Administrative sociology and apartheid

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First submission: 30 April 2014
Acceptance: 6 October 2014

Although sociological discourses are multiple and varied, with deeply critical versions challenging the auspices of apartheid, there is also a strand of what I call ‘administrative sociology’ that actively defined, supported and defended the vanguard of apartheid thinking and practice. It cloaked its biopolitical commitments beneath images of scientific neutrality, casting as necessary its assertions about apartheid society. The legacy of this strand of sociology remains subject to few explicit critiques, and its complicity in social atrocities is under-referenced (despite the decisive role of such professors of sociology as Hendrik Verwoerd, Jan De Wet Keyter and Geoffrey Cronjé). This article charts a brief genealogy of administrative sociology in context, focusing especially on the approach Cronjé adopted in his inaugural address, and indicating several dangers that attend to this sort of administrative sociology whose logic is still evident in strands of the discipline.

Approached as a socio-political discourse, apartheid defended rationales of rule based on assertions of a racially divided South Africa (Norval 1996). Among other things, it claimed that separate social, political, cultural and economic development was less a matter of choice than of necessity (Bonner et al. 1993). As is well known, its advocates championed a plan to entrench racial divisions across society to sequester paths for their ‘separate development’ (Moodie 1975). Following the National Party’s election in 1948, the Prime Minister D F Malan, at a UN address, framed a policy choice in these simple, if absolute, terms:
We can act in only one, one of two directions. Either we must follow a course of equality – which must eventually mean national suicide for the White race, or we must take the course of separation (apartheid) through which the character and the future of every race will be protected and safeguarded with full opportunities for development and self-maintenance in their own ideas, without the interests of one clashing with the interests of the other, and without regarding the development of the other as undermining or a threat to himself (Seroto 2013: 99).

Social engineering on the scale envisaged here was meant to redress the purported ‘failures’ of erstwhile ‘segregationist’ approaches, securing ‘white’ unity in the face of a supposedly omniscient ‘native’ question (Dubow 1989: 39, Norval 1996). To be sure, changing images of apartheid responded to dynamic economic and political contexts, but consistently called for racial divisions to be forged over vast areas of social life (Adam 1971, Posel 1991). Through various kinds of enunciations (including anthropological, Christian, nationalist, philosophical, economic, legal and political claims – Giliomee 2003), racial segregation became an anchor point for apartheid discourses.

This article concerns itself with a disconcerting facet of this devastating history, namely that a particular kind of sociology was deeply implicated in the initial enunciation, and justification, of apartheid. The discipline postulated several administrative, determinist and scientific claims that privileged certain ‘modalities of enunciation’ for apartheid discourses (Foucault 2001). These modalities in large measure claimed ‘apartheid’ as a necessary solution to specifically conceived racial problems and, in turn, ‘codified’ policies for a political programme (Louw 2004). It is thus not too surprising perhaps that three of the first professors appointed to newly minted sociology departments across South African universities also happened to be influential architects of apartheid discourses. All studied at South African universities before continuing postgraduate study overseas (for example, The Netherlands, Germany), and variously associated with right-wing organisations, playing leading roles in an Afrikaner brotherhood or Broederbond (Bloomberg 1990, Norval 1996). Part of a close-knit intellectual fraternity, this group used a version of sociology to authorise elements of an apartheid programme.1 The most famous of the three, H F Verwoerd was the country’s first Professor of Sociology and Social Work at the University of Stellenbosch from 1932 (Venter 2009). He later served as Minister

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1 As Evans (1997: 227) notes, “Between 1935 and 1944, Broederbonders such as Piet Meyer, Verwoerd, Geoff Cronjé, Henning Klopper, and other members of the Dutch Reformed Church met almost nightly, fashioning a policy that synthesised Fichtean-Kuypavian philosophy with the historical circumstances in which the Afrikaner volk continued to struggle towards its destiny.”
of Native Affairs before becoming the Prime Minister who used state institutions and law in a bid to entrench micro-divisions throughout society (Miller 1993). Jan De Wet Kuyter, Professor of Sociology at the University of the Orange Free State, played a role in framing apartheid’s ‘Bantu’ education policies (Kallaway 2002). Geoffrey Cronjé, the first-appointed Professor of Sociology at the University of Pretoria in 1937 offered an inaugural address that is intriguing, because it explicitly outlines a vision of sociology appropriate for South Africa (Coetzee 1991).

In concert, these sociologists significantly influenced the ‘scientific’ and ‘administrative’ modalities whereby apartheid discourses were framed, providing disciplinary legitimacy for policies and laws directed to ‘separate but equal’ development (Posel 1991). Such policies were instituted by way of governmental techniques, repression and force designed to steer apartheid divisions onto dynamic relational networks (Neame 1962). The terror, torment, censure, coercion and violence unleashed in the name of apartheid recall the vehemence with which this abhorrent social programme was instituted (Coleman 1997). It also raises a fundamental question: What version of sociology could so easily have helped to support, engineer and justify such a devastating social programme? To contextualise the question, I refer to Bauman’s (2000) pertinent analysis of how scientific thinking — including administrative sociology — shaped conditions for the Holocaust, and how modern society provided so few checks and balances to prevent inconceivable atrocities from happening. Consequently, for him,

there are reasons to be worried because we know now that we live in a type of society that made the Holocaust possible, and that contained nothing which could stop the Holocaust from happening
(Bauman 2000: 88, emphasis in the original).

Equally, many might worry about how an administrative, scientific sociology actively supported apartheid’s racist exclusions, or ‘contained nothing’ to stop its catastrophic expansion.

