GOVERNMENT, COMMUNITY AND THE UNIVERSITY IN AFRICA TODAY: THE CASE OF THE NATIONAL UNIVERSITY OF LESOTHO

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University of the Free State
Bloemfontein

January 2017

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Co-promoter: Professor A. C. Wilkinson
DECLARATION

I, MUNYARADZI MUSHONGA, declare that the Doctoral Degree research thesis that I herewith submit for the Doctoral Degree qualification Doctor Philosophiae (Africa Studies) at the University of the Free State is my own, original work, and that I have not previously submitted it for a qualification at another institution of higher education.

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I hereby declare that all royalties as regards intellectual property that was developed during the course of and/or in connection with the study at the University of the Free State, will accrue to the University.

31 January 2017
DEDICATION

I dedicate this work to my wife Simbai and daughters Patience Vongai, Jubilee Tariro and Kudzaishe Precious; my late wisdom-filled grandmother and life mentor, VaSori aka Mbuya va Munyaradzi; my late mother Bherita; and my father Jeri. Above all, I dedicate this work to the Lord who taught me to keep the seventh day, the Sabbath, holy. In Exodus (Chapter 20:9-11) (King James Version), the Lord commands us, “Six days shalt thou labour, and do all thy work: But the seventh day *is* the sabbath of the LORD thy God: *in it* thou shalt not do any work, thou, nor thy son, nor thy daughter, thy manservant, nor thy maidservant, nor thy cattle, nor thy stranger that *is* within thy gates: For *in* six days the LORD made heaven and earth, the sea, and all that in them *is*, and rested the seventh day: wherefore the LORD blessed the sabbath day, and hallowed it”. No single word contained herein was penned down on Sabbath Day.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

My wife Simbai, and daughters Patience Vongai (PV), Jubilee Tariro (JT) and Kudzaishe Precious (KP), I am exceedingly grateful and thankful for your endless prayers, support, encouragement and inquisitive minds. KP, then only eight years old when this study commenced, used to tell her mother, “mama, daddy vanobhohwa, vanongonakidwza nokutamba nekombiyuta voga vari kuoffice” (mama, daddy is boring, he enjoys playing with the computer alone in the office).

I am equally grateful to my supervisors who not only introduced me to Postcolonial Studies and Higher Education (HE) discourses, but studiously guided this study from start to finish.

To my informants who made this study possible, I thank you all. Promises of confidentiality preclude more specific acknowledgement of the many key informants. The staff in the Archives Records, Museum and Documentation Division (AREMDOD) of the Thomas Mofolo Library are heartily thanked for their careful and tireless retrieval of relevant documents. Ntsela Patricia Boroko and 'Maseokho Eulalia Matsoai are equally thanked for painstakingly translating questionnaires from English to Sesotho and responses from Sesotho back to English. Bisrat Mekbib and Evans Zhou are also thanked for rendering invaluable technical advice and services. Mamotlatsi Tsenolo Seloma, my surrogate mother in Lesotho, Maleshoane Rapeane-Mathonsi, Sean Maliehe, Jesmael Mataga, Motlatsi Thabane, Tefetso Henry Mothibe, Francina Liako Moloi, Lehlohonolo B. B. J. Machobane, the late Matsepo Machobane, Alison Love and many others encouraged me in many different ways. In a special way, I wish to single out James Muzondidya, a friend, brother and colleague I have had in life – he kept on asking me, ‘Papa, what are you waiting for’?; Associate Professor T. H. Mothibe and Professor M. Thabane for affording me ample space and time to complete this study; and Alison Mary Love for her extraordinary proofreading and editing skills.
This study is an investigation into relations of power between government, community and the university in Africa today. The purpose of the study is to examine the nature of contestations and contradictions among triadic actors in respect of the university in Africa today. The principal research question it seeks to address is: what kind of contestations and contradictions of normative and ideological principles take place in the Triad of government, community and the university, via the case study of the National University of Lesotho (NUL)? Key objectives of the research included developing a new interpretive framework for the study of Africa and African Studies; examining how triadic contestations are a product of history; showing the preponderance of discourses of representation in universities in Africa today; and analysing the various forms of resistance immanent in universities in Africa today, occasioned by pervasive and dispersed power. To attempt to address the principal question and to meet the stated objectives, the thesis deploys key pillars of Postcolonial Theory (PC) namely representation, hybridity, agency and resistance together with the decoloniality variant through the power-knowledge-being-discourse nexus to examine relations and technologies of power in the interplay between the Government of Lesotho (GOL), the Community (global and local) and the National University of Lesotho (NUL) from 1945 to 2014. A triangulated approach was adopted in this study. Data was collected from several archival and secondary sources as well as from a wide cross-section of informants from the GOL, the Community and NUL. Multiple methodological strategies were used to collect such data – observation, interviews and unstructured questionnaires. Data was then analysed qualitatively using the grounded theory approach together with content, textual and discourse analysis methods.

Theoretically and conceptually, the study suggests new approaches and new dimensions to Africa and African Studies and Higher Education Studies (HES) in order to enhance our understanding of contemporary African politics and society particularly in the 21st century. It makes a case for seeing the relations between state and non-state actors as complex, constitutive and interconnected transactions in net-like spaces which are forever evolving due to the ubiquity of ‘power to’, ‘power with’ and ‘power within’. Findings of the study show that there are complex contestations and contradictions of both normative and ideological principles among
triadic actors – not only over the meaning and purpose of the university in Africa today, but also over its control and governance. This I have demonstrated by, first, providing a theoretical/conceptual framework as well as a historical context for interpreting and understanding these contestations; and second, by empirically validating the preponderance of discourses of representation and ‘othering’, hybridity, agency and resistance in the Triad in general, and in a Higher Education (HE) institution (NUL) in particular, across space and time. On the basis of these findings, I call for a constructive reading of PC which must be complemented by decoloniality theory, hence proposal for a new interpretive framework, the Integrated Postcolonial Framework (IPCF) that can respond better to complex relations of power. I also highlight some limitations of the study and also make some recommendations for further research in order to bring to the fore more concrete data regarding the purpose and mission of a university in Africa in a fast decolonising yet globalising environment.

Key words: Government, community, university, triad, higher education, representation/‘othering’, hybridity, agency, resistance, power, knowledge, discourse, postcolonial theory/postcolonialism, restructuring, transformation.
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<td>AAU</td>
<td>Association of African Universities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABC</td>
<td>All Basotho Convention</td>
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<td>ACL</td>
<td>Anglican Church of Lesotho</td>
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<td>ACU</td>
<td>Association of Commonwealth Universities</td>
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<td>ADERN</td>
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<td>AESAU</td>
<td>Association of Eastern and Southern African Universities</td>
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<td>AMH</td>
<td>Africa Media Holdings</td>
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<td>AREMDOD</td>
<td>Archives Records, Museum and Documentation Division</td>
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<td>ASA</td>
<td>Academic Staff Association</td>
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<td>BCUC</td>
<td>Basutoland Catholic University College</td>
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<td>BD</td>
<td>Board of Development</td>
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<td>BNAS</td>
<td>Basotho National Association of Students</td>
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<td>BNP</td>
<td>Basotho National Party</td>
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<td>Black Staff Association</td>
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<td>Court of Appeal</td>
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<td>CASSAS</td>
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<td>CCL</td>
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<td>Christian Health Association of Lesotho</td>
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<td>CHE</td>
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<td>Commonwealth Higher Education Management Services</td>
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<td>Catholic Hierarchy of South Africa</td>
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<td>Computer Services Unit</td>
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<td>DDPR</td>
<td>Director(ate) of Disputes Prevention and Resolutions</td>
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<td>Acronym</td>
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<td>DPE</td>
<td>Development for Peace Education</td>
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<td>Finance and General Purpose Board</td>
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<td>Fees Must Fall</td>
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<td>First-Past-the-Post</td>
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<td>GBLS</td>
<td>Government of Bechuanaland/Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland</td>
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<td>GCU</td>
<td>Government, Community, and the University</td>
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<td>Government, Community, and the University in Africa</td>
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<td>ILO</td>
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<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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<td>IPCF</td>
<td>Integrated Postcolonial Framework</td>
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<td>Institute of Southern African Studies</td>
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<td>LAC</td>
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<td>LAM/CG</td>
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<td>LB</td>
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<td>LCD</td>
<td>Lesotho Congress for Democracy</td>
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<td>Lesotho Voluntary Students Association</td>
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<td>LLA</td>
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<td>LPVP</td>
<td>Lutaru President and Vice-President</td>
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<td>LSoM</td>
<td>Lesotho School of Medicine</td>
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<td>LTTU</td>
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<td>LUCT</td>
<td>Limkokwing University of Creative Technology</td>
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<td>LUSA</td>
<td>Lesotho Union of Students Association</td>
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<td>LUTARU</td>
<td>Lesotho University Teachers and Researchers Union</td>
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<td>MOET</td>
<td>Ministry of Education and Training</td>
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<td>NAAC</td>
<td>National Association for the Advancement of Coloureds (Zimbabwe)</td>
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<td>NAWU</td>
<td>Non-Academic Workers’ Union</td>
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<td>NGO(s)</td>
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<td>NHTC</td>
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<td>National University of Lesotho</td>
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<td>NULIS</td>
<td>National University of Lesotho International School</td>
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<td>NULSOP</td>
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<td>NULSP</td>
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<td>OSPAAAL</td>
<td>Organization of Solidarity with the People of Asia, Africa and Latin America</td>
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<td>PHD</td>
<td>Pull Him Down</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PKB</td>
<td>Power, Knowledge, Being</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PKBD</td>
<td>Power, Knowledge, Being, Discourse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PKD</td>
<td>Power, Knowledge, Discourse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PMU</td>
<td>Police Mobile Unit</td>
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<tr>
<td>PVC</td>
<td>Pro-Vice-Chancellor</td>
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<tr>
<td>PXIICH</td>
<td>Pius XII College House</td>
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<tr>
<td>PXIICUC</td>
<td>Pius XII Catholic University College</td>
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<tr>
<td>RCC</td>
<td>Roman Catholic Church</td>
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<tr>
<td>RL</td>
<td>Radio Lesotho</td>
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<tr>
<td>RP</td>
<td>Restructuring Process</td>
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<tr>
<td>SARUA</td>
<td>Southern African Regional Universities Association</td>
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<tr>
<td>SDF</td>
<td>Student Democratic Front</td>
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<td>SLF</td>
<td>Student Liberation Front</td>
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<td>Soc. Resp.</td>
<td>Social Responsibility</td>
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<tr>
<td>SRCP</td>
<td>Student Representative Council President</td>
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<td>SRCS</td>
<td>Student Representative Council Secretary</td>
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<td>SU</td>
<td>Students Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>SUSU</td>
<td>Senior University Staff Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>SWOT</td>
<td>Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats</td>
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<tr>
<td>TP</td>
<td>Transformation Process</td>
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<tr>
<td>TRC</td>
<td>Transformation Resource Centre</td>
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<tr>
<td>UB</td>
<td>University of Botswana</td>
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<tr>
<td>UBBS</td>
<td>University of Bechuanaland, Basutoland and Swaziland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UBLS</td>
<td>University of Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland</td>
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<tr>
<td>UEA</td>
<td>University of East Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>UFS</td>
<td>University of the Free State</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNISA</td>
<td>University of South Africa</td>
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<td>UNISWA</td>
<td>University of Swaziland</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>United States of America</td>
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<tr>
<td>UTB</td>
<td>University Tender Board</td>
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<tr>
<td>UZ</td>
<td>University of Zimbabwe</td>
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<td>V2000P</td>
<td>Vision 2000 Plus</td>
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<td>VC</td>
<td>Vice-Chancellor</td>
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<td>WB</td>
<td>World Bank</td>
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CHAPTER 1: GENERAL INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

1.1 GENERAL ORIENTATION

The university in Africa today is facing multiple challenges occasioned by changing and divergent views about its role and place in the economy, polity and society, setting in motion all kinds of contestations of normative and ideological principles. This raises questions about how the university should interface with the government and community, ideologically and practically. Consequently, these contestations not only directly impact or make it difficult for the university to fulfill its triple mandate of teaching, research and community engagement, but they also carry connotations for the African continent. However, it is important to emphasise that not all contestations and clashes are bad or destructive and neither does it mean that there are no points of convergence between government, community and the university in Africa today.

The tensions and contestations can only be understood within dominant socio-economic and socio-political contexts, both in the past and present. At independence, universities on the continent found themselves with expanded functions that went beyond their traditional roles of teaching and research, having been placed at the apex of the post-colonial developmental agenda for Africa. The new role assigned African universities by the new political elites was to haul Africa out of the spider-web of underdevelopment through meaningful contributions to the political, social, cultural and economic upliftment of the continent. However, once the drive to Africanise the public service had reached saturation point, politicians began to lose commitment in Higher Education (HE) and started to disinvest, leading to a decline in the tertiary educational systems for Africa. Moreover, the more universities began to be critical of their governments, the more politicians began to question their purpose and relevance.

So today it is commonly acknowledged that the quality of university education in Africa has declined significantly due to a number of factors – decaying infrastructure, phenomenal growth in student numbers (massification), declining resources and cuts in government subventions, academic brain haemorrhage, and increasing unrest on university campuses, among other causes.
(Seddoh, 2003; McDonald and Crush, 2002). This has been compounded by the ongoing efficiency movements in HE, largely informed by neoliberal and New Public Management (NPM) discourses as part of the central phenomenon of our epoch, globalisation. It is within these contexts that I seek to find answers to the principal question: what kind of contestations and contradictions of normative and ideological principles take place in the Triad of government, community and the university, via the case study of the National University of Lesotho (NUL)? The study takes off from 1945 because that is when the University was founded, while the overarching reasons for making 2014 the cut-off date is the need to capture the most recent contestations and contradictions occasioned by the neoliberal Restructuring Process (RP) of the University that lasted from 2010 to 2014.

This study is a qualitative study located in the field of African Studies, drawing mainly on disciplinary contributions from Political Science and History/Historiography in the African context and Postcolonial Studies as an interdisciplinary field. Specifically, it draws considerably on Postcolonial Studies to capture the historical specificity of the African experience in particular and the global South in general. It is a descriptive and analytical postcolonial study of dynamic relations and technologies of power in the Triad of government, community (local and global) and the university in Africa (GCUA) today, using NUL as a case study. Postcolonialism/postcolonial theory (PC) is therefore the main lens through which the study examines its data (see Chapter 2).

The main theoretical-analytical tools drawn from postcolonial theory are representation, agency and resistance, articulated around the key concepts that actualise them – power, knowledge and discourse. I draw on the work of leading postcolonial theorists such as Foucault (1976, 1980a-i, 1990), Spivak (1988), Said (1978), Bhabha (1994), Fanon (1963, 1967), Derrida (1978) and Gandhi (1998) among others, to show how power, knowledge and discourse manifest as key concepts in enhancing our understanding of the inner workings in the Triad of government, community and the university in Africa today. However, because the real world does not have boundaries, the study also draws on contributions from a range of scholarly fields and disciplines – Higher Education Studies (HES), Sociology, Anthropology, Ethnography, Literary Theory,
Linguistics, Cultural Studies, Philosophy, Politics, History, Geography, Economics, Women’s Studies, and Decolonial Option (DCO) among others, with HES as a major contributor.

Using a postcolonial analytical framework, reflected through the historical journey of NUL, the study shows that both past and present socio-political and socio-economic contexts have much to do with the numerous ideological and political contestations involving the Government of Lesotho, the Community and the NUL. I therefore conclude that to further enhance our understanding of triadic relations in particular, and the post-colonial epoch in general, there is need for a new interdisciplinary interpretive postcolonial framework.

1.2 CLARIFICATION OF TERMS AND CONCEPTS

- Government, Community, University

In many African countries, there is a tendency to collapse government and state notwithstanding obvious differences. In the modern sense, government is the organisation of people for effective resolution of dispute and conflict as well as for regulating many aspects of private and public affairs (Jackson and Jackson, 2003:8). State refers to a polity which claims in law that within a specific geographic zone, its properly constituted organs are “exclusively entitled to practice legitimate violence in the pursuit of public order and defence of the territory from foreign encroachments” (Caramani, 2008:701). The state is made up of people, government, territory and the abstract concept of sovereignty. In the case study, government specifically refers to the Government of Lesotho (GOL) and all the arms of state – the Executive, the Judiciary and the Legislature. In the Marxist vision, the state is considered the instrument by which the ruling class maintains domination. It is a model for the generation and management of large-scale political power (Poggi, 2011). Community means either people living in one particular area or people who are considered as a unit because of their common interests. It is therefore not possible to take government and university out of the community. Community also has a local and non-local sense. In the local sense, it means firstly, where NUL is physically located, and secondly, the wider geographical and political region defined as Lesotho. In the non-local sense, it means the international community represented by several governmental and nongovernmental organisations. I also use the term ‘non-state actors’ to refer to all other actors other than
government, including the university and the community. University means a place where people study for an undergraduate or postgraduate degree and is generally characterised by a triple mandate of teaching, research and community engagement. In this study, it means the founding Pius XII Catholic University College (PXIICUC), the University of Bechuanaland, Basutoland and Swaziland (UBBS), the University of Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland (UBLS), and the NUL. Wherever the words ‘Government’, ‘Community’ and ‘University’ are used in their upper case form, they refer to a specific government, community and university such as the GOL, the local community and NUL respectively. Where they are used in their lower case format, they refer to any other government, wider (global) community and university in general as well as context dependent, straddling the public and the private spheres.

- **Triad**

Triad means three related things that form a group and government, community and university are seen as such. Thus wherever the word ‘triad’ is used, it is used as a shorthand for government/state, community/society and the university. The above definitions show that there are complex constitutive, fluid and multimodal connections between the three. While the division between state and non-state provides a mental template, in practice, actors straddle this divide, garnering political capital from both. Therefore, the triad is no mosaic of individual existences in some stratified structure, but a dynamic formation of relationships and practices constituted in large measure by struggles for power. In the case study, the Triad is the Government of Lesotho, the Community (local and global), and the National University of Lesotho.

- **Postcolonialism/Postcolonial Theory**

In this study, the terms ‘postcolonialism’ and ‘postcolonial theory’ (PC) are used interchangeably. However, a distinction is made between postcolonialism without a hyphen and post-colonialism with a hyphen. The unhyphenated term is seen as a critical ideological, political and theoretical approach/stance against universalising discourses and against hegemonic and exploitative practices (Allen, 1998). As a critical theoretical stance, it aims to supplant the ideologies of colonialism. It is also seen as a discussion about experiences and overlapping
identities of various kinds across time and space (see 2.3.2). The hyphenated term is linked to a specific historical period, a period/time after colonialism or after formal decolonisation/independence.

- **Power, Knowledge, Discourse (PKD)**

While the notions of power, knowledge and discourse are both complex and contested, in this study, they are conceptualised from a postcolonial and a Foucauldian perspective\(^1\). Foucault (1980a, 1980b, 1980c) sees power as something which circulates, being neither specifically localised nor in the hands of a specific agent – it is situationally contingent and stems from innumerable sources and points; i.e., it comes from everywhere and operates through countless sites and channels in every direction. It operates rhizomatically\(^2\) rather than downwards or monolithically. The word ‘power’ is also used as a shorthand for the phrase ‘relationships of power’ (Foucault, 1980b, 1980c, 1980e, 1980f; Said, 1978; Spivak, 1988; Bhabha, 1994). Knowledge is inseparable from power, hence the configuration power/knowledge. Power cannot be exercised without knowledge. The exercise of power perpetually creates knowledge while at the same time knowledge constantly induces effects of power (Foucault, 1975, 1980f). Discourse (language) is the primary site for the exercise, not of consensual reasoning, but of power. Discourse is an instrument of power, a means by which power produces ‘truth’. It is in a discourse that power and knowledge are joined together (Foucault, 1976, 1980c, 1980d; Said, 1978; Abrahamsen, 2003; Epstein, 2013).

### 1.3 Rationale of the Study

There are a number of reasons for undertaking this study. These include personal and practical experiences; glaring gaps in the literature on the university in Lesotho; the need for challenging

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\(^1\) Michel Foucault (1926-1984) was a French philosopher and historian. His works analyse the relations between power, knowledge and discourse. He argues that power is multiple and differentiated in reality, that it is productive – hence the notion of technologies of power and governmentality.

\(^2\) In botany, a rhizome is any fleshy stem that grows horizontally rather than downwards, growing from several points rather than a single tap root. In postcolonial discourse, the term is used to contest the binary centre/margin view of reality and to demonstrate its numerous rather than monolithic operations.
the notion of the statism of African social formations; the need for theoretical contributions to the study of Africa; and for purposes of empirical validation. First, I seek to bring a fresh perspective to the study of triadic relations of power, using a postcolonial analytical framework backed by my own observation and experience, both as actor and researcher.\(^3\) Thus over the years I observed, with curiosity and amazement, the many complex struggles and contestations between students, academic and non-academic staff, university administration, government and the community in a post-colonial environment. These have received scanty treatment in scholarly literature.

The necessity to fill a glaring historiographical gap is the second reason for this study. Research on government, community and university relations has been and continues to be dominated by the logic and methods of the functionalist, constructivist (Kezar, 2001), interpretivist, Marxist and neo-Marxist (Manuh, Gariba and Budu 2007) epistemologies and methodologies. This ideational hegemony has to be challenged because such approaches not only occlude discussion of the wider, dynamic and hidden epistemological, political and social relationships inherent in government-community-university interactions, but also tend to see them as separate entities with independent existence. Moreover, these orthodox theories do not adequately address the why and how of power, as a Foucauldian or postcolonial approach would. The role of language (discourse), agency and resistance in the enactment, maintenance and the practice of power and dominance in most relations of power such as those between the government, community and university has often been at best, understated, and at worst, ignored. In Lesotho for example, there is no known study on relations of power involving the three triadic actors – government, community and the university. Yet still, while there is considerable literature on the politics of student revolt/resistance and activism in institutions of higher learning on the African continent (Nkinyangi, 1991; Omari and Mihyo, 1991; Byaruhanga, 2006), in Lesotho there is no known literature on student activism despite evidence of the immense impact of such movements. How students, academic and non-academic staff interface with the government, the community and university administrators in tertiary institutions in Lesotho is absent in scholarly literature. A PhD study by Fritz Ilongo (2013) on workplace bullying is one of the most recent academic

\(^3\) The idea of this study goes back to the late 1980s and early 1990s, first as an undergraduate and postgraduate student, and second as a member of the teaching staff at the University of Zimbabwe (UZ) from April 1992 to June 2004, and at the National University of Lesotho from July 2004 to date.
studies that partly focuses on how academic staff interface with university administrators in institutions of higher learning in Lesotho. It describes various forms of bullying as well as the varying coping mechanisms and strategies among NUL staff during the 2011-2014 Restructuring Process (RP). The major weakness with this study, just like that of Said’s *Orientalism* (1978), is the portrayal of the marginalised, i.e. those being bullied as victims, thus taking away their agency and creative adaptability in the face of power. My study takes the analysis far beyond Ilongo’s victimhood to agency and resistance, demonstrating a well-known proposition that where there is power, there is resistance.

Other earlier studies by Magagula (1978), Mashologu (2006), Ambrose (2006) and Mokopakgosi (2013) are overly concerned with the breakup of the University of Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland in 1975. In the main, while Mashologu’s (2006) 134-page long manuscript under the title *A Broken Reed: The traumatic experience of the last day of the University of Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland, and its aftermath*, remains, in my view, the only serious account of events that led to the nationalisation of the Roma campus of UBLS in 1975, it does not pretend to be a scholarly treatment of the subject. It is based on the personal experiences and insights of the author who at the time was the Pro-Vice-Chancellor (PVC) of the Roma Campus of UBLS. Ambrose’s (2006) account, in a self-published manuscript under the title *How UBLS at Roma Became NUL*, seems to overemphasise an internal departmental dispute as a precipitant to the breakup of UBLS at the expense of other important factors such as national pride and the challenges of regional cooperation. The work of Magagula (1978) and Mokopakgosi (2013) mainly demonstrate, through the trinational university (UBLS), problems associated with regional cooperation and the lessons learnt. They can therefore not be regarded as rigorous studies into relations of power in the manner proposed in this study. My study benefits from the many primary sources available in the Archives Records, Museum and Documentation Division (AREMDOD) of the National University of Lesotho Library as well as the numerous interviews I have conducted with participants cutting across PXIICUC, the UBLS and the NUL era. It is a postcolonial analytical study of the interconnectedness and constitutive relations of, and technologies of power between the institution, the GOL and the local and global community, across space and time.
The third reason for this study is to challenge the notion of the statism of African social formations which characterises universities on the African continent as either state-controlled or state-supervised or state-directed. Government regulation, intervention or steering is the other designation by which the government is seen to relate with the university, both in the developed and developing world (Neave and van Vught, 1994; Manuh et al, 2007; Eisemon and Salmi, 1993). For example, Eisemon and Salmi (1993:159) argue that in 1970, the Ugandan government revised the statutes of Makerere University in order to subordinate it to the state by making the Head of State the University Chancellor with powers to appoint senior administrators, members of the governing council and even the members of the powerful staff appointments board. In Zimbabwe, Cheater (1991) posits that the University of Zimbabwe Amendment Act of 1990 literally transformed an otherwise autonomous institution of learning into a state and ruling party university by conferring all authority and power into the office of the Chancellor and the Vice-Chancellor. The Chancellor was the Executive State President implying that in the event of any conflict of interest between Chancellorship and Presidency, the political office would dominate. Thus political and state interference in the affairs of African universities is something that is generally considered the norm, and something that has become a strong priority among African politicians in order to silence ‘subversive’ elements and merchants of foreign influences within universities. The funding arrangements of state universities, where the government has remained the principal donor have provided a cloak of legitimation for the state’s pervasive intervention (Zeleza, 1997:25). In all these designations, I find the central role of government not only overemphasised, but also faulty in underestimating the role of other players and other productive forces immanent in the Triad. In this study, via the case study, I attempt to show that power is dynamic, dispersed and polyvalent – thereby creating multiple opportunities for both governance and resistance.

Whereas many African governments have ensured that state control of their universities was entrenched in the laws governing such institutions, the GOL, through the National University Act (NUA) of 1976 dispersed power throughout NUL. In Foucauldian (1975; 1980f; 1984) formulation, at NUL, power is everywhere because it comes from everywhere and operates through numerous channels and sites in every conceivable direction (see 3.3). This may explain why today the GOL is not only struggling to impose its will on the university, but seems to dither
at crucial moments despite occupying political spaces within the University. Instead, actors other than the state have remained dominant in those spaces and have for nearly forty years not only governed the institution but also successfully resisted any undue external influences. However, while Lesotho may seem to offer an exception to the statism of African social formations, the entrenchment of participatory governance in 1976 was motivated by factors other than the voluntary relinquishing of power (see 3.3.3).

The fourth reason for this study is theoretical. I wish to show how postcolonial theory can be harnessed analytically to study relations of power in the Triad. On the strength of this, I argue that an integrated postcolonial analytical framework combining several approaches will immensely benefit Africa/African Studies. I thus wish to contribute, theoretically, to the knowledge society. My contribution to the debate is the proposed new interdisciplinary interpretive framework that I have labeled the Integrated Postcolonial Framework (IPCF). I argue that this IPCF will make a difference for researchers from various disciplinary backgrounds by giving them a new framework for studying relations of power across space and time, thus enabling new research. It is a theory of Africa/African Studies that cuts across several fields and disciplinary perspectives.

Fifth, and last, empirically, I wish to demonstrate that power, especially in the modern world, as Abrahamsen (2003) posits, is no longer centred exclusively in the state, or with capital, but that it works through micro-strategies and practices at both the local, domestic and the international levels. Thus both theoretically and empirically, there is a gap in our knowledge of contestations and clashes of normative and ideological principles regarding the role and nature of the university in Africa today. This is because there tends to be a dichotomy between what the state and society expect of the university in Africa today, and what the university does. On one hand, the state wants greater political control over the university as well as transparent and timeous accountability of the funds made available to the university. On the other hand, the university wants greater autonomy and the ability to appeal to critical reason in its view of both government and society. These divergent positions, which are by and large politically motivated, have driven the state, society and the university in Africa today on a collision path. Thus empirically, I wish to show that university spaces are political ‘battlegrounds’ in many diverse and complex ways.
The above-stated personal and practical experiences, historiographical, statist notions of African social formations, theoretical pursuits and empirical reasons form part of the principal question that I seek to address in this study (see 1.4) in order to increase our knowledge of triadic relations of power.

1.4 PROBLEM STATEMENT AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS

This is an empirical case study about the interplay between government, community and the university in Africa today, focusing on triadic contestations and clashes of normative and ideological principles in respect of the university through the case study of the National University of Lesotho. How the three actors interface has an important bearing on the present and future of the university in Africa today. The Triad that I propose to examine in this study is a complex space which is vast, much more discontinuous, much less closed, more flexible, more differentiated, and less rigidly hierarchical. The government, the community and the university are seen as spaces whose centres of power are multiple and in which the activities, tensions and conflicts are numerous and multidimensional with equilibrium only reached through numerous negotiations, compromises, or to use Foucault’s phrase, “through a variety of transactions” (Foucault, 1976, 1982). Consequently, this study puts emphasis on the interconnected, multimodal, fluid and constitutive relationships of power rather than their separateness.

The principal question this study grapples with is: what kind of contestations and contradictions of normative and ideological principles take place in the Triad and with what consequences for the present and future of the university in Africa today? Stated much more specifically, the questions are:

1. To what extent are the persistent tensions, contestations and struggles in universities in Africa today a product of their history (see Chapter 3);
2. How do the actors in the Triad engage in ‘othering’ practices, or put differently, who is constructing what images and from what perspective or point of view? (see Chapter 4);
3. What are the perceived (ideological and practical) notions of how the University should interface with the Government and Community and what kind of resistances, ideological or otherwise, take place in the Triad (see Chapters 4 and 5); and
4. What kind of contestations and struggles between Government, Community and the University in Africa today have been engendered by the drive towards the globalisation of HE (see Chapter 5).

These questions are premised on the assumption that the causes and sources of tensions and contestations are ideology versus reality; political control versus autonomy; fiscal responsibilities versus accountability; public roles versus institutional visions and goals, among others.

Given that power and knowledge are key facets in all forms of relations, further questions that I seek to address in respect of the Triad and which are discussed in all chapters of the study include: (a) who has what power and what knowledge to do what; (b) who hold power and knowledge; (c) what are the levels and spaces of power; (d) how is power exercised; (e) what are the mechanisms for power and knowledge; and (f) what are the limits to power and knowledge? In short, it is a political question of ‘who has what power to get what, when and how’. There is an intricate interconnectedness between the subject of power and power because there would be no power if there was no one on whom it is manifested while at the same time tendencies of ‘power over’ are put in check by ‘power to’ or ‘power within’ or ‘power with’ (collective agency) (Foucault, 1980g; Gaventa, 1980). All these exist in dynamic relationships in the Triad, constantly opening and closing through struggles for legitimacy, resistance, co-operation and transformation.

1.5 AIMS AND OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY

In line with the questions above, the main purpose of this research is not only to expand our knowledge of the causes and nature of tensions and contestations in triadic relations, but also to contribute to the ongoing debate pertaining to the realities and normative expectations of universities. This is done through the presentation of concrete data regarding the interplay between government, community and the university in Africa today via an empirically grounded study. Below I state the theoretical and empirical objectives for this study. The first two objectives are theoretical and the last three, while they still carry theoretical tones, are largely empirical.
• First, I wish to make a case for applying postcolonial theory to the study of Africa and African Studies by harnessing some of its key analytical tools such as representation, hybridity, agency and resistance, including the key variant of decoloniality (see Chapter 2).

• The second theoretical objective is to develop an integrated postcolonial theoretical framework that can inform future studies. By developing an Integrated Postcolonial Framework (IPCF) as a model for the study of African contemporary societies, I wish not only to make a contribution to the growing body of theory that can be deployed to study the global South in particular and all colonial and post-colonial societies in general, but also to contribute to general theory development (see Chapters 2 and 6). Yet this theoretical objective is also intertwined with the empirical validations of representation of an ‘othering’ nature (Chapter 4) and agency and resistance (Chapter 5) that are used to strengthen the formulation of an IPCF for the study of Africa and the postcolony.

• The third objective is to trace, examine and demonstrate, in historical perspective, that university spaces are political battlegrounds in many diverse and complex ways and how the triadic tensions, contestations and struggles in universities in Africa today are a product of their history (as demonstrated in Chapter 3 in particular and Chapters 4 and 5 in general). The interface of power, politics and education as an arena for the exercise of influential and authoritative decisions of global, regional and national actors seeking to control African educational processes constitutes a key area for a more critical reflection and needed research.

• The fourth empirical objective is to examine the preponderance of discourses of the construction of the ‘Other’ in institutions of higher learning in Africa. Using the binaries ‘Us’/‘Them’, ‘Self’/‘Other’ and ‘We’/’They’, I wish to show that social constructions, notions of identity and negative stereotypical images are more prevalent in universities in Africa than is otherwise thought (see Chapter 4). The aim is to show how power and knowledge, both of which are joined in a discourse (Foucault, 1976), are key concepts that make such alienating representations possible.
• My fifth objective is to analyse the various forms of agency and resistance occasioned not only by the ubiquity of power among triadic actors, but also by the colloidal forces between the global and the local (see Chapter 5). The analysis of tensions and contestations within their socio-political contexts is expected to benefit policy-makers in their re-engineering of public institutions. This way, the study is intended to be an important point of reference for informed recommendations for the transformation of HE in Africa and at NUL.

1.6 THE STUDY AREA/SITE, HISTORICAL OVERVIEW AND CONTEXTUAL BACKGROUND

This section presents the nature of the study area/site (1.6.1), the historical overview of Lesotho with emphasis on government-university relations (1.6.2), and the contextual background regarding the emergence and evolution of universities in Africa (1.6.3). The purpose of this section is to foreground and give context to the complex nature of relations in the Triad.

1.6.1 The Study Area/Site

The Kingdom of Lesotho has three types of HE institutions namely University, Institute and Polytechnic. NUL, the study area/site, is the premier university, the only public university in the country since 1945, and the only university until 2008. It is located 35 km to the south-east of Maseru, the capital of Lesotho, right in the middle of several villages4 (see Insert 1.1 below). The aerial view of NUL (Insert 1.1) was taken by the author in 2012 from the top of a mountain in the southwestern part of the Roma valley. The tarred and gravel roads to the south and the east respectively separate the University from the immediate surrounding villages. The principal chief of Roma allocated PXIICUC about 85 hectares of rural farm and pasture land.

4 These villages include Tloutle, Ha Mokhi, Pae-la-ithatsoa, Khobeng, Ha Mafefooane, Mafikeng, Hata-butle, Mangopeng, Ha Scout/Thoteng, Liphakoeng, Mahlanyeng, Ha Lehloha, Ha Maama, Maliele (St. Michaels), Ha Mopenyaki, Ha Subilane, Ha Makafane, Lipehleng and Maphotong.
By establishing itself as an educational enterprise in the middle of a rural area dominated by several establishments of the Roman Catholic Church\(^5\), and with the intermixing of various

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\(^5\) These are Roma Parish Ha ‘Ma ‘Jesu, St Augustine’s Seminary, Bishop Allard Vocational School, St Theresa Seminary, Oblate Scholasticate House (Oblates of Mary Immaculate, Our Ladies House, Brothers of The Sacred Heart of Jesus, St Mary’s High School (girls), Christ The King High School (boys), Roma Teacher Training College, Roma Parish, Roma Primary School, St Joseph’s Hospital, Roma College of Nursing, Roma Teachers’ Training, St Michael’s Primary and Roma Book Centre, among others.
nationalities and cultures by actors cutting across the Triad since the founding of PXIICUC in 1945, the University was occupying what Bhabha (1994) calls the ‘third space’ of culture. The process of hybridisation of the different cultures that came into contact with one another transformed a rural area then known as Tloutle into a small ‘Rome’, hence the name Roma, to mean the place of the Roman Catholics. So the Tloutle that many people grew up in, the Tloutle they knew, is not the Tloutle that many would see today. Ha Mafefooane village to the south-east of the University, affectionately known as ‘city Mafefs’6, was the favourite drinking place and ‘hunting ground’ of male students in the days of PXIICUC (1945-1963) and UBBS (1964-1966). Today the degree of intermixing and intermingling has increased exponentially as the majority of the students – over 80 % are accommodated in one-roomed ‘maline’ accommodation in the villages due to serious shortages of accommodation on campus. As a result, hybrid relations of a complex nature are constantly developing.

The pioneering university, PXIICUC, began with only five students and four priest lecturers in 1945. By 1963, the student population stood at 175 (100 male and 75 female) with about 20 academic staff (Botlohole, 1974:1). By 2014, the NUL student population stood at over 10 000 with 370 academic staff and about 308 non-academic staff spread across seven faculties7 (NULSOP, 2014; NULSP, 2007/2012) at the main campus in Roma. The University also has five extramural campuses in four of the ten districts of the country. The numerous transitions of the institution from PXIICUC to NUL are described in detail in section 3.2. In terms of international community, the University holds membership in the Association of African Universities (AAU), Association of Commonwealth Universities (ACU), International Association of Universities and the Association of Eastern and Southern African Universities (AESAU) and Southern African Regional Universities Association (SARUA), among others.

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6 One informant (Uadm2 Interview, 08/03/2011), a former minister of education felt that the designation ‘city Mafefs’ was an insult as Ha Mafefooane was not a city, but a place where male students frequented “to drink beer and ‘eat sin’ [sex]”.

7 Faculty of Agriculture, Faculty of Education, Faculty of Health Sciences, Faculty of Humanities, Faculty of Law, Faculty of Science and Technology, and Faculty of Social Sciences. The Maseru campus, known as Institute of Extra Mural Studies (IEMS) is home to over 2 000 part-time students spread over five departments.
As for the specific nature of the study site, it is important to mention that the governing body of the University is the Council headed by the Chancellor, who is the King and Head of State\textsuperscript{8}. To run the affairs of the University, the Chancellor is assisted by the Chairman of Council while academic policy is vested in Senate (NUL Calendar, 2006/2007:401-402; 407). Both Council and Senate are assisted in running the University by several university organs, bodies and committees with varying degrees of power (see 3.3).

1.6.2 Historical Overview of Lesotho

The modern Basotho nation is traceable to King Moshoeshoe I who, in the early 19\textsuperscript{th} century, received refugees at his stronghold of Thaba Bosiu and welded them into a nation. The global political pressures of the time forced him to seek British protection in 1868 (Thompson, 1975). In 1966, Lesotho became an independent country under the premiership of Chief Leabua Jonathan. Then in 1970, Jonathan’s ruling Basotho National Party (BNP) lost the first post-independence elections to the Basutoland Congress Party (BCP) of Ntsu Mokhehle. Instead of handing over power, Jonathan suspended the constitution, declared a state of emergency and ruled by decree until 1986 when he was overthrown in a military coup (Khaketla, 1971; Gill, 1993; Pule, 2002). Democracy returned to Lesotho in 1993 when the opposition BCP won a landslide victory with 74.7 \% of the vote (Pule, 2002:198). Since then, there have been periodic conflicts related to disputed election results and a mutinous army. However, the fact that Lesotho is completely surrounded by South Africa has dictated that any Lesotho government has to calculate carefully the extent of its cooperation or resistance to its powerful neighbour, from whose ‘belly’ it cannot escape.

Throughout the 1970s to the present, national political party differences have been significant in NUL, with both students and staff tending to group themselves along national political party lines. For example, in the era of the BNP dictatorship and during military rule, student supporters and sympathisers of the BNP coalesced around the Student Democratic Front (SDF) and those of the BCP around the Student Liberation Front (SLF) (Likate, 1989; GOL, 1989b). Control of the Student Representative Council (SRC) became a key factor between these two and other rival

\textsuperscript{8} The King in Lesotho is a Constitutional Monarch with no executive powers and barred from political activity.
student movements and has remained the case to this day. Today, student supporters of the BNP coalesce around the Basotho National Students Association (BNAS); those of the old BCP⁹ group around its various splinter parties – ABC around the Lesotho Students Convention (LESCO); LCD around the Lesotho Voluntary Students Association (LEVOSA); and the Democratic Congress (DC) around the Lesotho Students Congress Association (LESCA) (Ustu5 Interview, 20/10/2014; Ustufgd11 Interview, 23/10/2014; Gmin1 Interview, 07/08/2014). Yet it is equally important to note that not all students follow these divisions as some of them are either neutral or are deeply opposed to these national party political affiliations.

For members of staff, the university law bans political activity and the holding of executive positions in political parties. The tendency has therefore been to group around associations and trade Unions. For instance, in 1975, just before the split of UBLS, there were two rival associations namely the Academic Staff Association (ASA) which was seen as a white-dominated grouping and the ‘Black’ Staff Association (Ambrose, 2006). In the 1970s, 1980s and early 1990s, academic and senior Library and Administrative staff belonged to the National University of Lesotho Staff Association (NULASA), formed in 1976, while non-academic staff belonged to the Non-Academic Staff Association (NASA), formed in 1977. When NULASA split in 1993, academic and senior library staff formed a trade union – the Lesotho University Teachers and Researchers Union (LUTARU), while senior administrative staff established the Senior University Staff Association (SUSU), in 1995. NASA changed to the Non-Academic Workers Union (NAWU) in 1995. Again, not all academic and non-academic staff were members of these groupings, and since the law bans University staff from political activity, a good number do so clandestinely.

⁹ In 1997, the BCP split to give birth to the Lesotho Congress for Democracy (LCD). Then in 2007, the LCD split to give birth to the All Basotho Convention (ABC) while in 2011 the LCD split to give birth to the Democratic Congress (DC). Another split in the LCD in 2014 gave birth to the Reformed Congress of Lesotho (RCL). In 2016, the DC split to give birth to the Alliance of Democrats (AD), while the LCD split again to give birth to the Movement for Economic Change (MEC). More splits in all parties are in the offing.
1.6.3 Contextual Background: Problematising the Emergence and Evolution of Universities in Africa

The emergence and development of university education in Africa can be conceptualised in four distinct phases namely the pre-colonial university (before 1900), the colonial university (1900-c.1960), the developmental (post-colonial) university (1961-c.1980), and the market (entrepreneurial)/crisis-era university (1980-present). I summarise each phase below. Each phase or type of university is closely tied to the prevailing socio-economic and socio-political ideologies about the nature and purpose of the university. The purpose of this section is to demonstrate that the university on the continent has undergone tremendous metamorphosis via a complex mix of Western (global) and African (local) forces, demands and realities. Section 3.2 locates NUL and its preceding institutions within these broad phases.

1.6.3.1 The Pre-colonial University

HE on the continent long antedates the establishment of Western style universities in the 19th century. Zeleza (2006a) traces university education in Africa to the 3rd century BC. The oldest university still in existence is Al-Azhar in Egypt, founded in 969 AD. It is regarded as one of the leading Islamic institutions of HE in the world today (Tefera and Altbach, 2004:23). Tisani (2005) posits that not only did the idea of higher learning begin in Africa, but the spread of universities into “Western Europe was mainly through the traffic of knowledge and ideas that flowed across the strait of Gibraltar from north Africa” (Tisani, 2005:2).

1.6.3.2 The Colonial University

Colonial universities were a product of the European colonisation of Africa and most of these emerged after the Second World War10. Their mandate was to reorient European colonies through the idea of ‘colonial development’ (Hargreaves, 1973) as well as to “cultivate and sustain indigenous elites in the mould of European traditions that would be crucial in maintaining links with the former colonial powers upon attainment of independence” (Munene, 2010:400).

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10 The foundations of NUL go back to 1945 (see 3.2).
Thus colonial universities were among the major instruments and vehicles of cultural Westernisation and assimilation (Mazrui, 2005:62). Today the continent remains dominated by universities shaped by colonialism and organised according to the European model, thus entrenching the universalising tendencies of the West packaged today as globalisation. If relevance and purpose are seen in terms of the needs of the African communities and not those of the colonial masters, colonial universities score very low on relevance and meeting the developmental needs of the continent.

1.6.3.3 The Independence/Developmental University

To consolidate independence, many African states considered HE as a priority in their development strategies hence the establishment of development-oriented universities (SARUA, 2008:16). It was readily believed that HE was capable of contributing to the social, cultural and economic development of Africa (Munene, 2010:400). As a result, initially, many universities were generously funded and supported by the state. However, this commitment only lasted for about a decade or so. It is thought, among other reasons, that the ‘independence’ university was overly concerned with first, ‘Africanising’ the public service, and second, with the anti-colonialist aspiration of taking over and ‘Africanising’ positions within the institution. Third, the more nationalism turned into a state project, the more there were pressures on the developmentalist university to implement a state-determined and state-driven agenda, and the more this happened, the more critical thought was taken as subversive of the national project (Mamdani, 2008). For instance, the more professors sounded like Ministers or even Presidents-in-waiting, argues Mamdani (2008), the more their critique began to sound self-serving. The result was that the university, particularly in single-party contexts, began to take on the veneer of an opposition party in which academic staff and students were pitted against the state (see 5.2 and 5.4).

In the midst of all this, the African university lost its original mandate, and soon, its relevance was being questioned. The international policy environment did not help matters. In 1986, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) suggested that “Africa did not need university education” (Zeleza, 1997:39; Mamdani 2008:7), and called for the privatisation of
public universities. The fate of the ‘developmental university’ was sealed in 1990 when the World Conference on Education for All prioritised elementary education. Consequently, the market (entrepreneurial) university was born. Thus today, the fortunes of many universities on the African continent have been dramatically reversed.

1.6.3.4 The Market (entrepreneurial) or Crisis-era University

Until recently, most African universities were financed by the developmentalist post-colonial state. The increasing frustration with the perceived failure of the ‘developmental university’ on one hand, and changed Western priorities and the inevitable influence of Western aid and Western academic organisations on the other hand, has seen HE going in the direction of the market in many African countries. For close to two decades now, NUL has increasingly come under pressure to liberalise (see 5.4). This is happening at a time when state, economy and society are all in a state of flux with consequences for popular perceptions of the role, place and relevance of the university in personal and societal progress. This has seen the emergence of various forms of disputes and contestations. The contestations arise from differences in the values or normative and ideological principles of what a university in Africa today ought to be, versus more pragmatic, policy-driven and interest-based conceptualisations. Yet such universal neo-liberal constructions of the university do not always leave room for locally grounded and contextual peculiarities. As a result, frequent conflicts and contestations between state and non-state actors have punctuated relations within the Triad as Chapters 3, 4 and 5 demonstrate. Zeleza and Olukoshi (2004:1) posit that “struggles of various kinds and intensities are being waged within and outside the university system on the contemporary interpretation and operationalisation of its mission”.

The belief is that the market university will provide structural and operational reforms for the failed developmental university. A defining feature of the entrepreneurial university is the adoption of market-like behaviour and governance, and the retreat of the state in the provision of education, thus turning HE into a private rather than public good (Munene, 2010; Christensen, 2011). It is also associated with the idea that a highly diversified and differentiated university system will deal with the financial challenges through an injection of additional funding thereby
making public universities more efficient and economical (Christensen, 2011). Thus from the 1990s, universities in Africa came under pressure from both internal and external forces, with discourses of the privatisation and commercialisation of public universities permeating nearly all African campuses (see 5.4). The conversion or attempted conversion of public institutions such as NUL into market universities has set in motion complex contestations between state and non-state actors.

1.7 RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY

The study was approached from an interpretivist and constructivist epistemological perspective, or simply a post-positivist epistemological stance that acknowledges the fact that knowledge created can never be totally objective and that elements of subjectivity will always creep in (Crotty, 1998; Nieuwenhuis, 2007). Although I accepted the role of subjectivity in this work, I still strove towards objectivity by positioning myself as a researcher in an interpretive perspective as opposed to the objective normative position in positivism. This stance determined that the design of the study adheres to the qualitative research approach as a guiding paradigm and methodology. This is because qualitative research is based on “a constructivist philosophy that assumes reality as multilayered, interactive, and a shared social experience interpreted by individuals … It is concerned with understanding the social phenomena from the participant’s perspective … [and shows] context sensitivity” (McMillan and Schumacher 2001:396). Furthermore, this was actually a case study – which is one of the main designs within the qualitative paradigm. This case study type falls within the study of institutions and organisations (Babbie and Mouton, 2005) – complex contexts, which justify the appropriateness of adhering to a qualitative methodology.

1.7.1 Data Collection, Methods and Issues of Validity, Reliability and Objectivity

First, a wide array of published and unpublished secondary sources were extensively consulted and appraised in accordance with the rules of documentary analysis (see 1.7.2). Second, a variety of primary documents found in the AREMDOD of the NUL Library – Senate and Council papers, documents and minutes; Vice-Chancellor’s Annual reports; University policy documents, official speeches, and press releases; Student Union documents and magazines; trade union
records and minutes of meetings; University Acts, Statutes and Ordinances; GOL documents and Commissions of Inquiry among others were also consulted and similarly appraised. All these documents were crucial in giving the official point of view. Third, the above-mentioned sources were complemented by data derived from participant observation, in-depth interviews, and from the open-ended questionnaire administered on purposively sampled triadic actors. These multiple sources of data and approaches went a long way in increasing the trustworthiness of the study through the cardinal principle of triangulation.

The trustworthiness of any research is enhanced when multiple methods are combined in a triangulated approach. This is because the purpose of methodological triangulation is to guard against unreliable or invalid results (Hall and Rist, 1999; Turner, Cardinal and Burton, 2015). The principle of triangulation involves the use of multiple methodological strategies based on the understanding that individually “all research strategies and methods are seriously flawed” but that in combination, the imperfections in each method tend to cancel out one another (Turner et al, 2015:2). In order to increase the validity, reliability and objectivity of this study, data was collected through observation, interview and the questionnaire method. Validity refers to the ability of an instrument to measure what it is designed to measure; reliability is an indicator of measurement consistency, reproducibility or replicability of findings under constant conditions; and objectivity has to do with the extent to which research findings are independent of the researcher, i.e. attempts to diminish bias and to be fair and open to all sides of an argument as well as avoiding personal, financial and political interests (Babbie, 2004; Bradburn, Sudman and Wansink, 2004; Kumar, 2005). Thus guided by a qualitative tradition, this study is anchored on multiple research approaches. However, Marvasti (2003) argues that piecing several approaches and perspectives together does not necessarily mean that weaknesses and errors cancel out each other, but rather to see triangulation as a way to add complexity and depth to the data analysis.

**1.7.1.1 Participant Observation**

Whitehead and McNiff (2006:23) argue that we should not confuse methodology – “a theory of how we do things”, with methods – “the specific techniques we develop for finding something out”. In the ‘world’ of this study, I adopted an insider participative approach as part of my technique for finding out. My values, experiences, interaction with participants and continuous
reflection on my practice directed and influenced the way in which my claim to knowledge was 
created. Having been in the university system both as a student and as an academic for close to 
three decades, I felt I could bring a fresh perspective to triadic relations of power. However, the 
tension between being an insider versus being an outsider scholar was always there and difficult 
to handle. It is therefore no mean task to sit down and write about an organisation of which I am 
a participant without bringing to the task the preconceptions and biases which spring out of my 
own role and experience. I started to observe the university and how it related with government 
and community well before I even contemplated doing this research. But once the idea to study 
triadic actors had taken root, I became a ‘practitioner researcher’ through overt participant 
observation. Yet throughout the observation process, I did not follow any specific observation 
schedule. I just became an overt participant observer because of the many advantages associated 
with people knowing who the researcher is and what she/he is doing as compared to covert 
observation (Bryman, 1989; Dawson, 2009). But to minimise limitations associated with 
participant observation, I had to remain sensitive to the principle of reflexivity because 
participant observation, by its nature, increases the possibility of biased conclusions (England, 
1994). Reflexivity is the process of critical self-reflection on one’s biases, theoretical 
predispositions and preferences (Waghid, 2002:463). Throughout this research activity, I 
remained worried whether I was not, albeit unintentionally, essentialising and homogenising my 
diverse triadic actors, including even misrepresenting them. This awareness and sensitivity, 
including being aware of my own social identity and situatedness, limitations and prejudices as 
an ‘insider’ researcher helped me to objectively engage with my informants and data sources in a 
way that acknowledged the need for socially responsible treatment of human subjects and the 
topic under scrutiny. In this way, reflexivity becomes a method that qualitative researchers “can 
and should use to legitimize, validate, and question research practices and representations” 
(Pillow, 2003:175).

1.7.1.2 Interviews

The in-depth interview was the major source of primary data by which accessible information-
rich participants were selected according to predetermined criteria and characteristics through 
maximum variation sampling, snow-ball sampling and convenience sampling (Babbie, 2004; 
McMillan and Schumacher, 2001). All those interviewed were purposively sampled on the basis
of their presumed knowledge of the subject of study (‘expert interviews’) – it was about who can provide the best information to achieve the objectives of the study (Kumar, 2005; Bogner, Littig and Menz, 2009). For some of my informants, snowball sampling was used as those purposively selected and interviewed were asked to suggest additional people for interviewing, individuals who became part of the sample (Babbie, 2004). For this study, in-depth interviews were conducted with information-rich participants from the following four distinct groups of triadic actors: (a) government and ex-government officials (Appendix B1); (b) university administrators (Appendix B2); (c) local and wider community members (Appendix B3); and (d) student leaders (Appendix B4). The perspectives of these distinct groups were needed in order to understand the nature of triadic contestations and contradictions. In total, 69 triadic actors were interviewed – seven government and ex-government officials; 16 university administrators; 12 academic and six non-academic; 25 local (Roma) and wider community members; and three student leaders. All informants willingly and voluntarily participated in this research following full disclosure about the purpose of the research and why they were considered worthy participants. This was in line with the ethical principles of competence, voluntarism, full information and comprehension (Babbie, 2004; Dawson, 2009). The interviews lasted between 45 and 120 minutes and about 50% of them were digitally recorded and later transcribed.

However, the assumption that ‘expert interviews’ can guarantee the validity of data has to be weighed carefully. This is because the so-called expert interviews have, in some contexts, become problematic especially where the reconstruction of latent content of meaning is involved. I strove to enhance the validity and reliability of this research through the precise wording of the questions (Bradburn, Sudman and Wansink, 2004). For reinforcement purposes, almost similarly phrased questions were posed across all data collection instruments (see interview guide in Appendices B1-B4 and questionnaire in Appendices C1-C3). As a qualitative study, open-ended questions were posed in order to get in-depth information about the nature of triadic relations. This is because open-ended questions are the best in generating in-depth qualitative information as opposed to closed-ended questions (Dawson, 2009; Babbie, 2004). To further enhance the validity and ethicalness of the study, after every interview I asked if the information given could be directly or indirectly attributed to them using their real names. While all replied in the affirmative, I took a professional decision to protect their identity even where it seemed
unnecessary to do so. Consequently, I developed a simple coding system to hide the true identity of my oral informants. For ease of reference, the key codes are listed in Appendix D.

Yet the process of data collection posed some challenges. Firstly, the major methodological challenge I faced was to get some key government officials to sit across the table for an interview. My final phase of data collection in 2014 unfortunately coincided with a snap election set for February 2015. Scheduled meetings were postponed several times while others never materialised. Fortunately, such informants were an insufficient number to affect the reliability and validity of the study. Secondly, executive members of NAWU and SUSU were equally difficult to interview despite the fact that I rubbed shoulders with many of them on a daily basis at the workplace. It is for this reason that I switched to the questionnaire approach. As will be shown below, the return rate was not good compared to that for academic staff despite making several follow-ups. However, again, such informants were an insufficient number to affect the reliability and validity of the study. A third methodological challenge had to do with interviews conducted in Sesotho, the majority of them with Roma and wider community members. The questionnaire was translated from English to Sesotho, and responses were translated from Sesotho back to English. As a non-speaker of the Sesotho language, I had to depend entirely on my Basotho colleagues and research assistants. Müller (2007), Bower and Ervin (1953) and Lopez, Figueroa, Connor and Maliski (2008) all contend that the translation process is fraught with problems of translator bias; distortions arising from differences in the meaning of words, syntactical and cultural contexts; lack of equivalent words in the target language; and ambiguity in the original language.

1.7.1.3 Questionnaire

An unstructured (open-ended) questionnaire was also used to collect data not only because it was convenient and less time-consuming (Kumar, 2005), but because it was also necessary to capture data from those who could not be interviewed one-on-one. The questionnaire was in four different parts: academic staff and non-academic staff (C1), SUSU members (C2), students (C3) (see Appendix C), and local and wider community. Each questionnaire was preceded with a

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11 I am grateful to the assistance of Madira Thetso, Taelo Qhala, Maseokho Matsoai and Ntsela Patricia Boroko.
preamble explaining the purpose of the research and the rights of informants. Seventy (70) questionnaires were sent out to academic staff spread across the seven faculties of NUL, having been purposefully sampled. Twenty-four (24) were sent out to non-academic staff in both administrative and support divisions of the University who were also purposively sampled. The rate of return for academic staff was good as 50 (71%) of the 70 distributed questionnaires were completed and returned, whereas only twelve (50%) of those sent to non-academic staff were filled out and returned. Babbie (2004:259) attributes low return rates to absence of clear instructions and the extra burden of having to find an envelope, address it, buy a postage stamp and take the questionnaire to the post. However, in my study, instructions were clear and there was no cost involved and it seems to me that some participants probably just found completing the questionnaire to be a bother. After all, researchers have found that questionnaires are notorious for their low response rate (Kumar, 2005:130).

For students, 60 questionnaires were distributed to 3rd and 4th year students distributed across four faculties – Humanities, Education, Social Science, and Science. These were administered by different class instructors who asked their students to complete and return the questionnaire in class, thus producing a high return rate of 90%. The choice of 3rd year and final year students was deliberate and based on the concept of ‘expert’ interviews. I also wish to state that during the RP of 2011-2013, I exchanged many informal conversations – verbal, email and short message services (sms) with many members of the University community.

1.7.2 Data Analysis

In qualitative research, data collection, analysis and theory formulation form an integrated activity. This is because collection affects the data analysis, which in turn affects the gradual formation of theory, which also in turn affects further collection of data (Westbrook, 1994). My data analysis proceeded as follows: First, I transcribed every interview verbatim and as soon as it was completed because verbatim transcription, according to Halcomb and Davidson (2006), is thought to be central to the validity, reliability and veracity of qualitative data collection. Thus, analysis happened simultaneously with transcription because the process of analysing in-depth narratives calls for informed interaction and connection with the data (Mears, 2009).
Transcription of interview data refers to the process of reproducing spoken words, such as those from an audiotaped interview, into written text, including nonverbal cues such as silences and body language and emotional aspects such as crying, coughs, and sighs, and may disclose or obscure certain information (Wellard and McKenna, 2001; Halcomb and Davidson, 2006). However, verbatim transcription is time-consuming. While Britten (1995), cited in Halcomb and Davidson (2006) posit that for every hour of taped interview, six to seven hours of transcription time is required, it took me about 10 hours to transcribe one hour of interview time.

Second, data was then analysed using the grounded theory approach. The various patterns, categories and themes that emerged from the data were assigned different codes (coding) and analysed for their content and meaning, a procedure known as content analysis (Babbie, 2004). I thus went through all the responses given to specific questions to understand the meaning they communicated. I then developed broad themes, patterns and common categories from these responses and used them as the basis for analysing the interviews and for integrating them into the text. Central to the grounded theory approach is the belief that the researcher starts with a tabula rasa and elicits theory from the data, i.e. theory has to follow data rather than precede it, going against the positivistic notion of hypothesis testing and deductivism (Morley, 1996:144). Its advantage is that it promotes the development of theoretical accounts and explanations which conform closely to the situations being observed, thus making the theory more likely to be intelligible and usable (Turner, 1981). Thus, the IPCF that I propose here was derived from the analysis of such patterns, themes and common categories that I discovered in the data, and conforms to the realities of the relations of power in the Triad. Consequently, the IPCF seeks to reflect the complexity of the real world rather than oversimplifying it.

Third, the rest of the archival and secondary sources were analysed in accordance with the strategies and procedures of analysing such sources. Textual analysis or simply documentary analysis and content analysis proved to be the key procedures by which I asked only the important questions about each source material. These include questions such as who composed the document; why was it written; what is the meaning being communicated; what are some of

\footnote{Content can be manifest or latent. Manifest content refers to the concrete terms contained in a communication while latent content refers to the underlying meaning of communications (Babbie, 2004:319).}
the biases in the document; what are the key categories and concepts used and why; what sort of theoretical issues and debates does the document cast light on; and what sorts of valid inferences and generalisations can one make from the information in the document (Babbie, 2004:336)?

Fourth, the procedure of discourse analysis was also used in this study and is the backbone of Chapter 4. There is an important connection between language use and unequal relations of power. Language provides the tools for understanding the world in its complex political, social, religious and cultural nature (Epstein, 2013; Fairclough, 1999). Moreover, discourse analysis is premised on the understanding that ideologies are typically, though not exclusively, expressed and reproduced in discourse and communication, including non-verbal semiotic messages such as cartoons, pictures, photographs and movies. According to Rogers et al (2005), discourse analysis is a set of approaches to answer questions about the relationships between language and society. In the case study, it is a way to make sense of the ways in which people make meaning in political, economic, social, educational and power contexts.

