University of the Free State

Anton Wilhelm Amo (1703-1756) the African-German Philosopher of Mind: An Eighteenth-century Intellectual History

by

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PREFACE

The focus of this study within the arena of philosophy, history and theology has been made possible to an extent by interdisciplinary collaborative efforts between the Jonathan Edwards Centre Africa and the Department of Philosophy, at the University of the Free State (UFS), South Africa, in partnership with the Interdisciplinary Research Fund of the Directorate for Research Development, UFS. The research falls within a larger project on African intellectual history undertaken by the same entities, and is fueled by the growing appreciation for theology and philosophy as creative historical enterprises – consisting not only in the systematization of abstrat ed ideas, but in the dynamic aspects of the development and unravelling of those ideas as transactions shaped by diverse historical, cultural, and geographical particulars, and their location within various intellectual traditions. As such, the appraisal of an African role or contribution to the broader intellectual traditions elsewhere, and to dialogue in theology and philosophy becomes important, having suffered much neglect in scholarship.

The personal impetus for this study arose from philosophical-theological interests in movements of Enlightenment in Europe and the historical interval of 1650-1750, as part of a wider research journey to understand key philosophical turning points within theology and Christian thought, starting from the late seventh century into the nineteenth. Under near fortuitous circumstances, my research path led to the eighteenth-century African-German philosopher, academic, activist, and author, Anton Wilhelm Amo (c. 1703 – c. 1756), and to my initial research quest was added the dimension of an early intellectual-historical interchange between European and African thoughts – a field which much potential for research, particularly in theology, history, and philosophy. This dimension of my research focus brought me to a better appreciation of the demographic diversity of the contributors to the putative mainline philosophical discourses of seventeenth and eighteenth-century Europe, not least philosophy of mind or philosophical psychology. In a way the research experience challenged and upset my own former tendency to acquiesce to the dominant narrative of a near-exclusive Eurocentric identification of the actors in philosophy. Rather, the intellectual history reveals a rich economy of diverse players – big and small, no doubt – transacting complexly at different levels and contexts, thus creating a delightful mosaic. In that spirit the present study has been both conceived and executed.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This research project has certainly been made possible by assistance from many quarters. Above all, the enabling and sustaining grace of God amidst diverse challenges. The unrelenting prayers and encouragement of my parents, Emmanuel and Collette Emma-Adamah, and my ever-supportive siblings: Anita, Shekinah, Shammah, and Nissi.

Particular gratitude goes to the team of the Jonathan Edwards Centre Africa, for the study opportunity afforded me, for their vision to promote and build research capacity on the continent, their tireless support of this study, and their administrative genius in attending to the practical and logistic aspects of the project – in this regard, Prof. Dolf Britz, and Prof. Adriaan Neele. Special thanks to the Neele family: for your warm friendship and constant encouragement, the stimulating and pleasurable dinner conversations, and the hospitality of your home, in which a large chunk of the writing was carried out (Dankjewel, Kornelia!). To my thesis supervisors: Prof. Neele, thank you for your keen understanding of the direction of the research, your critical suggestions, your astonishing promptitude in giving detailed feedback, and your very supportive disposition; Dr. Johann Rossouw, thank you for your quick ability to give perspective and structure, and your encouragement. Much gratitude to Prof. Justin E. H. Smith of Université Paris Diderot (Sorbonne), whose availability to bat ideas back and forth, providing me with unpublished work and translations on Amo, efforts at gathering primary source material and compiling a growing Amo bibliography have been indispensable to the study. To friends too numerous so mention, and others that have been instrumental in the realization of this project, my heartfelt gratitude.
# ABBREVIATIONS

## Works of Amo

**Apatheia**

*Dissertatio inauguralis philosophica de Humanae Mentis Apatheia seu senionis ac facultatis sentiendi in mente humana absentia et earum in corpore nostro organico ac vivo praesentia*, (Wittenberg: Schomachiana, 1734)

**Disputatio**

*Disputatio philosophica continens ideam distinctam eorum quae competunt vel menti vel corpore nostro vivo et organico, quam consentiente philosophorum ordine, praeside M. Antonio Guilielmo Amo Guinea-Afro*, (Wittenberg: Literis Vidvae Kobersteiniana, 29 May, 1734)

**Tractatus**

*Tractatus de arte sobrie et accurate philosophandi*, (Halle: Kitleriana, 1738)

## Works of Descartes

**AT**


**CSM**


**CSMK**


## Works of Leibniz

**L**


**G**


## Other Works

**De Anima**


**Commentarius**


**OMP**


**ST**

Antoine Arnauld, *Des vraies et des fausses idées, contre qu’enseigne l’auteur de la recherche de la vérité* [N. Malebranche] (Cologne: N. Schouten, 1683).
INTRODUCTION

THESIS INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

Background and Motivation

This dissertation aims to investigate the philosophical psychology of an early eighteenth-century African academic philosopher in Germany, Anton Wilhelm Amo (c. 1703 – c. 1756). Even though there was a handful of distinguished Africans in early eighteenth-century Europe, their contribution to, and/or engagement with the big intellectual conversations of their time is often neglected. As such, the intellectual history and the histories of philosophy of the period often only take into account the major European (mostly male) contributing voices, and this at the expense of smaller voices representing culturally diverse backgrounds who were creatively engaging the same philosophical questions. On a related note, when at all they are undertaken, studies of African intellectuals tend to be isolationist, often failing to situate the thinkers as participants and relevant voices within the big trajectories of philosophical conversations. This study attempts to amplify one such neglected voices by drawing attention to a thinker from Africa who was engaged in the same philosophical enterprise as his contemporaries such as Gottfried Leibniz (1646-1716), a Christian Thomasius (1655-1728), or a Christian Wolff (1679-1754), but doing so from a different set of perspectives directly connected to his African cultural roots. It also aims to enable a better appreciation of the extent of Amo’s embedment within the philosophical world of the eighteenth century.

The study is thus concerned with a number of aspects or foci. Its primary focus is the philosophical thought of Amo, and specifically his philosophical psychology. Secondly, arising out of this overarching concern, but methodologically prior to it, is the historical-intellectual context that both shaped the African thinker, and to which he made contribution. Thirdly, connected to the previous context, is the world of literature in
philosophical psychology (and related themes) with which Amo was critically engaged; and lastly, the written result of that engagement – in Amo’s work, *Disputatio continens Ideam Distinctam*. From this perspective, the philosophy of Amo will be evaluated in its historical and philosophical contexts to discern what perspective it might contribute to the discussions around early modern philosophical psychology, and what appreciable dynamics it might reveal vis-à-vis an African-European intellectual history in general.

**State of the Research**

The secondary literature will be examined in four parts: (i) the life and work of Amo, (ii) the Enlightenment historical context of his time, (iii) the intellectual and academic institutional context of his career and writing, and (iv) the seventeenth and eighteenth-century philosophical issues around psychology. The first section will be the least comprehensive as the primary focus of this study is not biographical, but philosophical.

**Life and Work of Anton Wilhelm Amo**

The narrative of the African, Amo, has always captured the fascination of its hearers\(^1\) – a child from Gold Coast (Ghana) adopted by a German aristocrat in the early eighteenth century, trained in the arts, philosophy, physiology, and languages; lectured at the universities of Halle, Wittenberg, and Jena; operated in the same intellectual and academic space as contemporaries such as Wolff, Thomasius, Georg Stahl (1659-1734), Johan Franz Buddeus (1667-1729), Georg Bilfinger (1693-1750), Friedrich Hoffmann (1660-1742) and Joachim Lange (1670-1744), among others; was a player in the continent-wide Wolffian-Pietist controversies; was a writer of treatises and disputations that were in step with the most innovative philosophical developments in mechanistic physiology, Leibnizian metaphysics, Wolffian rationalism; but at the end of his life

returned to his native Africa. The account captures attention not only for its fascinating feuilletonistic appeal, but also for the suggestion of a very early convergence between African cultural sensibilities and the development of early modern Western European ideas – right at the heart of the German Enlightenment.

