The Rise and Fall of the First Coalition

Government in Lesotho:

2012 – 2014

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Mini-dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the Humanities, University of the Free State, in partial fulfilment of a Master’s Degree in Governance and Political Transformation.


Supervisor: Dr Tania Coetzee
Declaration

I declare that this study, *The Rise and Fall of the First Coalition Government in Lesotho: 2012 – 2014*, is my own independent work which has not been previously submitted for any degree or examination purposes to this or any institution and that it is not a product of plagiarism, all the sources used or cited have been indicated and duly acknowledged.
Acknowledgements

This academic milestone is a product of work carried out with support and encouragements from a number of people in different ways, to whom I remain deeply indebted. To mention but a few: my wife ‘Mamolemo Moseme, you have been a pillar of strength, kea leboha Mokuena; and our children, Naledi and Molemo…. Batebang, you spurred me on even when I had given up, although the project deprived you of family time.

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The list of cited and works referred to in the bibliography bears testimony to the depth of indebtedness to other authors in politics, governance and other related fields in providing a benchmark upon which this study could be judged and thus lending it its academic complexion. Dear friends and colleagues, too numerous to name, your support is appreciated.

I thank God the Almighty in making it possible for all and one to lend a helping hand to me during the process and progress of this study.
Abstract

This study examines the changing scenery in Lesotho’s political landscape since 2012. The May 2012 general election in Lesotho produced a hung parliament that necessitated a coalition government for the first time since the country’s 1966 independence. The occurrence of coalition governments has been rare in Africa, making Lesotho one of a few existing examples that can be studied comparatively, explanatorily or in an explorative manner. This study focuses on how the coalition was formed, the coalition arrangements of power sharing between the parties, the governance implications resulting from these arrangements, reasons for the collapse of this coalition, and the lessons that could be learnt from this experience. With these, the study attempts to create an understanding of political decisions that shaped the first coalition government in Lesotho as well as the impact of ideological differences on the nature and tenure of the coalition. Constitutions and electoral manifestoes of the 2012 coalition partners are analysed using game theory, coalition and government formation models. The coalescing parties are also analysed through different models of political party classification. The findings suggest that the power sharing arrangements agreed upon between coalition partners were based on proportions resulting from electoral results and that they were reduced to a written agreement. The manifestation of these power sharing arrangements took the form of a caucus of leaders as the ultimate guide, allocation of cabinet and other senior political positions to the coalition partners as well as block voting in parliament, informed by interparty consultations, inclusion of policies from all coalition partners, accounting through public dissemination of information, while conflict resolution was entrusted to a Joint Monitoring and Implementation Committee. Seen from governance perspective, these coalitional arrangements had the following implications: clear steering authority, legislative coalition, equitable sharing of pay-offs, inclusive policy gains, a semblance of accountability; and coalitional effectiveness, trust and transparency. Lesotho’s experience indicates that lack of legal status for coalition agreements and the structures they establish make for a weak institutional basis for governance. This, combined with ideological differences between coalition partners, rendered the partnership untenable in the long run. The study recommends that ideological differences between potential coalition partners as reflected by their policies, should be translated into programme of action that could be pursued by the resultant government; preparations for coalition formation should be made well in advance due to time constraints between the election results and government formation; status of coalition agreements and the structures they establish as well as their powers, should be defined in law.
List of Tables and Figures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.1: Governance Indicators and Principle of Good Governance</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2: National Assembly Seat Distribution in the 8th Parliament</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.1: Table of Coalition Features</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.1: Party Models and their Characteristics</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2: Lipset and Rokkan’s Eight-fold Typology</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.3: Gunther and Diamond’s Typology of Parties</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.4: Operational Measures for Party Orientation</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.5: National Assembly Seat Allocation in the 8th Parliament</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.6: Party Family relations for coalition partners</td>
<td>108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.7: Classification of Coalition Partners</td>
<td>111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.1: National Assembly Seat Distribution in the 8th Parliament</td>
<td>131</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.2: Allocation of Ministerial Positions</td>
<td>136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.1: Possible 2012 Coalition Governments in Lesotho</td>
<td>152</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 3.1: Orientation of political parties</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
List of Acronyms

ABC  All Basotho Convention
ADB  African Development Bank
ANC  African National Congress
AU  African Union
BAC  Basutoland African Congress
BBDP  Basotho Batho Democratic Party
BCP  Basotho Congress Party
BDNP  Basotho Democratic National Party
BFP  Basutoland Freedom Party
BNP  Basotho National Party
CPP  Convention People’s Party
DC  Democratic Congress
FPTP  First Past the Post
IEC  Independent Electoral Commission
IMF  International Monetary Fund
IR  International Relations
JMIC  Joint Monitoring and Implementation Committee
LCD  Lesotho Congress for Democracy
LDF  Lesotho Defence Force
LLA  Lesotho Liberation Army
LPC  Lesotho Peoples Congress
LTV  Lesotho Television
LWP  Lesotho Workers Party
MFP  Marematlou Freedom Party
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MMP</td>
<td>Mixed Member Proportional</td>
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<tr>
<td>MWC</td>
<td>Minimum Winning Coalition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAM</td>
<td>Non-Aligned Movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NDI</td>
<td>National Democratic Institute</td>
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<tr>
<td>NIP</td>
<td>National Independence Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>PAC</td>
<td>Pan-Africanist Congress</td>
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<tr>
<td>PFD</td>
<td>Popular Front for Democracy</td>
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<tr>
<td>PRI</td>
<td>Public Radio International</td>
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<tr>
<td>RSA</td>
<td>Republic of South Africa</td>
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<td>SADC</td>
<td>Southern African Development Community</td>
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<td>SEOM</td>
<td>SADC Electoral Observer Mission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
# Table of Contents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Declaration</td>
<td>i</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acknowledgements</td>
<td>ii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abstract</td>
<td>iii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>List of Tables and Figures</td>
<td>iv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>List of Acronyms</td>
<td>v</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table of Contents</td>
<td>vii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 1: Introduction</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.1 Motivation</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2 Rationale</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.3 Research Problem</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.4 Aim of the study</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.5 Methodology</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.6 Coalition Government: Product of the 2012 Elections</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.7 Coalition Government: Signs of Rupture</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.8 Coalition Government: The Collapse</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.9 Political Parties in Lesotho</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.10 Research Design</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 2: Political Coalitions and Governance: Conceptual Framework</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.1 Introduction</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2 Political Coalitions</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2.1 Definitions and Features of Coalitions</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2.2 Coalition Formation Models</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Chapter 2: Governance

2.2.3 Review

2.3 Governance

2.3.1 Defining Governance

2.3.2 Theories of Governance

2.3.3 Functions of Governance

2.3.4 Characteristics of Governance

2.4 Summary

Chapter 3: Lesotho’s Political Background

3.1 Introduction

3.2 Political Parties: An Overview

3.3 Classification of Political Parties

3.4 Emergence of Political Parties in Lesotho

3.5 Parties of the First Coalition Government in Lesotho

3.5.1 Basotho National Party (BNP)

3.5.2 Lesotho Congress for Democracy (LCD)

3.5.3 All Basotho Convention (ABC)

3.6 Application of Classification Models on Partners in Lesotho’s Coalition Government

3.6.1 Katz and Mair (1995)

3.6.2 Lipset and Rokkan (1967)

3.6.3 Gunther and Diamond (2003)

6.3.3 What were the governance implications of these arrangements? ..........................................................191

6.3.4 Which harmonization strategy was employed given assumed differences? ...........................................192

6.3.5 Why did the Coalition Government in Lesotho collapse? ..........193

6.4 Conclusions (Any lessons of Good Governance from the coalition governance experience?)..........................193

6.5 Recommendations ..........................................................................................................................195

6.5.1 General Recommendations ............................................................195

6.5.2 Specific Recommendations ........................................................................................................200

Bibliography ...........................................................................................................................................203
CHAPTER 1

Introduction

1.1 Motivation

The theme of this study is coalition governance in Lesotho. This alliance-based approach to government was first seen in Lesotho in May 2012. In political circles coalition refers to transitory collaboration of political parties to form a government. According to William H. Riker (as cited in Matthews, 1963: 578), a coalition is a subset of political formations, such as political parties, mandated by all other formations to execute political decisions on the entire population. The word governance is derived from a Greek verb ‘kurbernân’ meaning ‘to pilot or steer’ which Plato used to describe ‘how to design a system of rule’; it was later adopted in Latin as ‘gurbenare’ and it carried more or less the same meaning of ‘piloting’ or ‘rule-making’ (Kjær 2004: 3). More recently, a metaphor of steering a boat is employed to explain or illustrate governance in multidimensional communities (Peters: 2012: 20). Reflecting on this etymological background, the implication that comes to the fore is that, governance has always been about, and continues to refer to some form of determining direction or regulation of behaviour; ensuring order or securing predictability during intra as well as inter societal interactions or exchanges. To this understanding, Forrest (2008: 173) adds another aspect of governance over and above steering or regulation, which is also the provision of tangible services such as funding accommodation.

From a combination of the two concepts, one can coin a general definition of coalition governance as follows: the style of government in which two or more political parties coalesce to form a ruling majority in parliament particularly in situations where no single party has adequate parliamentary seats to form a government on its own.
Coalition governance should not be confused with collaborative governance, which is defined as:

*A governing arrangement where one or more public agencies, directly engage non-state stakeholders in a collective decision-making process that is formal, consensus-oriented, and deliberative...* (Ansell and Gash, 2007: 544).

Whereas in both governance designs, the key idea is cooperation or alliance between partners in government, the main difference is that for the former, only political parties are involved, especially in parliamentary systems of government. For the latter, cooperation is with non-state agencies and in many cases these collaborations are referred to as public-private partnerships (PPP’s).

### 1.2 Rationale

One might ask; why study coalition governance? An observation by Daniel Treisman (2007: 6) helps in part to start addressing this question:

*The question of how governments should be organized must be as old as the study of politics. From Aristotle to Polybius and Cicero, classical authors debated whether public authority should be entrusted to a monarch, a senate of aristocrats, a popular assembly, or some mixture of the three. The advantages of different constitutions were scrupulously examined.*

This observation reminds us that from the beginning of the study of politics, scholars have invariably been preoccupied with the discovery or designing of the best form of government. In this case, the best form could as well be determined by the organization of such a government. Coalition governance, in this case - Coalition Government of Lesotho, can also be seen as one form of how a government could be organized. Moreover, coalitions in the African political scenery are becoming a phenomenon on the upsurge (Kadima, 2006: 1). As such, and following in the footsteps of foregone scholars, coalition governance deserves the attention, if not systematic scrutiny, of contemporary students of politics. In B. Guy Peters’ (2012:
words “…if conceptualized adequately, then governance can be the foundation of a significant political theory that can be important for developing contemporary political science”. It therefore becomes clear that this study intends to take advantage of the open opportunities for contributing knowledge in the field of political science.

1.3 Research Problem

With this research, I intend to examine the rise and fall of the first Coalition Government in Lesotho. The 2012 election result in Lesotho produced a hung parliament, a situation that precipitated into the establishment of a coalition government in Lesotho; comprising All Basotho Convention (ABC), Lesotho Congress for Democracy (LCD) and Basotho National Party (BNP). The coalition pact that formed this government collapsed two years later in 2014 and its attendant government was eventually replaced following the February 2015 election, two years ahead of the constitutionally prescribed election time. This work attempts to examine, in an explorative manner, some of the episodes that appear to have contributed to the rise and the early demise of the first coalition government in Lesotho. It does not only shed some light on the coalitional realities, governance alternatives and implications presented by circumstances that prevailed then, but it also points out governance lessons from the country’s experience. A look at Lesotho’s experience and its governance implications could provide a convenient platform upon whose basis the country’s governance performance could be gauged using the common principles of good governance. This is especially so because institutional arrangements and the resultant governance implications (as dictated and fashioned by party constitutions, manifestos and coalition agreements) guided by a country’s constitution, harbour potential analytical avenue for understanding the rise and fall of these coalition governments.

This study further offers some perspective on Lesotho’s three political parties that played a role in the 2012 coalition government as well as their ideologies. As a matter of course, it deals with the possible role played by these ideologies as a measure of policy distance between these parties in the coalition’s institutional
emergence, development, decline and collapse; an academic domain that has hitherto been scarcely looked at, in as far as Lesotho is concerned. Few authors that have studied coalitional politics in Lesotho in recent years include Makoa (2008), Kapa and Shale (2014) and Motsamai (2015). Makoa (2008) examines alliances that formed between parties in a bid to win the country’s February 2007 election. In doubting the ability of alliances to consolidate democracy, he argues that without contravening applicable electoral laws, these alliances manipulated and abused the mixed member proportional (MMP\(^1\)) electoral and parliamentary model by using small political parties as surrogates for the main parties' proportional representation (PR\(^2\)) candidates, instead of accommodating these parties in parliament. Kapa and Shale (2014) look at political party alliances and coalitions from 2007 to 2012 and explore their causes as well as their consequences for party systems, democratic consolidation and the governability of the state. They conclude: that alliances are a result of vote-pooling and office seeking; that the party system has tended to be characterised by intra- and extra-parliamentary party conflicts; that democracy has suffered through parallel avenue of consolidating dominance of the main parties in violation of the MMP spirit of compensating minorities; and that slow policy implementation has detracted from governability. On her part, Dimpho Motsamai (2015) analyses Lesotho’s post-2012 political and security situation. She concludes that the main issues of contention in Lesotho’s 2012 coalition were a result of unresolved past hostilities between parties and their leaders, and that political power bargaining was characterised by politics of ultimatums.

In determining research questions for this study, Peters’ (2012: 22) work is instructive. He points out that in governance there are four functional requirements, namely: goal setting, goal reconciliation and coordination, implementation, and feedback and accountability. This contribution is of interest for this study in that it creates concrete foundation upon which possible questions for this study could be

\[^1\] MMP is a system of elections in which representatives are elected through majority vote and the proportional representation list that is meant to compensate disproportionality in the vote (Likoti, 2009: 58).

\[^2\] According to Kapa and Shale (2014), the formula for calculating PR seats in Lesotho is: Total Country Votes divided by Total Seats in the National Assembly equal Quota, Total Party Votes divided by Quota equal Party Seats; in short:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Total Votes} &= \text{Quota}, \\
\text{Total Party Votes} &= \text{Party Seats} \\
\text{Total Seats} &= \text{Quota}
\end{align*}
\]
contextualised. For example: what were the goals for the coalition government? How were goals from coalition partners reconciled and harmonised? To what extent were these goals implemented? Did the coalition manage to look back and take stock of its successes and failures? As a way of feedback to the electorate, how do the coalition government partners account for the early collapse of the partnership? The possibilities are many and varied. However, the researcher settled for the following specific research questions in order to address the research problem for this study:

1) How was collaboration between coalition partners (ABC, BNP and LCD) fashioned?

2) What was agreed as collaboration arrangements among the coalition partners?

3) Which harmonization strategy was employed (given assumed differences)?

4) What were the resultant governance implications of these arrangements?

5) Why did the Coalition Government in Lesotho collapse?

6) Any lessons of Good Governance from the coalition governance experience?

1 How was collaboration between coalition partners (ABC, BNP and LCD) fashioned?

The first question would assist in understanding issues around the advent and adaptation of the coalition government in Lesotho. The academic significance of examining this trend is that the process addresses one of the vital preoccupations of institutional analysis, that is - institutional change (Kjær, 2004: 9; Greif and Laitin, 2012:3; Cortell and Peterson, 2012: 69). In the like manner, if coalition governance in Lesotho was to be meaningfully studied, then the emergence and change of the coalition government as the seedbed of the phenomenon has to be probed as well.

2 What was agreed as collaboration arrangements among the coalition partners?

The second question seeks to confirm the apparent power sharing arrangements amongst the three coalition partners. The implication here is that an agreement was moulded out of certain give-and-take compromises in order for the coalition to
subsist. Since there would be competing solutions to challenges whose antidote is that particular coalition, the agreement has to be binding to all the partners (Ward, 1995; 81). The reasoning for this implication is that coalitions are based on the capacity of the partnership to deliver benefits lower than the invested effort – “the desire to maximise payoffs and minimize cost” (Susser, 1992: 307). For example, there had to be considerations behind decisions reached in the distribution, proportions and choices of positions at the levels of Minister, Principal Secretary and other senior posts (such as: parliamentary, diplomatic and other statutory positions) in order to leave each partner feeling reasonably compensated for their contribution in the coalition.

3 Which harmonization strategy was employed?
The third question deals with the harmonization strategy adopted by the coalition partners in terms of their perceived differences in the character of the three participating political parties in terms of ideology and general aims, as espoused by party constitutions and electoral manifestoes of each party for both May 2012 as well as February 2015 elections. These are formal regulations for political parties that bring regularity not only within the parties, but also between the coalition partners as well. Regularity and consistency within a population enforced by a public authority is what governance is about (Jonker, 2001: 64). The importance of looking at different constitutions of the coalition parties and their election manifestoes is that they will provide a basis for comparison and contrast to determine the size of the rift that needed to be bridged.

4 What were the resultant governance implications of these arrangements?
The governance implications for the give-and-take compromises referred to above form the response to the fourth question. Issues of political behaviour, their implications and possibly their strengths and weaknesses will be examined. This examination will bring clarity on the context and complexity of relations within a coalition environment. The depth of this question is underlined by the fact that governance theory is embedded in institutional foundation, with the understanding that an institution consists of “formal and informal rules, behavioural codes and
norms that constitute prescriptions ordering repeated, interdependent relations” (Kjaer 2004: 8 - 9). This aspect of grounding governance on rules is corroborated by Chhotray and Stoker (2009: 3) who assert that governance is “…about the rules of collective decision-making in settings where there are a plurality of actors or organizations where no formal control system can dictate the terms of the relationship between these actors and organizations”. Rules are not the only important aspect of governance, a plurality of decision -makers is also anticipated. A character in line with coalition principle of shared governance.

5 Why did the Coalition Government in Lesotho collapse?
This question attempts to capture the reasons for the premature demise of the first coalition government in Lesotho. The prematurity is in relation to the normal five year period expected of an elected government as stipulated by the country’s 1993 Constitution. The significance of this question may be seen better as forming the rear end of the first research question. Since the first question deals with the rise of the coalition government as the anterior of this study, this question addresses its decline and subsequent fall as the posterior. This question calls for an analysis of factors that prevailed in Lesotho’s political life during the two year life-span of the first coalition government. The importance of the analysis is to contribute to the understanding of the workings of coalition governments.

6. Any lessons of Good Governance from the coalition governance experience?
A desirable result in the wake of the rise and fall of the first coalition government in Lesotho is generally political development, and specifically good governance. This question aims at highlighting salient political governance lessons within the context of good governance. It looks at the performance of Lesotho’s experience against the principles of good governance during the rise, tenure and fall of the first coalition government. The lessons may be many and varied; for Elke Krahmann (2008: 200), “[governance] specifically appears to be defined by the fragmentation of policymaking in seven dimensions: geography, function, distribution of resources, interests, norms, decision-making and implementation”. This means that the political
leadership of Lesotho needs to understand the implications of these dimensions if their coalitions are to be durable.

1.4 Aim of the study

The study examines coalition governance in Lesotho as a single case; in other words, it is a case study. A case study is an in-depth analysis of one entity (Babbie and Mouton, 2001: 281). It aims at describing role players, roles, behaviour, context and meanings that characterized the rise and fall of the coalition government in Lesotho, thus it is descriptive and it gives a narrative analysis of the phenomenon. Narrative is an “…approach to the elicitation and analysis of data that is sensitive to the senses of temporal sequence that people, as tellers of stories about their lives and surrounding episodes and inject into their accounts” (Bryman, 2008: 696). In this case ‘surrounding episodes’ would be different stages and aspects of the coalition government.

The aim of this study is to provide an accurate narration of ideas of coalition partners of Lesotho, in describing the emergence and development of coalition government in Lesotho since 2012. From this narration, a number of academic objectives could be achieved:

(a) Understanding the meaning, situations and actions coalition partners were involved in, and of the accounts that they give of their own life and experiences and how their understanding of such meaning influenced their behaviour towards coalition governance. In this regard, Bevir (2010: xxv) posits that “we have to ask how people create, recreate, and change their beliefs and actions in ways that produce and modify institutions”. In other words, effort should be made to deepen knowledge about the process by which individuals and collectives arrive at a given political conviction which informs their attitude in favour or in contempt of one political view or the other.

(b) Appreciating the processes by which the first coalition governance in Lesotho as an institution, emerged, developed, declined and ultimately collapsed. Following from Kjær’s general institutional definition of governance, this aim could be
realized by studying the rules set for, and set by the coalescing parties themselves, the extent of compliance and the effectiveness of such rules in consolidating and sustaining the coalition government. The definition referred to above, perceives governance as “the setting of rules, the application of rules, and the enforcement of rules” (Kjær, 2004:10). This may also mean that if there is no compliance by one, some, or all of the coalition partners, the rules would be ineffective and the coalition as an institution would decline and ultimately collapse. Then, since “institutions are systems of established and embedded social rules that structure social interactions” (Hodgson, 2012: 288), then depraved rules as well as political decisions and actions that defy effective rules only help in the disintegration of a coalition as an institution.

(c) Identifying unanticipated aspects of reality of coalition government in Lesotho, their influences, and developing new theories about the said influences. To achieve this aim, the study would have to analytically interrogate the natural character of coalition governments that structured coalition government leaders’ options within which they made their political choices. That is, examining coalition traits that imposed restrictions or offered latitude on these individuals in terms of shaping the rationale of their political moves. There is also the need to analyze attempts by each of the three coalition government leaders to mould the government according to what their parties stood for. These analyses strands are referred to as normative institutionalism and discursive institutionalism respectively. Put more simply, normative institutional analysis studies “the manner in which institutions shape the preferences of individuals, while the discursive version of institutionalism tends to focus on how individuals and their ideas tend to shape institutions (Peters and Pierre, 2012: vii). However, Schmidt (2012: 23) cautions that successful employment of discursive institutional analysis have to “… show empirically how, when, where, and why ideas and discourse matter for institutional change, and when they do not.”

(d) Determining the role of political parties’ ideological and policy convergence and/or divergence in the rise and fall of the first coalition government in Lesotho. In pursuit of this aim, ideological inclinations and policy preferences of political parties in the coalition government will be gleaned from party constitutions,
electoral manifestoes and views of the leaders. Ideology is an overall perspective of the ideal of a perfect world and policy outlook necessary to realize that ideal (Abrams, 1980:163). The result accrued from addressing this aim will, at academic level, contribute in the body of knowledge regarding impact of ideology on coalitions. At topical level, the view that coalition between congress and nationalist parties is analogous to mixing water and oil (for example, see Lesotho Times, 2015: 2) will be tested, confirmed or rebutted by the findings.

(e) Measuring Lesotho’s coalition government against the Worldwide Governance Indicators (Norris, 2011: 188 – 189) or against the principles of good governance espoused by Richardson (Sindane and Nambalirwa, 2012: 700 - 701).

1.5 Methodology
Since the coalition government (and by extension governance), is an institutional phenomenon, the study will employ institutional analysis to examine its general dynamics. That is, the conception and creation of the coalition government, its institutional arrangements and relations up to the point of its collapse. The depth and extent of new institutionalism as an analytical tool renders it ideal for this study. To this end Anne Mette Kjær observes that: “The new institutionalism has become central in all corners of the political science discipline and can be used to identify broad core that is basic to most governance theory” (2004: 2). In this sense, the application of institutional analysis to this study poses no risk of diluting the political nature of cooperative governance that the coalition government of Lesotho exemplify.

The methodology adopted in this study, to a large extend, took into consideration the problem of conceptualizing the term “governance”. Owing to the divergence of approaches and perspectives of social scientists, identifying a single definition of the concept governance, is as problematic as defining many political science concepts. In this regard Chhotray and Stoker (2009: 3) aptly assert that “[a] regular complaint across all literatures is that governance is vaguely defined, and the scope of its
application is not specified." Perhaps faced with a different set of challenges but with a similar problem, Kjær notes that:

The usage of the concept of governance … is applied in many different contexts and with as many different meanings. There is not one coherent body of governance theory, and it is difficult to get a clear picture of what governance theory is about (2004: 2).

One might dare arrive at a different conclusion yet from the same issue of vagueness and lack of clarity. The vagueness and lack of coherence expressed here result from the fundamental core of governance and the wide applicability of the same core; rules or regulation. Governance is rooted in rule making, which in itself brings orderliness and a sense of direction. This implies that a given aspect of life, in this case governance as influenced by coalition, has to follow a certain direction within certain parameters. In this sense, one discovers that where life is ordered or regulated to unfold in this or that direction, especially through human intervention, governance naturally comes into play. Therefore, the ability of governance to cover a wide spectrum of social science purview may be attributed to the fact that science seeks to uncover rules that dictate in various forms and doses: the emergence and/or decline, nature and/or operations, function and/or form, what is and/or what ought to be in terms of a phenomenon that is being empirically studied.

Still on the flexibility of the concept of governance, Peters (2012: 23 - 27) develops four theoretical applications of the term. Firstly, it can be used as a basis for comparison. In this regard, governance addresses questions such as: self-government and collective direction in societies, state-society relationships, institutional networks between and within formal and informal sectors, and how relatively free exchanges in the international system survive without formal state-like administration. Secondly, integration of political science sub-fields: merging divergent subjects within comparative politics into a more coherent whole may provide symbiotic enrichment effect brought about by increased analytic rigor of other connected sub-disciplines such as comparative public policy, law, economics, sociology and development studies. Thirdly, the potential to utilize other approaches:
this draws attention to the possibility to integrate other scientific approaches to explain and understand institutional dynamics.

Lastly, the ability to link normative and empirical questions: here the normative nature of rule-making can be linked to elements that enable its empirical analysis or measurement. Peters’ contribution above, paves the way to a search for measuring the coalition governance in Lesotho. To this end, Worldwide Governance Indicators (Norris, 2011: 188 – 189) and Richardson’s principles of good governance (Sindane and Nambalirwa, 2012: 700 - 701), offer a possible way out. Table 1.1 below presents the two measuring tools:

**Table 1.1: Governance Indicators and Principle of Good Governance**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Worldwide Governance Indicators</th>
<th>Principles of Good Governance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Voice and accountability</td>
<td>Participation based on freedom of speech and capacity for constructive engagement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political stability and absence of violence</td>
<td>Rule of law that is fair and impartially enforced.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government effectiveness</td>
<td>Transparency that is built on free flow of accurate information.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regulatory quality</td>
<td>Responsiveness, in which institutions and processes aim at serving all stakeholders.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rule of law</td>
<td>Consensus orientation in which differing interests are mediated.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control of corruption</td>
<td>Equity in which all stakeholders have the opportunity to improve and maintain their well-being</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Efficiency and effectiveness whereby real needs are met by making the best use of available resources.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Accountability in which government officials, public officials, and civil society organization are accountable to the public.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Strategic vision, in which all stakeholders have a long-term perspective on public affairs.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Sources: Adapted from Norris (2011: 188 – 189), and Sindane and Nambalirwa (2012: 700 – 701)*
Application of measurements such as the above could face criticism emanating from their naturally normative origins. That is, they are based on value judgements and thus they depend on the theoretical conviction of the observer. This may increase biasness. However, one tends to agree with Peters’ (2012) assertion that governance theory can, convincingly link normative questions to empirical measurement. For example, efforts on control of corruption and electoral participation, as indicators of good governance can produce quantifiable results. That is, corruption cases can be counted, and participation, frequency and transparency of free and fair elections are directly observable.

In her study, Kjær (2004: 3 – 7) looks at different definitions of governance and she identifies three political science sub-fields in which to classify them. The first class is made up of definitions that address public administration and public policy. Here, responsibilities, administration and accountability arrangement of the public sector along with regulating independent interactions between institutions are core to studies in this class. Secondly, she points to those that are pertinent to international relations. Globalization of business, the need for international trade regulation, environmental concerns, conflict management and health concerns necessitated the extension of international relations to cover global governance. Comparative politics provides for the third group. This sub-field enables the comparative study of political institutions such as political parties and groups, constitutions, governments, and other phenomenon encapsulated by what Kjær calls “state-society relations”. Therefore, according to this classification the current research problem would fall squarely in the sub-field of comparative politics.

The methodology that will be employed in this study will consist of an analysis of party constitutions and electoral manifestoes of the coalition partners. The theoretical analysis will be based on two strands of new institutionalism; discursive institutionalism and rational institutionalism, following the logic of the research questions will be followed. To analyse the case of Lesotho, game theory, coalition and government formation models as well as political games model will be applied. Another helpful aspect of analysis in this study is the classification of political parties; it will enable the discussion to treat political parties as unitary or individualized
entities with specific qualities that characterise them. To this end Babbie and Mouton (2001: 28) point out that the phenomenological tradition founding principle is based on understanding individuals “… first and foremost as conscious, self-directing, symbolic human beings…We continuously interpret, create, and give meaning to, define, justify and rationalize our actions.” The study follows an interpretativist paradigm because it aims at understanding how the subjects interpret this phenomenon (namely, the collapse of the coalition government within the first half of its five year term). According to Terre Blanche, Durreim and Painter (2006: 7) interpretive approach “… aims to explain the subjective reasons and meanings that lie behind social action.” This is in contrast with the positivist aim of establishing causal explanation for a phenomenon. The study is also inductive because it starts with the observed phenomenon and intents to ultimately make sense of what happened.

On the strength of the fact that the phenomenon under examination occurred within the context of political institutions of government and political parties, the approach to analysis will be based on new institutionalism. According to Kjær (2004) new institutionalism interprets behaviour through two main perspectives: rationalism and sociological. Rational behaviour relates to the tendency for individuals to weigh options and act on the option which results in the best benefit, a basic tenet of game theory. Sociological perspective posits that the individual’s actions tend to be influenced by norms and values of what is deemed acceptable in society and these shape the rules of the game in society, especially in political interactions. She points out that fundamental focus of institutional analysis include the means by which institutions influence political behaviour and institutional conception, and how institutions evolve or develop. These focal points are significant for this study in that the advent of coalition government in Lesotho had some measure of influence on political actors and vice versa. Also, the rise and fall of the coalition government as an institution bears reference to rational and sociological foundations of political nature.

Given the fact that political actors in government are individuals and political parties (especially in decision making), perceptions from the meanings alluded to in item (a)
above, may bring in elements requiring behavioural approach because “[b]ehaviouralists look at actors in the political system as individuals who have the emotions, prejudices, and predispositions of human beings ... Behaviouralists therefore study the political process by looking at how it relates to the motivations, personalities, or feelings of human actors” (Nkwachukwu Orji 2009: n.p.).

1.6 Coalition Government: Product of the 2012 Elections

Coalition Government in Lesotho was established following the 26th May 2012 General Elections that gave birth to the country’s 8th Parliament. From three parties in pre-independence elections of 1965, through general elections of 1970, 1985, 1993, 1998, 2002 and 2007 the number of political parties that competed in the Lesotho elections had proliferated to 18 in 2012. This is despite the fact that the country’s population is around 1.8 million only (IEC Lesotho: 2013).

Lesotho operates a mixed member proportional electoral model in which entry into the 120 member National Assembly is determined through the election of eighty members on the first-past-the-post (FPTP) basis at the constituencies mixed with forty members drawn from proportional representation, which in turn is based on party lists. The 2012 elections failed to produce a single outright winner with enough parliamentary seats (i.e. 61) to form a government on its own (IEC Lesotho: 2013).

In these elections the ruling Democratic Congress (DC) garnered 48 seats (41 constituency and 7 PR), 13 seats short of the required 61 seats to form a government. All Basotho Convention (ABC) won 30 seats (26 constituencies and 4 PR). Then Lesotho Congress for Democracy (LCD) followed with 12 constituencies and 14 PR seats making 26 seats in all. LCD was followed by Basotho National Party (BNP) with 5 PR seats.

Table 1.2 below shows all the parties that won seats in the 2012 elections, (leaving out those parties and independent candidates that did not win any seat):

---

3 FPTP is described as an electoral system in which one candidate, standing in own right (as opposed to being nominated into a party list), is elected to represent a constituency on the basis of simple plurality of votes with no need for absolute majority of votes (Matlosa, 2004).
Table 1.2: National Assembly Seat Distribution in the 8th Parliament

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PARTY</th>
<th>ACRONYM</th>
<th>CONSTITUENCY SEATS</th>
<th>PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION SEATS</th>
<th>TOTAL SEATS IN PARLIAMENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All Basotho Convention</td>
<td>ABC</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basotho Batho Democratic Party</td>
<td>BBDP</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basotho Congress Party</td>
<td>BCP</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basotho Democratic National Party</td>
<td>BDNP</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basotho National Party</td>
<td>BNP</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Congress</td>
<td>DC</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lesotho Congress for Democracy</td>
<td>LCD</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lesotho People’s Congress</td>
<td>LPC</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lesotho Workers Party</td>
<td>LWP</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marematlou Freedom Party</td>
<td>MFP</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Independence Party</td>
<td>NIP</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Popular Front For Democracy</td>
<td>PFD</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TOTAL NUMBER OF SEATS IN PARLIAMENT** 120

*Source: Adapted from IEC Lesotho (2013: 58)*

As a result of this outcome, and in accordance with section 87 (2) of the Constitution of Lesotho (1993), the then incumbent Prime Minister, Dr Pakalitha Mosisili and leader of DC, led his party in negotiating coalition with other parties aimed at
soliciting support of at least 61 members of parliament (MP) to enable DC to form a
government. DC’s attempts to negotiate coalition arrangement succeeded in
attracting only one MP from the sole representative of BBDP. Ultimately, it was ABC,
LCD and BNP that managed to collaborate and form a coalition that was recognised
under the Constitution to form a government, albeit with a slim majority of 61 against
the opposition’s 59.

Thus, the July 2012 inauguration of Thabane as the Prime Minister of Lesotho left
DC and its partner BBDP in the opposition. Other parties (BDNP, LPC, LWP, MFP,
NIP and PFD) with a total of nine seats, opted to be regarded as neutral bloc on
parliamentary cross benches, undertaking to support either the opposition or the
government as and when they would deem appropriate, and BCP with one seat
decided not to join neither DC nor the bloc, but to remain an independent opposition
party (Mpeli, 2012). One could interpret this development as a deliberate move by
the opposition to snub DC and thus curtail its 15 years monopoly on power. DC
reacted by repeatedly predicting that the coalition will not last for its five year term,
dubbing it a ‘mixture of water and oil’ (Lesotho Times, 2013c: n.p.). This prophesy of
doom, according to DC’s leader Pakalitha Mosisili, was predicated on ideological
divergence between Congress and Nationalist parties (Lesotho Times, 2015: 2).

1.7 Coalition Government: Signs of Rupture.

Thomas Thabane, the leader of ABC became the Prime Minister; Mothejoa Metsing,
leader of LCD became his deputy; and Thesele ‘Maseribane became the first
minister. Ministerial portfolios were allocated in different proportions amongst MPs
from the three coalition partners. ABC was allocated 11 ministries; LCD was
allocated 9 and BNP 2 (LTV, 26 July 2012). Soon after the installation of the new
government, signs of disharmony began to show. Firstly, the Prime Minister
organized public rallies in different venues around the country. It was widely
expected that the three leaders would be seen together marketing their new
approach to issues of governance and soliciting support for their programme of
action. Or at least to show a unified front to the electorate so that confidence in the
novel arrangement of coalition is consolidated. Instead, what was witnessed was that
partners were going in separate directions and addressing different issues. For example: the Prime Minister’s rallies addressed corruption and theft, Deputy Prime Minister addressed issues around rebuilding his party which had lost a huge number of supporters before the election. This loss was a result of the then recent split in which DC was established in a February 2012 split, three months before the elections. The fact that DC won 48 seats and LCD 26 bears testimony to the extent of the loss. The BNP appeared less enthusiastic in holding rallies (MoAfrika FM, 29 September 2012). This showed no unity of purpose in government.

Another visible factor was that on Public Service day celebration in October 2012, the Prime Minister was expected to give a State of the Nation Address. The occasion coincided with the expiry of 100 days in office by the new coalition government, the time he had promised to deliver progress report on the question of goals of his new coalition government and programme of action (Shale, 2012: 3). He simply dismissed the expectation by indicating that there were issues still to be thrashed out by the leaders of the coalition (MoAfrika FM, 27 October 2012). That never happened; an indication that agreement was hard to come-by in the coalition.

Soon there were media reports that the multi-billion dollar Lesotho Highlands Water Project (LHWP) Phase 2 was to be transferred from the LCD controlled Ministry of Energy and Water Affairs to the Prime Minister’s office; the leader of LCD and Deputy Prime Minister, Mothejoa Metsing, publicly denied any knowledge of the plan and the move was abandoned after Metsing threatened to pull LCD out of the coalition (Lesotho Times, 2013a: n.p.). Hardly a month later, a new flare of conflict in the tri-partite coalition was reported (Lesotho Times, 2013b: n.p.). This time around, partners were in a row over allocation of diplomatic positions abroad. The foregoing episodes are but a few examples of a partnership beleaguered by internal disputes.

1.8 Coalition Government: The Collapse.

DC’s prediction materialized when the coalition government collapsed sometime in June 2014, just over two years into its five years term (Motsamai, 2015: 2). The collapse was announced in a press conference convened by LCD on 11 June 2014 and it partly read:
We have decided that we can no longer endure the humiliation that the Honourable Dr Thabane is inflicting upon the LCD by his unilateral and undemocratic conduct… [the LCD has decided to] accept that the Prime Minister has cancelled and rendered nugatory the strength and existence of the coalition by refusing to observe and adhere to the good faith and democratic principles… (Lesotho Times 12 -18 June 2014a: 2).

However, a rival newspaper reported the Prime Minister’s denial of the collapse of the coalition (Public Eye 13 – 19 June 2014b: 2). In this publication, Prime Minister Thabane is reported to have admitted that due to the instability within the coalition government, he had to advise the King, in terms of section 83 of the Constitution to suspend the parliament in order to give talks between the coalition partners a chance. The suspension of parliament and the ensuing tension in the government resulted in a visit by the then SACD Chairperson, Hifikepunye Pohamba the President of Namibia (Lesotho Times 12 -18 June 2014b: 4).

Following Pohamba’s visit to Lesotho, it became clear that the entire collective of heads of state and of government needed to chart a more robust approach to mediation. Several declarations were signed at Windhoek (31 July 2014), Victoria Falls (18 August 2014) and Pretoria (01 September 2014), but all failed to bring about a solution for resuscitating the coalition government in Lesotho (SADC, 2014; Motsamai, 2015: 10).

As the Coalition collapsed, an impasse of constitutional proportions ensued, and the resultant crisis was characterized by prorogation of parliament, violent skirmishes between the security organizations (the police and the army) and a general deterioration of the security situation in the country; (hopefully, more details on this crisis will be dealt with in subsequent chapters of the research whose foundation is this chapter). This instability prompted the Southern African Development Community (SADC) to intervene (Ramaphosa, 2014).

The intervention came in the form of the SADC appointed Deputy President Ramaphosa of South African who headed a mediation team into Lesotho (SADC, 2014: 2). One of the resolutions of this process was that Lesotho would hold early
elections before the end of February 2015 (Guardian News, 2015; Public Eye Online, 2014, 2015a and b; SEOM, 2015,). This was despite the fact that the last elections were held hardly two years earlier in May 2012 (IEC Lesotho 2013). Under the efforts of this team, Maseru Declaration was signed and progress was realised. The parliament was reopened on 17 October 2014; a date for fresh elections was set for 28 February 2015; head of the army and of the police were temporarily deployed out of the country; peaceful elections took place as agreed in the declaration – all parties seem to accept the outcome. The 9th Parliament of Lesotho was thereafter, sworn in on 10th March 2015 (LTV, 10 March, 2015). Dr Pakalitha Mosisili was inaugurated as a ‘new’ prime minister on 17 March 2015 (News24.com: 2015); he had been a prime minister for three terms from 1998 to 2012.

