South Africa's Foreign Policy towards Africa, 1994-2010:

Partner or Hegemon?

Tshaba Tjemolane
South Africa’s Foreign Policy towards Africa, 1994-2010:
Partner or Hegemon?

by

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Tshaba Tjemolane

Bloemfontein, May 2011
DECLARATION

I, Tshaba Tjemolane, declare that the dissertation, South Africa’s Foreign Policy towards Africa, 1994-2010: Partner or Hegemon?, hereby submitted for the Magister Artium degree in Political Science at the University of the Free State, is my own, independent work and has not previously been submitted at another university or faculty. All sources that I have used have been duly specified and acknowledged as complete references. I further cede copyright of the dissertation in favour of the University of the Free State.

SIGNATURE: 
T. Tjemolane

May 2011
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

<table>
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<tr>
<td>ANC</td>
<td>African National Congress</td>
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<td>APRM</td>
<td>African Peer Review Mechanism</td>
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<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
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<td>DFA</td>
<td>Department of Foreign Affairs</td>
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<td>DIRCO</td>
<td>Department of International Relations and Cooperation</td>
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<td>DOD</td>
<td>Department of Defence</td>
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<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
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<td>DTI</td>
<td>Department of Trade and Industry</td>
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<td>EU</td>
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<td>FDI</td>
<td>Foreign Direct Investment</td>
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<td>FTA</td>
<td>Free Trade Agreement</td>
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<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Products</td>
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<td>GNU</td>
<td>Government of National Unity</td>
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<tr>
<td>HIV/AIDS</td>
<td>Human Immunodeficiency Virus/Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome</td>
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<td>ICC</td>
<td>International Criminal Court</td>
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<td>INGO</td>
<td>International Non-governmental Organisations</td>
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<td>IR</td>
<td>International Relations</td>
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<td>ISDSC</td>
<td>Inter-State Defence and Ministerial Committee</td>
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<td>MDC</td>
<td>Movement for Democratic Change</td>
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<td>MNC</td>
<td>Multinational Corporations</td>
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<td>NAM</td>
<td>Non-aligned Movement</td>
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<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organisation</td>
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NCACC : National Conventional Arms Control Committee
NEPAD : New Partnership for Africa’s Development
NGOs : Non-governmental Organisations
NPT : Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
OAU : Organisation of African Unity
OPDS : Organ for Politics, Defence and Security
PAP : Pan-African Parliament
PSC : Peace and Security Council
SADC : Southern African Development Community
SACU : Southern African Customs Union
TNC : Transnational Corporation
TSM : Transnational Social Movement
SANDEF : South African National Defence Force
UN : United Nations
UNSC : United Nations Security Council
US : United States
WTO : World Trade Organisation
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

1.1. Orientation and Background

As the 21st century dawned, a number of immeasurable changes in South Africa’s domestic political sphere and eventually its relations with the rest of the world took place. This rapid political change led to the perception of South Africa as a leading economic, political and military influence on the continent and around the world. Since South Africa is conceived to be a “leader”, it is also expected to demonstrate its leadership capacity on the continent.

Adebajo, Adedeji and Landsberg (2007:18), without particularly pinpointing specific foreign policies and diplomatic acts, assert that the apartheid regime saw itself, culturally and politically, as a component of the West. Additionally, having been composed entirely of a white minority with European roots, the former National Party government regarded itself as the only “link” between Africa and the West that was based on the African continent. The presence of the West on African soil was often associated with the emergence of “civilisation”, “economic development”, “order” and “education”.

Nevertheless, Spence (2001:3) argues that apartheid rule was at complete ideological variance with the rule of the majority of the United Nations’ (UN) affiliates. Hence, international organisations, such as the UN, international banks and multinational corporations (MNCs), imposed sanctions on the pre-1990 South Africa. This clearly indicates that national political turmoil in South Africa by then, inevitably, had an adverse impact on its international relations with the global community.
The collapse of communism as well as mounting political pressure from the international community provided the ideal historical opportunity for the apartheid government to initiate the fundamental political changes that led to the release of Nelson Mandela, the unbanning of the African National Congress (ANC) and other parties, and the negotiation process that followed in the early 1990s. This subsequently led to the abolition of the apartheid government system. The Government of National Unity (GNU), composed of the ANC, the NP, and other smaller political parties and trade unions, was then assembled on an interim basis (Landsberg, 2006a:250). In 1994, the first democratic national election took place, with the ANC reigning victorious. A “new” government was formed. As a result, the country’s foreign policy was reformulated, against the backdrop of the new Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 108 of 1996 (Le Pere & van Nieuwkerk, 2002:248). As a result of positive political changes that took place in the 1990s, South Africa was re-admitted into the global community.

According to Spence (2001:8), South Africa’s post-apartheid foreign policy is Africa-oriented and particularly devoted to the Southern African region. It is also committed to “transformation” on the continent and further afield (Johnston, 2001:11). South Africa’s post-1994 foreign policy content further addresses critical policy issues including human rights, peace and security, and economic development.

In 1994, the ANC proclaimed it would endorse human rights which would automatically embrace the activities of human rights activists (ANC, 1994: Internet; Borer & Mills, 2009:10-11). Currently, human rights issues are given priority in South Africa’s foreign policy principles and objectives. Its advocacy
for human rights goes beyond political rights to include economic, social, cultural, and environmental rights. Former South African President Nelson Mandela, prior to his tenure of the presidency, warned that the neglect of human rights (issues) can be catastrophic to the international system (Mills, 2000:308). Furthermore, he optimistically vowed that a democratic South Africa’s foreign policy would stress human rights and democracy. It would further embrace the view that the country’s future is dependent on Africa, and Southern Africa in particular, and that South Africa would seek regional cooperation and not domination (Mandela, 1993: Internet).

For this reason, South Africa, owing to its political history, transition, and eventual re-admission into the international system, is perceived by many as a “beacon of hope” particularly for the oppressed (The Economist, 2008: Internet). That is, the South African government is ethically expected to play a key role in human rights promotion and protection (Mills, 2000:308). Moreover, the ANC (1994: Internet) has pledged to attend to widespread human rights-related issues such as the conduct of war, migration, torture, racism and apartheid, women’s and children’s abuse as prescribed by the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and many other UN protocols and conventions. It declared that it acknowledges the “obligation” of human rights custodianship in its bilateral and multilateral relations. In addition, the party promises to guard against biased participation in human rights violation issues, especially where its national interests might be undermined (ANC, 1994: Internet).

In the first few years of the democratic dispensation, hopes were high that South Africa’s would play a constructive role on the continent especially in
This optimism can be ascribed to the utterances made by the ruling party even before and almost immediately after it claimed victory at the 1994 democratic election. In its *Foreign Policy Perspective in a Democratic South Africa* (ANC, 1994: Internet) document, the ANC pledges the following peace- and security-related commitments, amongst others:

- Participation in the peaceful resolution of regional disputes, common security arrangements and disarmament in concert with neighbouring countries for the regional and sub-continental stability and security; Recommendation for fellow regional members to sign “non-aggression” treaty;
- Participation in the efforts to ensure a world free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction under the auspices of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT);
- Participation in the control of conventional arms through the UN Expert Group on Conventional Arms Transfers; and
- Attention to issues of international trafficking of small arms, military intervention in foreign countries and refugees.

In addition, international relations scholars such as Matlosa (2007:111), and Hamill (2001:47), assert that South Africa is expected to assume a supreme continental role in terms of security assurance. They reiterate that South Africa, due to its military (army, air-force and navy) power, resourcefulness and better organisation, is anticipated to spearhead peacekeeping interventions and mediations, particularly in the Southern African region.
With the release of the South African *Foreign Policy Discussion Document* (SAGI, 2008: Internet), continental issues received emphasis. In this document, it is indicated that South Africa’s participation in continental conflict prevention, peacekeeping, efforts in the alleviation of widespread conventional and nuclear arms necessitate integrated, coherent and consistent foreign and defence policies.

Moreover, the South African government has identified economic development as one of its foreign policy priority areas. As early as 1993 before the change of government, Nelson Mandela, emphatically announced that the South African government would attempt to help end the national economic crisis and incorporate South Africa into the world economy (Mandela, 1993: Internet). Again, in his speech to the Foreign Affairs Portfolio Committee of Parliament on 14 March 1995, the late Alfred Nzo, former Minister of the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) (currently known as the Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO))¹, emphasised the need for South Africa to promote the regional and, in extension, continental economy. The promotion of regional economic development is of supreme significance as the economies of the countries in the region are inextricably linked. For South Africa to believe that it could enter a potentially prosperous future in isolation from neighbouring countries

¹ Change in the name of this department, from Foreign Affairs to International Relations and Cooperation, was made the by the Zuma Administration which officially came into power in 2009. For this reason, the department will be referred to as the Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO), even when referring to the events that took place in the pre-Zuma Administration era while the department was still using Foreign Affairs as its brand name.
would be unrealistic. The minister maintained that South Africa would further
endeavour to involve the corporate world with the purpose of establishing the
fullest possible development of its human and natural resources by combining
foreign capital with expertise. In view of such commitments, South Africa can
arguably be assumed Africa’s economic actor that is expected to play an
imperative continental economic role (SAGI, 2008: Internet).

However, South Africa’s continental policy and role have not been
without defects. Its human rights approach, peace and security attempts,
and economic development patterns in Africa have provoked an outcry
amongst many actors, to the extent that South Africa has been dubbed a
selfish hegemon and dominant role player aimed at self-interest while
others insist it is only a partner.

1.2. Problem Statement

Since South Africa is a middle-income, emerging market economy, the
African and international community anticipates it to play a developmental role
on the continent. Since 1994, much research has been conducted pertaining
to South Africa’s foreign policy and its role on the continent. In spite of this,
some controversy still marks South Africa’s foreign policy and its
implementation in particular. South Africa has not played a leading role in the
region and on the continent, based on an argument that South Africa shows
an anxiety to “control” its neighbours, but without being perceived as a self-
argue South Africa is somehow pursuing a Western-oriented agenda and not
an African one. Much of the literature on South Africa’ foreign policy and role
on the continent is marked by a “… clash of concepts, arguments and normative convictions” (Prys, 2007:2).

The problem statement of the study is founded on the controversy surrounding South Africa’s foreign policy towards, and its role on the African continent.

As far as the study is concerned, the problem statement is demarcated as follows:

- **Conceptual demarcation**: The study is confined to determining whether South Africa can best be associated with the concepts of a partner or hegemon.

- **Geopolitical demarcation**: The study is geopolitically confined to South Africa and its role on the African continent. This would also mean to include South Africa’s role or representation of the African continent and the developing South on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC).

- **Temporal demarcation**: The study is limited to South Africa’s foreign policy towards Africa from 1994 to 2010. Nonetheless, some pre-1994 foreign policy incidents are generally considered as background information to South Africa-Africa policy.

In addressing the above, South Africa's official foreign policy towards Africa and related cases/issues will be considered.

1.3. **Research Question**

The research question that this study intends to answer is, “What foreign (policy) role does South Africa play on the African continent?” More
specifically it poses the question: “Is South Africa playing the role of a continental leader, or does it assume the role of a mere ‘team player’ on the African continent in a multinational context?” The problem statement of the study is founded on the discourse surrounding South Africa’s political profile and foreign policy towards the rest of the African continent. It also follows from the important and even controversial scholarly issue of whether South Africa’s role on the continent is that of a partner or a hegemon.

Supplementary to the abovementioned research question, three subsidiary questions emerge:

- How does South Africa define its foreign identity with particular reference to its role on the African continent and further afield?
- What are the regional and continental expectations with regard to South Africa’s role in Africa? and
- Is South Africa willing to be a leader or an ordinary actor within the multilateral (African) context?

A number of descriptive terms have been subjectively ascribed to South Africa, including hegemon, behemoth, pivot, partner, “just another kid on the block”, and so forth (Schoeman, 2007:92-104; Ahwireng-Obeng & McGowan, 2001:55-80; SARPN, 2003: Internet, 5-6). Currently, the most controversial debate is whether South Africa’s role on the continent is that of a partner or hegemon. Thus, owing to the scope of the study, the focus will be limited to the concepts of “partner” and “hegemon”.

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1.4. **Aim and Significance of the Study**

The post-1994 democratic government realised the need for South Africa to embark on the promotion of respect for human rights, peace and security assurance, and economic development on the African continent. As a result, the abovementioned areas of development have been entrenched as its main priorities in foreign policy towards Africa (Le Pere & Van Nieuwkerk, 2002:250). However, South Africa’s foreign identity and the conception of its role on the continent has been a cause of disagreement amongst observers and analysts. For this reason, the main aim of the study is to provide an in-depth analysis of South Africa’s foreign policy vis-à-vis Africa, and ultimately, to determine whether South Africa is a partner or hegemon.

The increasing significance of emerging markets such as South Africa (a significant local investor on the continent) and their interest in Africa’s resources has real implications for the continent. South Africa holds a key position in the African economic development. It is a gateway market to the African continent for new investors; and it is both a competitor and a potential partner to its fellow African countries (Games, 2010:1-2). For instance, the Mbeki government, in principle, not only led Africa in determining continental relations with the West but also in deciding the terms of the world’s partnership with the African continent. However, former President Mbeki’s projects such as the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) were severely castigated by some African countries mainly because of his leadership aspirations linked to his role in NEPAD. To some scholars and commentators, NEPAD was an endeavour to promulgate South Africa’s keen support for neoliberal economic thinking throughout the continent. Others
illustrate some part of President Mbeki’s role as an attempt to become Africa’s representative and “world statesman” (Mangcu, 2009: Internet).

Controversial issues of this nature propel the need to investigate South Africa’s actual role on the continent. Therefore, the study endeavours to analyse South Africa’s post-1994 foreign policy and role on issues of human rights, security and economy in Africa.

The study’s significance lies in the fact that it will contribute to the range of policy options available to the South African government in its quest to play a constructive role on the African continent. The findings of this research will help clarify regional and international conceptions on South Africa-Africa relations. The study will help to clarify the conceptual controversy surrounding South Africa’s role on the continent and to settle the issue whether South Africa should be epitomised as a partner or a hegemon.

More specifically, the objectives of the study are to:

- Provide a conceptual clarification of foreign policy, partner and hegemon;
- Discuss post-apartheid South Africa’s foreign policy with reference to fundamental principles and actors involved in the formulation and implementation processes;
- Provide an overview South Africa’s multilateral relations in Africa;
- Provide an overview of South Africa’s foreign policy issues with regard to human rights, peace and security, and trade relations; and
• Evaluate whether South Africa is a partner or hegemon in the Southern African region, and eventually on the continent.

1.5. Research Methodology

The study is qualitative since it involves the explanation of terms and concepts, attained via a literature review.

It is also deductive in approach, commencing with a critical, conceptual analysis of the term “foreign policy” and related terms. It progresses from a general description to specific and focused analyses of South Africa’s foreign policy formulation and implementation, in an attempt to answer the question whether South Africa is a partner or hegemon.

The study also descriptively analyses the relationship between South Africa and other African countries through an “inside-out” approach. It discusses South Africa’s foreign policy formulation and implementation both by governmental and non-governmental actors at national level, and eventually analysing its role beyond its borders, the continent and further afield. It is also based on a literature study aimed at working towards explanations why South Africa, among many other policy choices available to it, prioritised human rights, peace and security, and trade relations.

1.6. Literature and Data Review

In conducting this research, numerous sources have been consulted. These sources have been useful in the process of accumulating data on the subjects of foreign policy in general, South Africa’s foreign policy in particular, South Africa’s role in Africa, and as main objective to determine whether
South Africa is an African partner or hegemon. Sources are categorised as follows:

- **Primary sources.** Sources from which one has extracted raw (unanalysed) information include government publications such as the *SA Yearbook 2008/09: Foreign Relations* (GCIS, 2009a: Internet, 242-278), *South African Foreign Policy: Discussion Document* (SAGI, 2008: Internet), *Foreign Policy Perspective in a Democratic South Africa* (ANC, 1994: Internet), and others. Such sources are used to discuss South Africa’s external policies and role as prescribed by the South African government per se.

- **Secondary sources.** Several analytical sources scrutinising South Africa’s continental role are also consulted. These works are produced mostly by the foreign policy scholars and commentators listed below. Hill (2003), Russett and Starr (1996), Keohane (1984), Morgenthau (1978), Gilpin (2001), Frankel (1963), Kegley (1995), and Holsti (1995) all remain the classic scholars of all time. In these sources, they embark on general foreign policy analysis under a broader ambit of Political Science and International Relations. Owing to the fact that these scholars affiliate with differing schools of thought based on differing assumptions, they do not agree on the definition of the concept “hegemon” and its implications. They also differ greatly in terms of their views on foreign policy analysis, formulation and implementation. Schoeman (2007), Alden and Soko (2005), Landsberg (2006a), Le Pere and van Nieuwkerk (2002), and Prys (2007; 2009) analyse
South Africa’s foreign policy-making and implementation in Africa and beyond, arguing that the ANC-led government has been confronted with both micro- and macro-policy challenges. They present analyses on South Africa-Africa foreign policy transition from 1994 well into the 2000s, its successes and failures, acknowledging the exerted efforts and developments thus far in many areas of development. The government managed to punch above its weight, prioritising African development in its foreign policy and assuming a leadership role on the continent. They broadly contend that, in spite of great challenges experienced immediately after 1994, the Mbeki Administration brought considerable changes into South Africa’s foreign policy (although marked by somewhat opaque and undemocratic policy-making processes). Generally, these analysts confess that South Africa is a great economic and military power on the African continent. However, on the one hand, some of these experts interpret South Africa as an African hegemon while others, on the other hand, argue that it is a developing continental leader but one that is far from achieving a hegemonic status due to its lack of resources. That being said they all admit that there is a lot of work that South Africa still needs to do in Africa, regardless of its hierarchical status on the continent.

However, all of the above literature only (critically) analyse South Africa’s foreign policy status quo in Africa but fail, in conclusion, to make alternative policy recommendations and suggest a way
forward or possible future foreign policies to the readers. Therefore, this made it difficult for this study to reach conclusions on what the literature has to say about South Africa’s future foreign policy.

1.7. Structure of the Research

Owing to the fact that foreign policy embraces a broad area of state activity, this study is multifaceted and descriptively analyses foreign policy issues such as human rights, peace and security, and trade relations from the perspective of South Africa in Africa. The study is structured as follows:

Chapter Two: Examines key foreign policy-related concepts such as “foreign policy”, “national interest” and the distinction between “state and non-state actors”, as well as “partner” and “hegemon”. These concepts have been selected on the grounds of their explication and usage by different theories in International Relations (IR) such as realism, liberalism, and others.

Chapter Three: Discusses actors involved in South Africa’s foreign policy formulation and implementation. Attention is paid to state actors such as the presidency, DIRCO and other government departments, and non-state actors including civil society.

Chapter Four: Examines South Africa’s multilateral relations and role in institutions such as the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the Southern African Customs Union (SACU), the African Union (AU), NEPAD, and the UNSC.

Chapter Five: Investigates South Africa’s foreign policy issues in Africa. The critical analysis is based on human rights, security and trade relations issues that emerge around South Africa’s foreign policy in Africa. In this
regard, the study will identify and analyse certain outstanding issues such as South Africa’s view on, and approach to human rights on the continent, as well as peace and security and economic development endeavours.

**Chapter Six:** Generally summarises the study. It discusses research findings by evaluating South Africa’s role as a continental partner and/or hegemon and provides policy recommendations.

1.8. Conclusion

Since the post-war through to the post-apartheid era, South Africa has been a dominant economic and military actor in the African continent. Aware of its successful and exemplary political transition and economic dominance, South Africa pledged to assume leadership role on the continent. This promise raised the hopes of African states and other actors, that South Africa would indeed lead and help develop the continent. Therefore, this study analyses South Africa’s foreign policy towards and role in Africa, and eventually determines whether it is a partner or hegemon in this regard. The above will thus form the core of the discussion in the subsequent chapters, starting with chapter 2 next.
CHAPTER 2: FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPTS AND CONTEXTUAL ISSUES UNDERLYING THE STUDY

2.1. Introduction

Unlike natural sciences where scholars follow fixed and universally accepted meanings, the social sciences, IR in particular, tend to eclectically use diverse techniques to bestow connotations of different concepts. McGowan and Nel (2002:14, 15-16)\(^2\) maintain that “... scholars in ... [IR] ... are very eclectic, and they use methods and conceptual tools from a whole range of disciplines to carry out their investigations. As such, concepts form the basic tools with which researchers can describe, interpret, explain, predict and make normative judgments”. They maintain that IR scholars devote much time attempting to develop “correct” or “appropriate” connotations and denotations that can be appended to certain concepts. It is important to note that, due to the diverse nature of IR, even self-explanatory concepts such as “foreign policy” are interpreted differently by different observers; thus, numerous and slightly different definitions are often proposed. Olivier (2009:13) is of the opinion that concepts, perspectives, paradigms and theories do not emerge out of nothing; they help explain and describe existent realities. Therefore, various concepts are used in the study to describe and analyse South Africa’s foreign policy.

This chapter clarifies the relevant concepts and contextual issues that are often applied in IR and the foreign policy subfield. For the purpose of

\(^2\) McGowan and Nel (2002:14) maintain that IR is not a discipline but a subject that utilises various methods and approaches adopted from Political Science, Economics, History, Philosophy, Law, Sociology, Statistics, Anthropology and Literary Criticism.
conceptual clarification, various theories and approaches will often be referred to, especially in terms of their association with the concepts used in the study. Concepts that will receive specific attention are “foreign policy”, “national interests” and “state and non-state actors”, “partner” and “hegemon” and “multilateralism”. This is because these concepts form the basis of Foreign Policy Analysis as a subject.

2.2. Foreign Policy

Before attempting a conceptual clarification of “foreign policy”, it is important to mention that most IR scholars admit that the concept is supremely contested, ambiguous, vague and “futile” (Du Plessis, 2002:111). Thus, it is not the intent of the study to offer an exclusive, standard, and single definition of the concept, but to provide a credible, general and yet detailed conceptualisation.

Since there are numerous and different interpretations, statements and arguments on foreign policy, Russet and Starr (1996:62) contend that this culminates into nothing but lack of consensus on the definition of “foreign policy”. Owing to the lack of consensual intellectual exchanges, prominent theorists including realists, idealists, and rational choice scholars have proffered varied interpretations of foreign policy. Foreign policy choices of contentious issues such as human rights and democracy, justice and international law and economic development can be interpreted through fundamental theoretical prescriptions (GCIS, 2009a: Internet, 243).

According to Ojo, Orwa and Utete (1985:43), “foreign policy is a combination of aims and interests pursued and defended by a given state and
its ruling class in its relations with other states, and the methods and means used by it for the achievement and defusing of these purposes and interests”.

There are limitations to this definition. In view of the above, foreign policy is defined as being representative of state interests only, ignoring the interests of non-state actors.

Therefore, the definition is traditional and state-centric (realism-oriented) in the sense that the state is viewed as the only, rational and unitary actor participating in foreign policymaking. This could be because, historically, foreign policy has always been viewed through “state-centric”, classical realist spectacles, ruling-out other important actors such as civil society (Hill, 2003:6).

In more inclusive, though not all-encompassing terms, Du Plessis (2002:112) maintains that foreign policy refers to:

“… [T]hose actions which, expressed in the form of explicitly stated directives, and performed by government representatives acting on behalf of their sovereign communities are manifestly directed towards objectives, conditions and actors – both governmental and non-governmental – which … lie beyond their sphere of territorial legitimacy”.

This definition is rather multi-centric (liberal-pluralist). Here, foreign policy-related roles are not entirely ascribed to the state but also to non-governmental organisations (NGOs). For example, whereas states traditionally used to be the only major foreign policy actors, the international stage is now shared with INGO’s such as the International Red Cross Society, Human Rights Watch, Oxfam, and others. States remain the most important decision-makers in the international system, which does not imply that the role of NGOs is trivial (Hill, 2003:7).
Unlike other types of policies, foreign policy is an instrument for achieving the state’s policy objectives abroad on the bases of people, places, and any other issues of international concern. One of the best approaches in defining the term “foreign policy” is first to split the phrase per se, simultaneously taking into consideration issues of sovereignty and territory (Russett & Starr, 1996:163). Foreign policy on the one hand, is depicted as “foreign” in the sense that it is aimed at developing and sustaining relations with other actors beyond the borders of a particular country (Hill, 2003:3, 5). On the other hand, it is described as a decision or a combination of decisions that diplomats and other practitioners in the field of foreign relations make to accomplish their country’s outlined goals (Russett & Starr, 1996:163).

It is important to consider the origin of the word “foreign”. The term “foreign” originates from the Latin word “foris” meaning “outside”. Thus, foreign policy is associated with the setting beyond a state’s borders. “Foreign” can also be indicative of the fact that the world is divided into different components and that external state policies serve the purpose of factually bridging these various compartments of the globe. This type of policy also concerns tactics through which a particular actor, especially a state, endeavours to rationally exhibit its identity abroad via varied means such as foreign policy “objectives” and “instruments” (practitioners). For this reason, states regard foreign policy as a channel through which they attempt to give meaning to their international activities. Additionally, these activities can be approached and carried out from different angles including economic, political, and security points of departure (Hill, 2003:3, 5).
An assumption that foreign policy refers to “activities”, as Du Plessis (2002:111) and Holsti (1995:83) posit, must however be contended. Russett and Starr (1996:163) are of the view that foreign policy is not an “activity” per se; it is only the “link” between activities (domestic and abroad). Moreover, the argument is that a policy of whatever kind cannot be concrete as are “activities” or “actions”; that is, policies are abstract statements. Only foreign policy-related practices such as diplomacy, arbitration, negotiations, mediation, and good offices are practical and can therefore be considered “activities”. The aforementioned elements are real and factual, as contrasted with foreign policy that can be said to be a mere hypothetical statement that is yet to be implemented (Adar, 2006: 112–116).

It is also misleading to assert that “foreign policy can be regarded as simply diplomacy”, as postulated by Anissimov (2009: Internet). Foreign policy and diplomacy are two different yet inextricably interrelated aspects of international relations. Thus, foreign policy and diplomacy are inevitably connected, but are not “synonymous”. Foreign policy reflects the interests, aims and objectives of the state beyond its national borders while diplomacy is the feasible means via which the interests are being pursued. Foreign policy is regarded as a policy because it entails the anticipations, interests and objectives of a state as reaction to its transpiring partnerships with other states. Policies involving a state’s external relations can be founded on social, trade, security, political, and other issues (Du Plessis, 2002:113).

In the following subsection, attention will be focussed on the consecutive stages that the foreign policymaking process must undergo.
2.2.1. Stages in Foreign Policymaking

Foreign policy is understood to be a lengthy course of action that engages a body of numerous actors often with different mindsets. Knecht and Weatherford (2004:6) identify five stages that underpin the foreign policymaking process:

- **Stage 1. Agenda-setting/Problem Presentation**: This stage comprises two sub-stages. Firstly, policymakers (usually government) draft a list of possible areas on which focus should be set. Secondly, decision-makers must clearly identify and describe the stakes involved in a policy.

- **Stage 2. Opinion Generation**: This stage mainly involves brainstorming. Decision-makers must randomly generate a list of specific issues from which the most urgent and critical are being chosen.

- **Stage 3. Policy Design**: A decision-making body then makes policy decisions against the backdrop of issues or cases identified and prioritised in the previous stage. It must be pointed out that this is the key stage involving foreign policy formulation process.

- **Stage 4. Implementation**: Implementation refers to “strategies and tactics” involved in the execution of policies designed or made at Policy Design level. Additionally, foreign policy is usually implemented by multiple actors including DIRCO, and
the Defence, Trade and Industry departments, and others. The influence of civil society should not be precluded in this regard. Moreover, according to Jones (1970:34), the outcomes of this stage can include either “success”, “partial success”, or “failure”, or both.

- **Stage 5. Policy Review**: It is at this level that decision-makers revisit and assess the policy on the bases of achievements and failures. The body will then decide whether to continue, modify or abandon that particular policy.

Each stage of decision-making process “… raises structural and value problems …” perhaps emanating from communication breakdown or lack of consensus among key decision-makers. More often than not, emerging structural and value-related flaws can be detected in the last stage of the process, Policy Review, where assessment is done. This then possibly makes policymaking an endless, circular process since problems identified in the last stage might compel reviewers to either go back to square one repeatedly, depending on the recurrence of decisional or implementation problems (Jones, 1970:34).