Yet, in saying this, one needs to be cautious in a way that Taylor’s (1989) controversial depiction of South African sociology at the end of the 1980s was not. He bluntly alleged that the discipline had become little more than a tool for, rather than a critic of the apartheid state. Hindson’s (1989) stinging rebuke highlighted how far Taylor had eclipsed critical sociology’s challenge to apartheid apparatuses, and indeed the resistance posed by several anti-apartheid initiatives, often through the Association for Sociology in South Africa (Ally 2005). The critical sociology story has been told by a leading participant who helped to shape a ‘public sociology’ that would later prove influential in a wider US-instigated debate on the future of sociology (Webster 2004).
The present discussion, however, specifically examines a form of applied, administrative sociology that did indeed serve as ‘client’ of the state, performing “a technocratic managerial function and being responsible for the fine tuning and modernizing of the apartheid apparatus” (Taylor 1989: 65). It will turn to Cronjé’s explicit call for a sociological approach that he deemed ‘relevant’ to finding a scientific and policy ‘solution’ (apartheid) to administer an exclusively conceived ‘race problem’ facing South Africa (Dubow 1989). That this supposed problem was couched as a threat to white order, with miscegenation as the basis of social disorder and degeneracy, reveals a preconception and wider interest. It also fostered his call for a relevant, profession and policy-based sociology, whose currents Burawoy (2013) detects as still very much in evidence in the discipline today (within ‘policy’ and ‘professional’ sociology). In any case, Cronjé formulated a vision for a ‘deterministic’ approach to sociology in an address that inaugurated the first professorship in sociology at Pretoria. My discussion explores this perspective’s specific enunciation of apartheid as a necessary policy ‘solution’, before reflecting on four characteristics of a sociological approach that continue to dog administratively and managerially oriented sociology. The latter have left prominent forms of the discipline open to the danger of enunciating applied solutions to state-defined problems that pose as relevant, and absolute, solutions to indeterminate social courses.

1. A context: sociology professors and apartheid

In 1924, H F Verwoerd completed a PhD in Psychology at the University of Stellenbosch before studying in Germany (Berlin, Leipzig and Hamburg) and returning in 1928 to work in a department with the rather odd — though revealing — name of Applied Psychology and Psychotechnics. In 1932, the University named him as its first Professor of Sociology and Social Work. He had also travelled to the US embracing an applied policy approach that he later directed to a ‘problem’ of urban ‘white’ poverty (Miller 1993). Here he was influenced by such US academics as Charles Coulter, Professor of Sociology at the Ohio Wesleyan University selected by the Carnegie Corporation to team up with South Africa’s Poor White Commission with which Verwoerd was familiar (Correspondent 1933).

Coulter’s sociological approach is reflected in a contribution to a commission of enquiry for the International Missionary Council, examining the effects of copper mines upon ‘native society’ and its implications for the work of ‘Christian missions’ (Davis 1967). He paternalistically defined the ‘sociological problem’ as contoured by ‘the Rhodesian native’ who he assumed to be a ‘child of the soil,’ at an ‘early’ stage of social advancement (Coulter 1967). He insisted that while physical race differences may be products of a “germ plasm” and environmental interaction,
all “approved group ways [were] entirely social in character” and so subject to managed change (Davis 1967: 116). Coulter’s (1967: 88) technocratic, managerial approach framed a key issue as the “social tensions and problems” arising from a lack of cooperation between unequally developed “races” — “African Native” and “White”. His sociology was, therefore, mobilised in pursuit of “improvements” in attitude, education, as well as religious and moral adjustments to secure racial cooperation (Coulter 1967: 121). This solution would, for him, enable “races” to develop on their own terms, but with an eye to cooperation for the benefit of “human society” as a whole:

There are distinct values to a group, nation or race made up of individuals differing widely in physique, abilities and functions [...] providing there continues to be mutual respect and co-operation between the specialists; so also race differences may be a real advantage to human society. To make over the African Native and his society, then, into a replica of the White and his society, even if it could be accomplished, is neither desirable nor wise, but to create a better psychological basis for co-operation is necessary if both races are to be advantaged (Coulter 1967: 118).

Coulter’s technocratic sociology framed racial conflict as a problem of cooperation that science and policy could resolve neither by assimilation nor the creation of replica societies; the issue was to find ways to manage the relations between (supposedly) unequally developed races.

Such ideas influenced Verwoerd’s sociology. He considered it a policy science that could help to streamline the development of a racially divided society based on apartheid precepts (Tatz 1962). Emphasising an applied, practical science that ‘could effectively be used to both shape and defend social policies’, his sociology was applied and technocratic in form:

Verwoerd was descriptive, empirical and applied. He tended to describe social conditions rather than to look for patterns or irregularities and social behaviour, and he was less interested in theories of social change than he was in social problems. He laced his lectures with social statistics, telling his classes that they must deal with the facts first – theory would come later [...] The purpose of sociology as Verwoerd taught it was not to develop a general understanding of social phenomena, but rather to solve specific social problems in South Africa (Miller 1993: 5).

So, when appointed Minister of Native Affairs in 1950, Verwoerd created a policy research unit to frame apartheid’s implementation. Later, as Prime Minister, he evoked ‘science’ as part of his defence for apartheid laws and the creations
of a generally, and racially, divided society (Posel 1991). This subordination of sociology to the state’s proclaimed problems helped to legitimate subsequent administrative solutions, but from a putatively ‘neutral’ distance.

Perhaps less well-known, Jan De Wet Keyter was also initially associated with the Stellenbosch group, but later became Professor of Sociology and Social Work at the University of the Orange Free State in Bloemfontein. He echoed the call for a problem-solving, administrative sociology focused on state-defined issues regarding racial and social order. But his influence was strongest in shaping policies around ‘Christian National Education’ (Bloomberg 1990), especially as an academic commissioner for the influential Eiselen ‘Commission on Native Education’ (Kallaway 2002, Seroto 2013). He helped author a report on ‘native education’ that defined the role of education based on purported differences in the social development of variously defined “races”. In so doing, he used sociology to frame “philosophical and organizational foundations” behind the “1953 Bantu Education Act” that was enunciated as required for cooperation between races and their “separate development” (Seroto 2013: 101). His sociology provided a policy-framed, managerial and bureaucratic ‘solution’ that expanded apartheid precepts to justify ‘Bantu education’ (Tatz 1962).