A brief look at the background of political parties in Lesotho will provide the political context within which its first coalition governance subsisted.

1.9 Political Parties in Lesotho

With the end of World War II came the demise of colonialism and many colonial territories prepared for independence. It was within this background that on the 7th October 1952 the first political party, Basutoland African Congress (BAC), was born in Lesotho (Machobane, 2001: 2; Mphanya, 2004: 10). The establishment of BAC is closely linked to the struggle in South Africa to abolish colonisation and apartheid led by the African National Congress (ANC) and other movements. In 1949, an ANC Conference adopted a ‘Programme of Action’ under the auspices of which the ideals of ‘Pan-Africanism’ were to be propagated in Southern Africa through the establishment of congress movements in the neighbouring states; thus congress parties were formed in Zimbabwe, Malawi and Lesotho (Mphanya, 2004: 1 – 20). However, BAC was considered to be an ANC branch in Lesotho and with the country’s independence drawing near, BAC changed its name to Basutoland Congress Party (BCP). It developed its own independent identity as a political party and it drifted away from the ANC while drawing closer to the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC), a development that saw BCP even adopting PAC’s militant language. This inclination attracted perceptions that BCP was radical and communist (Khaketla,
1971: 39; Tsosane, 2010: 4). BCP’s affiliation to Nkrumah’s Convention People’s Party as well as dubbing to the church and the chieftainship as puppets of parasitic colonialists only served to reinforce the perceptions about its alignment with communism (Weisfelder, 1999).

Faced with the spectre of a hostile left-wing party poised to take over Lesotho’s administration at independence, the Roman Catholic Mission in Lesotho encouraged the establishment of Basutoland National Party (BNP) in 1958 to counter balance and/or neutralize BCP with an opposing ideology along the lines of Christian Democratic Parties that were present in Germany, Belgium, Switzerland, and the Netherlands (Khaketla, 1971). It was only logical for the church to seek to protect its interests in the face of communist threat.

Other parties that were established around the same time are Marematlou Party and Basutoland Freedom Party (BFP) in October 1957 and March 1961 respectively (Weisfelder, 1999: 37 – 45). Chief S. S. Matete, the former advisor to the Regent Paramount Chieftainess ‘Mantsebo Seeiso, was the founding leader of Marematlou Party. This party’s main objectives were to see to the immediate installation of Prince Bereng Seeiso as Paramount Chief, and to improve cooperation between chiefs and commoners. BFP was formed by B.M. Khaketla who had just then left BCP’s deputy presidency. Its main aim was to secure executive powers for the Paramount Chief. The merger of these two parties in October 1962 to form Marematlou Freedom Party (MFP) came as a matter of course.

The perceived radical and left-wing BCP and the religious right-wing BNP created a cleavage which may prove to be of interest in subsequent chapters as a basis for ideological difference between “congress” parties and “nationalist” parties. These three parties, BCP, BNP and MFP were the main contenders in the 1965 elections that paved the way for the 1966 independence.

At independence, Lesotho adopted a parliamentary system of government along the line of Westminster model emulated from the former colonial master, the United Kingdom. Lesotho’s system of government is discussed in more detail in Chapter 3; suffice it to indicate that Lesotho has a constitutional monarch, a prime minister and a cabinet appointed from the elected members of a bi-cameral parliament.
In summary, the above exposition presented coalition governance as the theme of the study. It argues that coalition governance is one form among many approaches to the organization of government. Therefore, it deserves to be studied systematically because of its potential to contribute meaningfully to governance as a field of study. The electoral result that produced coalition government in Lesotho was dealt with. A cursory look at the coalition government betrayed its potential threat of ultimate implosion from within. This was followed by an examination of the origins of political parties as key players in the coalition governance game as it unfolded in Lesotho.

1.10 Research Design

The research design in this section is used to denote the core components and layout of the study. This study will have the following layout of chapters:

1. Introduction

This chapter presents the study and highlights its main components. These constituent aspects include motivation, rationale, research problem, aims of the study and methodology. Methodology describes the planned and the actually employed methods in this study. It indicates the data collection techniques, the type of data collected and the format of presentation. It also reveals the strategies used for data analysis. Synopsis of the coalition reality in Lesotho is also presented in subsections that precede the research design.

2. Conceptual Framework

The second chapter will peruse the current literature on political coalitions, governance and good governance. The object of the exercise will be to establish the character of coalition governance and to formally establish the theoretical frame of reference and the context in which the concept will be applied in this study. This will also test the conceptual applicability in analyzing the situation in Lesotho. Of special interest will be game theory and Riker’s Minimum Winning Coalition; government formation model; and coalition formation in political games.
3. Lesotho’s Political Background

Chapter three will give a general overview of political parties; their definitions, functions and their classification models. It will also look at the origins and contemporary political history of Lesotho with particular emphasis on the political parties that formed the first coalition: ABC, LCD and BNP. It will also present an abridged description of the characteristics and functions of government structures in Lesotho. These will, hopefully, provide the context within which to understand political parties as players in Lesotho’s political games. It will also give proper political background that shaped the environment within which the coalition government was conceived and nurtured.

4. Coalition Governance in Lesotho

The fourth chapter will delve deep into the emergence and workings (as surrounding episodes) of the coalition governance in Lesotho. Special attention will be focused on expressed or implied coalition intentions, operations and endurance of the alliance. These focal points are reminiscent of, and indeed attract Mouton and Marais’ (1990: 40) Classification System in this study. This System groups individuals, institutions, social aspects/attributes and social interactions according to their conditions, orientations and acts. The application of this System is aimed at generating understanding of the phenomenon as it unfolds in Lesotho and turning it into knowledge of comparative value in the study of governance. In this context good governance principles of participation, accountability, transparency, rule of law, democracy, effectiveness, and responsiveness will be applied as a measuring tool for Lesotho’s case. In this manner, governance implications of the collaborative arrangements that underpinned the coalition government in Lesotho will be examined.

5. Evaluation of Lesotho Coalition Governance

The existence of governance challenges within the coalition government in Lesotho is not a figment of conjecture, rather its early demise and the early elections of February 2015, was a manifestation and indeed to some extent, the result of the said challenges. This chapter will address the fifth research question: why did the Coalition Government of Lesotho collapse? To this end, Lesotho’s 2012 coalition
government and its governance will be studied in the context of theoretical models, which would have been dealt with in the previous chapters. Looking at Lesotho’s experience through theoretical models will, to some extent, put to a test, the success with which theories can be applied to reality and shape an understanding of practical experience in perspective of theories and models. As a result of this approach, coalition governance in Lesotho, as presented in the preceding chapters, will be assessed, judged and evaluated.

6. Conclusion: Findings and Recommendations

The concluding chapter will be used to: re-capture in synoptic form, the salient issues put forth by each of the chapters in this study. Then the main findings of the research will be presented and be followed by recommendation. Lastly, other areas of study for the future will be suggested.
CHAPTER 2

POLITICAL COALITIONS AND GOVERNANCE:
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

2.1 Introduction

This chapter is a product of the perusal of the current literature on political coalitions and governance. The object of this exercise was to generate or develop a link between political coalitions and governance as relevant concepts in this study and to formally establish the theoretical frame of reference and the context in which other relevant concepts will be applied in this study. Tracing conceptual roots of political coalitions and governance, will hopefully, accentuate their relevance in analysing the case of Lesotho, thereby contributing to their credibility as concepts worth noting in political science theory. The capacity of theory to explain, enhances the understanding of political behaviour (De Swaan, 1973: 2). The opening section endeavours to retrace the roots and the context of political coalitions as a viable political phenomenon. A look at political coalitions highlights the formation rules of coalitions and the forces of cohesion that keep them together for some time, thus positioning the study in the realm of governance and providing a theoretical basis for the theme of this study: coalition governance in Lesotho.

2.2 Political Coalitions

Traditional political theories seem to be a convenient point to start the examination of coalitions. Of these theories, social contract casts some interesting parallels. Coalition between individuals can be likened to Hobbes’ (1588 – 1679) view of social contract in which an individual, in an endeavour to seek peace and self-defence, gives up some of his/her rights in relation to others for collective peace and common defence (Curtis, 1981a). In Hobbes’ opinion, man without community is in a state of
constant war against other men who also are at war with him. Thus man is in a state of anarchy, until he joins with some of them who are willing to form a community in which members share mutual surrender of individual rights to one another in exchange for collective peace and security. The result is a society in which individual rights are limited or regulated by the rights of other individuals within such a society. Though starting from a different premise, John Locke (1632 – 1704) arrives at a similar understanding of social contract. In his view, man is born in a state of nature in which natural law seeks protection of natural rights (life, liberty and property), which rights ought not to be arbitrarily taken away from one at the whim of another. Locke is emphatic in his argument, he says:

*Men being by nature all free, equal, and independent, no one can be put out of this estate and subjected to the political power of another without his own consent. The only way whereby any one divests himself of his natural liberty, and puts on the bounds of civil society, is by agreeing with other men to join and unite into a community for their comfortable, safe, and peaceable living one amongst another, in a secure enjoyment of their properties and a greater security against any that are not...* (Curtis, 1981a: 379)

In agreement, Hume (1711 – 1776) argues that all men in their native liberty are more or less equal in their physical and intellectual faculties, by their own consent affiliate together under laws of an authority of government in exchange for peace and order, based on a contract between willing partners (Curtis, 1981a). Rousseau (1712 – 1778) traversed a similar route and is view is that social contract is a solution for a social problem, described as:

*To find a form of association which will defend and protect with the whole common force the person and goods of each associate, and in which each, while uniting himself with all, may still obey himself alone, and remain as free as before* (Curtis, 1981b: 18).
The foregoing traditional theorists identify political coalitions, right at the beginning of society and the state. Agreeably so, because an underlying character of coalescing is the need to be with others for the sake of acquiring that which would otherwise be impossible to acquire when pursued by an isolated individual, in this case security and by extension, peace. Understandably, one can hardly be at peace in the face of deficiency in security. The following sub-sections deal with political coalitions.

2.2.1 Definitions and Features of Coalitions

An overwhelming majority of authors consulted on ‘coalitions’ do not assign any politically opposed definition for this concept. This might suggest that ‘coalition’ is used in its normal English Language meaning, that is: “a temporary alliance, especially of political parties forming a government” (Concise Oxford English Dictionary, 2006). The definitions that surfaced do basically corroborate the dictionary meaning of the concept albeit in different levels of complexity. According to William H. Riker (Matthews, 1963: 578),

"Politics is the making of decisions about “the authoritative allocation of value.” Most of these decisions are made by groups and reaching a group decision “is a process of forming a subgroup which, by the rules accepted by all members, can decide for a whole. This subgroup is a coalition” (Matthews, 1963: 578).

De Swaan’s (1973: 30) view is that “a group of actors that have decided to coordinate their choices into common strategy is called a coalition…the term is also used for an actor operating on his own (a one-man coalition)."

Coalition, according to Hinckley (1981: 4), is “defined as the joint use of resources to determine the outcome of a mixed-motive situation involving more than two units. A mixed-motive situation is further defined as one in which there is an element of conflict, since there exists no outcome which maximizes the payoff to everybody”

O’Day (n.d: 2) asserts that “[a] coalition is usually a temporary union between two or more groups, especially political parties, for the purpose of gaining more influence or power than the individual groups or parties can hope to achieve on their own.”
Acemoglu, Egorov and Sonin (2006: 1) suggest as follows:

Consider a society in which each individual possesses some amount of military power (“guns”) and can form a “coalition” with other individuals to fight against the remaining individuals. A group (coalition) that has sufficient power becomes the “ruling coalition”; it determines the allocation of resources in the society, e.g., how a pie of size 1 will be distributed.

More recent formulations that attempt to describe and define coalitions do not appear to deviate much from the above. Reilly-King’s (2011: 2) opinion is that “the term ‘coalition’ is used... to denote a number of like-minded organizations who have coalesced around a common focus to engage in a set of collaborative actions”. In their study of coalitions, regime types and militarized disputes, Graham, Gartzke and Fariss (2015: 5) define what they call ‘wartime coalitions’ as “states that fight on the same side of a military contest, whether or not they are party to formal treaties”.

Though differently styled, juxtaposing the seven definitions reveals interesting features of coalitions. These features are: 1. Coalitions are political in nature; 2. Coalitions occur in collective settings; and 3. Coalitions facilitate conferment of control.

Firstly, the political nature of coalitions is pronounced by the fact that they (coalitions) tend to form during the process of seeking to regulate distribution of values in society. In fact, for Riker (Matthews, 1963: 578), coalitions form as a means to some political ends, ‘authoritative allocation of value’. For O’Day, the emphasis is laid on political parties as the main actors. As such, in their struggle to seize political power, political parties involve the population through recruitment and political socialization. For as Kadima (2006: 5) points out, the main aim of political parties is to access power. Acemoglu et al. (2006: 1) trace the translation of individual power into collective power used as leverage to attain prominence into a ruling coalition. This in turn enables the ruling coalition to attain the right to allocate scarce resources.

Secondly, the setting of coalitions is rooted in collective effort. Undoubtedly, these authors refer to one form of collective or the other in order to establish a coalition. These collectives are: groups or subgroups (Acemoglu et al., 2006: 5; Matthews,
1963: 578) or political parties (O’Day, n.d.: 2). Regardless of the name given to these coalitions and for all intents and purposes, they can be seen as an amalgamation into a collective that acts as a distinct entity.

Lastly, according to Riker (Matthews, 1963: 578), conferment of the mandate to control is depicted by ceding the power to a subgroup to decide on behalf of the whole larger group. For O’Day (n.d.: 2), political parties compete for more influence, as a function of power, in order to take control of political power. This can be linked to the right to be a government. Here it should be remembered that “…whatever, changes are made to government and its interventions in economy and society, at the centre lies the fact of political power, possession of and closeness to which always bring reward and privilege” (Crouch, 2004: 101). The ‘reward and privilege’ can be seen as payoffs for being part of the winning coalition. For Acemoglu et al. (2006: 5), the dominant group attains the status of a “ruling coalition” and therefore, defines the formula for or regulates distribution of resources.

A tabular presentation of these features may be used to sum up this subsection, thus Table 2.1 below is employed in this regard.
Table 2.1: Table of Coalition Features

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Author</th>
<th>Political Context</th>
<th>Collective Setting</th>
<th>Aspiration to Control</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Riker (in Matthews 1963)</td>
<td>Authoritative allocation of value</td>
<td>Subgroups within a group</td>
<td>Group decision</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>De Swaan (1973)</td>
<td>Coordination of choices</td>
<td>Group of actors</td>
<td>Common strategy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hinckley (1981)</td>
<td>Mixed-motive situation</td>
<td>More than two units</td>
<td>Joint use of resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O'Day (n.d.)</td>
<td>Collective influence/ power</td>
<td>Two or more groups or political parties</td>
<td>More influence or power</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acemoglu et al. 2006</td>
<td>Ruling coalition</td>
<td>Groups of individuals</td>
<td>Allocation of resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reilly-King (2011)</td>
<td>Coalition around common focus</td>
<td>Number of organizations</td>
<td>Set of collaborative actions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Graham et al. (2015)</td>
<td>Military contest</td>
<td>States</td>
<td>Winning the war</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author's compilation

On reflection, and with the assistance of Table 2.1 above, the main reasons for the formation of coalitions is demonstrated: the desire to seize or control the power that determines allocation of scarce resources. Winter’s (n.d.: 5) conclusion in this regard is interesting:

*In politics, indeed in all voting situations, the power of a coalition comes down to the question of whether it can impose a certain collective decision,*
or, in a typical application, whether it possesses the necessary majority to pass a bill.

In other words, coalitions form to improve access to and consolidation of political power; for it is through this asset that the successful actors can control the distribution of values in society.

### 2.2.2 Coalition Formation Models

Studies of coalitions are preoccupied with determining which coalitions would form (Abrams, 1980: 231) as well as predicting and explaining models of government formation in parliamentary democracies (Kadima, 2006: 5). A number of models and approaches have been developed in this regard.

**(a) Game Theory**

The game theory, which W. H. Riker refined in the early 1960’s, is defined as

…the study of collective choice situations in which individual decisions depend on not only upon individual preferences, but upon preferences of the other individuals involved, and upon outcomes which result from different sets of individual choices (Abrams, 1980: 189).

For Turocy and Stengel (2001: 4):

*Game theory is the formal study of conflict and cooperation. Game theoretic concepts apply whenever the actions of several agents are interdependent... the concepts of game theory provide a language to formulate, structure, analyze, and understand strategic scenarios.*

Essential elements in these definitions are the relationships between individual preferences, preferences of others and outcomes of choices made severally and collectively. It is the essence of these relationships that underlie the study of collective choice. Conscious determination of own preferences, in the context of known or assumed preferences of others, and making a deliberate choice on an issue to achieve a particular goal, means that we are dealing with a set of rational
individuals. Given the foregoing, a question may arise as to what then game theory aims to achieve.

The aim of the game theory is to search for the dominant alternative or option for rational, utility-maximizing actors in a game (Abrams, 1980: 190). In this theory, decision-making plays out in the realm of collective-choice in which decision-makers are analogically labelled players in a game; which game is defined by its rules (Hoelle, 2014). Games are played in terms of their rules, moves, strategies and pay-offs (utility). That is, in any game, the pay-offs are the utility that all the players seek to maximise. However, of major concern for this study are characteristic-function games because they have coalitions as alternatives. In a parliamentary government ‘game’, the pay-off is the right to form a government, and that is the prerogative of a winning single party or coalition of parties whose dominance is determined by the number of seats in parliament (Alt and Alesina, 1996: 654).

Within the context of parliamentary system of government and the analyses of political coalitions, Riker predicts that the most likely coalition to form will be the minimum winning coalition (MWC); where MWC is “…a coalition which would not be winning if any one of its members defected” (Abrams, 1980: 236). Riker in Abrams (1980) continues by providing the following conditions for MWC to prevail:

(i) N-person zero-sum games
(ii) Rational players
(iii) Perfect information
(iv) Side-payments
(v) Negatively sloped characteristic function
(vi) Control over membership

The implications for these conditions may possibly be better understood through their generalised and simplified description in the context of government formation in parliamentary systems.
(i) N-person zero-sum games

N-person zero sum game means more than two players pitted against each other in a competition whose reward for the winner is the same for all players, such that the winner wins exactly what the losers lose, in this case ‘the opportunity to form a government’ (Abrams, 1980; Acemoglu et al., 2006; Başar, 2010; Tema, 2014). In this parliamentary game more than two political parties vie for dominance through deliberate decisions. This means parties would be assessing each other and making decisions in order to determine which allies would best suit coalition purposes in a hung parliament. That is, to minimise the number of beneficiaries in order to maximise the benefits of being ‘the government’; for example, sharing of cabinet and other senior government positions.

(ii) Rational players

Cerny (1990: 56 - 57) describes rational choice as a range of collective actors in societal, or economic, or political context engaged in different calculative decision-making in contest or collaboration to suit a specific challenge. The understanding therefore, should be that, players in coalitional games are rational actors who calculate benefit from invested effort, who weigh their options and are expected to act in a manner that enhances their advantage (Gintis, 2015; Turocy and Stengel, 2001). However, Eriksson (2011: 46) cautions that “people are not perfect decision-makers; they have limited information, limited time and definitely limited calculation capabilities.” Further, the rationality of players does not in itself guarantee that the best choice will be obvious (Fudenberg and Levine, 2016). These imply that the notion of rational players should be applied within reasonable practicalities of life.

(iii) Perfect information

According to Turocy and Stengel (2001: 3) “a game has perfect information when at any point in time only one player makes a move, and knows all the actions that have been made until then.” The benefits, in determining potential coalition partners, are considered in light of imperfect information. This notion of imperfect information is based on Kenneth Arrow’s (1951) conclusion that, “no aggregation method that takes individual’s preferences and turns them into a collective decision can be guaranteed to result in an outcome that corresponds reasonably to those preferences” (Eriksson,
2011: 3 - 4). That is, the long term intentions of these potential partners to remain in the coalition cannot be guaranteed in advance. The result of which is the existence of coalitions larger than MWC; the inclusion of extra member(s) is mainly designed to keep the coalition stable should one of the partners leave such a coalition (Abrams, 1980: 231).

In agreement with this thinking, one may see MWC as a deliberate means to consolidate the stability of the coalition by widening the margin between the winning majority and the losing minority.

(iv) Side-payments
Side-payments represent communication and agreement on trade-offs during the rational deliberations on who will be offered what in return for which concessions towards the ultimate winning coalition akin to cost-benefit analysis. Side-payments “are utility transfers between players in a cooperative game” (Zagare and Slantchev, 2010: 4). In less technical terms, Hinckley (1981: 60) defines side-payments as a “…transfer of some payment, such as money, from one player to another either before or after a coalition has formed, and it exists independently of the payoffs to the players”. This means that the value or benefit is transferable from one actor to another. The implication here is that a MWC partly owes its existence, and its stability – while it lasts, on a promise of a profit that would be shared amongst the members. One may safely assume that reneging on the promise and failing to deliver on part or all of the side-payments would lead to the collapse of a coalition.

(v) Negatively sloped characteristic function
Characteristic function refers to the graphic representation of the benefit allocation among coalition members in different coalitional configurations (Zagare and Slantchev, 2010: 3). Serrano (2012: 3) refers to characteristic function as “the payoff or sets of payoffs that are available to each player or set of players”. The ‘negatively sloped’ nature of the graph illustrates that ‘as the size increases, the benefits tend to decrease’. This means, since the aim is to maximise benefit brought-about by the payoffs, coalition membership would tend to be minimised in pursuit of an increase in
the share that each member would stand to gain with the exclusion of some member or members.

(vi) Control over membership
Control over membership relies on the assumption that collective choices by each of the parties in parliament override individual preferences of party members (Abrams, 1980). This homogeneous approach to intra-organizational membership is also noted by a number of authors, albeit without neglecting to acknowledge internal diversity (Liu, 2014: 2). Noting the importance of managing intra-organizational membership, Ruppel and Kennedy (1997: 1291) use an analogy of the US Congress membership diversity that breeds what they call an environment “rife with coalitions that form across a spectrum of values on any given set of legislative issues”. One would expect that collective choices, once reached, are not publicly challenged or rejected by intra or sub-party dissention, allowing for parties and other collective actors to be seen as discrete players. It can be inferred that in this context, coalitions can be seriously undermined by intra-organizational dissention and ultimately collapse.

In the final analysis, Cerny (1990: 136) advances a common criticism against MWC and observes that, “to some extent, the application of this theory to empirical evidence, and the various modifications which it has undergone, have partially undermined its primary analytical value – its generality and its predictive quality.” However, Cerny (1990) concedes that, despite weaknesses in the application of its methods, MWC’s value as a standard for rational choice cannot be totally refuted.

(b) Model of Government Formation
This model is concerned with “… the making and breaking of governments in situations in which actors are concerned with the substantive content of government policy outputs” (Laver and Shepsle, 1996: 58). The main characteristics of this model are as follows:

(i) **Policy-motivated parties**;

(ii) **A lattice of feasible governments**;
(iii) A status quo government;
(iv) A process of status quo government replacement;
(v) Common knowledge enabling actors to exercise rational foresight; and
(vi) No exogenous enforcement of deals between parties (Laver and Shepsle, 1996: 112).

Laver and Shepsle (1996: 112), concede that almost all of these characters are generally at odds with the common models of coalition formation, particularly those of government formation. They cite a number of examples:

(i) Policy-motivated parties

Ground-breaking coalition models, Riker’s (1962) model included, assumed that parties were office seeking rather than inspired by policy – Laver and Shepsle (1996) assert that this assumption has seen a lot of modifications since its inception. This implies that these postulations cannot be relied upon as theoretical basis without attracting the same conditions which necessitated the modifications. Indeed, looking at these models superficially would lead to over-simplification of assumptions about them. Riker’s (1962) model, for example, “dealt with the formation of government coalitions and argued that the coalitions formed will be the minimally winning ones, so that the benefits of office will be split between as few as possible” (Ericksson, 2011: 3). This clearly indicates that some coalitions form not only for the sake of being in office, but rather, they do so in order to reap the benefits of the office. However, policy influence remains one of the most important contingent of both coalition and government formation permutations in a multi-party political system. According to Horváth (2013: 1) party policy position appears to be one of the crucial “explanatory variables in predicting coalition and government type, coalition membership of strategic parties, and in forecasting government membership of parties in general.” In this regard, Döring and Hellström (2013: 685) also concur; they observe that “policy-seeking models predict that parties in a coalition mainly try to maximise policy coherence and form coalitions with parties connected in the political space.
(ii) A lattice of feasible governments

All coalition theories based on policy-seeking actors assume a single point in the policy space as the central point from which a winning coalition (government) could form – in contrast, Laver and Shepsle’s (1996) model points out that in reality, it is governments which come into being, not policy contracts. In defining policy, Nelson (1996: 554) quotes James Anderson (1995), who proposed policy to be “a purposive course of action, followed by an actor or set of actors in dealing with a matter of concern.” The understanding here may be that though political actors may be viewed in terms of their different approaches to issues (policy stand), they are not necessarily coalescing in pursuit of the establishment of universal policy for all to subscribe to. Rather, they seek to be a government; the role of whose policy is only to guide its approach to governing. Politicians are motivated by self-interest and the rents they receive (Persson and Tabellini, 2000: 10); therefore, they opportunistically choose a given policy as a means to these ends. In this sense, we are cautioned that policy choice might not necessarily lead to its implementation; it might be lip-serviced and/or be discarded as soon as it has propelled a politician into office and at time be a cover for corrupt self-enrichment by the elite (Moene and Søreide, 2015).

(iii) A status quo government and (iv) the process of its replacement

Most models of government formation processes “have been timeless and ahistorical” – the contrast here is that, Laver and Shepsle’s (1996) proposition starts from a specific chronological dimension and develops within and according to agreed rules of the game. This suggestion means that coalitions are determined among others, by the status quo and guided by convention. Therefore, coalition theory should not be divorced from historical conditions imposed by the status quo and the rules of the game as anticipated by the relevant constitutional regulation. This thought is reinforced by Roland’s (2012: 53) observation that “the relative strengths of forces of change and of conservatism map onto conflict and change also depends on the existing institutions”. The historical context brings with it comparative value in terms of political development in a single or a number of political systems. For instance, Easton (1990: 21) contends that improvements in the performance of political systems should be based on the knowledge of “the factors that lead to existing structures to take the form they do”. That is, factors responsible for changes
in governments’ form, outlook or performance as institutions are not only based on the processes involved in bringing about a new government, but can also be derived from the historical legacy bequeathed by previous governments. This is because this historical legacy forms part of the environment within which the in-coming government is born and operates, and this environment can be expected to be either enabling or hampering progress and/or success in certain directions. This logic finds support in Cerny’s (1990: 133) observation that the morphology of party systems (which could as well be governments), is derived from, among other things, their environments which in turn determine “mobilizable” resources given historical, economic and societal limitations.

(v) Common knowledge enabling actors to exercise rational foresight

Earlier theories presumed plain if not tacit parochial naivety by political actors – conversely, Laver and Shepsle (1996) recognize political actors’ ability to make calculated decisions, hence they propose more rigid test for equilibrium concepts. The implication here is that owing to sequential nature of government formation, political actors are not casually drawn together to form a winning coalition. The assumption is that each sub-coalition knows all there is to know about the intentions of others, and on that basis, they rationally think through their options and possible consequences of their choices (Laver and Shepsle, 1996: 113). In agreement with this notion, Myerson (1999: 5) asserts that individuals in a society will exercise their discretion to control what they can within the ambit of their information and capability to further their idea of happiness in anticipation of actions by others. This in turn raises the bar for predicting equilibrium concepts due to the difficulty in calculating variables associated with what one political actor thinks about the intentions of the next actor. Equilibrium concepts are notions that explain or describe stable conditions in which each player perceives maximization of benefit given available information to that player (Aumann, 1987; Tan and Wang, 2010).

(vi) No exogenous enforcement of deals between parties

Almost all game-theoretic approaches to government formation adopted a cooperative approach and based, albeit sometimes impliedly, on a third party referee – in contrast, Laver and Shepsle (1996) submit that non-cooperative approaches,
though accepting that parties engage in “cooperative” coalitions, policy compromises or portfolio allocations, they do so because it is in the best interest of all who cooperate and that depends on self-enforcement. The argument here is that cooperation is not based on external enforcement. Meaning the arbitration lies with the internally based mechanisms for dispute resolution since compromise on its own can only go so far. This accentuates the necessity and existence of dispute resolution arrangements and structures that ought to be robust enough either to prevent or resolve disputes in order to prevent the collapse of the coalition. Tsebelis (1988: 145 - 146) uses what he calls “Nested Games” to account for inter-coalition and intra-coalition cooperation. He asserts that, Nested Games model:

predicts the cohesion of coalitions as a function of the relative size of both the coalitions and the partners within each coalition... [The players’] choices affect the balances of forces within each coalition, and the balance of forces between coalitions. The game between partners is, therefore, nested inside the game between coalitions.

In a way, Tsebelis’ (1988) proposition corresponds with Laver and Shepsle’s (1996) understanding of internal cooperation though arguing from a different perspective. It would appear that cooperation that enhances cohesion relies on self-preservation on the part of coalitions as collective entities; they have an inherent desire to perpetuate their existence in furtherance of the benefits they stand to gain, as opposed to losing out as a result of leaving the coalition. One understands that internal cohesion lasts as long as the utility or the benefits of being in the coalition are perceived to be equal or greater than the ones anticipated to accrue from seceding from the coalition.

(c) Coalition Formation in Political Games

Acemoglu, Egorov and Sonin (2006) propose three complimentary approaches to the study of coalitions, particularly in relation to the process of their formation. These are: axiomatic approach, dynamic game and non-transferable utility cooperative game. Axiomatic game suggests that unique ruling coalition must meet two conditions; the first being the possession of power aggregate greater than all individuals within the population as the founding basis of the winning coalition. This condition is referred to
as power constraint. The second condition is enforcement constraint; that is, the absence of a stable subcoalition aspiring to break away from the main coalition in a bid to increase benefits for its members. In their words, Acemoglu et al. (2006: 1) assert that “…tension between the power and the stability of a group is a common feature in many situations where coalitions have to form in order to make collective choices or determine the allocation of resources”.

Dynamic game is the second approach to coalition formation examined by Acemoglu et al. (2006: 4). This approach deals with foundational stages or chain of episodes in which a subunit of actors forms a coalition, in what Hyndman and Ray (2007: 286) term “coalition formation in real time”, that eventually wins the competition to be the ruling coalition ahead of other contesting subunits. According to Ruppel, and Kennedy (1997: 1289) these precoalition dynamics involve predictions on:

(a) What coalition(s) will form,
(b) What the reward structure will be in the winning coalition, and
(c) How near the deliberating body is to an acceptable agreement

The establishment of an optimum coalition with no need for further elimination contest following this series of mutations is referred to as sequentially weakly dominant equilibria, and these coalitions are considered to be in concurrence with ruling coalitions recognised in axiomatic approach (Acemoglu et al. (2006). Informally, but still within the game theoretic terms, equilibrium refers to a situation in which players in coalitions are faced with absence of strategies that can produce better payoffs by unilaterally changing their strategy (Aumann, 1987; Moreno and Wooders, 1996; Myerson, 1999; Maskin, 2003).

Acemoglu et al., (2006) also suggest that the study of coalitions can be approached from the perspective of a non-transferable utility cooperative game. A game is described as non-transferable if its nature is determined by a collection of players and an array of possible results for each coalition (Hart, 2004). Players are said to be in a cooperative game if their decisions and actions towards bargaining and coalition formation are made collectively with full trust to the benefit of all players without
drawbacks (Başar, 2010: 3). The core of this approach, Acemoglu et al. (2006) further assert, is equivalent to both axiomatic and dynamic approaches.

The thrust of Acemoglu et al.’s (2006) work is associated with three main studies. The first is in the area of social choice; whose main problem is defining the social welfare function of a society as pointed out in Arrow’s impossibility theorem. Arrow’s theorem was an attempt to address one of the perennial problems of social choice – aggregation of individual preferences within a societal context (Risse, 2001). This theorem, according to Maskin (2009), proposes that it is not possible for collective social choice to satisfy all the following six conditions at the same time:

(a) Decisiveness – meaning, clearly defined choice or winner;
(b) Consensus – the most preferred choice will be selected/elected unopposed;
(c) No dictatorship – choice must not depend on one voter;
(d) Independence – irrelevant alternatives should not affect the result;
(e) Equal treatment of voters – e.g. one man one vote; and
(f) Equal treatment of candidates – all candidates should be ranked the same.

Acemoglu et al., (2006) introduce the notion that aggregating of individual preferences is possible in a situation where only self-enforcing coalitions are allowed to form. The implication is that lack of decisiveness and consensus in determining social choice occur where voters are treated as individuals and not allowed to coalesce. Hence, the need for coalitions where the election result fails to produce a clear winner and re-election appears to be impractical or too expensive.

The second is on models of bargaining for resources. These include legislative bargaining model and Shapley value of bargaining game. “The Shapley value is based on the idea that an actor by joining a coalition adds to its value and that the weighted average of these value increments effected by an actor are an indication of his importance (power) in the game…” (De Swaan, 1973: 45). Therefore, “like a price index or other market indices, the value uses averages to aggregate the power of players in their various cooperation opportunities” (Winter, n.d.: 2). Acemoglu et al.’s (2006) approach does not impose any specific bargaining structure and it focuses on
endogenously-emerging ruling coalition as opposed to bargaining among the society as a collective.

The third is in equilibrium coalition formation, which is characterized by a combination of cooperative and non-cooperative game theory. The idea of equilibrium in game theory was formulated by John Nash (1950) to denote “a profile of strategies, one for each player in the game, such that each player’s strategy maximizes his expected utility payoff against the given strategies of other players” (Myerson, 1999: 5). In their approach, Acemoglu et al. (2006: 7) suggest that compliance can be imposed by the majority over the minority without external enforcement thereby introducing “negative externalities” in contrast with “…positive externalities and free-rider problems…” dealt with by Ray and Vohra (1999) and Maskin (2003).

This study of Acemoglu et al., (2006: 5 – 6) on ruling coalitions arrives at a seven-point conclusion that can be summarised as follows:

1. ruling coalitions are an unavoidable phenomenon in society;
2. benefits of joining such a coalition do not depend on a single player, irrespective of the number of individual players and of their power as individuals;
3. therefore, the most powerful player may be excluded in the ruling coalition;
4. the rise in supermajority – (further majority beyond simple majority), does not produce larger ruling coalitions;
5. ruling coalitions are generally unstable;
6. power of individual players in a ruling coalition is complemented by the collective power of the coalition;
7. some sizes of coalitions are more likely to emerge as ruling coalitions than others.

The prescriptive picture that this conclusion paints renders it a possible tool for measuring coalitions in general, and coalition formation in Lesotho in particular. This does not mean that the measuring tool modelled out of this conclusion is perfect. For example, computational proofs in points 4, 5, and 7 of this conclusion require conversance with operational formulas that are usually expressed in set notations,
and are based on abstract mathematical and/or statistical equations (these formulas can be seen in: Liu, 2014: 3; Hyndman and Ray, 2007: 1128; Ruppel and Kennedy 1997: 1290; Weese, 2013: 4; Maskin, 2003: 4 and others). Such conversance, which this researcher is yet to acquire, is a rare aptitude for an average student of governance and politics. Owing not only to their abstract character, but also owing to their inclination towards natural science empiricism, these points of the prescription will be used sparingly in this study. This is especially so because natural science empiricism requires controlled experimentation methods, a tricky business given the setting of coalitions. According to Cerny (1990: 136),

> [c]oalitions in the real world are built in circumstances which are never entirely replicable and are not subject to control; and the intersection of a range of different games, with their interstitial gaps and tensions, is … characterized by complex regions of indeterminacy.”

### 2.2.3 Review

This subsection looked at definitions of coalition, models and the rationale for coalition formation. What was established from these definitions is that: participants seek to temporarily join coalitions pursuant to certain benefits that would not be forthcoming had it not been for the existence of the coalition. Coalitions are political in nature, they occur in societal collectives and their formation facilitate conferment of regulatory powers on winning coalitions. In other words, coalitions form in an effort to consolidate power which in turn qualifies the one who wield it to authoritatively regulate values in society.

Consolidation of power in turn qualifies the one who wields it, to authoritatively regulate values in society. Issues attendant to ruling coalitions, such as power, authority, regulation, and enforcement of compliance imply not only the political nature of coalitions but an inclusion of some elements of governance. Therefore, it becomes imperative to examine the concept more closely. Examination of governance, a subject of the next section, takes the discussion a step forward towards understanding the theme of this research: coalition governance in Lesotho.
2.3 Governance

Several authors have noted that the term governance is internally fluid and externally adoptable, thus making it very accommodating to adjectives that seek to delineate its meaning (Kjær, 2004; Chhotray and Stoker, 2009; Peters, 2012; Zumbansen, 2012). This means that a study that involves this term should contextualize it clearly for it to add value to the content of the discourse. Therefore, the direction that this part of the study attempts to take is inspired by Peters’ (2012: 19) claim that:

… if conceptualized adequately, then governance can be the foundation of a significant political theory that can be important for developing contemporary political science. In particular, an emphasis on governance enables the discipline of political science to recapture some of its roots by focusing more explicitly on how the public sector, in conjunction with private sector actors, transnational actors, or alone, is capable of providing direction and control for society and the economy.

Of general interest for this study, is the context in which certain actors capture the control of the public sector (government) and thereby achieve the right to “provide direction and control for society and the economy” as well as how they perform in that regard. This section examines governance in terms of: definitions, theory, functions and characteristics.

2.3.1 Defining Governance

Ruggie (2014: 5) defines governance as referring “to the system of authoritative norms, rules, institutions, and practices by means of which any collectivity, from the local to the global, manages its common affairs”. This definition points to the centrality of authority and regulation in running of mutual undertakings between actors. As alluded to in the last chapter, it is possible to situate governance in three different but related political science sub-fields as suggested by Kjær (2004: 3 - 7). These are: public administration and public policy; international relations; and comparative politics. Under each of these sub-fields, Kjær presents definitions proposed by other authors as examples. An example of a public administration and
A public policy based definition is attributed to R.A.W. Rhodes (Kjær, 2004: 3) and it reads:

*Governance refers to self-organizing, interorganizational networks characterized by interdependence, resource-exchange, rules of the game, and significant autonomy from the state.*

This definition brings to mind three salient points. These are: independent linkages between players; regulation; and the receding role of the state in the participants’ interactions. One recalls that the diminishing role of the state as represented through public administration has been understood to be the product of “a long standing critique in western democracies of the traditional Weberian type of public administration as being rigid and bureaucratic, expensive and inefficient” (Rothstein, 2013: 6). Peters and Wright (1996: 629) had earlier also alluded to this development in their essay, *Public Policy and Administration, Old and New*. They note that management notions adapted from the private sector have supplanted classical public administration concepts for the sake of economy, efficiency and effectiveness; curiously termed “new managerialism”. New managerialism is complemented by what they call “patrimonialism” which refers to politician’s bid to seek more support from civil service and to determine appointments into public offices. Peters and Wright conclude their observation by highlighting another mode in which public administration is declining – “new fragmentation”. This takes place in the form of more functions being decentralized to sub-national agencies such as regional or provincial authorities, municipalities and/or autonomous organizations. In turn, these agencies forge their own networks with the private sector and often agree and sign memoranda of understanding or cooperation.