As such, relative to the handful of known educated Africans in eighteenth-century Europe roughly contemporaneous with him – the Ghanaian abolitionist Quobna Ottobah Cugoano (1757-91); minister and missionary of the Dutch Reformed Church Johannes Eliza Capitein (1717-47); Olaudah Equiano (1745-97); the writer, music composer and activist, Ignatius Sancho (1729-80) – Amo has received a fair share of biographical mention. From the eighteenth century already, there are brief mentions of Amo in journals, university advertisements, and biographical dictionaries. The dominant portrait


3 David Nii Anum Kpobi, Mission in chains. The life, theology and ministry of the ex-slave Jacobus E.J. Capitein (1717-1747) with a translation of his major publications, (Boekencentrum: Zoetermeer, 1993); David Nii Anum Kpobi, Saga of a Slave: Jacobus Capitein of Holland and Elmina (Legon, Ghana: Sub-saharan publishers & traders, 2001); André Capiteyn, Ivoorzwart: Hollands glorie en de slavernhandel in West-Afrika: "over de slaverny als niet strijdig tegen de christelyke vryheid" (Gent: Stichting Mens en Kultuur, 2001).

4 Above the others, Equiano has received a fair amount of treatment. He was a freed slave, who became a prominent writer, merchant, abolitionist, and explorer. His narratives of the slave trade are well known. See Olaudah Equiano, The Interesting Narrative of the Life of Olaudah Equiano, Or Gustavus Vassa, the African (London, 1789). For details on his life see, James Walvin, An African’s Life: The Life and Times of Olaudah Equiano, 1745-1797. (New York; London: Continuum ; Cassell, 1998); Vincent Carretta, Equiano, the African: Biography of a Self-Made Man (University of Georgia Press, 2005).


of Amo is that of the eighteenth-century academic philosopher. G. Ludovici’s (1707-78) famous lists of prominent Wolffian philosophers in Germany includes Amo as “vornehmsten Vertreter der Wolffschen Philosophie,” 7 based on the contribution of Amo’s philosophical writings – the Disputatio and Apatheia.8 J. H. Zedler’s (1706-51) Universal Lexicon gives a brief account of his narrative and his presiding over a philosophical disputation (Disputatio Ideam Distinctam) at Wittenberg.9

Of the few nineteenth-century mentions he receives, his narrative was the favourite of anti-slavery activists such as Father Henri Grégoire (1750-1831),10 and monogenetist anthropologists like Johann Friedrich Blumenbach (1752-1840),11 where Amo is deployed as datum to counteract racist anthropologies and demonstrate the intellectual abilities of Africans. There is a reception among African-American abolitionists with the image of Amo as a “distinguished African.” Here his life and career takes centre stage. Abolitionist L. Child appeals to Amo’s life, and in a very short paragraph draws attention to his distinguished “character and abilities,” and “public testimony of their respect” of Amo by the Council of Wittenberg.12 S. William portrays him as an “eminent” exemplar for emulation.13

I am indebted to Justin E. K. Smith for the identification of most of these eighteenth-century resources on Amo, and his translation of some of them. See, “The Amo Project” [Web:] http://www.theamoproject.org/an-amobibliography-updated-regularly.html [Date of access: 15 June, 2014]

7 “One of the most important representatives of Wolffian philosophy”

8 See “Abbreviations” for full titles.


13 William Simmons, Men of Mark: Eminent, Progressive and Rising (Cleveland: W.W. Williams, 1887), 617-619.
There is a greater reception of Amo from the twentieth century on, and with this a multi-dimensional portrait. A new generation of biographical interests emerges among Ghanaian historians N. Lochner, W. Abraham and the concerns of the Historical Society of Ghana to piece together the primary sources of his life. The defining moment for Amo studies comes from the publication of the facsimile collection of all bibliographical accounts and citations of Amo’s life edited by Burchard Brentjes, along with, for the first time, translations of Amo’s works from Latin to German, English and French. His chief biographer, Brentjes, has skillfully pieced together the scanty data available, resulting in renewed interest in Amo’s life. Much of further biographical work is derivative or supplements the above-mentioned. In other circles, Amo has

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received brief biographical mentions, mostly within the context of postcolonial Africa: as an emblem of hope for the aspirations of development, African self-definition, philosophy. Here the emphasis on Amo is mostly biographical, and the portrait painted is that of the accomplished African, to which the particulars of his thought and philosophy appear merely incidental to this image and project.

In conclusion, the importance of Amo’s qualification as an eighteenth-century philosopher from Africa is overwhelmingly acknowledged and applauded. The points of interest in Amo centered around the fascination with the fact of his African origins, and his being the “first” of such African philosophers in modern Europe. As such, his story has inspired a number of short articles from authors motivated by the initial excitement at the discovery of such a personality. As one such author, Damis, has put it, the interests in Amo’s biographical trajectories are motivated by “[le] simple fait de l’existence d’une telle personnalité que de son œuvre philosophique.” This comment describes a large part of the agenda so far in Amo studies.

**Works**

For all the distinctly philosophical context of the eighteenth-century German setup in which Amo was situated, yet comparatively little attention has been given to the philosophical content of his work and its interaction with the rich intellectual milieu of that century. Brentjes, although mostly within the context of a biographical discussion, was one of the first to offer some detailed treatment of Amo’s thought within its intellectual context. Hountondji, a bit earlier, gave very cursory attention to Amo’s

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intellectual setting, identifying some of the important contextual issues of Amo’s academic life: the Aufklärung of Christian Wolff, debates around medical philosophy between Stahl and mechanists, and some discussion of Amo’s Apatheia. Some philosophical attention was paid by Nwala’s translation and commentary on Amo’s 1738 *Tractatus de Arte Sobrie et Accurate Philosophandi*; but its reception has in the very least been appreciative. A bit more recently, a focused philosophical study was given by Edeh’s doctoral dissertation, investigating the Wolffian roots of Amo’s philosophy. Another work, by Mabe, has investigated the intercultural German and African backgrounds of Amo’s philosophy. Mugnol has been instrumental in translating Amo into French and has provided some detailed account of Amo’s academic philosophical context, along with a thematic commentary on aspects of Amo’s *Tractatus de Arte Sobrie Philosophandi*. Besides these, short articles have provided some discussion of Amo’s thought, notable among which are Hountondji’s chapter endorsing Amo’s work as a true example of “African philosophy” even if the latter’s content is supposedly “Western.” There is Wiredu’s brief but insightful comparison between the dualism of Amo and of Descartes. Smith’s chapter on Amo’s life and works, highlighting the important philosophical items of his thought and briefly making connections with their immediate


intellectual contexts.\textsuperscript{32} A few other articles mention or highlight some aspects of Amo’s thought.\textsuperscript{33}

Some of the laudable scholarly attention to Amo’s philosophy has had the general drawback of being too cursory. In this regard, specifically: they have failed to give a detailed treatment of Amo’s philosophical work; they have not provided details on the greater philosophical context of Amo’s life and works, and the German academic setting of his philosophical career, or have done these only partially. While the historical data, doubtless, puts Amo as part of the narrative of Africans in early modern Europe, the existing works have failed to situate him on the intellectual and philosophical maps of that history, where he rightly belongs.

\section*{Historical Contexts}

\subsection*{The Enlightenment Context of his Time}

This study does not aim to sketch the vast field of Enlightenment scholarship, neither is it directly involved with its numerous debates. Of interest here is the broad historical-intellectual context of Amo’s time, in order to facilitate an understanding of the emergence of certain distinct philosophical ideas later on. This author contends that the contextual importance of the Enlightenment for Amo’s thought is discerned when a multi-perspectival approach is adopted for the period, as opposed to reductionist singular historiographies.

