A Trinitarian modal-spherical method of apologetics and cultural redemption: perspectives on religion and contemporary culture

by

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CHAPTER ONE - INTRODUCTION

1.1. Introduction of the research
The following study will be designed as an application of the recently developed Trinitarian modal-spherical method of apologetics, TMSA, to the field of Religious Studies. (Braun 2013). Therein, TMSA will function as the lenses (see 4.8 and 4.9), through which three selected focus areas will be tackled. Those are: (1) technology and everyday experience, (2) music and popular culture and (3) romantic love and economic freedom.

The above foci areas do not imply the pretension of completeness. But rather, points of entry will be provided in order to approach contemporary human beings and their culture from the radically Trinitarian and Neo-Calvinist perspective of TMSA (Braun 2013), in such a way that opens up new avenues for dialogue and cultural redemption. (I) Thereby TMSA stresses the reformational anthropocentric emphasis on the central law of religious concentration (Dooyeweerd 1960:25), to which the ego is subjected (II) and at the same time reinforces the reformed confessional conviction that the entire cosmos (including humans) is ultimately dependent upon the Triune God (Braun 2013:36). TMSA thus stresses both: the transcendent-confessional and the transcendental-anthropocentric as central to its religious methodology.

Also central to the approach of the selected focus areas is the basic distinction between the central (God, self, cosmos) and the peripherical (modal aspects of reality) relations of the ego. Thereby it is implicit that self-knowledge and knowledge of the cosmos are ultimately dependent on (religious) knowledge of the absolute (the triune God). (Braun 2013:56-59) More specifically, this stress upon the central relationships of the ego reflect reformational philosophy’s account on three transcendental ideas, i.e. the “supra-theoretical presuppositions” (Dooyeweerd 1971:75) laying at the foundation of any philosophy. Accordingly, those transcendental ideas (supra-theoretical presuppositions) are: (I) “the idea of the whole of our temporal horizon of experience with its modal diversity of aspects... (time), (II) “an idea of the central reference point of all synthetical acts of thought” (coherence in diversity) and “...”an idea of Origin...” God, relating all that is relative to this absolute.” (Origin) (Dooyeweerd 1960:36-37)

The main goal of this study of focus areas is twofold: To confront contemporary culture with TMSA in a way (I) that shows how the ego is ultimately driven by a religious orientation. Further, (II) redemptive ways of dealing with the specific focus areas will be pointed out.
Therefore, as a mere scientific (theoretical) account of the focus areas isn’t sufficient, the transcendental and transcendent visions of TMSA\(^1\) will be directive in order to approach them in a way that addresses (secular) humans and their culture at the pre-theoretical religious centre of their existence (the human heart), at the same time pointing to human being’s ultimate dependence upon the Triune God (i.e. as the true Origin of creation).

This study will look at three focus areas of contemporary culture through the Neo-Calvinist lenses of TMSA and demonstrate how their mastery depend on the interplay between knowledge of God, self-knowledge and knowledge of the cosmos (i.e. the meaning of true human freedom as wholehearted service of God).

Each focus area will be approached in terms of (I) its relevance in contemporary human being’s everyday life and (II) the centrality of the ego’s religious orientation. This procedure is designed as to open up TMSA’s transformational path. And the emphasis on TMSA shouldn’t be understood as a trust in a (theoretical) method, but rather it is based upon the pre-theoretical inclination of the author and his attempt of \textit{theoretically} doing justice to the (creational) \textit{structures} according to the (directional) biblical ground-motive (i.e. creation, fall and redemption). The latter includes TMSA’s transcendent (confessional) vision and emphasises that creation is ultimately dependent upon the Triune God.

Following questions will be central to each section of the study:

- How can this focus area be approached in an integral and redemptive way?
- How does the ego’s religious orientation manifest itself in this focus area?

\section*{1.2. Positioning of the research}

The foci will be approached in a manner that (I) elucidates their importance in contemporary culture and (secular) human being’s everyday experience (II) as well as the centrality of the ego’s religious orientation, in other words, the ultimate religious commitment of human beings which directs their attitude towards the focus area concerned. Thereby it must be emphasized, that TMSA won’t \textit{primarily} serve the texts used, but rather only as a \textit{side effect}. Accordingly, basic sources will help “drawing” the picture of each focus area, but only to the

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\(^1\) TMSA’s transcendental vision is based upon Reformational philosophy, while its transcendent vision is covenantal-reformed and theological. (Braun 2013)

\(^2\) Herein, questions relating to the ego’s religious manifestations (i.e. in the focus area at stake) are implied.

\(^3\) Ayn Rand’s “Capitalism: The Unknown Ideal” is a collection of essays on the moral aspects of capitalism.
extent that they help further developing TMSA’s approach of the subjects concerned. Thus, the study of the sources will not be the focus _per se_, but rather the application of TMSA.

Among several other sources, which will come into play during the study, central texts can be alluded to in advance:

1) Technology and everyday experience. De Vries’ (2005) “Introduction to Philosophy of Technology” will provide basic distinctions so that the ubiquity of technology in contemporary culture can be seen and the ways humans relate to it can be understood. And also by considering the accounts of different schools of philosophy (including reformational philosophy), De Vries will help sketching TMSA’s transcendental vision on the subject. In addition, insights from the philosophies of technology of Heidegger and Ihde will be introduced, as their account help elucidating the different ways contemporary humans relate to technology. Accordingly, after approaching _structural_ (transcendental) questions, TMSA’s confessional (transcendent) vision will be brought forth as representing its _directional orientation_ (i.e. faith in the Triune God). (Strauss 1998:10)

2) Music and popular culture. First of all, it must be remarked, that music and popular culture are two different subjects, which demand a separated treatment. Nevertheless, it is crucial to understand their interrelation, for music plays a central role in popular culture, which has become a _Kulturreligion_. Among other claims, this one will appear to be essential in order to grasp the importance of music and popular culture in everyday experience of contemporary human beings. In other words, popular culture may serve as a point of entry in order to grasp the central role of music in contemporary culture. Therefore, TMSA must deal with (I) music, (II) popular culture and (III) with their interrelation. Among other sources, “The Encyclopedia of Religion, Communication and Media” (Stout 2006) will help drawing the picture of this contemporary focal area.

Schopenhauer’s (2011) account on music in “Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellungskraft”, which was first published in 1819 and Nietzsche’s (1872) “Die Geburt der Tragoedie” will help understanding the ontological and aesthetical foundation upon which a religious function has been ascribed (via continental philosophy) to music in contemporary culture. As important figures of continental philosophy, Schopenhauer and Nietzsche will be pointed out as main exponents of the (post-Christian) “elevation of music” to (religious) metaphysical status. Further, Adorno’s (1993) “Music, Language and Composition” as well as his penetrating critique of popular music (Adorno 1990) will come into play for the sake of
dialogue with TMSA. This will function as the bridge linking up popular music with popular culture. Finally, Storey’s (2006) standard work on popular culture will be introduced as to provide a basic understanding of the basic definitions of popular culture.

It will be demonstrated in this exposition how “music and popular culture” are to be seen as central sites of contemporary culture, whereas the religious impulse of the ego manifests itself. Thus, TMSA’s account on this focus area will provide a confessional (transcendent) and at the same time structural (transcendental) outlook, thereby fulfilling the main goals established for this study: (I) to be integral and redemptive in its approach².

3) Romantic love and economic freedom. Illouz’ (1997) “Consuming the Romantic Utopia; Love, and the Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism” will provide basic insights for this focus area (i.e. romantic love and economic freedom). The main reason for selecting this point of entry is simply because it introduces the basic distinctions for the understanding of romantic love’s Sitz im Leben in contemporary culture. Thereby, not only will nowadays’ most common interpretations of romantic love be surfaced, but also, many of the crucial developments will be concisely portrayed, which played a central role in the formation of the contemporary (cultural) set up, which on the other hand, can be seen as the context where the intersection between romantic love and economic freedom are played out in contemporary culture. Further, in order to critically engage Illouz’s sociological perspective, insights derived from Rand’s Capitalism and from H.G. Stoker’s account on human freedom will come into play. It is intended that by means of this trajectory (i.e. Illouz > Rand > Stoker > Baader), besides pursuing true dialogue with the sources, the climax of this focus area will be reached.

As above mentioned, Rand’s defence of capitalism (Rand 1966³) will be TMSA’s point of entry for dealing with (I) economic freedom. Rand defends individual freedom based on the individual responsibility of each person and bluntly rejects collectivism for taking away human being’s right to agree or disagree, to cooperate or not, according to their own judgment. Thus, she sees laissez-faire capitalism as the only way of preserving human being’s (political) economic freedom (Rand 1966), for it is grounded on (individual) human self-responsible management of means and time. On the level of freedom from other’s

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² Herein, questions relating to the ego’s religious manifestations (i.e. in the focus area at stake) are implied.

³ Ayn Rand’s “Capitalism: The Unknown Ideal” is a collection of essays on the moral aspects of capitalism.
interference, Rand’s account on economic freedom seems to be in line with TMSA, for human beings are thereby (TMSA) seen as ultimately dependent on the triune God alone, who alone has the “right” of disposal over the lives of human beings. Their specific dependence upon their own competence within cosmic experience (a precondition for economic success) is therefore seen as ultimately grounded on God’s relationship to humans, who as creature of God, have a cultural mandate to fulfil, a vocation Coram Deo and have therefore been equipped with the necessary functions and talents in order to perform their task, etc. Thus, there’s a lot to be said by TMSA about human freedom. And in order to convey TMSA’s vision on the subject, main insights from Stoker’s “False viewpoints on human freedom” (Stoker 2007a) and from “The essence of human freedom” (Stoker 2007b) will be introduced. Thus, inspired by reformational philosophy, TMSA’s vision will be brought forth and provide an all-encompassing account on human freedom (as wholehearted service of God), which is key for grasping the (possible) coherence of romantic love and economic freedom in contemporary human existence Coram Deo.

Thus, Rand’s defence of capitalism (i.e. as individual economic freedom) will come into play as to counter-balance Illouz’s collectivistic view of capitalism. Due to the rapid development of technological society, the individual’s self-responsible (effective) management of time and means demands more skills and wisdom than ever, so that economic freedom isn’t merely a utopian dream, but rather an existential struggle in the everyday lives of human beings (be it realised or not). Nevertheless, as true human freedom implies more than economic freedom, Rand’s individualism isn’t sufficient. Therefore, reformational philosophy will be inspirational in the elaboration of an all-encompassing view on human freedom.

Furthermore, insights from Stoker’s treatise on human freedom (Stoker 2007) will help sketching out TMSA’s all-encompassing vision, which includes a positive view on economic freedom as well as a Christian (alternative) view on romantic love (via Baader). More specifically, by introducing TMSA’s systematic vision (i.e. including its Trinitarian interpretation of the transcendentals) and integrating Stoker’s insights on human freedom (i.e. as wholehearted service of God), a context will be provided, which (I) solves the (false) “dilemma” emerging from Illouz’s collectivistic account on the contradictions of romantic love and capitalism (and still implied in Rand’s individualistic account). Further, TMSA’s account on human freedom will also function as basic framework for its view on romantic love (via Baader).
Different collections of Franz von Baader’s writings have been explored and used as part of the deepening of understanding into his erotic philosophy, such as: Ueber Liebe, Ehe und Kunst (Baader 1953), Saemtliche Werke (Baader 1851), Schriften Franz von Baaders (1921). As one of the main charges against Baader’s theosophy was its lack of systematic presentation (Wehr 1980), Gerhard Wehr’s Franz von Baader – Zur Reintegration des Menschen in Religion, Natur und Erotik (Wehr 1980) contributes in organizing Baader’s main insights on erotic philosophy, which are basically badly accessible due to their fragmentary form of exposition. Baader’s strong emphasis on the integral redemption of humans (including their culture), led him to give a radically different account on sexuality than the dualistic tendency of western Church fathers, which ended up becoming the most common position among western Christianity (Wehr 1980:83). Thus, as Baader’s erotic philosophy covers both, the transcendental and the transcendent visions, TMSA’s absorption of its insights will aim at regaining the spiritual dimension of the Eros in such a way that confronts contemporary culture’s views on love and sexuality. Such an integral approach promises to be fruitful in different ways: (I) be it as the Christian redemptive alternative for contemporary culture’s sexual extrapolation or (II) be it to set Christians free from dualistic positions, which depreciate sexuality (Wehr 1980). Thus, by presupposing Stoker’s account on true human freedom (i.e. as wholehearted service of God) and TMSA’s systematics, the climax of the current study will be reached (via insights from Baader).

1.3. Presupposition, research design and methodology
As mentioned at the introduction of the research, the recently developed TMSA (Braun 2013) will be the paradigm used in order to approach the three selected focus areas of contemporary culture in a non-reductive and redemptive that also demonstrates the centrality of the ego’s religious orientation in it. TMSA's non-reductive (transcendental) vision is basically informed by the reformational philosophical nuances of Dooyeweerd and Stoker, while its Trinitarian (transcendent) vision is covenantal-reformed and inspired by Van Til's apologetics and Jeremy Ive's Trinitarian interpretation of reformational philosophy as it internally coheres with reformed theology. Nevertheless, other sources have been used (and new sources will continue being used) in order to enrich and to test TMSA’ approach, such as Marlet's Neo-Thomism, Radical Orthodoxy, Ravi Zacharias, Franz von Baader and Heidegger (Braun 2013).

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4 Mangel an systematischer Darstellungskraft (Wehr 1980:28)
Therefore, as TMSA’s methodology entails a non-reductive (transcendental) philosophical and a radically Trinitarian and covenental (transcendent) vision, it is intended to apply TMSA to the three selected foci in such a way that not only considers the diverse irreducible facets of human existence (cosmic experience) scientifically (theoretically), but in a mode of apologetic discourse which also speaks religiously (pre-theoretically), to the religious center of human beings in a radically Trinitarian-Christian and constructive way, for the sake of their integral redemption (including their culture).

Furthermore, although the selected foci don’t account for the human horizon of experience in its totality, their ubiquity and relevance can’t be overseen. Thus, it is intended to address them in an (I) integral and (II) redemptive way that (I) does justice to the irreducibility and coherence of created reality and (II) speaks to the hearts of human beings so that their existence can be enriched and they might grow as whole persons, in self-knowledge, knowledge of God and knowledge of the cosmos, thereby living out their calling Coram Deo, being integrally redeemed (including their culture) in Christ, through the regenerative work of Holy Spirit upon their heart and to the glory of the God.

Besides (a) designing the approach of the foci through the non-reductive lenses of TMSA, (b) demonstrating how their mastery depend on the interplay between knowledge of God, self-knowledge and knowledge of the cosmos, the climax of the current study will be reached (c) as TMSA’s vision will be brought forth more explicitly (and systematically) at the last focus area of this study. Thus, it is methodologically intentional that this more systematic exposition should only be brought forth at the end of the study, for this procedure emphasizes the pre-theoretical listening prior to theoretical articulation and makes room for the intuitive deepening into the focus areas (prior to criticism). This underlines TMSA’s hermeneutics, by which (I) intuitive openness towards the sources is firstly pursued, followed by (II) dialogue and transcendental reasoning and (III) transformation through reasoning coram Deo and TMSA’s (transcendent) confessional vision (i.e. in the light of the biblical narrative of creation, fall and redemption), which explicitly refers to the redemptive Work of Christ, applied to the hearts of humans by the Holy Spirit and to the glory of God (i.e. the restoration of creation - including man’s regeneration and obedience of God’s plan for creation).
CHAPTER TWO – TECHNOLOGY AND EVERYDAY EXPERIENCE

In the following pages, TMSA will function implicitly, as a “background technique\(^5\), in the attempt of presenting the first focus area of the study (technology and everyday experience) in a comprised manner, which nevertheless captures the basic ways contemporary human beings relate to technology in everyday experience. Seen from the perspective of TMSA’s non-reductive ontology\(^6\) (inspired by reformational philosophy), the presented existential outlook is to be understood as irreducibly correlated to the constitution\(^7\) of the creation order.

In the treatment of the subject, key insights will be sought in non-reformational sources such as Heidegger and Ihde, in order to underline TMSA’s attempt to promote dialogue with other philosophical schools (other than the Neo-Calvinist tradition, in which TMSA is embedded).

Thereby, TMSA’s transcendent vision will mostly remain implicit\(^8\), as its transcendental vision will provide the philosophical outlook by which the sources are to be approached. But before this happens, some of TMSA’s basic (transcendent) presuppositions should be briefly mentioned; as creatures of God, humans are receivers of revelation in the integral sense and ultimately dependent upon the triune God. By taking God’s integral Word-revelation into account (revelation of creation, Christ as the incarnated word, Holy Scripture as the Word inspired by the Holy Spirit), humans are to be seen as surrounded by God’s revelation. God meets them everywhere in creation (radical diversity and coherence of created reality, Origin), in the face of other humans as well as by mirroring themselves (inter-subjectivity, coherence in diversity), in the purposiveness of every event and in human beings’ longing for transformation in the unfolding and consummation of existence in its totality (being and becoming, time). With regards to technology, TMSA’s ultimate presuppositions are thus basic\(^9\), for they guarantee from the outset that technology will be approached in the awareness of its creaturely limitations. Nevertheless, the concrete meaning of this statement will be disclosed as the treatment of the subject of study unfolds in the following pages.

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\(^5\) Such as technologies functioning in the background (air conditioner, noises of electric appliances, etc.)

\(^6\) A basic reformational conviction, that of the irreducibility and correlation of law and subject

\(^7\) law-side of the cosmos, structures of the creation order

\(^8\) Due to the confessional nature (i.e. faith in the Triune God) of TMSA’s transcendent vision, it isn’t intended to use it in order to form arguments. But rather, by elaborating a philosophical outlook, subjects will be primarily approached by TMSA’s transcendental vision (inspired by reformational philosophy). The transcendent vision will thus only come forth to give testimony to the faith in the triune God and the saving power of the Gospel.

\(^9\) TMSA’s presuppositions will come forth more explicitly at the end of this study, i.e. at the end of the treatment of the last focus area “Romantic Love and Economic Freedom.” This procedure is intentional, for it is intended that TMSA will thereby unfold as a method which prioritizes dialogue with the sources and positive exposition. This doesn’t mean that criticism isn’t going to take place, but merely that it isn’t the focus of this study.
2.1. Introducing preliminary questions and goals

As the ubiquity of technology in contemporary culture became an indisputable fact, it makes sense to continue “questioning concerning technology”, as Heidegger did at the very beginning of his memorable lecture “Die Frage nach der Technik” (Heidegger 1962:5).

Do we understand what technology really is and how we relate to it in our everyday lives? In other words, does our understanding of technology signify its core meaning\(^{10}\) and the various ways we interact with it? In the midst of the quasi-omnipresence of technology and its progress in our time, how can we enter into a free relationship with it? (Heidegger 1962:5)

Implicit is the question regarding technology and our existential lifeworld (Ihde 1990), which will be explored in the following pages and evaluated via the recently developed Trinitarian method of apologetics TMSA, which was inspired by reformational philosophy and its reformed confessional context (Braun 2013).

At a first glance it might appear inappropriate for TMSA to give attention to existential philosophers such as Heidegger and Don Ihde, instead of focusing on the accounts on technology developed reformational philosophers such as Van Riessen\(^{11}\), Egbert Schuurman\(^{12}\) or Derek Schuurman (2013)\(^{13}\). But this methodological decision is intentional and interconnected to the reformational vision itself, which stresses the need of a self-critical and presuppositional (transcendental) attitude between different philosophical schools so that true dialogue can become possible. (Stoker 2010:25).

Thus, dialogue is to be taken as to promote (a non-reductive deepening) inter-subjective reasoning coram Deo, i.e. in the sense of a listening to God’s integral revelation (i.e. taking the transcendentals as supra-theoretical presuppositions into account; Origin, coherence in diversity, and totality) from the centre of our existence. For when it comes to truth, human beings as finite creatures can only listen and receive revelation. As Dooyeweerd (1984:21) states, it is from the religious root of their existence that the human heart receives central direction.

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\(^{10}\) Core meaning is used instead of essence due to the “meaning ontology” of reformational philosophy and its avoidance of speculative metaphysics. A definition is an account (logos) that signifies the essence. Topics (Aristotle 1996:244)

\(^{11}\) Van Riessen deals with the subject for instance in “The Society of the Future” (Van Riessen 1957), In: http://www.reformationalpublishingproject.com/pdf_books/Scanned_Books_PDF/TheSocietyOfTheFuture.pdf

\(^{12}\) See some of his publications, In: http://www.allofliferedeemed.co.uk/schuurman.htm and others at the data bank of http://www.reformationalpublishingproject.com/

\(^{13}\) Schuurman, Derek, Shaping a Digital World, Faith, Culture and Computer Technology, InterVarsity Press, 2013.
(I) But *how* does technology relate to revelation? Heidegger (1962) presents interesting answers in this regard; demonstrating how deeply the essence of technology (τέχνη) is related to the poetical of arts (ποίησις) and how both, τέχνη and ποίησις are to be essentially understood, as modes of revealing, i.e. bringing αλήθεια (truth) into appearance. This and more will be explored via TMSA’s Neo-Calvinist perspective.

(II) Further, before “speaking” to contemporary culture via TMSA, it is primordial to *listen and question concerning technology* in order to come to grips with the current situation.

(III) For this purpose, De Vries’ Introduction to Philosophy of Technology (De Vries 2005) will provide a multi-sided initial point of entry for TMSA’s questioning concerning technology, as a perfect starting point for the exploration of technology and everyday life.

### 2.2. Basic distinctions and characteristics concerning technology

When people think about technology, they merely think of technical artefacts, which are designed for a certain purpose, i.e. with a proper function and a design plan. Artefacts are intentionally developed by human beings in order to transform their current state into a desired one. Artefacts are created with the intention to fulfil human desires, for example a car which is designed in order to take entities from one place to another. (De Vries 2005:23-34)

Further, not only do technical artefacts have a proper function and a design plan, but they also function in all aspects of reality, as stressed by reformational philosophy ¹⁴ (just as every entity of cosmic reality). This multi-aspectual view is basic to TMSA’s transcendental vision:

If we take for example the design of a computer, we can recognize the various aspects the engineer can have knowledge of: the computer works with only 0’s and 1’s (arithmetical aspect), it takes a certain space of the desk or on your lap (spatial aspect), it must have moving parts (kinematical aspect), it has properties such as weight, hardness, strength (physical aspect), it is not a living thing itself, but it has to interact with living things (biotic aspect), it will be watched and touched (sensitive aspect), it is based on rules that humans have developed (logical aspect), it has been developed over a period of years (historical aspect), we interact with it by using languages (lingual aspect), it can connect people (social aspect), it has a price tag (economic aspect), it has a certain appearance that people may like or dislike

¹⁴ [http://www.dooy.salford.ac.uk/aspects.html](http://www.dooy.salford.ac.uk/aspects.html)
(aesthetic aspect), it’s design is protected by patents (juridical aspect), there are issues of privacy in the access of data that it contains (ethical aspect) and it has given rise to strong beliefs in the power of technology (pistic aspect). (De Vries 2005:45)

Also, not only do technical artefacts function in all aspects of reality, but so does the designer of the artefacts, who uses various types of knowledge when designing artefacts. (De Vries 2005:46).

But we shouldn’t stop here. For besides proper function, the artefact’s functioning in all aspects of reality and the design plan of artefacts, there is always something unpredictable with regards to the final effects of technology. Heidegger points out that technical artefacts not only have a material cause (causa materialis), a formal one (causa formalis) and a design plan (causa efficiens), but also a final cause (causa finalis). The latter can’t be controlled by humans. (Heidegger 1962:7)

This is in line with reformational philosophy’s view, which is foundational to TMSA: “Technology is not just a tool – it has Structure and Direction” (Schuurman 2013:4)

But unfortunately, besides uncritically believing in the neutrality of technology, contemporary common understanding of technology is restricted to its practical relevance in everyday experience. Technology is often times viewed as equal to technological artefacts. This reductive attitude has been widely observed for instance by teachers’ empirical research (i.e. questioning students). According to these studies, although students recognize the important role of technology in their lives, only a few of them are able to give balanced accounts on the negative and positive effects of it. (De Vries 2005:113).

Heidegger also saw this tendency and warned against a “neutral” and merely anthropological/instrumental view of technology. For although technology is something that humans do (anthropologically) and use (instrumentally) as a means, their will of mastering (the world in general - more specifically, their lifeworld), evidently points to technology’s non-neutrality. Thence, the anthropological/instrumental view may still be partially right, but the true essence of technology can’t be captured by it. (Heidegger 1962:7)

Nowadays, the common cultivated attitude towards technology seems to be an uncritical and consumerist one. People tend to seek their knowledge passively in television or other
technological devices (e.g. such as in the media in general), despite the fact that the media isn’t primarily concerned about science and technology\textsuperscript{15}. (De Vries 2005:114)

In fact, some may try to avoid such unbiased absorption of information and critically search knowledge, for instance via the internet, but the outlook provided by technology is intrinsically based on a magnification/reduction structure, which must always be taken into account if one is willing to arrive at \( \alpha \lambda \nu \eta \theta \varepsilon \alpha \) (truth)\textsuperscript{16}. Technological viewpoints remain human constructions and therefore they’re always situated viewpoints.