1.7.3 Ethics and Coding of Participants

The demonstration of ethical behaviour is important in any research/study in order to enhance its validity, reliability and objectivity. I tried to do so in this study by stepping out of my subject (as mentioned before), standing aside and analysing what appeared apparent (see Hellawell, 2006:483). Throughout, I engaged in self-critique continuously evaluating my relation to my work. This is because ethical research demands the exercise of some degree of responsibility between the researcher and her/his work, which involves respect for persons by treating individuals as autonomous agents; protecting persons with diminished autonomy; concern for welfare; integrity; beneficence and non-maleficence; and justice which demands the distribution of risks and potential benefits of research equally among those who may benefit from the research (OHRP) (Office for Human Research Protections), 1993; Babbie, 2004; Dawson, 2009; Valey, 2015). Respect for these principles is an important tenet for the validity of any research into humans. In line with the above principles, informed consent was granted voluntarily as most informants were known to the researcher and the researcher known to most of them.
As mentioned before, to guarantee the anonymity and privacy of my informants, and to protect their true identity, I adopted a simple coding procedure (see Appendix D). I coded government informants $Gmin$ or $Grep$ where $G$ stands for Government, with $min$ and $rep$ standing for minister and representative respectively, with the last numeric number simply distinguishing each informant in no order of importance e.g. $Gmin2$ or $Grep5$. Thus in this coding procedure, wherever numeric numbers appear, they follow the same principle. University administrators or leaders are coded $Uadm$ where $U$ stands for University and $adm$ for administrator(s). Academic staff members are coded $Uaca$ where $U$ stands for University and $aca$ for academic. Non-academic staff members are coded $Unas$ where $U$ stands for University and $nas$ for non-academic staff. For students, those who completed the questionnaire are identified as $Ustu$ where $U$ stands for University and the $stu$ for student, while those who participated in the focus group discussions are coded $Ustufgd$ where $U$ stands for University and $stufgd$ for student focus group discussions. Interviews with Student Representative Council President and Secretary General are coded $SRCP$ and $SRCS$ respectively. Informants from the community fall into two major groups namely those drawn from the local Roma community and those drawn from the wider community outside Roma including the bigger regional and global community. Roma community informants are coded as $RoCom$ where $Ro$ stands for Roma and $Com$ for Community. Wider community informants are coded $WiCom$ where $Wi$ stands for Wider and $Com$ for Community. Where information was drawn from conversations (verbal, email or sms) I had with some actors in the Triad, the code ‘personal communication’ was used in order to guarantee the privacy of such conversations. The necessary permission from NUL authorities to conduct the study within their premises was obtained (see Appendix A). The study was also approved by the Committee for Title Registration as well as the Faculty Board and Senate of the University of the Free State (UFS). At that stage the approval included the ethical approval and no special ethical number was issued.

**1.8 THEESIS STRUCTURE AND SCOPE**

The study is divided into six chapters inclusive of this introduction and background, which forms Chapter 1. The first chapter, while giving a bird’s-eye view of the entire thesis, also deals with fundamental aspects of research such as rationale, problem statement, research questions and issues of research design and methodology among others. Chapter 2 offers theoretical and
conceptual tools for the study of relations in the Triad. Postcolonial theory is used as the main lens with decoloniality as the variant. Representation, hybridity, agency and resistance are the postcolonial fulcrum around which this study is developed while the IPCF is the proposed interpretive definitional framework. Chapter 3 situates the study in a historical context in order to provide a better understanding of the complexity of relations of interaction among the triadic actors. It sets the basis for understanding discourses of representation involving ‘othering’, hybridity, agency and resistance by mapping out, in some chronology, key phases in the evolution and development of the University from the founding of PXIIUC in 1945 to the organisational restructuring of 2011-2014.

In Chapter 4, I use the tool of representation (discourse) to analyse relations of power and to empirically validate the complex triadic engagements. It shows that the construction of ‘otherness’ is more widespread in institutions of higher learning than is otherwise thought. It examines representation which involves ‘othering’ based on essentialist social constructions and notions of identity framed around the binary modalities of ‘Self’/‘Other’, notions of religion and place, and stereotypical representations and images of the ‘Other’ using such negative descriptions as *laisser-faire* (impunity), ‘in-breeding’ and ‘fixity’. Chapter 5 uses the tools of agency and resistance, supplemented by hybridity to study relations of power and shows that due to the rhizomic nature of power, triadic actors have multiple opportunities for both governance and resistance. The specific question the chapter seeks to answer is: what kinds of contestations, ideological or otherwise, take place in the Triad; who has what power to get what, when and how; how is power resisted or subverted; and what kind of resistance is occasioned by the encounter between the local and the global? Thus, Chapter 5 shows that the Triad is replete with various forms of resistance-cum-coping strategies namely overt confrontations, discursive and counter-discursive struggles and covert or subterranean forms of transgressions. It speaks to the well-known thesis that where there is power, there is resistance because power is productive in the sense that it is always met with resistance.

Chapter 6 concludes this study by, first, linking all the chapters and offering an assessment of the theoretical framework used (6.2), second, highlighting limitations and areas for further research (6.3), and last, making a case for a new integrated postcolonial theoretical framework that draws
on the strengths of postcolonial theory and the emergent decoloniality theory (6.4) in order to enhance our understanding of the post-colonial epoch.

To conclude this introductory chapter, and introduce the next, it is important to restate that this study is motivated by the need to understand contestations and contradictions of normative and ideological principles among triadic actors, occasioned by changing and divergent views about the role of the university in the economy, polity and society in the 21st century, hence the title Government, Community and the University in Africa Today. A postcolonial theoretical framework that deploys representation, hybridity, agency and resistance as key analytical tools seems to be the most appropriate lens that can add nuance to our understanding of triadic interactions. Chapter 2 is therefore devoted to elucidating and scrutinising this theoretical framework in order to build an interpretive framework that will inform the rest of the chapters. It also assesses the potential contribution of PC to the study of society and politics in Africa in particular and the global South in general.
CHAPTER 2: A POSTCOLONIAL THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE ANALYSIS OF GOVERNMENT, COMMUNITY AND THE UNIVERSITY IN AFRICA TODAY

2.1 GENERAL ORIENTATION

This chapter, in addressing the first and second objectives of the study (see 1.5), offers theoretical tools, drawn mainly from postcolonialism/postcolonial theory (PC), for studying complex webs of interwoven but dynamic relations and technologies of power in the Triad of the GOL, the Community (local and global) and the National University of Lesotho. Four key pillars drawn from PC, namely representation, hybridity, agency and resistance and the decoloniality variant (see Figure 2.1) are utilised in this study to analyse relations and technologies of power in the Triad in order to answer the principal question raised in Chapter 1. Yet it is important to note that hybridity as an analytical tool straddles the other PC elements, and is hence interwoven throughout the study. As a variant, decoloniality is considered a minor but important analytical tool for this study. This mix compels me to propose a new interpretive framework that tries to speak best to rhizomic relations of power in the Triad. I have termed this proposed definitional framework the Integrated Postcolonial Framework (IPCF) (see Figure 6.1). It is termed ‘integrated’ because the fusion of different theoretical standpoints is compulsive for studying the complex relations in the Triad over a 69 year period spanning from 1945 when the foundations of NUL were laid, to 2014. I argue that understanding relations of power, or ‘technologies of power’ in the Triad as complex networks of interactions and transactions in net-like spaces offers a more nuanced understanding of the interconnectedness between state and non-state actors.

The chapter begins with a general orientation of the study in section 2.1 and a synopsis of the argument in section 2.2. I then discuss current debates in postcolonial thought in section 2.3 and argue that instead of emphasising weaknesses of PC, we should emphasise its strengths and utility, hence its deployment as the main analytical framework for this study. Although the key pillars chosen for this study overlap and are inseparable in real life, it is analytically useful to distinguish them. I interweave these tools with relevant variants of PC such as decoloniality in order to strengthen and make a case for postcolonial analyses. Thus in section 2.4 I discuss the
the notion of representation or ‘the gaze’ of ‘the ‘Other’\textsuperscript{13}, then hybridity in section 2.5 and agency and resistance in section 2.6. I analyse the limitations of PC in section 2.7 and the strengths in section 2.8 vis-à-vis the study of contemporary African politics and society, and conclude that PC has much to contribute to the study of Africa.

Using an eclectic mix of the four key pillars and its variants, I propose, in section 2.9 the evolution of a new interpretive framework called the Integrated Postcolonial Framework for the study of relations and technologies of power in the Triad (see Figure 4.1, Figure 5.3 and Figure 6.1). This proposed framework is then deployed to analyse the extent to which power, particularly power in its dispersed, pervasive and rhizomic nature, is crucial to understanding government-community-university interactions in Africa today. I conclude this chapter in section 2.10 by calling for a constructive reading of PC. By proposing to deploy the IPCF, I argue that power is dispersed in the Triad of GCUA – that is, it is diffused rather than concentrated; embodied and enacted rather than possessed. I also argue that power is discursive rather than coercive; multidimensional rather than unidirectional; constitutive of agents rather than being driven by them; omnipresent; and more importantly, polyvalent\textsuperscript{14}, hence the notion of technologies of power and governmentality. Power is situationally contingent and stems from innumerable sources and points. Foucault (1980d:98) posits that power must be analysed as something which circulates, being neither specifically localised nor in the hands of a specific agent. In my case study therefore, the dispersed nature of power and its numerous technologies within the Triad afford multiple opportunities for representation and ‘othering’, including self-representation, hybridity, agency and resistance.

2.2 SYNOPSIS OF THE ARGUMENT

In this chapter I deploy a postcolonial perspective to rethink constructively the interconnectedness between GCUA, rather than their separateness, and examine how the

\textsuperscript{13} The ‘Other’ is not any particular person but the very condition of one’s existence without which the ‘Self’ or ‘I’ becomes impossible.

\textsuperscript{14} In medical discourse, the term ‘polyvalent’ is used to mean ability to counteract several related poisons. In postcolonial discourse, it means that power has many different functions, forms or facets (Foucault, 1975:205).
dialectics and technologies of power, knowledge and discourse, through the tools of representation, hybridity, agency and resistance (see Figure 2.1), interact to bring about social change within organisations and in wider social and political spaces. By so doing, the study goes beyond previous tendencies of mere compartmentalisation, of the fixed and static, the separate and self-contained (Southall and Kaufert, 1974; Wandira, 1981; Sawyer, 1994; Peil, 1996). The three spheres of GCUA today are held together, in one frame, exploring the entanglements of power, knowledge and discourse across space and time. PC emphasises interconnectedness, fluidity and constitutive relationships, and this is the approach adopted in this study through the four key pillars of representation, hybridity, agency and resistance. There are several reasons for using these tools in this study. First, the four analytical tools are applicable to many situations of relations of power. Relations of power are particularly valuable within PC frameworks. Second, these three seem most appropriate to study relations of power not only in the Triad, but also in other situations of interactions. Third, these tools allow for discussions that require broad generalisations on one hand, and specificities and particularities on the other hand. Finally, they promise to be relevant analytical tools for contemporary Africa and the global South.

Foucauldian notions of power inform this study. In Foucauldian formulation, power is found in all social interactions, rather than being located in a single individual or body, as shown in Chapters 3, 4 and 5 in this study. Power and politics are present in all human relations and permeate throughout society. Foucault further posits that,

> [power] must not be sought in the primary existence of a central point…it is the moving substrate of force relations which, by virtue of their inequality, constantly engender states of power… [Power] is produced from one moment to the next, at every point… Power is everywhere; not because it embraces everything, but because it comes from everywhere (my emphasis). Power is not an institution, and not a structure, [nor a possession], it is the name that one attributes to a complex strategical situation in a particular society.

(Foucault, 1976:93)

This argument by Foucault, that power is ubiquitous can be extended to mean that politics is ubiquitous because the process of mobilising power is the process of politics. Politics, and therefore power, can be generated from a number of situations. It can be due to structural and ideological differences, or the complexity and degree of uncertainty in an organisation, or
external pressure coming from stakeholders or other state and non-state actors, or even the history of past political practices within the organisation, or from a combination of one or more of these. Consequently, power and institutional politics are crucial to what goes on in an organisation. The present study seeks to demonstrate how both power and politics are productive in every conceivable interaction of GCUA today. As Foucault (1975:28) puts it, it is the political ‘anatomy’ or the ‘body politic’, a series of elements, techniques, routes and weapons by which power relations operate that this study is seized with. I therefore strive to bring to the fore the complex power relations and the complex politics of power in the interactions of GCUA today. The emphasis is on how power relations are organised, the forms they take, and the techniques they depend on, rather than on the groups and individuals who dominate or are dominated (Garland, 1986:853).

In PC discourse, an understanding of the ‘West’ (the ‘Self’) can only emerge from a recognition of its relationship to the ‘Other’, or from configuring a relationship between reality and its representation, or between thought and action (Abrahamsen, 2003:196; McLeod, 2007:9), so do Government, Community, and the University. The ‘Other’, in the Hegelian sense, is that which contradicts the ‘Self’ or that which ‘Self’ is not – no ‘Self’, no ‘Other. In the interactions between GCUA today, I explore not only the divergences that exist between reality and representation of the ‘Other’, or the contradictions, the hybridity, resistance and counter-resistance that we find therein, but also the possible circumstances that generate these conditions.

Therefore the study as a whole offers a re-configuration of government-community-university intersections, and in particular the relationships of power and the ways in which each institutional sphere attempts to define, dominate, appropriate and control the ‘Other’, and how the ‘Other’ ‘fights back’. The binary centre/margin, or active/passive view of colonial discourse, the notion of a one-way relationship of domination – power over (the power of the strong over the weak), power as limitation and imposition, is pushed aside. Abrahamsen (2003:199) posits that power, especially in the modern world, is no longer centred exclusively in the state, or with capital, but works through micro-strategies and practices at both the local, domestic and the international level. Ashcroft, Griffiths and Tiffin (2007:191) put it more pointedly, that “power does not … operate in a simple vertical way from the institutions in which it appears to be
constituted: it operates dynamically, laterally and intermittently”. These micro and macro levels of power are discernable in the interactions of GCUA today as power is exercised through a net-like organisation, affecting the other in both regular and irregular fashions.

In this study, I propose the existence of power to, power with, and power within rather than power over in the relations between GCUA today. I argue that these forms of power, which can be described as ‘visible’, ‘hidden’ or ‘invisible’ are used to resist and transform power over so that the community or society, and the university itself, for example, becomes part of the project of governmentality (Foucault, 1979, 1982). Power relations are not only restricted to the government or state, but also to non-state actors such as the community and the university. The project of governmentality involves relations of power which are reciprocal by making the modern sovereign state and the modern autonomous individual or community co-determine each other’s emergence. Foucault also refers to governmentality as the ‘conduct of conduct’ (Foucault, 1982), thus transforming power over into pervasive and dispersed power. Governmentality therefore, or participatory governance as it is called today, places emphasis on regulatory mechanisms, systems, processes and methods of thinking about or perceiving a domain. In the modern world, power is no longer centred in one place or system, and those upon whom it is directed are not passive to its effects (see Chapters 3, 4 and 5). It is this notion of power as intrinsically flowing downwards as part of domination, authority and control that I reject in the Triad of GCUA today. I am less concerned with the why of power, but more with the how of power, what Foucault (1980g:185, 1980h: 238, 252-253) calls ‘technologies of power’ that began to take root in society from the 17th century. This is power that was, and that is to this day multiple, differentiated and visible in reality. Jeremy Bentham (1962) used the idea of ‘the gaze’ to examine these techniques or technologies of power employed within the Panopticon or ‘the inspection house’ to monitor prisoners.

15 ‘Power to’ is about the individual’s capacity and agency to shape his/her life and world and to realise the potential of his/her rights, citizenship or voice. When based on mutual support, it creates space and possibilities of joint action with ‘power with’. ‘Power with’ has to do with group alliances, joint action or solidarity with others (what Spivak styles ‘strategic essentialism’). ‘Power within’ involves a person’s sense of self-worth and self-knowledge and awareness. It is often linked to culture, religion or other aspects of identity. It involves the ability to recognise individual differences and diversities while respecting others (Gaventa, 2006; Lukes, 2005).
Therefore, while the study draws on relevant aspects of decoloniality, a Foucauldian articulation of power, knowledge and discourse, using the tools of representation, hybridity, agency and resistance, remains the mainstay of this study. This is because I find decoloniality complementing rather than contradicting PC. It is a more recent theory originating in the global South. Proponents of decoloniality under the auspices of the Latin American Modernity/Coloniality Group (LAM/CG) or Latin American Subaltern Studies Group (LASSG) – of which Mignolo (2007, 2009, 2011a), Dussel (1995, 2000), Quijano (2000, 2007), and Escobar (2007) are leading proponents, see it as the only way through which the world can be liberated from Eurocentricism and contemporary legacies of coloniality. They propose that it should be possible to talk about other knowledges, that is the possibility of thinking “otherwise” (Escobar, 2007; Mignolo, 2011b:x), in opposition to Western modes of thinking and claims to objectivist-universalist knowledges. Decoloniality is very much in the service of resistance. The demand by the leading proponents of decoloniality for ‘epistemic disobedience’ strengthens rather than weakens postcolonialism. From a decoloniality perspective, power, knowledge and being (PKB) together with discourse need to be decolonised from their universalising pretensions.

While decoloniality’s notion of border thinking (Mignolo, 2000, 2009, 2011b; Lugones, 2010; Sajed, 2013) seems to offer an alternative radical epistemology, I tend to see a strong convergence between decoloniality and PC. For this reason, I treat them as somewhat synonymous. I regard decoloniality as something subsumed within the major narratives of PC and as speaking deep from within the horizons of PC. Moreover, both PC and decoloniality employ the same analytical categories – power, knowledge, being and discourse (PKBD) in their stance against ‘universal’ knowledges and in their counterhegemonic project. Therefore epistemically and politically, decoloniality and PC are moving in the same direction sharing the same aspirations. It would seem that the real reason why decoloniality may be seen as a contender to PC is its radical call for de-linking\textsuperscript{16}, epistemically and affectively, from the

\footnote{Proponents of decoloniality are calling or arguing for ‘another space’ for the production of knowledge, an ‘Other’ way of thinking. They propose that it should be possible to talk about other knowledges, that is the possibility of thinking “otherwise” (Escobar, 2007; Mignolo, 2011b: x), in opposition to Western modes of thinking and claims to objectivist-universalist knowledges. Their stated aim is to decolonise power and knowledge.}
imperial or colonial organisation of society. Decolonisation from coloniality of knowledge (from Western forms of thinking), is the main epistemological horizon of the DCO (Tlostanova and Mignolo, 2009:132). It is indeed this emphasis on knowledge production in relation to location, subject positions and power that a number of scholars, especially adherents of PC, seem to find very problematic and limiting.

Context and history make the theoretical lens of PC appropriate as relations between African governments and their universities on one hand, and the community and the university on the other hand, have shifted. Relations moved from one of initial and open cooperation in the early years of independence to one of open hostility in the last two decades, occasioned by clashes and differences in the shifting perceptions of the mission, purpose and relevance of the university in Africa today. As a result, universities in Africa today have become easy targets for cuts in government expenditure under austerity measures as African governments are increasingly confronted with the need to alleviate poverty and disease, among other challenges. Consequently, universities in Africa are being forced to embrace neo-liberal market reforms in which they are being asked to do more with fewer resources (Neave and van Vught, 1994:1-2; Mushonga and Maliehe, 2012:74). This has engendered complex power and ideological struggles – struggles and contestations which I analyse using the tools of representation, hybridity, agency and resistance as propounded in postcolonial discourse, together with decoloniality as the variant (see Figure 2.1). Figure 2.1 actually shows the first stage in the evolution of the IPCF that I propose in this study. It shows that the common and universalising denominators of power, knowledge and discourse (PKD) and power, knowledge and being (PKB) need to be subverted and decolonised at the same time.

17 In HE studies in Africa today, and from the point of view of both Government and Community, relevance has come to mean programmes that reduce poverty, create jobs, and improve the quality of life of people, as opposed to elite or ivory tower education. In 2003 the GOL identified Information and Communication Technologies and Computer Sciences; Economics and Business Sciences; Education particularly the teaching of Mathematics and Science; Agriculture and Environmental Sciences; Health Sciences; Engineering; Legal Studies; and Sciences as critical and therefore relevant to achieving these goals. Humanities/Arts and Social Sciences were not considered relevant. Consequently, governments in Africa are moving away from financing HE and encouraging entrepreneurial activities, thus transforming public universities into self-sufficient corporate enterprises. This is the sense in which relevance is used today in Africa.
It shows that representation, hybridity, agency and resistance together with decoloniality as the variant, are the key pillars for this study. The inclusion of decoloniality in Figure 2.1 serves to emphasise the fact that, though a variant, it does not contradict PC but rather complements it. The ‘being’ in decoloniality refers to the imperial enforcement and management of subjectivity through the deliberate distortion of the colonised people’s history, minds, bodies, souls, language and culture. According to Maldonado-Torres (2007:257), invisibility and dehumanisation are the primary expressions of coloniality of being. Figure 2.1 also shows that power, knowledge and discourse are multiple, differential and found everywhere. Because they are multiple and differential, they are productive of representation, hybridity, agency, resistance and decoloniality
as Chapters 4 and 5 will show. The overlap between agency and resistance shown in Figure 2.1 serves to emphasise the fact that these two are intimately connected or that they belong together. Furthermore, the differences in shapes between representation, hybridity, agency and resistance (circle) on one hand, and decoloniality (six-point star) on the other hand, serves to emphasise that the former belong together as PC constructs while the latter is a separate but complementary theory to PC. In short, it is power, knowledge and discourse that actualise these key four pillars and their decoloniality variant. Figure 2.1 further shows that hybridity is the fulcrum of everything. These four key pillars and their variant were used to develop the IPCF that I propose as a new interpretive framework for studying complex rhizomic relations of power (Figure 6.1). Figure 6.1 is derived from Figure 2.1, Figure 4.1 and Figure 5.3 and the four must be read together. It is important to note that all Figures, Diagrams, Inserts and Tables in this study are not drawn to scale.

2.3 CURRENT DEBATES IN POSTCOLONIAL THEORY

The volume of scholarship devoted to postcolonialism is so huge that it is not easy to keep pace with the debates (Harootunian, 1999:127). I therefore draw only on the debates that are directly relevant to my argument in this thesis. I do so in two distinct sections. In section 2.3.1, I offer a prologue to current debates through a discussion of Orientalism and the power-knowledge-discourse nexus (2.3.1.1) and an outline of the historical origins of PC (2.3.1.2). In section 2.3.2, I define PC (2.3.2.1), highlight its major assumptions (2.3.2.2) and problematise the ‘post’- in postcolonial theory (2.3.2.3).
2.3.1 Prologue to Current Debates

Edward Said’s *Orientalism* (1978), Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak’s *Can the Subaltern Speak* (1988), and Homi Bhabha’s *The Location of Culture* (1994), have for a long time been regarded as the major texts devoted to postcolonialism. Alongside Jacques Derrida (1978), Michel Foucault (1975, 1976, 1980a-i), Frantz Fanon (1967), Albert Memmi (1991) and Mahatma Gandhi (1958) among others, these scholars are seen as the pantheons of postcolonialism. Because Said’s *Orientalism* (1978) is seen as the text that inaugurates PC and that typifies the operations of power, knowledge and discourse, I shall discuss *Orientalism* and the notions of power, knowledge and discourse first before I engage with issues of definition, core assumptions and features of PC. In fact, any study that employs the concepts of power, knowledge and discourse such as this one cannot afford to ignore Said’s *Orientalism* because this is the text that is regarded as the *locus classicus* of postcolonialism. A brief historical note to PC follows after a detailed discussion of *Orientalism* vis-à-vis PC.

2.3.1.1 Orientalism and the Power-Knowledge-Discourse Framings

In PC, *Orientalism* is seen as a Western set of ontological assumptions, epistemological practices and cultural constructions which serve to create the ‘Other’, its object of study – an object which could be known by a European subject as it could not know itself. According to Said (1995:88-89), *Orientalism* is a discourse (language) in which the Western academy disseminated misleading ideas about the East for purposes of dominating, restructuring and controlling the Orient. It refers to a discourse without which “one cannot possibly understand the enormously systematic discipline by which European culture was able to manage – and even produce – the Orient politically, sociologically, militarily, ideologically, scientifically, and imaginatively.” This shows that there are important connections between language use and unequal relations of power (Fairclough, 1999). Politically, and as an instrument of power,

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18 In this study, the terms ‘practices’ and ‘discourse’ are used interchangeably and can be taken as a complex that includes signs and materialities. Discursive and non-discursive practices “organize social existence and social reproduction within colonial relationships” (Moore-Gilbert, 1997:37). They are ‘micro’ or capillary interventions. See also Abrahamsen (2003) and Chapter 4 of this study.
Orientalism promoted a binary opposition between the familiar (the West/Us/the Self) and the strange (the Orient/Them/the Other). The ‘Us’ and ‘Them’ discourse is an important aspect of the power/knowledge nexus. Power and knowledge are inseparable, and power cannot be exercised without knowledge. It is impossible for knowledge not to engender power (Foucault, 1980a-i:52; Abrahamsen, 2003:199).

Thus from a Foucauldian and postcolonial perspective, power cannot be separated from knowledge and vice versa. The two are intertwined hence sometimes the composite expression power/knowledge. According to Venn (2006:195), the term power/knowledge refers to the effects of power in the field of knowledge without the possibility of separating the one from the other. According to Foucault, “power relations give rise to a possible corpus of knowledge, and knowledge extends and reinforces the effects of this power” (Foucault, 1975:27-29). There is no body of knowledge that can be formed without a system of communications, records and accumulation, among others, while at the same time there is no power that can be exercised without the extraction, appropriation, distribution or retention of knowledge (Foucault cited in Sheridan, 1980:129). The Orient was invented through a combination of power and knowledge, via a discourse19. Consequently there is no such thing as ‘truth’ existing outside of power and this is what we see in Orientalism. Knowledge is not innocent but deeply connected with the operations of power. This is why Zeleza (2007:1) argues that the construction and conceptualisation of knowledge has social and temporal contexts and referents through very specific paradigms developed by specific groups of people in specific places and times. He argues that knowledge production is, in this fundamental sense, a social practice marked by period and place, what he calls “historical geography”.

The Occident (West)’s claim to ‘knowledge’ of the Orient gave them the power to name peoples, places and cultures, and to describe them and control them. Orientalism draws our attention to the intimacy of power and knowledge and by so doing challenges the hegemonic narratives of the West, a process which has been referred to as ‘writing back’ in an attempt to destabilise the discourses that construct the ‘Other’. Thus postcolonialism addresses the responses to the

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19 Woods (2006) says while some scholars define discourse as “language use above the level of the sentence”, her own definition, which I adopt in this study, is “language plus context”. It is ways of thinking and speaking about aspects of reality.
influential master discourses of imperial Europe. Prasad (2003: 9-10) posits that as an attempt to explore the complicity of power and knowledge, Orientalism produced an understanding of colonialism and imperialism at the level of representation. That is why Said, in his analysis of textual representations of the Orient in *Orientalism*, emphasises the fact that representations can never be exact or real (see 2.4 and Chapter 4). Said posits that

\[\ldots\text{in any instance of at least written language, there is no such thing as a delivered presence, but a re-}
\[\ldots\text{presentation, or a representation. The value, efficacy, strength, apparent veracity of a written statement about}
\[\ldots\text{the Orient therefore relies very little, and cannot instrumentally depend, on the Orient as such. On the}
\[\ldots\text{contrary, the written statement is a presence to the reader by virtue of its having excluded, displaced, made}
\[\ldots\text{supererogatory any such real thing as “the Orient”}.]
\]

(Said, 1979:21)

This assertion by Said brings out the centrality of language. Moreover, nobody who has an interest in relationships of power in modern society can afford to ignore language. The exercise of power in modern society is increasingly achieved through the ideological workings of language (Fairclough, 1999:2). Language, posits Epstein (2013), is necessary in deepening our understanding of the social world. For poststructuralists, language presents “open, generative structures that are always charged with relations of domination, and temporarily fixed within historically contingent sets of meanings (discourses)”. Many of the problems in our globalised world have to do with power and inequality. Therefore discourse analysis or language analysis recognises that inquiry into meaning-making implies an exploration into power (Rogers, 2011:1). Language therefore must not only be seen as mirroring the world, but more importantly as a system of differential elements or signs caught up in political, social, racial, economic, religious and cultural formations (Epstein, 2013; Rogers, 2011; Woods, 2006, viii-ix). It provides, all at once, the tools for understanding discourse.

Discourse also performs yet another function. According to Butler (1999), discourse produces and is productive of reality – it is performative, i.e. construction makes it real. Said’s *Orientalism* shows us how discourse is a means by which power produces ‘truth’ because the ‘will to truth’ is

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20 J. Derrida; J. F. Lyotard; G. Deleuze; and R. Barthes, among other leading poststructuralists, share the postmodernists’ unease with totality. They seek to avoid the totalitarian and utopian pretensions of reason by subjecting them to a permanent critique.
linked to the ‘will to power’ in the same way that power and knowledge are linked (Ashcroft, Griffiths and Tiffin, 2001:73). Foucault (1990:9) similarly argues that there is always something ludicrous about a discourse especially when it tries, from outside, to dictate to others and to tell them where their truth is and how to find it. But power justifies claims to knowledge. The Orient was a European representation or invention. This was so because the Orient was not allowed to represent itself, but was always represented as the Occident’s ‘Other’. This representation was made possible through discourse because, argues Foucault (1976:100), “it is in a discourse that power and knowledge are joined together”. Those who have power have control of what is known and the way it should be known. This link between knowledge and power is particularly important for the Triad because, as Said’s Orientalism demonstrates, it was a discourse of knowing the Orient that made it possible to maintain power over it. Thus discourses help to determine what is true or false in a particular field, and sometimes people become ‘trapped’ in such discourses without even knowing. Discourse becomes an instrument of power because “those who make statements in any venue, publicly or privately, openly or secretly, participate in the creation of a discourse and may wield power accordingly” (Eldredge, 2007:9). As already stated, without language, discourse is impossible because it is language that provides the terms by which reality may be constituted, the names by which the world may be known. Yet such a language (discourse) can have either an ‘utterance’ (general) meaning, or a ‘token’ situated meaning (Gee, 2001).

Therefore the Triad, as chapter 4 will show, is replete with discourses of ‘othering’. In the Triad, when it comes to the business of ‘knowing’, one notices that both the government and community in Lesotho have generated some kind of ‘knowledge’ about the University, ‘knowledge’ which both think should be used not only to bring about positive and progressive change to the institution, but even to warrant domination of the institution. An analysis of government and community discourses on, and about NUL, will show paternalistic constructions of the ‘Other’ (see Chapter 4) – the ‘Other’ who should be grateful for government funding; and the ‘Other’ who desperately needs government leadership.

The claim to ‘knowledge’ by the GOL and the Community about NUL has produced numerous stereotypes about the institution (see the outer circle in Figure 4.1) just as Orientalism became a
discourse which systematically produced stereotypes about Orientals and the Orient. Yet it has to be stated that those who are being ‘othered’, the non-state actors, are not a homogenous or monolithic entity. The University has also developed its own version of ‘knowledge’ or discourse about the Government and the Community, ‘knowledge’ it has deployed to counter Government and Community discourses. There are therefore several discourses and counter-discourses in the Triad of GCUA today. The business of ‘knowing’ is one of the key assumptions of PC as section 2.3.2.2 shows.

Under colonialism, the consequence of this business of knowing and the drawing of frontiers between ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’ was the suppression of a vast wealth of indigenous cultures beneath the weight of imperial control. According to Eldredge (2007:6), Foucault seeks to unmask the power structures that dictate what is seen as reality by pointing to alternative sites of knowledge that contest the dominant regime and perspective of what he calls ‘subjugated knowledges’.21 In decoloniality perspectives, this is known as coloniality of being already explained before.

But discourses not only serve merely the goal of domination, they can also serve the goal of liberation. While they are employed by the oppressor to justify their suppression of others, they are also employed by the dominated as a means of resistance to domination. Therefore discourse is essential to resistance. As Foucault posits,

Discourse can be both an instrument and an effect of power, but also a hindrance, a stumbling-block, a point of resistance and a starting point for an opposing strategy. Discourse transmits and produces power; it reinforces it, but also undermines and exposes it, renders it fragile and makes it possible to thwart it. In like manner, silence and secrecy are a shelter for power.

(Foucault, 1976:102)

The case study of relations of power in GCUA today shows that there are numerous discourses that both enhance or subvert strategies and operations of power – for example, both the GOL and

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21 By ‘subjugated knowledges’ Foucault means two things: first, those blocs of historical knowledge which were present but disguised within the body of functionalist and systematising theory; second, to a whole set of knowledges that have been disqualified as inadequate to their task (Foucault, 1980b:81-82).
the Community in general have become ‘trapped’ in the discourse that the NUL is change-resistant and ungovernable. Such discourses have been used by Government and the Community to demand change at the institution (see Chapters 4 and 5). However, as the study will show, the same discourses have worked to undermine the ‘reform agenda’ as those targeted have forged alliances to fight back, overtly and covertly, discursively and non-discursively, against attempts by Government, NUL management and Community to impose their will on the institution (see Chapter 5). For the case study, the consequences of this are struggles and contestations couched in complex discourses over the meaning and purpose of the University and over the role of Government and Community in the University. Foucault (1980e) argues that there can be no possible exercise of power without a certain economy of discourses of truth. In every society, argues Foucault (1980d:93), people are subjected to the production of truth through power and that power cannot be exercised except through the production of truth. Representation, through a language that is above the level of sentences, also becomes a tool that can be used to understand struggles over the meaning and purpose of the university in Africa today.

In Orientalism, Said (1979) shows that the idea of power, knowledge and discourse is an intricate and complex affair. As I shall show in section 2.4, representation is an important aspect of discourse. The power of representation was the real key to European hegemony. These binary oppositions not only reinforced domination, but also brought out issues of dissimilarity and power. For the study of Africa, Orientalism has much to offer. Africa, just like the Orient, is an invention of the West, of the European imagination. Its representation was central to the imperial construction of the colonial ‘Other’ as primitive and degenerate, among other inferiorising descriptions of the colonial ‘Other’22. Mudimbe (1988:12) argues that the preoccupation of Western discourses with discursive and material control of ‘Otherness’ led to the invention of Africa as the opposite of Europe within a framework that identified “alterity as a negative category of the Same”. African cultures and societies were seen as backward, traditional, barbaric and in perpetual opposition to European modernity. Ashcroft (2002:511) argues that whereas Orientalism was the discourse of knowing that controlled the ‘Orient’, it was the

22 Other binary oppositions include historical/ahistorical, nation/tribe, scientific/superstitious, subject/object, masculine/feminine, white/black, male/female, metropolis/country, modern/traditional, civilised/primitive, human/bestial, good/evil, Christian/pagan, light/darkness, active/passive, developed/backward, et cetera.
discourse of the unknown that generated the idea of Africa – a particular kind of Africa because it was the unknown into which the West needed to explore. The idea of a particular kind of Africa comes from Europe and for centuries Africa has represented the ‘Other’ of Europe.\(^{23}\)

The concept of ‘fixity’ is an important feature of colonial discourse as a paradoxical mode of representation which connotes “rigidity and an unchanging order as well as disorder, degeneracy, and daemonic repetition” (Bhabha, 1994:66). For Granger (1987:111), the traditional doctrine of fixity rules out any transmutation of the species because the species or natural kinds are not expected to suffer a fundamental modification in their essential features. The Triad seems to be replete with powerful and negative discourses of ‘othering’ and that there was need to question the mode of representation of this ‘otherness’ (Bhabha, 1994). ‘Who is allowed to speak about Africa’, asks Krenčeyová (2014), suggesting that African sources must be privileged “in order to genuinely work against oppressive knowledge structures” (Krenčeyová, 2014:8). Keet (2014) advocates for a decolonial approach to confront epistemic injustice within the disciplines, while Dabashi (2009:xvi) calls for a new understanding in a post-Orientalist world threatened by terrorism and Islamic fundamentalism. Dabashi calls this new understanding epistemic endosmosis (Dabashi, 2009:xvi).

**2.3.1.2 Postcolonial Theory and its Historical Origins**

While the term ‘postcolonial’ arrived on the scene in 1985, this does not mean that postcolonial tendencies were absent before 1985 (Rukundwa and van Aarde, 2007:1175-6). In fact, all anti-slavery and anti-colonialist movements in history are part of this body of ideas called PC. It existed for a long time before that particular name was coined by Simon During in 1985. For the ‘Third World’, Mbembe (2008) points to three cardinal moments in the development of PC. The first was the anti-colonial struggles of the 1950s and 1960s. Here, the theoretical and political foundations of postcolonialism are traceable to the 1966 Havana Conference which brought together the anti-colonial and postcolonial writings of people like Fanon, Amilcar Cabral and Ernesto Che Guevara as well as the Organization of Solidarity with the People of Asia, Africa

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\(^{23}\) Walter Mignolo (2009; 2011a) also offers a critique of the colonial genesis, foundation and development of the idea of Latin America.
and Latin America (OSPAAAL) (Rukundwa and van Aarde (2007:1181). The outcome of this Conference was a journal titled *Tricontinental*. The ideas captured here eventually formed the basis of PC.

The second moment was what was referred to as the period of ‘high theory’ of the 1980s which inaugurated PC as a critical discourse. This was dominated by the works of Said (1978), Ashcroft, Griffiths and Tiffin (1989) and Antonio Gramsci (1992). These scholars, among others, examined the subaltern or those who were excluded from power on the basis of race, gender, class, ethnicity or colonial status. The study of the subalterns was later taken up by Spivak (1988; 1995), Chatterjee (1993), Bhabha (1994), among others. In *The Empire Writes Back* (1989), Ashcroft, Griffiths and Tiffin posit that postcolonialism involves the challenge to postcolonial ways of ‘knowing’ by ‘writing back’ in opposition to such views (McLeod, 2000:32), contrary to the impression the term may give that colonial relationships no longer exist. In fact postcolonialism is concerned with practices related to culture and representation, in the past and the present (see 2.4). PC thus emerged as a critical response and as a political resistance to the impact of European and American colonialism on global culture. The third and last moment is the central phenomenon of our epoch, globalisation.

### 2.3.2 Defining and Problematising Postcolonial Theory

I this section I set out to define PC, highlight its major assumptions and problematise the ‘post’- in postcolonial theory. These definitions and assumptions, while intimately interwoven, are discussed separately for purposes of clarity. At the same time the discussion of the ‘post’- in PC ties both definitions and assumptions together. I show that PC’s inter- and transdisciplinarity and critical theoretical stance makes it an appealing framework for understanding society both in the past and in present.

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24 Globalisation can be defined as the process of the world becoming a single place through economic, political, cultural and social integration. To designate the engagement of the global with the local, especially local cultures, postcolonial theorists have coined the term ‘glocalisation’.
2.3.2.1 Definitions of Postcolonial Theory

Two interrelated and extended definitions of PC are offered here. First, the term postcolonialism involves a discussion about experiences and overlapping identities of various kinds, better known as hybridity. These experiences are related to power, subordination, race, gender, class, difference, culture, migration, slavery, suppression, representation, place, resistance, among others, including the attempts to break free from a colonising force. Put together, these issues form the complex fabric of the field (Ashcroft, Griffiths and Tiffin, 1995). Ranger (1996:271-272) argues that this “coming of Third World identities” (hybridity) becomes an important preoccupation of studies in PC. Hybridity best informs the analysis of the links between the local and the global. The local and the global combine or interact to produce a new identity, the hybrid. As the two interact, the local is universalised (globalised) and the universal is localised, what some postcolonial theorists call ‘glocalisation’ to foreground local agency against a seemingly global culture because the global cannot exclude the local (Coombes and Brah, 2000:12; Ashcroft et al, 2007:104-105). By dwelling on the links between the local and the global, PC also involves a discussion that transcends the colonial divide, examining how issues of power, domination and resistance linger on long after the coloniser has left the scene. As Bhabha posits, the perspective that postcoloniality is a salutary reminder of the persistent neo-colonial relations within the new world order enables the “…authentication of histories of exploitation and the evolution of strategies of resistance” (Bhabha, 1994:6).

At the second level, PC can be defined as a critical theoretical stance against universalising discourses and against hegemonic and exploitative practices irrespective of time and space (Lopez, 2001; Magubane, 2006). It is an epistemic approach that seeks not only to critique imperial science, but also to destabilise it. As an inter- and transdisciplinary approach, it cuts across many disciplines and employs concepts and epistemological perspectives deriving from a range of crisscrossing scholarly fields. In the wake of this eclecticism, Prasad (2003:7) argues that “postcolonial theory is a set of productively syncretic theoretical and political positions that creatively employ concepts and epistemological perspectives deriving from a range of scholarly
fields”. PC has roots in three traditions namely critical tradition, poststructuralism and postmodernism. It thus draws on many elements from these traditions and related theories such as Marxism, neo-Marxism, psychoanalysis, feminism, deconstruction, queer theory and decoloniality. This eclecticism has led Mbembe (2008) to conclude that PC is a particular and fragmented way of thinking that derives from a number of sources and that is far from constituting a theory at all because “it is in large part being constructed as it moves forward” (Mbembe, 2008:11). Similarly, the proposed IPCF (see Figure 6.1) for the study of power relations in the Triad is a particular integrated way of thinking.

This eclecticism of PC has convinced me to see decoloniality as a variant of PC rather than a competitor. Moreover, the leading disciples of decoloniality see the DCO as a critical, theoretical stance against the coloniality of power, knowledge and being (Mignolo, 2007, 2009, 2011a; Quijano, 2000, 2007, Escobar, 2007). Consequently, decoloniality is closely associated with postcolonial projects rather than contradicting them. This is because both decoloniality and postcolonialism are concerned with the enduring effects of colonialism well after it (colonialism) has come to an end. Mignolo admits that while the two may appear to be grounded in a different genealogy of thoughts with different existential modes, he does not see any one of them “campaigning for election to win the voting competition that decides which is the best, but as complementary trajectories with similar goals of social transformation” (Mignolo, 2011a:xxvi). He posits that there is nothing wrong with two projects co-existing and taking different roads to achieve similar goals. However, one major deficiency of decoloniality which sets it apart from PC seems to be its preoccupation with the legacies of ethnocentrism and coloniality, thus failing to account for the continued oppression and domination of peoples in the global South by their own fellow indigenes. PC goes beyond this kind of preoccupation by attempting to overcome all forms of exploitation in Third World societies and beyond. It is precisely for this reason that I have aligned myself with PC.

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25 These are literary theory, linguistics, symbolism, cultural studies, religion, philosophy, politics, history, sociology, anthropology, geography, economics, law, film and media studies, and women studies, among others.
In the study of power relations in the Triad of GCUA today, the above two definitions tend to converge as there are all kinds of experiences – hybridities of all kinds occasioned by cultural, ideological and political standpoints. Similarly, epistemological questions about the purpose of the university in Africa today, as well as inter-and transdisciplinary debates about the lingering effects of power, domination, resistance and representation of the postcolonial society are varied, hybrid and overlapping.

2.3.2.2 Core Assumptions of Postcolonial Theory

PC works within a basic set of critical assumptions, principles, and generalisations which tend to inform its definitions and interpretations. Here I seek to highlight two sets of assumptions that inform its construction. These are assumptions about discourse/knowledge and assumptions about culture (Andreotti, 2011:61; McLeod, 2000:37-46). The two major assumptions are intricately intertwined and find greater expression in the realm of representation, a key feature of PC (see 2.4). On the basis of just these two sets of assumptions, the criticism that PC is an ally of the West becomes unfounded.

First, assumptions about discourse/knowledge conceptualise discourses as the modes and the means of representation in any given society (Gandhi, 1998:77). This conceptualisation of discourse recognizes the instability of signification, the location of the subject in language or discourse, and the contingency of knowledge, which implies that (1) there is no secure outside ground on the basis of which different representations can be objectively studied or compared; (2) no sign is identical with what it signifies – there is always a gap between the signifier and the signified; and (3) meaning is not self-present in the sign or in the text, but is the result of interpretation from the space of the gap or slippage between the signified and the signifier.

(Andreotti, 2011:61)

I have already discussed how Orientalism was a matter of representation on the basis of power and knowledge. In the Triad of GCU, it shall be shown how such assumptions about knowledge have produced stereotypes about each actor. Over the years, NUL has come to be ‘known’ for
particular tendencies or practices by both Government and the Community (see outer circle of Figure 4.1) and the extent to which power is able to produce ‘truth’ is the subject of Chapter 4. As Townley (1993:523) argues, within the realm of knowledge and discourse, the concern is not the truth or falsity of the statements, or whether the knowledge that is generated is objective or subjective, but rather what is involved in rendering an arena or individual or institution knowable.

Second, assumptions about culture hold that culture and representation go hand in hand, and that “no representation can exist in isolation from its cultural or ideological categories [as] all systems of representation are imbricated in other systems of representation” (Andreotti, 2011:30). PC holds culture as a dynamic process of reproduction and contestation of meaning in the act of survival, and that its complex hybridity means any claims to purity, authenticity, and origination are untenable (Bhabha, 1994:58). While Andreotti (2011) sees strategic essentialism as an important strategy of resistance, there is the danger of reproducing ethnocentrism and hegemony internally, including being used by the more dominant groups to further marginalise the less dominant. According to Ashcroft, Griffiths and Tiffin (2008:73), essentialism is the assumption that groups, categories or classes of objects have one or several defining features exclusive to all members of that category (Ashcroft, Griffiths, Tiffin, 2008:73). Strategic essentialism as a category was significantly influenced by Spivak who presented it as a concept to challenge Western feminism’s historical complicity with imperialism. Spivak later on disavowed the term, unhappy about how it had been variously used by scholars.

2.3.2.3 Problematising the ‘Post’ in Postcolonial Theory

A better understanding of the ‘post’ in PC demands a juxtaposition of arguments for and against the concept. I align myself with those who argue that the ‘post’ in PC has nothing to do with

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26 Strategic essentialism as a category was significantly influenced by Spivak who presented it as a concept to challenge Western feminism’s historical complicity with imperialism. Spivak later on disavowed the term, unhappy about how it had been variously used by scholars. It refers to a strategy of elevating sameness (certain inherent defining features, often related to race and ethnicity) of a marginalised group to foster a shared identity for purposes of achieving a political goal. In theory the concept requires using ‘essence’ critically, remaining critical of the essentialist nature of the essence itself. In practice it means that while it is used as a temporary form of resistance, within the group issues of group identity need to be debated and contested (Spivak, 1990:51; 109).
looking back at, or privileging colonialism or preserving the West’s cultural and political
hegemony, but moving beyond colonialism while at the same time capturing continuities and
complexities of any historical period. Thus first, advocates of PC posit that the ‘post’ in
postcolonial refers to a transdisciplinary, critical, theoretical stance against universalising
discourses, and therefore entails moving beyond Eurocentric historicism, beyond imperialist
polarities of Self/Other, centre/periphery and superior/inferior, as well as capturing the idea of
engaging with, moving through, and moving beyond coloniality (Magubane, 2006:7; Xie, 1997).
The prefix ‘post’ expresses a conviction that it is possible and necessary to break with tradition
and institute new ways of living and thinking (Gandhi, 1998:7). Therefore PC seeks to transcend
strict chronological and dichotomous thinking where history is clearly delineated and the social
world neatly categorised into separate boxes through the recognition of both historical change

However, critics of PC argue that as an epistemological category, the persistence of
poststructuralism and postmodernism in the intellectual history of PC makes it less critical and
radical, and hence of little use to the study of Africa and the global South. They think that PC is
at best inadequate, utopian and unnecessary, and at worst not only glossing over the impact of
colonialism, but also “ignoring both the lingering effects of colonial and neo-colonial regimes
and denying its own proximity to (and even complicity in) hegemonic discourses” (Lopez,
2001:10). It is suggested that most postcolonial analyses look back at colonialism instead of
looking forward and moving beyond coloniality. This argument is premised on the shared
understanding by critics that postcolonialism is a cultural product of the West and therefore
politically passive and conservative to the point of being collusive with Western imperial power.
Consequently, the ‘post’ in PC is rejected as implying “after the demise of colonialism” (Xie,
1997:8).

The critics therefore argue that by focusing too much on contemporary state of ex-imperial
societies in Africa and Asia, concentrating on the lingering effects and the associative
exploitative disorders of colonialism (race, class and gender) postcolonialism looks back at
colonialism rather than forward (Zeleza, 1997:507; Loomba, 1998:1-2; Lopez, 2001:8; Sylvester,
2011:193; Scott, 2002). Therefore, despite the achievement of formal political independence
across the entire developing world, the enduring effects and the associative exploitative disorders of colonialism have remained in the globalised world (Heywood, 2011:16-17). As Hegel (1977:368) seems to be arguing in his *Phenomenology of Spirit*, the ‘post’ in postcolonialism has to be visualised as that space or index of a future already glimpsed or before us, a “future infinitely remote”. It is a condition or state of having been or presently being colonised as well as the problem of how best to think and live with that condition – a set of historical and cultural contingencies (Lopez, 2001). The vicious circle from colonial to postcolonial, argue Rukundwa and van Aarde (2007:1174), does not allow the world to be postcolonial and to be entirely free from colonialism. And yet it is the hybrid character of PC and its eclectic mix of theories and positions that advocates of PC find enriching and which enable it, more than any other theory, to capture the complex world of the past and today.

The second sense of the ‘post’ in PC emanates from the argument that in a world burdened by centuries of coloniality, constructing identities and forms of knowledge uncontaminated by universalist concepts and images may not be possible. Consequently, argues Xie (1997), one must take up a third space of revision by dwelling in a ‘beyond’ that is neither the indigenous past nor the colonised present (Xie, 1997:16-17) – the hybridity of things as will be illustrated in section 2.5 of this chapter, and in Chapter 4 and 5 at the empirical level. In this sense therefore, postcolonialism is not necessarily beyond, but it implies being in-between those liminal spaces where cultural practices of both the coloniser and the colonised are blended (hybridity). Hybridity thus becomes a space of intervention “in the here and now” (Bhabha, 1994:5-7; also see Appiah, 1991:348).

A third way to understand the ‘post’ in PC is to examine it in conjunction with an array of other ‘posts’ such as ‘post-structuralism’, ‘post-modernism, ‘post-Marxism’, ‘post-feminism’, ‘post-deconstructionism’ – all sharing the idea of a movement beyond. The ubiquity of the term ‘post’ signals a widespread epochal crisis in the idea of linear, historical ‘progress’ (McClintock, 1992:85-86). In this sense, the ‘post’ in postcolonial signifies both going beyond anti-colonial nationalist theory as well as a movement beyond a specific point in history, a passage into a new period and a closure of an old period, thereby aligning itself with these other genres of ‘posts’ (Lopez, 2001:10). But the ‘post’ in PC can also be seen as a deceptive marker of time that masks
persistent forms of injustice. Consequently, posit Hudson and Melber (2014) there is need to appreciate the fact that there is a constant shifting from issues of temporality to those of spatiality. McClintock (1992) sees PC as conferring on colonialism the prestige of time and history.

In short, the ‘beyond’ or ‘post’ in postcolonialism is neither a new horizon nor a leaving behind of the past but a mixture of both. The purpose of postcolonial writing is therefore twofold: first to reckon with the colonial past by acknowledging and then analysing the cultural and historical pressures brought by colonisation as well as revising and interrogating the coloniser’s culture; and second as an analysis or articulation of postcolonial diasporic communities resulting from the scattering of indigenous peoples around the globe through the machinations and processes of colonialism and its aftermath (Lopez, 2001:7). In this study, I align with this two-fold problematisation of the term postcolonialism.

2.4 REPRESENTATION/‘THE GAZE’ OF THE ‘OTHER’ IN POSTCOLONIAL THEORY

Representation or the discourse of ‘othering’ is a key feature of PC and will be employed in the study of relations and technologies of power in the Triad of GCUA today. It is already evident that representation is not possible without claims to power and knowledge, which are joined together in a discourse. In this section I seek to bring to the fore the nature of representation in PC and to show that discussions of representation are necessarily discussions about power, knowledge and discourse.

The relationship between history and culture, and reality and representation is at the centre of debates in PC with Spivak as one of the pantheons of representational discourses. In contemporary socio-cultural theory, representation means the production of meaning through language to stand for or re-present things (Hall, 1997:15). We know and understand the world in which we live through the medium of language and representation. Foucault (1976:201) argues that it is through language that things around us “are arranged as we see them today”. To name the world is to understand it, to know it and to control it because naming reality entails exerting power over it simply because the dominant language becomes the way in which it is known
Language, argues Epstein (2013:499-519), is the starting point of everything and therefore becomes a fundamental site of struggle. Drawing on the work of Spivak, Salazar (2008) identifies two related but conflated meanings of representation which are first, ‘speaking for’ in the sense of political representation and, second, ‘speaking about’ or ‘representing’ in the sense of making a portrait (Salazar, 2008:173).

In this study, representation is used in its second meaning. The key point about the power of representation is that its meanings, usages and interpretations cannot be said to be positive, hence the prevalence of stereotyping (see Figure 4.1). Hoogland (2008:172) argues that representations do not so much stand for some underlying ‘real’ or some original or pre-existing object, but that which they supposedly refer or re-present. Consequently, a definitive meaning of representation is not possible because of the existence of a dichotomy between intention and realisation, original and duplicate. The power of representation was the real key to European hegemony. Colonialism was therefore a matter of representation and the production of culture helped to reproduce imperial ideologies and values as the ‘colonising structure’ – the domination of the physical space, the reformation of natives’ minds, and the integration of local economic histories into the Western perspective all combined to produce subalternity and marginality (Mudimbe, 1988:1-23). The realm of culture – reading, writing and thinking representation, normalised European colonialism. Western culture contributed greatly to lubricating the machine of colonisation (McLeod, 2007:5). Representation then became a way of thinking and speaking that created the idea of the inferiority of the colonial subject. Colonialism was able to exercise hegemonic control over colonial subjects through control of dominant modes of public and private representation (Ashcroft et al, 2007:73). Ultimately it was the means of representation rather than the means of production that confirmed the hegemony of the European powers in their respective empires. In the empirical study, the representation of the ‘Other’ in public and private discourses as well as the print and electronic media in respect of the University is brought to the fore (see Chapter 4).

Thus colonial rule did not only rely on the military and economic power of conquering nations to disseminate European ideas, but also on domination over forms of cultural representation through, for instance, the printing press, film, travelogues and popular magazines. Salazar
(2008:172) argues that the politics of representation revolved around “issues of power and control over one’s own self and its representations and reproduction by others”. This is what is apparent in all forms of colonial representation, which even went as far as parading the bodies of the colonised people in public to show how oddly different and abnormal the ‘Other’ was as in the case of Sarah Bartman⁷⁷ and Ota Benga⁷⁸. Representation played a significant role in their subjugation through narratives of “backwardness and primitivity” (Paidipaty, 2008:260-262).

Gilman’s (1992) essay ‘Black Bodies, White Bodies’ shows how the representation of the African in 19⁹th century European art, medicine and literature reinforced the construction of the sexualised female body. Black bodies, both male and female servants were often portrayed in paintings, plays, films and operas as a sign of deviant sexuality even to a point of copulating with apes (Gilman, 1992:173-175).

The failure of Western/liberal feminism in dealing with the subaltern position of the feminine and to tackle the discrimination and oppression of women on one hand, and the perpetuation of gender biases on the other hand in the postcolony, has led to a radical brand of feminism known as postcolonial feminism (PCF). In Can the Subaltern Speak, Spivak (1995) argues that in the relationship between coloniser and the colonised, the abolition of the Hindu rite of sati (widow sacrifice) in India by the British for example, has generally come to be understood as a case of ‘white men saving brown women from brown men’²⁹. Spivak assigns absolute power to the hegemonic discourses in constituting and disarticulating the native and the subaltern sexed subject who is doubly-oppressed and cannot speak and who cannot be heard. PCF steps in with its primary aim of putting women’s issues on the agenda and of tackling the discrimination and oppression of women, including the persistent construction of the sexualized female body and

²⁷ A woman called Sarah Bartman, from the ‘Hottentot tribe’ of Southern Africa, better known to the world as the ‘Hottentot Venus’, was publicly exhibited in London in 1810 to illustrate the black woman’s primitive anatomy which was believed to be responsible for her animal-like sexual behaviour (Prasad, 2003: 154).

²⁸ Ota Benga, derogatorily known as the African ‘pygmy’, was brought to the United States and displayed as a native exhibit in the St. Louis World Fair of 1904. Later, Benga was placed in the Monkey House in the Bronx zoo to demonstrate the closeness between primitive people and primates (Prasad, 2003:153).

²⁹ In 1954 in Algeria, the French colonial regime launched a cultural offensive against the wearing of the veil or haik in an effort to subvert the indigenous Algerian way of life and undermine the basis of national consciousness and resistance. The idea was to encourage the Algerian woman to liberate herself from the yoke of the men, and to transform herself into the progressive force for a modern Algeria.
the perpetuation of gender biases in the postcolony (Spivak, 1995; 1999; Ashcroft et al, 2007; Petersen and Rutherford, 1986; Gilman 1992). By foregrounding the marginalisation of the colonial and postcolonial sexed subject, PCF parallels developments in PC studies which privilege the study of the marginalised both in the past and present, across space and time. PCF questions Western/Transnational feminism and its claim to universality by showing how it has been guilty of ‘othering’ by constructing the ‘Third World Woman’ as a singular monolithic subject (Mohanty, 2003:259-260).

Spivak’s famous question, “Can the Subaltern Speak” emphasises the idea that representation is a type of speech act, with a speaker and a listener. This is because more often than not, the Subalterns’ attempts to represent themselves (self-representation) tend to fall outside the “lines laid down by the official institutional structures of representation” (http://postcolonialstudies.emory.edu/representation/). In the Triad, and in typical Spivakean formulation, it can be asked: to what extent has the Government succeeded in silencing the university? Also the question “who are we”, and its sub-questions, “who is constructing what images”, and “how does one construct a self-image in the face of one’s definition by other”, are important questions posed by Mignolo (2000:183) from a decolonial perspective. What this all points to is the fact that in a world of domination by the powerful, self-definition and self-representation will always remain an illusion. Through the discourse of representation, the West thus invariably constructed or reconstructed Africa as a representation of the West’s negative image, “a discourse that simultaneously valorises and affirms Western superiority and absolves it from its existential and epistemological violence against Africa” (Zeleza, 1997:iii). Representation made it possible for the West to exploit and dominate Africa. This power of definition is further exemplified in both psychoanalytic and decoloniality discourses.

In psychoanalytic formulations, Fanon, in *The Wretched of the Earth* (1963) and *Black Skin, White Masks* (1967:8), suggests that it was not only modernisation but also colonialism that dislocated and distorted the colonised peoples’ psyche, making the black man not to be a man, because the colonial experience annihilated the colonised man’s sense of self and sealed him into a crushing objecthood. Psychoanalysis sees the internalised enemy, the ‘coloniser within’, as the most dangerous enemy that has to be resisted the most (Memmi, 1991). In this sense,
psychoanalysis is important in both the ‘decolonisation’ of the mind, and the political liberation of the oppressed. From a decoloniality perspective, as a variant of PC, coloniality of power articulates continuities of colonial mentalities, psychologies and world-views and highlights the social hierarchical relationship of exploitation and domination between Westerners and the Third World (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2013:8). After independence, the discourse of ‘development’ became the conduit for neo-liberal interventions while today interventions in Africa are justified on the grounds of ‘democracy’.

Representations are therefore ideological tools and mechanisms that serve to reinforce systems of inequality and subordination and thus sustain colonialist and neo-colonialist projects. It is these hegemonic modes of representation that PC seeks not only to question, but also to transform. Chapter 4 of this study shows how both state and non-state actors have constructed each other through language and representation. The Government and Community conceive of their view of NUL as objective knowledge of wholly reliable truths.