The historical location of Amo in the first half of the eighteenth century, and his geographical situation in the Brandenburg-Prussian regions of Germany, puts him at the intersection of distinct intellectual and cultural currents in Europe. The single biggest,

\begin{flushright}

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continent-wide, defining phenomenon of the period stretching from 1650 to 1750\footnote{I follow Jonathan Israel, \textit{Radical Enlightenment: Philosophy and the Making of Modernity 1650-1750} (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 3-6 and others in this dating. The dating is not uncontested: often the “high Enlightenment” is reckoned to occur much later in the eighteenth century. Israel, however, sees this hundred-year window as laying the philosophical foundations for what would later become more cultural-social movements. No doubt, it is a rough approximation, but a helpful one nonetheless.} is reckoned to be the \textit{Enlightenment} – that intellectually tumultuous period of history, with intricately woven strands of new ideologies that effected rapid transformation in Europe.\footnote{Israel identifies some of the radical changes in this frame as a sort of ‘heterogenization’ of what used to be roughly a common European intellectual foundation, institutionalized by a common faith, authority, tradition, ideals, and history. The “New Philosophy” or “philosophical revolution,” as he identifies it, began a process of rationalization and secularization that was to overthrow the hegemony of theology and religious authority, and as a result, new foundations of knowledge. Hazard identifies a slightly later date, but the similar currents of intellectual change, Paul Hazard, \textit{The Crisis of the European Mind, 1680-1715}, New York Review Books Classics (New York: New York Review Books, 2013[1953]).} It is notoriously difficult to satisfactorily describe the phenomenon, yet its defining role is widely acknowledged. Broadly, it may be characterized as the disintegration of old foundations in theology, natural science, practical philosophy, medicine, social structures and a host others, brought about by a complex mesh of interrelated historical-intellectual currents that shun any neat harmonist taxonomy.\footnote{The multiplicity of possible perspectives from which the ‘revolution’ of the period may be portrayed is almost inexhaustible. The range of perspectives available in the scholarly literature is itself dauntingly wide. No attempt is here made to engage any of those in particular, except to underscore that the period represented in important ways revolutions in thinking. As is well known, the phenomenon of ‘Enlightenment’ is a notorious conceptual minefield for its characterization eludes any tidy and systematic ordering; even bringing eighteenth-century players themselves to continuously ask: ‘What is Enlightenment?’ Challenged by what was a rather spontaneous, tumultuous and multifaceted enterprise, historians quite have often imposed various meta-historical interpretative schemes on the period. For example, as the struggle between the sacred and the secular, between tradition and libertinism: See, Ernst Cassirer, \textit{The Philosophy of the Enlightenment}, Updated edition, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009[1951]); Peter Gay, \textit{The Enlightenment: An Interpretation}, 2 vols. (New York: Alfred A Knopf, 1967); Paul Hazard, \textit{European Thought in the Eighteenth Century from Montesquieu to Lessing}, Trans. J. Lewis May, (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1965); Franco Venturi, \textit{Settecento reforematore}, 5 vols. (Turin: Einaudi, 1969-87). Other historians have adopted narratives of teleological historiographies in which identified actors in history drive the “Enlightenment project” towards an inevitable dénouement. Here, for example Israel, Jonathan I. \textit{Radical Enlightenment}; \textit{Democratic Enlightenment: Philosophy, Revolution, and Human Rights 1750-1790}, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013); \textit{Enlightenment Contested: Philosophy, Modernity, and the Emancipation of Man, 1670-1752}, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008); Margaret Jacobs, \textit{Living the Enlightenment: Freemasonry and Politics in Eighteenth-Century Europe}, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991); Charles Taylor, \textit{Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity}, (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1989). Under these programmes, the historical complexities of the Enlightenment have driven historians to adopt various tools of harmonization, which have been reductionist in their effect. The precise indeterminacy of Enlightenment history, coupled with the truncating historiographical filters of its assessment by historians, poses a methodological challenge to the appraisal of philosophical trajectories in eighteenth-century thinkers. For example, under Jonathan Israel’s scheme of a dialectic between a “Radical Enlightenment” (conceived as a revolutionary, anticlerical, antireligious movement inspired by Spinoza) and a “moderate mainstream” (conceived as}
side with more recent scholarship, therefore, in seeing the Enlightenment in all its kaleidoscopic richness, and generally with Outram, as “a capsule containing sets of debates, stresses and concerns,” which “appear to be characteristic of the ways in which ideas, opinions and social and political structures interacted and changed the eighteenth century.”

With the winds of change came new cultural paradigms characterized, among its exponents, by a general sense of curiosity about the philosophical and cultural heritage of the non-European world, and a disposition to be culturally ‘ecumenical’ by the collection of artifacts, exotic finds from expeditions, and the highest cultural emblem – the peoples of foreign lands,\textsuperscript{38} an outward-looking cultural perspective that was to account for, in some elite circles, the prestige for enlightened princes to line their courts with servants from distant lands. To a large extent, the Enlightenment enterprise, taken in its multidimensional totality, defined the intellectual, social and cultural contours that made the project of Amo’s education in Germany, along with the nature of his received training, possible. The Enlightenment and its program of reason, serves as the matrix for important offshoots of the philosophical revolution of that period – not least the mechanization and (in some cases) the materialization of world pictures, in critique or outright replacement of older paradigms, especially Aristotelian ones; the abstraction of universal natural laws and their homogenous application to both organic and non-organic particulars; and confidence in the ability of reason to discern truth through the application of right method. As shall be seen, the intellectual and cultural impulses arising from and closely associated with this Enlightenment enterprise, serve as a ubiquitous contextual backdrop to Amo’s life and thought, even when its role is not immediately striking.

The intellectual and academic institutional context of his career and writing

One of the important elements of these transformations concerns the rise of the mechanistic world picture.\textsuperscript{39} It represented, \textit{inter alia}, the rejection in natural philosophy,

\textsuperscript{38} Dorinda Outram, “Cross-Cultural Encounters in the Enlightenment,” in \textit{The Enlightenment World}, ed. Martin Fitzpatrick et al., (London; New York: Routledge, 2004), 551–67. Outram gives a brief account of eighteenth-century European engagement with distant cultures, and how this interaction was emblematic of an Enlightenment motivation. “The printed accounts of the images became an important part of the European repertoire of ideas, images, hopes and feelings. All this flow of information and image was eagerly taken up by a reading public defining itself as enlightened precisely by virtue of its encounter with the printed word, the theatrical performance and the visual representations given wide currency by engraving.”

\textsuperscript{39} I present mechanism neither as a \textit{cause} of Enlightenment, nor vice versa. No such facile causal scheme can be imposed. Rather, that there are all kinds of relationships of interdependence between both. This same perspective applies to other factors discussed below.
of the Aristotelian-Scholastic ontology of substantial forms, or hylemorphism, in favour of a corpuscular-related ontology in which natural phenomena are to be explicated exclusively in terms of their constituent shape, size, and motion.\textsuperscript{40} The mechanistic impulse, represented principally in the seventeenth century by the likes of Robert Boyle (1627-91), Francis Bacon (1561-1626), and Isaac Beeckman (1588-1637), gained quick traction and started find application in many accounts of knowledge. Mechanical philosophy found immediate application in medical philosophy, as is captured, for example, by Rene Descartes’ (1596-1650) concept of the “homme machine”: the account of the physiological constitution and biological processes of living organisms in terms of physical mechanical systems of movement, transfer of heat energy, expansion and the contraction of body fluids and muscles, etc.\textsuperscript{41} These developments offset an avalanche of medical physiological debates both contra and in favour of the mechanist project – a movement recently described as a “medical enlightenment,” reaching out from the Dutch University of Leiden to a full-blown polemic in Amo’s University of Halle.\textsuperscript{42} As shall be