Compliance in transactions above is not enforced by any formal state apparatus. In this sense, governance takes the form of a combination of exchanges and guidance of self-determined rules between interacting actors. This observation is in concurrence with Chhoktray and Stoker’s (2009: 3) assertion that:

*Governance is about the rules of collective decision-making in settings where there are a plurality of actors or organizations and where no formal control*
system can dictate the terms of the relationship between these actors and organizations.

By ‘formal control system’ one tends to understand the regulative and enforcement role played by the state through any number of government departments or agencies. Clearly, in the absence of the state to impose exogenous control, then endogenous rules agreed to by the participating collective find a way to flourish. Accordingly, application of regulations and any form of control system in interactions between and within different sectors of society inter-weave into configurations of rule, and these are the main ingredients of governance (Tsekpo, 2015).

In the sphere of international relations, Kjær (2004: 3) cites a definition coined by James N. Rosenau, which says:

*Global governance is conceived to include systems of rule at all levels of human activity – from the family to international organization – in which the pursuit of goals through the exercise of control has transnational repercussions.*

This definition points to the crucial role played by direction and regulation in interactions between groups of human beings. However, it introduces a different dimension, that of transnational implications. It is important for one to note that the “transnational” calls for the “national” to be defined in this context – the context of governance and international relations (IR). In IR, the concept of the “national” is commonly termed the nation-state and it is the main unit of analysis in this field. According to Goldmann (1996: 404), “[t]he state, in the sense of nation-state, is a defining feature of ‘international’. If the state did not exist, neither would IR. Without the concept of state to fall back on, scholars would have to abandon the claim that there is something unique about the ‘international’ or interstate realm”.

The relational continuum that link the sub-national actors across and beyond the national to the international, as perceived by Rosenau’s definition above, leaves the state governance amenable to involuntary change in congruence with changes in the international level under pressure from conglomerates (Chou, 2015). On this issue
Kjær’s (2004: 5) conclusion that “…increasing globalization has raised a need for
global governance in many arenas such as trade regulation, the environment and
conflict resolution” is in harmony with Keohane’s (1996: 462) view that “the
internationalization of the world economy has blurred the boundaries between
domestic and international politics, and made it harder to treat the two subjects as
separate spheres.” Globalization in this context is conceptualized in terms of
structural competition in which regional, national and local communities compete
globally such that growth and development is determined by success in securing a
niche in the worldwide marketplace (Bang and Esmark, 2013).

The following definition by Goran Hyden is seen by Kjær (2004: 3) as situated in the
realm of comparative politics:

*Governance is the stewardship of formal and informal political rules of the
game. Governance refers to those measures that involve setting the rules for
the exercise of power and settling conflicts over such rules.*

If Rhodes’ definition focused on network rules independent from the state and
Rosenau’s emphasises systems of rule whose impact goes beyond the state
(transnational), Hyden’s definition highlights regulation of political power. Power in
this context is looked at as a product of national and sub-national arrangements
structured and applied within a political system; and as such power is one of the
main preoccupations of comparative politics (Apter, 1996). Put differently, “a good
deal of governance is about the exercise of various forms of power. There are
different types of power – ideological, political, legal, economic, administrative, and
so on – and governments everywhere frequently use various combinations of power
to govern” (Yezi, Chipoya, Yezi, and Ndlovu 2013: 11). It is worth noting that
“interpreting the significance of differences in the uses and allocations of power by
different political systems is the common enterprise underlying various alternative
approaches to comparative politics” (Apter, 1996: 372).

Interesting linkages between this definition and some of the research questions of
this study can be established. The modelling of collaborative arrangements between
the coalition partners, cabinet seats allocation and power sharing agreement can be linked to “setting rules for the exercise of power…” In the like manner, harmonization of policies and priorities as depicted by election manifestoes can be linked to the part on “settling conflicts” within the definition. In the final analysis, these linkages place this study squarely in the domain of comparative politics.

A look at other definitions of governance presents similar state-centric notions albeit, with slight modifications as will be seen in the following:

…governance is defined as the manner in which power is exercised in the management of a country’s economic and social resources for development (World Bank, 1992: 1).

True to its state-centric nature, World Bank’s definition places the state’s role at the centre stage of governance context and activity. The core of the state’s activity in this regard is the administration of values in economic and social terms within her borders. Thus the central governance function of the state revolves around development. In clear recognition that governance cannot be confined within a one-size-fits-all description, the World Bank acknowledges the possibility of a wider approach, by recognizing three aspects of governance:

(i) The form of political regime;
(ii) The process by which authority is exercised in the management of a country’s resources for development;
(iii) The capacity of governments to design, formulate, and implement policies and discharge functions (World Bank, 1994: xiv).

These aspects do not deviate from the 1992 definition in their state-centric outlook as well as the associated implications for the state-society relations. The first aspect takes on the structural and institutional arrangements of governments. It is couched in a manner that acknowledges diversity in government types and styles. The second captures the procedural considerations that encapsulate the manner in which interaction between authority and scarce resources is channelled for self-
determination. That is, the distributive character of political power is focused at improving the lives of the citizens. The last aspect refers to the extent to which states are able to translate their political ideology into strategies and programmes necessary for the execution of their duties towards the citizens.

Governance concerns the rules, institutions, and processes that form the nexus of state-society relations where government and citizens interact. This domain combines public administration and state structures, politics and the exercise of power and authority, and policy-making and implementation (Brinkerhoff, 2007: 2).

Brinkerhoff’s definition captures the essence of both the second and third aspect of governance posited by the World Bank. That is, the application of authority in the state-society relations context as well as policy formulation and implementation.

Governance, broadly defined, is the means by which the state acquires and exercises authority to provide for citizens. The outputs of governance processes and systems, at their most basic, are at the core of what affects citizens on a daily basis (McNeil and Malena, 2010: 13).

The acquisition of authority in this definition can be linked to the first aspect of governance. One of the defining characters of a political regime is the manner in which it came into power and how it maintains its grip at the helm of a country’s political affairs. The definition goes on to include the distributive responsibility of the state and to emphasize the centrality of governance outputs in the daily lives of the citizens. The next subsection deals with theories of governance.

2.3.2 Theories of Governance

The meaning of theory in the context of scientific research is a convenient point to start this section. According to Bryman (2008: 6):
The term ‘theory’ is used in a variety of different ways, but its most common meaning is as an explanation of observed regularities. Theory is important to the social researcher because it provides a backcloth and rationale for the research that is being conducted.

This articulation recognizes the role of theory as to provide a framework within which the subject of study can be understood and the research findings can be interpreted. The same appears to be the case with governance theory as noted by a number of authors. These are a few examples: for Stoker (1998: 18), governance theory “provides a framework for understanding changing processes of governing”. It “helps to frame an understanding of how the processes of collective decision-making fail or succeed in our societies” (Chhotray and Stoker, 1999: 5). His contribution to the 2010 Jerusalem Papers, Peters’ (2010b: 1) article (Governance as Political Theory) “examines the potential utility of governance as an organizing framework for political science...” Thus, this apparent consensus points to the acceptability of using governance as a theoretical frame of reference in the field of political science.


Kjær (2004) suggests that governance can be theoretically located in three political science sub-fields of public administration and public policy, international relations and comparative politics. She further recognizes its use in the European Union and the World Bank studies. Public management reforms of the 1980’s gave rise to governance approach as network management under which networks analysis, their accessibility, types of actors, and how they can be managed are dealt with (Kjær, 2004). Here governance is concerned with rules that guide public policy formulation.
and implementation. This includes managing complex plurality of bureaucratic institutions, markets and networks (Dryzek and Dunleavy, 2009).

Governance in international relations resulted from the acceleration of complex interdependence occasioned by globalization (Kjær, 2004). In this context, governance takes the form of a process by which “rules of global public policy-making are set, applied and enforced” (Kjær, 2004: 192). Theoretical questions that arise here include: how effective are international institutions? To what extent can the nation-state be bound by the international rules? Which actors are responsible for upholding political norms and rules in the global arena? How can democratic principles and accountability be ensured at global level? In this regard, Risse (2006: 184) points out that “many argue that democratic governance beyond the nation state is impossible because there is no ‘demos’ based upon a collective and cosmopolitan identity of ‘world citizenship’ which includes a sense common purpose”.

In comparative politics, governance looks at institutional models and processes that are essential to economic development and regime change (Kjær, 2004). The role of the state in economic development has been a focus of study in comparative politics for some time and the central question has been the optimal extent of state regulation of the market. In Dryzek and Dunleavy’s (2009: 101) words, “from ancient times through to the dawn of the modern era, markets were hedged with restrictions about who could produce what, who could consume, who was allowed to labour for monetary income, and who was allowed to trade”. For comparative politics, governance provides a framework for economic policy-making and institutional framework for political regime, a basic function of a constitution.

At the supra-national level exemplified by the European Union (EU), governance seeks to identify actors in the policy processes and studies their impact on member states’ policy-making outputs (Kjær, 2004). According to Schmitter (2006: 158) the term governance befits the EU due to “the diffuse, obscure, and multi-layered way that the EU goes about its business”. In recognition of the importance of private actors in governance, European governance arrangements progressively improve cooperation between public and private actors (Benz and Papadopoulos, 2006). The
general outlook of governance then becomes the establishment, execution and enforcement of rules for European policy-making in the realms of networks, markets or hierarchies.

Governance in World Bank context takes three dimensions: first, economic governance and conditions the Bank attaches to loans to poor countries as they affect the state and politics; secondly, accountability of international organizations. Thirdly, as part of global governance, it needs to be accountable to the global public over and above its accountability towards its shareholders (Kjær, 2004). One recalls the Bank’s own recognition of three aspects of governance alluded to in section 2.3.1 above:

(i) The form of political regime;

(ii) The process by which authority is exercised in the management of a country’s resources for development;

(iii) The capacity of governments to design, formulate, and implement policies and discharge functions (World Bank, 1994: xiv).

Of interest from these aspects of governance is their exogenous outlook; they are directed at the state and nothing is said about the Bank’s internal governance issues. As a corporate entity and not a political one, perhaps the Bank is right in not reflecting on itself in this regard.

In a bid to minimize concerns about the characterization of governance as: a “fetish” (Peters, 2012: 19); as “many things” (Levi-Faur, 2012: 3); as a “catchword” (Kooiman, Bavink, Chuenpagdee, Mahon and Pullin, 2008: 2); and as “vaguely defined”, Chhotray and Stoker (2009: 3) advance this definition of the term:

*Governance is about the rules of collective decision-making in settings where there are a plurality of actors or organizations and where no formal control system can dictate the terms of the relationship between these actors and organizations.*
In order to delimit the scope and coverage of governance, Chhotray and Stoker (2009: 3 - 4) dissect the definition they offered into its constituent elements: rules, collective, decision-making, and ‘no formal control system can dictate’. By ‘rules’ they mean a combination of formal and informal institutions within which a group’s priorities are conceived and ordered – decision-making arrangements. This thinking mirrors Kjær’s (2004: 10) broad definition of governance: “the setting of rules, the application of rules, and the enforcement of rules”. The two opinions only serve to illustrate the essential role of rules in governance; in fact rules are the bedrock upon which governance is built.

The second element is “collective” and it refers to assured reciprocated incentive among peers and a shared duty to assent to agreed course of action (Chhotray and Stoker, 2009). Where people live together as a collective society, politics is an unavoidable phenomenon. In this context, Young (1996) equates politics to a life made up of citizens that, notwithstanding their individual preferences, participate in public life where individuals present themselves as such and act together to build and maintain their collective or societal existence through and shaped by instruments of order. A less abstract view of the ‘collective’ is noted by Peters (2012: 20):

\[\text{Societies require collective choices about a range of issues that cannot be addressed adequately by individual action, and some means must be found to make and implement those decisions.}\]

The third element of governance definition is “decision-making”; decision-making could be “strategic but it also can be contained in the everyday practice of a system or organization” (Chhotray and Stoker, 2009: 4). This means that governance agenda could dwell on collective decision-making processes within organizations as well as on rules governing larger systems of sub-national, national and international levels. Decision-making in this context begs a number of questions: does the proximity of decision-making arena enable it to sufficiently know the requirements and resources of its territory (Taiclet, 2006)? Are the decision-makers identifiable, their contribution to decisions perceivable and can they be controlled by those they represent (Benz, 2006)? Is ceding decision-making to a select sub-group (chartering)
justifiable, who should be chartered (composition), which decision-making procedure (rules) do they follow (Schmitter, 2006)? A closer look at these questions will reveal that they respectively refer to issues of decision-maker competence and accountability, and why (should they decide for others?), who (should they be?) and how (should they decide?). These are standard questions for governance.

The last element of governance definition identified by Chhotray and Stoker, (2009) is ‘no formal control system can dictate’. This is where no one is in charge, situations of “governance without government” (Rhodes, 1996; Pollack, 2005: Peters, 2010a: 4). Here the focus is on the relations and interactions between actors that are not dependent on government authority and its coercive institutions, but rather sustained by horizontal interdependence among the actors to achieve shared goals. Looked at from the theory of international relations, though the world order is said to be in a state of anarchy, states still interact collaboratively to accomplish mutual advantages or aims in an orderly fashion even without the world government (Pollack, 2005).

Levi-Faur (2012: 8) gives four meanings of the term governance, structure, process, mechanism and strategy:

As a structure, governance signifies the architecture of formal and informal institutions; as a process it signifies the dynamics and steering functions involved in lengthy never-ending processes of policy-making; as a mechanism it signifies institutional procedures of decision-making, of compliance and of control (or instruments); finally, as a strategy it signifies the actors’ efforts to govern and manipulate the design of institutions and mechanisms in order to shape choice and preferences.

Building from this background, Levi-Faur (2012) differentiates four approaches to state in governance theory. Governance as hollowing out of the state – this theorizes the move from government to governance characterized by dislodgment of power and authority from nation-states to transnational markets and political institutions and to local or regional governments, domestic business communities and non-governmental organizations. Degovernancing is the second perspective of state on governance theory. In this context degovernancing is about deliberate and
inadvertent implications of curtailing the ability to govern via bureaucratic and political mechanisms. The ideal here is preference of market forces over state rule and ‘lite’ types of regulation. The next perspective is state-centered governance. This refers to the merging of: an acknowledgement of changes in state administration, its policy deficiencies and the significance of private sector in policy process locally and internationally, without losing the centrality of the steering role of the state. The fourth perspective is Big Governance, and it examines the relations between governments and governance. Big Governance “suggests that governance and regulation are the hallmarks of the structure of polities, the processes of politics and of policy outcomes” (Levi-Faur, 2012: 13).

Peters (2012) offers a view that depicts the concept of governance as a broad political theory and illustrates multiple ways through which his perspective could be relevant to current theoretical and practical governance questions. He asserts that governance can be viewed as:

(a) A functionalist argument - it deals with questions around the state’s basic decision-making functions of rule-making, rule application and rule adjudication. For governance, the following are identified as functional requirements: goal selection, goal reconciliation and coordination, implementation, and feedback and accountability (these are briefly discussed in the next sub-section – 2.3.3).

(b) A basis of general comparison – this provides a dimension that investigates how governance functions in different settings, and implications of decisions made about governance arrangements and procedures.

(c) A link of fields within comparative politics – assimilating a multiplicity of topics and fields within comparative politics in pursuit of a more coherent whole in this sub-discipline. These topics include: economic governance and corporate governance, sociology and governance for society, development studies and
effective patterns of governance in transitional societies, and law and governance.

(d) Integrating other approaches – governance has the potential to mix or apply other methods to political science and to a certain degree, it can do the same for some approaches to other social sciences. That is, governance requires the involvement of other explanations for some aspects of decision-making if internal dynamics of processes are to be understood. An example can be seen in the conception of economics as “the use and governance of scarce resources” in the provision of public goods (Winden, 2012: 108).

(e) Linking normative and empirical questions – governance can be utilized to assess the quality of life in a society. The normative aspects become more pronounced with the application of good governance. In this sense, quality may be determined normatively and in some analyses be treated concurrently in quantitatively empirical methods. For example, economic growth can be presented in numerical indexes and its seedbed can be explained qualitatively in terms of normative political environment.

According to Rhodes (2012), there are three waves in governance literature, namely: network governance, meta-governance and interpretive governance. Network governance suggests an ideal in which state power is distributed over a large multiplicity of different dimensional and practical networks. Network governance is defined as “1) a relative (sic.) stable horizontal articulation of interdependent, but operationally autonomous actors; 2) who interact through negotiations; 3) which take place within a regulative, normative, cognitive and imaginary framework; 4) that to a certain extent is self-regulating; and 5) which contribute to the production of public purpose within or across particular policy areas” (Sørensen and Torfing, 2004: 7).

Network governance can be sub-divided into four faces that: provides a modernist-empiricist description of the changes in the public sector; explains or interprets
government change by clarifying the change resulting from functional diversity and development; offers policy advice to administrators on how best to navigate networks and cooperation; and that prescribes the means of advancing democratic governance such as the increase of participation through networks and governance (Rhodes, 2012).

The second wave is metagovernance, which is referred to as “the role of the state in securing the coordination in governance and its use of negotiation, diplomacy, and more informal modes of steering” (Rhodes, 2012: 37). Here the state’s role of steering is equated to and seen as rule-making, defining values (storytelling), and resource allocation. The role of directly providing services or rowing is, in metagovernance, done by sub-national authorities, private and voluntary organizations.

Interpretive governance is the third wave and it characterizes a move from institutional approaches to “meanings in action” (Rhodes, 2012: 39). That is, examining governance in terms of actors’ perspectives of how they interpret their own beliefs and practices. Here Rhodes (2012) argues that daily activities, that have a bearing on governance, are guided by individuals whose convictions and decisions arise from traditions and are recounted in their history. These activities are studied, he continues, in order to understand the shifting boundaries between the state and civil society resulting from the change in how the actors continuously revise their approaches to new challenges. Rhodes (2012: 44) further asserts that the third wave:

…replaces aggregate concepts such as state, institution, power, and governance with narratives that explain actions by relating them to the beliefs and practices of individual actors. Governance arises out of the diverse actions and practices inspired by varied beliefs of agents rooted in traditions.

This view of governance is closely associated with phenomenological or interpretivist tradition which emphasizes that any social science research should necessarily take into account “the fact that people are continuously constructing, developing, and
changing (common-sense) interpretations of their world(s)” (Babbie and Mouton, 2001: 28).

2.3.3 Functions of Governance
According to Chhotray and Stoker (2009:4) typical governance concerns are derived from “…specific combination of formal and informal institutions that influence the way that a group of people determine what to decide, how to decide, and who shall decide.” This conception of governance reminds one of Harold Lasswell’s definition of politics - “who gets what, when and how” (Gooding and Klingemann, 1996: 8). The two are analogous to each other on the issues of setting of the agenda or priorities; regulation of the process (rules of the game); and agents or actors in the game. What follows then, are perceptions on the functions of governance.

(a) Functions of governance
The key functions of governance are strategic planning and articulation of goals; financing; public communication and accountability to different stakeholders; and selection and performance review management (Wellman, 2006: 51).

From this prescription one perceives quite a range of areas under the ambit of governance. Strategic planning and articulation of goals combines the highest order of planning with the expression of what ought to be state priorities. Logically, a master plan produced by strategic planning has to enunciate goals to be reached, aims to be achieved and targets to be met; in the sphere of public life this is the function of governance. To this end, Karl Marx asserts that the state imposes its preferences on the citizens as a result of its control of both economic and intellectual production, put in his words: “the ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas...The class which has the means of material production at its disposal, has control at the same time over the mental production...” (Pascal, 1947: 39).
One may ask: is the ruling class or the state justified in imposing its will on a citizen? According to some, it is indeed justified. In politics, constitutions and laws, as plans to achieve defined goals, guide “…an existing hierarchy that attaches public authority to certain political roles (public officers) and gives the occupants of these roles (politicians) the right to impose decisions on everyone else. These decisions are enforced by courts and backed by the political power of the state” (Williamson, 1995: 120). In this context, constitutions bestow authority on the state (government) and as such, strategic Planning and goal articulation becomes a legitimate exercise of authority by the state. For her part, Pippa Norris asserts that “state capacity determines how far regime authorities can achieve their goals and perform functions essential for collective well-being, including maintaining order and security within the nation’s territorial boundaries, improving welfare outcomes for its population and expanding prosperity” (Norris, 2012: 44).

The governance function of financing could be better understood if taken from the basic function of government; that of ensuring the survival of a nation (Ranney, 1996). One of the ways that a government addresses this function is to satisfy the needs of the people who placed such a government in power. It does this by blending both economic and political demands into policies, and using funds appropriated by parliament to implement those policies in such a manner that the majority of the people feel relatively accommodated (Ranney, 1996). Financing in this context is raising and providing funds for public spending (Bartol and Martin, 1991). Financing as a function of governance is analysed at a more abstract level in the study of political economy. Political economy is the study that deals with the following two questions: (1) “how do institutions evolve in response to individual incentives, strategies, and choices [?], and [2] how do institutions affect the performance of political and economic systems?” (Alt and Alesina, 1996: 645).

Public communication and accountability: communication is “the transmission of meaning through the use of symbols… the most common form of communication is human society, … is the system of oral and written symbols that we call language” (Ranney, 1996: 133). Clearly, implications for communication in governance are very profound. That is, for the government to plan, to articulate goals, to finance,
and to account, it needs some form of communication to express itself. Accountability is defined as “the requirement to provide satisfactory reasons for significant deviations from duties or expected results” (Bartol and Martin, 1991: 353). This definition gives an ominous outlook towards accountability. Cultivating accountability should not always attract antagonistic interactions between involved parties (Bergh, Foresti, Menocal and Wild, 2012). One would suppose that accountability is needed even if there were no deviations and results came out as anticipated, for comparative and consistency purposes. However, in political circles accountability serves to reinvigorate legitimacy; its deficiency leads to administrative failure, poor political decisions and venality (Huque, 2011). In Zunbansen’s (2012: 85) words, “… where the grounds of legitimacy have become questionable or contested, accountability promises the re-establishment of a quasi-legitimating foundation of order, without having to answer to any question of substantive grounding.”

Starting from her hypothesis that management and governance are used to achieve different objectives Lynda Bourne (2014), makes a proposition that if one thing is recognized as a ‘management function’ it cannot, at the same time be identified as a ‘governance function’. She identifies management functions as: planning, organising, leading, coordinating, and controlling; and then she recognises the following as governance functions: determining the objectives of the organization, determining the ethics of the organization, creating the culture of the organization, ensuring compliance by the organization, ensuring accountability by the management, and designing and implementing the governance framework for the organization (Bourne, 2014: 2 – 3).

Relying on rational choice analyses and looking at government from the perspective of European Union, Pollack (2008: 5) identifies three functions of government as: decision-making within the Council of Ministers in the realm of legislative politics; delegating to European Commission and other agencies and exercising of executive powers; and judicial politics with special reference to the role of European Court of Justice in relation to European Union member governments and national courts. Pollack’s decision-making function of government could be inferred from both
legislative and executive outputs; and it clearly overlaps with that of Bourne (2014). Pollack’s (2008) view coincides with that of Heywood (2000: 19) who sees core functions of government as the ability to make laws (legislation), implement law (execution) and interpret law (adjudication). Thus Bourne’s (2014) proposition that governance functions cannot be government functions as well, is disputable. This becomes more obvious in light of the following two definitions of governance: 1. “Governance should, in theory at least, facilitate the linking up of … policy-making and policy administration; of the political and legal aspects” (Bulmer, 1997: 4); and 2. “… governance involves achieving public purposes through collaboration with organizations including private-sector and non-profit organizations (Mossberger, 2007: n.p.). Surely, legislative, executive and judicial decision-making processes are meant to achieve certain public goals beneficial to the citizens. In fact the effectiveness of governance is measured by the government’s capacity to solve problems and achieve sustainable development (Bernstein, 2015).

(b) Functional requirements of governance
Peters (2012) identifies four functional requirements of governance for it to succeed: goal setting; goal reconciliation and coordination; implementation; and feedback and accountability. Goal setting is derived from the character of governance as steering in that, determining direction presupposes a certain level of familiarity with the endpoint. In other words, governance must be purposive; there should be an aim to be achieved. This notion echoes Jan Kooiman’s postulation that governing should “be seen as purposeful efforts to guide, steer, control, or manage societies” (Kjær, 2004: 41).

Goal reconciliation and coordination refers to collation of individual preferences into collective decisions. Peters’ (2012) reference to reconciliation and coordination implies diversity and plurality of views that need to be harmonised. For Mortimer and Sathre (2006), internal considerations about governance are borne out of a set of values about legitimate behaviour. Crafting a collective decision where sustainability is an issue, Forje (2006: 128) suggests that an important requirement is “…a delicate balance of multiple goals which are weighed differently by actors”. The multiplicity of
goals and the difference in goals priority levels according to those involved contribute to the need for goal reconciliation and coordination.

Peters’ (2012) third functional requirement is implementation. Implementation is the stage that assumes that goal selection, reconciliation and coordination have been successfully dealt with; and now goals are to be executed or put into effect. For the World Bank (2004), implementation follows the design and formulation of policies in discharging government functions; this being the third aspect of governance aspects identified by the Bank. The first two aspects are: the form of political regime; and the process by which authority is exercised in the management of a country’s economic and social resources for development (World Bank, 2004).

The last of Peters’ (2012) functional requirements is feedback and accountability. In his words Peters (2012: 22) advises that “…individuals and institutions involved in governance need to learn from their actions. This is important both for improving the quality of the decisions being made and also for the democratic accountability”. Therefore, clear information to all involved, about the plan execution, impact of results, and proximity from the desired effect is necessary for evaluative analysis of action taken; this is what feedback is commonly known to be. Feedback would enable decision-makers to be aware of necessary changes, reinforcements or refinements to the design, plan, or execution.

(c) Functional sub-systems in governance

Brinkerhoff (2007) recognizes security governance, administrative and economic governance as well as political governance as interconnected sub-systems that can be found in a system of governance. Easton (1990) instructs that a system embodies a kind of vibrant, interactive unity among the parts that produces special attributes. The sub-systems therefore, can also be expected to generate special attributes that can be useful in determining the complexion of governance as a system of government.
Security governance as the first sub-system, play the roles anticipated in different strands of social contract by Hobbes (1588 – 1676), Locke (1632 – 1704), and Hume (1712 – 1776); a contract between the state and the citizen (Curtis, 1981a). Social contract binds the state to protect its citizens and their property together with associated aspects such as crime in general, legitimate application of coercive force and maintenance of the rule of law. Under this sub-system, the function of governance is to provide security to citizens and maintain law and order. Further to this, security along with governance and peace has been seen as essential and universally important for development (Bolaji-Adio, 2015).

The second sub-system of governance is administrative-economic governance which, according to Brinkerhoff (2007), covers the manner in which basic services are provided and economic opportunities are regulated. These also include rules in general, policy making processes, monetary policy, as well as public and private service systems. Administrative-economic governance coincides with what Rhodes (1996) referred to as new public management (NPM). NPM is defined in two interrelated strands: managerialism and the new institutional economics. Managerialism is the introduction of private sector management methods to the public sector and the new institutional economics relates to the introduction of incentive structures into the public service provision (Rhodes, 1996; Heinrich, 2011). Here a connection between governance and NPM through the centrality of steering in the analysis of public management is rightly established. This is because steering is a synonym of governance (Rhodes, 1996: 655). One can safely opine that administrative-economic governance sub-system accounts for the manner in which basic services are provided to the public.

Political governance is the third sub-system that Brinkerhoff (2007) identifies. This sub-system: “guides societal decision-making and public policy, and generates legitimacy through separation of powers, responsive and accountable government, representation and inclusiveness, and protection of basic rights for all citizens” (Brinkerhoff, 2007: 4). In apparent agreement with Brinkerhoff (2007), Chhotray and Stoker (2009) assert that since governance is a human activity, its character becomes essentially political. That is, governance involves harmonization and decision-making in the face of a multiplicity of diverse individual preferences,
managing collective choice in the context of conflicting interests. They point out that: “conflict and dissent provide essential ingredients to a governance process” (Chhotray and Stoker, 2009: 6). The long and the short of this sub-system is that where there are people and scarcity of value, there will always be differing views as to how that value is distributed. The struggle to determine the dominant view is the essence of politics and the rules established to manage this struggle is governance. In this context, the function of governance is to provide for a platform upon which political activities unfold.

### 2.3.4 Characteristics of Governance

This subsection deals with characteristics of governance. According to Jordan, Wurzel and Zito (2003: 5) governance “… is characterised by a growing use of non-regulatory policy instruments such as NEPIs [new environmental policy instruments], which are prepared, designed and implemented by non-state actors working together with state actors.” Although couched from the environmental perspective, the important characterization that this research is interested in is the “growing use of non-regulatory policy instruments”; in Stoker’s (1998: 17) words, “the essence of governance is its focus on governing mechanisms which do not rest on recourse to the authority and sanctions of government”. It would appear that governance is seen as a move away from the classic ‘command and control’ rule-making feature of the state to some new form of conducting government business. Other authors see governance as made up of “complex and continuous process of interpretation, conflict, and action that produces ever-changing patterns of rule” (Bevir, 2011: 59). What follows will provide a hint as to the extent of agreement by researchers on this characterisation of governance.

In trying to establish the character of governance, one would be advised to note the existence of several distinct meanings of the concept. To this end, Rhodes (1996: 653), while deliberately avoiding treatment of governance as a synonym for government, points to six uses of governance:

- as the minimal state,
- as corporate governance,
• as the new public management,
• as ‘good governance’,
• as a socio-cybernetic system,
• as self-organizing networks.

The implication here is that characteristics of governance might differ depending on the use of governance that is being dealt with. On account of space, time and inclination constraints, this research will not be able to delve deep into discussing these uses. However, owing to its remoteness from the core of this study, the governance use that is likely to be dissociated with this research is corporate governance.

From his definition that governance is “self-organizing, interorganizational networks”, Rhodes (1996: 660) develops four shared characteristics of governance:

1. Interdependence between organizations. Governance broader than government, covering non-state actors…
2. Continuing interactions between network members, caused by the need to exchange resources and negotiate shared purposes.
3. Game-like interactions, rooted in trust and regulated by rules of the game negotiated and agreed by network participants.
4. A significant degree of autonomy from the state. Networks are not accountable to the state; they are self-organizing. Although the state does not occupy a privileged, sovereign position, it can indirectly and imperfectly steer networks.

In his five propositions, Stoker (1998: 18) suggests aspects of governance that may as well be seen as his own characterisation of the term - governance:

1. Governance refers to a set of institutions and actors that are drawn from but also beyond government.
2. Governance identifies the blurring of boundaries and responsibilities for tackling social and economic issues.
3. Governance identifies the power dependence involved in the relationships between institutions involved in collective action.
4. Governance is about autonomous self-governing networks of actors.
5. Governance recognizes the capacity to get things done which does not rest on the power of government to command or use its authority. It sees government as able to use new tools and techniques to steer and guide.

Any description of a concept or phenomenon is bound to have limitations; Stoker (1998) also recognizes dilemmas that can be associated with his propositions. These include, but not limited to: apparent lack of traditional validation for governance; blurring of boundaries that leaves room for avoidance of responsibility when things go wrong; increased uncertainties on unanticipated consequences of governing decisions; accountability complications brought about by the autonomous nature of networks and some of the actors; and the possibility of governance failures even in the instance of complementary interactions between government and governance.

On her part, Kjær (2004: 164) suggests that there are four characteristics that limit governance. Firstly, authority: meaning legitimate power. Legitimate power is “the general belief of the members of a society that the government’s powers to make and enforce rules are proper, lawful, and entitled to obedience (Ranney, 1990: 30). In this sense, the building blocks of governance include the practices and institutions through which authority is exercised (Lane, 2015). Secondly, reciprocity: referring to a type of social interaction that generates new approaches to agree on basic rules of politics. Thirdly, trust: the trust that extends beyond family and affinity clusters towards more detached trust between institutions and officials. Lastly, accountability: with which she means the extent to which public authorities are responsive towards citizens and “the extent to which citizens can hold public authorities to account”. Kjær (2004) goes further to indicate that a governance system that confines itself and indeed complies with these characteristics consolidates its legitimacy which in turn encourages participation by the wider population of the citizenry. In this sense, it is these characteristics that provide an enabling environment for successful and peaceful coexistence. Kjær’s (2004) suggestion is resonated by Mossberger’s (2008) view referred to above, that governance is about reaching public goals through partnerships within and between organizations. In the final analysis, these
notions are reminiscent of Stoker’s (1998: 17) determination that governance “is ultimately concerned with creating the conditions for ordered rule and collective action”.

2.4 Summary

Coalitions have been subjected to scrutiny by notable scholars who developed theories. But this study looked at a few of those: Riker’s (1962) game theory and the principle of Minimum Winning Coalition; Laver and Shepsle’s (1996) model of government formation; and Acemoglu et al.’s (2006) coalition formation in political games.

In their model of government formation, Laver and Shepsle (1996) suggest a deviation from the normal approaches on several fronts: they suggest an approach inspired by policy instead of office-seeking model; they contend that the assumption that parties were office-seeking has been modified so many times that its value has diminished. Their argument is that policy-seeking actors pursue formation of governments not policy conformity. Laver and Shepsle (1996) introduce a historical dimension in which political actors are rational players making calculated decisions. They further point out that there are endogenous incentives for members to remain within a coalition.

According to Acemoglu et al. (2006) coalitions in political context can be considered in terms of axiomatic approach, dynamic games and non-transferable utility game. In axiomatic approach, a ruling coalition must follow the logic of both power and stability to withstand secession. Dynamic game refers to metaphoric power consolidating stages of a coalition on its way to becoming a ruling coalition. Non-transferable cooperative game is described by a combination of ‘the nature of players’, ‘a collection of possible outcomes for each coalition that could form’ as well as ‘a set of joint actions that a coalition can take’. Acemoglu et al. (2006) point out that social choice dilemma of individual preferences can be addressed through allowing
formation of self-enforcing coalitions. They show that bargaining for resources can be dealt with at the level of a ruling coalition; and that in equilibrium coalition formation, compliance can be enforced by the majority over the minority.

Discussion flowed from political aspects of ruling coalitions, such as power, authority, regulation, and rule enforcement into governance. Governance was examined in terms of its definitions, theory, functions and characteristics. Subsection 2.3.1 of this chapter illustrates how Kjær (2004) used different definitions of governance to situate the concept in political science sub-fields of public administration and public policy, international relations, and comparative politics. Other definitions depict governance as: the method of governing (World Bank, 1992); concerning regulations, partners, and practices in state-society relations (Brinkerhoff, 2007); and the modalities through which the government assumes and uses authority to address the problems of its people (McNeil and Malena, 2010). Looking at this array of definitions one can conclude that indeed governance as a business of ensuring order or a mode of regulating relationships, permeates almost all sectors of human life. Then the discussion delved into theories about governance. The generally attitude towards theory is that it provides a backcloth and rationale for research (Bryman, 2008).

In implied agreement with Bryman (2008) and though referring particularly to governance, Peters (2010b) explores the potential application of governance as an organizing framework for political science. Consequently, one can safely accept as appropriate the possibility of using governance as a theoretical point of departure for this study. It has been noted that the context of governance in political science can be attributed to four governance elements identified by Chhotray and Stoker (2009). These are: rules, collective, decision-making, and lack of formal control. These elements could assist a researcher or reader to recognize the relevant setting within which the term is applied. Governance is also perceived to have four meanings seen in terms of: structure, process, mechanism and strategy (Levi-Faur, 2012). Arguing from these meanings Levi-Faur (2012) constructs four approaches to state in governance theory: governance as hollowing out of the state – the seeming loss of influence by state governments to local, regional and transnational institutions; degovernancing – a move away from government bureaucracy towards market forces; state-centred governance – acceptance of the private sector in policy processes.
aimed at filling the policy deficiencies gap; and big governance – maintenance of rules and regulations, political processes and policy outputs as the defining features of political entities.

Peters (2012) suggests that as a broad political theory, governance can address a number of political questions and these are:

- A functionalist argument – the basic state decision-making functions of making, applying and adjudicating rules;
- A basis of general comparison – dimension of determining governance functions and meaning of governance applications;
- A link of fields within comparative politics - adapting a diversity of topics and fields within comparative politics;
- Integrating other approaches – the potential to combine or apply other methods to political science and vice versa.
- Linking normative and empirical questions – the potential ability to assess the quality of life in a society, for example good governance.

Governance functions are seen as strategic planning, articulation of goals, financing, public communication and accountability (Wellman, 2006); and these operate within the following governance sub-systems: security governance, administrative governance, and political governance (Brinkerhoff, 2007). Characteristically, governance is perceived as: inclusive of state and non-state actors engaged in continuous network of game-like interactions free from state direction (Rhodes, 1996), who share the responsibility of addressing social and economic issues (Stoker 1998), with limits set by authority, reciprocity, trust and accountability (Kjær, 2004).

Thus with the foregoing discussion, a theoretical foundation has been moulded out of the ‘what’ and the ‘why’ of political coalitions and governance. In line with the theme of the study, the ‘how’ of governance follows in the form of chapter 3, which examines Lesotho’s political life and its first coalition government as an example of the socio-political milieu within which governance unfolds.
CHAPTER 3

Lesotho’s Political Background

3.1 Introduction

Set against a backdrop of political parties in a political party system, this chapter will give a general overview of the origins and contemporary political history of Lesotho with particular emphasis on the political parties that formed the first coalition: All Basotho Convention (ABC), Basotho national Party (BNP), and Lesotho Congress for Democracy (LCD). First, parties in a political system will be briefly examined in terms of what they are and what their functions are. Political party system is “a system of interactions between several parties” (Saarts, 2011: 85). Secondly, classification of political parties will be looked at. Looking at party classification is of particular relevance to this study because the exercise will provide a theoretical basis for comparison as impliedly anticipated by the fourth research question posed in chapter 1. The question enquires about harmonization of real or imagined differences between these coalition parties emanating from the said parties’ ideologies and general aims as seen through their constitutions and their 2012 electoral manifestos. Thirdly, the genesis of political parties in Lesotho will be presented. Fourthly, parties that formed the first coalition government in Lesotho will be analysed. This chapter will conclude by an abridged description of the constitutional stipulation that shape the government system in Lesotho. These will, hopefully, give proper environmental background that had an influence on the leaders of the coalition government. An understanding of factors that influenced the leaders of the coalition government will in turn shed light on the decisions and choices that they made. These are important because they determined the character and the lifespan of the coalition itself, thereby addressing part of the theme of this study: the rise and fall of the first coalition government in Lesotho.
3.2 Political Parties: An Overview

Greenberg and Page (2005: 5) see political parties as “organizations that try to win control of government by electing people to public office who carry the party label.” In Hofmeister and Grabow’s (2011: 12) view, political parties are “permanent associations of citizens that are based on free membership and a programme, and which are anxious to occupy through the path of elections, the politically decisive positions of the country with their team of leaders, in order to materialize suggestions for resolving outstanding problems”. On the face of things, these definitions may look the same; however, a closer look will reveal their difference. The main difference lies on what could be deduced from the parties’ objectives. The first definition infers the ends to be control of the government, and this implies reaping the fruits of success, for example, in the form of jobs, office allocations and business opportunities – political patronage.

