) any record made or kept by a member or servant or agent of such an organisation or any document which was at any time in his custody or control shall be presumed to have been made or kept by him or to have been in his custody or control within the scope of his activities as such member or servant or agent, unless the contrary is proved.

10. (1) Whenever a member, agent or servant of any political organisation has, in carrying on the business or affairs of that organisation or in furthering or endeavouring to further its interests, committed the offence created by section 13, the Minister may by Notice in the Gazette declare that organisation to be an unlawful organisation.

(2) Whenever any organisation has, in terms of subsection (1), been declared by the Minister to be an unlawful organisation, no person shall perform any act that furthers or is likely or is intended to further the objects of that organisation, and without prejudice to the generality hereof—

(a) no person shall advocate, advise, defraud or encourage the achievement of any such object or any act which is calculated to further the achievement of any such object;

(b) no person shall become, continue to be or perform any act as an office-bearer, officer or member of that organisation or any branch, section or committee of that organisation;

(c) no person shall print, publish, import, convey, sell, distribute or have in his possession or under his control, any newspaper, periodical or other publication or any document or thing whatsoever that—

(i) professes, by its name or otherwise, to be a publication for propagating the aims, objects or policies of that organisation; or

(ii) is or has been published or disseminated under the direction or guidance of that organisation; or

(iii) serves or has served as a means for expressing views propagated by such an organisation; or

(iv) serves or has served as a means for expressing views or conveying information which is calculated to further the achievement of any of the objects of such an organisation.

(3) Any person who contravenes any of the provisions of this section shall be guilty of an offence and liable upon conviction to the penalties prescribed in section 13.
SCHEDULE

(Sections 2 and 9)

OATH OF OFFICE OF KING OR REGENT

In the presence of Almighty God and in the full realization of the responsibility and duties of the high office of King (Regent) and of the nature and binding force of this oath,

I, ____________________________

do swear that I will obey and observe the provisions of the office of King Order 1970 and all other laws of Lesotho, that I will discharge my duties in such manner as to preserve the character of the monarchy as a symbol of the unity of the Basotho Nation, and that I will accordingly abstain from involving the monarchy in any way in politics, or with any political party or group.

SO HELP ME GOD.

__________________________________________

Sworn before me at _________________________ on this

the ____________________ day of ___________________.
Exercise of the King's functions

91. (1) Subject to the provisions of section 137(4) of this Constitution, the King shall, in the exercise of his functions under this Constitution or any other law, act in accordance with the advice of the Cabinet or a Minister acting under the general authority of the Cabinet except in cases where he is required by this Constitution or any other law to act in accordance with the advice of any person or authority other than the Cabinet.

(2) Where the King is required by this Constitution to do any act in accordance with the advice of the Council of State and the Council of State is satisfied that the King has not done that act, the Council of State may inform the King that it is the intention of the Council of State to do that act after the expiration of a period to be specified by the Council of State, and if at the expiration of that period the King has not done that act, the Council of State may do that act themselves and shall, at the earliest opportunity thereafter, report the matter to Parliament; and any act so done by the Council of State shall be deemed to have been done by the King and to be his act.

(3) Where the King is required by this Constitution to do any act in accordance with the advice of any person or authority other than the Council of State, and the Prime Minister is satisfied that the King has not done that act, the Prime Minister may inform the King that it is the intention of the Prime Minister to do that act himself after the expiration of a period to be specified by the Prime Minister, and if at the expiration of that period the King has not done that act the Prime Minister may do that act himself and shall, at the earliest opportunity thereafter, report the matter to Parliament; and any act so done by the Prime Minister shall be deemed to have been done by the King and to be his act.

(4) No act of the King shall be valid to the extent that it is inconsistent with an act deemed to be his act by virtue of subsection (2) or (3).

(5) Without prejudice to the generality of section 155(2) of this Constitution, where the King is required by this Constitution to act in accordance with the advice of any person or authority, the question whether he has received or acted in accordance with such advice shall not be inquired into in any court.

(6) In this section, references to a requirement in this Constitution to act in accordance with the advice of some person or authority include references to the advice of, and a recommendation by, a tribunal and to the appointment to a tribunal of persons selected by any person or authority and any such reference shall be construed as a requirement to act in accordance with such advice, recommendation or selection.