### 2.2.2. Foreign Policy Goals and Anticipations

A foreign policy of a particular country is always goal-oriented. For that reason, there are always objectives in place to help attain the latter. Most frequently, foreign policy objectives mirror a state’s possible aspirations and future, set out by a small group of elites or individuals (not by the entire entity)
with the intention to manipulate actors further afield. What brings about the difference in foreign policies of states is how an individual state aims or wishes to best pursue such. As explained earlier, foreign policy is a plan of action that guides decision-makers, the executive body, and the implementation process in general (Landsberg, 2006a:250). However, “achievement” is not always the case since some actors still fail to accomplish their goals while following their respective policies. Foreign policies vary from actor to actor on the bases of goals set and anticipations imposed by the constituency it is meant to benefit.

With the above foreign policymaking stages in mind, Holsti (1995:18-19) points out general foreign policy goals frequently set by actors. Through foreign policy, decision-makers often aim at:

- Establishing security within, and to some degree, beyond their borders. Common national security acts may incorporate crime, insurgency, secession, and militancy. Some authoritarian governments have enforced “purges”, hampered freedom of speech and press, and even massacred the public all in the name of “national security” insurance;

- Efficiently achieving and enhancing national prosperity. National prosperity may involve creation of public welfare. By virtue of leadership, governments strive to develop and sustain public welfare through the provision of economic and social services, especially for those who cannot provide for themselves;

- Earning status and prestige in the international arena. States seek admiration particularly from international counterparts. Historically,
states have endeavoured to enhance their status and prestige through military power. In most countries, military displays have culturally been rendered into manifestation of status. Countries can also earn international status and prestige through science and technology invention, high level of economic development, prowess in extramural activities such as winning soccer World Cup titles, and so on;

- Ensuring and maintaining “autonomy”. The latter entails the capability to formulate and implement one’s own goals and interests without any international interference on the grounds of “sovereignty”. Usually, the possibility of a state’s self-control may be dependant on military, economic, scientific sophistication and independence.

From the perspective of foreign policy goal-setting, decision-makers need to take cognisance of a facet of “morality” in their relations with their international counterparts. Although the international system is anarchic and some policymakers just breach international law within or out of intent, most governments play by the rules of the international system especially in entities such as the UN or even the AU (Hill, 2003:39). In moral terms, they ought to act with “propriety”, “dignity”, honour”, “good faith” in accordance with certain set normative benchmarks. That is, their policies and principles should reflect a sense of “equal treatment” and “fair play” as recommended by international norms. Issues such as military intervention and human rights violations are some of highly debated cases from ethical perspective (Holsti, 1995:309).

Policymakers are also advised to set moderate and achievable targets. Too many goals may only raise the hopes of decision-makers themselves and
those of the public but be seldom attainable, and yet too “few” may generate scepticism around the competency (effectiveness and efficiency) and credibility of a state. Seemingly, foreign policy decision-makers set too many goals; this is manifested by the fact that many states hardly convert exclusively all of their goals into reality. Nevertheless, Hill (2003:45-46) argues that “it should be borne in mind that it is common to have exaggerated political expectations of what can be done with foreign policy … just as there is an academic trend towards expecting too little”. But it can be dangerous to promise beyond one’s capacity. For example, for decision-makers to pledge commitment to, for instance, global distribution of “wealth” can be over-ambitious and therefore seldom achievable (Borer & Mills, 2009:19).

Foreign policymakers have a tendency to pursue too many and various goals concurrently, the motive behind this is attributable to an earnest ambition to follow the so-called “national interests” (Hill, 2003:118-119). The phrase “national interests” is conceptualised in the following section.

2.3. National Interest(s)

In terms of “national interest theory”, states are self-centred especially in the international forums. For this reason, and many others, states are thus believed to be supremely good actors that have “interests” or what Frankel (1963:55-56) calls “raison d’état” just like human beings do. Against the backdrop of multitudinous definitions of the phrase, Bullard (2006: Internet) posits that “… there is no accepted common standard or definition of the concept of national interest … So understanding … [the] … meaning of national interest is totally different from one user to another".
Although there is no fixed definition of the phrase “national interest(s)”, some scholars assume that it concerns foreign policy “goals”, causing it to be a debated concept. Hill (2003:119) asserts that “national interests” cannot be a guide to foreign policy goals because they are “tautologous”. He maintains that the phrase “national interest” is a “measuring stick” in the sense that it indicates whether a particular policy is national or international, or public or private. It specifically shows that certain pursued goals actually emanate from people’s interests, a nation. It is hard to comprehend if one actor would perhaps prioritise regional development in its foreign policy if it were not about the national interests (Alden & Soko, 2005:396).

An element of the prominence of “power” stands out in realist interpretation of national interests. According to the classical realist Hans Morgenthau (1978:4-15), the concept of “national interest” can be explicated on the grounds of “power”. By defining an interest as power, a political observer attempts to portray politics as an independent field of action and understanding, separate from other spheres including economy, religion, security, and so on. Against the background of Morgenthau’s realist vision of national interest, states’ national interests are power-oriented and can also be indicative of such actors’ urge to monopolise political activities in the international sphere (Pham, 2008:258). States, or any other actors, tend to pursue their own interests and justify them as being done “in the name of national interests” so that their actions, whether good or bad, can be widely acknowledged (Adar, 2002:103).

The elite-centric model conceives of the relationship between “public and foreign policy” as almost non-existent. In other words, like realism, this model
views the public as having very diminutive if not no influence at all in foreign policy decision-making and implementation. Both the elite-centric model and realism critically hold that the public is less competent to have any say in foreign policy decision-making and execution because of their natural human weaknesses. These schools of thought emphasise that the masses are, at times, highly susceptible to aspects of weak personality such as “fluctuating moods” and “irrationality”. Thus, they postulate that a state should neglect the “preferences” of the nation, yet it should continue to make use of the phrase to refer to foreign policy goals or guidelines (Knecht & Weatherford, 2004:3). This argument discovers that governments hardly, if not at all, consult with the masses prior to undertaking any foreign policy decisions.

There is, however, a scepticism about the relevance and usefulness of the term “national interests”. Critics charge that governments are the main bodies directly involved in the formulation and implementation of foreign policy, and that a relatively small degree of influence emerges from grass-roots level and the corporate world. Thus, it is appropriate if the phrase “national interests” is replaced with the phrase “goals of the government of the day”. Adar (2002:103) argues that the concept of “national interests” is often “… used mainly by realist scholars … who claim that it provides a better explanation of state behaviour than an explanation that relates everything that a state does to its official ideology”. From a realist angle, one country’s military presence in other conflict-stricken countries can be ascribable to that country’s power-related national interests, let alone the motivation behind peacekeeping (Schoeman, 2007:98). Nevertheless, opponents for instance, can dispute that the majority of ordinary citizens are not even aware when their governments
develop peacekeeping missions in other countries; thus, they have little to do with decisions that have been taken on that matter. Yet decisions are still generally referred to as grounded in the “national interests”.

In the following section, the study will provide a distinction between state and non-state actors.

2.4. **The Distinction between State and Non-State Actors**

Within IR, there are numerous mutually interacting actors, who play pivotal roles in the development and practice of this field of study. In this subsection, focus is placed on both state and non-state actors.

Although the concept “actor” may appear multifaceted and ambiguous, in this subsection, “actor” is used to refer to states and civil society that participate (directly or indirectly) in foreign policy processes (formulation and implementation). As highlighted earlier on, the specific purpose is to draw the line between state actors and non-state actors in IR. The conceptualisation of “state actors” in IR will be succeeded by a conceptualisation and explication of “non-state actors” below.

2.4.1. **State Actors**

Hill (2003:32, 33) broadly conceives of a state as a combination of public institutions and “dispositions” for the enforcement of public order and social stability in a demarcated territory. A modern, industrial state is characterised by its possession of authority over the citizens of the state. This provides a political environment conducive to the existence of a government that has the function of running the political administration of the state. There is a bold line of distinction between a state and a government. The state embodies the
institutions and the citizens, who live within its borders, while government is the instrument through which the authority of the state is exercised.

According to McGowan and Nel (2002:13), “state actors comprise the sovereign territorial states (STSs) in the world together with the intergovernmental organisations … that they form”. It is important to note that states in the international environment are composed of individuals and groups, who are not always in agreement with one another and should therefore not be treated as if they were single, unitary actors. Additionally, intergovernmental organisations (IGOs) that developed because of efforts and involvement of that state, or any other state, can also be referred to as state actors. These institutions include, among others, SADC, the AU, NEPAD, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO).

Realism prescribes that states can be interpreted as “rationally selfish” yet “unitary” actors because of their “power and authority” in any given society (Hicks, 2004:3). States are often unscrupulous and “self-centred” in bilateral and multilateral relations with each other. Realism justifies the egoistic attitude of state actors that is propelled by the anarchical nature of the international system and argue that the blame should be put on the ungoverned international system rather than state actors (Morgenthau, 1978:4-15).

In addition, Goodrich (2004: Internet, 1-2) believes that realism’s rejection of the assumption that states are rational and unitary actors, has often been vilified and remains questionable. The chances of being rational in everything and everywhere are slender. The rationality of a state is heavily depended on a given country, time, and issue at hand: not all states are rational in everything they carry out. Moreover, according to Higgott, Underhill and Bieler
(2001:1), the rejection of states as rational players must not create an impression that they have become diminished in the international arena. However, it can be conceded that states’ roles have “changed”, owing to mounting competitive challenges posed by non-state actors including MNCs in areas such as trade. In the 21st century, states can be said to be dominant and all-embracing actors only at the national level where they are famous for proffering civil and governance services. Based on international politics, Higgott, et al., (2001:1) argue that “there is little or no role left to states beyond the provision of infrastructure and public goods required by business”.

The recent argument is based on the state as a collective actor. Opposite to state actors are non-state actors, which are usually formed by private institutions. Non-state actors are discussed below.

2.4.2. Non-State Actors

The nature of non-state actors can well be traced, from a linguistic viewpoint, by looking at the meaning of the prefix “non-”, which connotes “not” (Hornby, 2005:1142). In this regard, the discussion concerns actors that are not state actors; that is, they are not formed and managed by the state but nevertheless generally operate against the backdrop of national state laws. This may perhaps demonstrate the “power” that states possess, at least at the national political sphere (Adar, 2002:98).

However, there has been a significant increase in the number, size, and power of non-state actors due to increasing globalisation. Idealism, as the main contender of realism, will argue that states are not the only actors that play an eminent role in the international arena. Vincent (2002:147) states that
“... idealist scholars have argued that non-state actors have a significant impact on questions of politics, morality and peace, and that ... the state might not be the most important variable for explaining world events”. Nevertheless, although idealism supports non-state actors, it is against undesirable non-state actors such as criminal syndicates and terrorist groups such as Al-Qaeda.

Vincent (2002:148-161) and Higgott, et al., (2001:1-6) identify types of non-state actors. However, owing to the limited scope of the study, the intent is not to embark on extensive discussion of the illustrations. Rather, the latter shall be presented in a precise tabular form below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CATEGORY</th>
<th>DESCRIPTION</th>
<th>ILLUSTRATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 1. Liberation movements, secessionist groups, terrorist and criminal organisations | • Organisations that defy the authority of existing states and may act extra-legally to attain their aspirations.  
• They often intimidate either survival of a state as a whole or some elements of its lawful norms and values. | • Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) and the African National Congress (ANC) (liberation movement).  
• Tamils (secessionist groups), the Kurds, the Basques, and so on.  
• The Basques separatist organisation and Al-Qaeda (terrorist group).  
• Russian Mafias, Chinese triads, Nigerian drug rings, crime syndicates operating in South Africa (criminal organisations). |
| 2. International non-governmental organisations (INGOs) and transnational social movements (TSMs) | • INGOs – Non-profit, service-centred interest groups that function across numerous countries.  
• TSMs – societal movements whose affiliates are extended throughout the world, and who maintain contact with each other and sometimes carry out joint actions. | • World Federation of Trade Unions, World Federation of Democratic Youth, International Federation of University Women, International Chamber of Commerce, Amnesty International (AI), World Wildlife Fund (WWF) (INGOs).  
• Anti-slavery movement of the early-19th century, anti-Apartheid movement of the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s, worldwide activists against the World Trade Organisation (WTO) (TSMs). |
| 3. Multinational corporations (MNCs) | • Privately-owned business projects planned in one society, with activities in other countries growing out of foreign direct investment | • Industrial corporations such as Ford Motor Company.  
• Financial corporations such as multinational banks.  
• Service corporations such as |
In view of the above, the role of some of these state and non-state actors will be discussed in detail in the next chapter, particularly with specific reference to South Africa’s foreign policy implementation.

The next section draws the distinction between “partner” and “hegemon” in the international relations as ways through which both state and non-state actors may interact.

2.5. **The Difference between a Partner and a Hegemon**

South Africa’s foreign policy has been mired in a controversy with regard to its identity in the international sphere. The latter has somewhat affected the interpretation of the actual role that the country plays in Africa. There is an on-going debate about whether South Africa seeks a partnership with its continental counterparts or it is just a mere self-interested hegemon. It is therefore imperative to explicate both terms as the bases for a discussion of the research findings in chapter 6 where the question whether South Africa is a continental partner or hegemon will be evaluated.

The term “partnership” is used to refer to “friendly” political, economic, and military interaction and cooperation between two or more international actors such as states and non-state actors. Historically, the word

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>4. Individuals</th>
<th>(FDI) abroad.</th>
<th>McDonalds.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• All individuals who, for instance, purchase an imported item, have indirect influence on foreign policy making, and so on.</td>
<td>• Notable individuals include South Africa’s former President, Nelson Mandela and Yugoslavian Mother Theresa (high moral stand), Pope (religious position), and American Bill Gates (prosperity).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

“partnership was often used during British colonialism to depict a process whereby some degree of autonomy, but not full independence, was given to colonies to manage their internal and external affairs. Following these partial changes in interstate relationships, and based on the status of each colony, “partnership” began to be used interchangeably with terms including “dominions”, “dual policy”, “indirect rule”, “paramountcy” and “trusteeship”. In the 1970s and 1980s, the concept was largely manipulated due to the doctrine of international “solidarity” (Lister, [s.a.]: Internet, 2). It suggested some “dual policy” notion where gradual integration takes place, though not the formation of a totally new type of relationship (Duncan, 2007:56).

When explicated, the term “partnership” means actors are often presumed to share similar “... goals and objectives with equal treatment, even though not all partners may be equal in terms of ... power” (Schoeman, 2007:93-94). Partnership is more than mere international cooperation. It is the highest level of reciprocal commitment between international actors. In partnership, there can also be mutual interests, “interdependency”, “cooperation and trust”, “quality control” and “standards” amongst allies. Although there ought to be some extent of interdependence among partners, there must also be a strong sense of sovereignty and independence (Duncan, 2007:55).

As is the case in any other joint venture, international partnership concerns essential aspects of “tolerance” and “commitment” to the same set of values. However, in spite of joint aims and objectives, partners do not always reach consensus in every sphere of interaction (Schoeman,
Partnership, particularly in the international arena, is often visible in areas such as trade, security, humanitarian development, and many others (which will be discussed in chapters 4 and 5 with specific reference to South Africa) where the aim often involves capacity- and bridge-building, efficient use of scarce resources, increased sustainability, and sundry aspects (Lister, [s.a.]: Internet, 2).

Lister, [s.a.]: Internet, 3) argues that a fruitful partnership can be established by incorporating the following elements:

- Two-way trust, accountability, decision-making and information sharing;
- Common perceptions based on reciprocity;
- Neutrality on arising partnership issues; and
- Shared goals and clear allocation of responsibility and performance goals to each unit.

However, international partnerships have often been coupled with operational problems such as financial control especially in the case of aid distribution. As indicated earlier, a partnership must be marked by “mutuality”. What happens in an instance where one state always gives without getting something in return? The answer to this question is that there might be resultant disputes (Lister, [s.a.]: Internet, 4). In view of the above discussion, the concept of “hegemon” can now be considered.

The concept of “hegemon” is developed from the word “hegemony”, which is derived from the Greek word *hegemonia*, meaning “to lead”. A hegemon, in neo-realist terms, concerns “… a country that plays a firm, strong, and credible leadership role, enabled not only by hegemony tied to
military and political power … but also on the ability to exercise unchallenged leadership” (Schoeman, 2007:93). From this, one can deduce that “hegemon” is the word used in political, economic and social affairs to refer to a powerful (economic, political and military) and dominant state (or an organisation) that controls and orders other countries or even the world at large (Evans & Newnham, 1998:221-222). A hegemon plays a “firm”, “strong” and “credible” but sometimes monopolistically unchallenged leadership role in whichever sphere of influence it operates – regional, continental and global (Schoeman, 2007:93). It pursues its own interests, which may also be beneficial to other actors.

Critically, this “unchallenged leadership” can nevertheless be conducted by any powerful actor, be it a state or any other economic player. More often, hegemony has been closely linked with the International Political Economy (IPE) Theory of Hegemonic Stability (THS) founded in the 1970s. It is also associated with studies of international economy, war, and security (McGowan & Nel, 2002:350).

The usage of the term “hegemon” is more effective than often interchangeably used concepts such as “middle power” or emerging power. Hegemony clearly explicates hierarchical and perhaps ideological positions and normative actions of a predominant actor within the confines of regional, continental, and even global politics. Although it has been associated with the emergence of the United States (US) as a “global hegemon”, hegemony has fundamentally and historically been utilised within the field of IR to demonstrate a type and degree of bilateral interaction between developing and highly industrialised countries. In
recent, contemporary studies, the usage of “hegemony” has frequently been restricted to regional relations. Observers have argued that this does not necessarily signify that the concept can be replaced with phrases such as “regional leader”, “regional great power” or even “emerging middle power”. Nevertheless, this is not to deny the fact that all these actors serve one broad purpose: helping develop and coordinate their regions (Prys, 2007:4).

Schoeman (2007: Internet, 3) identifies the following characteristics of a hegemon on the grounds of an actor’s exercise of power, in “Theory of Hegemonic Stability” terms:

- A (potential) hegemon will always yearn for economic and military dominance in the global or, at the very least, in the regional political sphere, while sidelining rivals (also Lentner, 2005:736);
- Materially, a hegemon must be politically, economically and militarily influential in the areas where it seeks hegemonic leadership;
- Its participation and recognition in the international system must speak volumes about its political and leadership prowess;
- It must, to some degree, exhibit a sense of benevolence and “Ubuntu” (a commonly used South African vernacular word to refer to “humanity”) to fellow members within the system or even beyond;
• It ought to play an all-encompassing leadership role grounded in its values and interests; and

• A hegemon would strive to maintain and develop its role and position in what it perceives to be its sphere of influence.

A hegemon can be differently defined by other factors including normative and empirical evaluations. In spite of the failure to give tangible clarifications for the concept “hegemony”, it can be broken down to varying types incorporating “capitalist” hegemony, “regional” hegemony, “cooperative” hegemony, and “economic” hegemony. Prys (2004:7) thus ascribes the obscurity that blankets the concept of “hegemony” to the numerous connotations that have been associated with the term. It is therefore imperative to first conceptualise the term fully and clearly.

A hegemon can broadly take either or both of the two forms: positive or negative, or positive and negative. On the one hand, positive hegemony is frequently marked by commitment to “regulation”, “management”, and “ordering” all to its benefit and subordinate states’. To the strength and capacity of the so-proclaimed “constructive hegemon”, it can set up the rules and indeed convince its subordinates to abide by them, without coercion of any sort. A hegemon of this type can be kind and benevolent in terms of public goods provision and often strive to enlighten usually troubled or low-income secondary countries. On the other hand, a negative hegemon yearns for (oppressive) domination which is closely linked with coercion and “power inequalities” (Selby, [s.a.]: Internet, 3). A negative hegemon is also characterised by “bullying behaviour” and “arrogance”. Reportedly, illustrations of negative hegemons include Britain

For example, “global hegemony” is considered to be an all-encompassing, powerful, and preponderant single state that is preoccupied with hegemonic ambitions. However, according to Taylor (2001:3), global hegemony concerns “… transitional coalitions of social forces committed to a particular concept of control. Such a concept expresses the power of a concrete configuration of economic and political forces, while leading other forces in the absence of viable alternative”. In this instance, one dominant actor in the unity undertakes supreme, fundamental functions in either the military or monetary fields, or both. Nonetheless, this is not to reject the notion that the principal source of hegemony may be vested in the hegemon’s capability to tackle national and international challenges that culminate in a specific group of players interacting with a dominant power. According to Gramscianism, being a hegemon in whichever sphere goes beyond (military and monetary) material possession to also incorporate “intellectual and moral leadership” on the grounds of ideological affiliation (Taylor, 2001:12).

According to Prys (2004:15), there are theories of hegemony in the international arena, whose assumptions are broadly claimed to be valid. Such schools of thought include realism, liberalism, and Marxism, and their respective features are briefly tabulated below:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Prerequisites for and basis of hegemony</th>
<th>Neo-realism</th>
<th>Theory of Hegemonic Stability (THS)</th>
<th>Cyclical Theory</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hegemony = “unipolarity” = power as resource</td>
<td>Hegemony = power preponderance as resource + “prestige”/legitimacy</td>
<td>Material power base + specific idealistic aspects, and organisational and social capacities</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nature and behaviour</td>
<td>Coercive Malign Predatory (literally)</td>
<td>More or less literally gentle/coercive + consensual</td>
<td>Gentle nature, consensual leadership attached to the conceptualisation of “global leadership”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extent of hegemony</td>
<td>Instability (public bad)/private goods</td>
<td>Public goods provision to the whole system (by definition)</td>
<td>Provision of tangible solutions to real problems in global politics instead of broad provision of public good (implicit)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Standard connotations</td>
<td>Negative connotations</td>
<td>Very positive connotations</td>
<td>Very positive connotations, though termed as “global leadership”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denotation – the U.S. being global hegemon?</td>
<td>U.S. being hegemon today</td>
<td>US as today’s hegemon, but still controversial</td>
<td>U.S. from 1973-2050</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal Approaches to the Concept of Hegemony</td>
<td>Marxist Approaches to the Concept of Hegemony</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World System Theory</td>
<td>Neo-Gramscian Approaches</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prerequisites for and basis of hegemony</td>
<td>Hegemony emanating from both soft and hard power factors, abilities/will and legitimacy</td>
<td>Hegemonic status is economically dependant on the productivity of “national” enterprises</td>
<td>Hegemony construed as ability to present national interests as universal preferences grounded in a mixture of material and ideological power</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Nature and behaviour | Definition of hegemony in ethical terms, hegemony implies gentle behaviour and generosity | Barely any behaviour or character-wise implications of the concept per se | “Dominance is inherent to hegemony however obscured by achieving an appearance [...] as if it were the
Hegemonic leadership can be characterised by consensus among the units of the regional, continental, and global system. In view of the Gramscianism, hegemonic leadership is reliant not only on the possession of concrete material resources, but also on the ability to persuade and convince secondary actors, based on ideological grounds, to reach consensus. In this regard, a hegemon exercises leadership based on its “enlightened” interests which must be symbiotically beneficial to both the leader and the subordinates. The presence of a hegemonic power in whatever system may imply political order and minimisation of coercion, although this is not always the case. Prys (2008:8-11) proposes the

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Extent of hegemony</th>
<th>No particular outcomes are meant by definition, they depend on national interest</th>
<th>Hegemony entails stability and peace for the core but mistreatment of the periphery and eventually culminates in war</th>
<th>Hegemony concerns order + economic stability, however, the reproduction of current capitalist order and form of production do largely benefits in hegemony (production of private goods)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Standard connotations</td>
<td>Positive connotation</td>
<td>Negative connotation</td>
<td>Negative connotation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denotation – the U.S. being global hegemon?</td>
<td>The U.S. today is thought to be hegemonic</td>
<td>U.S. hegemon, but not for longer</td>
<td>Since it is not clear whether the U.S. is a hegemon or not, the US-based order is seemingly out of “order” and there is currently no possible successor</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Adapted from Prys (2004:15)
following three dimensions that ought to be considered when attempting to establish or comprehend a political hegemonic system:

- **Perceptions**: This dimension entails both the “self-perception” by the hegemonic power itself and the perceptions by subordinate fellow members within the system. Hegemons are perceived to possess a sense of political willingness to take on the “burdens of hegemony”. This is because a lack of political willingness may culminate in “disappointment” or “bewilderment” especially where there is a widening gap between expectations and concrete or abstract achievements. Most theories generally accept that there cannot be hegemony outside of the “followership” of secondary states. Probably, not all secondary actors will acknowledge the leadership of a hegemon; some are likely to express defiance and condemnation. Thus, establishing a hegemon may, to some extent, depend on reciprocal consensus from every single unit within the system.

- **Projection**: A hegemon must project its values and interests rather than imposing them on its allies. As power actors, hegemons ought to be conscious of the manner in which they carry out their activities and pursue their vision and values. For instance, such obligatory activities include conflict resolution, setting up of institutions, and acquainting themselves with resources such as finance. For a hegemonic power to be affective in values projection, it ought at least to institutionalise
the same “political system” in the intra-state spheres of “troubled”, subordinate state(s).

- **Provision:** As pointed out earlier, a hegemon in whichever sphere is characterised by unilateral, generous provision of public goods. Economic services that are often provided include free trade and markets, and just about any type of services such as infrastructure, security, and others. However, not all observers acknowledge security services as public good(s) (Lentner, 2005:736). Unlike the “perceptions” and “projection” dimensions where there is almost always political will by a hegemon, “provision” of public goods takes place regardless of the preponderant actor’s willingness to become involved or not especially in cases of (natural) disaster.

Material possession is not solely responsible for determining hegemony. Ideological affiliation also plays a significant part. A hegemon, in principle, follows what it ideologically stands for. The ideal image of what a hegemon stands for can be identified as the way in which it views and interprets the world and its contents, perhaps partly influenced by its national interests (Schoeman, 2007: Internet, 2-3).

By way of illustration, South Africa serves as the embodiment of a regional hegemonic actor in the Southern African region; within the framework of a continent, the US best epitomises both a continental and global hegemon in Northern America and in the world respectively. Historically, there have been three global hegemonic powers: Holland, Great Britain (1800s) and the US (1900s). Nevertheless, there is an on-
going about whether the US is a current global hegemon or there is presently no all-encompassing world hegemon, but only states dominating, economically for example, while lagging behind its rivals militarily (McGowan and Nel, 2002:347).

Lastly, the next section generally conceptualises the concept “multilateralism”.

2.6. Conceptualising Multilateralism

Multilateralism was first defined by the US after 1945 as the “international government of the ‘many’”. The US advocated and spearheaded the establishment of multilateral and treaty organisations to address “common” international issues of the time. This is because “multilateralists” believe that, although there is only one global hegemon, multilateral coalitions must benefit all other states for the sake of world stability. The motive behind the creation of multilateral institutions was to bring about security and diplomatic cooperation, and eventually stability in the international system through “multilateral obligations” (Slobodchikoff, 2009:2).

Moreover, there is a controversial and yet thought-provoking debate among constructivists, realists and institutionalists about the definition and implications of multilateralism. In constructivist theoretical terms, states are merely formations participating in multilateral relations, whose objectives, preferences and behaviours are conditioned by “shared norms” (Verdier, 2005:3-4, 5). Conversely, realists believe that moral standards have nothing to do with international relations. They contend that states’ actions are only regulated by their individual interests, where great powers or hegemons are
likely to remain conspicuous in the alliance unless subordinate states decide to amalgamate and form a sub-group in order to strike a power-balance (Verdier, 2005:3-4, 5). It must nevertheless be clear that in a multilateral context where (states) actors are accustomed to inter-rivalry, there are slender chances of development and progress. In the case where inter-rivalry-oriented multilateral institutions do develop, inferior states and the multilateral organisation at large are likely to mirror the national interests of a hegemon. The Institutionalists’ view is somewhere amid constructivism and realism. At some point, institutionalists do concur with constructivists that competition can be regulated by “institutional means”. At another point, the former agree with realists in that they believe that states are selfish and that they only participate in multilateral organisations when there are benefits to reap from them. Additionally, like realists, institutionalists follow a “unitarian and rationalistic” approach in their analysis of multilateralism (Verdier, 2005:3-4, 5).

Since multilateralism became prominent, common international problems have revolved around the global economy (trade and recession), environmental and climate issues, health, human rights (women and children), intellectual property, security, welfare, and other critical issues. The existence of multilateral institutions such as the SADC, the AU and even the UN, to mention but a few, provide a number of advantages. According to Wedgwood (2002:167-168), international multilateral organisations “... can commit powerful states that might prefer to spoil a [regional] strategy, destabilize a situation or travel on an inconsistent course ...”. Kegley (1995:10-14) purports that a multilateral environment is a great platform where states are obliged to respect international law and cooperate in many areas of development
including health, security, economy development and technology. They also get to exchange each other’s interests and concerns, simultaneously seeking to resolve their differences.