\textsuperscript{40} The momentous nature of mechanism for the period is described by Dijksterhuis: “Among the numerous modifications that scientific thought about nature has undergone in the course of centuries, it would be difficult to point to one that has had more profound and far-reaching effect than the emergence of the conception of the world usually called mechanical or mechanistic” (E. J. Dijksterhuis, \textit{The Mechanization of the World Picture: Pythagoras to Newton} (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1986[1961]), 3. There is, of course, more to the history of mechanism in philosophy and science than the replacement of Aristotelianism. The older scholarship construed mechanism predominantly in terms of a dethronement of Aristotelianism in natural philosophy as presented by Dijksterhuis, Marie Boas Hall, “The Establishment of the Mechanical Philosophy,” \textit{Osiris, Vol. X}, 1952, 1952; Richard S. Westfall, \textit{The Construction of Modern Science: Mechanisms and Mechanics} (Cambridge University Press, 1971). These have been seen by recent scholarship to be overly simplistic, since it was not always the case, for example, that the metaphysical paradigms of Aristotelian substantial forms was mutually exclusive with physical mechanism. Also, Aristotelianism was not the only paradigm of natural philosophy in currency at the time. As shall be seen much later, Gottfried Leibniz is an exception that proves this rule. Other aspects of mechanism thus can be identified Steven Shapin, \textit{The Scientific Revolution} (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996); Daniel Garber and Sophie Roux, eds., \textit{The Mechanization of Natural Philosophy}, Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, v. 300 (Dordrecht ; New York: Springer, 2013).

\textsuperscript{41} This was the project of Descartes’ \textit{Traité de L’homme} (1664) and his \textit{Description du Corps Humain} (1664). For both works, see AT, XI. Other thinkers and physicians can be mentioned in this program: William Harvey (1578-1657) in his \textit{De Motu Cordis} (1628); Albrecht von Haller (1708-77) and his discovery of muscular irritability in \textit{Elementa Physiologiae Corporis Humani} (1757-66); and Hermann Boerhaave (1669-1738), among many others.

seen, Amo’s medical training brings him to the centre of these debates, and his own written works later on place him squarely within the mechanist physiological camp.

In the German setting, the early Enlightenment – Frühaufklärung – is reckoned to roughly specify a historical frame running from 1680 to 1750, during which Germany’s own sweeping currents intellectual transformation occurred. Important among these currents was the establishment of the University of Halle in 1694. Its founding charter promoting the free pursuit of knowledge and teaching (libertas philosophandi et docendi), captured the ideal of what Kant would later identify as the motto of the entire Enlightenment project – sapere aude. Another current is seen in the founding professors of the new ‘progressive’ university – principally the jurist, Christian Thomasius (1655-1728), and the philosopher-mathematician, Christian Wolff (1679-1754). The former inaugurated the program of a “de-transcendentalized” realm of politics, ethics, and philosophy, by the development of theories of natural law; and with this, the jurisprudential framework for bifurcation between a secular political civil space, and a private realm of religious adherence. Wolff, inter alia, pioneered the rationalist method

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43 Beck defends the legitimacy of speaking of a German Enlightenment that is significantly distinct from the greater European movements in important respects: the former was not necessarily anti-clerical and atheistic, as was British and French movements tended to be; the intellectual discussions of the German context were dominated by academia; the German philosophy of the time was also not rabidly anti-Scholastic. See, Lewis W. Beck, Early German Philosophy: Kant and his Predecessors (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1969), 245-7.

44 I follow Martin Mulsow, Moderne Aus Dem Untergrund: Radikale Frühaufklärung in Deutschland 1680-1720 (Hamburg: F. Meiner, 2002), and others in this dating.


by the methodological starting point of all knowledge as a ‘science of possibles,’ famously systematized important aspects of Gottfried Leibniz’s (1646-1716) philosophy of sufficient reason, and extensively developed theories of psychology generally oriented towards the metaphysical and operational independence of the mind from the body, in the spirit of Leibniz’s pre-established harmony. The location of Thomasius and Wolff as professors at Halle, and the widespread recognition of their foundational roles in Germany, makes that institution the philosophical hotspot of the German enlightenment well into the 1740s. Amo attended the University of Halle in the years leading up to 1727 during which time he came under the philosophical visions of these giants and their disciples. The influence of Wolff’s rationalist method in philosophy is immediately evident in Amo’s work, and Thomasius’ appeal to natural law (and not revelation) to establish civil ethical norms is an intellectual streak that would find expression in Amo’s career.

No less influential in Germany and at Halle was Pietism and its strong presence in the theology faculties, in politics, and in mass education. With Hermann Francke (1663-1727), a disciple of the father of German Pietism, Jacob Spener (1635-1705), and also an influential founding professor of Halle, the Spenerian theological agenda soon

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50 Richard J. Blackwell, “Christian Wolff’s Doctrine of the Soul,” Journal of the History of Ideas 22, no. 3 (July 1, 1961): 339–54; It is important to note that for all his rejection of other accounts of soul-body causation (physical influx and occasionalism), Wolff himself never fully endorsed pre-established harmony. He saw is as theoretically superior to the available options, but still hypothetical.

51 The crucial role played by eighteenth-century Halle Pietism in making Prussia, and later Germany, into the political, military, and industrial powerhouse it came to be is often not recognized. Because Pietism is often associated with quietism and private spirituality, its political dynamism has often been overlooked. On the contrary, it wielded unprecedented power in Prussia, especially at the time of the pragmatic, “Soldier King”, Friedrich Wilhelm I of Prussia (1688-1740). For detailed account of this influence, see Mary Fulbrook, Piety and Politics: Religion and the Rise of Absolutism in England, Württemberg, and Prussia (Cambridge [Cambridgeshire]; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983); Richard L. Gawthrop, Pietism and the Making of Eighteenth-Century Prussia (Cambridge [England]; New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press, 1993).

became a powerful force to reckon with – viz., an emphasis on spiritual rebirth and renewal (homo regenitus); disciplined practical holy-living (as opposed to a rational cultivation by doctrine); a voluntarist psychology in which the will and affections are priced above the intellect (without necessarily suspending the latter), and are prime conduits for knowledge by inspiration; an “epistemology of intuition” and spontaneous religious experiences. Pietism stood as a formidable counterpoint to the Wolffian and Leibnizian rationalist visions of Enlightenment in Germany. Motivated by its theological perspective, it rejected the Wolffian optimism in the ability of human reason to attain truth, and objected to the pluralization of the sources of that truth – the tendency of rationalism to see truth as not exclusively revelatory. The extended ideological impasse (and sometimes open hostility) that would evolve between Wolff and Pietist professor of theology, Joachim Lange (1670-1744) would be a defining factor both at Halle and for the entire German academic establishment in the first half of the eighteenth century.

That academic landscape was defined principally by a Pietist or Pietist-leaning camp, on one hand: consisting of a large constellation ideas, but held together by the broad theological vision of Halle Pietism. On the other hand, a patchwork of related

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54 Pietism was by no means monolithic. There were many variants of the movement, as is usually recognized: Christian T. Collin Winn, ed., The Pietist Impulse in Christianity, Princeton Theological Monographs Series 155 (Eugene, Or: Pickwick, 2011). But given this variety, Brown gives core common denominator markers: Brown outlines five central themes: a concern for church reformation, away from doctrinal polemics and institutional rigidity to a fluid conceptions of Christian community built around Bible study, conventicle, etc.; a focus on the Bible and its simple literal interpretation; an emphasis of orthopraxis as accompanying orthodoxy; an ‘experiential’ theology built around the biblical motif of regeneration – repentance, new birth, conversion – and the place of personal decision-making in this process; finally, an eschatological optimism for the improvement of the world through tireless engagement in acts of social transformation and the change of individual lives (Dale Brown, Understanding Pietism, (Grand Rapids, MI.: Wm. B. Eerdmans, 1978). Yet the dominant expression of Halle Pietism is influenced (through Francke) by the more spiritualist and “enthusiastic” version seen in Spener’s Pia Desideria (1675), and its purist, heightened eschatological consciousness. See Gawthrop, Pietism and the Making of Eighteenth-Century Prussia, 104-120. For more detail on Halle Pietism and the Spener connection, see Albrecht Ritschl, Geschichte der Pietismus in der Lutherischen Kirche des 17. und 18. Jahrhunderts, vol. 2 (Bonn: Adolph Marcus, 1884), pp. 249-94; Heinrich Schmid, Die Geschichte des Pietismus (Nördlingen: Beck, 1863); Stoeffler, German Pietism during the eighteenth century, (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1973), 1-38; K. James Stein, Philipp Jakob Spener: Pietist Patriarch (Chicago: Covenant Press, 1986); Hans Schneider, German Radical Pietism (Lanham, MD: Scarecrow Press, 2007).
philosophies with a general mechanist world picture, and rationalist method, represented by the large figure of Christian Wolff.\textsuperscript{55}