Though admittedly brief, one sees how these Professors’ applied sociology was positioned to elaborate upon race as a foundation of social conflict and disorder, a problem to which apartheid policy provided the supposedly ‘scientific’ solution of ‘separate development’ and racial cooperation. However, it was Geoffrey Cronjé who explicitly demarcated a sociological approach applicable to the country’s putative race ‘problems’. The following section will focus on his inaugural lecture, briefly contemplating its use in his later sociology, before turning to what might be learned by confronting several dangers within a sociology that aided and abetted the violence of apartheid division.

2. Geoffrey Cronjé’s ‘deterministic’ sociology

On 8 September 1937, Cronjé delivered an address that inaugurated the first professorship of sociology at the University of Pretoria. He used the occasion to mark out his vision of the discipline by detailing what he took to be the ‘general sociological position’ as reflected by a ‘deterministic standpoint’ (Cronjé 1937). But who was Cronjé the sociologist? Born in the Cape in 1907, he attended the University of Stellenbosch until 1929 before visiting Germany and The Netherlands, where he received a PhD in Criminology and Sociology from the
University of Amsterdam (Coetzee 1991). Appointed a lecturer at the University of Pretoria in 1933, he remained politically active in student politics, helping to form the *Afrikaanse Nationale Studentebond* (Bloomberg 1990) and supporting a pro-Nazi student organisation. He also became an influential member of the Afrikaner Broederbond that played a key role in defining and implementing apartheid (Norval 1996).

His lecture begins by asserting that, in order to understand society, sociologists should neither focus on ‘man’ (*die mens*) as an isolated being, nor on some abstract society. Sociology should instead examine how the formation of personalities provides a nexus between individual and society, and how “personality processes” actualise social potential (Cronjé 1937). For him, every personality harbours innate social “potentials” that, when actualised, produce particular kinds of peoples who, in turn, form a specific community (Cronjé 1937: 6). Sociology should thus focus on two matters: the nature and development of “innate human social potential”, pointing to the significance of individual factors as integral to social causes, and the way social influences shape people’s internal (psychic) life processes, thus indicating the social causes of personality formation (Cronjé 1937: 14). While subjects may be conscious of how their personalities are formed through social interaction, it is more usual that a “selection and processing” will occur unconsciously (Cronjé 1937: 13). Sociology can show how given types of societies causally shape the human personalities that emerge in context. Although other factors such as material satisfaction, division of labour, gender, morality and religion, reproduction systems, and natural environment do affect the strength of community life, sociologists must, he argues, observe the interaction between individual personality and social environment, examining how “they find mutual supplementation” [*wedersydse aanvulling*] (Cronjé 1937: 6). ³ He (1937: 8) makes a basic assumption:

Naturally, without individual men there can be no social reality, but without society there can be no real men. So unbreakable is the connection between the individual–human and social that the one may be distinguished from the other but not completely separated.

As such, the individual’s “personality process” and surrounding “social reality” are sociology’s foundational objects. He calls on sociology to examine “the innate disposition of a complex of coherent potentials with which people are born and which were already in development before they were born” (Cronjé 1937: 6). As

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³ I have translated all quotations in this section from the Afrikaans text of his inaugural address. I would like to thank Karin van Marle for help on some tricky passages, but any faults are of my own making.
suggested by this idea of “development”, the “potentials” are not entirely fixed, nor are they always expressed in a given society. Rather, as indicated, the “inherent capabilities and capacities that are present in the innate aptitudes in man” may or may not be actualised; the process of actualisation is a matter for sociologists to study by examining how processes of personality formation and social reality interact (Cronjé 1937: 9). Yet, even if “cohesive”, “stable”, “steady” and “continuous” causal interactions between factors and phenomena are evident, personalities and societies do change (develop) over time (Cronjé 1937: 6-15).

Working with the sociological claim that “man is by nature a social being”, Cronjé asserts two fundamental “postulates”: first, within the “complex of coherent” human potentials, one finds closely interacting “social potentials”, and secondly, because of their unique social make-up, people “seek out ongoing ways of living together (saamlewe) with other naturally alike (aardgelyke) beings” (Cronjé 1937: 6). In this lies Cronjé’s (1937: 7) bow to Fichte for his sociological justification of apartheid:

the social makeup of man means that he first becomes actually social when he lives in ongoing communal relations with beings that have the same nature. Therefore the potential-social can only become an actual social when the bearer of the social potential is part of an ongoing human life-in-common.⁴

His overriding point here is that people may indeed be innately social, but they are only potentially so; such potential is actualised, according to Cronjé, when subjects live in a common geographical area and enjoy enduring communal ties to other individuals who possess the same essential make-up or nature. “Consequently”, he says,

the most primary and fundamental factor that underlies the past, present and future existence of our collective life — i.e. the social reality — is the social potential that is present in the innate nature of individuals (Cronjé 1937: 7).

In this sense, collective life may be “carried by” individuals who have a social potential, but when actualised, that potential produces a social reality both “more and different” from “a naked conglomerate of individual people who do not share an underlying social connection” (Cronjé 1937: 7). Moreover, Cronjé (1937: 7-8)

⁴ Challenging the injustice of a Napoleonic invasion, Fichte (Thomas 1997: 227) argued that: “[o]nly when each people, left to itself, develops and forms itself in accordance with its own peculiar quality, and only when every people each individual develops himself in accordance with that quality – then, and only then, does the manifestation of divinity appear in its true mirror as it ought to be”.

tells us that “individual-human potential can only emerge within an ongoing social bond that has achieved a highest possible level of development and working”.