However, multilateral organisations do not exist without defects. Decision-making processes in a multilateral context are likely to be sluggish especially if compared with a bilateral partnership. At times, issues at stake end up undecided because decisions are often broadly made without pragmatic and strategic implementation plans. Over time, the agendas for multilateral coalitions might become somewhat irrelevant to world dynamics due to globalisation. Again, notions such as “independence” might slightly distort multilateral decision-making since some member-states might for security reasons be reluctant to release sensitive or categorised information about their domestic affairs. Moreover, “cultural misunderstanding, inability to understand allies’ political constraints, and technological obstacles to interoperability add to the problems” (Wedgwood, 2002:168-169). From the vantage point of culture, multilateralism is, for example, appropriate in Europe because of affiliates who share almost similar cultures and history, but it might not be relevant in Africa and Asia where countries follow different cultures (Slobodchikoff, 2009:5; Acharya & Tow, 2005:1-2). Historically, realists have criticised multilateralism for being an ineffective form of interaction since some great powers use it to exploit low-income states and strive to fulfil their individual interests. They argue that multilateralism simply does not match the “hierarchical power configuration” of the international political environment. Great powers are prejudiced in the sense that they seldom participate in multilateral institutions in which they are likely to be overwhelmed by fellow
members (Wedgwood, 2002:168-169). Slobodchikoff (2009:4-5), for instance, writes that the US has been accused of using multilateral principles within a multilateral NATO while following bilateral doctrines in other multilateral organisations such as the Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO). In principle, if a state declares multilateral preferences, it should do so in all its foreign relations.

Neoliberalism also disagrees with the “universalist” notion of multilateralism. These scholars find regional, instead of global, multilateralism more conducive to dealing with international problems. The bone of contention here is that consensual cooperation and effective and efficient implementation of policies are unlikely in a massive multilateral organisation of almost 200 members-states as is the case of the UN and its subsidiary institutions. For this reason, global multilateralism is prone to unbearable operational problems (Kahler, 1992:682).

2.7. Conclusion

The aim of this chapter has been to provide clarification on key concepts frequently used in the study. This has been done through different theoretical reflections on fundamental IR concepts such as “foreign policy”, “national interests” and “state and non-states actors”, “hegemony” and “multilateralism”, grounded in different theoretical IR approaches of, inter alia, realism, idealism and the elite-centric model. The chief concepts were discussed, coupled with appropriate and practical examples. It was argued that, due to the diverse nature of the study of IR, the concepts do not have single, standard and fixed, and perhaps widely accepted definitions.
It is against the backdrop of this eclectic approach that a number of diverse explanations of terms are proffered. Thus, two slightly different definitions of “foreign policy” were proposed. The first definition can be conceived of as realist, defining foreign policy as aims pursued by a state as the only actor in foreign policymaking. In another liberal-pluralist explanation, “foreign policy” is construed as being developed both by state and non-state actors.

The chapter also discussed “national interest”. Since there is no precise definition of the latter, there are uncertainties surrounding the phrase “national interest”. There is a current debate about whether the concept “national interest” is still relevant in the contemporary political context, or national interests refer to the ambitions of leading elite and not those of the nation.

Since international relations are between actors, it is relevant to distinguish between two categories of international actors: state actors and non-state actors. States actors are those actors that constitute the 194 sovereign territorial states and the intergovernmental organisations they develop. Such intergovernmental institutions incorporate SADC, the AU, NEPAD, and others. Non-states actors are those actors that indirectly engage in foreign policymaking. Examples of the former are liberation movements, terrorist groups, TSMs, MNCs, and ordinary individuals.

Distinctions have also been made between the concepts of “partner” and “hegemon”. Usually, a partner shares similar aims and objectives with fellow partners; nevertheless, that does not necessitate equality. A hegemon is an actor that is economically and military powerful, and that plays a definite and influential leadership role within the region, continent or the world in general. It may be seeking to play a leading but sometimes
monopolistic role. There are various types of hegemons including regional and global hegemons, and military and economic hegemons.

Lastly, multilateralism a system of regional, continental and global coalition formed out different actors with the aim to address common problems. Multilateral relations are usually marked interactions among actors who share similar, common interests in the international sphere.

The contextually conceptualised terms mentioned above are fundamental to the entire study and will therefore be frequently referred to throughout subsequent chapters. For the purpose of the next chapter, specific roles of the actors (state and non-state) discussed above, are explored in a much-detailed way. The focus is placed specifically on the actor’s contribution to foreign policy formulation and implementation, particularly in the context of South Africa’s foreign policy. All actors were considered regardless of the degree of input they exert in foreign policy.
CHAPTER 3: SOUTH AFRICA’S FOREIGN POLICYMAKING

3.1. Introduction

When developing foreign policy or attempting to understand how it is formulated, it is important to contemplate the domestic environment of the state in question. It is widely accepted that domestic issues exert an influence on foreign policymaking. According to Holsti (1995:17), issues such as “…wars, alliances, imperialism, diplomatic manoeuvres, isolation, and the many goals of diplomatic action can be viewed as the results of domestic political pressures, national ideologies, public opinion, or economic and social needs”. More often than not, foreign policy of a particular state is not a mere “reaction” to the external political context but mainly a reflection of that state’s citizen needs and values at grassroots level.

This chapter offers a comprehensive overview of South Africa’s foreign policymaking. It is a continuation of chapter 2, especially with regard to the general actors in foreign policy. However, here, specific reference is made to South Africa’s foreign policy context. Therefore, the aim of the chapter is to analyse descriptively South Africa’s foreign policymaking, mainly stressing actors involved in the process. The broad argument of the chapter is that South Africa’s post-1994 foreign policy is multifaceted in the sense that it focuses on multiple issues, involving several actors, following a lengthy process of policy formulation. The first part of the chapter deals with the broad theoretical background of foreign policy decision-making. This is followed by an analysis of the bases on which South Africa’s foreign policy principles are
grounded. Subsequent to the latter is the discussion on various actors in order of the degree of their participation in South Africa’s foreign policymaking.

3.2. Foreign Policymaking: Theoretical Background

Direct foreign policymakers are no less influential in policymaking. In fact, Holsti (1995:17, 16) refers to policy decision-makers as “state behaviour” determinants. This implies that policymakers decide on foreign policy purpose, aims and objectives, resource allocation, formulation and execution all in the name of the state. Nonetheless, this does not necessarily signify that decision-makers are sheer “free agents” for their decision-making powers are limited, as explained earlier, by numerous national considerations (such as “terms of reference”, senior leaders and party rules) and even external factors. They nevertheless are permitted to make minimal policy changes as per their leadership styles and the national status quo (Hill, 2003:89).

From the vantage point of the theory of bureaucratic politics, foreign policymaking involves rival government actors such as departments that largely influence policy “choices” through “bargaining” and “compromise” (McGowan & Nel, 2006:392). In this regard, international scholars such as Graeme Allison (as cited by Hughes, 2004:7-8) have made a valuable contribution through works such as Essence of Decision in the 1960s and 1970s. Allison’s argument generally evolves around interdepartmental and interpersonal predicaments in the foreign policymaking context. It also scrutinises bureaucratic factors such as national interests and objectives involved when making foreign policy choices. Allison points out that such foreign policy elements may at some stage “clash” irrespective of how rational
they are, leading to inconsistencies. That is, bureaucratic roles and conflicting foreign policymaking often culminate in nothing else but lack of correspondence between ambitioned aims and objectives of an actor and eventual outcomes due to internal contradictory policies. Frankel (1963:34) predicts that in this kind of a situation, different foreign policies may emerge due to lack of cooperation stemming from competitive and antagonistic relations, which could turn well-formulated policies into mere, haphazard statements. In the international arena, conflicting or competing foreign policies are observable in an instance where a low-income actor may be democratic but regularly interacts with autocratic or authoritarian neighbouring countries (Hill, 2003:86-88).

While the bureaucratic politics model stresses that bureaucratic roles condition foreign policy architecture, “expected-utility” theory emphasises the view that decisions-makers generally seek to champion the cause of national interests and their individual preferences. This model is linked to realism.

Expected-utility theory is centred on the following doctrines:

- Individual policymakers are “rational” for they are able to prioritise foreign policy issues on the bases of national interests;
- Issues are organised transitively;
- Individuals are familiar with their own national interests;
- Decision-makers are likely to contemplate alternative ways through which they can realise their goals in accordance with “expected-utility”; and
• Individual policymakers go for the strategy that produces most-desired outcomes (Russett & Starr, 1996:224).

According to expected-utility theory, policymakers often become sceptical when exercising foreign policy preferences or making decisions due to possible unpredictable success or failure outcomes. The uncertainty regarding potential outcomes can psychologically and structurally affect decision-makers' capacity and confidence. This is a point clearly taken by expected-utility model that emphasise the willingness and ability to act on foreseeable opportunities instead of predictions, as the only basis for policymaking (Russett & Starr, 1996:224).

Although state-actors are universally considered foreign policymaking custodians particularly in realist terms, the "pluralist-interdependence" model notes that it is non-state players in the corporate world that often bring up the agenda for decision-making, which is made up of principles, national interests and "aspirations". Consequently, policymaking becomes a multifaceted and continual process “… of interaction and consultation between private transnational groups, politicians, bureaucrats, and many others: hence the term pluralist" (Holsti, 1995:8).

Russett and Starr (1996:13-16) argue that the following six aspects ought to be considered (as framework of analysis) when undertaking or analysing foreign policymaking processes:

• **Individual Policymakers**: Cognisance must be taken of the present decision-maker(s) as contrasted with their predecessors so as to establish differences in decisions made in all the generations;
• *Functions of Decision-makers*: The kind of policy-related decisions role-players undertake rest on the types of responsibilities designated to them, i.e. decision-makers’ assigned roles and activities that determine the degree to which they may make policy decisions that can subsequently shape their professional behaviour;

• *Government Formation*: Governmental context can greatly affect decision-makers. For example, in a democratic environment, some policy decisions made by policymakers are often challenged by the opposition and community representatives. In that sense, their policymaking powers are constrained. Contrary to this, authoritarian policymakers can undertake decisions outside the opposition’s or public approval;

• *Social Characteristics*: This entails different societal characteristics and capacity on the bases of the “haves” and the “have not’s”. Highly industrialised countries, for example, can afford contemporary sophisticated weapons because they are mostly well resourced. Conversely, low-income countries are apparently poor and under-resourced and are vulnerable to security or economic invasion. Consequently, decisions that leaders make are heavily dependant on how much their country possesses;

• *International Affairs*: Decision-makers must pay attention to whatever foreign policy decisions they make in the name of the state since such decisions will eventually affect their relations with their counterparts. Moreover, by way of embodiment, democratic states often interact very well and peacefully among themselves.
Problems might emerge in democratic-dictatorship relations where both states hold completely opposite belief systems. The same is the case in rich-poor relations: the rich is likely to dominate the poor; the poor is also prone to dependence on the rich in terms of resources; and

- **Global System**: Policymakers must take cognisance of the entire world system and all its contents in the decision-making process.

Further to the arguments above, it is important to consider South Africa’s foreign policy principles as prescribed by the post-1994 ANC-led government. This shifts the argument to South Africa’s foreign policy principles to which actors must respond.

### 3.3. South Africa’s Foreign Policy Principles

Policy principles are important and influential in decision-making in the foreign policy. National values constrain and condition personality and professional traits of decision-makers, even of those who do not believe ideologies can psychologically affect decision-makers (Hill, 2003:89; Hughes, 2004:9). Values also help preserve the culture of a particular community especially in the international sphere. Accordingly, values or principles remain as elements of the environment that exercise an influence on “and penetrate into the psychological environment of the decision-makers” (Frankel, 1963:117-119). Since national values are “social” rather than “personal”, the mental influence that these values impose on policy-makers differs based on the extent of their decisional consciousness and the support they have. Since policymakers make decisions in the name of the state in its entirety, the
sources of the principles that guide the decision-making processes should also emerge from or be grounded in public interest or culture.

Hughes (2004:10) observes that the ideas that drive the decision-making processes in contemporary South African foreign policy are no less powerful since “the guiding idea undergirding … South African foreign policy is that of the African Renaissance …”\(^3\).

Schoeman (2007:96) argues that post-apartheid South Africa’s foreign policy is by definition Africa-oriented. However, South Africa did not immediately assume an Africa-oriented policy after 1994, and its foreign policy has not always been “so African”, especially in the pre-1994 period.

In the post-1994 era, the ANC adopted a foreign policy plan of action, which has been castigated for being merely “idealistic” (recall mottos such as the promotion of respect for human rights and democracy) rather than pragmatic (Le Pere & Van Nieuwkerk, 2004:120).

Post-apartheid South African foreign policy generally prioritises the enhancement and development of the African Agenda. It also labels the North-South Dialogue (Landsberg, 2006a:252) and the Global Governance imperative and therefore devotes much attention to contentious issues (DIRCO, 2005: Internet).

South Africa’s post-1994 foreign policy is guided by the following normative principles.

The principle of promotion of respect for human rights extends beyond the political sphere, embracing the economic, social, and environmental

\(^3\) The role of South Africa in the development of the concept of the “African Renaissance” will be discussed in detail in chapter 4.
dimensions. As indicated earlier, the prioritisation of human rights has often been accentuated by President Mandela. The prioritisation of human rights in South Africa’s post-apartheid foreign policy perhaps emerged due to the ANC’s historical resistance for human dignity and equality (Barber, 2004:87). However, the latter and many other scholars such as Schraeder (2001:237), consider the Mandela Administration’s advocacy for human rights self-contradictory. They base their position, for example, on the cases of the “Two Chinas”\(^4\) and the “1995 Nigerian Human Rights” saga\(^5\), which had to do with human rights violations.

Human rights considerations, especially during the Mandela era, was an integral part of South Africa’s foreign policy. Maluwa (2000: Internet) is of the view that respect for human rights is not only significant in the political but also in the economic, social and even environmental spheres.

South Africa is committed to international relations guided by principles of peace, justice and international law. It is important to note that South Africa’s continental commitment to continental security is something that was not a priority during the immediate post-1994 era. This only became a preference in 1998 with South Africa’s military intervention in Lesotho, but especially became pronounced since 1999 when South Africa entered the peacekeeping

\(^4\) “The Two Chinas” is a phrase often used to refer to existing tension between the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the Republic of China (Taiwan), and is mainly based on their rival economic interests in Africa. Taylor (1997: Internet) and many other scholars have confirmed the bitter struggle between the PRC and Taiwan for recognition on the African continent and how that continues to exacerbate strained relations between them.

\(^5\) Contradictory support for human rights: Mandela supposedly censured the planned execution of Ken Saro-Wiwa by the Abacha Administration while he and the ANC have followed and continue to employ the so-called “quiet diplomacy” technique towards Zimbabwe on the grounds of atrocious human rights violations (Myburgh, 2008: Internet). Contradictory economic policy: following the mishandling of the “Saro-Wiwa” case, President Mandela then called for economic sanctions to be imposed on Nigeria yet his government proclaimed that South Africa is striving towards economic development on the continent. This call angered pro-Africans and those who oppose the West (Evans, 1996:263).
arena in the Democratic Republic Congo (DRC) (this issue will receive further elaboration in chapter 5). In the outline of its commitments, South Africa gives prominence to the promotion of continental security. It affiliated with the NPT immediately after voluntarily abdicating its nuclear weapons programmes. In concert with other African states and other states from outside the continent, South Africa has made a significant contribution in the development of the global prohibition of anti-personnel landmines (Schoeman, 2007:98-99). How pro-Africa the South African government is on security issues might largely depend on pragmatic, evident peacekeeping operations it has conducted and less on principles.

South Africa has promised to carry out international peacekeeping missions where necessary. South Africa has been the “dominant military power” on the African continent and it potentially remains so (Inglis, 2008:34). From the perspective of peacekeeping mediation, negotiation, and intervention in Africa, South Africa has often served under the auspices of the SADC, the AU and the UN. Inglis (2008:34) posits that the expectations of South Africa as an emergent “continental peacemaker and keeper” is high. The South African government has executed both peacemaking and peacekeeping operations in countries such as the DRC, Ivory Coast and Burundi (Adebajo, Adedeji & Landsberg, 2007:21). South Africa has also undertaken peacekeeping missions in Lesotho in 1998, in conjunction with Botswana (Landsberg, 2000: Internet, 110).

South Africa is committed to the promotion of justice and international law on the continent, on which the above peacemaking and peacekeeping endeavours are based. The SA Yearbook 2008/9 (GCIS, 2009b: Internet,
360) prescribes that actors dealing with international promotion of justice and international law should “… identify and research legal questions that relate to matters pertaining to the administration of justice between South Africa and other states … ”. It ought to develop international legal cooperation and conclude extraditions and mutual-assistance agreements.

Another principle concerns South Africa’s active participation and cooperation in the economic development of Southern Africa and Africa. Former DIRCO Minister Alfred Nzo has emphasised the need for economic development on the continent (SAGI, 2008: Internet). South Africa’s trade relations with the rest of Africa improved greatly towards the mid-1990s and mid-2000s (Schoeman, 2007:99). Today, South Africa is regarded as sub-Saharan Africa’s economic superpower, accounting for 35% of its combined Gross Domestic Product (GDP). It is also a principal FDI supplier; making it a key trading partner to numerous countries especially in the region (Rabobank, 2009: Internet, 2, 5). As part of the economic development plan, most South African transnational corporations (TNCs) are currently operating in Africa. The data released in 2002 indicates that South African exports were much larger than its imports from the rest of the continent. Nonetheless, South Africa has been denounced by some of its African counterparts for trade imbalances that exist between it and the rest of the continent (Alden & Soko, 2005:380-381). Critics argue that South Africa’s economy is growing and has become the largest African investor on the continent, precisely because it is exploiting its African partners. Inglis (2008:34) is one of the few authors who object to the fact that trade imbalances ultimately lead to South Africa being
conceived of as African “hegemon” and “bully”. This issue is discussed in depth in subsequent chapters.

As another principle, South Africa is committed to the development of national democracy in an attempt to overcome humanitarian problems. As a young democracy, South Africa aims to encourage the development of democracy in Africa. It aims to achieve this through the employment of the similar model it applied in negotiating its own democracy in the early to mid-1990s: the “democracy through peace deal model”. However, it might be improbable to realise a desired democracy if the following requirements are not met: the will and ability to negotiate, respect for human rights, neo-liberal economic persuasion and liberal democratic principles (Curtis, 2007:255-257; Vines, 2010:54-55). Hudson H. (2007:6) pessimistically contends that this goal might hardly be attainable since it is difficult to democratise foreign policy. Pragmatically, achieving democracy may be quite a difficult and difficult journey especially in seemingly authoritarian countries like Zimbabwe. This is because the latter does not meet any of the democratic requirements mentioned above. Again, since South Africa allegedly exercises “quiet diplomacy” towards Zimbabwe, this might seriously hamper the country from accomplishing its continental democratic aspirations (Landsberg, 2000: Internet, 12). Foreign policy scholars like Le Pere and Van Nieuwkerk (2002:250) propound the view that South Africa’s post-apartheid foreign policy has placed too much emphasis on “ideas” and “concepts” such as continental “democratisation”, paying limited attention to clearly outlined implementation tactics and strategies.
South Africa is also committed to a principle to uphold the interests of the African continent (DIRCO, 2009b: Internet, 7). South Africa is committed to the development of socio-political interests of Africa. It has probably played the principal role in the development of NEPAD and the AU. For example, South Africa proved its leadership competence when it organised the NEPAD Secretariat meetings and chaired the AU in 2002/3. The country has also affiliated with many other African organisations including the Pan African Parliament (PAP). This clearly shows South Africa’s demonstrable partnership character with other African countries (Schoeman, 2007:98-7).

South Africa’s foreign policy has generally been sharply criticised, inter alia, for outlining foreign policy goals without tactically delineating how its objectives will be realised and also for focusing too much on ideals rather than on pragmatism (Hudson H., 2007:2, 18). Venter (1997:78) holds the view that the problem also lies with South Africa’s all-encompassing “identity” phrase, namely the “rainbow nation”, and the slogan is therefore to be radically vilified for the “ambiguity” of its foreign policy. It is argued that the country “… cannot afford a ‘rainbow policy’ in [its] foreign relations; it cannot be everything to everyone”. South Africa’s endeavour to be all things to all people may be unattainable and may just end up being nothing unto itself. Although issues of human rights, economic development, democracy, and so forth, are of equal importance, South Africa needs to be selective and identify certain limited priority areas of concern pertaining to its commitment in Africa. This will obviously help identify the country’s “conception of the self”, which is currently missing. Most states attempt to avoid contradictory targets because they find it difficult to lay down specific priorities; they consequently uphold a broad

Hudson H. (2007:2) also criticises South Africa’s post-apartheid foreign policy as “inconsistent”, “incoherent” and “schizophrenic”. Lack of “coherence” allegedly stems from actors who are virtually from completely different mindsets, but participate in shaping and executing foreign policy (Suttner, 1996: Internet). Spence (2004:37) by contrast, argues that South Africa’s foreign policy is quite “coherent” and “goal-oriented”.

The four points expounded above mostly analyse ethical guidelines for South Africa’s foreign policy. These principles provide a concrete foundation for foreign policymaking. Hill (2003:51) notes that “… foreign policy actions cannot be understood without an appreciation of their implementation phase, which is at least as important as that of decision-making …”. For this reason, against the background of the earlier mentioned principles, it is essential to consider the actors involved in the formulation and implementation of South Africa’s foreign policy.

3.4. Foreign Policy Actors- Whose Role is what?

Generally, foreign policy is a double-sided component of international relations. It concerns both the internal and external spheres of state interaction. According to Carlsnaes (2008:86), foreign policy involves domestic issues and institutions of a particular state that are directly or indirectly involved, as well as foreign matters on which decisions are actually based. For example, South Africa’s post-apartheid foreign policy, although it is
formulated at national level, it also emphasises the government’s ambitious commitment to the region and, in extension, the continent (Van der Westhuizen, 1998:435). Hill (2003:28) posits that “… foreign policymaking is a complex process of interaction between many actors …”. In the foreign policy of any state, engaged actors may not play similar roles. Some institutions participate in decision-making more prominently than others (Carlsnaes, 2008:86). For instance, politicians are often dominant decision-makers, overwhelming non-state actors such as civil society (Kent-Brown, 2002:116).

Participating state-actors vary from state to state; therefore, they have different roles and titles. In some states, Ministers of International Relations and Presidents are primary actors in their foreign policies, while the US has the “Secretary of State” and Great Britain the Prime Minister (Hill, 2003:52-53). Following the preceding illustration, the head of government and international minister traditionally have been notable and crucial figures in foreign policy decision-making. Based on international law, the head of government, be it the president, prime minister or autocrat, authoritatively spearheads foreign policymaking processes and eventually the execution phase. The minister of international relations, cooperatively with the head of government, plays a role in both the formulation and implementation of the policy, and often administers advisory services to a head of government. In spite of role-player’s titles and the degree of their influence on foreign policy, all actors that have an impact on general decision-making in South Africa’s foreign policy will receive attention as per role they play.

South Africa’s foreign policy instruments and their respective roles are discussed below. Such actors include the president, the DIRCO, the
Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), the Department of Defence (DOD), Parliament, civil society and such.

3.4.1. The Presidency

Harry Truman, former US president (1945-1952), proclaimed that “the President makes foreign policy” (Frankel, 1963:21). Hill (2003:53) affirms that most heads of government are inevitably involved in foreign policy formulation and implementation, and that they often spend large proportions of their time on this process. This is also the case in South Africa, the US, France, and other states where a president serves the functions of both head of government and head of state.

Within the confines of South Africa, the president is the “most powerful actor” in foreign policymaking (Suttner, 1996: Internet; Hudson H., 2007:4). However, this does not necessarily signify that the president is the sole policy actor. Foreign policy powers, perhaps a bit inferior to those of the president, are also vested in the hands of a deputy president, a limited group of relevant ministers or departments in general (Landsberg & Masiza, 1995:12; Kent-Brown, 2002:116). Two presidents have so far largely dominated South Africa’s post-apartheid foreign policymaking: Nelson Mandela and Thabo Mbeki (Hughes, 2004:15).

Le Pere and van Nieuwkerk (2004:123) assert that former President Nelson Mandela, owing to his personality and international prestige, was mostly prominent in every foreign policy issue throughout his tenure. For this reason, he was even dubbed the “Colossus of Rhodes”. This name followed a perception that South Africa’s foreign policy was starting to follow his public
statements and profile instead of him, as the President, basing his leadership on established policy guidelines (Mills, 1997: Internet). By way of illustration, Landsberg and Masiza (1995:12) argue that former President Mandela, during his visit to Namibia, took a unilateral decision to cancel Namibia’s debt of R80 million to South Africa without consulting with the ANC, the Cabinet, or Parliament, let alone the opposition parties. Other notable events during the Mandela era include his call for the imposition of sanctions on Nigeria following the execution of Ken Saro-Wiwa in 1995, and advocacy for the removal of West African Gulliver from the Commonwealth, which Adebajo, et al. (2007:23) argue failed due to lack of African support. Procedurally, the South African president must keep Cabinet abreast of current affairs and get approval on every major policy decision from Parliament. This vividly embodies the superior foreign policy powers at the disposal of the President in South Africa.

International relations scholars such as Le Pere and Van Nieuwkerk (2004:123) are critical of former President Mandela’s dominance in South Africa’s foreign policy, arguing that he somewhat trivialised and compromised the capability or participation of other actors including DIRCO, the Cabinet and Parliament. Suttner (1996: Internet) provides the motive behind the confusing nature of the role of the President in South Africa’s foreign policy by stating that “in South Africa it is not clear exactly how the Office of the State President relates to the foreign structures. It is not clear how the foreign policy structures advise the State President before he makes any decisions on foreign policy”. Although former President Mandela’s foreign policy was arguably not fully coordinated especially as contrasted with that of the Mbeki
Administration, it is imperative to point out that it was not without successes. Apparently, among those who helped to organise and facilitate South Africa’s re-emergence in the international arena, Nelson Mandela was in the “foreground”. As possibly the world’s most famous political prisoner of the 20th century, Nelson Mandela became the “brand-name” utilised to sell South Africa in the international sphere. However, as one scholar conjectures, Mandela’s international profile reached the extent where it was too heavy for DIRCO to carry alone, especially from the perspective of fulfilling the international community’s expectations on South Africa. This led, he argues, to the evident “… inconsistencies in the conduct of South Africa’s foreign relations …” (Mills, 2000:286).

Conversely, former President Mbeki’s foreign policy was arguably much “clearer” and more “predictable” than that of the Mandela Administration (Landsberg, 2006a:264). Throughout his presidential terms of service, Mbeki has been in possession of very good and influential diplomatic skills. He purportedly acquired these skills during his lengthy years of exile as the ANC’s chief international representative and diplomat. President Mbeki’s achievements incorporate a reconfiguration of South Africa’s relations with the US, the European Union (EU), and the South especially the African continent. He has also been actively involved in the development of the concept of the “African Renaissance” and the NEPAD programme, which strives towards, amongst others, good economic and corporate governance (Le Pere & Van Nieuwkerk, 2002:252; Le Pere & Van Nieuwkerk, 2004:123-124). Throughout his presidential terms, President Mbeki called for multilateralism in resolving regional conflicts and additionally sent peacekeepers abroad. Moreover, he
has played a remarkable role in the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), the AU and the UN (Schoeman, 2007:23).

Against the backdrop of the current South African system of governance, it is clear that a president can have superior influence on foreign policy and in deciding whether South Africa will adopt a partnership or a hegemonic approach towards the African continent.

However, for some years, observers in the ANC have articulated their concerns regarding the leadership role of president vis-à-vis that of DIRCO (Cilliers, 1999: Internet). This paves the way for the discussion on the role of DIRCO in South Africa’s foreign policy processes.

### 3.4.2. The Department of International Relations and Cooperation

Presumably, within the confines of any state, the international relations ministry is often one of primary foreign policy planners. Unlike foreign policy that is somewhat “continuous”, foreign ministers change from government to government and from term to term (Frankel, 1963:28). The international relations ministry of any state does not exercise policymaking and execution in isolation from other government bodies. Usually, in a country where there is a cabinet, the international relations ministry is obliged to inform all cabinet members as a group of any foreign policy issues (Hill 2003:53, 54). Furthermore, such ministries, whether insightful of foreign policy issues and processes or not, must collaborate with a team of foreign policy experts for advice, external information and policy analysis (Frankel, 1963:28-29).