The second definition suggests a desire by the party to shape public policy through the programme that addresses priority areas in society as a party sees fit (Hofmeister and Grabow, 2011). The implication here is that this definition refers to parties that have a strong ideological drive to achieve certain objectives beyond simply capturing control of government. It would be interesting to determine where the coalition parties in Lesotho feature within this distinction. Since the former sees control of government as an end in itself that can be used for the benefit of the party members and the latter implies the responsibility of implementing a given programme in pursuit of stated ideals. If the stated ideals adequately capture or represent the preferences of the electorate, the electorate’s approval will be translated into votes, “votes are translated into legislative seats, legislative seats are translated into governments, and government proposals are translated into policies” (Golder and Ferland, 2016: 1), thus the policies are in a way the will of the people.

Another interesting aspect of political parties is what makes them different from other organizations. Hofmeister and Grabow (2011) list a number of criteria to identify political parties. These authors observe that, parties:

1. Endeavour to lead formation of public opinion that would have a generalized political impact on a wide region over the long term;
2. Are institutions with individual membership;

3. Seek political representation of the people during each election time;

4. Are autonomous and enduring entities (they do not just exist for a single election and disband afterwards);

5. Operate in a public domain.

William R. Schonfeld (1983: 489) advances one factor that distinguishes a political party from other groupings such as school, family, interest group, work or church association and others, that is “…its [political party’s] principal claim is to contain within its membership the personnel capable of governing the nation (either alone or, if necessary, in association with other parties)”. Bawn, Cohen, Karol, Masket, Noel and Zaller (2012: 571) put it differently in suggesting that parties are “best understood as coalitions of interest groups and activists seeking to capture and use government for their particular goals, which range from material self-interest to high-minded idealism”. Interestingly, this factor appears to be in consonance with both of the definitions above. Perhaps this is because of their common aim of winning a country’s political power or being in state government. Having looked at what political parties are and how they can be distinguished from other associations, one could also examine their role in the political system.

A number of authors (Schonfeld, 1983; Stokes, 1999; Fine, 2003; Greenberg and Page, 2005; Lowenthal and Bitar, 2015) seem to converge on the following functions of political parties:

1. provision of link between citizen interests and government actions,

2. aggregation of public interests,

3. articulation of policy preferences,

4. mobilization of public political engagement,

5. recruitment and training of candidates for public office,

6. organization and coordination of activities of government officials under party programs,
7. serve as the basis for order in legislative processes,
8. help choose candidates for, organize and conduct electoral campaigns,
9. mediate conflict among political allies,
10. ensure that elected officials are both responsive and accountable.

On the basis of the foregoing, political parties “can aggregate social cleavages, aggregate social divisions, translate social cleavages into political cleavages or block the politicization of social cleavages” (Ijere, 2015: 111). However, what becomes clear from this list is that it would be difficult to have a working democracy without political parties given the impractical nature of direct democracy with the current population demographics of modern societies. Here the assumption is that democracy takes the form anticipated by Dahl (1971); that is, a political system in which assumption of public office is determined through fair, competitive and regular election with unrestricted franchise to adult population, where basic freedoms of speech and association are protected. A further point to make is that parties are one of the units of analysis in examining state – society relations within the context of democracy as standard ideological frame of reference (Ramos, 2010).

However, the obvious needs to be pointed out, that is, though they serve the same ends, political parties differ in their nature, approach and character owing to various internal and external aspects. Therefore, the next section examines different classifications of political parties hopefully to account for these differences; also lays the foundation upon whose basis political parties in Lesotho can be analytically compared.

### 3.3 Classification of Political Parties

The analysis of parties that formed the first coalition government in Lesotho may warrant their comparison, for example; it had been suggested in Chapter 1 that ideological differences between coalition partners in Lesotho would proof to be one of the basis for the demise of that coalition. Therefore, in order to weave a background for comparing political parties a classification framework is
indispensable. Hofmeister and Grabow (2011: 20) assert that “…typologies help to sort the heterogeneity of social phenomenon, in order to better understand it”. To this end, a number of approaches with different results, according to inclinations and convictions of researchers in this field, have been employed by scholars over time. Looking at the same development, Gunther and Diamond (2003) observe that:

…political scientists have developed typologies and models of political parties in an effort to capture the essential features of the partisan organizations that were the objects of their analysis. The end result is that the literature today is rich with various categories of party types, some of which have acquired the status of ‘classics’ and have been used by scholars for decades… (Gunther and Diamond, 2003: 167).

This suggests that most party models and classifications can trace their origins from these three pioneers in the study of political parties. According to Wolinetz (2002), Duverger drew a distinction between cadre and mass political parties in 1954; two years later in 1956 Neumann brought forth a distinction between parties of individual representation and parties of democratic (mass) integration; and Kirchhiemer on his part identified catch-all party in 1966 to cope with the changing nature of political parties. However, Kirchhiemer’s catch-all is said to be the first extension of Neumann’s typology while Katz and Mair’s (1995) model is the latest reconstruction of the same typology (Wolinetz, 2002: 139 and 148).

Katz and Mair’s (1995) model is the result of their rejection of the implications deriving from what they term a tendency to categorize and perceive parties on the basis of their relations with the civil society. These implications are: one, the inclination to limit the standard of party comparison to mass-party model. Two, the inadequate attention/focus on the extent to which differences between parties may as well be seen in terms of their relations with the state.

Katz and Mair (1995: 6) contend that as a result of changes in both the civil society and changes in the relations between parties and the state, the stage is set for “…a
dialectical process in which each new party type generates a reaction that stimulates further development, thus leading to yet another new type, to another set of reactions, and so on”. According to them, mass-party as a party type transmuted into Catch-All Party type and this in turn metamorphosed into what they term Cartel party model. In this manner, these authors identify four models of political parties: elite, mass, catch-all and cartel party; these are then followed by thirteen characteristics that differentiate them. Briefly, these parties are described as follows: elite parties were characterised by exclusion of large sections of citizens by the dominant elite and cadre parties in the proto-democracies (Krouwel, 2006).

Mass parties feature “the central role of a representative or elected bureaucracy, emphases on membership, collegial internal leadership, financing through interest groups, and stress on ideology” (Wolinetz, 2002: 146). Mass parties transformed themselves into catch-all parties by moderating their efforts to convert masses and de-emphasising ideological domination and by pursuing support across the societal spectrum with the implication that formerly highly distinctive collective identities weaken, boundaries between sectors of the electorate become blurred and the society assume shared long-term interests (Wolinetz, 2002; Weissenbach, 2010). “Cartel party is a party that strictly moves within the context set by the state and is characterized by the state-party interpenetration” (Vernardakis, 2012: 4).

Table 3.1 illustrates these developments.
Table 3.1: Party Models and their Characteristics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristics</th>
<th>Elite party</th>
<th>Mass party</th>
<th>Catch-all party</th>
<th>Cartel party</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Degree of social-political inclusion</td>
<td>Restricted suffrage</td>
<td>Enfranchisement and mass suffrage</td>
<td>Mass suffrage</td>
<td>Mass suffrage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level of distribution of politically relevant resources</td>
<td>Highly restricted</td>
<td>Relatively concentrated</td>
<td>Less concentrated</td>
<td>Relatively diffused</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Principal goals of politics</td>
<td>Distribution of privileges</td>
<td>Social reformation (or opposition to it)</td>
<td>Social amelioration</td>
<td>Politics as profession</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basis of party competition</td>
<td>Ascribed status</td>
<td>Representative capacity</td>
<td>Policy effectiveness</td>
<td>Managerial skills, efficiency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pattern of electoral competition</td>
<td>Managed</td>
<td>Mobilization</td>
<td>Competitive</td>
<td>Contained</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nature of party work and campaigning</td>
<td>Irrelevant</td>
<td>Labour intensive</td>
<td>Both labour and capital intensive</td>
<td>Capital intensive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Principal source of party's resources</td>
<td>Personal contacts</td>
<td>Members’ fees and contributions</td>
<td>Contributions from a wide range of sources</td>
<td>State subventions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relations between ordinary members and party elite</td>
<td>The elite are the ‘ordinary’ members</td>
<td>Bottom up; elite accountable to members</td>
<td>Top down; members are organized cheerleaders for elite</td>
<td>Stratarchy; mutual autonomy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Character of membership</td>
<td>Small and elitist</td>
<td>Large and homogeneous; actively recruited and encapsulated; membership a logical sequence of identity; emphasis on rights and obligations</td>
<td>Membership open to all (heterogeneous) and encouraged; rights emphasized but not obligations; membership marginal to individual’s identity</td>
<td>Neither rights nor obligations important (distinction between member and non-members blurred); emphasis on members valued for contribution to legitimizing myth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party channels of communication</td>
<td>Interpersonal networks</td>
<td>Party provides its own channels of communication</td>
<td>Party competes for access to non-party channels of communication</td>
<td>Party gains privileged access to state-regulated channels of communication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Position of party between civil society and state</td>
<td>Unclear boundary between state and politically relevant civil society</td>
<td>Party belongs to civil society, initially as representative of the newly relevant segment of civil society</td>
<td>Parties as competing brokers between civil society and the state</td>
<td>Party becomes part of the state</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Representative style</td>
<td>Trustee</td>
<td>Delegate</td>
<td>Entrepreneur</td>
<td>Agent of state</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: adapted from Katz and Mair, 1995: 18)

76
Available literature enables this subsection to deal with a model developed by Lipset and Rokkan (1967) whose starting point is different from that of Katz and Mair. It is part of party formation and development theories that subscribe to the notion that political parties tend to gravitate towards iconic political cleavages born at certain land-mark moments (Lupu and Riedl, 2012). Hence, Lipset and Rokkan (1967) predicate this model is on political competition derived from four sets of cleavages emanating from, one: national revolutions, centre – periphery cleavages; and state – church cleavages. Two: industrial revolution, rural interests versus urban industry; and owners and employers versus workers. In this context, a cleavage is a reflection of general and enduring social and economic divisions within a society (Bodet and Rubenson, 2009). According to Lipset and Rokkan (1967), it is upon these cleavages that political party competition is predicated and therefore, competition strategies are developed to respond in favour of one side or the other of a given cleavage divide. In this sense a cleavage divide can be looked at as a strategic motivation (Lupu, 2015). Briefly, these cleavages are as follows:

1. Centre – periphery cleavages reflect tensions between core nation-builders at the centre and political, ethnic and cultural influence in the periphery;

2. State – church cleavages are competing interests between secular and religious priorities;

3. Rural interest – urban industry cleavages show conflict between primary mode of production, for example rural agrarian economy and secondary production mode such as urbanizing industrial developments.

4. Owners and employers – tenants and workers cleavages represent rivalry between those who control the means of production and those who produce.

The proponents of this cleavage based political competition caution that their list of cleavages is not exhaustive even for a limited geopolitical area such as Europe.

This model proposes an eight-fold typology of political parties founded on the bedrock of the afore-mentioned cleavages (see Table 3.2 in the next page) and it presents competing sides through their commitments on both religious and economic fronts.
**Table 3.2: Lipset and Rokkan’s Eight-fold Typology**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Central core of nation-builders’ alliance on the religious front</th>
<th>Nation-builders’ economic alliance</th>
<th>Examples of nation-builders’ economic alliance</th>
<th>Periphery or opposition’s response</th>
<th>Examples of opposition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. National church dominant (i.e. allied with the state)</td>
<td>Rural: landed interests</td>
<td>Britain: Conservative</td>
<td>Dissident religious, urban</td>
<td>Liberal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. National church dominant</td>
<td>Urban: commercial and industrial</td>
<td>Scandinavia: Conservative</td>
<td>Dissident religious, rural</td>
<td>Liberal or ‘old’ left</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. National church dominant, Catholic strong minority</td>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>Prussia/Reich: Conservative</td>
<td>Secular, urban vs. Catholic</td>
<td>Liberal vs. Catholic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Secular state against Catholic Church</td>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>Spain: Liberal</td>
<td>Urban vs. Catholic</td>
<td>Catalans vs. Carlists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Secular state against Catholic Church</td>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>France, Italy: Radicals, Liberals</td>
<td>Catholic, rural</td>
<td>Conservative Catholics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. State allied with Catholic Church</td>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>Austria: Catholics</td>
<td>Secular, urban</td>
<td>Liberals, Pan-Germans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. State allied with Catholic Church</td>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>Belgium: Catholics vs. Liberals</td>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>Flemish separatists</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: adapted from Sitter, 2002)

By their own acknowledgment, which one tends to agree with, Lipset and Rokkan’s (1967) model is quite complicated and although not impossible to understand; in
their own words, they reason that “[t]his typological exercise may appear excessively abstract and unnecessarily mechanical. To us the gains in analytical perspective outweigh the loss in historical immediacy…” (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967: 37).

In 2003 Gunther and Diamond identified fifteen basic kinds of political parties that exist in the world and styled them ‘species’ (Gunther and Diamond, 2003: 172). In this framework, species are clustered in one of the five genera, analogous to biological classification of living organisms, with each genus representing a different party organization. Though losing the “thickness – thinness” organizational dimension as well as party type positioning on the “left – right” spectrum in the authors’ model. “Those parties seen as part of ‘the Left’ are considered progressive, socialist, and communist parties… Those parties perceived as ‘the Right’ are considered conservative and fascist” (Matlosa and Shale, 2008: 8). Table 3.3 attempts to capture in summary and simplicity Gunther and Diamond’s (2003) proposed model.
Table 3.3: Gunther and Diamond’s Typology of Parties

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Genera</th>
<th>Species</th>
<th>Main defining aspects</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Elite-based</td>
<td>Traditional local</td>
<td>Election dependent on traditionally based prestige in limited franchise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>notable</td>
<td>Clientelistic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Personal favours for electoral mobilization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year - 1850</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mass-based</td>
<td>Religion</td>
<td>Denominational</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Values are based on traditional and clerical interpretation of religious principle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Fundamentalist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Proto-hegemonic; Seek to reorganize state and society in line with strict reading of doctrinal principles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nationalism</td>
<td>Pluralist-Nationalist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Extensive collaboration for territorial self-government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ethnicity-based</td>
<td>Class-mass</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Seek social integration; Open, tolerant and pragmatic. Organised in geographic and functional class constituencies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Leninist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Proto-hegemonic; class ideology, strict discipline; seek revolutionary over-throw of existing government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ethnic</td>
<td>Mobilize votes of its own ethnic group; seek distinction between friends and foes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Congress</td>
<td>Alliance of ethnic parties; seek national unity and mutual security among a coalition of ethnic groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electoralist</td>
<td>Programmatic</td>
<td>Distinct, consistent and coherent programmatic or ideological agenda; thinly organized and focused on electoral campaigns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Catch-all</td>
<td>Pluralistic, vague ideology and tolerant; seek to aggregate a wide variety of social interests, win elections and govern</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Personalistic</td>
<td>Only rationale is for the leaders to win election and exercise power; depends on personal charisma of the leader</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Movement Parties</td>
<td>Left-Libertarian</td>
<td>Rejection of markets and bureaucracy, favour social solidarity, little central control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year - 2000</td>
<td>Post-industrial</td>
<td>Xenophobic and racist and anti-state or anti-establishment; seek more order, traditional identity and security.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Extreme right</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: author’s reconstruction of Gunther and Diamond’s 2003 Types of Political Parties)

Some models are more abstract than others; one could consider the following two examples of less abstract models. The first is Mair and Mudde’s (1988) discussion of a classification model premised on party family; a metaphor whose application adopts one of the four modes of approaches as if they were family relations: 1. Party origins or sociology. 2. International organization to which a party belongs. 3. Policy
or ideological similarities among parties. 4. Party name or label. “Central to the concept is that parties maintain an identity as member in one of the ‘familles spirituelles’ due to their heritage from the great ideological movements of the 19th century and early 20th century” (Elff, 2013: 1). In other words, party family implies a certain degree of shared political viewpoints among party family members (Ennser, 2012).

The second is a model proposed by Wolinetz; the model draws a distinction among vote-seeking, policy-seeking and office-seeking parties, an analogy adapted from Strom’s 1990b study of coalitions in minority governments (Wolinetz, 2002: 150). He presents it in a schema that arrays party models in a triangular format in relation to each other, with each point of the triangle representing the main focus of the party type as illustrated in figure 3.1.

**Figure 3.1:** Orientation of political parties.

![Figure 3.1](image)

The characteristics of these party types are presented in terms of measurable indicators as shown in table 3.4.
Table 3.4: Operational Measures for Party Orientation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Possible Indicators</th>
<th>Parties</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Policy-seeking</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Internal policy debate</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time spent at party meetings</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Character of debate</td>
<td>Intense, protracted, issue-focussed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extent and level of involvement</td>
<td>Extensive; most levels of party involved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Consistency of policy position assumed</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Election campaigns</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prominence of policy</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Determination of strategy</td>
<td>Follows from policies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uses of electoral techniques</td>
<td>Low to medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Infrastructure to support policies</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(e.g. research bureaux, think-tanks, affiliated organizations)</td>
<td>Present</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: adapted from Wolinetz, 2002: 155)

A general observation towards the foregoing models is merely meant to conclude this section of the chapter and it unfolds as follows. Political scientists are agreed that there is no one single correct classification that exists in isolation and
independent from the rest; but rather there is much inter-connectedness and overlaps between most models, resulting in a plethora of literature on political party classification, typologies and models; be that as it may, it cannot be claimed that any one of these party collations is able to cover the full range of variation in party types for all times and all places on its own (Wolinetz, 2002: 149; Gunther and Diamond, 2003: 167 - 8).

This observation notwithstanding, an attempt can be made to apply these models in Lesotho; therefore, the next section deals with political parties in Lesotho. It starts off with the origins of political parties in the country and moves on to the rationale behind their establishment. Then the parties’ ideological inclinations are explored through the parties’ expressed policies as covered in their manifestoes, aims and objectives. The issue that is being pursued here is not only to present Lesotho’s political history, but it is also to exhibit the context within which the three coalition partners, i.e. ABC, BNP and LCD, came into being, given their ideological heritage that had an impact on their choices and decisions.

3.4. Emergence of Political Parties in Lesotho

Existence of political parties became a feature of political life in Lesotho sometime after the end of World War II with the founding of the first political party, Basutoland African Congress (BAC) in pursuit of independence (Machobane, 2001: 2). In corroboration, Mphanya (2004: 10) goes further than pointing the 7th October 1952 as the founding date of the BAC. He also places its establishment within a backdrop of Southern African struggle to rid itself of colonisation and apartheid influence from South Africa. He points out that it was inspired by the African National Congress (ANC) and its 1949 resolution on ‘Programme of Action’ and the ideal of ‘Pan-Africanism’. Pan-Africanism is “…a vehicle for the struggles of black people to regain their pride, strength and their independence…” in the face of land dispossession, enslavement, persecution, discrimination and dependency inspired by slavery and colonialism (Legume, 1965: 15 and 33).
The resolution also encouraged non-South African delegates to establish Congress organisations in their own countries to spread the struggle throughout Southern Africa, and so these organisations were established in Northern Rhodesia (Zambia), Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), Nyasaland (Malawi), Basutoland (Lesotho) (Mphanya, 2004: 1 - 20). BAC was largely seen as a branch of ANC in Lesotho and as Lesotho’s independence talks gathered momentum in 1960, it sought to reassert itself as an independent entity; it then changed its name to Basutoland Congress Party (BCP) and gradually drifted away from ANC and aligned itself with Pan-African Congress (PAC) albeit, without completely severing ties with the former (Weisfelder, 1999: 96). As a result of this association with the ANC and subsequently PAC, BCP was regarded as radical and too close to communism (Khaketla, 1971: 39; Tsosane, 2010: 41). Analysing the same perception of BCP’s inclination towards communism, Weisfelder (1999: 12 – 13) observes that over and above the purported use of “communistic phraseology”, some Catholics and chiefs in Lesotho used BCP’s affiliation to Kwame Nkrumah and the Convention Peoples Party (CPP) as proof that BCP was indeed communist.

It was perhaps this perception that BAC was left-wing that a rival party, Basotho National Party (BNP) was hatched in 1958. Khaketla (1971: 19) suggests that BNP was established with the assistance of the Roman Catholic Mission in Lesotho; and it was modelled along the lines of Christian Democratic Parties that existed among Catholics in Germany, Belgium, Switzerland and the Netherlands. Their main goal was to resist communism and defend the rights of Christians. To support his suggestion, Khaketla sites a report from The Friend of 6th January 1959 in which J.D. Des Rosiers, the Bishop of Maseru is said to have indicated that:

[A]s the population [in Lesotho] is mainly Christian, it would be the natural thing for them to belong to parties which subscribe to Christian principles, and were led by Christians. ‘Unfortunately, up to the present, the majority of political leaders had been left-wing and anti-religious…. All Christians should join forces in the fight against Communism’ (Khaketla, 1971: 21 - 22).
Weisfelder (1999: 37 – 45) documents that other parties that were to emerge were Marematlou Party in October 1957 and Basutoland Freedom Party (BFP) in March 1961. Marematlou Party was led by the erstwhile advisor to the Regent Paramount Chieftainess, Chief S.S. Matete, and it sought immediate coronation of the heir as Paramount Chief, and improved cooperation between chiefs and commoners. Following disagreements with Mokhehle, the leader of BCP, Bennett M. Khaketla left his deputy leadership of BCP and founded BFP. BFP advocated for, among others, executive powers for the monarchy. It came as no surprise when these two merged in December 1962 to form Marematlou Freedom Party (MFP). The apparent reason was their convergence on the centrality of the monarchy in their agenda, a fresh angle given the indifferent stance of BCP and BNP towards the monarchy.

The thrust of the foregoing is to illustrate the contrast between the perceived radical and left-wing BCP and the seemingly religious, moderate and right-wing BNP, albeit the royalist inclinations of the MFP (Weisfelder, 1999) also needed to be highlighted. This divide might be important at a later stage, as a foundation for ideological difference between ‘Congress’ parties, ‘Nationalist’ parties and the ‘Royalists’ that underlie their divergent political behaviour. It is worth noting that Lesotho went into the pre-independence elections in 1965 within the political climate reflected by these three contending parties. Most of other political parties that were to emerge, as breakaway fragments or claimed new inventions, from then to date bear reference and context to the background created by this trio (Matlosa and Shale, 2006); remnants of whom were still part of the 8th Parliament of Lesotho. Their degeneration into minor parties in terms of following and representation in parliament has relegated them to demure status of remnants. The genealogy of political parties in Lesotho is dealt with in detail elsewhere, for example see Tsosane’s (2010: 81 - 89) investigation of the impact of party splits on good governance as well as her exploration of implications of these splits and floor-crossing for the electorate.
3.5 Parties of the First Coalition Government in Lesotho

As alluded in previous chapters, the first coalition government in the independent Lesotho was formed in the aftermath of the 2012 general election and was made up of All Basotho Convention (ABC), Lesotho congress for Democracy (LCD) and Basotho National Party (BNP). The coalition government came about as a result of the failure of the incumbent ruling party, Democratic Congress (DC), to form a government given the allocation of parliamentary seats based on the 2012 electoral results captured in table 3.5 below.

Table 3.5: National Assembly Seat Allocation in the 8th Parliament

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PARTY</th>
<th>ACRONYM</th>
<th>SEATS ALLOCATED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All Basotho Convention</td>
<td>ABC</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basotho Batho Democratic Party</td>
<td>BBDP</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basotho Congress Party</td>
<td>BCP</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basotho Democratic National Party</td>
<td>BDNP</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basotho National Party</td>
<td>BNP</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Congress</td>
<td>DC</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lesotho Congress for Democracy</td>
<td>LCD</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lesotho People’s Congress</td>
<td>LPC</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lesotho Workers Party</td>
<td>LWP</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marematlou Freedom Party</td>
<td>MFP</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Independence Party</td>
<td>NIP</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Popular Front For Democracy</td>
<td>PFD</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Seats in National Assembly</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>120</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Adapted from IEC Lesotho (2013: 58)

Combination of parliamentary seats of ABC (30), LCD (26) and BNP (5) gave these coalition partners a slim majority of 1 in the 120 seat Lesotho’s National Assembly, reminiscent of William Riker’s (1962) minimum winning coalition discussed in
Chapter 2 section 2.2.2. The opposition was fragmented as follows: DC partnered with BBDP, BCP decided to be an independent opposition and the rest of the other parties formed a neutral bloc which pledged its support for the government depending on the government’s commitment to improve the lives of Basotho, declaring in their own words, that they will “judge an issue upon its merits” (Mpeli, 2012: 8).

The next section looks at coalition partners as individual parties, their origins and what they stood for. For purposes of coherent presentation the sequence of dealing with these parties will start with BNP, for it was the first to split from BCP in 1958; followed by LCD itself, a 1997 off-shoot of BCP. ABC, a 2006 splinter from LCD will round off this subsection.

3.5.1 Basotho National Party (BNP)

BNP is one of the parties that came to being in the period preceding the independence of Lesotho way back in 1958 (Khaketla, 1971; Weisfelder, 1999). Its establishment can be traced back to early internal conflicts in the Basutoland Congress Party (BCP) led by Ntsu Mokhehle. Maundeni (2010: 132) asserts that Leabua Jonathan left BCP in protest over its inclusion of communist elements within its ranks and formed Basutoland (later Basotho) National Party (BNP). Jonathan was assisted by Gabriel Manyeli, who was already in the process of establishing Lesotho Christian Democratic Party, to found BNP (Gill, 1993; Weisfelder, 1999). By virtue of its being established in 1958, BNP can be seen as the oldest party of the three coalition partners though its presence in the National Assembly had dwindled from 31 out of 60 at 1966 independence (Khaketla, 1971: 11), to zero out of 65 in 1993 (Mahao, 1997: 6) and 5 out of 120 at the time of the coalition in 2012 (IEC Lesotho, 2013: 58). A feature some analysts attribute to BNP’s authoritarian rule of over fifteen years since its leader’s usurpation of power in the wake of the 1970 election which BNP had apparently lost (Matlosa, 1997; Makoa, 1997; Kadima, 1999); in the words of Southall (1999: 128) reacting to BNP’s rejection of the 1993 election results, “…what the party [BNP] was unable to admit to itself was that the reversal in
its fortunes was overwhelmingly because of popular memories about the brutality of its dictatorship.”

Using Manyeli’s Christian Democratic Party manifesto, BNP was moulded around the principles of that party under the tutelage of the Roman Catholic Church in Lesotho and its electoral support base included Roman Catholic priests, minor chiefs, civil servants, and main traders (Khaketla, 1971: 18 – 23; Gill, 1993: 211; Weisfelder, 1999: 24 – 27; Machobane, 2001: 7 – 8). Christian Democratic Parties were Catholic parties in Europe starting from the nineteenth century (Khaketla, 1971: 19). Back in the run up for independence, BNP stood, among others for: curtailment of racial discrimination; resistance to incorporation of Basutoland into South Africa; gradual filling of positions in government and private employment with Basotho; government should be in the hands of Basotho; building of loyalty among the Basotho Nation towards the British Crown; and strongly explicit resistance to communism (Weisfelder, 1999: 27 and 90). However, according to Gill (1993: 211), “[w]hat made the BNP distinctive... was that it was willing to work within a framework of good relations with South Africa because it saw no imminent changes to the apartheid regime or an end in the near future to white domination”. In his analysis of Lesotho’s political crisis in the 1980s, Makoa (1994: 153) characterises BNP as a party that “…championed the cause of Christianity and chieftainship... favoured close links with South Africa and a policy of non-interference in church or religious activities”.

Current attitudes of BNP can be gleaned from its election manifesto and its constitution. Section 3 of BNP Constitution (2007) lists 14 points referred to as aims and objectives, these can be briefly translated (author’s translation) as follows:

The Party -

1. On the basis of the belief in God Almighty, will promote economic growth and defend national independence.

2. Rejects all forms of discrimination and will protect religious freedom and all basic rights espoused by international organizations.
3. Will promote democracy based on the principles of Moshoeshoe I, will reject western ideologies or eastern communism and their oppressive policies while promoting relations with international organizations whose goals and objectives do not contradict those of BNP.

4. Will associate itself with all international organizations and nations that seek world peace to end domination, colonialism, discrimination, oppression and will support the African Union and the United Nations.

5. Will pursue internal peace and stability in Lesotho and will promote economic development.

6. Will secure rewards for Lesotho farmers and workers that are commensurate to their labour and will promote their self-reliance by establishing self-help cooperatives.

7. Will oppose exploitation, discrimination, bribery, self-enrichment, prejudice and nepotism.

8. Will unite women and youth to play their part in political, cultural and economic development.

9. Will influence the establishment of surety and collateral for investment by internal and external investors and will foster good labour relations.

10. Will promote gender equity in all sectors of social life.

11. Will promote and support preservation of the environment and conservation of natural resources.

12. Will support children and youth and promote their rights and their protection.

13. Will protect the rights of the disabled.

14. Will protect development and self-reliance of its members and of the public at large in economic growth, in culture and in human development in general.

The reading of the BNP constitution in general and the list of aims and objectives in particular, does not make it clear why the issue of economy (in items 1, 5, 8, and 14)
is covered in so many items. One may have two guesses; it may be for purposes of emphasis on a priority issue or sheer failure to thrash out the gist of the matter as a sign of blurred focus and/or lack of clarity as to what the party wants to say about the economy.

Introducing the BNP 2015 election manifesto, BNP leader Thesele ‘Maseribane makes two points (author’s translation): BNP is a party founded on Christianity, this faith shapes the structure of both intra and extra party approaches to one another including friends in political competition as well as coalition partners; and pledges unwavering support the monarchy and the chieftainship in general (BNP, 2015). The manifesto focuses on six points:

1. Good governance: rejection of corruption and strengthening corruption fighting institution, constitutional and legislative reforms, public service professionalism and governmental transparency.

2. Economic growth: capital injection through the establishment of “Basotho National Bank”; introduce export tax on diamonds; and the development of small businesses at the centre of which should be women and the youth.

3. Protect the rights of Basotho workers in diaspora (especially those in South Africa): renegotiate employment terms with South Africa for Lesotho nationals in that country and promote trade relations.

4. Agriculture: increase rate of financial loans to farmers by the re-established Basotho National Bank.

5. Education: free education; enhance training of teachers; develop vocational schools; introduce computer training in primary schools.

6. Health: increase rural and mobile clinics; strengthen flying doctor services; establish emergency services; expand plans to combat HIV/AIDS; introduce programme for prevention of transmittable diseases; reject women and children abuse.
3.5.2 Lesotho Congress for Democracy (LCD)

The founding of LCD was announced in the National Assembly of the Parliament of Lesotho on 09 June, 1997 by Ntsu Mokhehle the former leader of the then ruling BCP (Sekatle, 1997). According to Matlosa and Shale (2006), following its landslide victory in the 1993 election BCP was plagued by faction-fighting and power struggles which later caused a rift whose result was the birth of LCD. In a special conference of the BCP held two days before the announcement of LCD formation (07 June 1997), it was resolved that owing to the irreconcilable differences within the party that have trapped the BCP in a quagmire of legal battles that impeded preparations for 1998 elections, a new and separate party be established. However, it has been noted that “…internal feuding within the ruling party [BCP] was not based upon any ideological or policy differences, but rather on leadership tussle involving the party bigwigs” (Matlosa and Shale, 2006: 5). This therefore, means that to understand LCD ideology, one has to understand BCP.

The BCP started off as Basutoland African Congress (BAC) in 1952 and changed its name to BCP only in 1959; its inception was founded on the ideals of Mokhehle’s mentor Josiel Lefela and his association called Lekhotla la Bafo (League of Commoners) (Khaketla, 1971: 40 – 53; Weisfelder, 1999: 4 – 6). These ideals are succinctly captured thus:

*That association [Lekhotla la Bafo] was critical of the abuses of the colonial administration and vitriolic against white supremacy. It was also critical of the evils of chieftaincy, but argued for the reform of the institution rather than its abolition. It was highly suspicious of missionary activities and churches generally (Machobane, 2001: 2).*

Key features that distinguished BAC/BCP from other parties prior to independence included: increased militancy from the rhetoric of Lekhotla la Bafo; rejection of the country’s incorporation into South Africa; opposed to racism and white domination seeping into Lesotho from South Africa; fervent rhetoric against chiefs, traders, church and the colonial administration (Machobane, 2001); commitment to the cause of African unity (Weisfelder, 1999: 97).
The pre-independence election of 1965 saw BNP forming a government with a slim majority of 1 and a tacit support of BCP by the monarch in destabilising the government (Machobane, 2001: 12 - 17). This situation led to an apprehensive BNP at the time it was losing elections in 1970; the BNP leader, Leabua Jonathan who was also the Prime Minister annulled the poll, suspended the constitution, banned the Lesotho Communist Party, house arrested the King and declared a state of emergency (Matlosa, 1997). In the instability that ensued over the subsequent years Mokhehle, the BCP leader together with most of high ranking BCP officials left the country into exile and established an armed wing styled Lesotho Liberation Army (LLA) which engaged in sporadic but violent incursions into Lesotho aimed at overthrowing the BNP regime (Makoa, 1991: 298; Machobane, 2001: 34). This regime was removed in a military coup d’état by the Lesotho Defence Force (LDF) in January 1986, the very army that had helped Jonathan to remain in power since the 1970 state of emergency. The Internal disagreements within the BCP in exile and the suspicions between the exiled faction and the one that never left the country promoted factionalism within the BCP.

In preparation for the military to hand over power to a civilian government, BCP exiles were invited to return home and elections were scheduled for 1993. With this background, BCP came to contest the elections with unresolved internal issues, such as the status and fate of the LLA, especially in the face of the obvious failure of incorporating its (LLA’s) cadres into the LDF (Maundeni, 2010: 133); having shed off the perception that it was communist, as well as having considerably toned down its antagonistic stance against chiefs, traders and the church, albeit remaining largely secular in outlook and indifferent towards chiefs. Be that as it may, BCP won the 1993 election and had 100% majority in the National Assembly by winning all the 65 constituencies contested for (Likoti, 2007). Then without any parliamentary opposition the BCP found time to battle-out factional differences within itself without fear of being toppled by the opposition; the details of factional in-fighting within the BCP are dealt with in greater detail in Pule, 1999. With 40 out of 65 members of parliament crossing the floor following an announcement that LCD has been established (Matlosa and Shale 2006: 5), and thereby wrestling power out of the BCP, leaving it complaining bitterly to the world and the courts of law but to no avail,
thus the new LCD became a ruling party. The foregoing background gives the LCD an ideological complexion similar to that of BCP and a natural rival of BNP by virtue of its ancestry and heritage. What follows then is the list of aims and objectives of the LCD as expressed in its constitution.

According to section 2 of LCD Constitution (1997), the aims and objectives of the party are as follows (author’s translation):

(a) To promote democracy based on the principles of Truth, Justice and Peace in Lesotho, Africa and the world at large.

(b) To promote the unity of the entire Basotho Nation by encouraging patriotism and cultivating common culture.

(c) To promote economic growth by supporting and encouraging cooperative societies.

(d) To promote development and strengthening of labour unions in Lesotho.

(e) To promote cooperation and coordination of countries in the Southern African Development Community (SADC) region and African Union on matters of politics, economic development, combating starvation and poverty.

(f) To promote human development in Lesotho, Southern Africa and Africa in general.

(g) To combat discrimination and oppression in all their forms.

(h) To combat discrimination of women and youth in the economy, employment, governance, and land distribution by pursuing the repeal of all discriminatory statutes.

(i) To combat pilferage, dishonesty and negligence in the public service by public servants.

(j) To combat invasion of Lesotho and its occupation by expatriates.
(k) To promote the development of education at all levels to all for purposes of human development and economic growth.

These aims and objectives are crystallised in the LCD 2012 election manifesto which covers the following issues:

1. Poverty alleviation and job creation - promote mass employment by: establishing more manufacturing industries with diversified production; dams, roads and bridges construction; training the workforce; relating remuneration to overall economic performance; protection of the informal sector from big business; and financing poverty reduction activities.

2. Economic development - foreign investment, investing more in energy, arts and culture; improvement of services and laws governing parastatal organizations; encouragement of both local and expatriate investors to invest in industrial ventures; improvement of commercial public transport; establishment of autonomous mining authority to manage natural resources in Lesotho; harnessing water potential for sale, agriculture, tourism, sports and hydro-electricity; marketing Lesotho as a tourist destination.

3. Agriculture: Examination and revision of land tenure system; research and improve efficiency and effectiveness of irrigation for crop farming, profitability of livestock farming, production of timber and firewood; and revitalize the efforts to transform Basotho farmers from subsistence to commercial farming.

4. Education: build more schools, lower the teacher-to-student ratio, and restructure institutional and systemic administration of scholarships.
5. Health: increase the number of health centres with adequately qualified staff; take active measures to control the spread of HIV/AIDS and other communicable diseases; reduce maternal and child mortality at birth.

6. Under social welfare: increase pensions for the aged; conduct needs assessment for the vulnerable groups in society; strengthen HIV/AIDS support groups and improve recreational and sporting facilities.

7. Democratic governance: improve the inclusion of women in public offices; ensure efficient delivery of services; hold the public service accountable for its performance; strengthen the police and anti-corruption departments to adequately deal with theft and corruption in the public service; and conduct a needs assessment for improvement of the judiciary system in a bid to enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of the administration of justice.

8. Regional and international relations: to strengthen relations with SADC, AU and the UN, improve relations with South Africa.
3.5.3 All Basotho Convention (ABC)

ABC was established on 09 October, 2006 (ABC Constitution, 2012), by Thomas Thabane, shortly after resigning his post as minister of broadcasting and telecommunications in the LCD cabinet. He had been a person of political note since the late 1960s when he became a permanent (now principal) secretary and served in different ministries (Machobabe, 2001); he was the first secretary to the military junta that ruled Lesotho from 1986; afterwards he held ministerial positions of broadcasting and later in the ministry of foreign affairs. Thabane’s ministerial services in the military government came to end on 30th April, 1991 in a palace coup that saw the replacement of Major-General Lekhanya as head of government by Colonel (later Major-General) Ramaema (Gill, 1993). Following the 1993 return of democratic election in Lesotho, Thabane re-surfaced in the political scene holding a position of special political advisor to the Prime Minister, Ntsu Mokhehle. As a member of the BCP, internal factional feuds in party did not leave Thabane unscathed. The two main factions in the BCP were the former “exiles” and “stay-homes” or “Pressure Group” and “Majelathoko” (Conservatives) respectively; the former sought to merge two centres of power, the party and the government; and would prefer the retirement of the ailing Mokhehle. The latter favoured a separation of the state from the party and desired the continued stay of Mokhehle at the helm of BCP (Pule, 1999). In other words, the Pressure Group was well placed and influential in party structures and weak in government; while Majelathoko occupied powerful positions in government and had not as much influence in party structures. In this regard, Pule (1999: 6) notes that “…one faction spoke as the party [Pressure Group] and the other spoke as government [Majelathoko]”. Thabane belonged to the latter and was in fact one of the architects of LCD formation; however, as Maundeni (2010) observes:

*His group of stay-homes and retired civil servants wanted to be treated as equal participants in the BCP and LCD governments, with equal rights to be elected to party positions and to be given the voice to influence government decisions. Members of Thabane’s faction never got elected into the structures of the BCP and LCD, and their policy proposals were rejected by cabinets of the two parties most of the*
In the aftermath of the press conference that announced the founding of this party, 17 LCD members of parliament and 1 LCD expelled MP for Mokhotlong Constituency (Lehlohonolo Ts'ehlana) crossed the floor to join the ABC on Friday 13 October, 2006 (Matlosa and Shale, 2006: 9). ABC has never expressed any ideological contradiction from LCD, the party whence it split from. Therefore, one may safely conclude and indeed in agreement with arguments that intra-congress conflicts have always been based on factional power struggles (Pule, 1999; Matlosa and Shale, 2006; Maundeni, 2010). The next sub-section looks at the ABC’s objectives and its 2012 election manifesto.