Cronjé appears to be speaking to the bases of apartheid thinking: social bonds form around “individual aptitudes” or potential capacities that, in turn, can only be actualised when individuals interact with people from an immediate community. In his view, there is a reciprocal relationship here — people are naturally social, but human individual processes affect social outcomes, just as “above-individual” social factors shape personality processes in specifically developed social contexts (Cronjé 1937: 13). He also proposes that social relations shape people more fundamentally than natural environments or innate biology (for instance, potentials). The social reality that forms when “social potentials materialize in these relationships and interactions” emerges as “an above-individual social reality” and is responsible for, “the progress of social development” (Cronjé 1937: 7-8).

Even if the concept of ‘race’ is avoided in this address, Cronjé’s view of the “above-individual” social reality may be read as providing a version of apartheid that he helped to define (see Coetzee 1991). Thus, he insists, social realities are ceaselessly developing, because underlying social potentials are materialised as individual personalities in response to the causal attractions of the advancing society to which they belong. To support this claim, he revisits the previous discussion on personality formation:

Every individual personality is from conception and especially from birth onwards continuously changing in a particular direction. We name this the life – or development – process; or better, the personality process. This process does not follow an accidental or random path but a continuous development that is brought about by steady and traceable factors and which consequently can be carefully described and causally explained (Cronjé 1937: 9).

The “steady and traceable factors” that materially elicit a specific kind of personality underlie Cronjé’s claim that the age-old question of free will must occupy a secondary place in his “deterministic sociology”. The latter does not deny that a will may or may not be free. But this will is part of human personality causally generated through the synthesis of three related factors: the “natural development of innate potential and capacities” that cohesively and mutually interact at the individual level; the influences and working of the social and natural contexts in which people live, and the internal psychic processes through which people integrate such influences (Cronjé 1937: 10-1).

As such, the development of personality might involve internal psychic work, but there is a fundamental “correlation” (samehang) between personality
and “above-individual” social factors: “This correlation would be completely meaningless unless these two realities, where one cannot exist or be conceived without the other, did not have an enduring interaction and mutual influence” (Cronjé 1937: 11).

These processes work themselves out mutually to form an integrated whole and a unified being (Cronjé 1937: 13). Within his ‘deterministic’ schema, sociology’s task is to describe the correlation between human individuality and society in order to have a better understanding not “simply of society but human society” (Cronjé 1937: 15):

Human society is a distinct reality that is ontologically different from all other realities, just as human personality and the natural environment are distinct realities. What distinguishes social reality from other realities is that as a totality its being is social. No other reality possesses this distinguishing mark of being.

The tautological assertion that “social” reality is ontologically “social” may seem odd, but it grounds his bid to assert an “above-individual” developmental foundation for racial determinism (Simons, 1959). That is, social reality constantly undergoes directed change — “social development” — but follows rule-governed and causally determined paths (Cronjé 1937: 16). Different communities are “at different stages of social development”, and when we study these analytically, “we can see that different communities follow different development stages [...] one after the other” (Cronjé 1937: 16). Prefiguring his paternalistic apartheid thinking most explicitly at this stage in his address, Cronjé (1937:16) tells us that “the completed stages must follow one another” and that there is no single social process for all societies to follow “simply because the people in a sociological sense is never an organic unity”. That is, for sociologists, people belong first to different national communities (volksgemeenskappe) distinguishable by their cultural-sociological differences (Cronjé 1937: 16).

These differences supposedly manifest themselves through “concrete appearances”. The implication here is this: once sociology has uncovered causal processes that bring change to specific communities, it can chart, explain, shape, anticipate and technically manage their respective forms of social development. In view of his latter work, one might be forgiven for replacing “community” with “race”, for there he embraces a form of social evolution where heterogeneous

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5 As he (Cronjé 1937: 15) puts it, “there is continuity in social change because it is brought about through constant and steady factors. Everything that takes place in society follows rules”.

6 As he (Cronjé 1937: 16) puts it, “In general terms, the different communities are at different stages of social development”.
communities (races?) occupy different stages on an inevitable development path towards advanced social being — the composite of their simultaneous developmental paths yielding at a given moment a “general social process”.7 In any case, Cronjé here sets his sociological stage to approach the “above-individual” realities of different communities — living within defined natural environments, and with idiosyncratic communal processes — as having actualised various innate social capacities, personalities and thus social forms. Moreover, the evolutionary paths of dissimilar communities are for him causally determined, and must be allowed to develop at different paces and on their own terms (recall Coulter here) in order to secure the overall advancement of South African society.

Signalling sociology’s basic role for apartheid thinking and practice, he enunciates a “deterministic” standpoint to discover, explain and scientifically manage the causes of communal development. But why emphasise this “deterministic” standpoint? He does so in order to provide a means of scientifically justifying apartheid policy, and to disarm opposition by dismissing as “untenable” any “study of the indeterminate” on the grounds that it can “never produce anything positive” (Cronjé 1937: 9). In his view, “[w]ithout causality, social life would be completely chaotic and so it would not be possible to describe and explain. This is what the deterministic standpoint holds” (Cronjé 1937: 16).

In other words, sociology must focus on factors that determine the personalities and communities behind South Africa’s social reality. The latter comprises, for him, multiple communities (races?) at different stages of social development, with different personality processes required to activate social potentials in each context. Consequently, apartheid’s policies of separate development appear not as contingent, moral or political decisions, but as necessarily determined by sociology’s scientific and causal validation. In his totalising schema, there is no room for doubt.

Needless to say, indeterminate and extra-sociological elements (ethical, political, economic, and so on) behind the seeming social imperialism are extruded. Indeed, by dismissing indeterminacy, Cronjé privileges the purported “neutrality” and “necessity” of sociology as a hard “science” used to detect causes and authorise his vision of differential social development. For him, sociology must represent only the causal processes that actualise innate social potentials in individual personalities, but always within the context of communities of “naturally alike” people: “Every personality within its development, according to its own special attitudes, is privy to and co-carrier of a social reality, wherein every individual

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7 For him (Cronjé 1937: 16), “In this way, we get a general picture of human social development. We name this the reconstruction of the general social process”.
aptitude is located” (Cronjé 1937: 19). Within the tangles of this abstraction lie the bases for his implicit view that apartheid’s policies of separate community development may be deduced from a deterministic sociological standpoint.