2.5 HYBRIDITY IN POSTCOLONIAL THEORY

The concept of hybridity is increasingly employed as an analytical tool to explore a variety of outcomes within the contact zone (local and external). There are three meanings attached to the term hybridity – in terms of biology, ethnicity and culture. While hybridity started life as a biological term (Coombes and Brah 2000; Bakrania, 2008), today it is a term used to describe a wide range of social and cultural phenomena that emerged from colonial encounters. Anthropologists and sociologists of culture see hybridity as the cultural logic of globalisation. Thus in contrast to modernisation of culture, hybridity stresses ‘glocalisation’, that is the dynamic intermix of the global and the local. In fact hybridity “rejoices in mongrelization and fears the absolutism of the pure” (Hazan, 2015:18). It signifies both the continuities of colonialism and its failure to fully dominate the colonised. Under colonialism, hybridity was seen as a condition of relations between the colonised and the coloniser. Today, the understanding of power as not merely domination, but also as productive of subjects and identities through various micro-technologies and relations, explains in large part the focus on hybridity within postcolonial discourse (Abrahamsen, 2003:204).
Another important sign of hybridity is colonial mimicry such as imitating the culture, dress, language, behaviour, ideology and lifestyle et cetera of the coloniser. This turned the dominated into some form of ‘coloniser within’. Bhabha (1994) argues that colonial mimicry is some form of ‘minus in the origin’ and as such hybridity tends to interrupt the representation of the fullness of life because the effect of mimicry is camouflage, of becoming mottled (Bhabha, 1990:314; Bhabha, 1994:85). While colonial mimicry and other practices that take after the coloniser’s culture can be seen as signs of complicity with the West and with colonial discourse, the colonised did not only abandon their cultural practices and emulate those of the colonisers, but they also resisted domination (Bhabha, 1994; Sylvester, 2011:191; Baharvand and Zarrinjooee, 2012:27-36). According to Ashcroft et al, (2007) and Bhabha (1984), mimicry was never far from mockery and this ambivalence was unsettling to colonial discourse. “Despite the ‘imitation’ and ‘mimicry’ with which colonised peoples cope with the imperial presence” posit Ashcroft et al, (1995:9), “the relationship becomes one of constant, if implicit, contestation and opposition. Indeed, such mimicry becomes the very site of that conflict”. Thus in its most politically articulated guises, hybridity, ambivalence and mimicry are believed to reveal, or even provide, a politics of liberation for the subaltern constituencies (Ashcroft, Griffiths and Tiffin, 1998; Prabhu, 2007:xi).

This sense of being ‘in-between’, or being ‘torn-halves’ has marked or dominated discussions of social and cultural relations between the coloniser and the colonised, what Bhabha calls “the connective tissue that constructs the difference between upper and lower, black and white” (Bhabha, 1994:4). This idea of an intermediate status, ‘in-between’ those liminal spaces where cultural practices of the colonised and the coloniser are blended, has been consciously constructed by both the structures and apparatus of the colonial state, and the agency of the colonised or the subalterns themselves. Thus liminality is seen as a necessary attribute of the colonial condition because the exercise of colonial authority required the production of differentiation – between the white man and the black, for example. Therefore ‘in-betweenness’ and liminality cannot be understood without reference to the ideological and institutional structures in which they are housed. In South Africa and Zimbabwe, both before and after the end of colonialism, Coloured identity stood for a hybridity, a difference ‘within’, and a subject
that inhabited and continue to inhabit the rim of an ‘in-between’ reality (Erasmus, 2001; NAAC, 2003; Mushonga, 2011b).

In this study therefore, I use hybridity in several senses. First, I use it to mean the intersecting discourses in the relations of power between the players in the Triad. Second, I use it to refer to complex, and sometimes blurred issues at the intersection of the local and the global in respect of the university in Africa today. Coombes and Brah (2000:12) posit that in an increasingly globalised world, the term ‘hybridity’ has become the means for reflecting upon the relationship between ‘the local’ and ‘the global’ and the multiple ways in which globality, region and locality feature in economic, political, and cultural forms and practices, including links between the local and the global as well as the interstitial space between the two. Third, I use it to describe political and institutional structures as well as cultural practices of power that come from the past and continue to permeate the present. Fourth, and last, I use it to mean resistance, both overt and covert because, argues Abrahamsen (2003), hybridity is intimately connected to resistance.

Hybridity rejects passivity and instead mocks power and works to deface power. It is a way out of binary thinking and allows the inscription of the agency of the subaltern in order to destabilise power. This is because today those differences that made possible colonial power are no longer clearly observable because hybridity disrupts this differentiation. Therefore hybridity becomes the name that is given for the strategic reversal of the process of domination through disavowal. According to Bhabha (1994:114), hybridity intervenes in the face or exercise of authority through reversing the original formal process of disavowal. Thus Bhabha (1994) is much more concerned with challenging the stability and security of forms of knowledge which install totalising models of cultural, racial and national purity and diversity irrespective of whether they emerge from colonising and domineering nations or anti-colonial modes of resistance. Bhabha’s argument is that today it is impossible to cling to some organicist or identitarian politics and culture, or some fixed nationality due to fast-changing ideas and the inescapable global influence. Consequently hybridity becomes a means of reflecting between the local and the global. African Studies in Africa and in the Euro-American academies enjoy some similarities based on intersected histories. The post-colonial university is a multicultural enterprise whose
organisational structures and epistemic cultures are not only patented in the global North, but equally deeply rooted in its particular locale.

Hybridity also draws attention to the way in which the coloniser and the colonised were forged in relationship with each other. For that reason, hybridity is mainly characterized by tensions, both interactive and dynamic (Castillo, 2005:34). Abrahamsen argues that,

[i]n postcolonial perspectives, hybridity is intimately connected to resistance, in that it signifies the creativity and adaptability of the subaltern in the face of power, and demonstrates that the colonial encounter as well as contemporary North-South relations cannot be understood in terms of a one-way relationship of domination and power over.

(Abrahamsen, 2003:207)

This way, hybridity rejects the passivity Said portrayed in Orientalism, and makes possible the presence of ‘power to’, ‘power with’, and ‘power within’. Therefore contrary to popular thinking, hybridity mocks power because power has to be de-faced (Hayward, 2004:11). As a concept, hybridity is invoked as an anti-colonial strategy that is intimately connected to resistance because, as Abrahamsen posits, “from ‘in-between’, hybrid identities can engender new forms of being that can unsettle and subvert colonial authority” (Abrahamsen, 2003:205).

Today, the notion of hybridity has been invoked as a measure of local agency in the face of globalisation and as signifying the “creative adaptation, interpretation and transformation of Western cultural symbols and practices, and [showing] that formerly colonised peoples are not simply passive victims in the face of an all-powerful Western culture” (Abrahamsen, 2003:205-206). A politicised concept of hybridity is one which uses the term to analyse forms of resistance to colonialism, including resistance to neocolonialism and any form of domination in the postcolony. According to Young (1995), Bhabha’s work (1990; 1994) celebrates hybridity as subversive and as an “active moment of challenge and resistance against a dominant cultural power” (Young, 1995:23). The desire to create copies that are ‘almost the same, but not quite’ compels colonial discourse to be ambivalent, and ambivalence is a sign of the agency of the colonised and their ability to resist domination.
Contemporary African politics and society via the study of the Triad of GCUA today shows that hybridity produces many moments of challenge and resistance occasioned by the intricately interwoven relations of power. In the Triad, because power exists in complex and dispersed forms, it is very hard to draw a neat line between ‘local’ and ‘global’ within a university in Africa. As a hybrid organisation, the university in Africa harbours different and often conflicting institutional logics, thus facing the challenge of sustaining its hybridity.

In terms of political choices, the notion of hybridity serves to refute political and cultural positions that advocate a return to ‘origin’ or ‘tradition’. This view underpins Said’s incisive critique of negritude, which he regards as not only reinforcing the imperial hierarchies between the colonised and the coloniser, but also as proposing an essentialised identity or ‘Africanness’ that is not only impossible, but also, politically and potentially dangerous and damaging. Said suggests that there is much to be gained from not remaining trapped in such emotional celebrations of one’s own identity, and in this way postcolonialism’s focus on hybridity is a warning both against nativist\(^{30}\) positions such as negritude and against the dangers of essentialism. Rukundwa (2006:16) thinks that the issue of how to remedy the ‘torn-halves’ and ‘hybrids’ among us is the most challenging aspect of postcolonial criticism. According to Rukundwa (2006), natives live in slow but constant mutation which does not allow them to be equal and to “return to their previous position, nor [to] be fully integrated into the new situation” (Rukundwa, 2006:16). Hybridity seeks to move beyond fixed identities, by drawing attention to their fluid and constructed character, and offers the “possibility of discovering a world not constructed out of warring essences” (Abrahamsen, 2003:206). Salman Rushdie’s pertinent rhetorical question quoted in Abrahamsen (2003:206), “doesn’t the idea of pure cultures, in urgent need of being kept free from alien contamination lead us inexorably towards apartheid, towards ethnic cleansing, towards the gas chamber”, draws our attention to how erroneous the idea of fixed identities could be.

However, there are some sharp criticisms about the usage of hybridity in PC. The first set of criticisms has to do with the inherent epistemological contradictions within the term itself.

\(^{30}\) Nativism refers to the desire to return to indigenous practices and cultural forms as they existed in pre-colonial society.
Within this framework, it is argued that, first, the term can never be liberatory because it always implies or presupposes a prior state of purity or two anterior purities which were never there in the first place; second, because the term is shaped by organic and biological conceptions that are heterosexist, the term risks naturalising essentialisms; and third, that, from the point of view that all cultures are hybrid and thus making any claims to purity a mythical construct, the term remains highly imprecise (Hutnyk, 2005:82; Bakrania, 2008:536). The second set of criticisms of hybridity has to do with its differing use of the term. First, it is thought that the notion is used in ways that allow real issues to escape critical attention; second, the term has been, and probably continues to be used in academia as “an apoliticized celebration of difference” (Bakrania, 2008:536); and third, there has been a tendency to reduce the usage of hybridity to refer to the diaspora community in the metropole at the expense of understanding broader transnational processes that problematise, for instance, issues of who is, and who is not ‘hybrid’. On this point Loomba (1998:183) forcefully argues that “the point is not to pit the themes of migrancy, exile and hybridity against rootedness, nation and authenticity, but to locate and evaluate their ideological, political and emotional valencies, as well as their intersections in the multiple histories of colonisation and postcoloniality”.

At the third level, hybridity is criticised for downplaying the bitter tension and clash between the colonisers and the marginalised, thus misrepresenting the dynamics of anti-colonial struggle (Loomba, 1998). Liberation struggles and other forms of nationalism were fuelled by exploitation and alienation as well as anger of the marginalised and cannot therefore be easily understood via theories of hybridity. Liberation meant restoration of a cultural identity which “European colonialism had disparaged and wrecked” (Loomba, 1998:181). It also meant search for a ‘true’ and collective identity based on common history and ancestry. Hybridity as a concept is thought to be unable to fully describe this. Again, it is thought that some postcolonial critics are quick to dismiss the idea of turning back to a pre-colonial past as a romantic nativism. Such criticism fails to appreciate the fact that identity is a matter of ‘becoming’ as well as not necessarily going back to a nostalgic past. After all, colonial subject formation cannot easily be erased as a false consciousness. Notwithstanding these limitations, employing hybridity helps us gain insights into the trajectories and impacts that result when international actors and
interventions (Western reforms) interact with local actors and structures in respect of the university.

2.6 AGENCY AND RESISTANCE IN POSTCOLONIAL THEORY

Agency and resistance are intricately intertwined because in PC discourse, agency is most visible in resistance, or is gained through resistance. For the Third World and Africa in particular, physically removing the colonising power (through resistance) and gaining independence, argues Khanal (2012:111), was just the beginning of the process of regaining agency. Thus while agency and resistance as key pillars of PC are intertwined, for purposes of elucidation, I shall discuss them in two separate sections, grappling with agency in section 2.6.1 and resistance in section 2.6.2.

2.6.1 Agency

Agency is considered an Enlightenment concept with emphasis on individualism and the ‘right’ to have choices and the ability to act on them. Today the concept can be creatively appropriated and enhanced by emphasising collective rather than individual agency (Hudson, 2016). Jabri (2013) argues that instead of emphasising the local or the universal, it is important to think in terms of ‘hybrid agency’, i.e. in terms of the global and the local – glocalised agency. In this study therefore, I place emphasis on both individual/personal agency and collective agency as well as on local and global agency in order to understand the complex interplay between triadic actors. According to Carter and Charles (2013:323), agency has been associated with a long list of terms namely self-hood, motivation, will, purposiveness, intentionality, choice, initiative, freedom, and creativity. Defined this way, every thing, including animals and innate things, has agency or is agential. In PC discourse, we can talk of critical agency, discursive agency, performative agency, political agency and subversive agency. Because these forms of agency are apparent throughout this study, it is important to briefly explain each of them.

Critical agency, according to Richmond (2011), points to an agonistic and contested post-liberal conception of peace and to a post-colonial civil society, with resistance as the essence of critical
agency (see Chapter 5). Closely linked to critical agency is the notion of discursive agency which tends to engage metapragmatic strategies that are highly context-specific (Apter, 2007:4). Discursive agency is the power to negotiate authority relations through a variety of grammatical and oratorical forms as section 5.4 shows. Performative agency, according to Apter (2007), is always other-oriented (see Chapter 4). Political agency or corporate agency entails the possession of the power to bring about effective change in collective life while subversive agency, for example, is resistance of the colonised to be turned into ‘mimic men’ – it is sly civility. The subject is a subversive agent because he or she both does homage to and menaces the authority (Lee, 2014:9).

On the basis of the above, and by way of definition, for the subaltern, agency is the ability to resist oppression; and for the powerful, agency may very well be the ability to contain resistance as the Triad shall show. In this study, borrowing from Lee (2014), I define agency at three related levels, namely choice, flexibility and accountability. First, choice refers to the relative freedom one has – the more freedom one has, the more agency he or she can exert (Lee, 2014:3). It is an autonomous engagement with the world at the interstices between individuals and social structures (Di Napoli and Clement, 2014:6). Agency therefore refers to the ability to act or perform an action and that it hinges on the question of whether individuals can “freely and autonomously initiate action, or whether the things they do are in some sense determined by the ways in which their identity has been constructed” (Ashcroft et al, 1998:8). For the post-colonial subject, agency means the ability to initiate action in engaging or resisting power, and by ascribing agency to the subaltern, PC insists that “the subject has the capacity to act” (Ahluwalia, 2001:109). Agency therefore implies a person’s ability to make choices, act and steer her/his life. The capacity of human beings to resist, and sometimes to deflect what appears to be their structural fate is key to understanding how human agency can effect change.

Second, agency refers to flexibility. It is the range of means and ends from which the agent may choose from, and a person has more agency when he or she has more flexibility of means and ends under a given condition (Lee, 2014:3). It is the ability to shift orientations according to the enablements and constraints of the context (Koenig, 2011:1106). It is those entities that have some degree of control over one’s own behaviour (Apter, 2007:3). It is about the temporal
relational contexts of action which, through the “interplay of habit, imagination, and judgment” reproduce and transform different structures in interactive response to the problems posed by changing circumstances (Emirbayer and Mische, 1998:970). As Carter and Charles (2013:329) put it, “agency is always Agency in relation to other Agents and to what those other Agents want to do. Society is therefore a necessary precondition for Agency but not for Action”. In this sense, agency has been positioned, from the beginning, against structure, implying that people always have a certain degree to maneuver even when they are oppressed. Life is a daily negotiation of power between individual agency and social structure.

In other words, the social structure helps create what the individual is, while the individual helps to create the social structure, meaning that agency and structure go together. Structure enables or constrains the agency of different groups while at the same time the agency of different groups is able to impact on structure. From the structure-agency nexus, it is clear, for example, that social action by triadic agents (politicians, managers, academics, students, activists, etc.) both reproduces and transforms the social structure, and social structures – in turn – circumscribe the agency of individual actors. The concept agency, in this second sense, has been particularly popular in studies that challenge reports of the victimisation of vulnerable groups (Nahar and van der Geest, 2014:382). For example, in discussions about displacements across borders in Africa, Hammar (2014:16, 25) argues that the persistent stereotype of those displaced as passive victims is flawed, suggesting that the ‘displaced’ must be seen as resilient and active agents in the complex processes of remaking their own lives under highly uncertain, adverse conditions. Yet there is widespread disagreement about what the social structure is and how it could affect us given the “strikingly nebulous and diverse” meanings ascribed to it (Elder-Vass, 2010:1). Moreover, while agency can be determined by structure, it is important to note that there is also a free hand for agency in relation to structure. Hudson (2012) warns against essentialist and instrumentalist interpretations of agency because of the disempowering effect of such an approach.

The third and last key feature of agency is accountability. The thesis here is that the more agency one has over a given condition, the more he or she is held accountable for the outcome of his or her choices. It is those entities whose actions are the object of evaluation, in terms of the
responsibility of either individuals or groups of persons or institutions for a given outcome (Apter, 2007:4). According to Lee (2014:3), one must be “subject to praise or blame, reward or punishment, pride or shame”. These three related definitions of agency mean that triadic actors are constantly negotiating their sense of agency.

2.6.2 Resistance

The framing of power in PC discourses as productive and ubiquitous, demands investigations into possibilities of resistance. Resistance as a concept has several meanings. In this study I use it in its politico-cultural sense. In a political context, resistance is associated with the ‘left’. Yet the concept was first introduced from the ‘right’ by Edmund Burke who argued for the need to resist revolutionary “progress”, incensed by the French overthrow of birthright authority (Burke, 1790). In a cultural sense, resistance is based on identity and identity-construction and against totalising systems and cultures. Gramsci (1971) argues that hegemony is both a political and cultural process and thus part of the revolutionary project is to create a counterhegemonic culture emanating from the experiences and consciousness of the people. But cultural resistance, argues Duncombe (2008:209), unless translated into political action, becomes mere imaginary solutions to real-world problems. Third World anti-colonial struggles entailed both cultural liberation and struggles for political independence. That PC makes culture an important site of struggle means that it is radically enriching in its endeavour to explain resistance. The use of psychoanalysis in anti-colonial struggles offers a means of investigating the inner effects of colonialism on the colonised and provides tools for resistance (Fanon, 1963; Rukundwa, 2006). Colonialism was seen as a psychological affair with the struggle against it both a material and mental war. Fanon (1963; 1967) writes angrily about the mechanics of colonialism and its effect on those it enslaved, declaring that the only cure is revolutionary violence.

By locating ambivalence and resistance in hybridity, Bhabha (1984) shows how resistance operates within a structure of power and how it is not always in a direct relationship of opposition and polarity. Instead, resistance is frequently much more subtle, and as part of the

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31 For example, the French resistance against Nazi occupation during World War II, or with Third World anti-colonial struggles of the 20th century.
recovery of subaltern subject positions, postcolonial investigations have often focused on ‘histories from below’ and everyday forms of resistance rather than revolutions, armed struggles or large-scale political opposition. Drawing on the work of Jean Baudrillard, Duncombe (2008:209) argues that where a system justifies and sustains itself through political consent, apathy was a strong strategy of resistance, as a form of “resistance to resistance”. The subtle forms of resistance, what Scott calls the ‘weapons of the weak’ may in the future act as a catalyst of broader, more openly oppositional liberation movements (Abrahamsen, 2003:208). In the Triad, PC is expected to bring to the fore both subtle and non-subtle transcripts of resistance.

In his discussion of the postcolony, Mbembe (2001:108) posits that ordinary people are not fooled or passive objects of the state’s display of power and that instead, they are capable of resistance by mocking and ridiculing such power through popular cartoons, caricatures, jokes, gossip and bastardisation of ruling party slogans, songs and manifestos, among other forms of resistance (see Chapter 5). Such forms of resistance are clearly subtle in their mocking of power through such ‘hidden transcripts’, and are far from being open violent revolutions or armed struggles as solutions to subalternity. Resistance, argues Bhabha, is not necessarily an oppositional act of political intention; rather it is an outcome of deferential relations of colonial power – hierarchy, marginalisation and other forms of unequal relations (Bhabha, 1994:110). The Triad is replete with numerous forms of mocking power as resistance.

The argument by Foucault that resistance has to be understood as an expression of power because where there is power, there is resistance underscores the fact that resistance exists in many forms. Foucault emphasises that,

> there are no relations of power without resistances; the latter are all the more real and effective because they are formed right at the point where relations of power are exercised; resistance to power does not have to come from elsewhere to be real, nor is it inexorably frustrated through being the compatriot of power. It exists all the more by being in the same place as power; hence, like power, resistance is multiple.

(Foucault, 1980f:142)

Thus the points of resistance, just like power itself, are present everywhere in the power network. In the Triad of GCUA today, there are innumerable possibilities of resistances that are, to borrow
Foucault’s (1976:96) expression, “possible, necessary, improbable, spontaneous, savage, solitary, concerted, rampant, violent, compromised, interested, or sacrificial”.

While psychoanalytic notions do not readily lend themselves to empirical validation, today they are seen as a rationalised bulwark to oppression irrespective of context and Fanon’s (1963) work bears this out. Decoloniality is also a key tool for resistance because, just like PC, it emphasises resistance to coloniality of power (Lugones, 2010:747). It shares the same primary aim with PC – to ‘decolonise’ power, knowledge and being, and to destabilise universalising and hegemonic discourses. This it does, adherents argue, by advocating for ‘border thinking’ or ‘border epistemologies’ as opposed to ‘global thinking’ or ‘global epistemologies’ as the ‘best’ way not only to challenge, but also to eliminate the pretended universality of the West and its structuring categories of nation-state, citizenship, capitalism, colonialism and globalisation (Mignolo, 2000; Sajed, 2013:16). Decoloniality demands the decolonisation of the category ‘universal’ to allow other articulations of the ‘universal’ to become more visible. Questions can be asked about the university in Africa today in terms of how far it has gone in decolonising its power structures and knowledge systems.

Foucault (1980c:84) refers to an “insurrection of knowledges” that are opposed primarily not to the contents, methods or concepts of a science, but to the effects of the power of a discourse that is considered to be scientific. As mentioned before, proponents of decoloniality see such an ‘insurrection’ as the only way the world can be liberated from Eurocentric and colonial discourses.

In this study therefore, I challenge Said’s casting of the colonised as a perpetual victim incapable of resistance by showing the possibilities of multiple opportunities of resistance within the Triad. Resistance, in the Foucauldian sense, is an effect of power. Said seems to have neglected obvious forms of resistance, subversion, mimicry and hybridity with which the colonised actively responded to the coloniser (Prasad, 2003:13; Bhabha, 1994; Jack and Westwood, 2006:491). In my case study, I therefore pose the question: how do the stereotyped fight back, or resist ‘subjugation’, or ‘write back’ in opposition to discourses that construct the ‘Other’ and what forms of resistance permeate the Triad? There is a huge gap in our knowledge of NUL as an
organisation and its structuring of power. My contribution therefore, from a postcolonial perspective, is to bring to the fore the why and how of NUL resistances by questioning and travestying monolithic discourses.

In the Triad, I theorise that relationships of power are dynamic, dispersed and polyvalent, thereby creating multiple opportunities for both governance and resistance. The Triad is a complex space which is less rigidly hierarchical, with multiple centres of power which the Powercube.Net theorists have designated as either ‘closed’, ‘invited’ or ‘claimed/created’. Here, the activities, tensions and conflicts are numerous and multidimensional, with equilibrium only reached through numerous negotiation and compromise, or to use Foucault’s (1984:82-83) phrase, “through a variety of transactions”. When spaces are ‘closed’, it is because ‘power over’ is in operation, and in the hands of elites such as politicians, bureaucrats, experts and managers who make decisions with little consultation or involvement of those for whom decisions are made (Gaventa, 2006:26). In the Triad, Government officials, politicians and university administrators have often acted this way especially when seeking to consolidate power and to control the institution. Strategies to open up ‘closed spaces’ often involve demands for greater transparency and the right to information and disclosure as well as public accountability. In the Triad, more often than not, university staff and students have often reacted angrily and sometimes violently to decisions made in closed doors and spaces, thus mocking ‘power over’ or rendering it ineffective. ‘Created spaces’ are spaces for participation which relatively powerless or excluded groups create for themselves. These range from spaces created by social movements and community associations to those involving natural places where people gather to “debate, discuss and resist, outside of the institutionalised policy arenas” (Gaventa, 2006:27; http://www.powercube.net). Within a university, campus-based organisations such as trade Unions, staff associations and student clubs and movements are examples of such spaces for participation.

In this study, I therefore define resistance as any activity that helps frustrate the operations of power, domination and control. From a broadly Foucauldian perspective, resistance is a process in which hidden, small-scale and marginal agencies have an impact on power, norms, civil society, the state and the international (Richmond, 2011:419). The fact that power itself is often
hidden means that it intends to avoid provoking resistance. The point of resistance is to elude power rather than to confront it head on (Richmond, 2011:422). Much of the resistance I grapple with in the Triad had this ultimate aim of eluding power rather than tackling it head on. Therefore, in this study, resistance is not a revolutionary or nationalist form of violence or some avant-garde radicalism.

In the present study, I seek to explain contestations between the Government, the Community and the University from 1945 to 2014 using analytical tools of representation (Chapter 4), hybridity (Chapters 3, 4 and 5), and agency and resistance (Chapter 5). I seek not only to show the actions of students, staff (academic and non-academic), Government and the Community in their numerous interactions but also to explain them. While ideological contestations about the mission and purpose of the university have always been there, differences over how to re-engineer the university have often resulted in visible and invisible resistances and contestations, sometimes resulting in open confrontations. These local-level micro-struggles and micro-politics at NUL point to the need for alternative ways of re-organising and restructuring the institution.

2.7 WEAKNESSES OF POSTCOLONIAL THEORY IN THE STUDY OF AFRICA

There are several criticisms of PC and its variants, some of which I have already discussed. For that reason, I will only engage with others which I consider fundamental enough to unsettle the utility of PC in the study of Africa. Four fundamental weaknesses of PC are, first, its elasticity and eclecticism and therefore apolitical theorisation; second, its preoccupation with textuality and language; third, its limited attempt to subvert modernity or Western knowledge from its belly; and fourth, its rejection of metanarratives. First, the elasticity and eclecticism of PC, together with its apolitical theorisation makes it to be ambiguous and to lack consensus and uniformity. Not all instances of decentering constitute active moments in a contest of power; all too often deconstruction becomes an end in itself (Lopez, 2001:14; Zeleza, 1997:494). The tendency to reduce complex historical conflicts to matters of discursive formation as well as the tendency to view the subjectivity and experience of the colonised people and postcolonial subjects solely in terms of the hegemonic frame of colonialism as if there were no life and existence outside that frame, is considered an enduring weakness of PC (Omari-Tunkara,
Therefore, postcolonialism is accused of privileging the colonial experience and for relying on the colonial/postcolonial dichotomy. Consequently PC is consistently accused of two opposite weaknesses; first that it homogenises the postcolonial experience by lumping societies together, and second, that it is an insufficient theory of the global (Ashcroft, 2002:517). The fact that PC derives from both the heritage of Western philosophy on one hand, and from the anti-colonial and anti-imperialist struggles on the other hand (Mbembe, 2008:11; Rukundwa, 2006:22) leaves PC standing on shaky ground. However, for others, it is precisely this eclecticism and the lack of a coherent methodology together with its fluidity and ambivalent position that is genuinely enabling. Therefore, this eclecticism can be seen as both a strength and a weakness.

Second, PC is dismissed as too theoretical, too ambiguous and esoteric to a point where it mystifies rather than clarifies the condition of the marginalised. The declared intention of recovering the voices of the marginalised through PC is therefore questioned (Abrahamsen, 2003:191). Furthermore, critics object to its jargonistic tendencies, especially its often theoretical language and focus on text and discourses, thus further moving away from the marginalised and their day-to-day struggles. Loomba (1998:2) contends that PC actually closes off both their voices and any legitimate place for them from which critics can speak, hence Spivak’s question, ‘Can the subaltern speak?’

Third, PC is accused of speaking from deep within the belly of Western modernity. In other words, PC is seen as making little attempt at subverting Western knowledge but rather entrenches it. For this reason, posits Gandhi (1998), PC is caught between the politics of structure and totality on one hand, and the politics of the fragment on the other hand (Gandhi, 1998:167-176). Gandhi is arguing that the major limitation of PC is that it is situated somewhere in the interstices between Marxism, poststructuralism and postmodernism. Critics argue that instead of PC being a tool of countering dominant discourses, it is actually in complicity with the very discourses of Western colonialism and neo-colonial domination that it purports to critique. Williams (1997) quoted in Abrahamsen (2003:192-3) contends that postcolonialism appears like a strong ally of “global capitalism rather than its foe; an intellectual facilitator of a new mode of colonialism”, peddled by both scholars from the global North and the global South who are not
only disengaged from or contemptuous of social movements, but who also have no real concern for the marginalised majority. According to Xie (1997:14), there is complicity even in the academy in the global South today as many knowledge centres of the global South have remained largely Western oriented notwithstanding the end of colonialism. In this context therefore, PC is seen as an ally of colonialism and imperialism.

Consequently, it is further argued that while the theory ostensibly sought to challenge the grand march of Western historicism with its entourage of binaries – self/other, metropolis/colony and centre/periphery, among others, postcolonialism re-orients the globe once more around a single binary opposition: colonial/postcolonial (Zeleza, 1997:508). Attacks on the binary mode of thinking started in the early 1990s, with Bhabha’s *The Location of Culture* (1994) as a key manifesto. Since then, the anti-binarism backlash has developed into a consistent theoretical orientation in postcolonial studies (Acheraiou, 2011:150). This binary mode of thinking is also prevalent in decolonial discourses, with their orientation around the modernity/colonial binary. Critics of modernity are thought to be blind to the epistemic and cultural colonial difference that then becomes the main focus of modernity/coloniality discourses. Conceptually, coloniality is seen as the hidden side of modernity, what Mignolo (2011a) calls the ‘darker side of Western modernity’ in a book by that title. Mignolo (2011a) tries not only to reveal the limitations of Western epistemic rationality and its geopolitical genesis, but also the terrible hidden underside of Western modernity. This critique is certainly directed at PC, which according to Zeleza (1997:508), recentres global history around Europe, privileging colonialism as the crucible through which the societies and cultures of Africa, Asia and Latin America were constituted. As a result, postcolonialism is unable to account for the complexities of globalisation (Loomba, 1998:1 Moore-Gilbert, 1998:63-64).

Finally, PC’s averseness to universalistic claims of Western scholarship and its rejection of master- or metanarratives and traditional political categories such as class, race and nation is blamed, argues Zeleza (1997:507), for keeping at bay more sharply political terms such as imperialism, neo-colonialism and geopolitics, thus reducing emphasis on “neo-colonialism and the ‘Third World’”. For this reason, critics wonder whether PC could have any meaningful contribution to the study of the African continent (Loomba, 1998:1; Moore-Gilbert, 1997;
It would seem that some of the criticisms raised above are misplaced as they are based on either a misreading or misrepresentation of the theory, thereby closing off, if not preventing an appreciation of one of its most crucial points, namely the relationships between power, knowledge, discourse and political institutions and practices. It is on the basis of these criticisms that I propose a new definitional framework that goes beyond the bounds of PC and that draws from the strengths of decoloniality and other frameworks. Decoloniality, as we have already seen, claims to offer an alternative epistemology through occupying the border between modernity and the margins. But because the position from where we speak is never pure and untainted, I maintain that there is a strong convergence between decoloniality and a critical postcoloniality and therefore treat the terms as somewhat interchangeable, hence the evolution into an Integrated Postcolonial Framework (see Figure 6.1). Notwithstanding the above stated limitations, PC remains an important lens for the study of Africa as demonstrated in section 2.8.

2.8 STRENGTHS AND UTILITY OF POSTCOLONIAL THEORY IN THE STUDY OF AFRICA

Both the shortcomings in PC itself and orthodox approaches demand that we harness the several strong points of PC in order to have a more nuanced interpretive framework for a better understanding of Africa and the global South. Five strengths of PC can be identified. First is its counterhegemonic, critical and liberatory stance from hegemonic and universalising discourses. Second is its ability to question any forms of exploitation and domination – as a discipline, postcolonialism is one of the few approaches that effectively interrogates and dismantles any form of imperialism and Eurocentric forms of knowledge and structures of feeling located on both sides of the neo-colonialist divide. Third is its hybrid character and eclectic mix of theories and positions that transcends time and space. Fourth is its conceptualisation of power to understand the contemporary world. Finally is its desire to recover the subject position of the subaltern – that its commitment to the subaltern is frequently invoked to differentiate it from postmodernism and orthodox approaches. Together with decoloniality, PC is one of the few radical and enriching interventions in the analysis of human interactions. Therefore, whether or
not PC and decoloniality are treated separately, it is the sum total of their critiques that not only expose the limits of universalising discourses, but equally subvert and reject them.

For me, the key strength of PC is its counterhegemonic stance against any exploitative and discriminatory practices irrespective of time and space. It is a space and language of liberation from colonial and other hegemonic forms of power, declaring war not only against past exploitative practices, but also against present political, economic and social realities. It is concerned with changing material circumstances of exploitation. Thus PC is viewed as the critique of European humanism, desiring to move beyond Eurocentric ideology and beyond colonialisist binary structures of Self/Other, towards a new dream of humanism. It stresses the idea of humanity-in-the-making, the humanity that will emerge once the colonial figures of the inhuman and racial difference have been swept away (Mbembe, 2008:1; Bayart, 2011:58). For the study of Africa, Zeleza (1997) thinks that the deconstruction of the hegemonic Western paradigms is desirable in as far as it seeks to challenge the universal claims to knowledge of Western discourses and to strip Western modernity of the will to truth, and open up spaces for previously silenced and dissident voices (Zeleza, 1997:494). Zeleza (2006b) contends that the challenge that remains is for both Western and non-Western scholars to make sure that they continue to struggle for the production, organisation, dissemination and consumption of knowledges that enhance, rather than undermine Africa’s possibilities (Zeleza, 2006b:29). This way, PC becomes a discourse against ‘major’ knowledges and on behalf of minor/deterritorialised knowledges (Seth, Gandhi and Dutton, 1998:8). As a discourse against ‘major’ knowledges’, PC becomes an ally rather than an enemy of decoloniality as the latter equally seeks to destabilise the so-called major or universal knowledges. PC, together with decoloniality, also seeks to expose both the political and epistemic violence of the West (Mbembe, 2008:1; Bayart, 2011:57). PC deconstructs colonial discourse by questioning the mental set-up and the symbolic forms and representations underpinning the imperial project. In this way, PC can deconstruct the imperialist subject.

Further still, in its counterhegemonic stance, PC remains an enormously influential framework for understanding the global South because of its rejection of the earlier legitimating and universalising narratives and categories of the Enlightenment (Chibber, 2013; Zeleza, 1997:508).
We therefore need PC to problematise even such terms as ‘Africa’. Abrahamsen (2003:196), and Mudimbe (1988:1-23), contend that the meaning of ‘Africa’ and ‘Africanness’ cannot be regarded as fixed. Rather the term ‘Africa’ needs to be reflexively appropriated in a way that gives the writing subject the widest audience possible. This way, posits Ashcroft (2002:517-518), postcolonial analysis looks beyond Africa to see that African cultures share something crucial with many other cultures around the world.

For Abrahamsen, it is actually the harsh, everyday realities of life for the majority of people on the African continent which lends urgency to both African Studies and PC (Abrahamsen, 2003). Consequently, the conceptualisation of the relationship between power, knowledge, discourse and political institutions and practices in postcolonialism has much to contribute to the study of African politics (Abrahamsen, 2003:189). The postcolonial perspective stands to benefit from the encounter with African Studies as a more empirical focus will help to give postcolonialism more contemporary relevance. Thus PC can be usefully deployed to sharpen our analyses of contemporary institutions and practices of power within the Triad.

According to Olukoshi (2005:15), the rationale for African Studies is premised on the fact that there is need not only to carefully retrieve and document the history of the continent for current and future generations, but also for purposes of building intra- and cross-national knowledge of one another. In respect of the university in Africa today, Zeleza notes that the postcolonial university has undergone quite profound and sometimes unsettling changes – infrastructure decay, brain drain, dwindling research funds, poor remuneration, heavy teaching loads, neoliberal and New Public Management reforms and political instability, among others (The Zeleza Post: http:www.zeleza.com; Olukoshi, 2005:14-15; Mushonga and Maliehe, 2013).

A further strength of PC is its hybrid character and its eclectic mix of different theories and positions. This way, PC seeks to capture and describe both the continuities and complexities of colonial experiences and the legacy thereof at the local and global levels irrespective of time and space (Rukundwa and van Aarde, 2007:1171; Abrahamsen, 2003:195-6; Ashcroft, 2007:169). Ashcroft et al (2007:169) contend that postcolonialism is now used in diverse ways to include the study of European territorial conquests, the various institutions of European colonialism, the
discursive operations of empire, the subtleties of subject construction in colonial discourse and the resistance of those subjects. The differing responses to such incursions and their contemporary colonial legacies in both pre- and post-independence nations and communities is another major focus of PC. Its critique of identity and subjectivity by stressing the existence of hybrid identities (‘Third Space’) (Bhabha, 1994) removes the West’s illusion of a permanent referral to oneself, as well as making nonsense of the category victim. Consequently, from an Africa/African Studies perspective, the radicality of its (PC) eclecticism and the decentring of the question of the humanities are seen as a definite strength (Mbembe, 2008).

Among contemporary postcolonial theorists, Rita Abrahamsen makes the most urgent and fervent appeal to the utility of PC in the study of Africa because of the way it conceptualises power to understand the contemporary world. Abrahamsen (2003:196) argues that it is the connections between the past and the present, as well as the interconnectedness, rather than the separateness, of the colonial and the postcolonial and the North and the South that emerge as a key focus and strength of postcolonial investigations. Its strength lies in drawing attention to continuities, fluidity and interconnectedness, or what Young (2001:8) refers to as the economic, political, cultural and diasporic “imbrication of the north with the south”. In the case study, there are continuities from the past that speak deep within colonial and post-colonial traditions whose understanding can only be enhanced by engaging postcolonial analyses. It is the constitutive relationships of the global North and the global South and the way in which they produce and reinforce each other, both in the colonial past and the postcolonial present that are key insights and concerns of postcolonial thinking.

The need to recover the subject position of the subaltern, to recover the voices of the once colonised peoples and their descendants so that they cannot only be heard, but also become visible and influential, and to achieve an identity uncontaminated by universalist or Eurocentric concepts and images (Loomba, 1998:2; Sylvester, 2011:183; Abrahamsen, 2003:197) is a central tenet of both PC and decoloniality. The emancipation of all colonised societies is a clear political strength of both postcolonial and decolonial thinking (Xie, 1997:15-17; Quayson, 2000:94; Grosfoguel, 2007; Mignolo, 2011b). In short, the utility of PC for African Studies and its
decoloniality variant lies in its counterhegemonic stance and the privileging of subalternity in its analyses, as well as its particular conceptualisation of power.

2.9 TOWARDS THE EVOLUTION OF THE INTEGRATED POSTCOLONIAL FRAMEWORK (IPCF) FOR THE STUDY OF POWER RELATIONS

The IPCF that I propose for the study of relations in the Triad and the global South is one of the key objectives of this study – theory strengthening and formulation. Figure 2.1 (see section 2.2) illustrates the first stage in the evolution of the IPCF. It is the main conceptual figure. Figure 4.1 (see section 4.4.3), while referring to the NUL context, to some extent, it shows the second stage in the evolution of the IPCF. Figure 5.3 (see section 5.4.3), just like Figure 4.1, to some extent refers to the NUL context, it shows evolution into the IPCF in its third stage. Figure 6.1 shows the fully fledged IPCF depicting the dispersed, pervasive and rhizomic nature of ‘power to’, ‘power with’ and ‘power within’ at the local, national and global levels in its visible, hidden and invisible forms (see 2.2), thus engendering numerous contestations. All the Figures are discussed in detail in the relevant sections quoted in brackets. However, it should be emphasised here that these Figures should be read together in order to make an integrated understanding of the discourses of representation, hybridity, agency, resistance and decoloniality possible. The evolution of the IPCF begins with a basic Figure (Figure 2.1) and evolves into a complex network of interactions as shown in Figure 4.1 and Figure 5.3. The Figures show the interconnectedness and constitutive nature of the issues involved and how triadic actors – government, community and university – co-determine each other’s emergence and existence through complex relationships of power, knowledge, discourse and political institutions and practices. In reality, triadic relations are much more complex than shown in these Figures.

2.10 EVALUATION

For a long time, postcolonial theory occupied a peripheral position in analyses of contemporary African politics and society, moreso for non-state actors such as the university. It is only in the last decade that it began to be a major critical discourse in the humanities (Abrahamsen, 2003:189-210; Scott, 2002:994). In this study of relations in the Triad of GCUA today, I wish to
show how PC can, first, be harnessed, and second, offer insights in analyses of relations of power. I thus call for a constructive and productive reading of postcolonial theory.

This chapter has presented the theoretical framework for studying relations of power in GCUA today by deploying some key pillars of PC, namely representation, hybridity, agency and resistance within the power, knowledge and discourse frameworks. These pillars are used to examine the interconnectedness, fluidity and constitutive relationships in the Triad. I draw from the works of postcolonial pantheons such as Said (1978, 1995), Foucault (1976, 1980a-i, 1984) Spivak (1988, 1990, 1995, 1999) and Bhabha (1984, 1994) and from the works of recent postcolonial proponents such as Abrahamsen (2003), Lopez (2001), Ratele (1999) and Magubane (2006), among others. Contending that on its own, PC cannot be a sufficient critical tool to adequately account for the complex web of relations of power in the Triad, I have harnessed the decoloniality variant in order to strengthen and consolidate the interpretive framework. A critical re-assessment of PC has led to the generation of the IPCF which I offer as a roadmap most appropriate for the analysis of relations of power, not only in the Triad of GCUA today, but also for explaining contemporary African politics and society. Consequently, the IPCF makes an important contribution to, first and foremost, a theory of Africa/African Studies that cuts across History, Anthropology, Political Science/International Relations, Higher Education Studies and Postcolonial Studies.

I posit that the use of PC in African Studies is the most valuable approach because, first, PC remains the most influential framework for understanding the global South, and second, it rejects the supposedly universalising categories of the Enlightenment and any pretention to universality. The recognition of the relationship between power and knowledge/discourse, and political institutions and practices is of enormous importance to understanding contemporary African politics and society, and nowhere is this better conceived than through the lens of PC. Using the postcolonial lens, I wish to interrogate not only the sources of tensions, struggles and contestations that permeate the history of NUL, but also their forms. While I have argued for an eclectic theory, I am not necessarily reinventing the wheel. Rather, I am reinforcing the postcolonial approach and calling for a constructive reading of PC in order to give a fresh perspective to debates on, and about Africa and the global South today. The critique against
postcolonialism is somewhat overstated, as the sensational and fanciful dismissal of PC on the basis of its ‘Western’ identity is deeply politicised and not very constructive in offering us a way forward. By employing PC in this study, I try to show how Africa and African Studies can shed their fear of postcoloniality.
CHAPTER 3: TRIADIC RELATIONS IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE, 1945–2014

3.1 GENERAL ORIENTATION

This chapter presents, in historical perspective, relations of power between the GOL, the Community (local and global), and the NUL. These relations are reflected on through the postcolonial-theoretical framings of representation, hybridity, agency and resistance. The overall aim of this chapter is to give a historical perspective which will help to enhance our understanding of the complex power relations in the Triad. I do so by addressing question number one and objective number three. The specific question is: to what extent are the persistent tensions, contestations and struggles in universities in Africa today a product of their history?; and the objective is to examine how, in historical perspective, university spaces are battlegrounds and the extent to which triadic tensions, contestations and struggles are a product of their history (see 1.4 and 1.5). To answer the above question and to meet the stated objective, I draw on the themes that emerged from the synthesis of secondary sources, archival and documentary evidence and field data. Throughout this chapter, I attempt to show how ‘the gaze is everywhere’, by showing that in all the complex interactions since the founding of NUL in 1945, no single player, whether Government, Community or University has managed to totally dominate the other, or to exude unlimited power. It is important to add that despite the challenges of the 21st century, and the complex contestations among state and non-state actors, the University has contributed immensely to the development, education, research and political agenda of the country. Since 1975, programme offerings have diversified, student numbers grew exponentially, access and extension activities increased. While the creation of NUL in 1975 may have been a very controversial and contested development, the outcome afforded Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland the opportunity to develop their universities. The historical perspective presented in this chapter benefits from a multiplicity of sources namely secondary and archival sources held in AREMDOD, government publications, newspapers and periodicals as well as oral sources. Oral interviews were conducted with diverse players in the Triad – government officials and their representatives, university administrators, academic and non-academic staff, students and student leaders, and Roma and wider community informants (see Appendix B).
The outline of this chapter comprises mainly the historical background of NUL which surveys the numerous transitions and argues that the creation of NUL was a traumatic affair (3.2); the legal instruments where I show that power was dispersed within the University through participatory governance (3.3); the imagined future role of NUL where I highlight national aspirations and expectations (3.4); the University and the turbulent political environment in which I capture the impact of the national political environment on the University (3.5); triadic relations in the era of democracy, where I show, for example, the lasting effect of trade unionism on the University and the appetite of the state to entrench ‘sovereign’ power through legal means (3.6); and a critique of the triadic relations (3.7). Although in real life the phases overlap, the periodisation adopted here is intended to facilitate analytical and focused discussion.

The history of Lesotho outlined in Chapter 1 has had, and continue to have a lasting effect not only on NUL, but all national institutions. According to one government informant, “NUL is a microcosm of what goes on in society, and as they say, if you want to know what is going on in a government, go to the University” (Gmin1 Interview, 07/08/2014). As this chapter and the entire study shall show, the Triad has multiple overt and covert, or powerful and weak actors, all with multiple opportunities for governance and resistance.

3.2 ORIGINS AND BACKGROUND OF THE NATIONAL UNIVERSITY OF LESOTHO

The NUL is traceable to 1945. Four distinct phases are identifiable in the evolution of NUL. These are Pius XII Catholic University College (PXICUC) (1945-1964); the University of Bechuanaland, Basutoland and Swaziland (UBBS) (1964-1966); the University of Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland (UBLS) (1966-1975); and the NUL (1975 – present). These phases roughly correspond with the four distinct phases associated with university development on the African continent (see 1.4.2).

While I try to single out each phase for analytical purposes, I nonetheless move in between and across timelines and spaces in order to demonstrate not only the constitutive nature of the phases, but also to show the lingering effects of the previous phase on the next phase(s). In this section therefore, I discuss the foundations of NUL and analyse change and continuity from PXICUC in
1945 (3.2.1.1), through UBBS in 1964 (3.2.1.2), to UBLS from 1966-1975 (3.2.1.3), showing how the Catholic origins of the University continue to have an impact on the present. Then in section 3.2.2, I discuss how the competing interests among the three countries led to the creation of NUL.

3.2.1 Foundations of the National University of Lesotho

3.2.1.1 Pius XII Catholic University College, 1945-1964

NUL started life as a Catholic institution when the Roman Catholic Hierarchy of Southern Africa founded PXIICUC on 8 April 1945. The location of PXIICUC in Roma in Lesotho was not by accident but by design. One reason for this was that Catholicism was well established and more advanced in Lesotho than in Botswana and Swaziland (Magagula, 1978). The other reason was that Protestant and Calvinist faiths, which were well established in South Africa, tended to be militant against the expansion of Catholicism (Arcbish Interview, 07/04/2014). Another overriding reason for the establishment of a university college in Lesotho was “the hardening of discrimination in South African government circles against black university students from outside the Union of South Africa” (Mashologu, 2006:4). This is because before 1945, all qualified students from Lesotho enrolled for university education at the University College of Fort Hare in South Africa.

Thus Roma, as it is known today, 35km south-east of Maseru the capital, became the location of PXIICUC, and remains the location of NUL today. Today, Pius XII College House (PXIICH), domiciled within NUL but outside the University site, represents the last remnant of PXIICUC. There are some key features of PXIICUC which need to be borne in mind, and which in later years were to become the source of contestation. First, that the College was conceived,

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32 Ambrose (2015:3) claims that insistence by Fort Hare on students of all denominations to attend mourning assembly and an interdenominational Sunday evening religious service forced the Catholic hierarchy to found its own university because “it was completely against Catholics attending services conducted by Protestants”.

33 In 2012 Catholics in Lesotho celebrated 150 years of their presence in the country. Today, anyone driving past or visiting the Roma Valley cannot miss even from a distance, the figure 150, inscribed in whitewash on well elevated hills and mountains.
established and staffed by whites with white Catholic fathers the majority of lecturers and administrators\textsuperscript{34}; and second that all students were almost exclusively black. In later years, the sluggishness of reform in the demographics of the University, together with its hybrid nature (religious parochialism – Catholic bishops, Catholic white fathers, Catholic lecturers and Catholic administrators, and exclusively funded from Rome, Italy on one hand; and black Catholic students; black Basotho community and black rural location), all proved to be its strongest and weakest link going into the future (see the birth of NUL below). This hybridity, then and now, is part of the everyday experience of NUL. Thus Roman Catholic influence within NUL still remains to this day, 40 years after it became a state university in 1975. The Royal Charter that transferred PXIICUC to the three governments of Bechuanaland, Basutoland and Swaziland in 1964 confirmed the umbilical connections between the Church and the University by reserving land for the Roman Catholic Church on campus and by entrenching certain privileges for the Church within University structures (see UBBS below, section 3.2.1.2).

Notwithstanding the narrow religious orientation described above, throughout the 1950s and 1960s, and well beyond, PXIICUC represented an escape route from the discriminatory educational system in South Africa, what decoloniality scholars call thinking ‘otherwise’ or ‘border epistemologies’ in opposition to ‘global’ or universalist modes of thinking (Escobar, 2007; Mignolo, 2011b). In the 1970s and 1980s, for instance, NUL set aside 25\% of scholarships for South African refugees with further scholarships for Namibian and Rhodesian students (Mothibe and Mushonga, 2013:488-490). Thus at the regional/continental basis, the institution at Roma was to prove pivotal to the evolution of nationalist politics and post-independence governments of Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland, South Africa and Zimbabwe. For example, many eminent South African academics, economists, lawyers, politicians and theologians came out of the institution at Roma\textsuperscript{35}.

\textsuperscript{34} The missionary Oblates of Mary Immaculate were responsible for providing Pius XII College with its teaching personnel (Ambrose, 2015:4).

\textsuperscript{35} These include Njabulo Ndebele, Tito Mboweni, Phumzile-Mlambo Ngcuka, Lindiwe Sisulu and the Archbishop of Bloemfontein, among many others (Mothibe and Mushonga, 2013:488-490; Arcbish Interview, 07/04/2011).
3.2.1.2 The Establishment of the University of Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland, 1964-1966

On 1 January 1964, PXIICUC became the University of Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland (UBBS), having been taken over by the governments of the three territories and thus appropriately renamed so. However, while PXIICUC was physically replaced by the independent and non-denominational UBBS, its ideological influence persisted as Christianity remained the main emphasis of the new University. The majority of administrators and lecturers were Roman Catholic priests drawn from the former University. Furthermore, the Royal Charter ensured that there was continuity by making provision for, first, maintaining a residential unit for the RCC on campus, known today as Pius XII College House (PXIICH), second, appointing a Roman Catholic Chaplain to the University, and third, maintaining two positions for the teaching of Theology and Philosophy. Furthermore, the Roman Catholic Church was accorded representation on the University Council, hereafter referred to as Council, whereupon in 1964, under Statute 2 of UBBS, the Superior and the Administrator of Pius XII College House were defined as first, members, and second, officers of the University (GBLS, 1964; Mashologu, 2006:5). Today the two are ex-officio members of the Council. All these provisions in respect of the Catholic Church in a secular and publicly owned University were to become, in the course of time, arenas of contestation as Chapters 4 and 5 will show.

As for the reasons that necessitated PXIICUC becoming UBBS, the most compelling one was its financial sustainability going into the future. Others included its difficult relations with the University of South Africa (UNISA) over its curriculum and due to its perceived racial accommodation; the desire by the three High Commission Territories (HCT) (Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland) to expand educational opportunities for their own people; and the real possibility of the University becoming an alternative to apartheid institutions for black South African students (Government of Lesotho, 1965; Magagula, 1978; Rosenberg, Weisfelder and Frisbie-Futton, 2004; Mashologu, 2006; Hincks, 2009; Mokopakgosi, 2013). However, it has to be stated that the idea of a university in the HCT was not without opposition. Britain, through its High Commissioner to the HCT, Sir John Maude, was opposed to the idea of PXIICUC being turned into a university, preferring instead to have it converted into a sixth form high school whose
graduates would attend university level education in Britain and other overseas universities (Magagula, 1978), thus reinforcing Eurocentric attitudes about the West.

3.2.1.3 Political Independence and the ‘New’ University of Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland, 1966-1975

On 30 September and 4 October 1966, Botswana and Lesotho gained independence from Britain respectively. To correctly reflect the political changes, UBBS was renamed the University of Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland in 1966. But just as with UBBS, the change to UBLS remained largely cosmetic. Cyril Rogers, an Australian, took over as VC in 1971 until 1975. Some keen observers think that the continued influence and domination of the institution by the white Roman Catholic fathers and white lecturers and administrators was one of the root causes of the collapse of UBLS in 1975 (Uadm13 Interview, 21/09/2014)(see 4.2.1). Furthermore, the new UBLS Charter confirmed the special privileges for the Roman Catholic Church in Lesotho, much to the chagrin of Botswana and Swaziland who felt that this privileged status within the regional University was one of the ploys used by Lesotho to increase its representation and influence on the Council (Mashologu, 2006:53).

It seems that the Roman Catholic special privileges were the only provisions that were clearly spelt out in the Charter, leaving most issues vague if not outrightly undefined. According to Mokopakgosi (2013), The Charter did not clearly define the role of the three governments and also failed to make provision for the physical development of the university in Botswana and Swaziland. Soon, the issue of physical growth on campuses in Botswana and Swaziland became a bone of contention among the three governments, with the GOL exploiting the ambiguity in the Charter to the fullest. The governments of Botswana and Swaziland remained terribly frustrated by the lack of rapid establishment of branches of the University in their own countries. This left them exposed to the criticisms by their own citizens who were wondering why resources were being transferred to a foreign country and students being sent there (Mashologu, 2006:5).

Yet the position of Lesotho was that whatever resources became available in the future, argues a former Government representative to NUL, should be shared equally without stalling infrastructural development at Roma on the basis that the Roma campus benefited before (Grep2
Interview, 03/05/2015). But this view was obviously not supported in Botswana and Swaziland. And soon UBLS ran into storms and by 1974, a number of issues had developed into huge problems and challenges. Among other reasons, at least two, in my view, stand out as the major factors behind the break-up. These are, first, the issue of devolution, and, second, the issue of localisation. Viewed through a postcolonial (PC) and IPCF lens, the differential power relations within the Triad and between the three national governments translated into a struggle over ‘who gets what, when and how’. Thus contestations for the domination of the three-country university were to prove decisive in the break-up as section 3.2.2 shows.

3.2.2 Problematising the Creation of NUL in 1975

In this section I analyse and contextualise the circumstances surrounding the birth of NUL in 1975 (see also 4.2.1). I posit that by 1975 the hybridised power structures and systems within UBLS, the cosmopolitan nature of the University, the rampant and dangerous forms of ‘othering’, and the multiple opportunities for both governance and resistance among all the actors proved fertile ground for the break-up in the march to a future imagined by each of the three partners (Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland). For Lesotho, it can be said that the break-up was hastened by the desire to move into a future and space ‘uncontaminated’ by the seemingly retrogressive and stifling tendencies of UBLS.

Thus while Magagula (1978), Mashologu (2006), Ambrose (2006), and Mokopakgosi (2013) have offered some explanations for the break-up, it is instructive to deploy a postcolonial perspective to enhance our understanding of the demise of UBLS on one hand, and the creation of NUL on the other hand in 1975. The tumultuous birth of NUL was a consequence of considerable disputes that began in the 1960s. While several measures had been taken to make UBLS viable, challenges remained. First, the idea of three different centres of political power and authority – Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland, sharing borders with countries under colonial rule (South Africa, Rhodesia, South West Africa and Mozambique) was a major challenge. Second, the idea of three different communities with differing aspirations, coupled with the personal, professional and group interests of academic staff and students spread over the three campuses was another mammoth challenge for the University. Disagreements over an
appropriate devolution plan especially for Botswana and Swaziland; the continued lack of black and local representation at the apex of the University administration and within key University structures and committees; the colloidal local and global (Western) influences and values; and general feelings of marginality and subalternity all combined to cause the collapse of the trinational University in 1975.

Amidst all these crosscurrents at play in Lesotho, argues Mashologu (2006), it would have been a miracle if UBLS had survived unscathed. After many unsuccessful meetings between University and Government officials of the three countries over an acceptable devolution package, the issue was referred to the Ministers of Education for the three governments, and subsequently to the Heads of States. That was the turning point because once it was in the hands of politicians, devolution was politicised. Tensions reached boiling point when the Lesotho Prime Minister, first, opposed the renewal of Cyril Rogers’ contract as VC in a meeting of the Heads of States held in Swaziland in 1975 without giving any reasons, and second, walked out of the same meeting and flew back to Lesotho without officially saying goodbye to the King of Swaziland, as required by protocol. Soon afterwards it was announced on Radio Lesotho that the Lesotho Government was against extension of Cyril Rogers’ contract as VC of UBLS. Instead Lesotho preferred to have a black person in charge as part of the Africanisation and localisation drive. Pleas by the acting Chancellor of UBLS, Prince Makhosini Dlamini of Swaziland, at the graduation ceremony held in Botswana on 18 September 1975 that “Government and university must respect each other’s power boundary” (Ambrose, 2006:15) must only have helped to incense Lesotho.

The battle for the control of the University reportedly got messier by each passing day since the Heads of States meeting in Swaziland in September 1975. The Council which met in the evening following the Graduation Ceremony of 18 September, where Lesotho representative(s) were conspicuously absent, resolved to move part of the Vice- Chancellor’s Central Administration to

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36 Ambassador Likate, then a student at the time, in reminiscences yet to be published, argues that after PM Jonathan found that his counterparts had shunned him by sending lower-ranked officials to the meeting, he came back and passed the bill establishing the National University of Lesotho (Likate, 2016:13).

37 Annual graduation ceremonies alternated between the three countries.
Swaziland in case the VC was declared persona non grata in Lesotho. The tense situation in Lesotho and the knowledge that Lesotho was not supporting the renewal of his contract purportedly forced Rogers to relocate to Swaziland. One academic thinks that the political environment was decisive in the VC’s attempts to migrate the headquarters of UBLS to Swaziland.

For me, my suspicion is that at the time Lesotho had just been taken over by the second Jonathan [Prime Minister] government, to which, coming on the wave of an attempted coup [of 1974] further complicated the relationship between the intellectuals and the government. So it might have been deemed by him [Rogers] that the environment was not right to have the headquarters of the university remain here [in Lesotho].

(Uaca4 Interview, 06/05/2014)

Mashologu (2006:9) posits that it is claimed to this day that “the projected move of the Vice-Chancellor and his office from Lesotho to Swaziland was the last straw that broke the camel’s back”. This move, it is strongly believed, prompted the Prime Minister of Lesotho, Leabua Jonathan, to nationalise the Roma campus of UBLS.

Thus the attempted relocation of UBLS’ Central Administration to Swaziland, many in Lesotho claim today, led Lesotho to hastily withdraw from the tri-national university. To prevent the anticipated transfer of assets or property to either Botswana or Swaziland, and without prior warning, and after seeking legal advice, the GOL moved swiftly to nationalise the Roma campus of UBLS. According to Mashologu (2006) and Ambrose (2006), who were both at Roma at that time, the legislation to nationalise the assets was drafted, discussed and passed into law in three days. And on Monday 20 October 1975, at 1300hours, Radio Lesotho (RL) announced the creation of the NUL through the National University Act (No. 13) of 1975, hereafter referred to as the 1975 Act. The immediate reaction by some students was to rampage campus shouting “NUL has nullified everything”, wondering whether the new name was a coincidence as the ruling party was the Basotho National Party (BNP) (Mashologu, 2006:15). Questions were being asked as to whether the new University was really a national University or a ruling party (BNP) University. There is even talk today, in unofficial circles, that post-1993 ‘Congress’ governments have been marginalising and maligning the University because of these imagined links.
The following year, in 1976, Botswana and Swaziland established their own University, the University of Botswana and Swaziland (UBS), thus effectively removing the L from UBLS\(^38\) (Ambrose, 2006:22-23). Seven years later, in 1982, Botswana and Swaziland each established their own national universities – University of Botswana (UB) and University of Swaziland (UNISWA). According to one top administrator, the creation of NUL was preceded by strong nationalistic feelings hence the designation ‘national’\(^39\) in the name of the new University. It implied inclusivity of staff and students from Lesotho. It also meant accessibility to the locals through the mature age entry without discarding the international outlook of the University (Udam5 Interview, 11/01/2011).

Despite the fact that the break-up was a seemingly nasty and highly contested development, the Basotho were satisfied that at last they had their own university. At the same time, while many Batswana and Swazis were bitter about the part played by Lesotho in the break-up, it also presented an opportunity to establish their own national universities. After all, historical precedence shows that the idea of regional cooperation through trinational universities has always proved problematic and not long lasting as the splits in the University College of Rhodesia (Southern and Northern) and Nyasaland (UCRN) in 1963, and the University of East Africa (UEA) in 1970 have shown. The UBLS split in 1975, occasioned by inertia and national interests was, therefore, not unique. One Government representative to NUL posits that the split was inevitable because devolution envisaged it. As sources of national pride, he further argues, “these countries needed their own universities because they were fresh out of colonialism” (Grep2 Interview, 03/05/2015). As in most newly independent African states, a local university was a prized possession, an important national asset that enhanced the prestige of the nation.

\(^{38}\) But the Charter which created UBBS and UBLS continues to exist to this day.