One of the preambles in the ABC constitution lists 9 objectives of this party and they are as follows (author’s translation):

i. To unite all the citizens within and out of the country under one political party to combat and eradicate starvation, poverty, diseases and ignorance.

ii. To combat and eradicate crime and corruption in all their forms.

iii. To cover all Basotho including men, youth, the traditionally initiated, the educated, people of different religions, under a single blanket policy of “Lesotho, our fatherland”.

iv. To establish for all Basotho, a free political party in which all could air their views without discrimination.

v. To accept women in all national issues.

vi. To accept and guide the youth towards governing and administering of their country.

vii. To make Lesotho an island of stability for local and expatriate investors.

viii. To turn Lesotho into, and keep her as an island of peace.
ix. To strengthen and augment Lesotho’s position in world organizations such as SADC, AU, NAM and the UN as well as their affiliates.

In the introduction of ABC 2012 manifesto, Thomas Thabane, the leader of ABC makes several points. If ABC wins the election it: would reinstate the 12th March as Moshoeshoe’s day, (the day commemorates King Moshoeshoe I, the founder of the Basotho Nation, it had been changed to 11th March by BCP government in 1993); would strive for the inclusion of Christianity in the country’s constitution; recognizes the failure of ‘freedom politics’ to solve the country’s problems such as extreme poverty, unemployment, crime, poor service delivery, failure to subsidize public services for the aged, the disabled, orphans and the needy. He further pledged that ABC will address the plight of factory workers and the public transport operators. Thabane concludes by highlighting that ABC will create poverty and starvation eradication policies, support to farming, food security, economic growth, and to ensure that natural resources benefit Lesotho in job creation and educational development.

The body of the manifesto covers a number of issues which can be summarised as follows *(author’s translation)*:

(a) Cooperation with the monarchy by reinstating the king’s powers to intervene in political crises and international affairs; deference to all chieftainship levels on matters relating to the administration of customary law, ensuring chieftainship representation in all sectors of government, and supporting the chieftainship through training on governance and development.

(b) Introduction of clear land administration plans to ensure: protection of orphans’ land rights on inherited property; fair distribution of land through local government councils, amendment of the law to restrict land ownership to Basotho only; support to those unable to use their allocated land instead of dispossessing them.

(c) Implementation of clear agricultural policies to increase production to commercial levels and to create jobs. These policies will include: to combat stock theft, to promote wool and mohair production, to resuscitate the defunct
Agricultural Bank in order to ease financing of agricultural loans, to revive irrigation projects, to ensure professional guidance to farmers.

(d) Introduction of policies for prevention and combating theft such as: to establish crime prevention committees throughout the country; to establish oversight finance sub-committees within government ministries; to create an autonomous anti-corruption agency; and to compel public servants to declare their assets.

(e) Improvement of administration of justice, security and good governance through: review of performance of all the courts of law; introducing special regulations for protection of vulnerable groups; strengthen police services; train the disciplined forces; strengthen offices of the auditor general, ombudsman, anti-corruption agency, and IEC; support policies that protect religious and media freedom.

(f) To conserve and protect the environment.

(g) To cooperate with the leadership of both Christian and customary/cultural groupings.

(h) To protect the rights of the disabled and ensure their overall development.

(i) To ensure development of youth, health services, and education.

(j) To reduce public spending on senior officials’ retirement benefits, large cabinet, types and number of vehicle for ministers, public servants’ salaries and training.

(k) To introduce policies on wages and terms of service for factory workers, private business employees and domestic workers.

(l) To establish a national panning board for economic development plans, to advise the government on the economy and land distribution.

(m) Economic development through controlled exploitation of natural resources such as diamonds, sand stone, sand and others.
Building economic pillars and job creation. For example: using local resources to construct roads, bridges and dams, improve health policies, increase pension for the aged, establish relief fund for retrenched workers, review land allocation in rural areas, country-wide electrification and water supply, review taxi fares between urban and rural settlements, improve telecommunication networks, roads and rail rehabilitation, etc.

Collaboration with the business fraternity (i.e. create a fund for traders’ loans, create conducive conditions for normal and industrial business, coordinate international trade between Lesotho and other countries, promote youth business initiatives, promote commercial tourism, ensure proper tax collection).

International relations: maintain strong and warm relations with RSA, continue Lesotho’s membership in international organizations, observe international treaties signed by Lesotho e.g. Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations and Kyoto Protocol; empower foreign affairs staff through training.

The lists above are long and express noble emancipatory ideas for the citizens. However, it may be difficult to make out politically distinctive features to differentiate the three parties. However, there are a few pointers within their manifestoes, aims and objectives that may sway one to perceive the parties’ alignments.

This section presented background information about the establishment of parties which partnered to form the first coalition government in Lesotho following the 2012 general election. In the absence of clearly expressed ideological stand, the parties’ manifestoes, aims and goals were also presented in order to make judgements about their ideological inclinations inherited from their predecessors. The logic behind muted ideological stand may be that freedom from “…being tied to a theoretical insistence ideology dominating in the same way all the time, practical judgement is able to make sense of the interaction of party preferences with situational factors…” (Budge and Keman, 1990: 191). Under these circumstances, one relies on ideal policies expressed in the parties’ manifestoes. According to Laver and Shepsley (1996: 25 – 26), “… a party’s ideal policy is the policy that the party is forecast to implement if given the opportunity to do so.” In this sense, it becomes
plausible to classify coalition partners in Lesotho by applying the classification models examined in section 3.3 above. The next section attempts to do that.

3.6 Application of Classification Models on Partners in Lesotho’s Coalition Government

Different classification models are inclined to take advantage of variations among and between the parties to found their criteria for classifying each party in a given category. These variations are characteristics that identify parties as unique entities that possess aspects such as nature, ideology and approach. In this chapter, five models have been considered and their choice was, to a large extent, determined by what was available in the literature accessible to the author at the time of this research. This section analyses the three coalition partners of Lesotho in the 2012 parliament based on these models. The models referred to are authored by: Katz and Mair (1995); Lipset and Rokkan (1967); Gunther and Diamond (2003); Mair and Mudde (1988); and Wolinetz (2002). However, any misfits or inappropriateness that may be detected between these models and the subjects of our study are a product of a range of reasons, one of which can be the fact that “…the existing models of political parties do not adequately capture the full range of variation in party types found in the world today….” (Gunther and Diamond, 2003: 167 - 168).

3.6.1 Katz and Mair (1995)

Katz and Mair’s (1995) model is based on their observation that societal dynamics and the changing relations between political parties and the state causes transformation of one party type to another in an unending process of evolution. Their model perceives party types to have evolved from elite-party type prevalent in the 19th century through mass-party, in the years 1880 to 1960; catch-all parties from 1945; to cartel-parties from 1970. In order to fit or apply this model to coalition partners in Lesotho, BNP, ABC and LCD, one has to re-combine and stretch the latter two parties back to their ancestor, BCP which existed contemporaneously with its first off-shoot BNP in the dying years of the period associated with the prevalence
of mass-parties. In this regard, Weisfelder’s (1999: 63) analysis of Lesotho’s 1960 and 1965 elections contends that BCP “… came closest to the mass party format…” In agreement with this view, Southall (1999: 119) observes that the BCP was the first party to build mass base in its struggle to secure Lesotho’s independence. Indeed even the BCP saw itself as a mass party and this claim was voiced by its deputy leader in April 1995 (Pule, 1999: 6). Looking at BNP’s support base, the chiefs, the clergy and large scale traders, one is inclined to see it as elitist. The long term aim of ABC reinstate some of the King’s executive powers in governance and their desire to involve the aristocracy, in the form of the chieftainship, in all levels of governance display the ABC’s elitist tendencies. As far as other aspects of the model are concerned, one observes that there is enough to consider the three parties ABC, LCD and BNP to have evolved towards becoming catch-all parties given their principal political goals and methods of electoral campaigning. Time has not yet revealed their ability to change into cartel-parties.

3.6.2 Lipset and Rokkan (1967)

This model expresses party competition on the bases of sides of cleavages in society that necessitated establishment of parties in their defence. Lipset and Rokkan cite the following four sets of cleavages as examples: centre – periphery cleavage; state – church cleavage; rural – urban cleavage; and owners and employers – tenants and workers cleavage. Their eight-fold typology distinguishes alliances within which parties gain support in defence of a chosen side of a cleavage. These alliances may be with: central government or national interest versus regional or ethnic interests; secular state versus the church (national or Catholic); rural and agrarian land owners versus urban industrialists; large scale traders and employers versus workers and tenants.

Lesotho is generally homogeneous with very little ethnic differences or regional interests of note. If one could again rely on the BCP – BNP dichotomy, then the following alliances could be noted: BCP was secular, albeit with a large protestant following, concentrated in urban areas, and worker oriented. On the other side BNP was allied to the Catholic Church, supported by the chiefs and traders, found mostly
in rural areas (Weisfelder, 1999); and once it won the independence election it became associated with the state. Coming back to the partners in the coalition government of 2012, party manifestoes reveal church alliances for BNP and ABC though lacking the denominational factor in favour of neither Catholic nor protestant. One can also sense a strong desire by these two to retain support from the chieftainship. While it may be difficult to ascertain the BNP support base on the urban – rural divide for 2012 election, ABC is reported to have prevailed in the urban based constituencies while the LCD and other parties were confined to the constituencies in the rural areas (IEC, 2013: 39 – 56).

3.6.3 Gunther and Diamond (2003)

For their model, Gunther and Diamond (2003) identify 15 species from the years 1850 to 2000 grouped under 5 genera styled Elite-based, mass-based, ethnicity-based, electoralist and movement parties. Disregarding the genus of elite-based parties on account of their predating party politics in Lesotho, focus of classification can start with mass-based parties. These appeared as a result of political mobilization of the workers in Europe countries and they featured a huge subscription paying membership. Structurally, mass-based parties have a network of local branches and affiliated trade unions who inform goals of their programmes (Gunther and Diamond, 2003). This genus is divided into six party species of two-way dimensional stand in their degree of commitment to programmes, ideology and/or belief system ranging from religion through nationalism to socialism on the one hand; and hegemonic to tolerant and pluralist continuum on the other hand. Mass-based parties with religious commitment have two categories; first are fundamentalist parties on the proto-hegemonic extreme seeking to reorganize society and the state to conform to strict doctrinal reading. Second are denominational parties; they are characterized by basing their programmes on a set of religious beliefs that are determined by a combination of tradition and interpretation by clerics; their examples being Catholic dominated Christian Democratic parties seen in Western European countries (Gunther and Diamond, 2003: 182).
Of the three coalition partners in Lesotho, BNP displays features that closely represent the description of denominational mass-party:

- Leabua Jonathan, the founding leader of BNP, was encouraged by Patrick Wall, a Roman Catholic Member of Parliament in United Kingdom, to form a party that will keep Basotho within the morals observed by Catholics (Khaketla, 1971: 18);

- Prototype Christian Democratic Party draft manifesto, first used by Manyeli in his attempt to found a party in Lesotho was used to draft BNP’s manifesto (Machobane, 2001: 7; Mphanya, 2004: 27);

- BNP desired close relations with apartheid South Africa as recommended by A.G.T. Chaplin, a South African citizen who had just been appointed British Resident Commissioner in Lesotho in 1958 (Khaketla, 1971: 19);


According to Gunther and Diamond (2003: 179) socialist class-mass parties are characterised by the following:

- Socialist ideological commitments;

- Executive authority is held by the executive committee of the secretariat on behalf of the full congress;

- Duality of power: parliamentary leadership and executive committee which leads to:
  - Occasional conflict over the parties’ agenda and candidates nomination;
  - Conflict between pragmatists favouring electoral victory and ideologues favouring constituency representation and ideological consistency;
  - Common splits of the party.
With the following features, the LCD appears to be a socialist class-mass party with these attributes:

- Via its BAC - BCP ancestry, the LCD bears its origins from the influence of the League of Commoners in the early 1950s (Weisfelder, 1999: 5; Machobane, 2001: 2; Matlosa and Shale, 2006: 5);

- The BAC formation was initiated by the ANC Ladybrand Branch in furtherance of ANC aim to spread the congress movement throughout Southern Africa (Mphanya, 2004: 11);

- Its founding leader, Ntsu Mokhehle, was a product of and inspired by the African National Congress (ANC) youth league of South Africa (Weisfelder, 1999: 5; Machobane, 2001: 2; Mphanya, 2004: 42);

- The LCD, by extension from the BCP, is Pan-Africanist in orientation (Weisfelder, 1999: 5; Mphanya, 2004: 42);

- Mokhehle’s election into the Pan-Africanist Steering Committee of the All-African People’s Conference held in Ghana in 1958, which also prompted the change of the party’s name from BAC to BCP (Mphanya, 2004: 31)

- The desire to nationalise diamond mining, promote cooperatives and to introduce price controls; and trade unionism (Mphanya, 2004: 42).

As indicated in subsection 3.5.3, the ABC was formed in 2006 by Thomas Thabane along with other Members of Parliament who crossed the floor from the LCD. From its constitution the ABC ideological inclination is not clear, it has hitherto not expressed any deviation from LCD secular policies; the LCD becomes the point of reference here because the ABC was formed out of disgruntled and defecting members of parliament crossing the floor from the LCD into ABC (Matlosa and Shale, 2006; Maundeni, 2010). However, in preparation for the 2012 elections, it seems to have joined the BNP in pursuing Christian principles, seeking to increase the monarchy’s as well as the chieftainship’s role in governance, and renouncing ‘freedom politics’ (ABC Manifesto, 2012). This marked a shift from the left inclined congress politics of freedom to the right inclined BNP conservatism. According to
Matlosa and Shale (2008: 9) ideological inclinations to the left emphasize liberty, equality, fraternity, rights, progress, reform and internationalism; while on the right are authority, hierarchy, order, duties, tradition, reaction, nationalism.

Putting aside ideological heritage of these three parties (ABC, BNP and LCD), 2012 saw them approximating electoralist catch-all parties given what their manifestoes, aims and objectives say. Catch-all parties are pluralistic and tolerant; they feature vague ideology seeking to aggregate a wide range of social interest in order to win elections and proceed to govern the country (Gunther and Diamond, 2003).


As indicated in passed sections, party families model classify parties in terms of four dimensions upon which relations akin to human family can be traced (Mair and Mudde, 1998). These are party origins, affiliation to international organizations, ideology and name or label. Party family is an important concept in comparative studies for classifying political parties; its rationality is founded on uniqueness and internal solidarity (Freire and Tsatsanis, 2015). Meaning that, parties within the same family should be easily differentiated from ones in another family, while maintaining more or less similar ideology or policy outlook within each party family. This subsection analyses the BNP, the LCD and the ABC in terms of the party family model dimensions. The BNP was established as an ideological alternative to the BCP (Khaketla, 1971: 22); it was modelled along the lines of Christian Democratic Parties (CDP) and was inspired by the Roman Catholic Church in Lesotho (Khaketla, 1971: 18 - 22). However, there appears to be no existing affiliation to any international organization, though the CDP origins would imply international kinship. Ideologically, it is conservative and therefore, to the Right. BNP emphasizes its Christian roots and seeks to amplify reverence to the monarchy as well as conserving the role of the chieftainship in Basotho life (BNP Manifesto, 2015). Its members regard themselves as ‘nationalists’ or ‘Nazi’ although their association with, and subscription to Hitler’s Nazi movement is doubtful. Their motto is “Victory” (BNP Manifesto, 2015), meaning victory over their problems.
The LCD was formed as a result of BCP split in 1997 following protracted factional infighting (Matlosa and Shale, 2006; Maundeni, 2010). Ideologically, it is inclined to the Left taking after BCP, its predecessor (Khaketla, 1971; Weisfelder, 1999); and it is internationally allied to the Pan-Africanist movement (Mphanya, 2004). It labels itself a ‘congress’ and describes that as “bohatammoho” thus making the members “Mahatammoho” (Mphanya, 2004: 22). These literally translate into ‘marching together’ and ‘those who march together’ respectively (author’s translation). They see themselves as a progressive and unifying movement. Their motto is “Truth, Justice, Peace” (LCD Constitution, 1997).

The ABC is also a product of a congress party split having been formed by mostly LCD defectors led by Thomas Thabane (Matlosa and Shale, 2006; Maundeni, 2010). In renouncing ‘freedom politics’, seeking a prominent role for the monarchy in politics and involvement of chiefs in government as well as its desire to include Christianity in the country’s constitution during the 2012 election campaign (ABC Manifesto, 2012), the ABC clearly came out of the LCD shadow in the Left and aligned itself with the Right. One is prone to suspect that by ‘freedom politics’ the ABC refers to Pan-Africanism. The ABC does not appear to have any international affiliations. They consider themselves as ‘conventionists’ that seek to liberate Basotho from protracted rivalry and at times animosity between national (BNP) and congress (BCP – LCD) parties. Their motto is “sera sa motho ke tlala” (ABC Constitution, 2006), translating into “Man’s enemy is starvation” (author’s translation).

In summary, table 3.6 attempts to capture the foregoing party families’ dimensional analysis of the coalition partners in Lesotho.
**Table 3.6**: Party Family relations for coalition partners

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dimension</th>
<th>LESOTHO COALITION PARTNERS 2012</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>BNP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Party origins</strong></td>
<td>Split from BCP in 1958, inspired by the Catholic Church in Lesotho; modelled like Christian Democratic Parties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Affiliation to international organizations</strong></td>
<td>Nil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ideology</strong></td>
<td>Conservative; seeking veneration to the monarchy and the chieftainship; adopts Christianity as guiding philosophy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Name/label</strong></td>
<td>Nationalist/Nazi; Motto – “Victory”</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s compilation

### 3.6.5 Wolinetz (2002)

In this model a number of indicators are spread out to determine a party’s position on a tri-focal chart whose three points identify Policy-seeking, Vote-seeking and Office-seeking parties (Wolinetz, 2002). This model is predicated on policy-seeking parties.
Characteristics in this model are measured by their emphasis on policy. Categories in this regard are:

- Internal policy debate in terms of time spent on debate, character of debate and the extent and levels of involvement;
- Consistency of policy position assumed;
- Relationship between election campaign in terms of prominence of policy in campaigns and campaigning strategy;
- Infrastructural support for policies.

Looking at the presentation of the data informing table 3.4, vote-seeking and office seeking parties are just appendages appearing in relation to policy-seeking parties in this model. This data appears in Wolinetz (2003: 155) as Table 6.3. This is so because all, but one, possible indicators relate to policy and virtually nothing on office seeking and quite minimal on vote-seeking. Therefore, in applying this model to the three Lesotho coalition partners involves estimating these parties’ commitment to policy in terms of the afore-listed possible indicators.

Time spent by these parties discussing policy is very limited as this occurs during the annual conferences (LCD Constitution, 1997; ABC Constitution, 2012; BNP Constitution, 2007); these are usually two days long, involving a large number of delegates from all the country’s 80 constituencies. Owing to the largeness of these conferences and the pre-planned agenda, the quality of debate does not lend itself amenable to serious intensity on policy issues. Policies are normally gleaned from speeches delivered by the leadership during the opening or closing of the annual conferences.

It might not be fair to judge the coalition partners on policy stands they each stood for in the run-up to the 2012 election since none of them anticipated to be in a coalition government. If they did, none of them said anything, neither in the constitution nor the manifesto as to how that eventuality (of joining a ruling coalition), would affect the implementation of their policy stand. It is possible that pre-election policies were abandoned in favour of coalition agreement and it would be virtually
impossible to identify policies would have been implemented had anyone of them won the election on its own. Another issue complicating this exercise would be the fact that the coalition collapsed within two years of its establishment.

Election campaigns - If one takes policy issues as reflected in the parties’ manifestoes and the serious contestations during campaigning period together with the use of media (radio, print, social media, television etc.) advertising and public gatherings for these issues’ discussions, then all the three parties would rank high in this category’s dimension of prominence of policy. There is no evidence to support any policy-driven election campaign strategy; it is suspected that campaign strategy is determined by the leadership in these parties. Of note here is that intensive use of media in this way is usually confined to the campaign period which, in Lesotho is constitutionally decreed to be not more than 90 days prior to the date of elections (Lesotho Constitution, 1993).

Infrastructure to support policy – In this category, it is only the ABC that has an informal but influential resource group while BNP and LCD do not have that structures. ABC resource group is informal in the sense that it does not appear as part of the structures of the party in any of its publications especially its constitution and the manifesto; it is influential in that candidates for many political appointments relating to the ABC during the life of the first coalition, are attributed to have been touted for or cleared by that resource group.

Table 3.7 below is an attempt to present the author’s view on the foregoing analysis of the coalition partners in terms of possible indicators of the tri-dimensional aspects of policy-seeking, vote-seeking and office – seeking parties drawn from table 3.4 in section 3.3 above. The last row of the table indicates the aggregate judgement of how one sees the coalition partners in relation to this model.
Table 3.7: Classification of Coalition Partners

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Possible Indicators</th>
<th>Parties</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>BNP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>LCD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ABC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internal policy debate</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time spent at party meetings</td>
<td>Low, Annual</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>conferences</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Low, Annual</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>conferences</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Low, Annual</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>conferences</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Character of debate</td>
<td>Pro-forma, abridged,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>issue-focussed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extent and level of involvement</td>
<td>Confined to</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>leadership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consistency of policy position assumed</td>
<td>Indeterminate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Indeterminate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Indeterminate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Election campaigns</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prominence of policy</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Determination of strategy</td>
<td>Varies, depends on</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>the leader</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uses of electoral techniques</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infrastructure to support policies</td>
<td>Either minimal or at</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(e.g. research bureaux,</td>
<td>disposal of leaders,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>think-tanks, affiliated</td>
<td>office holders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>organizations)</td>
<td>Either minimal or at</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>disposal of leaders,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>office holders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Informal but influential</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CLASSIFICATION</td>
<td>Policy-seeking…Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Vote-seeking….</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Office-seeking…High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Policy-seeking…Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Vote-seeking….</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Office-seeking…High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Policy-seeking…Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Vote-seeking….</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Office-seeking…High</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: author’s compilation)

As suggested at the beginning of this section, a perfect snugly fit of some parties into these typologies ought not to be expected for a variety of reasons; one reason being
that party dynamics over time have not followed a single straight route and it is believed that, “…changes in the organizational forms, electoral strategies, are the products of multiple causal processes…” (Gunther and Diamond, 2003: 193). Therefore, since most classification models are static, party – typology misfits will tend to grow as time goes by.

This section discussed the general overview of political parties, and focused on defining political parties and their functions. Of particular interest is an aspect which distinguishes political parties from other organizations: aspiration to govern through shaping of public policy or taking control of government. Owing to the fact that political parties differ in identity, organization and ideology, classification of parties was explored. In this regard, models presented by Katz and Mair, Lipset and Rokkan, Gunther and Diamond, Mair and Mudde, and Wolinetz were looked at. The implication here is that, political parties as the main actors in the competition to win state power and govern, come in different sizes and shapes; the exploration of party types and classifications provided an understanding of yet another aspect of political parties – analytically they can assume an identity of a single actor with origins and a set of ideals i.e. ideology which determine its relationships with other parties in coalition or in competition.

The other aspect that needs to be looked at is that of the state environment in which these parties exist and conduct their business. That environment is a polity, an example of which is Lesotho. It is important at this stage to explore the political environment as it unfolds in Lesotho’s system of government. This will be in conformity to the theme of this study, the rise and fall of the first coalition government in Lesotho. Therefore, what follows is a brief look at the system of government in the country.

3.7 System of Government in Lesotho

Following from her former colonial master, the United Kingdom, Lesotho adopted a parliamentary system of government crafted along the Westminster style at her 1966
independence (Gill, 1993: 214; Matlosa, 1997: 95; Sekatle, 1997: 71; Matlosa and Shale, 2006: 3). Parliamentary system is characterized by:

• Dual executive arrangement – Head of state is a symbolic monarch or figurehead whose functions are constitutionally limited to ceremonial and/or customary occasions with nominal executive powers i.e. king, queen, emperor, sultan, or tsar. These functions and powers are discharged and exercised on the advice/recommendation of other officials or institutions. The real executive power to govern is vested in the head of government i.e. a prime minister.

• Fusion of power – Members of the executive especially the prime minister and cabinet ministers are chosen from the legislature and are answerable to parliament. That is, they are both parliamentarians as well as members of the executive though, in theory there is separation of powers between the three arms of government; legislature, executive and the judiciary

• Party system – The party or coalition of parties with a majority in parliament form the ruling government (prime minister and cabinet ministers). The government is responsible to parliament and its tenure depends on the confidence of a parliamentary majority. Election of these officials into government is not done directly by the electorate. The electorate votes representatives into the parliament, who then select a prime minister, who in turn ‘appoints’ cabinet ministers (Sekatle, 1997: 71; Cheibub, 2007: 34 – 40; Szilagyi, 2009: 313).

3.7.1 The Legislature

Adoption of parliamentary system of government by Lesotho is entrenched in the constitution, albeit without direct mention within constitutional sections. According to the Constitution of Lesotho (1993), the Parliament of Lesotho includes the King, a Senate and a National Assembly (section 54). The King’s role is to assent to bills passed by both the National Assembly and the senate by signing them into law, styled “Acts of Parliament”. In line with the above features of a parliamentary system, section 44 presents the King as “a constitutional monarch and Head of State”. Section 51 portrays the symbolic nature of the head of state by prescribing the oath
of office of king which requires the in-coming king to swear among others, that he will execute his duties “...in such a manner as to preserve the character of the monarchy as a symbol of the unity of the Basotho Nation...” (Author’s emphasis).

A reading of section 87 further demonstrates the traits of parliamentary system in that, in addition to the office of king, it establishes the office of the prime minister and the entire executive. It also places political parties at the centre of the selection of both the prime minister and the ministers. Thus duality of executive, fusion of power, and party system are infused and intertwined together to give Lesotho’s system its parliamentary character.

The Senate is composed of twenty-two hereditary Principal Chiefs, who assume office by virtue of their birth, and eleven other members nominated by the King following the advice of the State Council (section 55). The National Assembly consists of eighty constituency seats and forty Proportional Representation (PR) seats totalling 120 seats (section 56). The seats in the National Assembly are contested for in the general elections at least once every 5 years (section 83). Though the Senate is usually referred to as the Upper House of Parliament, no bills can originate from within it and it cannot stop any bill from being enacted into law (sections 78 and 80). It can only delay passage of bills or return them to the National Assembly with recommended amendments. In such cases, the National Assembly may consider the amendments, accept or reject them; except for certain constitutional amendments which need majority vote in both Houses, disagreements between the two houses would not disqualify a bill for assent by the King.

3.7.2 The Executive

Constitutionally, the executive authority of Lesotho is vested in the King and this is exercised by the King through officers or authorities of the Government of Lesotho (section 86). In executing the business of governing in Lesotho, the first officer or authority is Prime Minister who is appointed by the King acting in accordance with advice of the Council of State; the candidate to be appointed, must be a leader of a political party or a coalition of parties that commands the support of a majority of the
members on the National Assembly; loss of this parliamentary support spells out such Prime Minister's loss of job (section 87). The King, acting in accordance with the advice of the Prime Minister, appoints government ministers from among members of the National Assembly as well as from 11 nominated Senators to become cabinet members (sections 87 – 89).

### 3.7.3 The judiciary

According to section 118 of the Constitution, the judicial power lies with the courts of Lesotho who are enjoined to be independent and free from interference and only subject to the Constitution and other laws of Lesotho. The judicial powers referred to here mean that the courts hear and decide on disputes and cases of crime, civil rights, labour, and commerce. In cases involving courts martial, the High Court is the first level of appeal from the military court martial. The judiciary also plays a checks and balance role between the law makers (the legislature) and those who govern (the executive). This section also compels the government to afford the courts of law all the support aimed at protecting their independence, dignity and effectiveness.

### 3.8 Summary

This chapter generally dealt with political parties; it defined political parties and their functions. In academics, a subject cannot be measured if it cannot be defined. Defining political parties gives this study a means of measuring its variables in the form of parties. The main thrust of the definition of party is that it is a collective unit of competition for state political power and formation of government; in the words of Daalder (1983: 6), political parties are “instruments of effective political control”. Two party definitions were distinguished: one that regard control of government and allocation of privileges that comes with it such as job opportunities and political patronage as the end in itself. The other sees the end as the ability to influence and shape public policy in a bid to reach some programmatic agenda. In other words, there are parties who simply aspire to be in government only to have control over
who benefits from holding government office, and there are those who hope to bring change in society through their programmes once they are in government.

Party definitions were looked at along with party functions. These included linking citizens’ interests with government actions; aggregating and articulating public interests and policy preferences; training candidates for public office; being foundation of logic in law making processes and others. These functions could serve as the basis for understanding the rationale for good governance questions of legitimacy, transparency, accountability, participation, responsibility, efficiency and effectiveness (Pomerantz, 2011: 164).

Owing to the fact that political parties differ in identity, organization and ideology, classification of parties was explored. In this regard, models presented by Katz and Mair (1995), Lipset and Rokkan (1967), Gunther and Diamond (2003), Mair and Mudde (1998), and Wolinetz (2002) were looked at. Katz and Mair (1995) suggest that dynamics in the exchanges between the political parties and the state provide a seedbed for a symbiotic progression that sees party types resulting in conditions that give rise to yet newer party types with their own set of effects in a continuous process. Their model presents four types of political parties: elite parties, mass parties, catch-all parties and cartel parties.

Lipset and Rokkan’s (1967) model postulates that party competition is based on societal cleavages and it gives four examples:

1. Centre – periphery cleavages reflect tensions between core nation-builders at the centre and political, ethnic and cultural influence in the periphery;

2. State – church cleavages are competing interests between secular and religious priorities;

3. Rural interest – urban industry cleavages show conflict between primary mode of production, for example rural agrarian economy and secondary production mode such as urbanizing industrial developments.
4. Owners and employers – tenants and workers cleavages represent rivalry between those who control the means of production and those who produce.

Gunther and Diamond (2003) use biological analogy of genera and species. They present fifteen species of party types divided into five genera of elite based, mass-based, ethnicity-based, electoralist and movement parties. Another analogous model is proposed by Mair and Mudde (1998): this model attempts to draw parallels by party lineage to resemble family relations. Four modes of approach are used to depict the relations; these are origins or sociology, international organization that a party may be affiliated to, policy or ideology, and party name or label.

The last model to be looked at was that suggested by Wolinetz (2002). This model identifies three types of parties: policy-seeking, vote-seeking and office-seeking presented in a triangular diagram that places each type at the corner adjacent to the other two to represent the main aim of the party type.

The presentation of classification models was followed by an account of contemporary political developments in Lesotho. The presentation traced the development of political parties in Lesotho from Lekhotla la Bafo in the early 1950s through BAC cum BCP and ultimately to the parties that partnered to form the first coalition government in Lesotho in 2012, BNP, LCD and ABC. Political issues of those days were just changing from the demanding fair treatment by the colonial authorities to demanding full political independence. The BAC was led by Mokhehle and others who were formerly members of the ANC youth league and close relations with those who later became founders of Pan-Africanist Congress in South Africa. It became a matter of course that the BAC adopted a Pan-Africanist view of the independence struggle. The spectre of what was viewed as impending communism prompted those with anti-communist feelings to actively encourage and support an alternative party that would safeguard their interests. Such a party was realized in the form of BNP. Then other parties were formed and they duly joined the independence struggle.

The BNP won the 1965 election and became the first party to govern the independent Lesotho from 1966. The next election was held in 1970, when it appeared like BNP was losing, its leader and the then Prime Minister Jonathan annulled the results and
ruled by decree until the army deposed him in 1986. A return to multi-party democracy in 1993 saw the BCP win all the 65 seats in the National Assembly. BCP’s internal factionalism led to an eventual split in 1997 and lost control of government to the LCD. 2006 saw another split of the ruling party when the ABC was formed. However, the split did not cause the change of government. The LCD continued to run the government until a split that established DC left it with a minority in the National Assembly and loss of government in 2012. The elections in the same year produced a hung parliament, thus creating an opportunity for the ABC, the BNP and the LCD to form the first coalition government in Lesotho; the subject of this research. A section that followed dealt with coalition partners as individual parties.

The section on coalition partners started off with their origins and moved on to how they were established. Then the parties’ ideological inclinations are explored through the parties’ expressed policies as covered in their manifestoes, aims and objectives. The issue that was being pursued here was not only to present Lesotho’s political history, but it is also to exhibit the context within which the three coalition partners, i.e. ABC, BNP and LCD, came into being, given their ideological heritage that had an impact on their choices and decisions. Then the stage was set for the classification models to be applied on the coalition partners.

In the application of classification models to the situation in Lesotho in the period under review, 2012 to 2014, a numbers of conclusions can be reached. Under the model by Katz and Mair (1995), BNP is seen as elitist, owing to its support base of large scale traders, the chiefs and the clergy. ABC is similarly elitist due to its pursuit of inclusion of the King and the chieftainship in governance. The LCD is regarded as having inherited its mass party status from the BCP, its predecessor. Due to their diffuse ideological differences and their all-inclusive recruitment of members in a bid to win elections, the three parties appear in the catch-all category of parties. Here one gets a sense of similarity among these parties.

Lipset and Rokkan’s (1967) cleavage-based model places ABC and BNP in alliance with the church and local authorities in the form of the chieftainship. LCD’s secular outlook and its tenure in government from 1997 to 2012 placed it in alliance with the state, though at the time of the election government was controlled by the then newly
formed Democratic Congress (DC) led by the former LCD leader, Pakalitha Mosisili. According to this model, the LCD becomes the odd one out in relation to the other two partners.

In light of Gunther and Diamond’s (2003) model, BNP is found to be a denominational mass-party due to its being an exemplar of Christian Democratic Parties and its support base in the Catholic Church in Lesotho. The LCD is placed in the socialist class-mass parties’ category. Among its attributes, it features: Pan-Africanist origins and inclinations via its BAC – BCP descent, its desire to nationalise mining, trade unionism and price controls. The ABC’s to the Right inclinations becomes apparent in the introduction to its 2012 manifesto. It refers to its desire to ‘reinstate’ the King’s intervention powers in political and international matters, seeking to increase the involvement of the chieftainship in government and in intending to include Christianity in the Constitution of Lesotho. This model also sets the LCD apart from its partners in that it sees LCD as secular and progressive while the ABC and the BNP are religious and conservative.

Drawing from the four dimensions of origin, affiliation, ideology and label that characterise Mair and Mudde’s (1998) party families’ model, the ABC and the BNP are classified as conservative and religious. The LCD is depicted as secular, Pan-Africanist and progressive. This ideological convergence between the ABC and the BNP is observed despite the difference in their origins. The implication here is that a party can originate on the one side of the Left – Right spectrum of ideologies but end up in the opposite side as time goes on. This is another model that show relative closeness between the ABC and the BNP as opposed to the relative distance where the LCD is ideologically concerned.

In the model by Wolinetz (2002) in which possible indicators are drawn from policy-seeking, vote-seeking and office-seeking aims of parties, the three coalition partners in Lesotho appear to be inclined towards being office-seeking. This is the only model in which all the three parties appear to have the same attributes. One is prone to believe that the reason behind this is that this model has a weakness of being policy oriented without equal weight being afforded to the other two aims of vote and office seeking in terms of possible indicators.
Lastly, the chapter dealt with the system of government in Lesotho. It was observed that Lesotho uses parliamentary system of government. She has a ceremonial constitutional monarch as head of state, a prime minister and cabinet that are appointed from elected members of parliament, (as opposed to executive head of state, and cabinet appointments from outside parliament in presidential system of government).

This study intends to understand the dynamics of the emergence, development and the ultimate demise of the first coalition government in Lesotho. This chapter has been instrumental in setting the political scene in terms of background theory on political parties, what they are and why they exist. Classification of parties shed light on the types of political parties and their characteristics. This exercise enabled the study to go beyond the mere history of which party was established when? The study was able to analyse the very players in the political dispensation that forms the heart of what is being studied; the coalition partners.

The next chapter will delve deep into the modalities and workings (as surrounding episodes) of an emerging coalition government in Lesotho. Special attention will be focused on factors such as: how the coalition was built; surrounding issues; who was involved; why; and governance implications on coalitions.
CHAPTER 4

Coalition Governance in Lesotho

4.1 Introduction

This study is within the realm of governance and within such parameters, the focus is on the rise and fall of the first coalition government in Lesotho. As Hinckley, (1981: 4) points out, “coalition activity is, in fact, a ‘small measure’ of political activity, and not merely a metaphorical insight”. This chapter will delve deep into the emergence and workings (as surrounding episodes) of the coalition governance in Lesotho. The starting point being the 2012 election results in which no single party won enough seats to form a government on its own. These results saw the ruling Democratic Congress (DC) give way to a coalition made up of All Basotho Convention (ABC), Basotho National Party (BNP) and Lesotho Congress for Democracy (LCD) to form a government, thus effectively ejecting the incumbent Prime Minister Mosisili out of the State House, the official residence of Head of Government in Lesotho. Of particular interest for this chapter, are the answers to some of the research questions as introduced in chapter 1. These questions ask:

1. How was collaboration between coalition partners (ABC, BNP and LCD) fashioned?

2. What was agreed as collaboration arrangements among the coalition partners?

3. What were the resultant governance implications of these arrangements?

4. Which harmonization strategy was employed (given assumed differences)?

The first question seeks to establish an understanding of issues around the advent and adaptation of the coalition government in Lesotho. The academic significance of examining this trend is that the process addresses one of the vital preoccupations of
institutional analysis, that is - institutional change (Kjær, 2004: 9; Greif and Laitin, 2012:3; Cortell and Peterson, 2012: 69). Following from her acknowledgement that coalition can be described as “the joint use of resources to determine the outcome of a mixed-motive situation involving more than two units”; Hinckley (1981: 4) notes that there are three components that come to the fore from this description of coalition. First is the use of power (power in the sense of capacity to cause a result). The second is a blending of confrontation and cooperation; and the third is a shared activity (Hinckley, 1981: 4 - 5). What this means is that each of the three coalition partners had to be aware of, and consider that firstly, they can use their numbers in the National Assembly to bargain in order to have a share in the spoils of being in government. Secondly, each one of them had to weigh the benefits of forsaking other parties and cooperating with these particular two partners. Lastly, each of these coalition partners had to come together to form a collective since singularly, they are not in a winning coalition; singularly, they lose the benefits of forming a government.

The give-and-take compromises and collaboration arrangements anticipated by the second research question, and indeed inherent in coalition governments, do have governance implications. This is especially so when recalling the part of governance definition, “…the nature of all patterns of rule… theories and practices of governing and the dilemmas to which they give rise” (Christensen and Tschirhart, 2011: 65). These implications are a subject of the third research question; and these will be dealt with simultaneously as the collaboration arrangements are presented. Governance implications on coalitions will add a crucial dimension to this study; for example, it will provide a backdrop if not a benchmark for comparison. This dimension attempts to build an understanding of the context and complexity of relations within a coalition environment and possibly weigh Lesotho’s experience on issues that have a bearing on good governance; and what follows is a brief look at good governance.
4.2.1 Debates on Good Governance

Increased attention to good governance was stimulated by a number of factors. According to Rothstein (2012: 144) a shift from the assumption that economic variables and social class structure are the main determinants of economic growth and development, to the view that “the character of society’s political institutions to a large extent determined its economic and social development”. In reiteration, it has become commonly acceptable that historical teachings have bequeathed a maxim “that political institutions are decisive in shaping economic institutions and, with them, the course of innovation and investment that leads to a developed society” (Mungui-Pippidi, 2016: 95). Rothstein continues to suggest that other sources of growing interest in good governance can be traced to some research efforts. Research efforts referred to had been in search for the possibilities of political regimes to design and apply appropriate laws that would create enabling environment for economic development. Some research had indicated that good governance agenda produced positive results in various areas of human well-being such as lower economic inequalities. Still other research efforts had studied “virtuous circles” that led to good governance as “success stories” in search of examples that could be applied to achieve the same results (of good governance); the understanding being that “the West’s superior prosperity is due to its superior institutions” (Mungui-Pippidi, 2016: 96).