Hill (2003:53) emphasises that foreign Ministers participate in foreign policymaking “… by virtues of specializing in external policy but … they are
always likely to be trumped by a head of government who decides to take a direct interest in foreign affairs”. Hill (2003:77-78) therefore outlines the following fundamental functions that any international relations ministry must perform:

- **Routine information-gathering**: The foreign ministry often relies on its credible diplomats that serve the purpose of, amongst others, accumulating and analysing detailed information about other countries. Diplomats frequently perform information-gathering duties in concert with the intelligence services and, to a limited degree, the media.

- **Policymaking**: Although politicians largely hold the foreign policymaking reins under the assistantship of their political parties, they do need professional help from experts in the foreign ministry. For example, it may be an onerous and daunting task for the Minister in DIRCO to scrutinise incoming data, to interpret and forecast other states’ actions and participate in foreign policymaking on her own, outside the advice of experts in this field.

- **Memory**: within the foreign ministry, diplomats play a crucial role of record keeping. It is always important to archive information on a state’s commitments and treaties into a system for future references, especially when it comes to foreign policymaking and restructuring. It might be challenging to accurately cite, in several decades to come, that the African continent was “… the second largest export region after Europe, with a R16.7 billion trade balance in 1994 in South Africa’s favour had the very data not been
kept in the system in spite of the changes in government since 1994 (Venter, 1997:85).

In the South African context, between 1994 and 1999, DIRCO was led by the late Alfred Nzo (1925-2000). However, almost in the same era, the “new” DIRCO was confronted with multiple intra-departmental challenges. The first challenge revolved around departmental racial composition (Suttner, 1996: Internet). At the dawn of the post-1994 epoch, DIRCO, under the Mandela Administration, was still largely racially dominated by white staff. Alden and Le Pere (2004:285) argue that the department in 1997 constituted 60 percent white staff members while the remaining 40 percent were black. The majority of white staff members were holdovers (a people who keep positions of power before, during and after political transition) from the previous regime mingled with the then incoming cadres from the ruling ANC to serve in the department. In that early post-1994 epoch, the fundamental challenge was to strike a balance or try to attain ethnic equilibrium in the department.

The second challenge was gender-related. According to Le Pere and Van Nieuwkerk (2004:121), as well as Suttner (1996: Internet) the DIRCO was confronted with departmental gender imbalances. Le Pere and Van Nieuwkerk (2004:121) report that male personnel outnumbered their women counterparts. Nonetheless, based on the March 2009 statistics, DIRCO staff members employed through the Employment Equity Act, 55 of 1998 stand at 1083 male and 1270 female. This clearly shows transformation in the departmental human resources section since women staff members now outnumber the male members (DIRCO, 2009c:23).
The third challenge was internal divisions based on ideological affiliation. This was believed to be one of the most important factors that led to departmental fragmentation in the early post-1994 era (Inglis, 2008:37). The department was divided into two camps: “neo-mercantilists” versus “internationalists” (Van der Westhuizen, 1998:444). The neo-mercantilists camp, which Le Pere and Van Nieuwkerk (2004:121-122) coin “holdovers”, consisted of ancien régime diplomats who had a firm belief in the significance of trade and self-interest. The belief system of the former was therefore rooted in the teachings of neo-realism and the “New Diplomacy”.

Conversely, “internationalists” were essentially former political activists who had returned from chronic exile immediately after the apartheid system was dismantled. This camp largely believed in “a demonstrably greater degree of solidarity with the collective problems of the developing world” (Le Pere & Van Nieuwkerk, 2004:122).

Bearing in mind South Africa’s history of human rights violations, this faction encouraged South Africa to adopt a position of the respect for human rights in its foreign policy (Van der Westhuizen, 1998:444). Overall, the basic challenge was to do away with the issue of ideological differences within the department.

The fourth challenge concerned departmental leadership and its performance in policy coordination (Cilliers, 1999: Internet). According to Alden and Le Pere (2004:285), former Minister Alfred Nzo was not a “strong and assertive” leader who could make firm decisions regarding policymaking and departmental transformation. These leadership flaws were attributed to Nzo’s timid personality. For example, according to Muller (1997:69), the
former Minister’s submissive character culminated in a perception that he was not fully doing his job, which left Aziz Pahad, former Deputy Minister, doing more than the Minister did. This leadership dilemma and others factors might have, to some extent, contributed to lack of steadfast foreign policy coordination guided by vivid strategic purpose (Muller, 1997:69). The fact that many actors with different mindsets participated in foreign policymaking process rather resulted in poor policy coordination. They maintain that multiple decision-makers’ participation and crowded policymaking process could have caused nothing else but “incoherent”, “inconsistent” and “opaque” foreign policy since actors themselves have different perhaps contradictory interests (Suttner, 1996: Internet; Le Pere & Van Nieuwkerk (2004:123).

Lastly, DIRCO had the challenge of thawing out its tense relations with the Portfolio Committee on International Relations and Cooperation, the DTI, and the DOD. Landsberg and Masiza (1995:13) report that there was some “hostility” between DIRCO and its portfolio committee in Parliament in terms of policymaking. The committee expressed dissatisfaction that it and the constituency were being shut out of foreign policy processes by both DIRCO and the ANC. The former maintained that it had less influence over the work of DIRCO than other committees have over their departments. Furthermore, to the disappointment of DIRCO, the “increasingly assertive” portfolio committee spelled-out the contradictions in the re-prioritisation of the country’s foreign policy (Vale, 1995: Internet).

DIRCO plays a critical part in South Africa’s foreign policy implementation through its diplomacy. The latter is the medium via which the South African government communicates with and conduct its relation with its continental
counterparts. It is thus this division of the department which is directly involved in pursuing South Africa’s national interests through its ambassadors, diplomats and consular officials, practicing either partnership or hegemonic tendencies abroad.

Although the South African government (SAGI, 2008: Internet) has often guaranteed that DIRCO would interact with all the departments that have international involvement, DIRCO has had not so good relations with the DTI. The “DFA-DTI” interdepartmental disputes had always existed, dating from the apartheid dispensation. The DTI had frequently expressed unease about what departmental officials called favouritism towards DIRCO when it comes to resource allocation by government. It was reported that “… there was a 7:1 DFA-DTI personnel ration in foreign missions in 1994 …” which the post-apartheid government seemed to be more than willing to get rid of. The “DFA-DTI” departmental interactions have been characterised by personality clashes notably between senior management. For instance, it was alleged that Rusty Evans and Zav Rustonjee, the then Directors-General in DIRCO and the DTI respectively, detested each other. These interdepartmental verbal fights were believed to have delayed and incurred lack of direction in the endeavours to bring about “coordination” and perhaps “amalgamation” between the two departments (Mills, 2000:283).

DIRCO has also been led by Dr. Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, who has recently been replaced by Minister Maite Nkoana-Mashabane (from 2009 to date). The latter is coupled with two Deputy Ministers, Sue van der Merwe and Ebrahim Ismail Ebrahim (DIRCO, 2009a: Internet).
DIRCO, as a bureaucratic custodian of foreign policy, envisions an African continent that is “prosperous, peaceful, democratic, non-racial, non-sexist and united … which contributes to a world that is just and equitable” (DIRCO, 2009b: Internet; Kent-Brown, 2002:127). The department is bound to develop South Africa’s national interests and values abroad, to uphold the African Renaissance and the create a better world for all on the foundation of the following values: patriotism; loyalty; dedication; Ubuntu; integrity and Batho Pele.

Suttner (1996: Internet) contends that the Minister in DIRCO is supposed to be a principal figure in foreign policy decision-making. Nevertheless, due to certain inevitable circumstances, primary decision-making powers are vested in the hands of the president. As the name of the department suggests, the Minister in DIRCO is often out of the country.

According to Hughes (2004:39), as explained earlier, DIRCO and the DTI have proven to be in some kind of bureaucratic competition. This rivalry is believed to be further exacerbated by contradictory and overlapping roles of both departments abroad. Consider the role played by the DTI in the foreign policy formulation arena.

3.4.3. The Department of Trade and Industry

Since 1994, the DTI has been considered the “chief steward” of South Africa’s bilateral and multilateral trade and investment relations (Le Pere & Van Nieuwkerk, 2004:124). The difference between foreign policy and trade policy is very slender; therefore, a tangible interplay between the DTI and other major foreign policy actors including the Presidency and DIRCO ought
to exist. Many trade policies concluded by the DTI inevitably affect South Africa’s foreign policy in general (Suttner, 1996: Internet). Notable trade policy actors within the DTI include the International Trade and Economic Development Division (ITED) (primary negotiator); the International Trade Administration Commission (ITAC) (trade policy administer); and Trade and Investment South Africa (export and investment promoter) (Draper, 2005:95). Overall, the abovementioned institutions variably deal with matters related to South Africa’s economic development, exports and diversification and industrialisation strategy (Le Pere & Van Nieuwkerk, 2002:252).

Comparable to DIRCO, the DTI has also been reported to have succeeded relatively better. Le Pere and Van Nieuwkerk (2004:124) affirm that the DTI spectacularly succeeded in bargaining free trade agreement with the EU. Consequently, it also occupies an increasingly high profile in the WTO in spite of departmental capacity limitations emanating from lack of personnel and inexperienced trade negotiators and many other administrative and operational issues (Draper, 2005:95-96).

The department envisions a South Africa that will, by 2014, have “... a restructured and adaptive economy characterised by growth, employment and equity, built on the full potential of all persons, communities and geographic area” (DTI, 2006: Internet). The DTI does play a role in South Africa’s foreign policy processes as well particularly on trade-related issues (Landsberg & Masiza, 1995:13).

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According to Draper (2005:95), the DTI spearheads the trade policy formulation and implementation within the national executive.
Schoeman (2007:99-100, 104) argues that South Africa’s economic relations with the African countries are “impressive”. These partnerships are sustained through the countries’ banking, hotel, mining, retail, telecommunications, tourist, production and services industries (Games. 2010: Internet, 2). All these sectors operate under the auspices of the DTI; the latter is on the mission to develop a free trade protocol in SADC and the reformation of SACU. South Africa has however been accused by its African trade partners for being a self-interested dominant economic actor and an aspiring hegemon, and that it is not a partner. This is due to an outrageous number of its businesses (such as Vodacom, MTN, Shoprite, etcetera) invading the African countries’ markets and unbalanced trade patterns skewed to the favour of South Africa (Schoeman, 2007:99-100, 104).

More on South Africa’s trade relations in Africa will be discussed in chapter 5 in much greater details.

3.4.4. The Department of Defence

The DOD is one of the prominent role-players in South Africa’s foreign policy (Kent-Brown, 2002:126). The DOD’s role is often visibly intra-departmental. For example, before any decision could be made on military intervention issues, decision-makers take cognisance of the recipient country’s “… human rights record and the existing tensions, armed conflicts and general security situation” as a criterion (Le Pere & Van Nieuwkerk, 2004:124). Furthermore, decisions on where and when the military can intervene primarily falls within the area of the DOD, acting in concert with the National Conventional Arms Control Committee and the Presidency.
Du Plessis (2009:4) maintains that the military instrument concerns the exercise of armed force. Although often subjectively linked with the aggressive employment of armed force (defensive, deterrent or offensive) in war zones (conventional or unconventional), military instruments also incorporate warless military methods (military aid and assistance, military intervention, military deployment in peacekeeping missions, and military threats,) often executed abroad. Similarly, under the umbrella of the DOD, there is also the South African National Defence Force (SANDF). Its contribution is more evident in the context of South Africa’s peace missions abroad. The SANDF is a foreign policy instrument; it can be argued that the former participates more in foreign policy implementation than formulation. The SANDF has been involved in conflict prevention, peace-building and peacekeeping in African countries such as Burundi, Sudan, Côte d’Ivoire, the DRC, and others.

In spite of serious questions about the SANDF’s capacity to undertake all its peacekeeping obligations effectively, March 2009 marked the approval of the extension of the deployment of the SANDF in the DRC to provide training to that country’s armed forces under Project Thebe until March 2010 by South African cabinet. An extension of the deployment of members of the SANDF in Burundi was also approved in this regard. The gradual withdrawal of 1 000 SANDF troops in Burundi started in June 2009 and was completed by 8 August of the same year, concluding a deployment that started in 2001 at the request of former President Nelson Mandela during civil war in that country. Following the gradual winding-down of the majority of SANDF troops, only a small South African deployment remained to assist Burundians develop
protection element in the post-reconstruction period (Vines, 2010:59-61). According to Vines (2010:59-61), “… SANDF helped end 15 years of civil strife in Burundi and today we are proud that peace has held together … Parties in that country have started campaigning in the elections in a peaceful atmosphere, all because of our contribution”. Therefore, the rapid deployment of SANDF troops to Burundi in 2001 shows that South Africa does have the capacity to play a lead national role; however, its capacity is “overstretched”. That is, according to South African regulations around participation in peacekeeping, deployment at any given time should be limited to one battalion. However, in February 2009 the SANDF deployed three battalions of troops: 1 130 personnel in the DRC, 973 in Burundi and 636 in Darfur.

Additionally, in March 2009, the South African cabinet approved the extension of South African deployments to other missions in Africa. These include the AU Mission in Northern Uganda (Operation Bongani), the South African Detachment Assisting with Integration, and Training in the DRC. Also, the United Nations-African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID), the Specialist and Advisory Team in the DRC (Operation Teutonic), the UN Mission in the Central African Republic, and the United Nations Mission in the DRC (MONUC, Operation Mistral) (Vines, 2010: 59-61).

Therefore, the above discussion examines the practical role and relevance of the SANDF on the issue of South Africa being partner or hegemon.

Van Nieuwkerk (1994:95) as well as Kent-Brown (2002:133) outline the following as areas of concentration for the SANDF’s international role with the aim of establishing a secure African continent:

- Advancement of the regional and continental security regime;
• Operationalisation of the SADC defence pact;
• Advancement of the AU’s security blueprint; and
• Improvement of intelligence services.

Although every decision taken by the DOD affects South Africa policy towards Africa, Suttner (1996: Internet) argues that there is no clear “… mechanism that coordinates all interventions affecting foreign policy matters”.

Besides state actors discussed above, there are other departments that have variable impacts on foreign policymaking. They include the Departments of Health, Home Affairs, Finance, Justice, Sports and Recreation, etcetera. African international actors such as the SADC, the AU and even individual countries and MNCs also influence South Africa’s foreign policy in one way or the other (Suttner, 1996: Internet).

3.4.5. Parliament

Traditionally, in the pre-1994 epoch, Parliament could not fully participate or even have any influence on foreign policymaking (Suttner, 1996: Internet). Nevertheless, even if it could have either superior or inferior say in foreign policymaking that would mean that it would represent the views of the minority white community. It would neglect the views of the black majority due to the apartheid system of governance that was employed. In South Africa, especially under the P.W. Botha Administration, only what Muller (1997:69) dubs the “defence family” - the State Security Council and other state departments - were considered appropriate for foreign policymaking.

Following a series of changes in Parliament in 1994 and beyond, a new multiparty Portfolio Committee on International Relations and Cooperation
was formed. The motive behind the formation of the latter is to oversee the cooperation of DIRCO in foreign policymaking and provide advice in the process (Le Pere & Van Nieuwkerk, 2004:125; Kent-Brown, 2002:137). Parliament\(^7\) has officially been integrated into the foreign policymaking panel (Hudson H., 2007:5). South Africa’s Parliament is formally a body comprising 400 members to represent public opinion on the multitude of issues affecting general society including foreign policy.

More often anywhere around the world where parliament is inferior to a national constitution, concrete parliamentary participation in international issues such as foreign policy implementation usually counts very little in determining state actions. Parliamentary and public contributions have practically had less influence on the organisational and other mechanisms of foreign policy execution (Schmitz, 2005:3).

In the South African context, regarding its role in foreign policymaking, Parliament has complained that its input is almost always marginalised in South Africa and that the portfolio committee has confronted discriminatory impediments in this undertaking (Suttner, 1996: Internet). Suttner (1996: Internet) protests that “… often a decision is taken before the committee even gets a chance to meet”. This and many other operational issues have therefore made it quite difficult for the portfolio committee to fulfil its purpose successfully. From this vantage point, Hudson H. (2007:6) foresees the radically increasing marginalisation of Parliament (public representation)

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\(^7\) Basically, Parliament serves the purpose of deliberating the Bills that Ministers forward, to amend and enact them if they fall within the confines of public interests. Parliament consists of two Houses: the National Assembly and the National Council of Provinces (NCOP). As in the general role of Parliament, the National Assembly in concert with the NCOP makes laws that govern the lives of the masses. The NCOP is fundamentally representative of provincial interests and issues at the national level (Taljaard & Venter, 2006:19-20, 28).
within the premises of foreign policymaking, and there is scepticism whether the dimension will turn in favour of this public-oriented actor. In view of the above, it can be preliminarily concluded that Parliament has a very diminutive tangible impact on South Africa’s attitude towards Africa, be it a partner or hegemon. Its role in foreign policy is mainly at the formulation stage in a form of ideal debates among committee members.

3.4.6. Civil Society

According to McGowan and Nel (2002:341), civil society refers to any non-state actor within a society including academia, businesses, labour unions, private media, churches, voluntary organisations and others. To be specific, such actors include the South African Non-governmental Organisations Coalition (SANGOCO), research institutions such as South African Institute for International Affairs (SAIIA), the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) and the African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD). Additionally, the business sector, and the print media such as The Star, Business Day, and other electronic media such as SABC3 and e-News Channel also regularly carry articles and discussions on issues pertaining to South Africa’s foreign policy, or foreign policy context.

Most of these actors have the capacity to make substantial foreign policy inputs through research publications, seminars, interaction with, and reporting on relevant role-players. Although civil society does not decide on policies directly, it does exert some influence in minds of foreign policy formulators and implementers, or at least it endeavours to do so. Like Parliament, civil society often represents the views of and informs the masses, cooperates
with and simultaneously denounces government actions on policies they embark on (Le Pere & Van Nieuwkerk, 2004:125). For instance, civil society reportedly vilified The ANC’s *South Africa’s Foreign Policy Discussion Document*. The contention is that, although the document is “comprehensive”, it is a “lofty, declaratory and ideal-driven” (Le Pere & Van Nieuwkerk, 2002:250). Other notable instances include the role played by South African civil society in the international attempts to ban anti-personnel landmines (Naidoo, 2004:185)\(^8\). It has also contributed remarkably to the conceptualisation of the DOD’s peacekeeping framework and to South Africa-EU free trade agreement (Le Pere & Van Nieuwkerk, 2002:253).

Nevertheless, in spite the above active role, as is the case with Parliament, civil society is largely placed on the periphery of foreign policymaking. Although many observers perceive that civil society “should” prominently be party to foreign policymaking, Suttner (1996: Internet) argues that “… there has not been regular and consistent involvement of civil society in this regard”. Against the background of the latter view, it can be declared that civil society’s contribution in foreign policymaking has not been without frustrations. This may well be reflective of the lack of transparency and openness in South Africa’s foreign policy, which is totally rhetorical to what the post-1994 democratic regime initially pledged (Le Pere & Van Nieuwkerk, 2004:125).

\(^8\) See Naidoo (2004:198) for further details on South African civil society’s role in the international campaign to preclude anti-personnel landmines.
### 3.5. Conclusion

This chapter offered an overview of South Africa’s post-1994 foreign policymaking. The study attempted to achieve this on two levels. The first part of the chapter deals with foreign policy principles. South Africa’s foreign policy is guided by a belief in the respect for human rights; promotion of global democracy; upholding of international law in international relations; promotion of international peace; development of African interests; and economic development. The above are the core on which South Africa’s foreign policy “should” be conducted.

The second half of the chapter deliberated actors’ involvement in policymaking and implementation. Within the context of the South African foreign policy process, the president is the primary figure that undertakes foreign policy decisions. This is because the head of government is inevitably involved in foreign policy formulation and implementation and that he/she spends most of his/her time in this process. However, this does not mean that he/she is the only actor involved in the process. To date, two presidents have dominated South Africa’s post-apartheid foreign policymaking area: Nelson Mandela and Thabo Mbeki. Based on the current South African governance system, it is clear that a president can have a principal impact on foreign policy and in determining whether South Africa embraces partnerships or hegemonic tendencies towards the continent. Former President Mandela took a unilateral decision to write-off Namibia’s debt to South Africa outside the knowledge of the ANC, the Cabinet, Parliament, not to mention opposition parties. Other notable events include his support for the imposition of sanctions on the Nigerian government following the hanging of Ken Saro-
Wiwa, and his backing for the expulsion of West African Gulliver from the Commonwealth. Former President Mbeki has been actively involved in the dissemination of the concept of “African Renaissance” and NEPAD programme. Throughout his presidential terms, former President Mbeki advocated multilateral solutions to regional conflicts and further deployed peacekeepers abroad. He has also played extraordinary role in the SADC, the NAM, the AU and the UN.

Government departments that contribute to foreign policy through intra- and inter-departmental decision-making include DIRCO. The latter plays a critical part in South Africa’s foreign policy formulation and implementation (through its diplomacy). Diplomacy is the means through which the government communicates with and conduct its continental relations. It is therefore this division of the department which is directly involved in pursuing national interests through its ambassadors, diplomats and consular officials, practicing whether partnership or hegemonic tendencies abroad.

The difference between foreign policy and trade policy is very slender; therefore, a tangible interplay between the DTI and other major foreign policy actors including the Presidency and DIRCO ought to exist. Many trade policies concluded by the DTI inevitably affect South Africa’s foreign policy in general. South Africa’s economic relations are sustained through the countries’ banking, hotel, mining, retail, telecommunications, tourist, and other production and services industries. These businesses function under the banner of the DTI. The latter is striving to develop a free trade protocol in the SADC and the reformation of SACU. Nevertheless, South Africa has been accused of being a self-interested dominant economic actor and an aspiring
hegemon. It is not a partner due to a high number of its businesses invading the African markets with South Africa benefiting the most, while other African countries struggle to penetrate South African markets.

Regarding the DOD, prior to the intervention decision-making, decision-makers take cognisance of the recipient country’s human rights records and the general security situation as a criterion. Furthermore, decisions on where and when the military can intervene are primarily reached within the confines of the DOD, in concert with the National Conventional Arms Control Committee and the Presidency. Under the aegis of the DOD, there is also the SANDF. The latter’s contribution is evident in the context of South Africa’s peace missions abroad. The SANDF is a foreign policy instrument that participates more in foreign policy implementation than formulation. The structure has been involved in conflict prevention, peace-building and peacekeeping in African countries such as Burundi, the DRC, Côte d’Ivoire, and others. Therefore, this manifests the practical role and relevance of the DOD and the SANDF on the issue of South Africa being partner or hegemon.

The Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on International Relations and Cooperation assists the DIRCO on foreign affairs issues in Parliament. This portfolio committee performs the function of debating policy issues before they can be amended or enacted and actually be considered as policies or be passed as laws. The former gives policy approval if the proposed policy issues are in public interests. In this regard, visible parliamentary participation in foreign policy implementation counts very little in determining state actions, indicating that parliamentary and public contributions practically have less impact on the mechanisms of foreign policy execution.
Civil society’s contribution to foreign policymaking is evident through actors such as academia and NGOs. The role played by South African civil society in the international sphere includes attempts to ban anti-personnel landmines. Civil society has also contributed to the conceptualisation of the DOD’s peacekeeping blueprint and to the South Africa-EU free trade agreement. Nonetheless, notwithstanding the abovementioned role, civil society is placed on the margins of foreign policymaking.
CHAPTER 4: SOUTH AFRICA’S MULTILATERAL RELATIONS IN AFRICA

4.1. Introduction

Although states have their individual national interests, they are required to partly compromise their individual interests and domestic policies particularly if they are not consistent with international law or if they are not sanctioned by multilateral institutions. For example, South Africa’s foreign policy is formulated in a way that allows it to play a role commensurate with its capacity (SAGI, 1996: Internet). Spies (2008:112) observes that South Africa is an emerging middle power; therefore, middle powers often affiliate with multilateral organisations with the view to participate in the resolution of international issues. Middle powers play significant roles within international organisations such the UN and regional organisations (the SADC in this case). South Africa’s former international relations Minister, Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, has often emphasised that multilateralism is the most “effective” and “efficient” system for settling global issues (Spies, 2008:112).

Therefore, the fundamental aim of the chapter is to explore South Africa’s multilateral relations on the African continent. The discussion focuses on South Africa’s continental multilateral affiliation and its role in these multilateral organisations in Africa. It makes a preliminary assessment whether South Africa has followed partnership or hegemonic tendencies in these institutions. In other words, emphasis will be placed on the country’s foreign policy initiatives towards and its role in African international institutions such as the SADC, the SACU, the AU, and NEPAD. In this regard, South
Africa’s role in the inception of “African Renaissance” as a developmental phrase is also contemplated.

4.2. South Africa’s Multilateral Relations in Africa

Multilateral organisations can be considered important since they can indirectly reconfigure a country’s interests to establish whether they abide by the agreed-upon international policies. For instance, in the case of the apartheid government in South Africa, owing to mounting pressure from the international community, it had to compromise its apartheid national interests and adopt democratic principles (SAGI, 1996: Internet).

Suttner (1996: Internet) contents that in multilateral relations there must be “multilateral agreements”, engaging all the affiliates. During the apartheid era, there was a point where South Africa had few international multilateral relations because it had lost most of its multilateral membership due to its then national political situation. South Africa requested to rejoin international multilateral institutions but was subsequently turned down, again, on account of the previous system of apartheid. Nonetheless, as soon as the apartheid regime was dismantled, the international community started opening its doors for the “new” democratic South Africa. For this reason, South Africa was re-admitted into international organisations including SADC, the AU, the UN, and the Commonwealth.

Since 1994, South Africa has actively engaged in multilateral issues such as human rights, economic and social development, disarmament, peacekeeping and global security, refugees and migration, and illegal drug trafficking (SAGI, 1996: Internet). The fundamental objective of South Africa is
to represent developing countries and cushion them against the pernicious effects of globalisation in some of the abovementioned areas. Le Pere and Van Nieuwkerk (2002:265) assert that South Africa has been “more successful” in executing its multilateral foreign policy objectives. The following discussion will deal with South Africa’s role in African multilateral institutions such as SADC, the AU, NEPAD, and others.

4.2.1. The Southern African Development Community

The South African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) was developed in 1980 by a team consisting of Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe (Gelb, 2002: Internet, 13; Murphy & Smith, 2002:143). The year 1992 marked the negotiation on the transformation of SADCC into the Southern African Development Community (SADC) (Olonisakin, 2002:245). South Africa then joined the SADC in 1994 and became one of the key role-players in the shaping and restructuring of the SADCC into the SADC (Landsberg, 2006a:255). South Africa has a leadership role to play within the region; therefore, the former must set out a plan on how to go about its leadership task (SAGI, 1996: Internet). In particular, South Africa is responsible for coordinating the Finance and Investment sector, and it serves on the Peace and Security Council within the SADC.
4.2.1.1. South Africa’s Regional Integration Efforts

Moreover, South Africa “… should strive to achieve regional economic development by utilising the instrument that is ready at hand, in the form of [SADC]” (Adebajo, et. al., 2007:26). Regarding the subject of regional economic cooperation or integration, the South African government proclaimed that it would undertake a “cautious step-by-step” technique through cooperation, instead of an abrupt and radical integration approach. The former would base its actions on the doctrines of equality and symbiotic partnership; avoidance of regional hegemonic attitudes; and partnership as the means through which foreign policy goals can be accomplished. Regional economic integration, especially from the perspective of the low-income countries may bring about significant economic opportunities and benefits as compared to market integration, which may lead to regional economic polarisation, and consequently unequal and unsustainable development (Alden & Soko, 2005:376).

Against the backdrop of realist economic prescriptions, South African policy towards the region was reconfigured in accordance with recent political realities, although focused on economic and political interests, or on what can be regarded as mercantilism. South Africa’s current economic interests in Africa rest on accelerated trade and investment flows from the former to the region and subsequently the entire Sub-Saharan Africa. The main objective in this regard is to improve domestic economic growth and employment creation in SADC member-countries by promoting regional trade. This has been realised by encouraging and monitoring the participation of South African
NGOs in development and construction projects within the region (Gelb, 2002: Internet, 13).

