Critical Linguistics and Postmodernism: An Assessment With Reference to Selected English Texts

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Co-promoters: Prof. W. J. Greyling
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Date: May 2006
DECLARATION

I declare that the thesis hereby submitted by me for the Philosophae Doctor degree at the University of the Free State, is my own independent and original work, and has not been previously submitted by me to another university/faculty. I furthermore cede copyright of this thesis in favour of the University of the Free State.

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Chaka Petrus Chaka

May 2006
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This work is dedicated to my late father, Ntate Chere Chaka, and to my late brother, Kgauwe Chaka.
ABSTRACT

This research study sets out to investigate the relationship between critical linguistics and postmodernism and to mount a critical assessment of these two areas. Firstly, it provides an overview of these two areas and offers their comprehensive and detailed discussion. It does so by discussing the works of Fowler et al. (1979), Kress (1989, 1990) and Fairclough (1989, 1992) in the case of critical linguistics and those of Lyotard (1984, 1988), Foucault (1972, 1980) and Derrida (1978, 1982) in the case of postmodernism. Secondly, it presents a critical analysis which foregrounds some of the concerns, shortcomings and weaknesses inherent in these two areas as raised, for example, by Grimshaw (1980) and Widdowson (1998, 2000) regarding critical linguistics, and as raised, on the one hand, by Habermas (1987) and, to a lesser extent, by McCarthy (1993), and on the other hand, by Gross and Levitt (1994) concerning postmodernism. In addition, it provides an appraisal of Habermas’s and Gross and Levitt’s views on postmodernism.

Thirdly, the study investigates the extent to which chaos theory can bridge the boundaries between critical linguistics and mainstream linguistics, between postmodernism and modernism, and between critical linguistics and postmodernism. Most significantly, it establishes the similarities and differences characterising critical linguistics and postmodernism. Moreover, it examines – through conducting a textual micro-analysis - the way in which discourse features employed in two texts (one on critical linguistics and the other on postmodernism) do (or do not) reflect instances of discourse and ideological strategies. Concomitantly, the questions this study sets out to answer are as follows:

- What does the overview of both critical linguistics and postmodernism reveal?
- What scholarly views and observations does a comprehensive and detailed discussion of the proponents of these two areas reveal?
- What concerns, shortcomings and weaknesses are inherent in these two areas?
- In what way is critical linguistics different from mainstream linguistics and how can the two areas be brought closer to each other?
- In what way is postmodernism different from modernism and how can the two areas be brought closer to each other?
- What are the similarities and differences between critical linguistics and postmodernism? and
- What does the micro-analysis of the discourse features of the two sample extracts selected from both LP and The PC reveal about the discourse and ideological strategies used in these two texts?

Two texts, Fairclough’s (1989) Language and Power (LP) – for critical linguistics- and Lyotard’s (1984) The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge (The PC) – for postmodernism - serve as the two main sources of data in this study. In this regard, the study mounts both a macro-analysis and a micro-analysis of these two texts. Thus, employing a discourse and ideological analysis and chaos theory methodological framework and a textual content analysis and chaos theory model in Chapter Five, the
macro-analysis has two sections. The first section focuses on the following aspects of both LP and The PC: their explicit and implicit goals; their respective areas of focus; their underlying theoretical assumptions; the approaches, methods and models of analysis they use; the types of data extracts used in LP and the cited material used in The PC; and the adequacy, trustworthiness and credibility of both the data extracts and the cited material.

The second section examines the usage of the concepts (mainstream) linguistics, critical linguistics, language, ideology, power, discourse, text, intertextuality, subject positions (identities), utterances, and postmodernism in the case of LP. It also explores the usage of the concepts modernity/modernism, postmodernity/postmodernism, grand narratives/meta-narratives, language games, utterances, pragmatics, performativity, paralogy/paralogism, incommensurability, knowledge, and legitimation/legitimacy in the case of The PC. The software programme, WordWeb 3.03, is used as a point of reference to benchmark some of the textual definitions, ideas and views attributed to the conceptual variables cited above. All of the above content variables are accompanied by their respective data exemplars extracted from the two texts. These data exemplars are presented in Appendix A.

Using the same framework as cited above, the micro-analysis focuses on two extracts (cf. Appendices B and D) - taken from LP and The PC respectively – and employs a multidisciplinary model of ideological discourse analysis (MIDA) (cf. Figure 4.2) for analysing these extracts in Chapter Six. In both extracts, it examines the following discourse features: narrative; repetition; rhetoric; pronominalisation (pronouns); modality (modals); topoi; stereotypes; metaphors; implication; presupposition; and conversational maxims. The use of the software programme Tropes V6.2 is enlisted to identify the word counts, content types and language styles the two extracts have. On the basis of the analysis of these features, an attempt is made to establish the discourse and ideological strategies employed in the two extracts (again cf. Figure 4.2) and the possible inferences that can be made from the use of such discourse and ideological strategies. The use of the software programme WordWeb 3.03 is also enlisted to cross-validate the ideological tendencies or practices inferred from the discourse and ideological strategies employed in the two extracts.

Finally, the study presents a summary of its findings, makes recommendations, and suggests further study.

Key words: critical linguistics, postmodernism, chaos theory, Fairclough, Lyotard, ideology, discourse, mainstream linguistics, modernism, language games, pragmatics
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List of Abbreviations

CDA Critical discourse analysis
CL Critical linguistics
CLS Critical language study
FDA Foucauldian discourse analysis
FL Formal linguistics
LP *Language and Power*
MIDA Multidisciplinary model of ideological discourse analysis
SFL Systemic functional linguistics
*The PC* *The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge*

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Chapter One
Previewing and Framing the Study

1.0 Introduction

This chapter details the purpose, necessity and focus of the study. It also spells out the relevant research questions. In addition, it provides a research methodology (together with sources of data, methods of data collection and data analysis, units of analysis, and a methodological framework) used in this study while at the same time specifying the details of the preliminary study and the value of the current research study. Above all, it previews and outlines the present study.

1.1 Purpose of the Research

The central purpose of this study is to investigate the relationship between critical linguistics and postmodernism and to provide a critical assessment of these two areas. Critical linguistics is a brand of linguistics, a perspective and an approach which constructs itself differently from mainstream or modern linguistics. Likewise, postmodernism is a perspective and an approach which configures itself differently from modernism.

1.2 Necessity of the Research

At best, scholars whose works are located within the critical language tradition make references to postmodernism without situating them within an integrated model or framework that combines both critical linguistics and postmodernism (cf. for example, Chouliaraki and Fairclough, 1999; Fairclough, 1989, 1995, 2000; Fowler, Hodge, Kress and Trew, 1979; Hodge and Kress, 1993). At worst, there are scholars who raise concerns about critical linguistics (cf. Davies, 1999; Luke, 2002; Widdowson, 1998, 2000) and those who do the same about postmodernism (cf. Habermas, 1987; McCarthy, 1993; Norris, 1996).
In the light of the above, this study maintains that there is a scholarly hiatus in the current literature dealing with both critical linguistics and postmodernism. It also contends that there is a lack of dialogue between critical linguistics and postmodernism in the available literature. Thus, firstly, the present study attempts to bridge this scholarly hiatus by establishing a dialogue between critical linguistics and postmodernism. Secondly, it tries to formulate an integrated framework and two models of analysis applicable to both critical linguistics and postmodernism. This last aspect seems to be a missing link in the current studies dealing with these two areas.

1.3 Focus of Research and Research Questions

The study has a critical evaluation of both critical linguistics and postmodernism as its first major focus. This focus has three aspects: to provide an overview of both critical linguistics and postmodernism; to offer a comprehensive and detailed discussion of some of the authorities associated with these two areas; and to present a critical analysis which foregrounds some of the concerns, shortcomings and weaknesses inherent in these two areas. Cross-literature research on both areas is fragmented and only pays little attention to the integrated study of both areas. Thus, the questions this study wants to answer in this regard are:

- What does the overview of both critical linguistics and postmodernism reveal?
- What scholarly views and observations does a comprehensive and detailed discussion of the proponents of these two areas reveal?
- What concerns, shortcomings and weaknesses are inherent in these two areas?

The second major focus of the study is to establish, on the one hand, how different critical linguistics is from mainstream linguistics and how the two can be brought closer to each other; and on the other hand, how different postmodernism is from modernism and how the two can be brought closer to each other. The third major focus of the study is to establish areas of similarity and difference between critical linguistics and postmodernism. So, here the questions the study seeks to answer are as follows:
• In what way is critical linguistics different from mainstream linguistics and how can the two areas be brought closer to each other?
• In what way is postmodernism different from modernism and how can the two areas be brought closer to each other?
• What are the similarities and differences between critical linguistics and postmodernism?

Finally, the fourth major focus of the study is to examine – through conducting a textual micro-analysis - the way in which discourse features employed in two given texts (one on critical linguistics and another on postmodernism) do (or do not) reflect instances of discourse and ideological strategies. Accordingly, the question this study wishes to answer in this case is:

• What does the micro-analysis of the discourse features of the two sample extracts selected from both LP and The PC reveal about the discourse and ideological strategies used in these two texts?

1.4 Research Methodology

This sub-section previews the sources of data, the methods of data collection and data analysis, and the units of analysis used in the study. It also briefly outlines the specific methodological framework underpinning the study.

1.4.1 Sources of Data and Methods of Data Collection and Data Analysis

The sources of data for this study are two published texts, Fairclough’s (1989) Language and Power (LP) – for critical linguistics - and Lyotard’s (1984) The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge (The PC) – for postmodernism. Surveying, sampling and reviewing are the key methods used in collecting the data from primary and secondary texts dealing with both critical linguistics and postmodernism. The principal methods employed in analysing the two data texts are quantitative and qualitative content
analysis, on the one hand, and discourse analysis, on the other hand. The units of analysis of the study are the content variables as outlined and represented in Figures 4.1 and 4.2 in Chapter Four.

1.4.2 Methodological Framework

This study is informed by a discourse and ideological analysis and chaos theory methodological framework. Two related dimensions of discourse analysis are relevant for this study: discourse analysis as both a conceptual and a methodological framework. As a conceptual framework, discourse analysis is concerned with conceptualising texts, language and forms of discourse from, inter alia, linguistic, Marxist, poststructuralist, and feminist points of view. Equally, as a methodological framework, discourse analysis refers to a diverse interdisciplinary family of methodologies of and approaches to the study of text and language that draws on linguistics, cultural studies, literary theory, philosophy of language, psychology and sociology (cf. Henning, Van Rensburg and Smit, 2004: 45-46; Luke, 1997: 50-53, 2002: 98-100; Mouton, 2001: 168-169; Slembrouck, 1998-2003: 1-2).

Similarly, there are two related dimensions of ideological analysis which are suitable for this study: ideological analysis as both a conceptual and a methodological framework. As a conceptual framework, ideological analysis entails conceptualising texts, ideology, language, and different types of discourse from, inter alia, linguistic, Marxist, poststructuralist, and feminist standpoints. As a methodological framework, ideological analysis – like discourse analysis – refers to an interdisciplinary family of methodologies of and approaches to the study of ideology that draws on such disciplinary areas as sociology, philosophy, language, cultural studies and literary theory (cf. Blommaert, 1997: 7 and 38; Luke, 1997: 50-53; Slembrouck, 1998-2003: 1-2; Threadgold, 2003: 5-10).

By the same token, chaos theory is a cross-disciplinary theory applied, for example, in fields such as mathematics, physics, management and systems sciences, cybernetics,

A macro-analysis, which is conducted in Chapter Five, has two parts (Part I and Part II). It is guided by a textual content analysis and chaos theory model (cf. Figure 4.1) which is formulated within the scope of the methodological framework outlined above. Part I provides the analysis of LP while Part II presents the analysis of The PC. In addition, the macro-analysis consists of two strands of analysis. The first strand of analysis focuses on the following aspects of both LP and The PC: their explicit and implicit goals; their respective areas of focus; their underlying theoretical assumptions; the approaches, methods and models of analysis they use; the types of data extracts used in LP and the cited material used in The PC; and the adequacy, trustworthiness and credibility of both the data extracts and the cited material.

The second strand of analysis examines the usage of the concepts (mainstream)
linguistics, critical linguistics, language, ideology, power, discourse, text, intertextuality, subject positions (identities), utterances, and postmodernism as applied in LP. It also explores the usage of the concepts modernity/modernism, postmodernity/postmodernism, grand narratives/meta-narratives, language games, utterances, pragmatics, performativity, paralogy/paralogism, incommensurability, knowledge, and legitimation/legitimacy as applied in The PC. These content variables are accompanied by their respective data exemplars extracted from the two texts which are presented in
Appendix A. The software programme, *WordWeb 3.03*, is used as a point of reference to benchmark some of the textual definitions, ideas and views attributed to these conceptual variables in the two texts.

A micro-analysis is conducted in Chapter Six and is guided by a multidisciplinary model of ideological discourse analysis (MIDA) (cf. *Figure 4.2*). The latter – like the first model – is structured within the parameters of the methodological framework outlined above. This micro-analysis focuses on two extracts (cf. *Appendices B and D*) taken from *LP* and *The PC*. In both extracts, it examines the following discourse features: narrative; repetition; rhetoric; pronominalisation (pronouns); modality (modals); topoi; stereotypes; metaphors; implication; presupposition; and conversational maxims. The use of the software programme *Tropes V6.2* is enlisted to identify the word counts, content types and language styles the two extracts have. On the basis of the analysis of these features, an attempt is made to establish the discourse and ideological strategies employed in the two extracts (again cf. *Figure 4.2*) and the possible inferences that can be made from the use of such discourse and ideological strategies. The use of the software programme *WordWeb 3.03* is also enlisted to cross-validate the ideological tendencies or practices inferred from the discourse and ideological strategies employed in the two extracts.

### 1.5 Details of the Preliminary Study

The present study is an extension, firstly, of my Master of Arts degree dissertation entitled “Schema Theory and Critical Language Awareness: The Problem with Becoming Critical.” Secondly, it is an upshot of a joint article entitled “Language, sexism and classism: the case of isiXhosa in South Africa” published in 2003 in the *Southern African Journal for Folklore Studies* (SAFOS) (cf. Chaka, 1996; Chaka and Mniki, 2003). It is also a follow-up to the first draft of my present PhD thesis (not submitted) which my current supervisors advised me to restructure and shorten. The first project provided me with the necessary foundation and grounding in issues related to critical linguistics while the second project offered me some insight into aspects associated with critical language
study and postmodernism. This last project introduced me directly to issues pertaining to critical linguistics and postmodernism.

1. 6 Value of the Research

This research study examines the relationship between critical linguistics and postmodernism. The interface between these two scholarly areas has, it appears from the current study, not been investigated and explored as well as it should be. In this case, the value of the study lies in the following parameters. First, it seeks to establish a critical-reflective dialogue between critical linguistics and postmodernism. Second, it generates a composite framework – on an experimental basis – mediated on the one hand, by discourse analysis, and on the other hand, by chaos theory, as a basis for exploring aspects related to critical linguistics and postmodernism. Third, it develops two tentative integrated models of analysis – a textual content analysis and chaos theory model and a multidisciplinary model of ideological discourse analysis (MIDA) – to analyse both chaotic qualities displayed by textual concepts and discourse and ideological features embedded in texts, respectively. As such, scholars of applied language studies (and others belonging to other cognate disciplines) might find both the framework and the two models of analysis proposed in this study useful and refreshing. So, what the research offers such scholars, is the opportunity to blend discourse analysis and content analysis with chaos theory in their academic practices and to use the two models to study textual concepts and such features as pronominalisation and modality as they apply to both texts and different types of discourse.

The research also provides the opportunity for inter-, multi- and cross-disciplinary study as both critical linguistics and postmodernism make ample reference to and are premised on other disciplinary areas (cf. Figures 5. 1 and 5. 6). In addition, the study offers exposure to different methodological approaches such as those employed in both LP and The PC. However, particularly provocative in the context of this study is Lyotard’s characterisation of both knowledge and skills (for higher education) in the postmodern condition (cf. Exemplar 5. 24 in Appendix A) as this relates directly to the formulation
and configuration of policies and to the curricular and programme designs in the higher education sector as Lyotard asserts (again cf. Exemplar 5. 24 in Appendix A). This type of characterisation of knowledge and skills needs to be critically interrogated by different education planners, curriculum designers, and programme planners and by different disciplinary specialists, especially in the social and human sciences.

1.7 Structure of the Study

Chapter One details the purpose, necessity and focus of the study. It also spells out the relevant research questions. In addition, it provides a research methodology (together with sources of data, methods of data collection and data analysis, units of analysis, and a methodological framework) employed in the study while at the same time specifying the details of the preliminary study and the value of the present research study. Above all, it previews and outlines the current study.

Chapter Two has a three-fold objective: to provide an overview of critical linguistics; to offer a comprehensive and detailed discussion of some of the authorities associated with critical linguistics, in particular Fowler et al. (1979), Kress (1985a, 1989, 1990; cf. Hodge and Kress, 1993; Kress and Hodge, 1979) and Fairclough (1989, 1992, 1995; cf. Fairclough, 2000); and to mount a critical analysis of this form of linguistics. The overview focuses on the historical origins of critical linguistics, the type of linguistics it is, and what constitutes it, while the critical analysis highlights some of the concerns, shortcomings and weaknesses associated with it.

Likewise, Chapter Three serves three related purposes: it provides an overview of postmodernism; it offers a comprehensive and detailed discussion of the views of three postmodern thinkers, Jean-Francois Lyotard (cf. Lyotard, 1984, 1988), Michel Foucault (cf. Foucault, 1972, 1973, 1980) and Jacques Derrida (cf. Derrida, 1976, 1978, 1982); and it also presents a critical analysis of postmodernism as represented by these three thinkers. The overview outlines the historical origins of postmodernism and some of its varieties and approaches. The critical analysis highlights some of the concerns,
shortcomings and weaknesses inherent in postmodernism as raised, on the one hand, by Jürgen Habermas (cf. Habermas, 1984, 1987) and, to some extent, by Thomas McCarthy (cf. McCarthy, 1993), and on the other hand, by Paul R. Gross and Norman Levitt (cf. Gross and Levitt, 1994). The analysis also offers an appraisal of some of the views and observations made by Habermas and by Gross and Levitt concerning postmodernism.

Chapter Four serves the following related purposes. Firstly, it details the sources of data, the methods of data collection and data analysis, and the units of analysis used in the study. Secondly, it delineates the discourse and ideological analysis and chaos theory methodological framework within which the study is located. Thirdly, it provides the rationale for employing such a methodological framework and highlights its strengths and weaknesses. Fourthly, it outlines and delineates two complementary models of data analysis used in Chapter Five and Chapter Six respectively. The chapter also offers the rationale for employing such models and pinpoints their inherent strengths and weaknesses. In addition, the chapter provides – within the confines of these models - sample data analyses for each of these two chapters. Finally, it outlines the analytic procedures and benchmarks for analysing the data in both Chapters Five and Six.

Furthermore, Chapter Five presents the data analysis as outlined and highlighted in Figure 4.1 (Chapter Four). It consists of two parts - Part I and Part II - of macro-analysis. The macro-analysis – which in turn comes in two strands of analysis in each case - in both parts is based on the textual content analysis and chaos theory model illustrated in Figure 4.1. Part I provides the analysis of LP while Part II presents the analysis of The PC. In each case, the analysis of the relevant sets of content variables follows the steps and procedures as formulated and described under the relevant sub-sections in Chapter Four. Finally, and most importantly, the chapter discusses the findings emerging from the analysis of the two texts and presents similarities and differences between critical linguistics and postmodernism.

Similarly, Chapter Six presents the data analysis using the multidisciplinary model of ideological discourse analysis (MIDA) as outlined and illustrated in Figure 4.2 (Chapter
Four). Like the previous chapter, it consists of two parts - Part III and Part IV - of micro-
alysis. Part III provides a micro-analysis of the extract from Fairclough’s LP entitled
Case Study which is an interview between Michael Charlton and Margaret Thatcher
conducted by BBC Radio 3, on 17th December 1985 (cf. Appendix B). Part IV mounts a
micro-analysis of the extract from Lyotard’s The PC (cf. Appendix D). In both extracts,
the analysis is on the discourse features as well as the discourse and ideological strategies
as identified and highlighted under the MIDA in Figure 4. 2 (Chapter Four). Lastly, the
chapter discusses the findings emanating from the micro-analysis of the identified
features used in the two extracts.

1. 8 Conclusion

This chapter has detailed the purpose, necessity and focus of the study. It has also spelt
out the relevant research questions for the study. In addition, it has provided a research
methodology (together with sources of data, methods of data collection and data analysis,
units of analysis, and a methodological framework) employed in the study and specified
the details of the preliminary study and the value of the present research study. Above all,
it has previewed and outlined the current study.
Chapter Two

Critical Linguistics: Issues, Trends and Current Debates

2.0 Introduction

The main objective of this chapter is three-fold: to provide an overview of critical linguistics; to offer a comprehensive and detailed discussion of some of the authorities associated with critical linguistics – in particular Fowler et al. (1979), Kress (1985a, 1989, 1990; cf. Kress and Hodge, 1979; Hodge and Kress, 1993) and Fairclough (1989, 1992, 1995; cf. Fairclough, 2000); and to mount a critical analysis of this form of linguistics. The overview focuses on the historical origins of critical linguistics, the type of linguistics it is, and what constitutes it, while the critical analysis foregrounds some of the concerns, shortcomings and weaknesses raised by scholars such as Grimshaw (1980), Hardford (1980), Murray (1981), Richardson (1987), and Widdowson (1995, 1996, 1998, 2000) regarding critical linguistics. The contention here is that, in order to have a proper sense and perspective of how critical linguistics as a brand of linguistics, as a perspective, and as an approach originated, and how it has developed to the level where it is now, it is vital that these three aspects be outlined and delineated for perspectival clarity.

2.1 Critical Linguistics: An Overview

The historical origins of critical linguistics (CL) lie in the Hallidayan systemic functional linguistics (SFL) and neo-Marxism. In this regard, critical linguistics has some affinities with critical language study (CLS) and critical discourse analysis (CDA) both of which are interrelated and both of which share one major focus with systemic functional linguistics and critical linguistics - the (critical) analysis of language as used in society. It is a brand of linguistics which developed from the work of the applied linguistics scholars, Roger Fowler, Robert Hodge, Gunther Kress and Tony Trew (hereafter Fowler et al.), all of whom were then based at the University of East Anglia in Britain. Fowler et al.’s (1979) work Language and Control and Kress and Hodge’s (1979) Language as
Ideology – also cf. Hodge and Kress’s (1993) work with the self-same title - are among the first authoritative texts in the area of critical linguistics (Bell, 1991, 1995; Birch, 1989; Faigley, 1992; Mills, 1995; Simpson, 1993; Steiner, 1985).

The East Anglian origin of critical linguistics is contextualised by Simpson (1993: 5): “critical linguistics ... can be traced directly to the work carried out during the 1970s by Roger Fowler and his associates at the University of East Anglia”. The entry of this form of linguistics into the anglophone world through Fowler et al.’s and Kress and Hodge’s path-breaking work, is provided by Menz (1989: 229) as follows: “In the anglophone realm, the term ‘critical linguistics’ appears for the first time in Fowler et al. (1979) and in Kress and Hodge (1979).” Having started as an East Anglian phenomenon, critical linguistics is now both a continental (European) and a global phenomenon. That is, it currently has scholars and linguists applying and practising it in Europe (e.g. Norman Fairclough, Teun van Dijk, Theo van Leeuwen, Paul Simpson, Ruth Wodak, Paul Chilton, Erich Steiner, Malcolm Coulthard, Mary Tabolt, Sarah Mills, etc.); in Australia (e.g. James Martin, Terry Threadgold, Paul Thibault, Frances Christie, David Birch, etc.); in America (e.g. Lester Faigley, Jay Lemke, etc.); in parts of South America such as Brazil (e.g. Carmen Caldas-Coulthard); and in some parts of Africa such as South Africa (e.g. Hilary Janks) (cf. Caldas-Coulthard and Coulthard, 1996; Fowler, 1996; Granville, 2001; Janks, 1995).

The fairly global spread of critical linguistics does not necessarily mean that its theorists and practitioners are a homogeneous grouping dotted in different parts of the globe. On the contrary, it has drawn scholars, theorists and practitioners from a broad spectrum of disciplines who have an inclination to apply theories and approaches with strong inter- or multi-disciplinary foci. For instance, it has scholars who - while critical linguists to the core - are semioticians influenced by the work of the Frankfurt-style critical sociology and it has text linguists who are at the same time discourse theorists (Bell, 1995; Birch, 1989, 1996; Chilton, 1985; Fairclough, 1989, cf. Fairclough, 2000, 2002, 2003; Fowler, 1991, 1996; Fowler et al., 1979; Hodge and Kress, 1988, 1993; Kress, 1985a, 1985b, 1989, 1990; Lemke, 1995; Simpson, 1993). It also has critical discourse analysts who are...

Again, it has systemicists and functionalists who see themselves as genre and social literacy practitioners (Christie, 1990, 1991, 1992; Christie and Martin, 1997; Halliday, 1978, 1985; Martin, 1997). Furthermore, it has language educationists who espouse critical literacy and critical pedagogy theories (Christie, 1991; Christie and Martin, 1997). Finally, it has composition theorists whose work falls within social constructivist framework (Faigley, 1992; Sullivan, 2002).

The discussion that follows below focuses on the following aspects: features, theoretical assumptions, and major aims and concerns of CL; and CL’s methods of analysis.

2.1.1 Some of the Features of CL

As pointed out above, critical linguistics is a brand of linguistics which draws its theoretical and methodological strengths from two traditions: the Hallidayan systemic functional linguistic and the neo-Marxist traditions. From the first tradition, it has borrowed and used eclectically, Halliday’s theory of systemic functional linguistics. Regarding the second tradition, it has adopted its label from and drawn extensively on critical sociology (cf. Fairclough, 1992; Fowler, 1991, 1996; Menz, 1989; Wodak, 1989).

In line with this dual theoretical foundation, critical linguistics projects itself as a socially and politically committed linguistics which describes and analyses language in terms of its key roles and functions in maintaining power relations. It views language as an instrument of power and control and as embodying ideologies which characterise power relations and social struggle. It does the same with discourse: it views discourse as an instrument of power and control as well as a tool for the social construction of reality. Correspondingly, it maintains that discourse is a form of knowledge and a way of representing social practices (Fairclough, 1989: 1-4; Fowler and Kress, 1979a: 186-190; Kress, 1990: 88-89; Mills, 1995: 10-12; Van Leeuwen, 1993: 193-194; cf. Hardford,
1980: 472-473; Murray, 1981: 744-745). In this way, it is a “study of texts from an avowedly political perspective” (Mills, 1995: 10). Above all, it is a theory of language whose aim according to Hodge and Kress (1988: vii) “is to provide an illuminating account of verbal language as a social phenomenon, especially for the use of critical theorists … who [want] to explore social and political forces and processes as they act through and on texts and forms of discourse.”

Another feature of critical linguistics is that it builds on the domain of stylistics by exploring and studying heterogeneous texts and by attempting to show how value- and belief-systems reside in such texts. In other words, it takes stylistics a step further by striving to highlight how ideologies manifest themselves in texts. The concept of ideology is here crudely construed in terms of social values and beliefs. Simpson (1993: 5) helps elucidate this use and conceptualisation of ideology in critical linguistics:

From a critical linguistic perspective, the term [ideology] normally describes the ways in which what we say and think interacts with society. An ideology, therefore, derives from the taken-for-granted assumptions, beliefs, and value-systems which are shared collectively by social groups. And when an ideology is the ideology of a particularly powerful social group, it is said to be dominant. Thus, dominant ideologies are mediated through powerful political and social institutions like the government, the law and the medical profession. Our perceptions of these institutions, moreover, will be shaped in part by the linguistic practices of the social groups [which] comprise them.

Evident in the above-cited quotation is the conceptualisation of ideology in terms of assumptions, beliefs and value-systems belonging to social groups and in terms of dominant ideologies. This latter part of the conceptualisation of ideology is related to the dominant ideology thesis characterising the work of both Louis Althusser and Michel Pêcheux. One of the major propositions of this thesis is that dominant ideologies are reproduced by social and linguistic structures (cf. Althusser, 1971; Faigley, 1992; Fairclough, 1989, 1992, 2000; Giroux, 1983; Macdonell, 1986; Montgomery and Allan, 2002; Pêcheux, 1982; Vološinov, 1973). Simpson pithily puts this point into its proper critical linguistic perspective:
A central component of the critical linguistic creed is the conviction that language reproduces ideology … [I]t is used in a host of discourse contexts, contexts which are impregnated with the ideology of the social systems and institutions … First of all, dominant ideologies operate as a mechanism for maintaining asymmetrical power relations in society. As language can be used by the powerful groups to re-inforce this dominant ideology, then language needs to be targeted as a specific site of struggle (1993:3).

The ideology-driven orientation of critical linguistics makes it perceive different contexts of texts as being socially and ideologically determined, and thus, as requiring a critical intervention or a linguistics that is critical (cf. Birch, 1989: 152; Fairclough, 1992: 26; Fowler and Kress, 1979a: 186 and 196). This type of linguistics assumes a form of ideology critique – which highlights its critical orientation. In this context, critical linguistics constructs itself differently from mainstream linguistics as represented by Ferdinand de Saussure and Noam Chomsky and from mainstream sociolinguistics as represented mainly – but not exclusively – by William Labov.

It rejects two dualisms embodied in mainstream linguistics. The first is the one which separates meaning from style or expression; the second is the one which posits a distinction between linguistic and grammatical structures and the ways in which they are used in actual instances of linguistic communication (cf. Fairclough, 1992: 26; Fowler and Kress, 1979a: 186-196). In addition, it espouses the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis which contends that languages embody reality and worldviews and which maintains that certain texts and certain instances of language use embody particular ideologies (cf. Birch, 1989: 132; Fairclough, 1992: 26; Fowler, 1991: 28-30; Hodge and Kress, 1993: 5-6 and 62-64; Simpson, 1993: 163-164).
2.1.2 Theoretical Assumptions of CL

In line with its dual theoretical foundation, critical linguistics makes the following assumptions:

- Language is social practice. It argues that language is but one of many social practices of signification and representation together with visual images, gestures, layout, music, etc.
- Texts are the result of the actions of socially situated speakers and writers who operate with relative degrees of possibilities of choice within structurings of power/domination.
- Meanings are the result of the interaction of readers and hearers with texts and with speakers or writers of texts. This implies that meanings are subject to more or less enforced normative rules – such as rules of genres – and to relations of power prevalent in a given interaction.
- Linguistic features result from social processes, and as such are motivated instances of forms (signifiers) and meanings (signifieds); that is, they are not arbitrary or pre-determined conjuncts of both form and meaning.
- Linguistic features do, in any given text, display opacity since language itself is an opaque medium.
- Language users tend, owing to their socio-cultural positionings, to adopt a particular stance towards sets of codes which constitute a language. That is to say, as socially located individuals, language users only have a partial or selective access to certain configurations of the language system. This means that there are different configurations, dispositions and knowledges that producers of texts bring to bear on textual forms which are in tune with the differing social positionings of language users.
- Language has to take history (both as an ideologically and politically inflected time) into account - whether it be the macro-stories of social and linguistic institutions or the micro-histories of spoken interactions such as conversations,

2. 1. 3 The Major Aims and Concerns of CL

Some of the major aims and concerns of critical linguistics are, inter alia:

- To uncover and demystify social processes and social structurings so as to expose mechanisms of manipulation, control, discrimination and propaganda inherent in language;
- To examine, interpret and understand how and why reality is structured by language;
- To analyse how underlying ideologies are embodied in linguistic expression or to examine how syntactic rules serve and reveal ideological frameworks;
- To relate language to its users and seek principled ways of exposing the ideologies inherent in language;
- To make the discipline of linguistics more responsible, more accountable and more responsive to issues of social equity;

It is the last aspect which links critical linguistics with critical sociology associated mainly with the work of Jürgen Habermas. Richardson (1987: 146) captures this rather aptly: “One facet of critical linguistics is an attempt to advance a critical theory of language – i.e. one which does not neutralize or suppress social conflict and antagonism – and understanding of languages and their use.” He then continues thus: “Pateman … connects critical linguistics with critical theory in sociology, especially the work of Habermas. The purpose of critical theory is to facilitate social critique upon sound
intellectual foundations … For critical linguistics likewise, societies are the ultimate objects of critique and languages and their uses only derivatively so, where they contribute to unjust social arrangements” (p. 146). Equally, Wodak (1996a: 6-7) highlights this interface when she asserts that: “It is here … that sociology and linguistics, and sociolinguistics and discourse theory, intersect. On the one hand, linguistic approaches are able to describe explicitly how conversations are structured, or how communication problems are constituted at the micro-level of text itself.”

2. 1. 4 CL’s Method of Analysis

With reference to its methodological approach and its analytic procedures and techniques, critical linguistics tries to marry a method of linguistic text analysis with a social theory of the functioning of language in ideological and political processes. It is for this reason that it is seen as “a marriage of Marxism and systemic-functional linguistics” (Faigley, 1992: 89) or “an odd blend of mentalism and materialism” (p.101). For textual analysis, it draws upon Halliday’s systemic grammar, Chomsky’s transformational generative grammar and Austin’s speech act theory; for social analysis, it draws on a neo-Marxist theory of discourse as informed by Antonio Gramsci, Valentin Vološinov, Louis Althusser and Michel Pêcheux. In this regard, it gives special attention to the grammar and vocabulary of texts by laying emphasis on such linguistic and grammatical processes as transitivity, modality, classification and transformation or as nominalisation, passivisation, lexicalisation and thematisation.

The major contention here is that these linguistic and grammatical processes - for example, the deletion or suppression of agency as in the case of passive transformations - reflect ideologically significant features of texts. At the same time, it pays close attention to language and ideology, language and power, and language and society – the relationship between language, ideology, power and society – a point linking it with a neo-Marxist analysis (Birch, 1989: 167-168; Carter, 1997: 79-82; Faigley, 1992: 89-104; Fairclough, 1989: 2-5, 1992: 25-30; Fowler, 1991: 66-67; Fowler and Kress, 1979a: 191-196; Mills, 1995: 10-14; Van Dijk, 1998: 3).
The Hallidayan mode of analysis built into critical linguistics is pinpointed by Fairclough (1992: 26) thus: “critical linguistics … takes a Hallidayan position, in contrast with the practice of mainstream linguistics and sociolinguistics, in taking complete texts (spoken or written) as the object of analysis.” This is a point also stressed by Kress (1990: 88-89) when he asserts that “critical linguistics has from the first time taken text as the linguistic unit, both in theory and in description/analysis … categories that have been particularly prominent have been transformations, transitivity (or case-grammar analysis), modality forms (modal auxiliaries, adverbial modifiers, mental process verbs), forms of embedding, and subordination and coordination.”

Likewise, the neo-Marxist mode of analysis underpinning critical linguistics is encapsulated by Mills (1995: 10) as follows: “Critical linguists such as Hodge and Kress have shown that meaning does not simply reside in a text but is the result of a process of negotiations and a set of relations between the social system within which the text is produced and consumed … They draw on explicitly political theorists such as Valentin Voloshinov and Michel Pêcheux to focus on how language can be a motivating force in the way that people define and are defined by others.”

The same sentiment is echoed by Fairclough (1992: 29) in a different but related context when he contends that “what is at issue more generally is the exclusively top-down view of power and ideology in critical linguistics, which accords with an emphasis one finds also in the Althusserian approach of the Pecheux group … on social statis rather than change, social structures rather than social action, and social reproduction rather than social transformation.” It is this view that accounts for the centrality of the notions of ideology and of social structures in critical linguistic analysis (cf. Grimshaw, 1981; Montgomery and Allan, 2002; Pêcheux, 1982; Simpson, 1993). A critical linguistic analytic procedure follows the pattern, “diagnosis first, interpretation and therapy [later]” (Wodak, 1989: xiv). This analytic mode is referred to as a “diagnostic textual interpretation” (Richardson, 1987: 145).
2. 2 Fowler et al. (1979)

Critical linguistics is the label applied to methods developed by a number of British and Australian linguists (for example, Fowler et al. 1979, Kress and Hodge 1979). Their work is concerned to analyse how underlying ideologies are embodied in linguistic expression. They examine how syntactic rules serve and reveal ideological frameworks often using news texts for data (Bell, 1991: 214).

The manifesto for critical linguistics, a marriage of Marxism and systemic-functional linguistics came in the 1979 Language and Control, written by four scholars who were then teaching at the University of East Anglia: Roger Fowler, Robert Hodge, Gunther Kress, and Tony Trew (Faigley, 1992: 89).

This section deals with aspects of critical linguistics as represented by Fowler et al. (1979). In particular, it highlights the views of the latter’s CL in relation to both mainstream linguistics (as represented by Noam Chomsky and Ferdinand de Saussure) and conventional sociolinguistics (as represented by William Labov).

The work of Fowler et al. (1979) proceeds from three Hallidayan assumptions. The first assumption argues that language is functional in that all language - spoken and written - takes place in a specific context of use; that is, it is functional in respect of human needs. The second assumption contends that language is systemic in the sense that all its elements can be explained by means of their functions. The third one views the relationship between form and content as not arbitrary but as systematic, as the former signifies the latter. This third assumption brings Fowler et al.’s views on language closer to the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis that asserts that language determines thought. However, instead of focusing on different languages as Sapir and Whorf did, Fowler et al. concentrate exclusively on English, thus linking language use directly to social structures and ideology (cf. Faigley, 1992: 89-90).

The Sapir-Whorf hypothesis or Whorfianism has two versions to it: linguistic determinism and linguistic relativity. Linguistic determinism posits that language is the “shaper of ideas, the programme and guide for the individual’s mental activity” (Whorf, 1956: 212) and that “linguistic differences determine differences in world-views”
(Simpson, 1993: 163; cf. Cameron, 1992: 134). Linguistic relativity is, on the contrary, informed by the principle of relativity which holds that:

All observers are not led by the same physical evidence to the same picture of the universe, unless their linguistic backgrounds are similar ... Users of markedly different grammars are pointed by their grammars toward different types of observations and different evaluations of externally similar acts of observation, and hence are not equivalent as observers but must arrive at somewhat different views of the world (Whorf, 1956: 214 and 221).

Fowler (1991: 29 and 30) emphasises the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis within the context of critical linguistics as follows:

The Sapir-Whorf hypothesis combines the twin assumptions of linguistic relativity and linguistic determinism. Relativity hypothesizes that languages differ radically in their structures ... Now, relativity would extend to any aspect of linguistic structure, including particularly vocabulary, and it is well known that different languages possess different vocabulary systems relating to roughly comparable conceptual areas ... The point is that different languages not only possess different vocabularies (and other aspects of structure), but also, by means of these linguistic differences, they map the world of experience in different ways ... Critical linguistics extends the principle of relativity to variable structures within a single language as well as between different languages.

According to Fowler (1991: 28-32), critical linguistics espouses linguistic relativity and the weaker version of linguistic determinism. The latter hypothesises that language users are likely to categorise their experience in tune with the mental map shaped by the semantic structure of their habitual linguistic usage. That is, it views language as helping people to sort things out and think about the world in terms of their common sense since it lends structure to their experience and shapes their ways of looking at the world.

Moreover, Fowler et al.’s critical linguistic work explores the way in which language functions in social and political practice. In this context, it is premised on at least four central propositions. First, mainstream linguistics is ineffectual as an instrument of analysis since it separates linguistic form from linguistic content; second, variation in
language is inseparable from socio-economic factors; third, language is impregnated with ideology; and fourth, language serves a manipulative and controlling role (Faigley, 1992: 90; Fairclough, 1992: 26-27; Fowler and Kress, 1979a: 185-196; Fowler et al. 1979: 1-5).

Regarding the first proposition, Fowler et al. take a swipe at mainstream linguistics. They fault, in particular, formalist linguistics as represented by Noam Chomsky. They do so by rejecting and challenging two related dualisms dominating current linguistic theory: the separation of meaning from style or expression (abstracting content from form); and the distinction drawn between linguistic structures and their actual instances of use. This second distinction, contends Thompson (1984: 118), relates to the dichotomy between linguistics and sociolinguistics.

These two dualisms are reflected in Chomsky’s theory of transformational generative grammar. This theory posits a linguistic binarism between deep and surface structures and between linguistic competence and linguistic performance. Linguistic competence here denotes an idealised and virtual language while linguistic performance has to do with an actual, real-world language. In addition to forging a dichotomy between deep structures and surface structures, it posits the same linguistic binarism for concepts such as I-language (internal language) and E-language (external language), universals and particulars, syntax and semantics, and language structures and social contexts. In all, it privileges the first set of concepts over the second set of concepts. That is, this linguistic theory ignores linguistic context and situation and the social functions and meanings of language, as according to it, meaning is embedded within syntactic rules of grammar and not within any other linguistic or social structures (cf. Birch, 1989: 134-135; Chomsky, 1965: 14; Fowler and Kress, 1979a: 187-189; Smith, 1999: 31-39; Williams, 1992: 159-161).

These two prevalent dualisms also underscore Saussure's structuralist linguistics. Saussurean structuralist linguistics is premised on classical binarism as it relates to concepts such as langue (language) versus parole (speaking), internal linguistics versus external linguistics, synchrony versus diachrony, speech versus writing, signifier versus signified, and syntagm versus paradigm. Correspondingly, this linguistics accords

The second proposition relates to mainstream or conventional sociolinguistics - as espoused by William Labov - into which, Fowler and Kress (1979a: 189-194) argue, the same dualistic tendency has made its way. Here Fowler et al. take issue with conventional sociolinguistics as advocated by Labov for differentiating between social structures and linguistic structures and between language and language use. They accuse it of maintaining that the link between language and society is arbitrary and accidental. They also do the same for its espousal of correlational or variationist theory which hypothesises that variables in linguistic structures correlate with variables in types of situation, speakers, subject areas, and class contexts in a rule-governed way; and that speech variation (variants in pronunciation in particular) corresponds to the socio-economic class of speakers. Of course all of this Labovian sociolinguistic paradigm has to do with variation as it occurs in phonological, morphological and syntactic structures of language perceived to correlate with sociolinguistic patterns such as social class, context, region, age, gender, ethnicity, and so on, which are definable in quantitative terms (Fowler, 1991: 32-34; Fowler and Kress, 1979a: 190-194; cf. Pennycook, 1994: 115-121; Williams, 1992: 67ff).

Fowler et al. counter the twin dualisms built into both mainstream linguistics and Labovian sociolinguistics with the Hallidayan socio-semiotic view of language. So, against the first dualism, they advance the socio-semiotic view that “language is as it is because of its function in social structure” (Halliday, 1973: 65) and go on to argue that the access people have to language is determined by the relative positions they occupy in the social system. Against the second dualism, Fowler et al. support Halliday’s view of the grammar of language as systems of options from which speakers make selections according to existing social circumstances, provided these options have contrasting meanings and their choices are meaningful. In respect of mainstream sociolinguistics, Fowler et al. contend that linguistic variations reflect the structured social differences and

The third proposition derives from the view - both explicit and implicit in Fowler et al.’s critical linguistic work - that ideology permeates and is encoded by language. Here language or language use is seen as a form of ideological impress and ideology itself is construed as linguistically mediated. Both language - and by extension language use and linguistic meaning - and ideology are regarded as inseparable. Hence, the twin assertions that “the systems of ideas which constitute ideologies are expressed through language” (Hodge, Kress and Jones, 1979: 81) and that “the analysis of language is thus a necessary part of any attempt to study ideological processes: through language ideologies become observable” (p. 81). Crudely put, the main contention of Fowler et al.’s work in this regard is that no language use and form is impervious to ideological influence as there are no raw, uninterpreted ideology-free facts (cf. Trew, 1979a: 95-97).

This view ties in with the belief that language does not occur in contextless vacuums. Rather, it is used in contexts which are impregnated with the ideologies of social systems and institutions. Thus, it reflects and constructs these ideologies. It is for this reason that language is so central to the understanding and analysis of ideology in Fowler et al.’s critical linguistic work (Birch, 1989: 17-18; Simpson, 1993: 5-6). Fowler (1991: 67) aptly sums up this point: “The method of applied language analysis known as critical linguistics ... was devised in response to ... problems of fixed, invisible ideology permeating language ... Critical linguistics seeks, by studying the minute details of linguistic structure in the light of the social and historical situation of the text, to display to consciousness, the patterns of belief and value which are encoded in the language.”

The fourth proposition serves as a leitmotif of Fowler et al.’s critical linguistic work. It stems from the Whorfian-Marxist ontology underpinning Fowler et al.’s critical linguistic work in addition to the Hallidayan socio-semiotic theory undergirding their work. In the main, it is concerned with the view that language is a tool of control, manipulation,
mystification and distortion. In the context of Fowler et al.’s work it is people (individuals or groups) having power and status who are perceived to be using language to control and manipulate those who do not have power. That is, powerful people use language to control, manipulate, mystify and distort reality, ideology, worldviews and thoughts of the less powerful.


The other aspect of this proposition is that language use embodies and encodes specific views or theories of reality. This has to do with the view that language embodies and constructs reality and worldviews and that certain texts embody particular ideologies (Birch, 1989: 132; Fairclough, 1992: 26; Fowler, 1991: 28-30; Hodge and Kress, 1993: 5-6 and 62-64; Simpson, 1993: 163-164).

Through Fowler et al.’s work - and the four central propositions related to it - critical linguistics projects itself as both a differential linguistics and a differential discourse in respect to mainstream linguistics and sociolinguistics. It controverts the Chomskyan formalism and Saussurean structuralism underpinning much of mainstream linguistics and charges that mainstream linguistics is not “a powerful tool for the study of ideological processes which mediate relationships of power and control” (Fowler and Kress, 1979a: 186) as “it is not a neutral instrument for the study of ideology” (p. 186). It
does the same with mainstream sociolinguistics which it accuses of elevating objectivity
and scientificity over power dynamics and ideological workings.

In this regard, it is “concerned not simply to describe the link between society and
language, but to see language being used as a form of social control” (Mills, 1995: 11).
This is so since for it “language serves to confirm and consolidate the organizations
which shape it, being used to manipulate people, to establish and maintain them in
economically convenient roles and statuses, [and] to maintain the power of the state
agencies, corporations and other institutions” (Fowler and Kress, 1979a: 190). In so
doing, critical linguistics sets itself up as a form of ideology critique and as an anti-
Cartesian linguistics rejecting not only mainstream modern linguistics and
sociolinguistics per se, but also the formalism and structuralism, and the Cartesian
dualisms and positivism underpinning them (Birch, 1989; de Beaugrande, 1998; Fowler
et al., 1979; Martin, 1997; Melrose, 1996).

2. 3. Kress and Critical Linguistics

There is now a significant and large body of work which enables us
to see the operation of ideology in language and which provides at
least a partial understanding of that operation. Some, perhaps the
major, problems remain. I take these to be around ‘what now’?
Having established that texts are everywhere and inescapably
ideologically structured, and that the ideological structuring of both
language and texts can be related readily enough to the social
structures and processes of the origins of particular texts, where do
we go from here? (Kress, 1985a: 65).

This part explores Kress’s (1985a, 1989, 1990; cf. Kress and Hodge, 1979; Hodge and
Kress, 1993) views on CL. Its primary emphasis is on the following related elements:
Kressian theorisation of text; Kressian theorisation of discourse; and Kressian
theorisation of ideology.

Kress’s critical linguistic work addresses three related aspects which up to now seem to
have occupied the minds of most critical linguists in their theorisation of language. These
aspects are text, discourse and ideology. It is for this reason that Hodge and Kress (1988: vii) maintain that “critical linguistics is a theory of language whose aim [is] to provide an illuminating account of verbal language ... for the use of critical linguists ... who [want] to explore social and political ... processes as they act through and on texts and forms of discourse” (my emphasis).

2.3.1 Kressian Theorisation of Text

Kress conceptualises text as a conversation, a debate, an interview, a tutorial, an essay, a sale, a sports commentary, a memorandum, a novel, an editorial, a political speech, a joke, a sermon, a seduction, and so on. Text in this sense does, at the same time, serve as a genre which is highly conventionalised and ritualised and which arises out of specific problematics. There is a Hallidayan view attached to this sense of text: text is both a social action and a social event and is part of social structures and social processes. One of Kress’s main theses is that texts are a mode of semantic expression and a material form of language. Texts are here regarded as significant units of language as it is through them that linguistic meanings find their expression and as it is through them that language manifests itself. That is, they are seen as providing meanings to language and discourse, and thus, as giving material realisation to both language and discourse. So, the belief is that an understanding of textual processes offers the possibility of a linguistic theory essential for language in toto (Kress, 1983: 122-125, 1985a: 74 and 81, 1989: 447-450).

Kress (1985a: 81) has this to say about this thesis: “Language always happens as text, and not as isolated words and sentences ... Texts arise in specific social situations and they are constructed with specific purposes by one or more speakers or writers. Meanings find their expression in text[s] ... Texts are the material form of language; in particular, texts give material realization to discourse. Hence the meanings of texts are in part the meanings of the discourses which are present in and have given rise to a specific text.” A similar line of thought is evident in Kress’s contention that “it is in the text, language in its non-particulate aspect, that the complex of questions of social system, the agentiveness of language users, the reproduction of the linguistic/social system in
exchange of meanings, and the change of social/linguistic system in the production of text as a social action and as a social event can be addressed” (1989: 447).

The other main thesis that Kress puts forth is that texts are shaped and influenced by the social structures and processes of which they are a part. Social structures and social processes in this case include the aggregate features and conditions constituting the specific contexts or situations in which texts take place. Classic examples are social factors such as gender, ethnicity, class and race; power, statuses and the linguistic and social histories language users have in relation to each other (structures of power and domination and social positionings characterising language use); and the purposes and goals language users have concerning their interaction. All of these factors have an aggregate effect on the form and shape a given text can assume (Dellinger, 1995: 2-4; Kress, 1983: 122-125, 1985a: 74 and 81, 1985b: 6-7, 1989: 447-450, 1990: 86-88; Hodge and Kress, 1993: 201-203). Thus, Kress (1985a: 67-68) maintains that theorising about and focusing on both text and language as aspects of social structures and processes and not as purely correlates of social and cultural matters, allows him - and other critical linguists - to deal better with the politics of texts than mainstream linguists do.

Within this theoretical conceptualisation, Kress (1985a, 1989, 1990) advances four related hypotheses. Firstly, he argues that any text takes place in the interaction of linguistic agents who have particular positionings in the complex of social structures. These social positionings are related to the linguistic and social histories of language users and are shaped and determined by social structurings which are complexly constituted. The same is true of the linguistic choices made by language users - they too are determined by and rooted in the social structures and their corresponding social practices. That is, “the sets of linguistic choices made by speakers in particular places in complexes of social configurations ... are the effects of and determined by the contingent social practices and meanings of the structures in which linguistic agents make their choices, and produce their texts” (Kress, 1989: 448). Put differently, “users of language, due to their socio-cultural positionings, have a particular stance towards the set of codes, which make up a language” (Kress, 1990: 86).
Secondly, Kress contends that texts are produced and reproduced in social structures typified by inequitable distributions of power and domination. This then guarantees differential access to the various components of language (e.g. choice and code) among language participants. Kress underscores this contention as follows: “Linguistic processes including the production of texts take place in social structures characterized by unequal distributions of power; that is, in structures of domination. Structures of difference have their effect everywhere in producing [and reproducing] inequalities of power. Through the experience of texts which are made by inequalities of power, linguistic/social subjects are trained into assuming certain positions in given texts” (1989: 449; cf. Hodge and Kress, 1993: 202-203). Choice in this regard “is a category that captures and reflects, on the one hand, degrees of power and control at issue ... and on the other hand, the potential degrees and characteristics of real - not determinate - action which are available to participants in linguistic interactions, whether spoken or written” (Kress, 1990: 88).

Thirdly, he maintains that every text is produced out of dialogic interactions - whether past interactions built into a dialogue characterised by social/linguistic positioning or whether a new dialogue of co-present speakers. The key concepts in this interactional sphere in which texts are produced are the three Bakhtinian concepts: dialogism, heteroglossia and intertextuality. Texts in this context are viewed both as encodings of choices of certain language users situated in one place in the social system and as encodings comprising a complex of social positionings of all the other participants in the formation of the text.

Fourthly, he asserts that texts constitute and position language users or that language users are constituted and positioned by texts. The central belief here is that language users are linguistic and social agents who are formed by the experience of texts, the latter being the products of the meanings of the linguistic/social positions. There are, argues Kress (1989: 447-450, 1990: 86-88), vast differences in the amount of social experiences and social positions that texts embody and which result in language users being positioned or constructed in a number of differing ways. This is to say that, “the differing
social experiences and present positionings leave language users placed in particular ways” (Kress, 1989: 449).

Allied to this conception of language users as linguistic and social agents constituted by texts, is the view of language users as linguistic and social subjects constructed by texts. This latter view has to do with the contention that language users are linguistically and socially constructed by texts through the lived social histories of their experiences. Kress (1989: 449) captures this view aptly: “as socially constructed, subjects in a social/linguistic interaction bring with them into the construction of a text, all the lived history of their experience.” He continues: “Language as text always instructs its users to take on certain positions in particular interactions, trains them to be certain kinds of subjects in certain kinds of texts. As fully effective users of a language we have been instructed into recognizing certain routinized kinds of texts and their assignment of differential positions of power. That is, we have become appropriate subjects for certain kinds of text, those which are relevant to our social positions” (p. 449).

This is, Kress (1989: 447-450, 1990: 86-88) further argues, a theorisation of the social/psychological make-up of language users whose subjectivities and histories are embedded in social structures and processes. It is a Foucauldian view of text in which subjects are produced not only by texts but by social institutions as well. In other words, it maintains that “institutions produce particular kinds of subjects: gendered subjects being one kind” (Kress, 1989: 450).
2.3.2 Kressian Theorisation of Discourse

Institutions and social groupings have specific meanings and values which are articulated in language in systematic ways. Following the work of the French philosopher Michel Foucault, I refer to these systematically organized modes of talking as DISCOURSE (Kress, 1985a: 68).

Kress conceptualises discourse in its Foucauldian sense as a systematically organised set of statements giving expression to the meanings and values of institutions. In this way, discourse provides a set of statements about a specific area, and organises and offers structure to the way in which a particular topic, object, or process can be talked about by providing rules, permissions, prohibitions and descriptions of individual and social actions. It serves to define, describe and delimit what is possible and what is not possible to say (Kress, 1985a: 67-68, 1985b: 6-7, 1989: 450; cf. Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1983: 62-68; Foucault, 1983: 250).

From this theoretical basis, Kress advances three related arguments concerning discourse. In the first instance, he points out that discourses embody exhaustiveness and inclusiveness. By this he means that discourses attempt to account both for an area of immediate concern to an institution and for increasingly wider areas of concern. A typical example is the discourse of sexism which determines the way in which the biological category of sex is naturalised into social life as gender. This discourse, contends Kress (1985a: 67-75), specifies what women and men may be, how they are to think of themselves, how they are to think of and relate across genders. Beyond that, the discourse of sexism determines what families - and the relations within them - may be. Above all, it permeates all other spheres of social life, specifying what jobs are suitable for what gender and why this is the case. Other types of discourses are the discourses of morality, religion, authority, politics, science, knowledge, aesthetics, etc (cf. Hodge and Kress, 1993: 62-66; Kress, 1989: 450, 1990: 87-90).

In the second instance, Kress argues that discourses do not exist in isolation but within a larger system of other, and sometimes, contradictory, opposing or differing discourses.
Added to this, is the idea of *colonisation*. This pertains to the fact that discourses colonise social life. Colonising discourses tend to resolve or suppress contradictions; at the same time, they tend to naturalise and normalise social reality. Kress (1985a: 73) puts this latter point rhetorically and punningly as follows: “when the social is made natural and when everything is both ‘obviously natural’ and ‘naturally obvious’ what then is there to talk about?” He further avers that:

> In the colonization of areas of social life, discourses (in their operation [as] texts) attempt to reconcile contradictions, mismatches, disjunctions and discontinuities within [a given] domain by making that which is social seem natural and the problematic seem obvious. The effect is that the areas accounted for within one discourse offer no spaces for analysis ... If the domination of a particular area by discourse is successful, it provides an integrated and plausible account of that area which allows no room for thought; the social will have been turned into the natural (Kress, 1985a: 72).

In the third instance, Kress maintains that discourses constitute individuals. His major point here is that individuals’ speaking/listening and reading/writing practices are determined by their positions in institutions, by their place within certain discourses, and in particular, by their place in intersecting sets of discourses. This particular perspective assigns individuals certain social and subject positions and assumes that individuals have their social and subject positions constructed for them by discourses. Accordingly, readers occupying the same discursive positions as those embodied in a discourse or text, are likely to be compliant readers. That is, they are likely to view the world constructed by familiar discourses as natural, whereas those occupying different discursive positions are less likely to adopt reading and subject positions constructed for them by textual discourses. So, the argument here is that the discursive history of each individual bears the traces of the discourses associated with the social places which the individual occupies and experiences and that the social or discursive history and position of an individual determine their access to the set of discourses available in society (Kress, 1985a: 67-75, 1990: 86-90; cf. Hodge and Kress, 1988: 4-7, 1993: 201-203; Van Dijk, 1993: 254-260).
The discourse-based theory of language characterised above, recognises, so argues Kress (1985a: 73-74), the social determination of an individual’s knowledge of language and individual differences and differing positions relative to the linguistic system. This, then, makes it different from mainstream linguistic theories which do not recognise social determination and differing social subject positions. It is also distinct from mainstream linguistic theories in that it insists that meaning does not exist outside discourse and that power is the effect of discourse (cf. Hodge and Kress, 1993: 158-159).

2. 3. 3 Kressian Theorisation of Ideology

Kress (1985a, 1985b, 1989, 1990) maintains that ideology refers to a systematic body of ideas organised from a particular point of view: it is a partial and false consciousness into which language is immersed. Seen in this way, ideology is a subsuming category which encompasses metaphysics, sciences and other ideologies such as political ideologies. Kress links ideology to language and discourse. There are two premises attendant on ideology. The first premise states that theories of language are theories of ideology. This is theorising language in its materiality as ideology. It is a belief rooted in the view that “the analysis of language is ... a necessary part of any attempt to study ideological processes” and that “through language ideologies become observable” (Hodge et al., 1979: 79 and 81).

The same view also informs Fowler et al.’s critical linguistic work. Related to this premise is the fact that language encodes ideology, and as such, no meaning is inseparable from ideology. That is, language - together with its attendant structures - is the carrier of ideological meanings. Hodge and Kress (1993: 208) pinpoint this aspect thus: “The signs of syntax are always ideologically inflected social meanings ... These meanings are ideological in two senses: as representations of social existence, and as traces ... of discursive positionings.” In addition, they point out that “ideological forms are structures of meaning ... that are inseparable from a set of practices that are themselves kinds of meaning” (p. 210).
The other aspect related to the first premise is that ideology encodes reality. This is a point which Hodge and Kress (1993: 15) emphasise when they state that “ideology involves a systematically organized presentation of reality.” The same point is alluded to by Hodge et al. (1979: 81) when asserting that: “Ideologies are sets of ideas involved in the ordering of experience, making sense of the world. This order and sense is partial and particular.” This is a Whorfo-Marxist view of ideology in which linguistic processes such as transformations and classifications are seen as ideologically distorting, suppressing or mystifying instances of language use as in the case of passives (cf. Durkin, 1983: 102-104; Grimshaw, 1981: 764-765; Hardford, 1980: 472-473).

The second premise links ideology to social structures and discourses, and views it as constituting and constituted by both discourse and social structures. Hodge and Kress exemplify part of this premise thus: “Ideological analysis of discourse must take full account of the ideologies inscribed in discursive practices ... The various dimensions of context ... [have to] be analysed as a series of actionals and relationships that carry important social meanings, the ideological meanings of the discourse itself” (1993: 210).

2.4 Fairclough and Critical Linguistics

Critical discourse analysis (CDA) ... is an approach to discourse analysis developed within the field of critical linguistics (CL). Linguists working within this field subscribe to a conflictual view of the nature of society and of social change ... [They] see groups as constantly in conflict, with dominant groups seeking to build and maintain their hegemony and subordinate groups seeking to wrest power from them, and change as the [inevitable] outcome of the struggle (Luckett and Chick, 1998: 82).

This section examines Fairclough’s (1989, 1992, 1995; cf. Fairclough, 2000) ideas on CL. The major areas of focus here are: Fairclough and language; langue and parole; ideology, discourse and power; common sense as an ideological framework; and hegemony as an ideological framework.
There are four notions that Fairclough (1989, 1992, 1995, 2000) focuses on in his critical linguistic theory: these are language, ideology, discourse and power. It is worth pointing out in advance, however, that Fairclough’s work falls more within the critical discourse analysis paradigm than within the critical linguistics paradigm. Nonetheless, there are elements of his work - particularly those which are related to the conflictual view of society (cf. 1989) - which lend themselves well to aspects of critical linguistics.

Fairclough’s brand of critical linguistics espouses a conflict theory of society and takes the view that conflict and change are inevitable in any society. This view differs fundamentally from functionalist approaches underscoring much of traditional sociolinguistics which regard society as a system characterised by a state of equilibrium and stability. Fairclough posits society as ridden by inequalities and by competing divisions and interests which lead to pervasive social struggles manifested in different levels and in different institutions of society. The type of social struggle and conflict built into his critical linguistic theory is class-based: it conceives of class in its classical Marxian terms as referring to differing relations of the means of production (capital versus labour) rather than seeing it simply in terms of socio-economic variables.

Inherent in this view is the fact that different classes occupy differing positions in the economic structure, and as such, have essentially antagonistic interests and differential access to the means of production and to social practices such as language, discourse and power. This then constitutes the basis for social struggle and for a dialectical relationship characterising social classes. In this way, Fairclough’s critical linguistic work falls within critical social theory (Fairclough, 1989: 31-37, 1992: 65-75, 1995: 16ff; Luckett and Chick, 1998: 82-83; Wade, 1997: n.p.; cf. Chouliaarki and Fairclough, 1999: viiff; Thomas, 2002: 1-6; Van Dijk, 1993: 250-255).

2. 4. 1 Fairclough and Language

In common with most critical linguists, Fairclough views language in terms of its materialist sense both as a form of social action and practice and as a form of discourse.
The materialist view of language radically departs from the conventional view of language as an autonomous, fixed and stable system of sentences characterising mainstream linguistics and sociolinguistics. Rather, it regards language as an unfixed and dynamic system linked to society, social structures, ideology and power. It is this particular conception of language, and the analysis based on it, which makes it critical. Fairclough (1989: 5) puts this point rather succinctly: “critical is used in the special sense of aiming to show up connections between language, power and ideology.” And these connections are inherently dialectical in nature.

2. 4. 1. 1 Langue and Parole

As is the case with most critical linguists (cf. for instance, Fowler and Kress, 1979a; Fowler et al., 1979; Hodge and Kress, 1993; Kress and Hodge, 1979), Fairclough impugns mainstream linguistics for its heavy reliance on and for its being influenced by the Saussurean dualistic view of language. The major Saussurean dualistic tendency he takes issue with is the langue-parole dichotomy underpinning much of mainstream linguistic theory. Mainstream linguistics, Fairclough argues, privileges langue over parole. It does so by constructing itself as an abstract, unitary and static system concerned with the idealised aspects of language and not with the actualised and practical uses of language.

In addition, it regards the study of langue (language) as invariant, synchronic, ahistorical and asocial and that of parole (speaking) as variant, diachronic, historical and social. It then contends that in any study of language, langue be accorded more status and attention than parole. However, Saussure’s parole - “what is said or written” (Fairclough, 1989: 20) - is more individualistic than simply social. In this regard, Fairclough maintains that the study of language should be concerned with the socially determined use of language - and not simply with the langue-parole binarism - and that the idea of sociality as opposed to individuality be built into parole (Fairclough, 1989: 6-8 and 20-22, 1992: 65-75; cf. Birch, 1989: 47-49; Cameron, 1992: 22-24; Pêcheux, 1982: 57-59; Pennycook, 1994: 115-119; Vološinov, 1973: 55-65).
In the same vein, he impugns mainstream sociolinguistics for being heavily influenced by and relying on the Saussurean *langue-parole* dichotomy and for being positivist in its orientation. He points out that one way in which this Saussurean dualistic conception manifests itself in mainstream sociolinguistics is through the practice and rhetoric of standardisation. His contention here is that standardisation strives for uniformity, homogeneity and invariance at the expense of diversity, heterogeneity and variance by privileging one standard variety of a given language over many other varieties of the same language and by according it a higher status than the rest of the other varieties. Thus, Fairclough argues that the practice of standardisation has much to do with ideology, power and social struggle, and as such, tends both to serve the interests of the dominant bloc and to act as *cultural capital* controlling access to positions of power and influence. By so arguing, he brings a conflictual view into his theorisation of *langue* and *parole* (Fairclough, 1989: 6-8 and 20-22, 1992: 65-75; cf. Pennycook, 1994: 115-119; Tollefson, 1991: 12-17; Wade, 1997; n.p.).

With reference to the positivist practice which predominates in mainstream sociolinguistics, Fairclough asserts that this practice is reflected by the tendency to mechanically correlate sociolinguistic variations in linguistic forms (phonological, morphological and syntactic forms) with standard sociological variables such as social class, education, occupation, etc., and use pseudo-natural scientific methods to describe and interpret them. According to him, what is missing in this mechanical correlation of sociolinguistic variations with sociological variables, and the positivist conception informing it, is the Marxist conception of classes and the social struggle or conflict characterising such classes. That is, Fairclough wants sociolinguistics to build conflict theory into social variables and sociolinguistic variations and to view the relationship existing between them as dialectical (Fairclough, 1989: 7-8, 1992: 70-75). This is a point he highlights thus:

Social classes in the classical Marxist sense are social forces which occupy different positions in economic production, which have different and antagonistic interests, and whose struggle is what determines the course of social history. In terms of this conception of social class, the sociolinguistic facts can be seen as the outcome
of class struggle and represent a particular balance of forces between classes. This conception of social class points to the ‘why’ and ‘how’ questions (1989: 8).

2. 4. 2 Ideology, Discourse and Power

The term ideology is open to multiple interpretations. However, for the current purpose, a brief characterisation of Larrain’s (1979: 13ff, 1994: 291-292) and Thompson’s (1984: 1ff, 1990: 3ff) typologies of ideology is necessary for a proper understanding of Fairclough’s conceptualisation and use of ideology. Larrain identifies two views of the concept of ideology: the neutral and negative views. The neutral concept of ideology regards ideology as a system of ideas and beliefs; and the negative or critical concept of ideology refers to a distortion of thought or reality which masks and conceals the real relations and social contradictions of society. This critical view of ideology entails illusionary or erroneous perception of human circumstances which underlies mystifying interpretation of socio-economic relations and their attendant class interests and conflicts. As such, it is related to orthodox Marxian conflict theory (Larrain, 1979: 13ff, 1994: 291-292; cf. Wade, 1997: n.p.).

In the same breath, Thompson makes a broad distinction between views of ideology that are inherently neutral and those that are essentially negative or critical. He argues that the neutral views characterise modern sociological and anthropological theory and that they are not typical of critical linguistic work. Regarding the critical views of ideology, Thompson further draws - unlike Larrain and in contrast to classical Marxist traditions - a distinction between views that regard ideology as illusionary, erroneous or impractical and those which see it as sustaining or expressing relations of domination. He contends that the first subdivision of negative ideology is concerned mainly with the pejorative uses of the term, and that the second subdivision has its roots in the writings of Marx and Engels, one of the major assertions of which is that the ruling ideas of any society are those of the ruling class.
Furthermore, he establishes the link between language (especially meaning) and ideology and between language and power, and focuses on how language is implicated in and facilitates forms of ideology, power and domination. Of great significance is the fact that he highlights the capacity of ideology to naturalise social relations e.g. relations of power and domination, and to present them as common sense (Thompson, 1984: 1ff, 1990: 3ff; cf. Wade, 1997; n.p.). Thus, both Larrain’s and Thompson’s ideological frameworks fall within the tradition of critical social theory with Thompson’s reformulated concept of ideology representing a revised version of this tradition. It is this critical conception of ideology as characterised by both Larrain and Thompson and the dialectical interface between language, ideology, power and domination as theorised by Thompson that encapsulates Fairclough’s own conceptualisation and use of ideology as will become clear below.

Fairclough espouses a critical view of the concept of ideology which at times borders on the pejorative. For him ideology serves to maintain social relations (e.g. relations of class, power and domination) and does so through manipulating language or meaning with a view to disguising or obscuring those relations (Chouliaraki and Fairclough, 1999: 30; Fairclough, 1989: 31-42, 1992: 65- 75, 1995: 15-19; cf. de Beaugrande, 1999: 266-272). That is, his treatment of ideology blends Thompson’s elements of the critical view of ideology with Larrain’s own critical version of ideology. He sees ideology as an instrument for sustaining and reproducing dominant relations of power and class whilst also regarding it as having an element of falsity (distortion, illusion, control or consent) (cf. Fairclough, 1989: 32-37, 1992: 15-17; cf. Thomas, 2002: 3-4; Van Dijk, 1998: 1-8; Wade, 1997; n.p.). Fairclough reflects on some aspects of his critical conception of ideology as follows:

A more indirect way of attacking ideological critique is to use the concept of ideology in a neutral way without its critical edge ... as virtually synonymous with ‘worldviews’, so that any group has its particular ideology corresponding to its interest and position in social life. What makes a theory critical is that it takes a ‘pejorative’ view of ideology as a means through which social relations of power are reproduced ... In my view, particular representations and constructions of the world are instrumental (partly in discourse) and
important in reproducing domination; they call for investigation and critique and the force and specificity of the concept of ideology has come from its deployment in the critique of these processes. If the concept of ideology is to be used, it should be used critically (1995: 17).

Most significantly, Fairclough (1992: 86-87) makes three other theoretical claims about ideology which are based on the Althusserian theorisation of ideology. The first claim is that ideology has a material existence in institutional practices. The second claim is that ideology interpellates subjects and that this leads to the constitution of subjects. The third one is that ideological state apparatuses (education, religion, media, etc) are both stakes in and sites of class struggle which entails the struggle in and over language and discourse.