3. Christian nationalism, scientific racism and Cronjé’s sociology

Breaking through the veneer of neutrality by which Cronjé’s abstracted, scientific sociology presents itself, Coetzee (1991: 10) detects “madness” at the heart of the endeavour. The latter becomes especially apparent when one confronts the “aggressive”, “xenophobic” racism behind its determinism.8 An obsession with race as the foundation of good and evil was no doubt swayed by the National Socialist ideas Cronjé encountered while studying in Germany, as well as being involved with the local Ossewa Brandwag movement and pro-Nazi student politics (Bloomberg 1990). Moodie (1975: 154) points to Cronjé’s role as one of the ideological leaders of apartheid who insisted that individuals were secondary to, and derivative of an “above-individual” community on the assumption that, “[s]ince man is by nature a social being, he is never fully man except within a human community” (Moodie 1975: 156). This community was defined, with overtones of Nazi thinking, as a volk which was articulated through racial frames of reference (Moodie 1975: 274). Even though Moodie may overstate the influence of Nazism on apartheid thinking (see Coetzee 1991), Cronjé’s approach was not unaffected by the blut and boden (blood and soil) views of the Nazi state, as reflected in his emphasis on a “national home” for the Afrikaner race.

In addition, he embraced Christian nationalism with its neo-Kuyperian and neo-Fichtean elaborations, as well as the criminologist Gerrie Eloff’s racial biology (Thomas 1997, Venter 2009). Cronjé’s science was put to work in a conception of Afrikaner “trusteeship” based on this racist (eugenic) schema:

The Christian standpoint boils down to the belief that it is God’s will that there should be a variety of races, volks, and cultures, and that every human group, whether race or volk, has its own task and calling, and further, that the self-realisation of every race or volk must tend to the glory of God [...] If all of mankind degenerates into one mixed ‘race’ with one hodgepodge ‘culture’ – as the Liberal’s desire in South Africa, in any event – then it would decidedly be an impoverished, uniform, one-tone humanity,

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8 One detects this because, as Coetzee (1991: 3) indicates, “In his old-fashioned innocence, Cronjé allows himself to fall into the delirium of writing with a lack of reserve quite foreign to his successors in the academic-bureaucratic castle he helped to build”.

because the variety of races and cultures can be characterized as a rich diversity (Bloomberg, 1990: 203).

He embraced an eugenically informed socio-biology that framed a “racist strain of separate development theory”, but did not fully endorse Eloff’s biological conception of race (Norval 1996). Instead, as suggested earlier, Cronjé conceptualised race as a kind of “organic volk” constituted by both biological and cultural factors (Coetzee 1991, Dubow 1989, 1995). Based on this assumption, he identified four ‘races’ in South Africa (Coetzee 1991, Cronjé 1945): European (in other words, a Boer volk alongside ‘English’ as ‘West Europeans’, with ‘East Europeans’ — read Jewish people? — named, but left in categorical limbo); ‘Native communities’ (a vastly heterogeneous number of people to whom he sometimes refers as the “Bantu”, ‘naturelle’ as well as other derogatory terms); Coloured (mixed race), and ‘Asiatics (which he did not so much see as a race but as — despite a long history in the country — ‘foreigners’). Alongside the arbitrary contingency that translated such racial distinctions of persons as absolute, Cronjé (1945) defined a “race problem” in terms of ensuring the survival of an unmixed (in eugenic terminology, ‘untainted’) white (Afrikaner) race challenged by English imperialism and capitalism, on the one hand, and a majority of ‘non-white’ races threatening ‘blood-mixing’, on the other” (Coetzee 1991: 10, Moodie 1975: 275).

From this assumptive universe he tethered a eugenic, racist attitude to his scientific rationality, proclaiming race as both natural and cultural, and as either pure or impure. Incredibly, he asserted (and it was assertion, not analysis) that the previously noted “blood-mixing” (miscegenation) was the basic cause of all social “conflict”, and even “unhappiness” (Coetzee 1991). The source of degenerate biologies and cultures produced, in his words, “inferior human material in biological terms (physically and mentally). Biological research shows that blood mixing between whites and non-whites is detrimental” (Cronjé 1945).

Further, his deterministic sociology attributed miscegenation to a history of British liberalism and capitalism that promoted racial equality; it supposedly encouraged a ‘mixing’ that threatened society and order (Simons 1959). As a solution to the “problem” so construed, Cronjé (1945: 47-9) called for numerous measures to prevent races from “mixing”, to halt degenerate consequences thereof, and to nurture racial purity by keeping the various race groups separated in their own “communities” (Cronjé 1945: 80-95). Each race was to develop to

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9 As Louw (2004: 29) notes, “The alternative was that Afrikaans culture would be swamped by a combination of Anglo cultural imperialism and the sheer weight of numbers of black migrants being imported by Anglo capitalism. Cronjé’s thesis was that Afrikaners found themselves (in a polity created by Anglo imperialism) in a minority group surrounded by majority who were culturally and racially different”. 
self-determination, but whites were to be entrusted, because of what he claimed
to be their advanced stage of development, to “lead” others through “responsible
guardianship” to social development (Cronjé 1945: 95).

There were two aspects to this claim. First, he sought to isolate – physically,
culturally and socially – the Boerevolk as a unified racial subtype for which the
apartheid state was arch protector. Cronjé put his sociology behind a national,
apartheid state and volk politics to further a specific ideal,

namely the freedom and self-determination of the Boer nation.
That ideal is not only our goal but also our measure. All which
will further the realization of our freedom-ideal is right and good;
everything which stands in the way of the realization of that ideal
is wrong and bad (Moodie 1975: 224).