Ihde illustrates this point with Galileo’s telescope and its “mode of seeing” which enhances the stars on the one hand and at the same time narrows down the rest of the world. (Ihde 1990:34-50)

Thence, the hermeneutical competence (lingual aspect) of human beings is always required in the quest of true knowledge, even if sought through technology. For only humans are capable of knowledge, technology isn’t.

True knowledge, viewed from a non-reductive reformational perspective, is only obtainable through a deepening of experience in self-knowledge and cosmic knowledge \textit{coram Deo}, who opens up the human heart towards the given truth of revelation. As situated creatures, humans are driven by a religious ground motive and can only receive \( \alpha \lambda \nu \eta \theta \varepsilon \alpha \) as a gift.

Although more is needed in order to grasp the embedment of technology within the radical diversity, coherence and totality of created reality (Braun 2013:29), technological “modes of seeing” may indeed provide revelatory ways of looking at creation; presupposed one’s attitude is self-critical enough in order to avoid the reductive/magnifying traps of technology.

Thus, contemporary humans are often times inclined to have a narrow conception of technology and to cultivate an uncritical and positive attitude towards it. (De Vries 2005:110).

Before further exploring the ways we experience technology in our lifeworld, the broader picture of technology and society will be surfaced, as part of everyday life in community.

\textsuperscript{15}This will be become clearer after establishing the link between technology and popular culture (i.e. in Music and Popular Culture). This and other elucidations will gradually come forth as the study of focus areas unfolds.

\textsuperscript{16}Heidegger speaks of truth (\( \alpha \lambda \nu \eta \theta \varepsilon \alpha \)) in the context of technology as “un-concealment” (Unverborgenheit), which doesn’t stand at the disposal of human beings through “rational” methods.
2.3. Anticipating the transcendent-transcendental approach

As the current focus area unfolds, it is intended that its *questioning concerning technology* will also point out to technology's *core meaning*, bringing ἀλήθεια into appearance. Then, after exploring human-technology relations according to TMSA’s transcendental vision, TMSA’s full-fledged Trinitarian and transcendent-transcendental vision will come into play in order to link up our subject with the absolute Origin (God) of human beings, their destiny and the meaning coherence of created reality.

Only then this treatise will have reached its goal of “enframing” technology and everyday life according to the ultimate dependence of human beings upon the triune God and their calling *coram Deo*.

Interestingly, *enframing* is the term which has been used to translate Heidegger’s *Gestell*, which in his view, is modern technology’s all-encompassing essence and mode of revealing the real (over against pre-modern instrumental technology) (Heidegger 1962:20). According to Heidegger, the present world is under the rule of *Gestell* 17. The essence of modern technology (*Gestell*) is challenging humans at their core as a necessary part of the history of Being and can only be overcome by the transformation of western thinking (Lin Ma 2007:7).

Humans aren’t free under *Gestell*. In reformational terms, humans have come in the grip of *technicism* and *scienticism* as the (religious) absolutization of limited and creaturely technical know-how and science. They aren’t only using technology but absolutizing it; not only developing science in order to *discover the world*, but *trusting in science for the sake of their redemption* 18.

Consequently, on the one hand contemporary (apostate) humans (may) believe that their self-fulfilment can be realized by means of modern technology (Schuurman 1977:11), while on the other hand they aren’t free under the rule of *Gestell*. As Charles Taylor states; “the malaise remains around the modern identity” (Taylor 1979:137). *Humankapital* has become a catchword in the “high developed” western technological society, giving testimony to the mechanical exploitation of humans under the rule of *Gestell*.

In contrast to Heidegger’s belief in a new beginning through such necessary historical unfolding of Being, TMSA (i.e. its transcendent vision) holds that humans are ultimately

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17 At a later stage of this treatise, a more detailed definition and explanation of *Gestell* will be given.
18 http://www.cpjustice.org/stories/storyReader$1010
dependent upon the triune God. The view that our present age is hopeless under the rule of *Gestell* is thus rejected through the reaffirmation of Christ’s lordship over the entire cosmos (including all spheres of human existence)\(^\text{19}\). God’s plan for human existence is its integral redemption in Christ, through the Holy Spirit and to his own glory, (i.e. setting humans free by renewing them according to the image of God). Consequently, true *Seinsvergessenheit* is to forget Christ.

But it is important to address the issues of our technological age as Heidegger did and we still have to elucidate the challenge of *Gestell* as the essence of modern technology more in detail. Charles Taylor deals with the same struggles of contemporary humans in a society organized by *scienticism* and *technicism*. But his trajectory follows another aim; that of how to situate freedom.\(^\text{20}\) The modern identity crisis is due to the attempt of human beings to break free from the divine creation order. Taylor unmask*sn revolutionar*y attempts of reconciling human existence with nature by means of *transformation of nature* as rooted in an empty notion of freedom which ultimately leads to nihilism (Taylor 1979:137-156). Taylor’s insights too, have to do with the *Seinvergessenheit* stressed by Heidegger in his portray of humans under the reign of *Gestell* (Heidegger 1962:37-47). Thus, if one really wants to enter into a free relationship with technology, i.e. opening up human existence to its true essence (αλήθεια) (Heidegger 1962:5), then it becomes primordial to deal with *how to situate freedom* (Taylor 1979:154). For how can one be free with regards to technology if not by experiencing it within the limits of the creation order, being thereby set free from the grip of *Gestell*?

Nevertheless, while the *dialogue* with the sources is deepened along the way of questioning, these and other crucial issues will be elucidated via TMSA. For there is still much to explore in this *questioning concerning technology*. Nevertheless, this will be done without the pretension of providing more than *situated perspectives*, for this basically reflects the human (limited) condition and creaturely self-insufficiency (i.e. ultimately dependent upon God).

### 2.4. Recapitulation and crossing point

Where did the current focus area get so far with regards to the exploration of technology and everyday experience? It has been stated that the general misconception of technology as

\(^{19}\) http://www.allofliferedeemed.co.uk/

\(^{20}\) The human quest for freedom is central to TMSA. This intention will come forth the clearest at the end of the last focus area, whereas Stoker’s insights on human freedom will be presented as fundamental to TMSA.
equal to technical artefacts is derived from the pre-modern instrumental view of technology. Although such instrumental view is partially right, it still doesn’t capture the true essence of technology. It was Heidegger who overthrew the conventional instrumental definition of technology, demonstrating how its essence isn’t technological per se, but rather the bringing forth of \( \alpha \lambda \nu \theta e \iota \alpha \) into appearance. Technology is a bringing-forth (Hervorbringen) of something that was hidden, in other words, it is \( \pi o \iota \sigma i \varsigma \). This essential relatedness of the artistic/poetical and the technical also implies the relatedness to revealed truth, the \( \alpha \lambda \nu \theta e \iota \alpha \).

Further, the difference between modern and traditional technologies thus lies in the fact that modern technology isn’t merely a bringing-forth (Hervorbringen) but also a challenging-forth (Herausfordern), which forces nature to manifest itself. This is the meaning implied in the German word for challenging (Herausfordern) applied to this context, which Heidegger uses to distinguish modern from pre-modern technology. Accordingly, modern science was founded as an attempt to control and transform nature. That's why Heidegger rejects the misconception that modern technology is applied science - the opposite is the case; it was modern technology which brought about modern science. (Heidegger 1962:12-19)

So after all, what is the mode of revealing of Gestell? According to Heidegger, Gestell as the mode of revealing of modern technology, reveals the real as Bestand (standing-reserve, calculable resource). Thereby, creation (including human beings) is turned into utter availability and come in the grip of Gestell’s rule. Consequently, besides offering a reductionistic viewpoint which hides the essence of things\(^{21}\), (Heidegger 1962:20-23) modern technology has the potential to control humans by turning them into an available resource\(^{22}\).

It is due to such dangerous tendencies that it’s so pressing to come to grips with technology. Thence it is important to understand that technology’s mode of revealing the real is a human and therefore reductive reconstruction of the real. In Ihde’s terms, technology’s modes of seeing are based on the magnification/reduction structure previously mentioned.

\(^{21}\) Take for instance an airplane or another sophisticated technological product. Only a few physicians understand the entire process and laws which constitute those products. Consequently, the “essence” of the airplane is hidden. That’s what Gestell does, according to Heidegger. It prevents us from seeing the true essence of things and it becomes a threat to the human race if it remains in the grip of Gestell. For as the tendency is one of hiding the revelation of creation from us and thus of preventing us to arrive at the

\(^{22}\) Nevertheless, modern technology obviously can’t do it by itself, for technology only obtains its direction through its normative use by human beings, who are the only entities functioning in normative aspects of reality.
In other words, modern technology has been developing modes of seeing, which are human reductive/magnifying reconstructions of what is given in creation. The tendency towards scienticism and technicism therein, has been denounced by reformational philosophy as rooted in an apostate religious ground motive (Schuurman 1977), whereby misdirected human hearts strive for redemption through technology. The outcome of such absolutizations (technicism) is therefore destructive for humans, for instead of setting them free, technicism (as religion) is unable to situate human freedom (Taylor 1979:159) in meaning coherence and unable to reconcile humans with their absolute Origin and ultimate destiny (Braun 2013:45-74).

From a reformational perspective, technology is a “cultural activity in which human beings exercise freedom and responsibility in response to God” (Schuurman 2013:8), more specifically, humans are called to listen and to respond to God’s unfolding revelation of creation. In that sense, seen from TMSA’s transcendent (Trinitarian) view, technology is part of God’s revelation of creation as one of the three Gestalten of God’s Word revelation. (Braun 2013:36-43) Thence, by developing technologies, creaturely humans uncover potentialities already given in creation.

Is that all that can be said? Definitely not, for although important distinctions have been established, such as; (I) that technical artefacts function within all aspects of reality, (II) the design plan, proper function and the four causes of technical artefacts (including the unpredictable final cause), (III) the magnifying/reduction structure technology of technology, (IV) the nexus between revelation, technology and the poetical, (V) the essence of modern technology (according to Heidegger) (VI) and even the bigger picture regarding cultural-religious inclination of our society towards technicism and scienticism, there is still much to be said about the ways through which humans experience the world via technology.

2.5. Humans as technological beings
Technology as a cultural-formative activity is intrinsic to humans (Schuurman 2013:8). From a modal-spherical perspective, technology is thus embedded in the formative (also called the

http://www.dooy.salford.ac.uk/aspects.html
historical or cultural) aspect of reality. Further, the relation between humans and technology (created by humans) is basically that of subject-object relations (Strauss 2009:93-95).

Humans behave “technologically” in order to fulfil specific desires. De Vries illustrates this point with Maslow’s hierarchy of needs; be it for the sake of survival (physiological needs), safety needs (stability, protection), love needs, esteem needs (respect, competence and mastery, independence, freedom) or the need for self-actualization (self-expression in music, arts, etc).

Thus, technology is developed in order to fulfil essential human needs from everyday experience and is in many cases, its functionality is intended as an extension of the self:

  Why did humans make a fist axe? Because their hands were too weak and too blunt in order to cut wood. Why did they come up with the idea of a spear? Because their arms were too short and their legs were too slow in order to catch a running animal. Why did they invent pots to store food? Because they only had two hands on their body, and there was a lot of food to be stored. Why did they invent lenses? That was because their eyes were not capable of seeing very small things, or things that were very far away. Likewise all technical artefacts can be explained to be extensions of natural human organs. (De Vries 2005:75)

Notwithstanding that from a reformational point of view, such an understanding of technical artefacts (as an extension of the body) is untenable if one takes it literally, for the relation between humans and technology is first of all a subject-object relation (Strauss 127-129). Nevertheless, De Vries’ intention here is similar to Ihde’s, namely that of emphasizing the way technology is perceived in everyday life (phenomenological emphasis).

2.6. Towards human-technology relations

Besides demonstrating how difficult it is, even to try to “think away” technology from our lifeworld (Ihde 1990:11-21), Ihde also developed interesting views on types of human-technology relations, which may be helpful in showing how technology shapes people’s

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24 http://www.dooy.salford.ac.uk/formative.html
25 Maslow, Motivation and Personality, 1954
contemporary perception of reality and consequently, may become another promising point of entry for TMSA in its treatment of technology and everyday experience.

Ihde’s phenomenological focus upon the way humans experience reality is also central to TMSA in its quest for an all-encompassing and at the same time concrete existential outlook. On the other hand, central ontological divergences between Ihde’s existential/postmodern and TMSA’s radically Trinitarian approach are unavoidable. But TMSA’s main intention isn’t to criticize the religious (transcendent) ground motives driving other approaches, but rather to seek true dialogue and redemption coram Deo by means of positive exposition. This incarnational motive is part of TMSA’s basic structure. (Braun 2013:98-129)

Of course, besides self-critically and transcendentally integrating important insights gained from the dialogue with other perspectives, it is intended to let TMSA’s Trinitarian (transcendent) and reformed voice speak as well. But in order to be truly non-reductive and do justice to the radical diversity and coherence of created reality, TMSA may have to cross long pathways of thinking (Denkwege) and to engage in dialogue with creaturely developed conceptions and misconceptions, which in essence, are always based upon religious ground motives and a certain way of listening and responding to God’s integral Word revelation.

In order to broaden the scope of the current focus area with regards to the different ways our everyday lives and technology are intertwined, a brief introduction of Ihde’s views on human-technology relations will be presented, in a way that may enable a deepening of experience and of knowledge of technology.

Thereby, the central threefold relation of God, self, cosmos will be kept in the foreground of the following section, primarily for the sake of demonstrating how the mastery of “technology and everyday experience” depends upon the interplay of true knowledge of God, self-knowledge and knowledge of the cosmos. Last but not least, as the different human-technology relations are introduced, examples will be given in order to demonstrate their Sitz im Leben.

Ihde (1990:72-111) distinguishes between four types of human-technology relations.
(I) Embodiment relation: (I-technology) → world (cultural-historical subject-object relation)

Some examples suffice in order illustrate how we use (embody) technology in everyday lives:

I may use an axe to cut wood or a hammer to hit a nail (it makes me stronger), a spear or other weapon in order to hunt a running animal (it makes me faster, my hands longer), a bicycle, car, boat, ship or airplane as a means of transportation (it takes me faster to desired places, even to distance places which would be hardly reachable by feet), a telescope to see the stars better (it enhances my capacity of seeing), sunglasses (to protect the eyes from the sun), contact lenses or glasses (for instance to improve my capacity of seeing in case I’ve got myopia), a window in a room (it limits my view but also gives me a certain view of the landscape outside the room) etc. The list could be indeterminately expanded.

The “parentheses” (I-technology) indicates that technology can be experienced as extensions of our own bodies. Usually though, as soon as the used technology doesn’t work properly, we tend to “push them off” and to experience them as an obstacle to our desired state. Although one should keep in mind that Ihde’s phenomenological stress on technology as an extension of the human body” shouldn’t be taken literally. Although the reformational account on subject-object relationships represents a more precise account of state of affairs, Ihde’s insights are still very interesting as they focus at showing how technology is perceived.

Take for instance the example of the car. As long as it takes people to the places they desire (without problems), they use it without giving many thoughts on it. Experienced drivers may know their cars so well that they almost “forget” that they are using a car to take them from A to B. But a flat tire or engine problems in the middle of the way back home from work can be enough to frustrate people for it may force them to change their plans for the rest the day.

(II) Hermeneutical relation: I→ (technology-world). (lingual subject-object relation)

De Vries gives a good example and a concise explanation of Ihde’s hermeneutical relation:

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26 Embodiment relation is the name given by Don Ihde to this sort of relation. Cultural-historical subject-object relation on the other hand, represents the way reformational philosophy accounts for this relation. In the introduction of the next human-technology relations, the same scheme will be maintained, i.e. first Ihde’s definition, followed by the reformational account in parenthesis.  
27 Again, it is important to remember Strauss’ reformational stress on the fact that human-technology relations are to be understood in terms of subject-object relations (Strauss 2009:127-129). 

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when an operator of a power plant wants to have information about what happens inside the power plant, (s)he reads the instrument panel. It is then taken for granted that what is read from this instrument panel is so closely connected to the inside of the power plant that the two are like one totality. In that case the instrument panel as a tool for observing does not become part of my body, but of the world that I observe. The relationship can then be presented as: I→(technology-world)... What I see now needs to be interpreted (and that is what hermeneutics is all about) in order to be understood (contrary to the window and glasses example). (De Vries 2005:70-71)

In contrast to such phenomenological emphasis on technology as an extension of the body, Strauss believes that this (phenomenological) understanding rests on a misunderstanding of the cultural-historical subject-object relation (Strauss 2015).28

Other relevant examples may be given in order to show the presence of hermeneutical (lingual) human-technology relations in people’s lives. Just think about facebook and whatsapp and its millions of daily users. Regardless their different features both function as a way of connecting people and demand hermeneutical (lingual) skills from both sides of the communicators.29 And in almost every conversations, with scientific and non-scientific people, young and older (usually between 14 and 50), the lack of such hermeneutical skills in the use of both technologies has been a cause for relationship problems and in some times, even of relationship break-ups. Again, this doesn’t mean that this is technology’s fault, but it does illustrate the fact that the structure and dynamics of technologies (for instance communication apps and sites) demand hermeneutical skills (lingual aspect) in order to work properly. Another common example of a hermeneutical relation (lingual) is a book. Its technology is an older one and reading skills have been intensively developed over the last centuries. Nevertheless, there is identity between a book, a movie, whatsapp and facebook with regards to their hermeneutical (lingual) dimension. For instance, the more a person understands the lifeworld (including his background, knowledge, skills, sources, etc) of the author of a book, the more the book is understood per se. The same applies to a movie, for if the script and the lifeworld of its author is known, people become more sensitive in capturing the main motives of the movie. So it is with whatsapp and facebook. The more the person’s

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28 This was DFM Strauss’ remark on that specific quote. Personal communication between GB and DS, February 2015.
29 I’ve been intensively observing this state of affairs during the last four years.
lifeworld is known, the better his/her messages and posts are understood. Those are mainly some introductory thoughts.

(III) Alterity relation: I $\rightarrow$ technology-(world) (inter-subjectivity relation – encompasses a sort of subject-subject relation, besides the common subject-object relation between humans and technological artefacts\(^{30}\))

Videogames are good examples of alterity (inter-subjective) relations. Although they aren’t actually real, people do perceive them as quasi-real. As (human) viewpoints, they’re capable of expressing truths concerning reality and enable others to acquire new insights and skills, etc. For instance in fantasy games, one may be immersed into different social roles, having to learn and apply specific skills to be successful in the given role (for instance war strategies in war games or managing skills in soccer manager games). In other words, alterity (inter-subjective) relations have the potential to play an important role in the process of actualization and specification of the self. (My own nuance\(^{31}\) - anticipating the specification relation\(^{32}\)) Tragic examples of addictions to violent videogames, leading teenagers to commit murder, illustrate that point. Of course other factors also play a role here, but the virtual lifeworld experienced in alterity (inter-subjective) human-technology relations can indeed have a powerful impact on humans. Thereby a technological (inter-subjective) mode of experiencing the world is given to humans, through which they may express their inclination, obviously in a limited sense. The same potential of influencing humans in the process of specification and self-actualization is also contained in movies. Although one knows that a movie isn’t real, one can perceive it as if it was real. It may happen quickly that people

\(^{30}\) I’ve discussed the here presented human-technology relations with the renowned reformational philosopher DFM Strauss. With regards to Ihde’s “alterity relation”, he firstly suggested that it relates to human imagination. In response, I’ve argued that “imagination” alone wouldn’t do it, i.e. it would be one-sided for the intended stress on (the possibility of) “inter-subjectivity” (via technology) would be missing. He then granted that this relation may encompass inter-subjectivity. Nevertheless, the reformational variants (in parentheses) of the other relations were his ideas (Personal communication between GB and DS, several emails in February of 2015).

\(^{31}\) Ihde simply refers to the alterity human-technology relation as a quasi-reality through/in which human beings express themselves. But I believe there’s another human-technology relation implicit, which I’ll explain in another section. Thus, by referring to self-actualization and specification I’m anticipating this other human-technology relationship – which is not contained in Ihde’s accounts.

\(^{32}\) With regards to the upcoming “specification relation”, I must also refer to my personal communication with DFM Strauss in February of 2015. For inspired by Carl Jung’s archetype theory, it was my initial intention to call this relation “individuation relation”. With reference to his standard work on reformational philosophy (Strauss 2009), he convinced me that the notion of “individuation” is problematic. For as the modal aspects of reality are universal, it follows that created entities (including human beings) can’t individualize what is universal, but rather, the typical way that entities function in every aspect of reality can only specify the modal meaning of each aspect of reality. (Strauss 2009:399-400; 449-453). Thus, while “specification relation” maintains my own intention with regards to this human-technology relation, it also entails TMSA’s intended reformational thrust and its non-reductive account on individuality and universality.
identify with a certain character or characters, with the story and/or the context presented, the fascinating scenario constructed, the dramatic music underlying different scenes and main motifs, etc. And then people may find themselves immersed in the stories they watch and feel as if they were part of it. That’s powerful and at the same time it explains the tremendous influence of popular culture; the media, Hollywood, the music industry, etc. But that’s something to be dealt with in more detail in the next focus area of this study, entitled “Music and popular culture”. But at this stage, the two given examples of alterity (inter-subjective) human-technology relations are enough to demonstrate their presence in our everyday lives.

(IV) Background relation - I→ (technology-)world (multiple subject-object relations)

Another ubiquitous human-technology relation is the background relation. Living in shelter technologies, often times with alarm systems to protect them from intruders, contemporary people are constantly surrounded by the noises of technology. In the household noises may be coming from electrical appliances, such the washing machine, the air conditioner, the clock or the fridge. In the car the noises are many, and the more sophisticated the cars get, the less disturbing they tend to become. But despite all progress in the improvement of the background noises caused by technologies, this background relation remains. At this very moment, the author is experiencing computer noises. There are times noises may be forgotten, (e.g. through the perceived immersion in the “world” of reading and writing). But the technological texture remains. This is what Ihde calls the background relation.

Ihde also talks about ‘horizontal phenomena. In those phenomena, the distinction between the “natural” and the artefact seem to almost disappear. Take for instance the implant of new teeth. After a while, people use to get accustomed to it and to forget its artificiality. Although in cases of prosthesis, the experience is rather that of a new mode of being instead of a natural one. At that point, the question regarding gene-manipulation arises (Ihde 1990:112-115). Many have written and speculated about the possibility of overcoming every human malaise via technology. This is part of the trans-humanist dream of being completely embodied and transformed by technology (De Vries 2005:78). Nevertheless, as this study is mainly concerned about current (already present) phenomena, such speculation about future possibilities exceed the intended field of enquiry. It suffices to state that from a (human) situated perspective, the causa finalis of such technological mutation can’t be predicted. But in essence, the trans-humanistic dream resembles the utopian dream of situation-less freedom endorsed by revolutionaries (Taylor 1979:140-166). And history has shattered down every single human attempt to obtain absolute freedom. Indeed, even in the case of believers,
freedom isn’t obtainable without human being’s true deepening of self-knowledge, knowledge of the cosmos and knowledge of God. Only situated freedom is possible, presupposed one’s heart direction is driven by the biblical non-reductive religious ground motive which grants an all-encompassing view of creation and preserves the different facets of life. Thus, the trans-humanist dream seems to be directed towards the same frustrations of previous revolutionaries. The future will show. And the next generations will give testimony.

With regards to the different human-technology relations just mentioned, De Vries borrows the term device paradigm, which was coined by Albert Borgmann33, in order to warn people against the reductions in human experience which are caused by technological devices:

> If we are not sufficiently aware of the intermediary role of technologies in our interactions with reality and we get used to the reductions that technologies causes in the way we experience reality, we may lose the sense of how rich our existence can be. (De Vries 2005:78)

It makes sense to apply the device paradigm to ways of communication such as whatsapp and facebook. One may think of the contemporary situation, in which technological communication became ubiquitous. Since the prominence of facebook and whatsapp, negative experiences with those new ways of communication became common. Facebook and whatsapp, in many occasions may substitute face-to-face encounters (i.e. preference for writing) and in many cases even impoverish personal encounters (chatting on the smartphone and neglecting the physically close person). Of course many positive examples could also be named if the different (already mentioned) technological modes of seeing were considered.

### 2.7. Binding up -TMSA and technology

In the previous pages, basic distinctions were introduced concerning what technology is and how contemporary humans relate to it. Primordial attention was first given to diverse structural issues, based on TMSA’s transcendental vision, which was inspired by reformational philosophy34. Thus the proper context was established and TMSA’s

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34 Although inspired by reformational philosophy in its emergence, it isn’t the intention to strictly follow the reformational philosophical methodology in the further development and application of TMSA. For besides
transcendent vision (based on the reformed theology) can now finally come into the play more explicitly. After all, how can TMSA’s transcendent-transcendental outlook serve contemporary humans so that they may experience technology within its limits (as well as its rich possibilities) and be redeemed towards a free relationship towards it? Now is time to bind together all the main insights gained up via TMSA and conclude this focus area.