\(^{39}\) Yet there are those who insist that the word ‘national’ was meant to show that the university belonged or was founded by the BNP, pointing even to the identical colours in the flags of both the University and the BNP (Uaca10 Interview, 14/10/2009).
3.3 LEGAL INSTRUMENTS AND THE ENTRENCHMENT OF DISPERSED AND RHIZOMIC POWER

In this section I analyse the legal instruments of 1975 and 1976 that created and continued the University. These are the National University of Lesotho Act (No. 13) of 1975 (section 3.3.1), and the National University Act (No. 10) of 1976 (hereafter referred to as the 1976 Act) (section 3.3.2). It is important to mention that there have been several amendments to the University law since 1975. In section 3.3.1, I outline the provisions of the 1975 Act which nationalised UBLS. In section 3.3.2, I try to show how the 1976 Act dispersed power across University structures, what some commentators call today the ‘overdemocratisation’ of the institution. The purported overdemocratisation has been blamed by some state and non-state actors as the chief reason for the current challenges ‘bedeviling’ the institution, an argument that is being used today to justify drastic revisions to the Principal Act (see section 3.6.4). However, it can be concluded that notwithstanding the several amendments, internal governance structures remained intact and continue to wield much power and influence through the Committee System which ensured that there was participatory governance across all the structures of the University. The Statutes and Ordinances, where dispersed power lies in many forms, continue to dictate how the University should be run to this day, much to the chagrin of advocates of ‘sovereign’ power. Therefore some of the major contestations in the Triad are linked to the law governing the institution – with those advocating for drastic revisions (government, university leaders and the community) being challenged or subverted by those favouring the status quo (university staff and students), as this and subsequent chapters show.

3.3.1 The National University Act (No. 13) of 1975

The National University Act (No. 13) of 1975 was a very brief law which did not provide any legal or operational framework for the functioning or administration of the University. It left the

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40 These are the National University Act (No. 10) of 1976; National University of Lesotho Act (No. 7) of 1984; National University of Lesotho Act (No. 4) of 1985; National University of Lesotho (Amendment) Order (No. 21) of 1989; National University of Lesotho (Amendment) Order (No. 19) of 1992; National University of Lesotho (Amendment) Act (No. 2) of 2002; and National University of Lesotho (Amendment) Act (No. 10) of 2012.

41 In all instances of the usage of the term ‘Principal Act’, reference is to the 1976 Act.
governance of the University not only in the old UBLS Charter and Statutes, but also not clearly defined. The GOL seemed to be preoccupied with trying to address two issues that were likely to lead to litigation as a result of the nationalisation of the Roma campus of UBLS. The first was the issue of the property, rights and liabilities of the former UBLS. The second was the issue of staff of the former UBLS. To address the first issue, Section 3 of the Act declared all property and liability belonging to the former UBLS to be “the property, rights and liabilities of the National University of Lesotho” while section 6(4) stated that “no proceedings or claims for loss of property, rights, or liabilities of the [UBLS] in the [NUL] shall be made or instituted except under this section” (GOL, 1975:41-42). As for the second issue, the Act declared all members of staff of the former UBLS to be members of NUL. This was occasioned by the fear of losing staff members to Botswana and Swaziland. Those who did not wish to be under NUL were supposed to advise the Minister in writing within seven days of the new law coming into force. Beyond these two issues, the rest were left appallingly silent if not undefined. According to Mashologu (2006), the apparent absence of a clear statement about the future governance of the University in the 1975 Act must have contributed to feelings of uncertainty about the real intentions of the GOL (Mashologu, 2006:31-33). Consequently, many people were left asking, ‘so what next’ by the unpredictable government of Jonathan which had five years earlier (in 1970), cancelled elections and declared a state of emergency. But to the surprise of many, the GOL granted unprecedented autonomy to the University through the 1976 Act to which I now turn.

3.3.2 The National University Act (No. 10) of 1976 and the Dispersion of Power

In the present section I strive to show how power was dispersed throughout the University. It is this dispersion of power and the granting of institutional autonomy and academic freedom that some critics call the ‘overdemocratisation’ of the University. Positions on this issue are deeply polarised.

In brief, the 1976 Act preserved and constituted NUL as body corporate, capable of suing and being sued (GOL, 1976:32). The Act also provided that Council must, before exercising any of its powers widely defined in section 13(2)(a)-13(2)(i), and in the spirit of collegial governance, first “seek and give due consideration to a report or recommendation from Senate in relation to a
matter which falls within the competence of the Senate”, except in a case of emergency or urgency. Furthermore, the Act, in section 14(1)-14(3) gave powers to Council to delegate all or any of its powers and authority to any member of or to any committee appointed by the Council or to any officer or officers of the University. While the VC was given powers to appoint his/her deputy, he/she could only do so in consultation with Senate (GOL, 1976:38). Thus the VC and Senate shared power in the appointment of the PVC.

Again, the Act gave students considerable power by establishing a Students’ Union (SU) that was defined as a body corporate, capable of suing and being sued. It established an autonomous Student Union which was neither a servant nor agent of the University. Article 27 (3) states, “[i]t is hereby declared, for the avoidance of doubt, that it is not the intention of this Part that the Students’ Union shall be or shall be regarded as, for any purpose, the servant or agent of the Council or the University” (GOL, 1976:39; Machobane 1989:12). The SU was put on par with the University. Just like in the Royal Charter, the Act also went on to confirm, and to accord the Catholic Church two places on Council in an ex-officio capacity and two academic positions in the departments of Theology and Philosophy for its historic role in laying the foundations of university education in Lesotho (see 3.2.1.2).

However, it is important to note that while many sections of the 1976 Act redistributed power within the University community, the Government retained the power to appoint the Vice-Chancellor. Section 17(3) read, “[t]he Head of State [The King], on the advice of the Prime Minister, may confirm or refuse to confirm the appointment made under this section or any term or condition in respect of the appointment”, while 17(4) read “[n]o appointment under this section nor any term or condition in respect of such appointment shall have any force and effect unless and until confirmed by the Head of State” (GOL, 1976:37). When a former Minister of Education asked why the Government was determined to decide who was or was not VC, the Minister responded rhetorically, “if you own your own business don’t you want to appoint your own manager” (Gmin1 Interview, 07/08/2014)? Thus while in the first twenty years since 1975, the GOL has not hidden its intentions to strengthen its grip on the appointment of the Vice-Chancellor through a series of amendments of the Principal Act, it left the Statutes and Ordinances – the sources of most power and resistance – intact. Attempts in later years to tamper
with these sources of power (see section 3.6.4) have led to resistance because, as Foucault (1976) posits, where there is power there is resistance, and like power, resistance is multiple (see Chapters 4 and 5).

The 1976 Act was largely an outcome of the input by both academic and non-academic staff, as well as by students themselves, having been given power to enact subsidiary legislation through the preparation of Statutes and Ordinances (Mashologu 2006:52). Thus the Act entrenched the collegiate committee style of management or Committee System in running the affairs of the institution. The Committee System is a strongly held tradition in British universities where the powers of Council and Senate are carried through a system of committees and Lesotho easily followed in the footsteps of its former colonial master.

A deeper examination of the 1976 Act would show that this legal instrument made certain that there was hybridised and ubiquitous power and by the same token resistance, spread across the University. Power was to operate rhizomatically rather than downwards through the numerous bodies, organs and committees of the University. These included the Finance and General Purpose Board (FGPB), Board of Development (BD), University Tender Board (UTB), Library Board (LB), Academic Staff and Appointments Committee (ASAC), Non-Academic Staff Appointments Committee (NASAC), Students Union (SU), Department of Students’ Affairs (DSA), Faculties, Institutes, Departments, and Units (NUL Calendar, 2006/2007:399-400; 413). Thus power, and therefore resistance, was to reside in multiple spaces, not least the numerous boards and committees of the University and their agentic players. These hybridised bodies have engendered hybridised and rhizomic power across the whole administrative framework of the University. As can be imagined, each of these organs performs specific and sometimes overlapping functions with varying degrees of power, agency and resistance. There is little doubt that striking balance between governance and resistance has left both critics and admirers of the law divided.

In line with the principle of the dispersal of power, the governing body of the University, the Council is headed by the Chancellor. The Chairman of Council normally chairs meetings on behalf of the Chancellor. Other members of Council include 5 ex-officio members namely the
Chancellor, the VC, the PVC, the Superior of Pius XII College House and the Administrator of Pius XII College House; 5 persons internal to Lesotho appointed by the Head of State; 4 members of Senate appointed by Senate; 2 members of Congregation appointed by the Congregation; 4 members external to Lesotho appointed by the Chancellor; 4 persons representing the wider community appointed by the Chancellor; the President of the Students Union; and 1 other person who is not a member of staff of the University or a student, appointed by the Chancellor. Academic policy of the University lies in the hands of Senate whose composition is made up of the VC as its Chairman; the PVC; Deans of Faculties; Directors of Institutes; the Librarian; Heads of Academic Departments; Professors of the University; three students one of whom shall be the President of the Students Union; and 5 members of the academic staff elected by Congregation (NUL Calendar, 2006/2007:401-402; 407). Both Council and Senate are assisted in running the University through many other university organs, bodies and committees with varying degrees of power (see 3.3.2). It is the revision or attempted tampering with some of these governance structures that has produced tensions and contestations as shown in Chapters 4 and 5.

3.3.3 Evaluation of the National University Act (No. 10) of 1976

Those critical of the 1976 Act argue that the Act, spurred by the urge to democratise the University in an undemocratic country, subordinated institutional interests to individual/group interests (Machobane 1989; Mashologu, 2006:55, 63, 108, 109, 117; Sejanamane 2010:2; Udam5 Interview, 08/02/2011; Gmin2 Interview, 08/03/2011; Uadm13 Interview, 21/09/2014). Yet it should be quickly qualified that if the 1976 Act overdemocratised the University, it was on the basis of some key assumptions which may no longer be tenable today. At the time, one major assumption was that granting greater self-rule and autonomy to the University would allay fears about the security and the future of the University.

At the time of the nationalisation, there was, as already mentioned, first, the real danger of losing the bulk of staff members to Botswana and Swaziland due to fear of security of tenure; and second, the fact that students were fearful and agitated about whether their degrees were going to be recognised internationally as they used to be during the UBLS era (Mashologu, 2006).
According to an insider at the time, the call from Botswana and Swaziland that all staff who would want to leave NUL could do so prompted the GOL to find the necessary means to retain staff. Guarantees were sought from the government to say that there would be no interference. “So the only way by which staff could be retained” argues the informant “was to say there would be some form of self-rule and that autonomy would be buttressed. And that is how we came up with that law [the 1976 Act].” (Uadm13 Interview, 21/09/2014). As for students, Mashologu (2006) posits that those who remained at the Roma campus – mainly Basotho students and students from South Africa, Namibia and Rhodesia, repeatedly sought assurances that their degrees would be recognised internationally, and that there would be no direct government interference in the University. Consequently, the Government of Lesotho gave the University community an opportunity to submit its views regarding the statutes of the institution and allowed them to develop a charter to govern themselves. In the end, the University community crafted a law that tried to insulate the institution from all influences from outside. According to Sejanamane (2010) and Mashologu (2006), the undemocratic government of Jonathan was determined to appease its detractors. As a consequence, posits Machobane (1989), members of academic staff at NUL have become too dominant in its Council and Senate, thus removing “all meaningful authority from the Vice-Chancellor, Pro Vice-Chancellor, Registrar, and Dean of Students Affairs” (Machobane, 1989a:11-12). None of these officers, according to Machobane, was left with any executive powers, with the consequence that the University found itself afflicted of conflicting sets of leadership, whose juridical clashes could only be resolved by the courts of law.\footnote{See 3.6.2. See also Appendix E on select list of court cases between 1979 and 2013.} In spite of the fact that the University Council is pronounced by the Act as the Supreme Governing body of the institution, it is for all intents and purposes a legal fiction. \cite{Machobane1989}

(Machobane, 1989a:12)

Today, with the benefit of hindsight, Sejanamane\footnote{Mafa Sejanamane is one of the most experienced academics and administrators of NUL who has held numerous positions in the University since 1975.} argues that the 3-man committee was wrong in coming with the 1976 Act, which he now blames for the numerous woes of the University. He argues that
The current law which came into force in 1976 was par excellence by staff for staff. The present difficulties of the university have their origin here. Institutional interests were subordinated to individual interests. It brought about a situation whereby we attempted to create an island of direct democracy in an undemocratic country. It attempted to level everybody everywhere.

(Sejanamane, 2010:2)

As Chapters 4 and 5 show, this appeasement if any by Government seems to have backfired. This is because instead of facilitating University governance and interpreting the provisions of the law in the best possible light, critics of the law would argue, University employees and its management seem to have turned the law into a convenient weapon to fight personal and institutional battles with impunity (see 4.1 and Chapter 5). According to Machobane, [w]hen we created NUL in 1975 we were not clear…as to what kind of university we wanted or needed [and] we were not clear on the purpose for the existence of our university” (Machobane, 1989a:10-11). Consequently, when the last white VC left, political considerations still dominated academic goals (Machobane, 1989a:11). A former member of NUL top management thinks that when the law was enacted, it was assumed that there would be tolerance and open discussion. However, people under-estimated the degree of anarchism and populism. He adds that

one problem we have in Lesotho is what is called molilitse (ululating). For example, if it is playing soccer, the moment one hears molilitse, he forgets everything and wants to be [everything] from a defender to a midfielder and to a striker instead of passing the ball. But where people have certain values, democracy is not a bad thing. It is not the legislation that is bad, but it is the general milieu in which people operate.

(Uadm5 Interview, 18/01/2011)

The 1976 Act is therefore a very important piece of legislation that remains pivotal to our understanding of the complex relations of power in the Triad. In Foucauldian formulations, power entails resistance and resistance is contained by power. The numerous amendments to the Act have sought to completely take away power from the various university bodies where it is found. In the very recent past, three amendments in quick succession have all demonstrated how dominant actors have attempted to impose their will on others (see section 3.6.4).
3.4 THE FUTURE ROLE OF THE UNIVERSITY: DEVELOPMENT AND COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT

At independence, all African universities found themselves with new or expanded functions that went beyond the traditional functions of teaching and research. In section 1.4 we have seen how the independence university was supposed to advise African governments on developmental issues. Consequently NUL was expected to contribute to the social, cultural and economic development of Lesotho. It was being said that if the right balance is struck, NUL will earn its rightful place as an important institution in the national development of Lesotho, and of southern Africa as a whole (Mashologu, 2006:127). The University became the source of high-level manpower and in the first decade or so of its establishment, NUL played an invaluable role in the social, political, cultural and economic development of Lesotho (Mashologu, 2006; Ebewo, 1999). The University became the source of high-level manpower. Those who conceived NUL in 1975 expected it to play a leading role in national development. A lot was therefore expected of the new institution. It was expected to be the leading light in the search for solutions to the developmental imperatives of the nation.

To facilitate and enhance the developmental role of NUL, the GOL further consolidated five-year development plans soon after pulling out of the trinational arrangement. It also revived a campus in Maseru, better known today as the Institute of Extra Mural Studies, and satellite campuses in the rural areas of Mahobong, Thaba-Tseka and Mohale’s Hoek to fulfill this developmental role. DEEMS\textsuperscript{44}/IEMS was taking the University to the people and bringing the people to the University (VC Report, 1977/1978:62; NUL Calendar 1992/1993:67; 2006/2007:308). This it did through the provision of residential and field courses and the holding of conferences, mass meetings and rallies across the country\textsuperscript{45}. With time, IEMS became, and continues to be the centre piece of the pursuit of third mandate of the University – community engagement, focusing on issues such as adult education, co-operatives, leadership for development, poultry production and community development. This function was well captured

\textsuperscript{44} Before it was renamed IEMS it was known as the Division of Extra Mural Services (DEMS).

\textsuperscript{45} About 10 mass meetings were held in 1977 alone. At one meeting there were 18 350 people in attendance (NUL, 1977:12, 22).
in the title of a magazine *The Light in the Night* (DEMS, 1976) in which NUL staff were portrayed as the rays of the sun shining on the wider Basotho society.

At the local level, the creation of NUL offered the chance of improving cooperation between the University and the Government, cooperation which seemed to lack under UBLS. The former UBLS was seen as an ivory tower institution aloof from the normal day-to-day concerns of the people. It had achieved extremely modest involvement in the development of Lesotho. It was, according to Mashologu, a University in Lesotho, and not of Lesotho (Mashologu, 2006:60). Therefore the establishment of NUL was expected to provide a welcome opportunity to construct a new bridge of cooperation between the University and the GOL. The academic departments were challenged to review their curricula to see how far they could address the problems of the country and the southern African region. The word ‘relevance’ became a buzz-word. For the first time members of staff of the new University were invited to official receptions hosted by GOL in the capital Maseru (Mashologu, 2006:100). Some members of staff were invited to join official Lesotho government delegations attending conferences abroad, while there were numerous requests from various Government ministries and departments to offer expert advice on a number of issues.

However, there was a limit to what the new University could do. Firstly, some academic members of staff felt very uneasy about the new relationship and wondered “whether it was wise and appropriate for members of staff to respond to certain requests that seemed to associate them too closely with the government of the day” (Mashologu, 2006:100). There was also reluctance on the part of some Government officials to engage University staff. Yet there was also the heightened expectation that the University had solutions to all the ills bedeviling the country, with the danger that reluctance or failure on the part of the academics to proffer such solutions led to disillusionment. Mkandawire (2005:23) posits that African governments tended to reduce the relevance of intellectuals to the provision of ‘manpower’ resources for development and to indigenise the civil service and that once indigenisation was achieved, most governments had little motivation to continue support for the African university. Further, there were challenges related to planning. At the inception of NUL in 1975, it was readily understood that the GOL would meet the recurrent costs of the institution for the first five years, and that efforts would be
made to secure donor assistance for capital developments. Mashologu (2006) remarks that beyond the first five years, realistic plans for changes in the future, including funding, physical growth and student enrolments, vision, mission, values and purpose of the institution were not attended to. Thus to the question: what kind of university do we need and what kind of university can we afford, there seemed to be no consensus. According to Mashologu (2006:56-57), there was an unbridgeable gap between those who maintained that the university should strive to uphold the highest standards in all respects (global/universal), and those who thought it should limit itself to being a people’s university (local). As a result, according to Mashologu, (2006:57), the intensity of the contention led to the deferment of committing to a clear objective. This lack of consensus meant that NUL would be anything ‘in-between’. This sense of ‘in-betweenness’ (hybridity) has punctuated much of the history of the institution (see Chapter 4), and probably compromised its effectiveness in development.

The failure, real or imagined, by NUL to play any meaningful role in national development in recent times has become a hotly contested issue. And sooner than later, around the 1990s, NUL began to struggle not only with its assumed role in national development, but with a limited budget. It became constrained by an increasingly falling Government subvention coupled with a wage bill made up of more than 90% of the University budget. As all this happened, the role of the University in national development increasingly got compromised. This led to a rethink about how NUL should transform and be governed going into the future. Consequently, complex relations of power emerged, leading to a whole host of contestations (see Chapters 4 and 5).


In this section I examine triadic relations within the context of the prevailing national and regional political environment, bringing to the fore the fact that the period 1970-1992 was the era of a large ‘elephant in the room with the grass ceiling’. First, the undemocratic national political environment in Lesotho led to lawlessness and abominable deeds by men in authority. Second,

46 According to Ping and Crowley (1997), ordinary Namibians demanded that the University of Namibia should help solve national problems, assist government and business, and develop economic and human resources, among many others, while academics and University administrators saw a more constrained role for the University. Both these roles were considered unattainable and unaffordable (Ping and Crowley, 1997:381-395).
open solidarity and support by the Lesotho government for the liberation of Southern Africa, right from within the belly of an apartheid monster, further complicated its national politics. These two combined to leave a lasting impact on the University. I discuss this impact under two major phases namely the BNP dictatorship (1970-1985) in section 3.5.1, and the era of military rule (1986-1992) in section 3.5.2. These phases are both symptomatic of relentless efforts by the Government not only to concentrate all power in its hands, but also to keep the University on a tight leash on one hand, and the sheer resistance to these efforts by the University community (staff and students) on the other hand. I try to show that what was happening at NUL in the 1970s and 1980s should not be judged in isolation from the national experience of the time.

3.5.1 Struggles within Struggles: The BNP Dictatorship and the University, 1970-1985

In this section I discuss the brief background to the turbulent national political environment, the ‘anarchy’ at NUL in the early 1980s, and Government attempts to tighten its grip on NUL through the arm of law. I show how the state wanted to keep NUL under surveillance by keeping soldiers and state security officers on campus, thus inducing a sense of permanent visibility in order to ensure the functioning of power (see 5.2).

3.5.1.1 Brief Background to the Turbulent Political Environment

In 1970 when the ruling BNP lost elections to the BCP, Jonathan declared a state of emergency, suspended the constitution and went on to rule by decree. Many pro-BCP people were dismissed from government, arrested and detained without trial, while others were forced into exile where they formed, in 1979, a military wing, the Lesotho Liberation Army (LLA) to fight the BNP government with the support of the apartheid regime (Pule 2002; Ambrose Interview, 28/10/2009). Many of those who were dismissed from Government tended to find both employment and ‘refuge’ at the University in Roma. But even here, they were not safe as they were systematically targeted and chased out of the institution.
NUL entered a turbulent political phase in the 1980s. Whatever cordial relations had existed between the Government and the University was over in just about six years after its creation. Relations started to deteriorate during this period because the many politically motivated decisions of the GOL, as well as the many politically motivated incidents on campus. Many of the incidents involved students who were divided between those who supported the ruling BNP and those who supported the opposition BCP. Thus the national party divisions of the country were mirrored at NUL, with student supporters and sympathisers of the BNP coalescing around the SDF while those for the BCP coalesced around the SLF. In 1981 for example, in the months of October and November alone, well over ten politically motivated incidents took place or were reported (see VC’s Report, 1981:1-15). The campus became a political battleground between 1980 and 1986, what could be seen as the reign of ‘white terror’\(^{47}\). The political unrest in the country and on campus was well captured by Stan Motjuwadi in the *Drum* magazine of April 1983 when he wrote,

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\text{[t]he political unrest in the beleaguered mountain kingdom is spilling onto the National University of Lesotho. Just as Chief Jonathan’s Basotho National Party and its Para Military Unit and Ntsu Mokhehle’s Basotho Congress Party and its military wing, the Lesotho Liberation Army, are killing each other, the pro-Jonathan, Student Democratic Front and the pro-Mokhehle, Student Liberation Front, are fighting a no-holds-barred fight on the Roma campus. Since last year the campus has come to look more like a microcosm of the politically torn and divided kingdom which is still being wracked by a bloody carnage of assassin and counter assassin (sic).} \\
\text{(Motjuwadi, 1983:228)}
\]

The Students Union remained deeply divided along national political parties, leading to instability in student government, and to deteriorating relationships between students and other students, students and administration, and to a general lack of security on campus (VC’s Report, 1984/5). When students went on strike in October 1985 to protest the presence of armed state agents on campus, some of whom were students, Senate was prompted to write to the PM to

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\(^{47}\) In its original meaning, it meant political violence or counter-revolutionary movement during the French Revolution between 1794 and 1795. In the context of this study, it means political unrest on the NUL campus.
register its concern about the continued armed violence on campus. Part of its memorandum to the PM read,

Sir, our most recent hair-raising experience came on Saturday/Sunday October 12/13/1985 when landrovers freely moved up and down the University campus. The passengers, some of whom have been identified, were heavily armed and were intimidating students and staff alike.

(Senate Report, 1985:7)

The Government did not deny the presence of an armed group on campus and instead promised to take immediate action to disarm their officers who were students at the University (Senate Report, 1985:4). Yet, notwithstanding these promises, no students were disarmed. Yet still, despite these difficulties, NUL enjoyed a relative degree of autonomy in such areas as the appointment of staff, student recruitment and staff promotions (Mashologu, 2006:94).

3.5.1.3 Tightening the Grip on NUL or Improving the Legislative and Governance Framework, 1984-1985?

By 1984, a perception had been cultivated in government circles that there was anarchy at the University, anarchy which rendered the University ungovernable. To this day this perception persists and has been used as an alibi to justify Government intervention. The past has thus left profound footprints on the present. While grounds for such a perception may have shifted, today it seems to be based on first, lack of respect for each other, and second, the lack of consensus between the University and the GOL about how best to make the University responsive to national needs (see Chapter 4 and 5).

Thus, following the troubles of 1980-1985, it seems the Government was convinced that one of the ways to deal with the situation at NUL was to amend the law governing the institution. Two amendments followed in quick succession – the NUL (Amendment) Act (No. 7) of 1984 and the NUL (Amendment) Act (No. 4) of 1985. Both the 1984 and 1985 amendments paid major attention to Section 17 of the Principal Act that dealt with the appointment of the VC. The 1984
Act\textsuperscript{48} gave the PM power to dictate to Council on the appointment of the VC while the 1985 Act gave him further powers to fire the VC, among other powers (GOL, 1984; GOL, 1985). Students at NUL felt that these legal instruments were a sure way of increasing the capacity of the government to “eavesdrop … at the door”, thus compromising free and unbiased policy and decision-making (SLF Graduation Statement, 1984). Government was convinced that tightening control of the institution required the arm of the law. And yet the GOL would not say it was about control, but about improving the legislative and governance framework of the institution. While the GOL seemed to usurp all the powers to appoint and fire the Vice-Chancellor, the Statutes and Ordinances – the sources of dispersed and rhizomic power in the institution were left fairly intact. The Government’s final say in the appointment of the VC did not translate into power to control the University because Government evidently underestimated the capacity of the University or of individuals or groups of people to subvert its will, even though such resistance could never be total or final (see 5.4).

3.5.2 Military Rule and the University, 1986-1992

On 20 January 1986, Prime Minister Jonathan was overthrown in a coup\textsuperscript{49}. The soldiers then established a Military Council to rule the country. According to \textit{Mochochonono (The Comet)} (1986:7) a Government controlled newspaper, the military coup which overthrew Jonathan was justified on the grounds that there were divisions “in the army and police force because of political bias and that the NUL had been turned into a political base to further party interests”, among other reasons. However, the military regime continued to interfere in the internal affairs of NUL and the era of military rule saw the simmering of tense relations between the University and the military junta. It also witnessed the growth of trade unionism on campus and the resultant collective bargaining that has almost become the standard approach to labour issues at NUL. Just like the previous Government, the first military regime moved in to tighten its grip on NUL through the NUL (Amendment) Order (No. 21 of 1989). According to one informant who

\textsuperscript{48} Evidence points to the fact that the 1984 Amendment was made in order to pave the way for the appointment of Mr B. A. Tlelase, a former Minister of Education as the VC, ahead of the Council’s choice of Dr A.M. Maruping (see Chapter 5). It also meant to give the PM more powers.

\textsuperscript{49} And by sheer coincidence of history, the year the military took power also marked the beginning of unstable Vice-Chancellorships at NUL, alternating between acting and substantive for long periods of time.
was a member of Council at the time, they (the military regime) even got to a point of wanting to close the University because of persistent student strikes (Uadm6 Interview, 06/08/2014). However, the second military regime (1991-1992) showed its commitment to moving the country towards a new democratic dispensation by among other things, loosening Government’s grip on NUL through the NUL (Amendment) Order of 1992 (see section 3.5.2.3).

3.5.2.1 Trade Unionism, Political Activism and the Military

In this section I briefly discuss the relations between trade Unions, the Administration, the military regime and the society at large. Thus during this period (1986-1992), one of the biggest challenges, in the opinion of the University Administration and the military regime, was the growth of trade unionism. However, on the part of University staff and students, their major challenge seemed to be first, the absence of democracy in the country, and second, continued Government interference in the affairs of the University (NULASA, 1989). Thus the activities of two university associations, NULASA and NASA, alongside a highly politically conscious Students Union, became creative forces both within and outside the University. Over time, these associations evolved to become trade Unions. Their overall aim, including the Students Union, was to have greater representation in Council and University Committees in order to influence policy-making and the day-to-day running of the University.

During this period, the most burning issue for NULASA, for which it evidently fought tooth and nail, was the ruling by Council in 1985 that Statute 24 was inconsistent with the principal law by defining senior administrative and senior library staff as academic. Council intended to synchronise this with the Principal Act. However, NULASA felt that this move was a deliberate move by Council to undermine its representation on Council (NULASA Minutes, 1987). Maybe it can be reasoned that at the time, this definition suited NULASA and its constituent partners as

50 See the respective Constitutions of these bodies.

51 It is interesting to note that in the 2015 Council approved amendments to some sections of Statute 24, the definition of academic staff has been left intact, in its original and controversial definition, choosing to concentrate, as it may seem, on less controversial issues (see clauses 24 (3), (5), (6), (7), (8) and (9). Ordinance 4 on the appointment and terms of office of Deans, Deputy Deans and Faculty Tutors was similarly repealed (see NUL Circular: Ref: REG/ADM-1.75-2015/01).
it allowed them to vote as a bloc and probably to deal with the excesses of power by either the University or the Government or both, through what Spivak (1990) calls strategic essentialism. Thus strategic essentialism was deployed as an important strategy of not only resistance (see Chapter 5), but also of influencing mainstream society. Yet it can also be said that as a result, a ‘golden’ opportunity was missed by the trade union to address one of the issues that has contributed to uneasy divisions among the staff of the University to this day. As Eide (2010) argues, the risk of advancing group identity in a simplified and collectivised way as NULASA did to achieve certain objectives may play into the “hands of those whose essentialism is more powerful than their own” (Eide, 2010:76). This way, strategic essentialism functions as a double-edged sword (Lee, 2014). As I shall argue below (see section 3.5.2.3), the essentialising strategy adopted by NULASA was the beginning of the ‘devaluation’ of the academic rank at NUL as the strategy played well into the hands of the state which saw a golden opportunity to undermine the academic rank for its own ends (see 3.5.2.3).

3.5.2.2 The NUL (Amendment) Order (No. 21) of 1989: Discipline and Punishment?

The trade unionism of NULASA and its political activism was loathed by the military regime which began to cultivate the view that at NUL, the VC lacked real authority and power (Likate, 1989; Machobane, 1989b). It is important to note that this feeling persists to this day and has been the basis of the most recent amendments and attempted amendments to the University law (see section 3.6.4). Thus in 1989 amending the law governing the University was the answer by the Military Regime. Yet the amendment did not give power to the VC, but instead gave power to the Government through the office of the Chancellor.

Sharp differences between NULASA on one hand, and the Administration and the GOL on the other hand had their origins, among other sources, in what NULASA perceived as the irregular appointment of Ms Abigail Taylor (not real name) by the PVC as a lecturer to the Department of Political and Administrative Studies (PAS), forcing NULASA to resolve to withdraw its participation from the graduation ceremony for that year (see Chapter 5 for finer details). The Government responded by intervening to purportedly protect the University Administration but also to discipline and punish the recalcitrant ‘Other’.

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The first step to amending the law was to set up a Commission of Inquiry into the Instability at the National University of Lesotho in 1989. As already stated, it was prompted by, among other things, the conviction by Government that NULASA was planning to disrupt the graduation ceremony for that year. It would seem that the work of the Commission was pre-empted as the GOL hastily amended the Principal Act before the Commission had even completed its work. Nonetheless, the Commission noted, in its preamble to the report, that in the “NUL there is a tendency for strife and conflict [and that] this is so because the University reflects Lesotho’s national political experience” (GOL, 1989b:1). It also noted the existence of two rival student groups aligned with the national political parties. According to the Commission Report (1989:16), the main criticism of the administrative structures of the university was the existence of too many committees. One witness to the Commission was of the view that “the decision making process had been overdemocratised” (GOL, 1989b:16), thus making University administration cumbersome. It would seem that the Commission did not address the real issue, but instead sought to shift blame from the Administration to NULASA.

Following the 1986 coup, the Military-Monarchy Alliance hammered out between the military and the King purportedly gave King Moshoeshoe II executive and legislative powers. And through the NUL (Amendment) Order (No. 21 of 1989), the Government was given more powers to control the University rather than addressing the bureaucratic procedures of the University. Under section 15 (6) of the NUL Order No. 21, 1989, the Chancellor could, without notice, terminate the appointment of, or dismiss any member of the University as he saw fit (GOL, 1989c; NUL Order, 1989:572-574). In all previous laws of the University, the King merely had ceremonial powers, and only acted on the advice of either the Minister of Education, the Prime Minister or both.

And following this amendment, NULASA launched a campaign against the military regime, appealing to the International Labour Organisation (ILO) for support and calling on foreign governments, Non-governmental Organisations (NGOs), institutions of higher learning, public bodies and “all people of goodwill to support our call that the GOL should immediately repeal the NUL (Amendment) Order 1989” and that the Government should also halt proceedings of the
Commission of Inquiry “until the bias embodied in its terms of reference have been expunged” (NULASA Press, 1989:3-4). Yet, NULASA did not only campaign for the welfare of its members. It also actively engaged in political activism, demanding the immediate return to democratic civilian rule. One of its slogans read: *Unchain the Nation! Restore Democracy Now!!* (NULASA, 1990). Thus, the political activism of the Union, through concerted pressure it exerted on the military to relinquish power contributed in no small measure towards the democratisation of Lesotho. Meanwhile the Military-Monarchy Alliance was marred by serious disagreements on a number of governance issues of the country between the Military Council, especially its then Chairman Major General Justin Metsing Lekhanya and King Moshoeshoe II. Mothibe (1990:243) argues that while Order No 2 of 1986 apparently gave power to the King, the Order did not necessarily remove it from the military. As a consequence, in 1990, the military moved in to strip the King of any executive and legislative powers he had been given and forced him into exile in the United Kingdom.

3.5.2.3 The NUL (Amendment) Order (No. 19) of 1992 and the ‘Devaluation’ of the Academic Rank

In 1991, Major General Lekhanya was overthrown in a coup by junior officers and was replaced by Colonel P. Ramaema, who had served as a Military Councillor since the coup of 1986. However, unlike the previous military junta, the new Military Regime was committed to the restoration of civilian rule at the earliest possible opportunity. To demonstrate this commitment, among other things, the military regime amended the NUL Principal Act via the NUL (Amendment) Order (No. 19) of 1992. The new law saw the return of dispersed and rhizomic power as it simply stated that “the NUL established under the 1976 Act is preserved, continued in existence and constituted … as a body corporate” (NUL Calendar, 2006/07:401).

However, the new law introduced a new, broad and controversial definition of academic staff. The NUL (Amendment) Order 1992 simply clustered teaching and non-teaching senior administrative and senior library staff into this category. It defined academic staff as “VC, PVC, the teaching and research staff, Senior Administrative Staff, Senior Library Staff, documentalists and all other members appointed on academic terms of service” (NUL Order, 1989:400). As a result, and through the agency of NULASA and the agency of the state, the academic rank was
devalued or, in PC framings, ‘bastardised’. This was in sharp contrast to the 1976 Act which defined them as simply “VC, PVC and members of the teaching and research staff” (NUL Act, 1976:31). In doing so, the state was fully aided by NULASA which fought to resist efforts by Council to rectify this anomaly. At the time (in 1988/1989), NULASA was riled by what it saw as professorial rank glorification and academic regimentation by the Baikie-headed administration\textsuperscript{52} (see 4.2.3.1). NULASA became inadvertent participants in the devaluation of its own profession. Thus by simply clustering together teaching and non-teaching senior administrative and senior library staff into the category of ‘academic staff’, the academic rank was devalued. This new definition was to be the site of complex contestations and counter-contestations.

Since the dawn of democracy in 1993, the new definition of ‘academic staff’ has been the site of many battles between LUTARU and the Administration. The ‘bastardisation’ and ‘creolisation’ of the academic rank was firmly entrenched by the interim University Administration of 2005/2006. First, the Administration reversed the separation of cadres that had been achieved during the Transformation Process (TP) (2002-2004). Second, the Administration introduced a new salary scale that put some of the senior administrative staff on par with professors while at the same time lumping together academics who belong to the same rank into a uniform salary structure irrespective of qualification, experience and publishing record. This was not the first time LUTARU had achieved separation of cadres. Earlier on, in 1996, and on the strength of a new contract negotiated with the employer through collective bargaining, LUTARU had achieved the separation of cadres, only to have it rescinded by the 8\textsuperscript{th} Council during the Vice-Chancellorship of Professor Moletsane\textsuperscript{53} (NUL, 1998).

While democracy returned in 1993, the transition left the basic character of state institutions intact, with the majority of them generally opposed to democracy (Pule, 2002:197). For NUL

\textsuperscript{52} A. D. Baikie was the 4\textsuperscript{th} substantive VC of NUL. He was a Nigerian Professor of Education. Appointed in 1988, he remains the only substantive VC to have remained at the helm for eight uninterrupted years (two terms) from 1988-1995.

\textsuperscript{53} Professor R. I. M. Moletsane was the 5\textsuperscript{th} substantive VC NUL (1997-2000), and the 4\textsuperscript{th} Mosotho to serve in such capacity.
this meant continuity of rule by Committees; the electoral process for officers of the University; the ‘devaluation’ of the academic rank; and a highly politicised and restive workforce. Also early in the 1990s, academics at NUL chose to cast themselves as ‘cadres’ ostensibly to describe themselves as a small group of people specially trained for the academic profession. However, their detractors and other actors in the Triad may have understood it to mean not only a group of political activists or revolutionaries masquerading as academics, but also to mean people who are ‘self-centred’, conflicted and manipulative (Grep4 Interview, 25/07/2014). It is therefore not surprising that some in Government came to see NUL as a sentenele, i.e. as a hiding place for government ‘enemies’ or even as ‘a political opposition’ party (Uaca10 Interview, 14/10/2009) (see 4.4). In Chapter 5, the discussion of agency and resistance gives the term ‘cadre’ more significance than is otherwise thought.

3.6 TRIADIC RELATIONS IN THE ERA OF DEMOCRACY, 1993-2014

In 1993, Lesotho returned to democracy after over two decades of dictatorship and military rule. In the elections of 27 March 1993, the main opposition BCP defeated the BNP by winning all 65 parliamentary seats available under the first-past-the-post (FPP) electoral system. Since then, government has changed four times due to the fragmentation of the original BCP mainly in pursuit of personal and group interests. The fortunes of the University have tended to vacillate with changes in the political environment too. In this section, beginning around 1993, I discuss three issues all related to the competition for power. Firstly, I discuss trade unionism at NUL and how this led Government to enact further legislation as part of its discourse of discipline and punishment. Secondly, I show how NUL has been, and continues to be, since the 1980s, court prone. Thirdly, I engage with those intersecting areas between the Roma and wider community and the Government with the University student. Specific areas singled out for discussion are the general security at the University, student accommodation, student allowances and general student behaviour. Fourth and last, I discuss further Government attempts to amend the NUL law in order to fully control the institution.

3.6.1 Trade Unions and University Legislation, 1993-2014

3.6.1.1 Triadic Relations vis-à-vis Trade Unionism

In the 1990s, as material conditions worsened, people in universities, just like the rest in other sectors of the African economy, coalesced around trade Unions to fight for better working conditions. As we have already seen, LUTARU was formed in 1993 to represent the interests of teaching, research and senior library staff while in 1995 the senior administrative staff formed their own trade union, SUSU. The formation of SUSU prompted some people to wonder whom the Union was unionising against given that its members were the ‘face’ of the Administration (Uadm14 Interview, 05/08/2014). Non-academic staff remained unionised under NAWU. As will be shown below and in Chapters 4 and 5, trade unionism became an essentialising strategy to lay claims to better working conditions.

However, the formation of LUTARU did not result in an immediate change of the salary structure. Salaries for senior administrative staff remained at the same level/structure as that for academic staff. LUTARU therefore, unlike its predecessor NULASA, began to advocate for a policy of the total ‘separation of cadres’ by demanding that people performing purely teaching and research functions must have a different salary structure from those performing purely administrative duties (Mothibe, 2013). The academic salary structure, according to LUTARU, was unduly inflated by the inclusion of the senior administrative staff (Taaka, 1998:21). Thus since 1993, LUTARU has been fighting for the separation of cadres. This is despite a redefinition of ‘academic’ by the Higher Education Act (HEA) 2004 as any person appointed to teach or to do research at a public HE institution (GOL, 2004:5). More than ten years since this redefinition, NUL is yet to implement it when it comes to the salary structure. Thus the seeming lack of will or capacity particularly by the different University Administrations since 2005 to implement this redefinition has led to turf battles between LUTARU and the Administration. In

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55 SUSU was registered as a trade union in 1996 and its members are thought never to exceed thirty (30) at any time.

56 The concept of the ‘separation of cadres’ draws upon the time-honoured and internationally accepted independence of branches of government (separation of powers) between the Judiciary, the Executive and the Legislature.
fact, it is important to note that the ‘Administration’ is made up of those senior administrative staff who are members of SUSU and who seem to stand to lose if the HE Act definition is implemented. Thus given the diversity of interests and conflicts of interests between and among NUL Unions, academic and non-academic staff, and Government and Community, contestations of all kinds have been engendered as captured in Chapters 4 and 5.

For nearly two decades, neither LUTARU, nor SUSU nor NAWU had a recognition agreement with the Administration, further complicating the nature of interactions between employer and employee. To this day NAWU and SUSU remain unrecognised by the employer while LUTARU only signed a recognition agreement with the Administration in 2012. Consequently, disputes over working conditions and remuneration packages further strained relations among the triadic actors. Due to these contestations, Government and Community, in typical representational discourse, have come to the conclusion that LUTARU is a destabilising force and is responsible for the perceived instability and ‘ungovernability’ of NUL. This charge is denied by the Union which sees such representation as nothing but a figment of imagination as well as phobia against trade unionism by both Government and the Community (Mothibe, 2013). General lack of appreciation by many in Government and the Community not only about the many challenges NUL is facing, but also about the complexity of issues at the institution seems to account for this phobia.

Taaka (1998), in a study of industrial relations at NUL, concludes that the major problem is labour relations between the organisation (NUL), and its employees grouped around the three Unions. While there were five major industrial disputes between 1995 and 1997 and two major law suits in the High Court (HC) between the University and trade Unions (Taaka, 1998), industrial disputes and court cases between 1998 and 2014 are just too numerous to mention (see Appendix E). However, it should suffice to say that the person of the VC, and her/his success or failure in handling these disputes, and the interpretation of these disputes vis-à-vis the interests of Government in particular, and the Community in general, tended to be an important point of departure. In general, the different VCs, both substantive and acting, have generally had

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57 A recognition agreement is a document signed by the Union and the Employer by which the Executive Head of an organisation or the Employer recognises the association or the Union for purposes of consultation and collective bargaining/negotiation.
unhealthy working relations with the Unions, the consequence of which was to engender dangerous and divisive discourses of ‘othering’, resistance and counter-resistance (see Chapters 4 and 5). For instance, A. D. Baikie (1988-1995), while he was considered quite able, is thought to have concentrated his energies and talents more on “manipulating people [and] building warring fiefdoms” such that by the time he left the University in 1995, he left it with several warring factions (Ernst & Young Report, 2000:165). Baikie’s successor, Professor M. I. R. Moletsane (1996-2000) is thought to have walked blindly and ill-advisedly into this highly charged environment and immediately took sides with one of the factions, thus missing an opportunity to defuse the situation. He was thought to have engendered a different conflict based completely around him such that within a few months, he had managed to alienate even his erstwhile faction (Ernst & Young Report, 2000:165).

After Moletsane unsuccessfully tried to renew his Vice-Chancellorship beyond 2000, Dr. T. H. Mothibe was appointed as the 6th substantive VC following many battles between trade Unions on one hand, and the University Administration and Government on the other hand. Mothibe’s Vice-Chancellorship (2001-2004) is considered by many to have been relatively calm, with few industrial disputes. However, a general perception by many in the University is that Mothibe’s strongest administrative tactic was also his weakest – accommodativeness. According to some informants, those opposed to Mothibe’s Vice-Chancellorship not only exploited his non-confrontational approach, but were believed to work in conjunction with politicians to scuttle his change agenda programme known as the Transformation Process (Uaca6 Interview, 18/04/2014; Uadm3 Interview, 24/07/2014, see 5.4.3). In the end, the GOL stepped in to stop the Transformation Process (see 5.4), thus making it impossible for Mothibe to extend his tenure beyond 2004.

Following Mothibe’s term, and for the third time since 1975, NUL entered another long period of Acting Vice-Chancellorship, from October 2004 to December 2006 under Professor Mafa Sejanamane. One keen observer and NUL academic submits that while Sejanamane was a good and focussed leader and administrator, he also considered him to be an opportunist with an insatiable love for power (Pers. Com, 22/02/2015). Sejanamane instituted what a LUTARU Press Statement (2006) called a “barrack-style” management. This style, Unions argue, brought him in
conflict with the entire workforce of the University. Consequently, the Unions are believed to have mobilised their multiple sources of power to make certain that Sejanamane did not become the VC on a substantive basis. In the view of a former non-academic employee, Sejanamane wanted to make NUL a better place by introducing a number of things “but he did not succeed because most people were (sic) [mediocre] … [and] did not care about anything, so they took all efforts to stop [him]” (RoCom14 Interview, 23/12/2010). In the end, whether as a result of power in the Unions or not, Sejanamane lost out to Professor A. F. Ogunrinade, prompting him to resign in a huff. Ogunrinade’s reign was brief but dramatic, cut short, first, by suspension on allegations of financial impropriety, and second, by his death in April 2010. Yet in the short period he was in office, trade Unions gave him a difficult time through demonstrations and strikes for better working conditions.

Following the death of Ogunrinade, another year-long (2010-2011) acting Vice-Chancellorship followed, under Professor E. M. Sebatane. By this time, relations between the Administration and the Unions had reached breaking point over salary adjustments (Lesotho Times, 29 Oct. 2009; Public Eye, 19 November 2010). Thus when Professor S. A. Siverts was appointed as the 8th substantive VC in 2011, she worsened relations which were already toxic by allegedly refusing to receive petitions from the Unions and by pushing her widely unpopular neoliberal cost-containment strategy packaged as RP (see 4.4.3 and 5.4.4). This brought her into direct confrontation with nearly the whole University community while enjoying the tacit support from the GOL and from the Chairman of the University Council (NUL (Court Order), 11 Aug. 2011; LUTARU, 7 Oct. 2011; Grep4 Interview, 25/07/2014). Professor Siverts’ RP was one of the most contentious issues that invited all manner of representation discourses and resistances never seen before in the 39-year history of NUL (see Chapters 4 and 5). Ultimately the RP collapsed and the VC resigned in 2013. Another acting period by Sejanamane followed from September 2013 to November 2014 when Professor Nqosa Leuta Mahao was appointed as the 9th substantive VC of NUL in November 2014.

58 A. F. Ogunrinade was Nigerian Professor of Veterinary Medicine. Since 1975, he was the second foreign VC and the second Nigerian to hold the post as the 7th substantive VC of NUL from 2007-2010.

59 S. A. Siverts was an American Professor of Education. She was the third foreign VC of NUL from 2011-2013.
Thus today, as in the past, unresolved issues have tended to divide the University into two warring camps – the Administration on one hand, and the Unions on the other hand. These issues include the separation of salary structures, the review of the controversial Patterson Pay Scale\textsuperscript{60}, the implementation of the appraisal system, and the revision of the law governing the University. These issues have not only become emotive, but have also become contentious resulting in frequent standoffs, strikes, demonstrations, go-slow, lock-outs, court orders and even withdrawal/withholding of salaries (see Chapter 5). As the Unions continued to push for better working conditions on one hand, the Administration and the GOL sought to portray them as destabilising forces, thus drifting further and further away from finding lasting solutions.

While the picture painted so far may sound deeply pessimistic, this does not mean that there are no positive developments as a result of these contestations. Within the University, LUTARU assisted with the drafting of several academic and non-academic administrative policies and improvement plans. These included salary reviews, promotion criteria for academic and non-academic staff, governance structures and several policy instruments that are driving the University today. In all these, whether in the departments, in the faculties, in deanships, or in the Senate, debate was driven and dictated by thoughts from LUTARU (Uadm4 Interview, 18/04/2014; Uadm8 Interview, 13/10/2009), thus positively impacting in the governance of the University.

3.6.1.2 The NUL (Amendment) (Act No. 2) of 2002: Further Discipline and Punishment?

By 2000, the role of trade Unions in general and LUTARU in particular was loathed by politicians and was often singled out as the source of instability at NUL. According to one informant (Uadm4 Interview, 18/04/2014), the absence of opposition in parliament in 1993, with BCP having won all the seats, those in Government tended to see NUL as “the seat of an opposition” and were very sensitive to criticism coming from the university. Thus the GOL

\textsuperscript{60} As implemented at NUL, all those who belong to the same grade, e.g., associate professors are paid the same salary irrespective of experience and qualifications. Movement within the grade is supposed to be based on the performance appraisal system which has not been put in place since the introduction of the Patterson Pay Scale in 2005.
moved in to amend the University law in order to deal with the perceived problems at the university. While the law curtailed freedom of association, it also opened up other spaces of power as the provisions outlined below shall show. At the bill stages, it was indicated that the purpose was to introduce innovations in the governance of the University by rationalising its management structures. According to the NUL (Amendment) Act of 2002, the Minister of Education was given powers to direct Council regarding administration and management of University with Council expected to comply with the directive (GOL, 2002:5-11). Second, the law prohibited holders of the offices of VC, PVC, Members of Council, Registrar, Bursar and Librarian from being members of trade Unions “and such other offices or bodies as the Council may declare as decision making offices or bodies”. Third, the law barred University employees from concurrently holding positions connected to political parties or from being a Senator or a member of the National Assembly (GOL, 2002:10-11; NUL Calendar, 2006/2007:418-420). These provisions were rejected by Unions as they were deemed to violate freedom of association and other fundamental freedoms guaranteed in the Constitution.

However, on a more progressive note, the NUL (Amendment) Act of 2002 opened more spaces of power. For instance, the law declared the President of the Students Union an ex-officio member of Council. It also made room for the Alumni Association to contribute an extra member to Council. Furthermore, participatory governance was further enhanced by subjecting the selection of the PVC to a joint Committee of Council and Senate followed by recommendation for appointment to Council. Previously, the PVC was a Vice-Chancellor appointee after consultation with Senate. But again, the Statutes and Ordinances, where real power lies, were left fairly intact in their ‘obstructionist’ forms. It is also important to state that when it suits the University and its employees, they refer to this law, and when it does not, they refer to the 1992 Order. This practice of capitalising on the dualities of the NUL (Amendment) Act of 2002 and the 1992 Order creates problems of inconsistent application of the law, thus not only leaving some of the root causes of the problems within the institution unaddressed, but undoubtedly also creating room for resistance.

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61 From a constructivist perspective (Giddens, 1984), the social structure creates the individual while the individual creates the social structure, thus seeing duality of structure as both constraining and enabling.
3.6.2 Litigious Nation, Litigious University

The complex nature of the legislative system and the persistent conflicts between the different actors at the University have led some commentators to refer to the institution as a “litigious university” as Appendix E attempts to capture. The majority of the court cases in Appendix E involved university employees, staff Unions, students and the University Administration. The idea of how litigious Lesotho is as a nation, and by extension NUL, came out in an interview carried out by a reporter working for Africa Media Holdings Lesotho (AMH) group of newspapers. In that interview with the Deputy Leader of DC, Mr Monyane Moleleki in October 2014, Thabo sought to find out whether the electoral model that allows smaller parties to be represented in parliament should be changed. Mr Moleleki, in response said,

I think the system we have is very good for Lesotho stability reasons, because our people are some of the most cantankerous nations. We argue about anything; we are very litigious, we want to take you to court over even the smallest things. Knowing Basotho, I think it is best to have the Mixed Member Proportional Representation (MMP) so that we have the best of both worlds.

(Moleleki quoted by Thabo in the Sunday Express, 2014)

This admission by Moleleki points to a deep-rooted culture of resistance among the Basotho. Within NUL, just like the national experience, there is a long standing practice of resolving issues in the courts of law. For NUL, the cases cited in Appendix E are only the tip of the iceberg. One acting VC bemoaned the fact that court cases against the University were “coming almost every week. The practice has in fact become part of NUL’s culture” (Uadm12 Interview, 03/03/2011). In a speech at the NUL 70th Anniversary Celebration gathering in Roma on 6 November 2015, the first substantive VC of NUL told those gathered that some cynics were saying that litigation has become the national sport for Lesotho.

A culture has therefore been entrenched at NUL where even the minutest of disputes find their way to the courts of law. Mokatse (2008), in an Alumni Report bemoaned the never-ending court cases at NUL. Part of the report read,

[one of the challenges noted by the alumni was the number of litigations and court cases that dragged the university into the courts, not only tinting (sic) its image but bringing shame and disgrace when it lost and
paid its own staff huge compensation money. It soon became clear to the Council that in most cases this was caused by the common expression ‘justice delayed is justice denied’. Litigants resorted to the courts of law because the university structures failed to act expeditiously and appropriately.

(Mokatse, 2008:5)

In 1989, an international study Sims\(^{62}\) (GOL, 1989a:69), noted that the University had too many cases before the courts of law and that “[i]t can never be in the interests of any institution to be so structured that any internal grouping has to seek resolution of its problems in the Courts unless there has been a major infringement of the law of the Land”. An undated NULASA statement also bemoaned the fact that NUL had become excessively litigious and that “to those outside this university, these unprecedented litigations will indicate to the futility of granting universities any degree of autonomy” (NULASA, n.d:3).

The court has therefore become a space through which various actors tried to resist one another and to seek legitimation of their actions. It became part of the ‘created space’, an arena and a public space through which people debated, discussed and resisted each other, outside of the established frameworks of the institution.

### 3.6.3 The Imbrication of the Roma, Wider Community and Government with the University Student, 1993-2014

In this section I engage with the overlapping issues regarding the relationship between the Roma Community, the wider Community and the Government with the University student body, in broad historical perspective. I focus specifically on issues of general security at NUL, student accommodation, student allowances and general student conduct as part of the many complex relations in the Triad. To start with, it has to be said that the rural location of NUL has its own advantages and disadvantages, but more of the latter. This location has meant that for over 70 years, the only and immediate neighbours of the University are the numerous villages that surround it (see Insert 1.1), with which it has had a very ambivalent relationship.

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\(^{62}\) The report is called the Sims Report because its Chairman was Professor G. D. Sims.
It was not until 1996/1997 that the University secured its perimeter of the 85 ha piece of land. Before that, the University was accessible from any direction by all and sundry. This left it too exposed to risks such as burglary, theft, harassment of students and staff, assaults, attempted and actual rape and murder by outsiders, including attacks by apartheid forces or operatives against specific students or members of staff for political reasons. For instance, according to Nhenga (1998), in the 1993/1994 academic year, students were “harassed by gun-toting and knife-wielding Mafefooane gangsters while several female students fell victim to rape” (Nhenga, 1998). As we have already seen, Ha Mafefooane is one of the largest villages in Roma, about 2km to the southeast of the University. There were even politically motivated attacks by internal security and dissident groups in the 1980s as discussed in section 3.5. Thus in the late 1990s, securing the perimeter of the University became priority number one in the security programmes of the University (John Grey Agencies, 1992:4).

Nonetheless, as could be expected in any relations of power, there was some resistance to the project by some groups of people both within and outside the University. The animals of Roma villagers used to freely roam and graze on campus and so their resistance was understandable. To placate them, the University offered them hundreds of jobs as domestic helpers, gardeners and cleaners among other menial positions. They were also allowed, with permission from University authorities, to harvest firewood on campus. In a country with a very small economy, the presence of the University in Roma served to create employment for the local residents. As already indicated, over a period of time, complex hybrid relations between the University and the Roma community evolved (RoCom5 Interview, 20/12/2010; RoCom10 Interview, 21/12/2010).

Although the University perimeter was secured, first by the electric fence fitted with cameras (in the course of time these were stolen), and second, by a screen door-like fence, security challenges still remained and are still part of the challenges of NUL in the 21st century. Thus the security fence did not completely insulate the University from thefts, murders or rapes, and neither did it completely close off invaders or the villagers. Students and staff live in constant fear of being raped or murdered. For instance, the national instability following the disputed

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63 The University as well as the local media reported numerous such cases between 1997 and 2015 (see LUTARU News, March 1998; Sunday Express 3 Feb 2014; http://www.lmps.org.ls/news/murder-at-nul;
elections of 1998 spilled over to the University as the institution was forced to close and postpone its 1998 graduation ceremony after being invaded by youths with guns on 21 September 1998. The youths also hijacked the University bus and some vehicles (Summary of Events in Lesotho, 1998; VC Report, 1998/2000:4).

Since 1997, the security fence has emerged as the most definitive physical barrier that defines its relations with the Roma community. Thus while the University fence can be seen as a solution to the security fears, it does not provide lasting solutions as the cases cited above have demonstrated. To the University, the fence is a technology of security and government, insulating the institution from surrounding villagers and intruders. Yet the fence also functions as a constant reminder that they (staff and students) are not safe. To the villagers, the fence is seen as a technology of separation which reinforces the enclavism and elitism of the university. “What I can tell you is that”, said one villager of Ha Thabuthe, “if you centre (sic) yourself around the community and you exclude yourself from the community, then the community will not accept you” (RoCom14 Interview, 23/12/ 2010). The fence, like the Israel ‘separation fence/wall’ (Trottier, 2007; Alatout, 2009; Falke, 2012), worsened the mobility of both villagers and students, forcing them to walk long distances to reach their homes on the other side of the fence. Similarly, the fence has also forced some motorists to take long winding routes to get to their homes or forced them to park their cars inside the University fence and away from their homes (RoCom14 Interview, 23/12/ 2010). As a ‘technology of government’, the fence serves an important metaphor of power. As a regime of government, its construction was contested not only by those it was supposed to keep out, but even by those it was supposed to protect (Summary of Events in Lesotho, 1998).

Another major aspect of the triadic relations closely related to the security of students is the issue of accommodation. The crisis of accommodation remains one of the most pressing issues, with the University only accommodating well below 50 % of its student population. For example, as


64 One informant wondered why NUL could not have a road going through the university “[like] The University of the Free State [which] has a highway going through the university” (Croc14 Interview, 23 Dec. 2010).
at 2005/2006, NUL could only accommodate about 21.2% of its full-time students with 78.8% living off-campus in surrounding rural villages (VC’s Report, 2006/2007), in substandard accommodation called *maline*. These facilities are called *maline* because they are single rooms built in a line-like format to cash in on the shortage of accommodation on campus. With no known expansion in on-campus accommodation provision since 2006, and with the growth in student enrolments since (over 8 000 full-time students at the Roma campus today), it can only be surmised that the provision has dropped to far below 20%. One informant blames the University for failing to play a critical role in turning Roma into an urban area: “Roma is an unplanned town which is completely chaotic. It could have been an urban area” (Uacal Interview, 28/10/2009). Ambrose (2007:71) posits that it is ironic that while Urban and Regional Planning is a specialisation within the NUL, the surroundings of the campus show that such planning is not being practised on the doorstep of the University.

One consequence of increased student enrolments with no physical expansion in accommodation facilities has been to congest students by exceeding the normal carrying capacity for every hall of residence. Consequently, overcrowding led to deteriorating interpersonal relations, electrical breakdowns, water shortages, sewerage blockages, competition for bathroom use, theft of cash, radios and clothing (VC Report, 1979/1980; 1994/1995; 1998-2000; 2001; 2003/2004). Another dire consequence, coupled with drunkenness, according to the VC’s Report (1994/1995: 15) was the “animalistic behaviour [of] sleeping with students of the opposite sex in the presence of others”. Only recently, and because of the ills associated with overcrowding, the authorities took a conscious decision to decongest the residences by sticking to the normal carrying capacity for every hall. This therefore left well over 80% accommodated in the surrounding villages, with a small number commuting daily from Maseru, 35 km away.

Student behaviour has often come under scrutiny by the Community, the GOL and the local University community. The apparent laxity of discipline, morals and excessive drinking habits has been singled out. Anyone familiar with NUL will be able to tell with a lot of ease whether or not students have received their allowances from the National Manpower Development
Secretariat (NMDS)\textsuperscript{65}. NUL students are known to resort to excessive drinking, non-class attendance, vandalism of University property, singing of abusive and offensive songs once they have received their ‘Manpower’ as it is called in student nomenclature. When I put the question to a former SRC President about what he thinks students like most, his answer was short but piercing, ‘drinking’ (SRC1 Interview, 24/07/2014). Yet their drinking habits have not been helped by the presence of drinking ‘holes’ just 30-50 metres from the main University entrance. And some villagers of Roma have complained about the undue influence students have on the youths, accusing some university students of peddling drugs and engaging in excessive drinking and loose sex (RoCom10 Interview, 21/12/2010). One local chief had this to say;

\begin{quote}
The students here [NUL] are behaving in a very unacceptable manner in our community, they are making some illegal marriages [cohabiting], they are drinking a lot, this is not what we are allowing our community children or minors. Yes I understand that university students are not called the minors, but the way they are doing things is not that acceptable to the majority of our people.
\end{quote}
\textit{(RoCom5 Interview, 20/12/2010)}

Yet, notwithstanding these social ills, NUL students have played a positive role in the upliftment of life in Roma and beyond by participating in several projects\textsuperscript{66}. Sometimes NUL students would give motivational talks to youths, or teach them certain subjects/skills, or offer expert advice in certain projects, or give food and clothes to orphaned children and the elderly, among many other benevolent activities (RoCom10 Interview, 21/12/2010).