For Phago (2013: 107), good governance is looked at “as being a result of the democratization process, which has been largely influenced by the World Bank ‘in the context of political conditionality’, especially for developing countries and elsewhere.” In this sense it is suggested that developing countries by the international donors and financiers to address good governance issues in exchange for aid, economic assistance and/or development funding. An alternative view is offered by Hill (2013), who suggests that the inherently normative principles of good governance were developed to direct and rehabilitate the command and obey governance structures which have failed to maintain their legitimacy. These efforts sought to discover new forms of institutional partnerships to resolve matters of common concern. It has also become common course to recommend or prescribe robust governance regimes as a cure for “government failure, market failure, and
system failure or a combination of these” (Hill, 2013: 22), giving rise to good governance reference contextualized by peculiarities dictated by each country’s political, cultural and geographic environment. In short, there cannot be a one-size-fits-all description of good governance, a feature natural to normative concepts.

One of the common definitions of good governance is offered by the World Bank Research Institute (quoted from Rothstein, 2012: 146):

*The traditions and institutions by which authority in a country is exercised. This includes (1) the process by which governments are selected, monitored and replaced, (2) the capacity of government to effectively formulate and implement sound policies, and (3) the respect of citizens and the state for the institutions that govern economic social interactions among them.*

Weaknesses of this definition have been identified as its reference to policy content, procedure (rule of law), and the inclusion of both institutions that facilitate influence of political power as well as those that apply an enforce laws and policies (Rothstein, 2012). Firstly, the contention against policy content is that the definition of appropriate remains with international experts who might not have solutions to all problems. Secondly, inclusion of both procedure and policy content in the definition creates what Rothstein (2012) calls “Platonian-Leninist” problem. That is, reliance to experts to determine policy, such reliance would not assume perfect knowledge of all policy problems by such experts, but would also supplant democratic participation by the less knowledgeable majority of those affected by the policy. Indeed, it becomes obvious that good governance would lose its meaning if the voices of minorities and the vulnerable are not heard in the policies that affect them (Nnamani, 2014).

Conceptions of good governance are many and varied; Rothstein (2012) draws attention to some of them and makes the following observations:

1. Good governance is not necessarily small governance and neither is big governance necessarily bad governance.
2. Good governance cannot be described solely on the basis of absence of corruption on account of the meaning of corruption i.e. clientelism, cronyism,
patronage, nepotism, systemic discrimination and other contradictions to good governance are viewed differently in different places and times.

3. Good governance as rule of law should take into consideration the debate on the balance between substance of the law and procedural interpretation of the law. That is, the distinction between good and bad law on the basis of its content and/or the process that produced such a law.

4. “Good governance is different from, and should not conceptually be equated with, democracy” (Rothstein, 2012: 150).

Looking at these observations one tends to have an impression that they are meant to show that the defining elements of good governance are not, in and by themselves, good governance. Rather, since governance is regarded as a device for institutional effectiveness in society, good governance should be seen as the product of relevant and effective democratic institutions (Deyanandnand, 2013; Mude and Chigora, 2013).

The enthusiasm towards good governance seems to be waning, though the starting point of this process is not clear. According to Moene and Søreide (2015), initiatives such as five year development plans and privatization, similar to good governance suffered a decline before their intended effects of boosting economic growth were realized. These initiatives were then part of aid conditions to developing countries, however, the initiatives fell victim to opportunistic elites who used them to acquire assets and enrich themselves in most of these countries. The argument here is that:

*rents can be extracted under the cover of executing good policies... nominally beneficial policies permit corrupt decision-makers to hide in plain sight... The reforms cover, or in other ways facilitate incumbents’ efforts to divert resources from the general public and to their own group... a higher international demand for integrity may lead to more fake supplies of good governance* (Moene and Søreide, 2015: 3 – 5).

Moene and Søreide’s (2015) view seems to flow from that of Kjær (2014). She posits that good governance agenda assumed that better governance results in economic growth, however, state intervention in the economy introduces a breeding ground for
“rent seeking behaviour and corruption” leading to bad governance that impedes economic growth; under such circumstances the rule of law is not observed and private property rights not respected (Kjær, 2014:2). She goes on to identify three reasons for the decline of good governance agenda. First, the rise of new donor countries whose aid conditions to African recipient countries are less focused on good governance e.g. China, India, Brazil, Saudi Arabia and South Korea. Second, the rise in the rise in the ability of many African countries to exploit their natural resources has increased their tax base and income as a result of economic growth, thus translating into less dependency on Western donors. Third, good governance’s “normative base has been questioned, the feasibility of implementing it has been challenged, and the assumptions about the causal relation between governance and growth have been problematised” (Kjær, 2014:3).

Within the context of these testing developments, one is invited to foresee a shift of focus and applicability of the good governance and its elements. A shift away from the normative ‘good’ to more pragmatic and tangible ‘good’; a phase that could resonate more with the human wellbeing associated with economic development and growth. Perhaps it was the same realization of an impending change that in her paper titled ‘An Ontology of Good Governance’, Cătălin-Valentin Raiu (2015: 168) concludes that:

_Narratives on the governance process are meant to explain how politics loses its place as the core of social reality… good governance means a good order neutral as against democracy, but in defense of rule of law and effectiveness. It has the persuasive power to become a new kind of political regime, it brings into arena pre-democratic elements, it facilitates the alliance of the marketplace and the state… Good governance is not directed towards democracy, but it is a social order that may bring our main stream Western political regime in front of a major turn._
4.2.2 Principles of Good Governance

A number of studies have produced distinct but closely related descriptions of what good governance is. Norris (2011: 188) sees good governance in terms of the following six dimensions:

1. **Voice and accountability** – the levels of free speech, political freedom of association, free press and ability of the citizens to freely elect their government.

2. **Political stability and absence of violence** – confidence in the stability of government and guarantee that government change in constitutionally determined without fear of violent conflict.

3. **Government effectiveness** – a measure of professionalism in public services and civil service free from political partisanship; ability of the government to ensure that policies are developed and implemented in response to the needs of the people.

4. **Regulatory quality** – state commitment to formulate strategies and legislative protection of economic development driven by free market forces.

5. **Rule of law** – a measure of trust placed on law enforcement and adjudication structures to ensure societal regulation aimed at protecting business transactions or exchanges and prevention of crime.

6. **Control of corruption** – the level at which the state agents use their offices for self-enrichment and abuse of state resources for the benefit of high society.

In a similar fashion, Pomerantz (2011: 164) lists what she terms governance agenda in the following manner:

1. **Rule of law** – regulatory authority, accountability, transparency, probity and anti-corruption.

2. **Government capacity** – leadership, organization, institutional structure, scope and effectiveness.


On their part, Sindane and Nambalirwa (2012) suggest that good governance can be defined by the under-listed features:

1. *Participation* - founded on free speech and an equal opportunity for all citizens to participate meaningfully.

2. *Rule of law* – an environment of just laws, applied fairly and in which all are judged equally without exception.

3. *Transparency* – the level of unimpeded access to accurate information.

4. *Responsiveness* – public agencies and processes that are geared towards addressing the needs of all stakeholders.

5. *Consensus orientation* – meaningful accommodation of diversity of interests present in society.


7. *Efficiency and effectiveness* – the capacity and efficacy of public agencies to competently exploit state resources to meet the people’s needs.

8. *Accountability* – the citizens’ ability to hold government officials, public officials, and civil society organizations responsible for their actions and performance.

9. *Strategic vision* – the citizens’ access to and participation in long-term planning for the future of the public affairs that stand to affect them.

A close look at these features of good governance reminds one of democratic rule as a form of governing. Dahl (2000: 38) describes democratic dispensation as the one in which there are good prospects for: effective participation by all members; equality in voting; gaining enlightened understanding of relevant alternative policies and their
likely consequences; controlling the agenda; and the inclusion of all interested adults. This implies that there exists close relationship between these two concepts (good governance and democracy), and in fact a study of one accentuates the understanding of another. In other words, in a democracy, the starting point for establishment of a government is an election. However, about elections and democracy, De Swaan (1973: 1) notes: “The absence of an obvious relationship between the outcome of the elections and the selection of parties for the government confronts the theory of multi-party democracy with a gnawing paradox”. In line with this paradox, De Swaan (1973: 1-2) observes that if a single election results poses a possibility of diverse governments with differing sizes and policy, then the ‘verdict of the electorate’ does not exist or the concept is not automatically attainable or it is rarely achieved in multi-party systems; the coalition theory that could respond to this conundrum could be crucial to democratic theory. This implies that coalition theory does not necessarily produce single explanation for a given phenomenon; there is often a multiplicity of possibilities for cause-and-effect relationship in political events and strange bed-fellows in a coalition government is one such possibility. In fact, determining how a particular election produces a certain government is one of the main questions in political science (Dumont, De Winter and Andeweg, 2011). In his study aimed at evaluating the evolution of the Conservative strategy and coalition relations in the United Kingdom, Hayton (2013: 7) charts an interesting roadmap for the life of coalitions. He asserts that coalitions live through three phases which he terms: civilised partnership, uneasy cohabitation and divorce. The first phase features careful preparations for coalition negotiations, identification of policy positions, choice of partner(s) and building of collective position on priority areas, as well as adjusting to (or adjusting the) legislative arrangements aimed at ensuring the incumbents’ tenure in office runs the full length of its term. The second phase represents the actual implementation of coalition commitments and living through the consequences of the choices made. These may include each party, especially junior partners, demonstrating that “they retained distinct core identities” (Hayton, 2013: 13); and striving to secure some demonstrable policy achievements, which may result in some incongruities between partners, these may in turn may plant the seeds of intra-party factionalism and vice versa. At other times priorities of the senior
partner may take precedence over those of junior partners resulting in deadlocks becoming more common on some programmatic issues; and actual reneging on some issues. The last phase describes the path towards a coalition’s demise. That could be signalled by increasing frequency of contradictory public statements from the leaders of coalition partners; discounting of future electoral cooperation; mutual allegations of unfaithfulness and the partners “increasingly keen to highlight their differences in public, coalition politics becom[ing] conflictual rather than consensual” (Hayton, 2013: 18). Following from this metaphor and in a bid to address the research questions cited at the start of this Chapter, Lesotho’s experience will be straddled across the said phases.

4.3 Emergence of Coalition Governance: Civilised Partnership?

The May 2012 election produced the 8th Parliament of Lesotho, and for the first time a hung parliament, in which no single party garnered enough seats to form a government on its own. Thus ushering in the need and rush for partnerships in a bid to found a winning coalition within the 120 member National Assembly. Of this number of seats, 80 are are derived from direct election of representatives in the 80 constituencies, and 40 are proportional representation (PR) seats. This means that a ruling party must have at least 61 seats, in the absence of which a coalition of parties becomes inevitable. The main contenders for the privilege to supply a candidate to occupy the State House as Prime Minister were the ruling Democratic Congress (DC) led by Pakalitha Mosisili, the All Basotho Convention (ABC) led by Thomas Thabane and the Lesotho Congress for Democracy (LCD) led by Mothetjoa Metsing; other smaller parties followed behind. Table 4.1 reflects the electoral results in terms of seat allocation in the National Assembly.
Table 4.1: National Assembly Seat Distribution in the 8th Parliament

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PARTY</th>
<th>ACRONYM</th>
<th>CONSTITUENCY SEATS</th>
<th>PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION SEATS</th>
<th>TOTAL ALLOCATED SEATS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All Basotho Convention</td>
<td>ABC</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>30</td>
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<tr>
<td>Basotho Batho Democratic Party</td>
<td>BBDP</td>
<td>0</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basotho Congress Party</td>
<td>BCP</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basotho Democratic National Party</td>
<td>BDNP</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basotho National Party</td>
<td>BNP</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Democratic Congress</td>
<td>DC</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lesotho Congress for Democracy</td>
<td>LCD</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lesotho People’s Congress</td>
<td>LPC</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lesotho Workers Party</td>
<td>LWP</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marematlou Freedom Party</td>
<td>MFP</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Independence Party</td>
<td>NIP</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Popular Front For Democracy</td>
<td>PFD</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TOTAL NUMBER OF SEATS IN PARLIAMENT**

120

*Source: Adapted from IEC Lesotho (2013: 58)*
The then incumbent Prime Minister Mosisili’s DC tried in vain to negotiate with other parties to form a government. The reasons might be numerous: though the DC had just been established through a split from the LCD, its leader, Mosisili had been the Prime Minister since 1998 and after three terms in office, a change could have been desirable from many quarters. The LCD split and formation of the DC earlier in February (Mail and Guardian, 2012: n.p.; National Assembly, 2012), and the acrimony attendant to the circumstances that led to the split, were still fresh in the minds of LCD leadership and therefore partnership between the two could have been unthinkable at that stage. Owing to its 48 seats in the National Assembly, the DC could be expected to demand the premiership post in any coalition that it could succeed to build, since all other parties had fewer seats and that fact relegated them to junior partner level in relation to the DC. Therefore, ABC could not be expected to accept the DC overtures because that would have meant to pass on the opportunity of becoming a senior partner in the ABC - LCD coalition, as opposed to becoming a junior partner in the DC – ABC coalition, which would have culminated in losing the premiership in the running. Being a senior partner in the ABC – LCD coalition meant that the ABC could legitimately demand the premiership position. Other smaller parties were a bit too numerous with too few seats to make a meaningful impact in favour of the DC. Within a very short space of time of less than a week, it became clear that DC would not have support from the two main parties (ABC and LCD) for coalition formation, as a result Mosisili resigned the premiership on 30 May 2012 in order to give way for the next party (the ABC) to form a coalition government (Times Live, 2012: n.p.). Most of the other smaller parties with three seats and fewer decided to support the ABC-LCD-BNP coalition that followed DC’s failure to form a government, albeit not as a formal part of the coalition (Mpeli, 2012). One is tempted to believe and indeed in agreement with reported views that the eventual partners that formed the coalition, the ABC, LCD and BNP, generally shared a common aim of ousting Mosisili from the State House (News24, 2012; PRI, 2012; Southern Africa Report, 2012; Motsamai, 2015).

On 08 June, 2012 Thabane was sworn in as the new Prime Minister of Lesotho (Sunday Express, 10 – 16 June, 2012: 2), seven days later on 15 June, ahead of other ministers, Metsing leader of the LCD was sworn in as his deputy, and Chief
Thesele ‘Maseribane leader of the BNP became the ‘First Minister’ responsible for the Ministry of Gender, Youth, Sports and Recreation (Public Eye, 29 June, 2012: 23). This signalled the beginning of the first coalition government in Lesotho established by a parliamentary majority of 61 seats made up of the ABC – 30 seats, the LCD – 26 seats and the BNP – 5 seats. As could be expected the new Coalition Government had written agreement to guide its partners in collaboration. The next subsection attempts to single out collaborative arrangements brought about by that Coalition Agreement along with the governance issues they attract.

### 4.4 Collaboration Arrangements and Governance Implications

This subsection relates to the **second and the third research questions** which deal with the exploration of the apparent power sharing arrangements amongst the three coalition partners and the governance implications they evoke. The notion of bargaining intrinsic in the give-and-take exchange presupposes an element of rationality. According to Michael Laver (as cited in Pridham, 1988: 8), summation of rational decision-making assumptions includes:

- The actors in the coalition game are unified parties, each of which can be treated as a single bargaining entity;
- Coalition governments must command majority support in the legislature;
- Parties are motivated by either or both of two objectives: the first to enter government, and the second to fulfil fundamental policy objectives;
- All winning combinations of parties represent possible coalition governments, with some being more probable than others.

A change of government in Lesotho in this manner implies a change in governance. That is, governance as institutional emergence and change from a single party government to a coalition government. The experience of Lesotho in this regard is the crux of the phenomenon being studied in this research.
To study collaboration arrangements this research relies on the Coalition Agreement itself. The disadvantage of this reliance is that a number of facts about its formulation are not obvious from reading it. These include: the persons involved in the negotiations i.e. that the leaders were personally involved is an assumption based on their vicarious responsibility towards their parties as leaders; the composition of the drafting team; the modality of communicating points of convergence i.e. was the wording dictated or deciphered from discussions; and the compromises made by each of the three sides. The preamble of the Coalition Agreement sheds some light on what the leaders of the coalition parties had in mind at the time of negotiating the agreement; albeit without attributing any point to any one of the leaders, and by extension, one assumes that they were of one mind in their ethical considerations.

The leaders were:

- Concerned with attending to challenges facing Lesotho speedily and diligently;
- Determined to end polarization, divisions, nepotism, patronage, corruption and poor service delivery;
- Committed to form a government founded on justice, fairness, openness, transparency, equality and efficiency;
- Set on respecting the rights of the citizens;
- Committed to demonstrating patriotism, loyalty and commitment to Lesotho;
- Agreed on accepting that coalition government needs to be approached with great sensitivity, flexibility and compromise.

The Coalition Agreement starts off collaboration arrangements with the caucus of leaders “whose principal function shall be consultation between the leaders of the parties on a regular and/or agreed basis for purposes of deciding what action to be taken with respect to critical issues of policy” (ABC-LCD-BNP Coalition Agreement, 2012). Article II of this Agreement establishes the caucus of leaders as the highest decision-making body in the government of Lesotho, to deal with critical issues of policy. Though ‘critical issues’ are not defined, policy making is one of the outputs of governance, a fitting task for the structure this high in authority, as it appears to have been intended. This would imply some amount of limit or checks regarding the Prime Minister’s decision-making powers bestowed by the country’s Constitution. The
government’s accountability extends beyond the parliament to the caucus of leaders as well.

The Agreement then moves on to prescribe eleven other articles that build the partnership referred to in this work as the first coalition government in Lesotho; a brief reference on each of them will give a clear picture of the collaboration arrangements that the coalition partners designed. Article III enjoins partners to support each other’s legislative motions and to vote together in the National Assembly; to cooperate with, support and learn from each other; to be results oriented while affording each other fair participation in government. The reading of this article does not make it clear what is meant by ‘fair participation in government’. However, one is prone to assume that it means that parties with higher numbers of ministerial positions (ABC and LCD) should not use their superior numbers to dominate the other partner (BNP). If this assumption is correct, then fair participation as envisaged by governance principle of participation in a democratic environment is not anticipated in this article. With reference to results orientation of the coalition, one is invited to conjure up the coalition’s eagerness to be efficient and effective in governing; noble governance aspirations indeed.

Article IV indicates that partners agree to fully engage each other in formulating and discussing motions and/or bills for the National Assembly; to vote together on election or appointments into parliamentary committees; and to ensure representation of all partners in all elected parliamentary structures. The object of this article appears to be ensuring inter-party and intra-coalition consultations and cooperation in the legislature.

The next article (5 (a) – (g)) is aimed at ensuring: that the government was inclusive, which is described as incorporation of policies from all the partners; the government operated on “good faith and no surprise basis”; “party political identities within Government” are safe-guarded; parties reserve their right to “agree to disagree” in public and in parliament; that allocation of ministerial, diplomatic, Senate and district administration positions is done in proportion to the seats held the National Assembly by the partners; appointment of principal secretaries, (departmental chief accounting officers subject only to the direction and control of a ministers), are made
in the same proportions and following consultations by each minister within their parties. Governance implications in this article bear reference to trust, ethical conduct and intra-party consultations.

Table 4.2 details the agreed allocation of ministerial positions as stipulated by Article VI to produce the 30 member Lesotho’s Cabinet, 23 ministers and 7 deputies.

**Table 4.2: Allocation of Ministerial Positions**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Ministry</th>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Deputy Minister</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Prime Minister, Minister of Defence and National Security</td>
<td>ABC</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Police and Public Safety</td>
<td>ABC</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Mining</td>
<td>ABC</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Minister to the Prime Minister’s Office</td>
<td>ABC</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Development Planning</td>
<td>ABC</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Agriculture and Food Security</td>
<td>ABC</td>
<td>ABC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Justice, Human Rights, Correctional Services, Law and Constitutional Affairs</td>
<td>ABC</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Health</td>
<td>ABC</td>
<td>BNP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Social Development and Cooperatives</td>
<td>ABC</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Trade and Industry</td>
<td>ABC</td>
<td>ABC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Tourism, Environment and Culture</td>
<td>ABC</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Home Affairs</td>
<td>BNP</td>
<td>BNP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Gender, Youth, Sports and Recreation</td>
<td>BNP</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Energy, Meteorology and Water</td>
<td>LCD</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Foreign Affairs and International Relations</td>
<td>LCD</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Local Government, Chieftainship and Parliamentary Affairs</td>
<td>LCD</td>
<td>LCD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Finance</td>
<td>LCD</td>
<td>ABC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Education and Training</td>
<td>LCD</td>
<td>LCD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Forestry and Land Reclamation</td>
<td>LCD</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Communications, Science and Technology</td>
<td>LCD</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>Public Works and Transport</td>
<td>LCD</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>Public Service</td>
<td>LCD</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>Labour and Employment</td>
<td>LCD</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Adapted from ABC-LCD-BNP Coalition Agreement (2012: 5 – 7)*
Article VII sets out the leadership hierarchy of the coalition by affirming the expected arrangement that the ABC leader would lead the coalition and become the Prime Minister in line with the fact that of the three coalition partners, the ABC held the largest number of seats in the National Assembly; LCD with the second largest number of seats would have its leader as the deputy leader of the coalition and become deputy prime minister in government. With reference to and subsequent to constitutional processes that had to be followed for the parliamentary investiture of the prime minister, this arrangement is expressly placed within the ambit of and subordinate to the country’s constitution. Verbatim wording of Article 7 (c) of the Agreement is unequivocal:

_The Parties agree that the leader of the Coalition, following the proper procedure laid out in the 1993 Constitution of Lesotho shall be the Prime Minister and the Deputy Leader of the Coalition shall be the Deputy Prime Minister; should there be a change in the proportionality of [National Assembly] seats the leadership of the Coalition shall change accordingly_ (ABC-LCD-BNP Coalition Agreement, 2012: 7).

With this provision, arrangement of seniority and order of precedence among the partnering parties is unambiguously created and institutionalised. This arrangement is reminiscent of one governance description as related to subjects of societal organization and the nature of all designs of regulation (Christensen and Tschirhart, 2011).

Article VIII assigns the parties the responsibility of ensuring: respect of the Agreement’s provisions and their implementation; that information is disseminated to members and supporters as well as to the nation through available media outlets. What may be implied is that the general party membership outside parliament is informed in order to facilitate accountability. Further, the content of the Agreement is placed in the public domain.

Article IX establishes a six member Joint Monitoring and Implementation Committee (JIMC). Functions of this Committee are: to monitor and assess the implementation of the Agreement; to build and encourage mutual trust, transparency and understanding among the parties; to study trends on coalitions and advise; and to
promote continuous dialogue. Inclusion of transparency in this article shows a desire to build in good governance in the workings of the coalition government.

With the foregoing arrangements together with their governance implications, a political experiment that tested the strength of harmonization efforts in coalition governance took off.

**4.5 Uneasy Cohabitation: A Test of Harmonization Strategy**

Closely related to the first two research questions, is the fourth research question which looks at the harmonization strategy adopted by the coalition partners. Presumably, the strategy would have been aimed at responding to the perceived differences between the three coalition partners in terms of the analysis made in the previous chapter.

The analysis involved the application of five different party classification models on the coalition partners in Lesotho following the 2012 election. These placed both the ABC and the BNP on the Right of the Centre and LCD on the Left along the ideological Left-Right spectrum. This means that the ABC and the BNP are regarded as conservative and allied to religious persuasions; while LCD is regarded as secular and Pan-Africanist. Naturally, one would expect to see a deliberate effort to harmonise these differences when these parties resolved to form a coalition. In the absence of any official pronouncement alluding to such an exercise, one again turns to the Coalition Agreement for clues.

The Coalition Agreement put up a fair attempt to lay foundations for harmonizing differences among the coalition members. Several articles are couched in a manner that suggests awareness on the part of the partners that the differences among them needed to be bridged. These are the articles that appear to carry this label or at least appear to suggest an attempt to harmonize:

- 3(h) refers to making sure that “each party fairly participates in Government”. In an effort to put this pledge in practice the Coalition Government could have gone some distance in bridging policy gaps between them. Discussions around this
issue would most probably covered what each party needed to achieve; how that was to be achieved, and inclusion from inputs from other parties would have ensured ownership or some level of consensus of the resultant policy decision.

- 3(i) refers to the need to “determine the roles and responsibilities of each Party in the Coalition”. Here also, the determination process would have involved consultations similar to the ones similar to 3(h) above and possibly produced the same harmonization effect.

- 4(a) notes an agreement to “fully engage with each other in formulating and discussing motions and/or bills for the National Assembly”. Consultations and contributions in this regard provide a platform and an opportunity for coalition partners to thrash out their policy differences and thereby resulting in harmony of approach.

- 5(a) records that “Parties agree to form an inclusive Government that fairly and adequately attempts to incorporate policies of all parties”. This appears to be the closest article to a deliberate decision to harmonize differences in policy, although it refers to incorporation and not adaptation. Without adaptation, modification or assimilation of each other’s policies, incorporation only amounts to a cluster of incompatible policies that do not reflect unity of purpose for the government. One may have a view that incorporation was meant to ensure that each of the parties in the coalition has a chance of some policy wins distinct from other parties’ wins; following from the desire to retain distinct party identities alluded to in article 5(c).

Looking at these articles one gets a general idea that the parties relied on consultations and discussions to deal with their differences. There appears to be no arrangement for prior harmonization or at least prioritization of policies; it is almost like they decided to deal with problems as they surface, instead of anticipating them and formulating procedures for solving them. Indeed the spirit of establishing the Joint Monitoring and Implementation Committee in Article 9.1 include the building of “an atmosphere of mutual trust, transparency and understanding” as well as promoting “continuing dialogue” (Article 9.3(c) and (d)). Basing harmonization of differences on a number of clauses in the Agreement without actively engaging in
reconciling such differences proved not enough to ensure a lasting association between the coalition partners.

The two year journey of the coalition government had its drama as governance episodes unfolded and thereby attracting opinions from analysts. Motsamai (2015) makes a number of observations; following on Hayton’s (2013) analogy of marriage, she starts off by pointing out that the ABC-led coalition was a marriage of convenience born out of personal aspiration on acquiring state power. She attributes the government’s intrinsic instability to the narrow majority of one seat in the National Assembly; exacerbated by internal but the hitherto dormant hostilities originating from past relationships. The recent history of mutual distrust between these parties as recounted in Chapter 3 bears witness to Motsamai’s (2015) observation. One can recall and indeed relate to some of the contentious issues in the life of the Coalition that she enumerates: One, politicisation of state structures by replacing heads of strategic government institutions such as the Chief Justice, the President of the Court of Appeal, Principal Secretaries, Commissioners of Police and the Independent Electoral Commission and attempting in vain to replace the Attorney General and the Director of Public Prosecution (DPP). Deputy Prime Minister and his party, LCD were at pains to oppose and distance themselves from these moves by Prime Minister Thabane. Their major complaint being that they were not consulted when these changes were initiated (Lesotho Times, 12 – 18 June, 2014: 2). Two, corruption charges that appeared to target Thabane’s rivals and/or perceived enemies in the opposition, and which later included his deputy, Metsing. To these, LCD and the opposition parties responded by dubbing the charges politically motivated.

According to the LCD Chairperson, Thabang Pheko, other episodes that put the Coalition Government at a precipice started right from the first month in government when Thabane unilaterally reduced LCD’s representation in the Senate in favour of the BNP; and the LCD deputy leader, Dr Motloheloa Phooko adds five more incidents that threatened the Coalition’s existence (Public Eye, 06 – 12 June, 2014a: 4). These are Thabane’s unilateral decision to: relocate the Lesotho Highlands Project to the office of the Prime Minister from the LCD controlled Ministry of Energy, Meteorology and Water Affairs in 2013; sack the Principal Secretary in the Ministry of
Finance; force the Attorney General and DPP into early retirement; sack the Government Secretary; and to suspend parliament. With the last incident causing a full scale fall out and a public declaration that the coalition has collapsed.

4.6 Collapse of the Coalition: Divorce

The ABC-led coalition ended in divorce as its collapse was signalled by an announcement by the Deputy Prime Minister Metsing at a press conference on 11 June 2014 that the LCD had withdrawn from the coalition; this followed reports that the Parliament of Lesotho had been suspended in a move termed ‘prorogation’ from 10 June, 2014 to 27 February, 2015 (Public Eye, 13 – 19 June, 2014b: 2; Lesotho Times, 12 – 18 June, 2014: 2). The main reason advanced for the LCD’s withdrawal from the coalition was that Prime Minister Thabane had rendered the coalition irrelevant by reneging from the Coalition Agreement and continuously ignoring to consult his partners on major national decisions; and the suspension of the Parliament was cited as the latest of such decisions. The announcement also indicated that the LCD will be forming an alliance with their former enemies DC led by Mosisili, the predecessor to Thabane. The other members of the new alliance were the BBDP led by Jeremane Ramathebane, BCP led by Thulo Mahlakeng and LPC led by Kelebone Maope. Had this new alliance managed to stage its floor-crossing in the National Assembly, it would have at least a total of 77 seats assuming all its members voted loyally; since they severally held seats as follows: DC – 48, LCD – 26, BBDP – 1, BCP – 1, and LPC – 1. A comfortable majority of 17 seats would have been achieved as compared to that of 1 in the ABC-LCD-BNP coalition.

However, owing to the prorogation of parliament that rendered floor-crossing impossible, Metsing had no choice but to join peace talks facilitated by President Pohamba as the then Chairperson of SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation. Pohamba’s mediation efforts were followed by shuttle diplomacy that resulted in the signing of several declarations at Windhoek (31 July 2014), Victoria Falls (18 August 2014) and Pretoria (01 September 2014), however, the Coalition Government of Lesotho could not be revived (SADC, 2014; Motsamai, 2015: 10).
Following the Coalition’s collapse, a constitutional stalemate arose as Thabane’s authority was openly challenged when the dismissed army (Lesotho Defence Force) Commander, Lieutenant-General Tlali Kamoli refused to leave office on 29 August, 2014. In the early hours of 30 August, 2014 army detachments raided several police stations in the capital Maseru in what was later described as an attempted coup-d’état; the LCD position on these developments was that Kamoli was still the lawful army Commander and that the raid was not a coup (Motsamai, 2015; Public Eye, 10 – 16 April, 2015c: 4). The security situation caused the Southern African Development Community (SADC) to intervene (Ramaphosa, 2014).

Deputy President Ramaphosa of South African was appointed to head a mediation team into Lesotho (SADC, 2014: 2). As a result of this mediation it was resolved that Lesotho would go for elections before the end of February 2015 (Guardian News, 2015; Public Eye Online, 2015b and c; SEOM, 2015). Curiously, the election date was set, seemingly, to coincide with the expiration of Thabane’s prorogation of parliament. Under the efforts of this team, a number of developments towards resolving Lesotho’s crisis took place:

- Parliament was reopened on 17 October 2014 and it confined its deliberations to election budget;
- Maseru Declaration was signed on 23 October, 2014 (Sunday Express, 23 - 29 November, 2014: 2);
- Election date was set for 28 February 2015;
- Commander of the Lesotho Defence Force and the Commissioner of Police were temporarily deployed out of the country in line with the Declaration’s stipulation;
- Peaceful elections took place as agreed in the Declaration – all parties seem to accept the outcome.

On 10 March, 2015 members of the 9th Parliament of Lesotho were sworn in (LTV, 10 March, 2015). With this eventuality, DC leader, Pakalitha Mosisili was inaugurated for the fourth time as Prime Minister on 17 March 2015 (News24.com:
the first three terms he served covered the periods: 1998 – 2002; 2002 –

4.7 Challenges and Successes

Using broad characterizations of good governance as points of reference this section
will examine challenges and successes of coalition governance in Lesotho. As an
institutional instrument, the exploration of Coalition Agreement in the preceding
sections will be used in the analysis hereof. This will be done bearing in mind that
where governance is concerned “the assumption is that the nature of institutions will
influence the capacity of the political system to govern effectively” (Peters, 2011: 79).
In the like manner, the quality of the Coalition Agreement had a serious influence on
the first coalition government in Lesotho. The next subsection deals with governance
challenges during the Coalition’s tenure.

4.7.1 Challenges

Most challenges of the coalition government stem from lack of legal provision or
recognition of the coalition agreements in Lesotho as well as the structures they
establish. One can start with the caucus of leaders in Article 2(b), which appears to
have been tipped to be a superior structure that would have directed cabinet
business via consultation among the Coalition leaders. The issue here was that this
structure was never supported by any legislation, thus its engagement and its
attendant consultations could be ignored at a whim by any member, especially the
largest party, without any recourse to the law.

Another dimension to this lack of legislation is that the Coalition Agreement lost its
ability to effectively dictate the policy agenda for cabinet as anticipated by Seyd
(2002). Further, the Agreement failed to ensure the inclusion of some issues in the
legislative agenda as one of its functions (Moury, 2010). The challenge goes further
and trickle down to the powers of the prime minister to appoint or cause to be
appointed as well as termination of appointments. As indicated above, totally
ignoring his partners and the provision set out in Article 5(a), Prime Minister Thabane worked on replacing the Chief Justice, the President of the Court of Appeal, the Attorney General, the Director of Public Prosecutions, Principal Secretaries, Commissioner of Police and the Commander of the Lesotho Defence Force.

In this manner, the government had no law binding it to the contents of the Coalition Agreement. The implication here is that no matter how perfect the Agreement could have been, without a legal position, its effectiveness is compromised. Effectiveness and efficiency could have been examined if there measurable and time bound aims and objectives. The law, if promulgated, could have turned common sense expectations into mandatory rights for individual partners and for the coalition as a collective. The lack of legislation in this regard short-changed the coalition of a regulatory instrument that could have ensured predictability, thereby severely weakening the Coalition Agreement as a governance instrument.

Reference to ensuring that each party “participates fairly in Government” posed another problem: the measurement of fair participation is not defined. Therefore, participation can only be seen in the proportional allocation of ministerial and other office portfolios. This appears to be more of representation issue than participation. One might also argue that the incorporation of policies from all coalition parties agreed upon in Article 5(a) would ensure participation. However, there was no adoption of priority list to prescribe the order of precedence. This means that implementation of policies are left to the discretion of ministers and principal secretaries heading the ministries. Then the challenge that faced the coalition is: how to ensure policy consideration of one party within a ministry controlled by another party?

Of note, is the bizarre fact that the Coalition Agreement was signed six months after the 2012 elections (Motsamai, 2015: 7), yet the new government was sworn in 15 June, 2012 just over two weeks of the elections. This development implies that the government was installed without a signed agreement; the agreement came as a formality only placing on record what was supposedly already taking place.
4.7.2 Successes

Despite the challenges identified above, the coalition government managed to score some success. These successes mainly relate to political development. On can site the following:

- Successful negotiations for the formation of a coalition government;
- Peaceful and constitutional change of government from Prime Minister Mosisili’ D.C. to a Coalition Government led by Prime Minister Thabane;
- No disputes against electoral results;
- A stable government for two years despite internal conflicts;
- Increased political tolerance i.e. no reports of politically motivated violence;
- Peaceful 2015 elections and constitutional hand over of power, following the collapse of the first Coalition Government in June 2014, to the second Coalition Government led by Prime Minister Mosisili.

4.8 Summary

The main thrust of this chapter is focussed on four research questions which sought to establish an understanding of: how the coalition was forged; what collaboration arrangements were made; what were governance implications of those collaboration arrangements; and what harmonization strategy was used. Good governance was presented as a lens through which coalition governance can be contextualized. It was noted that the rise in the interest in good governance had come from a number of sources. These included: institutional turn, research efforts, international aid conditionality, and efforts to reconstruct the legitimacy of state centric governance structures. Some conceptions of good governance were briefly looked at within a context of debates surrounding the defining elements or pillars of the concept. A down-turn in the emphasis on good governance was also suggested signalling a possible development that might change the way good governance is perceived and applied in the not so distant a future.
Be that as it was, the purpose was to create a point of reference against whose principles governance implications could intuitively be compared. These principles include: participation, accountability, effectiveness, rule of law, democracy, transparency and responsiveness.

The discussion then showed how coalition partners forged an alliance that became the winning coalition that succeeded in forming a government for Lesotho. Hayton’s (2013) marriage based analogy was used to juxtapose Lesotho’s experience in the analogy’s three phases of ‘civilized partnership’, ‘uneasy cohabitation’, and ‘divorce’.

Then collaboration arrangements, as depicted in the Coalition Agreement and their governance implications, were examined using principles of good governance as a benchmark. What the study revealed was that the arrangement relied heavily on self-discipline of parties and their leaders to observe and comply with the provisions of the Coalition Agreement.

Governance arrangements were that: the coalition was to be over-seen by a caucus of leaders which was to be a forum in which crucial policy decisions would be made and direct the cabinet accordingly; coalition members would consult each other in the development of legislative motion and bills in preparation for voting together; each party would be afforded to fairly participate in governance; policies of member parties would be incorporated; and that cabinet post and other senior positions would be distributed according to the proportion of seats that each party held in the National Assembly; and that a Joint Monitoring and Implementation Committee will ensure compliance, mutual trust and continuous dialogue.

The governance implications of these arrangements were that: participation through consultations was catered for. Other aspects were rendered inapplicable due to inbuilt ambiguities within the Coalition Agreement; these are issues such as lack of time frames for achieving certain milestones, resulting in an inability to test efficiency; lack of legal recognition of the Coalition Agreement, as well as structures established under it. Weak enforcement mechanisms and habitual disregard of the LCD by the ABC, led to the demise of the Coalition.
On the main, the chapter concluded that the challenge generally revolved around the non-existence of the law that would have defined coalition agreements and the structures formed under their auspices, as well as defining certain rights for junior partners and the extent to which the prime minister’s authority to make political and constitutional appointments would be controlled in coalitional dispensations. In the case of Lesotho, the premier behaved as if the coalition government was run by a single party. In governance terms the regulatory authority was biased in favour of the premier. The resultant crisis attracted some amount of violence which necessitated regional intervention. In the long run, one partner defected causing the Coalition to collapse. In the face of this eventuality, fresh elections were organized to replace that coalition in government.

The successes scored are generally on political development. That is, the change of government was peaceful and constitutional both on the entry of the first coalition government and on the point of its exit. The electorate and party leaders showed maturity in having faith in the electoral process and the election results. Such that there were virtually no electoral disputes and politically motivated violence was not experienced.
CHAPTER 5

Evaluation of Lesotho Coalition Governance

5.1 Introduction
The main thrust of this chapter is to address the fifth research question: *why did the Coalition Government of Lesotho collapse?* In pursuit of this, Lesotho’s 2012 coalition government and its governance will be examined in the context of theoretical models dealt with in the previous chapters. Through models, theory presents what ought to happen and experience reflects what actually happened. Looking at Lesotho’s experience in this manner will, to some extent, test the applicability of theories to reality and build an understanding of practical experience in terms of theories and models. Deriving from treating governance in Lesotho in this manner creates an opportunity to judge and evaluate the coalition presented in the previous chapter. The results of the findings will hopefully contribute towards academic knowledge about governance in Lesotho in general and the reasons behind the collapse of the Lesotho’s first coalition government in particular.