2. 4. 2. 1 Common Sense as an Ideological Framework

From the critical tradition outlined above, Fairclough (1989: 204, 1992:77-108, 1995: 27-53) locates ideology within the Gramscian conceptual framework of common sense. Common sense refers to commonly accepted and taken-for-granted assumptions, practices or conventions. It has to do with the familiar common-sense world of everyday social interactions and expectations which control actions of members of society. Most of these assumptions, practices and expectations are implicit and backgrounded, and are rarely questioned as they tend to work themselves into ideological common sense. One such social practice is the doctor-patient consultation or interview which embodies common-sense assumptions, conventions and expectations which treat hierarchy and authority as natural. Once common-sense practices such as interviews - with their attendant asymmetrical power relations - become natural and are accepted as such, the process of ideological naturalisation sets in. Ideological naturalisation takes place when people are “no longer aware of the hierarchies and systems which shape their social interactions” (Simpson, 1993: 6).

Alongside ideological naturalisation, Fairclough maintains, is the practice of ideological rationalisation which refers to explanations and reasons offered to justify common-sense
or naturalised ideologies (1989: 91-95, 1995: 42-46; cf. Wade, 1997: n.p.). He pinpoints the nexus between naturalisation and rationalisation thus: “Explanations should be seen as rationalizations which cannot be taken at face value but are themselves in need of explanation. We can see rationalization as part and parcel of naturalization: together with the generation of common-sense discourse practices comes the generation of rationalizations of such practices, which serve to legitimize them” (1989: 92). So, for him, both naturalisation and rationalisation are implicated in common sense.

Within this common-sense ideological framework, Fairclough argues that language, discourse and power function as convenient modes through which ideology manifests itself. He contends that ideologies are closely linked to language and language use as using language is itself the commonest form of social interaction and the type of social interaction through which common-sense assumptions, practices and conventions occur. There are twin points he makes in this regard. First, he asserts that ideology is pervasively present in language. Second, he maintains that the ideological nature of language should serve as one of the major concerns of modern social science theory and practice since language is a major locus of ideology (1989: 2-5 and 22-28).

In addition, he points out that ideology invests language in multiple ways and at various levels, and that it exists in potential underlying linguistic elements such as structures, codes, varieties and expressions. Ideology in this manner, resides also in texts: it invests such features of texts as content, form, coherence, meanings, presuppositions, implicatures and metaphors at various levels. All this is made possible by the fact that language is a material form of ideology (1995: 70-75). However, Fairclough cautions that “while it is true that the forms and content of texts do bear the imprint of ideological processes and structures, it is not possible to ‘read off’ ideologies from texts” (Fairclough, 1995: 71).

Moreover, Fairclough posits that both language and ideology are implicated in power relations - language and ideology are some of the means through which the modalities and the workings of power can be studied and understood. His contention concerning
language is that it is the primary medium of social control and power, and that as such, it merits attention in the study of the concept of power. That is, he attempts to establish a place for language in society as it is centrally involved in power and in struggles for power through its ideological properties. He believes that language partly contributes to the domination of some people by others, that there is a connection between language use and unequal relations of power, and that there is a gross under-estimation of the significance of language in producing, maintaining and changing social relations of power. The point is, language in this context is seen as helping encode common-sense assumptions that are ideologically shaped by relations of power - it is caught up in domination and oppression. He nonetheless offers a caveat that power should not be simplistically reduced to language (power is not a matter of language alone) as the latter is one aspect of a social process through which power can manifest itself (1989: 1-7 and 17-18; cf. Preece, 1998: 82-86; Wade, 1997; n.p.).

Similarly, he views power in terms of common sense and naturalisation. He argues that the exercise of power in modern society is primarily attained through ideology and that ideology serves to justify and legitimate the existence of relations of power and inequality by making them appear commonsensical or natural and unchallengeable. He characterises the ideology-power interface as follows: “Ideologies are closely linked to power, because the nature of the ideological assumptions embedded in particular conventions ... depends on the power relations which underlie the conventions; and because they are a means of legitimizing existing social relations and differences of power, simply through the occurrence of ordinary, familiar ways of behaving which take these relations and power differences for granted” (1989: 2). According to him, ideological common sense is common sense in the service of sustaining and reinforcing unequal power relations and ideology has its maximum effect when its workings is least visible - when its functionings are most disguised or hidden. The other aspect he advances is that the power to represent one’s practices as universal and common-sense complements economic and political power (1989: 1-6 and 77-86, 1995: 17-18 and 70-80; cf. Wade, 1997: n.p.).
Furthermore, Fairclough (1989: 28-56, 1992: 67-70) theorises discourse in terms of ideology and power. He asserts that discourse is a favoured vehicle of ideology and that social practices (e.g. classroom talk, interviews, etc.) which are routinely encoded through discourse, embody ideological assumptions which operate as common sense. The central point here is that discourse is implicated in the functioning of ideology and that ideological power (including political and economic power) is exercised and maintained through discourse. Discourse, according to Fairclough (1989: 28-37), is subject to and determined by social structures in the form of social institutions such as the judiciary, education, the media, etc. Social institutions have different sets of discourse types or “orders of discourse” (1989: 28; 1995: 2) which together define the form of discourse in each of these institutions.

Discourse, either as discourse types (interviews, counselling, therapy, or advertising) or as orders of discourse, is implicated in relations of power and domination. Thus, Fairclough (1989: 43-62) argues that discourse is a place where relations of power are enacted, exercised, reproduced and legitimised. In his view, there is *power in discourse* and *power behind discourse*. *Power in discourse* is concerned with powerful groups controlling and constraining actions of the less powerful groups such as in doctor-patient encounters or in interviews characterised by unequal and differential power relations. *Power behind discourse* refers to instances in which the entire social order of discourse is put and held together as a hidden or disguised effect of power. The power behind the media discourse, the medical encounter discourse and the standard language discourse, are typical examples of such instances.

Fairclough also offers a dialectical perspective of both *power in discourse* and *power behind discourse* as in the following case: “We might say that, in terms of ‘power in discourse’, discourse is the site of power struggles, and in terms of ‘power behind discourse’, it is the stake in power struggles – for control over orders of discourse is a powerful mechanism of sustaining power” (1989: 74). This dialectical view of discourse provides a basis for Fairclough’s ideological framework as embedded in hegemony.
2. 4. 2. 2 Hegemony as an Ideological Framework

Fairclough’s second ideological framework is related to hegemony. That is, he locates his theorisation of language, ideology, discourse and power within the Gramscian conceptual framework of hegemony. Hegemony – which serves as the centrepiece in Gramsci’s elaborated analysis of Western capitalism and revolutionary strategy (cf. Fairclough, 1995: 75) – refers to, according to Fairclough (1992: 91-94, 1995: 72-78), leadership, domination or power cutting across different social domains. It constitutes alliances or blocs - unstable equilibria – of diverse economically defined classes or social forces (both dominant and subordinate) which are achieved through either force (coercion) or consent. In other words, it acknowledges the need to integrate subordinates as opposed to simply dominating them by involving them in alliances and offering concessions to win their consent. In particular, it is construed in terms of constant struggles between blocs or classes waged over the highest points of instability so as to either build, reinforce or dismantle economic, political and ideological relations or alliances of domination or of subordination.

This conceptualisation of class, social and ideological struggles in terms of hegemony permeating different strata of society – with the concomitant formation or fracturing of alliances – has the notion of class conflict and of a dialectical relationship built into it. Most importantly, the idea of hegemonic struggle involves the structuring and restructuring and the articulation and re-articulation of ideological complexes (cf. Clegg, 1989: 104 and 159-161; Laclau and Mouffe, 1985: 65-71 and 134-144; Thomas, 2002: 5-6).

Within this conceptual framework, Fairclough views language in terms of hegemonically dialectical social, class and ideological struggles. His contention is that language is “both a site of and a stake in class struggle, and [that] those who exercise power through language must constantly be involved in struggle with others to defend (or lose) their position” (1989: 35). Many struggles – social, class and ideological – pre-eminently take place in and over language since “language is … a stake in social struggle as well as a
site of social struggle” (p.88). The struggle over language entails ideological and power struggle. For instance, having the power to determine which word meanings and which communicative or linguistic norms are legitimate, correct or appropriate is a crucial element of social and ideological power involving ideological struggle.

According to him, hegemonic language struggles reflect forms of hegemonic struggle and conflict existing between dominant and subordinate languages, dominant and subordinate discourses, dominant and subordinate classes, etc. The relationship characterising these hegemonic language struggles and conflicts is oppositional and dialectical in nature. That is, a subordinate language (or discourse) may be in an oppositional or dialectical relationship to a dominant one. Some of the subordinate languages identified by him are anti-languages (such as the criminal underworld and non-standard social dialects) which, he argues, are set up and used as alternatives to dominant or established languages. These anti-languages serve as examples of counter-hegemonic languages or discourses (1989: 88-91).

Hegemonic ideological struggles or conflicts manifest themselves, maintains Fairclough (1989: 86-89, 1992: 91-96), through ideological variation or diversity. That is, no single all-powerful (hegemonic) ideology exists on its own: there are many other counter-hegemonic ideologies within any society or any social institution which exist alongside the dominant ones. All this is occasioned by differences in power, positions, experiences and interests existing between social groupings. Such groupings could be social classes differentiated by gender, age, political allegiance, etc., like women and men, children and parents, pupils and teachers, or the public and the police involved in ideological struggles at different social and institutional levels. The ideological variation or diversity which is part of the hegemonic ideological and power struggle sets limits to ideological common sense or ideological uniformity as it gives rise to competing and conflicting ideologies (Fairclough, 1989: 31-35, 1992: 93-96; cf. Laclau and Mouffe, 1985: 65-71; Thomas, 2002: 5-6).
2. 5 Critical Reactions

Critical linguistics – in all its various versions – constructs itself as the only appropriate and suitable alternative linguistics in relation to mainstream linguistics and conventional sociolinguistics for studying language, ideology, power, social structures and other related social practices. However, in studying the functionings of ideology and power in language, critical linguistics resorts to the old tried-and-tested linguistic and grammatical processes such as transitivity, modality, classification and transformation (nominalisation, passivisation, lexicalisation and thematisation) characterising not only mainstream linguistics but also everyday language use. For instance, transformations constitute the basic part of Chomsky’s theory of transformational generative grammar (cf. Chomsky, 1957, 1965).

So, if ideology together with its functionings is tied to transformations or to other syntactic structures as is the case with critical linguistics as represented by Fowler et al. (1979), Kress (1985a, 1989, 1990), Hodge and Kress (1993) and Fairclough (1989, 1992, 1995), then Fowler et al.’s dual claim that their “linguistic theory emerged through many valuable experiences” (1979: 4) and that their collaborative work constitutes “an original, critical and practical theory of language in society” (p. 4) seems a bit too far-fetched and too self-congratulatory as there appears to be no inherently new theory in their work. Eclectically combining different and already existing linguistic theories – Halliday’s functional linguistic theory (a theory of language as a social semiotic), Chomsky’s transformational theory of syntax, Austin’s and Searle’s speech act theory, the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis, and the Marxist theory of language (cf. Fowler, 1991: 8, 1996: 5-11; Fowler et al., 1979: 3; Hodge and Kress, 1993) – and adapting them differently and controversially as most critical linguists do, hardly constitutes any original theory of language or of society (cf. Durkin, 1983: 101-102; Murray, 1981: 743-745; Widdowson, 1998: 137-138). Widdowson provides a caveat against this eclectic use of theories and their related concepts because of their instrumental value: “This would suggest that analysis is not the systematic application of a theoretical model, but a rather less rigorous
operation, in effect, a kind of *ad hoc* bricolage which takes from theory whatever concept comes usefully to hand (1998: 137).

Fowler et al. crisply sum up their eclectic fusion of different linguistic theories and models: “We have chosen the most fully developed of contemporary functional theories, that of M. A. K. Halliday … we have freely selected from it and adapted it to our purposes … We have also supplemented it with concepts from other linguistic models: for instance, we have used transformational descriptions of syntax where appropriate, and have also taken concepts from speech act theory” (1979: 3). The same is true of Fairclough’s work: it does not constitute any original theory of language, ideology and power as it draws loosely and eclectically from the linguistic theory of Halliday, the Marxist (conflict) theory of Gramsci and Althusser and the poststructuralist theory of Foucault (cf. Fairclough, 1989: 2-13, 1992: 91-94, 1995: 70-78).

In fact, there is work on language, ideology and Marxism that predates Fairclough’s. Althusser’s (1971), Vološinov’s (1973), Pêcheux’s (1982) and Thompson’s (1984) works are but some of the classic examples. Murray (1981: 743) offers the following cautionary note regarding Fowler et al.’s critical linguistic work in particular: “when authors claim for themselves an original theory of language in society (as do Roger Fowler et al. in *Language and Control*) resting on ignorance and presenting themselves as strongly critical of the dominant currents within the disciplines … when they do not seem to have discovered the water, let alone currents in it, questions of scholarship cry out.”

There is a tendency on the part of Fowler et al.’s critical linguistics to assign too much functionalist role to language: language controls, manipulates, distorts and mystifies reality and the way language users perceive the world. This conspiratorial functionalist role of language which is tied to linguistic processes and grammatical structures such as transitivity, modality, classification and transformation is highly suspect as language plays other roles than simply the conspiratorial functionalist one. For instance, assertions such as “transformations always involve suppression and/or distortion” (Hodge and Kress, 1993: 35), “the typical function of transformations is distortion and mystification”
(p. 35), and “in practical terms, the interview is a mechanism of control of one individual by another” (Fowler et al., 1979: 2) represent the most pessimistic conspiratorial view that can be attached to language. This view of language makes a mockery, particularly, of Fowler and Kress’s (1979a: 196) contention that “we do not say that authors and speakers deliberately obscure or mystify their aims or that language is generally an instrument of conscious conspiracy to conceal and distort.”

Widdowson (1998: 141) portrays this conspiratorial function of language as follows: “Transformations do not only result in subordination but in suppression, they do not only delete information, they distort it. Always. Transformations are, then, anthropomorphically pragmatic and always represent the exercise of power.” Murray (1981: 744) takes a swipe at this conspiratorial functionalist role assigned to language: “conveying information is not the sole function of language and … there is a modality (outside the verb system in English) that [Fowler et al.] regard all language use as mystification and every feature of language as modal.” He continues: “Information is not its sole function, nor is control by obfuscation. One major function, completely neglected by Fowler et al., is to create and preserve smooth social relations (between equals as well as unequals). This frequently requires sacrificing clarity to politeness” (p. 744). Moreover, this often requires sacrificing specificity, definiteness and directness to politeness.

In fact, linguistic processes and structures such as transitivity, modality, classification and transformation are part of everyday language, so to view them in terms of conflict and conspiracy theory every time they are used by language users, is tantamount to a simplistic and artificial characterisation of them. Most importantly, language by its very nature serves multi-functional purposes: it is used to entertain, and make jokes and humour; to please and console; and to negotiate, solve problems, greet; etc. All of these multiple uses of language constitute one of the major areas of focus for pragmatics and sociolinguistics. Thus, to reduce language use only to a conspiratorial view, is to have an inherently narrow and restricted view of it which runs counter not only to a scientific
study of language but also to a prosaic understanding of it. This then constitutes a “functional fallacy” (Widdowson, 1998: 139) in the true sense of the word (cf. Murray, 1981: 744; Widdowson, 1996: 68-69).

Closely related to the conspiratorial view attached to language, is the critical linguistic contention that language encodes, embodies, controls, mystifies and distorts reality, worldview, thought, meaning and ideology. Encapsulated mainly in the work of Fowler et al., Kress, and Hodge and Kress, this contention reflects a Whorfo-Marxist view built into critical linguistics. There are a number of shortcomings inherent in this view. Firstly, this view entails linguistic determinism in the strongest sense of the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis despite a disclaimer by Fowler (1991: 31) that “we shall in no sense be adopting an extreme pseudo-Whorfian position” (cf. Fairclough, 1992: 26; Fowler et al., 1979: 1-2; Hodge and Kress, 1993: 5-7 and 14).

When reality, worldview, thought, meaning and ideology are reduced to the dictates of language in this way, and when language is conceptualised deterministically in this manner, that is nothing short of linguistic determinism. Hardford (1980: 472) characterises this aspect of critical linguistics as follows: “[Fowler et al.] … are concerned with the role of language as a tool for the creation, maintenance, and transmission of social ideologies, where members of particular institutions control others through language. They regard this use of language as deterministic, in the strong sense of the Whorf-Sapir hypothesis.” However, bringing in the mystificatory and distorting conspiratorial view to this Whorfian linguistic determinism, adds an element of Whorfo-Marxism to it, a point Durkin (1983: 102) refers to as “the crux of Whorfo-Marxism … which assumes that language imposes the precepts of the powerful and sometimes opposing forces on the larger society.”

Secondly, this view portrays the relationship between language (linguistic features, syntactic features or textual features) and social meanings and ideology in straightforward and transparent terms. That is, despite a critical linguistic insistence that “there is no predictable one-to-one association between any one linguistic form and any
specific social meaning” (Fowler and Kress, 1979a: 198), and that “it is not possible to ‘read off’ ideologies from texts” (Fairclough, 1995: 71), in practice, values are mechanically attributed to particular linguistic and syntactic structures such as passive and nominal clauses having no agents.

Examples are a passive sentence such as *Boy shot from close range* formed from *Police shot boy from close range* and a nominal clause like *Picketing ... curtails coal deliveries* derived from *Strikers picket a factory and curtail coal deliveries*. Here the argument is that since the agents (doers of action) are deleted or hidden in both the passive and nominal clauses, this type of syntactic process serves a mystificatory ideological function (cf. Fowler, 1991: 71-78; Fowler and Kress, 1979a: 207-210; Hodge and Kress, 1993: 20-23; Trew, 1979a: 197-111). What this view ignores, though, is that in English passive and nominal trasformations allow optional deletion of agents, or - more neutrally - are fully grammatical without specification of agents (Pateman, 2002: 9-15).

The same is true of Kress’s and Fairclough’s contention that texts and discourse express meaning. The inherent limitation with this contention is that it tends to do exactly what critical linguistics claims it does not do. It assumes that there is a predictable correspondence between syntactic and textual structures on the one hand, and social structures, social practices and social and ideological meanings on the other hand. That is, it presupposes that social meanings and ideology can be read off syntax (and off language in general) in a linear format such as syntax → social structure → social meaning → ideology when that is not necessarily the case.

The point is, social structures, social meanings and ideology cannot be simply read off language or texts, and least of all, they cannot be read off syntax. Syntactic or textual analysis does not equal ideological analysis, as Fairclough (1989), Fowler et al. (1979), Hodge and Kress (1993), and Kress (1983, 1989, 1990) would want us believe. In fact, searching for ideology or traces of ideology embedded in syntax, vocabulary, grammar or texts amounts to suggesting that all these linguistic structures or texts themselves are a mirror-image of ideology (cf. Davies, 1999: 20-34; de Beaugrande, 1999: 269-272; Luke,
Widdowson sounds a strongly worded warning in this regard: “we still have ideological meanings read off from textual features, linguistic forms ‘conveying’, ‘carrying’ or ‘representing’ significance; and we still have talk of ‘linguistic-ideological’ moves as if these were necessarily the same thing” (1998: 142).

Another limitation inherent in critical linguistics is its exclusively one-sided and top-down reproductive view of language, discourse, power and ideology. Rooted in the Althusserian dominant ideology thesis, this view sees dominant ideologies (the ideologies of the powerful) as being almost incessantly reproduced by language, texts and discourse. It also sees language, texts and discourse as maintaining, sustaining and reinforcing existing social structures such as asymmetrical power relations and relations of domination. Whilst this reproductive nature of language, texts and discourse is much more pronounced in the work of Fowler et al, Kress, and Kress and Hodge, it is not so in the case of Fairclough’s work as it gets toned down by his theory of hegemony and its related hegemonic or dialectical struggles. However, there are instances in which this reproductive thesis also creeps into Fairclough’s work as when he argues that discourse and ideology serve to legitimise and justify relations of power and inequality by making them appear natural; and when he argues that hegemony involves reproducing, transforming or challenging dominant relations of power, dominant ideologies, dominant discourses and dominant orders of discourse.

A further shortcoming is related to the view that language, texts and discourse constitute or position language users or individuals. This view, which is more prominent in Kress’s work – and is evident in Fairclough’s work to a certain extent – has to do with the constitution of the subjectivity of language users by either language, texts or discourse. While this notion of subjectivity is not explained in any terms except to refer to it as agentive or subject position (cf. Fairclough, 1989: 38-42; Kress, 1989: 447-449), a noteworthy point about it is that it is a loose borrowing of an Althusserian interpellation of the human subject by ideology and of a Foucauldian constitution of the human subject by discourse (Montgomery and Allan, 2002: 4-9; Pêcheux, 1982: 104-109).
Nonetheless, in critical linguistics it is the Althusserian figure of interpellation that gains the upper hand, as in the final analysis, social structures, language, texts and discourse tend to reproduce language users’ subject positions (positionings) in the same way as ideology does in Althusser’s work. Referring to this notion of subjectivity as it relates to Hodge and Kress’s (1993) work in particular, Widdowson (1998: 140) points out that their work tends to ascribe representational subjectivity to linguistic features embedded in texts. He adds that this is not, however, a straightforward task as “subjectivity is taken to be a function of linguistic features which are not actually there but only virtually present, not part of the text at all but of the sentences which are derivable from the text” (also cf. Widdowson, 1995: 170).

Allied to the above limitation, is the narrowly conceived view of power and ideology in critical linguistics. Except to make reference to Althusser and Foucault as in the case of Fairclough (1989, 1992, 1995, 2000), there is no attempt to define and explain the concept of power in critical linguistics. Indeed, much of the critical linguistic work is replete with concepts such as power, domination, struggle, inequality, exploitation, subject position, etc., concepts which are neither defined nor explained whilst being pervasively and loosely used in most cases. As Thompson (1984: 126) notes of Kress and Hodge’s (1979) work elsewhere: “their writings are replete with terms like ‘agency’, ‘power’, ‘control’, ‘domination’, ‘social structures’, but nowhere are these terms clearly defined and structured within any systematic social theory.”

Similarly, ideology is ill-defined in much of critical linguistics. Except for Fairclough who locates it within the Gramscian common-sense and hegemonic framework – and within the Althusserian reproductive model – and who espouses a critical view of it, ideology is vaguely defined and loosely used by most critical linguists. For instance, Hodge and Kress (1993: 6) define ideology as “a systematic body of ideas, organized from a particular point of view” (also cf. Kress and Hodge, 1979: 6). Likewise, according to Hodge et al (1979: 81) “ideologies are sets of ideas in the ordering of experience, making sense of the world.”
This conception of ideology is simplistically tied to classes and classification. That is, just as different classes in society – social classes, social groups, ethnic groups, etc. – supposedly have different systems of classification, so too they have different ideologies or different ways of ordering experience and making sense of the world (cf. Hodge and Kress, 1993: 62 and 68; Kress and Hodge, 1979: 62-68; Thompson, 1984: 126). Thus, this conception of ideology is too loose and general to merit any significance. If different groups have different ideologies, it remains to be seen which group’s ideology is relevant and how it is to be defined. Also, does this mean that individuals have as many ideologies as there are different groups to which they belong? (cf. Thompson, 1984: 126).

On the other hand, Fairclough sees ideologies in one instance as “closely linked to power” and as “a means of legitimizing existing social relations and differences of power” (1989: 2). In another instance he contends that “ideology is significations generated within power relations as a dimension of the exercise of power and struggle over power” (1992: 67). This view of ideology reflects the pejorative effects built into the critical linguistic conception of ideology. There are three drawbacks associated with this pejorative view of ideology. Firstly, ideology is seen as sustaining more exercise of power and domination. Secondly, this view persistently presupposes that ideology can be effectively deconstructed or opposed only from the standpoint of another ideology. This, however, runs the risk inherent in many leftist and Marxist critiques, of seeming to offer only opposition and negation. As such, it forecloses the possibility of developing counter-ideologies that are ameliorative and positive in nature (cf. de Beaugrande, 1999: 266-270).

Thirdly, there is a concern regarding whether all discourses – and by extension all texts and all language uses – are ideological (cf. Hodge and Kress, 1988), or only some discourses are ideological whilst others are not (cf. Fairclough, 1989, 1995, 2000; Van Dijk, 1998, 2002; Wodak, 1996a, 1996b). If both positions favour a pejorative view, then the first is thus the more pessimistic than the second in implying that power and domination will forever control discursive practices. The second position suggests de-
ideologising discursive practices – that is purging ideologies rather than replacing or changing them. How this could be achieved without engendering some disorienting ideological vacuum remains to be seen. The point is, on the one hand, a pejorative conception of ideology as used in critical linguistics, tends to link – in advance – discursive practices to ideologies of power and domination in the most intuitive and pre-theoretical ways. On the other hand, in terms of practice, this conception tends to distinguish discourses which count as ideological from the ones which are not. The implication here is that once the ideological discourses have been identified, the non-ideological ones can be left out of analyses (cf. de Beaugrande, 1999: 266-270; Widdowson, 1995: 167-171, 1998: 145-148, 2000: 10-23).

Finally, both analysis and interpretation are conflated in most critical linguistic work. This practice stems from the fact that there is no systematic linguistic and social theory and no methodological framework guiding the processes of analysis and interpretation. Sometimes linguistic analysis and interpretation are equated with ideological analysis and interpretation. It is for this reason that, more often than not, linguistic, textual and discursive features tend to be read off as ideological features or significances. That is, “what critical linguists typically do is to make inferences about ideological intent on the evidence of textual features” (Widdowson, 2000: 10). And they do this “by the careful selection and partial interpretation of whatever linguistic features suit their own ideological position and [by] disregarding the rest” (Widdowson, 1998: 146).

The other crucial point related to the concerns raised above is that critical linguists mount their textual analysis and interpretation without regard to the relevant contextual and social factors related to texts. That is, texts and discourses are analysed and interpreted without taking the conditions related to their production and consumption into account. Producers and writers of texts (a majority of which are newspaper texts) and consumers of these texts (who are primarily the reading public of these newspaper texts) are never consulted regarding what the original ideological motives (if any) for producing those texts are and what the attendant ideological inferences readers are likely to make of those

This practice negates Fairclough’s (1995: 9) insistence that analysis and interpretation should take the process of production and consumption into account. All there is, is the constant suppression and disregard of the instability of language and the indeterminacy of meaning and of a possible plurality of interpretations of a given text by critical linguists, aspects which their work ironically stands for (cf. Widdowson, 1995: 168-169, 1998: 146-150). This position is further highlighted by Widdowson (2000: 22) as follows: “Texts are analysed in reference to grammatical and lexical categories without regard to the way they are discoursally realized: the signification of linguistic forms is carried intact into text to be recovered as significance. The process whereby these forms interrelate co-textually with each other and contextually with the circumstances of their use is left largely unexplored. Text is treated as a kind of static semantic patchwork, existing as an object for analysis in its own right.”

2. 6 Conclusion

This chapter has had a three-fold objective: to provide an overview of critical linguistics; to offer a comprehensive and detailed discussion of some of the authorities associated with critical linguistics – in particular Fowler et al. (1979), Kress (1985a, 1989, 1990; cf. Hodge and Kress, 1993; Kress and Hodge, 1979) and Fairclough (1989, 1992, 1995, 2000); and to mount a critical analysis of this form of linguistics. The overview has focused on the historical origins of critical linguistics, the type of linguistics it is, and what constitutes it, while the critical analysis has foregrounded some of the concerns, shortcomings and weaknesses raised by scholars such as Grimshaw (1980), Hardford (1980), Murray (1981), Richardson (1987), and Widdowson (1995, 1996, 1998, 2000) regarding critical linguistics. The contention here is that, in order to have a proper sense and perspective of how critical linguistics as a brand of linguistics, as a perspective, and
as an approach, originated, and how it has developed to the level where it is now, it is vital that these three aspects be outlined and delineated for perspectival clarity.
Chapter Three

Postmodernism: Issues, Trends and Current Debates

3. 0 Introduction

As is the case with the previous chapter, the main objective of this chapter is three-fold: to provide an overview of postmodernism; to offer a comprehensive and detailed discussion of three postmodern thinkers, Jean-Francois Lyotard (cf. Lyotard, 1984), Michel Foucault (cf. Foucault, 1972, 1980) and Jacques Derrida (cf. Derrida, 1976, 1982); and to provide a critical analysis of postmodernism as represented by these thinkers. The overview focuses on the historical origins of postmodernism, and on some of its varieties and approaches. The critical analysis foregrounds some of the concerns, shortcomings and weaknesses of postmodernism as raised, on the one hand, by Jürgen Habermas (cf. Habermas, 1984, 1987) and, to some extent, by Thomas McCarthy (cf McCarthy, 1993), and on the other hand, by Paul R. Gross and Norman Levitt (cf. Gross and Levitt, 1994). It also includes a critique of some of the views and observations made by Habermas and by Gross and Levitt in relation to postmodernism. The argument here is that, in order to have a proper sense and conception of postmodernism as a theory, as a perspective and as an approach, it is necessary that these three aspects be outlined and delineated for perspectival clarity.

3.1 Postmodernism: An Overview

Many scholars and theorists seem not to have a unanimous agreement about what the term postmodernism generally means and about when it precisely originated as a movement, as a cultural expression, as a perspective, theory or approach and thus tend to regard doing so as a futile exercise (cf. for instance, Benko, 1997: 10-12; Faigley, 1992: 3-5; Giroux, 1991a: 18-19, 1991b: 227-229; Hassan, 1987: 85-88; Kvale, 1992a: 1-2, 1992b: 31-32; Smart, 1992: 142-143; Usher and Edwards, 1994: 2-10). Hassan’s observation that “postmodernism suffers from a certain semantic instability: that is, no
clear consensus about its meaning exists among scholars” (1987: 87) is relevant in this case. And so is Benko’s view that “as an umbrella term for a wide variety of tendencies, postmodern (sic) suffers from a definitional imprecision that reflects its heterogeneous content” (1997: 11). In this study, though, I will attempt to briefly delineate a historical origin and provide a description of postmodernism without being definitive and prescriptive since its origin is uncertain (Hassan, 1987: 85) and as no one can unambiguously define it (cf. Hassan, 1987: 85-88; Hollinger, 1994: 169-177; Lash, 1990: 4-5).

Postmodernism has its genealogical origin (in its current forms and uses) in the 1950s, the 1960s and the 1970s - even though some scholars trace its historical origin and use to an earlier period (cf. for example, Cahoone, 1996: 3-4; Hassan, 1987: 84-90; Huyssen, 1990: 241-251; Smart, 1993: 18-22). It made its mark in architecture in the 1960s and gained currency in literary criticism, aesthetics and sociology - but not necessarily exclusively - between the 1960s and the 1970s. Its early use in literary criticism in particular came through the term “postmodernismo” (Smart, 1993: 19) which refers to a “kind of exhausted and mildly modernismo” (p. 19). It became increasingly prominent in America during the 1960s where it assumed a form of avant-gardist cultural movement which focused on the innovative temporal imagination, the iconoclastic attack on the institution and ideology of art and the promotion of popular culture. However, the earliest signs and foundations of postmodernism as a theoretical perspective and as an analytical approach are to be found in the works of Nietzsche and Heidegger (cf. Eagleton, 1996: 62 and 132; Hollinger, 1994: 106-112; Waugh, 1992a: 6-8, 1992b: 192).

It is in social theory and in philosophy that postmodernism has made its greatest impact. Here French thinkers such as Jacques Lacan, Jacques Derrida, Michel Foucault, Luce Irigaray, Julia Kristeva, Jean-Francois Lyotard, and Jean Baudrillard and American thinkers such as Frederic Jameson and Richard Rorty are some of the prominent postmodern thinkers. Some of these figures are also regarded as poststructuralists - e.g. Derrida, Foucault and Irigaray - while others are regarded as feminist scholars as well - e.g. Irigaray and Krestiva (Bordo, 1990: 136-145; Erasmus, 1998: 13-17; Griffiths, 1995: 58
Still, some of these thinkers like Lacan and Foucault, for example, are at times regarded as structuralists (cf. Parker, 1992: 67 and 109; Wuthnow, Hunter, Bergesen and Kurzweil, 1984: 135-140).

One important point to note here is that the figures outlined here are not sole advocates of postmodern theory and thought. Neither do they advocate one homogeneous form of postmodernism. The contrary is true - they focus on diverse aspects of postmodernism. In fact, Kvale (1992a: 3) points out that, inter alia, Lacan interprets the psychoanalytic unconscious; Derrida addresses language and deconstruction; Foucault analyses power-knowledge relations from a genealogical perspective; Lyotard analyses the status of science and knowledge in the postmodern age; Baudrillard focuses on seduction and the hyperreality of simulacra (the simulation of signs); Jameson treats postmodernism as the logic of late capitalism; and Rorty employs a neo-pragmatic approach to postmodernism. Here it would be logical to talk of Derridean, Foucauldian, Lyotardian, Baudrillardian, Jamesonian, and Rortyan postmodernisms.

There are three aspects delineated in this section. These are: varieties of postmodernism; approaches to postmodernism; and schematic representation of postmodernism and modernism.

3. 1. 1 Varieties of Postmodernism

There are at least three varieties of postmodernism: artistic postmodernism, philosophical postmodernism and social-historical postmodernism. Artistic postmodernism deals with art, culture and architecture, philosophical postmodernism with philosophical issues, and social-historical postmodernism with social and historical analysis (Best and Kellner, 1997: 2-10; Faigley, 1992: 5-10; cf. Lash, 1990: 3-5). It is for this reason that Faigley (1992: 5-13) identifies three metadiscourses characterising discussions of postmodernism: aesthetic discussions of postmodernism; philosophical discussions of postmodern theory; and socio-historical assertions that the world (mainly the Western
world) has entered an era of postmodernity. These three classifications of postmodernism correspond, respectively, to postmodernism, postmodern thought and postmodernity (cf. Kvale, 1992a: 2-3). For instance, Kvale argues that postmodernism refers to the cultural expression of a postmodern age; postmodern thought relates to the philosophical reflection on the postmodern age and culture; and postmodernity refers to the postmodern age itself (1992a: 2).

3. 1. 2 Approaches to Postmodernism


Epoch postmodernism is the era or historical approach to postmodernism; it is a social or cultural era following modernism which signifies a historical periodisation and which signals a new epoch of inquiry and analysis (Gephart, Jr., 1996: 21-22; Harvey, 1989: 39-42; Hassard, 1996: 46-47). The goal of the era view of postmodernism is to identify features of the external world so as to support the hypothesis that society is moving toward a new postmodern era in which modernist social and economic structures are fragmenting into diverse networks and are bound together by information technologies. Thus, as regards epoch postmodernism, postmodernism itself serves as an object of analysis and investigation (Gephart, Jr., 1996: 21-22; Harvey, 1989: 44-51; Hassard, 1996: 46-47; Smart, 1992: 185-198).

In contrast, epistemological postmodernism reflects developments in poststructuralist philosophy and focuses on a theoretical or philosophical perspective about the status of knowledge in the postmodern era. It is a method or style of cultural production that
reconceptualises how the world is experienced and explained. It contends that the world is constituted by language and that the best way to know the world is through particular forms of discourse language creates (Gephart, Jr., 1996: 21-22; Harvey, 1989: 44-51; Hassard, 1996: 46-47; Smart, 1992: 185-198). Put differently, epistemological postmodernism serves to challenge “the very foundations of knowledge, including the teleology of history and the myth that history reflects constant progress” (Gephart, Jr., 1996: 22). In this way, it challenges the modernist conception and perspective of knowledge and the world.

Critical postmodernism - also referred to as “oppositional postmodernism” (Kincheloe and Giroux, 1994: 144; cf. Smart, 1992: 177) - is, in the main, predicated on and informed by critical theory. It is a mid-range position between “epoch postmodernism, epistemological postmodernism, and critical modernism” (Boje et al., 1996: 64) having a materialist bent and attempting to “show that textualities (significations) are material practices [and] forms of conflicting social relations” (Kincheloe and Giroux, 1994: 144). Stated differently, critical postmodernism is critical of modernism and all that it stands for - master narratives, totalisms, universalisms, foundationalisms, generalities and ahistoricism (Boje et al., 1996; Giroux, 1991a, 1991b). It is because of this critical bent that it is also regarded as resistant, reactionary or sceptical postmodernism (cf. Boje et al., 1996: 64; Briton, 1996: 30-31; Giroux, 1991b: 229-234; Kincheloe and McLaren, 1994: 143-144; Smart, 1993: 19-20). Related to critical postmodernism - but not necessarily identical to it - is ludic postmodernism which, according to Kincheloe and Giroux, concerns “itself with a reality that is constituted by the continual playfulness of the signifier and the heterogeneity of difference” (1994: 143).

Finally, feminist postmodernism is a postmodernism informed by and employing a feminist theory and epistemology or feminism - a form of social theory, epistemology and criticism (which like postmodernism comprises many and varied strands) whose main objective is to challenge and critique traditional and foundational male-oriented (masculinist) knowledge. It concerns itself with, inter alia, issues of patriarchy, race, class and sexism. Its alter ego is postmodern feminism which is a form of a feminist approach

3. 1. 3 Schematic Representation of Postmodernism and Modernism

Given the foregoing discussion, what postmodernism generally entails and how it differs from modernism can be schematically represented as in Table 3.1 below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The Modern and the Postmodern: Contrasting Tendencies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Modernism/Modernity</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Master narratives and metanarratives of history, culture and national identity; myths of cultural and ethnic origin.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Master narrative of progress through science and technology.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Faith in, and myths of, social and cultural unity, hierarchies of social class and ethnic/national values, seemingly clear bases for unity.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Faith in ‘grand theory’ (totalising explanations of history, science and culture) to represent all knowledge and explain everything.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Idea of ‘the family’ as central unit of social order: model of the middle-class, nuclear family.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hierarchy, order, centralised control.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Faith and personal investment in big politics (nation-state, party.)</td>
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<tr>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Root/Depth tropes. Faith in ‘Depth’ (meaning, value, content, the signified) over ‘Surface’ (appearances, the superficial, the signifier).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Faith in the ‘real’ beyond media and representations; authenticity of ‘originals’.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Root/Depth tropes. Faith in ‘Depth’ (meaning, value, content, the signified) over ‘Surface’ (appearances, the superficial, the signifier).</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
wholeness (art, music, and literature).

Clear dichotomy between organic and inorganic, human and machine.

Phallic ordering of sexual difference, unified sexualities, exclusion/bracketing of pornography.

The book as sufficient bearer of the word; the library as a system for printed knowledge.

culture, intertextuality, pastiche.

Cyborgian mixing of organic and inorganic, human and machine and electronic.

Androgyny, queer sexual identities, polymorphous sexuality, mass marketing of pornography.

Hypermedia as transcendence of physical limits of print media; the Web or Net as information system.

Table 3. 1– Adapted from Irvine (1998:5-7; also cf. Hassan, 1985: 123-124; Faigley, 1992: 14; Visagie, 2003: n.p)

The above schema draws on fields as diverse as linguistics, rhetoric, literary theory, media and cultural studies, philosophy, anthropology, political science and theology. It portrays postmodernism in terms of its binary stylistic oppositions to modernism. As is evident from this schema, modernist categories, practices and tendencies (in the left-hand column) are negated and sometimes, subverted by postmodernist ones (in the right-hand column). For instance, while modernism advocates meta-narratives (grand theories), unity, centred self, order, depth (seriousness), reality, mass markets and knowledge mastery, postmodernism embraces local narratives (theories), disunities, fragmented selves, disorders, playfulness, hyper-realities, niche markets and information mastery. So, accordingly, modernism stands for stability and uniformity whereas postmodernism tends to celebrate instability, heterogeneity, multiplicity and fragmentation (cf. Faigley, 1992: 14-16; Harvey, 1989: 42-44; Hollinger, 1994: 169-177). However, one of the fundamental flaws with binary tabular representations such as this one is that they fail to recognise the fact that some of the categories often attributed solely to postmodernism also appear under modernism and vice versa. I outline some of the inherent shortcomings and contradictions associated with postmodernism at the end of this chapter.

Some of the postmodern aspects, categories and tendencies delineated above are explored in the work of Lyotard, Foucault and Derrida to identify the extent to which they feature and how they manifest themselves in the theories and views of these thinkers.
3.2 Lyotard, Language and the Postmodern Condition

Lyotard has emerged as the champion of difference and plurality in all theoretical realms and discourses, while energetically attacking totalizing and universalizing theories and methods … In this way he rejects notions of universalist and foundationalist theory … Arguing against what he calls ‘terroristic’ and ‘totalitarian’ theory, Lyotard thus resolutely champions a plurality of discourses (Best and Kellner, 1997: 1).

What is significant about Lyotard’s claim for discourse analysis is the reflection on the way in which narratives work as stories about the world. Discourse is now seen as responsible for having constituted a particular reality and subjectivity in modern times, and we are invited to believe that the shattered remains of discourse hold together the moves in language in the postmodern (Parker, 1992: 70).

This part of the study is devoted to discussing Lyotard’s postmodern thought with respect to the following salient areas: Wittgensteinian language game theory and the pragmatics of speech acts; Lyotardian language game theory and the pragmatics of speech acts; agonistics of language: new pragmatic moves and turns; Lyotard, grand narratives and legitimation crisis; Lyotard, science and knowledge; and universal pragmatics, performativity and paralogy.

3.2.1 Wittgensteinian Language Game Theory and the Pragmatics of Speech Acts

One of the distinguishing features of later Wittgenstein’s approach to the philosophy of language in *Philosophical Investigations* is his concern with and his focus on ordinary language as conceptualised within the paradigm of language games as opposed to ideal languages. Wittgenstein contextualises this point of departure in his theorising of language as follows: “The philosophy of logic speaks of sentences and words in exactly the same sense in which we speak of them in ordinary life” (1968: 108e). His view of language games is related to his conceptualisation of language as a game – a chess-like game – constituted by rules and characterised by tactical moves and turns almost typical
of “communicational adversaries” (Jameson, 1984: xi). In this sense, within any language or discourse there may be different language games each with its own rules, moves and turns (cf. Hoenisch, 1998: 3-7; Lyotard, 1984: 10; Wittgenstein, 1968: 8e-12e).

The appeal to ordinary language leads Wittgenstein to break ranks with the tendency to associate the meaning of a word with the object it names. Hoenisch (1998: 3) highlights this point thus:

[Wittgenstein’s] focus on ordinary language, rather than on such ideal or logical languages, is, for instance, a rather obvious starting point for any meaningful analysis of conversation or text. Such logic-based approaches to studying meaning as … truth-conditional semantics, while they have their place in postulations about how semantic meaning may be represented in the mind or brain of a speaker, are of little help in analyzing the meaning of utterances in actual conversation.

So, with respect to Wittgenstein, language is a means of communication – that is, “language is meant to serve … communication” (1968: 3e). He sees communication in terms of the metaphor of a chess-like game regulated by rules and moves. This is a rules-governed communication and language use (Hoenisch, 1998: 7-8; Wittgenstein, 1968: 15e). That is, a determining factor for language (conversational) games is “the existence of a socially constructed network of norms or rules which define what … action will be taken” as taking “a particular type of action is a matter of satisfying socially recognized criteria” (Jones, 1998: 36). In addition, within this language game framework, Wittgenstein views language as consisting of utterances bearing varying meanings which can be understood within the contexts in which they are used. That is, within his realm of ordinary language, Wittgenstein views meaning as use related to context – (the idea of language use or meaning related to context) and, thus, as indeterminate (Hoenisch, 1998: 3-6; Wittgenstein, 1968: 43e).

Furthermore, Wittgenstein adds another element to his notion of language games and to his view of meaning as use – that of function. In this case, language including discourse in both conversation and text, serves multiple functions or purposes: it conveys thoughts,
it expresses meaning, it informs, and it performs actions. So, according to him, a function of a word or a sentence is tied up more with what it is used to do: that is, a word or a sentence is used to do something since any word or any sentence carries a functional value. His major contention here is that words perform a variety of language or communication activities such as naming, referring, saying, stating, describing, asserting, reporting, commanding, questioning, speculating, entertaining, etc (Wittgenstein, 1968: 6e-11e; cf. Hoenisch, 1998: 4-6). Wittgenstein articulates the multiple functions of words, sentences, or language as follows: “But how many kinds of sentence are there? Say assertion, question, and commands? – There are countless kinds: countless different kinds of use of what we call ‘symbols’, ‘words’, ‘sentences’. And this multiplicity is not something fixed … but new types of language, new language-games … come into existence” (1968: 11e).

In all this Wittgensteinian language game theory lie the notions of pragmatics (meaning in context) and of speech act theory (doing things with words). His dictum that “words are deeds” (1968: 46e) parallels one of Austin’s famous dictums that “the issuing of an utterance is the performing of an action” (Austin, 1962: 6). However, in contrast to Austin, Wittgenstein maintains that there is no point in developing a taxonomy of speech acts as there is an infinite multiplicity of them (see Hoenisch, 1998: 2-9; Wittgenstein, 1968: 11e).

3.2.2 Lyotardian Language Game Theory and the Pragmatics of Speech Acts

Lyotard – and by extension Lyotardian postmodernism – is largely influenced by the later Wittgenstein’s views of the philosophy of language as encapsulated in *Philosophical Investigations*. Hence, he employs the concept of *language games* which he combines with the Austinian pragmatics of speech act theory in his analysis of the postmodern condition of science and knowledge. This is a point Pefanis (1991: 90) highlights thus: “[Lyotard’s] analysis focuses, and even exaggerates, the relationship between the narrative and knowledge, and [he] devotes much energy to the analysis of the pragmatics of speech acts, since it is within their structure that conditions of authority of modern

According to Lyotard, language games are utterances or narratives. As such, they are governed by specific rules, uses and moves or turns in the same way as they are in their Wittgensteinian conception. However, while following Wittgenstein the language game rules are constituted by agreement in practice, with respect to Lyotard these rules are regulated implicitly or explicitly by a contract between players. There are three types of utterances which Lyotard identifies and which he theorises within the framework of the pragmatics of speech acts. These are denotative, descriptive and prescriptive utterances. Denotative utterances are declarative utterances or discourses of science which reflect the truth or falsehood of statements; descriptive utterances are performative statements and represent narrative knowledge; and prescriptive utterances are directive moral statements and represent justice. Prescriptive utterances can, according to Lyotard, be formulated as orders, commands, instructions, requests, recommendations, pleas, prayers, etc.

These three types of utterances influence or position the sender of a statement, the addressee and the referent in a particular way. For instance, denotative utterances place the sender as a knower (of what he or she says); the addressee as having either to provide or to withhold approval; and the referent as requiring correct identification. In contrast, performative utterances are those in which the act of uttering has an effect of producing the referent; and the prescriptive utterances bestow a degree of moral or ethical authority on the sender while requiring the addressee to oblige accordingly (Benhabib, 1990: 117-124; Connor, 1992: 110-119; Holub, 1991: 139-149; Lyotard, 1984: xxiv, 9-15). Lyotard characterises the pragmatics of his utterances within the paradigm of speech act theory, thus:
A *denotative* utterance such as “The university is sick,” made in the
*context of a conversation or an interview*… positions its sender …
itst addressee … and its referent in a specific way … If we consider a
*declaration* such as “The university is open” pronounced by a …
rector at convocation, it is clear the previous specifications no longer
apply … The distinctive feature of this second “*performative*” is that
its effect upon the referent coincides with its enunciation … A
different case involves utterances of the type, “Give money to the
university”; these are *prescriptions* (1984: 9-10).

Through the pragmatic framework in which utterances are realised as language games,
Lyotard advances a three-pronged argument: denotative utterances construct science as a
denotative language of truth and falsehood; descriptive or performative utterances
construct narrative knowledge as a performative or narrative language game capable of
tolerating other language games; and prescriptive utterances construct justice as a
prescriptive language game of ethics. The three Lyotardian utterances, do on the one
hand correspond, analogously, to the hard sciences, the human and social sciences, and
law, justice and morality respectively. On the other hand, they do represent numerous
fields or areas of study that there are in life (cf. Benhabib, 1990: 117-124; Connor, 1992:

A significant point about the pragmatics of Lyotardian utterances and their attendant
language games is that each utterance or language game has its own “pragmatics of
language particles” (Lyotard, 1984: xxiv): it has “pragmatic valencies specific to its own
kind” (p. xxiv) and it has its own rules and moves. Herein lie the multiplicity,
heterogeneity and incommensurability of utterances and language games. That is, there
are not only many and different utterances that are incommensurable and whose rules are
irreducible, but there are, equally, many and different language games that are
incommensurable and whose rules are irreducible (Lyotard, 1984: 65-66; Peters, 1995a:

So, with reference to Lyotard, “language games are heteromorphous and subject to
heterogeneous sets of pragmatic rules” (1984: 65). This heterogeneity and
incommensurability implies that utterances and language games are also untranslatable. The untranslatability and the heterogeneity characterising language games parallels the one underpinning phrase rules (Fritzman, 1995: 66-67; Lyotard, 1988: xi-xii; Lyotard and Thébaud, 1985: 53). Lyotard (1993: 21) attaches credence to this view by maintaining that ordinary language is typified by multiple phrases obeying different rules. All of this entails the notions of difference and multiplicity or plurality that Lyotard espouses in his postmodern theory of language. In this regard, Lyotard insists metaphorically, that there are always new languages which are incessantly added to the old ones with the resultant formation of new suburbs to the old town (Lyotard, 1984: 40-41; cf. Norris, 1996: 199; Peters, 1995a: xxviii; Usher and Edwards, 1995: 157).

Furthermore, Lyotard builds the ideas of indeterminacy (provisionality), dispersal, and dissolution into language games (and by extension into language). First, he sees the social bond as linguistic and as woven into an indeterminate number of language games. Second, his utterances are, within the standpoint of language games, provisional, shifting and opaque – they are subject to contractual rules and moves determined by game players (language users). Third, to him, the social subject dissolves into or is constituted by language games. That is, with reference to Lyotard, the self is always situated within nodal points of communication circuits (Lyotard, 1984: 15 and 40-41; Usher and Edwards, 1994: 157). This conceptualisation of language is, according to Harvey (1989: 46), tantamount to taking the modernist preoccupation with language and situating it within an endless linguistic indeterminacy. So, Lyotard perceives the autonomous and rational subject of liberal humanism and the collective subject of the proletariat theorised by Marxism as outmoded (cf. Faigley, 1992: 39).

3. 2. 3 Agonistics of Language: New Pragmatic Moves and Turns

To speak is to fight, in the sense of playing, and speech acts fall within the domain of a general agonistics. This does not necessarily mean that one plays in order to win. A move can be made for the sheer pleasure of its invention … But undoubtedly even this pleasure depends on a feeling of success won at the expense of an
adversary – at least one adversary, and a formidable one: the accepted language (Lyotard, 1984: 10).

The *Concise Oxford Dictionary* (1995) gives two senses of the word *agonistic: polemical* or *combative*; or *associated with conflict*. According to Lyotard, agonistics is metaphorically related to speaking or communicating as fighting, as engaging in a war of language or in a linguistic contest (Holub, 1991: 142) in which players have to make tactical moves and turns. In addition, it is his brand of pragmatics (his general agonistics) - under which speech acts fall – in which utterances (denotatives, performatives and prescriptives) are at war with each other. Frederic Jameson’s notion of communicational adversaries as paraphrased by Peters (1995b: 31) helps illuminate this agonistic nature of language: “[U]tterances are not conceived of either as a process of the transmission of information or messages, or a network of signs, or signifyng systems (structuralism, semiotics); rather, they are seen as an agonistics of language, as an unstable exchange between communicational adversaries.” This is a conflictual view of language and communication and their related utterances in the postmodern condition as Lyotard regards speech (parole) as inherently agonistic since it is a struggle for advantage over one’s own adversary (Holub, 1991: 141; Løvlie, 1992: 121). Lyotard employs an agonistic philosophy of language and pragmatics – what McLaren (1995: 108) calls “semiurgical grammar” or “the rhetorical moves of language games” – to challenge, critique and subvert the status and legitimation of, inter alia, grand narratives of modernity, science and knowledge, universal pragmatics, totality and performativity (cf. Lyotard, 1984).

3. 2. 3. 1 Lyotard, Grand Narratives and Legitimation Crisis

Lyotard (1984) defines *postmodern* in terms of incredulity or distrust towards meta-narratives (p. xxiv) and uses the term *modern* to refer to any science that legitimates itself by making an explicit appeal to meta-discourses or grand narratives such as the emancipation of the rational subject, the dialectics of Spirit, the hermeneutics of meaning, and the creation of wealth (p. xxiii). A narrative is an account of fundamental values or of metaphysical ideals which serve as sources for fundamental values. In turn, by grand
narratives – what Jameson (1984: xii and xix) calls “master-narratives” - Lyotard refers to the overarching narratives of history such as Enlightenment humanism, scientific progress and Marxism, each of which is characterised by a belief in reason and science and a faith in human emancipation. It is these grand narratives of modernity towards which he calls for incredulity (Faigley, 1992: 39; Kiziltan, Bain and Canizares, 1990: 351; Nuyen, 1992: 28; cf. Kvale, 1992b: 33).

However, there are two primary grand narratives of legitimation that Lyotard singles out and against which he directs his agonistic pragmatics: these are the grand narrative of emancipation (the emancipatory narrative) and the grand narrative of speculation (the speculative narrative). The grand narrative of emancipation has to do with political humanism and pursues the Enlightenment ideals of freedom and autonomy for the people or for the nation as its goal. It privileges science, encourages humanity’s march towards scientific progress and argues for the production of scientific knowledge. On the other hand, the grand narrative of speculation is related to philosophical idealism and emphasises truth and unity of knowledge as the major criteria legitimising modern science. That is, it calls for philosophy to restore unity to learning which it sees as scattered over many sciences. So, in this way, it calls for the unity or commensurability of different sciences or forms of knowledge (Lyotard, 1984: 33-40; Nuyen, 1992: 29-30; Usher and Edwards, 1994: 160-164).

Lyotard posits two related contentions – two related pragmatic moves and turns - concerning these grand narratives of modernity. First, he argues that in the postmodern condition these grand narratives have lost their traditional legitimating role, and thus, face a legitimation crisis. That is, he contends that they can no longer legitimise science and knowledge and points out that the legitimation crisis they face leads to their delegitimation. Hence, he calls for an incredulity towards them and he pronounces their collapse and abandonment (Lyotard, 1984: 31-41; cf. Nuyen, 1992: 29-30; Smart, 1992: 170-171; Usher and Edwards, 1994: 164-165). By so doing, Lyotard not only questions and challenges the legitimating role of modernity in the postmodern, but he indirectly addresses his pragmatics of agonistics to Habermas’s unfinished project of modernity.
Peters (1995b: 21) aptly sums up this point thus: “the subtext [here] is a polemic against Jürgen Habermas and his attempts to complete the project of modernity.” Concomitantly, the collapse of the grand narratives signals the corresponding collapse of the universal systems of thought and meaning; it also signifies the ascendency of language, pragmatics or speech acts in analysing grand narratives in the postmodern age (Kvale, 1992b: 34-35; Usher and Edwards, 1994: 165).

Second, Lyotard contends that in the postmodern condition, grand narratives are replaced by little narratives as new forms of legitimation. The little narratives are local language games and local perspectives: they share no universal meta-language and nobody speaks or masters them all since they are multiple, heterogeneous and incommensurable. In the postmodern condition, grand narratives are, insists Lyotard, “dispersed in clouds of narrative language elements” (1984: xxiv) and the future of legitimation lies much in the “pragmatics of language particles” (p. xxiv).

3. 2. 4 Lyotard, Science and Knowledge

As is the case with the grand narratives, Lyotard directs his agonistics of language at science and knowledge. That is, employing language, not least the pragmatics of speech acts, he critiques the modernist status and function of science and knowledge in the postmodern condition and argues that the leading sciences and technologies – phonology and theories of linguistics, cybernetics, telematics, informatics, computer languages, and modern theories of algebra – are all significantly language-based. He then points out that modern science fails to obscure the problem of its legitimacy and tends to resolve this problem by turning to grand narratives. But since it legitimates itself by delegitimizing other forms of sciences – in particular narrative science – and by appealing to grand narratives, this paradoxically spells its own delegitimation as the latter lose their legitimating value in the postmodern condition (Lyotard, 1984: 31-41; cf. Peters, 1995b: 28-29; Usher and Edwards, 1994: 160-161).
By the same token, he uses language to examine the relationship between scientific and narrative knowledge. He avers that these two types of knowledge operate with different pragmatics and have different language games, even though they have equal validity. Narrative knowledge allows for heterogeneity of language games, tolerates difference, presupposes a social bond between the narrator and the audience, and is falsifiable. In contrast, scientific knowledge permits only denotative utterances, rejects difference and any social bond, and is not falsifiable. So, according to Lyotard, both scientific and narrative knowledge are incommensurable but equal in status, a point reflecting the relativity he attaches to them. However, he also contends that scientific knowledge derives its legitimation from devaluing narrative knowledge. It is this self-legitimation on its part and its appeal to grand narratives which result in its self-delegitimation in the postmodern condition. This is much more so since in the postmodern age scientific knowledge – like many other leading sciences – is just another language game reduced to its narrative or language form (Lyotard, 1984: 38-41; cf. Harvey, 1989: 46-49; Kvale, 1992b: 33-34; Smart, 1992: 170; Usher and Edwards, 1994: 165).

3. 2. 5 Universal Pragmatics, Performativity and Paralogy

Furthermore, Lyotard’s agonistic pragmatics is directed against universal pragmatics. Since the chief proponent of universal pragmatics is Habermas, so Lyotard’s general agonistics of language is directed (implicitly or explicitly) against Habermas and his views as well. Briefly stated, Habermas’s theory of pragmatics explores and emphasises universal or formal principles and conditions underlying the production of utterances – the universal rules or capabilities human beings use in producing utterances. Hence, he employs the notion of universal or formal pragmatics which calls for communicative rationality, dialogue, action and consensus or agreement (Connor, 1992: 105-110; Habermas, 1979: 2, 1984: 286-295; McCarthy, 1978: 272-289, 1993: 127-138).

Lyotard rejects and dismisses Habermas’s universal pragmatics as he deems it to be encompassing and perpetuating a modernist notion of universalism. That is, he sees in this form of pragmatics elements of modernity such as universal meta-narratives,
universal meta-language, universal truth, universal consensus and rationality, and universal norms and principles with their attendant totalising effects of closure. In fact, Lyotard perceives Habermas to be preoccupied with the “Enlightenment ideals like reason and truth” (Connor, 1992: 110) – a prototypical defender of the uncompleted project of modernity and as such he views him as the last victim of meta-narratives the demise of which postmodernity has spelt out. He argues that the Habermasian dialogue represents a unicity enforcing consensus between interlocutors and that the Habermasian consensus inflicts violence on the incommensurability of language games, and as such, it is oppressive and outmoded. So, he posits the end of science is dissensus (difference) and not consensus (Lyotard, 1984: 65 and 66; cf. Connor, 1992: 111-113; Holub, 1991: 140-143; Peters, 1995b: 27 and 33).

In one more instance, Lyotard argues that in the postmodern condition legitimation of science and knowledge by grand narratives (and their attendant universal consensus) has been replaced by legitimation by performativity (by the pragmatics of performativity). Here performativity – a term embodying both Austin’s speech act theory regarding performatives and Luhmann’s systems theory in relation to optimal systems performance or efficiency (cf. Holub, 1991: 139; Peters, 1995b: 33) – becomes a new criterion of legitimation. It even ousts truth as a much sought-after value. The ascendancy and prominence of the performativity principle in legitimating knowledge is occasioned by its systemic image of society wherein political, economic and educational relations are all reduced to their operationality for optimising the system’s overall performance. That is, this principle is driven by the systemic logic which strives for the predictability, stability, regularity, consistency, continuity and determinability of the whole. As its goal is efficiency (the technical game) as opposed to truth (the denotative game) and justice (the prescriptive game), performativity is part of the technological language game in which knowledge is commodified and sold as it is now stored in data banks, translated into quantities of information and managed through information technologies. Here skills and competences are valued over knowledge itself. All of this development is, according to
Lyotard, likely to lead to the emergence of technology-related disciplines, interdisciplinarity and the death of *the Professor* (cf. Lyotard, 1984: 44-53; Peters, 1995b: 33-36).

Having said all that, Lyotard impugns the performativity principle and contends that as it strives for efficiency at all cost, it effects totality and technicism on all systems (social, political, educational, etc). He argues that postmodern science proves that systems are inherently inefficient and that their performativity is hardly achievable. He cites developments in quantum physics, metamathematics, dynamic systems, topology, and catastrophe and chaos theories to back up his contention that notions such as predictability, stability, regularity, consistency, continuity and determinism which are associated with performativity, are inherently flawed. The critical point to him, here, is that postmodern science is characterised by fractals, undecidables, catastrophes, and pragmatic paradoxes, and as such, it is discontinuous and non-rectifiable (1984: 60).

In so doing, Lyotard insists that performativity, like grand narratives, has also lost its value as a criterion of legitimation. He contends that the final seat of legitimation lies with *paralogy* which is the notion embodying dissensus, dissent and difference. His paralogy strives for invention and not innovation, questions science rather than supports it, encourages dissension while deferring consensus, and destabilises closures generated by closed economies of dialogue and meaning. Above all, it embodies new moves and new plural language games played in the pragmatics of knowledge. Thus, Lyotard plays the pragmatics of paralogy off against that of performativity (Lyotard, 1984: 59-66; cf. Kiziltan et al., 1990: 66-68; Peters, 1995b: 33-36).

### 3.3. Foucault and the Postmodern

Commentaries about Michel Foucault are apt to begin with the ambiguity of his thought and personality, an ambiguity that he actively, and indeed playfully, encouraged and delighted in during his lifetime. As one commentator has put it, ‘as he moves from one topic to another ... his purposes and methods seem to change.’ So, here, there may not be a single ‘Foucault’ to cope with ... Much, in
particular, is made of and deduced from his frequent refusal to be pinned down to specific political or intellectual positions or creeds...

(Wain, 1996: 345)

This part focuses on Foucault’s postmodern theory. It, thus, discusses the following aspects: an archive of discourses; the power-knowledge-truth triplets and the microphysics of power; Foucault, disciplinary techniques and the self; and Foucault, language, and linguistics.

The quotation cited above fairly sums up Foucault and his political and intellectual inclinations - always ridden with ambiguities, contradictions and controversies. However, in the current study, I view Foucault as a postmodern theorist and construe his work as an instance of postmodernism. In fact, there are more elements of postmodernism in Foucault’s work than anything to the contrary. Foucault’s work spans three periods, archaeology, genealogy and ethics – what some critics refer to as forms of analysis (Davidson, 1986: 221; cf. Fox, 1998: 415-430; Hollinger, 1994: 12-15 and 112-115; Hoy and McCarthy, 1994: 144-167; Larrain, 1994: 292-296; Usher and Edwards, 1994: 82-100).

3. 3. 1 An Archive of Discourses

One of the key concepts central to Foucault’s views and to his work is *discourse*. There are three aspects attached to Foucault’s ontology of discourse: discourse as a system of rules governing the production, operation, and regulation of discursive statements; discourse as discursive practices embodied in institutions, in technical processes, in patterns for general behaviour and in pedagogical forms and as non-discursive practices; and discourse as something independent of human agency and as irreducible to ideology. The first conception of discourse is an archaeological ontology of discourse while the last two conceptions are related to the genealogical ontology of discourse (Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1983: 102-103; Foucault, 1972: 29-30, 1980: 37-38; Fox, 1998: 416-420; Hoy, 1986: 3-7). According to the archaeological ontology, discourse “refers to a group of statements, that is to say statements identified as belonging to a single discursive
formation” (Smart, 1985: 40). Elaborated further, discourse, here, is a coherent system of meanings; realised in texts; about objects; and historically located. It contains subjects; refers to other discourses; reflects on its own ways of speaking; supports institutions; and reproduces power relations and regimes of truth (Parker, 1992: 6-19; Fairclough, 1992: 35-48).

Central to the archaeological ontology of discourse are issues such as how discourses are constituted, how discourses constitute institutions and how institutions constitute and regulate discourses. In this regard, the rules of discourses govern what is said and what remains unsaid; they also determine who can speak with authority and who should listen (Cherryholmes, 1988: 33-34). A group of statements or discourses functioning and operating in relation to each other in this way constitute an archive of discourses. Foucault himself defines the term archive as “the law of what can be said, the system that governs the appearance of statements as unique events” (Foucault, 1972: 129). At the same time, he points out that the archive is that which defines, determines and embodies “the system of enunciability” (p. 129). The archive is the concept which Foucault came to use in lieu of his original term episteme - which refers to rules of formation (Davidson, 1986: 222; cf. Threadgold, 1997: 59) - to emphasise the fact that there are rules of discourses that are common to unrelated disciplines of the human sciences such as biology, medicine, psychiatry, economics, and grammar and that these rules are in no way different from those that went before them and those that are to come after them (Davidson, 1986: 221-224; Foucault, 1973: 340-361; Macdonell, 1986: 82-89; Smart, 1985: 37-42; Threadgold, 1997: 58-59).

Intrinsically tied to the Foucauldian idea of the archive is the concept of archaeology. Archaeology is a conceptual tool or a method of analysis. It is a term used to describe the various levels of description and analysis of the domain of statements, the archive, discursive formations, and positivities. In addition, it has to do with a historical analysis of systems of thought or discourses (Smart, 1985: 40 and 48). Other than statements or discourses, the archaeological analysis is also concerned with rules for the formation of objects, enunciative modalities, subject positions, concepts and strategies. Foucault’s
archaeological analysis and its relationship to other Foucauldian methods or domains of
analysis is pinpointed by Davidson (1986: 221) as follows: “Three main domains of
analysis can be found in Michel Foucault’s work as a whole: an analysis of systems of
knowledge, of modalities of power, and of the self’s relationship to itself. In each of these
domains, Foucault employed very specific forms of analysis, which he called,
respectively, archaeology, genealogy, and ethics.” Both archaeology and genealogy are
the two most known forms of Foucault’s methodology (Davidson, 1986: 221-224;

Two of the domains given attention by Foucault’s archaeological analysis are knowledge
and the human sciences. The main emphasis here is on the history of knowledge and the
human sciences - hence there is a penchant for both an archaeology of knowledges and an
archaeology of the human sciences. The main objectives are: to problematise knowledge
and the human sciences by undertaking a historical analysis of the immature sciences or
subjugated knowledges; to analyse the rules underlying these domains; and to expose and
highlight the discontinuities, gaps and ruptures characterising systems of knowledges
(Davidson, 1986: 221-224; Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1983: 79-100; Foucault, 1980: 81-82;
Smart, 1985: 37-42).

In this context, Fox (1998: 417) states that “Foucault sought to develop a basis for
understanding what makes knowledge possible, to attempt an ‘archaeology’ of
knowledge, underpinned by ‘rules’ which operate independently of subjectivity” and that
this has “some aspects in common with linguistics, in which a set of grammatical rules
authorizes an infinite set of language statements” as “there is a ‘deep’ level of rules, and a
’surface’ level of discursive statements” (p. 418). Rules for this knowledge are not
formulated by participants in the discursive practices as they are not available to
participants’ consciousness. Rather, such rules are relatively autonomous and anonymous
- they are independent of and unknown to participants (Davidson, 1986: 222; Fox, 1998:
As is evident from the points highlighted above, archaeology reflects elements of postmodern theory and analysis on the part of Foucault.

3. 3. 2 The Power-Knowledge-Truth Triplets and the Microphysics of Power

The power-knowledge-truth triplets and the microphysics of power constitute Foucault’s genealogy - also referred to as the genealogy of power-knowledge. In genealogy lie further elements of Foucault’s postmodern theory and analysis. Genealogy focuses on the analysis of power, knowledge and truth – that is the link and the dynamics existing between these three elements and their effects on modern (Western) societies. It concerns itself with the political regimes of the production of truth and the modalities of power. In this sense, genealogy is more of a method than simply a theory. From a genealogical perspective, discourse is seen as discursive practices embodied in institutions, in technical processes, in patterns for general behaviour and in pedagogical forms and as non-discursive practices. It is also seen as something independent of human agency and as irreducible to ideological instances. This then constitutes the genealogical ontology of discourse (cf. for example, Davidson, 1986: 224-227; Fairclough, 1992: 40-48; Foucault, 1980: 93-97, 1988: 98-109; Fox, 1998: 416-421; Hacking, 1986: 37-39).

Genealogy has a wider scope than archaeology and marks a move away from the archaeological project as it abandons the notion of autonomous discursive formations. It searches for difference, indeterminacy, discontinuity, and disparity. There is a Nietzschean conception attached to the Foucauldian genealogy (Davidson, 1986: 224; Foucault, 1980: 53 and 133; Larraín, 1994: 293-294; cf. Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1983: 106). This Nietzschean conception of genealogy is encapsulated in the following view:

Following Nietzsche, Foucault’s pursuit of genealogy led him to be concerned with the origin of specific claims to truth, especially the claims, concepts, and truths of the human sciences. ... Genealogy does not look to origins to capture the essence of things, or to search for some ‘immobile form’ that has developed throughout history; the
secret disclosed by genealogy is that there is no essence or original unity to be discovered (Davidson, 1986: 224).

Foucault’s theorising of power and knowledge is that the two are both implicated in each other and that they are, thus, inseparable. In other words, according to him, the two go hand in hand: knowledge is power and power is knowledge. There is no way power can be properly conceived outside of knowledge and vice versa (Foucault, 1977: 26-27, 1980: 51-53; Usher and Edwards, 1994: 85-90; Usher, Bryant and Johnston, 1997: 76-82). Foucault expresses the power-knowledge nexus as follows: “Knowledge and power are integrated with one another, and there is no point in dreaming of a time when knowledge will cease to depend on power … It is not possible for power to be exercised without knowledge, [equally] it is impossible for knowledge not to engender power” (1980: 52).