In physiology, these camps delineated two significantly opposed paradigms: (i) an organismic picture represented by the Pietist Georg Stahl (1659-1734), in which organic bodies, their biological processes and the phenomenon of life are not reducible to the physical properties of their material components, but constitute a fundamental unit called the \textit{organismus} – with the soul as the principle of vitality for a soul-body complex – that organizes its own processes spontaneously and intelligently through the discernment of final ends.\textsuperscript{56} (ii) A mechanistic picture in which organic bodies \textit{qua} physical quantities, are aggregates of matter, and thus, their biological processes and life can be resolved to their material constituents – size, shape, motion – and arrangements of efficient causation, without the inherence of the soul. These positions materialized, in Germany, into drawn-out debates between Stahl and Leibniz, later published by Stahl as \textit{Negotium Otiosum} 1720.\textsuperscript{57}

The presence of Amo within this academic world, and the strongly partisan nature of the ongoing debates,\textsuperscript{58} compels him to choose camps, both ideologically as well as professionally. His philosophical alignment with the mechanistic camp of physiology defines the important contours of the philosophical psychology he would give. Unlike the centuries of medical philosophy preceding modern mechanism, where the human soul was the principle of organic vitality and therefore reckoned to consist in vegetative, sensitive and intellective dimensions, the mechanical \textit{animal machine} relieves the soul of

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{55} Israel, \textit{Radical Enlightenment}, 544-58.
\item \textsuperscript{58} For a most comprehensive account of the debates and conflicts among professors at Halle in particular, but with extended application to the German academic context, see John Robert Holloran, “Professors of Enlightenment at the University of Halle 1690-1730” (PhD diss., University of Virginia, 2000).
\end{itemize}
its vegetative and sensitive functions. Philosophical psychology therefore becomes an enterprise of cognitive processes – or with Descartes, the thinking thing (*res cogitans*), construed along strongly dualistic lines. Within this framework, Amo is bequeathed the classic problems of dualistic, mechanistic anthropology: viz., the need to philosophically account for the possibility of the mind’s cognitive and perceptual processes through sensation, and for its intentional influence over the physical body, given their qualitatively different ontological orders.

**Philosophical and Intellectual Contexts**

**Seventeenth and eighteenth-century philosophical issues around psychology**

Amo’s attempted answer to this question constitutes his philosophical psychology, and draws on a broad intellectual tradition – from Aristotelianism and Stoic thought, to Thomas Aquinas (1225-74) and Philipp Melanchthon (1497-1560), down to modern thinkers like Descartes and Leibniz. As such, a highlight of Amo’s orientation in philosophy is to be seen in the rich diversity of its sources. The late seventeenth and eighteenth-century discussions around this question are particularly complex. Prior to the mechanism of the early modern period, the dominant conceptions of human nature consisted in diverse configurations of a broadly Aristotelian-Scholastic hylomorphist framework. Metaphysically, the soul was reckoned to be the form of the matter of the body, and functionally, serving as the principle for all the life-dependent processes.

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intellective soul, here, comes to cognition by various perceptual schemes of sense representation through sensible and intelligible species.\textsuperscript{62} Owing partly to Descartes’ ontological distinction between a ‘thinking thing’ (\textit{res cogitans}) and an ‘extended thing’ (\textit{res extensa}), and the rejection of the Scholastic strategies, new accounts of cognition and perception had to be found.\textsuperscript{63} An intersubstantial metaphysical chasm was precipitated, and as a result, the causation between the soul and body – being different substances – could no longer be taken for granted. No longer could the Scholastic perceptual and cognitive \textit{species} travel between both; a different set of causal scheme thus had to be provided for how soul and body interact as an entity in the human. Three outstanding options were available: (a) physical influx: an insistence on the possibility of inter-substantial causation, where this causation was conceived as the transference or communication of properties between the cause and the effect – say, the communication of momentum upon contact, from a moving billiard ball to a stationary one. Important mechanist thinkers of the seventeenth century held this position – Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679),\textsuperscript{64} Boyle,\textsuperscript{65} and Francisco Suarez (1548-1617).\textsuperscript{66} (b) Occasionalism: the denial of direct causation between finite substances – the mind and body, in particular – and the

\textsuperscript{62} These were the detailed schemes through which Peripatetic Scholastic philosophers accounted for the intellective soul’s knowledge of its surroundings, mediated by the sense organs and senses. Some more detail is provided in Chapter 2 of this study. For a thorough study of these doctrines, see Leen Spruit, \textit{Species Intelligibilis: From Perception to Knowledge: Renaissance Controversies, Later Scholasticism, and the Elimination of the Intelligible Species in Modern Philosophy}, 2 vols., Brill’s Studies in Intellectual History, v. 48-49 (Leiden ; New York: Brill, 1995).


\textsuperscript{64} Thomas Hobbes, \textit{De Corpore}, chapters 1–6, in A.P. Martinich (trans.), \textit{Part I of De Corpore}, (New York: Abaris Books, 1981[1655]). Hobbes himself was a materialist, so there was less of a philosophical dilemma in the application of physical influx to human psycho-somatic processes.


reckoning of God as carrying out efficacious modifications between causes and effects, at
the instance or occasion of individual non-efficacious acts. This position was advanced in
the second half of the seventeenth century many Cartesians such Nicolas Malebranche
(1638-1715), Louis de la Forge (1632-66). (c) Pre-established harmony: this position
advanced by Leibniz and later taken up with caution within Wolffian psychology, denied
any direct causal inter-action between the soul and the body. Rather, each substance has a
“complete concept” of all its past, present and future states and relations. Instead of a
determination from outside, the present states of any substance consist in the independent
‘unraveling’ of its complete concept, individually. By a divinely pre-established harmony
or concurrence, there is conformity between the independent acts of substances.

The choice between these positions of soul-body causation delimited a range of
solutions for an account for the internal operations of the mind – how it ‘perceives’
somatic states, and other extra-mental reality; and its other cognitive processes of
intellection, volition, and action. Further, the choice between these positions was not
inconsequential to the concerns of theology and morality. Part of the drawn out polemics
between Pietists and Wolffians concerned the former’s allegation that any system of pre-
established harmony implied determinism – the soul’s pre-calibration (by concurrence) to
respond to bodily states in the ways it in fact does (and vice versa) – and thus the
obviation of moral culpability. As a true philosopher of his time, Amo interacts with
these pressing philosophical debates, and shows in-depth knowledge of the intricacies of
the discussion.