5.2 Lesotho’s Coalitional Experience: Theoretical Analyses
In this chapter, an attempt is made to analyze Lesotho’s experience in coalition governance in terms of game theory, coalition and government formation models, and political games model. In this analysis, models and classification of political parties will enable the discussion to treat parties as unitary players with specific characteristics. Governance implications will be explained and/or described in relation to principles of good governance.

5.2.1 Game Theoretic Analysis
*Game theory* was developed from the recognition that most strategic challenges can be subjected to game-like analogies in which it is possible to “designate a set of players, rules, and strategies, and make assumptions about rationality and interdependence” (Hinckley, 1981: 23). A game is premised on a set of obstacles or challenges against which a player chooses a move from a set of strategies to
surmount in order to reach a certain target or secure a win with a payoff as motivation (Garigaparthi, 2014). For this, each player has the benefit of enabling resources applicable within the constraints imposed by the rules of the game. The game proceeds with the understanding that the best winner will have to choose options that will minimize the costs and maximize the payoff. In the case of this study, political parties are players; their challenge is to garner electoral votes in order to secure parliamentary majority; a win for one (or a coalition) of them means the right to form a government. The rules of the game in this regard would include legal prescriptions for: the composition and character of parties as unitary players, how electoral campaigns are conducted, election procedure, parliamentary membership, winner’s investiture, formation of government and others (Hoelle, 2014).

Political games in Lesotho are played within an environment of parliamentary system of government. This means that players are political parties that vie for seats in parliament as conduit through which the resources of the game can be amassed and utilized to win the game. One of the rules in parliamentary system is that a winner has to accumulate a majority of seats in parliament, in the case of Lesotho this is at least 61 out of 120 National Assembly seats. However, since the 2012 election result returned no player with such numbers (IEC Lesotho, 2013), therefore, a coalition of parties to form a government became a necessity, a scenario anticipated by the provision of section 87 (2) of the Constitution of Lesotho. Meffert and Gschwend (2010: 339) rightly point out that the electorate is alive to the need for coalition formation as “an additional and intermediary step between vote decision and government formation”. In this regard, William Riker (in Abrams, 1980) foresees the formation of minimum winning coalition. Minimum winning coalition is described as “the fewest number of parties to (sic.) needed to hold a majority of seats” (Hobolt and Karp, 2010). Riker’s prediction of minimum winning coalition comes with a number of conditions under which the minimum winning coalition could exist:

a) **Zero-sum game** – there can be only one party or one coalition of parties at a time that could form a government following any election. That is, in the case of Lesotho, one coalition wins exactly that which the parties outside that coalition lose (Ambrosino, 2013; Başar, 2010; Tema, 2014).
b) **Rational players** – this condition places political parties in Lesotho within the ambit of rational theory. In this sense, rational theory implies that political parties are engaged in deliberate decisional choices by participants aimed at maximizing their advantage or utility in forming and remaining in government power (Gintis, 2015).

c) **Perfect Information** – knowledge of events, electoral statistics and policies (as derived from manifestos) prior to making a move to court potential coalition partner where courtship is reserved for one party at a time (Aleman and Tsebelis, 2011), in game theoretic terms, one player at a time in common awareness of the moves by others (Turocy, and Stengel, 2001). That is, in Lesotho the ruling party (DC) held the largest number of seats in the National Assembly in following the 2012 election and was given the first priority to attempt to form a government in coalition with other party or parties and the aforementioned information was available to all parties before the negotiations. Failure to secure enough coalition partners to have majority seats in the National Assembly led Mosisili to resign the premiership on 30 May 2012 in order to give way for the next player (the ABC) to form a coalition government (Times Live, 2012: n.p.).

d) **Side-payments** – the transfer of some benefit from one collaborating partner to another beyond or aside of the negotiated and agreed payoff between coalition partners (Hinckley, 1981). The issue of side-payments in the case of Lesotho does not lend itself to clarity in the light of the coalition agreement. However, one may venture to suggest the allocation of the BNP representatives in the Senate which was more than the agreed number, might have been side-payment for BNP, though it was prejudicial to the LCD (see Chapter 4, section 4.5, p. 15).

e) **Characteristic function** – mathematical representation of diametric relationship between coalition size and benefits. That is, the increase in the size of the coalition results in the decrease in the amount of benefits for each of the members. The logic here is to keep the membership at a minimum in order to maximize the benefit. The subtle spurning of Bloc parties during the ABC-LCD-BNP coalition negotiations (Motsamai, 2015),
could have been induced by the logic of keeping the membership at a minimum for maximum payoff. The Bloc parties included BDNP, LPC, LWP, MFP, with 1 seat each, NIP with 2 and PFD with 3 seats (Mpeli, 2012). Since they controlled 9 seats in the National Assembly, their inclusion could have increased the majority from 1 to 10 and the coalition membership from 3 to 9.

f) **Membership control** – the expectation that, once reached, collective decisions supplant individual preferences; therefore, there is a need for internal cohesion mechanism. Cohesion is measured by defense of party position, unity in internal decision-making and resources-support (Müller and Miller, 2005). This could be built-in as part of the coalition agreement, as in Lesotho’s case wherein voting together was provided for in the agreement (ABC-LCD-BNP Coalition Agreement, 2012). In other countries membership control and inter-party cooperation are enhanced by sharing ministerial departments among the coalition partners (Hicks, 2013).

### 5.2.2 Government Formation Analysis

This subsection deals with the analysis of coalition government in Lesotho using the model developed by Laver and Shepsle (1996). The analysis will be based on the following hallmarks of the model:

a) **Policy-motivated parties**;

b) **A lattice of feasible governments**;

c) **A status quo government**;

d) **A process of status quo government replacement**;

e) **Common knowledge enabling actors to exercise rational foresight**;

f) **No exogenous enforcement of deals between parties** (see Chapter 2 section 2.2.2 (b), pp.9 – 12).

a) **Policy-motivated parties** – a look at political party electoral manifestos in general, and in Lesotho in particular, belive their policy positions and they indeed profess to be driven by those policies. Although, their manifestos list a number of areas of concern, these lack prioritization such that it is not
clear which policies would rank highest in terms of each party’s preference. The importance of policy in government formation cannot be over-emphasized and in the words of Horváth (2013:1), “policy position of parties features as one of the key explanatory variables in predicting coalition and government type”. However, Glasgow, Golder and Golder (2012: 250) caution that the importance placed on policy in this regard should be couched in proper context because its pivotal place depends “on how parties value the trade-off between office and policy”.

b) **Lattice of feasible governments** – an array of possible governments given permutations based on the number of seats held by each party in the National Assembly; each of these governments being a distinct entity from others with a unique potential policy output, but all these governments being at the mercy of the members of parliament for their existence. For Lesotho, which had no experience nor the inclination for minority government, the following coalition governments were possible in the wake of the 2012 election:

Table 5.1: Possible 2012 Coalition Governments in Lesotho

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Possibility</th>
<th>Coalition Membership</th>
<th>Seats in National Assembly</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>DC (48) + ABC (30)</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>DC (48) + LCD (26)</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>ABC (30) + LCD (26) + Bloc (9)</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>DC (48) + Bloc (9) + BNP (5)</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>ABC (30) + LCD (26) + BNP (5)</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s compilation based on IEC Lesotho (2013) statistics

Table 5.1 above presents five obvious coalition governments that could have formed, assuming members of parliament remained loyal to their parties at the time of investiture vote. Each of these possible governments would have produced a set of distinctive cabinets with its own policy output; however, the fifth possibility became the reality that this study is focused on. For the
duration of its existence, the ABC-LCD-BNP coalition government was, in theory, always facing a threat of varying decrees to be replaced by any of the other four possibilities.

c) **Status quo government** – a government forms within a setting determined by its predecessor following the process prescribed in the country’s constitution. The implication here is that coalition theory should not and cannot be treated in isolation from historical setting resulting from the reality and footprint of the status quo. As it has been indicated in the previous chapters, the first coalition government in Lesotho took over from the DC led government. The government whose reality and legacy is that it was formed by a party that had never contested popular election; a party that relied on parliamentary manoeuvres that won for it, investiture and confidence vote in February 2012 (National Assembly, 2012).

d) **Status quo government replacement process** – attendant to the status quo, and relevant to the process of replacing it, are the rules governing that change as well as institutions effecting and affected by that change. In this case the process included the general election run by Independent Electoral Commission, parties competing in the election, members of the National Assembly participating in the investiture process, the judiciary that swears in the in-coming government as well as the out-going government; all under the guidance of the Lesotho’s constitution and other laws. Though institutions are ideal starting point for analyzing decisions made in governing, they do not adequately address all the analytical questions that arise such as interaction of and change implications for players within institutions, inter- institutional relations that sustain governance systems (Peters, 2011).

e) **Common knowledge** – sequence of events that lead to the replacement of a government is guided by rational political actors. “In proposing portfolio allocations, in deciding whether to consent to cabinets in which they participate, and in determining whether to support particular
investiture and/or confidence motions, they think ahead”, thereby creating a tougher assessment for equilibrium concepts (Laver and Shepsle, 1996: 113). The concept equilibrium denotes a set of available strategies for players in a game in which each player’s decision depends on the decisions of other players whose strategies are known to the concerned player (Garikaparthi, 2014). For the government in Lesotho to survive, as in any parliamentary system, it needs confidence of the majority in the National Assembly. The numerical strength of the ABC-LCD-BNP coalition was known and the consequences of defection by some of its members were known to the Members of Parliament. For example, the withdrawal of the LCD from the coalition in June 2014 culminated into the collapse of the coalition government and subsequently the February 2015 election, two years ahead of schedule.

**f) No exogenous enforcement of deals between parties** – voluntary cooperation between strange bedfellows in pursuit of the best interest for all. This is especially so because coalition agreement in many countries are not yet enforceable through judicial intervention (Strøm and McClean, 2015), and Lesotho is no exception. The implication of this is that parties which were, under normal circumstances, opposed to each other such as the ABC, LCD and BNP, volunteer to become part of a ruling coalition in a bid to secure their interests.

**5.2.3 Political Games Analysis**

Political games model was developed by Acemoglu, Egorov and Sonin (2006) in their study of the formation of a ruling coalition in political environments. They identified three closely related approaches to the study of emerging political coalitions; axiomatic approach, dynamic game, and non-transferable utility cooperative game. Axiomatic approach deals with the balance between power that maintains a coalition in a ruling position and the enforcement that keeps it stable. Dynamic game refers to the nascent process of power and stability consolidation of sub-coalitions in a bid to gain preeminence and dominate other competing sub-coalitions to become the winning coalition. Non-transferable utility game denotes a
coalitional situation in which negotiated and agreed pay-offs are not permitted to change during the life of the coalition (see Chapter 2, section 2.2.2 (c) pp. 12 – 15). Acemoglu et al. (2006) come to the under-listed conclusions, and these can be applied to the situation in Lesotho:

1. **Inevitability of ruling coalitions in society** – civilized society is based on order and regulation. Therefore, rule making and application natural attendants of societal governance, will always require an authority to wield power over such matters, and that in turn requires ruling coalitions. Societal groupings such as political parties compete to become ruling coalitions that could influence the exercise of state power and authority to discharge governance responsibilities. Public life is surrounded, if not constituted, by institutions of governance and the duty to decide on the rules and their application within and between these institutions attracts players of different interests and abilities to compete for such institutions’ control or influence. Players in a political games vie for a stake in government and the rules are such that citizens group themselves into political parties that can compete through elections, to win that stake. Establishment of parties in Lesotho and the coalition government of ABC, LCD and BNP that assumed office following the 26 May 2012 election, are but small part of ruling coalitions.

2. **Coalitional pay-offs are not determined by a single player** – the benefits of each of the coalition members are not decided by the main partner but by the collective. The distribution of the pay-offs are agreed in advance within a negotiated understanding that produces a formula acceptable to all concerned. For example, the ABC-LCD-BNP Coalition Agreement (2012) stipulated that allocation of ministerial, diplomatic and other senior portfolios will be distributed according to the ration of seats held in the National Assembly by the coalition partners.

3. **The most powerful player may be excluded in the ruling coalition** – the dynamics of coalitional negotiations and majority decision make this a reality. Lesotho is a case in point; following the 2012 elections, DC was excluded
from the ruling coalition despite its 48 seats, the highest number of seats in comparison to all the other parties in the National Assembly. One can opine that owing to the lesser margin between the numbers of parliamentary seats they held in relation to that of the ABC, the LCD and the BNP found it easier to cooperate with ABC because each felt a little less dominated upon by the ABC than by the DC, see Table 5.1 on page 5 above.

4. **The rise in supermajority does not produce larger coalitions** – This refers to the number of legislators in excess of a simple majority needed to pass the law (Mayhew, 2003). The rise of supermajority is motivated by serialized organization of a voting game; in which one player accumulates sufficient votes in the first round of voting in order to prevent successful counter-collection of votes by the competing player in the second stage. That is, “the pressure to build a supermajority coalition is driven by the unseen competitive response that would have occurred had the first group attempted to secure only a bare majority” (Banks, 2000: 667). Had the Bloc parties not been snubbed in the 2012 Lesotho Coalition Government (see section 5.2.1(e) for details), that coalition would have had the benefit of supermajority. However, contrary to this particular conclusion, the coalition membership would have been nine and not three. Be that as it may, if one were to consider the possible government as depicted in Table 5.1 above, government possibility 1 and 2 would have supermajorities of 17 and 13 respectively with coalition membership of two. On may conclude that the impact of supermajority on the size of the coalition differ from case to case.

5. **Ruling coalitions are generally unstable** – Coalitions are unstable because a change in the numbers within the ranks of collective partners, always have a potential to change the balance of power between the coalition partners. Tan and Wang (2010: 283) observe that “when an increase in a player’s strength benefits himself along (**sic.**) relatively more than benefiting his coalition partners, the two weaker players will initially form a coalition in an attempt to balance the power of the strongest. And if they win, they will then fight
between themselves for the final victory”. Another factor is that there is never a guarantee for coalitional stability regardless of its structure (Weese, 2011). Given the situation in Lesotho, a slim majority of one for the government with 61 seats and facing an opposition with 59 seats presented a serious potential of instability due to floor crossing. Anyone of the members could destabilize the coalition with threats of defection should his demands be ignored. Beyond this relational dynamic between the partners, there is an element of being in a coalition as a means to end; that is, members join in the coalition formation process because they have a vision of what they want to achieve. Therefore, coalitions will be in a better position to last long to realize their goals if they are able to “clearly articulate the reason for their existence (Raynor, 2011: 17). This implies that partners should abandon their individual aims and adopt those of the collective. In doing so it becomes important to acknowledge each other’s policy priorities and ideological distance from one another to avoid instability (Hicks, 2013). For Lesotho, the ABC-LCD-BNP coalition should have addressed their differences more thoroughly to ease the discomfort brought about by perceived differences. This is especially so because as Hicks, 2013: 45 suggests, “forming a government where the political parties feel comfortable in the arrangements is admittedly a large part of the battle as that will engender trust and trust is the surest way to ensure stability”.

6. **Power of individual players in a ruling coalition is complemented by the collective power of the coalition** – In a coalitional environment, there is always a need for members to support each other. For example, in the United Kingdom the deputy prime minister was afforded support by the appointment of junior ministers to perform a “watching brief role” in some departments; further, the “decision-making processes [were] more formalised and transparent” (Paun and Hallifax, 2012). Here the leader of the junior coalition partner is supported by placing deputy ministers in position as oversight and consultative mechanism so that his party can contribute to and/or support policy development. Lesotho chose a different approach; it was only in the ministries of finance and that of health in which an LCD minister had an ABC deputy minister and an ABC minister had a BNP deputy, respectively (see
chapter 4, section 4.4, Table 4.2 on p. 11). Over and above that, a principal secretaries who ought to balance political priorities with professional management of the civil service, turned out in Lesotho to be persons appointed according to the discretion of each minister and his party (see Chapter 4, section 4.4, p. 10). Therefore, in this case, since Lesotho minimally applied the mixing of political appointees in the ministries, it lost its strategic and complimentary supportive advantage.

7. **Some sizes of coalitions are more likely to emerge as ruling coalitions than others** – This aspect is based on size principle which Riker developed from game theory; here the argument is that “for zero-sum games with perfect information, coalitions will form only to the point at which they reach minimum winning size” (Hinckley, 1981: 29). This principle had been criticized for not taking into consideration the potential likelihood of coalition partners to be interested in policy as much as they could be in pay-offs and as such the principle ignored the influence of policy incompatibility between partners on the coalition formation and its life-span (Laver and Shepsle, 1996). The scenario in Lesotho was such that there were a number of possible governments as depicted in Table 5.1 above. The main determining factor for the ABC-LCD-BNP coalition had not much to do with the size of the coalition, rather, it had much to do with negative attitudes towards DC leader Mosisili, born of recent party history in Lesotho as well as number of seats in the National Assembly (see Chapter 4, section 4.3, pp. 5 – 8).

### 5.3 Governance Perspectives

Theories explored in this study include: the tri-dimensional perspectives of governance derived from definitions identified by Kjaer, (2004); approaches to state governance theory proposed by Levy-Faur (2012); Peters’ (2012) suggestion of governance as political theory; and waves of governance put forth by Rhodes (2012) (see Chapter 2, section 2.3 pp. 16 – 28). Save for waves of governance, analysis of Lesotho’ case in this section will be done through these governance perspectives. The aspect on waves of governance is left out because its focus falls outside the context covered by the scope of this study.
5.3.1 Governance in Different Political Science Sub-fields

Identifying governance in terms of the three interrelated political science sub-fields of public administration and public policy, international relations, and comparative politics projects different dimensions and manifestations of the concept. In the realm of public administration, governance is concerned with the rules that guide public policy formulation and implementation. Governance in terms of international relations is a process by which rules of global public policy-making are set, applied and enforced. In comparative politics governance relates to institutional models and processes that are essential to economic development and regime change.

The salient issues that these perspectives bring to the fore include: regulation of decision-making rules, process and application of such rules and decisions in the public sphere, and the study of intra and inter-institutional structural and interactive settings relevant for economic development and changes in the organization of state power and authority. Practically, political parties as the main governance players in this study would develop their policies and tout them through their election manifestos. The party that wins the election forms the government and through the legislature, turns its policies into statutes and public policies that the executive arm of government can apply and enforce. In this case a tripartite coalition of ABC-LCD-BNP combined their seats in the National Assembly to become the government of the day (Mpeli, 2012; Public Eye, 29 June, 2012: 23). For example, the in-coming coalition government established new ministries for social development, police, and for law and constitutional affairs. The portfolios of police, defence and national security were headed by the Prime Minister while that of local government and chieftainship affairs was led by the Deputy Prime Minister. These developments could have been seen as indicatory of the priorities of the coalition government. Alternatively, priorities of each of the partners might have been reflected by the ministerial portfolios that each party held. But this would assume that each partner chose the preferred ministerial portfolios. What is clear is that as the most powerful figures in the coalition, both the Prime Minister and his deputy landed portfolios of their choice. Naturally, where there is conflict or infringement of rights in the interpretation and application of a policy or law, the judiciary adjudicates...
accordingly; thus the public policy feature of governance is realized and Lesotho is no exception.

In as far as international relations are concerned; Lesotho is a member of international and regional organizations such as the United Nations (UN), the Common Wealth, and the African Union (AU) and Southern Africa Development Community (SADC). She is also a beneficiary of international financial institutions such as the World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF) and African Development Bank (ADB). Therefore, Lesotho interacts with these entities according to the prescribed rules in a network of symbiotic relationships signalling governance at work. In the like manner Lesotho has bilateral economic and political relations with other countries and within those relations as well, there are governance issues.

For comparative politics the case of Lesotho, at least from the constitutional perspective, presents a political life predicated on a Westminster style of democracy (Machobane, 2001). Although Lesotho’s constitution is written, its parliamentary system of government is meant to resemble that of the United Kingdom whose constitution is not written in a single document. Governance institutions of the three arms of government, legislature, executive and the judiciary as well as their attendant processes are set out in the constitution and other supporting laws.

5.3.2 Approaches to State in Governance Theory

Levy-Faur (2012) distinguished four approaches to governance: governance as hollowing out of the state; de-governancing; state-centered governance; and big governance (see Chapter 2, section 2.3.2 pp. 25 – 26 for discussions).

**Governance as hollowing out of the state** – this captures the change from government to governance featuring dislodgment of power and authority from nation-states to transnational markets and political institutions and to local or regional governments, domestic business communities and non-governmental organizations. These changes are also known as globalization and decentralization respectively. Decentralization in Lesotho had taken the form of empowering local structures to provide services such as: land allocation; administrative supervision of health services; participation in recruitment interviews for potential police officers through
the representation of district departments of education, justice and district administration. On the globalization side, Chinese factories manufacture textile products for United States of America (USA) market facilitated through African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) of 2000, at subsidised local and American tax regimes that include duty-free and quota-free access to (Lesotho Times, 03 – 09 November, 2016b: 2).

**Degovernancing** is about structured and unintentional implications of restricting the ability to govern via bureaucratic and political mechanisms. The logic here is to promote the economic environment in which market forces prevail over state regulation and in which domestic laws are amended to be investment-friendly. Lesotho has introduced a concept of ‘One-Stop Business Facilitation Centre’ in which all departments necessary for acquiring traders’ licenses are housed under one roof such that requirements, processes and time are minimised for license issuance (Ministry of Trade and Industry, 2016). Another example is that of water and electricity supply agencies that have been transformed from parastatals to autonomous companies ran along professional lines.

**State-centered governance** – this refers to the realization that with the changes in the running of government affairs new policy deficiencies emerge. These, coupled with the growing significance of private sector in policy process locally and internationally, prompts the state to increasingly afford the private sector to play a role in governance matters without losing the centrality of its steering role. In Lesotho increasing number of government functions formerly performed by public departments are managed by the private organizations under the auspices of government. These would include: roads construction and maintenance; transport fleet management; electricity and water supply; tele-communication services and others. The involvement of private companies introduces new protocols that need to be observed by both the department staff and the beneficiaries of the services.

**Big Governance** - Big Governance examines the relations between governments and governance. It submits that governance and laws are the defining features of how societies are structured, the processes of election and replacement of regimes
and the products of government decisions. This is in areas where government role is emphasized and the private sector kept at bay. In Lesotho, this is exemplified by the conflict between trade unions and government (ministries of finance and labour) emanating from commensuration of tax rates increases to salary and wage annual increments, in the case of textile factory workers (Lesotho Times, 07 May, 2016a: n.p.); the balance between permit rates and bus fare rates in the case of public transport operators (Lesotho Times, 05 May, 2011: n.p.).

5.3.3 Governance as Political Theory

Peters (2012) presents an approach that casts the concept of governance as a broad political theory and suggests a number of ways through which his perspective could address current theoretical and empirical governance questions. He rightly observes that it is possible to view governance as:

1. A functionalist argument
2. A basis of general comparison
3. Linking normative and empirical questions
4. A link of fields within comparative politics
5. Integrating other approaches

The analysis that follows hereunder will not include the last two views on account of their inapplicability for this study. Whereas this study analyses Lesotho’s reality, the first of the two looks at assimilating a multiplicity of topics and fields within comparative politics in pursuit of a more coherent whole in the governance sub-discipline; these topics include: economic governance and corporate governance, sociology and governance for society, development studies and effective patterns of governance in transitional societies, and law and governance. The last view deals with the potential to mix or apply other methods to political science and to a certain degree, some governance approaches to other social sciences; that is, governance requires the involvement of other explanations for some aspects of decision-making if internal dynamics of processes are to be understood (Chapter 2, section 2.3.2, p. 26).
A functionalist argument - it deals with questions around the state’s basic decision-making functions of rule-making, rule application and rule adjudication. Functionalist argument for Lesotho’s situation would address issues of governance in terms of separation of powers on the basis of functions. That is, constitutionally defined roles of rule-making for the parliament through promulgation of laws; cabinet and the public service to execute such laws and policies as rule application; and the judiciary that interprets the law and decides on disputes as rule adjudication. For this study this can be used as the basis to assess the coalition agreement that underpinned Lesotho’s first coalition government. Of interest in this regard would be to determine the impact on parliament and the laws that it makes brought about by the advent of a coalition government in Lesotho; as well as the quality of representation, the law making process and the structure of parliament as they affect and in turn affected by the Coalition Agreement. The Agreement, in this context was an attempt to also regulate the executive arm of the state and an adaptation to the coaliational situation that Lesotho for the first time, found itself in. If on substitutes the institution of government by unitary organization, then coalition agreements would appear to be in consonance with the functions of governance viewed by Bourne (2014) as determining the objectives of the organization, determining the ethics of the organization, creating the culture of the organization, ensuring compliance by the organization, ensuring accountability by the management, and designing and implementing the governance framework for the organization. While the Coalition Agreement of Lesotho sets out a semblance of ethical considerations in its preamble, it completely fails to articulate goals and objectives of the government it creates (see Chapter 4, section 4.4, p. 9). It succeeds only in charting out working relations between partners in the coalition and in providing a formula for distribution of political appointments into offices.
The examination of the coalition agreements as instruments of regulation may also shed some light into the impact of such agreements on governance. The first port of call would be the definition of coalition agreements. For starters, Strøm and Müller (1999: 5) advance this definition; “coalition agreements, by which the negotiating parties abind themselves to the mast in such a way that when they go through unpleasant in the coalition’s life, the party leaders have a mechanism by which they can resist temptation and pressure from their respective parties to renege on their agreements”. In this sense, these agreements attempt to anticipate conflicts in the future in the life of a coalition, and then craft a conflict prevention instrument or a conflict resolution procedure. According to this definition, the agreements’ strategy would have to take into account the fact that motivation to renege comes not only from exogenous source, but even from within partnering parties themselves. For Lesotho, Article X of the Coalition Agreement makes a feeble attempt to conflict issues. Conflicts, according to this article, are to be dealt with by the JMIC whose powers in this regard were not defined. Be that as it may, there is no record that the JMIC was ever engaged in conflicts referred to in Chapter 4, section 4.5, pp. 14 – 15).

Pedersen and Christiansen (2012: 3) observe that “coalition agreements first and foremost decide the policy program of the government. This means that the coalition agreement is the policy declaration of the united government to which it commits itself internally and externally”. With this definition, one is inclined to understand that coalition agreements by and large would tend to produce governments that are policy oriented. An alternative view to the foregoing observation is that coalition agreement as the initial contract that underpins the existence of a coalition government is a product of negotiations aimed at aligning policy preferences from potential coalition partners who eventually become a collective that forms a government. Rather, one would see coalition agreement not as a deciding factor but as a foundation for policy programme. It would appear that besides collaboration of parties in government, the most salient character of a coalition government would be policy direction and programme of action. A look at Lesotho’s Coalition Agreement reveals a serious lapse regarding a meaningful attempt to align policy preferences.
There is no single policy mentioned in the Agreement. The Agreement paints a picture of the kind of government the partners wished to their coalition could be, how they would relate to each other, how ministerial and other offices would be distributed. This is an area that Lesotho’s Coalition Government showed clear and unified vision in terms of power sharing (Chapter 4, section 4.4, pp.10 – 11).

Catherine Moury (2010: 1) provides a more abstract definition of coalition agreement: “a tool used by coalition parties to reduce agency loss when delegating to ministers”. Agency loss is a problem associated with delegation and is manifested by the failure of an agent to execute the delegated mandate resourcefully for any number of reasons including insufficient information or competence, divided loyalties and others (Dowding, 2011). In this sense coalition agreements are seen as setting parameters of what ministers can and cannot do. In a way, coalition agreements curtail ministerial discretion to determine what issues make it into the cabinet agenda as opposed to such a capability anticipated by Laver and Shepsle (1996: 32 - 33). Since the Coalition Agreement in Lesotho does not set policy parameters, Laver and Shepsle’s (1996) scenario prevails. That is, each minister relies on what his party stands for, as opposed to what the coalitional collective should have imposed. This leaves each minister with own discretion on policy agenda and decisions. The result of this situation was likely to be conflictual and diffused progress on account of isolated instead of collaborative efforts on policies requiring cooperation between ministries. In governance term, this situation would be a breeding ground for duplication of efforts and inefficiencies.

A later definition by Eichorst (2014: 99) is rather brief and general, and it says “coalition agreements are written statements concerning themes considered relevant to members of the coalition”. The main feature of this definition is that it can stipulate anything about any issue that the parties deem appropriate; including their mere description or admiration to issues of agreement or disagreement. As is, one suspects that this definition leaves the door open for declarations that might not necessarily enhance the quality of the coalition. The case in Lesotho reflects this point in that the Agreement has in its preamble some ethical considerations and commitments which, however, hang in the air due to the absence of specific policies, except to attempt to “incorporate policies” of all coalition partners. It is difficult to
determine how the coalition partners hoped to achieve policy outcomes they preferred in ministries that they were not represented in if neither such policies nor their outcomes are not stipulated in the Agreement itself.

Having looked at what coalition agreements are, it may be of interest as well to examine their functions. This will assist in determining their significance to governance in general and specifically to coalition governance in Lesotho.

(ii) Coalition Agreements: Functions

Coalition agreements generally serve as regulatory mechanisms that bring some degree of predictability in the workings of a coalition. Strøm and Müller (1999) suggest that coalition agreements are meant to prevent defections out of the coalition as well as to ensure a certain amount of coalition discipline. Ben Seyd (2002) proposes three other functions of coalition agreements. Firstly, coalition agreements are used by junior partners in the coalition to bind the larger party to a certain course of action; this occurs by ensuring that agreements specify future policy developments and prescribing the procedure for making all government decisions. Secondly, they are used to control the Prime Minister’s use of unilateral powers to dissolve the government in system where he wields such powers. Thirdly, they “reassure or inform a governing partner or members of a party or to do the same for voters” about the coalition’s intentions (Seyd, 2002: 77). In Lesotho the course of action is limited to political appointments and referral of conflict to JMIC and mediators, and consultations on parliamentary bills and motions. Nothing in the Agreement suggests any limitation the Prime Minister’s powers to dissolve government. The limitation is confined to political appointments, the disregard of which caused disputes discussed in Chapter 4, section 4.5 p. 15. The Coalition Agreement’s silence on policy objectives therefore, makes it difficult to assess the government’s performance.

In the view of Moury (2010) the role of coalition agreements is made up of the following:

• To stipulate potential prospects of the partners
• To address possible policy contradictions
• To bind parties to the coalition
• To ensure government solidarity
• To dictate legislative direction for specified matters

The situation in Lesotho is that the Agreement set the foundation for a good working relationship between the coalition partners. There is nothing about policy contradictions or that which binds the parties to the coalition. Solidarity was ensured through a commitment to vote together in the National Assembly and to consult each other before motions and bills are introduced in parliament. There is no mention of any matter in the Agreement that appears to be intended to become law. That means any bill could be brought up for discussion by any of the partners at any time; thereby leaving the legislative direction to the most influential of the ministers and not the coalition as a collective.

The generality of this list is to serve as some superstructure within which rules of the game can be established, interpreted, applied and enforced among various and distinct elements who have resolved to maintain their identities while pursuing oneness in governing.

For Eichorst (2014: 99 - 100) the functions of coalition agreements can be summarized as follows:

• As performance measurement for coalition governments
• To highlight issues of agreement
• To determine potential policy product
• To advertise policy promises
• To commit partners to policy positions

These functions imply that the main content of the agreements should be policy issues and their outcomes. This list also assumes that once commitments are made compliance is guaranteed hence it is silent on issues of enforcement, procedures
and limitation of powers of the dominant or the larger partner that heads the coalition.

The reality that Lesotho faced was that the Coalition Agreement’s silence on specific policy issues such as policy goals, policy outcomes, policy promises or policy positions, makes it awkward to use it as performance assessment tool. The highlighted issues of agreement pertain to parliamentary voting, support for each other and allocation of ministerial positions.

(b) **A basis of general comparison** – this addresses an aspect that examines governance functions in different settings, and implications of decisions made about governance arrangements and procedures. A change from single party government to a coalition government calls for an exploration of governance implications such as coalition agreement ought to be the basis for coalition regulation. In this regard therefore, Lesotho’s situation can be compared with others using coalition agreement content. In this study Lesotho’s Coalition Agreement content is compared to the one developed by Rajen Prasad, he Special Envoy of the Commonwealth Secretariat to Lesotho, as well as the one in Kenya.

Coalition agreements would generally tend to include in their contents most of the issues that the partnering parties deem important for the success of their coalition. Prasad (2014: 15) lists what he terms the common features of coalition agreements, these are:

1. A statement of purpose, or objective with a headline agreement that the party agrees to provide confidence and supply on the basis of the agreement.
2. Some statement of philosophy or values (especially amongst parties that some common or highly compatible principles or values).
3. Some statement about parties maintaining their separate identities.
4. A statement on how the parties will cooperate with each other.
5. A statement enabling the major party to enter into agreements with other parties.

6. What consultative arrangements have been agreed to?

7. How the coalition will be managed by the leaders of the coalition.

8. A statement on good faith and no surprises.

9. What policy concessions or agreements have been made?

10. What will be the government’s legislative programme?

11. What cabinet positions have been agreed to?

12. A statement on collective cabinet responsibility.

13. A statement confidence and supply.


15. An agree-to-disagree provision.

One observes that the list is meant to cover as much ground as possible to secure trust among the coalition partners and stability of a coalition government. This calls for meticulous planning ahead of coalition negotiations in order to identify potential partners, policy priorities, areas of concession and others. In some countries the content of coalition agreements is governed by legislation, for example in Kenya, section 10 of the Political Parties Act, 2011 requires that coalition agreements must stipulate:

1. The parties to the coalition

2. The policies and objectives of the coalition

3. The overall structure of the coalition

4. The general organization structure and management of the coalition, including local bodies and systems
5. The formula for sharing of positions in the coalition structure, roles and responsibilities

6. The coalition election rules

7. The coalition nomination rules

8. The decision making structure, rules and procedures

9. Policy initiation, consultation and decision making structure, rules and procedures

10. The code of conduct of the coalition including the values and the principles guiding the performance of the individuals and the members within the coalition

11. Dispute resolution mechanisms and procedures

12. Enforcement and sanctions mechanisms and procedures for breach of any of the provisions of the agreement

13. Procedures for appeal to the Tribunal

14. The role of the governing body and political party organs of the individual member parties of the coalition

15. The formula and the mechanisms for sharing of funds from the Political Party fund to the respective members of the coalition

16. The grounds upon which the coalition may be dissolved including the mechanisms and procedures to be followed.

This list seems to suggest that the priorities of the law makers was to emphasize structures, rules, roles and procedural arrangements which all point to institutional approach to governance. For the coalition in Lesotho (ABC-LCD-BNP Coalition Agreement, 2012), the content can be summarised as follows:

1. Definitions of concepts

2. Consultative structure of the coalition i.e. “caucus of the three leaders”
3. Procedure for convening the caucus
4. Purpose and objectives of the coalition
5. Formulation of motions and voting in the National Assembly
6. Fair incorporation of policies of the partners
7. A statement on good faith and no surprises
8. Statement about parties maintaining their separate identities
9. An agree-to-disagree provision
10. The formula for sharing of positions in the coalition government
11. Statement on the exercise of executive authority
12. Ministerial portfolio allocation
13. The coalition’s leadership structure
14. Responsibilities of the parties
15. Implementation strategy of the agreement
16. Settlement of disputes
17. Collaboration of the coalition with other parties
18. Confidentiality clause
19. Commencement and duration.

Though lacking in detail, Lesotho’s coalition agreement appears on the surface, to contain similar themes to the preceding suggestion by Prasad (2014) and an example of Kenyan (2011) legislation. However, it is important to note that the specifics of coalition agreement contents are determined by the issues that the coalition partners perceive to be of relevance to their purpose, as well as what they actually agree or disagree on. Prasad’s (2014) suggestion and Kenya’s example have have crucial clauses that Lesotho’s Agreement lacks, these are:
• Policy concessions or agreement,
• Government’s legislative programme,
• Procedural motion (Prasad, 2014),
• Policies and objectives of the coalition,
• Policy initiation, consultation and decision making structure, rules and procedures (Kenya, 2011: section 10).

(c) Linking normative and empirical questions – as mentioned in Chapter 2, section 2.3.2, pp. 26 – 27 governance can also be applied to analytically determine the quality of life in a society. In this sense, quality may be examined normatively and in some analyses be treated concurrently in quantitatively empirical methods. For example, economic growth can be presented in numerical terms and its environment can be explained qualitatively in terms of normative political terms. Addressing the link between economic growth and governance Kjær (2014: 1) observes that “how to achieve economic development and reduce poverty was the central issue from which the concern with governance in Africa arose”. The failure of structural adjustment project sponsored by the international financial institutions to alleviate the economic crises of African countries in the 1980s led to the conclusion that financial austerity was inadequate. The solution was identified; in order for economic growth to take root, African countries need to rid themselves of bad governance manifested by corruption, inefficiency and lack of accountability (Kjær, 2014). In other words, good governance must also be prioritized. Good governance, according to Sindane and Nambalirwa (2012: 700), “can be attained by achievement of the goal of creating a good life for all through the foundation of enabling conditions for individuals and groups, in order for them to lead a satisfactory quality of life”. The phase of good governance in the context of this study was examined. This required some reference to governance debates and principles as established by the literature that was dealt with in Chapter 4, section 4.2.1 and 4.2.2, pp. 2 – 8. Using these principles as variables, the next section assesses coalition government in Lesotho in terms of good governance.
5.4 Good Governance Test on Lesotho’s Coalition Government

Among a number of descriptions, good governance can be viewed as a framework of guiding principles for political and administrative practice directly linked to three issues: the manner of conducting public governance; production and hierarchy of policy issues; and ideas of public sector organizational reform (Bang and Esmark, 2013). This description fits our purpose in this study since it deals with coalition at national government level, the level that should be concerned with the aforesaid related issues. As indicated in the previous chapter, literature provides good governance principles and defining elements in lists of differing lengths whose content is rarely disputed (Odo, 2015: 3; Wibowo, 2014: 11). However, in this section the analysis will be made on the basis of features put forth by Sindane and Nambalirwa (2012); though the choice is arbitrary, the list is comprehensive and captures most of what other authors do:

1. **Participation** - founded on free speech and an equal opportunity for all citizens to participate meaningfully. This aspect can be treated in a number of levels in this context, but of interest in this section are: the processes it took to create the ABC-LCD-BNP Coalition and the internal relations within the Coalition. Firstly, members of these parties, along with all adult population in Lesotho choose to belong (or not to belong) to any political party within which they can exercise their democratic rights of influencing party policy, candidate selection and ultimately electing representatives into the National Assembly. The situation of a hung parliament as experienced in Lesotho following the 2012 election necessitated an establishment of a coalition. The coalition agreement signed as a consequence of and indeed as a support mechanism to the coalition government is seen as a governance instrument (Moury and Timmermans, 2013). So negotiating and coming to an agreement on its content, format and tone becomes another level of participation albeit by proxy.

2. **Rule of law** – an environment of just laws, applied fairly and in which all are judged equally without exception. This principle looks fairly straight-forward but it caused a lot of frustration within the coalition government in Lesotho; the Prime Minister totally disregarded the terms of the Coalition Agreement in the application of his executive powers especially Article 5(g). As indicated in section
4.5 In the previous chapter, the Prime Minister used his powers under the Constitution to unilaterally replace heads of strategic government institutions such as the Chief Justice (section 121), the President of the Court of Appeal (section 125), Principal Secretaries (139), Commissioners of Police (section 147) and the Independent Electoral Commission (section 66) and attempted in vain to replace the Attorney General (section 140) and the Director of Public Prosecution (section 141). The significance of these changes lies in the fact that three of these offices – Chief Justice, Commissioner of Police and Attorney General are members of the Council of State, the only other body that constitutionally advises the king on the appointment of a Prime Minister and calling of elections (Constitution of Lesotho, 1993: section 95). Therefore, their appointment bear direct link to Prime Minister’s support in the Council of State and by extension, the Prime Minister’s grip on power especially when parliament is suspended.