2.8. Technology and revelation

As to its core meaning, technologies are modes of revealing (the revelation of creation). In other words, technology is a bringing forth of the revelation of creation into appearance (as that which God has put into creation – to be discovered and developed by human beings). This creaturely “bringing-forth” is at its core ποίησις and therefore intrinsically related to the poetical of arts. Thereby, humans have the calling to reveal (and to receive revelation) when engaging with technology (just as with arts) as modes of revealing; revealing the self and the cosmos to themselves and others, before God (coram Deo) who ultimately holds everything together according to His counsel and plan.

In TMSA’s terms, technology ought to be primarily understood as God’s revelation of creation, through the (cultural-formative activity) intermediate calling of human beings to bring forth (ποίησις) the revelation of creation to themselves and others coram Deo.

2.9. Technology and lifeworld

But besides the relationship of humans to God (the absolute) and the meaning of technology (in relation to God), there are specific meaning moments which should be stressed, i.e. the different ways human existence (including its different relations) is shaped by technology. Basically, human beings develop technologies in order to fulfil basic needs from everyday experience. Technologies are designed with a proper function and a design plan in order to transform a (human) current state into a desired one. Thus, technology functions in God’s creation order as ways through which humans express themselves as individuals, in their process of specification coram Deo in God’s world. The fact that humans function in all

drawing from reformational sources, it is also intended to maintain the link between TMSA and reformed theology as well as the dialogue with different nuances of reformed apologetics. Consequently, reformational philosophy should nevertheless remain a central source of inspiration and philosophical authority for TMSA. Thereby “essence of technology” is intentionally avoided. Based on the reformational epistemological conviction, creaturely humans don’t understand things “essentially”, but in terms of “meaning coherence”. Human knowledge is relative (bound to time) with regards to the meaning of creation. Human knowledge of the absolute is grounded in God’s Self-revelation and the opening up of the human heart through the Holy Spirit.
aspects of reality\textsuperscript{36} explains the perceived ubiquity of technology in everyday experience of contemporary human beings.

In fact, the reason why technology is often perceived as a cause for the impoverishment of experience, is related to this ubiquity. But what is the “structural-directional” reason for such (possible) oppressive effect of technology upon human beings? In order to answer to this question, it is important to understand the structure of technological viewpoints and of human-technology relationships.

2.10. Technological viewpoints and human-technology relationships

Besides having a proper function and a design plan, technology also has an unpredictable causa finalis. As already mentioned, technology isn’t neutral: “Technology is not just a tool – it has Structure and Direction” (Schuurman 2013:4)

As a mode of revealing the revelation of creation, modern technology has been developing magnifying/reductive modes of seeing creation, which are basically human reconstructions of what is given in creation. Previously, examples were given in order to illustrate this fact (television, movies, social networks, internet, movies, etc). But as such, technological magnifying/reductive viewpoints aren’t the problem, for they may reveal different facets of creation (including the way human beings function in the different aspects of reality) and enrich human experience. Such viewpoints only become a problem if humans put their faith in technology. Consequently, the impoverishment of human experience may be caused by the absolutization of technology, not by technology itself. Thence, such absolutization of technology takes place due to the religious inclination of human beings towards technicism.

More specifically, which basic human-technology relationships are there shaping (human) contemporary everyday experience? Don Ihde mentions four: (I) embodiment relations (cultural-historical subject-object relations), (II) hermeneutical relations (lingual subject-object relations), (III) alterity relation (inter-subjective subject-subject and subject-object relations and (IV) background relations (multiple subject-object relations). Due to TMSA’s emphasis on the ego’s threefold relation (God, self, cosmos) and the aspects of reality (as identified by reformational philosophy), a further human-technology relation must be added; (V) specification relation (also encompassing subject-subject and subject-object relations).

\textsuperscript{36} http://www.dooy.salford.ac.uk/aspects.html
The main reason for the addition of the fifth relation is based upon the law of religious concentration of the self, uncovered by the transcendent approach developed by reformational philosophy. Thereby it was demonstrated that in the pre-theoretical attitude of human beings, the self is inevitably religiously inclined towards God or something (idol) in creation.

Applying this insight to the realm of human-technology relations means, that besides (I) apparently embodying technology and extending one’s body (cultural-historical subject-object relation), (II) hermeneutically (lingual subject-object relation) reading the world through technology, (III) experiencing technology as a quasi-reality, where inter-subjective interactions is possible and (IV) experiencing the world with technology functioning in the background (multiple subject-object relations), (V) technology as a magnifying/reductive reconstruction of the world also provides a quasi-transcendent viewpoint, giving human beings (as the “suggested” creator of technology) the impression that they can transcend the modal-diversity and coherence of the temporal creation order. Thus, technological viewpoints become the absolutized idol in which humans may place their faith (trust, in a general sense). On the other hand, as technology is created by humans, belief in technology implies belief in the human self in an absolute (religious) sense (although technology can never be more than creaturely/reductive representations of reality).

A concrete example for a Grenzfall (limiting case) between a hermeneutical (lingual), an alterity (inter-subjective) and a specification (inter-subjective) human-technology relationship can be a movie. The (human) existential/structural relationship towards the movie is (I) hermeneutical (lingual) because the movie depends on the (human) hermeneutical ability (including the capacity to understand the lifeworld of the author as well as the movie’s script) in order to properly understand the movie. The (II) alterity relation (inter-subjectivity) is also present because as the movies imitate true human possibilities, thereby presenting “possible” real human characters, the movie’s spectator (although physically absent from the movie’s portrayed situation) psychologically and personally interacts with the characters he “encounters” in the movie. Further, the (III) specification relation is present because as individuals, humans open themselves up towards the persons and situations presented in movies. And as humans are still in the making, those encounters (which prior to modern technology were more often sought in face-to-face encounters) become part of the human process of self-actualization and specification. Religiously speaking, the persons and situations (often times fantastically portrayed by sophisticated technology, special effects in
audio and images, etc.) technologically presented, allow humans to “step aside” and take an “epic” (meta-narrative) standpoint, suggesting a way of how to transcend the diversity of motives of his temporal existence, giving a concrete form to the human self and directing towards a (possible) destiny. Thus, the actors (and characters they play) function as archetypes, (prophetically) inspiring and guiding humans who open up themselves towards such “poetic” revelation. Similarly, music may also play an important religious-poetic role in the human process of specification and self-actualization, in the person’s immersion into a specific meta-narrative, often times dramatically and poetically presented to human perception as a form of revelation (of man, creation, and God through man) through the ποίησις of the arts. In fact, the contemporary human technological possibilities may dramatically enhance the power and effectiveness of music upon man and culture. This subject will be treated more in detail as part of the next focus area, namely “Music and popular culture”.

For now, the main focus is laid upon the central insight gained from this (IV) specification relationship, namely that of the religious function and Sitz im Leben of technology, (as poetic revelation, ποίησις, in its connection to the arts) in everyday experience.

2.11. Technology and idolatry (pseudo-revelation)

Considering the above mentioned revelatory function of technology (bringing forth God’s revelation of creation) and at the same time keeping in mind that technological viewpoints are based on a magnifying/reductive structure (e.g. the telescope, where the stars are enhanced at the cost of the rest – e.g. videogames - as technologies are developed by human beings, despite how sophisticated virtual scenarios may be, they are still mere human reconstructions of the world – as human beings are created and situated in temporal reality, human viewpoints, just as technological viewpoints, will always be limited - that’s why technologies must necessarily display such magnifying/reductive structure), the main reasons why technology may cause an impoverishment of experience have been approximated. (I) On the one hand, the misdirection of the (human) faith function may cause humans to put their trust in technology for the sake of redemption (instead of acknowledging the human limits therein implicit).(II) On the other hand, individual extrapolations certainly can’t be taken as the only reason for contemporary (human) existential crisis in technological society, but if technicism

37 Rather men confess it or not, faith is one of the aspects of reality which constitutes human’s horizon of experience. http://www.dooy.salford.ac.uk/aspects.html. Thus, man’s faith function is “always there” and as it is grounded in a religious ground motive, it gives central direction to the self in cosmic time.
and scientism are understood as rooted in a supra-temporal religious ground motive (as argued by reformational philosophers), then it follows that the formative power of those supra-temporal ground motives may also cause a specific impact upon the lifeworld of human beings (including their culture), presupposed society’s organization is based upon it, or at least influenced by it.

For that reason, Heidegger’s notion of Gestell was introduced; thereby pointing to a specific mode of revealing of modern technology which has been causing a powerful influence (humans apparently being mechanically turned into utter availability by modern technology, as if creation and humans were calculable resources) upon culture since its emergence.

Accordingly, Charles Taylor’s notions of situated freedom and the crisis of the modern identity further illustrated the human condition within a society that is technologically organized (i.e. in the grip of Gestell). It also further elucidates the supra-temporal religious ground motive lying at the pre-theoretical foundation of technicism and scientism as it is rooted in modernity’s revolutionary attempt to reconcile human beings with nature by means of its transformation (of nature), breaking free from any sort of divine creation order.

Such a revolutionary (religious) inclination ultimately leads to nihilism, for it entails a self-destructive and empty notion of freedom. At the end of the day, instead of transforming nature and bringing forth redemption, revolutionary thinking leads humans to nihilistic desperation and the destruction of existential meaning coherence of their experience.

2.12. Conclusions - TMSA and technology

After all that has been said, is there a possible way of redeeming contemporary humans and their culture from the grip of Gestell? Or is it the ultimate fate of human beings to lose their identity and sense of life-orientation in cosmic experience?

In the previous points (I-V), a brief summary was given on the so far presented focus area “technology and everyday experience”. Throughout the entire exposition, two basic elements constantly found utterance as foundational to TMSA’s approach: (1) the stress on the ego’s basic threefold relation (God, self, world) as well as the fact (2) that human beings function within all the aspects of reality (inspired by reformational philosophy).

For instance; (1) with regards to God and self, technology is presented as a human (creaturely) mode of revealing and bringing forth of God’s revelation of creation into
appearance. In an ultimate sense, technology is based on the human ability to listen and to respond to God’s unfolding revelation of creation. And in its core meaning, technology (τέχνη) as bringing forth (Hervorbringen) is related to the poetical of arts (ποίησις). Still in terms of the central religious orientation of human beings, technology can also become the vehicle of pseudo-revelation such as pointed out in the religious attitude inclined towards technicism and scienticism.

(2) The relationship between technology and lifeworld on the one hand, technological viewpoints and human-technology relations on the other hand, are due to their intertwined Sitz im Leben to be seen as (I) irreducible and (II) correlated to each other. More specifically, basic technologies are developed by humans in order to fulfil their basic needs in cosmic time. Thus, technology is an indispensable component of (human) everyday experience and lifeworld.

(3) But the later (human beings and cosmos) relationship doesn’t provide insight into the specific existential/constitutional ways through which the human self specifies within cosmic time coram Deo, with and through technology. For this reason, the indication that technological viewpoints (developed by humans) are always “magnifying/reductive” in their structure, leads to the important insight with regards to the way human perception may be (is being) shaped by technology nowadays. Further, five basic human-technology relationships were introduced (with implicit reference to the aspects of reality, as they were discovered by reformational philosophy – as well as the three central relations of the ego), so that the diverse ways through which contemporary human beings constantly interact with technology may be grasped.

Consequently, it is profitable to train oneself in seeing the different ways by which human constitution and existence are related to technology, so that it may be experienced within its boundaries, fullness and richness. Such “thinking” accompanied by “seeing” coram Deo anticipates the true deepening into true self knowledge, knowledge of the cosmos and knowledge of God in its relation to technology, as pursued via TMSA’s methodology. True self knowledge and knowledge of the cosmos can’t be separated from knowledge of God. Consequently, (a) “seeing” and “thinking” imply the (human) person’s integrated embedment in the diverse and coherent creation order and the self’s encounter and responsive involvement with the knowable, (b) just like in the case of human self-examination, whereas true self-understanding (Verstehen) follows the self’s (deepened) “listening” to the revelation.
of creation. (c) Such listening leads to the awareness of one’s own religious ultimate dependence upon the absolute, (d) which on the other hand only takes place if the human heart is opened up and receives God’s integral Word-revelation. It is only through such (e) deepening that humans fully may grasp the *embedding of technology* within the radically diverse and coherent creation order, in such a manner that encompasses temporal existence in its totality (Braun 2013:29).

Thence, after presenting “technology and everyday experience” in terms of the central spheres of the ego, in the attempt to irreducibly consider the diverse and coherent ways human beings relate to technology, TMSA’s transcendent vision will now more explicitly come into play in order to conclude the present focus area.

According to TMSA’s Trinitarian and covenantal understanding, technology belongs to the revelation of creation. It is based upon God’s calling and the human ability to respond. Humans are called to bring forth the hidden, that what’s already given by God, in creation.

As a creaturely mode of revealing, technology is related to the ποίησις of arts. This central meaning explains the tremendous formative power it has had upon contemporary culture. And this insight also helps understanding the link between the revolutionary inclination and technology. The later, in its attempt to emancipate from the divine creation order, has absolutized the magnifying/reductive technological viewpoints created by modern technology in everyday life and science, leading to existential nihilism and to the mechanical exploitation of humans in society. This religious and formative impact of technology is still a vivid reality in contemporary culture.

Viewed from TMSA’s Trinitarian perspective, technologies may only enrich human experience if they’re taken as what they are, namely creaturely modes of revealing which presuppose a situated human perspective. Further, regardless how sophisticated technologies may be, due to its magnifying/reductive structure they can’t provide an all-encompassing (complete) “picture” of reality. Thus, the revolutionary project of transforming nature for the sake of (human) redemption remains a utopian dream.

As technology has become indispensable in contemporary (human) lifeworld and everyday life, shaping human experience and relationships like never before, TMSA’s emphasis upon the importance of a deepened understanding of the radical diversity and coherence of created reality *coram Deo* must be emphasized. This implies that in order to do justice to the different
facets and possibilities related to technology and everyday experience, contemporary humans are called to deepen themselves (I) in true knowledge of self, (II) knowledge of the cosmos and (III) knowledge of God.

(III) Knowledge of God (the absolute) is indispensable in order to relate the relations in cosmic experience, (I) knowledge of self implies the knowledge of oneself and the relation to others (inter-subjectivity) and (II) cosmic knowledge refers to the horizon of human experience in its totality (including the different aspects of reality).

Based on the TMSA’s Trinitarian (transcendent vision), the interplay of the above mentioned central ways of knowing all together provide an integral and redemptive way in dealing with technology and everyday experience, by recognizing the (II) structure and direction of technology as it is embedded in God’s creation order, and more specifically, also from the perspective of the human lifeworld. Thereby, not only does (III) the religious and revelatory meaning of technology become clear (IV) but also the specific ways human existence is related to technology (including human interactions with other entities through technology).

(III) Thus, it is only by knowing God in Jesus Christ, through the work of the Holy Spirit upon men’s hearts, that contemporary humans may experience technology within its limits, as ways of enriching human experience and of providing revelatory viewpoints on human existence and on God’s creation order. In combination with the arts and driven by the biblical ground motive, technology may offer true inspiration and be genuine revelations of the true self to himself and others coram Deo. But such personal knowledge of God (the absolute) isn’t merely the antidote against absolutizations and pseudo-revelations. True knowledge of God and (a) true self-knowledge are the ultimate basis for a (b) true understanding of the cosmos. Although differently suggested by technological viewpoints such as the “google search machine”, true knowledge isn’t immediately accessible. In order to truly understand anything at all (including himself), humans must open up themselves towards God’s revelation and listen. And even if humans would open themselves up towards existence and the infinitude of possibilities (including an undefined absolute Origin), without Christ as the convergence point for the diversity of created reality (including their relationship to themselves and others) the meaning coherence of existence and the ultimate destiny of human beings would remain a terrifying mystery and the contemporary (post-Christian) nihilistic inclination unchallenged. Human beings would remain lost.
In Trinitarian terms, the human heart must be opened up by the Holy Spirit. God’s reconciliation in Jesus Christ is the only way of redirecting the (human) faith function towards the true Origin so that humans may enter a truly free relationship with technology (in the ultimate sense). Consequently, only through a new heart direction is it possible for contemporary human beings to fulfil their calling coram Deo with regards to technology. And as the radically diverse and coherent creation order opens up, it may fulfil its ultimate purpose of revealing God’s plan of creation to man, blessing humans and enriching their cosmic experience in the unfolding of time.
CHAPTER THREE – MUSIC AND POPULAR CULTURE
The previous focus area “technology and everyday experience” was presented with the intention of providing a vantage point that captures both, the existential relevance as well as the constitutive complexity of the subject concerned.

Accordingly, a similar procedure will be pursued with regards to “music and popular culture”. But due to the fact that the current focus area actually entails two different subjects, the following pages will (I) firstly deal with music and everyday experience.

The initial focus upon music (instead of popular culture) isn’t merely a matter of chronology, but it is based upon the intention of primarily dealing with music, its constitution and existential relevance. Later, the concept of popular culture with its “shared set of beliefs that have attained global acceptance” (Brandon 2009:6) will be introduced in order to provide a context that elucidates music’s importance and function in contemporary culture.

Further, (II) won insights will be deepened in terms of the music philosophy of key continental thinkers, which on the other hand will be evaluated from the perspective of TMSA’s Trinitarian vision. And (III) by the time “popular culture” comes into the picture more explicitly, the first two points will have provided a basic understanding of the relation between “music”, “popular culture” and everyday experience, at the same time demonstrating (IV) how the ego’s religious orientation reveals itself in this focus area (V) so that redemptive ways of dealing with it may be opened up.

3.1. Preliminary thoughts on music
Music is everywhere. (I) Its ubiquity is indisputable. This is certainly also due to the fact that nowadays, technological devices facilitate its reproduction. But unlike technology, it doesn’t need a definition. For nobody seems to disagree on what music is. (II) Its compatibility allows it to be present in the context of other arts (series, movies, theatre, opera, etc.) and all sorts of social and religious activities (sport games, weddings, parties, funerals, church service liturgy, etc.). (Alperson 2004:261-263)

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38 Certainly one can distinguish e.g. between popular music and serious music like Adorno in his penetrating criticism of popular music (Adorno 1990: 259), although the most common distinction is between “popular music” and “classical music”, whereas the latter is usually characterized as difficult and inaccessible (Alperson 2004:161). But this will be discussed at a later stage, when dealing with music from an ontological perspective.
In fact, music is commonly seen as the art which is most typically associated with emotional experience (De Nora 2003:101). Consequently, music has the power to move people in very intimate and distinctive, at first glance even mysterious ways. Nevertheless, it is intended that the deepening into the subject in the following pages will shed enough light on the constitution of music and the ways we relate to it in everyday life, so that the impression of mystery may be replaced by a deeper understanding of music, its relevance and function in contemporary culture.

3.2. Music and everyday experience

In a fascinating book on music and everyday life, music sociologist Tia de Nora (2004:48) unpacks the results from her critical evaluation of more than fifty interviews, which she led between 1997 and 1998 in the USA and the UK about the role of music in the lives of the people she interviewed. The interviews focused on the people’s daily routines and how music features their days. Besides furnishing insights directly related to the interviews, De Nora also deliver arguments which are backed up by sources of music sociology and social theory. Basic insights therefrom will be introduced as “nine propositions”, which will offer interesting points of entry to music and everyday experience.

It is important to remark that the presentation of the “propositions” don’t coincide with the structure of De Nora’s work itself. Neither do the “nine” delivered propositions represent the entirety of her arguments, in quantity or in quality. For the central intention of the current sub-section is simply to present the propositions as basic to the understanding of the relevance and function of music in contemporary culture, before going deeper into music philosophy.

(1) Nearly all of the people were explicit about music’s role as an (aesthetical) ordering device of everyday experience (De Nora 2004:2). She also notes that the metaphor of “transport” (carrying one from one “emotional” place to another) has been one of the most common metaphors for musical experience in post-nineteenth century Western culture. Therefore, music can be conceived as a type of aesthetic technology (De Nora 2004:4).

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39 By contemporary culture “western culture” is meant and simply reflects the western background of the author. This clarification simply emphasizes the limitations of the author and of the sources used.

40 The only weakness of the given source, in my opinion, is De Nora’s concentration on women. According to her, this gender restriction was intentional due to the gender imbalance in cultural studies related to music and social life (De Nora 2004:48). Unfortunately then, some readers may regard De Nora’s data as one-sided.
(2) Music has the power to “compose” situations by changing the way time is experienced. For instance, if a person is waiting for a call, the introduction of music may enable him/her to reconstruct the way the duration of the time is experienced. (De Nora 2004:9)

(3) Music helps making sense of situations. This is very common e.g. when people put on music in order to tune into an ongoing or upcoming situation (De Nora 2004:11).

(4) Music is used as a resource to create and sustain ontological security. It also helps entertaining moods and dealing with distress. De Nora emphasizes that this isn’t merely typical of music therapy, but a common coping strategy of people in everyday life. In the course of everyday experience, people seek and find refuge in music as they listen to it reflexively. Thus, music thereby functions as a catalyst which enables people to move from an emotional state to another and to reconfigure themselves (De Nora 2004:16).

(5) Many people also describe music as having power over them, as source of inspiration and motivation. Thereby, De Nora also suggests that there’s the tendency that music may function as a drug although she avoids arriving at a definitive conclusions. (De Nora 2004:18)

(6) De Nora also points out that in all the named examples, music stands in dynamic relation to social life and human agency (collective and individual). By agency she doesn’t merely mean human responsibility, but also consciousness, identity, cognition, perception, embodied conduct, etc. Consequently, as music has the power to shape human agency and social life, it must be regarded as a source of social power. (De Nora 2004: 20)

(7) Music has the power to interest, enrol and transform their users. It can’t be generally determined to which extent this happens, but the tendency is evident. But it isn’t a mysterious process either. The effect of music depends on many factors such as the way the person listens (including the person’s constitution and abilities), the memories and associations the person brings up and the circumstances in which the person consumes it, etc. Consequently, music’s semiotic force also depends on the person (De Nora 2004:42-43).

(8) She emphasizes that all the interviews pointed to music’s (aesthetical) function of world-clarification, whereby music serves as a template against which feelings, perceptions and social situation are created and sustained. In this sense, De Nora identified music as a mythical resource against which other relationships can be mapped (De Nora 2004:44).
(9) De Nora also points out to aestheticization as a strategy of preservation of identity and social boundaries, which is characteristic of the anonymous (impersonal and often crowded) modern societies. Thus, this strategy was developed so that the modern self could cope with the high demands of modern society. (De Nora 2004:51-52).

The “nine propositions” on music and everyday life help sketching out a picture of how music is generally experienced in contemporary culture, furnishing basic distinctions which will come into play later, i.e. by the time the dialogue with the sources has reached the desired depth and a constructive integration of the delivered insights can take place (via TMSA). But until then there’s still many pages to go. The implicit procedure is similar to the first focus area of “technology and everyday experience”, whereas a kind of questioning must first unfold, bringing up basic distinctions and understanding before reaching the point where critical evaluation is appropriate.

Further, it is important to emphasize that the critical engagement with non-Christian sources will be implicit and embedded in a positive exposition of TMSA and the current focus area. Before such implicit critical evaluation becomes the priority, the following sub-sections will deal e.g. with main aspects of the philosophy of music of central figures of continental philosophy such as Schopenhauer, Nietzsche and Adorno. Further, popular culture will be introduced as a main “site” through which music functions and displays its power in contemporary culture.

3.3. Schopenhauer as starting point

Although other starting points would certainly be justifiable (such as the fathers of Greek philosophy) in the intended approach of music philosophy, there were some compelling reasons for choosing Schopenhauer instead. (I) His “Metaphysik der Musik”, which is part of the third volume of his opus magnum “Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung“ (the World as Will and Representation) is certainly a milestone in the history of continental philosophy of music and also a highly influential source to Nietzsche’s philosophy (including his account on music, which will be coming into the picture soon). (II) Further, Schopenhauer’s metaphysics of music is also characteristic of nineteenth century’s trend in music philosophy, which put

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41 This remark is important to me, because of several interactions with reformed and reformational friends, who expect that I should more explicitly criticize the worldviews of the non-Christian thinkers I deal with here. In my responses though, I’ve emphasized that this would exceed the scope of the current research (a positive presentation of TMSA). Nevertheless, their concern is valid and I shall give attention to it in a future study.
the Platonist (rationalist) understanding of music into question (Dahlhaus 1978:14, 179). Consequently, as rationalism is also radically rejected and criticized by the Neo-Calvinist tradition in which TMSA is rooted, Schopenhauer’s “supra-theoretical” account on music may later provide interesting points of contact for the dialogue between his non-Christian accounts on music and TMSA’s radically Christian and Trinitarian vision.

3.4. Schopenhauer’s metaphysics of music

As mentioned above, Schopenhauer’s philosophy of music emerged in a context of crisis of the humanistic worldview. (Dooyeweerd 2012:11). Already at the end of the eighteenth century, the belief in the superiority of (voiceless) instrumental music, as a language above verbal language, was gaining the upper hand in the cultural scene (Dahlhaus and Zimmermann 1978:179). This trend was accompanied by the increasing questioning of the common conceptions of music, which were basically Platonic and consisted of Harmonia (rational relations of notes), Rhytmos (temporal order) and Logos (language expressing human reason) (Dahlhaus 1978:14). Schopenhauer followed this anti-rationalist music philosophical trend in the both senses.