67 Nicolas Malebranche, The Search for Truth and Elucidations of the Search for Truth, trans. Lennon
and Olscamp, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997)

68 Louis de la Forge, Traité de l’esprit de l’homme et de ses facultez et fonctions, et de son union avec
le corps. Suivant les principes de René Descartes in La Forge, Oeuvres philosophiques, ed. Pierre Clair,
Causation in Early Modern Philosophy: Cartesianism, Occasionalism, and Preestablished Harmony,

69 Leibniz’s ’New System’ and Associated Contemporary Texts. Edited and translated by Roger
Woolhouse and Richard Francks, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997); Nicholas Jolley (ed.), The
Cambridge Companion to Leibniz (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995); Ibid., “Pre-established

70 Joachim Lange, Christian Wolff, von Freiherr, Recueil de different pièces philosophiques,
concernant le different renouvellé entre messieurs Joachim Lange, Dr. et Professeur en Theologie à Halle,
et Christien Wolf, Dr. et Professeur à Marbourg, avec des avis aux lecteurs, contenant l’histoire de ce
different, trans. Ernst Christoph von Manteuffel (ed.) (Leipzig, 1737).
Problem Statement and Methodology

This review of the state of research on the life and work of Amo, and the contexts of his time reveals some predicament. First, the available scholarship on Amo, while interested in showcasing the image of a great African intellectual, has been fixated on biography at the expense of his thought. Even this biographical focus has fallen short of adequately casting him as an authentic parcel of the wider enterprise of early eighteenth-century German academic philosophy. Second, if Amo is reckoned to be an African, and a philosopher of his time, then the available scholarship reveals a major lacuna vis-à-vis the contextualization of his philosophical thought *qua* philosopher-from-Africa-trained-in-Germany, and this in dialogue with the heated discussions of his time. Third, a detailed, systematic investigation of an aspect of his thought and philosophy, informed by the prevalent historical-intellectual backgrounds is yet to be undertaken.

The need for a detailed systematic philosophical engagement with Amo’s work has long been recognized. Since 1970, Hountondji expressed such desideratum for a systematic “historical and theoretical analysis” of Amo’s philosophical works; one that goes beyond the ordinary mention of his works to a close reading, and even beyond this to a contextual philosophical analysis. This task, Hountondji concludes, would take time and effort, and would not be completed by one individual alone; however, it must be taken up someday.71 Over two decades later, that task was yet to be undertaken. Damis, decrying the instrumentalist reception of Amo’s biography in 2002, articulately expresses the yet outstanding need for a “detailed analysis of the work of Amo, that would place emphasis on the history of German philosophy in the first half of the eighteenth century, while at the same time taking the author’s cultural premises (*les prémises culturelles*) into

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consideration.”

Ironically, unlike the reception of Amo so far seen, the few extant records contemporaneous with the philosopher’s life in Germany, appraised him on the basis of the philosophical content of his writing, and within the context of his immediate intellectual affiliations. Thus, in spite of what recognition he may have had in contemporary Wolffian circles, in particular, the Amo received so far has not been placed as a bona fide participant to the philosophical conversations of his time. As one German thinker observed, this philosopher from Africa remains unknown in European histories of eighteenth-century philosophy. In heeding the call made over four decades ago, the time is ripe to make an attempt towards an intellectual-historical appraisal of Amo’s philosophical works, by sketching as much as is possible the immediate intellectual economy of his operation, placing him as both a product and a contributor to that context, and giving a systematic treatment of his philosophical psychology.

In view of these, the present study is structured in three chapters. The first chapter attempts to give a new focus to existing biographies on Amo by exploring various intellectual influences on the development of his thought, and attempting to paint a richer portrait of his career as philosopher of the German academic institutional context, thus positioning him as a bona fide conversation partner within that context of philosophy. Adopted here will be a methodology of the intellectual biography. Historical sources will be investigated with view to identifying trajectories of thought in their contexts, and discerning intellectual influences. The second chapter, pursuing the goal of a systematic investigation of Amo’s philosophical psychology, explores the philosophical trajectories on the topic leading up to Amo’s immediate context and the context of his works. The task will employ an analytic study of the relevant philosophical texts, identifying the important philosophical doctrinal influences on Amo. The third chapter will consist of an in-depth exegetical-systematic exploration of Amo’s philosophical psychology primarily


73 Reference from Damis, “Le Philosophe Connus Pour Sa Peau Noire,” 124. I doubt that the ambition of the current project reaches as far as canvassing for Amo’s inclusion in the standard histories of European (or even German) philosophy. The writing of such histories necessarily have different aims that may or may not include a culturally diverse base of contributors. Interestingly, in the recent The Dictionary of Eighteenth-Century German Philosophers, Heiner F. Klemme and Manfred Kuehn (eds.) (London: Continuum, 2010), Amo receives an entry.
in the text of the *Disputatio*, and secondarily in his other written works, where necessary. A concluding chapter will appraise the aims and objectives of the study.

**Sources**

The study will primarily examine the Latin philosophical source documents of Amo’s written works. In their descending order of relevance to the present task, they are: *Disputatio Philosophica Continens Ideam Distinctam Eorum Quae Competunt Vel Menti Vel Corpori Nostro Vivo Et Organico Quam Consentiente Amplissimorum Philosophorum Ordine*, (Wittenberg, 1734) [A Philosophical Disputation Containing a Distinct Idea of Those Things that Belong Either to the Mind or to Our Living Organic Body, Which is the Consent of the Most Distinguished Order of Philosophers]. *Dissertatio inauguralis philosophica de Humanae Mentis Apatheia sau sensionis ac facultatis sentiendi in mente humana absentia et earum in corpore nostro organico ac vivo praesentia*, (Wittenberg, 1734) [Inaugural Philosophical Dissertation On the Impassibility of the Human Mind Or the Absence of Sensation and of the Faculty of Sensing in the Human Mind And the Presence of these in our Organic and Living Body]. *Tractatus de Arte Sobrie et Accurate Philosophandi, Academicis Suis Praelectionibus Accomodatus, addita tractatione succinta et diligenti de critica, interpretatione, methodo, arte disputandi, aliisque, quae in logicis traduntur, rebus* (Halle, 1738) [A Treatise on the Art of Philosophizing Soberly and Accurately: a collection of lectures delivered at the university, expanded with brief and in-depth critical notes bearing upon interpretation, method, the art of disputation, and other issues pertaining to logic]. The strongly contextual nature of this study will require the investigation of other philosophical and historical primary source documents, but these will be indicated as they arise.

**Note on translations**

We have provided an annotated English translation of the Latin text of the *Disputatio Ideam Distinctam*, for which see Appendix. To the best of my knowledge, there are no published translations of this work; hence, all quoted translations of this text are mine.
For the text of the *Humanae Mentis Apatheia*, the Latin text is used primarily, but in-text quotations are made in English, and such referenced translations belong to Justin E. H. Smith, either in their entirety or as modifications of his translation. Where necessary, reference is made to Simon Mugnol’s French translation of the same work. The *Tractatus de Arte Sobrie Philosophandi* is sourced from the French translation of Mugnol.


CHAPTER ONE
AN INTELLECTUAL BIOGRAPHY OF ANTON WILHELM AMO THE
PHILOSOPHER

Introduction

On the 24th of April, 1734, at the occasion of the successful defence of an inaugural dissertation in philosophy by an African student, Anton Wilhelm Amo Afer (c. 1703 – c. 1756), the Rector of the University of Wittenberg, Johannes Gottfried Kraus (1680-1739), eulogized and summed up Amo’s intellectual path hitherto in these words:

He first saw the light of day in the most distant region of West Africa, and came to Europe as a small boy. He was introduced to sacred things at Halae Juliae. The most serene princes, dukes of Braunschweig-Wolfenbüttel, August Wilhelm and Ludwig Rudolph, deployed their goodness so that he should not suffer, in his education, from the absence of a father's assistance. After having demonstrated his genius, he was brought to Halle in Saxony: there he was initiated into diverse sciences, after which he came to us. As he showed an equal spirit [in philosophy], he rallied the entire department in his favor, and all of his masters unanimously accorded to him the degree of Doctor in Philosophy.76

In narrating some biographical snippets of this philosopher from West Africa, Kraus highlighted an important component of Amo’s intellectual inclination:

He [Amo] was at home in explaining philosophy to a number of them [students], commenting on the positions of the ancients as well as of the moderns, always choosing the clearest explanation and giving the reasons for this choice swiftly and with precision.77

With regards to competence in philosophy, Amo was reckoned to stand a head above his generation, and to have drawn the approval of the best and most learned of men.78 Amo, it was underscored, attracted much admiration not only for the wide scope of his knowledge