One key aspect of the government-student relationship has been, and continues to be the financial support to all who qualify to enter tertiary institutions. While the current financial challenges and high unemployment rates are demanding a review of the funding policy, government financial assistance has been central in the training of the much needed human resources over the years. Since 1977 the Government has been disbursing financial support, through the NMDS without fail, and thousands of Basotho have been supported by the

\textsuperscript{65} The National Manpower Development Secretariat is a government department charged with student scholarships and the dispersing of allowances to all students in tertiary institutions on a monthly basis.

\textsuperscript{66} Students in Free Enterprise (SIFE) were known to do a lot of community service within and beyond Roma; the NUL Cultural Club was known to take NUL back to the Community.
Government to study either in local institutions or outside the country. However, some challenges associated with the administering of the scholarship fund have tended to generate frosty relations with the student body. For instance, delays in the issuance of student allowances have often resulted in student strikes, class boycotts, destruction of property and sometimes violent demonstrations. Unfortunately for the University, it has found itself at the receiving end of some of these boycotts and demonstrations, while NMDS remained insulated from these, in faraway Maseru.

3.6.4 Further Legal Instruments and the Undoing of Dispersed Power

The legal instruments I briefly discuss here were brought about as part of the discourse of the RP that began in 2011 (see Chapter 5). All three legal instruments (the NUL (Amendment) Act (No 10) 2012, the NUL (Amendment) Bill of 2013 and the NUL (Amendment) Bill of 2014) point to the attempt to undo the dispersion of power enshrined in previous Acts by reducing the influence of employees in the governance of NUL. However, like many amendments before, these legal instruments did not manage to take away power from where it currently resides.

In the thinking of the authors of the RP (see 5.4), a new law was needed to legitimise their processes, procedures and actions. They thus forced through a rushed amendment to the NUL law on three occasions in a space of three years in 2012, 2013 and 2014. The whole idea was to fundamentally revise the Principal Act and its previous amendments which purportedly overdemocratised the University. The NUL (Amendment) Act of 2012 which came into effect on 23 March 2012 sought to give more powers to Government through the Minister of Education, powers which the Minister did not have in the 1976 Act or 1992 Order (GOL, 2012b). It also sought to give the VC some executive powers while at the same time reducing the influence and number of university standing committees and bodies such as ASAC, NASAC and Senate. In neither the 1976 Act nor the 1992 Order did the VC have any executive powers. It also

purportedly gave, under section 49 of the Labour Code 1992, the employer powers to dismiss employees. However, this provision, contained in section 49 of the new Act, came in for heavy criticism by a top lawyer, W. C. M. Maqutu, an advocate for the High Court of South Africa. Maqutu had apparently been asked by the University Administration to give opinion on whether the new section gave the VC powers to appoint and dismiss academic and non-academic staff. Maqutu argued that, in the first place, the amendment was not necessary, and second, that the rule of law in a democracy must be free from arbitrariness and oppression of any group of the population, submitting that democratic governance is premised on a fear of a one-man government, and third, that the HEA 2004 “not only creates a participatory and representative system of university governance – it also creates a consultative one” (Maqutu, 2012:5-16).

Once it was clear to the University Administration that section 49 was not giving the Government and the VC the power it wished for, the University Administration pushed through parliament, a new bill, the NUL (Amendment) Bill of 2013. The Bill, when passed into law, sought to reduce the influence and power of University employees and students. This it did by seeking to reduce their representation and voting powers in Council and Senate while at the same time attempting to invest very considerable powers in an envisaged Executive Committee of Council68 (NUL Bill, 2013:4-18). A Senate report exposed the arbitrariness of the University management and attempts by the GOL to usurp power from the various spaces and bodies of the University, and recommended that the proposed Bill be dropped and the University be allowed to continue to exist and operate under the current Act, that is the NUL Order 1992 which draws heavily on the 1976 (NUL Senate Sub-Committee, 2013). It is important to note that the many previous Government initiated amendments focused greater attention on Section 17 of the Principal Act that deals with the appointment of the Vice-Chancellor, leaving most of the agentic power structures intact. This proposed NUL Bill (2013) sought to take away power in a manner never attempted before. It is not clear to me when and why the NUL (Amendment) Bill 2013 was dropped in favour of the NUL (Amendment) Bill of 2014. However, just like the 2013 Bill, the 2014 Bill sought to further reduce the influence of employees in the governance structures of the

68 The composition of the proposed Executive Committee of Council consisted of the Chairperson of Council, two external members of Council who are Lesotho residents, and one internal member of Council. The Registrar remained the Secretary of the Executive Committee.
University by strengthening the arm of the University Administration through the so-called Executive Management\(^69\) and the office of the VC, and by expanding the powers of the Minister of Education and Training in a manner not seen before (NUL Bill, 2014). On the evidence of these three legal measures in less than three years, it can only be surmised that more legal battles and challenges lie ahead.

### 3.7 EVALUATION

Given the vastness of the period under study, generalisations were inevitable. Chapters 4 and 5 are therefore meant to achieve focused discussion on a few of the many complex relations of power. However, this chapter has demonstrated how specific historical epochs have tended to shape and define the nature of relations between the Government, the University and the local and global Community. I have also showed that relations between the three entities were, and still are, a function of a complex set of factors, chief among them national politics and the prevailing local and global socio-economic environment. The tinkering with the law is a very good example. I have also showed that what goes on at NUL largely mirrors the national experience.

Therefore between the 1970s and 1990s, triadic relations must be understood in the context of dictatorial and military rule by which democratic space was muzzled. Ironically, it was the autocratic government of Jonathan that purportedly ‘overdemocratised’ the University in 1976. Ironically also, it was the Military Regime headed by Ramaema that restored the status quo of 1976 through the NUL (Amendment) Order of 1992. And even more ironically, it is the post-1993 democratically elected governments that have sought, time and again, to put NUL under the control of Government. For instance, the 8\(^{th}\) attempted amendment to the NUL law remains the most far-reaching attempt by the GOL to take away power from the many spaces in which it resides within the University. It is therefore clear that going into the future, the question of how best to transform NUL and how best to strengthen its governance instruments will be hotly contested matters. The chapter shows how tertiary education policies in Lesotho and Africa

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\(^{69}\) The proposed composition consisted of VC, Deputy VC Academic Affairs, Deputy VC Finance and Administration, Deputy VC for Student Affairs and the Registrar, unlike the 1992 Order which included Bursar, Dean of Student Affairs and Librarian as officers of the University.
today are located at a position of tension within the Triad where power, hybridity, representation and resistance always play out. The need to balance the relations of power between conflicting interests of the actors has had the effect of slowing down any meaningful changes in the institution. Yet the political and economic pressures exerted on NUL in the past decade by both Government and international institutions – IMF and the World Bank only point to one direction – ‘liberalise’ or close shop.

In subsequent chapters I therefore weave together documentary evidence, policy documents and interview data to paint an insider perspective in order to demonstrate that the discourses and practices of representation (Chapter 4), agency and resistance (Chapter 5) are essentially expressions of relations of power and technologies of power that have deep historical roots as outlined in this chapter.
CHAPTER 4: REPRESENTATIONS AND ‘OTHERING’ IN GOVERNMENT-
COMMUNITY-UNIVERSITY RELATIONS

4.1 GENERAL ORIENTATION

Drawing on the socio-historical context discussed in Chapter 3, this chapter is fully anchored on one of the most important pillars of PC – representation (see 2.4). Here I seek to analyse the representational discourse used in the triadic relations of power. It is important to restate that in discourses of representation, the ‘Other’ is almost innately a negative concept. The constructions of ‘otherness’ will serve, first to show how othering manifests in practice, in a specific postcolonial context as well as to add to the limited literature on the construction of the ‘Other’ in institutions of higher learning; and second, to strengthen or consolidate the theory in Chapter 2, building up towards a consolidated IPCF. To do so I seek to address question number two and objective number four. The question is: how do the actors in the Triad engage in ‘othering’ practices, or put differently, who is constructing what images and from what perspective or point of view; while the objective is to examine the preponderance of discourses of the construction of the ‘Other’ in institutions of higher learning in Africa (see 1.4 and 1.5). In attempting to answer this question and meet the stated objective, I analyse primary data and secondary sources for representations which involve ‘othering’ that are both apparent and obvious. In this study, the representations which involve ‘othering’ via public statements and verbal utterances fall into two main categories. They are based, firstly on essentialist social constructions and notions of identity using racial, ethnic, political, religious and cultural differences via the ‘Insider’/‘Outsider’, ‘Self’/‘Other’, ‘Us’/‘Them’, and ‘We’/‘They’ dichotomy; and secondly, on negative stereotypical images of NUL as the obstinate ‘Other’ using negative descriptions such as laissez-fairism\textsuperscript{70} (impunity), ‘in-breeding’\textsuperscript{71} and ‘fixity’\textsuperscript{72} (see Figure 4.1).

\textsuperscript{70} In Basotho nomenclature, both in government and the private sector, the general absence of the rule of law (impunity) has been described as laissez-faire. Thus wherever the word laissez-faire is used it implies impunity.

\textsuperscript{71} In its biological derivation, in-breeding refers to the mating of closely related members of a species, especially over many generations. In the NUL context, it is used to signify the perceived practice of recruiting and training of junior staff who then become ‘replicas’ of their trainers, hence the notion of NUL ‘reproducing’ itself. Many tend to see this practice as entrenching old practices that are considered detrimental to the institution.

\textsuperscript{72} The ‘fixity’ of NUL is derived from the idea of the ‘fixity of species’ whereby all species, once created, can never change. Some people have tended to see NUL as a change-resistant institution.
Yet, as I shall show in this chapter, the essentialist and stereotypical modes of representation involving ‘othering’ tend to ignore the fact that players are not homogeneous entities, but instead are highly differentiated internally. Thus the analysis builds on the historical triadic contestations of power outlined in Chapter 3, for example the contestations over the recruitment and appointment of VCs leading to several amendments to the University law (see 3.3.2; 3.5.1.3; 3.6.1.2 and 3.6.4). These modes of representation seek to bring to the fore the various ways through which such contests came to be acted out in the Triad. Just as the discursive and material control of ‘Otherness’ led to the invention of Africa as the opposite of Europe, so the discursive, political and material control of the ‘Other’, mainly by state and non-state actors including some actors from the University has led to the representation of NUL as the obstinate ‘Other’\textsuperscript{73}. As in Orientalism, it is claims to power and knowledge, both of which are joined together in a discourse (Foucault, 1976), which make such representations possible. Thus language becomes a very important vehicle, the primary medium through which social imaginary significations become manifest (Tekin, 2010:209). Epstein (2013:512) and Ashcroft et al, (1995:283) posit that representation is not possible without language because it is language upon which social, economic and political discourses are grounded and that provides the terms by which reality may be constituted and the names by which the world may be known. The numerous statements and the socially constructed images of the University and those in it are crucial to our understanding of the university and the relations of power within.

The contests for power, control and influence within and in respect of NUL have thus engendered an ‘otherness’ in which one actor apparently tries to equate difference with inferiority. Through the demonisation of NUL as the obstinate ‘Other’, it can be argued that the GOL and the Community are seeking some kind of difference and purity for themselves by seeing NUL as everything that they are not, or, as McLeod posits in respect of Orientalism, as an institution of “objective knowledge of wholly reliable truths” (McLeod, 2000:42). Consequently, it can be argued that Government and Community ‘othering’ of NUL was motivated not only by a desire to micro-manage NUL, but also by a desire to discover their own ‘Self’. Inasmuch as a

\textsuperscript{73} Cawood (2014) uses the term ‘recalcitrant other’ to unpack the interplay of identity construction and rhetoric in reference to Mandela. It derives from the rhetorically powerful colonial discourses of difference between the ‘Self’ and the ‘Other’.
work about representations of ‘the Orient’ lends itself to increasing misrepresentation and misinterpretation (Said, 1978), the spiral ‘anti-other’ rhetoric in the Triad has not only led to increased misrepresentations and misinterpretations of the institution, but also to increased misunderstandings of those who produce such discourses. Just as in heated election campaigns where political rivals are criticised through a trope of ‘othering’, the struggle for control of NUL has also led to a discourse of ‘otherness’ in which one actor or another is villainised. In the process the ‘we’ and ‘they’ relationships within groups and the writer/speaker’s position within the ‘we’ and ‘they’ dichotomy become a process of identity construction. ‘Othering’ becomes an important activity in the construction of collective identities.

This chapter is divided into five major sections. Section 4.1 presents the chapter synopsis and general outline. In section 4.2, I analyse essentialist representations and ‘othering’ vis-à-vis university governance and management. The history of NUL has tended to be dominated by practices by some in the wider community and within NUL to essentialise and standardise their public image in opposition to both the ‘outsider’ ‘Other’ or ‘insider’ ‘Other’. The opposition discourse from Basotho seems to have been clamouring for an essentialised ‘Africanness’ and ‘localness’ on the basis of inherent ethnic attributes. Discourses of ‘othering’ on the basis of religion, politics and place are captured in section 4.3. Here I explore the nature of the ‘otherness’ in respect of the Lesotho Evangelical Church (LEC) within the context of access to space on the NUL campus. The fourth section (4.4) presents representations and images of the ‘Other’ on the basis of acquired institutional ‘culture’ and practices. In the last section (4.5), I critically reflect on essentialist and stereotypical constructions of the ‘Other’.

4.2 REPRESENTATIONS AND ‘OTHERING’ VIS-À-VIS GOVERNANCE AND MANAGEMENT OF NUL

In this section I analyse discourses of representation which involve ‘othering’ related to issues of university governance and management, across time and space. Through focus on referential, argumentation and predication strategies, I show how the construction of in- and out-groups – around concepts of ‘Self’ and ‘Other’, ‘Us’ and ‘Them’, ‘black’ and ‘white’, ‘insider’ and ‘outsider’, ‘local’ and ‘expatriate’ and ‘Catholic’ and ‘Protestant’ have been consistently central to identity construction vis-à-vis NUL. In section 4.2.1, I discuss the idea of the ‘Self’ and the
‘Other’ with reference to the creation of NUL in 1975 (see 3.2.2). Catholic-Protestant discourses of ‘otherness’ vis-a-vis NUL Vice-Chancellorship are discussed in section 4.2.2 while the discursive construction of in- and out-groups involving NULASA, LUTARU and the NUL leadership and management is presented in section 4.2.3.

4.2.1 Predicating the ‘Self’ and the ‘Other’ in the Creation of NUL

The attribution of positive values to the ‘Self’ and negative values to the ‘Other’ are well-known strategies of predication while the construction of in-and out-groups using metaphors, membership categorisation, metonymies and synecdoches are well known referential strategies that play an important role in identity construction and formation (Wodak, 2001; Tekin, 2010). These strategies, through the medium of race, featured prominently in the creation of NUL in 1975. Therefore no discourse about the creation of NUL can afford to ignore the ‘Us’ and ‘Them’ or ‘Self’ and ‘Other’ binary modality framed around the race factor. In colonial Africa, race, the beast of European humanism, was the central division of all things. Therefore, as an important aspect of the power-knowledge nexus (Foucault, 1980a-i), the ‘Us’ and ‘Them’ discourse was deployed to demand changes in the administration of the University. From 1967, headship of departments at UBLS was held on a permanent and indefinite basis. Then from 1974, Cyril Rogers, the white Australian Vice-Chancellor of UBLS, ruled that only a person with the rank of professor could be head of department (Ambrose, 2006, 2007). This stipulation meant that the majority of black people, many of whom did not hold high academic qualifications at the time, were excluded from holding any key positions within the University. The lack of black representation in the top echelons of the UBBS and the UBLS administrations, including senior teaching positions (GBLS, 1975), almost a decade after the three countries got independence from Britain, tended to emphasise the race factor, thus promoting a binary opposition of ‘black’ and ‘white’, ‘us’ and ‘them’. Independence was supposed to translate into visible control of major institutions such as the university. The continued exclusion of black local input and participation in the trinational institution where the power structure was in the

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hands of white expatriates (Mochochonono, 1975:1) became a major site of ‘othering’. Politicians, academic staff and students blamed this anomaly on the legacies of race and racism in a post-colonial state. Xenophobic and racist feelings can create an artificial binary opposition resulting in the ‘us-them’ or ‘we-they’ dichotomy that produces a group that supports separation of particular racial, religious, ethnic or cultural groups (Merskin, 2004:159). By pointing to race as the reason for marginality, the advocates of change were simply appealing to a widely-held perception that white people were racist. In this section I therefore attempt to pull together evidence to buttress this hypothesis.

At UBLS at the time, and among Africans in general and Basotho in particular, there was a strong feeling that the white community in the University was determined to perpetuate Western domination at the expense of the needs of black people and the local community. This view was well supported by two government ministers, Joel Moitse (see 5.3.2) and Charles Dube (‘CD’) Molapo. In a speech published in a government controlled newspaper, Mochochonono, in February 1975, and directed against Cyril Rogers, Moitse accused Rogers of neo-colonialist tendencies. The accusation was premised on the alleged competition for the headship of the Mathematics Department where two professors, one black and one white were vying for the position. According to Ambrose (2006:7), VC Rogers was described by Moitse as a white Vice-Chancellor who was also “white in heart and …not pro-Africans” and that as a result he was determined to do all in his power to “preserve the University for the employment of his fellow neo-colonialists all over”. About six months earlier, in September 1974, an anonymous letter critical of the UBLS Central Administration over the headship of the Mathematics Department had been published in the same government newspaper. It was indicated in that letter that the Department of Mathematics had two professors who were struggling for leadership and that it was clear to students that the black professor will lose. “We the students” continued the letter, “watch this farce with total dismay” (Ambrose, 2006:5). Upon further investigation, it was later discovered that Joel Moitse had delivered the anonymous letter to Mochochonono. In reference

75 At the time Moitse was Minister of Commerce and Industry while Molapo was Minister of Justice.

76 History repeats itself. In 2012, in comments published in the media, the PM told the youth wing of his governing ABC party that his Government would not allow a “frail white woman to run NUL when there were so many qualified local intellectuals to do so” (http://www.lestimes.com/?p=10294) in reference to Professor Sharon Siverts.
to the student strike of January 1975 over alleged racism at UBLS, Minister Molapo was quoted in the same newspaper as saying that the students deserved “much praise from the government and the public” because their complaints were well-founded (Mochochonono, 1975:3).

In that strike students demanded, among other things, the resignation of the VC and David Ambrose77 for their alleged colonialist mentality and racist tendencies. Prefaced by the allegation that the Roma campus was “characterised with racism” (GBLS, 1975:19; Ambrose, 2006:5-6), the demands were contained in a document titled ‘The Students 14 Points’78. White people were accused of being responsible for the resignation of two black professors. “A black professor can never leave black students to suffer unless he is under pressure from somewhere” (Mochochonono, 1975:6), charged the students. Ostensibly emboldened by Moitse’s stigmatisation of the VC as a neo-colonialist, the SRC demanded his immediate resignation. ‘We Want Localisation’; ‘Ambrose Must Go’; ‘Down with White Devils and their Corruption’; ‘Power to the Black Man’; ‘Merit, Not Pigmentation Should be the Criterion’, read some slogans on the placards by students. One placard carrying the drawing of the Argentinian Latin American revolutionary Che Guevara read, ‘I am the way, the truth and the life’ (Mochochonono, 1975:6), an obvious invocation of John 14 verse 6. The construction of white people at NUL as racists finally turned into an essential part of African black identity formation. The ‘racist’ white ‘Other’ then functioned as a mirror for defining the ‘black self’.

The VC’s problems were compounded by the newly established Black Staff Association (BSA) which went on to criticise the University structure in very strong terms. It began to emphasise its subalternity and marginality in essentialist terms, claiming that lack of proper representation on the Academic Staff Association (ASA) was due to their ‘blackness’. It was a situation akin to what Mamdani (1996) describes as ‘citizens’ and ‘subjects’ in his problematisation of the legacy of colonialism. The preamble to the Draft Constitution of the BSA, in a language of essentialist homogenising of the expatriate ‘Other’ that highlighted the preponderance of racism, stated that,

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77 David Ambrose arrived in Roma, Lesotho from the UK in 1965. He was Head of the Department of Mathematics between 1967 and 1974. His teaching service spanned UBBS, UBLS and NUL, retiring in 2008.

78 A possible adaption from Woodrow Wilson’s 14 point plan to end the First World War.
The present structure of this University gives power to the expatriates to determine, sabotage, plan, control, implement and undermine decisions and programmes on the future development of this institution. Conscious that the above inherited colonial structure perpetuates white domination …; convinced that such a situation is intolerable in an [‘Our’] independent African state …; aware that in view of the critical role this [‘Our’] University should play in the development of Lesotho, continued silence and acquiescence to the present situation is treasonable and criminal.

(Ambrose, 2006:8)

There was thus a strong feeling that Africans were being left out in the allocation of key posts in the university on the basis of race. Admission by the predominantly white controlled ASA that students had genuine grievances and that there was a tendency within the university structure to give power to some individuals, often expatriates (Mochochonono, 1975:3), only served to rigidify the thinking that blacks were marginalised because of their ‘blackness’. The arbitrary division of the university into ‘black’ versus ‘white’, BSA versus ASA, ‘us’ versus ‘them’ eventually became a potent tool that saw the VC being ejected from his position. Strong language was used to vilify the VC and his pro-white administration. Fairclough (1999:ix) argues that language can be used not only to produce, maintain or change social relations of power, but also to achieve personal, social and political interests and goals. Language makes it possible for people to dominate others – language is power.

A report of a Commission of Inquiry into student unrest of March 1975 over the alleged racism at UBLS actually noted that Joel Moitse was determined to “stem the tide of alleged white hegemony on the Roma campus” at all costs (GBLS, 1975:25). Similar sentiments were expressed in interviews I had with some people who were key players in the unfolding drama of the mid-1970s. A former VC of NUL pointed out that people like Moitse and a few others had the feeling that the university was too lily-white under Rogers [because] when you look at the UBLS legislation, it favoured senior staff. Under UBLS, the Professor would be a permanent Head of Department. But Africans were junior and if you were to follow that [route] they [Africans] were always marginalised.

(Udam5 Interview, 18/01/2011)
For example, Ambrose who was a senior lecturer admits that his appointment as the Head of the Mathematics Department “had for some strange reason been for an indefinite period”, a situation he attributes to an oversight or some misplaced overconfidence in him by John Blake, the former white VC (Ambrose, 2006:2). Another key informant also admitted that there was a determination to stamp out white hegemony because “Rogers and his senior colleagues were a bunch of white men and nothing else, white men who were not necessarily qualitywise” (Uadm13 Interview, 21/09/2014). These notions of ‘othering’ led to heightened feelings of marginality where key decisions tended to be those of the ‘superior’ VC and his senior colleagues (NULASA, n.d:1). Thus in the face of both perceived and experienced neo-colonialist and racist tendencies and practices, ‘othering’ became an important weapon to resist hegemonic discourses and practices. One of the recommendations by the Commission of Inquiry into student unrest of March 1975 was to localise the positions of Vice-Chancellor, Pro Vice-Chancellor, Registrar, Personal Assistant to the Vice-Chancellor, University Librarian and Financial Controller within the next five to ten years. This recommendation was rejected by Basotho academics who felt that the time-frame suggested was not only too long, but also a ploy to further delay localisation (GBLS, 1975:21).

This representation which involves ‘othering’ of the mainly white Central Administration of UBLS and its officials by mainly black members of staff, students and government officials was facilitated by the sluggish pace of the Africanisation and localisation of senior administrative positions, including senior teaching positions. The politics of power and the desire for control was now reduced to a dangerous form of ‘othering’ in which race became its medium of expression. The supposed power of the whites was now being openly mocked, resisted and destabilised through a discourse of ‘writing back’ (Ashcroft, Griffiths and Tiffin, 1989; McLeod, 2000).

However, it is important to note that there were some Basotho who seemed not to share in the ideal of rapid localisation of the university. Seemingly supporting the thinking that Africans were ‘incapable of learning’, one informant stated emphatically and bluntly,
When the winds of change were blowing, it was just ‘let us have a university’. We Basotho stole the University in 1975. We nationalised it and we stole everything. And then Basotho started to say, ‘these white people have to go, these foreigners have to go, we have to be in charge’. But we were not ready. We didn’t have qualified people. (Grep4 Interview, 25/07/2014)

As if to buttress this strong perception, a former acting VC says that when he applied to be substantive VC in 1987, having acted in that position for nearly two years, he discovered that the Chancellor, King Moshoeshoe II, a graduate of Oxford, held the view that “Basotho per se were not yet sufficiently seasoned to become VCs” (Uadm2 Interview, 08/03/2011).

Yet the urge to Africanise and localise was not only confined to the university, but also to the civil service, where Lesotho pursued it more vigorously than Botswana and Swaziland (Udam5 Interview, 25/01/2011). Consequently, NUL could not be immune to the same kind of pressure which finally led to its nationalisation on 20 October 1975. However, the ‘Self’/‘Other’ dichotomy did not end with the nationalisation of the University. Rather, as a result of contestations for the control of key positions such as the Vice-Chancellorship, it produced different forms of representation involving ‘othering’ as subsequent sections shall show.

### 4.2.2 The NUL Vice-Chancellorship and Catholic vs. Protestant Discourses of ‘Otherness’

A combination of predication and referential strategies were deployed in the representational discourses of the Catholics and Protestants in respect of the NUL Vice-Chancellorship, an issue at the centre of the split of UBLS in 1975. In the post-UBLS era, the NUL Vice-Chancellorship has continued to be a site of contestation among all stakeholders. In this section, I therefore explore representations which involve ‘othering’ discourses in Catholic-Protestant relations of power vis-à-vis top University positions, particularly the Vice-Chancellorship which the Catholics seem to have turned into a space for essentialist arguments. During the 1970s and 1980s, there was a tendency to see appointments to top administrative positions at NUL as

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79 None of the first three VCs of NUL in a row (Mashologu (1975-1979), Setsabi (1979-1983) and Tlelase (1983-1986) was a PhD holder, or a professor or widely published scholar although they may have been good administrators.
following a religious trajectory. Using a few examples, I highlight ‘othering’ discourse along religious lines; while at the same time exposing the limits of such religious essentialism (see 4.3).

According to Mashologu, when the Roma campus of UBLS was nationalised in 1975, one of the unconfirmed stories doing rounds at the time was that one senior Botswana official was said to have caustically remarked, “Well, the Basotho may get away with their National University of Lesotho this time, but I bet it won’t be long before they are at each other’s throats over their university because of their inherent religious and political differences” (Mashologu, 2006:54).

Indeed sooner rather than later the inherent differences surfaced over who qualifies to occupy the office of the Vice-Chancellor. Mashologu himself, who as we saw was appointed VC of NUL in 1975, became a focal point of debates among Catholics about his religious and political ‘correctness’, in view of his seemingly overlapping identities. Mashologu was a known Protestant on one hand, and an ardent BNP supporter on the other hand. He was thus an ‘in-between’ or a ‘hybrid’. “It just happened that myself and Mohapeloa were appointed VC and PVC respectively, both [of us] Protestants”, recounted Mashologu. “There was a strong campaign against us and to have Anthony Setsabi, who was Catholic, replace Mohapeloa at the end of his two year Pro-Vice-Chancellorship contract” (Mashologu Interview, 11/01/2011).

The appointment of non-Catholics by the PM as VCs and PVCs seems to suggest something deeper than the simple Catholic versus Protestant dichotomy. It seems to point to the fact that the notion of a fixed identity is fallacious because the ideology and the motives that influenced these appointments probably had more to do with the PM’s probable motives and little to do with promoting denominational parochialism. It is also possible that it was the ‘in-betweenness’ of the candidate which persuaded the PM to appoint him VC in 1975. But essentialist Catholic discourse chose to see him and his deputy as simply the ‘Other’.

The campaign against the VC and his deputy must be understood within the context of the historic rivalry between Catholics and Protestants. Despite the passage of the University into the hands of Government in 1964, it would seem that the Catholics continue to want to see NUL as ‘their’ university. Therefore to die-hard Catholics, it was religion first, politics second, and not the other way round. Mashologu posits that denominational parochialism was at one time a
major issue with the result that there was a need to balance the top four positions at NUL (VC, PVC, Registrar and Bursar) by having them shared between the two main churches (Udam5 Interview, 11/01/2011). In his published memoirs, Mashologu (2006) notes that

[i]t is a hard fact that in the Lesotho of 1976 there was a large segment of people that was unable to look at any national issue on its exclusive merits other than in terms of a Catholic versus Protestant dichotomy. This mind-set arose from the historic rivalry between the Catholic and Protestant missions in Lesotho.

(Mashologu, 2006:53)

The appointment of Tlelase as VC was controversial in that the ruling BNP government not only controversially amended the NUL law in 1984 in order to fast-track his appointment (see 3.5.1.3), but it refused to accept Dr. A. M. Maruping, the choice of the University Council. Maruping was known to be a Protestant and a BCP follower and therefore regarded as “not their man [because] they wanted to have their own man there [at NUL]” (Uaca11 Interview, 18/04/2014). There is therefore a widely held belief that during BNP and military rule (1970-1992), all VCs save one were Catholics (Gmin1 Interview, 07/08/2014). However, this was not entirely true, because when Tlelase suddenly left, Dr. L. B. B. J. Machobane, a well-known Protestant, was appointed as acting Vice-Chancellor from 1986-1987.

As if to underscore this Catholic-Protestant binarism, one former acting VC strongly believes that he and his acting second in command were given a tough time at NUL by diehard Catholics because they were Protestants, something he felt was rare for a University Administration whose VC was a Catholic or pro-Catholic (Uadm2 Interview, 31/03/2011). Yet when he later became a government minister, his identity quickly shifted. It was being suggested that he was a Minister because he had become all of a sudden a member of the Catholic Church. And his determination to bring changes to the university, through Parliament, was simply interpreted as a Protestant determined to undermine Catholic influence. According to the former Minister (Gmin2 Interview, 31/03/2014), one Catholic priest approached the head of the Military regime and asked him pointedly, “why do you allow this Protestant to do this to us?” Collins (1989:5) argues that following the 1986 coup, the junta appointed Protestants to the Education Ministry in order to redress what they felt had been Jonathan’s favoring of Catholic educators. And as if to underscore this religious schism, one informant, in reference to the Vice-Chancellorship of
Professor Moletsane (1996-2000), had this to say, “If we are to be honest, one can say in 1997 the VC we had at the time was an LEC [member]. He is the one who faced challenges which were predominantly religiously motivated because he was not able to distance himself from the tension between Catholics and Protestants” (Uaca11 Interview, 18/04/2014). What we see in these two cases is a widely held view of the ‘Other’ on the basis of religion. The construction of the former acting VC and Minister, for example, shifting from one identity to another and back, testified to the existence of hybrid identities. It illustrates that the ‘Other’ is a socially constructed concept that is changeable, reinforcing the thesis that identities, as social constructions, are multiple, complex, and always changing (Ranger, 1996; Noble, Poynting and Tabar 1999; Hudson and Melber, 2014).

When the acting Vice-Chancellorship went to Professor Sebatane (2010 and 2011), some Catholics simply essentialised it as a Protestant takeover of the institution. According to one academic with strong ties to the RCC, this was the first time the University had a VC, an acting VC, a Registrar, and a Bursar all of whom were not Catholics “So it is the first time that we can say the Protestant churches are taking over The Roman Catholics are already watching”, observed the informant (Uaca2 Interview, 09/02/2011). This essentialist construction of the Protestants was based on the fact that throughout the history of NUL, there has always been Catholic influence within the hierarchy of the institution. This is because “even if there [was] a Protestant like during the Moletsane era, [we had] the Registrar who [was] Catholic [and] the Librarian who [was] Catholic” (Uaca2 Interview, 09/02/2011). From a discourse-analytical point of view, the language used by the Catholics, in its everyday as well as professional usages, enables us to understand issues of social concern (Fairclough, 1999:vi). The Catholics seemed worried about the perceived growth in influence of the Protestants within an institution they have historically dominated.

While the first three VCs of NUL from 1975-1986 may or may not have been appointed because of their denominational or political inclination, an indelible perception was cultivated that they were appointed on religious and political grounds. “In the past” claims one informant, “VCs

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80 Referring to Protestants aligned to BCP which led the country to in 1993, the same informant went on to say that it was also in 1993 that Maseru was taken over for the first time by the BCP when the Catholic-aligned BNP lost power.
were appointed on religious grounds because Jonathan [the PM] was a Catholic” (Uadm14 Interview, 05/08/2014). Yet it was not as simple as this. As we have already seen, the very first VC and his deputy were not Catholics but Protestants, thus blurring the Catholic-Protestant dichotomy that appears pervasive in the minds of many people. This perception has refused to pale into insignificance. In the very recent past, one informant claims that when one top university position became vacant, his application came to be seen in terms of the ‘Other’ Protestant determined to oust the Catholics from power. When an issue that required the intervention of his office arose, he decided not to take any active part in its resolution for fear of being seen as the ‘Other’ Protestant promoting LEC interests at the University (Uadm16 Interview, 03/08/2014). This example clearly shows how the agency of the Protestants themselves also helped to promote the Catholic-Protestant binarism. Thus the agency of the Catholics, the state and that of the Protestants themselves all played a key part in the construction of the ‘Other’ and ‘otherness’ in relation to the ‘Self’ and ‘selfness’.

Yet in a country divided mainly between two major denominations, the tendency to see things through a Catholic-Protestant lens seems unavoidable. One top church official says that everyone has her/his denominational and political inclinations to the extent that, whoever was picked for the position of VC, people were always able to say what denomination and what political affiliation she/he was, adding emphatically that “the neutrality of anybody in this country is a problem because Lesotho has never had divisions along tribal lines, but along denominational and political differences” (WiCom3 Interview, 29/07/2014). Thus of anyone who got into any position of authority, people were always bound to say, ‘he must be Catholic, he must be LEC’ (Gmin2 Interview, 31/03/2011). Similarly, there are people who think that the Catholic-Protestant schism, real or imagined, has led to the founding of an LEC-aligned university, Limkokwing University of Creative Technology (LUCT) (Uadm14 Interview, 05/08/2014), pointing to its 90% Protestant administrative profile. The majority view shared by the Catholics is that LUCT was established by the Congress-led government in 2008 not only as an alternative to NUL which they had failed to effectively control, but also as a means to undermine NUL (Uaca2 Interview, 09/02/2011; Uadm5 Interview, 11/01/2011).
Just as colonialism could not have succeeded without the complicity of the colonised, representations which involve ‘othering’ in respect of the NUL Vice-Chancellorship along religious lines could not have succeeded without the agency of those who were being othered. This representation of ‘otherness’ between Catholics and Protestants is part and parcel of the contestation for power among state and non-state actors. The next section continues the focus on this ‘othering’ discourse by discussing how two groups with special interests came to ethnicise identity in respect of the NUL Vice-Chancellorship in particular and university management in general.

4.2.3 The Discursive Construction of ‘In-’ and ‘Out-Groups’: NULASA, LUTARU and University Leadership and Management

Besides deploying referential strategies, both NULASA and LUTARU used argumentation strategies to justify and legitimise their calls for the control of the University by the locals. In this section, I therefore analyse ‘othering’ tendencies that are linked to inherent notions of identity and belonging. I do so by showing how NULASA deployed essentialist notions of ethnic identity in order to push its interests (4.2.3.1); and how similar notions were again essentialised by LUTARU, the successor union to NULASA, to push personal and group political projects (4.2.3.2). The positions of Vice-Chancellor, Dean of Faculty, Head of Department and membership of committees became sites of ‘othering’, with loud calls for the localisation of key university positions. They became discursive spaces equated with localness. Thus the ‘Self’ and ‘Other’ or ‘Us’ and ‘Them’ discourse did not end with the nationalisation of the Roma campus of UBLS, just as colonialism did not end with the West packing their bags and leaving Africa. The persistent ‘selfing’ and ‘othering’ is part of the ‘heritage’ of the past that emphasises continuity, fluidity and interconnectedness between the past and the present (Abrahamsen, 2003). The overlaps between the North and the South are crucial to understanding continuities and interconnections between the two (Young, 2001:8). One example of this continued ‘othering’ is the way in which the casting of the expatriate at NUL as the ‘Other’ also serves as a means to keep in check the imagined power and influence of the expatriate, thus bringing out issues of dissimilarity and power.

81 The strategies involve the use of topoi, fallacies and counterfactuals to justify inclusion or exclusion, discrimination or preferential treatment.
4.2.3.1 NULASA and ‘Anti-Basotho’ and ‘Anti-localisation’ Discourse

After more than a decade of local Vice-Chancellorships (1975-1987), the GOL, through the University Governing Council, decided it was time to go ‘international’, a move that was interpreted by some local members of staff and other sections of the society as ‘anti-Basotho’ and therefore ‘anti-localisation’. It was not clear why the Government made a sudden change to what looked like the established practice to appoint local VCs, leaving people to speculate, thereby feeding into the realm of ‘othering’. NULASA resorted to essentialising ethnic identity. One candidate, an ‘insider’ and local, had applied for the position and expected to be appointed substantive VC, having acted in that position. According to him he had been recommended to the Chancellor who was the King, “but the King had a different idea. The King had an idea that Basotho per se are not yet sufficiently seasoned to become VCs” (Uadm2 Interview, 08/03/2011) (see 4.2.1). According to this candidate, he only discovered much later that a Commission had been established, as he puts it, “behind my back to head-hunt a VC to come here” (Uadm2 Interview, 08/03/2011). Consequently, the government of the day, presumably invoking powers contained in the NUL (Amendment) Act of 1985 (see 3.5.1), went ahead and appointed Professor A. D. Baikie as VC in 1988 (see 3.6.1.1). This appointment of a foreign VC (an ‘outsider’) ahead of local candidates (‘insiders’) who had applied for the job did not go down well with both the local candidates and with some influential sections of the University community who persistently questioned the suitability of foreign candidates on essentialist grounds. Though an African, Baikie was considered the ‘Other’ to the Basotho ‘Self’. Mushonga (2011), in a study of the marginalisation of Coloured people in post-colonial Southern Africa, argues that the political legacy of the colonial state that tended to define citizenship on the basis of ethnicity and indigeneity has tended to exclude certain racial and ethnic groups in the scheme of entitlements. This appeal to ethnicity and indigenous roots was used by NULASA to make a case for the localisation of some key university posts. According to NULASA, localising the Vice-Chancellorship and other key university positions would be the pinnacle of Basothoness and localness.
A former government official (Grep3 Interview, 06/08/2014) indicated to the author that Dr. Machobane, and another local applicant, Dr. Maruping, were disqualified for being too young, a reasoning which he says was not favoured by Council members from the USA, Canada, West Africa and East Africa, some of whom had held equivalent positions at an early age (Grep3 Interview, 06/08/2014). But in the view of one local candidate, the King was influenced by ideas flowing from abroad, from the London School of Economics where he was a graduate, thus reinforcing the idea of, first, looking back at colonialism, and second, the universality of the West (Spivak, 1995), both of which PC and decoloniality challenge head-on. Moreover, the decision to disqualify or to overlook the local candidates reinforced the idea of the coloniality of power and its articulations of colonial mentalities, psychologies and world-views and the thinking that everything good comes from outside. Yet, as we have already seen (see 4.2.2), it could also be said that the two were eliminated because they were known Protestants while those in power at the time were Catholics. Thus, whatever the reasons for the disqualification or for overlooking the two local candidates, the decision to appoint a foreign VC in 1988 contributed to the devaluing of local talent and to reinforcing Afropessimism.

Indeed, as if to buttress the actions of the King, two high ranking government and ex-government officials both expressed the view that Government did not want to discriminate between local and foreign when filling the position of VC. In essentialist and very strong language, one of the officials categorically stated, “There will never be a home-grown VC because we are very lazy. Our work ethic as Basotho is bad. That one is ingrained. We like gossip and sulking to other people and stealing” (Uadm7 Interview, 25/07/2014). A similar viewpoint had been expressed earlier on in connection with the nationalisation of the Roma campus of UBLS, with the same informant suggesting that Basotho were not yet ready to run the University. Yet this stereotyping of Basotho as lazy and incompetent is highly reductionist, presenting members of a group as homogeneous by simply exaggerating and simplifying a few widely recognised characteristics of a person or group of people (Hall, 1997; Merskin, 2004:160-161). As recently as 2014, in reference to suggestions that the GOL tends to favour foreigners over locals when it comes to filling of the position of the VC, a former government official similarly stated, “The only thing I know is that Siverts [2011-2013] and Ogunrinade [2007-2010]
were hired because there were no qualifying local candidates. They all go through psychometric tests and [the local candidates] don’t make the grade”82 (Gmin1 Interview, 07/08/2014).

For Baike, to have stayed on for a relatively long period as VC of NUL (8 years) may mean that he was an able leader. He was generally liked by the majority of non-academic staff members while some sections of the academic staff were opposed to his style of leadership. Among academic staff, however, NULASA steadfastly opposed most of his decisions which they regarded as not only anti-localisation and anti-Basotho, but also as oppressive. According to NULASA, recommendations contained in a VC-spearheaded Task Force were meant to strip Departments and Faculty Boards of decision-making powers. NULASA argued that “[t]his Anti-Basotho, patriarchal regimentation, based on Professorial rank glorification, completely strips Departments and Faculty Boards of decision-making powers” (GOL, 1989b:5). It was able to present a picture of a foreign VC who did not have the interests of Basotho at heart. By so doing, the VC was obviously cast as the ‘Other’ who was determined to frustrate the progress of the locals just as colonialism was seen as bent on perpetuating the cultural and political hegemony of the West (Lopez, 2001). NULASA also charged that the professorial rank at NUL was skewed towards expatriate staff members (GOL, 1989b:5). NULASA simply went about essentialising ethnic identity notwithstanding that identities are not fixed or singular, but rather shifting, plural and even contradictory (Noble et al, 1999:59). The local media picked up the essentialist notions of identity by NULASA and went on to suggest that NUL was in chaos because of the supposed marginalisation of locals. The media thus also essentialised and homogenised the locals, thereby reinforcing the ‘othering’ of expatriates. The Chairman of NULASA at the time, Dr. Sejanamane, was quoted in The Mirror (1988) newspaper as saying that the chaos at NUL was a consequence of the fact that there were no incentives in the University for Lesotho nationals to stay on the staff of the University as the salaries were extremely low and that “there was a ruling that they [Basotho] will not get any promotion unless they have served the University for a period of 10 years”83, and further that “almost all Professors are expatriates who enjoy good

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82 Yet choosing a candidate on the basis of merit also constitutes discrimination.

83 It is interesting to note that having gotten rid of the 10 year clause, 26 years later, in 2014, the interim Administration brought back the clause by ruling that in order for one to get promotion to the rank of Associate and Full Professor, one must have served for “a minimum of ten years of service after being a lecturer or equivalent position”. More controversially was to make a PhD degree a requirement, a clause that was applied retrospectively
salaries and fringe benefits which are second to none” (Staff Reporter, 1988). The ‘anti-Basotho’ and ‘anti-localisation’ rhetoric of NULASA served to emphasise that locals had entitlements which went beyond those of the ‘outsiders’. It also served not only to lay claims to better salaries, benefits and to equal rights, but also to make Basotho academics more visible and make their voices heard. Yet it is important to state that neither locals nor expatriates formed a single homogeneous group. However, it is these fixed identities that enable some people or groups of people to claim group-differentiated rights. As Fuss (1989:103) argues, “identity is always purchased at the price of the exclusion of the Other, the repression or repudiation of non-identity”

The seemingly established practice of appointing only Deans and Directors to University committees also became another site of ‘othering’, because the majority of those appointed to such committees and positions of authority were inadvertently expatriates. For NULASA, this was a clear case of ‘anti-Basotho’ and ‘anti-localisation’ strategy, as it tended to block “advancement and development routes for local staff” (Ernst & Young Report, 2000:59). A Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Instability at the National University of Lesotho (GOL, 1989b) noted that NULASA had been critical of the employment of expatriates by the University. It further noted that its criticism was expressed in a way calculated to make some sections of the University, particularly students, to adopt a negative, and sometimes hostile, attitude towards expatriates, thereby causing feelings of anxiety and insecurity among some expatriates (GOL, 1989b:31). The language that NULASA used to portray expatriates seemed to display borderline nativist if not xenophobic and racist tendencies, thus reinforcing the construction of identity along ethnic and racial lines. Ashcroft et al, (1998:17) posit that in some respects, “cultural essentialism may be adopted as a strategic political position in the struggle against imperial power”. However, if the group internally does not maintain a critical stance towards its own identity it becomes counterproductive and simply reinforces binaries. Such dichotomisation is ineffective because postcolonial theory seeks to bring questions of subjectivity to the foreground, thus seeing “post-colonial identities as complex formulations in

in order to disqualify both local and non-local non-PhD candidates who had applied for promotion under the old criteria in 2013 (Circular Notice REG/Adm 1.75/2014/5).
which we are *all* citizen/subjects”, instead of rendering subjects passivity and denying them the capacity to speak or to act (Ahluwalia, 2001:19; emphasis in the original).

### 4.2.3.2 LUTARU and the ‘Self’/‘Other’ Dichotomy as Opposition Discourse to the 1996 Recruitment of the Vice-Chancellor

In 1996, the recruitment of the VC came under the spotlight again. It became both a site of essentialist ‘othering’ and resistance. In this section I deal with discourses related to the former, especially the use of language, while the latter is dealt with in detail in Chapter 5. I show how LUTARU used essentialist notions of belonging, of the ‘Self’ in relation to the ‘Other’, in opposition to the recruitment of a foreign VC. I also show how the ‘Self’/‘Other’ dichotomy was reinforced by the agency of the ‘outsiders’.

At the end of Professor Baikie’s term in December 1995, the University Governing Council attempted to replace him with another expatriate. However, for LUTARU, eight years of ‘expatriate rule’ was more than enough. Thus after the University Selection Panel shortlisted five expatriates and no Basotho candidates for the position of VC, LUTARU made it clear, in a letter sent to each of the five candidates that it was repulsed by the idea that the “Selection Panel dares imagine that a leading position such as the Vice-Chancellor’s is a pre-ordained turf for expatriates” (LUTARU, 27 February 1996). In these letters sent to each of the five shortlisted candidates, LUTARU made it clear that in the event that any one of them was appointed, she/he would not be welcome. In a statement sent to the media, LUTARU unequivocally stated, “we remain convinced that the appointment of another expatriate Vice-Chancellor at NUL is an affront to the ability of Basotho to run their own institutions” (LUTARU Press Release, 6 March 1996). LUTARU argued that “a University that has been around for fifty years [was] long past the stage of employing an expatriate for the position of Vice-Chancellor”, accusing the University of applying a dubious selection criterion in order to keep Basotho out of the race (LUTARU, 20 February 1996; 27 February 1996; 5 March 1996). The LUTARU statement that was read on Lesotho TV represented the University Council as fully understanding neither its accountability to the University community nor to the nation, aspersions which left the University Administration livid. The Administration was convinced that the reading of the statement on the public broadcaster was intended to, first, mislead the nation and the
international community into believing that the process was unprofessional, illegal and geared to eliminate Basotho candidates, and, second, attack the integrity and authority of the Selection Panel members. This seemed to be the case particularly when the media weighed in ostensibly on the side of LUTARU, conflating foreignness with failure of development of the university by pointing out that “the University cannot develop if run by expatriates as they tend to use the divide and rule policy by aligning with other expatriates to the detriment of the locals” (Lesotho News Agency (LENA), 6 March 1996). Once again the Vice-Chancellorship became a site of ‘othering’ in which each actor tried to portray the other in negative terms.

Consequently, opposition to the recruitment of an expatriate VC by LUTARU in 1996 led to the appointment of a local VC, Professor Moletsane (see 3.6.1.1). Interestingly, his appointment did nothing to signal the end of conflict in the University. Essentialist considerations shifted away from citizenship and indigeneity to seeing him as having been sent by the Ministry of Education. It was alleged that the Ministry was bent on unleashing “its refined fascism” on LUTARU by making sure that LUTARU members were not promoted and by being given powers “to expel any suspected LUTARU members from [the university]” (Summary of Events in Lesotho, 2001). Thus in the three years Moletsane was at the helm (1997-1999), he was accused of a litany of ills – heavy-handedness, incompetence, bias and financial impropriety among others (LUTARU, 2000). On the basis of these allegations, LUTARU petitioned Council to dismiss him. In the petition sent to Council, the ‘local’ versus ‘foreign’ dichotomy again featured prominently. LUTARU charged that Moletsane tended to marginalise local academic members of staff while favouring expatriate staff. Part of the petition read

> [t]he victims of this management style have been mostly local members of academic staff who have been marginalised while the interests of pliant expatriate staff have been promoted. The consequence has been a dangerous chasm between the two groups.

(LUTARU, 22 November, 1999)

This discourse of ‘othering’, as a form of contest for power and influence in the running of the University, punctuated the Vice-Chancellorship of Moletsane as it did that of Baikie. Like Baikie, Moletsane was accused of consistently appointing only expatriate Deans as acting Pro-Vice-Chancellors, thus denying “Basotho Deans the same opportunity” (LUTARU, 22
November 1999). A study by a consulting firm, Ernst & Young (2000:164) shows how NUL was allegedly run along a local-expatriate dichotomy. Probably as a means of resolving the chasm, it was then resolved that a policy of rotation, in alphabetic order of faculties, would be used to choose an acting Pro-Vice-Chancellor. However, headship of departments was subject to election. Only Deans remained directly elected by their faculties. The Moletsane case and subsequent developments demonstrate that essentialist claims are nothing but political necessities for advancing group interests (Eide, 2010).

At one time, when a local candidate lost the job to become VC to an expatriate, the candidate abruptly resigned in protest, a move that shocked some people both in the University and in Government. According to an informant who was privy to the developments, the local candidate organised a party for students where he allegedly told them that he was “leaving the university to the outsiders” (Uadm5 Interview, 11/01/2011). This essentialist notion of identity can be interpreted as both xenophobic and racist, implying that indigenes have more rights and entitlements than non-indigenes. Therefore to the local candidate, the non-Basotho ‘Other’ could seemingly not be ranked the same as the Basotho ‘Self’. Such arguably dangerous, divisive and irresponsible view of ‘Self’ in relation to ‘Other’ runs the risk of fuelling xenophobic or racist violence.

Yet this ‘insider’/‘outsider’ perspective was reinforced not only by the ‘insiders’ but also by the agency of the ‘outsiders’ themselves. While the demand by some staff and students in 2008 that the VC Ogunrinade ‘must go home’ may have emphasised his identity as an ‘outsider’, Ogunrinade himself also played a role in emphasising his ‘otherness’ by telling his international friends that if there was one lesson learnt, it was “that the African Vice-Chancellorship is not a bed of roses especially for foreign VC” (Ogunrinade, 2008). Ogunrinade’s successor, Professor Siverts, at her first and last Press Conference reinforced her ‘otherness’ and the perceived, innate differences between the global North and the global South. “To all Basotho, this is your university. Personally, I am privileged to be here” (VC (Siverts) Press Conference, 19 July 2011), she said. She repeated the same notion of being an ‘outsider’ in essentialist and homogenising terms at her last press conference in July 2013. This followed her controversial relocation of the VC’s residence to Maseru in the same year, 35km away from the University
under the seemingly guise of a security threat. “Believe me” she told the press conference, “if I wanted to live ‘in luxury’, would I choose Lesotho? Lesotho is a least developed country and many of us [expatriates] are here to build it” (VC Press Conference, 18 July 2013). Not long after this Press Conference, Siverts resigned in August 2013. This stands in contrast to views of anti-essentialists (Tekin, 2010) who argue for an approach that regards identity as non-fixed, as something more fluid and continuously changing through contestations and negotiations. Veronis (2007) also recognises the potentials of anti-essentialising notions such as ‘third space’ where immigrants, for example, can make claims to citizenship and redefine notions of inclusion. As part of discourses of representation that are community-based but in respect of NUL, I analyse representations and ‘othering’ that draw on the politics of religion and place in the next section (4.3).

4.3 THE POLITICS OF RELIGION AND PLACE: COMMUNITY-BASED ‘OTHERING’ VIS-À-VIS NUL

While community-based discourses of representation have featured in previous sections, here I specifically analyse those forms of ‘othering’ involving the politics of religion and place in respect of NUL. As we have already seen in Chapter 3, the Catholic Church pioneered the formation of NUL in 1945. Since then, the sense of ‘Self’ and ‘Other’ has dominated Catholic-Protestant relations for much of their history. In Lesotho in the 1970s and 1980s, there was a tendency to see things in terms of a Catholic-Protestant dichotomy, arising from the historic rivalry between the two (Mashologu, 2006:53). The campaign of violence, intimidation and persecution against primarily BCP members (see 3.5.1), served to create a feeling that this was indeed a “religious war waged by a Cabinet almost wholly Roman Catholic against the Protestant Churches in Lesotho” (Khaketla, 1971:284). According to a former government official, the growth of the BNP was based on constructing members of Protestant Churches as communists and a feeling still exists in Lesotho today that BCP victory in the 1970 elections was taken away on the grounds of communism (Grep3 Interview, 25/07/2014).

However, today it is generally agreed that the Catholic-Protestant dichotomy is no longer as pronounced as it was in the 1970s and 1980s (Uaca11 Interview, 18/04/2014; Gmin1 Interview, 07/08/2014). However, there are some who think otherwise. According to one top university
administrator, the rivalry is “worse at least within NUL [and] … the animosity and intensity of it is even worse than before” (Uadm13 Interview, 21/09/2014). The rivalry within NUL is partly linked to the politics of land on campus. As we saw in chapter 3, the Charter reserved and entrenched certain privileges for the RCC within university structures, including a residential unit (see 3.2.1.1 and 3.2.1.3). The entrenching of RCC privileges within a national university has fueled contestations between the main churches. In Lesotho, history and space have tended to define relations between Catholics and Protestants. Lefebvre argues that space is the ultimate locus and medium of struggle, and is therefore a crucial political issue, hence the statement, “there is a politics of space because space is political” (Lefebvre quoted in Elden, 2007:106-107).

Consequently, there exists a discourse of ‘othering’ among the three main churches that is related to place and space. History has it that the Roma Valley, where NUL is domiciled, came to be understood, at least in the public domain, as a place for the Catholics. On the other hand, Morija is seen as a place for the Evangelicals, and Mohale’s Hoek as a place for the Anglicans (Hinks, 2001; RoCom3 Interview, 17/12/2010). It is this historical development that has fundamentally aided the perception of territoriality among the main churches, giving rise to the tendency by one church constructing the other church(es) as the ‘Other’. This notion of territoriality was tested in 2009 when the RCC and Anglican Church of Lesotho (ACL)84, at the time the only two denominations with a physical presence on campus, approached the courts of law and lost a case in which they wanted the court to declare illegal and prohibit the building of an LEC chapel on campus, on land and space which was claimed to belong to the Catholics85. The Catholics were adamant that land in Roma and at NUL was theirs by right and by inheritance. Essentialising the issue of land on campus, one Catholic informant argued that “land at the university is not neutral. It is not anybody’s place” (WiCom6 Interview, 08/08/2014), while another declared that the RCC will continue to fight as “people cannot just come here and grab our land like this” (WiCom7 Interview, 29/12/2010).

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84 According to several informants on both sides of the divide, the RCC claims that the ACL are their ‘cousins’ whom they allowed to build in their backyard hence their physical presence on campus.

85 Citing Section 82 of the 1979 Land Act, the High Court of Lesotho ruled in favour of the LEC.
The RCC approach to land reinforces the idea that places are spaces of strategic essentialism\textsuperscript{86}. Yet this simple binary modality and essentialising homogeneity is not only disputed by other churches, but also fails to take account of realities on the ground, for instance the close working relations between the Churches in Lesotho under umbrella bodies like the CCL and the CHAL. Moreover, both Catholic and Protestant identity is fluid and open. These essentialising and territorialising notions of land are not shared by the LEC, which believes that the land in Lesotho belongs to everyone. In reference to land on campus where the LEC built a chapel in 2009, one LEC informant stated that it was not their site, adding emphatically, “the land in Lesotho belongs to the King. We cannot encourage church factionalism” (Grep4 Interview, 25/07/2014). Furthermore, the NUL Ordinance No. 1 of 1979, section 3 of the National University Act 1992 as amended, makes provision for the presence of not only the RCC on campus, but also “the Anglican Church, the Lesotho Evangelical Church; and other Protestant denominations” (GOL, 1992; NUL Calendar, 2006/2007:438), thus making space on campus more pluralist. Hudson and Melber (2014) posit that place continues to play a key role in the shaping of ordinary people’s collective experiences of identity, thus leading to contestations and the rejection of others’ claims of belonging to that particular space. They posit that “difference, and its construction is thus fundamentally intertwined with spatial politics and its meaning for identity as well as claims of ownership” (Hudson and Melber, 2014:2).

While the previous sections have showed how predication, referential, argumentation and essentialist strategies were deployed to construct the ‘Other’, the following section uses themes that emerged from the analysis of documentary and field data to demonstrate how negative and stereotypical images of NUL got inserted into the social imaginary of some triadic actors, chiefly the GOL and the Community including the media.

\textsuperscript{86}The majority of chiefs in the Roma community interviewed also essentialised the traditional connections with the University on the grounds that the University sits on land that was once part of their ancestral fields. By dint of this, they continue to question why ‘outsiders’ were being employed in the University ahead of ‘insiders’ (RoCom1 Interview, 17/12/2010; RoCom6 Interview, 22/12/2010; RoCom7 Interview, 17/12/2010; RoCom11 Interview, 22/12/2010; RoCom13 Interview, 23/12/2010; Ambrose, 2015; Ambrose, personal communication, 26/10/2013).
4.4 INSTITUTIONAL ‘CULTURE’ AND PRACTICES AND THE MAKINGS OF THE NUL IMAGE

It is important to note that the earlier image of NUL, as epitomised through IEMS as ‘the Light in the Night’ (see 3.4), was more positive compared with later images. When NUL was created, it was seen as a ‘university of Lesotho’ in contradistinction to UBLS which was seen as a ‘university in Lesotho’ (Mashologu, 2006). The new NUL was seen as the ‘University of the People’, with promising solutions to the problems of the nation and the region. However, as disillusionment began to set in, especially over the perceived failure of the university to find solutions to the multiplying problems of society, the image of the university quickly turned negative, with the government even beginning to see NUL as the seat of opposition politics. In this section I present what images the actors in the Triad – GOL, the NUL community and the wider community including the media have constructed of NUL, which do not necessarily accurately represent the institution. Via the business of ‘knowing’ (discourse), NUL has been constructed in negative and stereotypical ways as an organisation stricken by a ‘culture’ of ‘laissez-faire’/impunity, ‘in-breeding’ and ‘fixity’, among others. This is because, as we have already seen, the ‘Other’ is almost innately a negative concept.

The business of ‘knowing’, based on paternalistic constructions of the ‘Other’, has tended to draw boundaries between NUL on one hand, and GOL and Community on the other hand, despite the convergence of minds on a number of issues. Mignolo’s (2000:183) question of how one can construct a self-image in the face of one’s definition by the ‘Other’ becomes germane. This is because self-representation tends to fall outside the lines laid down by the official institutional structures of representation. While the modes of representation that I present here are intrinsically intertwined, I discuss them in three separate sections namely laissez-fairism/impunity (4.4.1), ‘in-breeding’ and ‘fixity’ (4.4.2), and the media ‘gaze’ (4.4.3) for purposes of explication. These modes of representation which involve ‘othering’ are presented here as a way of thinking and speaking of and about NUL, as well as being a means of maintaining power by those whose knowledge of the ‘Other’ is considered ‘wholly reliable’. Thus more than anything, the opposition discourse of both the GOL and the Community illustrates in no uncertain terms their dissatisfaction with NUL.
4.4.1 The ‘Laissez-faire’/Impunity Image of NUL

There is a widely shared feeling among many observers, both from within and outside the institution, that there is widespread, in local nomenclature, *laisser-fairism* or impunity at NUL, which has evolved over time to become part of the institutional culture. According to the VC’s address to Congregation in 2002, drunkenness, absenteeism, irregular lecture attendance and wanton cancellation of classes, irregular student assessment and feedback, deliberate sabotage of the university system and of colleagues, nepotism, insubordination and private practice at the expense of the institution among others (VC Address to Congregation, 2002), constituted a whole body of practices that went unpunished at NUL. Yet while actors in the University point to the pervasiveness of impunity, there is a tendency to deny its existence in public and when actors from outside the University complain about it. Moreover, it seems that explanations for the origins of the ‘culture’ of impunity are neither easy nor convincing. Rather than explaining its genesis, many interviewees chose to emphasise conditions that tend to foster and therefore ensure its continued existence and persistence. It is the view of many observers that the culture of impunity has been fostered by, among other factors, ‘egalitarianism’\(^{87}\), lack of leadership, lack of enforcement of existing policies, rules, regulations and laws and also the preponderance of family connections and family relations within the University (Uaca18 Interview, 18/10/2014; Uaca24 Interview, 18/10/2014; Uaca27 Interview, 20/10/2014; Uaca30, 20/10/2014; Unas3 Interview, 25/10/2014; Unas5 Interview, 25/10/2014; Uaca5 Interview, 08/08/2014; Grep3 Interview, 06/08/2014; Uadm15 Interview, 01/11/2014). Because of these ‘enabling’ factors, impunity has therefore evidently become part of the organisational culture of NUL, a culture which entails ‘lawlessness’, non-performance, mediocrity and a lackadaisical way of doing things.