Accordingly, he affirms in (I) his metaphysical perspective on music that words always remain a strange addition (fremde Zugabe) to music. In contrast to words, tones are less fallible, faster and more powerful. So if words are ever to be incorporated in music, they must merely play a subordinated role (Schopenhauer 1818:1964-1965). And in his treatment of the (II) genesis of the melody (Genesis der Melodie), he delivers a conception of music consisting of the interplay of two elements (Harmony and Rhytm) instead of common threefold (Harmony, Rhytm and Logos) Platonic conception (Schopenhauer 1818:1973).

Schopenhauer’s and Nietzsche’s anti-rationalist (nihilistically inclined) accounts are also characteristic of the decay of humanist rationalism in nineteenth century’s western culture and continental philosophy. Dooyeweerd refers to that period as the beginning of a crisis in the humanistic worldview and of a battle for the spiritual lead of western culture still unresolved in his (Dooyeweerd’s) days: “But in the last few decades of the nineteenth century a general process of decay entered the humanistic worldview. Out of this decay emerged the antihumanistic cultural powers (Marxism, Darwinism, Nietzsche’s doctrine of the Superman) which pushed humanism itself onto the defensive. This turn of events heralded a tremendous period of transition in world history and sparked a fierce battle for the spiritual leadership of western culture. Its outcome is still undecided.” (Dooyeweerd 2012:11) Over fifty years have passed since Dooyeweerd made this statement, and the battle for the spiritual lead of western culture continues. Nevertheless, the cultural scenario has rapidly changed since then. This is another reason for dealing with music in connection with popular culture as a focus area. For the contemporary function and relevance of music can’t be properly portrayed without reference to the postmodern and technological set up of contemporary culture, in which popular culture emerged as a globally shared culture.
Besides providing some insight into Schopenhauer’s historical context, the relevance of the two points above shall be further elucidated later, in connection to music’s function in contemporary culture. But at this stage, central traits of Schopenhauer’s philosophy of music still have to be introduced. In order to fasten the nexus to the previously delivered as well as the upcoming sections, they will be presented in enumerated rubrics. Beforehand it should also be reinforced, that the main goal of this sub-section is to identify valuable insights in Schopenhauer’s philosophy of music and not to criticize them.

(1) Music as an aesthetical representation of the world of the will/heart

The “Metaphysik der Musik” is certainly the aesthetic superlative of Schopenhauer’s philosophical system, which he developed in Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung “(the World as Will and Representation). Therein, music is the greatest of the arts, for unlike the others, it doesn’t merely express the ideas or grades of the objectivation of the will, but rather directly the will itself. That’s the ultimate reason why it immediately appeals to the feelings, passions and emotions of its hearers (Schopenhauer 1818:1963-1964). Music faithfully portrays all the movements of the will (i.e. the human heart), whose essential nature is always satisfaction and dissatisfaction. But still, music remains a representation of the will and not the will itself. And only thus does music remains pleasing, for on the one hand it presents the secret history of the will while at the same time preserving its hearers from actual sorrow (Schopenhauer 1818: 1970). Schopenhauer uses a Beethoven symphony as an example to illustrate how perfectly music represents the nature of the world (as will and representation), which he describes as a rerum concordia discors according to his pessimistic (influenced by Buddhism) worldview, in which the world sustains itself through continuous destruction and within which at the same time, all human passions and emotions find utterance, joy, suffering, love, hatred, terror, hope, etc. (Schopenhauer 1818:1967).

(2) The compatibility and profundity of music

Interestingly, as Schopenhauer takes this argument concerning music’s representation of the will further, he mentions the human tendency of realising what is felt when listening to music (clothing feelings in the imagination with flesh and bones) and firstly disregards it as a strange and arbitrary addition (einen fremdartigen willkürlichen Zusatz) which shouldn’t be taken seriously if one is willing to understand music in its immediacy and purity. Nevertheless, such “realization” anticipates music’s previously mentioned compatibility,
(Alperson 2004:261-263) as a feature which practically enables music to be present in all sorts of human activities. Ironically then, that Schopenhauer does acknowledges that i.e. the music composed for a drama, in its connection to actions, persons and words, becomes the drama’s soul, at last expressing the drama’s internal meaning. Therein, music again demonstrates its superiority whereas it reveals the true essence of the actions, e.g. in the opera (Schopenhauer 1818:1968). How then does music achieve such things in human existence? The answer is clear: by means of its constitution (as an aesthetical expression and reflection of the human will/heart). And that’s implicit in Schopenhauer’s exposition of the two basic elements of the melody (rhythm and harmony). In other words, music doesn’t present the will itself but rather man’s aesthetical response (representation) of his will, passions, feelings, emotions, etc. Music’s profundity is thus derived from the source of its inspiration, which is to be found in the human heart, as the place where the fullness of meaning of human existence is concentrated.

(3) The basic constitution of music

As previously stated, Schopenhauer distanced himself from the Platonic conception of music, elaborating his Metaphysik der Musik (as the aesthetic superlative of his metaphysics of the will) as consisting of two (harmony and rhythm) instead of three (harmony, rhythm and logos) basic elements. Accordingly, the rhythmic (quantitative) concerns the duration while the harmonic (qualitative) the heights and depths of the melody. Basically, the core of melodies always consists of the continuous renewal of the disunion and reconciliation (Entzweiung und Versöhnung) of the rhythmical and the harmonic elements. Even though the rhythmic may present a kind of melody (e.g. drums melody), a perfect melody always demand both and consists of the interplay of them. In every melody, the harmonic element presupposes a key note and the rhythmical a time signature, which consists of a wandering from it through all the notes of the scale until a harmonious interval is reached, granting the melody an incomplete satisfaction (unvollkommene Beruhigung). After that, the melody follows a path of return to the key note, with which the complete satisfaction occurs. (Schopenhauer 1818:1977)

Thus, the disunion (Entzweiung) of both basic elements occurs because while the demand of one is satisfied, that of the other is not. And their reconciliation (Versöhnung) occurs when both are satisfied at the same time. Thence, Schopenhauer considers the constant occurrence
of such disunion and reconciliation (Entzweiung und Versöhnung), metaphysically speaking, to be an image (Abbild) of the emergence of (human) desires and their satisfaction. This is the true reason why music flatters the human heart, for it continuously reflects (vorspiegeln) its perfect satisfaction (volkommene Befriedigung).

By looking even closer at the course of the melody, Schopenhauer regards this “encounter of preconditions” (Zusammentreffen der inneren und der äußern Bedingung), the rhythmical as the external and the harmonic as the internal, to be an image of the meeting of our (internal) wishes with favorable outward conditions, which are independent of them. Thus, it is a picture of happiness.

Further, Schopenhauer mentions the effect of suspension (Wirkung des Vorhalts) as a dissonance, which delays the final consonance and metaphysically represents the heightened satisfaction of the will through delay. This effect is most generally employed in analogy to human life’s actual situation, whereas the deeper satisfaction of the will and the most complete relief are only achieved when following the deepest longing. Thence, music consists of the continuous interplay of disturbing (beunruhigende) and relaxing (beruhigende) chords, the former strengthening the longing and the latter striving for relaxation and satisfaction. (Schopenhauer 1818:1979)

Thus, music corresponds to the life of the (human) heart in its interplay of wishes, fear as well as the diversely measures of satisfaction. It is according to this interplay that the harmonic-artistic progress of the interplay of dissonance and consonance takes place (die harmonische Fortschreitung in der kunstgerechten Abwechslung der Dissonanz und Konsonanz). Although dissonances may be embarrassing, they must be introduced in every melody, for a sequence of consonant chords alone would be experienced as oversaturating, tiring and empty. This again, corresponds according to Schopenhauer, to the human

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Elsewhere in the context of a physical/arithmetical perspective on music, Schopenhauer deals with consonances and dissonances more in detail. Therein, dissonances basically represent that which oppresses the will and consonances represent the satisfaction of the will (Schopenhauer 1818:1970). But for the sake of clarity I decided to mention this distinction in the context of music’s constitution, after establishing the link between Schopenhauer’s metaphysics of the will and his metaphysics of music. Firstly, (I) because Schopenhauer’s exposition on the so-called “arithmetical/physical” of music doesn’t add anything new or basic which could be useful in design of the upcoming interaction between music philosophy, music and everyday experience and popular culture. Secondly, (II) the section on the physical/arithmetical “side” of music entails many references to features of “classical music”, which aren’t of relevance for the current study, which aims at the approach of music in contemporary “popular culture”.
constitution in which the will basically consists of satisfaction and dissatisfaction *(Unzufriedenheit und Befriedigung)*. Consequently, there are only two basic moods of the human mind *(zwei allgemeine Grundstimmungen des Gemuehls)* and two basic keys in music, the minor and the major. The former signifies suffering and the latter satisfaction. This is one of the many reasons, some of which were already mentioned, used by Schopenhauer to demonstrate how deeply music is grounded in the essence of things and of humans (Schopenhauer 1818:1980).

Much more could be said about Schopenhauer’s philosophy of music, but at this stage the three presented points suffice, as they establish a connection between (1) human constitution expressed through music, (2) music’s compatibility and adaptability to the human lifeworld (3) and the constitution of music as interconnected to the human constitution.

### 3.5. From Schopenhauer to popular music

At the beginning of the last sub-section, preliminary reasons were given for the choice of Schopenhauer as the starting point for reflections on music philosophy.

Thereby, (I) the names of Nietzsche and Adorno were merely mentioned in order to anticipate what would follow after the presentation of some of the aspects of Schopenhauer's music philosophy. Similarly, (II) the connection between Schopenhauer, Nietzsche and Adorno and popular culture was mentioned, anticipating how the current approach to "music and popular culture” is designed to unfold.

Accordingly, the current sub-section aims at the elucidation of two main points:

Firstly, a trajectory will briefly be articulated, embedding the impact of Schopenhauer's philosophy of music as one of two major traditions of continental music philosophy. Secondly, the previously anticipated link between Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, Adorno and popular culture will be presented as a “bridge” that may connect music philosophy with everyday experience and contemporary “popular culture” (a concept that will be looked at more closely in a later section).

Consequently, the path to be followed will at last serve to bind together the gained insights from music philosophy and at the same time prepare the way for the introduction of popular culture. But before dealing with popular culture *per se* (in connection to music), main insights
from Adorno's criticism on popular music will be introduced. One could question this procedure and argue that popular culture should first be defined and explained before dealing with Adorno's criticism of popular music. In reply to this concern, the focus of the current sub-section must be reinforced though, namely that it should serve to introduce basic distinctions and notions so that the understanding of music (its constitution and existential relevance) may be deepened before the treatment of popular culture (in connection to music).

3.6. From Schopenhauer to Nietzsche

Schopenhauer’s metaphysics of music can be seen as the first of the two major traditions in continental thought which emphasized the central interconnection between music and philosophy, in the sense of philosophy’s aesthetic elevation via music and on the other hand, philosophy’s bestowing of greater depth to music. Or even more radically stated, this tradition regarded music to be of a central metaphysical (religious at its core) importance in human existence. According to this vision, music is a means of striving for the Absolute. In effect, the religious core of it consists in the assumption that music has the function to reconnect (religare) the human subject to the Absolute, which implies the core definition of religion. And this connection between music and religion should be kept in mind in its central relevance. For the religious aspiration therein entailed is characteristic of the modern identity crisis generated by the attempt to break free from (the Christian) tradition and the divine creation order (Taylor 1979:137-156). More specifically, the “aesthetical” system developed by Schopenhauer and followed by Nietzsche and others, although outspokenly atheistic, nevertheless display a religious core and an immanentistic attempt to aesthetically compensate their rejection of transcendent religion.

But how did Nietzsche follow Schopenhauer with regards to music and why is it relevant? Schopenhauer’s celebration of the transfigurative character of music inspired Nietzsche to regard music as the “life-affirming art” which would become central to his “new gospel” (Lütkehaus 2006:102). The established link between “music and redemption” may already be clear from the previous exposition on Schopenhauer, whereas music “proclaims” perfect satisfaction (volkommene Befriedigung) to the human heart, at the end of the constant interplay of reconciliation and disunion (Versöhnung und Entzweiung), representing the hearty felt drama of human existence. In fact, Nietzsche’s early work „The Birth of Tragedy out of the Spirit of Music“(Die Geburt der Tragödie aus dem Geiste der Musik) is the
culmination of the elevation of art (music) to metaphysical status in continental philosophy (Bowie 2010:74). Therein Nietzsche bluntly confesses (many times) his belief that human existence and the world only find “eternal justification as an aesthetic phenomenon”\textsuperscript{44} (Nietzsche 1988:17)

Thus, it is by presupposing Schopenhauer’s metaphysics of will that Nietzsche develops central themes of his philosophy (Moore and Paré 2006: 137-140), such as: his scheme of the needed interaction between Apollo (who stands for logic/representation) and Dionysus (who stands for the will) so that the human being’s prime unity can be regained, the decay of western culture due to its abandonment of Dionysus and the reliance on Apollo (logic, morality, etc.) since Socrates and later intensified by Christianity\textsuperscript{45}, the alliance of music with the Dionysian and herewith Nietzsche’s hope for the “rebirth” of human beings through the re-connection to the Dionysian (through music).

Summing up, Schopenhauer’s influence ultimately led to elevation of music to metaphysical status (Bowie 2010:74). Not to forget that it was through the influence of Richard Wagner’s work and music (who also relied on Schopenhauer) that Nietzsche was introduced to Schopenhauer’s philosophy. Further, the young Nietzsche also believed that the Dionysian spirit of Richard Wagner’s music would bring about “redemption” to German culture. (Moore and Paré 2006: 137). Later Nietzsche distanced himself from Wagner though, and also from Schopenhauer’s pessimism, which he replaced by the life-affirming stance (although still nihilistic). A hint towards this development is already present in the statement, that human existence itself and of the world, are eternally justified as an aesthetical phenomenon (Nietzsche 1988:17) and therefore worth living.

Basically, those general insights regarding Schopenhauer’s influence upon Nietzsche as well as the metaphysical function Nietzsche attributed to music (the Dionysian in it) are sufficient

\textsuperscript{44} “…im Buche selbst kehrt der anzügliche Satz mehrfach wieder, dass nur als ästhetisches Phänomen das Dasein der Welt gerechtfertigt ist” (Nietzsche 1988:17)

\textsuperscript{45} Implicit is Nietzsche’s criticism of the rationalistic dualism which dominated western culture’s main philosophical and religious tradition. Interestingly, Nietzsche’s criticism of dualism has been absorbed by later Christian philosophical traditions such as reformational philosophy and its non-reductive ontology, which for instance also denounces the absolutization of logic (such as in the case of the dualistic rationalism Nietzsche criticizes) as a form of idolatry in the absolutization of one of many aspects of reality. Nevertheless, the (multi-aspectual) ontology developed by reformational philosophy leads to the identification of the presence of such dualistic tendencies in all the main traditions of continental philosophy (including Nietzsche’s nihilism and the thereby inspired existentialism, etc.). These remarks should merely serve to point to the fact that rationalism and dualism can’t be identified with Christianity, as Nietzsche wrongly does.
for now, giving a basic understanding of one of the two major “post-Christian” traditions of continental music philosophy. And as previously mentioned these “aesthetic systems” of Nietzsche and Schopenhauer can be regarded as religious attempts of atheistic philosophers (even if it sounds paradox) to aesthetically find “metaphysical redemption” after the breaking away from the traditionally believed (Christian) divine creation order (Taylor 1979:137-156).

3.7. From Nietzsche to Adorno

The high influence and appreciation of this philosophy of music, as a discourse started by Schopenhauer and culminating in Nietzsche, remained vibrant for a long time in continental philosophy. In fact, by the time that the Frankfurt School (*Frankfurter Schule*) emerged, during the years following the Second World War, there was still continuous engagement with Schopenhauer, Nietzsche and Wagner taking place. The Frankfurt School consisted of a group of left-wing philosophers and composers. (Hermand and Richter 2006:10-11) And the work on philosophy of music developed by Frankfurt School’s leader, composer and social philosopher T.W. Adorno is certainly the most significant (on music philosophy) of the twentieth century. (De Nora 2004:2)

Also, Adorno’s music philosophy represents the last major tradition in the history of continental thought which emphasized the centrality of the interconnection between music and philosophy. In fact, reasons for this final decline are clearly alluded to by Adorno himself, in his criticism of popular music, which will be coming into the picture soon, at last becoming the point of entry for the upcoming sub-section on “popular culture” (Adorno 1990:256-268).

At a later stage, won insights from music philosophy will merge with “music and everyday experience” and the connection between music and popular culture as a globally shared culture will come forth, as it displays the religious function of music in contemporary culture.

But first, general traits of Adorno’s music philosophy will be presented, based on two selected key texts, so that, similarly to the exposition on Schopenhauer, it may lead to the deepening of the understanding of music, its constitution and existential relevance.

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46 More precisely, Schopenhauer is known for his inclination towards Buddhism, which Nietzsche didn’t share. Nevertheless, as Buddhism is an “atheistic” worldview, it isn’t wrong to qualify both philosophers as atheistic.
3.8. Adorno on music

In contrast to Schopenhauer's and Nietzsche's emphasis on the "supra-lingual" core of music, Adorno elaborates an account on music which emphasizes the similarities and differences between music and language. This will become clear through selected insights from his exposition on "Music, language and composition" Accordingly, although he arrives to a certain extent at a demythologizing position on music, he nevertheless demonstrates music's existential relevance by means of its constitution.

Further, after introducing basic insights on music and language, Adorno's account on popular music will come into play in order to point out music's relevance in contemporary culture and its influence upon social life (Adorno 1990:256-268).

Thence, the two selected sources will appear to be sufficient in terms of the current sub-section’s scope and intention. Therein, insights on music will be useful for the following reasons; (I) by emphasizing the human and therefore temporal character of music, Adorno's approach may help demythologizing, deepening and integrating the previously introduced music philosophical insights, thereby questioning and counter-balancing some of the basic anti-rationalistic assumptions of Nietzsche's and Schopenhauer's philosophy of music.

Also, (II) this approach will on the other hand serve to anticipate TMSA's ontological account on music by introducing the central reformational notion that all aspects of reality (including the aesthetical) are temporally structured according to God's creation order. Consequently, after identifying the elevation of music to metaphysical status as a form of idolatry (absolutization of the aesthetical aspect of reality), (III) the won insights from music philosophy will at last be merged with those of music and everyday experience and evaluated via TMSA, so that the current sub-section on music philosophy can be concluded.

3.9. Adorno on music and language

In his piece “Music, Language and Composition”, Adorno develops an approach to the relation between music and language, which emphasizes the interplay of their similarities and differences. Music is said to be similar to language in many ways; (I) as a temporal succession of articulated sounds, which are more than “just” sound, (II) music is formed by sounds which say something humane, (III) the succession of sounds in music is related to logic: there is right and wrong, (IV) music is similar to language as a whole (as an organized coherence of sounds) and as a single tone as well – as the threshold of mere (individual)
existence, (V) music chords, are similar to primitive concepts, (VI) as symbols they make room for music specification as concepts do for individual things, (VII) both, musical concepts and language are healed of abstractedness by their context, etc. (Adorno 1993:401-402)

(1) Music’s mythical element

Those evident similarities already point to the interconnectedness of music and language. “And as voices rise and fall, so does music borrow its gesture from the speaking voice” (Adorno 1993:401). But what kind of language is music? According to Adorno, (I) music is completely different then signifying language. (II) What music says is distinct and concealed at the same time and its Gestalt is based on the name of God. (III) Music is demythologized prayer, for it isn’t attached to the faith that “its prayer” will be responded. (IV) Music is a futile human attempt to grasp the Absolute instead of accepting the human limitations and merely communicating (creaturely) meanings. Nevertheless, (V) music can’t be completely separated from signifying language – their interconnectedness remains and the intentions of music appear intermittently. (VI) Neither can music be without signification, nor can it be absolute signification. But music points to language as to a language which reveals the content itself. (VII) Therein Adorno sees the root of music’s mythical element, in that music suggests that it says something definite whereby at the same time, the intentions always remain veiled, to a certain extent. (Adorno 1993:402)

(2) Music and interpretation – mimetic practice

A central difference between music’s language and signifying language has to do with interpretation. (I) To interpret (signifying) language means to understand language, (II) but to interpret music means to make music. Interpretation belongs essentially to music, thus to properly play music means to speak its language properly. (III) In order to understand the language of music, one must imitate it, for it is only in mimetic practice that music discloses itself (even if this imitation occurs in the unspoken imagination of the hearer, who “reads” music). (IV) Thus, Adorno believes that music can’t be interpreted independent of the act of execution (Adorno 1993:403). Considering the easy reproducibility of music in our technological age, the latter is an interesting claim which should be looked at more closely at a later stage, in connection with music’s contemporary role in everyday experience.
(3) Music as a way of knowing (Erkenntnisweg – author’s nuance) – The place of human intentions (in the creation of the musical context).

Another basic distinction introduced by Adorno (I) concerns the contrast between the nature of philosophy and the sciences on the one hand and that of the arts on the other hand. This distinction may become even more insightful if one understands its core meaning, namely that Adorno is referring to music as a (artistic) way of knowing (Erkenntnisweg) as essentially different than scientific ways of knowing. (II) On the one hand, such “reconnoitring” anticipates the Neo-Calvinist stress on the multi-aspectual diversity of created reality⁴⁷, and on the other hand it coincides with Adorno’s (elsewhere stressed) emphasis on music’s capacity of aiding enlightenment (Adorno 1973:15). (III) Consequently, as a distinct “way of knowing”, music brings together its elements in a non-judging fashion in order to express its prime intention (as art), namely that of the affirmation of something that is. Adorno refers to the “That is the way it is” as one of the most urgent intentions/motives of music (Adorno 1993:403). "In the highest as well as the most violent moments of great music, this intention, through the sheer power of its coherence, becomes distinctively eloquent” (Adorno 1993:403). (IV) But besides presenting such “non-judging” affirmation of something that is, music also forms a totality and a musical context, in which the (human) attempt at creating the gesture of judgment (for the non-judging medium) is implicit (Adorno 1993:403).

(4) Music’s constitution – Its direction/tendency towards the Absolute and its realization against intentions.

Further, (I) Adorno sees the differentiation of music and language as emerging from the entirety of their constitution, their direction or tendency (telos). Finite signifying language, always fail in its intentions of saying the Absolute in a mediated way, while music immediately reaches the Absolute but at the same time darkening (as when a strong light blinds the eye). Consequently, in its similarity to language, music is sent “on a wandering journey of endless mediation to bring home the impossible” (Adorno 1993:404). (II) Adorno stresses music’s distinctive “mediated way” of striving for the Absolute as the “mortal absorption of meanings “into a context that preserves meaning as it moves beyond that meaning with every motion” (Adorno 1993:404). (III) Music’s meaning structure demands that nothing be isolated in it and music only becomes what it is in its (physical) contact with

⁴⁷ This will be explained later, as part of TMSA’s critical evaluation of the won music philosophical insights.
what is closest and its (spiritual) contact with what is farthest away, in remembrance and expectation. (IV) Thus, music doesn’t rescue intentions by turning them into abstract ones, but rather by summing up the intentionless “That is the way it is” (Adorno 1993:404). (V) Consequently, Adorno points out that the type of music’s coherence is different than that of signifying language, for the “musical whole” is realized against (specific human) intentions, which are nevertheless integrated in it (in music)(Adorno 1993:404).

(5) Music’s interplay between the coherence of the whole and particular intentions

For Adorno, (I) there is a kind of transcendence which is basic in music: “Every musical phenomenon points beyond itself, on the strength of what it recalls, from what it distinguishes itself, by what means it awakens expectation” (Adorno 1993:405). (II) Music’s “being” can’t be reduced neither to “music as sound” nor to a “being for the subject”. Implicit is the fact that music, as a way of knowing, has to be understood in terms of the irreducibility and correlation of subject and object, whereas each of them is mediated by the other (Adorno 1993:405). (IV) Thence, Adorno sees music’s success as depending on the “abandon with which it relinquishes itself to its extreme poles”, namely the interplay between the (presented by music) coherence of the whole and particular intentions (Adorno 1993:406).