Another related point here is that no body of knowledge can be formed without a system of records, accumulation, and communications which in itself is a form of power linked, intrinsically, to the other forms of power. Equally, no power can be exercised without extracting, appropriating, distributing or retaining knowledge (Foucault, 1980: 69-74, 1988: 106-108). Within this power-knowledge framework, the question as to whether discourses are true or false, scientific or ideological, rational or irrational is no longer relevant (Larrain, 1994: 294).

Foucault’s conceptualisation of power and knowledge, as characterised thus far, challenges and problematises a rationalistic and humanistic conception of these two terms which posits a separation between them - that both power and knowledge can be conceived independently of each other (Usher and Edwards, 1994: 86-87; Usher et al., 1997: 68-69; cf. Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1983: 184-187 and 203). This is a point which Larrain (1994: 293-294) expresses as follows: “In a move reminiscent of Nietzsche, Foucault goes on to affirm that power cannot be conceived apart from knowledge. He wants to abandon the humanist idea that knowledge can only be acquired in the absence of power.”

Here Foucault’s is not only an anti-rationalist and an anti-humanist conception of power and knowledge; his is also a challenge and critique of the enterprises of rationalism and
humanism and of both the Enlightenment and modernity on which both these enterprises are premised. This then places his views about knowledge within the framework of postmodernism. In fact, Foucault is a proponent of subjugated knowledges - which are local and specific. He is suspicious of global and totalitarian theories or unified bodies of theories or globalising and totalising discourses. As such, he espouses deviation, dispersion, and contingency of knowledge (cf. for instance, Foucault, 1980: 81-87; Larrain, 1994: 292; Smart, 1986: 160-166; Walzer, 1986: 54-55). That is, he espouses the notions of multiple knowledges and of difference which are so central to postmodern thought.

Truth is another aspect of Foucault’s genealogical triplets. Foucault’s main concern here is with the regimes or politics of truth. Regimes of truth are truth-claims, effects of power and knowledge, powerful discourses or discourses having the status of truth and the attendant rules and procedures for producing such discourses (cf. Foucault, 1980: 93 and 131; Fox, 1998: 416; Smart, 1986: 162-164; Preece, 1997: 121-126, 1998: 79-82). Wain (1996: 346-347) calls such rules and procedures “games of truth.” Foucault contextualises his own conception of truth and what regimes of truth are, thus:

Truth is a thing of this world: it is produced only by virtue of multiple forms of constraint. And it induces regular effects of power. Each society has its regime of truth, its ‘general politics’ of truth: that is, the types of discourse which it accepts and makes function as true; the mechanisms and instances which enable one to distinguish true and false statements (1980: 131).

Truth like knowledge, argues Foucault, is intrinsically linked to power. Here truth is power, and it is impossible to detach one from the other. In fact, Foucault talks of the power-truth couplet and argues that there can be no possible exercise of power without discourses of truth. His contention is that people are subjected to the production of truth through power and that they cannot exercise power without the production of truth (Foucault, 1980: 93). Truth also equals knowledge. In this instance, knowledge not only represents truth but also constitutes truth itself. This is a view which challenges the modernist conception of truth and which refuses to link both truth and knowledge to
ideology as Marxism does (Larrain, 1994: 295; Smart, 1986: 164; Usher and Edwards, 1994: 87). Above all, it is a view that seeks to abandon the search for objectivity and for one truth (Rorty, 1986: 44).

The Foucauldian conception of truth as represented above is a problematisation of the modernist conception of truth as transcendental, universal, objective, and absolute (Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1986: 112; Usher and Edwards, 1994: 87-88). He espouses the postmodern idea of multiple and perspectival truths which are localised and partial and which operate at diverse or multiple levels: “Truth is centred on the form of scientific discourse and the institutions which produce it; it is subject to constant economic and political incitement; it is the object, under diverse forms, of immense diffusion and consumption (circulating through apparatuses of education and information whose extent is relatively broad in the social body)” (Foucault, 1980: 131).

As is evident from the foregoing discussion of knowledge and truth, power is the third component of the power-knowledge-truth triplets. Foucault’s view of power is located within the Nietzschean framework which conceptualises power not only in terms of its relation to knowledge and truth but also in terms of its micro-relations or micro-politics - the multiple processes through which power and its techniques and their effects manifest themselves (cf. Foucault, 1980: 98-99; Larrain, 1994: 293-295; Smart, 1985: 76-80; Usher and Edwards, 1994: 88-89). This, then, means that “analysis should proceed from a micro-level (hence the concept of a micro-physics of power)” (Smart, 1985: 79). The micro-political relations of power are about power constructed and functioning on the basis of micro-political actions. Within this framework, power is neither negative nor repressive; nor is it possessed. On the contrary, it is productive and positive; it is produced at various levels, hence, it is decentred. In addition, it is circular, and diffused through manifold networks or capillary levels. It exists in multiple axes, hence, it is omnipresent (Foucault, 1980: 98-99; Flood, 1991: 313; Larrain, 1994: 292-293; Threadgold, 1997: 67-70).
There is a postmodern view about Foucault’s conceptualisation of power. Not only does he de-link power from ideology and from class and groups - dominant or otherwise in the Marxist and neo-Marxist sense - but he also decentres it. According to him, power is dispersed and has no centre - it is not located at any centre - but exists everywhere (it has multiple axes and networks). By so doing, he introduces the postmodern idea of multiplicity to the concept of power - the idea of multiple powers. Faigley (1992: 154) poignantly captures this postmodern view of power as espoused by Foucault: “Thus, for Foucault power is decentred, dispersed, discursive, and multiple in nature, and to theorize a center for power such as Marxism’s mode of production, Weber’s bureaucracies, and feminism’s patriarchy becomes a misleading and fruitless endeavor.”

3.3.3 Foucault, Disciplinary Techniques and the Self

Within his genealogical architecture, Foucault also focuses on the notions of discipline (and its relationship with power and knowledge - the disciplinary technologies of power) and of the self (and its relationship to power, knowledge and discipline - the technologies of the self). In its Foucauldian conception, the term discipline has a dual meaning: discipline as a form of regulatory power and discipline as a body of knowledge. This is discipline in its power and knowledge senses. In its first sense, discipline or disciplining functions as a technology of power; in its second sense it operates as a technology of knowledge. However, the two senses are not mutually exclusive. Rather, they are co-implicated (Faigley, 1992: 143-145; Foucault, 1977: 214-216; Smart, 1985: 85-92; Threadgold, 1997: 67-70; Usher and Edward, 1994: 91-97; Usher et al., 1997: 68-78). Usher and Edwards (1994: 93) highlight Foucault’s use of the term discipline further: “Foucault uses discipline to identify a body of knowledge with a system of social control. A body of knowledge is a system of social control to the extent that discipline (knowledge) makes discipline (control) possible, and vice versa ... As knowledge develops so also do the parallel practices of controlling the outcomes of behaviour.”

Concomitantly, disciplinary practices or disciplinary techniques manifest themselves through the workings of the institutions of modern social formations, of which education
and language are but part. Central to disciplinary techniques of power is the idea of
governmentality. Governmentality - which is Foucault’s blend for government and
rationality - refers to both state governance and conscious supervision, administration and
maximisation of the activities, forces and relationships of not only the whole population
but of the self as well. Governmentality is more effective as a form of self-regulation,
self-control, self-monitoring or self-government - when individuals tend to govern or
discipline themselves (Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1983: 134-135; Smart, 1985: 127-132;
observation regarding governmentality is more to the point in this instance:

The corollary of the expressed objective of Foucault’s various
analyses, namely to ‘create a history of the different modes by
which in our culture human beings are made subjects,’ is a
revelation of the forms of government and self-government to which
human beings have been subject, where the concept of government
refers to ‘the way in which the conduct of individuals or groups
might be directed’, that is an action or practice synonymous with the
achievement or exercise of hegemony.

There are two forms of disciplinary technologies of power linked to govermentalisation
which are of great concern for Foucault: an anatomo-politics of the human body or
discipline; and a bio-politics of the population or bio-power. These two forms of power
are directed, respectively, at making individuals more useful and docile and at
administering or managing populations. While it is the case that bio-power functions at a
macro-level both as a strategy for and as an object of the governance of human relations,
it is also the case that it and the anatomo-politics of the human body (discipline) are part
of individualising and normalising techniques. Here, the main target is the human body.
That is, the human body - the self or the subject - constitutes the locus and the critical site
for exercising modern disciplinary techniques of power (Foucault, 1980: 55-61 and 186;
al., 1997: 56-62). Discipline in this case makes and moulds individuals. It is a technique,
technology or physics of power that views and treats individuals both as objects and as
instruments of power. This type of discipline employs disciplinary techniques and
technologies of power such as surveillance, examination, confession, normalisation,

The notions of the body constituting the primary target and site of disciplinary techniques and of the technologies of power bring into the spotlight the self or the human subject. Foucault’s idea of the self is related much to the genealogy of the subject and focuses on the techniques of the self - that is “the means by which individuals can affect their own bodies, souls, thoughts and conduct so as to form and transform themselves” (Smart, 1985: 108). So, human subjects are - within the framework of power and discipline - subjects of power and objects of knowledge. That is, Foucault’s conception of human subjects is that they are both subjects and objects of action - such as power and discipline - and of knowledge and discourse. Of course here power and discipline are co-implicated in knowledge and discourse and vice versa. In this way, it follows that the self or the human subject is as much constituted in power and discipline as it is in knowledge and discourse (Foucault, 1972: 49 and 55; Larrain, 1994: 295; Smart, 1985: 106-112; Usher and Edwards, 1994: 93-96; Williams, 1992: 250-254). Thus, Foucault’s subject, unlike the Althusserian one, is not constituted by ideology (cf. Larrain, 1994: 295).

What emerges from Foucault’s theorisation and ontologisation of the self is that it challenges and stands in opposition to the modernist conception of the self - the latter being conceptualised as rational, autonomous, sovereign, and all-knowing and as being the centre of the world (cf. for instance, Faigley, 1992: 8-9; Fox, 1998: 416-417; Pennycook, 1994: 58-59; Williams, 1992: 250-252). Fox (1998: 416-417), in particular, contends that Foucault’s ontology regarding the human subject breaks with both structuralism and humanism (both of which are key aspects of modernity) since it sees the subject as constituted and decentred by both power and discourse. This means that Foucault’s views of the human subject tilt towards a postmodern conception of the subject. He is not only suspicious of the autonomy of the subject, but he is also suspicious of the critical conception of ideology which is at the heart of Marxism (Larrain, 1994: 295-296; Williams, 1992: 250-252; cf. Wain, 1996: 350).
3. 3. 4 Foucault, Language, and Linguistics

Although Foucault’s work is not specifically about mainstream language and linguistics, there are nonetheless, instances of his work which make reference to aspects related to language and linguistics. Salient amongst such instances is the notion of discourse (Fairclough, 1989: 22-42, 1992: 37-61, 1995: 130-135; Lemke, 1995: 28-30; Pennycook, 1994: 30-33; Threadgold, 1997: 58-71). *The Archaeology of Knowledge* and *The Order of Things* are among Foucault’s works which foreground some aspects of language. For example, since Foucault believes that knowledge is expressed through language, in these two works he examines the origins of language and discourse with a view to highlighting how spoken and unspoken language leads to *autochthonous* transformations: that is the emergence of new knowledges.

In fact, the subject matter of *The Order of Things* is language, labour and life, each of which corresponds to shared meanings, the social and the embodied individual respectively (Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1983: 17; Wuthnow et al., 1984: 134 and 148). While in his later work (such as *The Birth of the Clinic* and *The History of Sexuality*) Foucault drops the notion of *language* and uses instead *discourse* in its place, his preface to *The Birth of the Clinic* still makes reference to language: “This book is about space, about *language*, and about death; it is about the act of seeing, the gaze” (Foucault, 1975: ix).

So, what is Foucault’s view of language and linguistics? His view of both language and linguistics could be said to be anti-Cartesian or anti-modernist. He challenges the Cartesian notion of correspondence, representation or self-reference attached to language - the idea of language as a medium of representation of reality. In addition, he does not see language as a vehicle for communication - either distorted or undistorted communication in the Habermasian sense. Here, language loses its transparency, objectivity and communicative purpose as man or the individual no longer masters it but is now mastered by it. The point is that the individual is constituted by language: the individual is always already in language, in the world, in society and in nature. This is a

Furthermore, Foucault like Wittgenstein, employs language to explore social contexts and tries to embrace what Austin would call perlocutionary effect of language as a way of moving to a concerted action. Above all, in a move similar to that of Wittgenstein’s critique of the notion of language-as-picture, Foucault questions the sovereignty of the signifier central to Saussurean linguistics. Consequently, Foucault’s anti-Cartesian view of language leads him to challenging and rejecting the Saussurean conception of language: he substitutes Saussure’s cogito which functions as the source of thought with an anonymously dispersed language field. His challenging of Saussurean linguistics is also a challenging of the enterprise of structuralist linguistics and the traditional linguistic binarisms that are part of it.

He, thus, collapses linguistic binarisms such as form versus content, expression versus referent, and text versus context by questioning the notions of the traditional unities, the unified discourse, and the speaking subject as conceived by psychology and humanism. He also questions context as an experience-based explanation of the knowing subject, and the a priori authority of knowledge. His critiquing and collapsing of these linguistic binarisms is also directed to the dominant forms of Chomskyan linguistics which he so much opposed (Richer, 1992: 113; Threadgold, 1997: 60; Williams, 1992: 251-252).

Most significantly, Foucault’s contribution to language lies in his views on discourse and in his brand of discourse analysis – Foucauldian discourse analysis (FDA). This form of discourse analysis is essentially poststructuralist and postmodernist in nature and falls under the umbrella label, French Discourse Analysis (Williams, 1992: 248). It encompasses not only language and its various verbal aspects, but also other non-discursive elements such as behaviours, events, practices, technologies and procedures.
One central tenet of Foucault’s view of discourse analysis is that language and the structural categories of linguistic analysis (speech acts, propositions, etc) fail fully to identify the statements that constitute discourse. These statements are not necessarily words and objects, but result in the formation of words and objects – statements about madness, discipline or sexuality which produce these objects (or knowledges) – and provide ways of positioning speaking subjects which have little to do with the intentional I of the linguistic utterance. For example, a set of statements expressing the same rules of formation and the same conditions of possibility might include the paradigm of verb in traditional grammar, a graph, or a mathematical equation (Threadgold, 1997: 62-63).

So, two of the major units of analysis associated with Foucauldian discourse analysis as identified by Wuthnow et al. (1984: 149) are the enonces and power/knowledge. The enonce is an equivalent of a constituent unit or a statement or an utterance. In this case, statements are not co-extensive with, or limited by such categories as speech acts even though they occur as language. Statements or enonces as units of analysis are part of Foucault’s early archaeological work. However, the analysis of statements is just one among other forms of analyses used by Foucault. The others are a logical analysis of propositions, a grammatical analysis of sentences, a psychological or contextual analysis of discursive formulations (Fairclough, 1992: 38-49; Foucault, 1972: 108-113; cf. Threadgold, 1997: 62-63).

A crucial point related to Foucault’s discourse analysis in this regard is that the enunciative analysis – the analysis of statements – is not an exhaustive description of language (langage) and that it does not substitute other methods of linguistic analysis. His view is that statements produce their own correlative knowledges (objects), but they are not propositions or signs designating a state of things or visible objects. So, the type of linguistics that Foucault tries to refine here is logical semantics (in the logical/philosophical tradition) concerned only with formal definitions of propositions, sentences and speech acts (Threadgold, 1997: 64).
Another central tenet of Foucault’s view of discourse analysis, as informed by his later (genealogical) work, is that discourse is constituted by power. Correspondingly, notions such as knowledge and the human subject (subjectivity) are constituted and dispersed in discourse through the techniques of power. What this implies, inter alia, is that: discourse analysis needs to take into account the discursive nature of power and knowledge and the effects of power (the techniques of power and the disciplinary technologies) on the subject; discourse analysis has to focus on the social, political and institutional nature of power and knowledge; and the human subject and subjectivity have to be accorded primacy in theories of language and discourse, and in linguistic and discourse analysis (cf. Fairclough, 1992: 50-61; Threadgold, 1997: 64-71). So, in his later work, Foucault shifts the focus and changes the subject of his discourse analysis to power. Here his discourse analysis becomes “independent of grammars, vocabularies, synthetic forms, and words” (Wuthnow et al., 1984: 160). This, then, marks a discursive turn to postmodernism.

3. 4 Derrida and Deconstruction

There is a notable tendency for professedly postmetaphysical thinkers to engage in metaphysics of a negative sort. When this happens, one set of hypostatizations typically gets traded in for another: the one for many, the universal for the particular, identity for difference, reason for the Other of reason, the structures of thought for the infrastructures of thought, the logical essence of language for the heterological essence of language, and so on (McCarthy, 1993: 3).

Derrida’s theory and views of language serve as an instance of a postmodern theorising and analysis of language. He questions and problematises the structuralist conception of language, text, and the subject by challenging the centredness, determinateness, fixity and closure attached to these concepts. At the same time, he controverts logocentrism and deconstructs the hierarchical binary oppositions (e.g. speech and writing, langue and parole, system and meaning, etc) and the preconceived truth-claims, values and priorities underlying Western logocentric tradition. In all this, he exploits the margins of philosophy to unsettle philosophy’s unthought axiomatics (Culler, 1983: 85-99; Lye,
The following aspects, deconstruction, language and meaning, and Derrida, text and the subject, constitute the basis of my discussion in this section.

3. 4. 1 Deconstruction

Deconstruction is largely credited to Jacques Derrida. Firstly, it represents a complex response to philosophical and theoretical movements of the 20th century, most prominently Husserlian phenomenology, Saussurean and French structuralism, and Freudian and Lacanian psychoanalysis. Secondly, it serves as a mode of textual reading, analysis and interpretation. In this sense, deconstruction serves as Derrida’s theoretical and conceptual toolkit meant to challenge and subvert Western metaphysics – the basic structures of Western thought. That is, through it, Derrida tries to destabilise, uproot, or overturn inherited metaphysical concepts and schemes so as to undo or dismantle them (Culler, 1983: 85-87; Leitch, 1983: 44; Lye, 1996: n.p; Norris, 1991: 64-67; Usher and Edwards, 1994: 142; Weiss and Wesley, 2002: 5).

Fundamental to Derrida’s deconstructive strategy is the notion of *différance*. Différance is based on the present participle – *différent* - of the French verb *différer* (differ or defer). It captures three significations: *to differ* (to be unlike or dissimilar); *to differre* (to scatter or disperse); and *to defer* (to delay or postpone). When pronounced, it sounds exactly the same as *différence*, but its ending *ance* turns it into a new form meaning *difference-differing-deferring*. In this way, it designates both a passive difference already in existence as the condition of signification and an act of differing which engenders differences. Its analogous English term is *spacing* which designates both an act of arranging (distributing) and an arrangement (Culler, 1983: 97; Leitch, 1983: 41; Melrose, 1996: 62-63; Norris, 1991: 32).

As is evident from the foregoing description, différance is the play of differences or Derrida’s open-ended free-play. Derrida puts this self-same idea thus: “*Différance* is the systematic play of differences, of traces of differences, of the spacing by which elements"
relate to one another. This spacing is the production, simultaneously active and passive (the a of différance indicates this indecision as regards activity and passivity, that which cannot yet be governed and organized by that opposition), of intervals without which the ‘full’ terms could not signify, could not function” (1981: 38-39). Put differently, to Derrida différance is “the origin of differences and the differences between differences, the play of differences” (Derrida, 1973: 130).

Related to différance are other kindred terms such as undecidability, iterability and supplementarity which are also part of Derrida’s deconstruction project. These are the “nonsynonymic substitutions of différance” (Leitch, 1983: 174). Undecidability is a term derived from Göedel’s metamathematical work which argues for the impossibility or incompleteness of constructing a theoretical system within which all true propositions of a number theory are theorems. Derrida uses this term to capture the indeterminacy of meaning or language (Culler, 1983: 133; Threadgold, 1997: 91). Iterability refers to repetition, citation, imitation, or parody. It is the capability of a text (or its part thereof) to be ceaselessly re-iterated, cited, quoted, imitated or parodied in other contexts over time and space. It is one of Derrida’s conceptual devices which foregrounds the endless citability or quotability (intertextuality) of texts (Culler, 1983: 228; Derrida, 1982: 318; Melrose, 1996: 66).

Lastly, supplementarity (the logic of supplementarity) refers to the sequence of supplements - additional or substitutional meanings - besides the core meanings that a text or language possesses. It is the unending supplementary and marginal meanings of a text – the idea that a text means more than what it says. A supplement is something that simultaneously adds on, completes and replaces. This is another Derrida’s conceptual device which, like différance, stresses the unceasing play of meaning (that is the dissemination and dispersion of meaning) and which runs counter to semantic reduction (Culler, 1983: 135; Leitch, 1983: 174-175; Løvlie, 1992: 126; Norris, 1991: 32-34; Usher and Edwards, 1994: 127-132).
Différance, undecidability, iterability and supplementarity are some of the playful deconstructive conceptual tools Derrida deploys to disrupt, subvert and dislodge the metaphysics of presence and the logocentrism (origin, unity, reason, logic, truth, stability, closure, and other classical logocentric categories) underpinning Western philosophical and scientific thought. The notion of the metaphysics of presence has to do with the belief that all entities – origin, being, truth, reality, essence, reason, logic, speech, knowledge, etc., are determined by their self-presence. It is an accepted assumption that the being of an entity is always determined and seen as presence. In addition, it is a classical view which argues that names or objects related to principles, to fundamentals, or to the centre always designate the constant of a presence.

Closely allied to the metaphysics of presence are two kindred terms, logocentrism and phonocentrism. Logocentrism is the idea of logos (unity) or of a centred reason as ordering the universe; phonocentrism is the idea that truth inheres in the spoken word or in speech. These two notions can be seen as constituting the logocentric self-presence and the phonocentric self-presence – the logocentric and phonocentric arms of the metaphysics of presence. It is for this reason that the metaphysics of presence comprises the binary axiological oppositions – being/non-being, consciousness/unconsciousness, inside/outside, reality/image, essence/appearance, intuition/expression, positive/negative, intelligible/sensible, transcendental/empirical, serious/non-serious, etc. – in which the first term in each pair is given priority over the second one. In these logocentric polarities the first terms belong to the logos and have a higher presence (Culler, 1983: 92-94; Leitch, 1983: 25-28; Melrose, 1996: 10-11; Norris, 1991: 28-30; Usher and Edwards, 1994: 121-122). Thus, in his deconstructive strategy, Derrida challenges and subverts these classical logocentric polarities. He employs deconstruction – by applying the conceptual tools identified above - as a tactical move to highlight and expose the aporias, contradictions, paradoxes, inconsistencies and gaps built into Western metaphysical thought (cf. Leitch, 1983: 174-175; Norris, 1991: 49-50 and 139; Usher and Edwards, 1994: 128-129).
Derrida sets out –through his deconstruction project - to challenge, critique and subvert the structuralist views of language as theorised by Ferdinand de Saussure. Saussure conceives of language as a signifying system of differences consisting of arbitrary and conventional signs. He questions the view that there is a one-to-one correspondence between signs or between the signifier (the word) and the signified (the concept). Rather, he posits each sign is not defined by the positive properties it possesses but by the differences that distinguish it from other signs. According to him, signs relate to each other negatively through distinctive features where differences of sound and sense are the major markers of meaning.

For instance, the phonemes /b/ and /p/ are in a binary relation, differentiated by virtue of the voiced/voiceless binarism. That is /b/ is voiced, while /p/ is voiceless. However, /b/ would not be called voiced if there were not a phoneme with a lack of voice to oppose it. The /b/ phoneme is differentiated by what it has (voicedness) and the /p/ phoneme by what it lacks (voicelessness). Here the voiced phoneme gains its centrality by being defined in terms of what the suppressed phoneme is not (Green and LeBihan, 1996: 216; cf. Cameron, 1992: 24). The other typical instance is the one in which the semiological signifier such as an acoustic image signifies an ideal concept (signified). Here both the signifier and the signified are present to consciousness. For example, the sound cluster chair indicates the idea chair; the real chair, the referent, is not present. So, a sign, then, marks an absent presence (Leitch, 1983: 44).

At the heart of Saussure’s language theory is the structured economy of differential features - on which structuralism and semiotics have relied - between langue (language as a system of differences) and parole (the speech events which the system makes possible); between synchrony (the study of language as a system at any given time) and diachrony (the study of the correlations between elements from different historical periods); and between syntagm (a string of grammatical elements within a sentence) and paradigm (relations functioning on the vertical axis of language). The other distinctions involve
speech (voice) and writing, phoné (spoken word) and graphie (written mark), phonetic script and non-phonetic writing, essence and appearance, and presence and absence. In these binary relations, the first terms are privileged over the second ones because they are characterised by presence. Since, they constitute the essence of language, they are thus worthy of study. In contrast, the second terms are perceived to be characterised by absence and as constituting the accidental elements of language which are unworthy of being studied (Birch, 1989: 46-51; Culler, 1983: 98; Derrida, 1978: 280-281; Green and LeBihan, 1996: 86-87; Leitch, 1983: 25; Saussure, 1959: 65-70 and 81-98).

It is in the midst of this binary representation of language that Derrida brings his deconstructive notions of différance, undecidability, iterability and supplementarity to bear on the Saussurean conception of language. First, his notion of différance implies that signs (e.g. the signifier and the signified or phonemes such as /b/ and /p/) differ from each other because the definition of one signified endlessly refers to other signifieds and to the whole system of signifieds comprising language. The point here is that the definitions of signs are endlessly deferred, undecidable, iterable and supplementary (cf. Derrida, 1982: 27; Green and LeBihan, 1996: 216-217).

Second, Derrida contends that Saussure’s binary representation of language is logocentric in nature as it espouses the metaphysics of presence which privileges positive linguistic terms over the negative ones. That is, he maintains that Saussure’s structural linguistics is constructed not only on classical logocentric polarities but also on phonocentric and phonological foundations as it always studies speech, the phoné and logos, and never the outlawed writing, graphie or trace. Third, he reverses and recasts Saussure’s guiding polarities so that they follow the order: writing/language (writing/voice), trace/sign, graphie/phoné, non-phonetic script/phonetic script, appearance/essence, absence/presence, etc.

His major basis for recasting and subverting these logocentric polarities is his theorisation of writing. He sees writing— and not speech or voice— as the origin of language: writing begets language. Here grammatology (the science of writing and textuality) displaces
semiology, text supersedes structure, and trace or arche-trace (a formation of writing and différance) takes the place of the sign. So, to Derrida, language is always already inhabited by writing through différance and through the undecidables, iterables, supplements, and traces and other marginal aspects which link it with writing (Derrida, 1976: 42-43, 1978: 280-281; Leitch, 1983: 25-28; Norris, 1991: 26-34). That is, language is a system consisting of endless play of dissemination – it is a structure of limitless differences and deferrals (Usher and Edwards, 1994: 127-128). Thus, with his use of these conceptual tools through which a sign is constantly split from itself by bearing traces and supplements of other signs not chosen from the relevant paradigm, and deferred by virtue of its relationship with all other signs represented on the syntagmatic axis, Derrida tends to introduce a non-deterministic linguistics into Saussurean linguistics (Melrose, 1996: 76-77). This means that his deconstruction project allows him to emphasise the disseminative power of language while at the same time allowing him to challenge the twin notions of transparency and clarity built into it (cf. Usher and Edwards, 1994: 121-122).

Meaning is another area of language which becomes the object of Derrida’s deconstruction project with its attendant free play tools. In coming to grips with meaning or with how language is used to convey meaning, Derrida engages J. L. Austin by deconstructing his speech act theory. The basis of Austin’s speech act theory is that words are used to do things and that meanings of utterances are derived from the context in which they (utterances) are made. He identifies three acts: locutionary, illocutionary and perlocutionary acts. The utterance *This chair is broken* has the locutionary act of uttering a particular English statement and the illocutionary act of stating, informing, proclaiming, complaining or warning. The perlocutionary act of this utterance is the effect or force behind it. He then distinguishes between constative utterances - statements which describe a state of affairs and which are either true or false - and performative utterances – utterances which perform actions by the act of being uttered and which are neither true nor false. A constative is an utterance such as *The cat is on the mat* while a performative is an utterance such as *I (hereby) promise to pay you tomorrow* (Austin, 1962: 1-7; Culler, 1983: 112-114; Melrose, 1996: 60-61; Norris, 1991: 109).
Austin asserts that utterances can function as performatives and thus have certain meanings or illocutionary forces if they satisfy felicity (happiness) and sincerity conditions (if they are uttered by appropriate people following appropriate conventional procedures in relevant contexts). Performatives which meet such conditions are serious performatives and those which do not (such as those used in fiction and poetry and those uttered in dramatic performances) are non-serious or deviant performatives which should be excluded from or should not constitute the object of speech act theory. So, the conditions of producing felicitous speech acts – on Austin’s terms - are sincerity, correctness of form and propriety of context. Hence, Austin’s major contention is that meanings of words or utterances can be accounted for by specifying the context, the nature of words, the presence of authorised persons and the sincere intentions on the part of utterers (Austin, 1962: 12-22; Culler, 1983: 115-121; Melrose, 1996: 61-62 and 77; Norris, 1991: 108-110).

Austin’s project is an attempt at structural explanation which offers a pertinent critique of logocentric assumptions. However, in Derrida’s view, in his analysis of speech act theory, Austin tends to reintroduce precisely those logocentric premises his project calls into question. That is, according to him, Austin’s project represents another version of the metaphysics of presence. He finds the notion of speech act reinstating the classical metaphysical dualism in which certain concepts are privileged over others. For instance, he argues that in distinguishing between serious and felicitous (happy) performatives and non-serious and infelicitous (unhappy) performatives, in privileging the former over the latter, and in excluding the latter from his project all because they are parasitical (dependent) on the former, Austin is emphasising the same logocentric polarities underpinning Saussurean linguistics (Austin, 1962: 10-22; Culler, 1983: 115-117; Derrida, 1977: 191-192, 1982: 325; Melrose, 1996: 68; Norris, 1991: 109).

In addition, Derrida contends that Austin appeals to certain forms of presence such as speech, the utterer, the intention on the part of the utterer, and context. This translates into privileging phonocentrism (the word or voice), the speaker or the subject, intentionality and context as the origins of meaning. He subverts this Austinian appeal to
presence by pointing out that speech is grounded in writing; utterances are not intrinsically tied to the presence of speakers; intentionality is not the essence of speaking; and presence entails absence. He also argues that the logic of supplementarity plays itself out in Austin’s work. For example, contrary to Austin, he maintains that non-serious (infelicitous) performatives are not parasitical on serious (felicitous) performatives and that serious performatives are, instead, a special case of non-serious performatives.

Moreover, Derrida brings the concepts of iterability and citability to bear on Austin’s views. First, unlike what Austin suggests, he insists that context (together with any utterance embedded within it) is not fixed and determinable. Rather, it tends to imitate, repeat and cite what happens in other contexts elsewhere. Second, he maintains that context is unmasterable and open to endless descriptions and modifications. His contention in this regard is that context is open, unfixed, boundless and non-determinable. The same is true for meaning: it is endlessly open, unfixed and non-determinable or undecidable. Third, through the notions of iterability and citability, Derrida, further argues that dramatic, poetic and fictional language (what Austin ignores) serve as a relevant instance for imitating, repeating and citing performatives or speech acts in general (Culler, 1983: 116-128; Derrida, 1982: 322-326; Leitch, 1983: 173-175; Melrose, 1996: 68-77; Norris, 1991: 109-115). Thus, in all, Derrida argues for the endless dispersal, deferral and indeterminacy of meaning (and word definitions) by challenging the logocentric presence which strives for the origin, centre, closure and thus fixity of meaning (cf. Cherryholmes, 1988: 36-40; Usher and Edwards, 1994: 126-129).

3. 4. 3 Derrida, Text and the Subject

Derrida conceptualises the notion of text within the framework of deconstruction. In particular, he brings the deconstructive notion of différance to bear on his theorisation of text. For instance, here, text is a complex network of unfinished meanings, a tapestry of traces constantly referring to something other than itself. Text in this sense is both a chain of differences and a matrix of dispersals and deferrals: it is endlessly unstable, decentred, and indeterminate. This implies that texts have no predictable openings and endings (or
closures); no transcendental signifiers (intentions) and transcendental signifieds (references); and no transcendental semantic meanings. Thus, texts include both what is written and what is not, producing in the process, shifting and decentred multiple meanings. Derrida also views text as interlarded with readings and codes of other texts. As a corollary, text is a machine consisting of multiple reading heads for other texts: it includes traces of words and concepts not present so that a present text is dependent on the absent text for its full understanding. So, in this way, he adds the notion of intertextuality to text and argues that any text displays multiple voices, and consequently, indeterminate multiple readings and meanings. Deconstructed, then, text is the system of differences, transformations and substitutions (Birch, 1989: 7-9; Cherryholmes, 1988: 60-63; Derrida, 1979: 84 and 107; Leitch, 1983: 105-111; Løvlie, 1992: 124).

A further aspect of Derrida’s conception of text is the idea of textualisation - the idea that everything should be seen as a text. His major contention here is that “there is nothing outside text” (Derrida: 1979: 107). This is a point he puts in another instance as follows:

It is precisely for strategic reasons that I find it necessary to recast the concept of the text by generalising it almost without limit, without any limit that is. That’s why there is nothing ‘beyond the text’. That’s why South Africa and apartheid are, like you and me, part of this general text, which is not to say that it can be read as one reads a book. That’s why the text is always a field of forces: heterogeneous, differential, open. That’s why deconstructive readings are concerned not only with library books … they are not simply analyses of discourse. They are also effective and active interventions that transform contexts without limiting themselves to theoretical utterances even though they must also produce such utterances (1982: 167-168).

Derrida’s notion of textualisation – which entails textuality – in which there is nothing beyond and outside text, suggests on the one hand that text has no inside and outside and that it is about everything and nothing. On the other hand, it suggests that text is a drifting and non-transparent entity – text as having non-transparent inscriptions and meanings - that cannot be completely mastered and controlled by readers or speakers at any given time.
In the same breath, Derrida theorises the subject or self as text – a view that all selves are constituted as texts. His contention in this regard is that subjects are enmeshed in the play of language, of significations, and of texts. This contention holds two related implications. First, there is no independent reference point and no unmediated presence from which subjects can know and create themselves. Second, since subjects cannot be present to themselves, they cannot understand themselves outside the texts, stories or narratives in which they are constructed. In this Derridean conception of the subject lie the notions of textualised, situated and decentred subject and subjectivity. This conception of the subject subverts and undermines the logocentric view that regards the subject as autonomous, rational, self-present, transcendental and unified and as the source of origin and centre. It throws into doubt the idea that subjectivity is the essential unity of self and reason: it questions the notion of an authentic, ever-present and thus centred subjectivity. This is more so as “the subject, and first of all the conscious and speaking subject, depends upon the system of differences and the movement of différance” (Derrida, 1981: 29).

Above all, it challenges the conventional belief in the transparent subject that masters and controls itself, its own language, its own texts and stories, and its own subjectivity and agency. Thus, in the final analysis, Derrida’s deconstructive views of both text and the subject serve as a critique and a problematisation of the determinate meaning and definition associated with text - that texts can be read unproblematically and uncontroversially. They also serve as a critique and inversion of the metaphysical presence, closure and transparency, and the attendant logocentric binary oppositions attached to text, the subject and subjectivity (cf. Cherryholmes, 1988: 60-61; Leitch, 1983: 105-111; Løvlie, 1992: 124-125; Usher and Edwards, 1994: 122-123 and 144-147).

3.5 Critical Reactions

This section consists of two parts. The first part attempts to weave an overarching thread running through the postmodern views articulated by Lyotard, Foucault and Derrida. The second part offers a critical appraisal of these views. The three postmodern thinkers,
Lyotard, Foucault and Derrida, discussed thus far, represent different strands of postmodernism. For example, Lyotard analyses the status and condition of science and knowledge and their legitimation in the postmodern – hence he embraces the notion of the postmodern condition. Foucault focuses on the archaeology of the human sciences from the standpoint of discourse and on power/knowledge and the attendant disciplinary technologies of power and of the self. Likewise, Derrida critiques Western metaphysics (logocentric thought) within a deconstructive framework.

However, despite the diverse postmodern strands they represent, there are certain elements they tend to share in common. Firstly, they all employ language – a linguistic turn – as a basis and a reference point in dealing with the issues their work focuses on, thereby highlighting how the social field is composed of linguistic phenomena. Lyotard’s linguistic turn involves (the Wittgensteinian) language games, Foucault’s entails discourse and Derrida’s includes signifying self-referential systems and writing. Secondly, they critique and problematise totalising concepts associated with modernity and the Enlightenment. For instance, Lyotard critiques meta-narratives (grand narratives) of modernity such as Kantianism, Hegelianism, Freudianism and Marxism, and the progress and emancipation associated with them. He does the same with the Habermasian rationality, consensus and universalism. Foucault problematises the Marxist conception of power which views power as a static, repressive and negative property possessed by a particular class or group of people to the exclusion of others and which separates power from knowledge and truth. He also critiques totalising theories of truth and knowledge. Similarly, Derrida deconstructs and critiques Kantian philosophy, Husserlian phenomenology, Hegelian thought and Saussurean structuralism and inverts the logocentric binary oppositions underlying them (cf. Connor, 1992: 102-104 and 120; Norris, 1991: 74-78, 1996: 8 and 43; Poster, 1989: 4-5 and 43).

Thirdly, all three of them question, in varying degrees, the notions of universal truth, reason, unity, logos, centre, closure, etc: they challenge the absoluteness and certainty attached to these concepts and their logocentric search for finality. To them, truth claims are, in particular, relative to or determined by language or discourse. They are a matter of
language games for Lyotard; they are implicated in and constituted by the discourses of power and are historically relative for Foucault; and they are entangled in the play of différance or in textual undecidability for Derrida (Cherryholmes, 1988: 47; Poster, 1989: 16; cf. Norris, 1996: xv). This is the view of truth (or truth claims) as ungrounded and provisional: it sees truth as lacking any transcendental unity.

Fourthly, these three postmodern thinkers espouse the view of multiplicity, difference and dispersal. The major contention here is that there are multiple and heterogeneous, and sometimes, competing and contradictory truths, rationalities, unities, discourses, meanings, interpretations, and claims. In this regard, Lyotard emphasises the pluralism and incommensurability of language games (e.g. narrative versus scientific knowledge) and le differend, dissensus or paralogy of phrases, of forms of justice and of cultural expressions. He also argues for the dispersed, local and little narratives (cf. Lyotard, 1984: 72, 1988: xi; Poster, 1989: 23 and 27). Equally, Foucault argues for the multiple, decentred and local power networks, knowledges and discourses. This is a multi-centred view of power in which power is dispersed throughout the entire social field (cf. Poster, 1989: 49). Derrida, too, puts a strong case for the dispersal and deferral of multiple signs, meanings and texts within a language system (cf. Cherryholmes, 1988: 60-61).

Fifthly, they build the notions of multiplicity, difference and dispersal into their theorisation of the human subject and subjectivity. For example, Lyotard argues that the autonomous and rational Enlightenment subject dissolves into nodal points of communication and into language games. He also regards the collective Marxian subject as both outdated and insidious (cf. Faigley, 1992: 39). Foucault counters a centred, rational and sovereign modernist conception of the subject with the postmodernist one which calls for decentred, multiple and provisional subjects (selves and subjectivities) which are constituted by power and dispersed in discourses (cf. Faigley, 1992: 8-9; Fox, 1998: 416-417; Olivier, 2000: 50-51; Poster, 1989: 54-66). Likewise, Derrida replaces the logocentric notion of an autonomous, rational, self-present, transcendental and unified subject with the subject (and subjectivity) that is situated, decentred and dispersed in

3. 5. 1 The Critique of Postmodernism by Habermas and McCarthy

Both Habermas and McCarthy have critiqued the postmodern views as represented by Lyotard, Foucault and Derrida. Habermas, in particular, has launched a fierce attack on Lyotard, Foucault and Derrida, an attack which is – in the case of Lyotard – seen as a tension between modernity and postmodernity (cf. Connor, 1992: 118; Holub, 1991: 139-140 and 149-154; Poster, 1989: 12 and 62). His work, *The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity* (Habermas, 1987) provides a sustained critique of postmodernity and serves as one of his strongest defences of the Enlightenment ideals of reason, rationality, consensus, truth and validity claims. His overriding goal is to defend the uncompleted project of the Enlightenment (cf. Holub, 1991: 149 and 152-153; Poster, 1989: 20-21).

3. 5. 1. 1 Habermas: Universal Pragmatics and Communicative Theory

Framing his views within speech act theory, Habermas argues for both universal pragmatics and the theory of communicative action. His conception of universal pragmatics is premised on the view that features of both language and speech – phonetic, syntactic, semantic, pragmatic features and linguistic and communicative competence – allow for universals (universal conditions and validity claims) that can be rationally reconstructed. This type of pragmatics is oriented towards establishing universal conditions of possible understanding and of possible utterances in an ideal speech situation and calls for a formal Kantian analysis of the universal dimensions of speech or parole which is not informed by the Saussurean-style linguistics.

According to Habermas every utterance or statement corresponds to three worlds: the external world of states of affairs and objects; the internal world of ideas, thoughts, and emotions; and the normative world of intersubjectively determined norms and values. He then identifies four validity claims: a comprehensibility claim, a truth claim (obligations
to provide grounds), a truthfulness or sincerity claim (obligations to prove trustworthiness), and a rightness claim (obligations to provide justification) on which communicative competence (action, reason, agreement or consensus) is based. In this case, a speech act is successful if both a speaker and a hearer accept its comprehensibility, truth, truthfulness and rightness, and if it brings about the interpersonal relations intended by the speaker. As such, the meaning of an utterance is determined by shared beliefs, norms, linguistic conventions, and intentions that give substance to the four validity claims (Cherryholmes, 1988: 56; Connor, 1992: 104; Habermas, 1979: 2-3; Holub, 1991: 11-13; McCarthy, 1978: 287, 1993: 134).

Of the four validity claims, the last three map out the domain of universal pragmatics in that the first world is concerned with acts of reference and predication; the second with the linguistic expression of intention; and the third with how interpersonal relations are established through illocutionary speech acts. From this pragmatic standpoint, communication involves raising, criticising and observing these validity claims. This means, therefore, that communicative exchange – in an ideal speech situation - has as its ideal goal the achievement of a rationally based consensus or the intersubjective mutual understanding, shared knowledge, mutual trust and agreement. So, according to Habermas’s universal pragmatics of language, if public speech were structured properly, the cultural domains of morality, art and science would be integrated into society, thus achieving human emancipation or the fulfilment of the project of modernity – universal reason, rationality, centre, subjectivity, etc., - as outlined by the Enlightenment (Connor, 1992: 104; Habermas, 1979: 2, 1984: 219-223; Holub, 1991: 13; McCarthy, 1978: 287-290, 1993: 130-134; Poster, 1989: 19-23).

Again within this pragmatic framework, Habermas adopts the Austinian illocutionary acts and fits them into his tripartite scheme of worlds and its corresponding validity claims. For instance, he divides the locutionary act into a propositional component and constative speech acts so that every speech act can have propositional and illocutionary contents (cf. Austin, 1962: 6-22; Holub, 1991: 13-14). On this basis, he distinguishes between instrumental rationality and communicative rationality. According to him, the
former has to do with systems practices related to institutions such as the bureaucratic state and the economy and is susceptible to domination and linguistic pathologies, while the latter designates the ability of speakers to raise validity claims and to problematise those claims in a general effort to achieve universal consensus. Only hierarchically distorted verbal exchanges can distort communicative action and rationality. In this case, he contends that strategic forms of communication (lying, deceiving, misleading, manipulating, etc.) lead to the suspension of certain validity claims (particularly truthfulness) since they are parasitic on speech oriented to genuine understanding. Moreover, Habermas posits that meaning is concerned with the rational reconstruction of universal competences (between speakers and hearers) and that it is entangled in power structures, human interests and ideologies from which it has to be saved. Thus, his views constitute a critical theory of language or discourse (Cherryholmes, 1988: 56-57; Holub, 1991: 8; McCarthy, 1978: 287; Poster, 1989: 23).

3. 5. 1. 2 Habermas versus Lyotard

Using the speech act framework as his basis, Habermas dismisses Lyotard, Foucault and Derrida (and postmodernists in general) as neo-conservatives (or anti-modernists) and Nietzschean disciples who betray the ideals of the Enlightenment and turn their backs on the unfinished project of modernity in pursuit of irrationalism and anarchy (cf. McCarthy, 1993: 3-7; Norris, 1996: 59, 116 and 187; Poster, 1989: 19-20). This is a point Norris highlights when he contends that “in his recent writings [Habermas] has targeted [the] post-structuralist discourse as a species of latter-day Nietzschean irrationalism allied to a deeply conservative turn against the truth-claims of enlightened critique” (1996: 7). So, Habermas maintains that in countering all that is associated with the Enlightenment or with modernity (rationality, reason, truth, consensus, subjectivity, etc.), postmodernists resort to spontaneity, the anarchic, the irrational and the emotional. His major contention is that by rejecting all general standards of truth and goodness, postmodernists leave no room for a social formation other than the struggles of antagonistic groups – a situation which according to him would lead to disorder (cf. Faigley, 1992: 41; Habermas, 1987: 23).
Hence, he makes the accusation that their (postmodern) project is nothing more than a playfully regressive and uncritical project.

For example, Habermas asserts that Lyotard’s rejection of the ideal of rational consensus in favour of dissensus, differend or paralogy is one instance of dangerous postmodern irrationalism. In this regard, he counters Lyotard’s dissensus, differend or paralogy and his multiple and incommensurable language games with universal reason and universal consensus. Thus, he insists that communicative action and rational argumentation lead to rationally based consensus while Lyotard contends that language games are irreducible and thus require paralogy. In addition, where Lyotard argues for the agonistics of language and for pragmatic language games and little narratives characterised by irreducible rules and moves, Habermas argues for universal pragmatics, for universally valid truth claims, and for the hierarchy of certain forms of language use – rational communication over instrumental or purposive language - within the confines of the ideal speech situation. Lyotard regards Habermas’s validity claims as meta-prescriptives while Habermas views them as anthropologically based universals inherent in any language.

In all of this, Habermas adopts an attitude towards communicative debate premised on values of reason, truth, enlightenment, principle, legitimation, emancipation, progress, and ideology critique or rational criticism in place of Lyotard’s anti-foundationalist and relativist stance toward these values. That is, Habermas adopts a rationally reconstructed stand towards these modernist values which are, for Lyotard, obsolete meta-narratives that have to be treated with incredulity and suspicion (cf. Connor, 1992: 110-113; Faigley, 1992: 38-42; Holub, 1991: 142; McCarthy, 1984:178-187, 1993: 5-6; Norris, 1996: 31-34; Rorty, 1984: 32-35).

From the foregoing, it is Lyotard, however, who seems to be missing the point: his agonistics of language fails to distinguish between the truthful and deceptive, the sincere and manipulative, and the consensual and coercive uses of language which Habermas’s universal pragmatics recognises. He privileges narrativity (narrative dissensus, differend
or paralogy) over Habermas’s criteria of validity while his rhetorics of language fails to distinguish between raising a validity claim and making someone believe in something in the same way as Habermas’s universal pragmatics project does. Thus, his accusation that Habermas reduces all language games to the meta-game of truth does not hold water since in Habermas’s theory of universal pragmatics, truth claims co-exist with other validity claims, and are in no way privileged over them (Benhabib, 1990: 113-116). It is partly for this reason that Hoy and McCarthy (1994: 166) argue that “defending consensus and reason leads Habermas to see the [postmodern] French thinkers as defenders of unreason.” They also contend that “Lyotard has tried to defend dissensus over consensus in *The Postmodern Condition*, thereby putting himself in the weak position of seeming to ask paradoxically for consensus on his claim that dissensus is indeed the higher good” (p. 166).

Lyotard’s postmodern views have come under severe criticisms from other quarters as well. First, Lyotard tends to have a vague conception of language games, pragmatics and speech acts. For instance, Connor (1992: 111-112) maintains that Lyotard has a rather hazy conception of what a language game is, subsuming under this term different language uses and rhetorical ends, such as denotation, exhortation, prescription, and so on, as well as what might be called different public or institutional idioms or discourses such as the philosophical use of language, the legal and economic uses and so forth. That is, to Lyotard, indeed everything from the Holocaust to the history of ethical and metaphysical thought is either a language game, an utterance, a speech act, or pragmatics, with these four concepts being almost synonymous. In this context, he tends to be caught up in a performative self-contradiction. He could only argue for the incommensurability or untranslatability of different language games after having first translated everything into language. As a result, he stands accused of illicitly using Wittgenstein’s language games to emphasise the agonistic (conflictual) nature of language or communication, a point which Wittgenstein’s use of this concept does not imply (cf. Holub, 1991: 148; Benhabib, 1990: 116-117).
Second, Lyotard stands accused of deviously manipulating – of a skewed postmodernist reading of - Kant’s third *Critique*, in particular, Kant’s notion of *sublime* to serve his own postmodern goal of heterogeneity and of presenting “the unpresentable” (cf. Lyotard, 1984: 77-81) or the *unsayable*. He illicitly appeals to the Kantian sublime so as to put a strong case for espousing differend and dissensus and for adopting his incommensurability thesis, thereby rejecting any grounds for (Enlightenment) warrants and criteria for reason, rationality, and truth. (Hollinger, 1994: 16; Holub, 1991: 136; Norris, 1996: 37-43. Norris emphasises this point:

> It is this misapprehension … which has lately given rise to the more extreme forms of anti-foundationalist thought … I call this a skewed reading because it ignores so much that is of crucial importance to Kant’s doctrine of the faculties in order to promote its own postmodern or counter-enlightenment agenda. For Kant, we should recall, these sublime intimations went along with an equal and countervailing … promise of agreement … But to raise them – like Lyotard – into a creed of out-and-out ethical decisionism founded on the incommensurability-thesis is a reading that finds no warrant in the Kantian text (1996: 38, 39 and 41).

Third, and finally, Lyotard is accused of invoking the new postmodern sciences so as to reduce truth and all the Enlightenment ideals to linguistic and discursive constructs and so as to turn science into another language game or another discourse. Here Lyotard stands accused of seeking refuge under the relativist side of these new sciences while failing to realise that even Einstein’s *Special Theory of Relativity* has recourse to some absolute values, and thus at most, avoids ontological or epistemic relativism he himself so much espouses. He is also criticised for failing to realise that old theories can only be discarded by presenting new scientific critiques and claims which he himself detests so much (cf. Holub, 1991: 142; Norris, 1996: 162 and 167-168).

### 3. 5. 1. 3 Habermas versus Foucault

In the same vein, Habermas controverts Foucault’s postmodern views. For instance, he counters Foucault’s archaeology of discourses (of knowledge and the human sciences)
and his genealogy of power/knowledge with a rationally reconstructive theory of
discursive communication. Whereas Foucault’s archaeological and genealogical projects
are about the ruptures, breaks, instabilities and discontinuities of the history of the
discourses and epistemes of the human sciences (e.g. psychiatry, penology, sexology, etc)
and the effects of power on discourses and knowledge respectively, Habermas’s universal
pragmatics of language focuses on mutual understanding, dialogue, consensus, rationality
and truth values characterising communication and discourse. In contrast to Foucault’s
archaeology and genealogy which are anti-sciences and emphasise the discursive
relativity (multiplicity) and power determination of reason, rationality, truth, subjectivity,
and so forth, Habermas’s universal pragmatics of language calls for communicatively
reconstructed reason, rationality, consensus, and truth values determined by universally
accepted validity claims or standards (cf. Habermas, 1987: 239-251; Hollinger, 1994: 128

Habermas is interested in the theory of reason and sees as the essential task of philosophy
the construction of a systematic theory of reason that recognises both the positive and
negative aspects of rationality. He thus finds fault with Foucault’s Nietzschean radical
critique of the history of Enlightenment reason which, in the name of establishing
genealogically disruptive and discontinuous historiography, dismisses all there is of
reason, thereby degenerating into irrationality. On this score, while Habermas
distinguishes between communicative, instrumental and strategic rationality on the one
hand, and between communicative and strategic action on the other hand, Foucault
reduces reason and rationality to Nietzschean perspectivism (cf. Hoy and McCarthy,
Habermas (1987: 251) highlights some of the shortcomings inherent in Foucault’s
Nietzschean radical critique of the history of Enlightenment reason as follows: “Foucault
wants … to put an end to global historiography that covertly conceives of history as a
macroconsciously. History in the singular has to be dissolved, not … into a manifold of
narrative histories, but into a plurality of irregularly emerging and disappearing islands of
discourse.” He then continues:
The critical historian will first dissolve false continuities and pay attention to ruptures, thresholds, and changes in direction. He does not produce teleological contexts; he is not interested in the large causal chains … From this destruction of a historiography that remains captive to anthropological thinking and basic humanistic convictions, there emerges the outline of a transcendental historicism at once inherited from and going beyond Nietzsche’s critique of historicism … Instead, the space of history is seamlessly filled by the absolutely contingent occurrence of the disordered flaring up and passing away of new formations of discourse. No place is left for any overarching meaning in this chaotic multitude of past totalities of discourse (pp. 251, 252 and 253).

Furthermore, Habermas takes issue with Foucault’s conceptualisation of the subject. For Foucault, the human subject is decentred and unfixed: it is dispersed in discourses and constituted by power. This is the subject characterised by the technologies of the self or disciplinary techniques. In its extreme form, this Nietzschean conception of the subject turns the subject into “a plaything of linguistic structures … that it becomes simply a product of discursive definition, a word (like ‘force’ in Newtonian physics) lacking any explanatory power” (Norris, 1996: 19-20) and pronounces the death of the subject itself. Habermas rejects this nihilistic philosophy of subjectivity and consciousness and counters it with the one that recasts the subject as a decentred, non-egoistic, rational and unified self embedded in a rationally reconstructed dialogue and communication. He sees the self in terms of intersubjectivity and communicative rationality (cf. Habermas, 1987: 310-312 and 321-326; Hollinger, 1994: 112-113; McCarthy, 1993: 56 and 209). He thus foregrounds some of the contradictions (aporias) and the circularity of Foucault’s genealogical ontology of the subject as follows:

In his basic concept of power, Foucault has forced together the idealist idea of transcendental synthesis with the presuppositions of an empiricist ontology. This approach cannot lead to a way out of the philosophy of the subject, because the concept of power that is supposed to provide a common denominator for the contrary semantic components has been taken from the repertoire of the philosophy of the subject itself … Foucault abruptly reverses power’s truth-dependency into the power-dependency of truth. Then foundational power no longer need be bound to the competencies of
acting and judging subjects – power becomes subjectless. But no one can escape the strategic conceptual constraints of the philosophy of the subject merely by performing operations of reversal upon its basic concepts. Foucault cannot do away with all the aporias he attributes to the philosophy of the subject by means of a concept of power borrowed from the philosophy of the subject itself (1987: 274).

As is evident from the preceding quotation, Habermas also takes issue with Foucault’s theory of the concept of power – the foundation stone of his genealogical project. For instance, Foucault rejects the traditional Marxist conception of power that links power to ideology. In his analysis, power is not a macro-level, centralised force; nor is it a negative, repressive or owned entity. Contrariwise, it is microscopic and omnipresent and pervades everything, including our bodies. Implicit in this Nietzschean conception of power is Foucault’s rejection of ideology critique and meta-narratives (such as Marxism) which marks the end-of-ideology and the end-of-history theses (Hollinger, 1994: 127-128; Norris, 1996: 8, 181 and 207; cf. McCarthy, 1993: 54).

Habermas argues that Foucault’s theory of power is fraught with inherent contradictions. He contends that in trying to represent the human sciences, knowledge, truth-values, reason and subjectivity through power effects (through various technologies of power) this theory becomes totalising and universalistic, thereby degenerating into reductionism, relativism and crypto-normativism. This theory of power, so maintains Habermas, is conceptually flawed as it fails to distinguish between power-holders and the subjected, between the power that subjugates and coerces and the one that effects freedom, and between the reifying effects of power and the enabling effects of power. To him, this conception of power is deceptive as it fails to free the genealogist from contradictory self-thematisations (Habermas, 1987: 284-287 and 289-294).

Similarly, McCarthy (1993: 54) contends that Foucault’s theory of power is conceptually ambiguous as for him everything is power: “power becomes all too like the night in which all cows are black” (p. 54). He charges that Foucault fails to distinguish between the just and the unjust, the legitimate and the illegitimate, the strategic and the
cooperative, and the coercive and the consensual uses of power. Thus, he maintains that this failure to distinguish between who possesses what power and with what right, and between who profits and suffers from it, takes Foucault back to the Marxist approaches that he so much disdains (pp. 54-55). In this regard, Foucault’s insistence that his work represents no theory and embraces no method – even though he calls for a new criticism (a limit attitude) - makes his position very vulnerable (cf. Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1983: 208; Poster, 1989: 77 and 113-116).

3. 5. 1. 4 Habermas versus Derrida

With regard to Derrida, Habermas contends that his views and his critique of the Enlightenment reason and of the logocentrism underlying the Western metaphysical tradition in particular, is at best, superficial and at worst, ironic or non-serious. He sees Derrida’s work as representing another philosophical convulsion and his philosophy as regressing to a pre-Kantian era in which religious mysticism held sway over all domains of thought. In addition, he engages Derrida’s critique of logocentrism and its attendant deconstructive tools - such as free play, undecidability, iterability, citation, the logic of supplementarity, etc. – thereby highlighting some of the fundamental contradictions inherent in them. Overall, Habermas remains unconvinced that Derrida’s work is about serious and rational philosophic discourse (cf. Habermas, 1987: 167, 184 and 207-209; Holub, 1991: 156-157; Norris, 1996: 81-82).

In the first instance, he views Derrida’s deconstruction as a renaming – another concealed name – of destruction. He maintains that a major point of departure between him and Derrida is that Derrida’s deconstructive critique (of structuralism and phenomenology) is driven by semiotics while his is driven by the pragmatics of speech. In this regard, he points out that Derrida appeals to Saussurean structural linguistics and employs grammatology to mount his critique of Western logocentrism. Moreover, he charges that this grammatological (archewriting) project counts as the originary sign which is abstracted from all pragmatic communication contexts and which is detached from speaking and listening subjects. Overall, Habermas’s contention is that Derrida’s
grammatology is subjectless and anonymously tends to leave its own traces in its trail (Habermas, 1987: 161-163 and 178-181).

On the same score, Habermas argues that because Derrida’s critique of the subject is located within the philosophy of subjectivity, it remains trapped – like that of Foucault’s - in the self-same philosophical tradition. Therefore, his critique is always just the irrational mirror image of the logocentric subjectivity it rejects. He further charges that Derrida offers nothing new, and that the philosophical status of consciousness (being or subjectivity) is still as it was (1987: 53 and 173). He captures part of this point thus: “As a participant in the philosophical discourse of modernity, Derrida inherits the weaknesses of a critique of metaphysics that does not shake loose of the intentions of [the] first philosophy” (p. 181).

In the second instance, Habermas takes Derrida to task about blurring the genre distinction between philosophy and literature – a distinction which mirrors the one between epistemology, ethics and aesthetics or the one between thought in its problem-solving, moral-evaluative and poetic or world-disclosive aspects. To him, by trying to conflate philosophy and literature, Derrida promotes the literary-aesthetic to a point where it dissolves all others into so many forms of metaphoric or poetico-rhetorical discourse devoid of any critico-normative force. So, both the literary and the aesthetic do not constitute serious rational discourse; they are a second-order form of discourse derived from and falling short of communicative action. They are a non-serious language which, argues Habermas, neither submits to nor can survive the various validity tests satisfied by rational discourse. In this way, they cannot have a legitimate role either in intellectual critique or in generating forms of social and moral values (Habermas, 1987: 205-209 and 336-341; Holub, 1991: 158-159; cf. Connor, 1992: 121-125; Norris, 1996: 82-85). In a tongue-in-cheek mode, Habermas dismisses some of Derrida’s conceptual tools meant to critique Western metaphysics and which draw their strength on the literary-aesthetic as follows: “In the metaphor of the archewriting and its traces, we see again Dionysian motif of the god making his promised presence … to the sons and
daughters of the West by means of his poignant absence: But the movement of the trace is … occulted … When the other announces itself as such, it presents itself in the dissimulation of itself’ (1987: 180-181).

By the same token, McCarthy (1993) points out that Derrida’s deconstruction is iconoclastic and lacks practical-political import. He argues that the whole character of deconstruction’s critique of logocentrism deprives it of any language to speak on behalf of the excluded other. Like Habermas, he finds Derrida’s project fraught with contradictions: Derrida wants to undermine all logocentric concepts while he continues employing them for his own deconstructive purposes. For instance, McCarthy maintains that most (if not all) of Derrida’s deconstructive work dismisses presence, origin, logos, reason, truth, objectivity, closure, etc., while using the self-same logocentric concepts and norms in its analysis and critique. He also points out that in most cases Derrida deploys undecidability after the fact (when the debate is over) and uses différance prior not only to subject and object but also to all of the oppositions basic to logocentrism and to any distinctions between sameness and difference, and identity and non-identity (cf. McCarthy, 1993: 107-112).

Above all, McCarthy contends that Derrida’s discourse (terminology) is embedded in vagueness and ambiguity and that his deconstruction is premised on the belief that what is constructed can be deconstructed, destabilised, recontextualised, and so on, and thus, ignores the other side of the ledger that what is constructed can also be reconstructed, reformed, renewed, and so forth (1993: 109-110 and 118). He charges: “As we have seen, deconstruction aims at ‘a language and a political practice that can no longer be comprehended, judged, deciphered by [existing] code’ … I have found nothing in Derrida’s writings to persuade me that his quasi-apocalyptic, near-prophetic mode of discourse about politics should displace the more prosaic modes available or constructible in our tradition” (p. 118).
Given all the criticisms levelled, in particular, by Habermas against postmodern thinkers such as Lyotard, Foucault and Derrida, how can his criticisms be evaluated? As highlighted above, Habermas follows a rational, reconstructive, communicative and dialogic route to engaging with the Enlightenment ideals. He tries to salvage the rational kernel of modern philosophy through the philosophy of language as opposed to postmodern thinkers who abandon this kernel. That is, he uses a linguistic turn to restore and legitimate reason and philosophy whereas the three postmodernists employ the linguistic turn to undermine both reason and philosophy (cf. Hoy and McCarthy, 1994: 153). However, Habermas’s theory of dialogue and consensus – his universal pragmatics – and the ideal speech situation in which it is embedded, seems to be too abstract, too counterfactual and too unrealistic to be of any immediate practical use. Habermas himself claims that reason is both counterfactual and actual. Thus, he tends to eat from the table of communicative reason as a universal necessity of logic while keeping it as a historical tendency that is actualised in communicative competence (cf. Hollinger, 1994: 157; Poster, 1989: 25).

Habermas also contends that only the unforced force of an argument – determined by background - is relevant to a dialogue. Here there is an attempt to pursue the best argument: the strategic behaviour wherein the search for truth turns into competition, conflict or debate, is not allowed as consensual agreement; and the act of not winning or losing, is a desired goal. This borders on utopianism. First, this contention neglects differences in argumentative ability and expertise. Second, the appeal to the background is in conflict with Habermas’s preference for consensus and reason, for once the background fails to be fully articulated, the ideal of achieving agreement through the unforced force of the best argument under ideal conditions becomes almost impossible. Third, arguments never win in the manner implied by Habermas as it is always possible to challenge the truth of premises, and to ask for further evidence and argumentation (cf. Cherryholmes, 1988: 112; Hoy and McCarthy, 1994: 161; McCarthy, 1993: 196-199). In addition, Habermas’s account says little about how or why anyone should be made to
submit to any ethico-discursive force, except to avoid contradicting themselves in their
discursive performance of the performative conditions of the language they are using (cf.

Moreover, there is an element of illusionary dualism in Habermas’s theorising. For
example, he distinguishes between uses of language which authentically entail
communicative action (or the orientation towards intersubjective understanding) and
those which embody purposive-rational action (the use of language to achieve strategic
purposes). However, it is difficult to demonstrate the absolute split Habermas proposes
here, since, no matter how hard a speaker in a discursive situation attempts to maintain an
orientation towards mutual understanding, there are always ways in which it is possible to
exert power through or gain strategic advantage from a discursive encounter. This implies
that communication is always likely to slip into strategy and ideal speech into rhetoric.
Thus, the theory of the absolute separability of communication from rhetoric faces a
crisis as communication seems set to serve the very strategic ends it is supposed to avoid

The other instance of illusionary dualism relates to his views on philosophy and
literature. Habermas’s criticism that Derrida conflates generic boundaries between
philosophy and literature – which he himself is keen to maintain – overlooks Derrida’s
point: his questioning of the necessary authority of reason over rhetoric. Such authority
can hardly be demonstrated without self-contradiction; it has to be simply asserted, but
the force of such assertions can precisely be the cutting edge of violence, the sword’s
argument that it is mightier than the pen. In this way, Habermas tends to be exorcising his
own spectre as Derrida does not argue for the claims of the literary over the
philosophical. Neither does he simply reduce philosophy to literature (cf. Connor, 1992:
123-125; Norris, 1996: 82-85). To this effect, Norris (1996: 59) maintains that Habermas
“offers little more than a travesty of Derrida’s work, an account based largely on
secondary sources and ignoring its close (if ambivalent) relation to the truth-claims and
values of enlightenment critique.”
Furthermore, Habermas’s distinction between theory and history is modelled on the distinction Piaget makes between the competences that theory reconstructs and the interactions charted by history. The idea of competence suggests that there are stable rules involved in a performance, even if a performer is unable to state those rules explicitly. Theory – for example, Chomsky’s linguistic theory – reconstructs these rules. Habermas then analogously reasons from Chomsky’s method to his own project of universal pragmatics, which is the basis for his theory of ethical reasoning as well. However, ethical competence seems to bear little resemblance to linguistic competence (Hoy and McCarthy, 1994: 160). Indeed, Habermas tends, at times, to have a narrow procedural conception of ethical values and judgement, to equate existing social structures with the achieved public sphere of enlightened rationality, and to define truth in terms of an ideal consensus. Besides, his conception of practical discourse is too restrictive to serve as a model – even as an ideal one – of rational will formation and collective decision making in the democratic public sphere (cf. Callinicos, 1989: 113; McCarthy, 1993: 198-199; Norris, 1996: 186).

3. 5. 2 The Critique of Postmodernism by Gross and Levitt

Of the criticisms levelled against postmodernism, one of the fiercest is that launched by Paul R. Gross and Norman Levitt – the former a biologist and the latter a mathematician - in their book *High Superstition: The Academic Left and Its Quarrels with Science* (cf. Gross and Levitt, 1994). In this “more detailed” and “well-researched” treatment of postmodernism and other related anti-science studies (e.g. constructivism, feminism, Afrocentrism, eco-radicalism (radical environmentalism) and Aids activism), Gross and Levitt portray the sloppiness and shallowness of pseudo-scientific approaches such as postmodernism in their endeavours – masterminded by the academic left – to topple science as a pre-eminent tool of Western rationalism (Martin, 1996: 161-173; Shallit, 1994: 98-100; cf. for instance, Gross and Levitt, 1994: 2-3, 5, 8-10, 23-28 and 252-253). They refer to the vocabulary and terminology employed by such pseudo-scientific approaches as nothing more than “muddleheadedness” (p. 1), “unalloyed twaddle” (p. 43), “nonsense” and “fatuous” (p. 254).
Even more damning to postmodernism’s obsession with pseudo-science is the so-called 
_Sokal Hoax_ (cf. Sokal, 1996) which serves as an indictment against postmodernism’s 
blindless and unquestionable dalliance with pseudo-science. The hoax comes about in 
that Sokal’s - Sokal is a theoretical physicist at New York University - manuscript 
entitled “Transgressing Boundaries: Towards a Transformative Hermeneutics of 
Quantum Gravity” (cf. Sokal, 1995) which actually _parodied_ postmodernism, was 
submitted to one of the leading cultural studies journal, _Social Text_. The editors 
subsequently published it without vetting it and without realising that it was meant to 
parody postmodern scholarship (cf. Sokal, 1996; Boghossian, 1996). Reflecting on his 
hoax article, Sokal had this to say: “my article is a mélange of truths, half-truths, quarter-
truths, falsehoods, non sequiturs, and syntactically correct sentences that have no 
meaning whatsoever” (1996: 93). Boghossian similarly concurs: “[As] Sokal himself 
later revealed in the journal _Lingua Franca_, his essay was merely a farrago of 
deliberately concocted solecisms, howlers and non-sequiturs, stitched together so as to 
look good and to flatter the ideological preconceptions of the editors” 1996: 14).

However, certain scholars (social scientists and mainstream scientists) criticise both 
Gross and Levitt (1994) and Sokal (1995, 1996). They accuse them of being ill-informed, 
biased and committing the same scholarly blunders they level against those they accuse 
(1996) fires his salvo thus:

*Higher Superstition* is ostensibly a critique of the constructivist analysis of 
science, attempting to show logical flaws, sloppy scholarship and 
sometimes just a poor understanding of science in key works … Gross and 
Levitt’s way of understanding science is fundamentally at variance with 
most of the work they criticise. In other words, they presume a certain 
picture of science and then criticise works that fail to conform to it … 
[They] do not provide any sociological justification for their construction 
of the ‘academic left’ -- they define it in terms of ideology … 
Postmodernism is even less easy to classify as left … Often these 
generalisations overshadow their actual critiques … In many cases, they 
seem unaware of critiques within the field of the sloppiness with science 
that they are so quick to criticise. For example, they make no mention of 
Sal Restivo’s penetrating analysis of Fritjof Capra’s thesis of a parallelism
between quantum physics and Eastern mysticism … [Thus] in other words, they feel free to make generalisations about society without bothering to provide evidence, argument, surveys of the literature, etc (pp. 161-165).