Secondly, he claimed that in a context of interracial “mixing”, Afrikaner
independence was threatened and put Afrikaners in the admittedly “unchristian”
predicament of having to “suppress” the interests of other races in order to
preserve their own social, cultural and economic integrity. In his mindset founded
on asserted racial difference, Afrikaners found themselves – because of a polity
created by British capitalism – as a minority group that would be dominated by a
Black majority if they did not suppress the latter’s interests.

Out of this bigoted, race-based assumptive universe, with its contorted
combination of political theology and necessity-based sociological thinking, he
added a moral dimension to his justification of apartheid: the charitable, just
and Christian thing to do would be to grant all ‘races’ the capacity for political,
cultural, and religious self-development in separated geographical areas. At base
though, his deterministic sociology asserted a fundamental difference in racially
conceived versions of community, calling for a complete separation of races that
would prevent mixing and allow self-development where, “whites would no
longer need to suppress black interests and could actually then assist blacks to
develop full potential in their separate black polities” (Louw 2004: 29).

The contrast between the abstract formality of Cronjé’s deterministic
sociology, as enunciated in his inaugural lecture, and the prejudiced, crass
ideological discourse that subsequently evoked “science” and rationality to

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10 Cronjé (Moodie, 1975: 203) worded it thus: “The Boer culture must be carried into the English
cosmopolitan life of the city […] It is an appalling struggle and more than one Boer has already
been demolished in this difficult transition period in our ethnic life. But I hope is that the organized
Afrikaner action in the city will day by day become more purposeful and more irresistible […] We
must not allow the organization of the Afrikaner to divide our People. We must not allow the city
Afrikaner to become a different kind of Afrikaner from his fellow on the farm”.

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legitimise his espousal of racial difference as the hallmark of South African society is striking. As Coetzee (1991) notes, a prodigious dread of miscegenation was posited as the key social problem, framed around a baseless assertion of ‘racial mixing’ as the ‘cause’ of all significant social conflict and ‘unhappiness’, to which apartheid’s racial separation and eugenic ‘purity’ appears as a solution. Cronjé cloaks his hierarchical racism under the guise of an abstracted sense of apartheid, and draws scientific legitimacy for this political ‘solution’ from a causally driven sociology that claimed to be working with neutral ontological causes. This was claimed even as a vast arsenal of bureaucratic, policy-oriented, coercive, violent, oppressive, propagandistic, censoring, fear-inducing, disciplinary and biopolitical governmental measures engineered a material manifestation of that divisive social vision. The subsequent engineering of racial division was, in other words, partially shaped, conceived and achieved through an alignment between deterministic sociology, socio-legal and political techniques that etched apartheid distinctions, prejudices and demands onto the lives of as many South Africans as possible.

4. What does this mean for sociology?

From the previous discussion one might ponder how a sociological discourse could place itself in the service of apartheid’s practical, applied, political programme. In what form did it appear as unequivocal supporter of vast, exclusionary social horizons dedicated to a biopolitics directed to racism, eugenics, internal militarisation, violence and the pursuit of divided and unequal populations? Of course, as noted, I do not mean here to claim that sociology (especially in its reflective, critical guises) was wholly unsuccessful in challenging apartheid. Nor do I claim that such administrative sociologies always and uniformly aligned with apartheid bureaucracies, or were destined to disastrous social atrocities. My narrower point is this: consequential strands of administrative sociological thinking helped drive apartheid’s bureaucratic, applied, policy-focused programmes. It also directed a kind of social engineering that promised (at times even guaranteed) an improved, advanced or progressive society. In other words, as long as sociology unreflectively aligned itself with dominant power-knowledge configurations of social problems as amenable to determinate resolution, it opened itself up to extreme dangers associated with advocating a state-submissive and privileged social science (Bauman 2000).

What lessons might sociology draw from such episodes in its history? And more particularly: What should we learn from the promises of a deterministic, bureaucratic sociology as ‘neutral’ applied science embedded in Cronjé’s justification of apartheid? There are several dimensions to this that require further
analysis, but suffice here to allude to four closely related lessons that may be extracted from the dangerous ‘deterministic standpoint’ in sociology.

To begin with, **beware a sociology that defines its project as solving applied problems enunciated by dominant power-knowledge agents or formations.** We have seen how Cronjé and others (Coulter, Verwoerd, Keyter) approached sociology as a means to provide practical, but causally posited social solutions to a racially framed problem. Cronjé’s sociology tied his sociology to the State’s evolving visions of apartheid, and framed a race problem specifically (for example, as miscegenation), proposing sociological informed solutions (for example, racial separation) and implied policies (for example, apartheid education). Such managed social engineering aligned itself closely with apartheid’s cultural, policy, legal, economic, social and political programmes. By directing a technocratic sociology to frame privileged governmental, legal and bureaucratic initiatives, Cronjé replicated precisely the ‘relevant’ solution-based sociology that Bourdieu (1999: 3) aptly describes thus: “State bureaucracies and their representatives are great producers of ‘social problems’ that social science does little more than ratify whenever it takes them over as ‘sociological’ problems”.

He calls our attention to sociological research devoted to problems such as “poverty, immigration, educational failure”, and how these come to be transcribed, or “more or less rephrased in scientific language”. In its applied forms then,

> From its inception, social science itself has been part and parcel of this work of construction of the representation of the state which makes up part of the reality of the state itself. All of the issues raised about bureaucracy, such as those of neutrality and disinterestedness, are also posed about sociology itself (Bourdieu 1999: 3).

In the wake of Foucault’s work, one might also reference sociology’s alliance with political and power-knowledge formations beyond state bureaucracies that define problems as amenable to administrative resolution. However, when it endorses the problems defined by privileged power-knowledge formations, managerially focused sociology subtly legitimates conjectural images of said problems and subordinates its ‘science’ to the role of solving them through policies to engineer favoured social forms.