Adebajo, et al. (2007:26) asserts that South Africa, as the largest foreign investor in the region, has devoted resources to reinvigorating the SADC, including the execution of protocols on free trade, politics, defence, and security. In August 2008, South Africa chaired the Summit of the SADC Heads of State and Government. At this summit, South Africa emphasised the need to establish the Free Trade Area (FTA) and paved the way for the launching of the FTA soon after. Additionally, several agreements were subsequently signed including the Agreement Amending Article 20 of the Protocol on Trade, the Agreement Amending the SADC Treaty, and many others (GCIS, 2009a: Internet, 247).

Prys (2009:208) highlights the differences that South Africa made, directly or indirectly, in the region. She argues that South Africa’s policy of “quiet diplomacy” has contributed to regional unity and security. It would have been “un-African” for South Africa to help the West lash out at its neighbours, especially following Western criticism that some Southern African countries had suffered, including South Africa (“denialist” attitudes on HIV/AIDS issues, for example). However, it must be conceded that South Africa’s silence nearly spoiled its international credibility especially in developed countries. More than that, South Africa also strengthened regional unity by spearheading boycotts on the SADC-EU’s Ministerial meeting in November 2002, were Zimbabwe was forbidden to attend. As a result, the EU had to make special arrangements by moving the meeting from Copenhagen to Maputo so that the Zimbabwean representatives could attend.
4.2.1.2. Criticism on South Africa’s Regional Integration Efforts

However, the SADC has been sharply criticised. The fact is that the Southern African region is not well developed provides evidence that South Africa’s policy towards the region has been “unsuccessful”, says Du Plessis (2002:126). He believes that South Africa should fix its attention on and keep in touch with SADC institutions and governments, while recommending that South Africa should mobilise the whole regional integration process.

Murphy and Smith (2002:143) maintain that regional economic cooperation might seldom be achievable especially in developing countries. The point is that at the embryonic stages of regional economic cooperation, and often due to a lack of resources, stagnant economies may need to be bailed-out by their fellow regional affiliates. For instance, middle-income countries such as South Africa might have to sponsor low-income members such as Zimbabwe. For this reason, South Africa ought to be liberal instead of conservative when it comes to resource allocation in the region. Furthermore, detractors continue to vilify South Africa for regional trade imbalances. Arguably, South Africa’s competitive trade advantage has culminated in regional business domination and imposed an unbearable pressure on the local manufacturing capacity of the other SADC states. As a result, trade imbalances between South Africa and the rest of its regional counterparts also compromise the primary vision of SADC, which is grounded in the principles of “equity”, “reciprocity”, and symbiotic relations (Alden & Soko, 2005:376).

Gelb (2002: Internet) argues that the South African government, seemingly, does not consider the SADC as the fundamental medium through which it can implement its regional agenda. Government officials have often
expressed frustration with the SADC’s bureaucratic setbacks and the wastefulness experienced within the SADC administration, ascribing it to a lack of dedication to execute organisational multilateral agreements, including the Free Trade Protocol. The lack of commitment in SADC has trivialised collective efforts to develop Africa, while the South African government in particular, have been criticised for its failure to put pressure on the Zimbabwe-controlled SADC Organ on Politics, Defence, and Security.

Since South Africa re-joined the SADC in the post-1994 period, there has been rivalry between South Africa and Zimbabwe for regional leadership. Such competition was, for instance, demonstrated by endless problems confronting the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security. It had unfavourable consequences such as in civil clashes in Lesotho and the DRC, and contributed to deteriorating relations between South Africa and other SADC members (Schoeman, 2000: Internet).

With regard to Lesotho, the South African intervention was denounced, in spite of the fact the mission was conducted under the auspices of the SADC and the AU. The South African military intervention in Lesotho in 1998 has been criticised for a number of reasons both in the Southern Africa region and further afield. Aggression and coercion, as in this case, is not consistent with South Africa’s stance on matters of conflict management, let alone the “wisdom of the decision” and the manner in which it was executed. This is because South Africa is known, at least on paper, for its commitment to peaceful solutions (Schoeman, 2000: Internet). Nevertheless, the country has further emphasised that, according to SADC principles, it would undoubtedly adopt forceful tactics in the case where a democracy is threatened or under
the possibility of such a threat. None of the other conflicts complied with this precondition whatsoever. Besides, South Africa already occupies a much higher hierarchical regional position making it unnecessary to prove its capability to act assertively in the region. Rather, its interpretation of when to utilise coercion and when to guard against it, irrespective of the source and degree of the conflict, largely hinges on prescribed SADC principles that condition its involvement in regional peacekeeping or peacemaking efforts (Schoeman, 2000: Internet).

4.2.1.3. South Africa’s Position in the Southern African Development Community

According to Prys (2007:8), “… being a ‘partner’ seems to be the rhetorically favoured role of South African foreign-policy makers … The role conception of a ‘regional leader’ is firmly implemented in key documents of the South African government …”. For example, in the South African Foreign Policy Discussion Document (SAGI, 1996: Internet), it is argued that the region expects a “positive” contribution from South Africa. In this regard, the latter is expected to interact with its regional counterpart as a partner and ally to establish reciprocal and symbiotic economic, political and security relations (SAGI, 1996: Internet). The purpose in this regard should be to guard against hegemonic postures in the region (Landsberg & Kondlo, 2007:3).

However, Alden and Soko (2005:376-377) contend that the objective of a reciprocal and symbiotic relationship might hardly be achievable, given the ostensible economic and political domination of South Africa in the region, which creates a possibility of regional polarisation. Prys (2007:9) underscores
this by arguing that South Africa has further adopted the so-called “strategy of denial”. This technique implies emphasising partnership, sovereignty, and African solidarity on the one hand while dictating the regional “terms of engagement” on the other.

Furthermore, based on its regional economic preponderance, many scholars recommend that South Africa takes the position of a “point man” which broadly entails regional hegemony especially towards embattled countries such as Zimbabwe and Swaziland (Prys, 2009:193-194, 199-200). If South Africa does not react to pending regional governmental and human rights issues, it would signify that the country is compromising its democratic and human rights principles on the international stage. Yet interfering, for instance, with Zimbabwe’s or Swaziland’s democratic and human rights problems seems contradictory with South Africa’s ambition to be a “good regional citizen”. Nevertheless, regional responsibility remains tied to the hands of South Africa based on availability of resources – something that is also of relevance to SACU. In the following sub-section, South Africa’s multilateral membership and role in SACU will be addressed.

4.2.2. The Southern African Customs Union

The “sub-regional customs union” was founded in 1889 and developed into SACU in 1910 (Adebajo, et. al., 2007:22; Gelb, 2002: Internet, 16). For this reason, it is said to be the oldest and most effective economy-oriented body on the continent, aimed at economic amalgamation in the Southern African region. SACU comprises Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa, and Swaziland as its affiliating states. The so-called SACU Treaty, which was
discussed for the first time in 1969, ensures the “duty-free” conveyance of merchandise and services, excluding labour, to member-states. SACU affiliates can exercise the so-called “common external tariff”, that is, they can develop one shared tariff towards all non-member-states (McGowan, 2006:323).

According to Alden and Soko (2005:370), the dismantling of apartheid created an environment conducive to the review of the SACU Agreements of 1910 and 1969. It also created the platform for much extensive deliberation and interaction between post-apartheid South Africa and neighbouring states –something that did not happen during the apartheid era. Rather, there was a suggestion before 1994 that, since SACU is the most effective and integrated regional institution in Africa, South Africa must not affiliate with other integration organisations, but instead slowly develop SACU’s role in the region. This egoistic proposal was opposed, probably as “realpolitik” views within the region obliged the (post-1994) South African government to actively participate in regional matters (Gelb, 2002: Internet, 16). It was followed by former President Mandela’s criticism of the SACU Agreement, in which he slated the agreement as “a reflection of the colonial oppressors’ mentality”, and denounced the previous apartheid regime for having used its “economic muscle to bully and intimidate small neighbours” (Alden & Soko, 2005:371). The aim of the ANC in this regard was to help democratise SACU and dilute the much-maligned “colonial” perspective of the customs union. This serves as the reason why the ANC prioritised the revision of the SACU Agreements in its regional trade plan in the immediate post-1994 period.
Subsequently, SACU member-states managed to reach consensus on extensively revised arrangements on 21 October 2002. This new Agreement has three components: a customs component, an excise component, and a development component (Alden & Soko, 2005:371). Although, SACU does not have a secretariat, South Africa has been fulfilling a vital administrative role within the customs union. Its Board on Tariffs and Trade recommends common tariff levels while the Departments of Customs and Excise, and Trade and Industry collect most duties and coordinate all SACU functions (McGowan, 2006:324). South Africa, together with other states in the customs union, committed itself to create a Free Trade Area (FTA). The Summit of the SADC Heads of State and Government was held in August 2008, and the launch of the FTA formed part of the summit agenda. The FTA Agreement is one of the ways through which SADC member-states attempt to forge powerful, reciprocal trade partnership among them (GCIS, 2009a: Internet, 247).

Nonetheless, South Africa’s partnership with its SACU counterparts has been described as “imperialist” by Alden and Soko (2005:371, 373). Notwithstanding generous relations between South Africa and the entire SACU community, recently incorporated trade, financial and other non-economic proposals (with reference to, for instance, infrastructure) bind SACU affiliates closer to South Africa, compromising their individual sovereignty (Alden & Soko, 2005:371, 373). Furthermore, South Africa, through SACU, has been castigated for what has been perceived as biased trade practices or policies and protectionism (restricting access of its markets to other African countries), with most trade benefits skewed in favour of South Africa. Since
South Africa is responsible for recommending tariff levels and administering all excise, customs, and other duties, it is reported to have “... often blocked its neighbours’ industrialisation efforts” (Adebajo, et. al., 2007:22).

For this reason, Alden and Soko (2005:370) argue that SACU is a relevant example where South Africa’s participation is characterised by historical contradiction and economic dominance. South Africa has previously acted as an imperialist “malevolent hegemonic power”, while it is striving to uphold the image of a “benign” regional hegemon.

In moving from the region to a much broader continental multilateral sphere, it is important to contemplate the largest African institution, the AU.

4.2.3. The African Union

The Organisation of African Unity (OAU), as the precursor of the AU, was established on 25 March 1963 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. The aim behind the foundation of the former was to coordinate African inter-state relations and ensure solidarity and unity, as well as economic integration. Throughout its existence, the OAU had usually come under fire from various continental and global angles. Critics charge that the OAU had been mired in chronic operational defects, especially during the 1970s and 1980s when it opposed coups d’état as a method of addressing national leadership problems in African states. The OAU was deeply obsessed with the principle of “non-interference” in the domestic affairs of its affiliates. Many organisational flaws have been attributed to its charter, which stipulates that the organisation “… would not interfere in the domestic affairs of its members, and would protect their territorial integrity and defend their sovereignty”. Rules and regulations of
this nature have indirectly restricted and downgraded the capacity and effectiveness of the OAU especially in the face of international lawbreakers (Le Pere & Van Nieuwkerk, 2002:263; Gelb, 2002: Internet, 7).

According to Landsberg (2006a:258), among states following the seemingly insurmountable security-related challenges (peacekeeping, human security, conflict prevention, and many other contentious issues), consensus was reached in an attempt to transform the OAU into the AU. This unanimous decision was concluded at an Extraordinary Session of the Assembly of African Heads of State and Government Summit held in Sirte, Libya on 9 September 1999. Le Pere and Van Nieuwkerk (2002:263) argue that in July 2000, the Constitutive Act of the African Union was adopted. Following this, the “new” African Union was brought into being and assumed a number of structural organs:

- Assembly;
- Executive Council;
- Specialised Technical Committees;
- Financial Institutions (the African Monetary Fund and the African Central Bank);
- Permanent Representatives Committee (PRC);
- Peace and Security Council (PSC);
- Pan-African Parliament (PAP);
- Economic, Social and Cultural Council (Ecosoc);
- African Court of Justice;
- African Court on Human and People’s Rights; and
African Commission on Human and People’s Rights (GCIS, 2009a: Internet, 243).

The AU was officially established and its role-players inaugurated in 2002 in South Africa. The host country had the honour of becoming the first to chair the newly founded AU. At this meeting, the organisation set its objectives, which included upholding the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of its member-countries; ensuring continental peace, security and stability; and developing the principles of democracy, good governance and public participation (Schoeman, 2002:219). Landsberg (2006a:258) asserts that the Mbeki Administration was ambitious and conspicuously instrumental in the process of setting out the AU’s goals and objectives. Yet, the South African government has been accused of considering the interests of some states while losing sight of others’ in the AU. It was former President Mbeki’s individual mandate to ensure that “his” vision of the African Renaissance was integrated into the new AU by dominating in decision-making. South Africa has always been backed by states such as Nigeria, Algeria, Senegal, Mozambique, Ghana, Tanzania, and others that endorsed the idea of institutionalising the African Renaissance via the AU. Former President Mbeki and former Minister Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma are said to have exercised an influential role at the Assembly and Executive levels respectively. Moreover, South Africa played a critical role in the AU’s Permanent Representatives Committee, to the degree that 2004 marked its appointment as permanent host of the PAP (Landsberg, 2007:197-200).

Landsberg (2007:202) reports that throughout its affiliation to the AU, South Africa has articulated the need to “… strengthen AU actions in conflict
prevention, management, and resolution, with … emphasis on peace support missions …” in conflict-stricken African countries. Unlike the OAU which was preoccupied with “military-defined state” security, South Africa, under the auspices of the AU’s PSC, accentuated the significance of “human” security and social justice. Again, under the wing of the PSC, former President Mbeki recommended that an African Standby Force (ASF) and a Military Staff Committee be established as part of the programme to shift from an old “non-interventionist” OAU to a more interventionist AU. In July 2004, South Africa further indicated that all such proposals would require sufficient financial and human resources. Therefore, South Africa, along with Algeria, Egypt and Nigeria, vowed to dig deep into their pockets and pay individual dues amounting to 8.25 percent of the AU’s annual budget. These countries promised to increase their annual contribution to 6.75 percent, making the sum of their individual yearly dues 15 percent of the organisation’s budget. Overall, the collective contribution by African “Great Powers” would be 75 percent of the AU’s twelve-monthly budget (Landsberg, 2007:202). South Africa has, however, been advised to admit the view that it has resource and capacity-related constraints which might affect its leadership capacity in the AU (SAGI, 1996: Internet).

As one of South Africa’s foreign policy cornerstones and preoccupations, the South African government is determined to interact with fellow African countries as “equals” and to steer clear of any hegemonic aspirations under the umbrella of the AU (SAGI, 1996: Internet). Landsberg (as cited SARPN, 2003: Internet, 6) argues that during a debate organised by the Southern African Regional Poverty Network (SARPN), South Africa rejected any
hegemonic aspirations and is committed to forging a partnership and alliance with African states. South Africa is expected to work towards championing the cause of Africa and of the South at large in spite of its hegemonic tendencies questioned by some African countries (CFR, 2007: Internet). Alden and Soko (2005:387) allege that this hegemonic concern can be ascribed to apprehension over South African businesses that continue to flood into the continent, where they soon establish their economic dominance and wield their economic influence.

Landsberg (2007:204) warns that South Africa ought to do away with a comparatively biased support for NEPAD vis-à-vis the AU. South Africa has in this regard been denounced for lending much larger support to NEPAD than to the AU as the bigger organisation. The argument is that NEPAD only operates under the banner of the AU, and not in isolation or independently of it. This skewed favouritism has consequently generated rivalry between the two institutions, probably downgrading the reputation of the AU. The AU-NEPAD debacle peaked when the Senegalese government pulled out of the executive committee, grumbling about sluggish implementation of NEPAD projects.

More on South Africa’s participation in the NEPAD will be discussed in the next section.
4.2.4. The New Partnership for Africa’s Development

Preceded by the concept of the Millennium Africa Recovery Plan (MAP), the New Partnership for Africa’s Development is guided by the belief in “accountability”, “ownership”, and “partnership”. It is portrayed as “… a holistic, integrated, sustainable development initiative primarily established as an African rejuvenation plan that focuses on creating the conditions for sustainable development” (GCIS, 2009a: Internet, 244). In conjunction with other African “Great Powers”, the Mbeki Administration reserved the room for manoeuvring for itself with the adoption of NEPAD in October 2001.

Landsberg (2007:203-205) as well as Gelb (2001: Internet, 35) argue that, although NEPAD was established through a concerted effort by South Africa and other African countries, the plan largely epitomises and reflects former President Mbeki’s development ideas. Seemingly, the latter persuaded other African leaders such as Egypt and Nigeria, and other low-income countries into advocating the NEPAD plan. In addition, it was a goal of the Mbeki Administration to develop the NEPAD headquarters in South Africa, together with the Development Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA). In spite of evidence of South Africa’s mostly positive hegemonic domination in NEPAD, the country has sought close partnership relations with the rest of the affiliates with regard to the North’s commitment to Africa’s development endeavours (Gelb, 2001: Internet, 35). Through NEPAD, former President Mbeki was attempting to bridge the gulf between the North and the South, and to eradicate Afro-

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9 MAP was initiated by South Africa in collaboration with two other African countries (Algeria and Nigeria) which can be categorized as a “Marshall Plan” for Africa. In a general sense, it can be said that MAP was rooted in the institutions devoted to the development of “South-South Cooperation” (Le Pere & Van Nieuwkerk, 2002:262).
pessimistic views held towards Africa by some developed countries. He also sought to increase the North’s involvement in the African development effort through debt cancellation, leadership capacity-building, foreign direct investment, and infrastructure development. It is therefore the objective of NEPAD associates to reduce power and development inequalities between developed and developing countries on political, economic, social, and other fronts through the very backing of the First World.

As Bischoff (2003:193) pointed out, South Africa must assume the responsibility to help develop NEPAD as the principal “custodian” of the plan. However, South Africa’s custodianship within NEPAD does not preclude the possibility of challenges. For instance, creating “good governance” on the continent might be quite a perplexing task coupled with problems. That is, attempting to ensure democracy throughout Africa might sound rather obnoxious to absolutist authoritarians and dictators. Besides, it is difficult to export democracy, as is the case where the US has attempted to establish democracy in Iraq (Hudson H., 2007:12). This implies that not all African states will embrace the objectives of the NEPAD ideal. Currently some African states already perceive South Africa as the messenger of the North, attempting to champion Western interests on the continent (Bischoff, 2003:193; Schoeman, 2000: Internet).

Nevertheless, the South African government continues to see the implementation of the NEPAD ideals as critically important particularly in consolidating the “African Agenda”. Following a proposal by NEPAD Heads of State and the Government Implementation Committee, NEPAD was integrated into the AU during the NEPAD Brainstorming Summit that was held
in Algeria in March 2007 (GCIS, 2009a: Internet, 246). However, in the early years of NEPAD’s existence, the South African government declared the plan an untested institution, yet to be transformed further to incorporate general matters of good governance, collective security, and human rights that all form part of “Pan Africanism” (Alden & Soko, 2005:384).

Additionally, the Mbeki Administration, together with its fellow African national governments, has developed a rather inextricable link between politics and economics through NEPAD. Since most parts of Africa are poverty-stricken, economic stagnation, civil wars, and many other socio-economic ills remain rife. Against the backdrop of these lugubrious problems, NEPAD consequently set up the “Peace and Security”; “Democracy and Political Governance”; and “Economic and Corporate Governance” clusters as preconditions for socio-economic revivalry, abject poverty alleviation and capacity-building efforts. Former President Mbeki is of the opinion that it is about time that Africa assumed responsibility for its own problems, and should guard against playing the politics of “blame” in their interaction with the North. The former president was optimistic that NEPAD could be utilised as a productive marketing instrument to sell Africa overseas (Landsberg, 2007:204-205).

The South African government’s commitment to the development of NEPAD is indeed outstanding. It recruited African countries to join NEPAD; arguing that by enticing African countries to affiliate with NEPAD would give a sign that African countries are indeed ready to accept FDI from developed countries (Alden & Soko, 2005:384). Furthermore, South Africa seems to be the only country in the NEPAD leadership that is concerned about NEPAD
processes per se, and assuring that it prospers. For this reason, one of South Africa’s national interests on the continent is to ensure continental development of which good governance is the crucial first step. Another critical step for South Africa is to ensure that states commit themselves to governance improvement programmes, independent peer assessment, and punitive measures in the case of under-performance. The commitment to these principles by African leaders is essential to develop NEPAD’s reliability, particularly if civil society in these countries is involved (Gelb, 2002: Internet, 36-37).

According to SA Yearbook 2008/09 (GCIS, 2009a: Internet, 245), the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) is part of NEPAD projects. The mechanism is therefore overviewed in the following subsection.

4.2.5. The African Peer Review Mechanism

The APRM was embraced and acceded to by 29 AU member-states as an “African self-monitoring mechanism”. This mechanism is fundamentally aimed at tackling the issues of corruption, poverty, and poor service delivery in African countries. The former envisions a politically stable, economically viable, integrated, and sustainable Africa (GCIS, 2009a: Internet, 245). Landsberg (2006a:259) contends that the mechanism is intended at exposing underachievers by identifying government flaws, where there are any, and brings about ways through which such leadership shortcomings can be rectified through government evaluation.

Similarly, as within NEPAD, the Mbeki government is reported to have played a key role in the creation of the APRM. To date, African states which
have been reviewed incorporate Algeria, Ghana, Kenya, Rwanda, Nigeria, Benin, Burkina Faso, Uganda and South Africa (GCIS, 2009a: 246). South Africa launched and conducted its annual Peer Review Mechanism in 2005 under the Mbeki government. Based on the view that governments would review themselves, civil society NGOs have expressed discontent demanding that public participation be increased. This came up subsequent to the fear that the government might probably control, “dominate”, and “dictate” the entire review process (Landsberg & Kondlo, 2007:6). In accordance with the rules that govern APRM, civil society ought to play an imperative role. Consequently, the Mbeki Administration voluntarily recruited as many stakeholders as practicable. By 2006, a panel of NGOs and academics were invited to participate in the peer review process and draft reports on issues of leadership efficiency, effectiveness, and corruption were discussed. The report titled “Country Review Report: Republic of South Africa” (APRM Country Review Report No. 4, African Peer Review Mechanism, November 2006) revealed that there is a lack of consultation between government and the public particularly at provincial and local level. It also recommends that the South African government fixes its focus on contentious issues incorporating capacity constraints and inefficient delivery of public goods and services; corruption; crime; diversity; HIV/AIDS; land reform; unemployment; women and child abuse; and racism and xenophobia. The government must attend to these issues if it were to be successful in terms of the requirements of the APRM (Landsberg, 2007:207-210).

In July 2007, at the 7th Summit of the African Peer Review Forum in Accra, Ghana, the African Peer Review Member States strongly supported
the process that South Africa embarked on in completing the Country Self-Assessment Report. Fellow Member States concluded that South Africa’s process was all-encompassing, participatory, and ground-breaking. The Panel applauded South Africa for fulfilling the tight time frames required by the APRM guidelines in a participatory and unbiased manner. According to former President Mbeki (DIRCO, 2007: Internet),

“the innovative approach included shortening the questionnaire and its translation into all languages, inviting research institutions to participate as partners, the validation process of the 2nd National Conference, involvement of civil society through the SA ECOSOC\textsuperscript{10} chapter, the establishment of Provincial Governing Councils, the role of Community Development Workers in enhancing popular participation in the APRM process, the use of outside broadcasts, the APRM song and blitzes in taxi ranks and major street corners to popularise the APRM process”.

In conclusion, former President Mbeki indicated that South Africa is prepared to exchange its experience and expertise when called upon to strengthen and develop the peer review mechanism on the continent (DIRCO, 2007: Internet).

4.2.6. The African Renaissance

Although former Ghanaian President Kwame Nkrumah was not the first person to use the concept of “African Renaissance”, it nonetheless “builds” on his philosophy. Former President Mandela at the OAU summit reportedly suggested the notion in 1994 in Tunisia. Former President Mbeki then, even before becoming South Africa’s head of state, adopted and disseminated the

\textsuperscript{10} Economic and Social Council – A United Nations organ facilitating international cooperation on standards-making and problem-solving in economic and social issues.
whole idea, with the optimism that the 21st century would be “the African Century”. According to President Mbeki, the African Renaissance is a “… common vision in favour of African unity and solidarity, African development and renewal, and an end to the marginalisation of our Continent” that ought to be fused with neo-liberal developmental prescriptions if it were to be a success (Alden & Soko, 2005:383).

Zondi (2010:28) is of the view that the international order in the 21st century was gradually being transformed and that this is well manifested in the new South Africa and Africa which embody this evolution to a new world. This further inspires the notion of an African Renaissance, which has recently been reconceptualised to signify both the rebirth of “self-confidence” and independence, on the one hand, and the “political stabilization” and “democratization” on the other. This rebirth has to prepare Africa for effective involvement in the perceived democratic world system.

South Africa’s search for a leadership role on the continent and further afield clearly matches with the Mbeki doctrine exemplified in the notion of an “African Renaissance”. South Africa’s leadership role in African revival is not only unequivocally stated but also cautiously implied in this doctrine. If vigilantly observed, the Mbeki Administration, in its reference to an African Renaissance, has always used ‘we’ and ‘us’ so as to involve not only South Africa but the rest of the African continent. The Mbeki government asserted that "as South Africa assumes the presidency of the NAM, we need to ask ourselves a question: in what way can the NAM enhance the drive towards the restructuring of the world order and the project of the African Renaissance?" (Schoeman, 2000: Internet). According to Gumede (2006:
the purpose of articulating such inclusive statements is to avoid being perceived as hegemonic or dominant actor in its endeavours to promulgate the “African agenda”, especially as suspected by many domestically and across the continent. Landsberg (2006b:8) is of the opinion that Africa is looking to South Africa’s foreign policy as a leader and a reliable partner, cooperating with African states, and not as some hegemon dictating the terms to the continent.

In this regard, former President Mbeki was supportive of the concept of an “African Renaissance” ideally with the eagerness to promote African solidarity and development. Since his speech at the adoption of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 108 of 1996, on 08 May 1996, former President Mbeki has become famous for the “I am an African” slogan (Hudson H., 2007:1). This ideal position set an appropriate platform for the creation of a new constitution, “conceptual narrative” and “normative agenda” for what was necessary for the renaissance of the African continent. Given Mbeki’s knowledge of Africa, (since he was the ANC’s chief diplomat located in Africa during his chronic years of exile), his “I am an African” slogan has raised hopes of fellow Africans pertaining to South Africa’s role in continental development (Le Pere & van Nieuwkerk, 2002:261).

Adebajo, et al. (2007:25) argue that South Africa’s foreign policy clearly mirrors some of the African Renaissance agenda facets. This is manifested by, amongst other factors, the country’s participation in continental peacemaking and peacekeeping, African democratisation and representation abroad.
In 1997, the office of the then Deputy President Thabo Mbeki, released a document entitled “The African Renaissance: A Workable Dream”. This document stipulated the areas of commitment with Africa as addressing and entrenching democracy in Africa; accelerating the process of globalisation on the continent; the “emancipation of African women from patriarchy”; the sustainable economic development; the rallying of the youth; and retrieving African history and culture (Taylor & Williams, 2001:267).

Since 1997, former President Mbeki has sought to utilise the concept of the African Renaissance in resolving the problems of Africa, from the perspective of the maximisation of development capacity in Africa (Taylor & Williams, 2001:267). Furthermore, former President Mbeki has been vocal about addressing continental corruption and poor governance, health issues, poverty and starvation, illiteracy, conflict, donations, and the like. The former believes that these are some of the factors that have contributed to a lack of development on the continent especially during the dawn of the 21st century (Le Pere & Van Nieuwkerk, 2002:26).

Although the African Renaissance is aimed at accelerating development on the African continent, the concept per se is coupled with flaws. As indicated earlier in the subsection, the African Renaissance has been perceived by many as conceptually self-contradictory and difficult to analyse in that it is “wide-ranging” and “vague” (Alden & Soko, 2005:383). The idea is aimed at fast-tracking a process of globalisation on the continent, but simultaneously seeks to reclaim African history and culture. These goals are contradictory in the sense that the African Renaissance is “Africanist”, yet it strives to pursue a “globalist” or Western agenda which many African actors
blame for Africa’s marginalisation from the process of globalisation and for a lack of public participation at the national spheres of government. Some critics argue that the African Renaissance is nothing but an “elitist project” that lacks substance. The ongoing controversial debates pertaining to “African identity” and “African-ness” obfuscate the idea of “African Renaissance”. This notion is used inappropriately at a bad time when the continent is tainted with challenges such as conflict and poor leadership (Mills, 2000:311-312).