He further maintains that:

It is easy to gain the impression that [Gross and Levitt’s] many statements about both scientists collectively and about the ‘academic left’ are based largely on their personal experiences plus a few selected references, thus ignoring standard social science practice in the making of sociological generalisations … They criticise others for not consulting scientists about their critiques, which is reasonable enough. But, at least according to their acknowledgements, they seem not to have consulted the social scientists whom they have criticised (pp. 166-169).

Shallit (1994: 98-100) also adds his twinge of criticism to Gross and Levitt’s (1994) work. First, he points out that the book is intended to expose the superficial scholarship of certain academic left scholars while it, too, slips into a sloppy polemic that indulges in some of the same tactics it decries. Second, he argues that the work displays an undisguised partisanship in which it labels as authoritative sources with which it agrees while disparaging those with which it does not concur. Third, he charges that Gross and Levitt are fond of poking fun at the rhetorical pretensions of leftist academics, while they, too, are occasionally guilty of the same offence. Lastly, he accuses Gross and Levitt of running out of steam in the latter third of the book as they end up making generalisation after generalisation for which they present no supporting data.

Regarding the Sokal hoax, Beller (1998: 29-34.) points out that it was touted as an ingenious exposure of the decline of intellectual standards in the academia and as a brilliant parody of the postmodern nonsense (*pomo gibberish*). However, she hastens to argue that the same near-postmodern babble abounds in Niels Henrik David Bohr’s, Werner Karl Heisenberg’s and Albert Einstein’s works – the works which Sokal is, at times, fond of quoting. She rhetorically retorts: “[If so], whom, are we laughing at?” (1998: 34.). She then continues: “The opponents of the postmodernist cultural studies of
science conclude confidently from the Sokal affair that ‘the emperors ... have no clothes’... But who, exactly, are all those naked emperors? At whom should we be laughing?” (1998: 34).

Beller’s message is instructive: both camps in the science war need not laugh at each other as they both suffer from the same disease – mumbo-jumbo and superficial knowledge of each other’s discipline! Spurrett (1999: 267) provides the following caveat: “Sokal and Bricmont (1998) offer an often superficial and uncharitable analysis of aspects of [post-modernism]. Unfortunately their grasp of post-modernism and philosophy more widely, is at least as poor as the understanding of science which they criticise ... Their book is saved from being completely useless by the extensive catalogue of pseudo-scientific pronouncements by people who should have known better which they have assembled.”

3. 6 Conclusion

This chapter has served three related purposes: it has provided an overview of postmodernism; it has offered a comprehensive and detailed discussion of the views of three postmodern thinkers, Jean-Francois Lyotard, Michel Foucault and Jacques Derrida; and it has also provided a critical analysis of postmodernism as represented by these three thinkers. The overview has focused on the historical origins of postmodernism, and on some of its varieties and approaches. The critical analysis has foregrounded some of the concerns, shortcomings and weaknesses of postmodernism as raised, on the one hand, by Jürgen Habermas (cf. Habermas, 1984, 1987) and, to some extent, by Thomas McCarthy (cf McCarthy, 1993), and on the other hand, by Paul R. Gross and Norman Levitt (cf. Gross and Levitt, 1994). Finally, it has offered an evaluation of some of the views and observations made by Habermas and by Gross and Levitt in relation to postmodernism.
Chapter Four

Framing Issues and Methodological Framework

All research methodology rests upon a bedrock axiom: *The nature of the data and the problem for research dictate the methodology*. All data, all factual information, all human knowledge must ultimately reach the researcher either as words or numbers. This may not sound true, but it is, and it is such a common phenomenon that we seldom notice … If the data is verbal, the methodology is *qualitative*, if it is numerical, the methodology is *quantitative* (Leedy, 1993: 139).

4.0 Introduction

The preceding quotation, however much contestable it may be, is both instructive and relevant for this research study. Thus, this chapter serves the following purposes. Firstly, it details the sources of data, the methods of data collection and data analysis, and the units of analysis used in the study. Secondly, it discusses the discourse and ideological analysis and chaos theory methodological framework within which the study is located. Thirdly, it provides the rationale for employing such a methodological framework and highlights its strengths and weaknesses. Fourthly, it outlines and delineates two complementary models of data analysis used in Chapter Five and Chapter Six. The two models in question are a textual content analysis and chaos theory model and a multidisciplinary model of ideological discourse analysis (MIDA) employed in these two chapters respectively. The chapter also offers the rationale for employing such models and pinpoints their inherent strengths and weaknesses. In addition, the chapter provides – within the ambit of these two models - sample data analyses for each of these two chapters. Finally, it outlines the analytic procedures and benchmarks for analysing the data in both Chapters Five and Six.
4. 1 Sources of Data and Methods of Data Collection

4. 1. 1 Sources of Data

The sources of data for this study are two published texts, *Language and Power* (Fairclough, 1989) - henceforth to be referred to as *LP* - and *The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge* (Lyotard, 1984) - hereafter to be referred to as *The PC*. Both of these texts constitute, simultaneously, the primary data and the data texts for this research study. I have selected Fairclough’s *LP* as it is one of the authoritative books on critical linguistics, following as it does on Fowler et al’s (1979) *Language and Control* and Kress and Hodge’s (1979) *Language as Ideology*. Thus, in the area of critical linguistics, this book represents an improvement on these two books and on others published at that time. Similarly, I have chosen Lyotard’s *The PC* as it is regarded as both an authoritative and a ground-breaking work in postmodernism, even though it is not necessarily a pioneering work in this area.

4. 1. 2 Methods of Data Collection

In gathering the data for this study, I surveyed, sampled and reviewed primary and secondary texts dealing with critical linguistics and postmodernism. The reason for this was to establish the most authoritative texts representing the most original and compelling thoughts and views on these two areas. I used the library resources of the University of Transkei (now part of Walter Sisulu University) and the University of the Free State, borrowed books and journals from the library resources of other universities and searched the Internet for gathering further information. All this took three years to complete.

So, surveying, sampling (systematic and sustained piecemeal sampling of different texts) and reviewing are the three methods I employed in collecting the data for this study. Fused into these three methods were the textual-navigational, probing and critical and analytical reading techniques or procedures (cf. Lindlof, 1995: 63; Maykut and
Morehouse, 1994: 95) which I employed in screening and determining the texts which contained the data that best captured the ideas, thoughts and views relevant to and suitable for the research topic of my study.

4.2 Methodological Framework

4.2.1 Framing Discourse and Ideological Analysis

This section outlines and highlights the discourse and ideological analysis and chaos theory methodological framework meant for this study. There are two related dimensions of discourse analysis which are relevant for this study: discourse analysis as both a conceptual and a methodological framework. As a conceptual framework, discourse analysis is concerned with conceptualising texts, language and forms of discourse from, inter alia, linguistic, Marxist, poststructuralist, and feminist points of view. Classic instances are discourse and social practices, discourse and power, discourse and ideology, discourse and gender, discourse and subjectivity, and so on.

In this context, discourse refers either to the organisation of language above the sentence, stretches of real language-in-use, utterances, texts, and speech events or to language as social action, as social practice, language as situated performance and language as tied to social relations, social struggle, identities, power and inequality (cf. Henning et al., 2004: 45-46; Luke, 1997: 50-53, 2002: 98-100; Mouton, 2001: 168-169; Slembrouck, 1998-2003: 1-2; Threadgold, 2003: 5-10). Indeed as de Beaugrande (1997: 1) points out, the concept discourse has multiple viewpoints: linguistic, philosophical, social, cognitive, literary, anthropological, historical, political and ideological.

As a methodological framework, discourse analysis is not a unified field. Rather, it is an umbrella term referring to an interdisciplinary family of methodologies of and approaches to the study of text and language that draws on linguistics, cultural studies, literary theory, philosophy of language, psychology and sociology. In this way, it represents a hybrid field of analytic inquiry that is data-driven and that entails a set of

Further discourse analytic approaches, including some of those identified above, are schematically represented in Table 4.1 below. The table depicts discourse analytic approaches together with their corresponding research interests.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Approaches to Discourse Analysis and their Related Research Interests</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Approaches</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Content analysis; ethnography of communication; ethnoscience; symbolic interactionism; ethnomethodology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transcendental realism; grounded theory; event structure analysis; phenomenography; naturalistic inquiry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phenomenology; hermeneutics; case study; life history; narratives/oral history</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reflective phenomenology; heuristic research</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Table 4.1: Adapted from Campos (1998: 1-2); also cf. Henning et al. (2004: 101-126)*

The different approaches to discourse analysis displayed above have many variations when applied in different disciplinary research areas as depicted in Table 4.2. For example, this table displays some of the discourse analytic approaches as they apply to analytical philosophy, linguistics, linguistic anthropology, new literacy studies, poststructuralist theory, semiotics and cultural studies, social theory, and the sociology of interaction.
### Further Variations of Approaches to Discourse Analysis as Applied in Different Disciplines

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Disciplines</th>
<th>Analytical Philosophy</th>
<th>5. Post-structuralist theory</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Speech act theory</td>
<td>M M Bakhtin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Principles of information exchange</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Disciplines</th>
<th>Linguistics</th>
<th>6. Semiotics and Cultural Studies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Structuralist linguistics</td>
<td>Semiotics and communication studies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Register studies and stylistics</td>
<td>Cultural studies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Text linguistics</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pragmatics</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Presuppositions</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Face and politeness</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Reference</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Disciplines</th>
<th>Linguistic Anthropology</th>
<th>7. Social Theory</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ethnography of speaking</td>
<td>Pierre Bourdieu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ethnopoetics</td>
<td>Michel Foucault</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Indexicality</td>
<td>Jürgen Habermas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Interactioional sociolinguistics</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Natural histories of discourse</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Disciplines</th>
<th>New Literacy Studies</th>
<th>8. The Sociology of Order in Interaction</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Critical literacy</td>
<td>Erving Goffman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Interaction order</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Frame analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Footing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Face</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Conversation analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Ethnomethodology</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.2: Adapted from Slembrouck (1998-2003: 2); also cf. Mouton (2001: 165-178)

Similarly, there are two related dimensions of ideological analysis suitable for this study: ideological analysis as both a conceptual and a methodological framework. As a conceptual framework, ideological analysis entails conceptualising texts, ideology, language, and different types of discourse from, inter alia, linguistic, Marxist, poststructuralist, and feminist standpoints. Characteristic examples are ideology and social structures, ideology and culture, ideology and power, ideology and domination, ideology and discourse, ideology and gender, ideology and subjectivity, and so forth.

In this case, ideology refers to messages, codes, images, beliefs, assumptions, conventions, practices (social, cultural, religious, political, economic, institutional, etc).
Accordingly, we can talk here about ideological messages, codes, images, beliefs, assumptions, conventions or practices (relating to society as constituted by individuals or groups), cultures, religions, institutions, etc. Ideologies can be negative (critical) or neutral, overt or covert and dominant and subordinate, and can have positive or negative effects (cf. Thompson 1984: 133-139, 1990: 277-291; Van Dijk, 1998: 3-36, 2003: 1-35, 2004: 1-43). So, it is possible to talk about how such ideologies manifest themselves (for example, in the form of messages, codes, images, beliefs, assumptions, conventions or practices) in language, discourse and texts.

The form of ideological analysis adopted in this study, then, views ideology in its critical conception: ideology is a critical tool of analysis and serves as a basis for critique. Thus, its analysis should reflect this critical element. This is particularly relevant as the study investigates two texts (LP and The PC) which, besides being ideological texts, are also instances of ideology critique.

As a methodological framework, ideological analysis – like discourse analysis – subsumes diverse approaches. It refers to an interdisciplinary family of methodologies of and approaches to the study of ideology that draws on, inter alia, sociology, philosophy, language, cultural studies and literary theory. It is a hybrid area of analytic inquiry encompassing a set of methodological approaches and frameworks. Classic examples are Marxist/neo-Marxist, structuralist, poststructuralist, deconstructionist, feminist and critical theory frameworks (cf. Blommaert, 1997: 7 and 38; Henning et al., 2004: 22-26; Luke, 1997: 50-53; Slembrouck, 1998-2003: 1-2; Threadgold, 2003: 5-10). In this study, ideological analysis - like discourse analysis – entails content analysis.

4. 2. 2 Framing Chaos Theory
Chaos theory – also known as *theory of instability* – is a cross-disciplinary theory having its origin in mathematical sciences, systems theory and cybernetics. It is applied in fields as diverse as mathematics, physics, management and organisational theory, communication studies, philosophy, linguistics, etc (Boudourides, 1995: 1-5; Flood, 1991: 305-309; Gleick, 1987: 5-6; Hayles, 1989: 314, 1990: 213-214; Progogine and Stengers, 1984: 180-184; Ströh, 1998: 17-19). This is a point highlighted by Gleick (1987: 5) thus: “Chaos [theory] breaks across the lines that separate scientific disciplines. Because it is a science of the nature of systems, it has brought together thinkers from fields that had been widely separated … It makes strong claims about the universal behavior of complexity.”

In general, chaos theory is the science of complex and non-linear phenomena or a study of unstable aperiodic behaviour in deterministic non-linear dynamical systems. It is, thus, concerned with distinguishing between linearity and non-linearity, order and chance, determinism and unpredictability, and clarity and aporia in systems hierarchies or in the way the universe is organised. It posits that certain kinds of complex systems do not always display the stochastic stability and unity as expected, but rather, are characterised by disorder, instability and disunity. In other words, it attempts to understand why systems seeming to be characterised by disorder, instability, disorganisation and randomness tend to have a semblance of order, stability, organisation and regularity. In this way it pays special attention to small background changes or quantum events as it views them as having far-reaching consequences for systems.

Chaotic systems themselves are collections of multiple orderly sub-systems which can switch rapidly and unpredictably between many different states. Hence, there exists the notion of *chaos* or *chaotic systems* which is used to refer to such systems. However, while chaotic systems may be unpredictable, they are nonetheless deterministic. That is, they are sensitive to initial conditions, they are aperiodic and they display strange attractors (the latter in turn display fractal images and serve as a means for examining the structure of the underlying order within a non-linear system). This implies that chaos theory is not to be associated with the word *chaos* in its everyday use since the former
involves seemingly unstable, random or chaotic behaviour that occurs within definable parameters while exhibiting no discernible patterns. In its conceptual and epistemological character, chaos theory has similarities to catastrophe theory, complexity theory, quantum theory, differential topology, morphogenetic theory, dynamic systems, fuzzy systems theory and spectral analysis (cf. Boudourides, 1995: 2-4; Byrne, 1997: 1-3; Day and Letts, 1997: 1-3; Mayer-Kress, 1995: 1-3).

Below is a schematic representation of chaos theory in terms of order, chaos and randomness:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>System</th>
<th>Order</th>
<th>Chaos</th>
<th>Randomness</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Paradigmatic Example</td>
<td>Clocks, Planets</td>
<td>Clouds, Weather</td>
<td>Snow on TV Screen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Predictability</td>
<td>Very High</td>
<td>Finite, Short Term</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effect of Small Errors</td>
<td>Very Small</td>
<td>Explosive</td>
<td>Nothing But Errors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spectrum</td>
<td>Pure</td>
<td>Yes!</td>
<td>Noisy, Broad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dimension</td>
<td>Finite</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Infinite</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control</td>
<td>Easy</td>
<td>Tricky, Very Sensitive</td>
<td>Poor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attractor</td>
<td>Point, Cycle, Torus</td>
<td>Strange, Fractal</td>
<td>No!</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.3: Discrimination table between order, chaos and randomness as adapted from Mayer-Kress (1995: 2)

For instance, according to this table, chaos theory hypothesises clock- and planet-like behaviour, very high predictability, very small effects of errors, pure spectrum, finite dimension, easy control and stable attractors for a system which has order. In contrast, it envisions cloud- and weather-like behaviour, short term predictability, explosive effects of errors, some spectral dimension, tricky control and strange and fractal attractors for a system typified by chaos. In addition, it posits no predictability, great effects of errors, broad spectrum, infinite dimension, poor control and no attractors for a system accompanied by randomness. The scribbles inserted at the top of the columns for chaos and randomness graphically depict the forms associated with each of these two states. Accordingly, chaos is a mid-range point between order and randomness.
4. 2. 3 Strengths and Weaknesses of the Discourse and Ideological Analysis and Chaos Theory Methodological Framework

One of the major strengths of discourse and ideological analysis is its inter- and cross-disciplinary nature: it is an approach that can be applied across many related and unrelated disciplines as shown above. Its second major strength is that it can be used in conjunction with other methodological approaches either to complement or to enrich them. In addition, it can be either qualitative or quantitative, or it can be both. Qualitative discourse analysis involves interpretation of a given text corpus such as, for example, an oral or written teacher-learner classroom discourse. Here the dimensions of interpretation – which may include commentaries, descriptions, explanations, and so on - depend on the researcher’s interests and on the research questions and the purposes of the research. On the other hand, quantitative discourse analysis entails the segmentation and coding of a given text corpus. Segmentation requires specific units of analysis while coding is guided by a coding scheme. Here both segmenting and coding have to be reliable and the frequencies of all codes need to be tallied for further statistical analyses (cf. for example Karasavvidis, 2001a: 1-2, 2001b: 1-3; Stubbs, 1994: 205-218, 1997: 110-111).

Likewise, chaos theory is an inter- and cross-disciplinary theory. As a conceptual device, it provides the interface between quantitative and qualitative research on the one hand, and between positivism and critical theory, between rationalism and anti-rationalism, between modernism and postmodernism, and analogously, between critical linguistics and postmodernism on the other hand. It does the same for the distinction between linear and non-linear conceptualisation of systems or variables. Moreover, it can be applied to both linear and non-linear systems or variables to either complement them or add a different perspective to them. Most importantly, it is beginning to be used in conjunction with discourse analysis in certain studies so as to add a new dimension to discourse theory (cf. in particular Day and Letts, 1997: 1-12; Ryan, 1999: 1-6; Walters and Williams, 2003: 1-10). In the context of the current research, chaos theory provides the relevant theoretical approach and offers the necessary metaphors, methodology and
model as it encompasses techniques applicable to multiple levels of analysis, ranging from micro-levels to macro-levels.

However, there are certain shortcomings characterising both discourse analysis and chaos theory as conceptual and methodological approaches. For instance, discourse analysis often derives its strength from negatively representing formal grammar. Thus, in most cases, it degenerates into *linguicism* (a narrowly linguistic analysis) and allows analysts to make unwarranted ideological, cultural and social interpretations on the basis of linguistic and textual elements as if there were a one-to-one correspondence between these elements and ideological, cultural and social structures.

Again, it often lends itself to misuse especially when analysts use it to generate their findings from isolated text fragments (from very scant textual data forms). Closely related to this last criticism is the fact that it presents the temptation to analysts to draw generalisable implications from inadequate data texts. In addition, discourse analysis lacks specific criteria (benchmarks) for data analysis and is sometimes prone to circularity (cf. Stubbs, 1994: 201-203, 1997: 103-109). That is there are no established generic guidelines and universally agreed criteria for conducting discourse analysis. Moreover, in most instances, analysis of data is equated with data interpretation, a practice amounting to circularity.

Besides, it is open to under-analysis through simply summarising and over-quoting certain parts of the data, and through taking sides and spotting features that the researcher is looking for (cf. Antaki, Billig, Edwards and Potter, 2002: 1-14). Above all, it can be open to *languagism* (when all there is, is reduced to language), *textualism* (when everything else is seen as text) and *discursivism* (when all there is becomes discourse). In the current study, two full-length books serve as sources of data analysis and interpretation.

Concerning chaos theory, one of its major drawbacks is that since it has the potential to span so many disciplines, it runs the risk of being regarded as *anything theory* applied to
any discipline, thereby losing its identity. The fact that chaos theory draws its strength from or shares similarities with other theories such as catastrophe theory, complexity theory, quantum theory, differential topology, morphogenetic theory, dynamic systems, fuzzy systems theory and spectral analysis, for example, makes it suffer from an identity crisis as it could be easily mistaken to be any of these theories or to be a variant of any of them even when that is not the case. As a result, it is not easy to attach a conclusive definition to it.

Allied to this last aspect is that unlike mathematics and physics, two of the areas from which it stems, chaos theory does not have a universal acceptance that other conventional sciences have. As such, it is sometimes viewed with suspicion or scepticism. This point largely has to do with the fact that a theory that purports to deal with disorder or chaos, or sets out to study the dynamics of how pockets of order and determinism emerge out of disorder and chaos, seems to be inherently self-contradictory or paradoxical if not nebulous in nature (cf. Boudourides, 1995: 2-4; Day and Letts, 1997: 1-12; Ryan, 1999: 1-6; Walters and Williams, 2003: 1-10).

Most importantly, chaos theory is prone to constant abuse and misuse. For instance, as it relies so heavily on mathematics and physics, it serves as a convenient conduit through which scientific concepts – such as differential geometry, mathematical topology, set theory and quantum theory - from these two areas are imported or invoked by scholars (particularly in the human and social sciences) without establishing any rationale for doing so. In most cases these scientific concepts are imported or invoked for their own sake, or for the sake of providing a veneer of science (pseudo-science) to the views and arguments scholars make. This practice is nothing short of misusing and abusing such concepts (Sokal and Bricmont, 1998: n. p; cf. Spurrett, 1999: 258-262).

In view of the above, the main reasons for employing a discourse and ideological analysis and chaos theory methodological framework in this thesis are as follows. Firstly, the framework offers the researcher the opportunity to integrate disciplines, research paradigms, epistemologies and theories. That is, it provides to the researcher an inter- and
cross-disciplinary platform and a space for integrating quantitative and qualitative research paradigms, rational and anti-rational epistemologies, and social and linguistic theory. Secondly, it affords the researcher the necessary conceptual tools and metaphors and the requisite techniques for mounting multi-level data analysis at both macro- and micro-levels. Above all, as the framework incorporates ideological analysis as part of its analytic approach, it lends itself well to studying and analysing both critical linguistics and postmodernism as areas of my research focus.

4. 3 A Textual Content Analysis and Chaos Theory Model for Part I and Part II

This section of the thesis presents a textual content analysis and chaos theory model employed in Part I and Part II of Chapter Five. It also specifies different sets of units of analysis used in these two parts. In addition, it provides – within the ambit of this model – a sample data analysis pertaining to these two parts. Lastly, it states the rationale for employing the model in question and pinpoints its inherent strengths and weaknesses.

4. 3. 1 Framing a Model of Data Analysis
The specific model of data analysis for Part I and Part II is an integrated textual content analysis and chaos theory model. For purposes of triangulation, the model draws on elements of both discourse analysis and chaos theory as outlined above. Textual content analysis here entails content-oriented textual analysis characterised by entextualisation, the latter referring to the process through which parts of texts or discourses are simultaneously and successively decontextualised and metadiscursively recontextualised so that they can become part of the new interpretive process. In entextualisation, original pieces of texts – as situated events – are lifted out of their original context and conveyed by quoting them, writing them down or inserting them into another context as instances of data for scientific analysis (Blommaert, 1997: 5-6). Figure 4.1 displays my composite model of analysis for this section.

As is evident from Figure 4.1, aspects of discourse analysis incorporated in this model are quantitative and qualitative content analyses of the content features related to the two data texts, LP and The PC as identified below. These two forms of content analysis are combined here as a further attempt to add triangulation to the data analysis process.

Quantitative content analysis involves breaking down the content of a text into countable variables or units (such as concepts, words, phrases, expressions, sentences or arguments), counting the occurrence or frequency of these units, and analysing them according to set procedures or specified categories. This type of analysis enables the analyst to describe, interpret and evaluate the measured units systematically and objectively. By contrast, qualitative content analysis entails analysing both the manifest and latent content features of the text such as its definitions of words or concepts, or themes, ideas and views it embodies against the broader historical, social and cultural contexts stated or implied by the text itself. In all this, it is guided by a careful
Figure 4.1: A textual content analysis and chaos theory model for Part I and Part II

examination, description, explanation, structuring and interpretation of the text. Above all, it takes into account the perspectives of others and it is open to re-interpretations or counter-interpretations (Campos, 1998: 4-5; cf. Stubbs, 1994: 201-211, 1997: 111-114).
Concerning LP and The PC, concepts, words, sentences, paragraphs and extracts or cited material serve as units of analysis in the first strand of analysis for Part I and Part II. Words, sentences and paragraphs relate to the expression of the explicit and implicit goals for LP and The PC, the areas of focus and the underlying theoretical assumptions they have, and the approaches, methods and models of analysis they use. Extracts comprising units of analysis are the types of excerpts used by Fairclough in LP and the types of cited material used by Lyotard in The PC. Here the word count each extract or cited material has serves as the basis of analysis. All of these elements constitute content variables.

The concepts serving as units of content analysis for LP are (mainstream) linguistics, critical linguistics, language, ideology, power, discourse, text, intertextuality, subject positions (identities), utterances, and postmodernism. With reference to The PC, the conceptual units of analysis are modernity/modernism, postmodernity/postmodernism, grand narratives/meta-narratives, language games, utterances, pragmatics, performativity, paralogy/paralogism, incommensurability, knowledge, and legitimation/legitimacy.

Elements of chaos theory incorporated into this model of textual content analysis for LP and The PC include the following conceptual tools: complexity, randomness, attractors, fractals, self-similarity, connectionism, dissipative structures, and paradoxes, contradictions or aporias. All of these constitute chaotic qualities in this model. Complexity is a descriptive term for systems consisting of complex elements that can be understood in terms of their hierarchical structures or their network relationship to each other. There are three properties built into complexity: adaptability (adaptiveness) which is the ability to produce innovations and changes; the presence of irreducible uncertainties in any analysis; and the multiplicity of legitimate perspectives on any problems. Most significantly, complexity is a characteristic feature of systems that are able to exist at the boundary between order and chaos so as to strike a balance between these two regimes that is neither wholly stable nor entirely turbulent.
Randomness refers to the aperiodic occurrence of events within a system. Random tendencies involve unexpected or unintended consequences. In this regard, attractors are underlying patterns which exist because of inherent structural characteristics of the chaotic system. Some attractors (e.g. point and limit attractors) are highly unpredictable, others have quasi-periodicity (e.g. torus attractors), while others (e.g. strange attractors) have quasi-stability and are sensitive to initial conditions. Correspondingly, dissipative structures are about the fact that far from equilibrium structures have internal and external fluctuations (instabilities), thus giving rise to bifurcation points which reconstitute them into new forms of order. It is for this reason that little changes or butterfly effects lead to significant changes.

Fractals are patterns or images of chaos; they are irregular shapes or qualities with no clear definition which display the same degree of irregularity on all scales. However, fractal objects, although irregular, look the same or similar when examined from afar or nearby. This is the quality of self-similarity which implies that a similar pattern can be detected at various levels of abstraction or observation. And it is the manifestation of self-similarity at various levels of chaotic systems which formally differentiates chaos from randomness.

The concept of self-similarity leads to that of connectionism which refers to the attention paid to the ways in which units or elements of a model or theory are related to each other and how these relationship patterns repeat themselves. Chaos theory is also built upon and foregrounds the notions of paradoxes, contradictions or aporias (gaps) inherent in systems or variables. One of its chief paradoxes is that order exists within disorder and vice versa. Here chaos and order are mirror images and, thus, complementary. Its other paradox is that both universal determinism (universal orderliness) and local determinism (local orderliness) are bounded by fuzzy boundaries (cf. Day and Letts, 1997: 1-12; Hughes and Attwell, 1999: 1-10; Walters and Williams, 2003: 1-10). The critical point regarding this model is the extent to which the content variables – especially the two sets of concepts - related to both LP and The PC as cited above display the chaotic qualities featured in it (cf. Figure 4.1).
4. 3. 2 Part I and Part II Data Analysis

Data analysis for this section of the study comes in two related parts: Part I and Part II which provide a macro-analysis of the two data texts. Part I focuses on LP whereas Part II deals with The PC. There are two strands of analysis mounted in these two parts. The first strand of analysis explores the following content variables of both LP and The PC: their explicit and implicit goals; their areas of focus; their underlying theoretical assumptions; the approaches, methods and models of analysis they use; and the types of data extracts used in LP and the types of cited material employed in The PC. In connection with this last aspect the intention is to establish whether such data extracts or cited material types are adequate, trustworthy and credible in the context in which they have been used (cf. Edge and Richards, 1998: 345-352). In relation to the first four content variables, words, sentences and paragraphs embodying these variables (in both LP and The PC) are analysed. Pertaining to the data extracts and the cited material, excerpts (in the case of LP) and quoted material (in the case of The PC) are analysed respectively. Here, the number of words (especially word counts) used in each case, are the basis of the analysis.

Explicit goals are the objectives which are explicitly and clearly stated while implicit goals are the objectives which are implied or indirectly expressed in both LP and The PC. Areas of focus are the specific issues on which each of the two texts focuses. Underlying theoretical assumptions are the theories or the theoretical claims which inform the two texts; approaches, methods and models of analysis refer to the specific methodological approaches adopted and the specific methods and models of data analysis used in the two texts. Lastly, extracts are the types of excerpts employed in LP and the types of cited material used in The PC as part of the data for these two texts.

Concerning quantitative content analysis the spotlight is on the frequencies to which the content variables specified above are individually repeated in LP and The PC. Here the occurrence frequencies, the total occurrence frequencies and the percentage frequencies of these variables throughout each of these two texts - and the pages on which they occur
in each text - are counted and tallied. The occurrence frequencies are worked out by calculating the number of times a variable occurs in a text, the total occurrence frequencies by adding together all the occurrence frequencies, and the percentage frequencies by dividing the total occurrence frequencies of individual variables by the total number of the occurrence frequencies of all the variables in the text.

All of the above information is presented in tabular forms in the case of the explicit and implicit goals, the underlying theoretical assumptions and the two sets of concepts identified above for each text. In the case of the approaches, methods and models of analysis used in each text and the underlying theoretical assumptions for *The PC*, this information is presented in diagrams. In addition, *Appendix A* presents exemplars of the textual evidence of these content variables as they relate to both *LP* and *The PC* respectively. With regard to qualitative content analysis the focus is on the specific definitions, ideas and views ascribed to these content variables.

In respect of the data extracts used in *LP* and the cited material for *The PC*, the number and types of extracts and the number and types of cited material used in the two texts respectively, the word count and the average words each extract and each cited material has, and the page numbers on which each extract and each cited material appears, are worked out and presented in a tabular form. This is done so as to work out how adequate, trustworthy and credible these data extracts are in the context of the texts in which they have been employed. Again, *Appendix A* provides instances of both the data extracts and the cited material used in *LP* and *The PC* respectively. With regard to *The PC* the data is in the form of cited material. For illustration purposes, the following sample data analysis together with its exemplars presents a quantitative and qualitative content analysis of the explicit and implicit goals for *LP* and *The PC* respectively.

*Sample Data Analysis 1*

*Data Exemplar 4.1: Explicit Goals for LP*

I have written (this book) for two main (goals). The first is theoretical: to help correct a widespread underestimation of the significance of language in the production, maintenance, and change of social relations of power. The second is more practical: to
help increase consciousness of how language contributes to the domination of some people by others, because consciousness is the first step towards emancipation (LP, pp. 1; cf. pp. 4, 12, 23 and 233).

**Data Exemplar 4. 2: Implicit Goals for LP**

Given my focus on ideology, this means helping people to see the extent to which their language does rest on common-sense assumptions, and the ways in which these common-sense assumptions can be ideologically shaped by the relations of power … But the effectiveness of resistance and the realization of change depend on people developing a critical consciousness of domination and its modalities … Therefore (this book) makes a contribution to the general raising of consciousness of exploitative social relations (LP, pp. 4 and 5).

*Table 4. 4* below exhibits the types and number of explicit and implicit goals referred to in *LP* as well as their occurrence frequencies, their percentage occurrence frequencies and the page numbers on which they appear in the entire text.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Types of Goals</th>
<th>Page Numbers</th>
<th>Number of Goals</th>
<th>Occurrence Frequencies</th>
<th>% Occurrence Frequencies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Explicit Goals</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implicit Goals</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Explicit Goal 1</td>
<td>1; 12; 23;</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Explicit Goal 2</td>
<td>1; 4; 233</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implicit Goal 1</td>
<td>5; 8; 19; 23;</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>20</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implicit Goal 2</td>
<td>4; 5; 20; 23;</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>66</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total OFs</strong></td>
<td><strong>29</strong></td>
<td><strong>4</strong></td>
<td><strong>65</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Table 4. 4*: Explicit and implicit goals as mentioned in *LP* and their occurrence frequencies (* = Total occurrence frequencies)

For example, the text has 2 explicitly stated goals: to help remedy a widespread underestimation of the importance of language in producing, maintaining and changing social relations of power; and to help increase awareness of how language contributes to the domination of some people by others, as such awareness constitutes the first step toward liberation. Throughout the text there are 4 references to the first goal and 5 references to the second goal (cf. LP, pp. 1, 4, 12, 23 and 233). Similarly, the text has two implicit goals: to help correct the hidden ideological workings of power realised through language
(hence the text has the leitmotif *language and power* built into it); and to raise and develop critical language awareness of relations of domination. The first implicit goal is mentioned 13 times and the second one 43 times in the whole text (cf. *LP*, pp. 4 and 5).

Sample Data Analysis 2

**Data Exemplar 4. 3: Explicit Goal for The PC**

The object of this study is the condition of knowledge in the most highly developed societies. I have decided to use the word *postmodern* to describe that condition. The word is in current use … among sociologists and critics; it designates the state of our culture following the transformations which, since the end of the nineteenth century, have altered the game rules for science, literature, and the arts (*The PC*, p. xxiii; cf. pp. 3, 4 and 5).

**Data Exemplar 4. 4: Implicit Goal for The PC**

The text that follows is an occasional one. It is a report on knowledge in the most highly developed societies … Our working hypothesis is that the status of (scientific) knowledge is altered as societies enter what is known as the postindustrial age and cultures enter what is known as the postmodern age … In this light, the new technologies can only increase the urgency of such reexamination, since they make information … more mobile and subject to piracy … That is the working hypothesis defining the field within which I intend to consider the question of the status of knowledge … This is as much as to say that the hypothesis is banal. But only to the extent that it fails to challenge … progress in science and technology (*The PC*, pp. xxv, 3, 6 and 7).

These two types of goals together with their occurrence frequencies, their percentage occurrence frequencies and the page numbers on which they appear in *The PC*, are displayed in *Table 4. 5*. 
As illustrated in Table 4.5, there is 1 explicitly stated goal for The PC: to investigate the condition of knowledge and to report on it in the most highly developed societies. The text also has 1 implicit goal: to examine and challenge the status of science, technology (including technocracy) and information in the postmodern era (cf. The PC, pp, xiii, xiv, xxiii, 3 and 4). There are 43 and 20 references to the explicit and implicit goals, respectively, throughout the text. A further analysis of the other remaining content variables is presented in Chapter Five.

The second strand of analysis in both Part I and Part II examines the use of each term in the two sets of concepts related to LP and The PC as outlined in Figure 4.1 above. Firstly, quantitative content analysis in this regard examines the frequencies to which these terms – as content variables - are respectively used or repeated within the relevant semantic contexts in each text. The variables are coded, quantified and tallied in tabular forms. Here, too, the occurrence frequencies are worked out by calculating the number of times a variable occurs in a text, the total occurrence frequencies by adding together all the occurrence frequencies, and the percentage frequencies by dividing the total occurrence frequencies of individual variables by the total number of the occurrence frequencies of all the variables in the text. This analytic strategy is consistent with conceptual and relational analysis which is at the heart of content analysis (cf. Mayring,

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Types of Goals</th>
<th>Page Numbers</th>
<th>Number of Goals</th>
<th>Occurrence Frequencies</th>
<th>% Occurrence Frequencies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Explicit Goal</td>
<td>vii; viii; xii; xv; xix; xxiii; xxv; 3; 4; 6; 5; 6; 7; 8; 11; 13; 18; 19; 25; 28; 52; 53; 54; 60</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implicit Goal</td>
<td>viii; xiii; xix; xx; xxiii; 3; 4; 5; 6; 7; 12; 17; 38; 49; 63</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.5: Explicit and implicit goals as stated in The PC and their occurrence frequencies
2000: 2-6; Petrina, 1998: 3-11; Wise, 2002: 1). Moreover, Appendix A presents exemplars of the textual evidence of these content variables as they relate to both LP and The PC respectively.

Secondly, qualitative content analysis explores the types of textual definitions, ideas or views assigned to each concept in each set. To ensure a credible and independent interpretation, the definitions, ideas and views attributed to the conceptual variables of the two texts are benchmarked against those provided by the other sources used in the study and against those provided by the software programme WordWeb 3.03. The latter is an electronic dictionary - mounted both online and offline – released by Antony Lewis in 2004. It has more than 230 000 English lexical entries (words spanning different disciplines, e.g. science, linguistics, philosophy, etc) and offers definitions, synonyms (words with similar or close meanings) and antonyms of words together with their related types/parts and contextual usages. This software programme will henceforth be cited in this study thus: (WordWeb, 2004).

Thirdly, the chaos theory-based content analysis investigates the degree to which these conceptual variables display – at a latent and inferential level - the chaotic qualities (e.g. complexity, randomness, attractors, fractals, self-similarity, connectionism, dissipative structures, and paradoxes, contradictions or aporias) represented in Figure 4.1. Fourthly, this part of the analysis also explores the extent to which chaos theory can be employed to bring the boundaries between critical linguistics and mainstream linguistics, between modernism and postmodernism, and between critical linguistics and postmodernism closer to each other. The underlying principle for this integrated model of data analysis is that both critical linguistics and postmodernism constitute chaotic and discursive systems and that the theories and views underpinning them encompass chaotic and discursive variables. For both Parts I and II a discussion of the results is mounted accordingly. Finally, a short comparative analysis is carried out to establish similarities and differences existing between critical linguistics and postmodernism.
As an illustration, the following sample data analysis mounts the quantitative and qualitative content analysis of the first concept in each set of the conceptual variables linked to LP and The PC respectively.

Sample Data Analysis 3

Data Exemplar 4.5: (Mainstream) linguistics - LP

The term linguistics is used ambiguously within the mainstream: it sometimes … refers just to the branch which has the most privileged status, 'linguistics proper'… I am referring here to 'linguistics proper', which is the study of 'grammar' in a broad sense: the sound systems of language ('phonology'), the grammatical structure of words ('morphology') and of sentences ('syntax'), and more formal aspects of meaning ('semantics') … It is a paradoxical fact that linguistics has given relatively little attention to actual speech, or writing, it has characterized language as a potential, a system, an abstract competence, rather than attempting to describe actual language practice … Mainstream linguistics has taken two crucial assumptions about langue from Saussure: that the language of a particular community can … be regarded as invariant … and that the study of langue ought to be ‘synchronic’ rather than historical – it ought to be studied as a static system … These assumptions … result in an idealized view of language … (Thus) mainstream linguistics is an asocial way of studying language (LP, pp. 6-7).

Table 4.6 exemplifies the use of the concept of (mainstream) linguistics and its related occurrence frequencies in each of the chapters in LP. For instance, it occurs 5, 28, 1, 2 and 2 times in the Preface and in chapters 1, 2, 4 and 9 respectively while it does not occur in the other chapters. Above all, it has a total frequency of 38 and a percentage frequency of 1.6 in the entire text.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Concepts</th>
<th>Frequences in Preface</th>
<th>Frequences in Chapter 1</th>
<th>Frequences in Chapter 2</th>
<th>Frequences in Chapter 3</th>
<th>Frequences in Chapter 4</th>
<th>Frequences in Chapter 5</th>
<th>Frequences in Chapter 6</th>
<th>Frequences in Chapter 7</th>
<th>Frequences in Chapter 8</th>
<th>Frequences in Chapter 9</th>
<th>Total Frequences</th>
<th>Percentage Frequency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(Mainstream) linguistics</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.6: The concept (mainstream) linguistics as used and its occurrence frequencies in LP
According to *Data Exemplar 4. 5*, Fairclough (1989: 6-7) views linguistics as represented mainly by Saussure (and by implication by Chomsky) as both having mainstream (modern) connotations and involving the study of phonology, morphology, syntax and semantics. Thus, it pays little attention to actual speech and writing, and characterises language as an orderly, abstract, stable and idealised formal system rather than as a disorderly, concrete, unstable and dynamic functional system. In this case, it privileges *langue* (abstract system) over *parole* (actual speech), the *synchronic* (the non-historical) over the *diachronic* (the historical), and *competence* (internal language) over *performance* (external language). As such, it is asocial as it has nothing to say about the interplay between language, power and ideology (cf. pp. 20-22).

What is evident from Fairclough’s characterisation of mainstream linguistics as exemplified in *Data Exemplar 4. 5* is his dualistic approach which is a binary reversal of what he impugns mainstream linguistics – as represented by Saussure – for. That is, his approach privileges all the linguistic instances which mainstream linguistics does not privilege – e.g. it privileges *parole* (and all it stands for) over *langue* (and all it embodies). So, what is missing in his conception of mainstream linguistics is the fact that, inferentially, the latter is a complex field characterised by self-similarity, connectionism and paradoxes. It has complex but adaptive elements; these elements are many and varied, but like chaotic fractals, display self-similarity. Above all, these elements are connected to each (have a quality of connectionism). All this is paradoxical. This is what Fairclough’s characterisation of linguistics as a human field misses.

From a chaos theory perspective, it is possible to study predictable and deterministic language areas such as phonology, morphology and syntax which - à la Saussure - may display order, stability and idealisation. At the same time, it is also possible to study sometimes unpredictable and indeterministic language areas such as, for example, semantics, conversation, pragmatics, speech acts and sociolinguistics which - à la Fairclough - may display disorder, instability and concreteness (cf. *WordWeb*, 2004). A point worth noting here is that there are parts of phonology, morphology, syntax,
semantics, conversation, pragmatics and sociolinguistics which may display both order and disorder – one of the core principles underpinning chaos theory.

For instance, some phonemes and morphemes may follow a predictable and deterministic pattern within a particular phonological or morphological system, while others may not. Similarly, the meanings of certain words may be fairly determinate and easily predictable while others may not be until their semantic, conversational and pragmatic contexts have been established. The case in point from the above exemplar is the concept linguistics itself which for Fairclough assumes two connotations – mainstream and proper. In another context the selfsame concept may have little or nothing to do with these two connotations. All of this is analogous to chaotic determinism, deterministic chaos or probabilistic determinism (cf. Alexander, 2002: 1-14; Byrne, 1997: 1-5; WordWeb, 2004). So, from this vantage point both langue and parole can be similarly privileged.

Sample Data Analysis 4

Data Exemplar 4.6: Modernity/Modernism – The PC

Science has always been in conflict with narratives. Judged by the yardstick of science, the majority of them prove to be fables. But to the extent that science does not restrict itself to stating useful regularities and seeks the truth, it is obliged to legitimate the rules of its own game. It then produces a discourse of legitimation with respect to its own status, a discourse called philosophy. I will use the term modern to designate any science that legitimates itself with reference to a metadiscourse of this kind making an explicit appeal to some grand narrative, such as the dialectics of Spirit, the hermeneutics of meaning, the emancipation of the rational or working subject, or the creation of wealth (The PC, p. xxiii).

The concept modernity has a total occurrence frequency of 23 in The PC – it occurs 16 and 6 times in the Foreword and in Section 15 respectively, and once in the Introduction. Its overall percentage occurrence frequency is 3.3 (cf. Table 4.7).
Following *Data Exemplar 4. 6*, Lyotard (1984: xxiii) views modernity as designating any science that legitimates itself by making an explicit appeal to grand narratives such as the hermeneutics of meaning, the dialectics of Spirit, the creation of wealth and the emancipation of the rational or working subject. Thus, he effectively associates modernity with global theories such as Marxism and functionalism which are themselves instances of grand narratives. Above all, he regards modernity as representing a utopian Newtonian worldview of order, linearity, determinism, regularity, homeostasis, equilibrium, homogeneity, consensus, normativity and foundationalism (cf. Milovanovic, 1997: 2-3).

*Data Exemplar 4. 6* reflects at least two points: the first is a one-dimensional view which Lyotard assigns to modernity; the second is his simplistic characterisation of the latter. This is not only a simplistic but also a restrictive view of modernity as it consigns the latter to sciences seeking to legitimise themselves through grand narratives. What this view ignores is that modernity as a phenomenon encompasses many and complex processes and includes diverse fields. Moreover, there are instances in which modernity or modernism can reflect both modern and postmodern features or vice versa. For instance, both Marxism and functionalism – which are the subject of Lyotard’s critique in *The PC* and which are the two areas he cites as instances of modern meta-discourses – can incorporate in their theorising and analysis, both modern and postmodern elements. Thus, from a standpoint of a chaotic system as understood in this study, modernity (or modernism) is both a complex and dynamic condition or process which is not necessarily about sciences legitimating themselves by appealing to grand narratives. Neither is it
associated with global theories alone; nor is it seen as representing only a linear deterministic Newtonian worldview.

Of course, chaos theory questions the reductionist view of Newtonian science that projects nature as a simple machine following a clock-like behaviour. However, according to it not all modernist sciences legitimate themselves through grand narratives – ironically Lyotard (1984: 20 and 27) himself refers to narrative knowledge as one such science. That is, in terms of chaos theory, it is possible for global and local theories, order and disorder, linearity and non-linearity, determinism and indeterminism, homeostasis and change, equilibrium and disequilibrium, homogeneity and heterogeneity, and consensus and diversity to co-exist within a modernist worldview. Its contention is that the positive attributes should not be privileged over their negative counterparts when configuring modernity. In this way, it accommodates both chaotic determinism and deterministic chaos (cf. Guess and Sailor, 1991: 15; WordWeb, 2004; Young, 1992: 1-15). So, from a chaos theory perspective, both modernity and postmodernity can mutually co-exist.

4.3.3 Strengths and Weaknesses of the Textual Content Analysis and Chaos Theory Model of Analysis

The model of analysis outlined above has some advantages. For instance, content analysis combines quantitative and qualitative operations on text analysis, thereby adding a qualitative richness to quantitative data analysis. In addition, it serves as an unobtrusive technique that can be applied almost to any form of data. It is a form of analysis that can cope with large volumes of data. Furthermore, the model tries to avoid the reductionism built into traditional discourse analysis which manifests itself in the form of linguistics, textualism and discursivism. It also tries to avoid a purely social theory-driven analysis. Again, it attempts to do away with the classical divide between quantitative and qualitative analysis characterising much research. In other words, it strives to establish the interface between discourse analysis and social theory-oriented analysis – both represented by content analysis and the chaos theory-driven analysis - of the data at hand.
In this way, it attempts to fuse two different but supplementary approaches which are a prerequisite for the type of analysis adopted in the study.

However, there are certain shortcomings inherent in this model of analysis which I want to highlight. First, content analysis is time-consuming. It sometimes poses reliability and validity problems and can be too subjective (cf. Correa, 1998: 1-5). It has its own reductionism: it reduces texts to words, concepts, and categories and mounts their mechanical counting. Second, this model is exploratory and still in its experimental stage. Third, this model characterises chaos theory in a very simplistic way. Allied to this last point is the fact that the distinction between chaos theory and complexity theory is not clear-cut in much literature on both theories (cf. Day and Letts, 1997: 1-3; Hughes and Attwell, 1999: 2-7; Spurrett, 1999: 260-261; Walters and Williams, 2003: 1-4).

Nonetheless, the simplified version provided here suffices for the purposes of the current study as the latter is not about the epistemological and philosophical debates and boundaries characterising the two theories, but rather, about the instrumentality and relevance of this composite model of analysis to the issues the study attempts to address.

4. 4 A Model of Data Analysis for Part III and Part IV

This section of the study presents a multidisciplinary model of ideological discourse analysis (MIDA) employed in Part III and Part IV of Chapter Six. It also spells out two sets of units of analysis used in these two parts. In addition, it provides – within the purview of this model – a sample data analysis pertaining to these two parts. Lastly, it states the rationale for employing the model in question and pinpoints its inherent strengths and weaknesses.
4. 4. 1 A Multidisciplinary Model of Ideological Discourse Analysis (MIDA)

As a further attempt at ensuring triangulation in the data analysis process of this study, I add one more dimension to this section. This is the multidisciplinary model of ideological discourse analysis (MIDA) employed to analyse the two selected pieces of data extracted from LP and PC in Part III and Part IV (cf. Appendices B and D). This model (cf. Figure 4. 2) augments the one used to analyse the data in Part I and Part II. The former approaches both LP and The PC from the discourse and chaos theory perspective (thus viewing the two texts as displaying discursive and chaotic qualities). The latter approaches these two texts from the standpoint of discourse and ideology (thus viewing them as discursive and ideological texts). This model incorporates elements of

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**Figure 4. 2:** A multidisciplinary model of ideological discourse analysis (MIDA) for Part III and Part IV

At the level of ideology, the model involves two forms of analysis (ideological and discursive analysis) and a depth-hermeneutic approach (cf. Thompson, 1984: 133-139). Ideological analysis deals with ideological operations (symbolic, institutional, power and domination relations) and how they manifest themselves in the two extracts selected from LP and The PC while discursive analysis has to do with how these ideological operations manifest themselves at the discursive level in the two extracts. The main focus of discursive analysis is on forms of discourse and linguistic constructions (e.g. pronouns and modals) and on explicating their role in ideological operations.

Depth-hermeneutics entails interpreting the analysed material drawn from the two extracts by trying to construct and reconstruct meanings from it. It is a tool for making claims and counter claims vis-à-vis the analysed material from the two extracts and synthesising them while being open to both reinterpretation and counter evidence. Most importantly, it is an interpretive process which highlights contradictions, inconsistencies, paradoxes and lacunae embedded in the analysed material from the two extracts.

The model also incorporates five ideological strategies – *legitimation*, *unification*, *dissimulation*, *fragmentation* and *reification* - through which ideology operates in texts (cf. Thompson, (1990: 277-291). For instance, *legitimation* relates to how rationalisation, universalisation and narrativisation as strategic devices are applied in the two extracts as instances of ideological texts. Both *unification* and *dissimulation* refer to how symbolisation of unity or standardisation and euphemisation as strategic devices, respectively, apply to the two extracts. By contrast, *fragmentation* is about how the strategic device of the differentiation or the expurgation of the other functions in the two extracts while *reification* has to do with how the strategic devices of pronominalisation, naturalisation and eternalisation operate in the two aforesaid extracts.
At the discourse level, the model analyses the following discourse features or units as used in the two extracts: narrative; repetition; rhetoric; pronominalisation (pronouns); modality (modals); topoi; stereotypes; metaphors; implication; presupposition; and conversational maxims. Narrative relates to how a narrative (a story) as a feature of discourse has been used in the two extracts. Repetition has to do with how words, expressions, phrases and statements have been repeated in the two extracts. Rhetoric is about a rhetorical use - and repetition – of certain words, expressions, phrases or statements for purposes of emphasis in the two extracts.

On the one hand, pronominalisation and modality refer, respectively, to the use of pronouns and modals in the two extracts. Modality in particular reflects one’s attitude towards the truth of a proposition as expressed in a sentence or utterance through the use of modals (cf. Simpson, 1993: 47-55; Strauss, 2004: 11; WordWeb, 2004). On the other hand, topoi, stereotypes and metaphors refer, correspondingly, to conventional themes or motifs, conventional frames or references, and metaphorical expressions (which involve associating one concept or object with another) in the two extracts. Implication and presupposition concern implied and presupposed meanings or the implicational and presuppositional intent attached to language as applied to the two extracts.

Lastly, conversational maxims relate to how Grice’s four maxims of conversation (e.g. the quantity, quality, relevance and manner maxims) operate in the two extracts. The maxim of quantity relates to one making one’s contribution (in conversation) as informative as is required; the maxim of quality requires one not to lie or not to say that for which one lacks evidence; the maxim of relevance expects one to be relevant; and the maxim of manner compels one to be brief and orderly and to avoid ambiguity (cf. Thomas, 1995: 63-84; WordWeb, 2004; Yule, 1996: 145-146). All of these discourse features constitute content variables which serve as units of analysis in this section.

Above all, the model focuses on six discourse strategies – positive self-presentation, negative other-presentation, justification, avoidance, attribution and scapegoating – as
applied to the two extracts (also cf. Van Dijk, 1998: 3-36, 2003: 1-35, 2004: 1-43). Positive self-presentation as a discourse strategy entails how one positively portrays oneself by emphasising the positive aspects or by de-emphasising the negative aspects about oneself. It is an attempt at self-glorification. By contrast, negative other-presentation involves how one negatively presents the other (the other person or party) by emphasising the negative aspects or by de-emphasising the positive aspects about the other. It is an attempt at derogating or discrediting the other.

Justification and avoidance are about justifying one’s points and being evasive in discourse respectively while attribution and scapegoating have to do with attributing things to others and apportioning the blame to others (or refusing to take the blame for one’s own actions) in discourse respectively. All of these are the discourse strategies employed in the two extracts. So, my analysis is intended to explore and highlight the way in which and the purpose for which these discourse strategies have been applied in these two extracts. The analysis relates to Part III and Part IV as shown below.

### 4. 4. 2 Part III and Part IV Data Analysis

Two more dimensions of triangulation are incorporated in this section. The first one concerns the micro-analysis applied to the two extracts selected from LP and The PC. The analysis consists of two parts: Part III and Part IV. Part III provides the analysis of the extract from Fairclough’s LP entitled Case Study which is an interview between Michael Charlton and Margaret Thatcher conducted by BBC Radio 3, on 17th December 1985 (cf. Appendix B). I have chosen this extract for the data analysis purposes as it serves as a flagship excerpt that Fairclough analyses in LP (cf. pp. 172-196). This part mounts an analysis and a meta-analysis of the extract. The former deals with the extract itself while the latter focuses on Fairclough’s analysis of, especially, the pronouns and modals used in the self-same extract. Part IV explores and analyses the extract from Lyotard’s The PC (cf. pp. 60-67; Appendix D). Here, again, I have chosen this extract as it serves as a salient section in Lyotard’s The PC.
Thus, the micro-analysis of the two extracts complements the macro-analysis mounted on *LP* and *The PC* as outlined in Part I and Part II (which investigates the content variables of the two texts from a macro-perspective). I enlist the use of the software programme *Tropes V6.2*, which is a content analysis software package designed to analyse documents loaded onto a computer, to identify the word counts, content types and language styles the two extracts have. The two extracts were typed in a plain text format and loaded onto the computer so as to work out the occurrence frequency counts of their words, expressions, phrases, statements, pronouns and modals and to identify the language style employed in them using this software programme. I also make use of the software programme *WordWeb 3.03* (cf. *WordWeb*, 2004) to cross-validate the ideological tendencies or practices inferred from the discourse and ideological strategies operational in the two extracts. This is, thus, the second dimension of triangulation incorporated into this data analysis section of the study.

Below follows a sample analysis of the two extracts which focuses mainly on narrative as a discourse feature in each extract. The analysis takes into account the discourse and ideological strategies illustrated in the MIDA in *Figure 4. 2*. The full analysis of the other discourse features is similarly conducted in Chapter Six (in Part III and IV).

*Sample Data Analysis 5*

*Data Exemplar 4. 7: Narrative – *LP* (Appendix B)*

(1) MC: Prime Minister you were at Oxford in the nineteen forties and after the war Britain would embark on a period of relative prosperity for all the like of which it had hardly known but today there are three and a quarter million unemployed and e:m Britain’s economic performance by one measurement has fallen to the rank of that of Italy now can you imagine yourself back at the University today what must be seen to be the chances in Britain and the prospects for all now (*LP*, pp. 172-173).
A salient discourse feature in *Data Exemplar 4. 7* is the narrative structure (form of narration) built into it. That is, the whole of this data exemplar is embedded in narrativisation (story telling). For instance, MC’s (Michael Charlton’s) opening remarks in this interview which culminate in his question to MT (Margaret Thatcher) are presented in a story form – in particular a historical narration of the past and the present as evinced by lines (1)-(10). Correspondingly, MT’s response from lines (11)-(35) (cf. *Appendix B*) is also constructed in a narrative swinging between the historical past and the historical present. In each case the two interlocutors cite specific instances as their points of reference so as to back up their arguments: MC cites Italy as his reference point and MT cites Rab Butler and Barry as her points of reference (again cf. *Appendix B*). Interestingly enough, MT presents her vision of Britain as conceived in the narrative past even though it also has an immediate historical present (cf. lines (25)-(35)).

The text analysis software programme mentioned earlier identifies the style used in the extract as *rather argumentative*, as presented by the “I” narrator, and as involving *discussing, comparing* and *criticising*. The point here is that the arguments presented by MT in the extract are embedded in a narrative framework. Overall, in terms of narrative as a discourse feature, the following discourse and ideological strategies can be inferred from this interview exchange (cf. *Appendix B*): positive self-presentation, justification, avoidance and attribution; and legitimation, unification and reification. The first set of strategies comes about in the way MT positively presents herself and her views in the extract (cf. lines (25)-(42)) and in the way she both justifies her views and her actions (of fighting the Falklands War) and avoids answering questions directly (cf. lines (11)-(25), (52)-(63) and (101-104)).

She simultaneously cites good counsel (about the standard of living and about the fact that a leader should do something for the community) (cf. lines (14)-(21), (33)) and attributes it to past authorities – Rab Butler and Barry. This entails positive self-presentation and a sense of a welfare state. The second set of strategies is exemplified by MT’s attempt to rationalise and naturalise her views or actions as representing those of Britain and her people in general, thereby projecting a picture of a well-advancing, well-
caring united Great Britain which is acutely conscious of her past (cf. lines (14)-(21), (33)-(36), (64)-(70) and 101)-(108)).

_Sample Data Analysis 6_

_Data Exemplar 4. 8: Narrative – _The PC_ (Appendix D)_

It [postmodern science] is changing the meaning of the word _knowledge_, while expressing how such a change can take place. It is producing not the known, but the unknown. And it suggests a model of legitimation that has nothing to do with maximised performance, but has as its basis difference understood as paralogy. A game theory specialist whose work is moving in this same direction said it well: “Wherein, then, does the usefulness of game theory lie? Game theory, we think, is useful, namely as a generator of ideas.” P. M. Medawar, for his part, has stated that “having ideas is the scientist’s highest accomplishment,” that there is no “scientific method,” and that a scientist is before anything else a person who “tells stories.” The only difference is that he is duty bound to verify them … But as we have just seen, the little narrative [petit récit] remains the quintessential form of imaginative invention, most particularly science … We all now know, as the 1970s come to a close, that an attempt at an alternative of that kind would end up resembling the system it was meant to replace (The PC, pp. 60 and 66).

This data exemplar - like the previous one - exhibits elements of narrativisation. However, it follows a different narrative format: it has (little) stories within a story, and as such, it is interlarded with stories. The case in point is the two little stories built into it. Thus, the key factor about this exemplar is that it presents its facts in a narrative form. This exemplar not only depicts a conversational narrative tone on the part of Lyotard but it also emphasises his predilection for stories. Indeed, his major contention is that researchers - scientists included - are first and foremost storytellers (narrators).

Another example of Lyotard’s preference for narrativisation in _The PC_ is encapsulated by the following quotation: “If we look at the pragmatics of science, we learn that such an identification is impossible: in principle, no scientist embodies knowledge or neglects the ‘needs’ of a research project, or the aspirations of a researcher, on the pretext that they do not add to the performance of ‘science’ as a whole. The response a researcher usually makes to a request is: “We’ll have to see, _tell me your story_” (The PC, pp. 63, my own emphasis; also cf. Appendix D).
There are other aspects of Lyotard’s reporting which are embedded in an expository prose as in: “This, in the context of scientific discussion, is the same process Thom calls morphogenesis. It is not without rules (there are classes of catastrophes), but it is always locally determined. Applied to scientific discussion and placed in a temporal framework, this property implies that ‘discoveries’ are unpredictable. In terms of the idea of transparency, it is a factor that generates blind spots and defers consensus” (The PC, p. 61; also cf. Appendix D). On this score, the text analysis software employed for analysing the style of this extract identifies the text as displaying a rather argumentative style involving discussing, comparing and criticising. However, both the expository prose and the argumentative style employed by Lyotard in this extract, bear a lot of narrative elements. That is, his arguments and their exposition are framed within a narrative structure.

The discourse and ideological strategies to be inferred from the use of narrative as a discourse feature in the extract are positive self-presentation and negative-other presentation on the one hand, and legitimation, fragmentation and reification on the other hand. Unlike in the case of the narrative feature of the interview extract analysed above, here these strategies seem to be intertwined. In fact, all these strategies are embodied in Data Exemplar 4. 8 above. For instance, in this data exemplar Lyotard privileges story telling (narration) over the scientific method, paralogy over performance – his notion of performativity - (in terms of his concept of legitimation), and postmodern science over all other forms of science. This technique is intended to positively present the first set of concepts in all the three pairs while negatively portraying the concepts comprising the second set.

This strategy also entails fragmentation – expurgating or derogating the other (each of the second concept in each pair). In so doing, Lyotard simultaneously tries to legitimise (universalise) and reify (naturalise) the first set of concepts. Thus, the rest of the extract (cf. Appendix D) together with The PC serves as a narrative text which stands in stark contrast to other mainstream scientific research texts. Here, then, we can extrapolate that narrative as a discourse feature tends to serve as a strategic device to promote and
popularise the ideology of narrativity or narratology in constructing and reporting knowledge as part of the research universe in the postmodern condition.

4. 4. 3 Strengths and Weaknesses of the MIDA

As its name suggests, this model is multidisciplinary in nature. For instance, as outlined above, it draws from both social and linguistic theory and combines both discourse and ideological approaches to the analysis of texts. As such, it provides a multidimensional view and analysis of discourse and ideology. In this regard, it allows for both discourse and ideology to be analysed, for example, from discursive, linguistic and textual points of view. Here the units of analysis for discourse are narrative; repetition; rhetoric; pronominalisation; modality; topoi; stereotypes; metaphors; implication; presupposition; and conversational maxims. These units are analysed in relation to positive self-presentation, negative other-presentation, justification, avoidance, attribution and scapegoating as discourse strategies, on the one hand, and legitimation, unification, dissimulation, fragmentation and reification as ideological strategies, on the other hand. Moreover, this model together with the previous one, offers the opportunity for a multi-level analysis and for breaking down the data related to the two texts (LP and The PC) into multiple content variables. This in turn helps cross-validate the data and its analysis.

Viewed from another angle, however, the model has certain lacunae. Firstly, if not understood and applied properly, the model runs the risk of being seen as a hotch-potch of unrelated theoretical perspectives. Secondly, the model offers the temptation for a choose-and-pick approach in which an analyst may be inclined to simply select, and in the process, focus on those aspects of the model which are only familiar to him/her instead of finding out which features of the model are displayed by the data at hand. If this happens, then that might lead to its simplistic and artificial application. Thirdly, the model, like other traditional ones, fails to pin down ideology to one specific dimension. In fact, it adds more dimensions to this concept, thereby making it even more impossible to narrow it down to any one dimension. Nonetheless, the model is sufficient and relevant for the analytic requirements of the current study.
4. 5 Analytic Procedures and Benchmarks

This part briefly presents guidelines essential for carrying out the analytic procedures in this study. It also provides benchmarks for conducting data analysis.

4. 5. 1 Guidelines for the Analytic Procedures

There are certain guidelines identified and suggested by Parker (1992: 7-20) which I took into account in analysing the data here. These guidelines – without any order of importance - are: 1) treating objects of study as texts which are described; 2) exploring connotations through free association; 3) talking about the talk as if it were a discourse; 4) specifying what types of persons are talked about in discourse; 5) speculating about what these persons can say in the discourse and what the analyst can say about them; 6) mapping a picture of the world the discourse represents; 7) setting contrasting discourses (ways of speaking) against each other and looking at the different objects they constitute; 8) referring to other texts to elaborate the discourse as it occurs; 9) reflecting on the terms used to describe discourses (e.g. describing discourses on race as racist discourses); 10) identifying institutions which are reinforced when this or that discourse is used and identifying institutions which are attacked or subverted when this or that discourse is used; 12) looking at which categories of people gain or lose when a particular discourse is employed; and 13) showing how one discourse connects with other dominant discourses which allow dominant groups to tell and justify their narratives while excluding subjugated discourses. Thus, my analysis, management and manipulation of the data in this study is informed by these guidelines. In particular, these guidelines are relevant and applicable to this study as it investigates aspects related to discourse.
4. 5. 2 Benchmarks for Conducting Data Analysis

Here are some of the benchmarks or criteria modelled on and adapted from Edge and Richards (1998: 343-350) which I consider appropriate and relevant in conducting the data analysis in this study: trustworthiness, credibility, warrantability and confirmability. Trustworthiness raises the question: Are the data at hand, their attendant analytic procedures and the findings emerging from the analysis worthy of being trusted or not? Credibility poses the questions: Are the data and their analysis adequate or not? Are both the data and their analysis and the findings emerging from the analysis reliable/dependable or not? Are the analytic strategies applied correctly or not and are alternative explanations accounted for or not? Warrantability addresses the questions: Are the findings grounded in the data or not? Are the claims or assertions made by the analyst justified or guided by the analysis or not? Are the inferences made logical? Confirmability attends to the questions: Can the findings be confirmed by other researchers or scholars within the same field of study or not? In other words, do the findings display a semblance of disciplinary transferability and validity or not?

Put differently, trustworthiness refers to the authenticity of the data and the appropriateness of the methods and procedures applied in the data analysis. Credibility relates to the adequacy, reliability and dependability of both the data and its analysis. Warrantability is about the justifiability of the claims or assertions made by the analyst as informed by his/her data and his/her analysis of the data. Lastly can be added reflexivity which has to do with positionality of the analyst. This entails accounting for the analyst’s role in social action and recognising that data texts are always partial and incomplete and are thus socially, culturally, historically, racially and contextually located (cf. Davis, 1995; Edge and Richards, 1998; Lindlof, 1995; Manning, 1997; Maykut and Morehouse, 1994).
4. 6 Conclusion

This chapter has served the following related purposes. Firstly, it has detailed the sources of data, the methods of data collection and data analysis, and the units of analysis used in the study. Secondly, it has discussed the discourse and ideological analysis and chaos theory methodological framework within which the study is located. Thirdly, it has provided the rationale for employing such a methodological framework and highlighted its strengths and weaknesses. Fourthly, it has outlined and delineated two complementary models of data analysis used in Chapter Five and Chapter Six. The two models in question are the textual content analysis and chaos theory model and the multidisciplinary model of ideological discourse analysis (MIDA) employed in these two chapters respectively. The chapter has also offered the rationale for employing such models and pinpointed their inherent strengths and weaknesses. In addition, the chapter has provided – within the confines of these two models - sample data analyses for each of these two chapters. Finally, it has spelt out the analytic procedures and benchmarks for analysing the data in both Chapters Five and Six.
Chapter Five

Macro-Analysis: Part I and Part II

5. 0 Introduction

This chapter presents the data analysis as outlined and highlighted in Figure 4.1 in Chapter Four. As such, it consists of two parts - Part I and Part II - of macro-analysis. The macro-analysis – which in turn comes in two strands of analysis in each case - in both parts is based on the textual content analysis and chaos theory model illustrated in Figure 4. 1. Part I provides the analysis of LP while Part II presents the analysis of The PC. In each case the analysis of the relevant sets of content variables follows the steps and procedures as formulated and described under the relevant sub-sections in Chapter Four. Finally, and most importantly, the chapter discusses the findings emerging from the analysis of the two texts and presents similarities and differences between critical linguistics and postmodernism.

Part I

5. 1 Language and Power (LP)

This section combines and integrates both quantitative and qualitative content analysis. It analyses the following aspects of LP: LP’s area of focus; underlying theoretical assumptions of LP; approaches, methods and models of analysis employed in LP; types of data extracts used in LP; some of the key concepts used in LP and their occurrence frequencies; and chaotic qualities displayed by the concepts illustrated in Table 5. 5. The analysis excludes the sets of content variables already analysed as part of the sample data analysis in Chapter Four. However, in the case of (mainstream) linguistics, its occurrence frequency is included in the total and percentage frequencies of the set of variables to which it belongs as depicted in Table 5. 5.
5. 1. 1 LP’s Area of Focus

According to *Exemplar 5. 1* (cf. *Appendix A*) the text is about language and power. Its primary focus is on depicting and explaining the connections existing between language use and unequal relations of power or between existing (language) conventions as the outcome of power relations and power struggle. Its extended focus is on ideologies: highlighting how common-sense assumptions are ideologically determined by power relations. One instance exemplifying this is the conventions associated with the doctor-patient encounter which, contends Fairclough, tends to naturalise authority and hierarchy. The text also focuses on discourse. There are 4 references to this focal area (cf. *LP*, pp. 2, 4 and 22).