Past images and practices have played a pivotal role in the construction of NUL as an institution that has embraced a culture of impunity. The present day representations of NUL in Government

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\(^{87}\) In this study ‘egalitarianism’ has a double meaning. First, it refers to the rampant practice of the absence of hierarchies and the belief that ‘we are all equal’; and second, it refers to the general absence of a healthy competition among NUL employees. It is thought that this ‘egalitarian’ ethos at NUL is rooted in Basotho culture where people tend to mix freely (which is good) without the restrictions that tend to go with the trappings of power. According to one interviewee, it is “not uncommon among Basotho to have the holder of the highest office interacting freely with his counterparts from the lowest office” (Uaca28, 20/10/2014).
and Community discourses carry with them attitudes to decades-old political developments on campus. Selective remembrance of some past events, such as the BNP politicisation and militarisation of the campus in the 1970s and 1980s (see 3.5) shows how opposition discourse prioritises memory of some events at the expense of others. Two government informants (Grep3 Interview, 06/08/2014; Gmin1 Interview, 07/08/2014) contended that the ‘culture’ of impunity was brought about by national politics, particularly during BNP rule when “people tended to be supported by the ruling party without being pushed out of the University”. During this period, people held office or positions at NUL “solely at the expense of professional qualifications and competence, let alone experience” (Motjuwadi, 1983:229). At one time the PM went out of his way to defend Majara, then a student at NUL, against what he called anti-government bodies (Motjuwadi, 1983:229). Majara had, in the 1982/1983 academic year, apparently grabbed graduation gowns from the University Administration, and took keys of the University bar and tuck shop and replaced them with his own keys. During the takeover of the bar and the tuck shop, Majara and his followers brandished brand new machine guns and pistols, and even threatened to take over the university administration (Motjuwadi, 1983:229). Instead of the PM condemning such behaviour by a student, he actually appeared to glorify it. This is one of many incidents during BNP rule that tended to foster impunity within the university, a practice that has refused to go away. Thus national politics enabled the entrenchment of a culture of impunity not only at NUL, but within most national institutions. According to a former minister, “NUL is a microcosm of what goes on in society and as they say, if you want to know what is going on in a government, go to the University” (Gmin1 Interview, 07/08/2014).

In 1989, in the wake of serious conflict between the University Administration and NULASA, Machobane, then Minister of Education, in a swipe at NULASA, likened NUL to “an eagle that has grown too used to chicken food, and is no longer eager to fly”. He then went on to suggest that the eagle needed to be reminded “that it is an eagle, and not a chicken”, which should stretch its wings and fly (Machobane, 1989a:14). Following disturbances at the University in 1989, Likate (1989:1), then NUL registrar, in his submissions to a Commission of Inquiry, stated that Lesotho’s “national experience has been characterised by strife and conflict, the classical qualities accredited to NUL…”. “Surely therefore”, he continued, “there is a connection that is apparent between the NUL and the national experience”. Therefore what we continue to see in
the University and the country today, some people argue, reflects continuity of such practices rather than an entirely new phenomenon. Machobane went on to single out the behaviour of the army as a typical example of the pervasiveness of the culture of impunity that goes far back in history. And to this day, some Government officials continue to see NUL as an institution riddled with an incessant tendency for strife and conflict. One government informant, described NUL, in typical ‘othering’ and opposition discourse, as a ‘Mickey Mouse’ organisation that resembled a political party where she/he who “makes the most noise is liked most” (Grep4 Interview, 25/07/2014). It is widely accepted that the seeming impunity at NUL was a consequence of an egalitarian ethos and managerial neglect over the years in which damaging practices and the protection of the status quo for own benefit were allowed to become the norm (Mahao, 2003:5; VC Press Conference, 18 July 2013; Udam15 Interview, 01/11/2014).

The representation as a ‘Mickey Mouse’ organisation, or an ‘eagle’ no longer eager to fly seem to be enhanced by Sejanamane’s characterisation of NUL as a ‘low hanging fruit tree’ whose fruits were “for anybody and everybody who passes by” to pick (Sejanamane, 2010:8). This was in apparent reference to rampant corruption and the deep-seated propensity to prodigal squander of scarce resources, including financial impropriety. Lack of leadership has routinely been blamed for the pervasiveness of a ‘culture’ of impunity. “Because we tolerated incompetence and people who dragged the image of NUL down for too long”, admits one top administrator of NUL, “that meant anybody could do as they wished” (Uadm13 Interview, 21/09/2014). Again some top administrators I interviewed, through the business of ‘knowing’, ‘othered’ NUL as an organisation with ‘lazy’ and ‘incompetent’ people or ‘deadwood’ who only come to the institution to get a paycheck, rather than working hard and for a good cause. Others are “busy moonlighting at the courts instead of teaching” and “when their full-time jobs interfere with their side vocations [they] tinker with the time-table or cancel classes altogether” (VC (Siverts) Press Conference, 2011:2; http://lestimes.com/i-told-you-so/; Uadm11 Interview, 07/05/2014; Uadm14 Interview, 05/08/2014; Udam15 Interview, 01/11/2014). This has further reinforced the image of NUL as a place stricken with a culture of impunity. At a Press Conference in 2013, Siverts

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88 The Minister made reference to the Army Commander who refused to vacate his position after the PM had relieved him of his duties in 2014 for insubordination. Twenty years ago, in 1994, the Minister of Finance and Deputy Prime Minister, Selometsi Baholo, was assassinated by members of the military after the Government refused a demand by soldiers for a 100 % pay rise (Ambrose, 2006:8).
singled out staff in the Faculty of Law, charging that they spend “more time in the courts and private practice than at NUL” (VC Press Conference, 18 July 2013). In 2000, an academic member of staff told a consulting firm how no one cared about whether or not she/he was teaching, and how she/he was performing (Ernst & Young Report, 2000:162), thus highlighting the absence of good leadership and management. The apparent absence of lines of demarcation between supervisor and supervisee, between academic and support staff, and even between a cleaner and a VC has helped to fuel this view of a paralytic institution.

As far back as 1984, a World Bank Report observed that there was a ‘laissez-faire’ culture at NUL, including absenteeism from duty without official leave by both academic and non-academic staff, with no report of any disciplinary action having been taken (World Bank Report, 1984:iv). Tefetso Henry Mothibe, the 6th substantive VC of NUL, in a speech in 2002, declared ‘war’ on what he called “the administrative and academic malaise and bankrupt institutional culture [which] encourages and rewards impunity …” (Mothibe, 2002:1-3). Deploring the culture of impunity, and in ‘othering’ reminiscent of Machobane’s ‘eagle’ and Sejanamane’s ‘low hanging fruit tree’, he told the University Congregation that the nation was no longer at ease with a University that was “drawing hard earned Maloti into a ‘black hole’ likened to a well groomed and fatted horse albeit it [has become] so wild that not even the owner can ride it” (Mothibe, 2002:2). Siverts concurred that the many problems bedeviling NUL could be blamed on the culture of impunity. She characterised NUL as a place with a “negative and poisonous culture that places blame everywhere but where it needs to be placed” (VC Press Conference, 18 July 2013). The many forms of the manifestation of the culture of ‘laissez-faire’/impunity at NUL have been unravelled by the ‘othering’ and ‘self-othering’ practices, all of which have aided the construction of negative images of the institution.

4.4.2 ‘In-Breeding’ and ‘Fixity’ Image of NUL

The image of NUL as a university that has not only stagnated but deteriorated in almost all aspects, ranging from the legal framework, human resources and financial matters to academic and curriculum issues has seemingly been firmly created in the imaginary of many state and non-

89 The loti (plural maluti) is the currency of Lesotho and is pegged directly to the value of the South African Rand.
state actors (Mothibe, 2002; Sejanamane, 2010; VC Press Conference, 19 July 2011). Such an image prompted VC Siverts to suggest that if NUL was not restructured it risked being “a dinosaur in a decade” (VC Press Conference, 18 July 2013). Such a state of affairs has been blamed on an institutional culture and practice that several observers have described as ‘in-breeding’. As a consequence of this practice, some observers argue that NUL has stagnated or remained in a state of ‘fixity’ or stasis (see 2.3.1). This ‘in-breeding’ and ‘fixity’ representation of NUL is constructed around the seeming practice of parachuting many staff and students to positions of responsibility without any degree of experience and international exposure. It is also constructed around the seemingly established practice or policy of rotation for headship of departments, for example.

While in-breeding seems desirable among plants, in humans it is avoided as it is thought to increase the risk of unwanted inherited characteristics. Several informants across the Triad think that this ‘culture’ of ‘in-breeding’ has done a lot of damage to the University and will remain harmful to the future of the institution. It is this ‘in-breeding’ practice within NUL that some blame for the persistence of the culture of impunity which in turn has solidified the image of ‘fixity’.

The misconception of the fixity of species over time was built into the colonial assumptions of fixed ‘African identities’ which imply primitivity, rigidity, disorder and degeneracy (Bhabha, 1994:66). This false concept of fixity has influenced those who ‘other’ NUL as ‘fixed’. Thus, the ‘fixity’ of NUL is derived from the idea of the ‘fixity of species’ whereby all species remained unchanged throughout the history of the earth, or that species, once created, can never change (Granger, 1987:110-116). Mamdani’s (1996; 1998) binary modality of ‘citizens’ and ‘subjects’ or ‘settlers’ and ‘natives’ seemed to emphasise this idea of fixity by arguing that a “settler can be a member of the civic space [and therefore a citizen], …but not [a member of] the customary space, still ethnicized” (Mamdani, 1998:7). NUL as an organisation is seen by some people as gripped with a ‘systemic inertia’ and ‘anti-change’ or ‘status quo culture’ and mentality. One government informant charged that NUL has not changed from how the British had designed it. In his view, NUL was designed by the British to teach classical courses – to produce people with certificates for the government, not to be independent. The colonial governments of the day, he
argues, never wanted the ‘natives’ to be in control of their lives and to be independent (Uadm7 Interview, 25/07/2014). By suggesting that NUL had not changed from its original colonial mandate, NUL was being put in the same bracket with the Orient which was stereotyped as timeless, strange and degenerate (McLeod, 2000:40-46).

To enhance our understanding of the notion of ‘in-breeding’ and hence ‘fixity’, it may be useful to go back to 1975 when, as part of the democratisation of the University, a policy of rotation for the headship of departments was instituted. To this day, rotation seems to be the established practice of appointing heads of departments, and even acting Pro-Vice-Chancellors in the absence of the substantive PVC. The inception of the policy of rotation implied that even very junior people and inexperienced people, or incompetent Deans or Directors, if popularly elected by their constituencies, could be thrust into positions of authority. One academic argued that “the almost unique process of electing people for senior university positions reduces the process to the level of a reality TV show where the most popular rather than the most competent [are] elected” (Concerned Academic, 2010). In an interview, a former top university official of NUL indicated how he found “a situation where a Teaching Assistant suddenly becomes a head of department [as] very unsatisfactory” (Uadm5 Interview, 11/01/2011), while a long serving technician in one Science Department expressed strong reservations about the practice “One big thing that I always complain about”, said the technician, “has to do with students … After they have completed they become Teaching Assistants and in no time they are lecturers. I do not understand that” (RoCom12 Interview, 23/10/2010). When a former Minister of Education was asked to identify at least two major problems at NUL, the Minister singled out the ‘culture’ of impunity and ‘in-breeding’. In reference to the latter the informant said,

[t]here is too much in-breeding at NUL. For instance, a student passes and all of a sudden is employed as a lecturer. Most of them have not had exposure outside NUL and that is not good. Newly recruited employees will not do anything differently because they think this is the norm.

(Gmin1 Interview, 07/08/2014)

Yet it is important to remember that forty-one years ago, black members of staff made a strong case against the old system of appointing heads of departments, the result of which was the introduction of the system of rotation. The merit of rotation was to minimise conflicts related to
power. The drawbacks of this ‘democratic’ and pro-black system which had replaced the then ‘retrogressive’ pro-white system of permanent headship now became apparent. It is an irony that, since the dawn of democracy in 1993, rotation has now come under heavy criticism even by its former proponents (Uadm5 Interview, 11/01/2011). At the time the system was introduced, it seemed to serve the institution very well, but over time, sectional interests became predominant. Critics of the system point to its supposedly unpleasant ‘progenies’ of ‘in-breeding’ and ‘fixity’. There are those who think that the hasty localisation of the institution in the 1970s was partly responsible for this apparent ‘in-breeding’ culture at NUL. One top NUL administrator thinks that NUL, unlike the University of Zimbabwe, localised before it had acquired a global outlook. “Many of our people are inbred. There is a problem of in-breeding. What we have here, the majority of people we have as staff members are not the best students in their fields” (Uadm11 Interview, 07/05/2014). The problem with the criticism of training people locally and the criticism of the rapid promotion of local junior staff is that it seems to be calling for the privileging of Western epistemology and procedures, thus preserving the cultural and political hegemony of the West. It fails to look forward and move beyond coloniality, towards an epistemological horizon of the DCO (Magubane, 2006; Tlostanova and Mignolo, 2009; Escobar, 2007). By seemingly advocating and articulating continuities of colonial mentalities, psychologies and world-views, this thinking reinforces both the coloniality of power and the coloniality of being (see 2.2, 2.6 and 2.7).

It is probably not surprising that many international organisations have been very critical of the system of rotation. Several Consultancy reports recommended that all key positions should be filled through a process of open and competitive advertising rather than election. In both 2011 and 2013, Professor Siverts told Press Conferences that one of the biggest drawbacks for the university was the culture of electing people to positions of deanship on the basis of popular vote. “This practice has evolved over time and any effort to recruit and appoint these positions has been met with fierce resistance. It is alleged that these individuals are elected because they


91 Today the University is awaiting the Minister to endorse these proposals. There have been several such attempts in the past to drop the system of rotation without success.
will ignore problems and issues in the respective faculties, so staff can do as they please” (VC Press Conference, 19 July 2011; VC Press Conference, 18 July 2013). Yet the election of people to positions and committees within the university, argues a former top university official, was the established practice in the USA and Canada. It provided ways for positive contributions by all as well as providing ways of diffusing possible confrontations (Uadm5 Interview, 11/01/2011). Furthermore, this participatory governance mechanism ensured the distribution of power across the university structures. Such practices do not fit well with the establishment of a corporate managerial system which yearns for the monopolisation of power.

4.4.3 The Media ‘Gaze’: Images of NUL in the Media

‘An individual with a big head cannot dodge blows’
(An African saying).

The media is instrumental in perpetuating dominant versions of history, politics, religion, culture and heritage. It is also a site of contestation through representational discourses that are both constructive and deleterious. Following the September 11, 2001 ‘terrorist’ attack in the United States, President George W. Bush, in his several addresses to the nation employed terms such as “us”, “them”, “they”, “evil”, “those people” and “demons”, to characterise people of Arab/Middle Eastern descent (Merskin, 2004:158). Bush’s rhetoric was built on stereotypical words and images of “Arabs as evil, bloodthirsty, animalistic terrorists” (Merskin, 2004:157) that are already established in the Western popular media and popular culture. Thus popular culture and mass media in the United States have generated and sustained stereotypes of a monolithic evil Arab. Such stereotypes have constructed all Muslims as Arab and all Arabs as terrorists. The framing of NUL in the public media has tended to suffer similar constructions of dominant representations. During the RP, NUL came under intense and unprecedented media ‘gaze’. During this period, the media villainised NUL staff and trade Unions and openly asserted its strong support for University Management, Council and the Government, and seemed to have succeeded in establishing an antagonistic relationship between the GOL and the NUL.
The analysis of the resistance discourse presented here is drawn from three weekly newspapers, namely *Public Eye*, *Lesotho Times* and *Sunday Express*. In their seemingly anti-NUL discourse, the weekly newspapers, and in particular the *Lesotho Times* and the *Sunday Express* of the Africa Media Holdings (AMH) Lesotho presented a consistently negative image of NUL. Negative stereotypes, including obviously perceptibly inflammatory, abusive words, defamatory allegations and derogatory statements, found their way into the print and electronic media – reflected in newspaper headlines and news coverage, opinion columns and editorials of newspapers, radio and television. Words and expressions such as ‘mediocrity’, ‘restlessness’, ‘change-resistant’, ‘Glorified High School’ (GHS), ‘Pull Him Down’ (PHD), and ‘a sex for grades institution were used to construct NUL during the failed RP. The AMH Lesotho group of newspapers were particularly abusive in their representation of NUL. The pseudonymous Scrutator of the AMH, whose ability to trivialise, pour scorn and offend appears second to none, played a leading role in the assault on NUL. Because discourse produces and is productive of reality – it is performative (Butler, 1999) – the media in Lesotho has succeeded, through performative power via negative stereotyping, to bring into being the very realities it claims about NUL – namely an institution bedevilled with numerous self-inflicted problems.

Moreover, in 2010, for example, the *Lesotho Times* (25/08/2010) made rather insulting allegations, representing NUL as an institution that was run by “self-centred greedy and stingy people” who cared little about the future of Basotho children. This was in the wake of the alleged financial scandal that eventually led to the suspension of the VC in late 2009. Consequently the media went on to call upon the GOL to rethink its subvention model of funding the institution. It also went on to heavily criticise LUTARU, the most influential trade Union at NUL of behaving like “an opposition party” which criticised every idea coming from management (Lesotho Times Correspondent, 2010).

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92 *Public Eye* started operations in Lesotho in 1997; *Lesotho Times* in 2008; and *Sunday Express* in 2009. The fourth weekly publication, *The Post*, only started operations in November 2014, and lies outside the cut-off date for this study.

93 It is both interesting and ironic to note that since 2009, the GOL systematically reduced the subvention to NUL (see 5.4.3 and Table 5.1).
And in 2010, when a new VC was appointed, the *Lesotho Times* greeted the appointment with a news headline, ‘Welcome To High School Prof’ (Scrutator, 26/01/2011). NUL was represented as a ‘Glorified High School’ masquerading as a university. The media criticised NUL students for allegedly failing to even spell correctly. According to Scrutator (09/02/2011), “many NUL graduates are functionally and numerically illiterate … a sad reality that we have to accept as a country”. The media also alleged that the tendency by NUL to insulate itself against the wider outside world and the absence of brilliant minds from across the globe was further testimony of the “banality” of NUL (The Editor, 11/03/2010). As if to agree with Scrutator, Mahao (2014) thinks that the so-called “reputation crisis” at NUL is a result of its failure to connect with stakeholders as well as its inability to project a positive self-image. Media statements to the effect that “people at NUL do it the NUL way”, that “mediocrity is their anthem”; that NUL was a place stricken with a culture of restlessness where VCs rarely went beyond three years in their position; and that at Roma, “nincompoops” are those who work hard and deliver on time (Scrutator, 26/01/2011) all constructed NUL in very negative terms. Yet some of these constructions are not without basis. For example, a brief survey of the terms of offices of a few VCs seem to point to the perception that people at NUL ‘chase away’ Vice-Chancellors, whether local or non-local. The pressure put on Moletsane by LUTARU, NAWU and SUSU, culminating in his unceremonious departure in 2000, is a case in point. As one key informant and participant at the time put it,

historically there is evidence to the fact that we chase away VCs at NUL … there was not much that Professor Moletsane was trying to bring about as dramatic change, but he was chased away [because] there was a feeling that he was not competent\(^{94}\) as a VC.

(Uaca12 Interview, 06/08/2014)

The 8\(^{th}\) substantive VC at a Press Conference alluded to the same perception that previous reform processes failed because “the staff has worked to push out all previous Vice-Chancellors, and basically have succeeded” (VC Press Conference, 18 July 2013). As no VC has survived beyond

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\(^{94}\) Throughout we have seen how local VCs and staff have invariably been described as incompetent while foreign VCs and expatriate staff have invariably been constructed as competent, thus reinforcing the binary modality between insiders and outsiders.
her/his first term except Baikie (1988-1995), the media and some in the Community have turned this seemingly established pattern into ‘objective knowledge of wholly reliable truths’.

The media also represented NUL as a conflict prone and change-resistant institution or as a ‘reluctant reformer’ where all people have graduated with ‘Pull Him Down’ (PHD)\(^95\) degrees. The ‘Pull Him Down’ syndrome, posits Scrutator (26/01/2011), was so pervasive in Lesotho that it can be seen as the bane of Basotho since independence in 1966. Scrutator’s harsh attack of NUL seemed to suggest a typical ‘Afro-pessimist’ mind-set, if not ‘Leso-pessimism’, by which she/he did not seem to see anything good coming out of Africa and Lesotho.

At another level, NUL has also been constructed, both in the media and outside media circles, as a place where bribery and sexual favours are rampant, thus further strengthening the image of a poorly governed institution where chaos is the order of the day. NUL teaching staff and students have been constructed as cheats and sex offenders who exchanged grades for sex (Grep4 Interview, 25/07/2014). The mention of bribes and sexual favours tends to position the traditional masculine ‘Self’ against the feminine ‘Other’. Thus in 2010, for instance, just a day before graduation, one local newspaper carried the headline, *Students Offer Sex to Pass Exams*. The report based its claims on a few interviews it allegedly conducted with some students and lecturers and came to the conclusion that while this practice was widely believed to have pervaded the University for many years, there was still no official evidence because “the learners concerned do not report it, either for fear of reprisals or out of an unwillingness to give away the secret to which they owe their ‘success’” (Ntoate, 2010). These allegations in the media of sexual favours at NUL tended to be buttressed by comments from some people in the University, especially its top managers, some of whom have gone to the extent of constructing NUL as a ‘market place’ where NUL staff were taking bribes and students offering bribes for grades. VC Siverts went so far as to tell the nation and the whole world that at NUL, “sex is considered a norm for passing a course” (VC Press Statement, 18 July 2013). And already in 2002 Mothibe, the then VC, declared a ‘state of emergency’ in respect of student matters, stating that the NUL student community was “becoming a community of bankrupt men and women with animal

\(^95\) A general tendency, by some people in Africa, to bring down those making great strides in life.
instincts … including rapists, drug pushers and addicts, criminal of all sorts, …” (Summary of Events in Lesotho, 2002). Such ‘self-othering’ served to construct NUL as an institution characterised by chaos, thus easily feeding into negative media constructions of NUL.

The media therefore, just like some Government officials and University leaders, have found the issue of bribery and sexual favours a fertile space for ‘othering’. Female students have been constructed as ‘hapless’ victims of deviant male lecturers. But just like any binary modality, this construction of female students as victims is flawed in its reductive simplification because it not only leaves no room for resistance, but also takes away the agency of female students and perhaps even their complicity. This is because, in general, sexual harassment takes place within the context of unequal power relations in which lecturers have power over students and men over women.

It is therefore clear that NUL, being the only public university in Lesotho, and the only university until 2008, cannot escape the ‘gaze’ of the media, along with that of the Government and the Community, including all other interested stakeholders. “This gaze … knows more about me than I do myself”, says Grosrichard quoted in Tekin (2010:38). As the African saying goes, ‘an individual with a big head cannot dodge blows’. Thus the media becomes not only an institution through which consensus is reflected, but one that reinforces consensus (Gavrilos, 2002).

Figure 4.1 in this Chapter attempts to capture all the elements of ‘selfing’ and ‘othering’ among triadic actors while at the same time showing progression towards the proposed IPCF. I borrow from du Gay et al’s (1997) notion of the ‘circuit of culture’ which puts representation at the centre of the production of culture. The ‘circuit of culture’ is made up of five major cultural processes namely representation, identity, production, consumption and regulation (du Gay et al, 1997:1, 3). Du Gay et al’s thesis is that “to study the Walkman96 culturally, one should at least explore how it is represented, what social identities are associated with it, how it is produced and consumed, and what mechanisms regulate its distribution and use” (du Gay et al, 1997:3). While

96 A Walkman is a small portable audio or video player with small headphones. Sony and Walkman are registered trademarks of the Sony Corporation.
du Gay et al use the cultural circuit to analyse the Walkman as a cultural object, the cultural circuit can be used to study any cultural text or artefact.

Similarly, in Figure 4.1, through the medium of language (discourse), I put representations and ‘othering’ at the centre of the production of processes of ‘selfing’ and ‘othering’ among triadic actors in respect of NUL, with agency and resistance in the background. Figure 4.1 shows that the GOL and Community expectations of NUL are built around research, teaching, community engagement, relevant and marketable programmes, financial accountability and social responsibility. On the other hand, NUL, like any institution of HE, has expectations of funding, support and academic freedom/non-interference from government. When roles and expectations are not met, negative stereotyping and ‘othering’ sets in the discourse as a means of ‘power-brokering’. The ‘othering’ discourse is built around issues of indigeneity, ethnicity, belonging, origin, race, religion, political affiliation and attitudes towards change. For NUL, this has led to the production of complex hybrid stereotypes that represent the University as a ‘glorified high school’ and as a place gripped with a culture of laissez-faire/impunity, ‘in-breeding’ and fixity (see outer circle in Figure 4.1). These practices are thought to be rampant at NUL. Through the agency of the GOL and the Community as well as the agency of NUL, representation enabled the construction of the institution in essentialist terms and negative stereotypical images.

Theoretically, Figure 4.1 shows the interconnectedness and constitutive nature of such discourses of representation and ‘othering’, hence the concentric circles. It also shows that discourses of representation are intertwined with those of agency and resistance, with hybridity intersecting all of them. While the issues and notions have been separated for ease of presentation, in the real world they continually overlap and intertwine in complex and contingent ways. Thus like du Gay et al’s (1997) ‘circuit of culture’, there is no starting or ending point in Figure 4.1.
In short, Figure 4.1 attempts not only to capture the array of representations and ‘othering’ immanent in the Triad, but also the complexity of such discourses and the view that representation of the ‘Other’ always implies a gap, ideological or otherwise, that exists between the ‘signifier’ and the ‘signified’. It is this situation that has tended to encourage the construction of NUL as the ‘opposite’ of the GOL and the Community in the same way as Africa was
constructed as the opposite of Europe. Such representation has made the construction of NUL in largely negative terms possible. Such representations have become ideological tools and mechanisms used to compete for power while at the same time resisting power, a subject that will be treated in detail in Chapter 5.

4.5 EVALUATION

This chapter has investigated triadic representations, images and perceptions of NUL, through an examination of such discourse. A major finding of this chapter is that triadic relations of power since the founding of the University in 1945 have been characterised by, first, essentialist notions of identity based on inherent differences between the ‘Self’ and the ‘Other’, and second, by stereotypical images based on acquired behaviours. These essentialist and stereotypical representations, in all their ambiguity and complexity, have been gleaned from interview data, official documents, policy documents, speeches and the print and electronic media. The proposed IPCF that is offered as a major contribution of this study draws its inspiration from these discourses of representations and ‘othering’.

I have shown that within the Triad there are several overlapping complex and intersected representations and self-representations of ‘otherness’ which are not easy to unpack. These representations have demonstrated that there are numerous (rhizomic) rather than monolithic operations and technologies of power within the Triad. Relations of power are always transformed by acts of gazing and being gazed at because this two-way process ensures that neither the observer nor observed wields too much power. This ‘selfing’ and ‘othering’ in the Triad, through the agency of NUL administrators, staff and students on one hand, and the agency of Government and the Community on the other hand, has made the construction of NUL as a particular and peculiar ‘Other’ possible (see Figure 4.1). Through ‘self-othering’ and ‘othering’, NUL has been made ‘knowable’ and therefore controllable by those in power. While there cannot be representation or self-representation which is totally divorced from the truth, it is of critical importance to note that some representations and self-representations presented in this chapter do not necessarily represent ‘objective knowledge of wholly reliable truths’. An analysis
of the data suggests that seeing people in terms of locals and non-locals for example, can lead to the essentialisation of ‘Self’ and ‘Other’, thus masking complex relations of power among actors in the Triad. It is therefore plausible to argue that these essentialist representations and arguments are to a large extent psychological strategies employed by locals to assert their identity within a multicultural and cosmopolitan university. In fact, as Chapter 5 will argue, these strategies represent contestations which point to the presence of agency and resistance in the Triad.

A further important finding is that all societies have a central imaginary in order to consider basic questions about their identity. This imaginary in the construction of reality is only possible through a discourse (language) (Tekin, 2010; Epstein, 2013). Foucault (1972), Fairclough (1999) as well as Tripathy and Mohapatra (2011) have all defined the complex nature of a discourse and the role it plays in helping our understanding of the world. Similarly, discourse has played a crucial role for us to understand and make sense of actors in the Triad, in the same way discourse produced the Orient (Said, 1995). The ‘selfing’ and ‘othering’ captured in Figure 4.1 has been made possible through language without which it would not have been possible to know, for example, NUL, let alone to manage and even control it. It is language that has provided representations in the Triad that may seem exaggerated or contrary to reality. Language, a fundamental site of struggle has made it possible for us to know what type of institution NUL is, real or imagined. Because representation involves stereotyping, its images, meanings, usages and interpretations are not necessarily positive and never innocent.

Yet it is important to state that the binary modality and the stereotypical images presented in this chapter are flawed. It paints a picture of passivity which could be misleading. As Chapter 5 demonstrates, the ‘subalterns’ of the Triad have demonstrated their agency and creative adaptability through various forms of resistance and a number of coping as well as negotiation strategies. The discussions on hybridity, agency and resistance reject the passivity of any one group of actors within the Triad by bringing to the fore the numerous ways through which they have tried to mock and deface power. By resisting and destabilising power, the binary modality and the passivity of some actors as implied in this chapter gets completely fractured.
CHAPTER 5: TRIADIC ENTANGLEMENTS: AGENCY AND RESISTANCE

5.1 GENERAL ORIENTATION

This chapter analyses triadic entanglements using the theoretical constructs of agency and resistance from a PC perspective. In PC discourse, agency is the intentional capacity to identify and implement alternatives and is most readily evidenced by the presence of resistance because resistance to domination is impossible and even conceptually incoherent in the absence of agency. It is the state of being contained while at the same time resisting containment (see 2.6). Resistance here is taken to mean any subtle and non-subtle disruptive actions against repression, domination, hegemonic discourses and globality. It is inherent in the exercise of power, and is significant in understanding power. Resistance is power in the hands of the less powerful because, posits Foucault (1976), the very effort of resistance has to be understood as an expression of power. The agency-resistance nexus I use in this chapter is aimed at strengthening, theoretically and empirically, the formulation of the IPCF for the study of Africa through the illumination of these elements of the theory. By so doing, this will increase our understanding of resistance in institutions of higher learning in its less politicised form by showing that resistance is not necessarily an oppositional act of political intention, but rather an outcome of differential relations of power. To reach this understanding, I seek answers to question number three and four raised in section 1.4 and to meet my fifth objective as stated in section 1.5. The questions are: what kinds of contestations, ideological or otherwise, take place in the Triad; who has what power to get what, when and how; and how is power resisted or subverted?; while the objective is to analyse the various forms of agency and resistance occasioned not only by the ubiquity of power among triadic actors, but also by the colloidal forces between the global and the local.

The answers to these questions are not straightforward because power, agency and resistance are not only intimately related, but they also work in many big and small ways. In the Triad, agency is most readily evidenced by the tendency towards oppression, domination, coercion and cajoling by those in Government and management on one hand, and by the presence of student and staff resistance on the other hand. In this chapter, it is therefore important to note that two principal triadic actors will feature more prominently, namely the GOL and NUL. Under NUL, three
categories of actors are clearly discernable. These are students, the administration/management and academic and non-academic staff.

To answer the above questions, I draw on the themes that emerged from the synthesis of documentary evidence and field data to analyse agentic forces and forms of resistance immanent in the Triad. These are overt, covert/subterranean, discursive resistance and counter-resistance. In this study, overt resistance means open, visible and sometimes confrontational forms of resistance like strike action (see 5.2.2 and 5.4.2.3). Covert resistance means resistance that is hidden or camouflaged like foot-dragging, deception, compliance, absenteeism (see 5.4.3). When resistance is discursive, it involves debate and discussion and can be either overt or covert or a combination of both. This therefore makes these forms of resistance intertwined and overlapping. Behind all these forms of resistance lie various causative and agentic factors – political, economic and ideological, among others. In the first major section (5.2), I analyse student discursive resistance via the satirical cartooning of state power in section 5.2.1; and second, overt resistance against University authorities by students with 'parasitic' relations with the state in section 5.2.2. In the second major section (5.3), I analyse overt and discursive employee resistance to apparent dictatorial managerial practices by both the GOL and the University Administration using the Abigail Taylor case (section 5.3.1); the Joel Moitse case (section 5.3.2); and the amendment of the University law in 1989 (section 5.3.3). Then in section 5.4, I analyse resistances, ranging from overt to discursive, linked to organisational restructuring of the University in the 21st century. I put organisational restructuring into context (section 5.4.1); examine resistance occasioned by the Transformation and Restructuring Processes (section 5.4.2); and analyse counter-reaction strategies occasioned by the same (section 5.4.3). An evaluation of all these forms of agency and resistance is carried out in section 5.5.

Among all the forms of resistance I discuss here, there are several overlaps by dint of the fact that resistance takes many diverse and complex forms. This is because the line between one form and another is very thin. I am therefore, for the purposes of this thesis, forced to categorise in order to provide analytical clarity, but in reality these categories overlap and are not clearly demarcated. Gordon (2008) and Scott (2003) concur that the binary division between resistance and non-resistance is an unreal one because there are several instances in which people simply
disguise their resistance in the public language of conformity. This explains why Bhabha and other postcolonial writers theorise the subversive, ambivalent, complex and postcolonial subject using the concepts of hybridity, mimicry, and interstitial third space (Bhabha, 1984; Lee, 2014) (see 2.4 and 2.5). Foucault (1976) actually posits that there is no single locus of conflict or revolt, but a multiplicity of them (see 2.6). Similarly, there is no single locus of resistance within the Triad because resistance (whether overt, disguised or discursive) is found everywhere. The points of resistance are distributed in irregular fashion and spread over time and space at varying densities, “at times mobilising groups or individuals in a definitive way, inflaming certain points of the body, certain moments in life, certain types of behavior” (Foucault, 1976:96). In this context, it is therefore unhelpful to emphasise the binary division between the powerful and the powerless or between agents and victims as the roles can be reversed at any time. For example, in the Rwandan genocide of 1994, Mamdani (2002) posits that power struggles in the bipolar world of Hutu and Tutsi revealed a truism – that “not only are members of the middle class the main beneficiaries of every victory, they are also the core victims in every defeat” (Mamdani, 2002:230). Because struggle gives an actor a sense of agency, by engaging in struggle, an actor is declaring that she/he is not merely a slave of circumstance. Struggle also promotes social interaction within a group by uniting in order to fight as well as paradoxically promoting social interaction with the group one struggles with. This chapter sets out to demonstrate these contradictions and complexities occasioned by multiple opportunities for both governance and resistance among triadic actors.

Consequently, triadic actors are neither victims nor agents, but are both victims and agents. All actors function in the interstitial or in-between space to overcome the predicament, demonstrating the fact that there are paradoxes of crisis and creativity all at once. In other words, the idea of rhizomic power (see 3.3) in postcolonial theory means that power entails resistance and resistance is contained by power (Foucault, 1976). Rather than situating any single actor or groups of actors within a single axis of domination and resistance, each actor’s or group’s agency moved within, and was constrained by multiple modalities of power. Foucault posits that “there are no relations of power without resistances [and that] resistance to power does not have to come from elsewhere to be real [but that] it exists all the more by being in the same place as
power; hence, like power, resistance is multiple” (Foucault, 1980f:142). The points of resistance, just like power itself, are present everywhere within the power network of the Triad.

5.2 STATE POWER AND STUDENT RESISTANCE

Discursive resistance and overt resistance by students are discussed and analysed in sections 5.2.1 and 5.2.2 respectively. Examples are drawn from the 1980s, when the BNP dictatorship sought to tighten its grip on the University. It is shown here that student resistance to state power was not homogenous as some students clearly collaborated with the state in exerting pressure on the University.

5.2.1 Agent and Victim in Ink: Discursive Resistance in Student Satirical Cartooning of State Power

The political turbulence and the repressive rule of the BNP between 1970 and 1986 directly affected the University (see 3.5). Between 1981 and 1985, NUL became a political battleground that saw unprecedented state repression and state-sponsored violence that then invited discursive resistance by students – resistance which vacillated between overt and covert. During this period, the student body was divided into two rival movements namely the Student Democratic Front (SDF) and the Student Liberation Front (SLF). Thus the SDF had ‘parasitic’ relations with the state while the SLF had close ties with the opposition Basotho Congress Party (BCP) (Likate, 1989; GOL, 1989b). The NUL management faced the difficult task of handling a highly restive and politicised student body on one hand, and a government bent on imposing its will on the institution on the other hand. In order to keep a watchful eye on the University, the Government deployed police and government security agents on campus. To further firmly control the University, the Government amended the University law in 1984, 1985 and 1989 (see 3.5.1).

97 It is argued that the coup of 1986 (see 3.5.2) was justified on a number of grounds, including divisions in the army and the police force which turned NUL into a political base to further party interests (see Pule, 2002; Mochochonono, March 1986).

98 SDF was allegedly formed at the behest of the BNP government in order to neutralise the influence of SLF.
To demonstrate that they were not just hapless victims of state power, the students resorted to satirical cartooning of state power in student magazines and newsletters. This way, students did not only resist state power, but they also spoke truth to power, sometimes with striking realism that unsettled those in power. The BNP government was satirised as a ‘thing’ with no historical existence and whose ‘biopower’ could only be accomplished in caricature (Mbembe, 2001) as shown in Figure 5.1 and 5.2 below. In a graduation speech in 1983, the SLF-aligned Student Representative Council (SRC) President mocked the SDF as a reactionary group, labeled the BNP government neo-colonialist, and described the visible presence of soldiers on campus (see Figure 5.1 below) as “Nazi-type militarism” charged with the task of finding the LLA and uprooting it mercilessly and ruthlessly (SLF Secretariat, 1983:3-5). The visible presence of heavily armed state security agents on campus resembled Bentham’s ‘inspection house’ for monitoring prisoners. By openly challenging the Government and its ‘puppets’ in full view of the public and before the Chancellor, King Moshoeshoe II, the PM, Leabua Jonathan, Government officials and other dignitaries, the SLF did not only subvert state power, but demonstrated that the scope for agency is far greater than often realised.

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99 Such magazines and newspapers included the Vanguard, Vigilante, Spark, Clarion, among others. Some of these magazines occasionally carried drawings, sketches and portraits of revolutionary leaders like Che Guevara, Nelson Mandela and Robert Mugabe.

100 A term coined by Foucault (1976:140) to refer to “an explosion of numerous and diverse techniques for achieving the subjugations of bodies and the control of populations” by nation states in the modern era.
The idea that to make it to NUL as a student, there was only one way (*tsela e’ngoe*), as captured in Figure 5.1, further undermines state power in a mocking way as the ‘road’ is shown to be narrow and apparently leading nowhere. The portrayal of use of violence and force, through the barrel of the gun and the machete easily turns the Government into a recipient of mockery, thus undermining its might (Mbembe, 1992b). Furthermore, in satirising SDF and CASSAS, the SLF was trying to portray itself as the only progressive force which espoused the philosophy that “there cannot be no (sic) international struggle without the national struggles” (SLF Statement,
1983:4). This way, it purported to offer an alternative radical epistemology along the lines propounded by Mignolo (2009; 2011b) and Lugones (2010) and other decolonial scholars. SDF and CASSAS are further satirised for their close ties with the GOL which controls the purse strings hence the money bag in Figure 5.1. Then in Figure 5.2 below, state power is further caricatured by depicting the Government as not only murderous, but also as incompetent, extravagant and corrupt. The Government was attacked again in the graduation speech of 1984 by the SLF which was sternly opposed to what it considered as the ‘BNP-nisation’ of NUL. The SLF took great exception to the continued presence of soldiers on campus and frequent rallies by BNP youths, and to claims by many BNP adherents that the University was a ‘BNP university’, financed through ‘BNP’ scholarships and ‘BNP’ taxpayers’ money and that all employees at NUL were ‘BNP employees’ (VC Report, 1981; SLF 1984:6).
As Figure 5.2 shows, the oppressed expressed defiance and resilience through a popular South African liberation struggle song *senzeni na* (what have we done?). In apartheid South Africa, this song was sung during protest marches and at rallies and funerals in order to “evoke an internal response from the subconscious of those being questioned” as well as to mock and resist apartheid (Nkoala, 2013:55). Mason (2002:388) argues that although it would be an exaggeration to claim that cartooning was a major factor in the overthrow of apartheid, caricaturing, in its various forms, played an important role in introducing revolutionary concepts into public
discourse while at the same time undermining the ideological hegemony of the apartheid state. Hall (1988:7) argues that “hegemonic order is … constantly being challenged, contested and repositioned and as such should not be seen as something that is static or permanent”. Satirical cartooning and caricaturing by NUL students also seemed an appropriate way of exposing the arbitrariness of state power in the same way the ‘biopower’ of the apartheid state was caricatured by “splatter[ing] ink as if it were blood, across the surface of the drawing” (Mason, 2002:390-391). Gaylard (2005:129) argues that despite the ludic lightness of satire, it has been a useful literary tool for exposing and destabilising political regimes of various sorts. Such discursive articulations by NUL students show that power can be subverted in numerous ways. Mbembe (1992a; 2001) posits that the ordinary people are not fooled or passive objects of the state’s display of power. Instead, they are capable of resistance by mocking and ridiculing such power through popular cartoons, jokes, songs, magic, drinking, rituals, gossip and bastardisation of ruling party slogans and manifestos among other forms of resistance. These serve as ways not only to reinstate ordinary people into history, but also as a way of undermining the hegemony of the state. Antagonistic moments of power can produce determined resistance. Hall (1998) and Mbembe (2001) posit that the same agents and mechanisms that a state can rely on for its sustainability can also be used to contest its very existence because the same forms of subjugation profoundly reconfigure relations of resistance, sacrifice and terror.

5.2.2 Co-option and Resistance

That student resistance to state power was not uniform is demonstrated by the fact that students with ‘parasitic’ state relations or those co-opted on the side of government, more often than not, overtly defied University authorities in several ways. This brought into sharp contrast the political party divisions of the country, mirrored through the two rival student movements which battled for the control of the Students Union (see 3.5). One of the ways by which they did so was by openly carrying guns around campus, and threatening their opponents with them, despite the

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101 During the protracted RP, some SRC leaders were co-opted on the side of the University management in order to maximise conflict between students and the striking academic staff. There were allegations of cash incentives, as much as M5 000 for each SRC leader, while the SRC President was allocated an office adjacent to the VC’s office in order to be the “ears and eyes” of the VC (SRCP Interview, 22/07/2016).
existence of university regulations that banned the possession of such weapons (VC Report, 1981:10). Some of my informants told me of their experiences on campus in the 1980s. A former Minister went on to say that “a student would bring a gun to class and put it on the table, and the thing was then how can you fail him/her” (Gmin1 Interview, 07/08/2014). One well known student was known to go to class or to offices of lecturers with a gun to demand, say a 90 % mark on his script. One lecturer at the time claims that he had the courage to kick him out of class for bringing an AK47, and that debate in Senate went to the extent of deliberating on whether or not “we should make him pass to make sure he goes away from campus” (Uadm13 Interview, 21/09/2014).

According to the Senate Report (1985), in August 1985, the Assistant Bursar and the Vice-Chancellor (VC) were also openly threatened by students with a ‘parasitic’ relationship with Government. The students were positively identified, but probably due to fear, no known action was taken against them. In October of the same year, three landrovers with heavily armed occupants who were also positively identified roved campus, singing insulting songs and displaying insulting posters directed against the VC, Pro-Vice-Chancellor (PVC) and Senate (Senate Report, 1985) (see also 5.2.2). Such open threats against the University and university officials could not have been possible without the backing, directly or indirectly, of those in power. At one time the PM openly condoned the rogue activities of Majara, a student of NUL during this period, stating that even if it meant seeking “counsel with God” (Motjuwadi, 1989) he was ready to do so. The invasion of campus by heavily armed pro-BNP students led to a two-week long student strike, from 9 to 23 October 1985 by which students demanded the removal of state agents and soldiers from campus.

5.2.3 Students’ Religious Faith and Subterranean Resistance

Well before the founding of PXIICUC, argues Ambrose (2016:3), at Fort Hare University, where the roots of PXIICUC are traceable, the Catholic Hierarchy of South Africa (CHSA) was “completely against Catholics attending services conducted by Protestants”. We have already

102 In 2005, the acting VC and two other senior staff members received death threats in the form of three bullets sent to them in an envelope (Transformation Resource Centre (TRC), 2005).
seen the conflict between Catholics and Protestants through their representational discourses in Chapter 4 (see 4.2.2 and 4.3). The demand by CHSA to build a hostel for Catholic students outside campus was also turned down by the Fort Hare Council, on which Lesotho was represented. These set-backs or constraining situations proved enabling as they spurred CHSA to found their own university in the then Basutoland (see 3.2). Ironically, an almost similar situation arose at PXIICUC. The small number of Protestant students refused to attend services conducted by Catholics. Instead, they held their Sunday services outside campus in a nearby village, suggesting in their publications “with certain theatricality” as Ambrose (2016:15) puts it, that this was because they were denied the right to meet on campus. These antagonisms eventually became part of the politics of agency that culminated in the construction of a chapel for Protestant students nearly six and a half decades later, in 2009 (see 4.3.2). Catholic-Protestant differences in Lesotho resonate with Indian Hindus’ resistance to the project of conversion to Christianity in 1817 on the basis of their vegetarianism. Indian Hindus argued that their acceptance of sacrament was conditional on being convinced that the evangelical utterances did not come from the mouths of meat-eaters (Bhabha, 1994; Kapoor, 2002). By demanding an “Indianized Gospel” or, “in effect, a ‘vegetarian Bible’”, the villagers were using the powers of hybridity to resist baptism and to put the project of conversion in an impossible position, thus producing a ‘supplementary’ discourse as a site of ‘resistance and negotiation’ at the same time (Bhabha, 1994:118-121; Kapoor, 2002:651-652). The origins of the University on one hand, and the subsequent construction of a chapel for Protestant students and worshippers on campus on land supposedly belonging to the Catholic Church on the other hand, point to hybrid moments of ‘spectacular resistance’ (Bhabha, 1994). In this case hybridity was deployed as a form of hidden resistance, or a weapon normally used by the weak. Moments of syncretic hybridity as a form of resistance are also apparent in ‘prayers’, ‘beatitudes’, some songs and visuals discussed in section 5.4.2, thus showing how discourses mingle, overlap and impact on one another in ways that may be virtuous at certain times and pernicious on other occasions (Roberto, 2014:1).

103 Syncretism means the combining of different religions, cultures or ideas. In this case, it refers to the practice of combining different ideas from both the African traditional world and Western Christian practices and beliefs.
5.3 UNIVERSITY GOVERNANCE/MANAGEMENT AND STAFF RESISTANCE

Since its creation as PXIICUC in 1945, overt and discursive struggles over the governance and control of the University have been taking place ever since and the 1975 split typifies this struggle. Chapter 3 has tried to capture these contests in a generalised historical overview. In this section, I discuss and analyse overt and discursive forms of resistance occasioned by the irregular appointment of Ms Abigail Taylor to the Department of Public Administration Studies (PAS) in section 5.3.1; overt and discursive forms of resistance occasioned by the detention of Mr Joel Moitse by the Military regime in section 5.3.2; and overt and discursive struggles linked to the amendment of the University law in 1989 in section 5.3.3. These three cases/issues demonstrate that the GOL, the University Administration and University staff all sought to control and ultimately influence governance decisions in the University. The overall thesis of the section is that ‘poor’ and dictatorial University governance/management invited overt and discursive resistance by University staff.

5.3.1 The Abigail Taylor Case: Overt and Discursive Resistance

The brief background to this case which generated both overt and discursive resistance seems to be either in the 1988/1989 Review Commission or the VC Task Force proposals that PVCs, Deans and HODs must of necessity be professors. NULASA contested the proposal, arguing that it was “inflexible structures and inappropriate management” which ranked high among the reasons for the break-up of UBLS in 1975. It saw the proposals as “the most powerful appeal and argument against local Basotho administrative control of departments and faculties”, thus in effect creating “a caste of ‘nobles’ to whom the rest of the academic community must pay homage” (GOL, 1989b). NULASA fought not only to retain decision-making powers of departments and faculty boards, but also to forestall the establishment of what it perceived as patriarchal and undemocratic structures within the University. By discursively deploying the notion of the ‘Other’ as agency (see 4.2.3), NULASA sought to undermine the authority of a foreign VC who was at the helm at the time. The representation of the NUL management by NULASA as ‘anti-Basotho’ and ‘anti-localisation’ buttresses Foucault’s (1975, 1980f) thesis of the co-production of resistance and power.
Thus, when in 1989 the University Council, under the hand of the PVC, outside established procedures, attempted to ‘impose’ Abigail Taylor as a Teaching Assistant in the Department of Public Administration Studies (PAS) where Sejanamane, the President of NULASA was also Head of Department (HOD), the stage was set for a bitter clash which ultimately split the University into two. The Abigail Taylor case was fought overtly and discursively as if it was a zero-sum game, demonstrating the fact that the different triadic actors had multiple opportunities for both governance and resistance. NULASA was adamant that Council had usurped the powers of committees (NULASA Statement, 1989:5) while the VC and the GOL defended the position of the University Administration. In a very overt manner, the Minister of Education used the Motebang case as a perfect alibi to address Council and to condemn in strong language, some unnamed individuals and organisations for the alleged destabilisation of the institution and the institutionalisation of anarchy. He charged that “the University has in effect become ungovernable” as Council, the supreme governing body, has been “rendered paralytic, purportedly through defiance, disrespect and denigration of its authority, by those whose end it further seems to be to establish parallel rule on this campus” (Machobane, 1989b:1). However, NULASA strongly disputed allegations by Government and instead argued that its desire to jealously guard the Charter of the University, Ordinances, Statutes and procedures was now being interpreted as ‘anarchy’. Thus, Government and the University were left fighting in one corner, while NULASA, supported by the SRC, was fighting in another corner. To protest this alleged flouting of procedures, and clearly drawing on its strategic essentialism (collective agency), NULASA made it known to the University authorities that it would not participate in the graduation ceremony for that year. This overt stance and announcement by NULASA was very unsettling to University authorities and Government. NULASA made it clear that it was not only opposed to the seeming wanton violation of recruitment and appointment procedures, but also to being dictated to.
5.3.2 The Joel Moitse Case: Overt and Discursive Struggles

Another case which occasioned overt and discursive resistance was the detention, in 1989, of Joel Moitse, an NUL academic for political protest against the Military regime (Eldredge, 1989; Grafeld, 2006). His detention also led NULASA, through its corporate agency, to strongly condemn what it saw as the “collusion between the University Administration and the Government in the detention of Mr. Moitse” (NULASA, 1989). NULASA demanded that the Administration secure his release within 48 hours as well as to remove from campus state security personnel within the same time period. To make sure its demands received consideration, NULASA resolved to observe ‘Work to Rule’, threatening that if its demands were not met within the stipulated period, they reserved the right to take tougher action (NULASA, 1989). The University Congregation also condemned Moitse’s detention without trial, and demanded that he should be immediately released or that charges should be laid against him without delay. Shortly thereafter, Moitse was released, and within a day after release, he was back on campus where he continued with his defiance of military rule (Eldredge, 1989:20). The Government tried to flex its power by demanding the dismissal of Moitse from the University, writing that it (government) had decided “that Mr. Moitse’s contract with the University be terminated forthwith, and in any case not later than next week” (Eldredge, 1989; Lekhesa, 1989). The University, drawing on its sanctity of academic freedom and autonomy, refused to acquiesce to the Government demand, arguing that the opinion expressed by Moitse about the Government was expressed outside the University. So in the end, Moitse was not expelled and “it was a victory for us” (Uadm6 Interview, 06/08/2014). By refusing to bow to Government pressure and demands, the university was not only able to assert its independence and autonomy, but also to expose the limits of power. It is clear that the arrest and detention of Moitse, and the demand by Government that he be expelled from the University, was intended to send a message to the University staff to stop meddling in politics. While it is academics’ responsibility to speak truth to power, the Joel Moitse case shows that the lofty ideal of speaking truth to power seems a risky

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104 Joel Moitse was a controversial South African citizen who held top positions in Lesotho. At one point he served as the PVC of the Roma campus of UBLS. He was dismissed from Government in June 1975. Those interested in Moitse’s individual agency and his role in the split of UBLS in 1975 should see M. Thabane (2016), Break-Up of the University of Botswana, Lesotho & Swaziland: Another Look. In: From Pius XII to National University of Lesotho: Seventy Years of Contribution to Development, Education, Research, and Political Activism, 1945-2015. Proceedings of the Conference. Roma: NUL. (See also 4.2.1).
way to operate. One academic noted that “resistance at individual level demands a lot of courage and extensive awareness of one’s rights. It is often costly” (Uaca18 Interview, 16/10/2014).

The Motebang and Moitse cases have demonstrated that every struggle gives an actor a sense of agency, and therefore that agency cannot be taken for granted, but that it needs to be found and negotiated continuously (Hegland, 1995). The cases further demonstrate Foucault’s (1976, 1980) thesis that resistance resides in the same spaces as power and that power is always met with resistance, sometimes overt, sometimes covert, sometimes discursive.

5.3.3 The Amendment of the University Law in 1989: Overt and Discursive Struggles

Subsequent to the animosity generated by the Motebang case, the GOL invoked its powers and amended the university law in December 1989. The NUL (Amendment) Order (No. 21 of 1989) gave more powers to Government to control the University as well as giving University authorities powers “to take prompt action as and when it is deemed necessary” (NUL Order 1989:572-574). This amendment followed the establishment of a Commission of Inquiry into the Instability at the National University of Lesotho 1989 (see 3.5.2.2) which reviewed evidence submitted by various players. It is important to state that way back before this amendment, in May 1989, in an address to the University Alumni, the Minister of Education contended that the experiment of 1975 “overdemocratised” NUL by “implement[ing] the concept of participatory administration complete with its freels” (sic) (Machobane, 1989a:11). Making reference to a legal case in which NULASA had taken the Administration (of which it was part under the participatory concept of administration) to the Labour Tribunal, and won a case against the so-called Administration, Machobane asked poignantly,

[n]ow, who is the administration in this case? Materially, in this regard it was the VC, PVC, Registrar …who [all] have no executive powers; [ASAC]; the Board of Finance, and Council – of which academic staff are a principal part: the Chairman of [NULASA] himself is a member of the Council. Hence, in short, in so far as it is an integral part of the so-called management, the Academic Staff is at war with itself, and winning. Its victory seems to be that it is capable of strangulating University Governance whilst the Government is unable to unlock its learned fingers from the university’s frail throat because the university lies behind the wall of autonomy. Thus turning autonomy into a legal travesty (emphasis in the original).

(Machobane, 1989a:13-14)
Since 1980, there had been suggestions that the 1976 University Act, by dispersing power throughout the university, subordinated institutional interests to individual and group interests (World Bank Report, 1984; GOL, 1989a; Machobane, 1989a-b; Likate, 1989). Unsurprisingly, the majority of those who submitted evidence before the Commission in 1989 felt that NULASA was a destabilising force and that top university officials lacked real authority and power. On its part, NULASA felt that management, in collusion with Government, was not only contemptuous towards academic staff, but was determined to destroy or undermine the union (GOL, 1989b:27; Likate, 1989). One of those who submitted evidence was the University registrar who argued that the University Act, Statutes and Ordinances did not confer any specific authority on university leaders and that authority and power were “diffused … mak[ing] the University ungovernable/unmanageable” (Likate, 1989:4).

This thinking that top university officials lack real power has persisted to this day and has apparently informed the attempted amendments of the University law in 2012, 2013 and 2014 (see 3.6.4). In Likate’s (1989:1) view, the participatory governance structure through the committee system was ripe for “deadlocks over issues which may not inspire the support of one faction or the other”. However, several informants within NUL deny the persistent allegation that the participatory governance structure makes the university ungovernable. According to one academic, it is the determination of the Government to starve the NUL of the much needed financial support which “sparks reactions that may be regarded as signs of ungovernability” (Uaca27 Interview, 20/10/2014). One non-academic member of staff was adamant that NUL was governable, and that this notion of ungovernability probably referred to “instances where staff is faced with challenges of a dictatorial nature”, because people like to be respected and consulted instead of being dictated to (Unas4 Interview, 25/10/2014). For another informant, the notion of the ungovernability of NUL was understandable as a cumulative impression which needed to be analysed against the performance of every administration (Uaca17 Interview, 16/10/2014). May (2006) argues that organisational cultures such as universities tend to be viewed “as sources of resistance” and therefore become targets for reform “simply because they are seen in a time lag with the imperatives of imagined futures” (May, 2006:336). It was therefore not surprising that among the findings of the Commission was the existence of too many committees within the
university’s administrative structures (GOL, 1989b:16). NULASA did not only refuse to cooperate with the Commission during its evidence gathering stages, but flatly rejected the findings when they were made public and launched a campaign against the military regime (see 3.5.2). NULASA criticised the amendment for its attempt “to supplant the powers of the University’s governing body and to give the Minister undue powers of appointing and terminating the employment of any member without notice” (NULASA, 1989:1).

5.4 ORGANISATIONAL RESTRUCTURING: THE GOL, NUL MANAGEMENT AND UNIVERSITY STAFF ENTANGLEMENTS

Without restructuring, without refocusing on what is relevant and marketable in terms of programmes and services, this university will be a dinosaur in a decade. (VC (Siverts) Press Conference, 19 July 2011)

The meaning of organisational restructuring produced complex and overlapping contestations among triadic actors. The struggles tended to vacillate between overt, covert and discursive resistance. It is shown in parts of this section that overt, covert and discursive resistance tended to go together (see 5.4.2.3 and 5.4.3). By organisational restructuring I do not only refer to the RP of 2011-2013, but to all forms of reform since the 1980s. But in this section I present and analyse struggles occasioned mainly by the Transformation Process of 2002-2004 and the Restructuring Process of 2011-2014. The section is divided into three major sections. I put the transformation and restructuring of NUL into context in section 5.4.1; engage with the various forms of resistance by academic and non-academic staff to the Transformation and Restructuring Processes in section 5.4.2; and bring to the fore further counter-reaction strategies mainly connected with the two reform initiatives in section 5.4.3.

5.4.1 Putting the Transformation and Restructuring of NUL into Context

Universities around the world are being asked to embrace neoliberal and New Public Management (NPM) discourses with their emphases on economic efficiency, effectiveness, competitiveness and quality (Christensen, 2011; Balarin, 2014). The Chief Executive of the Higher Education Funding Council (HEFCE) was quoted in The Guardian of 19 March 2002 as saying that “perpetuating the life of scholarship for its own sake is no longer an acceptable
mission statement, nor is the delivery of inaccessible knowledge from the secret garden of academic seclusion to a grateful public” (Collier, 2010:58). This new managerialism is often presented and justified in a discourse that stresses quality and efficiency, diagnoses and solutions that tend to conceal the political and ideological nature of such operations and consequences. It is for this reason that Lorenz (2012), borrowing from Frankfurt (2005), argues that NPM discourse is “bullshit” discourse that parasitises and perverts the real and original meanings of quality, efficiency, relevance, transparency and accountability, thus making NPM nothing but ‘qualispeak’, ‘efficiencespeak’, ‘transparencyspeak’, ‘relevancespeak’ and ‘valorisationspeak’ (Lorenz, 2012:626).

At NUL, since the 1980s and in typical neoliberal and NPM discourses, all proposals to transform the University highlighted structural crises rooted in a complacent, outmoded and cumbersome managerial and organisational system ill-suited to respond effectively and timeously to change imperatives, occasioned by poor planning, inefficient utilisation of resources and low cost-consciousness, among others (NUL SP, 2002/2007:1). All the proposals/reports were unanimous in their criticism of the decision-making processes and structures of the University, including its Acts, Statutes and Ordinances, as well as the tendency to refer any issue of any complexity to standing ad hoc committees. The proposals emphasised the need for a managerial hierarchy in which the Deans and HODs had managerial and financial responsibilities, answerable for the organisation and work of the Faculty to the VC. The proposals also emphasised the need for open and competitive advertising and interview for appointments to senior management positions, rather than the existing practice of election which tended to be made or controlled by power groups and interested parties (Ernst & Young Report, 2000:45-46, 119). It was the Ernst & Young Report (2000) that made comprehensive and far-reaching recommendations in nearly all areas of the University, and recommended a “major Transformation and Restructuring programme that will address the purpose of the organisation to examine its core beliefs and values” (Ernst & Young Report, 2000:6). The Report acknowledged that change at NUL was likely to be a difficult process as resistance was anticipated given that

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“the organisation has had a traditional collegiate multiple committee decision-making structure for many years” (Ernst & Young Report, 2000:113).