Taylor and Williams (2001:267) regard the African Renaissance more of a “wish list” for continental development, grounded in orthodox liberal approaches to international development. For this reason, Mbeki’s African rejuvenation concept also embodies coercive but liberal markets, trade and “polyarchic” organisations on the continent. Du Plessis (2002:126) maintains that this vision will forever be a “dream” if the Southern African region and the continent at large are not well coordinated. Another problem with the notion is that it sounds more like a mere promise than a policy. It does not tangibly spell out how governments should be held accountable by respective ordinary citizens. It also singles out states as primary actors, especially at the decision-making level, precluding the participation of NGOs and people at grassroots levels (Bischoff, 2003:191).

Although Mr. Mbeki is no longer president, he is still directly involved, perhaps representing South Africa, in the revival of the African continent. The former recently established two institutions – the Thabo Mbeki Foundation and the Thabo Mbeki African Leadership Institute – aimed at stimulating Africa’s “rise from the ashes”. Although former President Mbeki believes that Africa has been on the right track of good governance, economic growth and
stability for the past two decades, he simultaneously argues that the problem has always been human resources to implement policies (Ncana, 2010: Internet).

4.2.7. United Nations Security Council

South Africa’s multilateral representation of Africa extends as far as the UN system. However, owing to limited scope of this research, the study will not assess South Africa’s involvement in every UN subsidiary institution. Rather, the investigation will be limited to South Africa’s role in the UNSC. Spies (2008:97, 106-108, 112) asserts that the UNSC is the most discussed UN institution and is the most powerful especially with regard to Africa. Notwithstanding obvious rivalry between South Africa, Egypt and Nigeria with regard to Africa’s representation on the UNSC, South Africa was delegated to the UNSC in 2006 and began its first term in 2007 on a non-permanent bases. Its delegation was based on its diplomatic peace- and security-related experience. For example, it has been involved in countries such as Burundi, the DRC and Cotê d’Ivoire. It was the first country to voluntarily destroy its nuclear programmes and accede to the NPT in the early-1990s. South Africa’s non-permanent seat has also been attributed to its willingness to participate in attempts to resolve global security issues. Moreover, 2008 marked the country’s acknowledgement of “rotating” chairmanship on the UNSC. The country has also downplayed alleged hegemonic tendencies as the representative of Africa and the South on the UNSC. However, those who interpret a concept of “hegemony” as referring to nothing else but “state
leadership” believe South Africa harbours ample hegemonic elements because it is conceived of as an African leader in the UNSC.

Overall, Habib (2010: Internet) purports that the South African government’s performance during first UNSC tenure was “underrated”. He argues that the country was incredibly “energetic” (that is, participatory and well as representative of Africa and the world at large). South Africa prioritised African issues directly on the UN agenda. The country played a key role in the UN reform and, as far as decision-making was concerned, South Africa mostly followed the diplomatic mainstream.

Most recently, South Africa won a second UNSC term of office which commenced in January 2011 until the end of 2012 (Habib, 2010: Internet).

4.3. Conclusion

This chapter explored South Africa’s multilateral relations on the African continent. Throughout the chapter, “multilateral” ties imply relations between three or more players.

South Africa joined SADC in 1994 and became one of key figures in reshaping and rejuvenating the organisation. The country bears the responsibility of coordinating the Finance and Investment sector, as well as the Peace and Security Council in SADC. It bases its regional diplomacy on the principles of equality and symbiotic partnership; non-hegemonic tendencies; and partnership as a vehicle for the realisation of policy goals. The country aims to develop and promote domestic economic growth and to create employment in SADC member-countries through regional trade promotion. It is the largest foreign investor within the region and is dedicated
to the implementation of protocols on free trade, politics, defence, and security. South Africa has led the Summit of the SADC Heads of State and Government during which the need to establish the Free Trade Area was emphasised, and several agreements were signed.

However, the South African government does not regard the SADC as the means through which to implement its regional agenda. This is due to the SADC’s wastefulness, member-states’ lack of commitment and bureaucratic setbacks with which the organisation is confronted. South Africa was also castigated for failing to influence SADC’s Organ on Politics, Defence and Security controlled by Zimbabwe.

South Africa’s Board on Tariffs and Trade performs the function of recommending common tariff levels while the Departments of Customs and Excise, and Trade and Industry collect most duties and coordinate SACU respectively. Although SACU is said to be the most effective and integrated regional institution in Africa, Nelson Mandela has criticised it for reflecting the colonial oppressors’ mentality, and further criticised pre-1994 South Africa for being an economic actor seeking to dominate its smaller neighbours. Most recently at the 2010 summit, SACU members expressed great discontent regarding regional trade imbalances, marked by biased trade tendencies and protectionism, which block regional neighbours’ industrialisation endeavours. Moreover, South Africa-SACU relations has in some quarters been criticised as imperialist owing to recently integrated trade, financial and other non-economic proposals which bind other SACU members closer to South Africa, intimidating their individual sovereignty.
Furthermore, SACU members threatened that they would leave the union if South Africa fails to address such imbalances. In their view, it would be incorrect to regard South Africa as a partner in the union since it rather embodies an aggressive economic hegemon. Some maintain that South Africa’s participation in the SACU is marked by historical inconsistency and economic domination. The country has historically acted as an imperialist “malevolent hegemonic power”, whereas South Africa sees itself at most, as a “benign” regional hegemon.

Within the AU, the South African government has confirmed its commitment to interact with its African counterparts as “equals” and guard against any hegemonic aspirations under the banner of the AU. It aims to forge partnerships and alliances with other African states. South Africa is expected to champion the cause of the continent and of the South at large, in spite of alleged hegemonic attitudes ascribed by some African countries who are alarmed by the inroads that South African businesses are making into Africa.

The Mbeki Administration was predominant in formulating the AU’s goals and objectives. Nevertheless, the government was criticised for considering the interests of some states in the AU, while ignoring those of others. South Africa expressed the need to intensify the AU’s participation in conflict prevention, management, and resolution, particularly on peace support operations in conflict-stricken African countries. It has emphasised the significance of human security and social justice rather than military-defined state security. In addition, it is the Mbeki Administration that recommended the establishment of an Africa Standby Force and a Military Staff Committee
as a way of shifting from an old non-interventionist OAU to a more interventionist AU.

However, South Africa must guard against prejudiced support for the AU and NEPAD; that is, the former has been criticised for supporting NEPAD more than the AU as a much bigger institution.

Although NEPAD consists of African countries, it largely mirrors former President Mbeki’s development ideas. Although NEPAD was brought into being by South Africa and other African countries, the plan reflects South Africa’s development plans, particularly under former President Mbeki. Therefore, South Africa, under NEPAD, is led by the belief in accountability, ownership, and partnership. These are the cornerstones of NEPAD, aimed at breaching the gulf between the North and the South, and at disposing Afro-pessimistic views held by the West. It also aims to increase the North’s socio-economic commitment in African development. South Africa’s commitment to the development of NEPAD has been significant since the country has managed to cajole African countries to join NEPAD.

Based on the transformation of African governments, the Mbeki government has played a primary role in the development of the APRM. For the purpose of peer review, the South African government launched and conducted its annual Peer Review Mechanism in 2005 under former President Mbeki. The South African civil society has expressed dissatisfaction pertaining to the fashion in which the review is conducted. The former demanded that public participation be increased expressing the fear that the South African government might dominate, control, and dictate the whole evaluation process.
South Africa advocates the notion of the African Renaissance that is similarly aimed at African renewal. The country played and continues to play the key role within the framework of the African Renaissance; it led the instigation and promulgation of the concept particularly under the leadership of former President Mbeki. The Mbeki government always used ‘we’ and ‘us’ to involve not only South Africa but the rest of the African continent as well. The purpose of expressing such statements is to avoid being perceived as hegemonic in its attempts to disseminate the “African agenda”, especially as alleged by many international actors.

South Africa was first delegated to the UNSC in 2006 beginning its membership in 2007 on a non-permanent basis. Its delegation to the UNSC was informed by its peace and security management experience particularly in Africa. It has intervened in countries such as Burundi, the DRC, Coté d’Ivoire, and others. It is also the first country to willingly dismantle its nuclear weapons and sign the NPT in the early-1990s. The country also acknowledged the “rotating” chairmanship on the UNSC in 2008. South Africa may be counter-hegemonic but at the same time, does not intend to be a mere “team-player” in the international arena or in Africa, while others believe it becomes an automatic “state leadership” hegemon because it represents Africa and the South in the UNSC. This will be further explored in the following chapter from the perspective of South Africa’s participation in the management of peace and security issues in Africa.
CHAPTER 5: SOUTH AFRICA’S FOREIGN POLICY IN AFRICA: HUMAN RIGHTS, PEACE AND SECURITY, AND TRADE RELATIONS

5.1. Introduction

Following its readmission into the international community in 1994, South Africa has been faced with a huge challenge of addressing some outstanding issues in its foreign relations, both in Africa and further afield. Additionally, it has been expected to take up a more “prominent” and “assertive leadership” role on the multilateral fronts such as the SADC and the AU. Moreover, South Africa became increasingly involved in peace missions in different conflict-stricken African countries such as the DRC, Burundi, and Sudan. Being party to a team deployed to intervene in the neighbouring Lesotho in 1998 was another test for South Africa’s peace and security leadership capacity. For instance, the country is currently expected to play a mediatory part in Zimbabwe’s and Swaziland’s reported governance and human rights issues, and perhaps in economic stagnation as well (Du Plessis, 2006:119).

Aside from continental expectations, South Africa’s post-apartheid foreign policy has proved to be Africa-oriented in nature. This is well reflected in development programmes such as the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) and its replacement, the Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR), NEPAD, and others. Many assert that the South African government, in order to accomplish the objectives set out in these development programmes, would need to fully participate in socio-economic
development, political transformation and conflict resolution efforts in Africa (Schoeman, 2007:96).

It is against the background of the above development areas that this chapter explores South Africa's Africa foreign policy issues in the post-1994 period. Such issues of great prevalence and significance are human rights, peace and security, and trade relations. Therefore, the second section of this chapter overviews South Africa’s role in human rights issues on the continent. The third part tackles peace and security issues in Africa from the perspective of South Africa’s role. The fourth section focuses on South Africa’s continental trade relations. This will help the reader to grasp South Africa’s overall role in Africa, and perhaps enable one to conclude whether the country should be regarded as a partner or a hegemon vis-à-vis its African neighbours.

5.2. Human Rights

According to Holsti (1995:310), “no government that has taken actions to promote or protect human rights abroad – as in the case of South Africa – has failed to develop an argument that the abuses of these rights justify economic and other forms of sanctions ...”. This happens even in an instance where actors carry out actions that contravene the UN “fundamental norms” such as interference in others’ domestic issues.

5.2.1. General Background to Human Rights Issues

Certainly, this is a serious challenge for foreign policies of many states. According to Holsti (1995:309), a challenge is that foreign policies of states
have to align with the international norms and principles of moral conduct. Du Plessis (2006:135) asserts that foreign policy-makers have to contemplate justice-related issues such the promotion and respect for human rights. Furthermore, they ought to take cognisance of the fact that some actions are forbidden by “settled norms” and behavioural standards. Decision-makers need to be aware that interstate relations and issues such as arms trade, violent conflicts, and war intrinsically link up ethics with foreign policy. Of course realists would contend that states should be self-centred and inconsiderate of ethical impediments, arguing in favour of the element of raison d’état rather than morality. Conversely, idealists would dispute that moral principles should be the guide of foreign policy instead of individual states’ egoistic tendencies, or at least actors must guard against breaching moral rules when executing their individual interests. Seemingly, both these sentiments undermine the not so obvious relationship between morality and self-interest. This is because some actors may vindicate their foreign policy objectives, actions on moral grounds on the one hand, while their status quo and interests may impede the choices they make on the other. This effectually manifests conflict that exists between morality (idealism) and self-interest (realism). This kind of a situation forces decision-making bodies to justify their actions in idealist terms and calculate their interests through realism. Du Plessis (2006:135) argues that since morality is both “implicit” and “explicit” in foreign policy, a foreign policy without ethical implications is “incomplete”.

5.2.2. South Africa’s Role in African Human Rights Issues

Incidents such as anti-slavery and anti-apartheid and liberation struggles are genuine manifestations of a global moral campaign on human rights recognition. South Africa has taken a big step since the mid-1990s in this regard (Adebajo, et al., 2007:20). Additionally, as indicated in chapter 1, former President Nelson Mandela, even before assuming the honour of becoming the first democratically elected black president, was quick to declare that “… human rights will be the light that guides our [South Africa’s] foreign affairs” (Titus, 2009:5; The Economist, 2008: Internet). It is therefore less surprising that the principle of the respect for and promotion of human rights dominates the country’s foreign agenda (GCIS, 2009a: Internet, 268). In this regard, South Africa’s advocacy for human rights is not only “national” (constitution-oriented) but also “international”, motivated by international human rights law (Titus, 2009:8). The South African post-apartheid government saw it fit and vowed to take up a position of a human rights custodian, both at home-cum-abroad (Mills, 2000:308-309). Actors such as black-oriented movements in South Africa, INGOs, the developing world and the UN supported the instigation of seemingly huge and famous human rights campaigns allegedly held due to the formerly oppressed black majority up (Spence, 2001:4).

Based on its commitment to human rights issues and capacity (though seemingly limited), South Africa has been depicted by many as a “beacon of hope” in the international arena, especially for the oppressed. Having adopted one of the most progressive constitutions around the world, South Africa
would discourage, forbid, and alleviate any sort of discrimination and violation, in full support for human rights (The Economist, 2008: Internet). For example, the 1990s marked the abolition of the death penalty, voluntary dismantling of nuclear weapons programmes, and other remarkable human rights-related events (The Economist, 2008: Internet).

During this period, the South African government guaranteed to feature particularly in human rights areas. This commitment would be guided by its foreign policy, described as “value-centred” or ethical in principle. On the international stage, South Africa has pledged to participate fully in conflict prevention efforts, security assurance, and sustainable economic development through a “people-centred” approach. South Africa is expected to preside on both continental development endeavours and broadly championing the cause of the South on human rights fronts (Mills, 2000:308). It is also expected to act as other countries’ role model and abide by human rights principles and laws. The expectation is that South Africa, on moral grounds, should encourage other African countries and the South in general to embrace democracy and eventually recast their human rights records (SAGI, 1996: Internet). A typical example is the approval that former President Mandela received for reacting strongly to the execution in the mid-1990s of Ken Saro Wiwa and his colleagues by General Sani Abacha’s regime (Mills, 2000:264; Wheeler, 2004:98).

South Africa has recently been proclaimed by the UN as one of the dominant actors in the dissemination of international human rights law. Wheeler (2004:98) argues that, “since 1994, South Africa has acceded to a
commendable list of international and African human rights instruments and conventions … which entail the submission of … annual follow-up reports to the depository body to measure progress in achieving the objectives of the pertinent treaties”. Since its accession to these conventions, South Africa has forwarded some of the required reports to the UN. The country monitors the productiveness of current human rights treaties and proposes methods and instruments that can be utilised in both national and global human rights recognition. Currently, South Africa affiliates with the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC), in which the country has played the major role in getting it established. It is also a key proponent of an alternative protocol to the International Covenant with the aim of developing the recognition for economic, social, and cultural rights. In November 2007, South Africa became the first country to ratify and sign both the International Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and its alternative protocol. In addition, the country is also party to the Durban Review Conference as a continuation of the World Conference against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance which was staged in South Africa in 2001 (GCIS, 2009a: Internet, 268).

5.2.3. Criticism on South Africa’s Role on Human Rights Issues in Africa

According to Wheeler (2004:95), human rights is however an area where South Africa’s foreign diplomacy has been “uneven” regardless of the fact that this aspect forms a cornerstone of South Africa’s foreign policy. Thus, South Africa’s pragmatic position and role on the continent and further afield in
reaction to human rights issues have been widely questioned and denounced. The concern is that South Africa’s foreign policy in this regard is paradoxical, rhetorical and ambiguous. Borer and Mills (2009:10) note that “… in South Africa, the gap between principle and practice emerged perhaps more clearly than in other cases”. The country has often been vilified for lacking the will to participate in human rights cases, especially under the banner of the UN (subsidiary institutions) as a “beacon of hope”. Its human rights policy is somewhat marked by contradictions, the most obvious being the case of Zimbabwe and Swaziland in Africa.

Apprehension over South Africa’s approach to human rights in its foreign policy peaked in 2008 and 2009. Such concerns sprang up in reaction to South Africa’s stance on the Zimbabwe crisis, and in Swaziland (Titus, 2009:11). According to The Economist (2008: Internet), South Africa has often opposed the sanctioning of authoritarian states notorious for widespread human rights abuses. The diagnosis suggests that South Africa is loath to condemn and disapprove of its abusive allies, including Zimbabwe, Myanmar (Burma) and Iran (Borer & Mills, 2009:8; Wheeler, 2004:99). The South African government, once mired in human rights violations before becoming a beacon of hope, is now throwing its weight behind human rights perpetrators. The expectation is that South Africa should condemn human rights abuses in those countries. Moreover, the government has on a number of occasions stood in the way of those keen to alleviate such inhumane acts. For instance, the Zimbabwean March 2008 national elections were declared neither free nor
fair. This is because they were characterised by “voter intimidation” and violence committed by the Mugabe regime.

Chidaushe (2010: Internet, 29) reports that “South Africa used its position … to prevent sending a fact-finding mission … to investigate post-election violence; nor would it allow the Council to debate the worsening situation”. On the one hand, the West has been calling for the imposition of sanctions on Zimbabwe. On the other hand, the Mbeki government decided to prepare a meagre one-page report asserting that there was no crisis in the country, condemning the imposition of any embargo on its northernmost neighbour. Chidaushe (2010: Internet, 29) maintains that South Africa has been criticised for adopting a “quiet diplomacy” approach towards human rights-violating states issues. Critics protest that the problem is “unnecessarily prolonged”, causing further deaths, suffering and human rights violations because South Africa as a key mediator has opted for non-interference. Other observers attribute the undermining of the African character of partnership, good neighbourliness, and Ubuntu directly to South Africa’s quiet diplomacy. The argument is that a “good neighbour” and partner cannot overlook its neighbour’s misdemeanours merely because of a principle of non-interference.

South Africa’s passive reaction towards its northernmost neighbour has generated scepticism on its human rights activism in the eyes of those who rendered it as an emerging powerful force in the international human rights sphere (Southall, 2006:24). Kagwanja (2006:29) asserts that, based on cases such as the above, “… South Africa is not a regional hegemon simply
because if it were, it would surely have acted more forcefully and would have been more successful in dealing with the extended crisis in the country. Its policy would also not have been ‘quiet’”. This silence or inaction may well signify that South Africa is compromising its human rights values, integrity, and reliability in the international forums. Moreover, Zondi (2010:29) is of the opinion that South Africa’s endeavours to reinvigorate the United Nations’ human rights management, led the Human Rights Council to cast South Africa as a human rights custodian, whereas former President Bush’s “war on terror” had taken less cognisance of value-related issues by allowing issues of “security” and “interest” to dominate the US foreign agenda.

South Africa is expected to lead attempts to suspend President Al-Bashir’s prosecution over alleged genocide in Darfur, issued by the International Criminal Court (ICC). However, President Zuma, allegedly avoiding playing the role of arresting him, pronounced that President Al-Bashir was unwelcome at his presidential inauguration ceremony. This is because South Africa, in accordance with the Rome Statute, is obliged to incarcerate President Al-Bashir if he visits South Africa (Titus, 2009:13). The UN Watch also released a report based on 47 member-states to the Human Rights Council in 2007. In this regard, South Africa was disappointingly ranked at the bottom, grouped with states such as Cuba, Russia, China and Saudi Arabia. South Africa’s grading was conclusively ascribed to its closeness with perpetrators instead of victims of human rights violations.

Additionally, the Zuma government’s decision to decline issuing a visa to one of the globally renowned human rights activists, Tibetan Dalai Lama, to
participate in a conference in 2009 provoked woes and scepticism on the country’s stance on international human rights issues. This decision was harshly censured by other activists and observers, arguing that South Africa was compromising its commitment to human rights promotion possibly in an attempt to please China, a country with bad human rights record (Titus, 2009:11). South Africa has further been chastised for its attitude toward Angola. This follows South Africa’s economic interests in Angolan oil which have culminated in South Africa disregarding human rights violations in that country (Chidaushe, 2010: Internet, 29).

5.2.4. Alternatives for South Africa on Human Rights Issues in Africa

Although South Africa’s human rights values are firmly grounded in the doctrines of liberalism and democratic socialism, the country should guard against promoting its own human rights culture and interests in the African international sphere. Johnston (2001:21-23) is of the view that “… it would not be easy for South Africa to take a lead in promoting a specifically African human rights culture, no matter how attractive this might seem for political reasons”.

Based on its inconsistent and rhetorical position on international human rights, South Africa has also received criticism from national human rights actors. According to Zondi (2010:29), “… the growing domestic pressure for the government to project the country's national interests more sharply in international affairs”, is one of the major challenges confronting South Africa.
Titus (2009:13-14) as well as the Human Rights Watch (2009: Internet) suggest that, in so doing, the South African government has to attend to the following major human rights-related issues to revive its reputation since the country is gradually becoming less influential in this field:

- Exerting pressure on Somali and conducting international investigation on alleged “impunity”;
- Putting pressure on President Kabila of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) to bring about the alleviation of human rights abuses by state army, and coercing the DRC government to arrest war crimes perpetrator, Bosco Ntaganda, wanted by the ICC for prosecution;
- Ensuring non-deferral of President Al-Bashir’s condemnation so that the ICC arrest warrant remains “active” and can be executed;
- Thriving for a symbiotic government of national unity (GNU) in Zimbabwe since there is scepticism that the GNU might be impeded by the egoistic and obstinate nature of the ZANU-PF (Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front), which South Africa is suspected to be offering biased support at the expense of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC);
- Reviewing its “pro-human” rights position in the UNHRC and towards international individual human rights cases; and
• Sharply condemn “impunity” in Africa since African leaders retire without being prosecuted for human rights abuses as recently happened in Kenya and may recur in Zimbabwe.

Human Rights Watch (2009: Internet) purports that the current South African government needs to re-evaluate its proactive position in the human rights field so as to play a positive role in mitigating human rights abuses in the Southern Africa, the continent and further afield.

In view of the above discussion, one would argue that South Africa’s position on international human rights sounds rather rhetorical. Based on South Africa’s official documents, human rights are the priority of the country’s foreign policy. For instance, as mentioned earlier, former leaders such as President Nelson often reiterated that (international) human rights would be the centre of post-apartheid South Africa’s foreign policy. Owing to such promissory government statements, one gets the impression that the government is well aware of the leadership role in the field of human rights particularly on the international stage. However, the problem emerges when these promises have to be implemented. In practice, the preliminary findings in this chapter suggest that South Africa’s role in human rights practices has been uneven, and marked by inconsistencies. For instance, there are many African countries notorious for human rights abuses. Yet, South Africa has shown little will to condemn such immoral acts on numerous occasions, eventually compromising its international reputation in this field. For example, South Africa, has failed to condemn human rights violations publicly in Zimbabwe and Swaziland. From this point, it would not be correct to contend
or conclude that South Africa has occupied a primary and hegemonic (leadership) stance in international human rights practice particularly in Africa. In fact, South Africa has recently been vilified more than it has been complemented for its role in this area, which must become the foundation of sustainable human security in Africa.

The next section is an overview of South Africa’s role in Africa particularly from the vantage point of peace and security, with the view to judge whether is a partner or hegemon in this area.

5.3. Peace and Security

According to Russet and Starr (1996:466), peace is a precondition for development; also that the genuine development of a state ought to be grounded in the participation of its population which must be preceded by the development of and respect for human rights and democracy.

5.3.1. General Background to Peace and Security Issues

Elgström and Jerneck (2000:278) maintain, “Peace is not a homogenous phenomenon. The quality of peace relations varies and is subject to change”. Hence peace is categorised into different types, including “precarious peace marked by instant deterrence and threats of military confrontation; “conditional peace”, which is less tense in that disputant parties often attempt to avoid the outbreak of war through “appeasement” and open prevention; and lastly, a “stable peace”. The last type, where conflicting actors never contemplate war
as the means of settling their interstate differences, is the highest form of peace.

Theoretically, although liberal institutionalism does not directly engage in security concerns, it posits that economic and environmental cooperation is possible between state-actors, as a precondition for peace. Put differently, it means that a heightened possibility of cooperation amongst actors reduces the likelihood of war. However, the liberal institutionalism’s view still wishes to keep a stake in security matters. It fails to explicate how partnership between actors lessens the prospect of conflict. Liberal institutionalism is also limiting itself within the field of security, because fear of cheating in interstate relations is a major impediment for cooperation especially when military issues remain at stake. Liberal institutionalism, nevertheless, is not attempting to challenge the realist view that states are selfish. The analysis of collective security theory is somewhat different from that of liberal institutionalism. The former does not preclude the possibility of war; in fact, it also attempts to explain issues related to war-prevention and ensuring peace. In terms of collective security theory, the best way to prevent outbreaks of war involves proper management of military power. War-implicated or conflicting states should not resort to the use of force; rather, they should seek intervention or mediation of third parties for the sake of security and peace. Collective security theory believe that peace is possible as a means of ensuring “collective security” via the intervention of third parties, for the purpose of preventing the possibility of war-breakouts or for stopping an existing war between disputants. Interventionists should guard against the use of forceful means in their

Mearsheimer (1998:370) asserts that critical theory totally rejects realism’s analysis of the international system particularly from the perspective of peace and security. Critical theory hopes to develop a pluralist security international system where states operate in accordance with certain standardised international norms. The argument is that in a system where states are predicated on similar norms or institutions, there are generally shared expectations of peaceful resolution of conflicts and less risk of the use of force. Critical theory considers war “unacceptable”, and supports an authentic “peace system”. “National interests” become “international interests” guided by the doctrines of selflessness. Mearsheimer (1998:370) argues that states bear one actor’s security as the responsibility for “all”, instead of being preoccupied with principles of self-help or self-centredness, as interpreted by realists in Layne’s (1994:11) Kant or Cant: The Myth of the Democratic Peace. Democratic peace theorists such as Layne (1994:8) endorse the political adage that democracies never or seldom go to war with one another. However, this does not necessarily mean that democratic states never go to war at all, particularly with any states other than democratic ones. They maintain that even conflicting democracies hardly pose threats of war or violence of whatever nature to one another because it is “illegitimate” to do so within a democratic system.
Issues of peace and security form part of a state’s foreign policy, revolving around a particular state’s national interests and its international relations. Over the years, peace and security issues that have been prevalent in the international space incorporate drug trafficking, illegal arms trading, migration, and refugees, non-proliferation of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, regional conflict resolution, and peacekeeping (SAGI, 1996: Internet). Moreover, these are some of the issues that almost always feature in a foreign policy formulation and implementation of any state especially one striving for a stable, peaceful and secure international environment.

Nevertheless, the post-Cold War era marked the West’s reluctance to intervene (through armed forces) in the national and international peace and security affairs of African countries. Adebajo, et al., (2007:22) attribute such lack of willingness to the perceived possible recurrence of incidents played out during the UN’s failed intervention in Somalia and Rwanda in 1993 and 1994 respectively.

5.3.2. South Africa’s Role on Peace and Security Issues in Africa

Owing to the West’s military absence, particularly in conflict-stricken African countries, many observers question whether African countries such as South Africa can fill the continental security leadership void due to their (but limited) capacity, resources, and effectiveness (Adebajo, et al., 2007:22).

Landsberg (2000:109) argues that since the advent of its national democracy, South Africa has moved from being the so-called “pariah state” to a democratic and peace-oriented state on the African continent. According to
Southall (2006:23), South Africa is now Africa-centred and willing to create cooperative relations with its Sub-Saharan neighbours. On many occasions, it has been a key actor in continental conflict resolution attempts. In the mid-1990s, former South African leaders, Presidents Nelson Mandela and Thabo Mbeki, were clear when they proclaimed that the ANC-led government is more than willing to embark on transforming Africa into a stable “zone of peace” through a process of democratisation (Landsberg, 2000: Internet, 109). The former optimistically declared that the South African government pledges to participate in the OAU-led endeavours to ensure continental cooperation and development, peace and security, and stability. They announced that South Africa, as an affiliate to SADC and the AU, would play its part “… in the struggle of these organisations to build a continent and a region that will help create for themselves and all humanity a common world of peace and prosperity” (SAGI, 1996: Internet). Additionally, all the commitments would be carried out against the backdrop of the country’s national interests and the UN’s political and operational objectives (Hudson H., 2007:13; SAGI, 1996: Internet).