76 The congratulatory note of the university Rector Johannes Gottfried Kraus attached to the dissertation of Anton Wilhelm Amo, *Dissertatio inauguralis philosophica de Humanae Mentis Apatheia seu senionis ac facultatis sentiendi in mente humana absentia et earum in corpore nostro organico ac vivo praesentia* (Wittenberg: Schlomachiana, 1734), 20. [All English translations of *Humanae Mentis Apatheia* belong to Justin Smith (unpublished), unless otherwise stated.]
78 Ibid. “Honorem, meritis ingenii partum, insigni Probitatis, insdustriae, eruditionis, quam publicis, privatisque exercitationibus declaravit, laude auxit.”
within the philosophical tradition (tam veterum, quam novorum), but also for his ability to critically evaluate positions for their merits, selecting and presenting the best conclusions with lucidity.\textsuperscript{79}

Moreover, even beyond the applause he received for his personal achievements, Amo’s laurels occasioned the outpour of praise and acclaim for the illustrious history of his native Africa:

This continent [Africa] nurtured the growth of a number of men of great value, whose genius and assiduousness have made an inestimable contribution to the knowledge of human affairs and, much more, to the knowledge of divine things.\textsuperscript{80}

Yet again,

We publicly declare that Africa, and Guinea, one of its countries, so far from us, are your homeland. This Guinea […] was justly celebrated like a mother who bears natural goods and treasures in her womb, as also, still more, men of great genius and of very great inventiveness.\textsuperscript{81}

Somehow, Amo seems to have been so fully emblematic of Africa that the glory of his accomplishments naturally reached beyond his person to be reflected unto the continent he embodied.

By the third decade of the eighteenth century, Amo’s competence in philosophy and his intellectual accomplishments had strategically positioned the African within the academic establishment, in the intellectually fecund matrix of the early German Enlightenment. He was active in the following decade achieving several academic qualifications, holding teaching positions at Germany’s foremost universities (Halle, Wittenberg, and Jena), and releasing a number of publications. Within the window of 1729 to 1738, Amo’s pen was fairly busy in engaging with important philosophical issues of the eighteenth century, deploying his aptitude in ancient and modern wisdom. One of the important topics of concern, to which he dedicated two entire works, and part of another, was philosophical psychology, whose disciplinary locus in the eighteenth century lay at the convergence of medical physiology, theories of the soul, logic, metaphysics, and natural philosophy.

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\textsuperscript{79} Ibid. “Compluribus philosophiam domi tradidit, excussus tam veterum, quam novorum, placitus, optima quaque selegit, selecta enucleate, ac dilucide interpretatus est.”
\textsuperscript{80} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{81} Ibid. Note of the President of Wittenberg University at the publication of Amo’s dissertation – Wittenberg, Saxony, April 1734.
\end{flushright}
The philosophical context with which Amo transacted was one largely defined by the currents of Cartesian metaphysical dualism, and the tides generated after its mid-seventeenth-century clashes with Aristotelianism, which had yet to calm. As such, across various disciplines, there were either intense reactions to new philosophies, or consolidation of old systems, or concession and the forging of new philosophical alliances. For example, the discipline physiology and its adoption of a Cartesian mechanistic system in the account of the human organic body as “homme machine” (man-machine); or the jettisoning, within some circles, of former Scholastic accounts of powers and entelechies, in favour of mechanical and (in other circles) materialist ones.

Within this context Amo wrote his first known philosophical treatise published in April 1734, *Dissertatio inauguralis philosophica de Humanae Mentis Apatheia seu senionis ac facultatis sentiendi in mente humana absentia et earum in corpore nostro organico ac vivo praesentia*. A month later, he authored a philosophical disputation that was defended by his student, Theodosius Meiner, entitled: *Disputatio Philosophica continens Ideam Distinctam eorum quae competent vel menti vel corpori nostro vivo et organico*. These works record Amo’s philosophical psychology and his informed engagement with the debates of his time. They reveal Amo’s strong inclination toward the new mechanist philosophies, but tempered by a nearly commensurate dependence on a broad range of influences from the older philosophies, and in each case, neither a full endorsement nor an uncritical reception. Even before any detailed consideration of Amo’s philosophical psychology can proceed, an investigation into the making of the philosopher and the important biographical historical determinants of his thought is in order.

Given the promise for intellectual history of his academic pedigree, his defining historical positioning, and possible convergence of African and European paradigms in his thought, it might have been expected that more effort would be aimed at a biography that brings to focus Amo as a bona fide philosopher of eighteenth-century Germany – not least to counter the already warped judgment of Africans’ ability in philosophy voiced by David Hume (1711-1776) when he opined in 1758, only two decades after the peak of Amo’s academic activity in Europe:
I am apt to suspect the Negroes [...]. There never was a civilized nation of any other complexion than white, nor even any individual eminent either in action or speculation. No ingenious manufactures amongst them, no arts, no sciences [...] none ever discovered any symptoms of ingenuity...  

Available biographies on Amo show all kinds of interesting foci. There is the portrait of Amo deployed as an apologetic against slavery and the anthropologies of racial polygenesis of the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. In these biographies, his intellectual, moral and literary abilities are highlighted to show parity with European capabilities. Another portrait, within the context of twentieth-century African anti-colonial aspirations and its growing black intelligentsia, is the picture of Amo the accomplished African in a European-dominated society. Further, within the nascent optimism in the 1960s for a “postcolonial African philosophy,” there is a biographical portrait of Amo whose narrative is considered instrumental in molding a new post-independence African identity.

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All these helpful biographical perspectives have not had the effect of presenting Amo within the German academic philosophical context of his operation, and portraying him as the philosopher he was noted to be. Biographers, to be sure, have been careful to underscore the importance of Amo as a philosopher, but they have come just short of fully offering a biography of Amo qua philosopher.\textsuperscript{88} Even the significant labours of Amo's foremost biographer, Burchard Brentjes, while giving attention to Amo as philosopher,\textsuperscript{89} yet fail to completely integrate philosophy and biography – i.e. a focus on Amo's life from the perspective of his intellectual formation, university setting, academic career and works, and for the purpose of better discerning and appreciating points of intersection between his thought and eighteenth-century philosophical discourses, consequently situating him historically as a legitimate part of that context.

The purpose of this chapter, then, is an attempt to sketch a portrait of Amo the philosopher, and the academic institutional matrix in which the fledging and maturation of the man and his thought took place, noting the various streams of intellectual and philosophical influences that his biography may present. The importance of such a portrait lies in its potential for helping discern, from a biographical perspective, a fuller


picture of the philosophical orientation of Amo. In this regard, preliminary questions to bear in mind may include: In the context of Amo’s upbringing, education and career, precisely in what ways have his inclinations in philosophy been framed? Among the dominant philosophical schools and currents in the universities of his education and career in early eighteenth-century Germany, which one(s) does he incline to; or how do various intellectual strands interact in his thought? Even more specifically, and for the concern of this research as a whole, how do the philosophical streams under whose influence Amo is subject condition his perspective in philosophical psychology as observed in his works? The investigation will proceed in a roughly chronological order of Amo’s life, presenting the historical and intellectual contextual issues as they arise, and establishing links with Amo’s thought – hence, an attempt at an integration of philosophy and biography.