Here, the basic danger of an administrative approach lies precisely in its presumption that complex and moving social relations are amenable to simply framed ‘problems’ and policy-framed ‘solutions’ (worse, amenable to any final solution, with chilling echoes of the Wannsee conference). The point is not that administrative sociology necessarily harvests atrocity. However, as long as it seeks
to solve problems contoured by dominant political envelopes, especially using a deterministic causal standpoint that renders rulers’ enunciations necessary, sociology closes itself from alternative framings of social issues beyond dominant problem–solution models. While an amorphous ‘public sociology’ could rely on other power–knowledge contexts to frame issues, it does not necessarily eschew the problem–solution logic (Burawoy 2013). By contrast, an entirely different approach may be adopted; perhaps a ‘dissociative’ social theory that abjures calls to sculpt collective problems, solutions and visions issued on dominant or other writs, or to conjure closed “how to [.....] policy schemes (Pavlich 2001: 213). This social theory could instead, for example, work from the vantage of an unceasing ‘limit attitude’ (Foucault 2000) that is attentive to the deconstruction of historical forms of ‘being with’ that form historical identities through indeterminate moments of becoming (Nancy 2000). The thought is not new, of course; but there is a gesture associated with genres of thought that works to keep current political practices and rationales from closing themselves off as causally determined, being receptive to the very indeterminacy, the incalculability, that enables any finite calculations of being.

Secondly, beware an applied sociology that claims to have unearthed the coexistence of parallel societies, with some at higher stages of social development and others following behind. Allied with such an extraordinary claim one often finds, as with Cronjé, a social evolutionary belief that sociology could define static societies at different developmental stages, causally explain how these arose, and isolate policies that point the way to putatively more advanced social formations. A modern colonial belief in a universal conception of progress masks the imperialism of the approach, as well as the underlying claim that (expert?) administrative sociologists and their social science could arbitrate such matters with certainty. But the devastating effects of such arrogance lie elsewhere: progress and the precepts through which it is conceived (for example, race, separate existence, development, and so on) depend upon extensive socio-political, cultural, legal and military compulsion for their imposition (Coleman 1997). For its part, administrative sociology’s attempt to engineer apartheid society, with claims to determinate knowledge, became a causal accomplice to arenas of pain, violence, bloodshed and death.

We have seen how Cronjé embraced a type of eugenics and Spencerian social evolution that posited European forms of life at the pinnacle of social development. The imperialist dangers of colonial metanarratives of social progress are evident from, for example, the ways in which they authorised narratives of racial superiority and exclusion, with serious consequences for those designated as somehow ‘inferior’, ‘impure’ or ‘degenerate’ (Mbembe 2008). When predicated on assertions of the so-called purity of one or other categorisation of persons,
or on declarations of denigrated statuses for others, sociology’s capacity to enunciate supposedly progressive social forms rests on a potentially dangerous decision. This is ultimately a political and normative decision that is especially hazardous when it masquerades as causally determined, neutral, scientific and, by implication, necessary (Pavlich 2003).

Indeed, the contingency of any asserted universality explodes in contexts beset with epistemic uncertainties generated, in part, by the notorious perils associated with dreams of progress, order and purity (as, for instance, indicated by atrocities of genocides, holocaust, and so on – see Bauman 1992). Asserting that one vision of society must necessarily be implemented, because it harbours a more advanced, pure order than another, should ring loud warning bells to remind us of past atrocities accompanying attempts to engineer purity-based social visions (Bauman 2000). Any sociology that legitimates either such visions, or the mechanisms to achieve them, cannot but be complicit in any associated waves of coercion that enforce such ‘progress’. Even if the ‘ambient uncertainties’ of postcolonial and advanced modern (or postmodern?) horizons might challenge the faith required to assert social advancement, we should be deeply attentive to the ubiquitous risks beneath the faith, especially when they countenance a ‘necessary’ path to progress (Bauman 1992, Woodiwiss 1997, Best 2001). After all, assertions of social progress are irremediably beset with a privileging imperialism whose translation can have profoundly negative effects on those excluded as less advanced. Perhaps, again, a dissociative gesture might be more appropriate if social theorists are to remain vigilant to the limits that close around contingent collective associations (Pavlich 2003).

Thirdly, beware a sociology that claimsscientifically( causally, deterministically) to identify a fixed nature to individuals, societies, and their integration. Assertions of historically situated individuals, communities and societies are never a necessity; instead, they reflect successful political rationales that carve up individuals and contingent group identities as if immutable ontologies. As noted, Cronjé’s deterministic standpoint focuses on an individual–society nexus, emphasising the societal causes that shape personalities by actualising social potentials within specific race-based communities. His standpoint paradoxically distinguishes seemingly fixed individuals from society, but the stability of each is simultaneously undermined by an underlying dynamism. Cronjé’s recognition that social change and personality processes are always in ‘development’ muddles claims about a distinct individual nature and/or community (as is required to distinguish between ‘races’ or racial communities, and to declare relative advancement). An administrative approach that asserts causally fixed ontologies, even if historically located, masks how clear notions of individual and collective division are always contextual, a posteriori realisations.
Perhaps this might alert us to the political rationales that sustain sociology’s focus on an individual-society nexus. On this score, Foucault may help to understand sociology’s founding concepts of individual and society as an outcome of modern power-knowledge formations. Perceptively, he draws attention to a political rationality of modern ‘governmentality’ that simultaneously shapes our political forms and is embedded in sociology’s individual-society problem: “the main characteristic of our political rationality is the fact that this integration of the individuals in the community or in a totality results from a constant correlation between an increasing individualization and the reinforcement of this totality” (Foucault 2000: 417).