(6) The disintegration of music’s constructive powers due to romantic dualism

Consequently, (I) Adorno also criticizes the contemporary tendency towards the emphasis of “vivid details” over against the “consciousness of totality”, which has its root in Romanticism. Thereby Adorno sees the weakening of music’s constructive powers taking place through the “romantic dream of uprooting consciousness from the material” (Adorno 1993:407). Adorno strikingly denounces the disintegrating tendency of the romantic “subjectivistic” utopia: “it was thought that simply by uprooting the latter it would be possible to regain what had been lost, without accepting the challenge of actually rescuing that best element from the irrevocable state of both consciousness and material”.(II) Viewed from TMSA’s perspective, it can be concluded that Adorno is striving for the reconciliation of the pre-theoretical and the theoretical, the subject and the object in their irreducibility and correlation. This is precisely the sort of reconciliation, which is proclaimed by reformational philosophy and rooted in the biblical worldview: “...the biblical view concerning the correlation and mutual irreducibility of law and subject” (Dooyeweerd 1971: 79). (III) This insight is crucial, for it implies a criticism of “subjectivistic” tendencies of music in
contemporary culture, whereas human subjectivity is overemphasized at cost of the whole (Adorno 1993:406-407). (IV) In many occasions, Adorno alludes to the major tradition of Schopenhauer, Nietzsche and Wagner which historically emerged in the nineteenth century. After pointing out how composers who followed this tradition cultivated an aversion against every lingual trait in music and a technique of “consciously induced primitivism” in the hope of grasping pure musicality, he denounced this “musical ontology” as being presumptuous in the sense that it implicitly regarded everything “left over” from this purification (from the lingual) as the “truth”. (V) Adorno believes that this attitude resulted in a “repression” of their historical context (the nineteenth century) instead of transcending it (Adorno 1993:408).

(7) Music and technological trends of composition

Adorno also criticizes (I) new trends of composition which e.g. replace the act of composition by making use of formulae in the generation of electronic sound, whereas the (technologically) generated is supposed to be the cosmically superhuman essence of music (Adorno 1993:404). Therein Adorno sees something terrific implicit, something that’s identical with complete reification: “the desire to be pure nature corresponding to the purely manufactured thing”. (II) Accordingly, the electronic production of sound is thought of as the “voiceless voice of being itself”. Adorno identifies this technological extrapolation as “the utopia of a quasi-supra-artistic art” whereas the human effort is substituted by alienated mechanical procedures. (III) Further, Adorno sees the hope of restoration via technology therein implicit, whereas the natural law is taken literally in order to replace musical language’s lost aesthetic authoritativeness. It is “the dream of a wholly spiritualized music removed from the sullying influences of the animalistic nature of human beings” (Adorno 1993: 409-410). (V) Implicit in Adorno’s denunciation of the danger of new “technological music productions” is the pseudo-religious tendency towards technicism, which was already dealt with in the previous focus area. According to Adorno, technicism is thus expressed in the realm of music productions, in human being’s pretended elevation of himself to a “subject of absolute rule”, an attitude by which he ends up divesting himself of his own humanity (Adorno 1993: 409).

(8) The fulfilment of music’s similarity to language

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48 In reformational terms, the rich diversity and coherence of created reality (including the different aspects of reality) is at stake here.
Finally, (I) Adorno believes that music’s similarity to language fulfils itself by distancing itself from language (Adorno 1993:408). (II) Music imitates its similarity to language and constantly poses a riddle. Nevertheless, in contrast to signifying language, music doesn’t answer those riddles. (III) Music can’t be reduced to what it says, but it speaks. (IV) Music presents “truth” as if it was liberated from illusion, but it can’t escape appearances, although it suggests it. (V) Consequently, it is by absorbing the strength of signifying language that music distances itself from language. (Adorno 1993:411-412)

As previously stated, insights from Adorno’s “Music, Language and Composition” should help deepening the dialogue with continental music philosophy, thereby presenting challenging perspectives, which shouldn’t only relate to music’s constitution and existential relevance, but also help questioning some of the basic presuppositions entailed in Schopenhauer’s and Nietzsche’s metaphysical elevation of music. This on the other should open up the way so that some of the aspects of TMSA’s ontological account can be introduced, as they appear to be elucidating in the treatment of the issues concerned. As this sub-section comes to an end, there are only two steps left, before presenting TMSA’s integrating vision and arriving at the conclusion of this focus area.

3.10. Adorno on popular music

Now that the point has been reached, where the connection between Schopenhauer, Nietzsche and Adorno is established, after (I) surfacing their historical relevance (II) as well as summing up some of their music philosophical insights, (II) it is time to introduce Adorno’s criticism of popular music. As already anticipated in introductory remarks of previous subsections, (IV) this positioning of Adorno’s criticism on popular music was designed to function as a "bridge" between (the current section) music philosophy and the upcoming section on "popular culture". (V) But before dealing with popular culture (and its connection to music), provisional conclusions will integrate the insights won from the treatment of (a) music and everyday experience and (b) continental music philosophy via TMSA. (VI) Conversely, the treatment of "popular culture" will help further exploring music's function and relevance in contemporary culture, as the results of the so far developed elaborations will be considered in the light of it.

In order to fit into the shape and design plan of the current study, insights from Adorno’s (with assistance of George Simpson) “On Popular Music” (Adorno and Simpson 1941) will
also be presented (like in the previous sub-sections) in enumerated rubrics. This will facilitate the upcoming cross-references as well as the later intended integration of insights. 49

3.11. The musical material of popular music

(1) Standardization as a fundamental characteristic of popular music

(I) Based on the kind of stimuli popular music produces, Adorno sets up a contrast between popular music and serious music. Accordingly, he believes “standardization” to be the fundamental characteristic of popular music. Even in the attempts of circumventing standardization, the whole structure of popular music remains standardized. Not only is the structure of popular songs always standardized, but also the “characters” in them (mother songs, lament songs, love songs, home songs, nonsense songs, etc.). (II) Most important, the “harmonic cornerstones of popular hits (the beginning and the end of each part) always beat out of the same standard schemes. (III) Adorno claims that the “primitive harmony” created by those standard schemes emphasize that “complications have no consequence”. (IV) Consequently: “regardless of what aberrations occur, the hit will lead back to the same familiar experience and nothing fundamentally novel will be introduced”. (V) Further, Adorno points out that the standard scheme of popular songs is often times hidden behind “individual effects”, which are handled as the expert’s secrets. Nevertheless, this secret is easily recognisable for musicians (Adorno and Simpson 1941:256-257).

(2) Serious music and popular music

(I) Adorno believes that popular music promotes subjectivism, in that the standard construction of popular songs induce their listeners to “evince stronger reactions to the part than to the whole” (Adorno and Simpson 1941:257). In popular music, (II) “the whole is pre-given and pre-accepted, even before the experience of music starts: therefore it is not likely to influence, to any great extent, the reaction to the details, except to give them varying degrees of emphasis. (III) Adorno illustrates this by pointing to the “positioning of details” in popular songs, which are usually introduced at the beginning of the chorus or after the bridge in order to find greater attention. (IV) Although such “details” may find greater attention, they nevertheless never interfere with the (standard) scheme of the song itself (Adorno and

49 In order to keep the formal unity, despite the fact that George Simpson assisted Adorno (to an unknown extent), further reference in the text will still be made to Adorno, whereas the bibliographic reference will include Simpson, i.e. (Adorno and Simpson 1941)
Simpson 1941:257). (V) In contrast to popular music, serious music is characterized as “deriving its musical sense from the concrete totality of the piece which, in turn, consists of the life relationship of details and never of a mere enforcement of a musical scheme” (Adorno and Simpson 1941:257). Adorno mentions Beethoven’s Seventh Symphony as an example of serious music, as music which entails different themes and a true meaning that can only be grasped in connection to its musical context. (VI) In contrast to this complexity, Adorno claims that the “musical sense” of popular songs (music) wouldn’t be affected if any detail were taken out of context, for popular music is based on a mere musical automatism (Adorno and Simpson 1941:257). Summing up the difference between serious and popular music, Adorno claims that every detail of serious music “virtually contains the whole and leads to the exposition of the whole, while at the same time, it is produced out of the conception of the whole” (Adorno and Simpson 1941:258). In contrast to this, details of popular music have no bearing on the whole. Consequently, the whole is never affected by the individual events in it and musical details (of popular music) remain caricatures of their own potentialities (Adorno and Simpson 1941:259).

(3) Popular music’s manipulative nature

(I) Further, Adorno believes that by its own nature, popular music is manipulative in the sense that it forms a system of response mechanisms, which is antagonistic to true individuality and a free society. (II) This is due to the fact that the structure underlying popular songs is abstract and independent. Serious music on the other hand, regardless how simply structured it may be, functions as “itself”. (III) Popular music is pre-digested, therefore it promotes conditioned reflexes. Neither does it require effort to be followed (as serious music does), but due to its standard build-up, popular music dictates the way in which it must be listened (Adorno 1941:259).

(4) Popular music as industrial mass production – the freezing of standards

(I) Popular music is only industrial in promotion and distribution (not in composition). The standardization of popular music originally came about through “imitation”. Its standards were discovered in the competitive process, whereas “successful” songs were imitated by others, leading to the crystallization of standards. (II) Further, the music industry is responsible for “freezing” those standards, i.e. using “centralized power” in order to enforce
those standards upon the material to be promoted (Adorno and Simpson 1941:260). (IV) But the “freezing” of standards is enforced upon the agencies themselves (allusion to capitalism – author’s nuance) and in order to sell, popular music (to be promoted) must fulfil two basis demands; (a) create stimuli that provoke the listener’s attention and (b) create the impression in the untrained that he (the untrained listener) is listening to natural music (summing up the material formulae in music with which he is familiar). (V) Consequently, due to the standardization of popular music, a musical frame of mind is imposed upon the masses.

(5) Pseudo-individualization and standardization

(I) To a certain extent, popular music maintains the illusion as well as the reality of individual achievement. In terms of musical mass production, popular music must preserve its handicraft elements (i.e. in composition) in order to hide standardization. For hidden, it would provoke (the consumers) resistance. (II) Thus, Adorno sees pseudo-individualization as the necessary correlate of musical standardization, whereby cultural mass production is endowed “with the halo of free choice or open market on the basis of standardization itself” (Adorno and Simpson 1941: 261). (III) Consequently, (a) standardization does the listening for the listeners (prior their listening of the music) and (b) pseudo-individualization makes the listeners forget that what they listen is already pre-digested. Thus “popular music commands its own listening habits”(Adorno and Simpson 1941:261-262).50

(6) Popular music and “Leisure Time”

(I) Popular music appeals and reinforces a frame of mind, which distracts from reality by means of entertainment which doesn’t demand attention (Adorno and Simpson 1941:263). (II) Adorno speaks of “distraction” as a mode of production to which the masses (under the influence of rationalized and mechanized processes of labour) are subjected in (technological) society. (II) Correlate to this mode of production stands “non-productive”

50 Adorno’s exposition is full of examples from the musical scene of his time. He also illustrates arguments based on references to classical music. Due to the focus of this study, those very technical and specific references are left out, in the hope that with the restriction to the most basic features, the upcoming dialogue with contemporary culture will be more fruitful. In order to present an account which is relevant and underlines music’s contemporary function and existential relevance, classical music won’t find much attention though, for the design of the current study is intended to “speak” to the lifeworld of contemporary persons, and consequently, the sort of music that is commonly heard. Conversely, there is no shadow of doubt that the contemporary decline of interest in classical music may be linked to the “manipulative power” of mass productions denounced by Adorno, and that the standard schemes of popular music bears witness to its “inferiority” in terms of its compositional quality, the power of its coherence, etc. But this is another subject.
entertainment, as a sort of relaxation which doesn’t demand any effort. (III) In contrast to such a desire for “fun without effort” in leisure time, Adorno claims that a fully conscious and concentrated experience of art is only possible to those whose lives don’t put such a strain that in their leisure time so that they expect a simultaneous relief from (a) boredom and from (b) effort. (IV) Adorno illustrates this dual desire by mentioning cheap commercial entertainment, which on the one hand induce relaxation (for being patterned and pre-digested). On the other hand, as the masses are spared of effort and participation (in observation and in listening) the stimuli thereby provided offer an escape from boredom of (mechanized) labour (Adorno and Simpson 1941:262-263). (V) But Adorno regards this attempt to escape boredom by avoiding effort to be incompatible, for it is precisely “leisure” time which (possibly) offers the only real new experiences which are denied to the masses in their (mechanized) work scenario (Adorno and Simpson 1941: 264).

(7) Popular music as social cement

(I) Finally, Adorno claims that most listeners of popular music don’t understand music as a language in itself. He sees this claim confirmed in the fact that this must be the case, or else popular music’s standardly repeated schemes wouldn’t be tolerated by the masses. (II) Consequently, Adorno claims that listeners of popular music transform “the language of popular music” (by objective processes) into a language which they think is their own (Adorno and Simpson 1941: 264). (III) This is why Adorno believes music functions as social cement in contemporary culture: “Music today is largely a social cement. And the meaning listeners attribute to a material, the inherent logic of which is inaccessible to them, is above all a means by which they achieve some psychical adjustment to the mechanisms of present day life” (Adorno and Simpson 1941:264). (IV) Adorno then identifies two main types of hearers, the rhythmically obedient (mainly young people from the radio generation - repression and crowd-mindedness are characteristic of them – inclined to blindly follow the beat/rhythm) and the emotional type, which Adorno characterizes as similar to a “movie spectator” who is guided by wish fulfilment, in the sense that they use the work of art (e.g. music) in order to become aware of (implicitly affirming) the possibility of happiness which is denied in his (actual) life (Adorno 1941:265). Thus, Adorno’s pessimism with regards to popular music can’t be overlooked: “The actual function of sentimental music lies rather in the temporary release given to the awareness that one has missed fulfilment. The emotional listener listens to everything in terms of late romanticism and of the musical commodities
derived from it which are already fashioned to fit the needs of emotional listening. They consume music in order to be allowed to weep”. (Adorno 1941:266)

3.12. Provisional conclusions
Throughout the current exposition, the link between music and technology (i.e. previous focus area) has been intentionally avoided in order to concentrate upon the specific trajectory, which was designed for the current focus area (including insights of key continental philosophers on music) as a way of deepening the understanding of music's constitution and existential relevance. But now that the time has come to bind-up what was elaborated so far, it is crucial to link up the won insights with the previous focus area on "technology and everyday experience”. For besides recalling what already has been accomplished, the understanding of this connection (music and technology) will appear to be decisive at this stage of evaluating and summing up. This will be the first (introductory) step of the provisional conclusions.

3.13. Linking up with the previous focus area - music and technology
First of all, (1) the sketched out human-technology relations should be recalled: (I) cultural-historical subject-object relation (embodiment relation), (II) lingual subject-object relation (hermeneutical relation), (III) inter-subjectivity relation (alterity relation), (IV) Multiple subject-object relations (background relation) and (V) specification relation. Secondly, (2) it is important to ascertain that the use of music instruments resembles the use of scientific instruments (technological artifacts) if one looks at it in terms of subject-object relations. Thirdly, (3) in contrast to Adorno's depreciation of new trends of composition (and the substitution of human effort by technologically generated sounds) as "the utopia of a quasi-supra-artistic art" (Adorno 1993:409-410), one can consider one of Ihde's phenomenological insights, which point out to how those sounds are sometimes (unconsciously) perceived by humans, namely as something quasi-human or even "other" then human (in cases where sounds don't resemble human and natural sounds, they can be perceived as "supra-natural") (Ihde 1991:95-98). Consequently, technological sounds not only entail the capacity of reproducing familiar sounds, but also the potential of producing strange sounds which might be experienced by human perception as quasi-transcendent (religious). (4) This possibility should be further explored in another study though. This was
only mentioned to counter-balance Adorno’s pessimism with regards to new technological possibilities of composition and (5) to point to a different (more optimistic) possibility of looking at the contemporary function and existential relevance of music. (6) Further, this insight from philosophy of technology also confirms and deepens De NORA’s account on "music and everyday experience" (See 1.2), which was presented at the beginning of the current focus area, i.e. for at the very core of the given propositions, music’s contemporary function was characterized as that of an "aesthetic technology". (7) Accordingly and again recalling the five basic human-technology relations, music’s ubiquity (due to its compatibility) in contemporary culture underlines precisely that role of music as an "aesthetical technology", which is used by human beings in the process of creating and sustaining harmony (aesthetical aspect) in their specific way of living out their lives in this God given multi-aspectual world (specification relation), helping to compose life-situations and interactions with others (inter-subjectivity) and also their relationship to God (e.g. church liturgy and individual worship). Thence, music’s Sitz im Leben must still be characterized as one that represents the life of the human heart, in the ego’s inevitable (religious) strive for the Absolute in the midst of the struggles of temporal existence.

3.14. Adorno and the religious absolutization of the aesthetical

As we proceed with the provisional conclusions, it makes sense to look more closely at the specific way Adorno relates music to the Absolute. This will be important in order to sustain previous observations pointing to the absolutization of the aesthetical in the music philosophical traditions of Schopenhauer (followed by Nietzsche) and Adorno (Frankfurter Schule), as both emerged in a “post-Christian” context in the attempt of breaking free from the divine creation order and ultimately leading to the elevation of music to (religious) metaphysical status (Bowie 2010:74).

Although less radically articulated then Schopenhauer and notwithstanding his criticisms of the same, (I) Adorno couldn’t really escape the absolutization of the aesthetical either. For after the apparent denial of music’s power of reaching the Absolute (Adorno 1993:402), he dialectically reaffirms the exact opposite in different instances of the same exposition, in the way he characterizes music: (a) music as futile human attempt to grasp the Absolute, (b) music’s Gestalt (form) is based on the name of God (simultaneously saying something distinct and concealed), (c) music is as a demythologized prayer (without the expectation of

51 (Taylor 1979:137-156).
being responded), (d) music points to language - as if language revealed the content itself (GB nuance - the truth itself) (Adorno 1993:402), (d) music reaches the Absolute but darkens at the same time (Adorno 1993:404), (e) music presents “truth” as if it was liberated from illusion – although it can’t escape appearances either (Adorno 1993:411-412).

(II) Consequently, (g) Adorno’s dialectical account on music’s strive for the Absolute, although apparently demythologizing music’s (religious) redemptive power, nevertheless implicitly reinforces music’s religious function (at least its psychological suggestions).

(III) Furthermore, by “reviving” Platonic (rationalistic) notions through such a contrast between truth and appearance, Adorno’s (implicit) criticism of Schopenhauer’s music philosophical tradition, which he believed was grounded in the irrationalistic romantic utopia of uprooting consciousness from the material (Adorno 1993:407-408) ends up dualistically expressing the extreme opposite tendency of romantic irrationalism, namely that of a Platonic and dialectical rationalism. (VI) Thence, the uncovering of such rationalistic tendency may indeed point to the rationalistic and dualistic root of Adorno’s emphasis on (serious) music’s function of aiding enlightenment (Adorno 1973:15). Although it is importance to recognize that Adorno did attempt at emphasizing the distinctive character of the artistic “way of knowing” (Erkenntnisweg) in contrast to cognitive knowledge (Adorno 1993:403).

(VI) Conversely, while Schopenhauer’s (and Nietzsche’s) irrationalism absolutizes individuality, Adorno’s rationalism absolutizes universality. These reductionistic views, although apparently mutually exclusive, are both rooted in the (post-Christian) self-destructive vision of modern Humanism and its pretentious attempt at “deriving the (normative) law side of reality from the supposed autonomy of the human subject” (Strauss 2010:290). On the other hand, reformational philosophy’s non-reductive Christian approach overcomes this dilemma by stressing the irreducibility and coherence between universality and individuality²⁵² (Strauss 2010:64). In terms of the basic religious ground motives of western culture uncovered by Dooyeweerd (Dooyeweerd 2012), the just mentioned (post-Christian) approaches are seen as grounded in the apostate ground motive of freedom and nature, ending up in reductionistic theoretical attitudes and in insoluble and self-refutable dualisms. (a) Nevertheless, one shouldn’t falsely and simplistically suggest that Schopenhauer’s (and Nietzsche’s) account on music is merely irrationalistic and thus the

²⁵² ... since concepts are always constituted by uniting universal features, rationalism results from the absolutization of conceptual knowledge...whereas irrationalism follows from an absolutization of concept-transcending idea-knowledge. (Strauss 2010:369)
precise opposite of Adorno’s. This may be right in terms of its religious (ultimate) meaning moments, but this shouldn’t be confused (b) with the richness of this music philosophy in terms of specific meaning moments, i.e. including the way music’s constitution and existential relevance is thereby portrayed. (b) Consequently, neither should Adorno’s account be reduced to the supra-theoretical religious ground motive underlying it, but rather the richness of his contribution must still be appreciated, as it relates to music’s specific meaning moments.53

Therefore, the provisional conclusions should be closed by means of a positive exposition which integrates won insights from the two major continental music philosophical traditions dealt with in the previous sections, recapitulating and binding up the so far elaborated and at the same time paving the way for the upcoming sections on popular culture (and music).

3.15. Continental music philosophy and the horizon of human experience

Since the beginning of the current focus area, (I) emphasis has been laid on music’s constitution and existential relevance, in a way that enables the approximation of the selected sources of continental thought. Although (II) this distinction between “constitution” and “existence” (a) entails (in anticipation) the biblical view concerning the correlation and mutual irreducibility of law and subject (Dooyeweerd 1971: 79), (b) the multi-aspectual reformational vision must still be brought more explicitly into the picture, in order to (c) uncover and reframe some of the central insights from Schopenhauer, Nietzsche and Adorno. Thence, besides summing up insights, (b) the following positive exposition will also entail implicit criticism of dualistic tendencies in the accounts of the philosophers at stake.

In the attempt to shed some reformational light on the continental accounts on music previously presented, references to the various aspects of reality will be introduced (in

53 (1) The distinction between religious (ultimate) moments (P-A) and specific meaning moments (P-C) is derived from Stoker and very useful in the way it captures and relates the radical diversity (C-content) and coherence of the cosmos to its ultimate purpose (P-Plan) which is found in God’s (A-architect) plan (Stoker 1971: 57):

The plan (P) of this building as a whole and every part thereof has its origin, in the architect (A)... I call this the P-A context, view, or approach. But then I ask my friend to turn right and to tell me how many rooms, passages, stairs, windows, doors, there are, what their functions and purposes are, where they are situated, and thus to explain to me the contents (C) of the plan (P) according to which this building was built. I call this the P-C context, view, or approach (Stoker 1971: 57)

(2) Thus, it isn’t intended to be synthetical in the appreciation of those insights from Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, Adorno, etc., but rather to enter into dialogue with main figures of continental music philosophy. Consequently, a truly Christian account must integrate both, religious and specific meaning moments, in a non-dualistic fashion that may transform insights discovered by other philosophical traditions, according to the all-encompassing Christian ground motive and the life and worldview originating from it.
parenthesis). This will help in order to bind together what has been worked out so far. Further, this procedure is also supposed to facilitate the identification (and overcoming) of dualistic and reductionistic tendencies of the continental traditions concerned, as they fail to give an account on the diversity and irreducibility of the aspects of reality.

3.16. Sketching out a multi-aspectual approximation

Schopenhauer’s metaphysics of music put the traditional Platonist-rationalist (overemphasis of inviduality) understanding of music into question, and by implication, it denied music’s relation to language (lingual aspect). Consequently, Schopenhauer identified harmony (aesthetical aspect) and rhythm (kinetical aspect) to be music’s basic elements. In reaction to Platonist-rationalist accounts on music, Schopenhauer declared music to be the greatest of all arts, precisely for being a direct representation of the will (psychic-sensitive aspect of reality) and thus of pre-theoretical origin (instead of rational-universal). Thus, an irrationalist protest against the Platonic-rationalist can’t be overseen in Schopenhauer. Nevertheless his reaction remains a dualistic one, stressing the irrational (individual) in contrast to the Platonistic overemphasis of the rational (universal). Accordingly, he situates the will’s satisfaction and dissatisfaction as if they belonged to a mere “natural” organic realm (biotic aspect) of the pre-theoretical will (modal aspects preceding human responsibility) of human beings. Thus, although he refers to the will as synonymous to the human heart and to music as presenting the secret history of the will, his “metaphysics” of music still failed to transcend the dualistic tendencies present in his historical context and end up in repression instead of in transcending it (by overcoming dualisms), as denounced by Adorno (Adorno 1993:408).

Furthermore, it is only for being a representation (cultural-formative aspect) of the will (i.e. heart) and not the will itself, that music remains pleasant and preserves from actual sorrow (psychic-sensitive), for when the (person’s) will itself is tormented, then we’re not dealing

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54 Reformational philosophy’s non-reductive ontology also emphasizes the heart, but in an all-encompassing fashion which transcends the dualistic and irrationalistic tendency Schopenhauer couldn’t.: In his lecture on ―Sphere Sovereignty‖ in 1880, Kuyper bluntly confesses the kingship of Christ as the incarnate Word from which nothing in this world is to be stolen. In his —Calvinism of 1898 he naïvely confronts the fundamental cosmological confession of the —ordinances of God on the diverse terrains of life. Kuyper’s reformational starting point comes to the fore most clearly in his conviction that the Calvinist life- and world-view has to be rooted in the understanding of the human relationship to God. And such a life- and world-view will have to manifest a life encompassing character: —If such an action is to put its stamp itself upon our entire life, it must start from that point in our consciousness, in which our life is still undivided and lies comprehended in its unity, - not in the spreading vines, but in the root from which the vines spring.l That point is the —depths of our hearts from which —the different streams of our human life spring and separate themselves and where —all the rays of our life converge as in one focus.(Strauss 2012:6)
with music anymore (as a cultural-formative activity) but with the (suffering) person as the “trembling string that is stretched and twanged” (Schopenhauer 1818:1971). This, although in a more dramatic fashion, resembles Adorno’s stress on music as aiding enlightenment (Adorno 1973:15), in order words, music as a cultural-formative expression of the human heart, provides a distinctive way of knowing (Erkenntnisweg) and in the power of its coherence, it creates a virtual place of expressing the most diverse feelings and motives driving the human heart. The latter on the other hand, coincides with De Nora’s stress on music’s function (due to its availability) as aesthetical technology (De Nora 2004:4-18), and its deeper meaning with TMSA’s worked out emphasis on the ubiquity of music in individual (including inter-subjective relations and human specification in everyday experience) as well as social realms (all sorts of events) of contemporary culture.