Deputy Prime Minister and his party, LCD vehemently opposed these moves by Prime Minister Thabane. Their major complaint being that they were not consulted prior to initiating these changes. Further use of his powers without consulting his coalition partners to prorogue parliament as indicated in Chapter 4, section 4.6 brought an end to the coalition in June 2014. This was caused by what Rothstein (2012) refers to as ambiguity in the definition of the rule of law; it relates to unsettled debate on whether to consider the substance of the law or its procedural interpretation for purposes of good governance.

3. Transparency – the level of unimpeded access to accurate information. Within the coalition, consultations and proper participation in decision making would enable all partners to contribute meaningfully and thereby secure ownership of decisions and policies. Failure to adhere to this principle leads to mistrust and in worst cases the collapse of the coalition as shown in item 2 above. In their study of conflict management and implementation of coalition agreements, Timmermans and Moury (2006: 403) conclude that “since agreements are not self-enforcing, additional governance mechanisms were vital for both the degree of faith and the stability of the government”.

174
4. **Responsiveness** – public agencies and processes that are geared towards addressing the needs of all stakeholders. Looking at the spirit of the Coalition agreement as enunciated in the Preamble and summarised in section 4.4, one sees the original intent for the coalition to be responsive. The parties commit themselves to attending to challenges facing Lesotho speedily and diligently. Empirical evidence to support action towards this commitment has not been available.

5. **Consensus orientation** – meaningful accommodation of diversity of interests present in society. Reference to the inclusion of policies from all coalition partners in Article 5(a) might have been intended to capture diverse interests in the society. However, this article concentrates on people represented by the coalition partners. Intra-coalitional consensus would have been ensured if the consultations that the LCD complained so much about were taken seriously.

6. **Equity** – equal opportunity to the means of self-determination for all. Again here one tends to rely on the preamble of the Coalition Agreement which expresses what the partners were hoping to achieve during the life of the coalition. They were:

   - Determined to end polarization, divisions, nepotism, patronage, corruption and poor service delivery;
   - Committed to form a government founded on justice, fairness, openness, transparency, equality and efficiency;

7. **Efficiency and effectiveness** – the capacity and efficacy of public agencies to competently exploit state resources to meet the people’s needs. The response to item 6 above seems to cover this item as well. Suffice to point out that for the two items neither time nor the statistics were available to put the coalition’s performance to test.

8. **Accountability** – the citizens’ ability to hold government officials, public officials, and civil society organizations responsible for their actions and performance. Put differently, “procedures requiring officials and those who seek to influence them to follow established rules defining acceptable processes and out-comes, and to
demonstrate that they have followed those procedures” (Johnston, 2002: 2). The coalition government in Lesotho continued to support institutions meant to consolidate accountability such as parliamentary Public Accounts Committee, the office of Ombudsman, and Directorate on Corruption and Economic Offences. The importance of these institutions to accountability has been lauded by some authors (Kjær, 2014: 2; Moene and Søreide, 2015: 11).

Lesotho’s situation in this regard is two pronged: first, the existing institutions and their legal framework. Two, arrangements presented by the Coalition Agreement. Institutions meant to ensure accountability are as follows:

a) Directorate of Dispute Prevention and Resolution (DDPR) was established under the provisions of the Labour Code Order No. 24 of 1992. It deals with disputes in the labour market;
b) Directorate on Corruption and Economic Offences (DCEO) was introduced through the Prevention of Corruption and Economic Offences Act No. 50 of 1999 and it cover all matters related to suspected corruption activities in both private and public sectors;
c) Lesotho Electricity and Water Authority (LEWA) was established under Lesotho Electricity Authority (Amendment) Act No. 6 of 2011 for dealing with matters of regulating electricity, urban water and sewage services, complaints and their resolution;
d) Broadcasting Disputes Resolution Panel (BDRP) is provided for in the Communications Act No. 4 of 2012 and its functions include to review and seek to resolve all disputes regarding broadcasting content;
e) The courts of law are also appellate authority where avenues in the above institutions have been exhausted without a settlement.

On its part, the Coalition Agreement provides for:

- Inter-party accountability within the coalition was anticipated in Article 4(a) through engagement “with each other in formulating and discussing motions and/or bills for the National Assembly”;

176
• Intra-party accountability could have been achieved in part through communication “to their members and supporters” as provided for by Article 8.2;
• Government to the public accountability could also be partly realized through media communication sanctioned by Article 8.3.

9. Citizens’ influence on strategic vision – the citizens’ access to and participation in long-term planning for the future of the public affairs that stand to affect them. This issue appears to have been covered under item 1 above.

5.5 Why did the Coalition Government in Lesotho collapse?

This section attempts to assess what went wrong with the coalition; the assessment looks at theories and alignments, as well as coalitional arrangements in an effort to address the question ‘why the coalition collapsed?’ It is suggested that the coalition collapsed because ideological differences between the two larger partners, the ABC and the LCD expectations were different and they handled the ensuing conflict acrimoniously. The section also suggests moves that should have been pursued in order to have had a coalition with better internal relationships.

5.5.1 Ideological Alignments

Chapter 3, section 3.8, pp. 42 - 47 presented ideological inclinations of the three coalition partners as suggested by five different classification models and classifications. Four of the five models that were dealt with aligned ABC and BNP together and LCD became some sort of the ‘odd one out’. Following the societal cleavage model, it was established that the ABC and the BNP were dissidents in alliance with the church while the LCD was perceived as part of the state functionaries. On the Left-Right spectrum, other models placed ABC and BNP to the Right of Centre as denominational mass parties. LCD was placed to the Left as in the socialist class-mass party category. Inclination to the Right presupposes hierarchy, command and control accentuated by close relationship with royalty and chieftainship resulting in tacit acceptance and compliance to authority. Inclination to
the Left represents an aspiration to egalitarian society often pursued through radical means manifesting in tendencies to challenge the status quo and the authority

In the case of Lesotho, it was not clear as to the influence of these alignments on the relationships between the coalition partners. However, neither ABC nor BNP ever criticized each other in public; of all the allegations of bad faith and lack of consultation on the part of the ABC by the LCD, BNP never confirmed or denied LCD’s claims. One is tempted to speculate that during disagreements, the ABC would expect the LCD to comply or accept the Prime Minister’s position or decisions and the LCD would expect consensus based on mutual compromise.

Conflict between the LCD and the ABC had never reported to have emanated from any policy dimension or decision. Therefore, it becomes difficult to judge the coalition on the basis of ideological differences. The claim by Mosisili, whose DC was dislodged from power by the coalition, which the coalition was like mixing water and oil is found to have merit on the basis of this established ideological divide between LCD and ABC-BNP sub-coalition.
5.5.2 Institutional Weaknesses

The coalition was established on the basis of a written agreement which had no legal status as there is no statute that addresses its provisions. It became a weak governance instrument that failed to protect one partner against the other two. Its weakness also appears to be too general in content and leaving issues of concern to common sense. As Hicks (2013:31) asserts, “the detail included in agreement is simply one of a number of factors that will contribute to a coalition government’s policy and legislative success and its stability”. For example, it does not clearly state:

- Where the Prime Minister is not expected to act unilaterally without consultation;
- Policy priorities
- Decision making procedures for priority policies
- The relationship between the cabinet and the caucus of leaders
- Time based programme of action

The coalition agreement shows that little or no preparations were made prior to negotiations as to which policies will be targeted for implementation in short, medium or long term period. It also proved to be of no help in limiting the Prime Minister’s executive powers. As it was, it gave any of the partners a chance to ignore it whenever it suits them, a situation fraught with uncertainty and mistrust, a situation in which anything could have caused a bitter argument. It would appear as if the Prime Minister aspired to be more powerful than the coalition that made and gave him the keys to the State House, superior to all and subject only to the Constitution (Public Eye, 13 – 19 June, 2014b: 2). The Deputy Prime Minister subscribed to a premier whose power emanates from the collective of the coalition (Public Eye, 06 – 12 June, 2014a: 4). The two views are clearly at odds with each other and this contributed to a large extend to the collapse of the coalition.

5.6 Summary / Conclusion

This chapter cast Lesotho’s political life in light of game theoretic, coalition and government formation, and political games perspectives. In the game theoretic
perspective political parties are players and the pay-off for the winner is to form a government. Among others, this presentation showed how Riker’s minimum winning coalition played out among political parties that contested the 2012 election.

Coalition and government formation analysis showed that coalitions that are formed were not only motivated by policy, but were also motivated by the desire to attain office. However, political parties have to be elected and in Lesotho as in other places, the election result allowed for a possibility of different governments to form as a result of having no single party that won overall majority in parliament. Any of these new governments, when it forms, it not be launched from a baseless vacuum, but it will be taking a cue from the existing status quo along with the relevant constitutional regulations as well. Thus, the study of governments acquired a dimension of time in history.

The lens of political game views Lesotho as no exception to the norm, including that: ruling coalitions are inevitable in society; coalition pay-offs are not determined by one player; the most powerful player or party can be excluded in the ruling coalition. The collapse of the first coalition in Lesotho is a testimony to the theory that the power of individual players in a ruling coalition is complemented by the power of others in the coalition.

The analysis further looked at governance in Lesotho in terms of three sub-fields of political science of public administration, international relations and comparative politics. Approaches to state in governance theory described through:

- Hallowing out of state - diminishing of state power and authority in favour of international organizations through globalization and locally through decentralization.

- Degovernancing - where public-private networks collaborate to provide public goods.

- State-centered governance - this refers to the realization that with the changes in the running of government affairs new policy deficiencies emerge and the increasing acceptance for private sector to address such deficiencies.
• Big governance – points to governance and laws as significant attributes of how societies are structured, the processes of election and replacement of regimes and the products of government decisions

Trends lead one to conclude that Lesotho has not escaped the rise of governance in this regard. The manifestation of the changing governance situation are characterised by increasing responsibilities of local government authorities in provision of public services; special tax regimes aimed at encouraging production and export of textile goods; withdrawal of central government from directly running water and electricity supply enterprises. However, through big governance, Lesotho has retained control of defence, revenue collection, international relations and diplomacy.

The last theoretical aspect that this chapter looked at related to governance as political theory; and it addressed the view that governance can be approached as:

1. A functionalist argument
2. A basis of general comparison
3. Linking normative and empirical questions
4. A link of fields within comparative politics
5. Integrating other approaches

Lesotho as a state has functional structures such as the legislature, the executive and the judiciary which are constitutionally regulated to discharge state functions of rule-making, rule application and rule adjudication. On the issue of general comparison, one comes to the conclusion that one of the main weakening flaws in Lesotho’s Coalition Agreement is the missing clauses covering some important areas. These relate to:

• Policy concessions or agreement,
• Government’s legislative programme,
• Procedural motion,
• Policies and objectives of the coalition,
• Policy initiation, consultation and decision making structure, rules and procedures.
Of normative principles of good governance that could successfully be linked to directly observable and measurable variables in Lesotho’s situation, participation as an example provides among others, the following possibilities:

- Number of participants in primaries for electing party candidates for 2012 elections
- Number of parties that took part in the 2012 election
- Frequency of elections
- Voter turn out
- Votes per party

Owing to the limitations of both data and time constraints, an evaluation of Lesotho’s coalition governance was made in terms of the principles of good governance. The thrust of this chapter was to place Lesotho’s experience in perspective using theories of governance and coalition formation as a frame of reference. The analyses facilitated by these approaches were building blocks for understanding the nature and evolution of coalitions and the attendant governance implications in general. The general findings were applied to the case of Lesotho as it unfolded following the May 2012 election that produced a hung parliament, under the auspices of which Lesotho opted for a coalition government. As in any parliamentary system of government, another option would have been a minority government (Hayton and Munce, 2014), a route that Lesotho has not yet traversed. The analyses went further to examine episodes that highlighted the unstable nature of coalitions and the eventual fall of the first coalition government in Lesotho.

In the final analysis, it can be concluded the coalition government collapsed because of two reasons. Firstly, the ideological background and inclinations of the two main partners, the ABC and the LCD propelled them to have different expectations on governance processes. Secondly, the internal weaknesses of the institutional and procedural governance arrangements of the coalition itself, as encapsulated in the coalition agreement were too fragile to hold the coalition together.

Findings and recommendations will be dealt with in greater detail in the next chapter.
CHAPTER 6

Findings and Recommendations

6.1 Overview
This study examined the rise and fall of the first Coalition Government in Lesotho. The government that came into being following the 26 May 2012 general election was made up of a coalition between the ABC, the LCD and the BNP on account of the existence of hung parliament. This coalition came to an end in June 2014 and what followed was a transitional period within which political parties and the country at large prepared for a fresh round of elections scheduled for February 2015 (Chapter 4, sec. 4.6, pp. 134 – 136). As governance institution, this Coalition Government presents an opportune empirical setting to explore governance in terms of how coalitions are established, their internal relations and how and why they fall apart.

Governance, though at times lauded as lacking clear theory (Kjær, 2004), forms the bedrock of this study. That is, the “who, what, when, why and how” of an organized society embedded in the regulative character of political governance frames the institutional super-structure within which the coalition governance in Lesotho unfolds. The flexibility of governance, including its ability to link normative and empirical approaches (Peters, 2012), enables the application of good governance as an evaluative instrument. Inter-weaved among several aspects of this research are game theoretic explanations common in the analyses of coaltional arrangements of political, social and economic life. However, the generality of this study is narrowed down to the following specific research questions:

1) How was collaboration between coalition partners (ABC, BNP and LCD) fashioned?
2) What was agreed as collaboration arrangements among the coalition partners?
3) Which harmonization strategy was employed (given assumed differences)?
4) What were the resultant governance implications of these arrangements?
5) Why did the Coalition Government in Lesotho collapse?

The aim of this research is to produce an accurate political analysis of coalition partnership that describes the emergence and decline of coalition government in Lesotho from 2012 to 2014. This analysis enabled contribution towards achievement of the under-listed academic objectives (Chapter 1, sec. 1.9, pp. 17 – 19):

a) Assessment of ideological foundations of partnering political parties as the main players in this political scenario
b) Understanding the rules of the game through which the first coalition government in Lesotho decided to live by; as deduced from the coalition agreement signed for the purpose.
c) Determining aspects of reality regarding coalition government in Lesotho i.e. examining coalition traits that imposed restrictions or offered latitude on these individual or collective actors in terms of shaping the rationale of their political moves.
d) Appreciating the impact of ideological convergence and divergence in coalitions.
e) Interpreting coalition governance in Lesotho in terms of good governance principles.

6.2 Synoptic Review of Chapters

The subsequent subsections form part of an attempt to review and summarize this study. To this end, salient points that make the main core of each of the chapters are highlighted.

6.2.1 Motivation

The first chapter presents motivation and rationale for the study. This study was motivated by an observation that a governance phenomenon had just played itself out in the political scenery of Lesotho. This phenomenon came in the form of the first coalition government in Lesotho and it came into existence from June 2012 to June 2014. The change and form of government presented an opportunity to a student of
governance and political transformation to apply and test theories on the empirical world as well as to actually conduct a research on a governance process; a chance to determine or interpret reality in terms of theory.

The rationale for this study is based on the organization of government as it took place in Lesotho. This forms part of an age old tradition of scholars in politics to search for and to discover the best form of government. In this sense, this study is a quest for contribution to knowledge to the study of politics in general and governance in particular as enumerated in the aims and objectives (Chapter 1, sec. 1.9, pp. 17 – 19).

The chapter went on to introduce the political climate prevailing in Lesotho at the time of the coalition. It also dealt with methodological issues and research design.

**6.2.2 Conceptual Framework**

In Chapter 2 several theoretical concepts were used to cast a frame of reference that would shape academic understanding of governance issues pertinent to the situation of coalitional governance in Lesotho from June 2012 to June 2014. Starting from the man’s state of nature (Hobbes); state of anarchy (Locke); and native liberty (Hume); to submission to the general will as the essence of a state’s legitimate authority (Rousseau) in a social contract (Curtis, 1981a and b), a stage was set for political coalition discussion. That is, the process of people associating together for a common goal is a coalition formation and that gives rise to governance.

The chapter introduces the concept of political coalition that describes the process of seeking to regulate distribution of values in society i.e. amalgamation of individual power into a collective seeking preeminence and becoming the ruling coalition. This is an end that rewards the winner with the political authority of allocating scarce societal resources. The chapter also looks at game theoretic approach to coalitions. Game theory denotes cooperation and/or conflict in collective choice situations where decisions of actors are interdependent; where one’s move depends on preference of others as well as a set of possible repercussions of choices of others.
Political games model that looks at coalition concept as it applies to government formation was also examined. Its main thrust is that out of parties as rational actors differentiated by policy along a continuum of possible of possible governments, new governments form depending on the actors’ electoral and/or coalitional success. In this scenario the new government is expected to take over from an existing one in a prescribed format in a self-regulating and self-enforcing environment (Chapter 2, sec. 2.2.2(b), pp. 33 – 37).

Governance: the concept of governance is seen generally as the manner in which power and specifically as it combines elements of societal collectives, interactive actors, decision-making and regulation. As theory, state level governance refers to structure of government, application of authority in addressing development agenda and state power to direct and administer policy decisions. It is possible to situate governance in the political science sub-fields of public administration and policy, international relations, and comparative politics. Thus, it becomes an important organizing frame of reference in a wide range of applications. Functions of governance include: strategic planning, financing of public goods, communication and accountability. Functionality of governance requires purposiveness; that is, goal setting, reconciliation and coordination, implementation, feedback and accountability. Through sub-systems of security, administrative-economic and political, governance ensures state security obligations in social contract, provision of basic public services and market regulation as well as guidance in societal decision-making respectively (Chapter 2, sec. 2.3.3, pp. 59 – 60).

6.2.3 Lesotho’s Political Background
Starting with what they are and roles they play, Chapter 3 deals with classification of political parties. Political party is described as a collective unit in competition for state political power. Parties’ aggregate and articulate public interests but their main aim is to become or influence government. They are in effect conduits towards state political power and at times vehicles for state policy shift targeting certain programmatic ends.
The parties that formed the first coalition government in Lesotho, ABC, LCD and BNP, were presented and analyzed in terms of the following five classification models:

1) Katz and Mair’s (1995) model associates the LCD with mass party, the ABC and BNP as elitist. But the three of them appear to be progressing into the category of Catch-all parties.

2) Lipset and Rokkan’s (1967) cleavage model views the ABC and the BNP as allied to the church and local chiefs, while sees the LCD as secular and allied to the state center.

3) and 4) Mair and Mudde’s (1998) as well as Gunther and Diamond’s (2003) model identify the ABC and the BNP as religious and conservative, and the LCD as secular, Pan-Africanist and progressive.

5) Wolinetz’s (2002) model places all the three parties in the office seeking category.

**6.2.4 Coalition Governance in Lesotho**

Chapter 4 couched good governance as a measuring tool for coalition governance in Lesotho. The increasing interest in good governance stem from a number of sources such as: institutional turn, a search for improving enabling government sponsored economic development environment (Rothstein, 2012); conditionality for aid (Phago, 2013); guidance towards rebuilding legitimacy of governance structures and promotion of new forms of institutional partnerships to reinvigorate governance structures (Hill, 2013).

This chapter stresses that elements, pillars and principles of good governance are not, in themselves, good governance, rather they are outcomes and indicators of good governance. The chapter also observes that governance agenda has shown signs of declining, possibly owing to its lack of immunity to be abused for corrupt ends (Moene and Søreider, 2015), as well as owing to the apparent lack of evidence for causal relations between good governance and economic growth (Kjaer, 2014). The chapter goes further to look at the principles of good governance as suggested by other authors (Norris, 2011; Pomerantz, 2011; Sindane and Nambalirwa, 2012;
Then the chapter used the three phased life cycle of coalitions suggested by Hayton (2013) as a road map for the subject. Analogous to marriage, this life cycle includes the following three stages:

- Civilised partnership – alliance and collaboration full of hope.
- Uneasy cohabitation – co-existence of intra-institutional arrangements fraught with uncertainty and mistrust that leads to instability.
- Divorce – public disclosure of suspicions and disagreements leading to collapse.

The chapter closed by identifying governance implications, challenges and successes.

**6.2.5 Assessment of Coalition Governance in Lesotho**

Chapter 5 sets out to establish the reasons behind the demise of the first coalition government in Lesotho, this being the crux of the fifth research question of this study. This was addressed through analyses based on several theories and/or models related to coalitions and governance. Coalitional theories applied are game theory, coalitions and government formation, and political games. Game theoretic approach interpreted political competition in Lesotho following the May 2012 election as a game in which political parties were seen as players engaged in a game of conflict and cooperation. A game in which players’ decision to either cooperate or compete with each other are viewed as moves, and moves by one player are dependent on the anticipated move by another player. In this game the reward is the right to form a government. Owing to the reality of a hung parliament after the elections, the ABC-LCD-BNP coalition was born and incidentally coincided with Riker’s minimum winning coalition (Chapter 3, sec. 3.5, p. 81).

Models of coalitions and government formation revealed that over and above the desire for political parties to ensure that their policies are adopted to govern Lesotho,
the competing parties were also driven by their desire to govern Lesotho. These models rightly acknowledged the possibility of other coalitions forming along the lattice of feasible governments and attaining the necessary ruling majority, other than the ABC-LCD-BNP coalition (see Table 5.1, section 5.2.2, p. 146).

Political games model proposed by Acemoglu et al. (2006) provided propositions upon which the analysis of Lesotho was based (see Chapter 5, section 5.2.3, pp.148 – 152). The general existence of political parties and other political institutions in Lesotho and the rise of a coalition government in 2012 is a testimony to the inevitability of ruling coalitions in society. These coalitions are inherently unstable because of the dynamics of coalitional pay-offs associated with coalition sizes and respective threat from other sub-coalitions.

Governance theories applied in Chapter 5 pointed to the following: The advent of a new government in Lesotho, as is the case elsewhere, ushered in changes in administration of public policy both in home and international fronts; thus lending Lesotho amenable to comparative politics in terms of its parliamentary system of government. Approaches to state theory of governance highlighted different ways in which Lesotho’s hierarchical domain of state governance is diminishing to give way to both international and local institutions in a bid to improve efficiency in service delivery, a development consistent with discussed theoretical propositions (see section 5.3.2, pp. 154 – 156 for discussions). Governance as political theory presented Lesotho’s situation in terms of functional differentiation characterized by separation of powers between the legislature as rule-makers, the executive as agents of rule-application, and the judiciary as rule-adjudicators. The analysis went further to include descriptions and functions of coalition governments; these were used to examine Lesotho’s model and deficiencies on policy and legislative programmes were noted. Finally, general comparisons for Lesotho’s coalition agreement content was based on Prasad’s (2014) recommendation as well as Kenya’s (2011) example (see Chapter 5, section 5.3.3, pp. 156 – 166).
6.3 Findings

The under-listed findings are ordered according to the research questions they pertain to, such that the findings in a way, address or respond to the questions.

6.3.1 How was collaboration between partners fashioned?

Collaboration was formed in on the basis of a negotiated and written Coalition Agreement between the ABC, the LCD and the BNP (Chapter 4, section 4.3. pp. 124 – 127). The Agreement was drawn following the election and it facilitated both the legislative and the executive collaboration. However, the Agreement, in comparison to others, it was found to be lacking in policy specifics such as enumerating policy areas, policy prioritization and programme.

6.3.2 What was agreed as collaboration arrangements? (Chapter 4, section 4.4)

a) By establishing a caucus of leaders to decide on crucial issues (p. 127), the Agreement anticipated a centralized control of the coalition under which consultations on regular basis would produce a course of action for an issue of concern at the time.

b) Voting together in the National Assembly (pp. 127, 128). Starting from the premise of majority rule, the main point of legislative collaboration is to have appropriate numbers where voting is to decide an issue in the National Assembly. Therefore, this arrangement envisaged assurance of a majority vote for confidence in government and its business.

c) Allocation of political appointments in accordance with proportions of seats held by each coalition party in the National Assembly (p. 128). This arrangement created an equitable formula for sharing of power between the three coalition partners as a means of ensuring fairness.

d) Engagement with each other in formulating parliamentary motions and bills (p. 128). The presupposition here was full consultation between partners, the importance of which was to maintain trust and engender ownership of positions adopted in order to ease voting support in the National Assembly.
e) Incorporation of policies of all coalition parties (p.128). Though difficult to implement in situations in which policy areas have not been prioritized and important policy positions for each coalition partner had not been defined; this area attempted to afford each party a chance to leave its mark through policy achievements.

f) The designation of the ABC leader to have been the prime minister and the LCD leader to have been the deputy prime minister defined the top leadership hierarchy of the coalition (p. 129), a mere formality given Thabane’s party numbers in the National Assembly, advanced age and vast civil service and political experience from successive regimes dating back from late 1960s when he then headed ministries as permanent (now principal) secretary and later as a minister in different departments (Chapter 3, section 3.5.3, p. 89).

g) Information dissemination about the terms of the Coalition Agreement to party members and the public through media outlets was the responsibility given to all coalition parties by the Coalition Agreement (p. 130). This had the effect of spreading the information as widely as possible.

h) Establishment of a Joint Monitoring and Implementation Committee (JIMC) appear to have been aimed at creating a consultation forum at a lower tier of the coalition below the caucus of leaders, as well as creating a conflict resolution structure (P. 130).

6.3.3 What were the governance implications of these arrangements?

a) Caucus of leaders – establishes a steering authority for the ABC-LCD-BNP coalition. The output of this structure was expected to be agenda for the cabinet, policy decisions and general programme direction for the government.

b) Voting together – retains the power of majority rule through collective numbers in the National Assembly. This was a manifestation of legislative coalition which kept the coalition in government as is required in parliamentary system of government.
c) Proportional allocation of political posts – this arrangement ensured allocation of responsibilities, equitable sharing of pay-offs for being in government.

d) Engagement and discussions was an attempt to secure some level of participation and ensure a policy buy-in by and between all the coalition partners.

e) Incorporation of policies of all coalition parties implied an avenue for all the partners to have an equitable opportunity to pursue or cause their preferred policies to be implemented, the success of which is an advantage for soliciting votes in the next election.

f) Establishment of leadership hierarchy did not only assign responsibility, it also translated coalitional arrangements into an official authority for the control and running of the executive arm of government.

g) Informing the public and members about the Coalition Agreement was one of the ways of ensuring some level of accountability. Looked at from a different perspective, an informed community makes for a better quality of participation in public matters that affect it.

h) The establishment of JMIC sought to achieve coalitional effectiveness, trust, and transparency; this body was planned to be one of the levels of conflict resolution structures.

6.3.4 Which harmonization strategy was employed given assumed differences?

a) The Coalition Agreement stipulates the following provisions which appear to be aimed at harmonizing the differences between the coalition parties (Chapter 4, section 4.5, pp. 130 – 133):

   (i) Fair participation in government by each party (Article 3(h))

   (ii) Roles and responsibilities of each party (Article 3(i))

   (iii) Formulation and discussion of legislative motions and bills (Article 4(a))

   (iv) Incorporation of each party’s policies (Article 5(a))
6.3.5 Why did the Coalition Government in Lesotho collapse?

The under-listed eventualities, to a large extent, contributed to the early demise of the first coalition government in Lesotho:

a) Weak institutional arrangements (Chapter 5, section 5.5.2, pp. 170 - 171). This was caused: by lack of legal standing of the coalition agreement which resulted in its being ineffective as institutional governance instrument (Chapter 4, section 4.7. pp. 135 – 138); unlike the appointment of the Prime Minister and Deputy Prime Minister in Article 7 (c) of the Agreement, the authority of the caucus of leaders was not supported by any law.

b) LCD’s perception of breach of agreement by the Prime Minister was a culmination of the inadequacy of several coalitional arrangements and the constitution to clearly define how and to what extent the constitutional powers of the Prime Minister were supposed to have been shared and/or limited by the incumbent’s assumption of prime minister’s office under coalitional arrangements (Chapter 4, section 4.6, pp. 133 - 135 and Chapter 5, section 5.4(2), p. 166).

c) Perceived ideological incompatibilities between congress parties as represented by the LCD and nationalistic parties as represented by the ABC and the BNP pointed to suspicions and mistrust born of the different manner of handling matters and expectations from the coalitional arrangements. These ideological differences are analogous to Left-wing – Right-wing spectrum of political party ideologies as well as the progressive – conservative divide common distinguishing features in political analyses (Chapter 5, section 5.5.1, p. 170).

6.4 Conclusions (Any lessons of Good Governance from the coalition governance experience?)

This section draws conclusions from the meaning of the above mentioned findings. It thus provides pointers to the lessons that could be learnt from Lesotho’s first experience in coalition governance.
a) Since the Coalition Agreement was the basis for government, it should have been transformed into a binding contract; since it was not binding, the Agreement was redundant as a governance instrument.

b) The establishment of the caucus of leaders as a steering authority means that it needed the power of law for it to control cabinet and parliamentary agenda as well as accurately defining power sharing arrangements. The law could have even gone as far as to limit the authority of a prime minister under coalition arrangement of government.

c) Agreement to vote together means that there was a need to support it with a clear procedure for initiating and discussing legislative motions. In this manner a coalition government could have had a better control over legislative agenda and possibly progress.

d) Allocation of ministerial portfolios was clearly spelled out in the Agreement and their ultimate swearing in accordingly followed the legal procedure stipulated by the country’s constitution. The same applied for the Prime Minister and the Deputy Prime Minister. The conclusion here is that a legal provision should have been made for the caucus of leaders and the JMIC as well.

e) Anticipating the incorporation of policies from all coalition parties without actually stipulating and prioritizing them within the provisions of the Coalition Agreement stripped the Agreement of its capacity to become a reference document of authority regarding future policy direction for the government. This also means that the Coalition lacked a unifying vision for the future.

f) The stipulations of the agreement that appear under harmonization strategy above, that is if they did harmonize at all, it was only by implication and therefore easy to side-step or ignore.

g) This means that there was no deliberate strategy to harmonize the parties’ differences.

h) Weak institutional arrangements mean that the cohesion within the coalition partners was weak and therefore, could not support the continuation of the coalition.

i) Breach of agreement by the Prime Minister means disregard towards shared responsibility and a drift towards personal rule. On this issue, the dissatisfaction
of one partner (the LCD), that led to defection and the collapse of the coalition, was justified.

j) Ideological differences between the ABC and the BNP on the one hand, and the LCD on the other, appears to have played a role into the early demise of the Coalition.

6.5 Recommendations

The recommendations hereunder are of two tiers; the first tier deals with recommendations from the experts in the study of coalitions proposed by the National Democratic Institute of Oslo, Norway. The second tier presents my recommendations on the coalitions’ legal status and further research on coalitions in general.

6.5.1 General Recommendations

On the aspect of ideological differences, an attempt was supposed to have been made to steer the coalition partners to a pragmatic zone of determining what was to be pursued once they are in government, probably by thrashing out the details within the generality of the first agreement. Government programmes are better to manage than manifesto pledges (Paun and Hallifax, 2012). Understandably, the first agreement was compiled within a limited time. That would have forestalled free reign of individual imagination persuaded by one’s political ideology.

On the issue of coalition building, proper preparations for negotiations ought to have established party priorities and position on different issues. Intra-party consultations should be made well ahead of time to lay the foundations for successful negotiations. The National Democratic Institute (NDI, 2015) recommends five steps to ensure successful coalition building:
a) Developing party strategy

(i) Decide on the aim of the coalition – It would be wise for each party to clarify within itself the main aim of joining a coalition i.e. whether it is for being in government (office seeking) or pushing a given agenda (policy seeking). This clarity will help in choosing concessions, fall-back positions and basic aim.

(ii) Examine the applicable laws – Different countries treat coalitions differently, where they are legislated for, the law guides the formation process, structures and other requirements. Where there is no statutory regulation, political norms and practices need to be examined carefully so that any preferred deviation or emphasis could be clarified and included in the agreement.

(iii) Confirm the regulations that must be complied with – Party rules and regulations must also be looked at in order to ensure a unified interpretation and compliance. Issues such as consultations, who authorises coalition initiation, who negotiates, and who gives the final approval of coalition agreement, should be clarified even if party rules do not cover them.

(iv) Secure intra-party consensus – Through normal party communication channels, structures and procedures, internal party consensus should be sought in order to avoid intra-party conflict and rebellions. The consensus could be on the agenda of the coalition, consultation methods, policies, which aspects of party culture should be maintained and how to maintain them. On account of time constraints (especially for post-electoral coalitions), parties would be wise to deal with internal issues well ahead of elections so that options could be decided upon under less stressful circumstances.

(v) Devise methods of approach – The negotiating team should have a clear mandate on the objectives to be achieved and how it would communicate with the party leadership if the leadership is not part of
the team. On the basis of strengths and weaknesses of the party, a party should prioritize the main policy issues to be discussed in the negotiations and draft a proposal on negotiation process, coalition structure, administration and policy objectives. Coalition objectives would assist the negotiating teams to choose approaches to the negotiations depending on potential partners as well.

(vi) Identify potential coalition partners – Using known policy positions, estimated numerical strengths, other strengths and weaknesses of the potential partners, prioritize and plan negotiation strategy for each one of them. That is, who to start with, what concessions to offer them and what demands could be made from them. Here additional research on potential partners may be necessary.

b) Negotiating a coalition

(i) Agree on the terms of the coalition – Negotiating parties should agree on rules and procedures that would govern the negotiation process such as size of negotiating teams; phases of negotiations, chairing of negotiation meetings, venue of meetings, agenda, level of confidentiality and others.

(ii) Establish clear roadmap and time line – A time table for negotiations should be agreed upon by the parties given available time to conclude the negotiations.

(iii) Document proceedings – Minutes of issues agreed in the negotiations should be recorded meticulously, signed off and kept as a record that will inform the final coalition agreement.

(iv) Allow each party to keep its priorities – The adoption of the main policy proposals from each potential partner by the coalition enables incorporation of policy priorities of each party.
(v) **Find the middle ground** – A compromise between opposed policies and/or approaches must be found and the agreed middle ground should be used to determine the way forward.

(vi) **Agree on conflict resolution procedure** – Since conflict is in the nature of political interactions, coalitions are bound to experience some amount of conflict, this is especially so when two different political parties attempt to work together; therefore, it is important to reflect on ways to deal with conflict when it occurs.

c) **Getting started**

(i) **Outline a written agreement** – The negotiating parties’ priority policies, consensus based policies or policies on common ground and concessions as well as other aspects of the agreement must be worked into a written draft agreement. This can be compared to the individual draft prepared before the negotiations and thus producing a means of measuring success for each of the parties.

(ii) **Follow the rules of approval by each party** – The outline above provides a tangible proposal for each negotiating team to present and consult the party leadership and/or other designated structures for approval as dictated by each party’s rules.

(iii) **Communicate the approved agreement to party members** – An approved agreement should be disseminated to the membership of the parties and a buy-in solicited. This will not only afford ordinary members to be consulted and render the leadership accountable, it will also enhance member participation which started from internal consensus building done during negotiation preparations.
d) Working in a coalition

(i) *Develop clear lines of communication* – Though a coalition agreement might have built a common vision for the coalition partners, each party might have its own conception of how to reach and achieve the agreement’s goals and objectives. The key to minimising conflict that usually results from differing means to the same ends is communication. In this sense, communication facilitates intra-coalitional consultation and participation and ensures ownership by all involved. However, lines of communication must be straightened such that the questions of who talks to whom about what, when and how, must be clarified.

(ii) *Use political advisors to facilitate communication* – Advisors are normally good strategists, they do not experience the same pressures from the followers as leaders do and their professional detachment from issues of contention place them in a good position to communicate sensitive issues. Another advantage of political advisors is that they are normally privy to information about the thinking of the leadership more than other party office bearers and ordinary members. Therefore they are expected to appreciate the intricacies and consequences of a wide spectrum of political choices.

(iii) *Use specialised subcommittees for technical issues* – The party leadership are not expected to be experts on all issues, hence they need specialised individuals to form subcommittees for technical areas to draw from their expertise and advise accordingly in the planning and implementation of some programmes in the coalition agreement.

(iv) *Resolve disagreements behind closed doors* – It is wise to deal with disagreements in private. This is because public display of disagreement does not only detract confidence on the coalition, it also complicates the finding of face saving compromise and thus solidifying antagonistic stances of the partners the result of which is a stalemate and at times the collapse of the coalition.
e) Drawing lessons learnt

The under-listed activities are so inter-linked that they do not necessarily have to be done in isolation. They deal with impact assessment of the coalition arrangements and charting the way forward.

(i) *Engage different levels to assess impact of the coalition to the party* – Feedback from different party structures and membership such as women and youth leagues, trade unions and other collaborating groups is necessary so that corrective measures can be employed where there are adverse reactions to some aspects of the coalition.

(ii) *Collect information on what worked well and what did not* – The feedback collected from the assessment in (i) above should be part of the collected information for future reference. The information collected deals with successes and challenges of the coalition as they apply to the party.

(iii) *Consult on the way forward* – The lessons learnt from the above (i) and (ii) should be studied carefully so as to eventually form the basis for planning a better deal for the next coalition, should the party find itself in need of joining the same or another coalition.

### 6.5.2 Specific Recommendations

The following are recommendations developed by this author, drawing from the experience of the situation in Lesotho as well as literature that was examined for purposes of completing this study.

(a) *Coalition status and content*

1) The status of coalition agreement must be defined in law. This will guide: the electorate on how to better articulate their interests to their parties; the parties
in preparing for the negotiations; the adjudicating authorities in settling disputes.

2) The structures established under coalition agreements and their powers should be provided for in law. A clear statutory acknowledgement of these structures and their powers will assist in defining power relationships between coalition partners and the power sharing arrangements they agree on, as well as what should be expected from a coalition government in terms of limitations, consultations and/or concurrence of coalition partners in the application of all or some of the executive powers of the head of government provided for in the constitution.

3) Statutory guidelines for coalitions are important in ensuring consistency, stability and better management. Over and above the current content of the Coalition Agreement in Lesotho, the law should require future coalition agreements to include:
   (i) Policy concessions or agreements made between collaborating parties,
   (ii) Policy initiation and consultations,
   (iii) Decision-making structures, rules and procedures,
   (iv) Legislative programme

4) Policies included in the agreement should be prioritized. This will elevate the worth of the coalition agreement from being just informative to being a guiding document for the implementing public servants. Also, the agreement would become a better combined post-electoral manifesto upon which the performance of the coalition could be judged.

5) Party leadership must require their advisors, when dealing with coalitional matters, to study coalition trends in the international scene and benchmark their efforts according to the best practices such as the one presented in
Section 6.5.1 above. This will enable local practitioners and the electorate to benefit from the experience of others.

(b) Areas for further research
The under-listed possible studies appeared to be of interest and somehow related to this study; they would cover aspects of Lesotho’s political life not covered here:

(i) The impact of coalition governance on political development for Lesotho’s electorate;
(ii) Political coalition formation games and shifting alliances between parties in Lesotho, prompted by the changes in alliances in the Lesotho’s post 2015 election as compared to the post 2012 election;
(iii) The role of Intra-party democracy and good governance on party discipline and rebellion;
(iv) Constitutional design and coalition governance.
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