The resulting governmental technologies (and reinvigorations of pastoral power) use images of social order to complement sovereign law, and they do so in ways that are both individualising and totalising. Thus, Cronjé’s focus on personality (the intersection between individual and community) claimed a ‘determinate’ foundation for a racially divided society, and suggests a governmentalisation of the apartheid state. Like modern social science more generally, his sociology helped to fashion a governmentally created social ‘order’ as a counterpart to the enforcement of apartheid law – a veritable confluence of law and social order. For all the talk of a determinate causal analysis of social reality, his sociology was in the end concerned with preserving a political interest (White, Afrikaner, Christian nationalist, and so on) and calling for divisions and separations to dilute a perceived majority threat. By providing a determinate account of the ‘nature’ of individuals, communities, and personalities, his sociology offered ‘scientific’ targets for an apartheid governmentality, with all its attendant exclusions. If nothing else, this calls for sociologists to pay close attention to the political auspices and effects of their basic concepts, and not to masquerade as an apolitical science that uncovers determinate causality.

Finally, and on a related note, beware of sociology that claims to decipher a determinate structure to social reality. Why? It frames an always undetermined, local political accomplishment as something necessary (for instance, it ascribes a fixed ontology to the effects of power). On this note, the scientific cloak Cronjé used to mask his racist assertions is striking, as is the ferocious violence required to enforce the racially divided communities he championed. By couching apartheid political ambitions as an essential social reality, this deterministic sociology deflects attention away from the political violence and force required to materialise distinctions of persons as definitively part of pre-existing (absolute?) racial communities, and to construct an apartheid society around separated racial/community development. But turning to his inaugural lecture, with the intricacies of developing potentials and personality processes within race-based
communities, one might not easily detect the sort of force required to impose this contingent, scientifically framed vision.

But Cronjé’s attempts to dress apartheid violence in deterministic absolution should not allow us to overlook the politics of sheer cruelty through which an imagined racial ordering — and vision of a divided society — was enforced. Nor should we underestimate the support of a privileged, deterministic, instrumental and managerial sociology that proffered apartheid solutions to the state’s putative race problem. Despite the abstracted lexicons of applied science, Cronjé’s sociology did not discover — it instead asserted — the causal basis of apartheid’s racially conceived persons, personalities and communities. This should again alert us to the foundational role of local political contexts that give life breath to sociological regimes of truth. The creative narratives of sociology, whether couched in science, rationalism, theory, or empiricism, should always subject to explicit scrutiny. This is more than a call for disciplinary modesty; it is an imperative and foundational self-awareness designed to counter dogmatic espousals made possible by contextually granted privilege. Focusing on sociology’s footprint leads us to a politics that lies hidden in shadows cast by a deterministic standpoint in sociology. In its place, sociologists might continuously monitor the interest-based auspices of their endeavours, perhaps returning to ask Becker’s simple question: “Whose side are we on?” (Becker 1967).

Do these lessons, in concert, leave sociologists with nowhere to go but a critical sociology that recycles a debilitating postmodern relativism and reflexivity, or should it recover a ‘public’ sociology driven not by state power but the issues defined by changing social movements? (Burawoy 2013). Of course, this question taps into a now popular US debate on the ‘future of sociology’ both encouraged by dialogue between advocates of public sociology and a key South African contribution to this (see Clawson et al. 2007, Webster 2004). Yet, as might be clear, I have intentionally skirted this debate, preferring to contrast administrative sociology with a more diffident reflective, dissociative social theory that takes seriously the indeterminacy of ‘being with’ others (Nancy 2000). This is my call for intellectual modesty within sociology, and attentiveness to how one might take seriously the ‘inoperativeness’ of collective associations (communities, societies). In other words, how might social theorists recognise through their practice (and it is a practice) the contingency of historically located regimes from which any claims about social pasts or futures are launched?

To be sure, a dissociative social theory need not be confined to waning reflexive cloisters, or resound fading echoes in a corporatised ivory tower, as Burawoy’s (2013) challenge to a ‘critical sociology’ seems to allege. At the same time, it is not a call for sociology to gain popularity from enraptured audiences (whether
graduates, academics or organic intellectuals) that pliantly receive the good news of an innovative publicly ‘relevant’ sociology as the de-corporatised prince to solve problems defined by amorphous publics. The lessons above warn of the dangers of this problem-solving logic and hence my deliberate refusal of Burawoy’s (2013) three-fold characterisation of sociology (policy, professional, and critical), or the idea that elements of these might be placed — despite their heterogeneity — in the service of his public sociology. Quite aside from Scott & Inglis’ worries about exporting US provincialism, or the problem of self-appointed speakers claiming to represent public domains, one might also — as does Morrow — point to the weak straw person that is made to represent ‘critical sociology’ in this debate (Morrow 2009, Inglis 2005, Scott 2005). By reconceptualising the latter, remaining attentive to the consequential effects of past sociological approaches, one might further a social theory that works with the contingency of ‘being with’, always dissociating its changing forms in given contexts. In the end, embracing indeterminacy may be our only — admittedly limited — counter to the flood of totalitarian necessities that drive many sociological approaches.

In conclusion, these basic lessons suggest internal difficulties for elements of sociology — whether described as administrative, policy, professional, critical, or public — that claim to solve problems deemed by authorities as relevant to today’s ethos. Cronjé’s deterministic approach demanded administrative relevance to the apartheid state by providing causal policy solutions to racist formulations with the attendant dangers noted earlier. Although from a completely different political context, eschewing the privilege of state definitions of social problems, one finds this logic surprisingly operative in Burawoy’s (2013) critique of critical sociology’s ivory tower as irrelevant, and his quest for a relevant public approach directed to solving key problems facing ‘us’ — as defined by social movements — today. Of course, this is not to equate Cronjé’s administrative with public sociology, but only to challenge the latter’s inappropriate yielding to a pervasive neoliberal demand for social science to be ‘relevant’. If there is here a broader lesson for sociology’s future, it may be this: resist the pressure to define a sociology purely and simply as relevant to the limits of what is presently possible, whether defined by left, right or centre. Yielding to that demand can only turn sociology away from a basic responsibility to unknown futures that are entirely incomprehensible to, and beyond the reach of our current thought apparatuses.
Bibliography