Moreover, Schopenhauer’s claim that music which is composed for a drama (e.g. opera) becomes the soul of drama based on music’s supposed revelation of the true essence of actions (Schopenhauer 1818:1968) is nowadays even more powerfully suggested (cultural-formative aspect) by the high developed technological machinery of contemporary culture. One might pause for a moment and e.g. think about the technological sophistication of film production, as well as the artistic (aesthetical aspect) placement of soundtracks in the unfolding of human dramas thereby portrayed (as artistic expressions of true or/and imagined human possibilities).

Thus, the awareness of music’s compatibility with the drama of human existence may indeed justify the proximity between music’s strive for aesthetical harmony and the spiritual (faith aspect), i.e. music as flowing from the human strive for religious redemption. Consequently, even “outspoken” atheism can’t escape expressing the religious impulse of the human heart. For such redemptive motive (faith aspect) is not only contained in music’s proclamation of “reconciliation” (Versöhnung) to the human heart through the interplay between the harmonic and the rhythmic (Schopenhauer 1818:1977), but also in Nietzsche’s “Dyonisian myth” wherein music’s transfigurative power becomes the only “metaphysical” means for the eternal justification of human existence as a aesthetical phenomenon (Nietzsche 1988:17).

Finally, Adorno also attributes a sort of transcendence to serious music and sees the fulfilment of its destiny in its proximity to the spiritual. Conversely, his striking criticism of popular music by consequence denounces the decay of contemporary culture. Therefore,
central claims from his criticism of popular music are going to be questioned via TMSA, in order to close up the provisional conclusions and to prelude the treatment of popular culture.

3.17. On Adorno’s criticism of popular music

Although Adorno’s exposition on “Music, language and composition” (Adorno 1993:401-414) doesn’t directly touch upon popular music, some of its central themes do have bearing on the subject, as they are typical of Adorno’s approach and entail basic presuppositions which also apply to popular music: (I) According to Adorno, the (subjectivist) romantic attempt of uprooting consciousness from the material has caused the weakening of (composition of) music’s constructive power (Adorno 1993:407). Further, (II) he demonizes new (technological) trends of composition and their mere replacement of truly “human” effort in music composition, as: “the dream of a wholly spiritualized music removed from the sullying influences of the animalistic nature of human beings” (Adorno 1993: 409-410).

Accordingly, as Adorno declares “standardization” (correlated to pseudo-individualisation – pseudo-specification in reformational terms) to be the fundamental characteristic of popular music, the same two traits also come up again: (I) popular music’s constructive power is declared to be weak in the sense that its standard schemes aren’t able to create more than a “primitive harmony”. Consequently, popular music never transcends the (subjectivist) listener’s familiar experience (Adorno and Simpson 1941:256-257) and in this manner, it only promotes conditioned reflexes. In contrast to popular music, serious music “virtually contains the whole and leads to the exposition of the whole, while at the same time, it is produced out of the conception of the whole” (Adorno and Simpson 1941:258). Thus, Adorno’s stress on music’s function of aiding enlightenment (Adorno 1973:15) appears as the central presupposition underlying his entire criticism of popular music. For even with regards to (II) technological trends in composition it is implicit that in Adorno’s view, “electronically produced sounds” must necessarily follow the standardized patterns of popular music, for only then can popular music fulfil its manipulative role in the imposition of a musical frame of mind upon the masses (Adorno and Simpson 1941:259). Thus it is implicit that according to Adorno, music may only be serious if it fulfils this enlightening (intellectual) function.

Nevertheless, some serious concerns against such focus upon enlightenment has already found explicit utterance in another context, namely in that of the previous sub-section (3.1), in the sense that it has been pointed out that Adorno’s rationalistically inclined (focus upon
universality) criticism of Schopenhauer’s *irrationalistically inclined* (focus upon individuality) account on music *isn’t sufficient* in order to *overcome dualism*. For a dualistic tendency (in its extreme opposite form) is entailed in Adorno’s criticism of popular culture, for by defining *serious music* in terms of complexity of its compositional construction (rational) and by implicitly criticizing popular music’s “standard schemes” as correlative to pseudo-individualisation (pseudo-specification in reformational terms), Adorno’s criticism of popular music fails to transcend rationality (universality at cost of individuality) and the rational as absolute standard. Such rationalism also implies *logicism* (absolutization of the logical aspect) and leads to the depreciation of *positive ways* popular music may function: (a) in its ubiquity as aesthetic technology, in individual as well as social life, (b) as memorably present in the (specification) unfolding of the life stories of contemporary human beings, (c) in its compatibility to different life situations, (c) in the composition of relationships and events, etc. Consequently, after contrasting such *reductionistic* tendencies and arriving at an integral perspective, it is time to proceed with *popular culture* (and music).

### 3.18. Popular culture

As previously demonstrated, Adorno's praise of serious music (classical music in all his examples) clearly resonates the distinction between (vulgar) popular culture in contrast to the elite's high culture. And in fact, the origin of the term "popular culture" (in contrast to high culture) goes back to German poet, philosopher and theologian Johann Gottfried Herder, whereas in his work "*Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit*", the contrast between the culture of the people (*Kultur des Volkes*) and the culture of the learned (*Kultur der Gelehrten*) is explicitly set (Herder 1784:39).

But nowadays, the distinction between high and popular culture is neither satisfactory nor does it correspond to the contemporary experience of contemporary human beings. In fact, the elevation of a "higher" over against the "lower" (popular) isn't able to capture the global presence of popular culture. For it encompasses the whole of society, including the lifeworld of the "supposedly superior" (intellectual) elite: Accordingly: *"what we call “popular culture”—e.g. a set of generally available artifacts: films, records, clothes, TV programmes, modes of transport, etc.—did not emerge in its recognizably contemporary form until the post - Second World War period when new consumer products were designed and manufactured for new consumer markets"* (Hebdige 1988:47). Thus, *"what we call popular culture"* is a recent phenomenon.
Thence, just as contemporary popular culture can't be reduced to "the culture that is left over after we have decided what is high culture" (Storey 2006:6), applying the same insight to the realm of popular music quickly leads to the justifiable suspicion of contemporary fellows that Adorno's criticism of popular music doesn't hold water, for it condemns popular music (as a whole) as inferior to "higher" serious (classical) music from the outset. Conversely, such depreciation of popular music is sensed as elitist and can hardly escape charges of being antiquate, rationalistically biased or simply insensitive with regards to the lifeworld of human beings in contemporary culture. And criticisms arising from such suspicion may indeed be well taken. For regardless the indisputable greater complexity of classical music over against the standard schemes of popular music, the former (in its traditional forms) possibly doesn’t actually represent the contemporary "sense of life" (Lebensgefühl) of most people and if that’s so, then it doesn’t serve as an aesthetical technology either. Nevertheless, this doesn’t need to remain the case and the classical can be successfully and powerfully adapted to the contemporary. The main reason for its failure to become popular would then be its (e.g. formalistic inflexibility) incompatibility with the drama of contemporary human existence and its aesthetical representations. Of course this alone doesn’t constitute an argument in favor of popular music, but nevertheless it points to the need of an emphatic treatment of contemporary sensibilities. For this reason, the previous sections intended to open up a way of discourse that is open towards the possibility of appreciating popular music, why still (non-dualistically) absorbing main insights from “traditional” continental philosophy.

Thus, throughout the current exposition it has been assumed that popular music belongs to popular culture and the latter has been defined as "a set of generally available artifacts: films, records, clothes, TV programmes, modes of transport, etc." But this isn't the only definition available.

### 3.19. Storey’s six definitions of popular culture

In fact, it makes sense to approximate some of the basic definitions of popular culture in order to gain more clarity about the context in which popular music functions.

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55 [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HZa1iFO0Juk](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HZa1iFO0Juk)
For this purpose, as John Storey’s “Cultural Theory and Popular Culture: An Introduction” (Storey 2006) still represents “the most systematic discussion of attempts to pin down popular culture” (Parker 2011:2), his six definitions of popular culture therein discussed are going to be briefly presented:

(1) Quantitative definition: “Popular culture is simply culture which is widely favoured or well-liked by many people.” (Storey 2006:4). This is usually the first (commonly held) definition that comes to people’s mind when they’re asked about popular culture.

(2) Qualitative definition: “the culture which is left over after we have decided what is high culture.” (Storey 2006:5) As above mentioned, the elitist connotation therein implicit may have applied in Herder’s time, but since the post-Second World War period it doesn’t apply anymore (as delineated by cultural theorists) (Parker 2011:1-5). Since then, popular culture has been emerging as a globally shared culture (Brandon 2009:6), encompassing both, elements “traditionally” regarded as belonging to “high culture” (Kultur der Gelehrten) as well as those belonging to (vulgar) the people’s culture (Kultur des Volkes). This can be illustrated by e.g. multi-themed artworks such as contemporary movies, which provide different viewpoints/insights into the lives and roles of people from different classes and levels of education “at once and non-exclusively” (all in the same artwork)

(3) Aesthetic definition (in a pejorative sense): “synonymous for mass culture, that commercialized, commoditized culture industry” (in allusion to Adorno and the Frankfurter School) (Storey 2006:6).

(4) Reactionary definition (against the suspicion of mass culture): “culture that originates from ‘the people’... for the people.” (Storey 2006:9).

(5) Political (Marxist) definition: This definition is derived from Italian Political Theorist Antonio Gramsci’s concept of hegemony (Gramsci 2009) and states that the machinery of popular culture is used in the cultural-formative process in order to achieve a “compromise equilibrium” (Gramsci 1971:161) in the struggle between classes: ”popular culture as a site of struggle between the ‘resistance’ of subordinate groups and the forces of ‘incorporation’ operating in the interests of dominant groups” (Storey 2006:10).
(6) Postmodern definition: This definition emerged from debates on the relationship between postmodernism and popular culture and its main emphasis lies upon the claim that “postmodern culture is a culture that no longer recognizes the distinction between high and popular culture”. (Storey 2006:12) Reactions against this “postmodern state of affairs” are ambivalent, although its impact is with no doubt tremendous: “for some this is a reason to celebrate an end to an elitism constructed on arbitrary distinctions of culture; for others it is a reason to despair at the final victory of commerce over culture.” (Storey 2006:12).

Now, instead of evaluating each definition and pointing out their shortcomings, a (inclusive) synoptic view/stance (Zusammenschau) will be taken, i.e. combining the presented definitions so that they may work together (zusammenwirken) in the elucidation of the relationship between popular culture and music. Thereby the meaning coherence (Sinnzusammenhang) of the current focus area should come forth more clearly and the climax of the current exposition will be reached thereafter, by (I) summing up the accomplished, (II) and presenting a (conclusive) positive view on music and popular culture (III) via TMSA’s Trinitarian vision.

3.20. Approximating popular culture and music (via the six definitions)

One function Adorno attributes to popular music (e.g. social cement56) is analogue to the one attributed to popular culture by Storey’s fifth definition, which is derived from Gramsi’s political theory (e.g. popular culture as an instrument for the achievement of compromise equilibrium in the struggle between classes57). Conversely, as those two merely touch upon three (negative) of the six given basic definitions (meanings) of popular culture, namely: the

56 “Music today is largely a social cement. And the meaning listeners attribute to a material, the inherent logic of which is inaccessible to them, is above all a means by which they achieve some psychical adjustment to the mechanisms of present day life” (Adorno and Simpson 1941:264). “The actual function of sentimental music lies rather in the temporary release given to the awareness that one has missed fulfilment. The emotional listener listens to everything in terms of late romanticism and of the musical commodities derived from it which are already fashioned to fit the needs of emotional listening. They consume music in order to be allowed to weep”. (Adorno 1941:266)

57 In Gramsi’s concept of hegemony (Gramsci 2009) it is stated that the machinery of popular culture is used in the cultural-formative process in order to achieve a “compromise equilibrium” (Gramsci 1971:161) in the struggle between classes: “...cultural theorists have taken Gramsci’s political concept and used it to explain the nature and politics of popular culture. Those using this approach see popular culture as a site of struggle between the ‘resistance’ of subordinate groups and the forces of ‘incorporation’ operating in the interests of dominant groups. Popular culture in this usage is not the imposed culture of the mass culture theorists, nor is it an emerging from below, spontaneously oppositional culture of ‘the people’ – it is a terrain of exchange and negotiation between the two: a terrain, as already stated, marked by resistance and incorporation” (Storey 2006:10).
(5) political (Marxist) definition, (3) the pejorative aesthetic definition (popular culture reductionistically equated to mass culture) and (2) the qualitative definition (left over from high culture), it should have become clear at this stage (after previous criticisms of reductionistic/dualistic approaches), that the Marxist trajectory (Adorno, Gramsci and co.) is insufficient in the approach of popular culture (including popular music), for it is restrictively draws upon negative definitions (connotations). And regardless how insightful these approaches may be in specific matters, the fact that they fail to give positive perspective on the concerned contemporary affairs show their limitedness and reinforce the need of shifting the focus towards constructive alternatives, in a way that may enable insights from previous sections (on music) to be brought into the perspective of popular culture (and music).

In order to avoid the wrong impression of having rejected the exclusive claims of the above mentioned (second, third and fifth definitions) due to an uncritical acceptance of the postmodern definition (6), it is important to remember that popular culture, as a recent phenomenon, only emerged “as we know it” in connection to the magnifying/reductive technological viewpoints created by modern technology (see 5.1. of the previous focus area on technology and everyday experience). Thus, popular culture’s ubiquity (1- quantitative definition) in contemporary culture and its compatibility (4- culture of the people and for the people) to different personal and social events (e.g. series, movies, theatre, opera, sports, games, romantic dates, weddings, parties, funerals, church service, etc.) are only possible “as we know it” nowadays due to the very presence of technology. Consequently, the (6) emergence of the postmodern definition goes hand in hand with the emergence of popular culture and its obliteration of the elitist distinction between "high and popular culture".

Therefore, neither does it make sense to reject the (6) postmodern definition based on (3) the pejorative aesthetical definition delivered by Adorno and co. (2), nor based on elitist presumptions (5) or as based on Marxist’ emphasis upon the struggle of the classes, nor does it make sense (conversely) to reject Adorno and co. based on a postmodernist cultural relativism. For postmodern cultural relativism doesn't primarily rest upon popular culture per se, but rather upon the absolutization of the magnifying/reductive (fragmentary) viewpoints provided by contemporary technologies. Consequently, it is due to the technological mediation of popular culture that it may be perceived as fragmentary by contemporary fellows, for popular culture has emerged as an instrument of the pluricultural (via technological viewpoints), thus it isn’t relativistic per se, but pluricultural (therefore rejecting the separation between high and popular culture): "image saturated" popular culture, itself
filled with multicultural fragments, is also perceived as threatening. Cultural relativism, however, is only a trivialized and often degraded form of pluriculturality. It is also the sign of the pervasiveness of the pluricultural”. (Ihde 1990:167-167) Thus, this connection between technology and popular culture was only pointed out in order to shift the attention away from the mentioned negative and exclusive claims, towards a more open, inclusive and integral absorption of the six definitions.

Also, it might have been noticed (in the last paragraph), that Storey's first (quantitative) definition was replaced by "ubiquity" just as his fourth definition (culture of the people and for the people) was replaced by "compatibility". This replacement is based upon two key characteristics of music’s role in the contemporary world and as they’re derived from positive definitions of popular culture (in contrast to the second, third and fifth definitions), they help understanding the positive meaning of music and popular culture. Accordingly, they are decisive in the elucidation of the relationship between “music and popular culture”.

Applying the six definitions of popular culture to (popular) music: its (1) ubiquity, (4) compatibility and (6) usage in the strive for a unified diversity in cultural life (postmodern definition) can be taken as convergent, as they positively encompass the (pre-theoretical) naively experienced lifeworld of contemporary (technologically mediated) popular culture, whereas (2 and 3) the elitist deepens the critical-scientific(theoretical) understanding of music, accounting for its (manipulative) power (3) in human (pseudo) specification. Further, (5) the political definition points to struggles between different “social” groups. Thence, despite the negative tone of the last three, their strength shouldn’t be dismissed, namely to promote critical awareness of central problems related to popular culture (and music).

3.21. Moving towards the conclusion of the focus area

Now that the connection between music and popular culture has been established, most of the main goals of the current focus area have been reached. By elucidating central relationships such as; (1) music and its main site (popular culture) of functioning in the contemporary world, (2) music philosophy and everyday experience (including technology), (3) continental music philosophy and the post-Christian (religious) absolutization of the aesthetical and (4) by sketching a multi-aspectual approach to Schopenhauer, Adorno and co. (inspired by reformational philosophy) and the dualistic tendencies therein contained, (5) a long trajectory was traced, motivated by the core intention of constructively (although non-synthetically)
absorbing central insights from traditional (continental) sources and bringing them into the perspective of contemporary culture. By considering (6) that the latter can only be done by means of a non-dualistic understanding of contemporary sensibilities (i.e. including the lifeworld and drama of human existence as they’re experienced nowadays), it was also crucial (7) to demonstrate how popular culture emerged in connection to postmodern (technologically mediated) pluriculturality and that elitist prejudices had to be overcome by means of what has been called a “synoptic view” (Zusammenschau) of the different definitions of popular culture. Thus, (8) before concluding the current focus area via TMSA’s Trinitarian vision, (9) it makes sense to point out the central meaning attributed to popular culture in the contemporary world, (10) as it reflects the elevation of the aesthetical to metaphysical (religious) status in a similar fashion to the aesthetics of Schopenhauer and co.

3.22. Religion and popular culture

Since the introduction of popular culture at the beginning of this chapter, it has been suggested (1) that ubiquity and compatibility are to be regarded as main features of (both) music and popular culture. This assertion not only (2) served to show the interconnectedness of both (music and popular culture), but also brought forth the insight that nowadays, technologically mediated (globally shared culture) popular culture is possibly the most important site in which to examine the interaction between religion, music and contemporary culture.80 (3) Accordingly, since the emergence of popular culture (including music), it has been functioning as a replacement for traditional religion (for the masses): “...people in contemporary consumer capitalist societies increasingly seek in popular culture the meanings, identity, and community they once found in religion” (McCloud 2006:354-355)

(4) Further, popular music have been functioning as an aesthetic (religious) technology in order to “cause” (pseudo) religious experiences59: “music subcultures like hip hop, metal,
rave, and grateful Dead fandom are religious because they provide —a powerful religious experience, an encounter with the numinous that is the core of all religion” (McCloud 2006:355)

(5) Others have simply called this phenomenon (related to religion and popular culture) “the emergence of postmodern or cultural religion”, for it implies parallels that can’t be overseen: “Ritual, semiological, and communal aspects of religion are now found in media of popular culture such as rock music, television, and film. Religious experiences have been described by teen Internet users... devotees of popular music... (Stout 2006:15)

(6) Thus, this religiously connoted view on popular culture resembles the same sort of (religious) absolutization of the aesthetical, which was previously pointed out in Schopenhauer, Nietzsche and Adorno. Consequently, this interconnection helps picturing the way (popular) music functions in the context of popular culture: “This type of religion is postmodern in that it is rarely connected with institutions and is practiced outside of traditional houses of worship. These practices are similar to what is described as popular religion... vernacular religion and cultural religion.” (Stout 2006:15)

(7) Finally, this brings us to the conclusion of the historical trajectory which was elaborated so far, (a) establishing the link between two major traditions of continental music philosophy (Schopenhauer’s and Adorno’s) and contemporary popular culture, (b) by the demonstration that nowadays, the aesthetical is still functioning as a religious substitute for God in the West.

3.23. Final conclusions via TMSA
A long trajectory has been traced in the approach of music (and popular culture) and its religious function in the contemporary world. Many steps were taken in order to present TMSA’s integral perspective, allowing the interaction between continental music philosophy and cultural development to take place in such a way that traditional (continental) insights were absorbed, while at the same time considering contemporary sensibilities. But after all that has been said, where does TMSA’s Trinitarian vision fit in the articulated trajectory?

either descriptive (i.e., rituals, myths, symbols, etc.) or functionalist (how popular culture works in people’s lives) definitions of religion”. (McCloud 2006:356).

By following the main thrust implicit throughout the current exposition, and also made explicit at the end of the previous focus area, the attentive reader most probably already arrived at decisive conclusions. For instance, (I) music as art is ποίησις just as technology’s τέχνη is ποίησις, thence both are creaturely modes of bringing forth of God’s revelation (technology may reveal creation whereas music may reveal humans to themselves and others coram Deo). Consequently, as a creaturely mode of revealing, music can only offer a human and therefore situated perspective. Accordingly, (II) while distancing from philosophical tendencies which elevate music and the artistic to metaphysical status, the contemporary function of music as an aesthetical technology (via popular culture) has been preserved by TMSA, (a) pointing to its ubiqutity in individual and social life, (b) its presence in the (specification) unfolding and revealing of the drama of human existence coram Deo in contemporary culture and its artistic representations (movies, series, etc.), its (c) compatibility to different life situations and its usage as “tuning device” in the composition of inter-subjective relationships (e.g. worship music, romantic music, party music, etc.).

Thence, in terms of the ego’s threefold relationship (God, inter-subjectivity and cosmos) stressed by TMSA, it must be reinforced (III) that it is due to a misdirected faith (pistic aspect) that humans (as subjects – subjected to the multi-aspectual creation order) misuse music (and popular culture) as a substitute for traditional religion. Nevertheless, such misuse is only possible due to the religious impulse of the human heart and his strive for the absolute in the midst of the drama of temporal existence. (IV) Therefore, in contrast to (a) Adorno’s lamentation over the futile attempt of music to grasp the absolute, (b) music’s immanentistic proclamation of reconciliation to the human heart (e.g. Schopenhauer) or (c) human existence being justified as an aesthetical phenomenon (e.g. Nietzsche), TMSA affirms that the human strive for the absolute can only be ultimately satisfied in Jesus Christ, in whom the diversity of created reality converges, and in whom alone the human heart can find rest from its restlessness.

Consequently, (V) it is only in connection to God in Jesus Christ, through the work of the Holy Spirit upon men’s hearts, that music come to its own as aesthetic representation of the human heart in its strive for redemption; so that (a) without becoming instruments of pseudo-revelation nor (b) promoting pseudo-specification, music can fulfil the human heart with eternal joy while still functioning (and comforting) as an ordering device in everyday life and popular culture.
CHAPTER FOUR – ROMANTIC LOVE AND ECONOMIC FREEDOM

After presenting two focus areas of (contemporary) culture, perspectives have been given on the contemporary lifeworld as to enable one’s deepening of understanding into the subjects at stake, and also reinforcing the (human) deepening into knowledge of self, God and the cosmos as central and redemptive to the temporal existence of human beings coram Deo.

This emphasis upon the contemporary lifeworld pointed out some of the ego’s religious manifestations via the aesthetical (poetical) and technological in contemporary culture, while keeping inter-subjective relationships (as a subject of enquiry) in the background most of the time (although surfaced in the context of knowledge and of human-technology relations).

One of the reasons for the selection of the next focus area was to invert this priority and place a central inter-subjective human relationship in the foreground: (I) romantic love. Nevertheless, a second theme will be approached, as its intersection with romantic love decisively shapes human relationships in the contemporary lifeworld: (II) economic freedom.

(III) Basic insights for this focus area, as a joint treatment of subjects, are provided by Eva Illouz’s “Consuming the Romantic Utopia; Love and the Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism”. (IV) In order to critically engage insights from Illouz’s sociological perspective, philosophical insights derived from Ayn Rand’s Capitalism and from H.G. Stoker’s account on freedom will also come into play. (V) Finally, insights from Franz von Baader’s erotic philosophy will be introduced, anticipating TMSA’s view on romantic love, which will be linked up to TMSA’s view on economic freedom (inspired by reformational philosophy).

4.1. Preliminary thoughts

One of the main reasons for choosing Illouz’s work as starting point (Illouz 1997) is simply because it offers the perfect point of entry for the approach of romantic love and everyday experience in contemporary culture. Although it isn’t intended to present Illouz’s work in its entirety, insights thereof will be basic to introduce romantic love and its Sitz im Leben in contemporary culture. Accordingly, the main intention of this introduction will be to deliver a positive exposition. Nevertheless, as Illouz will be read through TMSA’s lenses, not only will insights be absorbed and transformed in the light of its Neo-Calvinist understanding of reality (ontology), but also, central notions will be critically engaged as to enable further deepening.
While the previous focus areas were designed to point out the ego’s religious expressions via the aesthetical (poetical) and technological in the contemporary lifeworld, one of the main goals of the current exposition will be to reveal the ego's religious strive as it manifests itself in romantic love. Also, it is intended to demonstrate that the contemporary (post-Christian) rejection of the divine creation order (Taylor 1979:137-156) doesn’t remain without consequences when it comes to romantic love. In fact, not only is this inter-subjective human relationship central nowadays, but it is presented by contemporary culture as a religious leitmotif of human existence, finding utterance everywhere (e.g. in songs, novels, movies, series, ads, etc.). Thence, it is crucial to come to terms with it in a redemptive way.