Over the past decade, post-1994 South Africa also abruptly shifted from a military-defined “Total Strategy” of state security applied by the apartheid government to “human security” and “social justice”, as well as friendly relations and cooperation between neighbouring states (Kagwanja, 2006:31). The South African government has repeatedly reassured the region and the continent that it will not act aggressively or threateningly towards its neighbours. It seeks to employ cautious “defensive non-threatening” military
strategies grounded in the principles of “deterrence” and effective operation. Neethling (2004:138) asserts that cautiousness in the country’s peacekeeping participation during the 1990s can be ascribed to three factors. Firstly, substantial obstacles attended the integration process of the seven formerly adversarial military forces into the SANDF. Secondly, South Africa, particularly immediately after 1994, had no practical experience in peace operations. Lastly, there were major cuts in budget allocations to the SANDF, which negatively affected the availability of resources. Notwithstanding, such resource impediments, the country has demonstrated its willingness to provide humanitarian aid and to put its resources at the disposal of the continent (Adebajo, et al., 2007:27-28).

South Africa, based on the promises made by the government since its readmission into the international system, is expected to make a huge contribution to continental peace and security (SAGI, 1996: Internet). This does not signify that the country will entirely shun its leadership role in the continent’s political and security affairs and multilateral organisations. The way in which the new South African leadership has approached continental forums mirrors some extent of humility with regard to the need for a lucid approach to Africa’s problems. The South African government has been cautious in assuming the leadership in continental mediation attempts and, as indicated earlier, realising that dominance of any sort may cause political unease and problems. However, on some issues such as regional peacekeeping and development, the country is moving towards a more active leadership role. Ironically, the initiative in such areas hinges fundamentally on
the South African defence establishment. A strange and notorious aspect of South Africa's emergence as a leader is that it is helping to settle continental security issues to which it contributed, and aggravated through its arms trade and underground activities during apartheid. In spite of such leadership contradictions, it is advisable that South Africa utilises its military-security technology in continental conflict-prevention, peacekeeping and peace-building endeavours (Black & Swatuk, 1997: Internet).

According to Neethling (2004:135), “… the ‘new’ South Africa was identified by many observers as the one state able to help ensure effective conflict management and peacekeeping on the African continent”. Based on it’s national political transformation and its commitment to regional peace and security since the mid-1990s, there are increasing hopes on the continent and further afield that it would assume a leading mediatory and peacekeeping role in Africa’s conflicts. South Africa’s dedication to peace and security is further reflected in the White Paper on South African Participation in International Peace Missions (RSA DFA, 1999:22). The White Paper states that South Africa’s national interests encourage global peace and stability, and the country’s participation in peace operations. Moreover, the country is willing to offer “civilian assistance” and “armed forces” in conflict situations so long as international institutions including the UN, the AU, and the SADC approve (multilateral organisations under which South Africa operates in peace missions).

Wheeler (2004:92) asserts that South Africa has shown enthusiasm to participate in international peacekeeping projects. This was proven by the
publication of the White Paper and the opening of a National Office for the Coordination of Peace Missions, all under the auspices of DIRCO. South Africa’s role in conflict resolution has been more preponderant in the multilateral regional and continental spheres under the umbrella of the SADC and the AU than worldwide. Landsberg and Masiza (1995:25) affirm that post-1994 South Africa has realised “moderate success” in this regard. Although confronted with resource capacity impediments, South Africa has been a key player in peace missions and negotiations in African countries such as Burundi, Comoros, Côte d’Ivoire, the DRC, Eritrea(-Ethiopia), Lesotho, Somalia and Sudan (Hudson H., 2007: 14). Nevertheless, according to Selinyane (2006:78), South Africa’s successful intervention in Lesotho in 1998 was one way to hegemonic intervention and a stronger state perpetrating a weaker neighbour in an attempt to create regional peace and stability.

The contribution made by the SANDF in this regard has been great. In the post-1994 period, the SANDF has been involved in several peacekeeping efforts in the continent. For example, the SANDF made significant contribution to peacekeeping endeavours in Africa when it deployed troops to the DRC. Thousands of deployments have also been made to Burundi and Ethiopia. Neethling (2004:144-146) argues that “… South Africa’s incremental involvement in peacekeeping has undoubtedly enhanced the country’s image in the eyes of the international community”. The SANDF does not have an “unlimited capacity” due to budgetary limitations. The argument is that the SANDF should have the capacity to carry out its direct involvement in African peace missions although it may not be able to sustain or even increase its
deployments. Under the Mbeki government, South Africa was eager to react to the increased calls for the South African military participation in peace support missions as part of the implementation of South African-brokered peace agreements, though the SANDF’s capacity to undertake all its peacekeeping obligations effectively continues to be questioned. As an illustration of recent developments, the South African cabinet endorsed the expansion of the deployment of South African armed forces in the DRC to trade skills with that country’s armed forces under Project Thebe from March 2009 to March 2010. In the same period, another extension of the deployment of members of the SANDF in Burundi was also approved (Vines, 2010:59).

However, Solomon (2010:144) warns that South Africa’s peacekeepers will continue to experience setbacks as in Darfur, Sudan, if the armed forces remain careless and ill-disciplined. He points out that such domestic weak spots in the SANDF will also limit its impact in the ASF. It is in South Africa’s and Africa’s own interests for the country to utilise the required resources to develop a skilled armed force. Vines (2010:61) argues that South Africa can take up a leading responsibility in African peace missions. However, the realities on the ground, for instance, in Burundi and the DRC have indicated that the country has been confronted with obstacles largely because of limited economic and human resources, but also due to mismanagement in the SANDF itself. Reports on the deployments demonstrate that the SANDF just cannot keep its equipment operational in a sustainable manner.

South Africa was the first country to chair the AU (2002/2003) under the leadership of former President Mbeki, who was commended for adopting a
development plan consistent with the UN’s global peace blueprint (Kagwanja, 2006:27).

Nonetheless, it must be mentioned that, in some cases, the South African government was not directly involved in conflict settlement negotiations. Rather, it contributed by approving of consensus reached by actors who were at odds with one another, sticking to the principle of non-interference as conceived of as continental “leader” (Landsberg & Masiza, 1995:26).

Moreover, Black and Swatuk (1997: Internet) argue that some of the major changes have transpired in the security arena. The post-apartheid South Africa security system is involved in a wide array of co-operative exercises to fight regional insecurity, since the apartheid South African military and police security establishment were the main cause of regional insecurity. Through a bilateral crime-combating project dubbed “Operation Rachel”, the South African police specialists have destroyed hand-grenades, landmines, mortars, and rocket-launchers. Similar agreements and operations have been initiated with other neighbouring states such as Mozambique. More broadly, the post-1994 SANDF has been a key figure in the formulation of a regional security arrangement: SADC’s Organ for Politics, Defence, and Security (OPDS). The purpose of this security mechanism is to incorporate the provision of intelligence services for preventive diplomacy projects with regard to ongoing intrastate conflicts in the regional, management of multilateral operations, and the development of security agreements among states on issues such as international weapons smuggling.
Although states such as Angola and Egypt have historically had (quantitatively) larger military forces, South Africa is presumed to be the most powerful, effective, best-resourced and capacitated country in Africa. This can be attributed to the fact that South Africa has fewer political and socio-economic problems than its African counterparts have. For example, although Angola is potentially one of the richest countries in Africa, it had been caught up in prolonged and devastating civil wars, while Zimbabwe has been confronted with widespread social and political turmoil and economic collapse, which have greatly affected their military leadership capacity. Egypt, on the other hand, despite its political and economic capabilities, has shown a lack of interest in African affairs since it is an African-Arab country that traditionally considers itself as part of the Middle East and therefore as “non-African” (McGowan, 2002:281; Adebajo & Landsberg, 2003:171; Spies, 2008:108).

Furthermore, Spies (2008:97, 106-108) as well as Wheeler (2004:94, 95) argue that even three years after the 2005 UN World Summit which was aimed at reforming the institution, Africa still remains the only major global region without a permanent seat in the UNSC. Some observers have brought into picture South Africa as one of the potential African countries that can permanently represent the continent if there were such space. However, many are sceptical whether there will be such opportunity for an African country in the near future. Nonetheless, over the years, as explained earlier, there has been some rivalry between South Africa, Egypt and Nigeria with regard to Africa’s representation on the UNSC. Although, South Africa was delegated to the UNSC in 2006 on a non-permanent basis, it officially
occupied its seat only in January 2007. Its designation was based on its diplomatic peace- and security-related experience in countries such as Burundi, the DRC and Côte d’Ivoire, and due to it being the first country to voluntarily dismantle its nuclear programmes and sign the NPT in the early-1990s. Moreover, the country has also served a term as chairman of the UNSC in 2008, based on the “rotating” chairpersonship of the UNSC. Spies (2008:112) further attributes South Africa’s stint on the UNSC to its willingness to play a part in addressing internationally contentious issues. The country has also shown some counter-hegemonic traits, but that it should not be considered a mere team-player” particularly with regard to Africa, because of the strength of its participation in the international arena.

Adebajo and Landsberg (2003:172) as well as Sidiropoulos (2007: Internet, 2) argue that South Africa is a potential military hegemon but that lacks legitimacy to fully undertake such a role because of lack of resources and assertiveness. Rather than pursuing hegemonic ambitions, which would engender “anti-hegemonic” alliances and aggravate continental competition leading to further polarisation and division on the continent, South Africa should seek to expand continental “solidarity” and “partnerships”.

Lastly, it remains to be seen whether President Zuma will pursue former President Mbeki’s policies in the new era, both in principle and in practice. Concerns that were spelled out as being at the crust of South Africa’s foreign policy include partnerships, peace, peaceful conflict resolution, peacekeeping, development of African organisations, and upholding national interests in the international sphere (Sidiropoulos, 2009: Internet, 2).
In view of the above, one would affirm that South Africa has increasingly taken part in African peace efforts since 1994, operating under the banner of the SADC, the AU and the UN. Some of South Africa’s conflict resolution and peace efforts, such as in Lesotho and Zimbabwe, were chiefly informed by the country’s self-interests. However, others, such as in Burundi and Côte d’Ivoire, were based on the request made by the AU. In spite of the outcomes – successes or failures – of the country’s participation in ensuring continental peace and security, its foreign policy on peace and security proves to be largely grounded in NEPAD.

Additionally, academic and policy deliberations point out that South Africa’s peace and security role in Africa is associated with regional hegemony. The hegemony is grounded in three perspectives. The first perspective considers South Africa’s “huge moral capital” drawn from its domestic political transformation. Observers argue that South Africa should make use of this moral power to positively influence and bring about change in conflict-stricken African countries. According to Kagwanja (2009:2), the second perspective is that “… South Africa is a comparatively great military power… [Based on] the contribution of South Africa’s military power in making it a regional superpower in the world’s most marginalised continent, the country could perhaps provide its engine to pull Africa out …”. This perspective is perhaps enthusiastic but inconsiderate of South Africa’s status quo with regard to the availability of resources. The fact is that South Africa has many natural resources (gold, platinum, and others), but it lacks unlimited finances in the country as far as peacekeeping is concerned. The third
perspective purports that South Africa has always been hegemonic, dating from the apartheid era, and just after 1994. By way of illustration, apartheid South Africa’s economic power, self-interest and protectionist tendencies, and its 1998 military intervention in Lesotho, was hegemonic, coercive and aggressive.

Therefore, one would maintain that the Lesotho intervention is symptomatic of South Africa’s hegemonic (leadership) aspirations but rather in an aggressive way, as interpreted by many. However, South Africa’s participation in African peace efforts across the continent, have not reached the level where the country can be dubbed hegemonic. Despite flaws by consecutive South African administrations in mediating peace, Solomon (2010:139) asserts that South Africa has nevertheless been instrumental in expanding the continent’s peace and security architecture in the post-apartheid era. Although this is a commendable endeavour, South Africa must not lose sight of the loopholes in these structures. For example, one such part that must be attended to is post-conflict reconstruction – a critical area of endeavour, given the phenomenon of the recurrence of conflicts in Africa. Nonetheless, it must be acknowledged that South Africa has emerged as one of the most prominent actors in this field on the continent, based on its relatively limited resources, capacity, and experience.

Solomon (2010:144) reports that, with regard to recent developments in the Sudan, the Zuma administration’s efforts together with former President Mbeki’s initiatives, are aimed at contributing to state-building, public administration and judicial capacity building. The Zuma government has finally
proclaimed its advocacy for the ICC in its accusation of Sudanese President Bashir, in so doing assuming its international liability under the Rome Statutes. According to Ncana (2010: Internet), the AU appointed former Mbeki to lead a panel attempting to settle the conflict between Sudan's northern and southern regions as well as bringing a halt to the violence in the capital of Darfur. Recently, Mr. Mbeki has been spending most of his time travelling between South Africa and Sudan with the view to implement his peace-brokering mission in support of the South African government's efforts. Reportedly, South Sudan is planning to hold a referendum in January 2011 with the possibility of forming a “breakaway state”. For Mr. Mbeki, “… neither the Sudanese President [Al-Bashir] nor the South Sudan regional government had the power to postpone the process as the referendum was the responsibility of an independent commission” (Ncana, 2010: Internet). However, Mbeki has expressed concerns with regard to the possible conflict that could be triggered by the announcement of election results, as in Lesotho in 1998. If secession does take place in Sudan, mediators will have to exert even greater efforts to develop good relationships between these two states – the north and the south – in the interests of the new Sudan.

International trade issues have become even much significant since the twilight of the Cold War. Trade issues have also overwhelmed the United States and its supporters’ previously irresistible obsession with military security. Gilpin (2001:22-23) argues that it is deceptive, however, to over-emphasise the difference between international economic and security issues. This is because the two areas are intrinsically linked, always have been, and
certainly always will be. Thus, it is incredibly hard to divorce the two in practice. The international political and security system provides an indispensable structure in which the international economy operates; moreover, national and international economies stimulate wealth, which is the basis of the international political system.

5.4. Trade Relations

In times to come, the economic foundation of the international political system will change in accordance with “the law of uneven growth” since the ultimate transformation of the international balance of power will compel states to review their national interests and foreign policies. Political dynamics of that nature often degrade the constancy of the international economic/political system and they can even culminate in international conflict (Gilpin, 2001:22-23). Landsberg and Masiza (1995:14) maintain that the end of the Cold War also marked a strengthened interconnection between the economy and politics.

5.4.1. General Background to Trade Relations Issues

Theoretically, in terms of neo-liberalism, economic cooperation is “possible” and “likely”, even in the absence of an acting hegemon within the alliance. Yet, interstate trade is an “iterated game” but that somehow results in stability and cooperation. According realism, states are obsessed with “relative” instead of “absolute” benefits in their economic cooperation. Therefore, under given circumstances, partnership is less likely (Reardon, Kling, McCorkle & Miller, 2002: Internet).
Economic nationalism, like realism, underscores the anarchic character of international issues, the superiority of the state and its interests within the international system, and the significance of “power” politics in international relations. Nevertheless, nationalism, sometimes justifiably, does not favour normative commitments to “economic liberalism”. That is, it does not advocate commitments to regional free trade and minimal trade barriers to the capital, merchandise, and services across domestic borders (Gilpin, 2001:14).

Almost similarly, classical mercantilism focused on the increase of wealth through unequal trade patterns; that is, promoting exports and limiting imports. This early form of mercantilism was rooted in protectionism through the imposition of trade barriers such as import tariffs as a method of wealth creation and security assurance. However, the post-World War II era marked the emergence of neo-mercantilism with the intention to end setbacks of economic protectionism posed by classical mercantilism. Therefore, it could well be said that neo-mercantilism is aimed at ending economic protectionism and dependency. Thus, neo-mercantilism as well as realism, prescribe that interdependent trade relations can be characterised by inequalities. Contemporary neo-mercantilism emphasise that states can further accumulate wealth and power by intervening not only in national economies but also in the economies of their neighbours and generally in the international political-economic system (Balaam & Veseth, 2005:28, 33, 35).

Reardon, et al. (2002: Internet) assert that some of the appealing developments in the post-World War II era have been the formation of regional trade blocs. For some reasons, economies of individual states
constitute “the economy of the world” (SAGI, 1996: Internet). Furthermore, international cooperation is best thought of as “… an active process of discovering and reinforcing previously unrecognised mutual interests of sovereign states” (Keohane, 1984:22). Significantly, trade coalitions are generally developed with the aim to construct less-protective trade relations among members of the bloc, while simultaneously practising trade protectionism towards non-member states (Reardon, et al., 2002: Internet).

According to Makgetlaneng (2010: Internet), Kwame Nkrumah has always emphasised that “no independent African state today has a chance to follow an independent course of economic development, and many of us who have tried to do this have been almost ruined or have had to return to the fold of the former colonial rulers”. This situation will not change unless Africa has an integrated economic plan and collective policies. Nkrumah maintained that, although there are limited resources, Africa still has the capacity to transform the economic structures of its individual states and strive for wealth and fulfilment of social primary needs. It is only in a continental context that Africans can plan the complete utilisation of all resources in the name of a successful continent. The aspects of domination, dictatorship and exploitation amongst Africans totally oppose the principle of economic independence. It condemns the control over African states’ national economies and their individual formulation and implementation of liberal, autonomous development strategies and tactics. Political economic independence implies control over economic decision-making and the national economy, the development of a strong industrial system, resulting in a “self-generating” and “self-sustaining”
economic expansion, and diverse overseas economic ties in accordance with individual countries’ economic interests. It is important to consider the perspective of South Africa African economic development.

5.4.2. South Africa’s Role in Trade Relations in Africa

As indicated in South African Foreign Policy Discussion Document (SAGI, 1996: Internet), “… South Africa must take due cognizance of the implications of … foreign and economic policy, and formulate industrial, investment, labour and political policies which promote the national interest”. In addition, during foreign policy formulation, policymakers ought to contemplate the way in which certain issues may grant an opportunity for South Africa to uphold the economic interests of other regional and continental states. Without question, the promotion of economic development within the region is of the utmost importance since regional economies are intrinsically linked due to geographical proximity. Since bilateral and multilateral regional relations have inter alia, the aim of achieving sustainable economic growth, it is of critical importance for South Africa to develop its economic relations with the international community and to work towards an “integrated economic foreign policy”.

During the Heads of State Mission Conference held in September 1995, former Finance Minister Trevor Manuel identified the aspects that ought to be considered in South Africa’s foreign economic policy as (SAGI, 1996: Internet):
• The creation of a foreign investor-friendly environment by both the government and foreign missions;
• Foreign investors have to be regularly informed about South Africa’s national economic developments including investment opportunities through programmes such as the RDP; and
• Based on South Africa’s affiliation to the Marrakech Agreement, the country was readmitted into the world trading system; therefore, the government and corporate system have to be “competitive” in the international economic sphere.

Hugon (2003:117) asserts that South Africa is the biggest economy in the Southern African region, and in extension, of the continent. South Africa has been conspicuous in the (seemingly moderate) process of integration within the region. The Southern African region expects South Africa to make a “positive” contribution to regional economic development. Fellow regional countries expect South Africa to cooperate with them as a “partner and ally” and not as a regional “super power”, in order to accomplish symbiotic economic partnership. South Africa and Africa at large cooperate on economic bases and are on the mission to enter EU markets together. This does not preclude the possibility of competition though. Rivalry almost always exists in a market-driven economy. However, observers advise that an aspect of competition must be given a closer, meticulous look as it may just culminate in antagonism amongst economic actors (SAGI, 1996: Internet).

According to Adedeji (2007:59-60) as well as Hudson J. (2007:131, 135), South Africa has since the mid-1990s shifted from playing the role of a
hegemon (which Schoeman (2002:228) argues was a given, based on its exports and the exorbitant amounts of regional GDP that it contributed) to that of a multilateral partner within the region. Such a move is very well embodied in the “positive” role that the country plays in both SACU as well as the SADC. However, South Africa has been denounced for failing to join and actually exercise a significant role in the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA). Nonetheless, South Africa has followed a “neoliberal economic strategy” as part of post-apartheid economic development. It has therefore adopted a leading role in the process of regional economic reconfiguration, guided by economic prescriptions of a market-oriented and export-led (capital) accumulation process in both the region and the continent. Additionally, further animosity amongst other leading African economies towards South Africa has been exacerbated by the fact that South Africa is becoming the “most favoured” by MNCs from developed countries in that most of them have established continental head offices in South Africa. South Africa has also become the leading single investor in Africa with multilateral companies operating on the continent.

South Africa’s bilateral trade relations with Africa have been outstanding since the advent of democracy in the country. Reportedly, Africa is South Africa’s fourth largest export market (Adedeji, 2007:59-60). South African corporations have invaded African markets, which Hudson H. (2007:15) as well as Naidu (2004:214) label the “southafricanisation” of Africa’s economy. For instance, consider South Africa’s telecommunication MNCs such as Mobile Telephone Network (MTN) and Vodacom that have flooded African
countries such as Nigeria, Swaziland and Uganda. However, the trend of trade and gains thereof have been unevenly skewed to the favour of South Africa at the ratio of 7:1 in trade imbalances with the rest of the continent. This has been of a much serious concern for most actors on the continent including Nigeria and Kenya, which are leading economic players in their respective regions (Adedeji, 2007:59-60).

Other business sectors in which South African corporations operate on the continent incorporate construction, financial services, manufacturing, property, retail, tourism and transport. Some African countries have expressed discontent, arguing that South Africa’s MNCs have adopted “apartheid” attitudes in their markets, driven by selfish profit-making, market share, and exclusion of competition (Hudson J., 2007:129). Hudson H. (2007:15) further maintains that South African corporate invasion of African countries ultimately drives out such countries’ small businesses. According to Sidiropoulos (2007: Internet, 2), South Africa’s continental involvement is both marked by its “gigantism” as contrasted to other regional economies. South Africa is the leading and most sophisticated African economy – with its GDP around 40 times higher than the overall average of sub-Saharan economies. Continentally, its GDP contribution is approximately 25% to that of the overall African economy. As a result, on the one hand, South Africa has to address the contradictions that accompany it in being the continent’s largest economy; while on the other hand, it has to focus on influencing its sceptics in order to entrench perceptions of it being a hegemon. South Africa favours forging
multilateral agreements with fellow continental partners instead of acting in isolation.

However, Mills (2000:351) contends that, in spite of obvious South African economic preponderance, the country cannot and will not “control” African markets or economies because they essentially lie in the hands of the African community at large. Nevertheless, the former confesses that South African businesses attempt to perform to the best of their ability and exploit every business opportunity that presents itself on the continent. This conversion of business opportunities does not destroy but rather ameliorates South Africa-Africa trade and investment relations and continental economy in general.

Adedeji (2007:60) as well as Hudson H. (2007:16) assert that South African parastatals such as Eskom, Spoornet, and others, have virtually invaded the African market with great force. They maintain that such businesses operate under the umbrella of organisations such as the Industrial Development Corporation (IDC) and DBSA through funding, profit-sharing and risk-sharing. Hudson J. (2007:131) extols South African parastatals in Africa for managing to conduct their businesses in accordance with NEPAD stipulations such as emphasising the significance of partnership all in the name of infrastructural development and continental industrialisation. Hudson J. (2007:129, 132, 136) further maintains that the country has become a “pivotal” economic actor in Africa particularly with reference to capital flow, merchandise and human resources. Hudson J. (2007:129, 132, 136) attributes South Africa’s less restrained economic domination on the continent to two major factors: South African market and consumer base is too little to
take up all the products, while South African MNCs are much too small to compete in the developed world. On the one hand, apartheid South Africa’s (virtual) exclusion from the international economic system somehow meant that surplus capital was accumulated but became stuck within domestic boundaries. On the other hand, the dismantling of the apartheid regime also literally opened African economic opportunities for South Africa’s potential businesses that sought foreign investment during the period of sanctions. In addition, the country’s economic domination is also fuelled by individual “self-interest”. South Africa’s economic involvement in Africa through trade and investment continues to reinforce external investor confidence of overseas investors in Africa.

Although the post-1994 South Africa’s foreign policy towards the Southern African region was reconfigured to adjust to the new political realities, it continues to focus stereotypically on economic and political interests, or mercantilism. The fundamental interest, at least with regard to Africa, is the promotion of accelerated trade and foreign direct investment from South Africa to the SADC, and, in expansion, the rest of Sub-Saharan Africa, with the intent to augment domestic growth and job creation (Gelb, 2002:13). Additionally, according to Alden and Le Pere (2009:159), “… South Africa’s commercial interests contradict with an idealist foreign policy that is oriented to providing critical public goods for Africa”. They allege that South Africa’s economic interests are informed by a political strategy that was orchestrated to interfere with open markets, and to set the stage for establishing “footholds”
in various economic sectors wherein the country will be able to exercise its corporate muscles penetration.

Gelb (2002:18) advises South Africa to adopt a position of ‘partnership’ instead of a ‘selfish hegemon’ in its trade relations with other African countries. The country should ensure that trade benefits flow to the region rather than to itself.

In view of the above, one would assert that South Africa’s trade relations with the region are rather asymmetrical. That is, South Africa benefits more from trade relations than do its African counterparts. This makes South Africa a dominant economic actor exploiting its continental counterparts. On the one hand, these imbalances generated criticism levelled at South Africa, that it is a selfish hegemon aiming to pursue its national interests at the expense of weak and under-resourced African states. On the other hand, South Africa is a partner to African economies. However, this economic partnership has been marked largely by trade imbalances (with South Africa benefiting more than the others do). Thus, this shows the country’s economic self-interestedness. After all, economic partnership, as in the case of South Africa-Southern Africa, does not necessarily mean equal economic power: emerging middle economic countries can still forge trade partnership with low-income countries in spite of unequal development levels. Almost certainly, there are likely to be trade imbalances when middle-income countries such as South Africa trade with low-income countries such as Swaziland, Lesotho and Zimbabwe.
5.5. Conclusion

This chapter has overviewed some of the most important pillars of post-apartheid South Africa’s foreign policy: human rights, peace and security, and the economy and trade.

South Africa has been declared one of the dominant forces in the promulgation of international human rights law at the UN level. However, some observers argue that South Africa has been paradoxical, rhetorical, and ambiguous with regard to its human rights standpoint. A gap exists between the principle and practice of human rights perhaps more than in any other areas, proving to be “uneven”. For instance, South Africa has frequently condemned the sanctioning of notorious human rights abusers including Zimbabwe, Myanmar, and Iran. The country prevented the deployment of a fact-finding mission to investigate post-election violence.

Therefore, it would be inappropriate to conclude that South Africa is a key and positively hegemonic leader or actor in international human rights issues particularly in Africa, and further afield. The country has recently received more criticism than applause in this field. Pragmatically, South Africa is now an ordinary partner or actor in international human rights and not a leading hegemon. The country has been accused and construed by many as an unethical human rights actor incapable of undertaking a moral responsibility to effectively address international human rights issues in both Africa and further afield.
Based on the West’s reluctance to intervene (through armed forces) in African peace and security affairs, many have questioned whether South Africa can fill the continental security leadership vacuum due to its (but limited) capacity, resources and effectiveness. Likewise, former Presidents Nelson Mandela and Thabo Mbeki proclaimed that the South African government is willing to embark on transforming Africa into a stable “zone of peace” through democratisation. The South African government has pledged to participate in the AU-led continental cooperation and development, peace, security and stability efforts, all in the name of the country’s national interests and the UN’s political and operational objectives. South Africa has shown eagerness to contribute to international peacekeeping operations in that it has been a key player in peace missions and negotiations in African countries such as Burundi, Comoros, Côte d’Ivoire, the DRC, Eritrea(-Ethiopia), Lesotho, Somalia and Sudan, through the SANDF and other actors. The contribution made by the SANDF in this regard has been great. The SANDF’s involvement in peacekeeping missions has certainly improved the country’s reputation in the international arena.

South Africa is expected to utilise its moral power to exert a positive influence and change in conflicting African countries. Based on its military power, South African could be a regional superpower in the continent and provide “its engine to pull Africa out” of conflicts. Some assert that South Africa has always been a hegemonic power. For example, during apartheid, South Africa was a leading economy, yet it employed the principles of self-interest and protectionism. Moreover, its 1998 military intervention in Lesotho
shows its aggressive and hegemonic behaviour. However, South Africa’s participation in overall continental peace efforts has not reached the level where the country can be dubbed an exclusive hegemon. It must therefore be conceded that South Africa has emerged as one of the most prominent actors in this field on the continent based on its resources, capacity, and experience.