5. 1. 2 Underlying Theoretical Assumptions of LP

The text is informed by Halliday’s systemic functional linguistics (SFL) in most of its theoretical underpinnings as opposed to Chomsky’s formal linguistics (FL). It makes 2 references to this effect (cf. *Exemplar 5. 2; LP*, p. 24). It also asserts that it borrows from the social theories of Bourdieu, Foucault and Habermas. There are 5 one-sentence references to this effect throughout the text (cf. *LP*, pp. 2, 12, 15, 197 and 198). In fact, most importantly, *LP* has a strong Marxist or critical orientation in its approach to language, power and ideology (cf. for example, *LP*, pp. vi-x, and 1-16). Overall then, *LP* loosely borrows from both language and social theories. In this regard, of language theorists significant to this study, it mentions Noam Chomsky once, Roger Fowler once, Michael Halliday 4 times, Gunther Kress once and Ferdinand Saussure 15 times. Of social theorists, it mentions Louis Althusser 3 times, J. L. Austin once, Pierre Bourdieu 4 times, Michel Foucault 8 times, Antonio Gramsci 4 times, Jürgen Habermas 6 times, Karl Marx once, John Searle once, and Max Weber once (cf. *Exemplar 5. 2*). *Table 5. 1* below indicates the names of language and social theorists mentioned in *LP* and the number of times each is referred to in the whole text:
Table 5.1: Theorists and their occurrence frequencies in LP (* = Percentage of frequencies of references to the theorists according to the total number of pages LP has; ® = percentage of frequencies of references to the theorists according to actual page numbers in LP;  = this excludes instances such as Marxist/Marxism and the theorist’s name as listed under LP’s References section;  = the same condition as stated in  applies here as well)

<table>
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<th>Occurrence Frequencies</th>
<th>Sub-Totals</th>
<th>% of (Sub-) Totals</th>
<th>% Occurrence Frequencies in the whole text</th>
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5.1.3 Approaches, Methods and Models of Analysis Employed in LP

LP employs a critical language study (CLS) model of data analysis which blends language and social theories. This model adopts seven language approaches on the one hand. These are, as pinpointed in the text, linguistics, sociolinguistics, cognitive psychology, artificial intelligence, pragmatics, conversation analysis and discourse analysis. On the other hand, it adopts the following three social theories: a Marxist theory of language, power and ideology; Foucault’s theory of discourse; and Habermas’s theory of communicative action (cf. Exemplar 5.3; LP, pp. 84 and 102-107; Sheyholislami, 2001: 6). Figure 5.1 illustrates the language and social theories comprising this model and their occurrence frequencies (in brackets) in the section of LP which frames its methodological approach:
The model consists of three levels of data analysis: description, interpretation and explanation. These three levels are stages of a procedure for conducting critical discourse analysis (CDA) or critical language analysis. Description and interpretation deal with the formal properties of text and the relationship between text and interaction, respectively. Explanation focuses on the relationship between interaction and social context together with social determination of the processes of production and interpretation and their social effects (cf. Exemplar 5. 4; LP, pp. 24-26). Two forms of analysis, text analysis and discourse analysis, are part of this model and are seen as complementary. These two forms of analysis and the productive and interpretative processes involved in conducting them, are represented by Figure 5. 2:
While the model does not spell out any method or technique for data analysis, it does however, have ten main questions – some of which are accompanied by sub-questions - guiding its text and discourse analysis. These ten questions are as follows:

1. What experiential values do words have?
2. What relational values do words have?
3. What expressive values do words have?
4. What metaphors are used?
5. What experiential values do grammatical features have?
6. What relational values do grammatical features have?
7. What expressive values do grammatical features have?
8. How are (simple) sentences linked together?
9. What interactional conventions are used?
10. What large-scale structures does the text have?

Here the contention is that a text has formal features which in turn have experiential, relational and expressive values. Experiential values have to do with contents, knowledge and beliefs; relational values deal with relations and social relations; and expressive
values are concerned with subjects and social identities (cf. *LP*, pp. 110-137). *Table. 5. 2* provides a schematic representation of these features and values:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dimensions of meaning</th>
<th>Values of features</th>
<th>Structural effects</th>
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<td>Knowledge/Beliefs</td>
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<tr>
<td>Relations</td>
<td>Relational</td>
<td>Social relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subjects</td>
<td>Expressive</td>
<td>Social identities</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Table 5. 2: Formal features of text and their relevant values as depicted in Fairclough (1989: 112)*

Both interpretation and explanation as processes take place in this model as pinpointed in *Figure 5. 3* and *Figure 5. 4* respectively:

*Figure 5. 3: Interpretation and its areas of focus as adapted from Fairclough (1989: 142)*
Figure 5.3 presents a synopsis of the process of interpretation. In the right-hand column of the diagram, under the heading *Interpreting*, are listed six major domains of interpretation. The two domains in the upper section of the diagram relate to the interpretation of context, whereas those in the lower section pertain to four levels of interpretation of text. In the left-hand column, under the heading *Interpretative procedures* (*MR*) – with the latter standing for, according to Fairclough, members’ resources or background knowledge - are listed major features of MR which operate as interpretative procedures. Each feature of MR is associated with the level of interpretation which occurs on the same line of the diagram. The middle column identifies the range of *Resources* which are drawn upon for each of the domains of interpretation in the right-hand column (cf. *LP*, p. 142).

For instance, surface of utterance is, argues Fairclough, the first level of interpretation relating to the process by which interpreters convert strings of sounds into recognisable words, phrases and sentences by drawing on their MR of phonology, grammar and vocabulary. Meaning of utterance is the second level of interpretation in which interpreters assign meanings to the constituent parts of a text by drawing on their semantic and pragmatic resources. In this context, local coherence is the third level of interpretation serving to establish meaning connections between utterances. Its focus is on establishing local coherent relations within a specific part of a text. Finally, text structure relates to a text’s global coherence - working out how the whole text hangs
together. This involves matching the text with one’s schemata (knowledge) of the text. The point of a text deals with a summary interpretation of the text as a whole (LP, pp. 143 and 144).

In Figure 5. 4 the explanation level of analysis portrays discourse as part of societal, institutional and situational process. In this case, explanation tries to show how discourse is determined by social structures and what reproductive effects discourses can cumulatively have on these structures. Interpreters arrive at interpretations of situational context both through features of the physical situation of a context and their MR. As such, explanation sees discourses as part of processes of social struggle within a matrix of power relations (cf. LP, pp. 162-166).

5. 1. 4 Types of Data Extracts Used in LP

Overall, LP consists of 42 data extracts. 15 of these constitute the two analysis sections - Chapters 5 and 6. Added together, they have 1308 words with the average of 87.2 words per extract. The remaining part of LP has 27 data extracts consisting all together of 6 555 words with the average of 242.7 words per extract. In all, the 42 extracts have 7 863 words with the average of 187.2 words per extract. Tables 5. 3 and 5. 4 display the data extracts used in the two analysis sections and in the rest of LP respectively:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Extracts</th>
<th>Extract Types</th>
<th>No. of Words</th>
<th>Page No.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Psychiatric Text 1 and Text 2 from Edelman, 1974: 300 (Book extract)</td>
<td>192</td>
<td>113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Twenty-Three Steps to Success and Achievement (Leaflet)</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Extract from The Guardian newspaper</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>116-117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Left Unlimited (Leaflet)</td>
<td>169</td>
<td>118</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Extract from a Scottish newspaper</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Extract from The Guardian newspaper</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Daily Mail, 3 May 1982 (Newspaper extract)</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Berlei (Newspaper advert)</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Sample classroom discourse from Coulthard, 1977: 94 (Book extract)</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Simulated exchange between A and B</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>136</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 5.3: Data extracts used in the two analysis sections (Chapters 5 and 6) of LP

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Extracts</th>
<th>Extract Types</th>
<th>No. of Words</th>
<th>Page No.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Simulated police-witness interview</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Exchange between a doctor and a group of medical students (Granada Television excerpt)</td>
<td>314</td>
<td>44-45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Simulated job interview</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Lancaster Guardian, 12 September 1982 (Newspaper extract)</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Daily Mail, 1 June 1982 (Newspaper extract)</td>
<td>167</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Simulated interview between a headmaster and a youth</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>68-69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>True Story Summer Special, 1986 (Magazine extract)</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Blue Jeans, No. 488, 24 May 1986 (Extract from a teenage magazine)</td>
<td>189</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Mein Kampf (Book extract)</td>
<td>219</td>
<td>86-87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>7 Days, June 1986 (Extract from a weekly)</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>The Times, 20 May 1982 (Newspaper extract)</td>
<td>203</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Simulated police woman-man interview</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Consultation between a doctor and a patient from BBC2, 8 August 1986 (Radio excerpt)</td>
<td>153</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Good English – The Language of Success, 1979 (Leaflet)</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Student-experimenter exchange taken from Garfinkel, 1967: 42 (Book extract)</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Interview between Margaret Thatcher and Michael Charlton (Extract from BBC Radio 3, 17 December 1985)</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>172-175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>The Miele advert text (Newspaper advert)</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>204</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In addition, *Exemplars 5. 5 and 5. 6* (cf. *Appendix A*) provide the textual instances of these extracts. As shown from these two exemplars and from the two tables above, the data types employed in *LP* comprise newspaper, leaflet, simulated, book, magazine and radio/television extracts. Of these, 31% are newspaper extracts, 19% leaflet extracts, 17% simulated extracts, 14% book extracts and 9.5% magazine and radio/television extracts apiece.

### 5. 1. 5 Some of the Key Concepts Used in *LP* and their Occurrence Frequencies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Concepts</th>
<th>Frequencies in Preface</th>
<th>Frequencies in Chapter 1</th>
<th>Frequencies in Chapter 2</th>
<th>Frequencies in Chapter 3</th>
<th>Frequencies in Chapter 4</th>
<th>Frequencies in Chapter 5</th>
<th>Frequencies in Chapter 6</th>
<th>Frequencies in Chapter 7</th>
<th>Frequencies in Chapter 8</th>
<th>Frequencies in Chapter 9</th>
<th>Total Frequencies</th>
<th>Percentage Frequencies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(Mainstream) linguistics</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Critical linguistics/ Critical language study/</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 5.5: Some of the key concepts used in LP and their occurrence frequencies

Table 5.5 above reflects some of the key concepts underpinning LP and their respective occurrence frequencies in this text. For instance, on the one hand, discourse(s), text(s), language(s), power, subject position(s)/social subject(s)/identities and ideology/ideologies have the total occurrence frequencies of 829, 395, 356, 355, 203 and 125 respectively in LP. Their respective percentage occurrence frequencies are 33.8, 16.1, 14.5, 14.5, 8.3 and 5.1. On the other hand, critical linguistics/critical language study/critical discourse analysis, (mainstream) linguistics, intertextual(ity), utterance(s) and postmodern(ism) have the occurrence frequencies of 78, 38, 36, 27 and 6 respectively. Their corresponding percentage occurrence frequencies are 3.2, 1.6, 1.5, 1.1 and 0.3.

5.1.6 Chaotic Qualities Displayed by the Concepts Illustrated in Table 5.5

5.1.6.1 Critical Linguistics (Critical Language Study/Critical Discourse Analysis)

Fairclough regards CLS (cf. Exemplar 5.7) – and by extension CL and CDA – as a critical approach capable of both revealing connections between language, power and ideology which are normally hidden from people and analysing social interactions by exposing determinants hidden in the system of social relationships. According to him, CLS serves as an alternative orientation to the study of language which, unlike ‘linguistics proper,’ does not encourage a watertight compartmentalisation of the
different sub-disciplines of language. Implied in this view is that not only is CLS an alternative approach to studying language, power and ideology and their dynamics, but that it is an approach resisting subordinating tendencies of mainstream linguistics as well. This, then, projects CLS as a resistant and oppositional approach (also cf. Exemplar 5.2).

Despite Fairclough’s argument to the contrary, his views of CLS – and thereby of his CL and CDA as well – are as binary and compartmentalised in their orientation as those of ‘linguistics proper’ which he so much impugns. For example, Fairclough asserts that CLS is an alternative orientation to language study implying a different demarcation of language study into branches, different relationships between them, and different orientations within each of them (cf. Exemplar 5.7). Moreover, he avers that CLS favours Halliday’s functionalist approaches over the formalist ones associated with Chomsky and that CLS also maintains the langue/parole dichotomy (cf. Exemplar 5.2).

In terms of chaos theory, however, both CLS and CL and all the other approaches set out in Exemplars 5.2 and 5.7 display complexity, randomness, fractals, self-similarity, connectionism, and paradoxes, contradictions or aporias. Firstly, they are complex approaches (and not the simplistic ones as constructed by Fairclough) existing in a complementary network relationship with one another. Secondly, all these approaches are adaptive - they can produce innovations and changes; they can also help provide multiple perspectives on various language issues. This entails the ideas of self-similarity and connectionism. That is, on the one hand, they all look like they are – as is the case with chaotic fractals and attractors - unrelated and have nothing in common. Yet, on the other hand, they serve the common purpose of studying and analysing language from different perspectives. In this way, they are connected and have a sense of connectionism.

Therefore, in a true chaotic sense, they can always exist at the boundary between order and chaos thereby striking a balance between these two regimes. However, all this entails randomness: there are always unexpected and unintended underlying paradoxes, contradictions and tensions characterising these approaches as exemplified by CLS/CL and mainstream linguistics. The case in point is when practitioners of certain approaches (e.g. Fairclough and Chomsky) try to both advocate the theoretical foundations of their
approaches and vigorously defend them against what they perceive as attacks and threats from rival approaches. Thus, CL (and by extension CLS and CDA) as a variable can embody the chaotic qualities set out above (cf. Donahue, 2001: 1-14; Hughes and Attwell, 1999: 1-10; WordWeb, 2004). As such, it is not an either/or approach.

5.1.6.2 Language

Two crucial aspects emerge from Exemplar 5.8 in relation to Fairclough’s conception of language. First, Fairclough espouses a neo-Marxist (materialist) view of language. Here he ties language to power, ideology, social control and class struggle. Second, he espouses a Hallidayan view of language. In this context, he regards language as discourse or as a form of social practice serving different uses in modern society. The first view reflects a conspiratorial role assigned to language while the second ascribes a functionalist role to language. This construction of language stands in stark contrast to the mainstream conception of language and rejects all that the latter embodies (cf. LP, pp. 1-16 and 20-22). Above all, it is a reductionist view of language: it reduces language to its conspiratorial and functionalist role.

From a chaos theory standpoint, language is not either/or: it is both. It is a complex system comprising not only CL and CLS (as implied by Fairclough) but also other types of mainstream linguistics and approaches such as the Saussurean, Bloomfieldian, Chomskyan linguistics and their respective approaches. Accordingly, any one of these can display linear and non-linear, static and dynamic, and abstract and concrete features. For instance, any of these types of linguistics can study language from the points of view of phonetics, phonology, morphology and syntax and build into these areas a form of linearity, stability and abstractness.

By the same token, each one of them can study and analyse semantics, conversation, pragmatics and sociolinguistics by highlighting the linear and non-linear, static and dynamic, and abstract and concrete variables these areas have. Furthermore, each of these forms of linguistics and approaches can study not only language, power, ideology, and
social control – as Fairclough suggests in respect of CL and CLS – but also other areas of language such as, for example, language and gender/sexism, language and education, language and ecology, language and science, and language and technology. All this entails chaotic connectionism and multiple perspectives on the one hand, and foregrounding the paradoxes or aporias (gaps) inherent in these areas on the other hand. (cf. Guess and Sailor, 1991: 1-10; Hughes and Attwell, 1999: 1-10; WordWeb, 2004).

5. 1. 6. 3 Ideology

According to Exemplar 5. 9, Fairclough theorises ideology within a neo-Marxist framework and attributes to it a critical conception. He links ideology to language, power and domination (dominant classes or blocs). His theorisation of ideology, then, entails dominant and subordinate ideologies. This is on the one hand, a circularly reproductive and top-down view of ideology, and on the other hand, a conspiratorial and functionalist view as it reduces ideology to the dictates of language, power and dominant social classes. In as far as chaos theory is concerned, ideology is a dynamic and complex phenomenon whose occurrence can be on the one hand deterministic (predictable) while on the other hand it can be random (unpredictable). For example, institutional ideology and class ideology – as some of the instances cited by Fairclough in Exemplar 5. 9 – are both predictable and unpredictable. If one uses the ideological histories of the designated institutions and classes as a reference point, one can predict the likely ideological behaviours of such entities.

However, since past and present ideological histories are no guarantee that these entities will always display a given ideological orientation, then at times, it is not easy to predict their likely ideological behaviours. Put differently, in terms of chaos theory, ideology can be characterised by point, limit cycle and strange (butterfly) attractors. A point attractor in that it can settle at a particular point or state (as when the nature of institutional, group and class ideologies can be easily predicted); a limit cycle attractor in that it can cycle through a limited sequence of states (as when either institutional, group or class ideology oscillates from one state to another); and a strange attractor in that it can display both
determinism and randomness (as when institutional, group or class ideology is both predictable and unpredictable).

In addition, ideology can embody bifurcations (moments when one has to choose between two alternative ideological states), butterfly effect (when a minor change in the ideological standpoint of an institution can lead to significant changes), and dissipative structures (ideological structures of an institution are capable of collapsing and reorganising themselves into new structures) (cf. Day and Letts, 1997: 1-6; Guess and Sailor, 1991: 1-10; Hughes and Attwell, 1999: 1-10; *WordWeb*, 2004). Any institution, group or class can simultaneously display any of these chaotic elements.

### 5. 1. 6. 4 Discourse

Fairclough (cf. *Exemplar 5. 10*) conceptualises discourse in conflictual and dialectical terms: in one instance it is implicated in ideology and power relations; in another instance it is involved in class domination, social control and power struggle. He incorporates to some extent – by a form of loose borrowing - a Foucauldian *orders of discourse* and a Habermasian *colonisation of discourse* into this neo-Marxist view. This, again, is a circularly reproductive and uni-dimensional view of discourse which untenably ties it to the vagaries of ideology, power, domination and control while simultaneously reproducing them. Besides, it sees discourse in conspiratorial functionalist terms: discourse serves to legitimise and sustain dominant class and societal relations. However, following the chaos theory paradigm, discourse – such as conversation or the discourse of interviewing, advertising, or counselling - is both a complex and dynamic phenomenon characterised by randomness, fractals, self-similarity, connectionism, and paradoxes or contradictions.

Conversation, for example, besides being both a complex and dynamic discoursal action, can in one instance assume orderly and predictable conversation patterns while in another it can assume disorderly and unpredictable patterns occurring randomly. The case in point is a crowd in a sporting arena cheering its team at regular predictable intervals.
while at the same time booing a rival team at random and unpredictable intervals. In terms of chaos theory the regular cheering intervals embody point attractors whereas the random and unpredictable intervals encompass strange attractors. Although these two types of intervals are inherently contradictory and oppositional as they are simultaneously regular and irregular thereby evincing chaotic self-similarity, they are nonetheless related (the idea of connectionism) (cf. Day and Letts, 1997: 1-6; Hughes and Attwell, 1999: 1-10; Walters and Williams, 2003: 1-10; WordWeb, 2004). This is what Fairclough’s characterisation of discourse fails to capture.

5. 1. 6. 5 Power

In Exemplar 5. 11 Fairclough attributes a manipulative and conflictual view to power in which power not only permeates language, ideology and discourse – particularly dominant ideology and dominant discourse in the case of the last two instances – but also manipulates language, ideology and discourse. Once more, this is a reductionist and top-down view of power. This is so despite Fairclough’s triple contention that he is not suggesting that power is a matter of language, that power relations are not reducible to class relations, and that power exists in various modalities (also cf. Exemplars 5. 8 and 5. 10).

For a chaos theory-based model, power does not have one dimension or view attached to it. Neither is it invested in the powerful alone. Rather, it is a complex multidimensional phenomenon that is both deterministic (predictable and orderly) and random (unpredictable and chaotic). In this case both the dominant and subordinate classes – to use Fairclough’s example - can wield power in varying degrees which may for either class be too pronounced in one instance while being less marked in another instance. Thus, power is characterised by periodicity - periods of fluctuations between order and chaos and is exercised by different groups – dominant and subordinate – at different times.
Above all, it has its own dissipative structures, attractors, fractals, butterfly effects and paradoxes. At any given time it can stabilise or destabilise and reorganise itself into a new form – it is open to change. It may be limited to a particular point, go through different complementary or contradictory cycles, or may not settle to any particular state. At the same time, different forms of power may display marked differences which, when looked at from another perspective, may embody fractal patterns (the notion of self-similarity). Furthermore, one minor change in the structure of power may trigger unintended radical changes (the idea of butterfly effect) (cf. Day and Letts, 1997: 1-10; Guess and Sailor, 1991: 1-10; Hughes and Attwell, 1999: 1-10).

5. 1. 6. 6 Text

Following Exemplar 5. 12 Fairclough hypothesises text within a Hallidayan framework: text as spoken or written product. On the one hand, he regards a spoken text as what is said in a piece of spoken discourse; on the other hand, he uses the term text to refer to a written record of what is said. In this context, he argues that a text is a product of the process of text production and that discourse refers to the actual process of social interaction of which a text is just a part. From this Hallidayan stance, Fairclough challenges the positivist view which treats texts as objects comprising formal properties which can be mechanically analysed without due interpretation. While he concedes that texts also subsume visuals (visual material) he, however, contends that in modern society spoken language – and by implication spoken texts – supersedes visual language. Moreover, Fairclough argues that texts embody ideology and position (and reproduce) both text producers and interpreters. In this regard textual meanings – meaning relations - are ideologically determined. Accordingly, texts are a site of ideological struggle.

This is another form of a circularly reductionist and reproductive view of text with its attendant functionalist and conflictual outlook in which text is seen to conspire with ideology to position (and condition) text producers and text interpreters and to colour meanings. This is the view that chaos theory stands to controvert. According to chaos theory, texts do not inherently embody ideology. Nor do they exist out there so as to be
conspiratorially at the service of ideology either to position producers and interpreters or to colour meaning relations in texts.

Besides, any given text can have parts that are orderly determinate and chaotically indeterminate. That is, it can simultaneously have closures and indeterminacies and fixed and unfixed meanings. This is more so with a spoken or visual text as exemplified by Figure 5.5. For instance, the visual text in this figure simultaneously displays parts that are chaotically indeterminate and orderly determinate. That is, it reflects differing patterns which both contradict and complement each other. Thus, it embodies both fractal irregularity and regularity, thereby yielding self-similarity. This means it gives rise to both dissonant and consonant meanings and voices characterised by indeterminacy and determinacy. Its dissipative structures can result in the collapsing of its existing fractal

![Figure 5.5: A visual text displaying both regular and irregular patterns or chaotic self-similarity](image)


5.1.6.7 Intertextuality

In Exemplar 5.13 Fairclough defines intertextuality as a situation in which texts are in dialogic (intertextual) relations with other texts. Intertextuality in this context means that
discourses and texts are embedded in histories and that the interpretation of intertextual context needs to take account of the series to which a given text belongs. This view of intertextuality differs, argues Fairclough, from the traditional language studies approach which tends to interpret texts by abstracting them away from their historical contexts. However, it is in his (1992: 84) work where Fairclough puts intertextuality into a proper perspective. Here he points out that intertextuality is “the property texts have of being full of snatches of other texts, which may be explicitly demarcated or merged in, and which the text may assimilate, contradict, [or] ironically echo.”

Despite Fairclough’s foregoing characterisation of intertextuality, his conception of the latter is reductionist and static. He ties discourses and texts to their histories: these histories are static. They are not dynamic and changing with times. In addition, his treatment of discourses and texts is as static, abstract and formalist as that of traditional language studies which he so much criticises (cf. Exemplars 5. 4, 5. 5, 5. 6, 5. 10 and 5. 12). He also tends to analyse and interpret most of the texts he has used in LP with no regard to their histories and to their attendant intertextuality. This is evident in his treatment of the texts included in Exemplars 5. 5 and 5. 6 (e.g. interviews, conversations, exchanges, extracts and advertisements) which is not only devoid of any history but is also similar to that of traditional language studies in its orientation.

From the chaos theory outlook, intertextuality entails texts that fluctuate between order and chaos and whose boundaries are fixed and determinate on the one hand, while they are shifting and indeterminate on the other hand. This means that texts may embody fixed point attractors (settle to a single point), limit cycle attractors (reflect a cyclical sequence of patterns), and strange attractors (display a degree of indeterminism) while also displaying a degree of randomness. Interviews and conversations are the case in point here. In addition, intertextuality may imply that certain hybrid texts can be accounted for linearly whereas others may be accounted for non-linearly. Or it may imply that while hybrid texts contradict each other and bear irregular forms, those forms can constitute patterns displaying self-similarity when looked at holistically. The case in point again is the text in Figure 5. 5 and interviews and conversations (cf. Day and Letts, 1997: 1-10;

5. 1. 6. 8 Subject Positions (Social Subjects/Identities)

Fairclough (cf. *Exemplar 5. 14*) perceives identity in terms of subject positions or social subjects. In this case subject positions are set up by classroom discourse types. This is particularly the case with the subject positions assumed by teachers and pupils: teachers and pupils occupy their subject positions in accordance with their respective discoursal rights and obligations. He further argues that social structure determines the types of discourse characterising these subject positions. Thus, in occupying their subject positions, teachers and pupils, as social subjects, tend to reproduce their respective subject positions. They are either passive or active social agents.

In this sense, the teacher-pupil relations, and the teacher and pupil positions are directly reproduced in educational discourse, while the same discourse indirectly reproduces class relations. This view of social subjects – and their attendant subject positions - which is espoused mainly by CL (cf. Hodge and Kress, 1993: 201-203), is too reproductive and reductionist. It relegates teachers and pupils to tools which are at the mercy of subject positions they occupy; it also reduces them –willy-nilly – to reproductive tools. They reproduce, and are reproduced by, both their subject positions and their class relations.

In terms of the chaos theory model, subject positions can be viewed along a complex continuum where they are both orderly and chaotic, stable and unstable, fixed and unfixed, fluid and non-fluid, and linear and non-linear. That is, as social subjects, both teachers and pupils constitute on the one hand, a coherent and homogeneous whole whose behaviours, actions and thoughts are highly predictable. On the other hand, they constitute an incoherent and heterogeneous whole whose behaviours, actions and thoughts are highly unpredictable. At one point their behaviours, actions and thoughts are determined by their subject positions. Yet, at another point, their behaviours, actions and thoughts transcend (if not defy) those subject positions.
Moreover, at one moment, teachers and pupils have certain things in common (in which case their interests converge) while at another they have different and clashing expectations (in which case their interests diverge). Above all, the subject positions and expectations of some teachers may correspond to or be at variance with those of certain pupils and vice versa. Thus, both teachers and pupils can occupy – at any given time – multiple positions which are simultaneously complementary and oppositional. All this is likely to involve complexity, randomness, self-similarity, connectionism, and paradoxes, contradictions or aporias (cf. Day and Letts, 1997: 1-10; Guess and Sailor, 1991: 1-10; Hughes and Attwell, 1999: 1-10; McClure, 1997: 1-9; WordWeb, 2004).

5.1.6.9 Utterances

In Exemplar 5.15 Fairclough challenges the classical conception of utterances associated mainly with Anglo-American pragmatics and specifically with Austin’s and Searle’s speech act theory. According to the latter theory, language is construed as a form of action in which spoken or written utterances perform speech acts such as asserting, warning, asking, or promising. In addition, it is viewed as referring to people or things, presupposing the existence of people or things or the truth of propositions, and saying through implying. In this case, Fairclough contends that speech acts turn out to be problematic when they are applied to analyse real extended discourse. However, he also regards utterances as constituent parts of a text or as corresponding to both sentences and semantic propositions.

Exemplar 5.15 provides a restrictive characterisation of utterances. For instance, utterances are associated – in their classical conception - with both Austin’s and Searle’s speech act theory in which they are primarily seen to be performative (performing speech acts). In contrast to this, Fairclough uses them loosely to refer to constituent parts of a text or to sentences and semantic propositions. Fairclough’s use of utterances corresponds, in particular, to the traditional mainstream linguistic conception in which utterances refer either to features of a text or discourse or to semantic propositions (cf. Exemplars 5.5, 5.6 and 5.12). This use tends to, especially, contradict his assertion that
language should be seen as discourse rather than as accomplished text (cf. in particular *Exemplar 5. 2*).

In terms of chaos theory, utterances are conceptualised beyond this restrictive characterisation. They are complex and dynamic entities which are, on the one hand, fixed, determinate, closed, static and predictable while on the other hand, they are shifting, indeterminate, open-ended, spontaneous and unpredictable. The classic examples are utterances used by speakers when communicating with each other. In one instance their utterances are fixed, determinate and predictable while in another instance their utterances are indeterminate, open-ended, spontaneous, random and unpredictable. Moreover, their utterances can be performative and non-performative, complementary and contradictory, and similar and dissimilar.

Furthermore, utterances are sensitive to initial conditions – a change in a communicative context can lead to a new meaning, understanding or interpretation of an utterance. This means that utterances are subject to periodic or temporal factors such as changes, fluctuations or oscillations in communicative topics. This last point demonstrates the critical role played by bifurcations and attractors - fixed point attractors (the fixed nature), limit cycle attractors (the circular nature), torus attractors (the fluid nature) and strange attractors (the chaotic nature) - in utterances. Above all, this shows that binary states, meanings and interpretations can co-exist in utterances, especially when the latter are conceptualised from the chaos theory standpoint (cf. Donahue, 2001: 1-14; Guess and Sailor, 1991: 1-10; Hughes and Attwell, 1999: 1-10; *WordWeb*, 2004).

**5. 1. 6. 10 Postmodernism**

*Exemplar 5. 16* characterises postmodernism as either a linguistic turn or a post-linguistic condition in which visual images replace language. It asserts that not only is language a primary medium of social control and power but that it also – together with its related varieties – performs multiple functions in modern society. It further makes two related assertions: verbal and visual composite texts feature prominently in television and
advertising; and images constitute one of the hallmarks of contemporary postmodern culture. Although all of what is encapsulated above has something to do with postmodernism, this is nonetheless a restrictive and reductionist characterisation of postmodern culture. The first salient feature of this reductionism is that postmodernism is seen in terms of social control and power – a functionalist role that Fairclough (1989) consistently assigns to both language and ideology. Its second salient feature is its reducing of postmodern culture to visuals and images or to a consumerist culture.

Against this backdrop, a chaos theory approach takes the view that postmodernism or postmodern culture - as referred to by Fairclough in *Exemplar 5. 16* - comprises many and varied features. For instance, it consists on the one hand, of mainstream, popular and marginal cultures, and on the other hand, of sub-cultures existing within and alongside mainstream, popular and marginal cultures. All these different postmodern cultures can make use of language, visuals or images, or a composite of these three mediums at any given time. At the same time, they can be encoded through printed and electronic media (e.g. newspapers, advertisements, brochures, etc) in which both television and the Internet may play a critical – but not the only – role.

In addition, in terms of chaos theory, it is possible for a visual or an image to have determinate and indeterminate, coherent and incoherent, integrated and fragmented, and singular and multiple meanings and interpretations. Thus, some visuals and images can display similarity and dissimilarity and exhibit order (regularity and predictability) and disorder (irregularity and unpredictability). Besides, they can complement and contradict one another. All of this forms part of chaotic self-similarities and paradoxes (Guess and Sailor, 1991: 1-10; McClure, 1997: 1-9; Walters and Williams, 2003: 1-10; *WordWeb*, 2004).

5. 1. 7 Discussion

What emerges from the delineation of the explicit and implicit goals of *LP* is that there is an overlap between them. Both language and ideology are implicated in power relations
and in relations of domination. Similarly, power relations and relations of domination manifest themselves – albeit rather dialectically – in language and ideology. Firstly, this gives rise to a form of dialectical circularity existing between language, ideology and power. Secondly, this practice assigns a conspiratorial role to language and ideology which is common in critical linguistics (cf. Data Exemplars 4.1 and 4.2). In the same way, the primary and extended foci of LP link language use and ideology conspiratorially to unequal relations of power and to power struggle. This is exemplified by the contention that doctor-patient encounters – as instances of common-sense (unequal) relations of power - tend to naturalise authority and hierarchy (cf. Exemplar 5.1).

The text claims to be rooted in Halliday’s SFL, combining both language and social theories, and espousing a critical view of ideology (cf. Exemplars 5.2 and 5.7). However, it has the total number of 24 references to language theorists and 29 references to social theorists. This translates into 45% and 55% references respectively. Of the language theorists it uses, the one on whose work LP is grounded (Halliday’s) has fewer references - 4 references (8%) while the ones whose works it attacks (Chomsky’s and Saussure’s) have the most references put together – 16 references (30%). Of the social theorists it cites, none of them is invoked and engaged meaningfully for their contribution - or lack thereof - to the critical treatment of ideology even though the text claims to be critical (cf. Exemplars 5.2 and 5.7; Figure 5.1).

Moreover, the text invokes a Foucauldian view of discourse, and yet it treats discourse from a Marxist reproductive point of view which deprives it of its Foucauldian conception. Furthermore, even though the model of analysis adopted in LP refers to many other approaches (both linguistic and social approaches), in the final analysis this model is fragmented, remains inherently linguistic in nature, and is only accompanied by a neo-Marxist rhetoric (cf. Exemplars 5.3 and 5.7). For instance, the text impugns all the approaches to which it refers – (cf. Exemplar 5.3 and Figure 5.1) - and accuses them of being uncritical and of treating language abstractly. Yet, it too – besides relegating language (and all there is) to the dictates of power and ideology – treats language and its related aspects in the classical abstract way. It regards text as existing in its two classical
forms - spoken and written forms (cf. *Exemplars 4. 5, 5. 7 and 5. 12*). It also privileges the classically abstract formal properties of text – phonological, syntactic, semantic and pragmatic elements - in its analysis and interpretation (cf. *Figure 5. 3*). As such, it is uncritical of its own practices.

In addition, the text claims – in *Exemplar 5. 3* - to be influenced by Habermas’s theory of communicative action, and yet except for the fleeting references it makes to this theory – in particular that some discourses (e.g. advertising, interview and therapy) tend to be colonised by other discourses – there is no attempt to integrate this theory into other aspects of the text or to critically probe it as such. Above all, it views this theory within the Marxian framework of power and ideology – a far cry from what this Habermasian theory stands for (cf. *LP*, pp. 197-198).

The extracts – as instances of the data types - employed in *LP* are lopsided: they display a bias towards certain text types to the exclusion of others. For instance, they are exclusively newspaper extracts (13 or 31%), leaflet extracts (8 or 19%), simulated extracts (7 or 17%), book extracts (6 or 14%), magazine extracts (4 or 9.5%), and radio/television extracts (4 or 9.5%). This analysis of the extracts used in *LP* is telling in that it makes Fairclough’s dual claim that his approach is different from that of mainstream linguistics – a claim which is at the heart of CL – and that CLS/CL engages more of real extended discourse than does Austin’s and Searle’s speech act theory which he accuses of focusing on abstract and idealised language use contexts, appear rather suspect. First, 100% of the extracts used by Fairclough in *LP* are written texts or taken from written sources. 38 (90%) of these are simply newspaper, leaflet, simulated, book and magazine extracts. His radio and television extracts are also taken from written sources (cf. *Exemplars 5. 5 and 5. 6; Tables 5. 3 and 5. 4*). This contradicts Fairclough’s claim that his approach in *LP* – as opposed to that of mainstream linguistics and pragmatics - focuses primarily on real language use or deals with real extended discourse (cf. *Exemplars 4. 5, 5. 5, 5. 6, 5. 7, 5. 12 and 5. 15*).
Second, simulated use of language as exemplified by his simulated extracts in *Extracts 10, 11 and 13 in Exemplar 5. 5 and in Extracts 1, 3, 7 and 13 in Exemplar 5. 6* hardly constitutes any real language use; nor does it serve as an instance of real extended discourse. Another point worth highlighting is that the extracts are grossly unevenly balanced in terms of their length. For example, *Extract 25 (Table 5. 4)* and *Extract 11 (Table. 5.3)* have only 9 and 26 words respectively whereas *Extract 17 (Table 5. 4)* and *Extract 21 (Table 5. 4)* consist of 1138 and 833 words respectively.

Furthermore, the extracts serving as the data for *LP* seem to have been deliberately selected to serve the purpose *LP* wants to achieve: that different instances of language use involve and reflect unequal power relations and relations of domination, and that all this entails dominant ideologies and dominant discourses which tend to be reproduced at every level of language use. This is the case of a self-fulfilling prophecy looking at the nature of the interview extracts used in *LP* such as *Extracts 11 and 13 and Extracts 1, 3 and 7 in Exemplars 5. 5 and 5. 6* respectively. The other point is that the choice of these extracts does not bear any indication of the process of text production (soliciting the viewpoints of text producers) and of the process of text consumption (incorporating the viewpoints of text consumers) that *LP* and much of CL lay so much emphasis on (cf. *Figure 5. 2*).

The fact that the extract types employed in *LP* are skewed and inadequate (they lack variety and some of them are grossly short in length), that they are tailored to serve a declared purpose, and that they reflect little evidence of the process of text production and text consumption, tends to seriously undermine and compromise their trustworthiness and credibility as instances of the data used in *LP*. This renders *LP* uncritical of its own analytic and interpretive practices. That is, inadequate data are used to make generalisations about instances of unequal power relations and about relations of domination (dominant ideologies and dominant discourses that are claimed to be reproduced) in language use.
Lastly, contrary to the mainline argument advanced in LP that language concepts, entities and phenomena should be viewed from a binary perspective which discredits modern linguistics, the current study contends that language issues should be viewed from a chaos theory perspective. This perspective allows for language concepts, entities and phenomena to be seen as embodying aspects related to both critical linguistics and modern linguistics without privileging or discrediting either. In this instance, chaos theory tends to serve as a meeting point and an interface between both mainstream linguistics and critical linguistics.

Part II

5. 2 The Postmodern Condition (The PC)

This section, like Part I, combines and integrates both quantitative and qualitative content analysis. It analyses the following aspects of The PC: The PC’s areas of focus; underlying theoretical assumptions of The PC; approaches, methods and models of analysis employed in The PC; types of cited material used in The PC; some of the key concepts used in The PC and their occurrence frequencies; and chaotic qualities displayed by the concepts illustrated in Table 5. 8. The analysis excludes the sets of content variables already analysed as part of the sample data analysis in Chapter Four. However, in the case of modernity (modernism), its occurrence frequency is included in the total and percentage frequencies of the set of variables to which it belongs as depicted in Table 5. 8.

5. 2. 1 The PC’s Areas of Focus

According to Exemplar 5. 17, the major focal area of The PC is the condition of knowledge in the most highly developed societies. This condition of knowledge – which is the postmodern condition - is framed within narratives which, argues the text, are in crisis and are in conflict with science. Consequently, the text views scientific knowledge as one form of discourse. Hence, it contends that over the last forty years, the leading
sciences and technologies have had to do with the different areas of language. This is a point meant to highlight that the advancement of scientific knowledge (as an embodiment of the leading sciences and technologies) takes place within the framework of language. Built into this major focus are five subsidiary focal areas: the computerisation and commercialisation of science, knowledge and information; the computerisation of societies; the problem of the legitimation of knowledge (or science); a disbelief in grand narratives or meta-narratives; and the embracing of paralogy in knowledge and the incommensurability of knowledge (also cf. *The PC*, pp. viii, xix, 15, 26 and 43). These focal areas are referred to at least 21, 75, 29, 14 and 23 times, respectively, in the text.

5. 2. 2 Underlying Theoretical Assumptions of *The PC*

In line with *Exemplar 5. 18* the text is underpinned by the following theoretical assumptions: Wittgenstein’s theory of language games; Austin’s theory of pragmatics – especially his theory of the performative (this term also carries a sense of input/output as used in systems theory); Searle’s and Grice’s speech act theory; Heraclitus’s notion of agonistics; and Nietzsche’s nihilism (perspectivism). It makes 4 references each to both Wittgenstein’s language game theory and Austin’s theory of pragmatics, 3 references to Searle’s speech act theory and 1 reference to Grice’s speech act theory (cf. *The PC*, pp. 10, 17 and 39; also cf. pp. 87n28, 88n30-n36 and 90n62). Then, it makes 7 references to Heraclitus’s notion of agonistics, and 1 reference to Nietzsche’s nihilism (cf. *The PC*, pp. 10 and 39; also cf. p. 88n35).

In addition, the text makes allusions to some aspects of the following so-called new sciences: Gödel’s notion of undecidability; quantum theory; probability theory; catastrophe theory; chaos theory; and morphogenesis. It refers twice to Gödel’s undecidability, twice to quantum theory, once to probability theory, 6 times to catastrophe theory, thrice to chaos theory and once to morphogenesis (cf. *The PC*, pp. 42-43, 55, 57, 58 and 61). In all this, the text discredits Marxism - and its variants (especially as represented by Habermas) - as an outdated grand narrative. It does the same for functionalism represented by Luhmann. Overall, the pragmatic, social and *new sciences*
theories underpinning *The PC* (with their occurrence frequencies in brackets) are summarised in *Figure 5.6*:

**Figure 5.6: Pragmatic, social and *new sciences* theories used in *The PC***

Furthermore, the text mentions the following theorists: Jürgen Habermas (22 times); G. W. F. Hegel (7 times); Wilhelm von Humboldt (8 times); Immanuel Kant (10 times);
Pierre Laplace (2 times); Niklas Luhmann (7 times); Benoît Mandelbrot (3 times); Karl Marx (5 times); Talcott Parsons (5 times); and René Thom (5 times). Table 5.6 displays the names of these theorists and their occurrence frequencies in The PC:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theorists</th>
<th>Pages</th>
<th>Occurrence Frequencies</th>
<th>Sub-Totals</th>
<th>% of (Sub-)Totals</th>
<th>% Occurrence Frequencies in the whole text</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Habermas</td>
<td>vii; viii; ix; x; xvi; xvii; xviii; xix; xx; 60; 65; 66; 72; 73; 79</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>29.7</td>
<td>23.7 (29)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hegel</td>
<td>x; xix; 33; 34; 38; 81</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>7.5 (12.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humboldt</td>
<td>32; 33; 52</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>8.6 (6.3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kant</td>
<td>36; 40; 73; 76; 77; 78; 81</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>10.8 (14.6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laplace</td>
<td>55; 58</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>2.2 (4.2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luhmann</td>
<td>12; 46; 61; 62; 63; 66</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>7.5 (12.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mandelbrot</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3 (2.1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marx</td>
<td>xix; xx; xxiv; 12; 13</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>5.4 (10.4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parsons</td>
<td>11; 12</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>5.4 (4.2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thom</td>
<td>58; 59</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>5.4 (4.2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>(48)</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>79.5* (100)®</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5.2.3 Approaches, Methods and Models of Analysis Employed in The PC

Four key words stand out in Exemplar 5.19: narrative, pragmatics, language games and agonistics. These are the words underpinning the approach, method and model of analysis used in The PC. Firstly, the text employs a narrative and pragmatic model and a language game method as a way of analysing knowledge (science) and its problem of legitimation in the postmodern era. In particular, its narrative and pragmatic model (together with its approach and procedure) is situated within the language game methodological framework. In this context, it draws heavily on Wittgenstein’s concept of language games which identifies three utterances – denotative, declarative and prescriptive utterances - as different and incommensurable language games. The following three instances exemplify these three utterances respectively: The university is sick, The university is open and Give money to the university (cf. The PC, pp. x, xi, xx, 9 and 10).
These three utterances correspond to scientific, narrative and moral (legal) language games. The contention here is that each of these utterances is defined in terms of its own rules and that such rules specify the properties each utterance has and determine the uses to which each utterance can be put. As depicted in Figures 5. 7, 5. 8 and 5. 9, language

Figure 5. 7: A chessboard with pieces of chess in four different colours symbolically representing moves and turns taken by players in a denotative language game

Figure 5. 8: A chessboard with black and cream white pieces arranged in an oval shape symbolically representing moves and turns involved in a declarative language game
Figure 5. 9: A chessboard with pieces placed in different slots of the chessboard symbolically representing moves and turns taken in a prescriptive language game

games – and their respective rules and moves - operate, as the text argues, in the same way as the game of chess is defined by a set of rules or by specific moves determining the properties of each of the pieces. Accordingly, the three figures provide samples of chessboards and pieces together with the various symbolic moves and turns involved in each of the three Lyotardian language games as delineated above. The point worth highlighting here is that each figure displays the chess moves and turns specific to each of the three language games. Therefore, each language game – in line with the central contention of the text - has its own moves and turns (as determined by its particular rules) which are only commensurable with it while being incommensurable with the other language games.

Secondly, in addition to Wittgenstein’s language game theory, the methodological approach employed in The PC draws on both Austin’s and Searle’s speech act theory – in particular Austin’s notion of performatives – and on Heraclitus’s notion of agonistics (cf. The PC, pp. 59, 88n30 and n35). In this regard, it is underlined by two principles. The first is that speaking or communication entails fighting and that speech acts fall within the realm of general agonistics. The second is that the observable social bond consists of language moves.
Thirdly and lastly, the text contends that knowing about and analysing the most highly developed contemporary society, involves choosing what approach an inquiry has to take. So, the choice of a methodological approach for carrying out the inquiry is critical in this regard. It does the same for knowledge: it argues that inquiring about knowledge in the most highly developed contemporary society, entails answering the question of what methodological representation to apply to a given society. It identifies Marxism (which espouses the principle of class struggle and the dialectics as a duality operating in society) and functionalism (which views society as a functional whole) as models which have dominated the analysis of knowledge and of the society within which it is situated. However, it rejects both models – as it views them as out of step with most vital modes of postmodern knowledge – in favour of the agonistic language game approach (Exemplar 5. 19; also cf. pp. 11-15).

The diagram in Figure 5. 10 depicts this methodological model as used in The PC. The top half of the diagram features the three Lyotardian language games – denotative, declarative and prescriptive language games (and their respective rules and moves) – which are at the core of this methodological model. The three language games – enclosed in cylinders bearing chessboard-like spots - are separated by two partitions of incommensurability to emphasise the fact that they not only exist independently but that their rules and moves are incommensurable as well. The middle part of the diagram displays Austin’s and Searle’s speech act theory and the little narratives (local discourses or knowledges) embodied in the model. Finally, the base of the model reflects Marxism and functionalism (the two grand narratives that Lyotard discredits). The base underscores two related aspects: to accentuate the fact that the model discredits the very basis which launches it; and to highlight that without the discredited base the model cannot come into existence.
5. 2. 4 Types of Cited Material Used in *The PC*

*The PC* consists of at least 12 main pieces of cited material. All together they have a total of 4,634 words which amount to 386.16 average words per cited material. However, taken individually, their word counts vary from 52 (the one with the fewest words) to 1
758 (the one with the most words). Table 5. 7 below displays these twelve pieces of cited material together with their word counts and their related page numbers in *The PC*.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cited Material</th>
<th>Types of Material Cited</th>
<th>No. of Words</th>
<th>Page No.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Parsons’s cited material (PT)</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Cashinahua’s cited material (PT)</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Copernicus’ cited material (ST)*</td>
<td>392</td>
<td>23-24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Humboldt’s cited material (ST)</td>
<td>562</td>
<td>32-33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Wittgenstein’s cited material (PT)®</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>40-41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Gödel’s cited material (PT)</td>
<td>185</td>
<td>42; 43; 55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Laplace’s cited material (PT)</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Quantum mechanics/quantum theory, atomic physics and microphysics cited material (ST)</td>
<td>1758</td>
<td>55; 56; 57; 58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Perrin’s cited material (PT)</td>
<td>378</td>
<td>56; 57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Mandelbrot’s cited material (ST)</td>
<td>255</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Thom’s cited material (PT)</td>
<td>518</td>
<td>58-60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Luhmann’s cited material (ST)</td>
<td>207</td>
<td>61-62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>4634</strong></td>
<td><strong>17 (23)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Average words per text</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>386.16</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Table 5. 7: Types of cited material used in *The PC* (ST* = Secondary Text; PT® = Primary Text)*
### 5.2.5 Some of the Key Concepts Used in The PC and their Occurrence Frequencies

| Concepts                        | Frequencies in Foreword | Frequencies in Intro | Frequencies in Section 1 | Frequencies in Section 2 | Frequencies in Section 3 | Frequencies in Section 4 | Frequencies in Section 5 | Frequencies in Section 6 | Frequencies in Section 7 | Frequencies in Section 8 | Frequencies in Section 9 | Frequencies in Section 10 | Frequencies in Section 11 | Frequencies in Section 12 | Frequencies in Section 13 | Frequencies in Section 14 | Frequencies in Section 15 | Frequencies in Total | Percentage Frequencies |
|--------------------------------|-------------------------|----------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|-------------------------|
| Modernity/Modernism            | 16                      | 1                    | 0                        | 0                        | 0                        | 0                        | 0                        | 0                        | 0                        | 0                        | 0                        | 0                        | 0                        | 0                        | 0                        | 0                        | 0                       | 6                       | 23                      | 3.3                     |
| Postmodernity/Postmodernism    | 15                      | 0                    | 0                        | 0                        | 0                        | 0                        | 1                        | 0                        | 0                        | 1                        | 0                        | 0                        | 0                        | 0                        | 0                        | 0                        | 0                       | 7                       | 24                      | 3.6                     |
| Grand narratives/Meta-narratives| 6                       | 6                    | 0                        | 0                        | 0                        | 1                        | 0                        | 0                        | 0                        | 3                        | 3                        | 0                        | 0                        | 2                        | 0                        | 0                        | 0                       | 21                      | 3.2                     |
| Language game(s)               | 1                       | 5                    | 0                        | 0                        | 8                        | 0                        | 12                       | 3                        | 12                       | 8                        | 6                        | 16                       | 14                       | 8                        | 6                        | 18                       | 4                        | 121                     | 18.2                    |
| Utterance(s)                   | 1                       | 0                    | 0                        | 0                        | 11                       | 0                        | 2                        | 3                        | 0                        | 0                        | 5                        | 0                        | 2                        | 0                        | 1                        | 5                        | 0                        | 30                      | 4.5                     |
| Pragmatics                     | 1                       | 1                    | 0                        | 0                        | 1                        | 0                        | 0                        | 5                        | 5                        | 2                        | 0                        | 0                        | 2                        | 0                        | 4                        | 12                       | 0                        | 33                      | 5                       |
| Performativity                 | 0                       | 0                    | 0                        | 0                        | 1                        | 0                        | 2                        | 0                        | 0                        | 0                        | 0                        | 1                        | 8                        | 11                       | 3                        | 5                        | 0                        | 31                      | 4.7                     |
| Paralogy/Paralogism            | 2                       | 1                    | 0                        | 0                        | 0                        | 0                        | 0                        | 0                        | 0                        | 0                        | 0                        | 0                        | 0                        | 1                        | 0                        | 0                        | 5                        | 0                        | 9                       | 1.3                    |
| Incommensurability             | 0                       | 0                    | 0                        | 0                        | 0                        | 0                        | 0                        | 1                        | 0                        | 0                        | 0                        | 0                        | 1                        | 0                        | 1                        | 0                        | 1                        | 4                       | 1                       | 0.6                    |
| Knowledge                      | 14                      | 4                    | 27                       | 13                       | 0                        | 7                        | 2                        | 30                       | 18                       | 25                       | 38                       | 15                       | 13                       | 23                       | 12                       | 11                       | 4                        | 256                     | 38.6                    |
| Legitimation/Legitimacy        | 11                      | 7                    | 6                        | 1                        | 0                        | 0                        | 7                        | 0                        | 17                       | 23                       | 12                       | 8                        | 2                        | 8                        | 11                       | 0                        | 113                     | 17                      |                     |
| **Overall Totals**             | **67**                  | **24**               | **27**                   | **19**                   | **22**                   | **7**                    | **19**                   | **49**                   | **36**                   | **52**                   | **75**                   | **48**                   | **49**                   | **44**                   | **37**                   | **67**                   | **22**                   | **665**                 | **100**                 |

*Table 5.8: Some of the key concepts used in The PC and their occurrence frequencies*
Table 5. 8 reflects some of the key concepts featuring prominently in The PC and their respective occurrence frequencies in this text. For instance, on the one hand, knowledge, language game(s) and legitimation/legitimacy have the total occurrence frequencies of 256, 121 and 113 with the percentage occurrence frequencies of 38.6, 18.2 and 17 respectively. On the other hand, the total occurrence frequencies for pragmatics, performativity, utterance(s), postmodernity/postmodernism, modernity/modernism, grand narratives/meta-narratives, paralogy/paralogism and incommensurability are 33, 31, 30, 24, 22, 21, 9 and 4 respectively. Their respective percentage occurrence frequencies are 5, 4.7, 4.5, 3.6, 3.3, 3.2, 1.3 and 0.6.

5. 2. 6 Chaotic Qualities Displayed by the Concepts Illustrated in Table 5. 8

5. 2. 6. 1 Postmodernity/Postmodernism

Lyotard (cf. Exemplar 5. 21) defines postmodernity in terms of incredulity towards meta-narratives. On this basis he makes two assertions: this incredulity is the product of progress in the sciences; meta-narratives have lost their legitimating function (as they have become obsolete) and this has rendered metaphysical philosophy together with the academia on which it relies, questionable. In effect, he contends that postmodernity signals the demise of meta-narratives of modernity (or legitimation) and ushers in a new pragmatic or narrative era. With respect to this last point, he maintains that the legitimating role of meta-narratives is diffused through, inter alia, denotative, prescriptive and descriptive narrative (language) elements which have their own specific pragmatic properties, and are thus, incommunicable.

Most importantly, Lyotard predicts that the future of society has more to do with the language pragmatics (the pragmatics of language particles) than with the Newtonian determinism (structuralism or systems theory). His futuristic language pragmatics entails incommensurabilities, instabilities, differences and indeterminacies permeating various aspects of life. This implies the end of modernity and all it stands for (also cf. Exemplars 5. 17 and 5. 19; The PC, pp. xxv, 53 and 66).
Two aspects stand out in Lyotard’s characterisation of postmodernity: he (uncritically) privileges postmodernity over modernity; and he embraces his narrative or pragmatic approach at all cost and sees the postmodern world only through the narrative lense. As such, his delineation of postmodernity (or postmodernism) is, simplistic, restrictive, lopsided and reductionist. By contrast, chaos theory views postmodernity as encompassing diverse and complex processes and areas which are both related and unrelated. A typical example is the field of study that can be theorised and studied from both modernist-postmodernist perspectives or a modern day city the architectural designs and landscapes of which may display both modernist and postmodernist features.

In this case, chaos theory does not privilege postmodernist tendencies over modernist ones as Lyotard does. Rather, it sets out to highlight the strengths and weaknesses associated with both postmodernity and modernity and to conceptualise them along a determinism-indeterminism continuum – or on a chaotic order-chaotic disorder plane. This contrasts with Lyotard’s approach which religiously espouses narrative language elements to the exclusion of Newtonian determinist elements. That is, there is no reason why narrative elements may not co-exist with the Newtonian ones which may not necessarily be narrative.

Thus, from the chaos theory perspective, the postmodern world also reflects stabilities, similarities and determinacies – and not only their opposites as Lyotard would like us believe. For example, while Lyotard’s postmodern self (cf. The PC, p. 15) - including postmodern human agency and subjectivity - is exclusively dispersed, decentred, unfixed, disunified and fragmented, the self (or human agency) as understood by chaos theory is a complex entity that is simultaneously grounded and dispersed, centred and decentred, fixed and unfixed, unified and disunified and coherent and fragmented. Analogously, in terms of chaos theory a stable self displays point attractors, a semi-stable self limit cycle attractors, and a dispersed and fragmented self torus and strange attractors.

That is, the self can occupy one particular fixed or predictable state; it can cycle through a series of limited states characterised by a fair degree of regularity; and it can also
display a torus state characterised by two independent oscillations or quasi-periodic motions. This is especially the case with the individual oscillating between different states (happiness/unhappiness, satisfaction/dissatisfaction, anger/delight, joyousness/disappointment, etc at any given time. All of these states can exhibit a combination of chaotic determinism and chaotic randomness characterised by chaotic contradictions. At the same time, the self can evince bifurcations (when it has to choose between two alternate states), butterfly effects (when a minor change in one of its states can lead to significant changes) and dissipative structures (when its structures are capable of collapsing and reorganising themselves into new structures) (cf. Day and Letts, 1997: 1-10; Guess and Sailor, 1991: 1-7; Hughes and Attwell, 1999: 1-10; WordWeb, 2004; Young, 1992: 1-8).

5. 2. 6. 2 Grand Narratives/Meta-Narratives and Legitimation/Legitimacy

According to Lyotard (cf. Exemplar 5. 22) grand narratives are in crisis as they have lost their credibility. He identifies at least four such grand narratives – speculation, emancipation, Marxism and functionalism – and singles them out for attack. He does the same for justice, consensus, legitimation and totality. He claims that they too – as universalising practices and tendencies serving the interests of the grand narratives of modernity and sometimes as instances of grand narratives themselves – have lost their credibility, and as such, are in crisis. He singles them out for attack as well. All this is evinced by his war-like cry: “Let us wage war on totality” (cf. Exemplar 5. 22; *The PC*, p. 82). This is a war cry which - by extension – is also directed at modernity and all it embodies.

Of the universalising tendencies linked to grand narratives it is legitimation (legitimacy) which Lyotard discredits at length and at which he directs his fiercest attack (cf. *The PC*, xxiii-xxv and 31-47). He defines legitimation as “the process by which a ‘legislator’ dealing with scientific discourse is authorized to prescribe the stated conditions … determining whether a statement is to be included in that discourse for consideration by the scientific community” (*The PC*, p. 8). In fact, in certain instances Lyotard equates
legitimation and justice with grand narratives themselves. This is evident in his dual assertion that “It is only in the context of the grand narratives of legitimation – the life of the spirit and/or the emancipation of humanity – that the partial replacement of teachers by machines may seem inadequate or even intolerable”; and that “justice is consigned to the grand narrative in the same way as truth” (p. xxiv). He rhetorically poses a question: “Where, after the metanarratives, can legitimacy reside?” (pp. xxiv-xxv), thereby suggesting that with the demise of grand narratives, legitimacy has no survival at all. In this case, he calls for the replacement of grand narratives by little narratives (petit récits) (cf. Exemplar 5. 22).

From the two preceding paragraphs, it is clear that as far as Lyotard is concerned, grand narratives are anything ranging from speculation, emancipation, Marxism and functionalism to justice, consensus, legitimation and totality. It is also clear that all of these so-called grand narratives are in crisis and have no credibility any more in the postmodern era. In terms of chaos theory, both grand narratives (totalising theories) and little narratives (local theories or local knowledges) have to be challenged as they both have their own strengths and weaknesses. However, for this to happen it does not mean that the former need be replaced by the latter as suggested by Lyotard. Grand and little narratives can co-exist in any given field of study, thereby enriching each other. This then entails the idea of chaotic connectionism. Both can consist of areas and aspects which are stable and unstable, determinate and indeterminate, fixed and unfixed and predictable and unpredictable. For example, a grand narrative such as Marxism (Lyotard’s anathema and nemesis) has retained its traditional function – has retained its function as a stable, determinate, fixed and orderly theory, approach and framework in certain academic disciplines.

However, because of bifurcations (the need for more competing alternatives), butterfly effects (when minor changes in the conceptualisation of Marxism lead to far reaching consequences) and dissipative structures (when alternative models of Marxism collapse and reorganise themselves into new models) new versions of Marxism and neo-Marxism have emerged. This is the case with some of the strands of postmodernism, feminism and
poststructuralism which incorporate – in one way or another – certain versions of neo-Marxism. Some, if not most of these versions, display fundamental differences (disorder or instability) from orthodox Marxism. The same is true of the little narratives advocated by Lyotard. Most importantly, some grand and little narratives are more legitimate and credible than others - in which case they have a greater degree of legitimacy and credibility than others. This means that both legitimacy and credibility play a critical role in both grand and little narratives (cf. Milovanovic, 1997: 1-14; WordWeb, 2004; Young, 1992: 1-12).

Thus, according to chaos theory, it is not grand narratives alone that face a legitimation crisis. Many little narratives - including those cited by Lyotard – do have their own legitimation and credibility problem. For example, many postmodern models (including Lyotard’s) are treated with suspicion and scepticism in certain fields of study as they have not proven themselves to be convincing alternative models (cf. Boghossian, 1996: 10-14; Gross and Levitt, 1994: 1-3, 43 and 254; Sokal, 1996: 93). However, the most important aspect here –which is a radical departure from Lyotard’s model and which is also supported by Guess and Sailor (1991: 3-4) and Young (1992: 3) - is that chaos is a science of wholes (holism) which places emphasis on the parts making up wholes. That is, it focuses on small changes (little narratives) affecting the whole system (grand narratives).

5. 2. 6. 3 Language Games, Utterances, Pragmatics, Knowledge and Incommensurability

In Exemplars 5. 19 and 5. 23 Lyotard argues that language games – denotative, performative and prescriptive - together with their rules, moves, utterances, pragmatics and discourses are heterogeneous and incommensurable. This implies that they are different and thus incompatible. Consequently, he maintains that different language games give rise to local patches (heterogeneous narrative or language particles). Similarly, he regards utterances – also denotative, performative and prescriptive – as both heterogeneous and incommensurable. His major contention in this context is that these
three types of utterances - representing scientific, narrative and legal/moral discourses respectively – have rules, moves, pragmatics and language games that are peculiar to each one of them, a condition rendering them incommensurable.

He advances the same argument for science and knowledge as well. He distinguishes, on the one hand, between science and knowledge, and on the other hand, between narrative and scientific knowledge. On this basis he asserts that there is incommensurability between the pragmatics and language games of narrative knowledge and those of scientific knowledge as the two forms of knowledge have different criteria of validating themselves. However, at the same time, he insists that scientific knowledge depends on narrative knowledge for legitimating itself. Hence, one of his leitmotifs is that narrative knowledge (narration) is the quintessential form of customary knowledge (cf. Exemplar 5. 23; The PC, pp. 40 and 64-66).

One of the aspects which emerges from Exemplar 5. 23 is that Lyotard constructs and represents language games, utterances, pragmatics and knowledge only in terms of incommensurability. From a chaos theory standpoint, different knowledge forms are neither perennially incommensurable nor inherently incompatible. That is, while knowledge forms may be many and varied, they do – at times – complement and enrich each other in terms of their models of inquiry. As is the case with grand and little narratives above, this entails the idea of chaotic connectionism and self-similarity into which is built commensurability and not incommensurability as Lyotard asserts. The same connectionism and self-similarity is possible even in relation to their language games, utterances, pragmatics and discourses, however different they may be. In fact, as far as chaos theory is concerned, different language games, utterances, pragmatics and discourses associated with knowledge forms belonging to different fields of study are both commensurable and incommensurable. That is, while on the one hand they are different, contradictory and incommensurable, on the other hand they are complementary, and thus commensurable (cf. Donahue, 2001: 15-21; Guess and Sailor, 1991: 6-7; Hughes and Attwell, 1999: 4-5).
5. 2. 6. 4 Performativity and Paralogy

Lyotard avers in *Exemplar 5. 24* that performativity is the principle of optimal performance or of efficiency: he associates it with technical operativity which maximises output while minimising input. He points out that as a technical criterion introduced and operating in scientific knowledge, performativity influences and tends to supplant the truth criterion associated with the grand narratives of speculation and justice. In this regard he equates it with power as a criterion of legitimation. Most importantly, Lyotard maintains that the performativity criterion influences higher education and that it requires the latter to make an optimal contribution to the social system.

Accordingly, he argues, higher education is expected to provide skills. He identifies two categories of such skills: computer science, cybernetic, linguistic and mathematical skills on the one hand; and medical, teaching, engineering and administrative skills on the other hand. Having competence in these skills, he further contends, is a necessary condition. In this performativity milieu, knowledge and performance-oriented skills, in particular, become commercialised, and thus, marketable. As a result, competence determined by the true/false and just/unjust statements – competence derived from the grand narratives of speculation and justice – is rendered invalid, inefficient and useless in the postmodern condition.

Most significantly, Lyotard outlines the notion of interdisciplinarity and its indispensable nature in the postmodern condition of knowledge. A radical view he articulates in this case is his assertion that the advent of the interdisciplinary approach spells the sudden death of the university *Professor* as the latter’s utilitarian role of embodying (universal) knowledge is taken over by memory banks and interdisciplinary teams. Implied in this is that, in the postmodern condition, idealistic and non-performance related knowledge typified by grand narratives and personified by the *professor*, loses its values.

Lyotard further asserts that the principle of paralogy makes postmodern knowledge be tolerant of differences and the incommensurable. His paralogy refers to instabilities,
differences or dissensus. It is, he maintains, a move played in the pragmatics of knowledge and stands in contradistinction to innovation. In this instance, it negates consensus: in fact, the latter is unreachable, and as such, has paralogy as its end. In all, Lyotard’s fundamental argument is that both performativity and paralogy have given rise to the delegitimation of modernist science and knowledge. In particular, he insists that science and knowledge are, in the postmodern condition, typified and legitimated by paralogy.

From *Exemplar 5. 24* it becomes obvious that Lyotard conceptualises his postmodern science and knowledge in terms of performativity and paralogy. Not only does paralogy become the final arbiter of legitimation, but skills (saleable technical or performance-oriented ones in particular) replace all other forms of knowledge as well. This is a narrowly technicist and reductionist view of postmodern condition of knowledge. Again, not only do data memory banks perform the functions of the professor, but interdisciplinary teams, too, perform the self-same professorial duties. This, too, constitutes a very narrow-minded view of both memory banks and interdisciplinary ventures in relation to knowledge in the postmodern era.

With reference to chaotic systems, the existence of performativity (as a technical criterion or as embodying skills) and paralogy (in the form of instabilities, differences or dissension) within a given system – and within a given science or knowledge – does not spell a delegitimation of that system. Most importantly, from a chaos theory viewpoint, professors (embodying whatever grand narrative-based knowledge) can exist side by side with data memory banks and interdisciplinary teams. The very notion of interdisciplinarity entails that there must be broad-based teams of experts and professors pooled from different disciplines so they can make an effective and collaborative use of memory banks.

In fact, in accordance with chaos theory, knowledge systems embody both stabilities and instabilities, consistencies and inconsistencies, consensus and dissensus, and simplicity and complexity, on the one hand, and are represented by professors and non-professors,
and experts and non-experts, on the other hand. In this way, it does not privilege one set of extreme attributes – as constituting knowledge and as knowledge providers - to the total exclusion of the other. That is, in terms of chaos theory, both performative and non-performative, technical and non-technical, and same and different forms of science and knowledge can co-exist to constitute a well-balanced and a variegated spectrum of science and knowledge. Thus, the existence of one form of science or knowledge does not necessarily spell the invalidation or delegitimation of another. Nor does the presence of memory banks and interdisciplinary teams spell the end of the professor.

5. 2. 7 Discussion

What emerges from the goals and the area of focus of The PC is that the two overlap: they are both about the condition of knowledge (in the most highly developed societies) which – according to Lyotard - is a postmodern condition. The striking feature of this condition of knowledge is that it is framed within narratives which are conceptualised in terms of crisis and conflict. This means that narratives face a legitimacy crisis and are in conflict with science. This last point underlines the fact that Lyotard assigns a conflictual view to both narratives and science (cf. Data Exemplars 4. 3 and 4. 4; Exemplar 5. 17).

However, this conflictual view - which is at the heart of the Marxist conflict theory – contradicts Lyotard’s own postmodern thinking which discredits and impugns Marxism as a grand narrative of modernity (cf. Data Exemplar 4. 6; Exemplars 5. 21 and 5. 22). Particularly ironic in this regard is his assertion that the leading sciences and technologies have to do with language – language is at the cutting-edge of science and technology (cf. Exemplar 5. 17). This assertion tends to reduce both science and technology to language instead of highlighting that language has benefited enormously from all types of sciences and technologies. Classic examples are artificial intelligence, neurolinguistics, and computational linguistics or computer assisted language learning (CALL).

The other striking feature evident from the text’s area of focus is that while Lyotard rejects Marxism and functionalism as outdated and discredited grand narratives, he
nonetheless, conceptualises modernity primarily in terms of these two grand narratives (cf. Data Exemplar 4. 6; Exemplars 5. 21 and 5. 22). Thus, his conception of modernity appears to be contradictory and shallow as everything that stands for modernity and all other totalising narratives are reduced to these two grand narratives. The same applies to his characterisation and conceptualisation of postmodernity: he views it solely in terms of incredulity towards meta-narratives. However, referring to postmodernity as incredulity towards meta-narratives does not only reflect a circumscribing view Lyotard attaches to this concept, but does highlight his failure to unambiguously define it as well. Added to this, is the claim he makes in Exemplar 5. 21 that “the narrative function is losing its functors” (its value), and yet, in the same exemplar he contradicts this claim by asserting that the same narrative function is salvaged by narrative language elements. His statement, “[i]t is being dispersed in clouds of narrative language elements,” serves to exemplify this.

Another aspect worth highlighting is that in one context Lyotard contends that different language games and utterances – together with their different forms of pragmatics and knowledge – are incommensurable, and as such, cannot legitimate or validate one another. Yet in another context, he turns this contention on its head by maintaining that scientific knowledge resorts to and is validated by narrative knowledge (cf. Exemplar 5. 23). Moreover, in one occasion he argues that after the demise of meta-narratives, legitimation – what I consider to be the ability of any science or knowledge to legitimate or validate itself – ends or loses its value or function. His rhetorical question – “Where, after the metanarratives, can legitimacy reside?” – serves to illustrate this (cf. Exemplar 5. 22).

However, in another occasion, he revives the spectre of legitimation through performativity and paralogy. Here the former, as a technical and performance-oriented criterion, serves as a temporary seat of legitimation and is ranked alongside power and technology in its effectiveness and efficiency. Then, the latter, serves as a permanent seat of legitimation. What becomes apparent, in this regard is that, while legitimation loses its value in relation to all totalising grand narratives of modernity, it becomes effective and
efficient in the form of performativity and paralogy with reference to all totalising little narratives of postmodernity (cf. Exemplar 5. 24).

Perhaps the most telling aspect in Exemplar 5. 24 is Lyotard’s claim that knowledge in the postmodern condition is a saleable commodity typified by performance-oriented skills and that higher education is increasingly required to provide such skills. His characterisation of these skills is, nonetheless, too narrow and too technicist. Above all, he does not clearly spell out whether what he has in mind are technical and professional skills or not. Allied to this is his contentious assertion that in the postmodern era memory banks and interdisciplinary teams spell the end of the professor. Here, too, his conception of both memory banks and interdisciplinary ventures – good ideas as they are - in relation to knowledge in the postmodern era seems to be very lopsided.

A further aspect emerging from Lyotard’s text is that the text itself is embedded in too many theoretical strands which fail to constitute a coherent whole. Some of the theories it employs are largely fragmented while others are only attended to and treated inadequately, flippantly and rather ironically. The typical examples are Gödel’s theorem of undecidability, probability theory, catastrophe theory and chaos theory (cf. Figure 5. 6; Exemplars 5. 18 and 5. 20). The same applies to the methodological approach adopted by Lyotard in the text: it is rather vaguely and incoherently formulated (cf. Figure 5. 10; Exemplar 5. 19). Not only does the use of terms such as language games, pragmatics, utterances, knowledge and performativity in this area of the text border on pun but also no attempt is made to indicate how language games and language areas such as pragmatics and performative utterances fit in with any of the new sciences mentioned in the text.

In fact, the text does not even differentiate between language game, narrative and pragmatic forms of analysis to which it refers. Neither is there any attempt to show how a combination of these language areas and the new sciences renders the old science – the Newtonian science or modernity – dysfunctional, worthless and outdated. There is, also, no clear-cut distinction in the text between the use of language games as a method (cf.
Exemplars 5. 18 and 5. 19) and the rhetorical use of the self-same concept throughout the text (cf. Exemplars 5. 21, 5. 22 and 5. 23).