It is therefore always the case that when a new institutional logic modifies relations of power, individuals and groups of individuals may promote or resist the new logic, depending on how they are affected by the power shift. After all, restructuring and transforming universities is not as straightforward as it sounds, and poses challenges of getting everyone on board (Mahao, 2003; Wilkinson, 2003; Leduka, 2013). Ferrer-Balas et al (2008:297) argue that since universities present resistance to even the most minor perturbations, such as changes in class size, an overly rigid market structure can be a barrier to transformation. When reforms are met with resistance, they may lead to partial or non-implementation of the reform process. This was the case with Vision 2000 Plus (V2000P), the TP of 2002-2004, and the RP of 2011-2013. The preamble to the final Lenomo Consultants (2013:4) report on NUL actually notes that “the implementation of the restructuring programme [of 2011-2014] was dogged by resistance and industrial action by various union formations, and mistrust and dissatisfaction among staff”. Thus despite the local and global pressures exerted on NUL to adopt market-oriented reforms since the 1980s, NUL is yet to embrace the market reforms due to sharp overt, covert and discursive disagreements among triadic actors about the ‘how’ rather than the ‘why’ of reform. At NUL, just like in many universities around the world, relentless efforts have been made not only to understand and internalise the market mantra, but also to question and resist and even transform it. Thus, in the subsequent sections, I demonstrate how organisational transformation and restructuring was not only overtly and covertly resisted, but also how it was discursively justified and discursively resisted. While discursive justifications for the TP and the RP may have been too powerful to counter, some of their underlying assumptions were nonetheless discursively contested, notwithstanding Anderson’s (2008:262) contention that academics are poorly prepared to argue publicly against the “imperializing discourse” of neoliberalism and NPM.

5.4.2 Organisational Transformation and Restructuring: Resistance by Academic and Non-Academic Staff

In this section I present and analyse, first, the discursive justifications for the TP as well as the discursive articulations for its collapse and non-implementation (5.4.2.1); second, the discursive
and counter-discursive articulations of the RP (5.4.2.2); and third, the interlocking overt, covert and discursive oppositions to the RP (5.4.2.3). Yet again, the categorisations in these three sections are purely for presentation and analytical purposes, otherwise all the different forms of resistance must be seen as constitutive and interconnected transactions.

**5.4.2.1 The Transformation Process and Discursive Resistance**

In 2002, following approval by the University Governing Council (UGC), the NUL management launched a massive reform agenda known as the TP. It was justified on the basis of a discourse of efficiency and accountability. According to the Strategic Plan that launched the TP, there was every need to deal with structural crises that were thought to hinder the efficient and effective discharge of the mission of the University, occasioned by “a complacent and cumbersome managerial and organisational system ill-suited to respond effectively and timeously to change imperatives; poor planning; inefficient utilization of resources and low cost-consciousness” (NULSP, 2002:1). The TP was a response to the Ernst & Young Audit Report of 2000 which recommended a major Transformation and Restructuring programme. It was noted that NUL was characterised, inter alia, by staff alienation, poor levels of accountability and a general atmosphere of fatalism and paralysis (Ernst & Young Report, 2000, cited in NUL SP 2002/2007:1). Thus, a financial and efficiency argument was fronted to justify the TP. While several informants attest that the TP was a bottom-up approach that was anchored on extensive consultations, internally and externally, it is important to understand that not everyone consulted was in agreement. It is this that largely explains the absence of overt resistance to the process. Yet it is the abandonment by management of the bottom-up approach in favour of a top-down approach claiming that the process was not moving fast enough, contend some keen participants and observers, which invited covert and discursive resistance. “They got it wrong”, argues the informant, further adding, “it [the process] is slow due to committees [and to] collegialism” (Uadm11 Interview, 07/05/2014). But one of the top drivers of the process submitted that it was not necessarily necessary to consult and get agreement by everyone because “the theory of change management says there is an 80/20 ratio where the 20 % are those who are always invariably opposed to change [with] the 80 % always a sufficient majority to move on” (Uadm3 Interview, 06/05/2014). Yet, the informant quickly admits, “in Lesotho it looks like it is the 20 %
who can hold. It is not just the university, but the nation is [also] held at ransom. This university appears to have been sacrificed on that draw of that 20 %” (Uadm3 Interview, 06/05/2014). Yet, according to one informant, one source of resistance was the general feeling that management was becoming “more and more a club of friends where they could give each other favours, jobs, benefits and promote each other at the expense of the rest of other people” (Uadm11 Interview, 07/05/2014). The same thinking was also shared outside the university. A Government official argued that the TP failed because NUL forgot that it was autonomous but not independent. “They are fed by government” he argued, “and they wanted to create a private company run by Executive Deans. You cannot restructure yourself because you are conflicted [actors]” (Grep4 Interview, 24/07/2014). It was this, among other reasons, that must have prompted the GOL to step in and disband the TP around April 2004.

The TP failed because, further goes the argument, those in Administration tried “to get rid of the law by imposing the law” (Uadm16 Interview, 03/08/2014), or by putting the cart before the horse by starting to implement reforms without the legal framework (Uadm13 Interview, 21/09/2014). “Even if there were merits in some of the things they were trying to do”, argues one university informant, “they created a situation which was untenable. The Government could not contemplate funding illegal structures from public funds” (Uadm13 Interview, 21/09/2014). Yet Mahao, Marake and Mothibe106 (2015:14) argue that the Interim Executive Deanship Structure was not envisaged, but that it was an imperative to accomplish the objective of restructuring units. Furthermore, the structure was not funded from Government coffers, but from internal savings. The thesis that the Government could not contemplate funding ‘illegal’ structures was questioned by Mahao (2004) who wondered whether disbanding the so-called ‘illegal’ structures, and then replacing them with further ‘illegal’ structures, was the real answer to exorcising the ghost of illegality. Mahao went on to cite several examples of what he saw as ‘illegal’, “legally dubious” departments and ‘illegal’ faculties among many others, all of which he said did not comply with the provisions of the NUL Act (Mahao, 2004). He argues, for example, that the “statutory rights of ordinary members to elect or be elected to positions of Heads of Departments or Deans of Faculties [were] unjustifiably infringed upon [as] a number of colleagues filed one

106 During the TP, Mothibe was Vice-Chancellor, Mahao Pro-Vice-Chancellor, and Marake Director of Transformation.
by one to the Pro-Vice-Chancellor’s office where they were offered positions of Dean, Director etc” (Mahao, 2004:4-6). Another top university informant suggested that the TP was dismantled because the GOL was allegedly incensed by the suggestion that the Chancellor of the University should be someone else other than the King, and that the name of a top South African businessman and politician was mentioned as a possible candidate (Uadm14 Interview, 05.08/2014). As if to contest this suggestion, Mahao et al (2015:22) contend that the period 2001 to 2004 was many things to different actors, “the best of times and, to others, the worst of times”, with “opinions, factual and outright misinformation and distortions abound”. It is therefore possible that some people within the University may have deliberately created this impression in order to give the Government adequate ammunition to dismantle the TP. In the opinion of Mahao et al (2015:21), “a cardinal sin that became the straw the (sic) broke the camel’s back” was committed when NUL tried to rebut a Government directive to the Lesotho Agricultural College-NUL non-negotiable demerger. This section has, in a nutshell, and from the perspectives of some triadic actors, presented some of the discursive struggles that took place during the TP and the reasons for its failure or non-implementation.

5.4.2.2 The Restructuring Process: Discursive and Counter-discursive Articulations

This section engages with discursive and counter-discursive arguments for and against the RP. Just like the TP, the RP was justified using a discourse that stresses quality, accountability, efficiency, institutional effectiveness as well as the need to achieve financial stability and to review existing governance instruments, among other reasons (NUL, 2011). The notification letter that launched the RP and was signed by the VC on 9 August 2011 contained a forty-three bullet-point list highlighting some of the reasons for embarking on restructuring. According to the list, these included breakdown of discipline; lack of accountability with “everything couched in terms of ‘the Committee’”; course and programme duplication; poor leave management; financial mismanagement and corruption; absenteeism; and astronomical University wage bill (over 90 % expenditure on personnel) (NUL, 2011:3). As mentioned in the quotation heading of section 5.4, without restructuring and marketable programmes, NUL was destined to be a dinosaur in the next ten years (VC Press Conference, 2011). In typical neoliberal and NPM language the document emphasised the need for efficiency, marketable programmes and
eliminating costs. Thus, both before and after the process was launched, its justification was the projected M50 million (R50 million) budget deficit for the 2011/2012 academic year (NUL, 2011). It was argued that the RP was needed to make the institution “cost effective and live within its means”, and that if the needed efficiencies and reduction in costs were not achieved, the University could resort to retrenchments (NUL, 2011:8). It was being argued that over the past decade or two, NUL had been allowed to deteriorate “in almost all respects” and that what was needed was a rationalisation of the organisational structure (VC Press Conference, 2011; Lenomo Consultants, 2013:1). Thus, a financial argument was similarly fronted to justify the RP. Its launching, following Council approval, and immediate implementation of several cost-cutting measures was something many employees and students were least prepared for. The immediate implementation of the cost-cutting measures not only undermined the core business of the University, but also led to multiple contestations that sucked in all triadic actors.

“NUL is very sick and it needs a major well thought out ‘surgical operation’” (NUL Minutes 12/08/2010), concluded a meeting of NUL Management and Government that was held in August 2010. Among the suggested solutions was to institute a number of cost-cutting measures, including a shift away from being dependent on Government subvention. The Government thesis was that because of limited resources at its disposal, it could “no longer afford to fund the recurring operating costs and poor delivery of the University” (GOLMOET, 19 Feb. 2013) (see 5.4.3). A Consultant went on to rubber-stamp the Government and University Management position, including reductions in the staff complement of academic and non-academic staff (Lenomo Consultants, 2013).

Because financial arguments are considered fact-like, non-challengeable arguments, or a ‘non-negotiable truth’, it was not easy for employees to make financial counter-arguments. For example, in South Africa, instead of taking a strong, united public stance against Government budget cuts, the VCs and University managements simply increased fees (De Vos, 2015). This triggered the ‘Fees Must Fall’ (FMF) campaign by university students. For NUL, despite the difficulty of making counter-arguments, there was still room for some discussion. For example, the Organisation for Social Science Research in Eastern and Southern Africa (OSSREA) Lesotho
Chapter organised a local conference to debate the fast changing HE landscape in Lesotho. Some papers which were subsequently published critiqued the financial arguments and the rationale for the RP. Dunton (2013:3) offers one of the fiercest rebuttals to market arguments, positing that the market should not be allowed to impose on us a skewed vision of the role of HE, and that at a time when “obfuscation, misrepresentation, downright lies, build like cloud banks around issues such as HIV/Aids and poverty, clarity of thought and expression are at a premium, as is critical thinking” (Dunton, 2013:2). He says that during the RP, a colleague in the Faculty of Science and Technology told him, “you people in Humanities think your job is to say ‘no’ to everything. You are completely negative” (Dunton, 2013:2). But Dunton posits that critical thinking goes beyond just saying ‘no’. He contends that the cardinal role of a university as a locus of critical thinking has to be honoured and that it is the role of every university to “take up the responsibility to transgress when circumstances demand” (Dunton, 2013:5-6).

Sejanamane (2010), Mushonga (2012) and Mothibe (2016) all argue for the continued role of the state in HE, and against privileging financial arguments in order to create a market university because universities are not for-profit entities. Making reference to Makerere University, Sejanamane (2010:8) posits that “the private university within a public institution thesis is now totally discredited” while Mushonga (2012) further posits that the thesis of relevant and marketable disciplines and programmes that over-emphasises Science disciplines to the exclusion of the Humanities is very myopic because no nation can operate without philosophers, historians, linguists and theologians, among others (Mushonga, 2012:20). Imploring the GOL to continue investing in HE, Mothibe (2016:2) posits that HE is a public good with long-term and sometimes hidden benefits that go a long way in improving health, reducing population growth, reducing poverty, improving income distribution, reducing crime, strengthening democracy and ensuring civil liberties. But the Chairman of the 11th Council, who could not have missed these arguments, continued to insist in official and private circles that NUL was set to go the Makerere

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107 Between 2012 and 2015, I was part of the Executive Committee for OSSREA Lesotho Chapter that organised the Conference under the theme Funding, Governance and Reform Issues in Higher Education in Lesotho. Generous funding was received from the mother body in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.
way\textsuperscript{108} (Staff Reporter, 2011). Again, following attempts by NUL management to phase out Development Studies (DS) as a subject among others, some scholars questioned the wisdom of the university authorities, arguing that, first, the rejection was coming at a time when enthusiasm in the subject was at its peak, internationally and regionally; and second, that perceptive universities and institutions were actually repositioning themselves and their programme offerings to reflect the growing relevance of DS (Thebe, 2013:44; Tsikoane, 2016:4).

So far these discursive positions do show that there were concurrent and competing discourses among triadic actors. The discourse of financial management followed by the GOL and NUL administration seemed to be at odds with the discourse of teaching and research followed by academic staff. These ‘opposing’ actors were following different trajectories based on different assumptions regarding organisational restructuring. The failure by those in authority to respect the agency of the most affected generated such discursive contestations and counter-contestations. By failing to consult widely, the GOL and the University Administration had written off too quickly academic and non-academic staff, students and trade Unions as possible actors in organisational transformation and in the resistance to neoliberal restructuring. Approaches abound that do not foreground the agency of local actors. For example, Hudson (2012) argues that women’s agency is often circumscribed by limiting them to the non-political sphere while Jabri (2013:5) posits that “the question of agency should not be framed in the terms of the primacy of the internationals over the locals, but rather in terms of an exchange that effects agency on the ground and in the local”. Postcolonial or decolonial approaches need to recognise the political agency of the local actors.

By the time the GOL ‘realised’ the need to respect the agency of those most affected by neoliberal restructuring, and hurriedly brought in what Leduka (2013) describes as a doggy “boutique” consultant\textsuperscript{109} to “create an enabling climate of dialogue and discussion” (Lenomo Consultants, 2013:1), this ‘recognition’ seemed to be coming too late as resistance was already

\textsuperscript{108} Makerere University instituted far-reaching neoliberal reforms from 1989-2005 and was often touted by the World Bank as the preferred model for the transformation of HE on the African continent (see Mamdani’s \textit{Scholars in the Marketplace: The Dilemmas of Neo-liberal Reform at Makerere University 1989-2005} (2007)).

\textsuperscript{109} See http://www.lenomostrategicadvisory.co.za/profile/. The dubious consultant was allegedly paid M3 million (R3m) to restructure NUL in three months.
embedded in university structures. In this context, the resistance by those in middle management (e.g. HODs, Deans, Directors) who were expected to identify with the new institutional logic that was being established was therefore hardly surprising. This constituency of actors directly appealed to the Minister of Education, imploring her to relieve the VC and the Chairman of Council of their duties and to “stop the restructuring process with immediate effect and [to] allow a new leader to take the restructuring process forward in consultation with stakeholders” (NUL, 18 June 2012:4). According to Parke and Fails (2014:1), the thesis of the ‘logic of external reform resistance’ states that when people view changes as externally imposed, they are less likely to develop supportive and satisfied attitudes toward the process. The RP was viewed as not only externally imposed, but also as illegal. But, as we have already seen, even internally initiated reforms were not immune to resistance as long as those in the organisation felt threatened by the proposed changes. The position of University authorities was that a successful restructuring was going to affect delinquents and therefore could not include everyone (Uadm7 Interview, 25/07/2014; Uadm14 Interview, 05/08/2014).

The monotonously repeated yet difficult to rebut thesis by the VC was that in everything the university was doing, “students come first” and that it was their education that was supposed to drive the NUL agenda (VC Press Conference, 2013). However, some in the University and the Community found this claim to be at odds with the actions of the VC. For instance, many students, parents and academics struggled to understand the logic behind the closure of the university for three months from October to December 2011. No wonder some people in the University parodied the closure in what they called ‘The Siverts Theory’ (see Diagram 5.1 below). The theory exposed, through a clear and forceful analysis of the situation, the disjuncture between the VC’s claims of student-centeredness on one hand, and the local realities of a well-paid management, poorly paid staff and inadequate teaching and learning facilities on the other hand.
Diagram 5.1: ‘The Siverts Theory’ as a Discourse of Resistance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The Siverts Theory:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A well-paid &amp; dysfunctional management +</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A poorly-equipped, poorly-paid and highly-intimidated, fearful academic staff +</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A Closed University =</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quality Education for the African Child</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: National University of Lesotho Archives, Thomas Mofolo Library, 2011.

In postcolonial formulations, such mimicry as captured in Diagram 5.1 is seen as a sly weapon of anticolonial civility, an ambivalent mixture of defence and disobedience, a strategy of power as well as resistance (Gandhi, 1998:149). According to Bhabha (1994), repetition in a mocking manner, as in Diagram 5.1, constitutes a moment of resistance rather than passivity. It is obvious that these discursive forms of resistance are far from being open violent oppositional or armed struggles as the solution to ordinary peoples’ subalternity because salvation does not always lie in seizing state power (Mbembe, 2001).

To conclude this section, I also highlight some discursive struggles occasioned by the NUL (Amendment) Bill of 2011. In section 3.5.2.3, I showed how the NUL (Amendment) Order of 1992 restored the 1976 Act. The restoration of dispersed and rhizomic power was loathed by some triadic actors, leading to a series of amendments of the University law (see 3.6.4). Sejanamane (2010:9) contends that as part of a three-person committee that drafted the 1976 law, they made a “gigantic error of judgement by fostering a law … which was meant not to facilitate action but to constrain management and the government”. He continues

[w]e attempted to democratise management through an electoral process. This created a situation where we had elected Heads of Departments; elected Deans of Faculties; …an elected Pro-Vice-Chancellor. Needless to say rather than to produce a core of senior and middle management for running the affairs of the University we produced politicians. We created a situation where hierarchy and knowledge were frowned
Thus, Sejanamane argues that a person should not account for the actions and decisions made by other people. Clearly drawing on some of these arguments and on previous studies, many of which recommended giving more powers to the VC, Siverts, in her capacity as VC\textsuperscript{110}, repeated several times in her interviews with the press and at her press conferences that without restructuring, relevant and marketable programmes, a new bill, and a change in culture, NUL faced a bleak future (NUL Notification, 2011; VC (Siverts) Press Conference, 2011: VC (Siverts) Press Conference, 2013). On the strengths of these arguments, her ‘Management Team’ brought before Parliament proposals to amend Section 49 of the University law in order to give the VC powers to appoint and dismiss staff. This proposal became a locus of discursive contention among various stakeholders\textsuperscript{111} who took the conflict to the lower House of Parliament in 2011, a sign that both the VC and the GOL took for granted the role of students, parents and academic staff in the governance of the University. The GOL, through the Ministry of Education and Training (MOET) and the NUL administration argued that the amendment was needed in order to “instill discipline around campus” as well as to align the NUL Act with the Labour Code and to strengthen the legal framework for the employer (National Assembly, 2011:3). On their part, LUTARU and NAWU argued that the Bill intended to target certain individuals seen by the University management as obnoxious, while the Concerned Parents Association saw the Bill as a “quest for unlimited powers by the Administration [and as an instrument] to deliver its ‘restructuring process’ without regard to statutory structures” (National Assembly, 2011:6).

Despite discursive divergences among triadic actors, Section 49 was amended as proposed by the VC. Yet as amended, argues Maquutu (2012:2-5), Section 49 did not give the VC powers to appoint and dismiss any employee by virtue of her/his office, further submitting that a one man government, “whether it is of a State, a university or a company soon becomes oppressive”\textsuperscript{110} It is important to note that Sejanamane was the substantive PVC during the reign of Professor Siverts as VC.

\textsuperscript{111} These were the MOET, the NUL Administration, LUTARU, NAWU, SRC, the Concerned Parents Association, the Congress of Lesotho Trade Unions (COLETU), and Development for Peace Education (DPE).
Maqutu argued at length against arbitrariness and made a case for the need for parliamentary democracy, checks and balances and rule of law, much to the chagrin of the VC and her supporters. The University Senate also argued that by seeking to increase the powers of Government and University management at the expense of university employees, the Bill “takes the University several decades backwards in terms of the acknowledged principles of good governance” (Senate Report, 2013). There is no justification in trying to establish in the office of the VC some dictator, argues a top academic, asking rhetorically, “if you can’t have democracy in the university, where else should you have it”

These discursive and counter-discursive positions show the nature of disagreement over the restructuring of NUL and over the nature and purpose of the University law as well as the fact that the agency of triadic actors can come from many sources. By bringing together the power of different discursive contexts, global and local, I have showed that restructuring organisations are sites of discursive struggles where “different organizational groups drawing on various discourses compete to shape the social reality of the organization for their own benefit” (Erkama, 2010:151). Such struggles are a lived reality of any organisation undergoing organisational re-engineering, and the quotation heading section 5.4 sums up the neoliberal spirit that is gripping universities around the world today.

5.4.2.3 The Restructuring Process: Overt, Covert and Discursive Resistance

Unlike the TP which was in the main covertly and discursively resisted, the RP was overtly, covertly and discursively resisted all at the same time. It is these overlapping forms of resistance that I engage with in this section. Thus in the face of the massive organisational restructuring that seemed to threaten the working and material conditions of employees, including retrenchments (NUL, 2011:7-8), academic staff led by LUTARU, and non-academic staff led by NAWU, through collective agency, not only overtly protested against the RP, but they also covertly and discursively contested the process. Thus, first I show how vulgarities and obscenities, through

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112 In 1989, University of Zimbabwe (UZ) students resisted attempts by the Zimbabwean government to establish a one-party state amid endemic corruption, declaring in no uncertain terms: “This university is the last island of democracy in this country and we will fight to the bitter end and hilt to sustain these democratic rights and extend them to the generality of the masses of Zimbabwe” (Omari and Mihyo, 1991:5).
jeering songs and dance, were hurled at targeted officials – the VC, the Registrar, the PVC, the Bursar, the Chairman of Council and some Government ministers (see Appendix F); second, how visuals such as placards were deployed to publicly resist restructuring and power; and third, how God and the Bible, through ‘prayers’ and ‘beatitudes’ were harnessed as part of the resistance discourse that sought to mock and ridicule those in authority – overtly, covertly and discursively.

**Resistance in Songs**

Songs, as in many protests, formed an important part of the resistance discourse to the RP as well as against corruption and incompetent leadership. Thus while the act of singing could be seen as overt resistance, the content of the majority of songs revealed deep covert and discursive resistance. The popular song *lipoho*\(^ {113}\) (bulls) expressed a defiant stance (see song # 1, Appendix F) by restating a well-known fact that when bulls fight, they do it face to face. Thus LUTARU, in an open display of collective agency, dared authorities to do a face to face duel as bulls do. By calling themselves ‘bulls’ (*poho ke tse na li bopelana* (here are bulls facing each other) or (*ha poho e fata makoatsi* (when the bull is ruffling the soil) (see song # 12, Appendix F) or even as ‘cannibals’ (*thabeng tse la tse ntso tse la* (in those black mountains\(^ {114}\)); *ke LUTARU malimo a eja batho* (it is LUTARU, the cannibal eating people); *le ha u ka botsa John, Peter and ‘Mary* (not real names) (you may even ask John, Peter and ‘Mary) (see song # 15, Appendix F), LUTARU members refused to be seen as hapless victims, but rather as agents in control of the situation. With reference to gender binaries, Hudson (2012) critiques the hegemonic framing of agency which tends to determine who is assigned or denied agency, arguing that “the overemphasis on essentialist, stereotypical notions of women as victims or mothers underplays the role of women as political agents in conflict, and conversely masks the victimhood of men and boys” (Hudson, 2012:450). Another Sesotho song, which was always sung during strikes against the RP, is *ho ea rona* (we are the ones going) – *ho ea rona ba pelo li thata* (we who have hardened hearts are the ones going) (see song # 2, Appendix F). It was sung to urge the

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\(^ {113}\) All songs were sung in the local Sesotho language (see Appendix F).

\(^ {114}\) During the lifaqane wars of the early 19\(^ {th}\) century, drought and famine led to widespread cannibalism and Moshoeshoe I’s grandfather Peete, was captured and eaten by the cannibals of Rakotsoane (see Gill, 1993:60-70).
‘courageous’ ones to march forward, to confront the ‘enemy’, while at the same time telling the ‘cowards’ to retreat (ba boi ba cheche) and to go back (ba boi ba cheche morao). In its discursive formulation, the song simply told those in power that LUTARU was not afraid of them. The song sent a strong message that there is power in collective agency.

Besides songs that tried to muster the courage of protestors and that expressed a defiant stance, protestors also mocked certain administrators by calling them ‘liars’, ‘idiots’, ‘rubbish’ as well insulting others for not being married e.g, Ntho ena ke masaoana (this is rubbish); ke lekehile ke nyetse ‘Maggie, Mary (not real names) (I am fed-up, I am married ‘Maggie, Mary) (see song # 13 in Appendix F). This particular song ends with protestors openly declaring violence on the authorities - tlisa koto ke bolae ntja ena (bring me the knobkerrie to kill this dog). They also discursively mocked and ridiculed others by restaging their professions as well as their private lives both in song and dance - thibang ka mona, thibang ka mona (round them that side; round them this side); re ente Peter (so that we inject Peter) (see song # 6, Appendix F). This way, they introduced Bhabha’s (1994) slippages, contradictions and displacements in Peter’s medical profession. By demanding that Peter, a medical doctor by profession, must be forcibly ‘injected’, the protestors were implying that the official was both physically and mentally ‘sick’ and required an injection to make him see the reality of the work environment at NUL. The same song also ridiculed and insulted another administrator for not being married, demanding that she be rounded up re nyalise ‘Maggie (so that we get ‘Maggie married). And in yet another song, the protestors ridiculed a top university administrator for allegedly wearing excessive make-up which left her face looking like she had applied peanut butter to it. Ha u le koata (when you are so uncivilised); u itlotsa ka pinabatha mahlong (when you apply peanut butter on your face), goes the song (see song # 11, Appendix F). The old colonial binaries of backwardness and civilisedness are invoked in the song, while song number 6 demands that this administrator be forcibly ‘captured’ so that she could be powdered with modern cosmetics instead of ‘peanut butter’; Thibang ka mona, thibang ka mona (round them that side; round them this side); re poere ‘Mary (so that we powder ‘Mary). Yet in reality, the administrator does not of course apply peanut butter to her face; rather, she applies modern cosmetics but presumably in excessive quantities. It is this act which the protestors capitalise on, and invert into backwardness in order to subvert her power into nothingness.
What has marriage or one’s profession or the use of cosmetics to do with university administration, we may ask? The answers are not easy, but it is argued here that these elements of vulgarity and grotesque description seemed to leave some protestors thoroughly satisfied with their ability to reduce those in authority to nothingness by refusing to acknowledge any human attribute in them. In the colonial era, the native was removed from the “historically existing” when the coloniser chose “to not to look at, see, or hear him/her”, thus making him or her “a thing denied” (Mbembe, 2001:187). Mbembe (2001:109) posits that there is a kind of aesthetics in vulgarity when directed against oppressive African states as the fetish of state power tended to be located in the realm of ridicule (see 5.2.1). In Mozambique, under conditions of forced labour, resistance was often expressed in jeering songs, making hidden transcripts or private discourse public. As an overseer passed, for example, peasants chanted, “[t]his monkey is stopping here, why? He is stopping here because he has nothing else to do” (O’Laughlin, 2002:523). These songs of protest and suffering not only represented an act of defiance and empowerment, but also “normalized a world of cash-cropping and migrant labour” in the same way the songs by LUTARU, NAWU and the students seemed to do (O’Laughlin, 2002:523). In colonial Mozambique as at NUL, the songs provided unparalleled insights into popular perceptions and dissatisfactions with the work environment.

These songs of protest were not only sung during the RP of 2011-2014. Professor Moletsane (1997-2000), Professor Ogunrinade (2007-2010) and Professor Sebatane (2010-2011) were similarly mocked during their tenure as VCs. In 2000, for example, a procession of toyi-toyi-ing staff wound its way round the campus singing tsamaea Maboe Moletsane (go, Maboe Moletsane) (Summary of Events in Lesotho, 2000). The VC was accused of violating statutory requirements by allegedly extending his term beyond the expiration of his contract, among other ‘transgressions’. Thus, LUTARU and NAWU used their collective agency to launch petitions to the authorities and to demonstrate by toyi-toyi-ing in order to force him to go on leave. One informant who happened to be in the forefront of the demonstrations at the time reminisced

I think the kind of picketing we embarked on, at least in retrospect, was really ruthless and in some cases uncivil … Every day the picketing started with a song, and not just a song, with a bell, the kind of bell you
hear in the villages for the village church services. We will be singing from there, straight to the office of the VC, banging doors, windows and blocking the corridors. Basically the intention was to make life impossible for him and in fact he left as a result.

(Uadm16 Interview, 06/08/2014)

The intensity of the opposition finally forced VC Moletsane to leave the University. Celebrating what it called the demise of the most powerful VC the University had ever had, a report by the LUTARU President (2001) triumphantly noted that this “was not to be unexpected for the year had been designated as a year of action and struggle both to regain our dignity and to ensure accountability within the University management” (LUTARU President’s Report, 2001).

Visual Forms of Resistance

Just like the songs, visuals in the form of placards served to function as overt and discursive forms of resistance. Thus the visuals did not only openly subvert power, but they also carried varying messages of defiance against both the RP and those seen to be driving it. They were an important part of every strike and demonstration. For example, in 2010, a salary increase dispute was turned into a space for sloganeering and resistance by striking academic staff. In the protests that ensued, one placard which read, ‘2 %? Acheke!’(To Hell With 2 %) stood out. The protesters were demanding a 25 % salary increase. Instead, the employer offered 2 %. Turning down the offer, the protestors mimicked a funeral and ‘wept uncontrollably’ in a mocking manner. As we have already seen, during colonial rule, a restaging of the values of the coloniser actually introduced a moment of slippage, contradiction and displacement of the coloniser’s position (Bhabha, 1994:226). In the same way that mimicry was unsettling to colonial discourse (Bhabha, 1984), this open and discursive mockery by the protestors could not go unnoticed by University and Government authorities. The VC’s style of management was also restaged and mimicked in a huge placard which read in full ‘Certificate of Excellence: This certificate is presented to Sharon Siverts for excellence in Intimidations’. Another placard read, ‘When You Want to Reason, She Says It Is Treason’. The purpose of these visuals was to expose not only the

115 In the course of time, and after protracted LUTARU strikes and negotiations, salaries were adjusted across the board by 10 %, with the employer committing to pay a further 15 % in the following academic year. To this day this promise has not been fulfilled, and its violation was the basis of more strikes in 2011.
VC’s alleged appetite for power, but also to discursively mock and ridicule her style of management. By suggesting that the VC considered reason as treason, the protesters were appealing to a long established tradition of academic freedom and inalienable right of every academic to speak truth to power. The feeling within NUL was that instead of allowing academics speak truth to power, the VC was speaking power to truth.

Other messages of open defiance and discursive opposition carried in placards by the toyi-toyi ing academic and non-academic staff demanded the VC to resign. ‘Go Home Pensioner Your Time Is Up!!!’; ‘Sharon! Sharon! You Must Go To America, This Is Lesotho!’; ‘Sharon! The Holiday Is Over. Go Back Home!’ read some of the placards directed against the VC, while students occasionally joined the protests with their own brand of song, dance and placards, hurling unprintable insults against the VC. Other top administrators were similarly mocked. ‘Joki’, ‘Tsotsi’ (not real names): You are Lecturers’, read another placard directed against two other top administrators. Having been recruited and co-opted from among the academic staff, these two were seen as pushing personal and repressive agendas. Like those who are normally “co-opted to be ‘governed’ and to help ‘govern’ other trouble-makers”, argues Hudson (2012:450-451), ‘Joki’ and ‘Tsotsi’ were similarly labeled. But there are those who argue that avoiding co-option is not always the solution, and that sometimes it works better to resist from within by undermining and disrupting domination (Khanal, 2012). Resistance and collaboration, or complicity and co-option, posit Vail and White (1983:855), were recognised as “alternative strategies open to African leaders as they sought to maintain or augment their power in the face of the colonial challenge”. Some observers were convinced that Joki and Tsotsi were averse to the underlying neoliberal rationale behind the restructuring process and that they operated as subversive agents by working from within to undermine it (Pers. Com, 2014).

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116 The retirement age at NUL is 65. Professor Siverts was employed as the 8th substantive VC of NUL at age 65. In 2015, the retirement age was raised to 70 for people in the rank of Professor and Associate Professor.

117 ‘Siverts Wanted, Dead or Alive’; ‘Pack Your Belongings and Go Back To Canada’, read some of the students’ placards. Siverts was a US citizen, not Canadian. The students got it wrong.
Resistance in ‘Prayers’ and ‘Beatitudes’

Like in songs and visuals, during the RP, Government and University officials were also overtly as well as discursively resisted through what was known as the ‘NUL Community Prayer’ and the ‘NUL Beatitudes’. Through these forms of resistance, the peacefully assembled protesters asked God to intercede and cause VC Siverts to resign. “We are not asking you Father to remove them from the earth, but to guide them out of the National University of Lesotho”, read part of the prayer (see Insert 5.1). Those who were seen as “pushing this University into oblivion” were labeled as people who cared less about the need to preserve the University for the “present and future generations”. Such people were seen as possessed by “evil spirits” that deserved to be “driven into the wilderness” (HCL, 19/09/2012). While the ‘praying’ aspect was an overt act of resistance, the content of the ‘prayer’ revealed deep emotional discursive oppositions to the leadership of the University (see Insert 5.1).
Insert 5.1: ‘NUL Community Prayer’: ‘Mocking Prayer’ of Resistance

Source: High Court of Lesotho, National University of Lesotho (Applicant) v Thabo Ntitsane and 61 Others (Respondents). CIV/APN/454/12, 19/09/2012.

The ‘NUL Community Prayer’ and the accompanying ‘NUL Beatitudes’ proved to be a platform to mock those in authority and thus deface their power. The University countered these ‘prayers’ and ‘beatitudes’ by taking the demonstrating staff to the High Court (see also 3.6.2 and Appendix E). According to the founding affidavit by the University Registrar, the University argued that the demonstrators were “hurling worst insults continuously in front of the administration block, further pray[ing] mockingly” (HCL, 19/09/2012). The advocate representing NUL and the VC submitted that “the respondents …vulgarity [was] unbearable when they insult the applicant’s management [and that] the songs they sing under the pretext of prayer are immoral…” (HCL, 19/09/2012) (see Inserts 5.1 and 5.2). The ‘NUL Beatitudes’, just like the ‘NUL Community Prayer’, contain both overt and discursive elements of resistance
against those in authority, who are apparently labeled as people with hearts “made of steel” (see insert 5.2 below).

**Insert 5.2: ‘NUL Beatitudes’: ‘Mocking Prayer’ of Resistance**

1. Blessed are those who unite for a good purpose-To foil the tragic destruction of NUL

2. Blessed are those crying with a loud voice that NUL’s integrity be secured.

3. Woe betides those meeting in the dark corners in order to bring NUL to its knees.

4. Woe betides those whose hearts are made of steel and refuse to listen to the voice of multitudes.

Source: High Court of Lesotho, *National University of Lesotho (Applicant) v Thabo Ntitsane and 61 Others (Respondents).* CIV/APN/454/12, 19/09/2012.
Inserts 5.1 and 5.2 were presented before the courts of law as part of the evidence to prove the vulgar and immoral nature of the prayers and beatitudes. The idea was to convince the court to issue an interdict against the “unlawful” demonstrating staff members and to prevent the environment from “blow[ing] into a full scale chaos and anarchy” (HCL, 19/09/2012). The act of seeking the protection of the courts by University authorities seems to suggest that they found the prayers to be unsettling. Mbembe (2001) posits that the production of vulgarity, as a deliberate and cynical operation, is a normal condition of state power (see also 5.3.2). The fetish of the state, seen for the sham it is, is made to lose its might, and becomes merely an idol (Mbembe, 1992b:8). Yet the use of the words ‘oh father’, ‘blessed’, ‘woe’, ‘betides’ and ‘prayer’ by the protesters makes it difficult to say these were not real prayers as the authorities submitted in their affidavits.

In times of struggles, it is not uncommon for God and the Bible to be invoked. During struggles for independence on the African continent, the blending of politics with prayer was a common occurrence. For example, the West African Students’ Union inverted the official Lord’s Prayer, thought to have been bequeathed to Africans by the West, into what it called “The African Prayer” (Falola, 2001:97). While on one hand the NUL ‘prayer’ is highly ambiguous, on the other hand it can readily be seen as a genuine prayer appealing to God about the NUL situation, and could easily be prayed by many Christian staff. In its ambiguity, the ‘NUL Prayer’ forms part of what Jabri (2013:14) calls ‘hybrid agency’ whose nodes of a complex network can shift from here to elsewhere, or, according to Bhabha (1994:72), it can be seen as a discourse which empowers at two levels – “incitement and interdiction”. As a form of discursive instability, it makes for agency and thus transforms “conditions of impossibility into possibility” (Kapoor (2002:651). However, the ‘NUL Beatitudes’ are a clear parody. These ‘prayers’ and ‘beatitudes’ highlighted the fact that people most of the time have a certain degree of freedom to act and to maneuver even under the most oppressive situations (Nahar and van der Geest, 2014). The

\[118\] The inverted ‘African Prayer’ goes: Our Country, which art on Earth, Honoured be thy Name; Thy Freedom Come, Thy work be done Abroad, as it is done at home. Give us each day the vision clear, And forgive us our foolishness, As we forgive them that daily try to fool us. And lead not into submission, but deliver us from trickery. For thine will be Freedom, Due Power, and due glory, For ever and ever – Amen.
The overall effect of the collective agency of LUTARU, NAWU and SUSU worked to cause instability in administrative structures as evidenced by the court case.

The overt, covert and discursive forms of resistance presented here demonstrate the fact that employees were in charge of their own destiny, and that “even in tight corners individual and collective agency can bear causal fruit” (Lonsdale, 2000:6). The songs, visuals, ‘prayers’ and ‘beatitudes’ presented here not only carried defiant, vulgar and obscene messages, but they also performed a double role – to show the banality of power on one hand, and to act as some form of aesthetics, on the other hand.

5.4.3 The Transformation and Restructuring Processes and Counter-Reaction Strategies

The restructuring processes of the 21st century namely V2000P, the TP and the RP did not only produce responses from those most affected by the processes, but they also produced counter-reactions by those in authority, counter-reactions which in turn generated further counter-reactions from employees. These counter-reaction strategies by both employer and employee can also be seen as coping strategies in their own right. In this section I discuss counter-reaction strategies occasioned by the Transformation and Restructuring processes. I show how the deliberate circulation of malicious rumours and falsehoods and anti-union tactics and strategies were used as both overt and subterranean forms of resistance (5.4.3.1); argue that the persistent decline of the Government financial subvention to NUL over the years is camouflaged coercion and therefore counter-reaction (5.4.3.2); and analyse how some hidden subversive practices are part of the trope of the ‘weapons of the weak’ used by some in the Triad to resist and subvert power (5.4.3.3).

5.4.3.1 Rumours, Lies and Union-bashing Strategies as Covert Resistance

In times of contestations, rumours and falsehoods tend to form part of the resistance discourse. During the TP, one of the most covert counter-responses to the process was the almost deliberate circulation of malicious rumours about the PVC\textsuperscript{119}. These rumours were published on 15 March

\footnotetext{119}{Professor Mahao finally won the lawsuit against the \textit{Public Eye} in August 2015, thirteen years after it was launched (see \textit{The Post} of 21 August 2015; http://thepost.co.ls/prof-mahao-wins-defamation-lawsuit/).
2002 in a front-page headline of the local newspaper Public Eye under the title, “Sex Scandal hits NUL”. The newspaper sensationally reported that the PVC sexually assaulted his secretary, thus throwing “the country’s only university into a steaming sex scandal” (Summary of Events in Lesotho, 2002; http://lestimes.com/defamation-ruling-postponed/). According to the Summary of Events in Lesotho (2002), the newspaper report went on to attack Mothibe and Mahao, calling them “a cabal” that “ousted former Vice-Chancellor Maboe Moletsane”, and a “clique of high-powered communists [who] are behind the transformation process”. The VC, Dr. T. H. Mothibe, in a press release, offered a strong (counter-discursive) response to the allegations of sexual assault. He charged that the rumours were part of a smear campaign “perpetrated by reactionary elements that seemed determined to scuttle forensic investigations into alleged financial impropriety in the bursary department” (http://allafrica.com/stories/200203270390.html). The VC had, besides instituting a forensic audit in the Bursary Department, suspended the Bursar and his deputy pending investigations (VC Report, 2003).

During the RP, VC Siverts also made damaging sexual harassment allegations against academic staff and students. She told a Press Conference that it was “more than disturbing that students are sexually harassed by staff. It is disgraceful that staff takes (sic) bribes and students offer bribes for grades, and that sex is considered a ‘norm’ for passing a course”\(^{120}\) (VC Press Conference, 2013). LUTARU went on air to rebut these claims, telling the nation that by claiming that sex was considered a ‘norm’ to pass a course at NUL, the VC was insinuating that “90 % of NUL staff and our civil service and all who graduated from NUL passed by having sexual relations” (LPVP, 27 July 2013). According to LUTARU, this statement among others was meant to hide the truth and to shift public attention from the failings of the VC. By constructing students largely as victims and academic staff as perpetrators, the VC was taking away the agency of students in the ‘sex scandal’. A study on sexual harassment at the institution shows that while the practice was rampant, students were also perpetrators as some female students tended to sexually hassle male teachers (Makatjane et al, 2012). Such essentialist homogenising claims by the VC could be construed as attempts to seek to portray academic staff as cheats and offenders whose supposed untoward behaviour could only be put in check by strong governance and disciplinary

\(^{120}\) This was not the first time such allegations were made. In 2010, on the eve of the graduation ceremony, Public Eye newspaper carried a headline ‘Students Offer Sex to Pass Exams’ (Public Eye, 2010) (see 4.4.3).
structures which the RP sought to entrench, thus playing the politics of agency by revealing intentionality and purpose. In PC discourse, the sex rumours or scandals represent what Bhabha (1994) calls subversive resistance, and can be equated to the British stereotypical rumour ‘By Bread Alone’. According to Kapoor (2002:662), this rumour, about Indian villagers passing a chapati (flat bread) from hand-to-hand and village-to-village before the ‘Indian Mutiny’, ended up playing the role of disarming the mutineers.

Again, during the RP, NUL management instituted an array of anti-union tactics and strategies aimed at reducing the influence and expansion of trade unionism in the university. For example, all newly recruited staff were given part-time to short-term contracts which left the majority of them frustrated and insecure (NUL, 2012; Sunday Express, 2013). According to Rhoades (1998) and Nelson (2010), this is precisely the purpose of such contracts as part-timers are far less likely to be unionised. Another counter-strategy used by the employer during the dispute of 2011 was the locking-out of employees from employer premises. From 16 October to 28 December 2011, LUTARU members were locked-out by the employer following a protracted strike and the closure of the university. “[I have] just been escorted in and out of my office like a common criminal” wrote one LUTARU member in a group email that also acted as a ‘counselling forum’ (Pers. Com, 19 October 2011). Part of the reason for the lockout was to prevent LUTARU from declaring that they were suspending the strike for two weeks, following a deal brokered by Parliament. The authorities were adamant that LUTARU should call off the strike.

The employer went on to invoke the ‘No Work, No Pay’ edict as a further counter-reactive strategy to bust LUTARU (NUL, 2012). Salaries for LUTARU members for the months of October, November and December were either withheld or deducted under this edict. In December 2011 for example, some LUTARU members received as little as M1 (R1) while others received pay advice slips that showed that they owed the employer, prompting some to resign from the Union (Ntsukunyane, 2011; Staff Reporter, 2011). Salary withholding or deductions under the ‘No Work, No Pay’ edict as a union-busting tactic is probably one of the most lethal weapons the employer holds. In most cases, members are forced to quit the Union under threat of starving, as some LUTARU members did. According to one informant, divide and rule practices by the employer during the RP actually succeeded in “deepening divisions and
mistrust amongst the various workers’ Unions” (Uaca18Interview, 16/10/2014). LUTARU tried to counter this edict by advising authorities that it was also going to withhold the marking of tests and assignments currently in their hands as well as disrupting end of term examinations (LUTARU, 2012). In an interview with the Sunday Express, the President of LUTARU told the reporter that if the Government and the University were insisting on “‘no work no pay’, then we are now saying ‘no pay no work’. We will not do work for which we have not been paid. When we go back to work we will not set the exams, invigilate or mark them” (Staff Reporter, 2011). Vilification of Unions and publication of threatening letters among others were other counter strategies used by the employer. All these tactics and counter-tactics show that agency can be enacted in many different and complex ways.

5.4.3.2 Government Financial Subvention to NUL: Resource Constraint, Coercion or Counter-reaction?

That the Government subvention to NUL has been consistently falling both in nominal and real terms in the last ten or so years is not debatable (Sejanamane, 2010, 2014; Mahao, 2014; WiCom6 Interview, 08/08/2014). What is debatable, though, are the reasons for the persistent decline – is it resource constraint or coercion/counter-reaction or a combination of both? This sharp decline is apparent since 2002/2003 tangential to inflation, personnel costs and massification (see Table 5.1).
Table 5.1: Patterns of Government Subvention to NUL, 2002 to 2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Gvt rec exp.</th>
<th>ME&amp;T</th>
<th>NUL subvention (10^6 Maloti)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2002/3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>104m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003/4</td>
<td>3.5b</td>
<td>777.2m</td>
<td>117m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004/5</td>
<td>4,318b</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>117m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005/6</td>
<td>4,772.18b</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>120m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006/7</td>
<td>4,907.5b</td>
<td>927.4m</td>
<td>121m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007/8</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>122m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008/9</td>
<td>5,956.7b</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>132m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009/10</td>
<td>8,236.7b</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>120m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010/11</td>
<td>7,536b</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>100m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011/12</td>
<td>8,000.8b</td>
<td>1,843.516b</td>
<td>100m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012/13</td>
<td>8,474.3b</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>120m (UB P869,789m)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013/14</td>
<td>9,724b</td>
<td>1,8b</td>
<td>105.825m (UB = )</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 5.1 shows that in the 2008/09 financial year, the subvention was M132m (R132m); in 2009/10 it went down to M120m; then in 2010/11 it went down to M100m, going up slightly to M120m in 2012/2013 before dropping down to M105m in 2013/14 (Mahao, 2014:9). At M106m in 2013/2014, its real value was a paltry M59 million (Sejanamane, 2014:10). In fact, the dramatic U-turn illustrated in the arrow in Table 5.1 shows that in 2013/2014, in real terms, the subvention dropped back to 2002/2003 levels notwithstanding inflationary pressures and escalating costs. Comparatively, the Table also shows that while NUL received M120 million
from the GOL in the 2012/2013 academic year, the University of Botswana (UB), an offshoot of the UBLS, then headquartered in Roma, received BWP869.978 million from its Government, about seven times more (Mahao, 2014).

Without discounting the resource constraint thesis as the local and global resource environments continue to shrink, on the basis of testimonies by different triadic actors, I wish to advance the thesis that the subvention is disguisedly used by the GOL as a weapon of coercion (coercive power) as well as counter-reaction in order to force compliance. That the subvention to NUL has been continually falling since the start of the 21st century while the budget of the MOET and operating costs were increasing sharply has invited many interpretations. These include the suspicion that the GOL, having failed over the years to impose its will on NUL, is turning its fiscal monopoly into an instrument of coercion and counter-reaction in order to ‘discipline and punish’ NUL for its alleged resistance. Asked to comment about the persistent decline in the subvention, one informant speculated that,

[t]he consistent decrease of subvention is a tool. It is not lack of money as far as I can see because the military budget has skyrocketed and any other budget has tripled…while [that of] NUL is constantly decreasing. If the university is not bowing to the demands of those in power, the only way to bring it down is to give it as little money as possible.

(WiCom6 Interview, 08/08/2014)

In reference to Government obligations to NUL, one principal chief felt that the GOL was not being fair, and that instead of assisting the University to develop, the Government was “pushing for its downfall as they prefer Limkokwing institution over the NUL” (RoCom1 Interview, 17/12/2010) (see 4.2.2). These views from the Community seem to be well supported by utterances from some Government officials, utterances that are nothing short of admitting that the subvention is being deployed as a weapon of coercion and counter-reaction. For example, an official in the Ministry of Finance indicated in an interview that the MOET prioritised other areas ahead of NUL “because there was too much resistance to restructuring” (Grep1 Interview, 01/10/2014). The Government official went further to say that because the basis of priority was scarcity of resources, a decision was made at the ministerial level to stop funding certain programmes at NUL in order to “push it to change because there was a lot of resistance” (Grep1
Interview, 01/10/2014). In remarks that further point to the use of the subvention as an instrument of coercion, another Government official admitted that one way by which they sought to bring down NUL was simply by starving it of subvention so that it “will just fall or we close it” (Grep4 Interview, 25/07/2014). When he was asked to explain why the Government wanted it that way, his response was defiant, namely

[t]hat is the best way to manage NUL. Don’t give them money because they don’t perform. They steal the money. They don’t want to account. NUL is the only place on earth where 90% of the subvention goes to salaries. We want to close it down. You just tighten the purse. That was the strategy [during the RP] because they [NUL] are living beyond their means.

(Grep4 Interview, 25/07/2014)

Even a former Minister of Education also conceded that “government priority was not in tertiary education” but in primary education and in the fight against poverty (Gmin1 Interview, 07/08/2014). Mahao (2003:2) argues that HE has not only been knocked off the pedestal of favoured projects in the allocation of scarce resources, but that it has to “endure the humiliation of vying for mere recognition in what states consider their priorities”. Yet the subtle coercion and counter-reaction through the subvention is not in the public domain. What is often presented to the public is the thesis of resource scarcity, which is difficult to argue against.

The Ernst & Young Report (2000) had long observed that NUL faced a stark choice of either embarking on a far-reaching change of direction or terminal marginalisation. In 2002, an analysis of the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats (SWOT) of the institution identified budgetary constraints and the reduction in Government subvention to NUL as posing “a real threat to the sustainability of the institution” (NUL Strategic Plan, 2002:12). Some of the above utterances may be dismissed as individual opinions, but they are clearly clothed in the language of Government, and therefore reflect Government thinking. The thinking that the GOL is indeed deploying the financial subvention as a coercive weapon seems to find confirmation in a statement released by the Minister of Education and Training in 2013. The Minister complained that the gap between what NUL was spending and the subvention income was “growing at an unacceptable rate” (GOLMOET, 19 Feb. 2013). Consequently, the Minister said there were three options available to Government to deal with the situation. These were to continue funding NUL
“while progressively reducing operating costs over time and allowing natural attrition to reduce staffing to appropriate levels”; to immediately restructure NUL; and to liquidate NUL and allow operations to resume “under a new mandate”\(^{121}\) (GOLMOET, 19 Feb. 2013). The idea of closing NUL was repeated in the VC’s Press Conference where she indicated that the current situation at NUL may demand a drastic though costly option of “closing the university, send the students away and start again” (VC Press Conference, 2013). The neoliberal thinking that tertiary education is not a priority still persists in government circles in Lesotho despite the reversal by the World Bank and the IMF in their earlier calls to disinvest in HE (Zeleza, 1997; Mamdani, 2008).

According to one university official who was part of a team of university management that met with the PM in 2011, the PM is said to have told VC Siverts, “Well, you know, you must know that we fully support you. If you want to close that university for one reason or another, don’t think that we will be opposed. We will support you” (Uadm13 Interview, 21/09/2014). Some informants were quick to link the subvention to contestations for power between the GOL and NUL. One informant observed that power takes different forms and that the university, from the Government point of view, “is a seat of knowledge and power” (Uaca7 Interview, 18/04/2014) while another further observed that,

\[
\text{[a] university sits very uncomfortably with the political class in a decolonising environment. For this simple reason, the newly engendered class that controls the political economy is a weak class, very insecure. Any apparently autonomous centre of power, even if it is just a centre of power in the sense that it generates contestable knowledge becomes a threat.}
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(Uaca4 Interview, 06/05/2014)

Mashinini (2013:4) posits that one political challenge faced by African governments was the extent to which they could continue tolerating the autonomy and freedom of HE which had increasingly been used by some as radical centres from which to challenge the power of the state and the ruling class. Tight (2003) argues that the most interesting conclusion with respect to

\(^{121}\) The statement released by the Minister of Education stated that “option 3 may be considered in future as a last resort” (GOLMOET, 19 Feb. 2013). NUL is sitting on a financial knife edge today and this last resort remains a real possibility.
funding relationships between state and university is the diversity and variability of governments’ changing strategies as they “are to be found speaking in different voices; vacillating between solutions; exerting contradictory pressures; using constructive ambiguity as a tool of policy making” (Tight, 2003:130-131). According to Ylijoki (2003:307), universities have engaged in academic capitalism as a response to the decrease in budget funding and the external push towards entrepreneurial activities. Starving NUL of the much needed financial resources seems calculated at turning the institution towards entrepreneurial activities. Thus today, financial strangulation rather than political interference seems to be the biggest threat to the survival of the public university in Africa today.

Thus, on the evidence presented here, it can be argued that while the powerless are expected to overtly resist, the powerful normally coerce, or even counter-react, sometimes covertly. Patterns in the financial subvention to NUL strongly suggest this. The Government subvention can be seen as a tactic the GOL is employing in a disguised manner to coerce the University. Yet it is not as simple as that, and for that reason, there is nuance in seeing it as a combination of both – resource constraint on one hand, and coercion and counter-reaction on the other hand. Moreover, the financial squeeze is not unique to NUL as many universities around the world are faced with shrinking budgets from the national purse. In Namibia there has been increasing parliamentary resistance to large annual increases in University funding, demanding that the University must develop new sources of funding other than government (Ping and Crowley, 1997). And in South Africa, Government budget cuts to universities prompted university VCs and managements to increase tuition fees in order to meet rising costs and to make up for their budgetary shortfalls (Pillay, 2016:156). The move ignited overt student resistance, demanding that the fees must not only fall, but that free education be introduced. The collective agency of the students finally forced the Government to announce a 0 % increase in tuition fees for 2016. The #RhodesMustFall and #FeesMustFall movements have now fed into an international movement.

122 The #FeesMustFall (FMF) movement started at the University of Witwatersrand (Wits) after a proposal to increase tuition fees by 10.5 % for 2016. Meanwhile Rhodes University announced a minimum initial payment of 50 % for 2016, meaning an upfront payment of about R45 000 for an average student in University accommodation.
calling for the decolonisation of HE in Africa and South Africa\textsuperscript{123} in particular. But because universities in Africa have tended to be actors in politics, civil society and the public sphere, their transition into market universities remains very problematic. Major public universities have often remained key sites for debate, critique and mobilisation on behalf of political change, especially but not exclusively in the direction of democratisation and the resolution of conflicts. Throughout the post-colonial era, universities have been simultaneously the best allies and the most dreaded challengers of state power.

5.4.3.3 Organisational Restructuring: Further ‘Hidden Transcripts’ of Resistance

Resistance can take the form of highly disguised or hidden transcripts, and these kinds of everyday forms of resistance make no headlines. For example, avoidance by feigning ignorance and ‘forgetting’, argues Anderson (2008:263), are forms of resistance that can be both non-confrontational and effective. Gaventa (1980), Scott (1990, 2003), and Leander (2010) have identified deception, poaching, foot-dragging, pilfering, dissimulation, flight, camouflaged resistance and mimicry, among others, as covert forms of resistance. In the Triad, there are also several moments of covert or subterranean resistance, i.e. actions by the powerless which may be beyond direct observation by power holders. Thus, whereas the powerful may subtly assert their mastery, the powerless may feign deference, buttressing the thesis that confrontations between the powerless and the powerful are laden with deception. The disguised forms of resistance I discuss here are few of the several subterranean forms of resistance-cum-coping strategies\textsuperscript{124} that are prevalent in the Triad and that are beyond the power of the powerful. Because it is sometimes difficult to actively oppose power, or to argue publicly against dominant discourses (Anderson, 2008), many academics tended to resort to guerrilla tactics in order to circumvent power. These included qualified compliance, non-cooperation, absenteeism, voting with one’s feet and syncretism.

\textsuperscript{123} See the Africa Decolonial Research Network (ADERN) based at the University of South Africa (UNISA). ADERN hosted an International Conference under the theme Decolonising the University in Africa from 17-18 August 2016.

\textsuperscript{124} Others include apathy, drunkenness, moonlighting and feigning sickness. Anonymously published opinion pieces, letters and notices were also in wide circulation in the University, some in English, others in the local Sesotho language, some containing unprintable insults mainly directed at the VC.
LUTARU, for example, in the late 1990s when its members felt that their “progressive governance processes” were being deliberately frustrated by management (Uaca7 Interview, 18/04/2014), it resorted to qualified compliance as a form of resistance, awaiting an opportune moment. One informant says he still remembers the wise advice offered by one of their own. “Don’t stress guys”, the member advised, “look at all these guys …all of them are within five years of retirement. We can outlive them. Just let them retire. Our time will come to change this thing” (Uaca7 Interview, 18/04/2014). According to this informant, those ‘wise words’ “changed the way we acted as LUTARU. We actually decided that there was no need for frustration and we [silently] complied. And indeed within five years LUTARU had influenced the institution of the Mothibe administration” (Uaca7 Interview, 18/04/2014). Anderson (2008:264) argues that where avoidance was not possible, academics often “complied with managerialist demands in minimal, pragmatic, or strategic ways” without necessarily supporting the practices they complied with. Such compliance by LUTARU seemed the best strategy in the absence of alternatives. Bhabha (1994) argues that subversive agency is a kind of cultural and psychological guerrilla warfare while Scott (1990:4) posits that the hidden transcript is “derivative in the sense that it consists of those offstage speeches, gestures, and practices that confirm, contradict, or inflect what appears in the public transcript”. During the RP, when the GOL directed that the recruitment of the new VC to replace Professor Siverts must wait until a new University law was in place, the University strategically complied while exploring possibilities to proceed with the process without openly challenging the Government (NUL REG, 21/07/2014; Uadm14 Interview, 05/08/2014).

Some triadic actors engaged in acts of subtle non-cooperation as a way of resisting the employer and this practice was widespread during the RP (Uaca26 Interview, 26/10/2014). The ‘Mickey Mouse’ thesis of NUL as an organisation with a rampant culture of ‘lawlessness’, non-performance and lackadaisical way of doing things (see 4.4.1) seems to imply a non-cooperative stance, and therefore a form of hidden resistance. When one administrator complained that one of the challenges he faced during the RP was working with “people who mostly didn’t want to

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125 It is safe to say that the current VC, Professor N. L. Mahao was recruited in an atmosphere of resistance in its qualified form.
do their work” (Uadm14 Interview, 05/08/2014), he may not have realised that this was subtle resistance. But the same administrator was quick to understand that the refusal by NUL employees to attend meetings organised by the doggy ‘boutique’ Consultant (Leduka, 2013) was part of the resistance to the RP. “I attended every consultation meeting and people just didn’t attend. And that is normal with any restructuring. We expected that people wanted to frustrate the whole system and I understand that” (Uadm14 Interview, 05/08/2014). The final report of the Consultant notes that the Faculty of Agriculture (FOA), the Faculty of Humanities (FOH) and the Faculty of Law (FOL) all failed to provide the requested details on their current and proposed structures, the number of staff in each department, and the nature of programme offerings, while the Computer Services Unit (CSU) “failed to attend to its scheduled session with the consultants, claiming in a written response that the restructuring was ‘illegal’” (Lenomo Consultants, 2013). This non-attendance was a form of resistance.

It is important to note that while I have chosen to categorise these as hidden forms of resistance, they were also discursive in nature. For instance, on 16 April 2013, the FOL wrote to the Consultant, advising it that after studying a letter written by its Dean, and addressed to the Attorney General, the PM, the Minister of Education and the Registrar of NUL, it resolved not to avail itself before the Consultant. It argued that as “a professional Faculty it cannot make any meaningful presentation of its stand without having had adequate time to consult with the judiciary and the legal profession as a whole”, further adding that it would be inappropriate and injudicious to make a presentation before the Consultant “because it considers the whole exercise illegal and not having been accorded adequate consideration as it is being done in undue haste” (FOL, 2012). The FOH followed the example of the FOL, writing to advise the Consultant that the Faculty voted unanimously to “disengage”. This was discourse taking place offstage (Scott, 1990). One informant thinks that the widespread tendency by some academics to report for meetings late, to give infrequent feedback to students and to submit examination marks late, was a form of apathetic resistance (Uaca19 Interview, 16/10/2014). Ignoring something can be seen as both a form of agency and a form of resistance.