Post-apartheid South African security has been involved in a wide array of co-operative exercises to battle regional insecurity. Through a bilateral crime-combating project dubbed “Operation Rachel”, South African police specialists have destroyed hand-grenades, landmines, mortars, and rocket-launchers. Again, the SANDF has been a principal player in the formulation of the SADC’s OPDS.

South Africa is willing to participate in international contentious issues, has exhibited counter-hegemonic traits, and cannot be regarded as a mere “team-player” participating in the international or in the continental arena of Africa. Some observers argue that South Africa is a potential military hegemon but it lacks the capacity and legitimacy to perform such a role. There is a fear that the country, in pursuing its hegemonic ambitions, may propel the formation of “anti-hegemonic” alliances and exacerbate continental rivalry.

As far as trade relations are concerned, South Africa is a dominant economic actor in Africa. However, South Africa’s trade relations with the region are rather lopsided. This implies that trade benefits are uneven and skewed to the benefit of South Africa, resulting in trade imbalances with the rest of the continent. Some African countries have expressed dissatisfaction
concerning the “apartheid” behaviour of some post-apartheid South African businesses that are obsessed with profit making, market-share, and exclusion of competition. South African businesses strive to excel and utilise every business opportunity on the continent. Furthermore, it generated criticism leveled against South Africa, that it is selfish hegemon aiming to pursue its national interests at the expense of weak and under-resourced African states.

The South African policy documents such as strategic plans, discussion documents, and white papers set down “something” while its foreign policy practices suggest something else. The country is experiencing a serious challenge of failing to implement exactly what is stipulated on paper. This explains why its foreign policy documents prescribe partnerships and alliances with the region on the one hand, but one also observes huge trade imbalances between South Africa and neighbours on the other. In the end, economic partnership, as in the case of South Africa-Southern Africa relations, does not necessarily mean equal economic power: emerging middle economic countries can still forge trade relations with low-income countries in spite of unequal development levels. In all probability, there are likely to be trade imbalances when middle-income countries such as South Africa trade with low-income countries such as Swaziland, Lesotho and Zimbabwe. Notwithstanding the economic development gap, the South African government continues to deny any hegemonic ambitions. Perhaps South Africa is aware of other African governments’ sensitivities to any probability of its domination. Any intention to pursue hegemonic tendencies would be sharply condemned and counterproductive.
CHAPTER 6: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

6.1. Summary

The purpose of this study has been to provide an overview of South Africa’s foreign policy towards and its role on the African continent. This was done in order to determine whether South Africa should be regarded as a partner or hegemon. This research goal was based on the post-1994 South African government’s perceived need to embark on the promotion of respect for human rights, peace and security assurances, and economic development on the African continent. Consequently, South Africa’s foreign policy and the conception of its role on the continent has been a cause for disagreement.

To facilitate this study, the following research question was formulated:

“What is the foreign policy of South Africa towards and its role on the African continent: partner or hegemon?”

The discussion on the “partner/hegemon” question is based on the literature on South Africa’s foreign policy and its role on the continent. This debate suggests that the country’s foreign policy is marked by contradictory concepts, arguments, and normative principles. Having observed the eclectic quality of South Africa’s foreign policy towards Africa, Davies (1992) suggests there is one of two courses that the country could follow. It could pursue regional integration driven by hegemonic ambitions and egocentrism while favouring some of its lesser neighbours, or it might pursue the so-called “non-hegemonic regional co-operation and integration” mandate. Schoeman (2007) holds an almost similar sentiment. South Africa is not an exclusive partner nor is it a complete hegemon. South Africa finds itself somewhere in-between.
This is because the country has shown hegemonic aspirations through its multilateral socio-political leadership and economic aggressiveness while simultaneously maintaining that it is willing to act as a partner without any hegemonic ambitions. Other than that, Habib and Selinyane (2004) suggest that South Africa should assume a hegemonic role. The region needs a leader capable of addressing socio-political and security issues with economic rewards that promise a tenable stability. This will eventually restore Africa’s stature in the international sphere. As a result of these contradicting concepts, the problem statement of the study is founded on the controversy surrounding South Africa’s foreign policy identity and its eventual role on the African continent.

In order to assess South Africa’s foreign policy and role, the study was conceptually demarcated by determining whether South Africa can best be associated with a concept of partnership or hegemony. Moreover, the study was geopolitically confined to South Africa and the African continent. South Africa’s representation as a major African power and of the developing South on the UNSC was also considered. As far as temporal demarcation is concerned, the study was limited to South Africa’s foreign policy towards Africa from 1994 to 2010, although some pre-1994 foreign policy events were broadly considered as background information with regard to the South Africa-Africa policy.

The study descriptively analysed the relationship between South Africa and other African countries via an “inside-out” approach; discussing South Africa’s foreign policy processes both by involvement of state and non-state actors at national level, and eventually evaluating their roles on the continent.
and further afield. Generally, the study examined and portrayed the foreign policy relations of South Africa with other African states. It is a descriptive analysis based on a literature study aimed at working towards explanations on why South Africa, among many other policy issues and choices, decided to prioritise human rights, peace and security, and trade relations. All the data in the study was acquired from primary (state documents), literature sources, and secondary analytical and scholarly sources.

The significance of the study is that the findings can be used to inform foreign policy actors and observers about South Africa’s foreign policy in Africa. The answers to the research question can help to clarify and better understand the country’s policies and international expectations on the South Africa-Africa relations. Regarding the conceptual controversy surrounding South Africa’s role on the continent, the study helps determine whether the country epitomises a partner or hegemon.

In view of the above, the main aim of chapter two was to conceptualise terms that are frequently used in IR, particularly those often used in the study. The chapter commenced by conceptualising “foreign policy”, “national interests” and “state and non-states actors”, “partner” and “hegemony”, and “multilateralism”.

In this regard, a state-centric, classical realist interpretation defines foreign policy as aims pursued by a state as the only actor in foreign policymaking, while liberal-pluralism interprets “foreign policy” as being developed by both state and non-state actors. The study found that foreign policy is representative of national interests, not only of state actors’ interests, but also of those of non-state actors. Such national interests may be economic,
political or social, or even more than that. Furthermore, foreign policy-related roles cannot be entirely attributed to the state but to NGOs as well.

The study also shown that foreign policymaking is a lengthy process that involves at least five stages: agenda-setting/problem presentation, opinion generation, policy design, implementation, and policy review. Moreover, the foreign policy of a state is developed with the view to ensure security domestically and abroad; achieve and enhance national prosperity; earn status and prestige in the international arena; and ensure and maintain the autonomy of the state in question.

With regard to “national interests”, liberalism would presecribe that “national interests” are no longer relevant to the contemporary political environment, while others contend that the phrase only involves the aspirations of the leading elite and not those of the public. However, the research reveals that “national interests” is a “measuring stick” since it only distinguishes national policies from foreign ones. The phrase specifically shows that certain pursued goals actually arise from people’s interests.

The research has also shown that sovereign territorial states as well as the intergovernmental organisations that they have developed are all state actors, who together, constitute the community of nations. Such intergovernmental institutions in the African context include the SADC, the AU, NEPAD, and others. Non-states actors are those actors that indirectly engage in foreign policymaking. By way of embodiment, non-governmental organisations include liberation movements, terrorist groups, TSMs, MNCs, and ordinary individuals.
The research showed that the concept of a “partner” refers to a “friendly” political, economic, or military actor with two or more international actors such as states, MNCs, and so on. A partner shares similar aims and objectives with fellow partners and is characterised by tolerance and commitment but there is no guarantee of equality among partners. The study further revealed that a hegemon is an actor that is economically and militarily powerful, and that plays a firm and influential leadership role within the region, continent, or the world in general. A hegemon may be a leading actor or organisation but it can sometimes be monopolistic.

Chapter three of the study was aimed at discussing South Africa’s foreign policymaking. In this regard, the research demonstrated that South Africa’s foreign policy since 1994 has been guided by a belief in the respect for human rights; promotion of global democracy; upholding of international law in international relations; promotion of international peace; development of African interests; and economic development.

With regard to foreign policy decision-making, the study indicated that the president is one of the actors involved and he is the primary player that takes foreign policy decisions in South Africa. Having mentioned that, this does not signify that he/she is the sole actor involved in the process. However, a president can have a major influence on foreign policy and in determining whether South Africa embraces partnership or hegemonic tendencies towards the continent. For instance, former President Mbeki was involved in the promulgation of the concept of the “African Renaissance” and the NEPAD programme. During his presidential terms, former President Mbeki supported
multilateral solutions to regional conflicts and further deployed peacekeepers abroad. He also played an extraordinary role in NAM, the AU and the UNSC.

Moreover, the research determined that other actors or specifically government departments that contribute directly or indirectly to foreign policy (formulation and implementation) include DIRCO through the minister in charge, South Africa’s diplomats and ambassadors, the DOD and the DTI. The DOD, through the SANDF, has been involved in conflict prevention, peace building, and peacekeeping in African countries such as Burundi, the DRC, and others. This shows the practical role and relevance of the DOD/SANDF on the issue of South Africa being a partner or a hegemon. The research further indicated that Parliament and civil society are other actors also indirectly involved in foreign policymaking. The contribution of various foreign policy actors to foreign policy decision-making differs greatly, depending on each actor’s relevance to the process.

The main aim of chapter four was to explore South Africa’s multilateral relations on the African continent. The research on South Africa’s multilateralism in Africa emphasised its role in multilateral organisations on the continent. Notwithstanding the criticism that South Africa failed to influence SADC’s Organ on Politics, and Defence and Security controlled by Zimbabwe in the late 1990s, the country continues to play a leading role in SADC. The study showed that South Africa has been one of key players in the rejuvenation of the SADC. In fact, the country is also responsible for coordinating the Finance and Investment sector in the SADC. It bases its regional role on the principles of equality and symbiotic partnership; non-hegemonic tendencies; and partnership as the means accomplishing its policy
goals. The study disclosed that expectations are generally high amongst African governments for South Africa’s cooperation with its regional counterparts as a partner and ally to ensure mutual and symbiotic economic and political relations. The country led the Summit of the SADC Heads of State and Government at which the need to establish the FTA was emphasised, and several agreements were signed.

The study showed that South Africa’s Board on Tariffs and Trade recommends common tariff levels while the Departments of Customs and Excise (fixed three instances), and Trade and Industry collect the most duties and monitor SACU in that order. However, some maintain that South Africa’s participation in SACU is characterised by inconsistencies and economic supremacy. The country in the past has often been regarded as “imperialist” and a “malevolent hegemonic power”, and is currently reported to be a “benign” regional hegemon. Most recently at the 2010 summit, SACU members registered their dissatisfaction about regional trade imbalances, marked by biased trade tendencies and protectionism, which hamper regional industrialisation endeavours. Furthermore, SACU members threatened that they would leave the union if South Africa failed to address regional trade imbalances. For this reason, research findings prove that South Africa cannot be regarded as a “partner” in the union; rather it showed itself to be an economic hegemon – at least in some instances.

At the AU level, the study revealed that the South African government has since 1994 expressed its commitment to cooperate as “equals” with its African counterparts and eschewed any hegemonic ambitions under the watchful eyes of the AU. Since then, the country has sought to build partnerships and
alliances with other African states. South Africa is also expected to champion the cause of the continent and of the South at large, in spite of the accusation of some African states that South Africa may be guilty of alleged hegemonic tendencies. Illustratively, in the early 2000s, the Mbeki Administration was predominant in re-outlining the AU’s goals and objectives. Nevertheless, the government was criticised for considering the interests of some states while ignoring those of others’ in the AU. However, South Africa stated the need to intensify the AU’s participation in conflict prevention, management, and resolution, particularly on peace support operations in conflict-stricken countries in Africa, emphasising the importance of human security and social justice instead of military-defined state security.

Research pertaining to South Africa’s role in NEPAD demonstrated that the plan largely reflects former President Mbeki’s development ideas, embodying the country’s leadership role on this continental multilateral platform. South Africa’s commitment to the development of NEPAD is guided by its belief in accountability, ownership, and partnership. South Africa’s role in NEPAD has been significant since the country has managed to coax many African countries to join NEPAD.

Based on the transformation of African governments, the study showed that the Mbeki government played a crucial role in the expansion of the APRM. For the purpose of peer review, the South African government launched and conducted its annual Peer Review Mechanism in 2005 under former President Mbeki.

Investigations show that South Africa under the Mbeki Administration played and continues to play a significant role in developing and promoting
the African Renaissance ideal. The Mbeki government has always avoided being conceived of as hegemon in its endeavours to disseminate the “African agenda”, despite allegations by some international actors in this regard.

The research further showed that South Africa represented Africa and the South on a non-permanent seat on the UNSC in 2006, which was informed by its peace and security management experience particularly in Africa. It also accepted the “rotating” chairmanship on the UNSC in 2008. In October 2010, the country won another non-permanent seat for the 2011 to 2012 period.

South Africa’s approach is counter-hegemonic but simultaneously, it does not intend to be a mere “team-player” in international politics, particularly in Africa. Many believe however, that it has automatically become a “state-leadership” hegemon since it professes to represent Africa and the South in the UNSC.

Chapter five of the study was aimed at addressing South Africa’s Africa foreign policy issues in the post-1994 period with reference to human rights, peace and security, and trade relations.

From the perspective of human rights, the research also revealed that South Africa was proclaimed one of the dominant actors in the promulgation of international human rights law at the UN level. However, some argue that South Africa is paradoxical, rhetorical, and ambiguous in its approach to human rights. The gap between the principle and practice of human rights perhaps stands out clearer than in any other areas, proving to be “uneven”. For instance, South Africa often disapproved of international criticism of human rights abusers such as the governments of Zimbabwe, Myanmar, and
Iran. For this reason, the study maintains that South Africa is not a hegemon with regard to international human rights, neither in Africa, nor in the rest of the world. In fact, South Africa has recently received more criticism than applause in this field. In practice, the country is not a leading hegemon, but merely a typical partner with an average sense of political morality when it comes to the international promotion of respect for human rights. Some observers even consider South Africa as a human rights actor incapable of taking moral responsibility to successfully address international human rights issues in both Africa and further afield.

Relating to peace and security, the research indicated that the South African government has shown its willingness to offer assistance for transforming Africa into a stable “zone of peace” through democratisation. It has promised to participate in the AU-led continental cooperation and development, peace, security, and stability efforts, all in the name of the country’s national interests and the UN’s political and operational objectives. The country has shown its willingness to participate in the African peacekeeping missions as can be deduced from its involvement over many years in peace missions and negotiations in African countries such as Burundi, Comoros, Côte d’Ivoire, the DRC, Eritrea(-Ethiopia), Lesotho, Somalia and Sudan, through the SANDF and other actors. The SANDF’s involvement in peacekeeping missions has certainly improved the country’s reputation in Africa and in the international arena. Although some contend that South Africa, based on its military power, is a potential regional superpower that can tender “its engine to pull Africa out” of conflicts, some argue that it
has always been an African military hegemonic power. Its military intervention in Lesotho in 1998 illustrated its aggressive and hegemonic behaviour. Many interpreted South Africa’s rather aggressive intervention in Lesotho as proof of its hegemonic (leadership) ambition. However, South Africa’s participation in recent African peace efforts on the continent has not reached the level where it can be coined as hegemonic. South Africa has nevertheless emerged as one of the most prominent players in the continent’s peace and security missions since it is well resourced, capacitated, and experienced. However, one needs to indicate that although the South African military is one of the most capable forces in the African context – which might imply to some observers that South Africa is a potential military hegemon – the country is still short of the legitimacy and capacity to act as a political-military hegemon on the continent.

With regard to economic issues, the research findings in the last section of chapter five showed that South Africa’s trade relations with the region, as hinted earlier in the research findings on the country’s role in SACU, are rather asymmetrical. It also showed that trade benefits are uneven and skewed in favour of South Africa, resulting in trade imbalances with the rest of the continent. Such imbalances stirred criticism against South Africa, that it is a selfish hegemon intending to pursue its national interests at the cost of weak and under-resourced African states. The country is confronted by a stern challenge since it fails to implement the stipulations in its economic and trade policies. This demonstrates why its foreign policy documents prescribe partnership and alliance with the region on the one hand, but reflects huge
economic and trade imbalances between South Africa and its neighbours on the other. In the end, South Africa-Southern Africa economic partnership does not necessarily mean equal economic power; that is, emerging middle economic powers can still forge trade relations with low-income countries despite unequal levels of economic development. Admittedly, there are often trade imbalances when middle-income countries such as South Africa trade with less-developed countries in its neighbourhood. In spite of such trade gaps, the South African government continues to reject alleged hegemonic aspirations.

6.2. Conclusions

With regard to the main research question, three subsidiary questions were asked:

- How does South Africa define its foreign identity with particular reference to its role on the African continent and further afield?
- What are the regional and continental expectations with regard to South Africa’s role in Africa?
- Is South Africa willing to be a leader or an ordinary actor within the multilateral (African) context?

The following conclusions can finally be articulated in the context of the research question and subsidiary questions.
How does South Africa define its foreign identity with particular reference to its role on the African continent and further afield?

Although apartheid South Africa did not have much interest in Africa, the foreign policy of the democratic, post-1994 South African government proved to be Africa-oriented in nature. Furthermore, Nelson Mandela, even before being inaugurated as President, often reiterated that South Africa’s post-apartheid foreign policy specifically with regard to Africa would be guided by the country’s commitment to the promotion of the principle of respect for human rights. It can be safely asserted that the country’s resolve to address human rights issues was informed by its socio-political history. For this reason, South Africa’s advocacy led to a situation where human rights issues dominated its foreign policy agenda in Africa. This obsession with human rights promotion further led to South Africa earning itself the title “Beacon of Hope” due to its commitment, at least in principle, to African human rights issues. South Africa sharply condemned the execution of Nigerian human rights activists including Ken Saro Wiwa in 1995. Over the years, the country has also deployed its troops, under the auspices of the SADC and the AU, with the view to curb human rights abuses and ensure human security and stability in African conflict-stricken countries. However, South Africa continues to be denounced for its failure to condemn and effectively help address human rights abuses in countries such as Zimbabwe and Swaziland. Many argue that South Africa is gradually compromising its foreign principles by adopting the so-called “quiet diplomacy” towards some African (and even non-African) countries notorious for human rights violations.
With Thabo Mbeki taking over as President of the Republic, South Africa’s “Africanness” continued through slogans such as “I am an African”. However, specifically, South Africa’s foreign policy focus in Africa indirectly took a gradual shift to economic issues losing sight of human rights support hence the ignorance of blatant human rights abuses in 2008. Currently, South Africa’s foreign policy, based on practical circumstances, is gradually becoming dominated by economic issues. This point is manifested by the Mbeki Administration’s leading role in economy-oriented institutions such as NEPAD while keeping “quiet” when it comes to continental human rights issues.

However, most observers argue that South Africa does not have a clear foreign identity in Africa; perhaps this is due to ambiguities, inconsistencies, and paradoxes that characterise its foreign policy and eventually its role in Africa.

What are the regional and continental expectations with regard to South Africa’s role in Africa?

The entire continent expects (more of) a leadership role from South Africa. One of the reasons for such optimism is that South Africa is the most resourced, capacitated, developed and well-governed country on the continent. Other than that, at the dawn of democracy in South Africa, the government made a series of promises with regard to its role on the continent. This might have sparked African countries’ hopes pertaining to South Africa’s continental role. As soon as the democratic dispensation was brought into effect, or even before then, the South African post-apartheid government was already making development promises to fellow African states. By way of
illustration, former President Mandela frequently emphasised, even in a foreign policy-related academic article published in 1993, that democratic South Africa would take up a leadership position but avoid hegemonic attitudes in Africa. Additionally, the ANC’s Foreign Policy Discussion Document further accentuates that it would be unrealistic for South Africa to “think” that it would enter a possibly prosperous future in isolation from its African neighbours. The document maintains that South Africa intends to strengthen its ties with Africa. This is because South Africa is intrinsically and inextricably linked with the African continent, geographically and otherwise. Once again, these represent some of the factors that raised poor African states’ expectations of South Africa.

Although countries such as Nigeria seem to be critical towards South Africa, some African countries, and even the West, still vest the responsibility of African development in South Africa as Africa’s leading economy. Africa, particularly, expects South Africa to make a significant contribution in many development areas. Currently, South Africa is expected to address human rights violations in countries such as Zimbabwe and Swaziland via mediation or any other related effective means, other than quiet diplomacy. The country is also expected to make an economic contribution to African development through trade (foreign direct investment) while simultaneously ensuring that trade relations and benefits are even and symbiotic. Furthermore, it is important for South Africa to contribute in a form of material resources, finance, deployment of more troops to conflict-stricken and under-resourced countries, and others. The country is also expected to be a more assertive
leader in the development of African multilateral political institutions such as
the ADC, the AU, NEPAD, and others.

Is South Africa willing to be a leader or an ordinary actor within the
multilateral (African) context?

The Mbeki Administration, more than any other South African
governments, declared and often emphasised its favouritism for
multilateralism over unilateralism. In fact, the need for multilateralism has
been one of the predominant items in South Africa’s foreign agenda and
approach towards its relations with Africa since the late 1990s. The country
contends that multilateral relations are more effective than bilateralism and
unilateralism when it comes to regional development. South Africa’s
preference for multilateralism is well mirrored in the Foreign Policy Discussion
Document and DIRCO’s annual strategic plans. In these documents, the
South African government, again, continues to reflect its keenness to be a
leader and not just an ordinary player particularly in African multilateral
institutions.

The Mbeki government, by way of embodiment, played a principal part in
the establishment of NEPAD. South Africa’s role in the founding and
consolidation of NEPAD gave birth to claims that NEPAD is a complete
reflection of former President Mbeki’s vision and development plans, and
today NEPAD is largely considered a South African product. South Africa was
also one of the key actors in the transformation of the Organisation of African
Unity to the African Union. Additionally, South Africa holds the honour of being
the first country to chair the “new” AU in the early 2000s. South Africa has
also played a leadership role in the SADC, particularly in the reshaping and
restructuring of the organisation, in coordinating the Finance and Investment sector within this organisation, and in having chaired the Summit of the SADC Heads of State and Government in 2008. In spite of “imperialist” accusations that have been levelled at South Africa in SACU, the study reveals that South Africa’s Board on Tariffs and Trade recommends common tariff levels while the Departments of Customs and Excise, and Trade and Industry collect most duties and coordinate SACU respectively. Moreover, South Africa has shown its leadership role as a representative of Africa and the South on the UNSC. In fact, the country has recently won its second non-permanent seat for the 2011-2012 term on the council with an overwhelming majority of 182 out of 192 votes.

One can therefore conclude that South Africa is willing to be a leader in Africa’s multilateral context and not a mere team player.

Finally, based on the above discussion, it is recommended that the South African government be transparent and democratic (the public must be informed of any decisions made) in its foreign policymaking processes. The second recommendation would be that, the government ought to revise its policy priorities. It must be known whether South Africa’s first priority is human rights or economic development; recently, the country has prioritised human rights issues on paper while it remains preoccupied with economic or trade relations issues in practice in Africa. The third recommendation concerns foreign policy identity. South Africa needs to redefine its foreign identity. For example, it allies with both human rights advocates and abusers at the same time. That makes it difficult to determine exactly who South Africa is in the international sphere. The last recommendation would concern the
partner/hegemon issue. Currently, South Africa’s position is somewhere between a partner and a hegemon. It needs to redefine its policy goals not only at the formulation level but also at the implementation phase. It needs to determine whether it wants to be either an exclusive partner or a hegemon, another aspect that concerns foreign policy identity.
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ABSTRACT

As part of post-war developments and the new political dispensation after a regime change in 1994, South Africa regained its international stature on the continent and further afield. Based on its phenomenal political recovery, and resourcefulness and capacity (though both limited), the post-apartheid South African government has pledged and is therefore expected to help develop the African continent. This commitment is well mirrored in its foreign policy, which strives for regional and African recovery and seeks to champion the cause of the South at large.

Since 1994, South Africa has played a critical role in Africa. On multilateral grounds, the country has been preponderant in the development of SADC, the AU and other African multilateral institutions. For this research, three areas of development were considered: human rights, peace and security, and trade relations. Its human rights role, although mired in controversy – accusations of befriending and defending human rights abusers – has been fairly significant, at least on paper. With regard to peace and security, South Africa continues its peacekeeping efforts in several African countries by devoting its resources to peace missions under SADC, the AU and the UN. Notwithstanding the perceived aggressiveness in its asymmetrical trade relations with the rest of the region, South Africa has contributed largely to continental economic development through its foreign direct investment.

It is against the background of its continental foreign policy and actual role that this research attempts to investigate whether South Africa is a partner or hegemon on the continent. This facet of South Africa’s post-1994 foreign policy towards and its role in Africa has been widely debated by political
observers. Some political commentators contend that South Africa is a continental partner while others conclude it is just a selfish hegemon and a “bully”. Moreover, due to its post-1994 role on the continent, others suggest South Africa shares characteristics of both a partner and a selfish hegemon. This assertion particularly subscribes to the view that while South Africa may claim to be a partner, it is in reality seen to be an aggressive hegemon in its trade relations with the region; a viewpoint reinforced by the fact that South Africa, lying somewhere between the developed and developing worlds, should primarily be regarded as an emerging, middle-income country.
OPSOMMING

Suid-Afrika het as deel van die na-oorlogse ontwikkelinge en die nuwe politieke bedeling as gevolg van 'n regimeverandering in 1994, sy internasionale statuur op die kontinent en ook in ander wêrelddele herwin. Uit hoofde van sy fenomenale politieke herstel, vindingrykheid en ontwikkelingspotensiaal, en ondanks die leemtes waardeur dit steeds gekortwiek word, het die post-apartheid Suid-Afrikaanse regering sy onderneming, en die verwagting om Afrika te help ontwikkels, gestand gedoen. Hierdie verbintenis word duidelik weerspieël in die regering se buitelandse beleid wat ten doel het om Afrika regionaal te laat herlewe en om die rol van pleitbesorger vir die groter Suide te vervul.

Sedert 1994, het Suid-Afrika 'n sleutelrol in Afrika gespeel en was sy aandeel in multilaterale verband van deurslaggewende betekenis vir die ontwikkeling van die SAOG, die AU en ander multilaterale instellings op die vasteland. Hierdie navorsing het drie ontwikkelingsgebiede onder die soeklig geplaas, t.w. menseregte, vrede en sekuriteit, en handelsbetrekkinge.

Suid-Afrika se rol ten opsigte van menseregte is ondank die kontroverse wat dit omhul en die beskuldigings dat die regering menseregteskenders bevriend en verdedig, nogtans betekenisvol, al blyk dit soms slegs op papier te wees. Wat vrede en sekuriteit betref, bly Suid-Afrika steeds konstruktief by vredesinisiatiewe in verskeie Afrika-lande betrokke deur sy hulpmiddele onder toesig van die SAOG, die AU en die VN vir vredesendings aan te wend. Nieteenstaande die klaarblyklike aggressiwiteit waarmee Suid-Afrika sy eensydige handelsvoorsprong teenoor die ander state in die streek benut, het
dit grootliks tot die kontinentale ekonomiese ontwikkeling deur middel van regstreekse buitelandse investering bygedra.

Dit is teen dié agtergrond dat die navorsing probeer vasstel het of Suid-Afrika as ’n bondgenoot of ’n hegemoon op die kontinent beskou moet word. Laasgenoemde aspek van die Suid-Afrika se buitelandse beleid het sedert 1994 ’n veelbesprok de debatspunt onder politieke waarnemers geword. Sommige beweer dat Suid-Afrika ’n kontinentale bondgenoot is terwyl ander tot die slotsom kom dat Suid-Afrika ’n selfsugtige handelspotentiaal en bullebak is. Daarby suggereer ander dat Suid-Afrika op grond van sy spesifieke rol sedert 1994 die eienskappe van beide bondgenoot en selfsugtige hegemon vertoon. Hierdie stelling word spesifiek toegeskryf aan die standpunt dat Suid-Afrika voorgee dat hy ’n bondgenoot is terwyl dit in sy handelspraktyke en verhoudinge in die streek eerder as ’n aggressiewe hegemoon oorkom. Lg. standpunt word verder versterk op grond van die waarneming dat Suid-Afrika iewers tussen die ontwikkelde en ontwikkelende wêreld as ’n ontluikende middel-inkomste-land beskou moet word.
KEY WORDS

Africa
Foreign Policy
Hegemon
Human Rights
National Interests
Partner
Peacekeeping
Post-apartheid Era
South Africa
Trade Relations