Most of the cited pieces of material employed in the text, while illuminating in their own right, are however, suspect. Some of them are derived from or cited through secondary sources (cf. Table 5.7; Exemplar 5. 20). Even those cited through the primary or original sources are presented in short quotations whose exposition is insufficiently captured in endnotes (cf. Exemplar 5. 20). Except in few instances, no real engagement with the cited material is evident in the text. For instance, there is a random and flippant reference to quantum mechanics, Laplace’s determinism, Mandelbrot’s fractals and Thom’s indeterminism (again cf. Exemplar 5. 20) without meaningfully engaging these concepts.

In fact, these concepts mean more than what the text makes them out to be - they are not as simplistic as they have been presented in the text (cf. Alexander, 2002: 5-14, 28-37, 112-120 and 141-165; Donahue, 2001: 1-30). Moreover, the types of cited material used in the text seem to have been specifically chosen to prove what the text wants to prove: that the new sciences or postmodern sciences have come to replace the old science and have rendered it outmoded. These points of concern about the kinds of cited data material tend to cast a serious shadow of doubt on their adequacy, trustworthiness and credibility.

The last feature which is apparent from The PC is that it tends to semantically conflate concepts such as narratives and grand narratives, one the one hand, and language games, games, pragmatics and utterances, on the other hand. In the first instance the text tends to use both narratives and grand narratives interchangeably. In addition, at one point, the text associates grand narratives with speculation, emancipation, Marxism and functionalism whereas at another point it singles out justice, legitimation and consensus as instances of grand narratives (cf. Exemplar Data 4. 6; Exemplars 5. 17, 5. 21 and 5. 22). It does the same for the word performative: it has both Austinian and technical senses (cf. Exemplars 5. 18 and 5. 24). In the second instance, the text treats language games and games as meaning the same thing at certain times, while at other times, it regards pragmatics and utterances as referring to one thing. Still, in some instances, it
conflates language games and pragmatics, thereby treating them as synonyms (cf. Exemplars 5. 19, 5. 23 and 5. 24).

Finally, contrary to the views and arguments advanced by Lyotard about the postmodern condition of knowledge in The PC, the current study has shown how concepts, entities and phenomena if viewed from a chaotic perspective, can at different levels, display both the Newtonian modernist and non-Newtonian postmodernist worldviews. This allows for such concepts, entities and phenomena not to be theorised from the standpoint of mutually exclusive dualities (as is the case with grand versus little narratives or with narrative versus scientific knowledge), but rather, from that of mutually complementary variables or fractals displaying self-similarity (cf. for example, Figure 5. 5). Thus, from a chaos theory vantage point, the two worldviews can co-exist.

5. 3 Brief Similarities and Differences between CL and Postmodernism

There are certain similarities shared by CL and postmodernism. For instance, they both construct themselves as oppositional discourses in relation to mainstream linguistics and modernity respectively. CL attacks and discredits all that modern linguistics stands for while projecting itself as a viable alternative to it. Similarly, postmodernism impugns and discredits all that modernity stands for while presenting itself as an alternative to it.

However, in all this frontal attack, they both tend to throw out the baby with the bath water. That is, they over-emphasise only the weaknesses inherent in certain aspects related to modern linguistics and modernity, thereby failing to acknowledge their respective strengths. In fact, they fail to reveal their own corresponding weaknesses. This is evident in their general aversion to the scientificity – the scientific outlook - associated with these two areas (modern linguistics and modernity). Ironically, they too, in different but related ways, construct themselves as sciences in their own right. This last point is much more profound in the case of Lyotard’s postmodernism with its penchant to substitute the modernist science with the postmodern sciences.
Again, both CL and postmodernism display a high degree of interdisciplinarity both as theoretical frameworks and as models and methods of analysis. For example, as a theoretical framework and as both a model and a method of analysis, CL draws on and appeals to a number of theories and approaches such as those outlined in Figure 5.1. Likewise, as a theoretical framework and as a model and a method of analysis, Lyotard’s postmodernism draws on and invokes a variety of theories. A classic example is provided by Figure 5.6. In both instances – particularly as exemplified by the two texts analysed in this study - the use of interdisciplinary theories and approaches is very fragmented as there is little attempt to integrate the various theories and approaches invoked. This is especially unfortunate in the case of Lyotard, as he, more than Fairclough, foregrounds and valorises the notion of interdisciplinarity (cf. Exemplar 5.24). Above all, both CL and postmodernism espouse linguistic and discursive turns: a practice in which all there is tends to be reduced to language and discourse. In particular, they draw on and make use of pragmatics. This is much more so in the case of postmodernism as represented by Lyotard.

Most significantly, there is a notion of skills built – in varying degrees - into the two areas. In the case of CL this is more implied than overtly accentuated. For example, for one to be able to apply either CL or CLS with a view to unpacking the hidden workings of power and ideology in texts as suggested in LP (cf. Data Exemplars 4.1 and 4.2; Exemplar 5.1), one has to have at least analytical and critical (both critical reading and critical thinking) skills. In the case of Lyotard’s postmodernism the notion of skills (or skills-based competence) is explicitly expressed. The emphasis in this instance is on computer science, cybernetic, linguistic and mathematical skills on the one hand, and on medical, teaching, engineering and administrative skills, on the other hand (cf. Exemplar 5.24). Whether or not these two sets of skills correspond to technical and professional skills, and whether or not they are too restrictive, what is evident is that one of the thought-provoking aspects stressed by Lyotard is the indispensable presence of skills (and competence) in the postmodern condition of knowledge.
However, there are certain differences characterising CL and postmodernism. For instance, on the one hand, CL is underpinned by SFL and espouses a pronounced Marxist or critical approach in its theorisation of language, discourse, power and ideology. In all this, ideology plays a pivotal role. On the other hand, postmodernism - especially in the case of Lyotard – discredits and dismisses any form of Marxist orientation or approach. In fact, Marxism serves as one of the most important targets of Lyotard’s postmodern attack. Again, postmodernism - as personified by Lyotard - rejects ideology and its critical treatment as espoused by CL.

In addition, CL - in the case of LP - adopts Foucault’s orders of discourse and embraces Habermas’s theory of communicative action in its analysis of advertising as a form of discourse (cf. Figure 5.1; Exemplars 5.3 and 5.16). For its part, postmodernism – as theorised in The PC – controverts and rejects Habermas’s theories outright. In particular, it dismisses Habermas’s idea of consensus – a central pillar of the theory of communicative action - as a grand narrative inflicting violence on heterogeneous language games (cf. Exemplar 5.22). The PC does not make any reference to Foucault – or to his theories – except to say that an implicit parallel can be drawn between Lyotard’s language games or utterances and Foucault’s notion of discourses or orders of discourse as used in LP.

Another point of departure between CL and postmodernism relates to pragmatics and utterances. As applied in LP, CL challenges mainstream pragmatics and its classical conception of utterances as advocated by Austin and Searle. For instance, it views utterances as relating to the real extended discourse – a view attempting to construe utterances beyond their Austinian conception. However, it ends up being wedded to the same Austinian conception of utterances which, ironically enough, it also applies in its classical linguistic sense which views utterances as representing constituent parts of texts and as corresponding to both sentences and semantic propositions (cf. Exemplar 5.15). By contrast, as theorised in The PC, postmodernism explicitly employs utterances in their Austinian sense (cf. Exemplars 5.18 and 5.23).
Most importantly, CL – particularly as advocated by Fairclough in *LP* - seems to be wary of postmodernism and much of what it stands for (cf. for example, *Exemplar 5. 16; Fairclough, 1995: 15-17*). This is, again, despite the fact that Fairclough refers to and uses *intertextuality* (cf. *Exemplar 5. 13*) - which is a postmodern notion - and that he claims images are one of the salient features of contemporary postmodern culture (cf. *Exemplar 5. 16*). On the other hand, postmodernism, as constructed in *The PC*, hardly ever makes mention of CL.

**5. 4 Conclusion**

This chapter has conducted and presented the data analysis process as outlined and highlighted in *Figure 4.1* in Chapter Four. This has come in two parts - Part I and Part II - of macro-analysis. The macro-analysis – consisting of two strands of analysis in each case – has employed the integrated model of data analysis illustrated in *Figure 4. 1*. For example, while Part I has provided the analysis of *LP*, Part II has mounted the analysis of *The PC*. In each case, the analysis of the relevant sets of content variables has been informed by the steps and procedures as formulated and described under the relevant sub-sections in Chapter Four. Lastly, and most importantly, the chapter has both discussed the findings emerging from the analysis of the two texts and presented similarities and differences between critical linguistics and postmodernism.
Chapter Six

Micro-Analysis: Part III and Part IV

6.0 Introduction

This chapter presents the data analysis using the MIDA as outlined and illustrated in Figure 4.2 in Chapter Four. Like the previous chapter, it consists of two parts - Part III and Part IV - of micro-analysis. Part III provides a micro-analysis of the extract from Fairclough’s *LP* entitled *Case Study* which is an interview between Michael Charlton and Margaret Thatcher conducted by *BBC Radio 3*, on 17th December 1985 (cf. *Appendix B*). It simultaneously mounts a meta-analysis of Fairclough’s analysis of the pronouns and modals used in the self-same extract. Part IV mounts a micro-analysis of the extract from Lyotard’s *The PC* (cf. *Appendix D*). In both extracts, the analysis is on the discourse features as well as the discourse and ideological strategies as identified and highlighted under the MIDA in Figure 4.2 (cf. Chapter Four). This excludes narrative as a discourse feature as this feature has already been analysed in the previous chapter as part of the sample data analysis for both extracts (cf. *Data Exemplars 4.7 and 4.8*). Lastly, the chapter discusses the findings emanating from the micro-analysis of the discourse features used in the two extracts.

6.1 Part III Micro-Analysis: The Extract from *LP*

This section of the study presents a micro-analysis of the extract entitled *Case Study* selected from *LP*. The micro-analysis embodies two forms of analysis: a meta-analysis of Fairclough’s analysis of the pronouns and modals used in the extract; and an analysis of the following discourse features as employed in the extract: repetition; rhetoric; pronominalisation (pronouns); modality (modals); topoi; stereotypes; metaphors; implication; presupposition; and conversational maxims. The analysis is guided by the MIDA (cf. *Figure 4.2*) and is followed by a discussion of the findings.
6. 1. 1 Repetition and Rhetoric in the Extract from LP

As is evident from Appendix B, there are words, expressions, phrases and statements which are repeated in the extract from LP. They are repeated either for emphasis or for rhetorical purposes. This is especially the case with most of MT’s responses in this extract. The words – excluding modals and pronouns which are treated separately below - having the highest repetition frequency counts in a descending numerical order, are people (repeated 18 times and used 15 times by MT), because (10 times and used exclusively by MT), Britain (10 times and used 4 times by MT) and think (10 times and used only by MT). Allied to this last term is the phrase I think which is repeated 8 times by MT and used only once by MC.

These words are followed by government(s) (repeated 9 times by MT), but (8 times and used 5 times by MT), strong (repeated 7 times by MT), and now and then (each repeated 6 times and each used overwhelmingly by MT). These last two words together with because also serve as linking devices. Two more words repeated in the extract are say(ing) and yes. They are repeated 6 times and 3 times by MT respectively. At the same time, they also tend to function as fillers or as a form of back-channelling in the same way as the structure e: does in this extract. All of these words are also used for emphatic and rhetorical purposes by MT.

Closely related to the words say and yes are the phrases I would say - repeated once by MT - (cf. lines (106) and (118)) - and you would say (line (37)), and the phrases yes you expect people – repeated once by MT - (cf. lines (73) and (76)) – and so you expect PEOPLE (line (72)). In this regard, the word expect is repeated 3 times while always is repeated 4 times (by MT). These phrases and words, too, tend to serve a rhetorical and emphatic function in the extract. In the same vein, the two statements Many of the things which I’ve said strike a chord in the hearts of ordinary people and I say it strikes a chord in the hearts of people I know because it struck a chord in my heart many many years ago - (cf. lines (118)-(120) and (125)-(127)) –equally tend to serve a rhetorical function. The words in bold typeface exemplify the rhetorical emphasis they are intended to serve.
within these statements. Their rhetorical usage tends to highlight one aspect: in rhetorical repetition the manner in which statements are expressed is worth more than the propositional content statements embody.

There are other purposes served by both repetition and rhetoric in the extract. For example, there is a contrast and polarity built into the extract by repeating expressions such as the nineteen forties and those days on the one hand, and now and today on the other hand (cf. lines (1)-(13)). These types of cohesive devices are part of temporal deictics (cf. Simpson, 1993: 13-14; Thomas, 1995: 9-10). The same holds true for now/ today and then as used in the different parts of the extract. There is also cohesion brought about by the repetitive and rhetorical use of near-synonyms or synonymous expressions. Typical examples of such words are today and now, vision and future, and currency, finance and money. And classic instances of near-synonymous statements are Yes you expect people each and everyone from whatever their background to have a chance to rise to whatever level their own abilities can take them (cf. lines (73)-(76)) and Yes you expect people of all sorts of background and almost whatever their income level to be able to have a chance of owning some property (cf. lines (76)-(79)).

Two more illustrations of near-synonymous statements are The ownership of property of a house gives you some independence gives you a stake in the future (cf. lines (79)-(81)) and If you’re interested in the future yes you will probably save you’ll probably want a little bit of independent income of your own (cf. lines (86)-(88)). This repetitive and rhetorical use of words, expressions, phrases or statements in the extract is, besides constituting cohesion, a typical feature of most political discourse which MT tends to employ successfully in this case. This is, however, a feature that Fairclough leaves unattended to in his analysis of this extract (cf. LP, pp. 179-196; Appendix B). For example, Fairclough contends that MT employs the term people so as to implicitly claim the authority to tell people what they are like or to articulate on their behalf her own self-perceptions (cf. LP, pp. 181-182).
Certainly while this might be the case, there appear to be two contrasting senses in which the term *people* is used in the extract. One is rather inclusive and has an accommodating effect; the other is probably exclusive and has a distancing and paternalistic effect. The first sense is represented by the two statements, *but there it’s part government and part people because you CAN’T have law and order observed unless it’s in partnership with people* (lines (63)-(66)) and *Many of the things which I’ve said strike a chord in the hearts of ordinary people* (lines (118)-(120)). The second sense is embodied in these three statements, *look Britain is a country whose people think for themselves act for themselves can act on their own initiative they don’t have to be told don’t like to be pushed around are self-reliant* (lines (27)-(30)), *you have to say over to people people are inventive creative and so you expect PEOPLE to create thriving industries* (lines (71)-(73)), and *it’s very much a Britain whose people are independent of government* (lines (89)-(90)).

In terms of repetition and rhetoric as discourse features, the following discourse and ideological strategies can be deduced from the extract: justification; avoidance; legitimation; unification; and dissimulation. These five strategies seem to be intertwined. For instance, the rhetorical repetition of the word *people* especially in lines (54)-(78) serves to both justify and legitimise (in the sense of rationalising and universalising) MT’s views about, first, the idea of individualistic and self-reliant citizens, and second, the notion of Britain’s freedom, security and defence both at home and in the midst of other countries. At the same time, this rhetorical repetition serves both as a rallying cry for consensus and unity (a sense of unification) by MT to the British people and as a form of populism (also cf. lines (120) and (126)).

The words *social security* and *pre-eminence* seem to be euphemisms (an element of dissimulation) for *social welfare* and *military pride/strength*, respectively. At the same time, the words *freedom, security and defence* – rhetorically repeated in lines (102), (103) and (104) – also seem to be euphemisms for stock-piling arms so as to put Britain on a high state of alert in the event of an enemy attack (in this case Argentina). In the same vein, the word *government* is a euphemistic rhetorical reference to the Tory government...
led by MT. On the other hand, a rhetorical reference to *people* as in lines (52)-(54) serves as a means by MT to avoid responding directly to questions posed to her by MC. Similarly, a rhetorical repetition of the words *hearts* and *people* (cf. lines (119)-(126)) appears to serve the same purpose.

6.1.2 Pronominalisation as Used in the Extract

Below are two classic instances of Fairclough’s (1989: 179-180) commentary and analysis of the uses of the pronouns employed in the extract *Case Study*. Firstly, concerning the first person plural pronoun *we*, Fairclough contends that:

MrsThatcher (henceforth MT) uses the pronoun *we* mainly in lines (13)-(25) and (101)-(104), both inclusively and exclusively. The inclusive use (e.g. *now we do enjoy a standard of living which was undreamed of then*) is relationally significant in that it represents MT, her audience, and everyone else as in the same boat. It assimilates the leader to ‘the people.’ Even in this case, however, it is not clear exactly who is being claimed to have this ‘undreamed of’ standard of living: when *we* refers to a collective like ‘the British people’, claims can be made about the collective which do not necessarily hold for any particular member of it … Claiming that a collective has a certain standard of living when it is in fact characterized by gross disparities might be regarded as somewhat mystificatory. This imprecision in terms of who is being referred to is even more marked in other cases. It is not clear, for instance, in lines (101)-(104) whether *we* is being used exclusively to refer to a collective (the state, the government) which excludes those addressed, or whether it is used inclusively to refer to the whole ‘people’ like the previous example. This ambivalence effectively allows what the government was, believed and did to be put across as what ‘the people’ was, believed, did … There is only one case of unambiguously exclusive *we*, in line (16), referring to MT’s political party (pp. LP, 179-180; also cf. Appendix B).

Secondly, regarding the second person pronoun *you*, he argues that:

The pronoun *you* is used mainly as an indefinite pronoun, referring to people in general. It occurs most in lines (34)-(37), and (59)-(88). The relational value of *you* is partly to do with the significance of choosing it rather than the indefinite pronoun *one*. Readers might like to try replacing *you* with *one* to see how it changes the relational value … Firstly, *one* undermines the meaning of ‘people in general’ because people in general don’t use the word – it is, roughly, a middle-class pronoun; it is therefore difficult to make an effective claim to ‘ordinary people’ about the common experience of ‘ordinary’ people using *one*. You, on the other hand, is used to register solidarity and commonality of experience in working-class speech. Secondly, *one* is sometimes used as a delicate way of saying *I … You*, as I have been suggesting, claims solidarity, and by using it MT is able to pass off her practices, perceptions and precepts as those of ‘the people’ in general, and by implication claim for herself the status of one of ‘the people’ (LP, p.180; also cf. Appendix B).
Pronominalisation is the strategic use of pronouns in a text or in speech (cf. Fowler, 1991: 53 and 63). As is evident from the two preceding quotations, Fairclough identifies and analyses, mainly, two pronouns – *we* and *you* (and to a little extent *one*) - as used by MT in the extract under study here (cf. *LP*, pp. 179-180). He claims the pronoun *we* has an inclusive and exclusive use even though this type of use becomes *mystificatory* at times. He also contends that *you* is used by MT to claim solidarity with the ordinary people. The thrust of his argument is that pronouns carry and express a particular ideological use.

In the ensuing analysis, I want to briefly demonstrate that there are more instances of pronouns used in the extract than those pinpointed by Fairclough and that their uses are more complex, and thus are not only restricted to those outlined by him. There are, for instance, 4 instances of personal pronouns, *we*, *I*, *you* and *they* used in the extract. They are accompanied at different points by their corresponding possessive pronouns and at times by their reflexive pronouns. Examples here are *our*, *my*, *your*, *yourself*, *their*, and *themselves*. There is also the use of indefinite pronouns *one* and *everyone*. So, in all, there are 12 instances of pronouns used in the extract having 109 occurrence frequencies all together. Their occurrence frequency, from the highest to the lowest degree of frequency, is *you* (37 - 29 by MT and 8 by MC); *I* (25 – all by MT); *we* (11 – all by MT); *their* (10 – all by MT); *they* (9 – all by MT); *your* (6 – 4 by MT and 2 by MC); *my* (3 – all by MT); *them* (2 – by MT); *themselves* (2 – all by MT); *our* (1 – by MT); *yourself* (1 – by MC); *one* (1 – by MT); and *everyone* (1 – by MT).

By and large these pronouns serve multiple and complex functions. For instance, Rastall (2003: 51-52) identifies the following eight different uses of the pronoun *we*:

1. Royal *we* and editorial *we* - usually to the speaker only in the first person singular form - (e.g. by a royal person and by another speaker or writer).
2. Encouraging *we*, coaxing or parental *we* and sarcastic or ironic *we* – usually to an addressee in the second person – (e.g. doctor to patient, adult to child and adult to adult).
3. Reporting we – to a third person – (e.g. reference by a secretary to a boss).
4. Inclusive we, authorial we (in a book) and collective we (in an organisation) -
to the speaker and addressee(s) and possibly another or others).
5. Exclusive we – to the speaker and another or others, but not the addressee.
6. Distributive we (also possible in an organisation) – to the speaker or another
   or others (either addressee(s) or not.
7. Generic we (universal statement) and associative we (through a sense of
   belonging) – to a wider collective including the speaker.
8. Tribal we – to a sub-group in the collective with which the speaker wishes to
   be associated.

In the extract, the pronoun we as used by MT tends to perform the 8 functions identified
by Rastall quite subtly and variably. Built into these functions is the deictic function that
this pronoun serves as well. For instance, in line (13) it is used both inclusively and
generically (to refer to MT, her party the Conservative Party (the CP), MC and the
British people). This use also carries a sense of tribal or national collectivity and entails,
in another sense, rhetorical and associative functions. In lines (15), (16), (20) and (116) it
is used exclusively to refer to MT herself and her party, the CP. Again in lines (101)-
(104) it has an exclusive reference to MT herself and the government. On the other hand,
in line (25) we seems to have three complementary uses: a restricted inclusive use
(referring to both MT and MC); an editorial use (referring to MT); and a distributive use
(referring to MT as an embodiment of the Tory-led government – an organisation).

The pronouns you, your, yourself; she, I and they too, serve varying multiple purposes in
the extract. Among these purposes is the fact that these pronouns serve as person deictics
(cf. Thomas, 1995: 9-10) – as words which both MC and MT employ to refer to the
people they are talking about in the extract. For example, you in lines (7), (43), (46), (83)
and (93), your in lines (51) and (96), yourself in line (8) and she in line (44) are employed
by MC to refer to MT both as a person and as a Prime Minister. The use of she here
serves as an indexical reference to MT as a woman Prime Minister and as a Tory leader.
In contrast, the pronoun you is employed by MT to perform other referential functions.
For instance, as applied in lines (11), (13), (36), (37), (42), (84), (110) and (124) the pronoun you is used by MT to exclusively refer to MC as an interviewer. Likewise, as used in lines (49)-(76) you together with your (lines (59)-(61)) exclusively refers to MT as the embodiment of the Tory-led British government.

However, as applied in lines (24), (81), (86)-(87) and (110) you is used inclusively to refer to MT, MC and the rest of the British people. The same applies to the possessive pronoun your used in line (88). In lines (33)-(35) you carries the connotation of the impersonal pronoun one and also operates rhetorically in this context. Most significantly, as used from lines (71)-(81) the pronoun you has an aura of a patronising tone about it. Throughout the extract, MT employs I primarily for three uses: as an interviewee, as a British Prime Minister and as a Tory leader. Finally, she makes use of they rhetorically to refer to the people in general (the British people in general), and to the ordinary people in particular. The case in point is her use of they (which is both paternalistic and patronising) in lines (120)-(123).

Most importantly, the pronouns employed in the extract also function as cohesive devices. For example, in lines (1) and (8) you and yourself are used anaphorically to refer to Prime Minister. Likewise, the repetition of the personal pronouns I, they and you in lines (15), (21), (22), (25), (26), (33), and (36) tend to perform a cohesive function as well. The same cohesive usage of the pronouns I and you and sometimes I, we and they is manifest in lines (51)-(87) and (101)-(126) respectively. Throughout the extract (barring line (49)) I makes an anaphoric reference to MT, and thus, serves as a form of self-referentiality.

At the same time, the pronoun I is used interchangeably with one (cf. line (21)) and with we (cf. lines (101)-(126)) while in some instances it is used contrastively with they and you (cf. again lines (101)-(126)). Besides, you is interchangeable with one in line (24) while they makes an anaphoric reference to people in most parts of the extract. This interchangeable use of you and one is an instance of impersonal second and third person pronouns which are often employed as a strategy for portraying one’s controversial or
less popular views by attributing them to others – *self-attribution* versus *other-attribution* (cf. Strauss, 2004: 18 and 23). This use of you seems to be largely employed by MT in the extract (cf. lines (33)-(88)).

Furthermore, in line (44) MC employs the pronoun *she* to refer to MT in the third person singular form, thereby making a distant link between him as the interviewer and MT as a woman Prime Minister. On the other hand, *you’re* (line (11)) and *you* (line (13)) are used contrastively with *me* in line (12), with *we* in lines (13), (15) and (16), with *I* in line (15), and with *our* in line (17) by MT. Moreover, *we* (cf. line (102)) contrasts with the phrase *other countries* (cf. line (60)). These complex and multiple uses of pronouns in the extract stand in stark contrast to the almost simplistic or two-pronged use identified by Fairclough as the two earlier quotations demonstrate.

With reference to pronominalisation as a discourse feature applied in this extract, the following discourse and ideological strategies can be extrapolated: justification, attribution, positive self-presentation and scapegoating; and legitimation, unification and reification. In most cases, these strategies are interlinked. For example, the statement *now we do enjoy a standard of living which was undreamed of then and I can remember Rab Butler saying after we returned to power ... that if we played our cards right the standard of living ... would be twice as high as it was then and ... he was just about right* (cf. lines (13)-(19)) entails justification, legitimation, attribution, positive self-presentation, unification and reification.

Firstly, in this statement, MT tends to both justify and legitimise the current standard of living (in contrast to the one that existed then) in Britain. In the case of legitimation she does this through rationalising her opinions (which may not be necessarily true), universalising them (by making use of the pronoun *we*), and narrativisation (by recounting what one authority - Rab Butler – once said). MT’s rationalising of her opinions in this case has the effect of naturalising them as well (reification). The expression *we: was invaded of course* (lines (102)-(103)) provides an instance of MT’s legitimising her action of going to war through rationalisation. Secondly, MT tends to
attribute the current standard of living to Rab Butler and to the Tory government of which she is the head. All this seems to involve positive self-presentation: Rab Butler was right in his predictions and everything the Tories have achieved is remarkable. However, by attributing things to others, MT also tends to run away from taking any responsibility or blame for anything (the idea of scapegoating). Thirdly, MT’s use of we has an element of unification about it: in particular, it is intended as a device symbolising unity within her party regarding the current status quo.

Above all, the use of the pronoun we in other parts of the extract also entails an attempt by MT to symbolise unity not only with her party but with the British people in general, and especially with the ordinary people as well (cf. lines (101)-(104)). In contrast, the pronoun I allows her to engage, at times, in fragmentation – that is, I versus them (cf. lines (52)-(57)) while you makes it possible for her to engage in both unification (symbolisation of unity) (cf. lines (33)-(36) and (86)-(88)) and fragmentation (cf. lines (59)-(76)). Lastly, in lines (124)-(125) MT tends to employ you for attribution and scapegoating purposes: she appears to attribute (political) populism perceived to be associated with Thatcherism to MC, thereby avoiding taking a blame for it or engaging in the act of scapegoating. The same act of scapegoating is manifest in MT’s use of we in lines (102)-(103) as well.

6.1.3 Modality and Modalisation as Used in the Extract

Modality is the use of modals – e.g. modal verbs, semi-modal verbs, auxiliary verbs, modal lexical verbs, modal adverbs, and sometimes hedges, intensifiers and intonation - in a text or in speech. In this case, it encodes the subjunctive mood, and as such, tends to reflect one’s attitude towards, or one’s opinion about, the truth of a proposition expressed in a sentence or in an utterance. Sometimes it reveals more about the pragmatic implicatures – in particular presuppositions - attached to sentences or utterances (cf. Fowler, 1991: 85-87; Simpson, 1993: 47-55; WordWeb, 2004). Correspondingly, modalisation serves, according to Strauss (2004: 11), to express one’s commitment to or one’s detachment from the truth of the proposition.
There are four types of English modals identified by Simpson (1993: 47-51). The first two are *epistemic* modals which express the speaker’s confidence or lack of confidence in the truth of a proposition expressed; and *deontic* modals which express one’s obligation and commitment to duty – a speaker’s attitude to the degree of obligation pertaining to the performance of certain actions. And the last two are *boulomaic* modals which indicate a speaker’s wishes and desires through modal lexical verbs; and *perception* modals which are a sub-system of epistemic modals reflecting one’s perception and one’s evaluation of the state of affairs.

Therefore, while modality has the potential to tell more about one’s point of view, it also tends to embody both a sense of subjectivity (speaker’s position of commitment regarding the propositional content of the utterance) (Salkie, 2004: 4) and a sense of indeterminacy (p. 2) or fuzziness. In addition, it has varying degrees of gradability which become evident is the case of epistemic and deontic modalities. These are possibility, probability, necessity, prediction and factuality (degrees of certainty) in the case of epistemic modality; and permission, duty, obligation, insistence and command (degrees of obligation) in the case of deontic modality (cf. Badran, 2001: 49-50 and 54-58; Salkie, 2004: 2 and 8-9; also cf. Appendix C).

Fairclough isolates three modals *have to*, *have got to* and *should* (and only makes a fleeting reference to *can’t*) in his analysis of the extract under study here (cf. *LP*, pp. 183-184; also cf. Fowler, 1991: 85-87). His main contention again is that modals – like pronouns - carry a particular ideological use. In particular, he argues that *have to*, *have got to* and *should* signal more authority on the part of MT than do expressive modalised forms such as *I wonder if I perhaps I can answer* and *that’s always I suppose most difficult of all* (cf. lines (52) and (105)-(106) respectively).

In the following analysis, I want, firstly, to briefly indicate that there are more instances of modals used in this extract than those outlined by Fairclough and that their uses are more complex, and thus are not only restricted to those identified by him. Secondly, I want to highlight that the types of modals featuring in the extract carry a sense of
subjectivity and indeterminacy due to the complex and ambiguous manner in which MT uses them and due to the varying degrees of obligation and commitment they signal. As such, modality on its own as applied in the extract is not a reliable index of ideology on the part of MT. Thus, thirdly, I maintain that if there are any instances of ideology in the extract, they cannot be simply and straightforwardly read off modality. Instead, they have to be extrapolated from the strategic use of instances of modality and from the other strategies (such as those I have characterised above and others I have outlined below) that MT employs in his exchange with MC (also cf. Appendix C).

There are, on the one hand, 6 basic modals, can/can’t, could, will, would/wouldn’t, should and must, and on other hand, at least 2 types of modal auxiliaries, have/has to be/don’t have to be and have (got) to be in this extract. In addition, there are instances of epistemic modal lexical verbs, think, believe, suppose and wonder and of perception modal adverbs such as forcibly, necessarily, wholly, always, probably, really and indeed. Some of these adverbs like really and indeed are intensifiers while probably and almost are instances of hedges (cf. here Strauss, 2004: 10, 23 and 26).

Thus, in terms of occurrence frequencies, can/can’t, would/wouldn’t, have/has (got), should, could, will, and must occur 11, 9, 8, 3, 2, 2 and 2 times respectively. Except for must which is used exclusively by MC (cf. lines (9) and (50)), a majority of these modals and modal expressions are employed mainly by MT. So, contrary to the three instances of deontic modals that Fairclough attributes to MT, my contention is that in this extract MT employs – in varying degrees – all of the four types of modality I highlighted at the beginning of this sub-section. In the case of deontic modals, for instance, MT applies a combination of modals exhibiting different degrees of obligation. The following cases shed some light in this regard: I wonder if I perhaps I can answer best by saying (line (52)); government should be very strong (line (55)); how I see what government should do (line (52)); it has to be strong (lines (56)-(57)); so you’ve got to be strong (line (59)); yes you HAVE got to be strong (line (62)); and indeed I think it’s wrong to think in material terms (lines (22)-(23)).
The first statement represents permission, while the five subsequent statements display higher degrees of obligation. In fact, the first two and the three subsequent statements instantiate duty and obligation respectively whereas the last statement is almost an insistence. So, here we have low modality statements juxtaposed with high modality statements – an instance of bipolar modalisation. This instance becomes more pronounced when the whole chunk from lines (52)-(62) is taken together as one continuous unit.

As Strauss (2004: 26) contends, combining can (a low modality verb) with wonder and perhaps (hedges) and with if (a conditional conjunction) – employing extensive modalisation - as is the case in line (52), is a way of presenting a debatable view or position. This seems to be what MT also does here. But at the same time, line (52) represents the case of MT trying to articulate a doubtful standpoint while attempting to express her wish to answer MC’s question as well (cf. Appendix C). This bipolar modalisation underlines the multiple uses these modals serve and the subjective and indeterminate nature of their uses in this case.

Concurrently, MT employs – again in varying degrees - epistemic modality. This is exemplified by the following: I don’t think now one would necessarily think wholly in material terms (lines (21)-(22)); it is populist I wouldn’t call it populist I would say that many of the things (lines (117)-(118)); yes you will probably save you’ll probably want a little bit of independent income (lines (86)-(88)); when I took over we needed to be radical (lines (116)-(117)); yes you will probably save you’ll probably want a little bit of independent income (lines (86)-(88)); and the ownership of property of a house gives you some independence gives you a stake in the future (lines (80)-(81)) (also cf. Appendix C).

All of these statements encode varying degrees of gradients within the epistemic modality continuum. For example, the first two statements and the third one occupy the possibility and the probability gradients respectively. On the contrary, the remaining statements assume the necessity, prediction and factuality slots respectively (cf. Appendix C). However, it is worth noting that yes you will probably save you’ll probably want a little
bit of independent income (lines (86)-(88)) occupies both the probability and the prediction slots. Here again, we have an instance of bipolar modalisation (combining low and high modalities) – and extensive modalisation - which serves to highlight the complex multiple functions these modals are made to perform and the subjectivity and indeterminacy attached to these functions.

Three instances of boulomaic modality are: if we played our cards right the standard of living ... would be twice as high as it was then (lines (16)-(18)); so you expect PEOPLE to create (line (72)); and because really the kind of country you want is (lines (23)-(24)). These three statements represent the slots for wishes, expectations and wants within the boulomaic modality continuum (cf. Appendix C). On the other hand, two instances of perception modality are: now I don’t think now one would necessarily think wholly in material terms indeed I think it’s wrong to think in material terms because really the kind of country you want is made up by the strength of its people (lines (21)-(25)); and yes you expect people of all sorts of background and almost whatever their income level to be able to have a chance of owning some property tremendously (lines (76)-(79)).

From the foregoing examples, multiple modal configurations – comprising deontic, epistemic, boulomaic and perception modalities - have been put together to create both harmonic and non-harmonic modal combinations. This strategic use of multiple modalisation tends to exhibit conflicting degrees of deontic obligation and epistemic commitment to both the obligation and the truth of the propositions expressed respectively. This multiple modalisation – like the bipolar modalisation characterised above - serves to highlight the complex functions these modals are made to perform. Likewise, it tends to emphasise the subjectivity and indeterminacy attached to these modals.

A further classic instance in this regard is that’s always I suppose most difficult of all I would say really restoring the very best of the British character (lines (105)-(107)) whereby the strategic use of multiple modals results in conflicting degrees of obligation and commitment as a stronger modal adverb really happens to be vitiated by a weaker
modal would (cf. Simpson, 1993: 152-153). By the same token, the self-same strategy – in which multiple hedges such as probably, perhaps, I suppose, I think, I would, and I could are combined with intensifiers like, necessarily, wholly, really and indeed - signals that the opinion or position articulated by the speaker (in this case MT) is controversial (cf. Strauss, 2004: 26). All of this, again, emphasises the subjectivity and indeterminacy underlying the use of these modals in this instance.

In respect of modality as a discourse feature employed in this extract, the following discourse and ideological strategies can be inferred: attribution, scapegoating, avoidance, fragmentation and unification. Instances of attribution and scapegoating are exemplified by the following lines: (15)-(20); (21)-(24); (33)-(40); (52)-(69); (70)-(79); and (116)-(119) (cf. Appendix B). For example, in the following statement, I don’t think now one would necessarily think wholly in material terms indeed I think it’s wrong to think in material terms because really the kind of country you want is made up by the strength of its people (lines (21)-(24)) – which has a combination of epistemic, boulomaic and perception modalities in bold typeface - MT attributes her views about both the material needs people should have and the kind of country Britain should be to the two indefinite pronouns, one and you, respectively. By so doing, she also tends to shift the blame or the responsibility for her views to the unknown other. As such, she engages in scapegoating.

The same holds true for her use of hedges, conditional clauses, intensifiers and deontic modals (permission, duty and obligation modals (cf. Appendix C)) in lines (52)-(65). Here she attributes the strong deontic modals (duty and obligation modals) and intensifiers to both the government and the indefinite personal pronoun you while leaving hedges to the pronoun I (to herself). At the same time, lines (59)-(62) and (121)-(123) reflect an instance of fragmentation whereas lines (72), (73) and (76) and (117)-(118) display instances of unification and avoidance respectively. For example, in lines (59)-(62) MT directs strong deontic modals (obligation modals) to other countries and to the people, thereby differentiating them from the government in terms of national duty, obligation and security. In lines (72), (73) and (76), however, she employs the boulomaic
modal expect (cf. Appendix C), thereby signalling the cooperation and unity (unification) she expects from people.

6. 1. 4 Topoi, Stereotypes and Metaphors

As pointed out in Chapter Four, topoi, stereotypes and metaphors refer, respectively, to conventional themes or motifs, conventional frames or references, and metaphorical expressions (which entail associating one concept or object with another). In particular, topoi are ready-mades in argumentation which need no defending or refuting. In most instances they invoke conventionally accepted stereotypes. In the extract under analysis here, both topoi and stereotypes are interconnected, and are, therefore, analysed concurrently as one unit.

One instance of a topos in the extract is related to MT’s invoking of the ethic of personal responsibility on the part of the British people. This is exemplified mainly by lines (26)-(32), (70)-(82), (86)-(90), and (102)-(123). Fowler (1991: 182) argues that this ethic of personal responsibility was one of the central tenets of Thatcherism. Another instance of a topos is a constant reference to the defence of the freedom and security of the British people by MT (cf. lines (57)-(58), (61) and (103)-(105). This feature appears to reflect elements of unification (symbol of unity), legitimation (an attempt by MT to rationalise and universalise her views and actions) and reification (a strategy to naturalise those views and actions).

A further instance of a topos is the consensus politics (cf. Fowler, 1991: 16-17) in which a constant reference is made to people throughout the extract and in which reference is made to the partnership with the people (cf. line (66)). Allied to this topos is populism (the politics of populism) – which MT implies in the extract even though she purports to deny it (cf. lines (116)-(127)). One more topos in the extract is the one on law and order which is foregrounded by MT. These three topoi, too, appear to embody unification, (symbol of unity), legitimation (an attempt by MT to rationalise and universalise her views and actions) and reification (a strategy to naturalise her view and actions).
point to note here is that these topoi also serve as stereotypes that are projected by MT as indisputable, and thus, ready-made truths.

There is one instance of a metaphorical (idiomatic) expression – *strike a chord in the hearts of (ordinary) people* or *struck a chord in my heart* - rhetorically repeated twice by MT (cf. lines (119)-(120), (125)-(126) and (126)). This is an attempt by MT to project her heart as striking a chord with the hearts of (ordinary) people. It is her attempt at symbolising unity with people (unification), and at justifying and legitimising (legitimation) her own views while simultaneously attributing them to others (to the people). From these three discourse features can be deduced, again, the politics of populism despite MT’s apparent denial of this in lines (117)-(118).

### 6.1.5 Implication and Presupposition

MT’s first response to MC’s first question implies either that MC’s question is misguided or that the comparison MC draws between the Britain of the 1940s and the one of the 1980s on the one hand, and between Britain’s economy and that of Italy on the other hand, is wrong (cf. lines (1)-(10) and (11)-(12), respectively). The other implication stemming from MT’s response is that the standard of living in Britain now (as once predicted by Rab Butler) is twice as high as it was then. This is a convenient political discourse feature which MT employs so as to rebut, refute and dismiss MC’s assertion. It also serves as a denial strategy which is part of positive self-presentation. Another implication made by MT is that fighting the Falklands War – against Argentina in 1982 – was tantamount to defending Britain’s freedom (and security) and to portraying Britain as a reliable ally. The significance of this implication lies in the fact that the Falklands War earned MT the affectionate name, the *Iron Lady* (see, Fowler, 1991: 118).

Related to implication as a discourse feature employed by MT is presupposition. For example, the statement *now we do enjoy a standard of living which was undreamed of then* presupposes that before MT (and her party) came to power the standard of living in Britain was low or not as good as it is now, a factor reflecting both positive self-
presentation and negative other-presentation on the part of MT. This discourse feature also has elements of rationalisation. However, the self-same feature embodies a semblance of contradiction in that MC’s question negates this presupposition (cf. lines (4)-(7)). By the same stripe, the statement *indeed I think it’s wrong to think in material terms* presupposes that there is a widespread tendency among the people to think in material terms which seems to be a cause for concern for MT.

However, the same presupposition is explicitly contradicted by MT’s statement *yes you expect people of all sorts of background and almost whatever their income level to be able to have a chance of owning some property tremendously important the ownership of property of a house gives you some independence gives you a stake in the future you’re concerned about your children* (lines (76)-(81)) which expresses her observation that all people need to have some material possessions – one of which is at least a property – for them to have a sense of independence and some future for their children. The same statement presupposes that not all people have such material possessions.

Finally, one more presupposition made by MT is that Thatcherism entails *restoring the very best of the British character to its former preeminence* (lines (106)-(108)) or vice-versa. Herein lies a concomitant presupposition that the very best of the British character is not at its former pre-eminence. As highlighted above, both implication and presupposition in this extract seem to embody elements of positive self-presentation, negative other-presentation and rationalisation strategies. Implicit in all this is the politics of denial and self-glory on the part of MT.

### 6. 1. 6 Conversational Maxims

At various points in the extract, MT seems to be violating the four Gricean conversational maxims. For instance, most - if not all – of her responses to MC’s questions are not only unnecessarily long and without relevant evidence to back them up, but in most instances they are irrelevant and ambiguous (cf. lines (11)-(40), (52)-(82), (101)-(112) and (116)-(125)). All this represents instances in which MT violates the
maxims of quantity, quality, relevance and manner respectively. Her rhetorical reference to the word *people* (a clear instance of populism) and her protestation that Thatcherism is not populist and radical but rather the things she says (including Thatcherism for that matter) strike a chord in the hearts of people (another case of populism) ineluctably fly in the face of these four maxims. This feature of discourse as employed by MT in the extract, tends to display elements of positive self-presentation, negative other-presentation, justification, legitimation, avoidance and attribution.

6. 2 Discussion

As I pointed out earlier on, ideology cannot be simplistically and straightforwardly read off language use or discourse. To some extent the foregoing analysis attests to this fact. For example, the repetition of words, expressions, phrases and statements and the rhetorical use of discourse features such as pronouns and modals give credence to the fact that all of these elements – at least in the context of this extract – function more as strategies for political discourse than as unproblematic carriers of ideology. So, if anything, only ideological inferences can be made from the use of such discourse and ideological strategies and devices.

In the case of narrative as a discourse feature, a sense of both a welfare state and a united Britain is projected from which the politics – and possibly the ideology - of *welfarism* (cf. *WordWeb*, 2004) can be deduced. In relation to repetition and rhetoric as applied in the extract, it has been argued that five intertwined discourse and ideological strategies, justification, avoidance, legitimation, unification and dissimulation, can be extrapolated. For instance, the rhetorical repetition of the word *people* (cf. lines (54)-(78)) seems to be intended to instil and rouse the idea of individualism and self-reliance. From this can be inferred the politics - and perhaps, the ideology - of individualism and self-reliance. At the same time, this rhetorical repetition serves both as a rallying cry for consensus and unity (a sense of unification) by MT to the British people and as a form of populism (also cf. lines (120) and (126)). Here seems to lie the politics of consensus, unity and populism
from which to extrapolate the ideology of consensus, unity and populism which, in this context, stands in stark contrast to the notion of individualism (cf. WordWeb, 2004).

In addition, a euphemistic reference *social security for social welfare* seems to entail the politics of social welfare from which the ideology of *social welfarism* may be inferred. Similarly, MT’s rhetorical repetition of the words *freedom, security and defence* (for Britain) can be taken to imply the politics of freedom, security and defence for Britain and her people. From this politics can be deduced the ideology of *freedom, security and defence* (for Britain). Allied to this, is a euphemism *pre-eminence for military pride* for Britain which leads to the inference, British militarism, to be made. The ideology of militarism (cf. WordWeb, 2004) can, in this context, be deduced from this euphemism.

With respect to pronominalisation as a discourse feature employed in the extract, it has been highlighted that justification, attribution, positive self-presentation, scapegoating, legitimation, unification, fragmentation and reification as instances of discourse and ideological strategies can be deduced. For example, the pronoun *we* (in its inclusive, associative, collective, editorial, distributive, generic and tribal uses) and the other pronouns such as *I, they, you* and *one* allow MT to engage in justification, attribution, positive self-presentation, scapegoating, legitimation, unification, fragmentation and reification in the extract. Through employing the pronouns *we, I, and you*, in particular, MT is able to signal unity, partnership and consensus with her party, with government and with people. From this can be inferred the politics of national unity and partnership – which may, to some extent, entail the ideology of national unity. The politics – and concomitantly the ideology – of consensus can also be extrapolated from MT’s use of these three pronouns (cf. LP, pp. 179-182; also cf. Fowler, 1991: 16-17 and 48-54; Pateman, 2002: 20-21).

At the same time, the usage of these three pronouns (*we, I, and you*) enables MT to adopt a patronising and paternalistic tone (and attitude) towards people (and others). This, in turn, tends to create a social distance between her and the very people whose views she purports to articulate and whose consensus, partnership and unity she purports to need.
From this strategic use of pronouns can be deduced the notions of paternalism and disengagement (from people) into which the politics – and not the ideology - of both paternalism and disengagement (cf. WordWeb, 2004) can be read. This last point dovetails with the central contention of this study that pronouns as employed in this extract involve complex and multiple uses. That is, pronouns do not necessarily and simply encode ideology as Fairclough, especially, insists in LP and as CL, generally, claims.

Moreover, the pronouns as employed in the extract, have generic, rhetorical, indexical and cohesive uses. These multiple uses which pronouns serve are part of a convenient strategy employed by MT (and by politicians) when participating in a public political discourse. Built into these multiple uses, is the fact that MT employs a self-attribution versus other-attribution strategy in which she imputes her controversial or less popular views to others. This strategy is evident in her use of you and one, and in certain of her uses of we.

As regards the modals used in the extract, I pointed out earlier on that they do not, in this case, serve as a good and reliable index of ideology. For example, mostly high modality statements (signalling high degree of obligation and necessity) are juxtaposed with low modality statements in the extract (cf. Appendix C). This does not only engender indeterminacy and subjectivity but also ambiguity on the part of MT. On the one hand, the low modality statements and phrases employed (and attributed to the pronoun I) by MT could be regarded as an indeterminate standpoint she adopts towards those things she is not completely certain about their being carried out as expected (cf. lines (52)-(65)). On the other hand one, her use of the high modality statements and phrases (attributed mainly to the government and to the pronoun you) tends to reflect a high degree of commitment and obligation concerning the issues about which she is certain (cf. again lines (52)-(65) and (91)). Two such issues are law and order, and freedom and security. Here lies the politics of both law and order, and freedom and security. Correspondingly, the ideology of law and order, and of freedom and security - typical of many governments and many ruling parties - can be inferred from this form of politics.
Furthermore, the use of topoi, stereotypes and metaphors makes it possible for MT to instil and rouse the ideals of personal responsibility, law and order, freedom and security, and unity in the minds of the British people. From all these ideals, one can extrapolate the politics – and concomitantly the ideology - of personal responsibility; law and order; freedom and security; and unity. This may also entail, to some extent, a sense (and the ideology) of (British) national security and defence. On the contrary, implicit in MT’s use of implication and presupposition is the politics of denial and self-glory.

Lastly, at various points in the extract, MT tends to violate the four Gricean conversational maxims of quantity, quality, relevance and manner by trying to employ positive self-presentation, negative other-presentation, justification, legitimation, avoidance and attribution. A dominant feature implicit in her attempt to employ these strategies is the politics of populism from which can be deduced, circumspectly though, the ideology of populism. These are, thus, the forms of ideology that can be cautiously extrapolated from the use of these strategies. All of this, once more, runs counter to one of Fairclough’s – and CL’s – central contentions in LP: that ideology can be read off language – a contention having to do with the belief that language use is ideologically inflected.

6. 3 Part IV Micro-Analysis: The Extract from The PC

This section of the study presents a micro-analysis of the extract selected from The PC (cf. Appendix D). The micro-analysis focuses on the following discourse features as employed in the extract: repetition; rhetoric; pronominalisation (pronouns); modality (modals); topoi; stereotypes; metaphors; implication; presupposition; and conversational maxims. The analysis is guided by the MIDA (cf. Figure 4. 2) and is followed by a discussion of the findings.
6. 3. 1 Repetition and Rhetoric in the Extract from *The PC*

As is the case with the previous extract, the current extract has words, expressions, phrases and statements that are repeated at various points. There are words which function as deictics which are repeated so as to establish cohesive links in the extract. Among such words are the pairs *this* and *that*, *these* and *those*, and *here* and *there* - repeated 29 and 63 times, 5 times and once, and once and 5 times respectively. These three pairs of words are instances of spatial deixis signalling directionality and location (cf. Fowler, 1991: 63-64; Simpson, 1993: 13). Other words and expressions repeated and used rhetorically in the extract include *system* (30), *science* (14), *consensus* (13), *knowledge* (13), *pragmatics* (11), *performance/performativity* (11), *legitimation/legitimacy* (10), *decision(s)* (10), *society* (6), *statements* (6), *utterances* (4), *totality* (3), *language games* (8), and *pragmatics of science* (5) (cf. Appendix D).

In addition, the extract employs rhetorical statements and questions. The following instances are but some of the examples to this effect: *Postmodern science by concerning itself with such things as undecidables, the limits of precise control, conflicts characterised by incomplete information, “fractals,” catastrophes, and pragmatic paradoxes - is theorising its own evolution as discontinuous, catastrophic, nonrectifiable, and paradoxical; and The general question of legitimation becomes: What is the relationship between the antimodel of the pragmatics of science and society? Is it applicable to the vast clouds of language material constituting a society? Or is it limited to the game of learning?*

Some of the rhetorical emphasis of words, expressions and statements entail the use of pun. Examples are: *It is changing the meaning of the word knowledge, while expressing how such a change can take place; It is producing not the known, but the unknown; And it suggests a model of legitimation that has nothing to do with maximised performance, but has as its basis difference understood as paralogy; The problem is therefore to determine whether it is possible to have a form of legitimation based solely on paralogy; Paralogy must be distinguished from innovation; Such is the arrogance of the decision*
makers - and their blindness; What their "arrogance" means is that they identify themselves with the social system conceived as a totality in quest of its most performative unity possible; Such behavior is terrorist, as is the behavior of the system described by Luhmann; and By terror I mean the efficiency gained by eliminating, or threatening to eliminate, a player from the language game one shares with him (cf. Appendix D).

The other instance of rhetorical repetition involves the use of other devices such as near-synonyms and oppositional contrasts. Firstly, near-synonyms come in the form of pairs such as rules and moves; statements and utterances; decision-makers and authorities; consensus and agreement; performance and performativity; performance/performativity and efficiency; paralogy and difference/dissension; game and play/playing; criterion and principle; aspirations and needs; and totality and unity. Secondly, oppositional contrasts come in the form of pairs such as consensus and dissension; agreement and paralogy; dehumanise and rehumanise; dismantling and remounting; stabilise and destabilise; continuous and discontinuous; grand narrative(s) and little narrative; and the known and the unknown. Others are built into statements such as Returning to the description of scientific pragmatics ... it is now dissension that must be emphasised; Consensus is a horizon that is never reached; Research that takes place under the aegis of a paradigm tends to stabilise; It is necessary to posit the existence of a power that destabilises the capacity for exploitation; Consensus has become an outmoded and suspect value; But justice as a value is neither outmoded nor suspect.

The discourse and ideological strategies to be deduced in respect of repetition and rhetoric as discourse features applied in the extract are positive self-presentation, negative other-presentation, justification, legitimation, fragmentation and reification. These strategies seem to be interlocked. For example, in rhetorically repeating certain words, expressions, phrases and statements (as outlined above), Lyotard appears to be intent on positively presenting them while negatively presenting others. This is particularly the case with his use of the oppositional pairs such as consensus and dissension, paralogy and agreement, stabilise and destabilise, and continuous and discontinuous.
Here his intention is not only to derogate the first concept in each pair while privileging
the second one in each pair, but also to background each of the first concepts while
foregrounding each of the second ones. In so doing, Lyotard tends to engage,
simultaneously, in fragmentation (valuing the second set of concepts over the first one),
justification, legitimation and reification (justifying, legitimising and naturalising the
second set of concepts). In all this can be inferred a move by Lyotard to both popularise
and entrench the concepts he rhetorically positively repeats in his knowledge report.
Allied to this move is an attempt by him to naturalise these concepts as part of
mainstream knowledge.

6.3.2 Pronominalisation as Used in the Extract

In this sub-section, I want to briefly highlight instances of pronouns used in this extract.
There are 5 instances of deictic or personal pronouns employed in the extract. They are
we (14), they (14), I (5), he (5) and you (1). Of the five, they is in particular, accompanied
at different points by its corresponding possessive pronoun their (8) and at times by its
reflexive pronoun themselves (2) and its object pronoun them (9). It is followed by he and
you with 4 and 3 corresponding possessive pronouns - his and your - respectively.

In the extract the pronoun we tends to serve five pronominal functions: authorial or
editorial, inclusive, distributive, generic and associative functions. The uses of the
authorial we are represented by statements like The conclusion we can draw from this
research (and much more not mentioned) is that; But as we have just seen, the little
narrative [petit récit] remains the quintessential form of imaginative invention, most
particularly science; and Let us say at this point that the facts we have presented
concerning the problem of the legitimisation of knowledge today are sufficient for our
purposes. An instance of the inclusive we is exemplified by we all now know, as the
1970s come to a close, that an attempt at an alternative of that kind would end up
resembling the system it was meant to replace (cf. Appendix D).
On the other hand, the distributive *we* is exemplified by *We should be happy that the tendency toward the temporary contract is ambiguous.* Two instances of the generic *we* are *If we look at the pragmatics of science, we learn that such an identification is impossible* and *We no longer have recourse to the grand narratives - we can resort neither to the dialectic of Spirit.* The typical examples of the associative *we* in the extract are *We must thus arrive at an idea and practice of justice that is not linked to that of consensus* and *Rules are not denotative but prescriptive utterances, which we are better off calling metaprescriptive utterances to avoid confusion* (again cf. Appendix D).

A noteworthy point here is that in its authorial use the pronoun *we* can logically occupy all the five instances of the pronoun *I* available in the extract. As a result, it tends to be functioning interchangeably with the latter in this case. Thus, Lyotard employs it alongside *I* for referential and authorial purposes: it is a device for referring to himself and for referring to his reporting voice in the text. However, his use of the pronoun *I* also tends to contrast with the pronoun *we*. He accords the former less controversial or non-debatable views. Classic examples are: *I have emphasized the differences ... between the various language games; I would also say that the system can count severity among its advantages; By terror I mean the efficiency gained by eliminating ... a player from the language game; and by which I mean argumentation.*

The two discourse and ideological strategies to extrapolate from the use of this discourse feature are attribution and unification, which are, in turn, interconnected. That is, in employing the pronoun *we*, in particular, Lyotard attempts to attribute his own (often controversial and debatable) views to others - his general readers (both real and imaginary) – so they could be thought to belong to or to be owned by them as well. At the same time, in employing this pronoun, he tries to appeal to the same readers as a way of both symbolising unity with them and winning their support (for his views).
6.3.3 Modality and Modalisation as Used in the Extract

In this extract there are 6 basic types of modals: would, will, can/cannot, could, must, and should. There are also instances of modal auxiliaries such as have to/do not have to/does not have, need to have and would have to. In addition, the extract has instances of such perception modal lexical verbs as suggests, seems, assumes, and prefers and of perception modal adverbs such as indeed, especially, obviously, always, finally, inevitably, frequently, necessarily, and particularly. Of these adverbs indeed functions as an intensifier while phrases like it is possible operate as instances of hedges.

In academic writing, especially, intensifiers serve to strengthen the argument in the face of anticipated criticism while hedges signal that writers strive to be careful about acknowledging the limits of what can be concluded from their data (epistemic concerns) and about acknowledging the existence of competing views (cf. here Strauss, 2004: 11 and 17). Of great importance here is the use of modalities for: 1) epistemic purposes (marking speaker’s commitment to or detachment from the certainty of statements; 2) cultural standing concerns (expressing speaker’s view of the controversialness or non-controversialness of an idea – expressing whether a view is highly controversial or completely taken-for-granted - in a given salient opinion community); and 3) politeness purposes (signifying interpersonal considerations) (Strauss, 2004: 3-10; cf. Badran, 2001: 49-50 and 54-58; Recski, 2005: 5-6; Salkie, 2004: 2 and 8-9).

As was the case with the previous extract, in the ensuing analysis, I want, firstly, to briefly indicate that the modals employed in this extract have complex and multiple uses. Secondly, I will argue that the types of modals featuring in this extract entail a sense of subjectivity - speaker’s position of commitment regarding the prepositional content of the utterance (Salkie, 2004: 4) - and a sense of indeterminacy (p. 2) due to the complex and ambiguous manner in which Lyotard uses them and due to the varying degrees of both epistemic commitment and deontic obligation they convey. As such, modality on its own as applied in the extract is not a reliable index of ideology on the part of Lyotard. Thirdly, I maintain that if there are any instances of ideology in the extract, they cannot be simply
and straightforwardly read off modality. Rather, they have to be extrapolated from the strategic use of instances of modality and from the other discourse and ideological strategies (such as those I have characterised above and others I have outlined below) that Lyotard employs in the extract (also cf. Appendix E).

Overall, in this extract Lyotard employs - in varying degrees - all the four types of modality, epistemic, deontic, boulomaic and perception modalities (cf. Appendix E). For example, concerning epistemic modality, he employs modal verbs and modal auxiliaries ranging from possibility on the one end through to necessity, prediction and factuality on the other end of the continuum. However, he sparingly uses modal expressions related to the probability gradient. Instances of this type of epistemic modality are, respectively, exemplified by the following statements: *The conclusion we can draw from this research (and much more not mentioned) is that the continuous differentiable function is losing its pre-eminence as a paradigm of knowledge and prediction; We must thus arrive at an idea and practice of justice that is not linked to that of consensus; a move in the direction of counterculture, with the attendant risk that all possibility for research will be foreclosed due to lack of funding?; and This, in the context of scientific discussion, is the same process Thom calls morphogenesis.* The last statement is an example of factuality (cf. Appendix E).

On the contrary, in the case of deontic modality, he employs both modal verbs and auxiliaries clustered in a continuum between permission, duty and obligation. However, he hardly uses deontic modals related to both insistence and command on the other polar opposite end of the continuum. The following instances serve to attest to this fact: *The only legitimation that can make this kind of request admissible is that it will generate ideas, in other words, new statements; Administrative procedures should make individuals “want” what the system needs in order to perform well; The reduction in complexity is required to maintain the system’s power capability; The decisions do not have to respect individuals’ aspirations: the aspirations have to aspire to the decisions,*
or at least to their effects; and *The objection will be made that these molecular opinions must indeed be taken into account if the risk of serious disturbances is to be avoided* (cf. *Appendix E*).

6.3.3.1 Intra-Modality Combinations and Inter-Modality Overlaps

There are two striking features from the two sets of modalities outlined above. These are, on the one hand, intra-modality combinations, and on the other hand, inter-modality overlaps. In the case of the former, different modal verbs, auxiliary verbs, lexical modal verbs or adverbs from different modality gradients are combined within or across sentences. For example, the sentences *The only legitimation that can make this kind of request admissible is that it will generate ideas, in other words, new statements; On the one hand, the system can only function by reducing complexity, and on the other, it must induce the adaptation of individual aspirations to its own ends and If all messages could circulate freely among all individuals, the quantity of information that would have to be taken into account before making the correct choice would delay decisions considerably, thereby lowering performativity, combine the modal pairs can/will, can/must and could/would have to (would)* (cf. *Appendix E*).

The first two sentences occupy, respectively, the possibility and prediction and the possibility and necessity slots along the epistemic certainty gradient. The last one mainly occupies the permission slot and to some extent the obligation slot (because of the would which is combined with the have to) along the deontic scale. This particular kind of modal usage represents an instance of bipolar modalisation engendered by combining low and high modalities. At the same time, it constitutes a non-harmonic modal combination as modal auxiliaries used here fail to logically complement each other (cf. Simpson, 1993: 152-153). This practice - in which both weakly and strongly modalised expressions are combined in this way - reflects varying degrees of epistemic and deontic commitment (low versus high epistemic and deontic commitment) Lyotard displays concerning the statements he makes here. Moreover, the use of modals in this context
encapsulates an instance of varying degrees (low versus high) of both cultural standing concerns and subjectivity and indeterminacy.

In the case of The objection will be made that these molecular opinions must indeed be taken into account if the risk of serious disturbances is to be avoided, and but what makes this process attractive for them is that it will result in new tensions in the system, and these will lead to an improvement in its performativity, the modal pairs will/must and will/will have been combined. Concomitantly, since they are located within both the prediction and necessity slots and the prediction slot respectively, they serve as classic instances of strongly asserted modal constructions encoding a higher degree of certainty along the epistemic gradient. In this context, the intensifier indeed, serves to mark or support a debatable view (cf. Strauss, 2004: 10 and 26) being made by Lyotard. This use of strongly modalised expressions constitutes a harmonic modal combination (cf. Simpson, 1993: 152-153). In addition, it entails a degree of subjectivity and a strong sense of cultural standing consideration.

In contrast to the above instances, sentences such as I would also say that the system can count severity among its advantages; and There is no reason to think that it would be possible to determine metaprescriptives common to all exemplify a combination of weakly asserted modalities. The same is true of the following extended quotation:

In that case, it would inevitably involve the use of terror. But it could also aid groups discussing metaprescriptives by supplying them with the information they usually lack for making knowledgeable decisions … Language games would then be games of perfect information at any given moment. But they would also be non-zero-games, and by virtue of that fact discussion would never risk fixating in a position of minimax equilibrium because it had exhausted its stakes. For the stakes would be knowledge (or information, if you will) (cf. Appendices D and E).

Thus, this typifies both weaker forms of epistemic commitment and deontic obligation to the assertions made here. In addition, the foregoing quotations involve the use of multiple subjunctive modals operating as compound hedges (here cf. Strauss, 2004: 16-17). So,
while a single hedge signifies a debatable viewpoint, multiple hedges juxtaposed with each other as applied here serve as the hallmark of controversial views raised by Lyotard. At the same time, when combined with intensifiers and frequency emphasisers such as *invariably* and *usually*, as is the case with the above quotation, multiple hedges tend to cautiously strengthen the views being put across while acknowledging the existence of competing viewpoints. Thus, as a corollary, this use of modals constitutes, on the one hand, a sense of subjectivity and indeterminacy and on the other hand, tends to reflect a weaker form of cultural standing.

Inter-modality overlaps refer to instances of modality overlaps across modality boundaries. The following cases help shed some light in this regard: *If all messages could circulate freely among all individuals, the quantity of information that would have to be taken into account before making the correct choice would delay decisions considerably, thereby lowering performativity*; and

> Language games *would* then be games of perfect information at any given moment. But they *would* also be non-zero-games, and by virtue of that fact discussion *would* never risk fixating in a position of minimax equilibrium because it had exhausted its stakes (again cf. *Appendices D and E*).

The first sentence occupies, on the one hand, the possibility slot within epistemic modality, and on the other hand, both the permission and obligation slots within deontic modality. At the same time, it tends to function as an assertion expressing a wish, and thus, occupying the wish slot within boulomaic modality. Its use of the modal adverbs (operating here as intensifiers) *freely* and *considerably* qualifies it for a place in perception modality. Likewise, the indented quotation seems to occupy the possibility, permission, and wish slots within epistemic, deontic and boulomaic modalities respectively (cf. *Appendix E*).

On the contrary, the following sentences *The only legitimation that can make this kind of request admissible is that it will generate ideas, in other words, new statements; The objection will be made that these molecular opinions must indeed be taken into account if*
the risk of serious disturbances is to be avoided; and We must thus arrive at an idea and practice of justice that is not linked to that of consensus, display different inter-modality overlaps. For example, the first sentence is located, on the one hand, within the possibility and prediction slots, and on the other hand, within the permission slot in the epistemic and deontic modality gradients respectively. The second tends to occupy both the prediction and necessity slots along the epistemic modality continuum and the obligation slot within the deontic modality continuum respectively. The third sentence, however, seems to occupy, correspondingly, the necessity slot and the obligation slot within both epistemic and deontic modalities.

Thus, from the foregoing characterisation of modality, can be inferred attribution. In this regard, Lyotard tends to frame his controversial and debatable views within contrasting low and high modality gradients (epistemic and deontic modalities) and attribute them to the collective we or to a distant impersonal deictic reference such as it or this (cf. Appendix D). Further examples are: We must thus arrive at an idea and practice of justice that is linked to that of consensus; We should be happy that the tendency toward the temporary contract is ambiguous; the “moves” playable within it must be local; Paralogy must be distinguished from innovation; It cannot be discounted; The needs of the most underprivileged should not be used as a system regulator; In this sense, the system seems to be a vanguard machine; This would be to make two assumptions. It could become the “dream” instrument for controlling and regulating the market; and This sketches the outline of a politics that would respect both the desire for justice and the desire for the unknown (also cf. Appendix E).

6. 3. 4 Topoi, Stereotypes and Metaphors

There are instances of topoi which Lyotard tends to employ in the extract. The following statements are an illustration of such instances: We no longer have recourse to the grand narratives; Consensus is a horizon that is never reached; Consensus has become an outmoded and suspect value; The decisions do not have to respect individuals’ aspirations: aspirations have to aspire to the decisions; The needs of the most
underprivileged should not be used as a system regulator as a matter of principle; Countless scientists have seen their “move” ignored or repressed ... because it too abruptly destabilized the accepted positions; and Such behaviour is terrorist, as is the behaviour of the system described by Luhmann. These statements have also been presented as stereotypes or as indisputable ready-made truths.

Furthermore, Lyotard uses metaphors in the extract as in the following cases: the continuous differentiable function is losing its pre-eminence; Postmodern science by concerning itself with such things as undecidables, the limits of precise control, conflicts characterised by incomplete information, “fractals,” catastrophes, and pragmatic paradoxes; Consensus is a horizon that is never reached; there are classes of catastrophes; The objection will be made that these molecular opinions; It also contributes to elevating all language games to self-knowledge; Such behavior is terrorist; and It is a monster formed by the interweaving of various networks. Here Lyotard uses metaphors to construct postmodern science as resembling chaos and catastrophe theories, and as consisting of numerous language games while projecting aspects of modern science such as consensus as terrorist and as an unreachable horizon. Thus, he (rather playfully) resorts to metaphors in lieu of presenting convincing arguments to counter issues related to and represented by modern science.

There are seven interlinked strategies to be deduced from the use of these three discourse features: positive self-presentation; negative other-presentation; justification; attribution; fragmentation; legitimation; and reification. For instance, in framing most of his views as topoi and stereotypes, Lyotard attempts to positively project them so as to justify and legitimise them as ready-made truths. This is also a move intended to naturalise (reify) and popularise his views. Two typical examples are: To the extent that science is differential, its pragmatics provides the antimodel of a stable system and Consensus has become an outmoded and suspect value. But justice as a value is neither outmoded nor suspect (cf. Appendix D).
Another form of topos and stereotype to be inferred from the extract is a conventional academic practice of citation in which Lyotard engages and through which he tends to either attribute his own views to other authorities or pass off other authorities’ views as his. The case in point is his attribution of his own views on game theory and on morphogenesis to both P. M. Medawar and René Thom respectively (cf. Appendix D). While it is a fact that these views may be attributable to the two cited authorities in question, it is also a fact that their being cited by Lyotard may have to do with his attempt either to buttress his own case or to indirectly pass them off solely as theirs. According to Strauss (2004: 18), attribution to others is an academic ploy conveniently used to lend weight to one’s ideas. It is also a convenient device for presenting controversial views or ideas as though they belong to others or to everybody. This seems to be what Lyotard is doing here.

Again, in framing some of his arguments within the structure of metaphors, Lyotard tries to derogate and ridicule (as part of negative other-presentation) all concepts and views associated with modernity while simultaneously attempting to positively portray concepts and views associated with postmodern science. There is a semblance of fragmentation that this move appears to entail as well. The following statements serve to illustrate this point: Postmodern science by concerning itself with such things as undecidables, the limits of precise control, conflicts characterised by incomplete information, “fractals,” catastrophes, and pragmatic paradoxes and Consensus is a horizon that is never reached. This practice, again, serves to highlight Lyotard’s attempt to playfully resort to metaphors instead of probingly engaging issues related to modernity – especially those related to both Habermas and Luhmann.

6.3.5 Implication and Presupposition

The following instances of implication as applied in the extract are worth mentioning. At the beginning of the extract the implication Lyotard makes is that postmodern science is inherently founded on and fundamentally entails difference or paralogy. This foregrounding of postmodern science as one universal body of knowledge rooted
in difference tends to imply that modern science is, conversely, inherently one universal body of knowledge rooted in *similarity* with no room for difference at all. In addition, the symbiotic link he creates between consensus and dialogue suggests that both these concepts exist outside the framework of difference and dissension and that the last two concepts, in turn, exist in mutual exclusion to both consensus and dialogue. However, the point is, dialogue is conducted in situations of differences and dissension, and consensus is reached in order to resolve differences.