4.2. Basic presuppositions on the religious function of romance

So the assumption that romantic love is a religious site of contemporary culture can already be seen as a starting point. Although unproved, to raise this claim right from the start isn’t unjustified, for already if one would pause for a minute and contemplate the narratives of contemporary songs, novels, movies and series, one would easily become aware (in case he isn’t already) of the central role attributed to romantic love in those narratives:

Why do romantic love and its attendant mythologies have such a powerful grip on our collective imagination? ...love is a privileged site for the experience of utopia. In capitalist societies, love contains a utopian dimension that cannot be easily reduced to "false consciousness" or to the presumed power of "ideology" to recruit people's desires. Instead, the longing for utopia at the heart of romantic love possesses deep affinities with the experience of the sacred... such experience has not disappeared from secular societies but has migrated from religion proper to other domains of culture. Romantic love is one site of this displacement. (Illouz 1997:7)

Regardless the fact it may function this way in the case of innumerable individuals, from a religious (encompassing the whole of life) perspective, it is disputable if romantic love should be seen as a utopia per se (later on, this will be challenged by Baader’s erotic philosophy). On the other hand, viewed from the perspective of “capitalist society”, it becomes most natural to picture “romantic love” as something that transcends the (supposedly) capitalistic social order. Therefore, for the sake of meaning coherence, this point won’t be exhaustively questioned for now, although it can already be remarked that at the core of the issue, we’re
dealing with the transcending human self in the manifestation of its religious impulse. So even if society is to be qualified as capitalist (in a pejorative sense) in its tendency (this will be questioned later via Ayn Rand), the religious self will always find ways to transcend any societal order that attempts at undermining the religious (transcending) impulse of the ego. Therefore, considering that institutional religion has lost its power in contemporary culture, it makes sense to picture romantic love as a site where the ego’s religious impulse finds utterance (i.e. popular media, songs, movies, series, ads, etc.).

Also, the impact technology (computers, internet, telephones, television, etc.) has had upon the organization of social life and inter-subjective relationships, besides bringing about new challenges to human existence via technicism (see first focus area), has also been invoking an irrational antithesis to manifest itself as a religious alternative, i.e. romanticism: “Romantic love, we are told by some, is the last repository of the authenticity and the warmth that have been robbed us by an increasingly technocratic and legalistic age” (Illouz 1997:1)

But what does capitalism (as understood by Illouz) have to do with romantic love anyway? In resemblance to the 5th (Gramscian) definition of popular culture, given in the previous focus area (battlefield of hegemony), capitalism is seen as having created an economic and symbolic sphere of consumption which enables everyone to participate while at the same time legitimating social divisions. (Illouz 1997:2) Thus, Illouz believes that the contemporary definitions and practices of romance are linked to this apparent contradiction of capitalism and that romantic love (via the emergence of the mass market) has become “a collective utopia cutting across and transcending social divisions” (Illouz 1997:2). Thence, although this sociological understanding of capitalism is questionable, it does in fact open up an interesting way of looking at the religious function attributed to romantic love, as a force that may transcend social divisions without eradicating them: “Like art and religion, love “is the site par excellence of the denial of the social world” especially when this world takes the murky face of economic interest, and, like art and religion, romantic love denies its social basis through its claim to transcend or overturn it. (Illouz 1997:3)

And what are the roles played by culture in romantic love? For Illouz, there are at least four semiotic ones: (1) labelling. For instance, sexual arousal (depending on the person’s culture and/or worldview, can be seen in different ways; as divine gift, lust, love, hormonal disorder, etc.). (2) Those labels belong to bodies of norms. Besides defining, this normative context may influence how people deal with emotions – depending on whether or not they’re willing
to conform to specific cultural norms. (3) Cultural values provide frames of interpreting the intensity of the arousal. Interestingly, herein Illouz distinguishes between the romantic tradition’s elevation of the initial and most intense stage of romantic love and the realist’s emphasis on the declining intensity and increasing consistency. At last, (4) “culture provides symbols, artifacts and images symbolic “snapshots” in which romantic feelings can be recapitulated and communicated”. Thus “people make sense of their romantic experiences by drawing on collective symbols and meanings”. (Illouz 1997:4-6)

Furthermore, granted the possibility that “romantic and realist views” may nowadays represent the most common interpretations of romantic love (this assumption is based on contemporary cultural frames); it will be indirectly demonstrated via TMSA that both options are intrinsically dualistic and therefore self-destructive. This will be accomplished through the transformational absorption of insights from Baader’s erotic philosophy into TMSA’s Neo-Calvinist perspective, which aims at doing justice to the biblical ontology of the heart.

Assuming that cultural frames provide definitions of romantic love, how then does contemporary culture express its different stages? (1) Attraction comes first, (2) then romantic sentiments are expressed in the cultural institution of dating via postmodern and hedonist values and (3) last the institution of marriage, which stands for the longevity and stability of romantic love. (Illouz 1997:5) These “stages” of contemporary romantic love will be compared to facets of Baader’s erotic philosophy too.

For now, besides considering the semiotic entanglement of romantic love in cultural frames, as central for its contemporary definitions and interpretations, it is important to take to heart that romanticism has been manifesting itself as the religious antithesis to technicism.

4.3. Romantic love and the emancipation from the tribe

Although romantic love was already present during the period of industrial capitalism, as a celebration of moral individualism, things have considerably changed since then (including the emergence of the mass media and market, new technologies, popular arts and culture, etc.). For instance, less than one century ago, marriage was still seen as one of the most important financial operations in life. (Illouz 1997:8) By then, romantic love was often times the “irrational enemy” of tribal authorities, which strategically sought to safeguard social reproduction via the institution of marriage. (Illouz 1997:8) While this is still the case in certain contexts, the tribal power over the individual’s choice of who he/she is supposed to
Marry has been dismantled in contemporary (western) culture. Now, notwithstanding self-interest may still influence individual choices, the emancipation of romantic love from tribal authority represents victory and liberation to the self-responsible individual living coram Deo, and this opened up new ways of shaping romantic relationships in contemporary everyday experience:

In proclaiming the supremacy of human relationships governed by the disinterested gift of oneself, love not only celebrates the fusion of individual souls and bodies but also opens the possibility of an alternative social order. Love thus projects an aura of transgression and both promises and demands a better world. (Illouz 1997:9)

But how did this emancipation of romantic love take place? According to Illouz, the autonomy of the romantic couple grew since college attendance by both, young men and women became common in the beginning of the last century. This development relaxed tribal control and led to the creation of youth culture as a separate social sphere, which on the other hand “legitimized intimacy with the other sex as an intrinsic feature of socialization into adulthood”. (Illouz 1997:27) Consequently, not only did romantic love emancipate from tribal control but also from (dualistically understood61) Christian sexual mores, which were gradually replaced by the mores of youth culture. Not to forget that this development was strengthened by the values proclaimed in the emerging mass media and popular culture: “movies and advertising images codified romance in visual vignettes of erotic intimacy, luxury and leisure” (Illouz 1997:15).

Also, the increasing level of women’s education and participation in cultural life, contributed to the emergence of a “heterosocial” world, whereas the sphere of leisure began to be shared by men and women (Illouz 1997:27). This is how romantic love came to “meet” the market:

By inscribing the romantic encounter into the consumption of leisure, the practice of "dating" marked the symbolic and practical penetration of romance by the market. This shifted the focus of the romantic encounter from marriage as a permanent and unique union to the fragmented but repeatable pursuit of pleasurable experiences. (Illouz 1997:14)

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61 A sketch of the Neo-Calvinist non-dualistic alternative view on romantic love will be provided at the end of the focus area, via TMSA’s interpretation of insights from Baader’s erotic philosophy.
Further, the heterosocial leisure sphere was strengthened by the increasing commercialization of leisure and the dramatic growth in numbers of discotheques, amusement parks, cinemas, etc. (Illouz 1997:27) The increasing of power of the leisure industries was then facilitated by the new technologies, which helped restructuring the contemporary lifeworld by making resources of the emerging popular culture available to the masses (via telephone, radio, motion pictures, newspaper, popular songs, magazines, film, etc.). (Illouz 1997:27-28)

4.4. Romantic love and the contemporary lifeworld

So the (shared) sphere of consumption and leisure emerged alongside the emancipation of romantic love from tribal authorities. Since then, individuals jointly make use of the cultural sphere of consumption (e.g. going to the cinema and consuming “romantic” movies, restaurants for “romantic meals”, bars and discotheques for “flirting”, etc.) in order to engage one another in a romantic relationship. Thence, the sphere of consumption functions as a site where the “conditions set by work, money and exchange” (Illouz 1997:10) are temporarily overturned by the individual’s romantic aspirations. And this has become the scenario in which romantic relationships are played out in contemporary culture.

Does this mean that romantic love is shaped by the market (or vice-versa)? To a certain extent, that’s definitely the case. But what if this is not the decisive factor, how then is this link between romance and the market to be ontologically conceived? As already surfaced at the beginning of the “basic presuppositions”, it is the ego’s religious impulse that enables the human self to transcend the diverse facets of the creation order and to find meaning coherence in temporal existence. Therefore, as the “market” only entails spheres, which are created, used and sustained by humans and thus belong to the human lifeworld (including its multiple facets), instead of following Illouz’s attempt of demonstrating the entanglement of romantic love and capitalism, a different trajectory will be designed; (1) by presupposing that the pejorative view of capitalism is based on a “pessimistic” view of the economic (this will be further elucidated later) and (2) romanticism as a “optimistic” absolutization of an ethical inter-subjective human relationship, (3) TMSA’s Neo-Calvinist alternative will be sketched...

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62 The sociological approach used by Illouz, which is inspired by the sociology of Durkheim and other “left-wing” thinkers (including Adorno and others), although insightful in many specific issues, is due to its “collectivistic presuppositions” (at cost of individuality) ontologically irreconcilable with TMSA’s perspective, which is inspired by reformational philosophy’s stress on the irreducibility and correlation of individuality and universality.
out in the attempt of providing redemptive perspectives on how the economic and the romantic can be fully and coherently experienced by human beings in contemporary culture.

4.5. Provisional conclusions

Seen from TMSA’s perspective, the intersection between romantic love and the market isn’t negative *per se*, but rather, in terms of individuality structures (subject-object and subject-subject relationships)\(^63\), as the sphere of consumption is a creation of individuals, whose lifeworld encompasses multiple relationships and aspects of reality, this intersection thus naturally reflects the constitution of human beings, cosmic relationships (including intersubjectivity) and the unfolding of cultural-formative activities and developments. Thus, whenever absolutizations of (human) created spheres take place, they point to the human heart as their root. Consequently, by considering the above mentioned view (inspired by reformational philosophy), the following claims demand a closer reading and elucidation via TMSA:

...the postmodern culture of late capitalism articulates a powerful utopia of love promising transgression through the consumption of leisure and Nature. Romantic practices include transgressive rituals that oppose the values of the productive sphere and celebrate personal freedom, but these rituals are ultimately based in the market” (Illouz 1997:10)

First, (1) even if human society is to be seen as “capitalistic” (suggesting the absolutization of the economic aspect), romantic love expresses something irreducible to the economic aspect, namely love (ethical aspect) as well as the mythical (possibly religious) position occupied by romantic love (i.e. people loving each other romantically) in a person’s lifeworld. While it still must be questioned (later via Baader’s erotic philosophy) what the elevation of this intersubjective relationship implies (i.e. romantic love) and how it can become a redemptive human relationship, (2) the contrast set by Illouz between the productive sphere and romantic practices must be rejected, simply because it presupposes a dualistic division between the profession/vocation (productive sphere) of human beings and their romantic aspirations. With no doubt, (3) there may be often times tension caused by technicism in the contemporary work situation of many people, but at the end of the day the transcending self always find

\(^{63}\) See previous focus areas – on the treatment of (human) specification.
ways to express the human heart’s religious impulse towards eternity in its search for meaning coherence in temporal existence. “He has made everything beautiful in its time. He has also set eternity in the human heart”. (Ecc 3:11) And in contemporary culture, romantic love has become one of the most prominent sites, where the ego’s religious impulse finds utterance.

After surfacing recent developments, which lead to the “contemporary situation” of romantic love, key insights derived from Illouz’s sociological perspective can be briefly summed up for the sake of recapitulation of these developments and the closure of this sub-section:

These cultural, social, and economic changes helped transform the meanings of love, as it became progressively incorporated within the emerging mass-market and mass-media culture. The transformations undergone by the meaning of love are characterized by the extrication of love from religion, that is, the secularization of the discourse of love; the increasing prominence of the theme of love in mass culture, especially in film and advertising; the glorification of the theme of love as a supreme value and the equation of love with happiness; the association of love and consumption, more specifically, the romanticization of commodities; the inclusion of "intensity " and " fun " in the new definitions of romance, marriage, and domesticity. (Illouz 1997:28)

If one pauses for a moment and contemplate the different changes mentioned by Illouz, one comes to realize the link between the current and the previous focus areas. Take for instance the central role played by new technologies and popular culture (including popular arts such as music) in the named (postmodern) cultural transformations, which are explicitly linked to the emancipation of individuals from the power of tribalism and of institutional religion over the people’s lives. Thence, it is important to notice that the emergence “of new societal spheres” as pointed out by Illouz, (4) doesn’t primarily stand for the individual’s “emancipation” from the power of religion (e.g. notice the emergence of “new” religions such as the absolutization of romantic love) (5) but it stands for the individual’s emancipation from the “imposed” power of institutional religion and the tribe over (self-responsible coram Deo) individual human freedom.

And now, instead of engaging further aspects of Illouz’s work, other points of entry will be introduced in order to link up romantic love with economic freedom. Thence, these other
points of entry will help articulating TMSA’s Neo-Calvinist alternative approach to the intersection between “romantic love and capitalism” in contemporary culture.

4.6. Capitalism and the emancipation from tribalism

Capitalism is taken by Illouz in the conventional pejorative (and collectivistic) sense: “...capitalism is characterized by an entire mind-set, in that exchange relationships, that of buying and selling, have permeated most of the society.” (Illouz 1997:1) Nevertheless, viewed from TMSA’s multi-aspectual perspective, this pejorative connotation isn’t necessary, for even if one assumes that absolutizations of the economic aspect do occur in society and in the lives of individuals, it is fallacious to conceive such absolutizations apart from human subject’s (individual) economic responsibilities and concrete actions.

While capitalism can be conceived as an economic system (reflecting how individuals interact “economically” in society nowadays), this conception merely refers to one mode of viewing society: “As an economic system, capitalism involves the production and exchange of commodities with the aim of accumulating a surplus value, that is, profit, with some part of this profit being re-invested in order to maintain the conditions of future accumulation ...” (Illouz 1997:1) Thence, in order to know how (human) economic responsibilities are related to romantic relationships in contemporary culture, one shouldn’t fall prey to the trap of collectivism, but rather seek to understand the drama of the human heart manifested in the diverse and coherent facets of human existence. Consequently, there’s the need of breaking away from this pessimistic and collectivistic view on capitalism if one is willing to truly grasp (individual) human potentialities in everyday experience. So, despite other possible procedures, Ayn Rand’s “individualistic” understanding of capitalism was chosen in order to provide positive ways of viewing the impact of capitalism (as economic system) upon human beings and society.

Furthermore, although specific problem fields of both approaches; Ayn Rand’s “individualism” and Illouz’s “collectivism” could be more specifically criticised (i.e. for instance on grounds of their reductive accounts on individuality and universality), it is intended to keep on tracing a constructive trajectory instead; identifying, absorbing and integrating valuable insights via TMSA. Such transformational procedure has been
characteristic in the elaboration of all focus areas of the current study, which is a Neo-Calvinist attempt of engaging contemporary sensibilities coram Deo.

4.7. Ayn Rand on capitalism and tribalism

In contrast to the collectivistic attempt of defining capitalism as a consumerist mind-set that permeated most of society, Rand develops a positive view of capitalism by starting with the centrality of the individual: “I want to stress that our primary interest is not politics or economic as such, but man’s nature and man’s relationship to existence” (Rand 1967:9).

In Rand’s individualistic view, capitalism is the superlative economic system; “we advocate capitalism because it is the only system geared to the life of a rational being... the only moral system in history.” (Rand 1967:9) Since Rand’s view of capitalism is based on a strict rejection of collectivism, basic traits of her arguments against collectivism should be named. Ever since capitalism has been defined on collectivistic grounds; (I) “man was regarded simply as one of the factors of production, along with land, forests, or mines.” (Rand 1967:12) Furthermore, (II) Rand identifies the root of such collectivism as based on the tribal view of human beings, characteristic of European culture (Rand 1967:13)64. And according to such tribal view (III) “in law and in principle, all property belonged to the head of the tribe” (Rand 1967:13) Consequently, “Europe’s predominant idea of emancipation consisted of changing the concept of man as a slave of the absolute state embodied by a king, to the concept of man as a slave of the absolute state embodied by the people – i.e. switching from slavery to a tribal chief into slavery to the tribe.” (Rand 1967:13)

Thence, (IV) Rand’s claim that capitalism is the only moral system in history (Rand 1967:9) rests on the presupposition that human beings shouldn’t be regarded as “properties of the tribe”, but as self-responsible individuals. Thus, her concept of human beings as free and independent individuals provides the basis for her positive understanding of capitalism. (V)

By reinforcing the primacy of the individual in terms of knowledge and action, Rand stresses individual freedom as fundamental to human existence; “Since men are neither omniscient

64 Although it is questionable if “tribalism” has originated in European, it did in fact dominate European culture: The concept of man as a free, independent individual was profoundly alien to the culture of Europe. It was a tribal culture down to its roots: in European thinking, the tribe was the entity, the unit, and man was only one of its expendable cells. This applied to rulers and serfs alike: the rulers were believed to hold their privileges only by virtue of the services they rendered to the tribe, services regarded as of a noble order, namely, armed force or military defense. But a nobleman was as much chattel of the tribe as a serf: his life and property belonged to the king. It must be remembered that the institution of private property, in the full, legal meaning of the term, was brought into existence only by capitalism. (Rand 1967:13)
nor infallible, they must be free to agree or disagree, to cooperate or to pursue their own independent course, each according to his own rational judgement. Freedom is the fundamental requirement of man’s mind”. (Rand 1967:15)

Consequently, instead of negatively seeing capitalism as a consumerist mind-set and an economic system which is based on production and exchange of commodities with the aim of accumulating profit (Illouz 1997:1), Rand (VI) sees capitalism as based on (economic) freedom, integrity and creativity of human beings (Rand 1967:16) in the creation and sustaining of their lifeworld and culture. Thus, on an individual level, Rand’s defence of capitalism is a defence of (individual) economic freedom. 65

According to this view, there’s no contradiction between the professional vocation (sphere of production) of human beings and the aspirations of the human heart (including romantic aspirations). But rather, the fact that “man has to work and produce in order to support his life” (Rand 1967:16) underlines his economic responsibility in temporal existence. For Rand, 66 “capitalistic society is voluntary society... Men are free to cooperate or not, to deal with one another or not, as their own individual judgements, convictions, and interests dictate.” (Rand 1967:17) Keeping TMSA’s non-reductive view of reality in mind then (without absolutizing individuality or universality), in a certain sense, Rand’s insights coincides with TMSA’s non-dualistic approach of contemporary culture, reinforcing how recent cultural developments such as the emancipation of romantic love from tribe control, new technologies, popular culture and the emergence of new cultural spheres (e.g. heterosocial leisure sphere, sphere of consumption, etc.) reflect a positive “opening up” of ontic (creational) possibilities. To be clear, this “opening up” of ontic (creational) structures by no means implies the eradication of human responsibility (and/or possible absolutizations). The contrary is indeed the case; such processes of “opening up” increases human self-responsibility (and human freedom). Having said this, how then does economic freedom relate to romantic relationships in contemporary culture? In order to convey a

65 Rand’s defence of capitalism as a politico-economic system exceeds the scope of the current study, but as her defence of capitalism stresses individual human freedom and responsibility (including the economic aspect), its sheer rejection of “tribalism” (collectivism) coheres with TMSA’s views on cultural “opening up” of creation.

66 To be clear, Ayn Rand defends capitalism on the basis of individual freedom, while rejecting that capitalism is the dominating economic system. This would only be the case (capitalism as ruling economic system) if society was truly liberated from “tribalism”. Therefore, Ayn Rand’s defence of capitalism is taken by TMSA as a defence of economic freedom. This interpretation coheres with TMSA’s multi-aspectual view of reality. (inspired by reformational philosophy)

67 In the first focus area, technologies have been described in terms of the cultural-formative, i.e. as a bringing forth of the revelation of creation. Thus “opening up” converges with such unfolding of creational possibilities.
positive view on the existential meaning coherence between human’s romantic aspirations and the human strive for economic freedom in temporal existence; the following sub-section will firstly present TMSA’s presuppositions, and then draw on insights from reformational philosopher H.G. Stoker on human freedom to enable further deepening into this focus area’s contemplation of the contemporary lifeworld.

4.8. Stoker and TMSA’s transcendent-transcendental view

One of the main reasons for proceeding with the elaboration of the current focus area by drawing on Stoker’s insights on human freedom (I) is based on the fact that his approach can be easily read in terms of TMSA’s Neo-Calvinist and Trinitarian vision.

Thus, (II) besides being a central source of inspiration in the process of TMSA’s evolvement (Braun 2013:29-96), Stoker’s philosophy may now again play a decisive role in TMSA’s approach of contemporary focus areas. Thence, (III) not only will his account on human freedom help linking up economic freedom with romantic love, according to the so far elaborated discourse, but (IV) it will also provide basic distinctions for TMSA’s evaluation of insights from Franz von Baader’s erotic philosophy as the climax of the current focus area.

Furthermore, (V) as this is now the last major focus area of the current study, for the last chapter merely represents a context for the application of TMSA’s vision, (VI) it is intended to draw on Stoker’s insights as to prepare the way for the final climax, so that TMSA’s Trinitarian vision may come forth more explicitly and systematically, thereby gradually (VII) directing the current study towards its completion.

For the sake of coherence, (VIII) Stoker’s account on human freedom will be interpreted according to TMSA’s basic Trinitarian vision, which is inspired by the reformed Trinitarian and the reformational non-reductive ramifications of the Neo-Calvinist worldview (Braun 2013:45-57). And for the sake of clarity, (IX) basic tenets of this vision will be brought forth systematically, alongside the condensed presentation of Stoker’s account on human freedom, which will then (X) function as framework in the evaluation and closing up of this study.
4.9. TMSA’s basic Trinitarian and transcendental presuppositions

One of the main features of reformational philosophy is its transcendental approach, which *inter alia* aims at uncovering the “*supra-theoretical presuppositions*” (Dooyeweerd 1971:75) laying at the foundation of any philosophy. Accordingly, those transcendental ideas (supra-theoretical presuppositions) are: (I) “the idea of the whole of our temporal horizon of experience with its modal diversity of aspects... (time), (II) “an idea of the central reference point of all synthetical acts of thought” (coherence in diversity) and “...”an idea of Origin...” God, relating all that is relative to this absolute.” (Origin) (Dooyeweerd 1960:36-37)

And (I) despite specific divergences in the methodologies of reformational philosophers (e.g. Stoker, Dooyeweerd, Vollenhoven, etc.), (II) those three mentioned *transcendental ideas* are central to all of them. This insight has been decisive in the evolvement of TMSA (Braun 2013:45:74), (IV) whereby besides drawing on Jeremy Ive’s transposition of the transcendental ideas (i.e. individuality, relationality and time), (V) insights from his systematic comparison (and Trinitarian reconstruction) of the philosophies of Dooyeweerd and Vollenhoven (Ive 2012:191-204) have also been inspirational to TMSA’s Trinitarian interpretation of Stoker’s insights in the light of the Neo-Calvinist worldview. (Braun 2013:59-71). Thus, (VI) for the sake of consistency, Stoker’s insights on human freedom will be read in the light of TMSA’s Trinitarian interpretation of the transcendental ideas:

(a) (the idea of) *individuality* (e.g. specification) as based on the ultimate dependence of creation (including human beings) upon the absolute Origin (God the Father), involving the (human) intuitive grasp of individual wholes (Ive 2013:8), (b) (the idea of) *relationality*, which refers to the coherence of the diverse (multi-aspectual) creation order, involving the (human) intuitive grasp of the irreducibility and correlation of every cosmic relationship (Ive 2013:9). On a transcendent level, this idea correlates to Christ’s upholding of the entire cosmos (Heb 1:3) And (c) the idea of *time*, encompassing the temporal horizon of experience (Dooyeweerd 1961:36-37) and also comprising the unfolding and uniqueness of every cosmic event. (Ive 2013:9) On a transcendent level, this purposefulness of events refers to the triune God’s Providence through the Holy Spirit’s *transformational* work upon human hearts and creation. Through the Holy Spirit, possibilities of creation (including human existence) are opened up and the history of the world unfolds in a unique and purposeful fashion. (d) And finally, this *transformational* role (i.e. bringing forth Christ’s Kingdom) played by the Holy
Spirit refers to the Father as absolute Origin of creation and to the Son as the redeemer of fallen creation.