Despite the absence of records of known convictions, from time to time, the employer complained of absenteeism from work and drunkenness at the work place. Addressing
Congregation on 28 August 2002, the then VC complained about absenteeism from work among many other ill-practices by members of staff. He suggested that students, parents, the Community and the Government were justified and had every reason to lose faith in NUL and the academic profession,

when personal business interests take priority over organizational endeavours … when excessive drunkenness and endemic absenteeism are encouraged and rewarded by default … when staff members abscond from work on full pay … when classes are routinely missed and cancelled.

(VC Address to Congregation, 2002:2)

The VC accused both academic and non-academic staff of employing guerilla tactics to subvert the authority of those in power. Evasions as guerrilla-style, defensive campaigns of attrition that require little or no coordination are forms of resistance by the ‘weak’ (Scott, 1985, 1990). In 2012, and with repeated similarity, the VC charged that absenteeism was the order of the day at NUL, claiming that some employees could go for a week or more without reporting for duty, while others practiced as lawyers, consultants and employees of other organisations while they were on full pay at NUL (VC Press Conference, 2011, 2013; NUL Challenges, 2012:5). Another top administrator observed that NUL had been “taken over by employees” who were using the organisation to take care of their fixed expenses while they were “employed elsewhere, plough[ing] their fields and not come to work because NUL will still pay them” (Uadm14 Interview, 05/08/2014). In many organisations, there is a tendency to see absenteeism as deviance, but it is also helpful to see it as a sign of subtle resistance. These seemingly covert and overt forms of resistance must have contributed a great deal to the impunity image of NUL discussed extensively in Chapter 4.

The persistent haemorrhage of highly qualified and experienced staff, especially in the academic zone, can also be seen as a form of subtle resistance because, argues one academic, when academics get frustrated, they “usually leave for greener pastures” (Uaca19 Interview, 16/10/2014). According to a VC Report (2003:6), in the 2002/2003 academic year, there were 30 resignations by academic staff citing poor salaries, while between July 2011 and August 2012 alone, at the height of the RP, close to 40 academic and non-academic staff left NUL, 26 of them doctorate degree holders, two professors and three associate professors (Sunday Express, 2013).
At the University of Zimbabwe (UZ), a large number of highly qualified and experienced academics also left the institution at the beginning of the 21st century due to poor working conditions exacerbated by a political meltdown, leaving many faculties and departments with vacancy rates hovering around 50-70% (Mushonga, 2011a:81). While this can be seen as the normal movement of people seeking better opportunities, there is nuance in seeing it as disguised resistance in order to think beyond the simple binary of cause and effect.

During the RP, striking LUTARU members appealed, through songs, to both Christianity and traditional religious beliefs and practices in ways that could be described as syncretic resistance. For example, they sang, “oe-oe ke tla itjarela sona s’fapano sa aka ka mahetla – I will carry my own cross on my shoulders” (song # 10); “moekelesiea ho baloe, ntho e ‘ngoe le e ‘ngoe e na le nako – the Ecclesia should be read, there is time for everything” (song # 14). They also sang, “ea lona khomo eso mphe matla – it is a battle; my home come cow give me power” (song # 17). This syncretism demonstrates the various ways by which people seek to overcome predicament.

Syncretic hybridity is very much the condition of many postcolonial subjects in their daily struggles for survival in the global South today. Bhabha’s (1984) focus on hybridity, mimicry and ‘third space’ and Scott’s (1990) on ‘hidden transcripts’ or ‘weapons of the weak’, is a sign that resistance can assume many subtle yet discursive forms. When resistance takes the form of highly disguised or hidden transcripts, more often than not, people are not aware of this type of agency. Comaroff (1985) and Scott (1990, 2003) submit that if we overlook such subtle, covert, undeclared, or even unknowing forms of resistance, we would be leaving out a vast area of political activity. According to Richmond (2011:423), hidden, everyday forms of resistance are illustrative of the agency that springs from them and their ultimate circulation and engagements with power. Foucault (1976) aptly argues that silence and secrecy are a shelter for power.

Finally, it is important to restate that qualified compliance, non-cooperation, absenteeism, voting with one’s feet and syncretic hybridity are equally coping strategies in as much as they are forms of resistance and subversion. There is therefore merit in seeing many hidden forms of resistance as coping strategies. Ilongo (2014) argues that during the RP, academic staff adopted a number of coping strategies namely denying-withdrawing-helplessness; group support systems; self-valorisation; and physical exercises against workplace bullying. “Through experiencing negative
emotions occasioned by workplace bullying”, argues Ilongo (2014:180), “participants become less creative, experience negative workplace relationships, use negative coping strategies of avoidance and withdrawal”. As we have already seen, these coping-cum-resistance strategies fit Scott’s (1990) categories of ‘hidden transcripts’ of resistance. Avoidance and withdrawal are both important forms of resistance as well as coping mechanisms, thus making participants agents rather than “victims [who] scream within, hardly daring to be daring [and] seeking escape more than fighting” as Ilongo (2014) suggests. Moreover, the group support systems which he identified as made up of different groups of people – colleagues, families and others for purposes of “letting off steam”, are the clearest sign of agency rather than victims “hoping against hope” (Ilongo, 2014). Thus during the protracted RP, LUTARU used many coping and survival strategies like get-together functions and motivational speakers. For example, in December 2010, a motivational speaker with a long history of trade unionism with the Lesotho Teachers Trade Union (LTTU) as well as the South African mining industry was brought in to express solidarity and to share experiences with the striking members of LUTARU (LUTARU, 2010).

Forms of resistance discussed in this Chapter are shown in Figure 5.3 which itself must be seen as the last phase in the gradual progression towards the IPCF proposed in Chapter 6 (see Figure 6.1). The inner circle in Figure 5.3 shows that agency and resistance take complex and overlapping strategies such as overt (strike action, ‘work to rule’, picketing), covert (foot-dragging, deception, coercion) and discursive (satirical cartooning, disagreements over organisational restructuring), among other complex forms of resistance. While the outer circle speaks to the NUL context, some of the specific forms of resistance indicated here, such as class boycott, vandalism of property, ‘no work no pay’ edict, jeering songs, coercion and co-option have universal application. The arrows in Figure 5.3 are meant to emphasise the fact that power and resistance flow in both directions as well as to show the overlaps in power and resistance, rather than emphasising specific forms of resistance. Again, the splitting of triadic actors in the University into university management, university staff and university students serves to show that actors are not a homogenous or monolithic entity with similar needs or demands. In this Figure, representations and ‘othering’ are shown to be in the background.
Figure 5.3: Triadic Entanglements: The Circuit of Agency and Resistance

- Overt (strike action, work to rule, picketing)
- Covert (foot-dragging, deception, coercion, feigning ignorance)
- Discursive (satirical cartooning, disagreements over organisational restructuring)
5.5 EVALUATION

The agency and resistance that I grappled with in this chapter constitute part of ongoing efforts of the recovery of subaltern subject positions globally. The chapter privileged subaltern agency and resistance in the face of repression, domination and coercion by those in power. I have therefore demonstrated that in the ceaseless triadic power entanglements in which the meaning of anything is produced, reproduced, negotiated and resisted all at once, triadic ‘subalterns’ are not just passive victims, but also creators of their own destiny. Throughout this chapter, I have showed that power and resistance, by residing in the same spaces, have a reciprocal relationship. Every form or situation of resistance presented in this chapter helped to add to the thesis that where there is power, there is resistance because power is always met with resistance. It is often forgotten that those resisting are in intimate, long-term contact with power sources, and that they have spent their lives observing, analysing and testing that power.

The categorisation of resistance into overt, discursive and subterranean resistance proved useful in capturing the complexity and nuances of triadic relations of power because power and politics are endemic in organisations. Moreover, on the strength of the forms of resistance presented here, it is plausible to conclude that in the face of power, they are also coping strategies or mechanisms inasmuch as they are forms of resistance. I also showed that resistance and consent are rarely polarised extremes because resistance frequently contains elements of consent and consent often incorporates aspects of resistance. On the basis of these swings from resistance to compliance, I submit that a new strategy is needed in order to take the university into the future.

Thus, on the basis of the evidence presented here, it is plausible to theorise that what has often been presented as ‘instability’ or ‘ungovernability’ at NUL is what postcolonial theorists call resistance, whether subtle or non-subtle, discursive or non-discursive. As demonstrated, none of the resistance presented here was anywhere near being violent oppositional resistance of political intent. Therefore the spaces of agency and the forms of resistance available to different triadic actors in HE, whether local or international, individual or group-based, should not be read as necessarily oppositional, but rather as situations of mutual constitution and hybridisation. I thus conclude that contrary to popular opinion, resistance is not entirely a negative force or something
that is bad, but something that can contribute to the evolution and development of a shared vision for the good of the university in Africa today. The search for a sustainable future cannot be possible without agency and resistance because productive sites of resistance offer great possibilities for change. Where resistance is against change, it can help authorities to gauge the intensity of employee emotions on a particular issue and thus re-examine their proposals. Thus for both employer and employee, resistance is an important way of talking and thinking about change. Therefore if the university is to be successful in implementing reforms, whether of a structural governance or transformational nature, then it is necessary to understand and handle conflicting positions. Resistance or protest is an integral part of social change, development, progression, growth and of democracy in which both the powerful and the less powerful must be made to feel uncomfortable in order to force them to reflect, question and listen to each other.

Finally, it is important to note that the forms of resistance, coercion and acquiescence and the counter-strategies presented here are nowhere near being a full account of the forms of agency and contestations among triadic actors. There are several forms and strategies of resistance as well as coping mechanisms that were not discussed. This is because my study is an in-depth investigation that only allowed me to focus on select issues pertaining to the core propositions which I bring together in Chapter 6 below.
CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION

6.1 GENERAL ORIENTATION

This concluding chapter is organised around three main sections namely assessment of findings of the study (6.2); limitations of the study and recommendations for further research (6.3); and concluding remarks (6.4). The propositions I make in these sections add up to the overall thesis that the Triad is replete with contestations and contradictions of normative and ideological persuasions with dire consequences for the present and future of the University in Africa today on one hand, and prospects on the other hand. These contestations and contradictions have been analysed using tools from PC namely representation, hybridity, agency and resistance. A critical assessment of the findings does attest that the major objectives have been met and that the triangulated approach adopted for this study makes the conclusions reached trustworthy. Consequently, I show, first, that an unpacking of the complex triadic relations was only possible through a critical appraisal and application of PC, thus empirically validating the theoretical framework (6.2.1); second, that a new interpretive framework such as the proposed IPCF is needed in order to add nuance to our understanding of contemporary African politics and society (6.2.2); third, that in view of the limitations of the study, there is need for not only a new IPCF, but also for further research (6.2.2 and 6.3); and fourth, that there is need for a constructive reading of PC, including the proposed IPCF, while at the same time carefully balancing both the enthusiasm for, and, antagonism towards PC (6.4).

6.2 ASSESSMENT OF FINDINGS OF THE STUDY

I this section I show how a critical reading of PC facilitated its empirical validation (6.2.1), thus leading to the development of the new interpretive framework – the Integrated Postcolonial Framework (IPCF) (6.2.2). But in order to be able to make a critical assessment of the findings, it is important to restate the objectives of the study. These are, as stated in Chapter 1, section 1.5, first, to make a case for applying PC to the study of Africa and African Studies; second, to develop an integrated postcolonial theoretical framework that can inform future studies; third, to trace, examine and show that as products of their history, university spaces are political
battlegrounds; fourth, to bring to the fore and to examine the discourses of representation and ‘othering’ involving triadic actors; and fifth, to analyse the various forms of agency and resistance that both the ‘powerful’ and the ‘powerless’ resort to in the face of power. It is also important to restate that power assumes many forms namely ‘power over’, ‘power to’, ‘power with’ and ‘power within’. These forms of power, in their visible, hidden and invisible nature operate in spaces that can be described as ‘closed’, ‘invited’ or ‘claimed’ at the household, local, national and global level (see 2.2 and 2.6.2).

6.2.1 A Critical Appraisal and Empirical Validation of Postcolonial Theory

This section unpacks the issues examined in all the Chapters. I offer a critical appraisal of the key pillars of PC used in this study in section 6.2.1.1; empirical validation of representation in section 6.2.1.2; and empirical validation of agency and resistance in section 6.2.1.3. Because hybridity straddles all elements of PC, its empirical validation is implied in section 6.2.1.2 and section 6.2.1.3.

6.2.1.1 A Critical Appraisal of the Key Pillars of PC

Chapter 2 provided an important starting point to PC theorisation and its utility in the study of the global South. In so doing, the Chapter addressed objectives one and two (see 1.5) as well as question one of this study (see 1.4). For this study, I identified four key pillars of PC namely representation, hybridity, agency and resistance with decoloniality as the variant (see Figure 2.1). The Chapter showed that while PC has its origins in the anti-colonial struggles of the 1950s and 1960s, PC remains valuable to contemporary analyses/studies of the global South. This is because PC is a critical theoretical stance not only against hegemonic and exploitative practices, but also against universalising discourses. This critical stance makes it an ally rather than a competitor of decoloniality whose thrust is the decolonisation of the category ‘universal’ in order afford more visibility to other forms of the ‘universal’. A further key definition of PC that stands out in this study is the fact that it is a discussion about the experience and overlapping identities of all kinds (hybridity). It is for this reason that the study tied hybridity to all the pillars of PC, thus embedding it in all the Chapters in this study. This study has demonstrated that the Triad is
replete with numerous overlapping experiences and identities, with Chapter 3 showing the complexity of these, at least within a specific historical context. I have demonstrated how specific historical epochs have tended to shape and define the nature of relations between the GOL, the Community (global and local) and the NUL. Thus while the past continues to be pervasive on the present, the contemporary local, national and global political and socio-economic environment remains central in the production of diverse and complex relations of power. The tinkering with the University law provides a good case in point. By showing that what goes on at NUL largely mirrors the national experience, the definition of PC as a discussion about the experience and overlapping identities of all kinds is vindicated. For example, between 1970 and 1992, triadic relations were negotiated in the context of dictatorial and military rule in which those in power were determined to impose their will on NUL on one hand, while the NUL community (staff and students) used whatever agency was at their disposal to resist and negotiate their own space in the new environment on the other hand. Then in the post-1993 period, different democratically elected Governments sought, time and again, to put NUL under the control of Government. For instance, the 8th attempted amendment to the NUL law remains the most far-reaching attempt by the GOL to take away power from the many spaces in which it resides within the University. Chapter 3 and the entire study have demonstrated that interactions at any level are productive of layered identities, thus showing that human beings are far more layered and far more complex than we see.

6.2.1.2 Empirical Validation of Representation

In this study I demonstrated that the discourses and practices of representation and ‘othering’, hybridity, agency and resistance were expressive of relations and technologies of power that have deep historical roots as outlined in Chapter 3. Chapter 4 sought to specifically address question number two (see 1.4) and the fourth objective of this study (see 1.5), and by so doing, to empirically validate PC. Discourses of hybridity and representation were manifested in the binary modalities of ‘Self’ and ‘Other’ via the notions of identity, belonging, religion, space and practices (see Figure 4.1). Multiple and differential relations of power were manifested through various overt and covert forms of agency and resistance (Chapter 5), thus demonstrating the overlapping and complex nature of identities. Thus, through the Triad of the GOL, the
Community (local and global), and the NUL, Chapter 4 has showed how PC tools of representation and ‘othering’ manifest in practice. The rampant ‘othering’, framed around the ‘Self’ and ‘Other’, has enabled the building towards the IPCF (see Figure 6.1). This way, the study was able to add to the limited literature on the construction of the ‘Self’ and ‘Other’ in institutions of higher learning as well as to show that negative representations and ‘othering’ are alive and well in HE institutions. Theoretically, Chapter 4 has demonstrated, just like Chapters 3 and 5, that no actor has an independent existence, and that, instead, discourses of representation and ‘othering’ are only possible because of the constitutive nature of relations of power. The centrality of discourse (language) in the business of representation and ‘othering’ has equally been demonstrated. Claims to knowledge and power, both of which are joined in a discourse, have made such representations and ‘othering’ possible. A major finding of this chapter is that triadic relations of power are characterised by two basic sets of discourses. The first comprises of essentialist notions of identity based on inherent differences between the ‘Self’ and the ‘Other’ (see inner circle of Figure 4.1), and the second of negative stereotypical images (see outer circle of Figure 4.1) based on acquired behaviours as illustrated in Figure 4.1. The essentialist social constructions are built around the ‘Insider’/‘Outsider’, ‘Self’/‘Other’, ‘Us’/‘Them’ dichotomy using categories of race, ethnicity, politics, history, religion and culture, among others. The negative stereotypical images of the ‘Other’, in particular of NUL, are built around the notions and perceptions of laissez-fairism/impunity, ‘in-breeding’ and ‘fixity’, and the media ‘gaze’. Rather than the largely unidirectional European colonial ‘gaze’, in the postcolony, the act of gazing and being gazed at, as demonstrated in Chapter 4, is an omnidirectional activity with serious consequences for relations of power. This analysis shows that while “imperial binaries suggest a unilinear movement of domination from coloniser to colonised, post-colonialism opens up the possibility of movements in both directions”, thus disrupting imperial binaries (Ahluwalia, 2001:92). The analysis also shows that without deploying power, knowledge and discourse, an understanding of triadic interactions will forever be elusive.

In Chapter 4, both essentialist social constructions and negative stereotypical images functioned well through predication, referential and argumentation strategies (see 4.2). But as demonstrated in Chapter 5, the essentialising and reductive simplification of ‘Self’ and ‘Other’ tended to mask complex relations of power, thus negating hybridity, agency and resistance (see Figure 5.3). It is
important to state that while these representations may not be uncommon in many organisations, I did not expect to find them to be so deeply entrenched in a university set-up such as NUL. On the basis of this finding, it is plausible to conclude that there is no organisation that is immune to discourses of representation and ‘othering’. This finding and others do not only reinforce the utility of PC in the study of politics and society in the global South, but it also points to the need for its further strengthening and consolidation, hence the proposed IPCF in section 6.2.2. These findings in Chapter 4 therefore serve an empirical purpose. By showing that representations are a result of unequal imaginative distinctions between the power holders and the ‘powerless’, they validate the usefulness of PC.

6.2.1.3 Empirical Validation of Agency and Resistance

In Chapter 5, the purpose of which was to establish the nature of contestations, ideological or otherwise, taking place in the Triad (see question three and four in section 1.4) and which objective was to analyse forms of resistance within the Triad (see the fifth objective in section 1.5), the major findings are that agency and resistance took various forms that ranged from overt resistance, discursive and counter-discursive resistance to covert/subterranean resistance with complex overlaps across all categories (see Figures 5.3 and 6.1). By their nature and by being violence-free, these forms of resistance were instrumental in strengthening the thesis that resistance is not always an oppositional act of political intention, but rather an outcome of differential power relations. By demonstrating both their capacity to govern and to resist, triadic actors buttressed Foucault’s (1984) thesis that where there is power, there is resistance because power is always met with resistance. This is an important finding for this study which further strengthened the thesis that by residing in the same spaces, power and resistance have a reciprocal relationship. Another important finding is that an analysis of relations of power in the Triad through the agency-resistance nexus led to the plausible conclusion that the binary division between agents and victims is fundamentally flawed as the subalterns of the Triad showed great capacity to subvert the powerful. Thus, instead of seeing triadic actors in terms of victims and agents, there is nuance in seeing them as both victims and agents. Ahluwalia (2001) posits that as postcolonial identities, we are all “citizen/subjects”. Ascribing agency to the subalterns of the Triad allows PC to insist that the marginalised have the capacity to speak, act and resist. This
way, it is shown that PC is concerned not only with foregrounding subaltern agency in the face of power, but also with subverting and transforming hegemonic and exploitative practices. A further important finding is that resistance in the Triad was not just for its own sake, but a way of coping with the effects power. For this reason, it has been argued that most forms of resistance should be seen as coping mechanisms, thus making such forms complex multiple overlapping strategies that proved difficult to analyse. Furthermore, resistance was seen to be an integral part of social change that can offer great possibilities for the future of the university in Africa today. The study therefore cautions against seeing resistance as a bad thing or as an anti-change gesture. Moreover, the limit to which academics can speak truth to power was exposed by the fact that having failed to openly resist power, academics resorted to guerrilla tactics such as qualified compliance, non-cooperation and absenteeism, including being co-opted into the echelons of power in order to resist from within. Thus Chapter 5 has showed that tertiary education policies in Lesotho in particular and Africa in general, are located at a position of tension where agency and resistance, actualised by power, knowledge and discourse, always play out. The sharp discursive disagreements over the restructuring of NUL, for example, point to the need for alternative ways of re-organising and restructuring the institution. I thus recommend that rather than being caught in an edgy game of compliance and resistance, triadic actors must present themselves as partners in a collaborative process. Finding common ground could go a long way in building a solid foundation for a world class university.

Empirically, the study has showed that the idea of a one-way relationship of domination is not tenable as each actor has multiple opportunities for both the exercise of power and resistance to it. By unpacking contestations which are generally hidden from the public view using the tools of representation, hybridity, agency and resistance, the study has given PC more empirical validation and therefore more contemporary relevance. It is therefore contended that PC is the most appropriate and influential framework for understanding the global South by dint of its rejection of the supposedly universalising categories of the Enlightenment. The recognition of the relationship between power and knowledge/discourse, and political institutions and practices is of enormous importance to understanding contemporary African politics and society, and nowhere is this better conceived than through the lens of PC. The case study has showed that mere sensational and fanciful dismissal of PC on the basis of its ‘Western’ identity serves no
purpose. By employing PC in this study, I showed how Africa and African Studies can shed their distrust of postcoloniality.

6.2.2 Towards an Integrated Postcolonial Framework for the Study of African Higher Education Institutions

In Chapter 2, I proposed that an Integrated Postcolonial Framework should evolve from a combination of key aspects of PC and its decoloniality variant. Figure 6.1 is a culmination of complex triadic interactions and technologies of power. These have been made possible via an integration of the discourses of representation, hybridity, agency, resistance, as well as decoloniality. These complex discourses seem to attest to a profound socio-economic and political reconfiguration underway across the continent today and recent developments in the universities in South Africa are a case in point. These seem to call for new entry points into empirical studies of societies in Africa today vis-à-vis the prevailing theoretical frameworks. Ideas drawn from PC make important interventions in the study of government-community-university relations in Africa today. Woven together with ‘epistemic disobedience’ as propounded by decoloniality the proposed IPCF is meant to give a more nuanced analysis of relations of power and technologies of government within the Triad. It is this integrated body of ideas that I propose should be seen as a new IPCF.

While the IPCF can be applied to any relations of power in the study of African politics and society, the global South, whether colonial or post-colonial, it is particularly suitable to analyse relations of power in the Triad. This is because I align with scholars who argue that PC seeks to capture continuities and complexities of any historical period. In the case study, Chapter 3 has demonstrated the pervasive influence of the denominational and colonial origins of NUL on the present, i.e. historical continuity and change. It has set the stage for our understanding of representations of otherness (Chapter 4) and the different forms of agency and resistance (Chapter 5). This has served to demonstrate that while PC looks back at colonialism, it also looks beyond the colonial, thus transcending space and time. Yet I am equally averse to theories with an imperial pretension to universalism, be they from the global North or global South. It is precisely for this reason that I call for a new definitional framework that transcends geography and time in order to ameliorate the limitations posed by any single narrative. After all, problems
faced by PC are common to all major theoretical approaches, thus individually, all theoretical approaches are flawed. It is for this reason that I advocate for an integrated framework that combines the strengths of postcolonial theory and decoloniality theory in order to mitigate weaknesses that may be apparent in any one approach. I argue that there is no utility gained in over- emphasising the weaknesses in PC and that instead, focus must shift from this negative approach to a more accommodative approach. I maintain that an Integrated Postcolonial Framework, my contribution to theory formulation in this study, is the most suitable approach for studying contemporary African politics and society of which the Triad is an important institutional space.

The outer circles in the proposed IPCF (Figure 6.1) show triadic interactions at the local/community, national and global levels, while the inner circle captures the particular in respect of the University. The concentric circles also show that relations are more hybridised, complex and interconnected, punctuated by the existence of ‘power to’, ‘power with’ and ‘power within’ rather than ‘power over’. These complex interactions are actualised by power, knowledge, being and discourse. In each major sphere, power is multiple and differential with both state and non-state actors, whether at the local, national or global level, co-determining each other’s emergence. However, in real life, these interactions are more complex and multidimensional than depicted in Figure 6.1. Discourses of hybridity straddling across all chapters, representation and ‘othering’ analysed in Chapter 4, and agency and resistance discussed in Chapter 5 all testify to the ubiquity of power among triadic as well as international actors. The concentric circles in Figure 6.1 further serve to show that there is a reciprocal relationship flowing in all directions among local, national and global actors. The arrows in the inner circle and the overlapping oval circles (University) serve to capture the historical (colonial and post-colonial) continuity and change (circle number 1), binary representations (circle number 2), entangled resistances and counter-resistances (circle number 3), hybrid identities and practices (circle number 4) and the emergence of ‘victagents’ (circle number 5). They also serve to demonstrate the complex overlaps in PC discourses. This shows that power does not operate in a simple vertical way, but rather dynamically and intermittently. Tendencies towards ‘power over’ are always put in check by ‘power to’, or ‘power with’ or ‘power within’ or a combination of these forces. Thus there are multiple layers of power in a global world – the household (micro
level), the local, the national and the global (macro level) (see Figure 6.1). This is because in the modern era, power is no longer centred in one place or system and those upon whom it is directed are not passive to its effects (Foucault, 1980c). As such, there are binary representations of ‘self’/‘other’, ‘insider’/‘outsider’, ‘us’/‘them’ and ‘we’/‘they’ which tend to lead to entangled overt, covert and discursive resistances and counter-resistances. The result is a complex network of hybrid identities and practices (‘in-betweenness’, liminality and the ‘here and now’) that denote agents as victims and victims as agents, whether state or non-state actors, and whether at the local/community, national or global level. There is therefore nuance in seeing both triadic actors as both victims and agents hence the idea of ‘victagents’ as captured in Figure 6.1.
Figure 6.1: The Integrated Postcolonial Framework (IPCF) for Understanding Power Contestations in the Triad

The seemingly vanishing roles and expectations of the University in Africa today have tended to define the nature of relations between the university, the community and the government. A
close analysis and re-reading of Figure 4.1 and Figure 6.1 will show that when government and community provide material and financial support to the university, they expect the university to live up to its triple mandate of teaching, research and community engagement, including relevance and social responsibility. The thinking by some in government and the local and wider national community, that the University is not organically linked with the society it is supposed to serve, tends to lead to the notion of the obstinate ‘Other’. In the case study, the shifting perceptions regarding the purpose of a university in Africa today have tended to generate negative stereotypes such as laissez-faire/impunity, ‘Mickey Mouse’ organisation, ‘in-breeding’, fixity’ anti-change, ‘Glorified High School’, sex for grades institution, including being seen as both a seat of the opposition and a hiding place for enemies of government. On the other hand, when government resorts to, or seems to use disguised tactics (coercion) such as financial squeeze to enforce compliance, those in the University, and some in the community, will not only interpret such actions as discipline and punishment, or as deliberate moves to impose itself on the university (political control and power), but they will also resist in overt and covert ways\(^\text{126}\) (see Figure 5.3). Thus the desire for greater political control of the University by government on one hand, and the desire for greater autonomy and the need to appeal to critical reason by the University have proven to be two divergent paths with the consequence of setting the two on a colloidal path. In Figure 6.1, the concentric circles (local, national, global) not only indicate the levels, spaces and forms of power, but also show a constitutive and reciprocal relationship among all actors in respect of the University. Coercion by government may indicate dissatisfaction with the University. This coercion may in turn produce discourses of ‘othering’ and resistance. In short, there are complex overlaps between representations, ‘othering’, hybridity, resistance and decolonial movements taking place at micro and macro levels.

The Triad, through the Lesotho context, has demonstrated the complexity of both interactive and divergent relations of power. Figure 6.1 shows that the levels of power – global, national and local constantly interact with one another to produce more complex forms of power and contestations. For this reason, I reject the victim/agent binary emphasised in other studies and propose seeing triadic players as both victims and agents. Yet these intricately interwoven,

\(^{126}\) In the Republic of South Africa, for example, cuts in government funding to universities on one hand, and increases in tuition fees by universities on the other hand, have led to the demand for not only free education, but also a decolonised curriculum (Pillay, 2016).
complex and overlapping interactions are difficult not only to analyse, but also to replicate diagrammatically. The proposed IPCF is offered as an interpretive framework for any forms of interactions involving members of the same group (intra-) or between different groups (inter-). While the IPCF depicted in Figure 6.1 is tailored to suit the contextual realities of triadic actors (historical continuity and change) of the Government of Lesotho, the Community (local and global), and the National University of Lesotho (see Chapter 3), because it draws from several fields and disciplinary perspectives, I propose that it can, and must be seen as a framework for Africa/African Studies in particular and the global South in general. This is because, as Figure 6.1 shows, in order for it to be a truly counterhegemonic stance against universality, PC needs to be complemented by decoloniality theory with its emphasis on epistemic violence. It (PC), also has to be complemented by decoloniality theory in order to fully understand the complex and rhizomic relationships of power, knowledge, being and discourse at the household, local, national and global levels without which one cannot possibly understand discourses of representations (‘othering), hybridity (identity, religion, space and practices) and resistance (overt/discursive, covert/discursive). While PC may be a sufficient approach to subvert power, in the 21st century, it is an insufficient approach to decolonise it. There is therefore need for a theory that can offer us a full understanding of the operations of rhizomic power at various levels and in complex spaces and complex forms. PC therefore needs to be fully complemented by decoloniality theory because power, knowledge, being and discourse need to be both subverted and decolonised. For example, PC cannot adequately problematise decolonial movements such as the #Fees Must Fall student movement in South Africa whose tipping point came with the throwing of faeces on 9 March 2015 on the statue of Cecil John Rhodes by Chumani Maxwele, a student from University of Cape Town (UCT) (Pillay, 2016:155). The FMF movement left many university campuses in South Africa paralysed for much of the 2016 academic year. The Africa Decolonial Research Network (ADERN) scholars, from whom the FMF movement seems to be getting its inspiration, by calling for the decolonisation of the HE environment in South Africa and across the continent, are clearly calling for ‘epistemic disobedience’ against the epistemic violence of “oppressive curricula, teaching practices, research methods, examination techniques [and] student selection processes” in South African universities (Pillay, 2016:159). Decolonising knowledge and systems of knowing in universities by embedding indigenous perspectives requires the recognition of colonial hegemony and forms of domination within academic
institutions on the continent. The proposed IPCF does exactly that, by combining strategies from PC and decoloniality theory as they are both actualised by power, knowledge, being and discourse (see Figure 6.1). Seen in this way, the IPCF has wider application for other studies, albeit with minor modifications.

6.3 LIMITATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH

I have demonstrated in this study some of the theoretical limitations of PC, namely its elasticity and eclecticism; preoccupation with discourse; and aversiveness to totality as well as reluctance to subvert modernity, among others (see 2.7). Some of these theoretical limitations find empirical validation in this study. While the whole notion of fluidity, complexity and overlapping identities is a novel theoretical concept, to analyse it in real life and through the case study was very challenging. For example, the PC lens was unable to adequately deal with the denominational parochialism so immanent in the Triad and to explain the muted persistence of this religious binarism despite denials in the public domain. It was thus difficult to use PC to explain why, for example, religion, and not politics, has for a long time been a highly pervasive factor in the interplay between triadic actors. Another limitation is that it was difficult to use PC to study, for example, numerous disguised forms of power and resistance that permeate the Triad. As a result, what is presented here is far from what happens in the day-to-day contestations of power and in real everyday life. It is also important to state that one other limitation of this study could be my closeness to the topic. While I remained sensitive to the principle of reflexivity in order to minimise the possibility of biased conclusions (see 1.7.1.1), this proximity may have, on one hand and unintentionally of course, introduced some biased analyses and conclusions which other readers other than the author may detect. On the other hand, I may have introduced further biases in this study as a result of being an expatriate scholar and therefore lacking in both proximity and understanding of certain cultural practices of the people of the Kingdom of Lesotho. These limitations among others could have contributed to possible shortcomings in the theoretical framework propounded here.

A further set of limitations has to do with both the scope of the study. Because of the need to achieve an in-depth analysis of what happens in the contest of power, how it happens and why, it
was therefore not possible to investigate every key issue in the Triad. Moreover, some of the issues proved to be beyond the scope of PC tools used in this study. Therefore at this point I can only make some recommendations for further research. First, the long drawn out political and ideological contest between the GOL and NUL over the establishment, administration and management of the Lesotho School of Medicine (LSoM) requires further problematisation. The idea of establishing a Medical School goes as far back as 1974/1978, but sharp differences between the key triadic actors have prevented such a project from taking off. There is a need to understand why the GOL has been vacillating between giving NUL full responsibility to run the school on one hand, and preferring to give the Ministry of Health full charge, on the other hand. For example, in 2014, the GOL established the Medical School, which started operations at the National Health Training College (NHTC) in Maseru under the Ministry of Health. However, the LSoM collapsed in 2015 after the Council on Higher Education (CHE) Lesotho refused to accredit the institution “because it did not have the capacity to train doctors” (Kabi, 2016). Thus since the 1970s, several discussions and attempts to establish and to make the LSoM part of NUL have collapsed. For example, during the TP, NUL made efforts to establish not only the Faculty of Health in Maseru, but also the Faculty of Agriculture, but these two “were expelled by government without any reasons being given” (Uadm3 Interview, 24/07/2014). Therefore, further investigation into this issue would significantly enhance our understanding into the seemingly divergent political and discursive positions regarding the Medical School. While NUL has consistently argued that “the government is not the appropriate place to run a Medical School” (Uadm13 Interview, 21/09/2014), it has never been clear why the impression was created that the GOL can run it without the active participation of NUL.

Second, the academic leadership and the administrative function of NUL have not been fully examined in this study. Further research in this area is needed in order to shed light on the changing nature of university leadership and governance structures in institutions of higher learning in the 21st century. Traditionally, universities were often loosely coupled entities with little emphasis on strong formal leadership. But today neoliberalism and NPM are fast eliminating shared governance in universities around the continent and the world. Third, student activism and academic political participation requires further research (see brief discussion in section 3.5.2.1). This is because NUL has, particularly in the 1970s and 1980s, been home to
several student-led and staff-led movements, which did not only influence national politics, but also fed into the political liberation struggles for Southern Africa\textsuperscript{127}. Fourth, further research is recommended on trade unionism and academic unionisation. While I have touched on trade unionism and academic unionisation in several sections of this study (e.g. section 3.5.2.2, section 3.6.1), a holistic and exhaustive investigation is required. NUL has been home to vibrant academic and non-academic associations and trade Unions – NULASA, LUTARU and NAWU. These three have had a profound impact on NUL, including dictating the general direction of the University. A thorough study of these can enhance our understanding of the changing nature of employer-employee relationships in institutions of higher learning in a fast neoliberalising era. Fifth, and lastly, challenges and opportunities posed by proximity to South African universities can be informative about the future of HE in Lesotho. The structural and epistemic revolutions occasioned by the FMF movement in South African universities are certain to have an impact on the HE landscape in Lesotho.

6.4 CONCLUDING REMARKS

For a long time, postcolonial theory occupied a peripheral position in analyses of contemporary African politics and society. It is only in the last decade that it began to be a major critical discourse in the humanities (Abrahamsen, 2003; Scott, 2002). In this study of relations in the Triad of GCUA today, I showed how PC can, first, be harnessed, and second, offer valuable insights in analyses of relations of power. PC has enabled analyses of fluid, complex and overlapping forms of power immanent in the Triad. I have therefore attempted to harness the theoretical constructs of representation, hybridity, agency and resistance in a creative and useful manner to analyse relations of power in the Triad of Government, Community and the University in Africa today through the case study of the NUL to show what happens in the process of contestations, how it happens and why. Theoretically and empirically, the study has showed that PC perspectives can be productively harnessed to problematise relations of power. In particular, the pillars of representation, hybridity, agency and resistance, together with decoloniality theory can be deployed to give nuance to relations of power between state and non-state actors, and

\textsuperscript{127} These included CASSAS, Lumumba Society, Lesotho Union of Students Association (LUSA), NULASA, SDF and SLF. CASSAS and Lumumba Society were known to actively support liberation struggles in Namibia, South Africa and Zimbabwe.
between actors within the same organisation. The study demonstrated the need for a further consolidated theoretical framework that incorporates the contextual realities of NUL and its triadic partners. It also demonstrated the need for a framework that can tackle more universal and contemporary challenges bedeviling the HE landscape and situations of complex power relations, as illustrated in the recent FMF movement in South Africa, hence the call for an Integrated Postcolonial Framework. The IPCF makes an important contribution to, first and foremost, a theory of Africa/African Studies that cuts across History, Anthropology, Political Science/International Relations, Higher Education Studies and Postcolonial Studies.
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Gmin2 (Former Minister of Education). Interviewed on 31 March 2011, Roma.
Grep1 (Government Representative to the University). Interviewed on 1 October 2014, Maseru.
Grep3 (Government Representative to the University). Interviewed on 6 August 2014, Maseru.
Grep4 (Government Representative to the University). Interviewed on 25 July 2014, Maseru.
RoCom1 (Roma Community). Interviewed on 17 December 2010, Roma.
RoCom3 (Roma village chief). Interviewed on 17 December 2010, Roma.
RoCom6 (Roma Community). Interviewed on 22 December 2010, Roma.
RoCom7 (Roma Community). Interviewed on 17 December 2010, Roma.
RoCom12 (NUL non-academic member of staff who is also a villager of the Roma community). Interviewed on 23 October 2010, Roma.
RoCom14 (Former NUL non-academic staff employee). Interviewed on 23 December 2010, Roma.
SRC1 (Former SRC President). Interviewed on 24 July 2014, Roma: NUL.
Uaca4 (NUL academic and former PVC). Interviewed on 6 May 2014, Roma.
Uaca5 (NUL academic and a priest of the Catholic Church). Interviewed on 8 August 2014, Maseru.
Uaca6 (NUL academic and a priest of the Roman Catholic Church). Interviewed on 29 December 2010, Roma.
Uaca10 (NUL Dean of a Faculty). Interviewed on 14 October 2009, Roma.


Uaca12 (NUL academic and former PVC). Interviewed on 6 May 2014, Roma.

Uaca17 (NUL academic staff). Interviewed on 16 October 2014, Roma.

Uaca18 (NUL academic staff). Interview on 18 October 2014, Roma.

Uaca19 (NUL academic staff). Interviewed on 19 October 2014, Roma.

Uaca24 (NUL academic staff). Interviewed on 18 October 2014, Roma.

Uaca27 (NUL academic staff). Interviewed on 20 October 2014, Roma.

Uaca28 (NUL academic staff). Interviewed on 20 October 2014, Roma.

Uaca30 (NUL academic staff). Interviewed on 20 October 2014, Roma.

Uadm2 (Former Acting VC and former Minister of Education). Interviewed on 8 March 2011, Maseru.

Uadm3 (Former top NUL administrator). Interviewed on 24 July 2014, Roma.

Uadm5 (Former VC). Interviewed on 11, 18, 25 January and 8 February 2011, Maseru.

Uadm6 (Former Chairman of Council). Interviewed on 6 August 2014, Maseru.

Uadm8 (Former VC). Interviewed on 13 October 2009, Roma: NUL.

Uadm11 (NUL Acting PVC). Interviewed on 7 May 2014, Roma.

Uadm13 (Former Acting VC and acting PVC). Interviewed on 21 September 2014, Maseru.


Uadm15 (Former VC). Interviewed on 1 November 2014 (Electronically).

Uadm16 (Former Registrar). Interviewed on 3 August 2014, Roma.

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WiCom6 (Wider Community). Interviewed on 8 August 2014, Roma.

WiCom7 (Wider Community). Interviewed on 29 December 2010, Roma.
APPENDICES

Appendix A: Research Clearance Letter

THE NATIONAL UNIVERSITY OF LESOTHO

OFFICE OF THE VICE-CHANCELLOR

VC/ADM 1.48
NLM/nmm

4th April, 2017

Mr. Munyaradzi Mushonga
National University of Lesotho
Faculty of Humanities
Roma

Dear Mr. Mushonga,

RE: PERMISSION TO CONDUCT AN ACADEMIC STUDY ABOUT THE NATIONAL UNIVERSITY OF LESOTHO (NUL)

Sometime in the 2009/2010 academic year, Mr. Munyaradzi Mushonga requested University authorities to grant him permission to conduct an academic study whose main thrust was the National University of Lesotho (NUL). We were made to understand that the study, leading to a PhD, would focus on relations of power between the Government of Lesotho (GOL) the Community and NUL itself. We gladly granted that permission in the 2010/2011 academic year.

The permission was granted on condition that:

(a) The researcher would observe good ethical practices; and
(b) That a copy of the study would be deposited with the University Library

Yours sincerely,

Professor Nqosa L. Mahao
Vice-Chancellor
Appendix B: Interview Guide/Questions

Appendix B1: Interview Guide for Government and Ex-government Officials

1. Why did the GOL nationalise the Roma campus of UBLS in 1975?

2. Some people argue that the GOL must stand blamed for ‘overdemocratising’ NUL in 1976 through National University Act (No. 10) of 1976. If indeed NUL was ‘overdemocratised’ in 1976, why has it taken so long to revisit the law?

3. The University at Roma used to be a household name and ‘the light in the night’. When and where did things go wrong?

4. Why was NUL turned into a political battleground between 1981 and 1986?

5. Share with me the way the GOL understands its role at NUL.

6. What does the GOL expect from NUL?

7. In government circles, it has been said many times that NUL is an institution gripped with a ‘systemic inertia’ and ‘anti-change’ or ‘status quo culture’ and mentality. Why is there such a view/perception?

8. ‘Crisis’? What crisis does the GOL see at NUL?

9. Why did the GOL dismantle the internally-driven process of change (Transformation) at NUL in 2004?

10. Why did the government-initiated Restructuring Process of 2011-2014 fail?

11. Why is the GOL fond of dictating the choice of Vice Chancellors at NUL?

12. Over the years, government subvention to NUL has been steadily falling? Why?

13. In the view of government, should (a) academics and (b) administrators unionise and why?

14. Why does the GOL think that it is necessary to amend the law governing NUL?

15. There is a tendency to portray NUL negatively in the media? Why?

16. How have religious differences between Catholics and Protestants, both in the past and present, affected NUL?

17. What exactly is the bone of contention between the GOL and the NUL in the establishment of a Medical School in the country?

18. Why do national political parties jostle to influence and control the student body at NUL?
Appendix B2: Interview Guide for University Administrators

1. What, in your view, is the main purpose or role of a University in Africa today?

2. What do you consider to be the most lasting legacy of the Lesotho Government’s decision to nationalise the Roma Campus of UBLS on 20 October 1975?

3. Some pundits think that the National University Act (No. 10) of 1976 ‘overdemocratised’ the University. What is your view on this?

4. What, in your view, informs this perception by some in government and the community that NUL is an institution gripped by a ‘systemic inertia’ and ‘anti-change’ or ‘status quo culture’ and mentality?

5. There is also the thinking that NUL is gripped by a laissez-faire culture or a ‘do as you wish culture’. If so, where is this ‘culture’ coming from?

6. What, in your view, has been the role of trade Unions at NUL (NULASA, LUTARU, NAWU, SUSU)?

7. What kinds of relations exist between trade Unions and the University Management?

8. Why did the 2002-2004 Transformation of NUL fail?

9. Why did the 2011-2014 Restructuring of NUL fail?

10. Over the years, government subvention to NUL has been steadily falling? Why, in your view, has this been the case?

11. How have religious differences, especially the Catholic-Protestant schism, both in the past and present, affected NUL?

12. In NUL discourse, what exactly is meant by ‘separation of cadres’ and how can this be achieved?

13. What, in your view, are the competing interests between the GOL and the NUL?

14. What, in your view, are the competing interests between academic and non-academic staff at NUL?

15. History shows that many disputes at NUL end up in the courts of law. Why, in your view, has this been the case?

16. In what ways have NUL employees tended to resist the employer or the government?

17. What, exactly, is the dispute between NUL and the GOL over the establishment of a Medical School?
Appendix B3: Interview Guide for Local (Roma) and Wider Community Members

1. What kind of relations exist between NUL and (a) the Roma Community (b) the wider Community?
2. What has been the impact of NUL on (a) the Roma Community and (b) the wider Community?
3. What does (a) the Roma Community and (b) the wider Community expect NUL to do for them?
4. What kind of relations exist between NUL and the wider Community?
5. What does the Community expect the Government of Lesotho to do for NUL?
6. What do you want NUL to do for your Community?
7. What does the Community want to do for NUL?
8. Why has NUL received a lot of bad publicity (tv, newspapers, radio etc)?
9. What do you think is the source of problems at NUL?
10. What do you consider to be the major challenge/problem at NUL and how can it be overcome?
11. In your view, how should NUL be run or administered and why?
12. What kind of relations exist between the GOL and NUL?
13. What is the view of the Community regarding the steadily falling government subvention to NUL.
14. What is the view of the Community regarding trade unionism at NUL?
15. How has the Community come to view NUL students?
16. To what extent has NUL, both in the past and the present, been affected by fractious relationship between the two main churches in Lesotho - the RCC and the LEC?
17. What kind of relations does the church in general have with the National University of Lesotho?
18. In what ways has national politics affected, and continue to affect NUL?
19. Any other comments?
Appendix B4: Interview Guide for Student Leaders

1. As a student leader, how would you describe relations between (a) the Student Union and the NUL management and (b) the Student Union and academic and non-academic staff?

2. As a student leader, how would you describe the nature of relations between the SU and the GOL?

3. As a student leader, how would you describe relations between NUL and the GOL?

4. As a student leader, how do you see relations between NUL and the Community/society?

5. Why, in your view, have students at NUL been described as drunkards and hooligans?

6. As a student leader, what do you think is the major challenge/problem at NUL and why?

7. NUL has at times been characterised as an ‘ungovernable’ and change-resistant institution. What are your views about this characterisation of NUL?

8. Why, in your view, do some people in the Community negatively portray NUL?

9. National party divisions of the country continue to be mirrored at NUL. How does the SRC and the Student Union deal with this?

10. What is the opinion of the SU regarding (a) teaching/learning facilities and (b) shortage of accommodation facilities at NUL?

11. How would you describe relations between students and academic and non-academic staff?

12. What does the SU (a) like most and (b) does not like most about NUL?

13. What changes/developments would the SRC/SU want to see taking place at NUL in the next 20 years?

14. As a student leader, what are your views regarding the activities of LUTARU, NAWU and SUSU at NUL?

15. In what structures of the University would the SRC/SU like to be represented more and why?

16. Any other comments?
Appendix C: Questions for the Open-Ended (Unstructured) Questionnaire

Appendix C1: Questionnaire for Academic and Non-Academic Staff

1. What, in your view, is the nature of relations between the GOL and NUL?

2. What, in your view, is the nature of relations between the Community (local and wider) and NUL?

3. How should the Government of Lesotho relate with NUL?

4. How should NUL relate with (a) the Government of Lesotho and (b) the Community?

5. What, in your view, is the major challenge/problem at NUL?

6. Why, in your view, has NUL attracted a lot of negative publicity in the media (radio, TV, newspapers etc.)?

7. Why, in your view, does the Government of Lesotho tend to see NUL in negative terms?

8. (a) What are your views regarding the existence of the Committee System in the governance of NUL? (b) Should the practice be changed and why?

9. How do employees at NUL resist against the employer or immediate supervisor(s) or government?

10. Comment on the idea that NUL is (a) an ‘ungovernable’ institution (b) against change.

11. Why, in your view, did (a) the 2002-2004 Transformation Process and (b) the 2011-2013 Restructuring Process fail?

12. What are your views regarding trade unionism (NULASA, LUTARU, NAWU and SUSU) at NUL?

13. What are your views about student politics and the governance of NUL?

14. Comment on the idea that employees at NUL do as they wish (the laissez-faire ‘culture’).

15. Comment on the notion of the pervasiveness of the so-called ‘egalitarian’ ethos at NUL.

16. Comment on the general working conditions/environment at NUL.

17. Any other comments?
Appendix C2: Questionnaire for Senior University Staff Union (SUSU)

1. When and why did you become a member of SUSU?

2. What do you think SUSU has achieved for its members over the years?

3. Describe the nature of relations SUSU has with LUTARU and NAWU?

4. What is SUSU’s position regarding the ‘separation of cadres’ at NUL?

5. How does SUSU want to participate in the governance of NUL when in effect its members are part of the administration?

6. How should the GOL relate with NUL?

7. How should NUL relate with the GOL?

8. How should NUL relate with the Community?

9. Comment on the nature of working conditions at NUL.

10. In your view, what is the main challenge/problem at NUL?

11. Any other comments?
Appendix C3: Questions for Focus Group Discussions/Questionnaire with Students

1. List down and explain the nature of the problems you face as students at NUL.

2. NUL receives a lot of negative publicity in the electronic and print media (radio stations, TV, newspapers). What do you think is the major source of this negativity about NUL?

3. What (a) do you like most and (b) do not like most about NUL?

4. How does the Student Union relate with (a) NUL management, (b) NUL staff and (c) government?

5. Over the years, the Student Union has been rocked by divisions. Explain the nature of these divisions and their root causes.

6. What, in your view, is good and bad about the activities of LUTARU, NAWU and SUSU at NUL?

7. What should be the role of the Government of Lesotho at NUL?

8. National political parties are known to be actively involved in the Student Union. What are your views about such involvement?

9. Any other comments?
Appendix D: List of Codes for Protection of the Identity of Informants

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>Government minister</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grep</td>
<td>Government representative</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Personal communication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RoCom</td>
<td>Roma community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SRCP</td>
<td>Student Representative Council President</td>
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<tr>
<td>SRCS</td>
<td>Student Representative Council Secretary General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uaca</td>
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<td>University administrator</td>
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<tr>
<td>Unas</td>
<td>University non-academic staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ustu</td>
<td>University student</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ustufgd</td>
<td>University student focus group discussion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WiCom</td>
<td>Wider community</td>
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Appendix E: List of Select Court Cases Involving Triadic Actors

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<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Parties Involved</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>Joachim Mokoteli Ntebele v NUL (HC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>Maseabata Ramafole v NUL (HC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>Fosa &amp; Others v Ntsike &amp; Others SRC (HC)</td>
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<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>Motselisi Tsu v NUL (HC)</td>
</tr>
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<td>1983</td>
<td>Napo Gabriel Mohale v NUL (HC)</td>
</tr>
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<td>1984</td>
<td>Triste Patricia Mokoena v NUL (HC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>Seisa Nqojane v NUL (HC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>Petronella Matshego v NUL (HC)</td>
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<td>1988</td>
<td>Mokoane Monoto v NUL (HC)</td>
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<td>1989</td>
<td>'Malerato Leah Ramakhula v NUL (HC)</td>
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<td>1990</td>
<td>NULSU v NUL (HC)</td>
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<td>1991</td>
<td>Students' Union v NUL (CA)</td>
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<td>1994</td>
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<td>1996</td>
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<td>1997</td>
<td>Motlatsi Thabane v Koatsa Koatsa and NUL (HC)</td>
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<td>1998</td>
<td>LUTARU v NUL (AC)</td>
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<td>2000</td>
<td>Makoala Marake v NUL (LC)</td>
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<td>2001</td>
<td>Matsobane Putsoa v VC NUL (HC)</td>
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<td>2002</td>
<td>VC NUL and Another v Putsoa (AC)</td>
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<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>B. T. Bolibe &amp; Another v NUL &amp; Others</td>
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<td>2004</td>
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<td>2005</td>
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<td>2006</td>
<td>LUTARU and NAWU v NUL (LC)</td>
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<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>NUL and Others v DDPR &amp; Others (HC)</td>
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<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>Judith Refiloe Motaung v NUL &amp; DDPR (LC)</td>
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<td>2008</td>
<td>Nthabiseng Mathibeli v NUL (LC)</td>
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<td>2009</td>
<td>Anglican Church and Another v Lesotho Evangelical Church &amp; Others</td>
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<td>2009</td>
<td>Makhele Cleaning Services (PTY) LTD v NUL (HC)</td>
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<td>2011</td>
<td>Caston Motaphala Thaanyane v NUL &amp; Another (HC)</td>
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<td>2011</td>
<td>Kenewoe Rajake v NUL (LC)</td>
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<td>2012</td>
<td>NUL v LUTARU (LC)</td>
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<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>Karabo Mohau and Others v Principal of NULIS, Registrar &amp; NUL</td>
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<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>NUL v LUTARU (LC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>Thabo Ntitsane &amp; 57 Others v NUL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>Tumelo Monyane v NUL (LC).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Key:
- **CA**: Court of Appeal
- **DDPR**: Director (ate) of Disputes Prevention and Resolutions
- **HC**: High Court
- **LAC**: Labour Appeal Court
- **LC**: Labour Court
## Appendix F: LUTARU Songs of Resistance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Song Title</th>
<th>Translation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 1. Lipoho ha li Loana | **When the bulls fight**<br>Here are bulls facing each other (ready for a fight)  
Hey men, bulls!  
**When the bulls fight**<br>Hey men, bulls!  
**When the bulls fight** (x4) |
| Lipoho ke tse na li bopelana  
He banna, lipoho!  
Lipoho ha li loana (x2)  
He banna, lipoho!  
Lipoho ha li loana | **We are the ones going**  
We are the ones going  
We are the ones going  
We are the ones going |
| 2. Ho ea Rona | **How had you thought it would be**<br>How had you thought it would be  
How had you thought it would be  
On Monday, how would it be  
How had you thought it would be |
| Ho ea rona  
Ho ea rona  
Ho ea rona  
Ho ea rona  
Ho ea rona  
Ho ea rona ba pelo li thata (2x)  
E, ba boi ba cheche  
Ba boi ba cheche, ba chechele morao  
Ba boi ba cheche  
Ba boi ba chechele morao | **Suddenly someone fell**<br>Suddenly someone fell, suddenly  
While we were playing someone suddenly fell (x2) |
| 3. U n’u itse ho tla ba joang | **Suddenly someone fell**<br>Suddenly someone fell, suddenly  
While we were playing someone suddenly fell (x2) |
| U n’u itse ho tla ba joang  
U n’u itse ho tla ba joang  
Mantaha, ho tla ba joang  
U n’u itse ho tla ba joang  
Mantaha, ho tla ba joang  
U n’u itse ho tla ba joang | **Suddenly someone fell**<br>Suddenly someone fell, suddenly  
While we were playing someone suddenly fell (x2) |
| Mantaha, ho tla ba joang  
Mantaha, ho tla ba joang  
U n’u itse ho tla ba joang  
Mantaha, ho tla ba joang | **Suddenly someone fell**<br>Suddenly someone fell, suddenly  
While we were playing someone suddenly fell (x2) |
| 4. Sekirileke Motho a oa | **Call John for me**<br>I am going to talk to him  
About LUTARU issues |
| Sekirileke, he motho a oa, sekirileke (x4)  
E ile ea re ha re bapala motho a oa sekirileke | **Call Mary for me**<br>I am going to talk to her  
About LUTARU issues |
| 5. Thalolo-thalolo | **Also call ‘Matšoana**<br>We are going to talk to her  
About LUTARU issues |
| Thalolo, thalolo, thalolo, thalolo-thalolo  
A k’u mpitsetse John  
Ke tlo bua le eena  
Litaba tsa LUTARU  
Thalolo-thalolo (x several times) | **Call John for me**<br>I am going to talk to him  
About LUTARU issues |
| Thalolo, thalolo, thalolo, thalolo-thalolo  
A k’u mpitsetse Mary  
Ke tlo bua le eena  
Litaba tsa LUTARU  
Thalolo-thalolo (x several times) | **Call Mary for me**<br>I am going to talk to her  
About LUTARU issues |
| Thalolo, thalolo, thalolo, thalolo-thalolo  
A bitse le ‘Matšoana  
Re tlo bua le eena  
Litaba tsa LUTARU | **Also call ‘Matšoana**<br>We are going to talk to her  
About LUTARU issues |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Thalolo-thalolo (x several times)</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td><strong>Thibang ka mona</strong>&lt;br&gt;Thibang ka mona, thibang ka mona&lt;br&gt;Re ente Peter(x3)&lt;br&gt;Re ente Peter&lt;br&gt;Rona re ente Peter(x2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Thibang ka mona, thibang ka mona&lt;br&gt;Re poere Mary (x3)&lt;br&gt;Rona re poere Mary (x2)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Thibang ka mona, thibang ka mona&lt;br&gt;Re nyalise ‘Matšoana (x3)&lt;br&gt;Rona re nyalise ‘Matšoana(x2)</td>
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<td>7.</td>
<td><strong>(Le) Sale la ka la ponto</strong>&lt;br&gt;Sale la ka la poto&lt;br&gt;Sale la ka la ponto(x2)&lt;br&gt;Sale la ka, sale la ka, sale la ka he-oe-lele</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>La tholoa ke John&lt;br&gt;John oa sehole&lt;br&gt;Sale la ka, sale la ka, sale la ka he-oe-lele</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>La tholoa ke Peter&lt;br&gt;Manyamane raleshano&lt;br&gt;Sale la ka, sale la ka, sale la ka he-oe-lele</td>
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<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td><strong>Supe</strong>&lt;br&gt;Supepepe sabala-bala,&lt;br&gt;Supepe-pepe sabala-bala&lt;br&gt;Supepe-pepe sabala-bala&lt;br&gt;Supepepe (starts from the top, over and over)</td>
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<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td><strong>John oa tatasela</strong>&lt;br&gt;John oa tatasela(x4)&lt;br&gt;Oa tatasela, sela(x4)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mary oa thothomela(x4)&lt;br&gt;Oa thothomela, mela (x4)</td>
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<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td><strong>Ke tla itjarela sona sefapano sa ka</strong>&lt;br&gt;Öe-öe ke tla itjarela sona s’fapano sa ka ka mahetla (x4)&lt;br&gt;On my shoulders; on my shoulders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.</td>
<td><strong>Ha u le koata</strong>&lt;br&gt;Ha u le koata&lt;br&gt;U itlotsa ka pinabatha mahlong</td>
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<tr>
<td>Line</td>
<td>Original Text</td>
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<tr>
<td>------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>John, u n’u ‘mona ka e ha e se u jele tsuo</td>
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<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>He Mary, he Mary!</td>
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<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>He nkhonono enoa , he o leshano!</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Ha u le koata</td>
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<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>U lula Sehlabeng-sa-Thuathe</td>
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<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>John, u n’u ‘mona ka e ha e se u jele tsuo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>He Maggie, he Maggie!</td>
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<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>He ‘moulo oona, he u leshano!</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td><strong>12. Ho se ho tla senyeha</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>Ho se ho tla senyeha he!</td>
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<tr>
<td>11.</td>
<td>Ha poho e fata makoatsi</td>
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<tr>
<td>12.</td>
<td>Tsam’u joetsa John he!</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.</td>
<td>Ha poho e fata makoatsi</td>
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<tr>
<td>14.</td>
<td><strong>13. Ntho ena ke masaoana</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>15.</td>
<td>Halala, halala, he halala!</td>
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<tr>
<td>16.</td>
<td>He ntho ena ke masaoana(x4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17.</td>
<td><strong>Ke lekehile ke nyetse Mary</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18.</td>
<td>Mosali enoa o khema le John</td>
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<tr>
<td>19.</td>
<td>Ka lekeke ke enoa Senateng</td>
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<td>20.</td>
<td>Tlisa koto ke bolae ntja ena</td>
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<tr>
<td>21.</td>
<td><strong>14. Moekelesia</strong></td>
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<td>22.</td>
<td>Moekelesiea ho baloe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23.</td>
<td>O-oe ho baloe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24.</td>
<td>Moekelesiea ho baloe</td>
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<tr>
<td>25.</td>
<td>Ntho e ‘ngoe le e ‘ngoe e na le nako</td>
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<tr>
<td>26.</td>
<td><strong>15. Thabeng tse la tse ntsu</strong></td>
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<td>27.</td>
<td>Thabeng tse la tse ntsu tse la</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28.</td>
<td>Ke LUTARU malimo a eja batho</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29.</td>
<td>Le ha u ka botsa John, Peter le Mary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30.</td>
<td>Ke LUTARU malimo a eja batho</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31.</td>
<td><strong>16. Mo ntseng</strong></td>
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<td>32.</td>
<td>Mo ntseng Mary a tsamae</td>
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<tr>
<td>33.</td>
<td>Mo ntseng Mary ke khoho e bolisitse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34.</td>
<td>Le ntse John, Peter le Maggie</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35.</td>
<td>Le ntse John, Peter le Maggie</td>
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<tr>
<td>17. Khomo eso mphe matla</td>
<td>My home come cow give me power</td>
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<tr>
<td>He, ea loana khome eso mphe matla</td>
<td>It is a battle; my home come cow give me power</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ea lona khomo eso mphe matla</td>
<td>It is a battle; my home come cow give me power</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bothata bo saletse John</td>
<td>The difficulty is left for John</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khomo eso mphe matla</td>
<td>My home come cow give me power</td>
</tr>
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