Also implicit in the extract is the fact that paralogy has come to replace both innovation and consensus, and that it is the ultimate goal of all discussion. The following assertion encapsulates this point: *Paralogy must be distinguished from innovation; the latter is under the command of the system ... the former is a move ... played in the pragmatics of knowledge. But as I have shown in the analysis of the pragmatics of science, consensus is only a particular state of discussion, not its end. Its end, on the contrary, is paralogy.* Here Lyotard seems to conveniently employ – as highlighted above and elsewhere in this analysis - a strategy in which he characterises postmodern science positively while deliberately presenting modern science negatively. This strategy operates as part of the broad positive self- and negative other-presentation discourse strategy (cf. Strauss, 2004: 15). Most importantly, Lyotard’s *paralogy* seems to be a euphemism for *postmodern difference*. This must be interesting as according to *WordWeb* (2004), paralogism - a near-synonym for paralogy – refers to an unintentionally invalid argument. So, if this is the case, Lyotard’s postmodern difference – and probably his postmodern science – could actually involve unintentionally invalid arguments, a factor that would render it a flawed science.

Similarly, the following instances of presupposition as applied in the extract are worth highlighting. One glaring case at the beginning and at the end of the extract concerns the presupposition Lyotard makes that his readers are part of his research. He does so through his use of the personal pronoun *we*. This strategy is exemplified by the following sentences: *The conclusion we can draw from this research (and much more not mentioned here) is that the continuous differentiable function is losing its pre-eminence*
as a paradigm of knowledge and prediction and We are finally in a position to understand how the computerisation of society affects this problematic. In the first sentence Lyotard presupposes that the conclusion he draws from his research, he makes jointly with his readers. In the second sentence the presupposition he makes is that he and his readers are collectively finally in a position to understand the effects of computerisation on society at large. What can be tenuously extrapolated here is that by so doing he tends to give an ideological credence to the computerisation of society by science in the postmodern era.

Furthermore, there are examples of “the constancy under negation test for presupposition” (cf. Yule, 1996: 132) that exist in the extract. This is illustrated particularly – but not exclusively – by the following statements: The function of the differential or imaginative or paralogical activity of the current pragmatics of science is to point out these metaprescriptives; To the extent that science is differential, its pragmatics provides the antimodel of a stable system; and A recognition of the heteromorphous nature of language games is a first step in that direction.

That is, when these three statements are turned into their negative forms, The function of the differential or imaginative or paralogical activity of the current pragmatics of science is not to point out these metaprescriptives, To the extent that science is differential, its pragmatics does not provide the antimodel of a stable system and A recognition of the heteromorphous nature of language games is not a first step in that direction, their basic presuppositions remain still intact. These are, respectively, The current pragmatics of science has differential or imaginative or paralogical function, Science is differential and Language games are heteromorphous. Thus, there seem to emerge, from Lyotard’s use of implication and presupposition in the extract, positive self-presentation, negative other-presentation, legitimation, fragmentation and unification.
6. 3. 6 Conversational Maxims

There are instances in the extract when Lyotard violates maxims of conversation. For example, the first paragraph of the extract starting with *The conclusion we can draw from this research ...* (cf. Appendix D) represents an instance of the violation of the maxims of manner, quality and quantity. At stake, here, is clarity and specificity. In this paragraph not only does Lyotard construct postmodern science in very ambiguous and obscure terms – thus violating the maxim of manner – but he also does fail to provide evidence to back up the views he puts forth. In this latter case, he makes unsupported claims (he fails to be sincere and truthful), thereby violating the maxim of quality. His assertion that postmodern science *is producing not the known, but the unknown* tends to violate all the four maxims of conversation as it lacks informativeness (quantity), truthfulness (quality), relevance (relation) and clarity (manner).

Another classic instance is the paragraph beginning with the sentence: *Social pragmatics does not have the “simplicity” of scientific pragmatics.* At stake, here, are all the four maxims. First, Lyotard violates the maxim of quantity: the reader is left in the dark concerning what social pragmatics is vis-à-vis scientific pragmatics. Again, his reference to social pragmatics as *a monster* does not only negate the maxim of relevance, but does in fact, flout both the maxims of manner and quality as well. His social pragmatics which is *a monster* is both ambiguous and obscure. Above all, here again, he makes unsubstantiated claims, thus violating the maxim of quality.

6. 4 Discussion

As is the case with the previous extract, ideology cannot be simplistically and straightforwardly read off language use or discourse. The preceding analysis seems to bear testimony to this fact. That is, if there are any instances of ideological operations that come into play in the extract, they can largely be extrapolated from the discourse and ideological strategies employed by Lyotard as highlighted above. For example, from the narrative discourse feature can be extrapolated, if at all, the ideology of narrativity or
narratology that Lyotard tries to promote in research. This is evident from his privileging of the narrative (ideology) over the scientific (ideology) and from his using of the narrative (ideology) to subvert the scientific (ideology) in research with a view to constructing postmodern science as primarily narrative and pragmatic in nature.

The same can be said of Lyotard’s rhetorical use and repetition of words, expressions, phrases and statements. Here, for instance, Lyotard tends to rhetorically use and repeat words, concepts, expressions or statements and to ask rhetorical questions so as to embed his views and arguments simultaneously in a narrative tone and in a textual narrative (cf. Appendix D). In all this can be inferred a move by Lyotard to denigrate those concepts he deems to be inherently modernist while trying to popularise and entrench the ones he rhetorically positively repeats in his knowledge report. Allied to this move is an attempt by Lyotard to naturalise these concepts as part of mainstream knowledge.

With reference to the types of modality used in the extract, as I pointed out above, they serve as a poor and unreliable index of ideology. In fact, more than anything else, both Lyotard’s intra-modality combinations and inter-modality overlaps give rise to three related processes: harmonic and non-harmonic modal combinations; varying degrees of epistemic, deontic, boulomaic and perception gradients; and varying degrees of cultural standing, subjectivity and indeterminacy. Here modality is not, as argued by Fairclough (1989) in particular, a ready-made carrier of ideology. So, what can be deduced from this particular usage of modality, rather, is attribution. That is, Lyotard tends to frame his controversial and debatable views within contrasting low and high modality continua (e.g. epistemic and deontic modality continua) and attribute them to the collective we or to a distant impersonal deictic reference like it or this.

Moreover, Lyotard seems to employ topoi, stereotypes and metaphors so as to engage in positive self-presentation, negative other-presentation, justification, attribution, fragmentation, legitimization and reification. In particular, he tries to frame his views as positive topoi and stereotypes so as to justify, legitimise and naturalise them as ready-made truths vis-à-vis their modernist counterparts. In addition, he tends to use topoi and
stereotypes as a means of citing other authorities (e.g. P. M. Medawar and René Thom) so he could attribute either his own views to them or their own views to himself.

Through this practice, he is able to either conveniently lend weight to his own controversial views or present them as though they belong to others or to everybody. At the same time, he attempts to formulate some of his arguments within the framework of metaphors with a view to derogating and ridiculing (as part of negative other-presentation) all concepts and views associated with modernity while positively portraying concepts and views associated with postmodern science. Above all, there are instances in the extract whereby Lyotard playfully resorts to metaphors instead of probingly engaging issues related to both Habermas and Luhmann.

Furthermore, Lyotard tends to employ both implication and presupposition as part of the overall positive self- and negative other-presentation discourse strategy and as part of legitimation, fragmentation and unification strategies so as to privilege postmodern science over modern science. Finally, there are instances in the extract in which he tends to violate the four maxims of conversation (the maxims of quantity, quality, relevance and manner). One such instance is his assertion that postmodern science *is producing not the known, but the unknown* which tends to flout all the four maxims of conversation.

### 6.5 Conclusion

This chapter has presented a two-part micro-analysis of the two extracts from *LP* and *The PC* respectively. For example, Part III has provided the analysis – and in some instances the meta-analysis of certain parts - of the *LP* extract while Part IV has mounted the analysis of *The PC* extract. In both extracts, the analysis has focused on the discourse features together with the associated discourse and ideological strategies as identified and highlighted under the MIDA in *Figure 4. 2* (cf. Chapter Four). Lastly, the chapter has discussed the findings emerging from the micro-analysis of the identified discourse features of the two extracts.
Chapter Seven

Summary, Recommendations, Further Research and Conclusion

7.0 Introduction

This chapter briefly reviews the whole study and summarises the results of the study. It also makes recommendations and suggests further research in relation to the current study. Most significantly, it concludes this study.

7.1 Executive Summary

This research study set out to investigate the relationship between critical linguistics and postmodernism and to provide a critical assessment of these two areas. It did so by trying to respond to the following seven questions:

- What does the overview of both critical linguistics and postmodernism reveal?
- What scholarly views and observations does a comprehensive and detailed discussion of the proponents of these two areas reveal?
- What concerns, shortcomings and weaknesses are inherent in these two areas?
- In what way is critical linguistics different from mainstream linguistics and how can the two areas be brought closer to each other?
- In what way is postmodernism different from modernism and how can the two areas be brought closer to each other?
- What are the similarities and differences between critical linguistics and postmodernism?
- What does the micro-analysis of the discourse features of the two sample extracts selected from both LP and The PC reveal about the discourse and ideological strategies used in these two texts?

In this regard, Chapter One detailed the purpose, necessity and focus of the study. It also provided the research methodology used in this study and highlighted the details of the
preliminary study and the value of the current study. Above all, it previewed and outlined the present study. Chapter Two presented an overview of critical linguistics and offered a comprehensive and detailed discussion of some of the proponents of critical linguistics, especially Fowler et al. (1979), Kress (1985a, 1989, 1990; cf. Hodge and Kress, 1993; Kress and Hodge, 1979) and Fairclough (1989, 1992, 1995; cf. Fairclough, 2000). It also mounted a critical analysis of this form of linguistics. The overview focused on the historical origins of critical linguistics, the type of linguistics it is, and what constitutes it. The critical analysis highlighted some of the concerns, shortcomings and weaknesses associated with this type of linguistics.

Similarly, Chapter Three provided an overview of postmodernism and offered a comprehensive and detailed discussion of the views of three postmodern thinkers, Jean-Francois Lyotard (cf. Lyotard, 1984, 1988), Michel Foucault (cf. Foucault, 1972, 1973, 1980) and Jacques Derrida (cf. Derrida, 1976, 1978, 1982). It also presented a critical analysis of postmodernism as represented by these three thinkers. The overview outlined the historical origins of postmodernism and some of its varieties and approaches. The critical analysis highlighted some of the concerns, shortcomings and weaknesses associated with postmodernism as raised, on the one hand, by Jürgen Habermas (cf. Habermas, 1984, 1987) and, to some extent by Thomas McCarthy (cf. McCarthy, 1978, 1993), and on the other hand, by Paul R. Gross and Norman Levitt (cf. Gross and Levitt, 1994). Moreover, it offered an evaluation of some of the views and observations made by Habermas and by Gross and Levitt in relation to postmodernism.

Chapter Four served the following related purposes. Firstly, it detailed the sources of data, the methods of data collection and data analysis, and the units of analysis used in the study. Secondly, it discussed the discourse and ideological analysis and chaos theory methodological framework used in the study. Thirdly, it provided the rationale for employing such a methodological framework and highlighted its strengths and weaknesses. Fourthly, it sketched and delineated two different but complementary models of data analysis used in Chapter Five and Chapter Six respectively. The two models in question are the textual content analysis and chaos theory model and the
multidisciplinary model of ideological discourse analysis (MIDA). Following this, the chapter pinpointed the strengths and weaknesses inherent in these two models. In addition, the chapter presented – within the parameters of these two models - sample data analyses related to each of these two chapters. Finally, it outlined the analytic procedures and benchmarks for analysing the data in this study.

Chapter Five presented the data analysis of the content variables illustrated and highlighted in Figure 4.1 (Chapter Four). Thus, it consisted of two parts - Part I and Part II - of macro-analysis. The macro-analysis – comprising two strands of analysis in each case - in both parts was informed by the composite model of data analysis illustrated in Figure 4.1. Part I provided the analysis of LP while Part II mounted the analysis of The PC. In each case, the analysis of the relevant sets of content variables followed the steps and procedures as formulated and described under the relevant sub-sections in Chapter Four.

For instance, the first strand of the macro-analysis in both Part I and Part II focused on the following content variables of the two texts: their explicit and implicit goals; their areas of focus; their underlying theoretical assumptions; the approaches, methods and models of analysis they use; and the types of data extracts used in LP and the types of cited material employed in The PC. With reference to this last aspect the intention was to establish whether such data extracts or cited material types were adequate, trustworthy and credible in the context in which they had been used. Regarding the first four content variables, words, sentences and paragraphs embodying these variables (in both LP and The PC) were analysed. Pertaining to the data extracts and the cited material, excerpts (in the case of LP) and quoted material (in the case of The PC) were analysed respectively. In this instance, the number of words (particularly word counts) used in each instance, constituted the basis of the analysis.

The second strand of the macro-analysis in both Part I and Part II examined the use of each term in the two sets of concepts related to LP and The PC as outlined in Figure 4.1. In respect of LP, the concepts which served as units of content analysis were
(mainstream) linguistics, critical linguistics, language, ideology, power, discourse, text, intertextuality, subject positions (identities), utterances, and postmodernism. With regard to *The PC*, the conceptual units of analysis were modernity/modernism, postmodernity/postmodernism, grand narratives/meta-narratives, language games, utterances, pragmatics, performativity, paralogy/paralogism, incommensurability, knowledge, and legitimation/legitimacy.

On the one hand, the quantitative content analysis aspect of this section investigated the frequencies to which these concepts were respectively used or repeated within the relevant semantic context in each text. On the other hand, the qualitative content analysis section examined the kinds of textual definitions, ideas or views Fairclough assigns to each of the above concepts as selected from *LP* and the kinds of textual definitions, ideas or views Lyotard assigns to all of the above concepts as selected from *The PC*. In addition, the chaos theory-based analysis explored the degree to which these conceptual variables display - at the latent and inferential level - the chaotic qualities represented in *Figure 4. 1*. These chaotic qualities included complexity, randomness, attractors, fractals, self-similarity, connectionism, dissipative structures, and paradoxes, contradictions or aporias. The computer software, *WordWeb 3. 03*, was used as a point of reference to benchmark some of the textual definitions, ideas and views attributed to the conceptual variables cited above.

Moreover, this part of the analysis also investigated the extent to which chaos theory could bridge the boundaries between critical linguistics and mainstream linguistics, between postmodernism and modernism, and between critical linguistics and postmodernism. Concomitantly, for both Parts I and II, a discussion of the findings emanating from the analysis and interpretation of the data was mounted. On the basis of this, a short comparative analysis was conducted to establish similarities and differences existing between critical linguistics and postmodernism.

Chapter Six presented a two-part micro-analysis - based on the MIDA - of the two extracts from *LP* and *The PC* respectively. For instance, Part III mounted the analysis of
the extract selected from LP and the meta-analysis of Fairclough’s analysis of the pronouns and modals used in the selfsame extract. Part IV analysed the extract selected from The PC. The micro-analysis examined the following discourse features of both the LP and The PC extracts: narrative; repetition; rhetoric; pronominalisation (pronouns); modality (modals); topoi; stereotypes; metaphors; implication; presupposition; and conversational maxims. The use of the software Tropes V6.2 was enlisted to identify the word counts, content types and language styles the two extracts have. In addition, the use of the software WordWeb 3.03 (WordWeb, 2004) was enlisted to cross-validate the ideological tendencies or practices inferred from the discourse and ideological strategies operational in the two extracts. The analysis of all these features was followed by the discussion of the results in each case.

7.2 Summary of the Findings

At the macro-analysis level, the study has discovered the following. Firstly, LP perceives language and ideology as implicated in both relations of power and domination. From this perspective, it assigns a conspiratorial role to language and ideology often common in critical linguistics. However, this entails a dialectical circularity between language, ideology and power (cf. Data Exemplars 4.1 and 4.2). Again, even though the text claims to be grounded in Halliday’s SFL - combining both language and social theories, and espousing a critical view of ideology (cf. Exemplars 5.2 and 5.7) – it makes fewer references to language theorists and more references to social theorists. Of the language theorists it cites, it makes more references to both Chomsky and Saussure (the two theorists whose works it attacks) and fewer to Halliday. Of the social theorists it uses, none of them is engaged meaningfully for their contribution - or lack thereof - to the critical treatment of ideology even though it claims to be critical (cf. Table 5.1; Figure 5.1).

In addition, while the text invokes a Foucauldian view of discourse it, nonetheless, treats this term from a Marxist reproductive point of view. Thus, this deprives it of its Foucauldian conception. The same holds true for its treatment of Habermas’s theory of
communicative action: it views this theory within the Marxian framework of power and ideology – a far cry from what it stands for (cf. *LP*, pp. 197-198). Moreover, the model of analysis adopted in *LP* refers to many other approaches (both linguistic and social approaches). Yet, in the final analysis, this model is fragmented, remains intrinsically linguistic in its outlook, and is only accompanied by a neo-Marxist rhetoric (cf. *Exemplars 5.3 and 5.7*).

Furthermore, *LP* impugns all the approaches to which it refers – (cf. *Exemplar 5.3 and Figure 5.1*) - and accuses them of being uncritical and of treating language abstractly. Yet, it too – in addition to relegating language to the dictates of power and ideology – treats language in the classical abstract way. Above all, it regards text as existing in its two classical forms - spoken and written forms (cf. *Exemplars 4.5, 5.7 and 5.12*), and it privileges the classically abstract formal properties of text – phonology, syntax, semantics and pragmatics in its analysis and interpretation (cf. *Figure 5.3*). As such, it is uncritical of its own practices.

By and large, the text employs lopsided (and in some instances very short) data extracts. As a result, these extracts display a bias towards certain text types to the exclusion of others. For instance, they are exclusively newspaper, leaflet, simulated, book, magazine and radio/television extracts. These types of data extracts – in particular the simulated ones – renders Fairclough’s claim that his text, specifically, and CLS/CL generally, deals with real extended discourse rather suspect (cf. *Exemplars 5.5 and 5.6; Tables 5.3 and 5.4*). This then calls the adequacy, trustworthiness and credibility of his data extracts into question.

It also emerged from the analysis of the conceptual variables of *LP* that they are viewed, overall, from an exclusively dualistic and binary oppositional perspective – e.g. mainstream linguistics versus critical linguistics. As a result, the current study has argued that language issues need to be viewed from a chaos theory perspective which embodies aspects related to both critical linguistics and modern linguistics without privileging or discrediting either.
Secondly, concerning The PC, the macro-analysis has revealed the following aspects, most of which are self-contradictory. Lyotard frames the postmodern condition of knowledge within narratives: he perceives narratives to be in crisis and assigns a conflictual view to both narratives and science (cf. Data Exemplars 4. 3 and 4. 4; Exemplar 5. 17). This conflictual view - which is central to the Marxist conflict theory – tends to contradict Lyotard’s own postmodern thinking which discredits Marxism as a grand narrative of modernity (cf. Data Exemplar 4. 6; Exemplars 5. 21 and 5. 22). Particularly disputable within this narrative configuration of science is Lyotard’s assertion that language is at the forefront of all the leading sciences and technologies. This serves to reduce sciences and technologies to languages or narratives. However, this is self-contradictory as his narratives are in crisis – facing a legitimacy crisis.

The other aspect is that while Lyotard rejects Marxism and functionalism as outdated and discredited grand narratives, he nevertheless, conceptualises modernity primarily in terms of these two discredited grand narratives (cf. Data Exemplar 4. 6; Exemplars 5. 21 and 5. 22). This stems from his shallow and contradictory conception of modernity which tends to reduce the latter and all other totalising narratives to these two grand narratives. His characterisation and conceptualisation of postmodernity is equally shallow and unconvincing: he views it purely in terms of incredulity towards meta-narratives. Added to this, is the fact that in one instance, Lyotard contends that different language games and utterances are incommensurable, and as such, cannot legitimate or validate one another. Yet in another, he contradicts himself and asserts that scientific knowledge resorts to and is validated by narrative knowledge (cf. Exemplar 5. 23).

Furthermore, the text is grounded in too many incoherent and fragmented theories which it engages only punningly and flippantly. Classic examples are Gödel’s theorem of undecidability, probability theory, catastrophe theory and chaos theory. The text also fails to make any attempt to show how combining different language areas and the new sciences renders the old science – the Newtonian science or modernity – dysfunctional or outdated. In addition, most of the cited pieces of material employed in the text, while
illuminating in their own right are, nonetheless, suspect. Some of them are derived from or cited through secondary sources (cf. *Exemplar 5. 20; Table 5.7*). Even those cited through the primary or original sources are presented in short quotations whose exposition is insufficiently captured in endnotes (cf. *Exemplar 5. 20*). Except in few instances, no real engagement with the cited material is evident from the text. For example, the text makes random and flippant references to quantum mechanics, Laplace’s determinism, Mandelbrot’s fractals and Thom’s indeterminism (again cf. *Exemplar 5. 20*) without meaningfully engaging any of these concepts. In this regard, there is a serious shadow of doubt concerning the adequacy, trustworthiness and credibility of the isolated data texts employed in *The PC*.

Against this backdrop, the current study has, as is the case above, argued for a chaos theory conceptualisation which displays both the Newtonian modernist and the non-Newtonian postmodernist worldviews. But above all, the study has found that both critical linguistics and postmodernism display similarities and differences. For example, they both construct themselves as oppositional discourses in relation to mainstream linguistics and modernity respectively. However, critical linguistics is underpinned by SFL and espouses a strong Marxist or critical approach in its theorisation of language, discourse, power and ideology while postmodernism, especially as advocated by Lyotard, discredits and dismisses any form of Marxist orientation or approach.

At the micro-analysis level, the study has discovered the following. Firstly, with reference to the excerpt used by Fairclough in *LP*, it emerges that ideology cannot be simplistically and straightforwardly read off language use or discourse. For example, the rhetorical and discourse features used in the extract (such as pronouns and modals) tend to function more as strategies for political discourse than as unproblematic carriers of ideology. If anything at all, only ideological inferences can be made from the use of such discourse features. In the case of narrative as a discourse feature, a sense of both a welfare state and a united Britain is projected from which the politics – and possibly the ideology - of *welfarism* can be deduced.
With reference to repetition and rhetoric, the rhetorical repetition of the word *people* (cf. lines (54)-(78)) seems to be intended to instil and rouse the idea of individualism and self-reliance. From this can be inferred the politics - and perhaps, the ideology - of individualism and self-reliance. At the same time, this rhetorical repetition serves both as a rallying cry for consensus and unity (a sense of unification) by MT to the British people and as a form of populism (also cf. lines (120) and (126)). This embodies the politics of consensus, unity and populism from which to infer the ideology of consensus, unity and populism. Similarly, MT’s rhetorical repetition of the words *freedom, security* and *defence* (for Britain) can be viewed as implying the politics of freedom, security and defence for Britain and her people. From this politics one can deduce the ideology of *freedom, security* and *defence* (for Britain). Allied to this, is a euphemism *pre-eminence* for *military pride* which lends itself to the notion of British militarism. The ideology of militarism can, in this context, be deduced from this euphemism.

In connection with pronominalisation as a discourse feature used in the extract, MT is able to signal (by employing the pronouns *we, I, and you*) unity, partnership and consensus with her party, with government and with people. The politics of national unity and partnership – which may, to some extent, entail the ideology of national unity - can be inferred from all this. With regard to the modals applied in the extract, it emerges that they do not serve as a good and reliable index of ideology. Instead, due to their multiple and sometimes overlapping uses by MT – e.g. her combination of low and high modality statements - they tend to display, on the one hand, conflicting degrees of deontic obligation and epistemic commitment to the obligation and the truth of the propositions expressed, and on the other hand, a sense of indeterminacy, subjectivity and ambiguity. Two issues accorded high modality statements are law and order, and freedom and security. This entails the politics of both law and order, and freedom and security from which the ideology of law and order, and of freedom and security can be deduced. Furthermore, topoi, stereotypes and metaphors as employed in the extract tend to evoke the notions of personal responsibility, defence, security, freedom, consensus and populism. On the contrary, both implication and presupposition allow MT to engage in denial and self-glory.
Equally, in respect of the extract from *The PC*, it emerges that ideology cannot be simplistically and straightforwardly read off language use or discourse. Here again, only ideological inferences can be made from the use of the discourse features applied in this extract. For instance, from Lyotard’s use of the narrative feature can be extrapolated the ideology of narrativity or narratology that he intends to promote in research. This is discernible from his privileging of the narrative (ideology) over the scientific (ideology) and from his using of the narrative (ideology) to subvert the scientific (ideology) in research with a view to constructing postmodern science as essentially and solely narrative and pragmatic in nature. The same holds true for Lyotard’s rhetorical use and repetition of words, expressions, phrases and statements. Here, for example, Lyotard tends to rhetorically use and repeat words, concepts, expressions or statements and to ask rhetorical questions so as to embed his views and arguments simultaneously in a narrative tone and in a textual narrative.

As is the case with the previous extract, modality, as used by Lyotard in this extract, serves as a poor and unreliable index of ideology. More than anything else, Lyotard’s intra-modality combinations and his inter-modality overlaps tend to encode, on the one hand, varying degrees of epistemic, deontic, boulomaic and perception gradients, and on the other hand, varying degrees of cultural standing, subjectivity and indeterminacy. Here modality is not, as argued by Fairclough (1989) in particular, a ready-made carrier of ideology. Thus, what can be inferred from this particular usage of modality, rather, is attribution. That is, Lyotard tends to frame his controversial and debatable views within contrasting low and high modality continua (e.g. epistemic and deontic modality continua) and attribute them to the collective we or to a distant impersonal deictic reference such as it or this.

Moreover, Lyotard tends to use topoi and stereotypes as a means of citing other authorities (e.g. P. M. Medawar and René Thom) so he could attribute either his own views to them or their own views to himself. This enables him to lend weight to his own controversial ideas or to present them as though they belong to others or to everybody. At the same time, he attempts to structure some of his arguments within the framework of
metaphors with a view to denigrating (as part of negative other-presentation) all concepts and views associated with modernity while positively projecting concepts and views associated with postmodern science. Similarly, he employs implication and presupposition as part of the overall positive self- and negative other-presentation discourse strategy to privilege postmodern science over modern science. Finally, there are instances in the extract in which Lyotard tends to violate the four maxims of conversation - the maxims of quantity, quality, relevance and manner.

7.3 Recommendations

The current study investigated what both critical linguistics and postmodernism entail. It did so by closely analysing two texts at two levels: a theoretical and abstract level and a practical and textual level. Thus, it is recommended that these two texts be studied and analysed further through rigorously combining more of theory and practice for pedagogical purposes. This is much more necessary as our current postmodern education requires, more than ever before, that theoretical knowledge be integrated into and synergised with practical skills. In fact, Lyotard’s views on skills and competences required in the postmodern era – however narrowly formulated they seem to be – are instructive in this case.

In addition, these two areas could be taught to students at classroom level to highlight areas of similarities and differences between them. Students could also be taught both critical linguistics and postmodernism as a way of equipping them with the necessary textual analytical skills. In all this, an attempt must be made to highlight the inter-, multi- and cross-disciplinary nature of these two areas since there is an increasing need for a dialogue between and a multilogue across disciplines. This is also a view articulated by Lyotard in his text even though he does so for a different motive – a motive intended to denigrate other forms and bodies of knowledge when his notion of interdisciplinarity should be setting a stage and creating a space for interdisciplinary collaborative ventures.
One of the challenging aspects presented by Lyotard, in this regard, is his characterisation of both knowledge and skills which he claims higher education should provide in the postmodern condition (cf. Exemplar 5. 24 in Appendix A). This relates directly to the formulation and configuration of education policy and to the curricular and programme designs in higher education, even though Lyotard does not address this aspect in The PC. Thus, his characterisation of knowledge and skills requires a critical interrogation by different education planners and curriculum and programme designers, and by different disciplinary specialists especially in the social and human sciences. This is particularly relevant as there is a contention that we are living in a knowledge-based society in which an integrated approach to knowledge, information and skills is required (cf. for example, Fairclough, 2003: 1-3; Lyotard, 1984: 47-53; also cf. Exemplar 5. 24). Moreover, relevant study materials and workbooks – based on the two areas – could be produced and compiled for both teachers and students to use as teaching and learning resources. This aspect is worth highlighting as it did not fall within the remit of the current study.

7.4 Further Research

The present study explored two texts, Fairclough’s (1989) Language and Power (LP) and Lyotard’s (1984) The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge (The PC) in order to understand and unpack some of the aspects of both critical linguistics and postmodernism. However, since only certain areas from the two texts were selected as units of analysis and as the basis for delimiting the focus of the current study, it is advisable that future studies include other areas and aspects not covered in this study so as to get a broader picture of the two areas. One other point worth mentioning is that in order to come to grips with the workings of both critical linguistics and postmodernism, it is vital that future research should attempt to undertake a much more comparative study involving more texts or other different texts from both areas which would have to be exhaustively studied and analysed. Finally, it would be illuminating if future research could combine the treatment of these two areas with classroom practice, even though this is much more dependent on the specific curricular requirements of a given language study programme and on student needs.
7. 5 Conclusion

This chapter has summarised and briefly reviewed the whole study. It has also made recommendations and suggested further research in relation to the current study. Lastly, it concludes the present study.
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Appendix A: Exemplars for Part I and Part II

Part I Data Exemplars - LP

Exemplar 5.1: LP’s Area of Focus

This book is about language and power, or more precisely about connections between language use and unequal relations of power … [Thus] my main focus in this book … [is] on trying to explain existing conventions as the outcome of power relations and power struggle. My approach will put particular emphasis upon ‘common-sense’ assumptions which are implicit in the conventions according to which people interact linguistically, and of which people are generally not consciously aware. An example would be how the conventions for a traditional type of consultation between doctors and patients embody ‘common-sense’ assumptions which treat authority and hierarchy as natural … Such assumptions are ideologies. Ideologies are closely linked to power … Given my focus on ideology, this means helping people to see … the ways in which these common-sense assumptions can be ideologically shaped by relations of power … Let me now relate this to my decision to focus upon discourse. I shall not accept the Saussurean concentration on language as opposed to language use (LP, pp. 1, 2, 4 and 22).

Exemplar 5.2: Underlying Theoretical Assumptions of LP

Central here are two assertions; that language is a social practice and not a phenomenon external to society to be adventitiously correlated with it, and that language [is] seen as discourse rather than as accomplished text. The arguments adduced [in this book] are important for students of social theory. They tie the abstractions of Bourdieu, Foucault and Habermas to the actualities of encounters, linking the work of British and Australian “critical linguists” (Fowler, Kress … and others) to the mainstream of European social theory. CLS … place[s] a broad conception of the social study of language at the core of language study. It … favour[s] certain emphases within the various branches of study: for instance, in the study of grammar it would find ‘functionalist’ approaches (such as that of the systemic linguistics associated particularly with Michael Halliday) more helpful than ‘formalist’ approaches (such as that of Noam Chomsky and his associates) … Anglo-American pragmatics is closely associated with analytical philosophy, particularly with the work of Austin and Searle on ‘speech act’ … [P]art of Saussure’s langue/parole distinction is a general one between underlying social conventions and actual use, and this is a distinction I maintain, though in different terms … The relationship [between common-sense and ideology] was explored by the Italian Marxist Antonio Gramsci … The French philosopher Louis Althusser pointed to an important connection between common-sense assumptions … about meaning and common-sense assumptions about social identity … According to the sociologist Max Weber, a bureaucracy ‘is a hierarchical organization designed rationally to coordinate work of many individuals in the pursuit of large-scale administrative tasks and organizational goals’ (LP, pp. vii, viii, 9, 13-14, 22, 84, 102 and 212).

Exemplar 5.3: Approaches, Methods and Models of Analysis Employed in LP

There are many existing approaches to the study of language, so why do we need CLS? Because, while each of the approaches I review [here] has something to contribute to CLS, they all have major limitations from a critical point of view … Linguistics has won widespread acceptance within the human sciences and beyond for the centrality of language among human phenomena, and of language study among the human sciences … [However], mainstream linguistics is an asocial way of studying language, which has nothing to say about relationship between language and power and ideology … Sociolinguistics has
shown systematic correlations between variations in linguistic forms … But sociolinguistics is heavily influenced by 'positivist' conceptions of social science … Social classes in the classical Marxist sense are social forces which occupy different positions in economic production, which have different and antagonistic interests … In terms of this conception of social class, the sociolinguistic facts can be seen as the outcome of class struggle … The main weakness of pragmatics from a critical point of view is its individualism: ‘action’ is thought of atomistically as emanating wholly from the individual … Not surprisingly, cognitive psychology and artificial intelligence have given little attention to the social origins … I shall concentrate on conversation analysis, which is one prominent approach within discourse analysis … [T]he influential work of Michel Foucault … ascribes a central role to discourse in the development of specifically modern forms of power … And … equally the influential work of Jürgen Habermas [on] ‘theory of communicative action’ highlights the way in which our currently distorted communication … foreshadows communication (LP, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12-3).

Exemplar 5. 4: Three Levels of Analysis

A text is a product rather than a process – a product of the process of text production … This process includes … the process of production, of which the text is a product, and the process of interpretation, for which the text is a resource. Text analysis is correspondingly only a part of discourse analysis, which includes analysis of productive and interpretative processes … It is important to take account of such differences when analysing discourse from a critical perspective. Discourse, then, involves social conditions, which can be specified as social conditions of production, and social conditions of interpretation … Corresponding to these three dimensions of discourse are three stages of critical discourse analysis: description is the stage which is concerned with formal properties of the text; interpretation is concerned with the relationship between text and interaction; … explanation is concerned with the relationship between interaction and social context (LP, pp. 24, 25 and 26).

Exemplar 5. 5: Extracts Used in the Two Analysis Sections (Chapters 5 and 6) of LP

Extract 1 (Psychiatric Text 1 and Text 2)

depprivation of food, bed, walks in the open air, visitors, mail, or telephone calls; solitary confinement; deprivation of reading or entertainment materials; immobilizing people by tying them into wet sheets and then exhibiting them to staff and other patients; other physical restraints on body movement; drugging the mind against the client’s will; incarceration in locked wards; a range of public humiliations such as the prominent posting of alleged intentions to escape or commit suicide, the requirement of public confessions of misconduct or guilt, and public announcements of individual misdeeds and abnormalities (Psychiatric text 1)

discouraging sick behaviour and encouraging healthy behaviour through the selective granting of rewards; the availability of seclusion, restraints, and closed wards to grant a patient a respite from interaction with others; enabling him to think about his behaviour, to cope with his temptations to elope and succumb to depression, and to develop a sense of security; immobilizing the patient to calm him, satisfy his dependency needs, give him the extra nursing attention he values, and enable him to benefit from peer confrontation; placing limits on his acting out; and teaching him that the staff cares (Psychiatric text 2)
We suspect that industrialists are at the point of realising that they need to do something, but are not sure what that something is. We are not suggesting that industry becomes voyeuristic about personal problems, or that it intrudes into private grief and sorrow! It would be counterproductive to give the impression that it owns its workforce. Nor are we advocating a return to the nineteenth century paternalism of chocolate and soap barons. But their concept of engaging with their employees as whole persons is one we cannot ignore.

Extract 4 (Left Unlimited)

**LEFT … AFTER A FASHION**

Fashion is propaganda in clothing – it tells you about who people are, what they want to be and their politics. The fashion industry is in constant flux, pumping out new images: street fashions meet haute couture – offspring – high street fashion. With personal politics and style high on the left’s political agenda should fashion consciousness be part of political consciousness, or is it just an excuse for consumerism? What’s radical about a radical look?

*Left Unlimited* is proud to present the first ever left fashion show. The very latest designers from college will present their work, followed by some of the old favourites: Ken Livingstone’s flares and Safari jacket; the trotskyte flat top; the workerist donkey jacket and badges; ageing *Marxism Today* Euro chic, and much more.

And on hand will be ‘street fashion’ editor of *ID* magazine Caryn Franklin; and high fashion designer Paul Smith; ‘High Street’ fashion writer Angela Stephens of *Just 17*; commentator Chris Kirk, and *City Limits* journalist Kathy Myers. Lights, music, a catwalk … And politics.
Extract 5 (Extract from a Scottish newspaper)

As the cancer spreads

As the riots of rampaging youths spread from the south, even the most optimistic have fears for the future, afraid worse is yet to come. How far can the trouble spread? If it comes to Scotland, where will it strike?

Extract 6 (Extract from The Guardian newspaper)

Having agreed some time ago to an interview next Sunday, he (Mr Kinnock) plainly thought it could take its place in the mushery surrounding the launch of Investing in People [= a Labour Party campaign]. But meanwhile the defence issue came to the front, and the programme, responding to the news, became a programme about Labour's defence policy – which the leader doesn’t to talk about …

Extract 7 (Daily Mail, 3 May 1982)

Foot refuses offer from No. 10 but …

MAGGIE PLANS THE INVASION

By GORDON GREIG, Political Editor

MRS THATCHER is preparing for the crunch in the Falklands crisis with a landing by commandos and paratroops.

As the prospect of a bloody confrontation looms, Opposition leaders have been invited to discuss the last options with her.

Extract 8 (Berlei)

THE MATERNITY BRA WITH COTTON by

The first bra to look after the woman and mother in you
- Front fastening for comfort and convenience
- Unique non-slip feature
- 3-piece cotton cup for comfort and support
- Cotton lining for extra absorbency
- Stretch straps
- 3 placement hook and eye fastening
- Available in white only
- Sizes 34-40B/C/D/DD/E

Available from Leading department stores and selected retail outlets
Extract 9 (Sample classroom discourse)

T: Where does it go before it reaches your lungs?
P: Your windpipe, Miss.
T: down your windpipe … Now can anyone remember the other word for windpipe?
P: The trachaea.
T: The trachaea … good

Extract 10 (Simulated exchange between A and B)

A: it was broken when I came in for lunch
B: was it
A: so it was being done while I as talking to the kids upstairs sort of thing
B: so it wasn’t done by the kids upstairs then
A: ah. I suppose not

Extract 11 (Simulated interview between a headmaster and a youth)

H: and you deny leaving school during class time or
Y: I deny leaving school going to that shop taking the money anything cos I never done that

Extract 12 (Lancaster Guardian, 7 October 1986)

Firemen tackle blaze

NIGHT shift workers on a coating line at Nairn Coated Products, St Georges Quay, Lancaster had to be evacuated after fire broke out in an oven Wednesday evening.

Four fire engines attended the incident and firemen wearing breathing apparatus tackled the flames which had started when a break off in an oven caught fire under the infra red element.

The fire caused severe damage to 20 metres of metal trunking, and to the interior of a coating machine and the coating room was smoke logged.

But the department was running again by Thursday morning.

Extract 13 (Simulated police–witness interview)

(1) P: Did you get a look at the one in the car?
(2) W: I saw his face, yeah.
(3) P: What sort of age was he?
(4) W: About 45. he was wearing a …
(5) P: And how tall?
(6) W: Six foot one.
(7) P: Six foot one. Hair?
(8) W: Dark and curly
Extract 14 (Women's Weekly, 9 August 1987)

Wasn’t it a lovely day?

The sun came out, the colourful crowds gathered, and at the centre of it all were Sarah and Andrew, spilling their happiness in every direction and making it a day to remember – for them and for us.

Along with half the world, probably, I saw that enchanting TV interview the night before the wedding, and was struck by the completeness of their relationship. How they complement each other – in humour, in delight in each other’s personalities, and in commitment to the future. Sarah obviously realises the demands of the role she has taken on as Navy wife and Royal duchess, yet still retains her own career. Surely that must be unique in Royal history, but how in tune with contemporary life and relationship.

Extract 15 (Blue Jeans, No. 488, 24 May 1986)

No amount of make-up and hair stuff will turn you into a glamorous chick if your gnashers aren’t in good condition. It’s nothing to be proud of if you haven’t been to the dentist for the past five years – you’re only asking for trouble. Treatment isn’t the equivalent of a week of listening to Nana Mouskouri albums, and your dentist isn’t there to give you nightmares and inflict unnecessary pain on you. Regular check-ups are the best idea – prevention is always better than cure! If you haven’t been to your dentist for eons, pluck up the courage and make an appointment – it’ll be worth it! The British Dental Health Foundation have produced a series of well-helpful booklets on dental care. Including information on crowns, gum disease, oral hygiene, sugar and selecting a dentist, they’re worth a look. For free copies of the leaflets, send an SAE to the British Dental Health Foundation, 88 Gurnards Avenue, Unit 2, Fishermead, Milton Keynes, Bucks.

Exemplar 5. 6: Extracts Used in the Other Parts of LP

Extract 1 (Simulated police-witness interview)

(1) P: Did you get a look at the one in the car?
(2) W: I saw his face, yeah.
(3) P: What sort of age was he?
(4) W: About 45. He wearing a …
(5) P: And how tall?
(6) W: Six foot one.
(7) P: Six foot one. Hair?
(8) W: Dark and curly. Is this going to take long? I’ve got collect the kids from school.
(9) P: Not much longer, no. What about his clothes?
(10) W: He was a bit scruffy-looking, blue trousers, black …
(11) P: Jeans?
(12) W: Yeah.

Extract 2 (Exchange between a doctor and a group of medical students)

(1) D: and let’s gather round. the first of the infants – now what I want you to do is make a basic. neo-natal examination just as Dr Mathews has to do as soon as a baby arrives in the ward. all right so you are actually going to get your hands on the infant. and look at the key points and demonstrate them to the group as you’re doing it will you do that for me please. off you go
(2) S: well first of all I'm going to first. before you do
(3) D: that is do wash your hands isn't it I cos you've just been examining another
baby (long silence) are you still in a are you in a position to start examining yet ()
(4) S: just going to remove this .
(5) D: very good it's outing it back that's the problem isn't it eh -
(6) S: come back Mum -
(7) D: that's right. Ok now just get a little more room by shifting baby . er up the .
thing a bit more that's very good . well now . off you go and describe what's
going on
(8) S: well here's a young baby boy . who we've decided is . thirty . thirty seven weeks
old now . was born . two weeks ago . um is fairly active . his er eyes are open .
he's got hair on . his head this eyes are open
(9) D: yes yes you've
told me that
(10) S: um he's crying or making
(11) D: yeah we we we've heard
that now what other examination are you going to make I mean -
(12) S: erm we'll see if he'll respond to
(13) D: now look . did we not
look at a baby with a head problem yesterday .
(14) S: right
(15) D: and might you not make one examination of the head
almost at square one . before you begin .
(16) S: feel for the ( )
(17) D: now what the next most important thing .
(18) S: gross motor function
(19) D: well now come down to the mouth
don't we.
(20) S: yes
(21) D: now what about the mouth

Extract 3 (Simulated job interview)

Interviewer: What about the library interests you most?
C2: What about the library in terms of the books? or the whole building?
Interviewer: Any point that you'd like to …
C2: Oh, the children's books, because I have a child, and the children … you
know there's so many you know books for them to read you know, and little
things that would interest them would interest me too.

Extract 4 (Lancaster Guardian, 12 September 1982)

Quarry load-shedding problem
UNSHEETED lorries from Middlebarrow Quarry were still causing problems by shedding stones on their journey through Warton village, members of the parish council heard at their September meeting.

The council's observations have been sent to the quarry management and members are hoping to see an improvement.
Extract 5 (Daily Mail, 1 June 1982)

The Paras’ new leader
He’ll do his job well says major’s wife

The wife of the new CO of the 2nd Parachute Battalion spoke last night of her fears for her husband’s safety.
As she played in the sunshine with her four children, Jenny Keeble said she hoped her husband would not have to go into battle again.
She said: “I pray he and his men have done enough. But if they do go on I know that he is a man who will do his job to the best of his ability and I am certain he and the 2nd Parachute Battalion will succeed.

Major Christopher Keeble, a 40-year-old devout Roman Catholic, is to succeed Colonel Herbert Jones who died leading his men against an Argentine machine-gun post in the battle for Goose Green.

Yesterday Jenny Keeble’s family and friends gathered around in the garden of her old vicarage home – a rambling Tudor building at Maddington on Salisbury Plain – for a picnic afternoon as she tried to maintain an air of normality for the children’s sake.


(1) Q: Mr. Ehrlichman, prior to the luncheon recess you stated that in your opinion, the entry into the Ellsberg psychiatrist’s office was legal because of national security reasons. I think that was your testimony.
(2) A: Yes
(3) Q: Have you always maintained that position?
(4) A: Well, I don’t know -
(5) Q: Well, do you recall when we had our first interview in my office, and we discussed this issue you expressed shock that such a thing had occurred, and indicated that you had informed Mr. Young or Mr. Krogh to see that this thing should not happen again but you did not take any action such as ordering the firing these people because of the general sensitive issues that were involved. Do you recall that?
(6) A: Well, that is not on the ground of illegality, Mr. Dash. I do not think you asked me at that time whether – what my legal opinion was, for whatever it was worth. What you were asking me was what I did, and that is what I did.
(7) Q: Well, if it was legal you would ordinarily have approved it would you not?
(8) A: Well, no, the thing that troubled me about it was that it was totally unanticipated. Unauthorized by me
(9) Q: Who was it authorized by?
(10) A: Well, I am under the impression that it was authorized by Mr. Krogh, but it is not based on any personal knowledge.
(11) Q: Well, no, as a matter of fact, Mr. Ehrlichman, did you not personally approve in advance a covert entry into the Ellsberg psychiatrist office for the purpose of gaining access to the psychoanalyst’s reports?
(12) A: I approved a covert investigation. Now, if a covert entry means a breaking and entering the answer to your question, no.

Extract 7 (Simulated interview between a headmaster and a youth)

(1) H: Why didn’t you go straight down Queen Street?
(2) Y: I’m not walking down there with a load of coons from St Hilda’s coming out of school.
(3) H: Why’s that?
(4) Y: Well that’s obvious, isn’t it? I don’t want to get belted.
(5) H: Well there isn’t usually any bother in Queen Street, is there?
(6) Y: No. None of us white kids usually go down there, do we?
What about that bust-up in the Odeon carpark at Christmas?
(7) H: That was nearly a year ago, and I’m not convinced you lot were as innocent as you made out. So when you got to the square, why did you wait around for quarter of an hour instead of going home?
(8) Y: I thought my mate might come down that way after work. Anyway, we always go down the square after school.

Extract 8 (True Story Summer Special, 1986)

His kind of loving …

Driving rain almost obscured the wooded hills as I made my way along the winding roads towards the village where I had my craft shop.

As I drove over the bridge and towards the shop I was excited about Geoff’s arrival that afternoon. I hadn’t seen him since I’d left Hampshire for Scotland three months before.

Geoff had been annoyed. ‘I can see there’s no use my trying to change your mind, Carrie. Go ahead, move to Scotland and open your shop.’

‘We can be married next year,’ I pleaded. ‘I have to take this chance of running my own business, Geoff.’

‘Just when I think you’re going to settle down, you get this hare-brained idea.’

I sighed as I remembered our conversation …

Extract 9 (Blue Jeans, No. 488, 24 May 1986)

Need someone to talk to? We’re always willing to listen. You can write to us, Dave and Lesley, at:

Blue Jeans, P. O. Box No. 305,
London NW1 ITX. Please enclose a stamped, addressed envelope if you’d like a personal reply.

Embarrassed By Boys

Please help me. I’m 13 and whenever there’s a boy on TV, and my mum’s in the room I get really embarrassed. I’ve never been out with anyone even though Mum says I’m quite pretty. How can I get over this problem?

Worried BJ fan, Chester.

Most people – girls as well as boys – go through a phase of feeling nervous with the opposite sex. It happens because all of a sudden boys aren’t just friends any more – they’re people you fancy and think about going out with.

The secret is to relax and try to still look on the boys you know as friends. You’ll find you get on much better with boys if you’re not always worrying about how you look – it’s much more important to have fun. Don’t worry that you haven’t been out with anyone yet – you’ve got plenty of time!

Lesley
Extract 10 (Mein Kampf)

As a whole, and at all times, the efficiency of the truly national leader consists primarily in preventing the division of attention of a people, and always concentrating it on a single enemy. The more uniformly the fighting will of a people is put into action, the greater will be the magnetic force of the movement and the more powerful the impetus of the blow. It is part of the genius of a great leader to make adversaries of different fields appear as always belonging to one category only, because to weak and unstable characters the knowledge that there are various enemies will lead only too easily to incipient doubts as to their own cause.

As soon as the wavering masses find themselves confronted with too many enemies, objectivity at once steps in, and the question is raised whether actually all the others are wrong and their own nation or their own movement alone is right.

Also with this comes the first paralysis of their own strength. Therefore, a number of essentially different enemies must always be regarded as one in such a way that in the opinion of the mass of one's own adherents the war is being waged against one enemy alone. This strengthens the belief in one's own cause and increases one's bitterness against the attacker.

Extract 11 (7 Days, June 1986)

Thatcher's fortress family

The left has been occupied of late grappling with shifts on the economic and industrial terrain. Too preoccupied, it seems, to focus any attention on another area that is also under reconstruction: the family.

Last week Thatcher, Gillick and the Mary Whitehouse posse closed ranks to launch a further onslaught on the 'permissive society.'

The demands for cheap, part-time semi-skilled labour in non-unionised industries is ensuring women's 'right to work.' Many women have no choice but to work, as men are increasingly unable to provide a 'family wage.'

However, as the state skulks off through the back door, one meddling hand remains to ensure that a 'good, moral' sex education, emphasizing a diet of 'self-restraint' and 'stable family life' will act as salvation to all potential hippies and homosexuals.

Extract 12 (The Times, 20 May 1982)

THE STILL SMALL VOICE OF TRUTH

Since the invasion of the Falklands on April 2, there has been the sound of many voices. Yet at the heart of the matter, it was an evil thing, an injustice, an aggression. Nobody disputes that. Even loyal Argentines – let alone Argentina's apologists – accept that force should not have been used to prosecute the Argentine case. But force was used; and it was not necessary. Beneath the roll of Argentine drums there are voices, however small, however still, which say that too, and they recognize that the unity achieved by the junta in Buenos Aires may only be a passing one, since it was born of an injustice. Unity in Britain, on the other hand, is based on recognition of the invasion as an incontrovertibly evil act. Obviously there have been disagreements about the method of coping with that evil, but there should recognition that to compromise with evil – to appease it – is to run the risk of having to share responsibility for it. How we react to evil must therefore be conditioned by the need to compromise with it as little as possible, while taking care to see that our reaction to it does not compound the original evil.
Extract 13 (Simulated police woman-man interview)

(1) PW: can I help you?
(2) M: oh . yes . police?
(3) PW: yes-
(4) M: reckon you can help me can you? .
(5) PW: yes
(6) M: are you a police lady? good
(7) PW: (unclear) what's the problem?
(8) M: I've got to . renew my car licence…

Extract 14 (Consultation between a doctor and a patient from BBC2, 8 August 1986)

P: she said that I could she thought that it might be possible to me for me to go to a council flat
D: right yes yeah
P: but she said it’s a very em she wasn’t pushing it because . my mother’s got to sign
D: hm
a whole lot of things and e: . she said it’s difficult and em
D: hm hm hm
. there’s no rush over it . I I don’t know whether . I mean one thing they say AA is that you shouldn’t change anything . for
D: hm
a year
D: hm yes I think I think that’s wise . I think that’s wise (5-second pause) well look I’d like to
keep you know seeing you keep . you know hearing how things are going from time to time if that’s possible
P: yeah
D: you know if you like to pop in once every em . two weeks or so
P: yes
D: and just let me know of how things are getting on

Extract 15 (Good English – The Language of Success, 1979)

How A Command of Good English Will Bring You New Recognition And Success

Language – the everyday act of speaking and writing, of reading and thinking – plays a much more important part in our daily lives than we usually realise. Indeed, it is a success “secret” of most outstanding men and women.

This booklet describes a new, unique way to improve your English, to increase your business and social success, to find new power of thought and expression, and to get more out of life.

Command Respect

You will learn in detail how to dominate and influence every situation simply by using the right words at the right time. What’s more, you can confidently look forward to ending boredom and frustration and gaining the attention and respect that win friends and influence people.

Yes, a command of good English is the most important single aid you could have in your search for success.
Extract 16 (Student-experimenter exchange taken from Garfinkel, 1967: 42)

(S): I had a flat tire
(E): What do you mean, you had a flat tire
(S): What do you mean? What do you mean? A flat tire is a flat tire. That is what I meant. Nothing special. What a crazy question?

Extract 17 (Interview between Margaret Thatcher and Michael Charlton) (Extract from BBC Radio 3, 17 December 1985) NB: (cf. Appendix B)

Extract 18 (The Miele advert text)

The Miele Washing Machine
Think of it as a load off your mind

Miele
Anything else is a compromise

Imagine a washing machine that’s easy to use. More economical, more efficient. More reliable. And more durable. One that really cares for your wash. That washing machine is waiting for you. The Miele, Manufactured to the highest standards of German engineering, your Miele washing machine is designed to make life is easy for you.
Everything about it is functional from features that save you energy and money to its unique enamelled casing, that keeps your Miele looking as beautiful as its performance.
See the Miele washing machine at your nearest Miele Specialist. You’ll find no more wash-day worries.

Miele
Anything is a compromise
As professionals, your family doctor, dentist, pharmacist, optician, district nurse, health visitor and midwife are concerned to make the service they provide even better.

Collectively, the services they offer are known as Primary Health Care. And each and every day over a million of us use them.

The government has put forward a discussion paper called ‘Primary Health Care’ to act as an agenda for public debate.

We spend over £5,000 million a year on these services. Yet they have never been comprehensively reviewed in all their forty year history. Until now.

Basically, its objective is to raise standards and make services more responsive to the changing needs of the people who pay for them.

You.

To find out exactly what’s being proposed, fill in the coupon for a leaflet or write to us.

It’s your Health Service and we need your views on how to make it even better.

To Primary Health Care, Curzon House, 20-24 Lonsdale Road, London, NW6 6RD

Please send me the leaflet ‘Primary Health Care.’

Name: 
Address:

Primary Health Care
WW1 ISSUED BY DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND SOCIAL SECURITY
2. The supervisor (S) establishes rapport with the client (C), who may be very nervous about the interview. This will be easier if S maintains good day-to-day contacts with C. They may chat briefly about common interests, so that status barriers are reduced, and C is ready to talk freely.

3. It may be necessary for S to explain that there is a problem – C has been persistently late so that production has fallen, C has been getting very low marks, etc. This should be done by stating objective facts, not by passing judgement, and should be done in manner that is pleasant rather than cross.

4. S now invites C to say what he thinks about the situation, what he thinks the reason for it is. This may involve a certain amount of probing for fuller information, if C is reluctant to open up. S is sympathetic, and shows that he wants to understand C’s position. S may ask C whether he thinks the situation is satisfactory; in an appraisal interview he can ask C to evaluate his own performance. C may produce new information, which explains the cause of the trouble, and suggests how it can be tackled; the interview could then end at this point.

7. … if further interviews become necessary, sterner means of influence may have to be resorted to. Most Ss are in a position to control material sanctions such as bonuses, promotions, and finally dismissal. S will not usually want to sack C – what he wants is to keep him but make him behave differently. The possible use of such sanctions should first be mentioned reluctantly as a rather remote possibility. – for example by the quite objective statement, ‘There are several other people who would like this job’, or, ‘I may have to tell the people who pay your grant about your progress’.

8. The interview should end with a review of what has been agreed, the constructive steps that have been decided upon, when S and C will meet again to discuss progress, and so on. The meeting should end on as friendly as possible.
Family Income Supplement: If you work and have children, you should know about Family Income Supplement – FIS for short. FIS means more money for families on low earnings.

**Who can get it?**

You can claim if you are single, married or living with someone as if you are husband and wife – it doesn’t matter which one of you is working.

You can get FIS if you work for an employee or if you are self-employed.

**And these things free**

- school meals
- milk and vitamins
- prescriptions
- dental treatment
- glasses
- hospital travel for treatment

**More Money**

How much money you get depends on your income, how many children you have and how old they are. The less you earn, the more FIS you get. A family with one child under 11 could get from £20 to £25.30. With two or more children it could be more. FIS is paid at the same amount every week for a year. And it’s tax free.

**Claim FIS if you can answer YES to these three questions**

1. **Do you have any children under 19?**
   You can get FIS for any children under 16, or under 19 if they still attend courses up to and including A levels.

2. **Do you or your partner work full time?**
   By full time we mean at least 30 hours a week. If you are bringing up children on your own, by you or your partner, or 24 hours a week if you are bringing up children on your own.

3. **Is your total weekly income less than £86.95 plus…**
   £11.65 for each child under 11, £12.65 for each child 11-15, £13.65 for each child 16 or over? For example, if you have one child aged 8 and one aged 14 you may be able to get FIS if your total weekly income is less than £111.25 (£86.95 + £11.65 + £12.65). To work out your total weekly income:
   Add: up your and your partner’s earnings before tax, national insurance and other deductions have been taken off. You can’t get FIS if all your children are 16 or over and have left school.

   **Prescriptions**
   - hospital travel for treatment
   - dental treatment
   - glasses
   - milk and vitamins
   - school meals

**How to claim**

You do not have to go to a social security office to claim. FIS claims are dealt with by post. Fill in the claim form and send it to:

**FIS, Freepost, Blackpool FY2 OYA**
Telephone: 0253-52311

What you put on the form is private and confidential. Claim as soon as you can, or you may lose money.
Family Income Supplement

Please give details for yourself and your one-parent family, tell us about you and your children. Please write clearly in CAPITALS. There is a space at the end for you to give extra information.

1 START HERE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MAN</th>
<th>WOMAN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Title</td>
<td>Mr/Mrs/Miss/Ms</td>
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<td>Surname</td>
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<tr>
<td>Other names</td>
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<tr>
<td>Date of birth</td>
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<tr>
<td>National Insurance (NI) number</td>
<td>Letters Numbers Letter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Postal address and Postcode</td>
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</tbody>
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Do you have a FIS book now? No [ ] Yes [ ]

If you ticked No, please answer this question have you had FIS in the last 4 weeks? no [ ] yes [ ]

If you ticked Yes, please answer this question what is the number on the cover of the book? ……………………

At which Post Office would you like to get FIS? give address

Is your (and your partner’s) permanent home in the UK? No [ ] Yes [ ]

Are you a one-parent family? No [ ] Yes [ ]

If your are claiming FIS as a couple but your partner lives at a different address, please explain why.

Please give details of the children who you want to claim FIS for. Generally that means children under 19 who live with you. You cannot include:

- children who are 16 or over if they have left school.
- children who you do not provide for.
- children who the Council gives you a boarding allowances for.
You can include:

- children who are not your own, so long as you provide for them.
- children who normally live with you but are in home or at boarding school.

If you (or your partner) are pregnant, when is the baby due?

Now go on to section 2 on the next page

**Extract 22 (Client-therapist interview)**

1. **CL:** It all comes pretty vague. But you know I keep, keep having the thought occur to me that this whole process for me is kind of like examining pieces of a jigsaw puzzle. It seems to me I, I’m in the process now of examining the individual pieces which really don’t have too much meaning. Probably handling them, not even beginning to think of a pattern. That keeps coming to me. And it’s interesting to me because I, I really don’t like jigsaw puzzles. They’ve always irritated me. But that’s my feeling. And I mean I pick up little pieces (T gestures throughout this conversation to illustrate CL’s statements) with absolutely no meaning except I mean the, the feeling that you get from simply handling them without seeing them as a pattern, but just from the touch, I probably feel, well it is going to fit someplace here.

2. **T:** And that at the moment that, that’s the process, just getting the feel and the shape and the configuration of the different pieces with a little bit of background feeling of, yeah they’ll probably fit somewhere, but most of the attention’s focused right on, ‘What does this feel like? And what’s its texture?’

3. **CL:** That’s right. There’s almost something physical in it. A —

4. **T:** You can’t quite describe it without using your hands. A real, almost a sensuous sense in —

5. **CL:** That’s right. Again, it’s, it’s a feeling of being very objective, and yet I’ve never been quite so close to myself.

6. **T:** Almost at one and the same time standing off and looking at yourself and yet somehow being closer to yourself that way than —

7. **CL:** M-hm. And yet for the first time in months I am not thinking about my problems. I’m not actually, I’m not working on them.

8. **T:** I get the impression you don’t sort of sit down to work on ‘my problems’. It isn’t that feeling at all.

9. **CL:** That’s right. That’s right. I suppose what I, what I mean actually is that I’m not sitting down to put this puzzle together as, as something, I’ve got to see the picture. It, it may be that, it may that I am actually enjoying this feeling process. Or I’m certainly learning something.

10. **T:** At least there’s a sense of the immediate goal of getting that feel as being the thing, not that you’re doing this in order to see a picture, but that it’s a, a satisfaction of really getting acquainted with each piece. Is that —

11. **CL:** That’s it. That’s it. And it still becomes that sort of sensuousness, that touching. It’s quite interesting.

12. **T:** A rather different sort of experience.

13. **CL:** Yes. Quite.
Extract 23 (Employment Counselling)

(1) CL: the other thing that’s difficult is if I don’t succeed in getting this job I think the real difficulty will actually be at . staying where I am . I mean if I don’t get it I’m almost tempted to resign . become unemployed.
(2) C: well there’s e . have you talked to your husband about this
(3) CL: e:m . in passing yes . I’ve threatened it on more than one occasion . we could . afford it . for a short period . because of an inheritance . literally I mean just mean just pure coincidence e:m . in normal circumstances no .
C: mhm
(4) C: wel then . that’s your call . it would be sad because it is much easier to get a job (CL: mhm) from a job . so . if you have the chance or the opportunity . to . stay . and . grit your teeth then that would be very good . and have you considered that by handling . the emotional stress . and the hassle from . ignoring and . almost being crucified (by) the other people that you actually grow and mature as a person —
(5) CL: I recognize that as an objective statement but I’m not sure if I recognize it when it becomes subjective .
(6) P: are you telling her there Michael that suffering’s good for you .
(7) C: e:m good question I’m not sure how to handle that myself e: good question

Extract 24 (Outwrite No. 52, November 1986)

Misogynist hysteria unleashed over Molesworth rapes

Three women were raped at Molesworth peace camp over the past 12 months, as reported in Outwrite no. 50. The four known rapists have been and still remain, active in peace circles. Meanwhile, sections of the peace movement agonies, with little apparent success, over how to effectively deal with male violence and feminist anger. In addition, the demand made by the rape survivors and their supporters that Molesworth peace camp be closed altogether, in recognition of the crimes against women committed there, crimes which have gone ignored, trivialised and even disbelieved, remain unmet.

Predictably, the response of some male pacifists exposes rampant misogyny. An examination of some of the letters published in recent issues of Peace News speak for themselves. Opinions range the spectrum of typical patriarchal reaction – disbelief at the occurrence of the rapes; likening the efforts of the women to close the peace camp to those of the Tory MPs and bailiffs; condemnations of the ‘violence’ of the women for taking direct action at Molesworth in protest; accusations that the women are dividing the peace movement, and so on. Almost all objectors withdraw support from Peace News for what they describe as its biased, ignorant and


The causes of the anger, ie. the rapes of the women by individual men, seem to have been forgotten and buried as accusing fingers point at the women who, in their anger, destroyed some property at camp and spray painted bunks and caravans. After all, violence against property must be punished, while violence against women, the commonest crime of all, continues to go unnoticed.

What is being displayed is the paucity of understanding of issues surrounding rape male violence against women and women’s anger. Can non-violent strategies work effectively against individual acts of male violence against women? The failure of the peace movement to handle the bailiffs they are becoming? Fear renews, is the man trembling?

This self-opinionated bigot then suggests that both peace and feminist movements take a long very hard look at what they are doing, and also, that male violence must be dealt with. But how? No strategies are offered. Must we conclude that communally sipping camomile tea by the camp fire is the true expression of harmonious fraternal relations?

The rape survivors, and supporters, themselves are terrified, and continue their campaign, addressing meetings, forcing the issue and getting an inevitably mixed response of abuse (they have been compared to the NFI!) and support. CND groups are being asked to stop
offensive stance on the issue. The stance in question is PN’s support for the women demanding the closure of the camp. However, PN’s non-editorial stand on this would seem to be contradicted by their decision to publish offensive, anti-woman statements in their letters pages. PN comments, that they see their role as ‘seeking to change these views (misinformed misogynist views on rape) by allowing open debate whilst making our positions clear in the editorial statements.’ They go on to claim that suppression of such views would alienate rather bring about changes, a position that is at once questionable and potentially dangerous. The protesting women are angry, declaring that PN has violated its own anti-sexist policy. Still, it is clear that these virulent attacks on the women, disguised as moral outrage, reveal fear at women’s anger.

ment to work out effective strategies, strategies that permit expression of anger rather than containment of it, is emerging.

Perhaps the most offensive letter published in Peace News 17th October, is the drivel delivered by Keith Ollett who protests that ‘Molesworth is becoming the scapegoat for all rapes against all wimmin throughout time’, and goes on to whine about the women who want to close the camp and who ‘are trying to enforce that with violence’ (our italics). ‘…Instead of diminishing, the violence and anger of the women is growing. It seems venting their rage and grief, rather than helping them and healing them, is damaging these angry wimmin even more. Instead of dispersing in destruction, they are drawing strength from that destruction, a dreadful, fearful strength… are the angry wimmin acknowledging the vigilantes, the lynch mobs, supporting Molesworth peace camp, which continues to function as a mixed camp, and a proposal is to be put to CND National conference in mid-November asking that groups withdraw support. CND office has expressed its deep concern and has claimed that since it doesn’t set up peace camps, it is not empowered to close them, but ‘condemns unequivocally all violence.’ The outcome remains to be seen. That the issue is now being debated and is even on agenda of the CND National Conference is a victory in itself. But only partial, considering the overwhelming reaction that the women had to battle with, and the fact that the rapists remain free.

Shaila

Contact the rape survivors and supporters at: Kari, c/o Box MW, 3 Fletchers Terrace, Cambridge

Extract 25 (The British Code of Advertising Practice 1)

All advertisements should be legal, decent, honest and truthful.

Extract 26 (The British Code of Advertising Practice 2)

The Code’s rules on truthful presentation place no constraint upon the free expression of opinion, including subjective assessments of the quality or desirability of products, provided always that
- it is clear what is being expressed is opinion;
- there is no likelihood of the opinion or the way it is expressed misleading consumers about any matter in respect of which objective assessment, upon a generally accepted basis, is practicable.

Extract 27 (The British Code of Advertising Practice 3)

No advertisement should cause children to believe that they will be inferior to other children, or unpopular with them, if they do not buy a particular product, or have it bought for them.

Exemplar 5. 7: Critical Linguistics (Critical Language Study/Critical Discourse Analysis)

The approach to language which will be adopted here will be called critical language study, or CLS for short. Critical is used in the special sense of aiming to show up connections which may be hidden from people – such as the connections between language, power and ideology … CLS analyses social interactions in a way which focuses upon their linguistic elements, and which sets out to show up their generally hidden determinants in the system of social relationships … Ultimately, CLS is probably best understood not just as another
approach to language study which complements those I have referred to by highlighting issues which they intend to ignore, but as an alternative orientation to language study which implies a different demarcation of language study into approaches or branches, different relationships between them, and different orientations within each of them … One aspect of power is the capacity to impose and maintain a particular structuring of some domain or other – a particular way of dividing it into parts, of keeping the parts demarcated from each other … Mainstream linguistics has imposed such a structuring on language study … and ‘linguistics proper’ is privileged within this structuring of language study. All of the other approaches tend to be regarded as sub-disciplines which extend the results of ‘linguistics proper’ in various specialized directions – though sometimes they resist such subordination … From a critical perspective, this is unsatisfactory … It is not, however, within the scope of the present book to put forward a fully-fledged alternative to mainstream linguistics (LP, pp. 5, 13 and 14).

Exemplar 5.8: Language

It is not just that language has become perhaps the primary medium of social control and power, though that is noteworthy enough; language has grown dramatically in terms of the uses it is required to serve, in terms of the range of language varieties, and in terms of the complexity of the language capacities that are expected of the modern citizen. If, as I shall argue, ideology is pervasively present in language, that fact ought to mean that the ideological nature of language should be one of the major themes of modern social science. Language is therefore important enough to merit the attention of all citizens. In particular, so far as this book is concerned, nobody who has an interest in modern society, and certainly nobody who has an interest in relationships of power in modern society, can afford to ignore language … This section develops the argument that, for CLS, the conception of language we need is that of discourse, language as a form of social practice … [L]anguage is both a site of and a stake in class struggle (LP, pp. 3, 20 and 35).

Exemplar 5.9: Ideology

Ideologies are closely linked to power, because the nature of the ideological assumptions embedded in particular conventions, and so the nature of those conventions themselves, depends on the power relations which underlie the conventions; and because they are a means of legitimizing existing social relations and differences of power … Ideologies are closely linked to language, because using language is the commonest form of social behaviour … But despite its importance for language, the concept of ‘ideology’ has rarely figured in discussions of language and power … Ideology is the prime means of manufacturing consent … But a more significant factor is ideology. Institutional practices which people draw upon without thinking often embody assumptions which directly or indirectly legitimize existing power relations. Practices which appear to be universal and commonsensical can often be shown to originate in the dominant class or the dominant bloc … I stressed the importance of ideology in the way in which various social institutions contribute to sustaining the position of the dominant class … Ideology is most effective when its workings are least visible (LP, pp. 2, 4, 33, 36 and 85).

Exemplar 5.10: Discourse

I shall use the term discourse to refer to discoursal action, to actual talk or writing, and the term practice will be used in a parallel way … I shall also use discourse when there is no risk of ambiguity to refer to a convention, a type of discourse (e.g. the discourse of police interviews). Where the meaning may be unclear, I shall use instead discourse type, or discourse conventions. Discourse and practice are constrained not by various independent types of discourse and practice, but by interdependent networks which we can call ‘orders’ – orders of discourse and social orders … For example, we find ‘conversation’ as a discourse type in various orders of discourse, associated with various social institutions … How discourses
are structured in a given order of discourse, and how structurings change over time, are
determined by changing relationships of power at the level of the social institution of the
society. Power at these levels includes the capacity to control orders of discourse; one
aspect of such control is ideological … Modern society is characterized by a rather high
degree of integration of social institutions into the business of maintaining class domination
… There are for instance certain key discourse types which embody ideologies which
legitimize … existing societal relations, and which are so salient in modern society that they
have ‘colonized’ many institutional orders of discourse. They include advertising discourse,
and the discourses of interviewing and counselling/therapy … As well as being determined
by social structures, discourse has effects upon social structures … It is because the
relationship between discourse and social structures is dialectical in this way that discourse
assumes such importance in terms of power relationships and power struggle (LP, pp. 29,
30, 36 and 37).