This (VII) is the compact version of TMSA’s Trinitarian (transcendent) and transcendental vision, against which Stoker’s insights on human freedom will be measured and then brought into perspective of the current focus area. Thereafter, (VIII) central insights from Baader’s (non-dualist) erotic philosophy will be interpreted according to TMSA’s framework, as it can be easily read in terms of the latter’s multi-aspectual (non-reductive) view of reality (derived from the biblical meaning of the heart.). Finally then, (IX) this study of contemporary focus areas will be concluded. (X) Thus, the main *hermeneutic* reason for this systematic deepening at such a late stage, besides summing up the accomplished, was to devote more attention to basic traits of the Trinitarian faith (creation, incarnation, transformation) and to demonstrate how TMSA is rooted in it.

**4.10. Moving towards the end of the focus area**

Basically, Stoker’s account on human freedom encompasses the three (above mentioned) *transcendental ideas*, and in addition, it also includes a *transcendent* perspective upon which the three ultimately depend (Stoker 2007b:10). This stress on the latter (transcendent perspective), as the ultimate ground upon which the transcendental vision depends, is based upon the Christian presupposition that the triune God is absolutely sovereign over creation. And although acknowledging this ultimate (transcendent) presupposition as basic to TMSA’s framework, the *hermeneutics* to be applied in the absorption and integration of Stoker’s insights will be *implicit*, i.e. the same one used throughout the current study, for according to TMSA’s methodology, features of the Trinitarian faith (transcendent vision) don’t constitute arguments *in themselves*, but rather, their presentation should follow *transcendental* arguments (i.e. accounting for the radical diversity and coherence of created reality), as testimonies of regenerated hearts and lives, which were transformed by the power of the Gospel. Due to the fact that (Trinitarian) faith always involves the human self’s relationship with God and creation, the need of starting with dialogue *coram Deo* has been stressed right from the start of TMSA’s approach of the first contemporary focus area (i.e. technology and everyday experience), followed by *transcendental* reasoning and positive exposition.

Thence, (I) besides elucidating how Stoker’s philosophy relates to TMSA’s framework, (II) the last pages were designed to enable a deepening into TMSA’s presuppositions and
hermeneutics, (III) thereby also pointing out how Stoker’s account on human freedom should be absorbed and set into the perspective of the current focus area. Consequently, (IV) not only will this deepening process eventually lead to the conclusion of the focus area, but also, (V) by bringing forth TMSA’s systematics, which is already in the process of unfolding, (VI) the climax of the current study will be reached.

4.11. Stoker on human freedom

As mentioned above, the transcendentals are central to Stoker’s account on human freedom. After pointing to its ultimate dependence upon God’s freedom, (I) he deals with individuality (e.g. specification in ultimate dependence upon the Origin), stressing the essence of human freedom as human mastery, whereby according to his original design (i.e. created in the image of God), (II) (relationality) spiritual abilities, functions and talents were given to humans such as the “logical, economical, artistic, jural, moral, etc”. (Stoker 2007a:2) Consequently, human freedom can’t be limited to one or some of the aspects of reality (e.g. functions), but in its full meaning (III) it refers to human beings as a whole (including their destiny on earth). And this reference to their destiny on earth already (implicitly) belongs to time (i.e. in the sense of an ontology of events), although Stoker placed it in the context of the diverse abilities, functions and talents of human beings. Further, although: “human freedom presupposes a real choice between different possible acts, ultimately between obeying and disobeying the principles of order concerned, i.e. the divine commandments the norms of culture and the laws of nature” (Stoker 2007a:1), human freedom shouldn’t be identified with this choice between different possible acts, but rather, it can only be truly discovered by those who seek to live in conformity (a) with the divine commandments, (b) with the multi-aspectual creation order and (c) with the cultural norms (i.e. in their contextual meaning). Thence, it is by means of human freedom that the coherence between the romantic and the economical may be achieved.
4.12. On the coherence between economic freedom and romantic love

One should pause for a moment and recall the recent developments, which have been described in the current focus area (prior to Stoker’s and TMSA’s systematics), such as the emancipation of romantic love from tribe control, new technologies, the emergence of popular culture and of new cultural spheres (e.g. heterosocial leisure sphere, sphere of consumption, etc.). What happens if one looks at those through the lenses of Stoker’s non-reductive view of human freedom?

Firstly, recapitulating the just mentioned transcendental approach: (I) human beings are designed to strive for the mastery of creation and of his own lifeworld, (II) he has been equipped by God with all the spiritual abilities, functions and talents in order to pursue this life-task. He has been placed by God in a meaningful life-context to live in responsible relation to God, the world, himself and others. (III) Thence, human beings are the ones responsible for the formation and development of culture. This threefold orientation not only entails (Ia) the (human) religious dependence upon God (the absolute), but also the (human) (IIa) embedment in the diverse creation order and (IIIa) his participation in the purposeful unfolding of events of the world. (IV) To negate any of those three would be self-destructive, for they safeguard the coherence of human experience itself. Therefore, despite the innumerable challenges of the contemporary lifeworld and all the recent developments (e.g. new societal spheres, new technologies, popular culture, etc.), it is the design of human beings (i.e. created in the image of God) to strive for freedom coram Deo, in every single relationship of his temporal existence.

Secondly, applying the transcendental approach: (V) assuming that romantic love and economic freedom are both common pursuits of human existence, to be truly free in both; in the economic and in the romantic sense, (VI) humans must learn how to live coram Deo in the just mentioned threefold way, which implies a wholehearted service to God in a strive to live in conformity to (a) God’s divine commandments, (b) to the multi-aspectual creation order and (c) to cultural norms (i.e. in their contextual meaning, involving the unique responsibility given to human beings to consciously participate in the process of “opening up” and unfolding of world events.)

Now, the true meaning of economic freedom coram Deo is partially implicit in Rand’s defence of capitalism, although the transcendental approach transcends her individualism. (V) Economic freedom not only entails “a real choice between different possible acts”
(Stoker 2007a:1), implying the human responsibility of mastery (e.g. development of abilities and management of limited time and means), (VI) but in its full meaning, “economic freedom” refers to human beings as a whole, who by living coram Deo may discover their destiny on earth (this includes the responsibility of human beings to sustain themselves by working within their God given vocation), thereby participating in cultural formation and in the purposeful unfolding of world events.

(VII) What about human freedom and romantic love? So far, the picture delivered mostly reflects Ilouz’s sociological perspective, which helped introducing romantic love’s Sitz im Leben in contemporary culture (including recent developments). But what is the meaning of romantic love for humans living coram Deo? What is the biblical meaning of romantic love and how does it relate to the (human) wholehearted service (i.e. human freedom in the true sense) to God? (VIII) Insights from Baader’s erotic philosophy will now come into play in order to answer those questions in a fashion that converges with the just sketched transcendental view.

4.13. Romantic love and the restoration of culture

An interesting facet of Baader’s erotic philosophy is his sheer rejection of the dualism between thinking and feeling, which was dominant at his lifetime. Thereby he rejected both; (I) the irrationalism of romantics such as Jacobi and Rousseau with their prejudiced emphasis that thinking makes one stop feeling and that love and religion are only about feeling (Baader 1966:97), (II) as well as the rationalistic counter-pole, which he identified as the ingrowing oracle of his time (eingewachsenen Orakel), elevating reason (Vernunft) to an infallible idol (Wehr 1980:49). In order to overcome this dualism, he stressed “thinking with the heart” as relating the self to the central “areas of being” (Seinsbereichen); God, human beings and creation (Wehr 1980:58). He also identified the heart and the “needs” of reason as referring to the inner man, so that truth isn’t to be found in words, but in their inner meaning, through the self’s deepening coram Deo (Wehr 1980:51). Indeed, this resembles reformational philosophy’s non-reductive ontology, which is derived from the biblical meaning of the heart. Thence, Baader’s erotic philosophy provides an interesting point of entry for TMSA’s biblical interpretation of romantic love in its central relevance in contemporary culture.

68 In his lecture on —Sphere Sovereignty in 1880, Kuyper bluntly confesses the kingship of Christ as the incarnate Word from which nothing in this world is to be stolen. In his —Calvinism of 1898 he naively
Unlike the voices of those from Church history, who became prominent for dualistically reducing the meaning of romantic (erotic) love to sinful lust, Baader’s approach seeks to regain its integral “spiritual dimension” (Wehr 1980:83). In his non-dualist view, not only are religion and romantic love seen as the most precious gifts of temporal existence, but also, as closely related to each other, their proper (reasonable) use determines whether human existence (individual and societal) is led towards tragedy or happiness. (Baader 1966:97)

The central importance of romantic love in the human pursuit for happiness is thus acknowledged and resembles contemporary culture’s equation of love with happiness (Illouz 1997:28). Nevertheless, Baader doesn’t stop at temporal happiness, although he grants it a positive meaning in human existence. In its first stage, romantic love is unchecked and thus it’s still mortal (sterblich). Thence, romantic love shouldn’t be identified as true love in its first fragile state, but rather, after opening up their hearts and giving themselves to each other entirely, (human) romantic relationships may someday become true love. (Baader 1966:99) In order for this to happen, romantic love, just as in the case of a person’s relationship to God, must first go through the process of death and rebirth (Wiedergeburt). (Baader 1966:100)

confronts the fundamental cosmological confession of the — ordinances of God on the diverse terrains of life. Kuyper’s reformational starting point comes to the fore most clearly in his conviction that the Calvinist life- and world-view has to be rooted in the understanding of the human relationship to God. And such a life- and world-view will have to manifest a life encompassing character: — If such an action is to put its stamp itself upon our entire life, it must start from that point in our consciousness, in which our life is still undivided and lies comprehended in its unity, not in the spreading vines, but in the root from which the vines spring. That point is the — depths of our hearts from which — the different streams of our human life spring and separate themselves and where — all the rays of our life converge as in one focus… (Strauss 2012:6)

This resemblance by no means implies the identity between the two. In fact, reformational philosophy has been elaborated with unchallenged systematic precision, whereby Baader’s approach, although very insightful, is very scattered and lacks systematic coherence (Wehr 1980:28). In the past I’ve supported the idea that reformational philosophy was inspired by Baader, based on Friesen’s hypothesis (Friesen:2003), but later I revised this position after systematically reading Baader’s works with more attention. That Baader wasn’t a systematic thinker, is illustrated by the fact that his “scattered treatises” had to be organized and “artificially” brought together by other scholars in order to be at all readable.

Most prominent is probably Augustin’s negative influence (many other church fathers could also be named) upon western Christianity’s dualistic conception of erotic love as a mere instrument of procreation. (Wehr 1979:81) In this view, which unfortunately has been the dominant one in western culture until recent times (i.e. notice the presence of this dualism in Illouz’s alluded Christian mores prior to the recent opening up of societal spheres, the emergence of popular culture via new technologies, etc.), lust was condemned as sinful: In Eden, it would have been possible to beget offspring without foul lust. The sexual organs would have been stimulated into necessary activity by will-power alone, just as the will controls other organs. Then, without being goaded on by the allurement of passion, the husband could have relaxed upon his wife’s breasts with complete peace of mind and bodily tranquility, that part of his body not activated by tumultuous passion, but brought into service by the deliberate use of power when the need arose, the seed dispatched into the womb with no loss of his wife’s virginity. So, the two sexes could have come together for impregnation and conception by an act of will, rather than by lustful cravings. (Augustinus, City of God, Book 14, Chapter 26).

Due to the contemporary usage of words, it will be referred to romantic love as synonymous to erotic love.
Accordingly, *cross* and *resurrection* are central to *true* (romantic) *love*, which in contrast to the nowadays commonly held (romantic) opinion, can never be found *at first sight*, but rather, it can only *become*, through *dying to self* and *rebirth*. Interestingly, Baader thereby overthrows romanticism’s idea of “love at first sight” by referring to what he calls the “phantastasmagoria of sexual love” (*Phantasmagorie der Geschlechtsliebe*), meaning that at the initial stage of a romantic relationship, lovers see each other as much better than they *actually* are; as more beautiful, more charming and appearing to be perfect. Baader interprets this initial *ecstasy* as signifying God’s promise, calling lovers to open up their hearts and to fully dedicate themselves to each other, thereby revealing them a *glimpse* of the future happiness they may experience together, in case they overcome *selfishness* and their romantic relationship reaches its full *potential*, as intended by God (Baader 1966:109).

Thus, besides this promise of (possible) future flourishing, which God gives to the couple in their initial stage of (commonly felt) “falling in love”, *true love* can only *emerge* if both lovers give themselves entirely, by opening up their hearts and investing all their talents and abilities. This wholehearted dedication (i.e. notice the link to the multi-aspectual creation order) is necessary, for *human romantic love* (in its temporal state prior to Christ’s return and the removal of sin’s influence) also carries (the potential of) *death within it*. The need of the lovers’ wholehearted dedication in order for romantic relationships to work out is thus a *vocation* given by God, a life-task for the lovers to solve *coram Deo*. (Baader 1966:99)

This life-task can only be mastered through God’s grace, as He is the one who ultimately mediates *reconciliation* to human beings, and who through His work upon human hearts, brings about reconciliation *among men* (Baader 1966:101). Consequently, the *purpose* of romantic love as designed by God, isn’t only temporal happiness (although its wholehearted pursuit is in accord to God’s will), but the restoration of human beings according to the image of God by men and women *complementing* each other. But due to the influence of sin in human existence, romantic relationships also demands from lovers the carrying of the *cross*, implying that man and woman must carry each other and learn to love each other with all their hearts, as they love God (see above the transcendental account of the wholehearted service of God). Thus, by presenting a view that enables romantic love to be seen in the light of the biblical ground motive of creation, fall and redemption, Baader situates romantic love as serving Christ’s Gospel and the reintegration of humankind in God’s good creation (Wehr 1980:78). According to this vision, romantic love has the purpose of reshaping human beings according to the image of God, so that by learning to love (via death and rebirth) they may
embody *recreated* humankind in Christ. Consequently, according to Baader’s view of romantic love, marriage too, receives a spiritual meaning; marriage, when based on the wholehearted covenant of both lovers before God, brings about blessing for coming generations of humans, also via procreation and its meaning for the coming and expansion of God’s kingdom and the restoration of creation (including human culture) thereby advanced (Wehr 1980:88-89).

4.14. Redeeming romantic love in contemporary culture

So what about contemporary culture’s interpretation of romantic love as a *leitmotif* of human existence? As long as understood in convergence with the above mentioned wholehearted service of God, this *religious* connotation is indeed biblical, signifying how the lovers’ commitment to one another *coram Deo* demands from human beings that they love one another with all their hearts. Only then can the *romantic utopia* (as labelled by Illouz) become a *redemptive reality* in the life of *free* human beings, who having learned to live in *conformity* to (a) God’s commandments and (b) His creation order, (c) may participate in the purposeful opening up of creational possibilities and in the purposeful unfolding of world events (i.e. in an ultimate sense, in Christ, through the Holy Spirit and to the glory of God).

In the current focus area, (I) it has been affirmed that since institutional religion has lost its *power* in the public sphere, romantic love has become a religious site, where the *sacred* is experienced in contemporary culture (Illouz 1997:7). That this is the case can be easily observed if one just listens to the *narratives of popular culture*. In contemporary culture, (II) romantic love is perceived as a *religious force*, which is able to transcend the world’s social order. Although (III) such *transcendence* may indeed be attributed to romantic love in a *redemptive way* (see above), placing this relationship within the great scheme of God’s wholesome restoration of creation, (IV) there is also the danger of *dualistically* interpreting romantic love according to *irrationalistic romanticism* on the one hand, and *rationalistic technicism* on the other hand. Both (V) *dualistic* tendencies represent vivid contemporary interpretations of romantic love, the latter commonly referred to as the *realistic view* and the former as the *view of romanticism*. Nevertheless, (VI) TMSA’s vision, which is inspired by reformational philosophy and its Neo-Calvinist interpretation of Baader’s erotic philosophy, *transcends both dualistic tendencies*, offering an alternative to reductive views deriving from *rationalism and irrationalism*, which aren’t able to lead human beings to *true human freedom*. For (VII) the latter can only be obtained through the *wholehearted* service of God.
Is there hope for contemporary culture? In fact, (VIII) the intuition that romantic love somehow stands in relation to human redemption, is still present in contemporary culture, as a refuge for humans under the challenges of technicism: “Romantic love, we are told by some, is the last repository of the authenticity and the warmth that have been robbed us by an increasingly technocratic and legalistic age” (Illouz 1997:1)

So (IX) how could it be at all possible to link up the above presented view of romantic love as part of God’s plan of creation’s restoration and of the (human) wholehearted service of God with contemporary culture’s views? In the most common contemporary view of romantic love, (X) three stages are identified (i.e. attraction, dating and marriage). This constitutes the “cultural frame”, in other words, the normative context in which contemporary human beings come to engage one another in romantic relationships nowadays (Illouz 1997:5). Therefore, (XI) in order to do justice to TMSA’s transcendental approach, a transformational point of entry is needed for those who are willing to live in conformity to God’s integral will. And (XII) such point of entry is also provided by Baader, who describes the three stages of romantic love as admiration, veneration and marriage (Bewunderung, Verehrung, Vermählung72). Baader’s (XIII) religious interpretation of romantic love (i.e. as demanding the same sort of wholehearted service, submission and regeneration as in the love relationship between God and his child), thus provides a way of re-interpreting contemporary cultural frames of interpretation of romantic love coram Deo. Thence, (XIV) by setting Baader’s three stages in contrast to the contemporary cultural frames, a redemptive re-definition of the stages of romantic love is opened up, thereby enabling (XV) the spiritual dimension of romantic love to be regained and emphasizing that the fulfilment of its destiny is only possible via true human freedom73.

4.15. Final conclusions

The main goals of the study of contemporary focus areas have been achieved, namely: (I) to introduce TMSA as a religious method, thereby leading to a deeper understanding of the approached subjects, (II) to point out some of the ego’s religious expressions in the

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72 On the other hand, the dominating powers of contemporary culture are dualistic; and the stages of admiration (attraction) and dating (veneration) are commonly shaped by postmodern and hedonist values. According to TMSA’s interpretation, romantic relationships may only become redemptive to humans in case the lovers go through the religious process of death and rebirth. This implies that the redemption of romantic love is obtained in connection to true human freedom, which implies the full integration of a human being in God’s world.

73 True human freedom includes economic freedom, i.e. human beings sustaining themselves by working in their God given vocation. The exercise of their vocation demands that they (individually) get to know themselves before God so that by developing their abilities and talents, they may fulfil their calling on earth.
contemporary lifeworld and (III) to present redemptive ways of dealing with the focus areas at stake. For (IV) specific hermeneutic reasons, TMSA's systematics has only come forth more explicitly at the end of the study; (a) by keeping systematics for the end, constructive dialogue with the sources was prioritized. By (b) cultivating such openness in the elaboration of the focus areas, transcendental reasoning came into play in such a manner that positive exposition remained the focus, while still giving some room for the criticism of reductionistic tendencies. Thus, (c) openness in the dialogue (including transcendental reasoning) with the sources was pursued for the sake of identifying and absorbing valuable insights non-synthetically, thus (d) still remaining faithful to the all-encompassing Neo-Calvinist vision, which is derived from the biblical meaning of the heart. Finally, (e) this procedure was also designed to make room for TMSA's Trinitarian (transcendent) vision, which in itself doesn't constitute arguments (i.e. as the transcendental vision), but rather gives testimony to the saving power of the Gospel (Rom 1:16), as an expression of faith in the Triune God.

Therefore, (V) TMSA's transcendent vision reflects directional issues related to the human heart, whereas its transcendental vision (i.e. inspired by reformational philosophy) accounts for structural issues related to the radical diversity and coherence of created reality. Further, (VI) it has been argued right from the start of the current study that human mastery over the approached focus areas depends on the interplay of true knowledge of God, self-knowledge and knowledge of the cosmos. This insight (VII) was deepened at the end of the study, whereby it has been demonstrated (i.e. via Stoker) what mastery entails, as the essence of human freedom. On the other hand, (VIII) not only did Stoker's transcendental account on human freedom reflect the ego's central threefold relation (e.g. God, self and cosmos), but also, it has been demonstrated how TMSA’s transcendental and transcendent visions coheres in terms of the Christian belief in the triune God. Consequently, (IX) TMSA's vision could come forth more forcefully, stressing the true meaning of human freedom as based on the (human) wholehearted service of God. And (X) this has become the key insight of this study.
**ABSTRACT**

The following study of focus areas is an application of the recently developed Trinitarian modal-spherical method of apologetics, TMSA (Braun 2013), to the field of Religious Studies. The trajectory to be pursued will make use of basic sources in the presentation of three focus areas of contemporary culture: (a) Technology and everyday experience, (b) music and popular culture and (c) romantic love and economic freedom. Further, the philosophical deepening into the presented focus areas will be sought through the dialogue between continental and reformational philosophy as well as the integration of insights. Gained insights and conclusions from this dialogue will then be presented in terms of TMSA’s Christian (confessional) stance.

Main goals of this study are (I) to demonstrate how the ego's religious orientation manifests itself in the focus areas concerned (II) as well as to point out redemptive ways of dealing with them, as central sites of the contemporary lifeworld, through TMSA’s Neo-Calvinist vision.

As such, this study was designed in order to provide points of entry for the approach of contemporary human beings and their culture via TMSA. Accordingly, it isn't thereby intended to deliver the "full picture" of the subjects concerned, but rather, new possibilities of dialogue will be opened up (from TMSA’s radically Christian perspective). Therefore, as the main priority of this study is the application of TMSA, basic sources will come into play as to enable an approximation of the contemporary lifeworld and the chosen focus areas.

**ABSTRAK**

Die volgende studie van fokusareas is ’n toepassing van die onlangs ontwikkelde Trinitariese modaal-sferiese metode van apologetiek, TMSA (Braun 2013), op die gebied van Religiestudies. Die trajek wat nagestreef word, sal gebruik maak van basiese bronne in die aanbieding van drie fokusareas van kontemporêre kultuur: (a) Tegnologie en alledaagse ervaring, (b) musiek en populêre kultuur en (c) romantiese liefde en ekonomiese vryheid. Verder sal die filosofiese verdieping in die voorgestelde fokusareas gesoek word deur die dialoog tussen kontinentale en reformatoriese filosofie, sowel as die integrasie van insigte.

Die insigte en gevolgtrekkings wat uit hierdie dialoog verkry word, sal dan aangebied word in terme van TMSA se Christelike (konfessionele) posisie.

Die hoofdoelwitte van hierdie studie is (I) om te demonstreer hoe die ego se godsdienstige oriëntasie homself manifesteer in die betrokke fokusareas, (II) asook om verlossende maniere
uit te wys om daarmee, as sentrale areas van die hedendaagse leefwêreld, om te gaan deur TMSA se Neo-Calvinistiese visie.

As sodanig, is hierdie studie ontwerp om toegangspunte tot die benadering van die hedendaagse mense en hul kultuur via TMSA te verskaf. Gevolglik is die doel daarvan nie om die "volle prentjie" van die betrokke temas te verskaf nie, maar eerder om nuwe moontlikhede vir dialoog te open (vanuit TMSA se radikaal Christelike perspektief). Daarom, aangesien die hoofprioriteit van hierdie studie die toepassing van TMSA is, sal basiese bronne gebruik word om dit moontlik te maak om nader aan die hedendaagse leefwêreld en die gekose fokusareas te kom.

**KEYWORDS**

Heidegger, De Vries, Ihde, Taylor, Dooyeweerd, Strauss, cultural redemption, contemporary lifeworld, contemporary culture, philosophy of technology, technology and everyday experience, human-technology relationships, technology and revelation, De Nora, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, Adorno, music philosophy, popular culture, Illouz, Rand, Stoker, Ive, Baader, romantic love, erotic philosophy, capitalism, economic freedom, human freedom, Neo-Calvinism, reformational philosophy, continental philosophy, TMSA.

**SLEUTELWOORDE**

Heidegger, De Vries, Ihde, Taylor, Dooyeweerd, Strauss, kulturele verlossing, kontemporêre lewenswêreld, kontemporêre kultuur, filosofie van tegnologie, tegnologie en alledaagse ervaring, mens-tegnologie verhoudings, tegnologie en openbaring, De Nora, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, Adorno, musiekfilosofie, populêre kultuur, Illouz, Rand, Stoker, Ive, Baader, romantiese liefde, erotiese filosofie, kapitalisme, ekonomiese vryheid, menslike vryheid, Neo-Calvinisme, reformatoriese filosofie, kontinentale filosofie, TMSA.

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