Exemplar 5. 11: Power

It is important to emphasize that I am not suggesting power is just a matter of language …
Power exists in various modalities, including the concrete and unmistakable modality of
physical force. It is a fact, if a sad fact, that power is often enough exercised through
depriving people of their … homes, and their lives, as recent events in … South Africa have
reminded us … [T]hese three chapters present the main elements of the position which I
am adopting in this book on the place of language in society: that language is centrally
involved in power, and struggles for power … The way in which orders of discourse are
structured, and the ideologies which they embody, are determined by relationships of power
in particular social institutions … The relationship between social classes starts in economic
production, but extends to all parts of a society. The power of the capitalist class depends
also on its ability to control the state … I shall assume that the state is the key in
maintaining the dominance of the capitalist class, and controlling the working class. This
political power is typically exercised not just by capitalists, but by an alliance of capitalists
and others who see their interests tied to capital … We can refer to this alliance as the
dominant bloc … Ideological power, the power to project one’s practices as universal and
‘common sense’, is a significant complement to economic and political power … There are
power relations between social groupings in institutions … and there are power relations
between women and men, between ethnic groupings, between young and old, which are not
specific to particular institutions … Power relations are always relations of struggle (LP, pp.
3, 17, 31, 32-33, 34 and 36).

Exemplar 5. 12: Text

Let us turn now to the second implication of regarding language as social practice – that
language is a social process – and approach it through looking at what differentiates
discourse from text. I shall be making extensive use of the term text, and shall use the term
as the linguist Michael Halliday does, for both written texts and ‘spoken texts’; a spoken text
is simply what is said in a piece of spoken discourse, but I shall generally use the term for a
written transcription of what is said. A text is a product rather than a process – a product of
the process of text production. But I shall use the term discourse to refer to the whole
process of social interaction of which a text is just a part … What one ‘sees’ in a text, what
one regards as worth describing, and what one chooses to emphasize … are all dependent
on how one interprets a text. There is positivist … tendency to regard language texts as
‘objects’ whose formal properties can be mechanically described without interpretation …
Even when texts are essentially verbal … talk is interwoven with gesture, facial expression,
movement, posture, [etc] … Let’s call them collectively visuals … When we think of written,
printed, filmed, or televised material, the significance of visuals is far more obvious. Indeed,
the traditional opposition between spoken and ‘written’ language has been overtaken by
events, and a much more helpful terminology in modern society would be spoken as
opposed to visual language …
The operation of ideology can be seen in terms of ways of constructing texts which constantly and cumulatively 'impose assumptions' upon text interpreters and text producers, typically without either being aware of it … [I]nvisibility is achieved when ideologies are brought to discourse not as explicit elements of the text, but as the background assumptions which on the one hand lead the text producer to 'textualize' the world in a particular way, and on the other hand lead the interpreters to interpret the text in a particular way. Texts do not spout ideology. They so position the interpreter through their cues that she brings ideologies to the interpretation of texts – and reproduces them in the process … Among the various forms which social struggle may take, it is ideological struggle that is of particular concern … We can think of such struggle as not only in language in the obvious sense that it takes place in discourse and is evidenced in language texts, but also over language … Relations of synonymy [are] ideologically determined, and in fact meaning relations can often be regarded as relative to particular ideologies; either the ideology embedded in a discourse type, or the ideology being creatively generated in a text (LP, pp. 24, 27-28, 83, 85, 88 and 115-116).

Exemplar 5.13: Intertextuality

Discourses and texts which occur within them have histories, they belong to historical series, and interpretation of intertextual context is a matter of deciding which series a text belongs to, and therefore what can be taken as common ground for participants … Since texts always exist in intertextual relations with other texts, it is arguable that they are always ‘dialogic’, a property which is sometimes referred to under the general heading intertextuality … The concept of intertextual context requires us to view discourse and texts from a historical perspective, in contrast with the more usual position in language studies which would regard a text as analysable without reference to other texts, in abstraction from its historical context (LP, pp. 152 and 155).

Exemplar 5.14: Subject positions (Social subjects/Identities)

The discourse types of the classroom set up subject positions for teachers and pupils, and it is only by 'occupying' these positions that one becomes a teacher or a pupil. Occupying a subject position is essentially a matter of doing (or not doing) certain things, in line with the discursal rights and obligations of teachers and pupils – what each is allowed and required to say, within that particular discourse type. So this is a case where social structure, in the particular form of discourse conventions, determines discourse. But it is also the case that in occupying particular subject positions, teachers and pupils reproduce them; it is only through being occupied that these positions continue to be a part of social structure. So discourse in turn determines and reproduces social structure … Social subjects are constrained to operate within the subject position set up in discourse types … and are in that sense passive; but it is only through being so constrained that they are made able to act as social agents … Reproduction may be basically conservative, sustaining continuity, or basically transformatory, effecting changes … In terms of reproduction, we can say that, for example, the teacher-pupil relations, and the teacher and pupil positions, embedded in educational discourse types are directly reproduced in educational discourse, while the same discourse indirectly reproduces class relations (LP, pp. 38, 39 and 40).

Exemplar 5.15: Utterances

Anglo-American pragmatics is closely associated with analytical philosophy, particularly with the work of Austin and Searle on ‘speech acts.’ The key insight is that language can be seen as a form of action: that spoken or written utterances constitute the performance of speech acts such as promising, or asking or asserting or warning; or, on a different plane, referring to people or things, presupposing the existence of people or things or the truth of propositions, and implicating meanings which are not overtly expressed. The idea of
uttering as acting is an important one, and it is also central to CLS … Pragmatics is
[however] limited in having been mainly developed with reference to single invented
utterances rather than real extended discourse, and central notions like ‘speech act’ have
turned out to be problematic when people try to use them to analyse real discourse … The
second level of interpretation is a matter of assigning meanings to the constituent parts of a
text, which I refer to as ‘utterances’, using that term in a loose sense. In some cases, but not
always, utterances … correspond to sentences, or to semantic ‘propositions.’ (LP, pp. 9-10
and 143).

Exemplar 5.16: Postmodernism

Some people refer to ‘the linguistic turn’ in social theory – though more recently, writers on
postmodernism have claimed that visual images are ousting language, and have referred to
postmodernist culture as ‘post-linguistic.’ It is not just that language has become perhaps
the primary medium of social control and power, though that is noteworthy enough;
language has grown dramatically in terms of the uses it is required to serve, in terms of the
range of language varieties, and in terms of the complexity of the language capacities that
are expected of the modern citizen … The combination of verbal and visual elements to
constitute texts is becoming increasingly important in our society, and advertising is at the
forefront of it. Television as a medium produces only such composite texts, but
advertisements in printed materials also give ever greater emphasis to them … The salience
of the images has been taken to be one of the main characteristics of contemporary
‘postmodern’ culture (LP, p. 3, 207 and 208).

Part II Data Exemplars – The PC

Exemplar 5.17: The PC’s Areas of Focus

The object of this study is the condition of knowledge in the most highly developed
societies … [Thus it] place[s][this condition][in the context of the crisis of narratives.
Science has always been in conflict with narratives … A portion of [our] description would
necessarily be conjectural. At any rate, we know that it is unwise to put too much faith in
futurology. Rather than painting a picture that would remain incomplete, I will take as my
point of departure a single feature, one that immediately defines our object of study.
Scientific knowledge is a kind of discourse.

And it is fair to say that for the last forty years the “leading” sciences and technologies
have had to do with language: phonology and theories of linguistics, problems of
communication and cybernetics, modern theories of algebra and informatics, computers
and their languages … problems of information storage and data banks, telematics and the
perfection of intelligent terminals, paradoxology.

These technological transformations can be expected to have a considerable impact on
knowledge. Its two principal functions – research and the transmission of acquired learning
– are already feeling the effect … With respect to the first function, genetics provides an
example that is accessible to the layman: it owes its theoretical paradigm to cybernetics …
As for the second function, it is common knowledge that the miniaturization and
commercialization of machines is already changing the way in which learning is acquired,
classified … and exploited … Along with the hegemony of computers comes a certain
logic, and therefore a certain set of prescriptions determining which statements are
accepted as “knowledge” statements.

In the postindustrial and postmodern age, science will maintain and no doubt strengthen its
pre-eminence in the arsenal of productive capacities of the nation-states … This scenario,
akin to the one that goes by the name “the computerization of society” … makes no claims
of being original, or even true … The scenario of the computerization of the most highly
developed societies allows us to spotlight … certain aspects of the transformation of
knowledge … [I]t is hard to see what other direction contemporary technology could take as an alternative to the computerization of society. When we examine the current status of scientific knowledge … the question of double legitimation … comes to the fore … Where, after the metanarratives, can legitimacy reside? … Postmodern knowledge is not simply a tool of the authorities … it reinforces our ability to tolerate the incommensurable (The PC, pp. xxiii, xxv, 3-4, 5, 6-7, 8).

Exemplar 5. 18: Underlying Theoretical Assumptions of The PC

Lyotard … ingeniously “saves” the coherence of scientific research and experiment by recasting its now-seemingly non- or postreferential “epistemology” in terms of linguistics, and in particular of theory of the performative (J. L. Austin) … What is most striking in Lyotard’s differentiation between story-telling and “scientific” abstraction is its unexpected modulation towards a Nietzschean thematics of history … Wittgenstein writes: “Our language can be seen as an ancient city: a maze of little streets and squares” … Wittgenstein’s strength is that he … outlined in his investigation of language games a kind of legitimation not based on performativity.

Gödel has effectively established the existence in the arithmetic system of a proposition that is neither demonstrable nor refutable within that system, this entails that the arithmetic fails to satisfy the condition of completeness … The advent of quantum mechanics and atomic physics has limited the range of the applicability of this principle in two ways, the respective implications of which differ in scope.

Quantum theory and microphysics require a far more radical revision of the idea of a continuous and predictable path. The quest for precision is not limited by its cost, but by the very nature of matter. It is not true that uncertainty (lack of control) decreases as accuracy goes up: it goes down as well.

Mandelbrot shows that data of this kind describe curves similar to those of continuous functions for which no derivatives exists … Because their relevant dimension of self-similarity is a fraction, Mandelbrot calls objects of this kind fractals … The work of René Thom moves in a similar direction. He directly questions the validity of the notion of a stable system, which is a presupposition in Laplace’s determinism and even in probability theory.

Thom constructs a mathematical language allowing a formal description of the discontinuities that can occur in determined phenomena, causing unexpected forms: this language constitutes what is known as catastrophe theory … The catastrophe model reduces all causative processes to a single one, easy to justify intuitively: conflict, the father of all things according to Heraclitus … This in the context of scientific discussion, is the same process Thom calls morphogenesis. It is not without rules (there are classes of catastrophes) (The PC, pp. ix, xii, 40, 41, 42-43, 55, 56, 58-59, 61).

Exemplar 5. 19: Approaches, Methods and Models of Analysis Employed in The PC

The Postmodern Condition presents us with significant methodological operations, which, although they draw on a whole very rich contemporary tradition of narrative analysis nonetheless strike a relatively isolated and unusual note in the whole range of contemporary philosophical research … In a more general way, the linguistic dimensions of what used to be called French structuralism and the seemingly more static possibilities of a dominant semiotics have in recent years been corrected and augmented by a return to pragmatics, to the analysis of language situations and games, and of language itself as an unstable exchange between its speakers.

The reader will already have noticed that in analyzing this problem within the framework set forth I have favored a certain procedure: emphasizing facts of language and in particular their pragmatic aspect … Wittgenstein, taking up the study of language again from scratch, focuses his attention on the effects of different modes of discourse; he calls the various types of utterances [denotative, declarative and prescriptive utterances] … language games. What he means by this term is that each of the various categories of utterance
can be defined in terms of rules specifying their properties and the uses to which they can be put - in exactly the same way as the game of chess is defined by a set of rules determining the properties of each of the pieces, in other words, the proper way to move them.

There are many different [and incommensurable] language games … It is useful to make … [the following] observation about language games … that their rules do not carry within themselves their own legitimation … [E]very utterance should be thought of as a “move” in a game. This last observation brings us to the first principle underlying our method as a whole: to speak is to fight, in the sense of playing, and speech acts fall within the domain of a general agonistics … This idea of an agonistics of language should not make us lose sight of the second principle … that the observable social bond is composed of language “moves.”

If we wish to discuss knowledge in the most highly developed contemporary society, we must answer the preliminary question of what methodological representation to apply to that society … [I]t is fair to say that in principle [there are] two basic representational models for society: either society forms a functional whole, or it is divided in two. An illustration of the first model is suggested by Talcott Parsons … and of the second, by the Marxist current … I find this partition solution unacceptable … What is needed if we are to understand social relations in this manner … is not only a theory of communication, but a theory of games which accepts agonistics as a founding principle (The PC, pp. viii, xi, xxiv, 9, 10, 11, 14 an 16).

Exemplar 5. 20: Types of Cited Material in The PC

Cited Material 1 (Parsons’s Cited Material)

The most essential condition of successful dynamic analysis is a continual and systematic reference of every problem to the state of the system as a whole … A process or set of conditions either ‘contributes’ to the maintenance (or development) of the system or it is ‘dysfunctional’ in that it detracts from the integration, effectiveness, etc., of the system.

Cited Material 2 (Cashinahua’s Cited Material)

Here is the story of — , as I’ve always heard it told. I will tell it to you in my turn. Listen … Here ends the story of — . The man who has told it to you is — (Cashinahua name), or to the Whites — (Spanish or Portuguese name).

Cited Material 3 (Copernicus’ Cited Material)

Copernicus states that the path of the planets is circular. Whether this proposition is true or false, it carries within it a set of tensions, all of which affect each of the pragmatic posts it brings into play: sender, addressee, and referent. These “tensions” are classes of prescriptions which regulate the admissibility of the statement as “scientific.”

First, the sender should speak the truth about the referent, the path of the planets. What does this mean? That on the one hand he is supposed to be able to provide proof of what he says, and on the other hand he is supposed to be able to refute any opposing or contradictory statements concerning the same referent.

Second, it should be possible for the addressee validly to give (or refuse) his assent to the statement he hears. This implies that he is himself a potential sender, since when he formulates his agreement or disagreement he will be subject to the same double requirement (or proof or refutation) that Copernicus was. He is therefore supposed to have, potentially, the same qualities as Copernicus: he is his equal.

But this will only become known when he speaks and under the above conditions. Before that, it will be impossible to say whether or not he is a scientific scholar. Third, the referent (the path of the planets) of which Copernicus speaks is supposed to be “expressed” by his statement in conformity with what it actually is. But since what it is can be known
through statements of the same order as that of Copernicus, the rule of adequation becomes problematical. What I say is true because I prove that it is - but what proof is there that my proof is true?

The scientific solution of this difficulty consists in the observance of two rules. The first of these is dialectical or even rhetorical in the forensic sense: a referent is that which is susceptible to proof and can be used as evidence in a debate. Not: I can prove something because reality is the way I say it is. But: as long as I can produce proof, it is permissible to think that reality is the way I say it is. The second rule is metaphysical; the same referent cannot supply a plurality of contradictory or inconsistent proofs. Or stated differently: “God” is not deceptive.

Cited Material 4 (Humboldt’s Cited Material)

Humboldt does indeed declare that science obeys its own rules, that the scientific institution “lives and continually renews itself on its own, with no constraints or determined goal whatsoever.” But he adds that the University should orient its constituent element, science, to “the spiritual and moral training of the nation.” How can this Bildung-effect result from the disinterested pursuit of learning? Are not the State, the nation, the whole of humanity indifferent to knowledge for its own sake? What interests them, as Humboldt admits, is not learning, but “character and action.”

The minister’s adviser thus faces a major conflict, in some ways reminiscent of the split introduced by the Kantian critique between knowing and willing; it is a conflict between a language game made of denotations answerable only to the criterion of truth, and a language game governing ethical, social and political practice that necessarily involves decisions and obligations, in other words, utterances expected to be just rather true and which in the final analysis lie outside the realm of scientific knowledge.

However, the unification of these two sets of discourse is indispensable to the Bildung aimed for by Humboldt’s project, which consists not only in the acquisition of learning by individuals, but also in the training of a fully legitimated subject of knowledge and society. Humboldt therefore invokes a Spirit (what Fichte calls Life), animated by three ambitions, or better, by a single, threefold aspiration: “that of deriving everything from an original principle” (corresponding to scientific activity), “that of relating everything to an ideal” (governing ethical and social practice), and “that of unifying this principle and this ideal in a single Idea” (ensuring that the scientific search for true causes always coincides with the pursuit of just ends in moral and political life). This ultimate synthesis constitutes the legitimate subject.

Humboldt adds in passing that this triple aspiration naturally inheres in the “intellectual character of the German nation.” This is a concession, but a discreet one, to the other narrative, to the idea that the subject of knowledge is the people. But in truth this idea is quite distant from the narrative of the legitimation of knowledge advanced by German idealism. The suspicion that men like Schleiermacher, Humboldt, and even Hegel harbor toward the State is an indication of this. If Schleiermacher fears the narrow nationalism, protectionism, utilitarianism, and positivism that guide the public authorities in matters of science, it is because the principle of science does not the people, but the speculative spirit. It is not embodied, as in France after the Revolution, in a State, but in a System. The language game of legitimation is not state-political, but philosophical.

The great function to be fulfilled by the universities is to “lay open the whole body of learning and expound both the principles and the foundations of all knowledge.” For “there is no creative scientific capacity without the speculative spirit.” “Speculation” is here the name given the discourse on the legitimation of scientific discourse. Schools are functional; the University is speculative, that is to say, philosophical. Philosophy must restore unity to learning, which has been scattered into separate sciences in laboratories and in pre-university education; it can only achieve this in a language game that links the sciences together as moments in the becoming of spirit, in other words, which links them in a rational narration, or rather metanarration.
Cited Material 5 (Wittgenstein’s Cited Material)

“Our language can be seen as an ancient city: a maze of little streets and squares, of old and new houses, and of houses with additions from various periods; and this surrounded by a multitude of new boroughs with straight regular streets and uniform houses.” And to drive home that the principle of unitality – or synthesis under the authority of a meta-discourse of knowledge – is inapplicable, he subjects the “town: of language to the old sorites paradox by asking: “how many houses or streets does it take before a town begins to be a town?” New languages are added to the old ones, forming suburbs of the old town: “the symbolism of chemistry and the notation of the infinitesimal calculus.

Cited Material 6 (Gödel’s Cited Material)

The properties generally required of the syntax of a formal system are consistency (for example, a system inconsistent with respect to negation would admit both a proposition and its opposite), syntactic completeness (the system would lose its consistency if an axiom were added to it), decidability (there must be an effective procedure for deciding whether a given proposition belongs to the system or not), and the independence of the axioms in relation to one another. Now Gödel has effectively established the existence in the arithmetic system of a proposition that is neither demonstrable nor refutable within that system; this entails that the arithmetic system fails to satisfy the condition of completeness.

The metamathematical research that led to Gödel’s theorem is a veritable paradigm of how this change in nature takes place. But the transformation that dynamics has undergone is no less exemplary of the new scientific spirit, and it is of particular interest here because it compels us to reconsider a notion that, as we have seen, figures prominently in the discussion of performance, particularly in the domain of social theory: the notion of system.

Cited Material 7 (Laplace’s Cited Material)

The idea of performance implies a highly stable system because it is based on the principle of a relation, which is in theory always calculable, between heat and work, hot source and cold source, input and output. This idea comes from thermodynamics. It is associated with the notion that the evolution of a system’s performance can be predicated if all of the variables are known. The ideal fulfilment of this condition is clearly expressed in Laplace’s fiction of the “demon:” he knows all of the variables determining the state of the universe at a moment t, and can thus predict its state at a moment t’>t. This fiction is sustained by the principle that physical systems, including the system of systems called the universe, follow regular patterns, with the result that their evolution traces a regular path and gives rise to “normal” continuous functions (and to futurology …).

Cited Material 8 (Quantum Mechanics/Quantum Theory, Atomic Physics and Microphysics Cited Material)

The advent of quantum mechanics and atomic physics has limited the range of applicability of this principle in two ways, the respective implications of which differ in scope. First, a complete definition of the initial state of a system (or all the independent variables) would require an expenditure of energy at least equivalent to that consumed by the system to be defined. A layman’s version of the de facto impossibility of ever achieving a complete measure of any given state of a system is provided in a note Borges. An emperor wishes to have a perfectly accurate map of the empire made. The project leads the country to ruin – the entire population devotes all its energy to cartography.

Quantum theory and microphysics require a far more radical revision of the idea of a continuous and predictable path. The quest for precision is not limited by its cost, but by the very nature of matter. It is not true that uncertainty (lack of control) decreases as accuracy goes up: it goes up as well.
Here, the relation between the scientist’s statement and “what ‘nature’ says” seems to be organized as a game without perfect information. The modalization of the scientist’s statement reflects the fact that the effective, singular statement (the token) that nature will produce is unpredictable. All that can be calculated is the probability that the statement will say one thing rather than another. On the level of microphysics, better “better” information—in other words, information with a higher performance capability—cannot be obtained.

It will be argued that these problems concern microphysics and that they do not prevent the establishment of continuous functions exact enough to form the basis of probabilistic predictions for the evolution of a given system. This is reasoning systems theorists—who are also the theorists of legitimation by performance—use to try to regain their rights. There is, however, a current in contemporary mathematics that questions the very possibility of precise measurement and thus the prediction of the behavior of objects even on the human scale.

Cited Material 9 (Perrin’s Cited Material)

Jean Perrin offers as an example of this measurement of the real density (the mass/volume quotient) of a given quantity of air contained in a sphere. It varies noticeably when the volume of the sphere is reduced from 100 m³ to 1 cm³; there is very little variation when it is reduced from 1 cm³ to 1/1 000 mm³, although already in this range irregularly occurring variations of the order of a billionth can be observed. As the volume of the sphere decreases, the size of the variations increases: for a volume of 1/10⁹ of a cubic micron, the variations are of the order of a thousandth; and for 1/100⁹ of a cubic micron, they are of the order of 1/5⁹.

Further decreasing the volume brings us to the molecular scale. If the spherule is located in the void between two molecules of air, the real density of the air in it is nil. But about one time in a thousand, the center of the spherule will “fall” within a molecule, and the average density is then comparable to what is called the real density of the gas. Reduced to intra-atomic dimensions, chances are high that it will be located in the void, once again with a density of zero. But one time in a million its center will fall within a corpuscle or in the nucleus of the atom, and when it does the density will be several million times greater than that of water. “If the spherule contracts still further … the average density and the real density will probably soon become nil and remain nil, except in some very rare positions where it will reach values spectacularly higher than those obtained previously.”

Knowledge about the density of air thus resolves into a multiplicity of absolutely incompatible statements; they can only be made compatible if they are relativized in relation to a scale chosen by the speaker. In addition, on certain levels, the statement of density cannot be made in the form of a simple assertion, but only as a modalized assertion of the type: it is plausible that the density will be equal to zero but not out of the question that it will be of the order of 10^n, where n is a very large number.

Cited Material 10 (Mandelbrot’s Cited Material)

Mandelbrot cites as a source the text by Perrin discussed above. But he extends the analysis in an unexpected direction. “The functions with derivatives,” he writes, “are the simplest and easiest to work with, they are nonetheless exceptional. Using geometrical language, curves that have no tangent are the rule, and regular curves, such as the circle, are interesting, but quite special.

This observation is not just an object for idle curiosity but is valid for most experimental data: the contours of a floccule of soapy, salinated water present such irregularities that it is impossible for the eye to draw a tangent to any point on its surface. The applicable model here is that of Brownian movement, a well-known property of which is that the vector of the particle’s movement from a given point is isotropic, in other words, all possible directions are equally probable.

Mandelbrot shows that data of this kind describe curves similar to those of continuous functions for which no derivative exists. A simplified model of this is Koch’s curve; it is
self-similar, and it can be shown that the dimension of self-similarity in which it is constructed is not a whole number but \( \log 4 / \log 3 \). It would be justified to say of such a curve that it is located in a space whose “number of dimensions” is between one and two, and thus that it lies intuitively somewhere between a line and a flat surface. Because their relevant dimension of self-similarity is a fraction, Mandelbrot calls objects of this kind fractals.

_Cited Material 11 (Thom’s Cited Material)_

The work of René Thom moves in a similar direction. He directly questions the validity of the notion of a stable system, which is a presupposition in Laplace’s determinism and even in probability theory.

Thom constructs a mathematical language allowing a formal description of the discontinuities that can occur in determined phenomena, causing them to take unexpected forms: this language constitutes what is known as catastrophe theory.

Take aggressiveness as a state variable of a dog: it increases in direct proportion to the dog’s anger, a control variable. Suppose the dog’s anger is measurable, when it reaches a certain threshold it is expressed in the form of an attack. Fear, the second control variable, has the opposite effect; when it reaches its threshold it is expressed as flight. In the absence of anger or fear, the dog’s behavior is stable (the top of Gauss’s curve). But if the two control variables increase together, the two thresholds will be approached simultaneously: the dog’s behavior becomes unpredictable and can switch abruptly from attack to flight, and vice versa. The system is said to be unstable: the control variables are continuous, but the state variables are discontinuous.

Thom shows that it is possible to write an equation expressing an instability of this kind and also to plot a graph (which is three dimensional, since there are two control variables and one state variable) mapping all of the movements of the point representing the dog’s behavior, including the abrupt passage from one type of behavior to the other. The equation is characteristic of a class of catastrophes, which is defined by its number of control and state variables (here 2 + 1).

This provides us with an answer in the debate between stable and unstable systems, determinism and nondeterminism. Thom formulates it as a postulate: “The more or less determined character of a process is determined by the local state of the process.”

Determinism is a type of functioning that is itself determined: in every case nature produces the least complex local morphology compatible with the initial local circumstances. But it is possible – in fact, it is most frequently the case – that these circumstances will prevent the production of a stable form. This happens because the circumstances are usually in conflict: “The catastrophe model reduces all causative processes to a single one, easy to justify intuitively: conflict, the father of all things according to Heraclitus. It is more probable that the control variables will be incompatible than the opposite. All that exist are ‘islands of determinism.’ Catastrophic antagonism is literally the rule: there are rules for the general agonistics of series, determined by the number of variables in play.

It is not out of the question to establish an (admittedly weak) parallel between Thom’s work and the research of the Palo Alto school, especially in its application of paradoxology to the study of schizophrenia, known as the Double Bind Theory. Here, I will do no more than note the connection. The theory helps us understand how research centered on singularities and “incommensurabilities” is applicable to the pragmatics of the most everyday problems.

_Cited Material 12 (Luhmann’s Cited Material)_

In this context, let us examine two important points in Luhmann’s argument. On the one hand, the system can only function by reducing complexity, and on the other, it must induce the adaptation of individual aspirations to its own ends. The reduction in complexity is required to maintain the system’s power capability. If all messages could circulate freely among all individuals, the quantity of the information that would have to be taken into account before...
making the correct choice would delay decisions considerably, thereby lowering performativity.

Speed, in effect, is a power component of the system.

The objection will be made that these molecular opinions must indeed be taken into account if the risk of serious disturbances is to be avoided. Luhmann replies – and this is the second point – that it is possible to guide individual aspirations through a process of “quasi-apprenticeship,” “free of all disturbance,” – in order to make them compatible with the system’s decisions. The decisions do not have to respect individuals’ aspirations: the aspirations have to aspire to the decisions, or at least to their effects. Administrative procedures should make individuals “want” what the system needs in order to perform well. It is easy to see what role telematics technology could play in this.

Exemplar 5. 21: Postmodernity/Postmodernism

Simplifying to the extreme, I define postmodern as incredulity toward metanarratives. This incredulity is undoubtedly a product of progress in the sciences: but that progress in turn presupposes it. To the obsolescence of the metanarrative apparatus of legitimation corresponds, most notably, the crisis of metaphysical philosophy and of the university institution which in the past relied on it. The narrative function is losing its function, its great hero, its great dangers, its great voyages, its great goal. It is being dispersed in clouds of narrative language elements – narrative, but also denotative, prescriptive, descriptive, so on. Conveyed within each cloud are pragmatic valencies specific to its kind. Each of us lives at the intersection of many of these. However, we do not necessarily establish stable language combinations, and the properties of the ones we do establish are not necessarily communicable. Thus the society of the future falls less within the province of a Newtonian anthropology (such as structuralism or systems theory) than a pragmatics of language particles (The PC, p. xxiv).

Exemplar 5. 22: Grand Narratives (Meta-narratives) and Legitimation (Legitimacy)

The present study will place these transformations in the context of the crisis of narratives …[I]f a metanarrative implying a philosophy of history is used to legitimate knowledge, questions are raised concerning the validity of the institutions governing the social bond: these must be legitimated as well. Thus justice is consigned to the grand narrative in the same way as truth … Still the postmodern is as much a stranger to disenchantment as it is to the blind positivity of delegitimation. Where, after the metanarratives, can legitimacy reside? The operativity criterion is technological; it has no relevance for judging what is true or just. Is legitimacy to be found in consensus obtained through discussion, as Jürgen Habermas thinks? Such consensus does violence to the heterogeneity of language games … Here is a question: is a legitimation of the social bond, a just society, feasible in terms of a paradox analogous to that of scientific activity? What would such a paradox be? … In this case, legitimation is the process by which a “legislator” dealing with scientific discourse is authorized to prescribe the stated conditions … determining whether a statement is to be included in that discourse for consideration by the scientific community.

In contemporary society and culture – postindustrial society, postmodern culture - the question of the legitimation of knowledge is formulated in different terms. The grand narrative has lost its credibility, regardless of what mode of unification it uses, regardless of whether it is a speculative narrative or a narrative of emancipation … Even if we adopted … these hypotheses, we would still have to detail the correlation between the tendencies mentioned above and decline of the unifying and legitimating power of the grand narratives of speculation and emancipation … It is only in the context of the grand narratives of legitimation – the life of the spirit and/or the emancipation of humanity – that the partial replacement of teachers by machines may seem inadequate or even intolerable … But as we have just seen, the little narrative [petit récit] remains the quintessential form of
imaginative invention, most particularly in science … Let us wage war on totality! (The PC, pp. xxiii, 8, 37, 38, 51, 60, 82).

Exemplar 5. 23: Language Games, Utterances, Pragmatics, Knowledge and Incommensurability

There are many different language games – a heterogeneity of elements. They only give rise to institutions in patches – local determinism … [I]t is clear that language games are heteromorphous, subject to heterogeneous sets of pragmatic rules … Knowledge is not the same as science, especially in its contemporary form; and science, far from successfully obscuring the problem of its legitimacy, cannot avoid raising it with all of its implications … Narration is the quintessential form of customary knowledge, in more ways than one. [T]he narrative form, unlike the developed forms of the discourse of knowledge, lends itself to a great variety of language games … There is, then, an incommensurability between popular narrative pragmatics, which provides immediate legitimation, and the language game known to the West as the question of legitimacy – or rather, legitimacy as a referent in the game of inquiry.

In the first place, scientific knowledge does not represent the totality of knowledge; it has always existed in addition to, and in competition and conflict with, another kind of knowledge, which I will call narrative in the interests of simplicity. Scientific knowledge requires that one language game, denotation, be retained and all others excluded. A statement’s truth-value is the criterion determining its acceptability … Scientific knowledge is in this way set apart from the language games that combine to form the social bond … It is therefore impossible to judge the existence or validity of narrative knowledge on the basis of scientific knowledge and vice versa: the relevant criteria are different … This unequal relationship is an intrinsic effect of the rules specific to each game … This unequal relationship is an intrinsic effect of the rules specific to each game … It is not inconceivable that the recourse to narrative is inevitable, at least to the extent that the language game of science desires its statements to be true but does not have the resources to legitimate their truth on its own … Scientific knowledge cannot know and make known that it is the true knowledge without resorting to the other, narrative, kind of knowledge, which from its point of view is no knowledge at all (The PC, pp. xxiv, 7, 18, 19, 20, 23, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29 and 65).

Exemplar 5. 24: Performativity and Paralogy

And invention is always born of dissension. Postmodern knowledge is not simply a tool of the authorities; it refines our sensitivity to differences and reinforces our ability to tolerate the incommensurable. Its principle is not the expert’s homology, but the inventor’s paralogy … Obviously, a major shift in the notion of reason accompanies this new arrangement. The principle of a universal metalanguage is replaced by the principle of a plurality of formal and axiomatic systems capable of arguing the truth of denotative statements; these systems are described by a metalanguage that is universal but not consistent. What used to pass as paradox, and even paralogism, in the knowledge of classical and modern science can … acquire a new force of conviction and win the acceptance of the community of experts … This is where technology comes in. Technical devices originated as prosthetic aids for human organs … They follow a principle, and it is a principle of optimal performance: maximizing output … and minimizing input … Technology is therefore a game pertaining not to the true, the just … etc., but of efficiency.

But the fact remains that since performativity increases the ability to produce proof, it also increases the ability to be right: the technical criterion, introduced on a massive scale into scientific knowledge, cannot fail to influence the truth criterion … This [has] led Luhmann to hypothesize that in postindustrial societies the normativity of laws is replaced by the performativity procedures … This is how legitimation by power takes shape. Power is not only good performativity, but also effective verification and good verdicts … The
performativity of an utterance, be it denotative or prescriptive, increases proportionally to the amount of information about its referent one has at one's disposal.

It should be easy to describe how the other facet of knowledge – its transmission, or education – is affected by the predominance of the performativity criterion … The desired goal becomes the optimal contribution of higher education to the best performativity of the social system. Accordingly, it will have to create the skills that are indispensable to that system. These are of two kinds … computer scientists, cyberneticists, linguists, mathematicians … and so many doctors, so many teachers … so many engineers, so many administrators, etc … In the context of the mercantilization of knowledge, more often than not this question is equivalent to: “is it saleable?” And in the context of power-growth: “Is it efficient?” Having competence in a performance-oriented skill does indeed seem saleable in the conditions described above, and it is efficient by definition. What no longer makes the grade is competence by other criteria true/false, just/unjust, etc.

The idea of an interdisciplinary approach is specific to the age of delegitimation and its hurried empiricism … But one thing that seems certain is that in both cases the process of delegitimation and the preponderance of the performance criterion are sounding the knell of the age of the Professor: a professor is no more competent than memory bank networks in transmitting established knowledge, no more competent than interdisciplinary teams in imagining new moves or new games.

The problem is therefore to determine whether it is possible to have a form of legitimation based solely on paralogy. Paralogy must be distinguished from innovation: the latter is under the command of the system; the former is a move … played in the pragmatics of knowledge … [I]t is now dissension that must be emphasized. Consensus is a horizon that is never reached … [C]onsensus is only a particular state of discussion, not its end. Its end, on the contrary, is paralogy. This double observation (the heterogeneity of the rules and the search for dissent) destroys a belief that still underlies Habermas’s research, namely, that humanity … seeks its common emancipation through … the “moves” permitted in all language games and that the legitimacy of any statement resides in its contributing to that emancipation(The PC, pp. xxv, 43, 44, 46, 47, 48, 51, 52, 53, 61, 65 and 66).
Appendix B

(1) MC: Prime Minister you were at Oxford in the nineteen forties and after the war Britain would embark on a period of relative prosperity for all the like of which it had hardly known but today there are three and a quarter million unemployed and em Britain’s economic performance by one measurement has fallen to the rank of that of Italy now can you imagine yourself back at the University today what must be seen to be the chances in Britain and the prospects for all now

(10) MT: they are very different worlds you’re talking about because the first thing that struck me very forcibly as you were speaking of those days was that now we do enjoy a standard of living which was undreamed of then and I can remember Rab Butler saying after we returned to power in about 1951-52 that if we played our cards right the standard of living within twenty five years would be twice as high as it was then and em he was just about right and it was remarkable because it was something that we had never thought of now I don’t think now one would necessarily think wholly in material terms indeed I think it’s wrong to think in material terms because really the kind of country you want is made up by the strength of its people and I think we’re returning to my vision of Britain as a younger person and I was always brought up with the idea look Britain is a country whose people think for themselves and for themselves can act on their own initiative they don’t have to be told don’t like to be pushed around are self-reliant and then over and above that they’re always responsible for their families and something else it was a kind of em I think it was Barry who said do as you would be done by e: you act to others as you’d like them to act towards you and so you do something for the community now I think if you were looking at another country you would say what makes a country strong it is its people do they run their industries well are their human relations good e: do they respect law and order are their families strong all of those kind of things

(25) MC: and you know it’s just way beyond economics but you people still people still ask though e: where is she going now General de Gaulle had a vision of France e: a certain idea of France as he put it eyou have fought three major battles in this country the Falkland Islands em against the miners and local councils and against public expenditure and people I think would like to hear what this vision you have of Britain is it must be a powerful one what is it that inspires your action

(30) MT: I wonder if I perhaps I can answer best by saying how I see what government should do and if government really believes in people what people should do I
believe that government should be very strong to do those things which only government can do, it has to be strong to have defence because the kind of Britain I see would always defend its freedom and always be a reliable ally so you've got to be strong to your own people and other countries have got to know that you stand by your word then you turn to internal security and yes you HAVE got to be strong on law and order and do the things that only governments can do but there it's part government and part people because you CAN'T have law and order observed unless it's in partnership with people then you have to be strong to uphold the value of the currency and only governments can do that by sound finance and then you have to create the framework for a good education system and social security and at that point have to say over to people people are inventive creative and so you expect PEOPLE to create thriving industries, thriving services yes you expect people each and everyone from whatever their background to have a chance to rise to whatever level their own abilities can take them yes you expect people of all sorts of background and almost whatever their income level to be able to have a chance of owning some property tremendously important the ownership of property of a house gives you some independence gives you a stake in the future you're concerned about your children MC: but could you sum this vision up MT: ( ) you said my vision please let me just go on and then that isn't enough if you're interested in the future yes you will probably save you'll probably want a little bit of independent income of your own and so constantly thinking about the future so it's very much a Britain whose people are independent of government but aware that the government has to be strong to do those things which only governments can do MC: but can you sum it up in a phrase or two the aim is to achieve what or to restore what in Britain when clearly risking a lot and winning in a place like the Falklands Islands is just as important in your philosophy for Britain as MT: I think restoring sound money reducing the money supply in the Bank of England but of course it showed that we were reliable in the defence of freedom and when part of Britain we: was invaded of course we went we believed in defence of freedom we were reliable I think if I could try to sum it up in a phrase and that's always I suppose most difficult of all I would say really restoring the very best of the British character to its former preeminence MT: but this has meant something called Thatcherism now MC: but can you sum it up in a phrase or two the aim is to achieve what or to restore what in Britain when clearly risking a lot and winning in a place like the Falklands Islands is just as important in your philosophy for Britain as MT: I think restoring sound money reducing the money supply in the Bank of England but of course it showed that we were reliable in the defence of freedom and when part of Britain we: was invaded of course we went we believed in defence of freedom we were reliable I think if I could try to sum it up in a phrase and that's always I suppose most difficult of all I would say really restoring the very best of the British character to its former preeminence MT: but this has meant something called Thatcherism now
distinct from traditional conservatism in this country

MT: no it is traditional conservatism
MC: but it’s radical and populist and therefore not

(115) conservative
MT: it is radical because at the time when I took over we
needed to be radical e: it is populist I wouldn’t call it
populist I would say that many of the things which
I’ve said strike a chord in the hearts of ordinary

(120) people why because they’re British because their
character IS independent because they DON’T like to
be shoved around coz they ARE prepared to take
responsibility because they DO expect to be loyal to
their friends and loyal allies that’s why you call it

(125) populist I say it strikes a chord in the hearts of
people I know because it struck a chord in my heart
many many years ago

Case Study - The interview between Michael Charlton and Margaret Thatcher conducted by BBC Radio 3, on 17th December 1985 (Fairclough, 1989: 172-175)
### Appendix C

#### Epistemic Modality

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Possibility</th>
<th>Probability</th>
<th>Necessity</th>
<th>Prediction</th>
<th>Factuality</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- I don’t think now one would necessarily think wholly in material terms</td>
<td>- yes you will probably save you’ll probably want a little bit of</td>
<td>- the first thing that struck me very forcibly as you were speaking of</td>
<td>- yes you will probably save you’ll probably want a little bit of</td>
<td>- now we enjoy a standard of living (12-13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(21-22)</td>
<td>independent income (86-88)</td>
<td>those days (12-13)</td>
<td>independent income (86-88)</td>
<td>- the ownership of property of a house gives you some independence gives you a stake in the future (80-81)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- I think it’s wrong (22)</td>
<td>- the kind of Britain I see would always defend its freedom and always be</td>
<td>- when I took over we needed to be radical (116-117)</td>
<td></td>
<td>- I say it strikes a chord in the hearts of people I know because it struck a chord in my heart many many years ago (125-127)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- I think we’re returning to my vision (25)</td>
<td>always be a reliable ally (57-59)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>-(they) act for themselves (they) can on their initiative (28-29)</td>
<td>- that’s always I suppose most difficult of all I would say really</td>
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<tr>
<td>- I think it was Barry (33)</td>
<td>restoring the very best of the British character to its former preeminence (105-108)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>- do as you would be done (33-34)</td>
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<tr>
<td>- now I think if you were looking at another country you would say (36-37)</td>
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<tr>
<td>- if government really believes in people (53-54)</td>
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<tr>
<td>- the kind of Britain I see would always defend its freedom and always be</td>
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<tr>
<td>a reliable ally (57-59)</td>
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<tr>
<td>- constantly thinking about the future so it’s very much a Britain whose</td>
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<td>people are independent of government (89-91)</td>
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<tr>
<td>- which only governments can do (93)</td>
<td></td>
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<td>- I think restoring sound money reducing the money supply in the Bank of</td>
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<tr>
<td>England (98-100)</td>
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<tr>
<td>- we believed in defence of freedom (103)</td>
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<tr>
<td>- I think if I could try to sum it</td>
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</table>
up in a phrase (104-105)
- that's always I suppose most difficult of all I would say really restoring the very best of the British character to its former preeminence (105-108)
- it is populist I wouldn't call it populist I would say that many of the things (117-118)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Deontic Modality</th>
<th>Permission</th>
<th>Duty</th>
<th>Obligation</th>
<th>Insistence</th>
<th>Command</th>
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<tr>
<td>- I wonder if I perhaps I can answer best by saying (51)</td>
<td>- because really the kind of country you want (23-24)</td>
<td>- so you’ve got to be strong to your own people (59-60)</td>
<td>-indeed I think it's wrong to think in material terms (22-23)</td>
<td>- you CAN'T have law and order observed unless it's in partnership with people (65-66)</td>
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<td>- and only governments can do that by sound finance (66-67)</td>
<td>- I don’t think now one would necessarily think (21)</td>
<td>- and other countries have got to know that you stand by your word (60-61)</td>
<td>- you HAVE got to be strong on law and order (62)</td>
<td>- then you have to be strong to uphold the value of the currency (66-67)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>- please let me just go on (85)</td>
<td>- they don’t have to be told (29)</td>
<td>- yes you HAVE got to be strong on law and order (62)</td>
<td>- then you have to be strong to uphold the value of the currency (66-67)</td>
<td>- and at that point have to say over to people (70-71)</td>
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<tr>
<td>- I believe that government should do (54)</td>
<td>- (they) don’t like to be pushed around (30)</td>
<td>- you have to create the framework for a good education system and social security (68-70)</td>
<td>- the government has to be strong to do those things (92-93)</td>
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<tr>
<td>- really restoring the very best of the British character to its former preeminence (106-108)</td>
<td>- how I see what government should do (52-53)</td>
<td>- and then you have to create the framework for a good education system and social security (68-70)</td>
<td>- and at that point have to say over to people (70-71)</td>
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<tr>
<td>- (they) don’t like to be pushed around (30)</td>
<td>- what people should do (54)</td>
<td>- and other countries have got to know that you stand by your word (60-61)</td>
<td>- then you have to be strong to uphold the value of the currency (66-67)</td>
<td>- the government has to be strong to do those things (92-93)</td>
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<td>- I believe that government should do (54)</td>
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<td></td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Boulomaic Modality</th>
<th>Wishes</th>
<th>Desires</th>
<th>Expectations</th>
<th>Wants</th>
<th>Necessities/Needs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- if we played our cards right the standard of living … would be twice as high as it was then (16-18)</td>
<td>- so you expect PEOPLE to create (72)</td>
<td>- because really the kind of country you want is (23-24)</td>
<td>- because really the kind of country you want is (23-24)</td>
<td>- because really the kind of country you want is (23-24)</td>
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<tr>
<td>- if we played our cards right the standard of living … would be twice as high as it was then (16-18)</td>
<td>- you expect people (73)</td>
<td>- because really the kind of country you want is (23-24)</td>
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<tr>
<td>- if we played our cards right the standard of living … would be twice as high as it was then (16-18)</td>
<td>- you expect people (76)</td>
<td>- because really the kind of country you want is (23-24)</td>
<td>- because really the kind of country you want is (23-24)</td>
<td>- because really the kind of country you want is (23-24)</td>
<td>- because really the kind of country you want is (23-24)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
- they … don't like to be pushed around (29-30)
- do as you would be done…act to others as you'd like them (33-34)
- I wonder if I perhaps I can answer best by saying how I see (52-53)
- if government really believes in people (53-54)
- I think if I could try to sum it up in a phrase (104-105)
- I would say really restoring the very best of the British character to its former preeminence (106-108)

- because they DO expect to be loyal (123)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Perception Modality</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- because the first thing that struck me very forcibly as you were speaking of those days was that now we do enjoy a standard of living which was undreamed of then (12-15)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- now I don’t think now one would necessarily think wholly in material terms indeed I think it’s wrong to think in material terms because really the kind of country you want is made up by the strength of its people (21-25)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- yes you expect people of all sorts of background and almost whatever their income level to be able to have a chance of owning some property tremendously (76-79)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- you will probably save you'll probably want a little bit of independent income (86-88)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- and so constantly thinking about the future (89-90)</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Epistemic, deontic, boulomaic and perception modalities as used in the LP's extract (adapted from Badran (2001) and Simpson (1993))
Appendix D

The PC (pp. 60-67)

The conclusion we can draw from this research (and much more not mentioned) is that the continuous differentiable function is losing its pre-eminence as a paradigm of knowledge and prediction. Postmodern science by concerning itself with such things as undecidables, the limits of precise control, conflicts characterised by incomplete information, “fractals,” catastrophes, and pragmatic paradoxes – is theorising its own evolution as discontinuous, catastrophic, nonrectifiable, and paradoxical. It is changing the meaning of the word knowledge, while expressing how such a change can take place. It is producing not the known, but the unknown. And it suggests a model of legitimisation that has nothing to do with maximised performance, but has as its basis difference understood as paralogy.

A game theory specialist whose work is moving in this same direction said it well: “Wherein, then, does the usefulness of game theory lie? Game theory, we think, is useful, namely as a generator of ideas. P. M. Medawar, for his part, has stated that “having ideas is the scientist’s highest accomplishment,” that there is no “scientific method,” and that a scientist is before anything else a person who “tells stories.” The only difference is that he is duty bound to verify them.

Legitimation by Paralogy

Let us say at this point that the facts we have presented concerning the problem of the legitimisation of knowledge today are sufficient for our purposes. We no longer have recourse to the grand narratives – we can resort neither to the dialectic of Spirit nor even to the emancipation of humanity as a validation for postmodern scientific discourse. But as we have just seen, the little narrative [petit récit] remains the quintessential form of imaginative invention, most particularly science. In addition, the principle of consensus as a criterion of validation seems to be inadequate. It has two formulations. In the first, consensus is an agreement between men, defined as knowing intellects and free wills, and is obtained through dialogue. This is the form elaborated by Habermas, but his conception is based on the validity of the narrative of emancipation. In the second, consensus is a component of the system, which manipulates it in order to maintain and improve its performance. It is the object of administrative procedures, in Luhmann’s sense. In this case, its only validity is as an instrument to be used toward achieving the real goal, which is what legitimates the system – power.

The problem is therefore to determine whether it is possible to have a form of legitimisation based solely on paralogy. Paralogy must be distinguished from innovation: the latter is under the command of the system, or at least used by it to improve its efficiency; the former is a move (the importance of which is often not recognised until later) played in the pragmatics of knowledge. The fact that it is in reality frequently, but not necessarily, the case that one is transformed into the other presents no difficulties for the hypothesis.

Returning to the description of scientific pragmatics … it is now dissension that must be emphasised. Consensus is a horizon that is never reached. Research that takes place under the aegis of a paradigm tends to stabilise; it is like the exploitation of a technological, economic, or artistic “idea.” It cannot be discounted. But what is striking is that someone always comes along to disturb the order of “reason.” It is necessary to posit the existence of a power that destabilises the capacity for exploitation, manifested in the promulgation of new norms for understanding or, if one prefers, in a proposal to establish new rules circumscribing a new field of research for the language of science. This, in the context of scientific discussion, is the same process Thom calls morphogenesis. It is not without rules (there are classes of catastrophes), but it is always locally
determined. Applied to scientific discussion and placed in a temporal framework, this property implies that “discoveries” are unpredictable. In terms of the idea of transparency, it is a factor that generates blind spots and defers consensus.

This summary makes it easy to see that systems theory and the kind of legitimation it proposes have no scientific basis whatsoever; science itself does not function according to this theory’s paradigm of the system, and contemporary science excludes the possibility of using such a paradigm to describe society.

In this context, let us examine two important points in Luhmann’s argument. On the one hand, the system can only function by reducing complexity, and on the other, it must induce the adaptation of individual aspirations to its own ends. The reduction in complexity is required to maintain the system’s power capability. If all messages could circulate freely among all individuals, the quantity of information that would have to be taken into account before making the correct choice would delay decisions considerably, thereby lowering performativity. Speed, in effect, is a power component of the system.

The objection will be made that these molecular opinions must indeed be taken into account if the risk of serious disturbances is to be avoided. Luhmann replies – and this is the second point – that it is possible to guide individual aspirations through a process of “quasi-apprenticeship,” “free of all disturbance,” – in order to make them compatible with the system’s decisions. The decisions do not have to respect individuals’ aspirations: the aspirations have to aspire to the decisions, or at least to their effects. Administrative procedures should make individuals “want” what the system needs in order to perform well. It is easy to see what role telematics technology could play in this.

It cannot be denied that there is persuasive force in the idea that context control and domination are inherently better than their absence. The performativity criterion has its “advantages.” It excludes in principle adherence to a metaphysical discourse; it requires the renunciation of fables; it demands clear minds and cold wills; it replaces the definition of essences with the calculation of interactions; it makes the “players” assume responsibility not only for the statements they propose, but also for the rules to which they submit those statements in order to render them acceptable. It brings the pragmatic functions of knowledge clearly to light, to the extent that they seem to relate to the criterion of efficiency: the pragmatics of argumentation, of the production of proof, of the transmission of learning, and of the apprenticeship of the imagination.

It also contributes to elevating all language games to self-knowledge, even those not within the realm of canonical knowledge. It tends to jolt everyday discourse into a kind of metadiscourse: ordinary statements are now displaying a propensity for self-citation, and the various pragmatic posts are tending to make an indirect connection even to current messages concerning them. Finally, it suggests that the problems of internal communication experienced by the scientific community in the course of its work of dismantling and remounting its languages are comparable in nature to the problems experienced by the social collectivity when, deprived of its narrative culture, it must reexamine its own internal communication and in the process question the nature of the legitimacy of the decisions made in its name.

At risk of scandalising the reader, I would also say that the system can count severity among its advantages. Within the framework of the power criterion, a request (that is, a form of prescription) gains nothing in legitimacy by virtue of being based on the hardship of an unmet need. Rights do not flow from hardship, but from the fact that the alleviation of hardship improved the system’s performance. The needs of the most underprivileged should not be used as a system regulator as a matter of principle: since the means of satisfying them is already known, their actual satisfaction will not improve the system’s performance, but only increase its expenditures. The only counterindication is that not satisfying them can destabilise the whole. It
is against the nature of force to be ruled by weakness. But it is in its nature to induce new requests meant to lead to a redefinition of the norms of “life.” In this sense, the system seems to be a vanguard machine dragging humanity after it, dehumanising it in order to rehumanise it at a different level of normative capacity. The technocrats declare that they “cannot trust what society designates as its needs; they “know” that society cannot know its own needs since they are not variables independent of the new technologies. Such is the arrogance of the decision makers – and their blindness.

What their “arrogance” means is that they identify themselves with the social system conceived as a totality in quest of its most performative unity possible. If we look at the pragmatics of science, we learn that such an identification is impossible: in principle, no scientist embodies knowledge or neglects the “needs” of a research project, or the aspirations of a researcher, on the pretext that they do not add to the performance of “science” as a whole. The response a researcher usually makes to a request is: “We’ll have to see, tell me your story.” In principle, he does not prejudge that a case has already been closed or that the power of “science” will suffer if it is reopened. In fact, the opposite is true.

Of course, it does not always happen like this in reality. Countless scientists have seen their “move” ignored or repressed, sometimes for decades, because it too abruptly destabilised the accepted positions, not only in the university and scientific hierarchy, but also in the problematic. The stronger the “move,” the more likely it is to be denied the minimum consensus, precisely because it changes the rules of the game upon which consensus had been based. But when the institution of knowledge functions in this manner, it is acting like an ordinary power center whose behavior is governed by a principle of homeostasis.

Such behavior is terrorist, as is the behavior of the system described by Luhmann. By terror I mean the efficiency gained by eliminating, or threatening to eliminate, a player from the language game one shares with him. He is silenced or consents, not because he has been refuted, but because his ability to participate has been threatened (there are many ways to prevent someone from playing). The decision makers’ arrogance, which in principle has no equivalent in the sciences, consists in the exercise of terror. It says: “Adapt your aspirations to your ends- or else.”

Even permissiveness toward the various games is made conditional on performativity. The redefinition of the norms of life consists in enhancing the system’s competence for power. That this is the case is particularly evident in the introduction of telematics technology: the technocrats see in telematics a promise of liberalisation and enrichment in the interactions between interlocutors; but what makes this process attractive for them is that it will result in new tensions in the system, and these will lead to an improvement in its performativity.

To the extent that science is differential, its pragmatics provides the antimodel of a stable system. A statement is deemed worth retaining the moment it marks a difference from what is already known, and after an argument and proof in support of it has been found. Science is a model of an “open system,” in which a statement becomes relevant if it “generates ideas,” that is, if it generates other statements and other game rules. Science possesses no general metalanguage in which all other languages can be transcribed and evaluated. This is what prevents its identification with the system and, all things considered, with terror. If the division between decision makers and executors exists in the scientific community (and it does), it is a fact of the socio-economic system and not of the pragmatics of science itself. It is in fact one of the major obstacles to the imaginative development of knowledge.

The general question of legitimation becomes: What is the relationship between the antimodel of the pragmatics of science and society? Is it applicable to the vast clouds of language material constituting a society? Or is it limited to the game of learning? And if so, what role does it play with respect to the social bond? Is it an impossible deal of an open community? Is it an essential
component for the subset of decision makers, who force on society the performance criterion they reject for themselves. Or, conversely, is it a refusal to cooperate with the authorities, a move in the direction of counterculture, with the attendant risk that all possibility for research will be foreclosed due to lack of funding?

From the beginning of this study, I have emphasised the differences (not only formal, but also pragmatic) between the various language games, especially between denotative, or knowledge, games and prescriptive, or action, games. The pragmatics of science is centered on denotative utterances, which are the foundation upon which it builds institutions of learning (institutes, centers, universities, etc). But its postmodern development brings a decisive “fact” to the fore: even discussions of denotative statements need to have rules. Rules are not denotative but prescriptive utterances, which we are better off calling metaprescriptive utterances to avoid confusion (they prescribe what the moves of language games must be in order to be admissible). The function of the differential or imaginative or paralogical activity of the current pragmatics of science is to point out these metaprescriptives (science’s “presuppositions”) and to petition the players to accept different ones. The only legitimation that can make this kind of request admissible is that it will generate ideas, in other words, new statements.

Social pragmatics does not have the “simplicity” of scientific pragmatics. It is a monster formed by the interweaving of various networks of heteromorphous classes of utterances (denotative, prescriptive, performative, technical, evaluative, etc). There is no reason to think that it would be possible to determine metaprescriptives common to all of these language games or that a revisable consensus like the one in force at a given moment in the scientific community could embrace the totality of metaprescriptions regulating the totality of statements circulating in the social collectivity. As a matter of fact, the contemporary decline of narratives of legitimation – be they traditional or “modern: (the emancipation of humanity, the realisation of the Idea) – is tied to the abandonment of this belief. It is its absence for which the ideology of the “system,” with its pretensions to totality, tries to compensate and which it expresses in the cynicism of its criterion of performance.

For this reason, it seems neither possible, nor even prudent, to follow Habermas in orienting treatment of the problem of legitimation in the direction of a search for universal consensus through what he calls Diskurs, in other words, a dialogue of argumentation.

This would be to make two assumptions. The first is that it is possible for all speakers to come to agreement on which rules or metaprescriptions are universally valid for language games, when it is clear that language games are heteromorphous, subject to heterogeneous sets of pragmatic rules.

The second assumption is that the goal of dialogue is consensus. But as I have shown in the analysis of the pragmatics of science, consensus is only a particular state of discussion, not its end. Its end, on the contrary, is paralogy. This double observation (the heterogeneity of the rules and the search for dissent) destroys a belief that still underlies Habermas’s research, namely that humanity as a collective (universal) subject seeks its common emancipation through the regularisation of the “moves” permitted in all language games and that the legitimacy of any statement resides in its contributing to that emancipation.

It is easy to see what function this recourse plays in Habermas’s argument against Luhmann. Diskurs is his ultimate weapon against the theory of the stable system. The cause is good, but the argument is not. Consensus has become an outmoded and suspect value. But justice as a value is neither outmoded nor suspect. We must thus arrive at an idea and practice of justice that is not linked to that of consensus.
A recognition of the heteromorphous nature of language games is a first step in that direction. This obviously implies a renunciation of terror, which assumes that they are isomorphic and tries to make them so. The second step is the principle of that any consensus on the rules defining a game and the “moves” playable within it must be local, in other words, agreed on by its present players and subject to eventual cancellation. The orientation then favors a multiplicity of finite meta-arguments, by which I mean argumentation that concerns metaprescriptives and is limited in space and time.

This orientation corresponds to the course that the evaluation of social interaction is currently taking; the temporary contract is in practice supplanting permanent institutions in the professional, emotional, sexual, cultural, family, and international domains, as well as in political affairs. This evolution is of course ambiguous: the temporary contract is favored by the system due to its greater flexibility, lower cost, and the creative turmoil of its accompanying motivations – all of these factors contribute to increased operativity. In any case, there is no question here of proposing a “pure” alternative to the system: we all now know, as the 1970s come to a close, that an attempt at an alternative of that kind would end up resembling the system it was meant to replace. We should be happy that the tendency toward the temporary contract is ambiguous: it is not totally subordinated to the goal of the system, yet the system tolerates it. This bears witness to the existence of another goal within the system: knowledge of language games as such and the decision to assume responsibility for their rules and effects. Their most significant effect is precisely what validates the adoption of rules – the quest for paralogy.

We are finally in a position to understand how the computerisation of society affects this problematic. It could become the “dream” instrument for controlling and regulating the market system, extended to include knowledge itself and governed exclusively by the performativity principle. In that case, it would inevitably involve the use of terror. But it could also aid groups discussing metaprescriptives by supplying them with the information they usually lack for making knowledgeable decisions. The line to follow for computerisation to take the second of these two paths is, in principle, quite simple: give the public free access to the memory and data banks. Language games would then be games of perfect information at any given moment. But they would also be non-zero-games, and by virtue of that fact discussion would never risk fixating in a position of minimax equilibrium because it had exhausted its stakes. For the stakes would be knowledge (or information, if you will), and the reserve of knowledge – language’s reserve of possible utterances – is inexhaustible. This sketches the outline of a politics that would respect both the desire for justice and the desire for the unknown.

An extract from Lyotard’s *The PC* (1984: 60-67)
## Appendix E

### Epistemic Modality

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Possibility</th>
<th>Probability</th>
<th>Necessity</th>
<th>Prediction</th>
<th>Factuality</th>
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<tr>
<td>- The conclusion we can draw from this research (and much more not mentioned) is that the continuous differentiable function is losing its prominence as a paradigm of knowledge and prediction. - while expressing how such a change can take place. - we can resort neither to the dialectic of Spirit nor even to the emancipation of humanity as a validation for postmodern scientific discourse. - On the one hand, the system can only function by reducing complexity, and on the other, it must induce the adaptation of individual aspirations to its own ends. - I would also say that the system can count severity among its advantages. - The only counterindication is that not satisfying them can destabilise the whole. - Science possesses no general metalanguage in which all other languages can be transcribed and evaluated. - The only legitimation that can make this kind of request</td>
<td>- The stronger the “move,” the more likely it is to be denied the minimum consensus, precisely because it changes the rules of the game upon which consensus had been based. - The objection will be made that these molecular opinions must indeed be taken into account if the risk of serious disturbances is to be avoided. - Paralogy must be distinguished from innovation - even discussions of denotative statements need to have rules. - (they prescribe what the moves of language games must be in order to be admissible). - It is necessary to posit the existence of a power that destabilises the capacity for exploitation, manifest in the promulgation of new norms for understanding - We must thus arrive at an idea and practice of justice that is not linked to that of consensus. - (they prescribe what the moves of language games must be in order to be admissible). - it must reexamine its own internal communication - The second step is the principle that any consensus on the rules defining a game and the “moves” playable within it must be local</td>
<td>- The objection will be made that these molecular opinions must indeed be taken into account if the risk of serious disturbances is to be avoided. - but what makes this process attractive for them is that it will result in new tensions in the system, and these will lead to an improvement in its performativity. - The only legitimation that can make this kind of request admissible is that it will generate ideas, in other words, new statements. - a move in the direction of counterculture, with the attendant risk that all possibility for research will be foreclosed due to lack of funding? - since the means of satisfying them is already known, their actual satisfaction will not improve the system's performance - “We'll have to see, tell me your story.” - In principle, he does not prejudge that a case has already been closed or that the power of “science” will suffer if it is</td>
<td>- Consensus is a horizon that is never reached. - This, in the context of scientific discussion, is the same process Thom calls morphogenesis. - Such is the arrogance of the decision makers – and their blindness. - Science is a model of an open system, in which a statement becomes relevant if it generates ideas, that is, if it generates other statements and other game rules. - The pragmatics of science is centered on denotative utterances, which are the foundation upon which it builds institutions of learning (institutes, centers, universities, etc). - This orientation corresponds to the course that the evolution of social interaction is currently taking</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
admissible is that it will generate ideas, in other words, new statements.
- It cannot be discounted.
- It cannot be denied that there is persuasive force
- The technocrats declare that they cannot trust what society designates as its needs;
- they “know” that society cannot know its own needs
- Game theory, we think, is useful, namely as a generator of ideas.
- There is no reason to think that it would be possible to determine metaprescriptives common to all
- If all messages could circulate freely among all individuals
- It could become the “dream” instrument for controlling and regulating the market system
- But it could also aid groups discussing metaprescriptives
- It is easy to see what role telematics technology could play in this.
- a revisable consensus like the one in force at a given moment in the scientific community could embrace the totality
- If all messages could circulate freely among all individuals, the quantity of information that would have to be taken into

- Returning to the description of scientific pragmatics … it is now dissension that must be emphasised
- On the one hand, the system can only function by reducing complexity, and on the other, it must induce the adaptation of individual aspirations to its own ends

reopened.
account before making the correct choice would delay decisions considerably, thereby lowering performativity.
- In that case, it would inevitably involve the use of terror.
- Language games would then be games of perfect information at any given moment.
- But they would also be non-zero-games, and by virtue of that fact discussion would never risk fixating in a position of minimax equilibrium.
- For the stakes would be knowledge
- This sketches the outline of a politics that would respect both the desire for justice and the desire for the unknown.
- that an attempt at an alternative of that kind would end up resembling the system it was meant to replace.
- This would be to make two assumptions.
- The first is that it is possible for all speakers to come to agreement
- The problem is therefore to determine whether it is possible to have a form of legitimation based solely on paralogy.
- The first is that it is possible for all speakers to come to agreement on which rules or
metaprescriptions are universally valid for language games, when it is clear that language games are heteromorphic, subject to heterogeneous sets of pragmatic rules.
- For this reason, it seems neither possible, nor even prudent …
- that it is possible to guide individual aspirations through a process of “quasi-apprenticeship,”
- and contemporary science excludes the possibility of using such a paradigm to describe society.
- a move in the direction of counterculture, with the attendant risk that all possibility for research will be foreclosed due to lack of funding?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Deontic Modality</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Permission</td>
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<tr>
<td>- The only legitimation that can make this kind of request admissible is that it will generate ideas, in other words, new statements.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Language games would then be games of perfect information at any given moment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- But they would also be non-zero-games, and by virtue of</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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that fact discussion would never risk fixating in a position of minimax equilibrium. If all messages could circulate freely among all individuals, the quantity of information that would have to be taken into account before making the correct choice would delay decisions considerably, thereby lowering performativity.

matter of principle:
- We should be happy that the tendency toward the temporary contract is ambiguous
- It requires the renunciation of fables; it demands clear minds and cold wills;
- The reduction in complexity is required to maintain the system’s power capability.
- The response a researcher usually makes to a request is
- Within the framework of the power criterion, a request (that is, a form of prescription) gains nothing in legitimacy by virtue of being based on the hardship of an unmet need.
- But it is in its nature to induce new requests meant to lead to a redefinition of the norms of “life.”

the aspirations have to aspire to the decisions, or at least to their effects.
- The objection will be made that these molecular opinions must indeed be taken into account if the risk of serious disturbances is to be avoided.
- We must thus arrive at an idea and practice of justice that is not linked to that of consensus.
- (they prescribe what the moves of language games must be in order to be admissible).
- It must reexamine its own internal communication
- The second step is the principle that any consensus on the rules defining a game and the “moves” playable within it must be local
- Returning to the description of scientific pragmatics … it is now dissension that must be emphasised.
- On the one hand, the system can only function by reducing complexity, and on the other, it must induce the adaptation of individual aspirations to its own ends.

**Boulomaic Modality**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Wishes</th>
<th>Desires</th>
<th>Expectations</th>
<th>Wants</th>
<th>Necessities/Needs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- If all messages could circulate freely among all individuals, the quantity of information that</td>
<td>- This sketches the outline of a politics that would respect both the desire for justice and the</td>
<td>- and on the other, it must induce the adaptation of individual aspirations to its own</td>
<td>- Administrative procedures should make individuals “want” what the system needs in order</td>
<td>- The response a researcher usually makes to a request is</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- The needs of the most</td>
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would have to be taken into account before making the correct choice would delay decisions considerably.
- Language games would then be games of perfect information at any given moment.
- But they would also be non-zero-games, and by virtue of that fact discussion would never risk fixating in a position of minimax equilibrium.
- For the stakes would be knowledge.
- It could become the "dream" instrument for controlling and regulating the market system.

desire for the unknown.
ends.
- The decisions do not have to respect individuals' aspirations: the aspirations have to aspire to the decisions, or at least to their effects.
- It says: "Adapt your aspirations to your ends- or else."
- That it is possible to guide individual aspirations through a process of "quasi-apprenticeship"

to perform well.
underprivileged should not be used as a system regulator as a matter of principle:
- The technocrats declare that they “cannot trust what society designates as its needs.”
- They “know” that society cannot know its own needs since they are not variables independent of the new technologies.
- In principle, no scientist embodies knowledge or neglects the “needs” of a research project, or the aspirations of a researcher.

Perception Modality
- From the beginning of this study, I have emphasised the differences (not only formal, but also pragmatic) between the various language games, especially between denotative, or knowledge, games and prescriptive, or action, games.
- This obviously implies a renunciation of terror, which assumes that they are isomorphic and tries to make them so.
- If all messages could circulate freely among all individuals, the quantity of information that would have to be taken into account before making the correct choice would delay decisions considerably.
- But what is striking is that someone always comes along to disturb the order of “reason.”
- It is not without rules (there are classes of catastrophes), but it is always locally determined.
- Of course, it does not always happen like this in reality.
- When it is clear that language games are heteromorphous, subject to heterogeneous sets of pragmatic rules.
- It brings the pragmatic functions of knowledge clearly to light, to the extent that they seem to relate to the criterion of efficiency.
- We are finally in a position to understand how the computerisation of society affects this problematic.
- In that case, it would inevitably involve the use of terror.
- Their most significant effect is precisely what validates the adoption of rules – the quest for paralogy.
- Extended to include knowledge itself and governed exclusively by the performativity principle.
- The fact that it is in reality frequently, but not necessarily, the case that one is transformed into the other presents no difficulties for the hypothesis.
- The stronger the “move,” the more likely it is to be denied the minimum consensus, precisely because I changes the rules of the game upon which consensus had been based.
- For this reason, it seems neither possible, nor even prudent, to follow Habermas in orienting treatment of the problem of legitimation in the direction of a search for
universal consensus through what he calls Diskurs, in other words, a dialogue of argumentation.

- This obviously implies a renunciation of terror, which assumes that they are isomorphic and tries to make them so.

- This property implies that “discoveries” are unpredictable.

- But as we have just seen, the little narrative [petit récit] remains the quintessential form of imaginative invention, most particularly science.

- That this is the case is particularly evident in the introduction of telematics technology.

- In addition, the principle of consensus as a criterion of validation seems to be inadequate.

- In this sense, the system seems to be a vanguard machine dragging humanity after it.

- The problem is therefore to determine whether it is possible to have a form of legitimation based solely on paralogy.

A table representing epistemic, deontic, boulomaic and perception modalities (adapted from Badran (2001) and Simpson (1993))