Early Years, Early Influences

The fascinating life of Amo comes to light from the diary and notes of a young Dutch-Swiss ship’s surgeon, David-Henri Gallandat (1732-1782), who on his voyage to Axim (Gold Coast) in 1753 met the African academic philosopher, Anton Wilhelm Amo, towards the end of the latter’s life. Gallandat found Amo not within the exalted precincts of the academic establishment in Germany as expected, but living miserably as a prisoner, a recluse and a local soothsayer in his native land. Gallandat’s journal reports:

While he [Gallandat] was on this voyage to Axim, on the Gold Coast of Africa, he went to visit the famous Herr Anton Wilhem Amo Guinea Afer, Doctor of Philosophy and Master of Liberal Arts. He was a Negro, who had spent around 30 years in Europe. He was in Amsterdam in 1707, and was bestowed to the Herzog of Braunschweig, Anton Ulrich, who gave him to his son, August Wilhelm. The latter sent him to study at Halle and in Wittenberg, where in 1727 he was promoted to Doctor of Philosophy and Master of Liberal Arts. Some time later his master died; this made him very melancholy, and he decided to return to his home country. He lived as a hermit, and was reputed to be a soothsayer. He spoke various languages- Hebrew, Greek, Latin, French, High and Low German, was very learned in astrology and astronomy, and was a great philosopher. At that time he was around 50 years old. His father and a sister were still alive, and lived a four days' journey inland. He had a brother who was a slave in the colony of Suriname.
Later he moved from Axim and went to live in the fortress of the West Indian St. Sebastian Company, in Chama.\textsuperscript{90}

From Gallandat’s report, it is estimated that Amo was born around 1703 in Axim, Gold Coast (present-day Ghana, West Africa). His story in Europe begins when he was brought from Axim to Holland by the Dutch East India Company in 1707 under circumstances that are quite uncertain. He was given as a gift to the Duke of Braunschweig-Wolfenbüttel, Anton Ulrich (1633 – 1714), who adopted him as a son,\textsuperscript{91} and baptized him into the Lutheran faith of the castle. From baptismal records of 1707, Amo was baptized as a Lutheran, and christened with European names, as “Anton

\textsuperscript{90} David-Henri Gallandat, reported and published by Winkelmann in \textit{Verhandelingen uitgegeven door het Zeeuwsch Genootschap der Wetenschappen te Vlissingen}. Negende Deel. Middelburg, Pieter Gillissen, 1782, p. 19-20, \textit{trans.} Justin E. H. Smith [Web:] (http://www.theamoproject.org/amo-sources/) [Date of access: 15 June, 2014]. “Terwyl hy op deeze reis te Axim op de Goudkunst in Africa was, ging hy den beroemden Heer Anthonius Guilielmus Amo Guinea Afer, Philosophiae Dr. et Artium Liberalium Magister bezoeken. Hy was een Neger, die ruim 30 Jaaren in Europa verkeerd had. Hy was in den Jaare 1707 in Amsterdam, en werd vereerd aan den Hertog van Brunswyk, Anthoni Ulrich, die hem aan zyn zoon Augustus Wilhelms gaf. Deeze liet hem studeeren te Hall, en in Wittenberg, waar hy in den Jaare 1727 tot Doctor in de Philosophie en Meester in de Vrye konsten Gepromoveerd werd. Eenigen tyd daarna overleed zyn Meester: dit maakte hem zeer droefgeistig, en deed hum besluiten naar zyn Vaderland te rug te keeren; hy leefde daar toen als een Heremiet, en had den naam van een Gelukzegger te zyn; hy sprak verscheiden taalen, Hebreeuws, Grieks, Latyn, Fransch, Hoog- en Nederduitsch; was zeer kundig in de Astrologie en Astronomie, en een groot Wysgeer; zynde toen omtrent 50 Jaaren oud. Zyn Vader en eene Zuster leefden noch, en woonden vier dagreizen landwaard in; hy had een Broeder, die Slaaf was in de Colonie van Suriname; naderhand is hy van Axim verhuist en gaan woonen in de Fortres der West-Ind. Comp. St. Sebastiaan, te Chama.” David-Henri Gallandat barely twenty years old at the time of the encounter with Amo in 1753 was already a prodigious young doctor, and was later to become very famous as a surgeon and obstetrician. He embarked on a journey aboard a merchant ship that set sail on the 15th of April 1751, and did his first medical expedition to St. Eustatius on the 5th of May 1751. His second and third trips were to the coast of Guinea in about the same period, on which occasion he met Amo. That encounter would have been a memorable one for both, owing to their shared interests and knowledge: Amo was also a physician, they had shared languages (Latin, Dutch, French, possibly German). Gallandat’s fourth and last medical expedition was in 1757 to the West Indies, precisely Suriname, following which he evidently could was in position to confirm that Amo’s brother was working as a slave. For biography of Galladat, see, A.J. van der Aa, \textit{Biographisch woordenboek der Nederlanden. Part 7}, (J.J. van Brederode: Haarlem, 1862). Amo biographer William Abraham, on the assumption that Amo must have related his brother’s whereabouts to Gallandat, had used this data to conclude that because families of slaves did not know where their kin were deported to, therefore, if Amo knew that his brother was in Suriname, then Amo’s family was possibly of higher social standing, and therefore not enslaved. Abraham’s reconstruction seems far-fetched, since Gallandat’s journal entry of Amo’s brother is better explained by the fact that it was rather \textit{after} his Gold Coast expedition and a memorable encounter with the African medical doctor-philosopher, that Gallandat went to Suriname, and likely there met Amo’s brother in about 1757 – and later recorded the events in his journal. As such, a more likely alternative is that Gallandat is the one supplying the information about Amo’s brother, not Amo.

\textsuperscript{91} Gallandat’s travelogue journal. Winkelmann, \textit{Verhandelingen uitgegeven door het Zeeuwsch Genootschap der Wetenschappen te Vlissingen}. Negende Deel (Middelburg, Pieter Gillissen), 19-20.
Wilhelm” – the names of his adoptive godfathers, Duke Anton Ulrich and son August Wilhelm (1676-1731):

This twenty-ninth day of July has been baptized a little Moor in the Saltzthal Castle Chapel, and he has been christened Anton Wilhelm. His Godfathers are all of them very noble Lordships.92

The data around Amo’s early years at the Wolfenbüttel court, scanty though they are, yet preserve a few important biographical snippets. Extant records at the court reveal financial transactions of payments made to Amo between the Easters of 1716 and 1717, and between Christmas 1720 and Michaelmas 1721. In these financial records, in acknowledgement of the receipt of funds from the court between 1719 and 1720, Amo signs off his name on 23 April 1720, not with his christened “Anton Wilhelm” alone, but with an added African name, “Amo.”93 Roughly aged seventeen at the time, this is the earliest known record of this other name. In another snippet, Amo receives his confirmation in 1721 and his name is entered in the church registry as “Anthon Wilhelm Rudolph Mohre” – ‘Mohre’ being a derivative of the German ‘Mohr’: African, or Black. The African “Amo” name is absent from this registry, but it seems a compromise has been reached in settling for “Mohre.”94 The predominant christening conventions of the time – viz., the complete Europeanizing and Christianizing of African names, and the consequential erosion of the attendant African identity – have apparently been observed with Amo, in that the two official instances of name registration (baptism and church registry) do not bear the name, “Amo,” but bear purely European ones.95 A fair measure

92 Baptismal records found at the Wolfenbüttel castle (Niedersächsisches Staatsarchiv, Wolfenbüttel, KB 1 Abt. 1332, S. 84). Quoted from William Abraham, “The Life and Times of Anton Wilhelm Amo,” 64. Also see Lochner, “Anton Wilhelm Amo: A Ghana Scholar in Eighteenth-Century Germany,” 170; Mabe, Anton Wilhelm Amo interkulturell gelesen, 16.


94 Lochner, “Anton Wilhelm Amo: A Ghana Scholar in Eighteenth-Century Germany,” 170. As Lochner has conjectured, although using the name “Amo” as a self designation since 1719 at the latest, Amo might have been unable to convince church authorities for the inclusion of the heathen name as his surname. The name “Rudolph” comes from Amo’s later patron Duke Ludwig Rudolph (1671 – 1735), brother of Anton Ulrich, and later Duke of Braunschweig-Wolfenbüttel (1731-1735).

95 Some of the known African contemporaries of Amo in Europe have completely lost their African names. For example, countryman from the Gold Coast, Johannes Eliza Capitein (1717-1747); Francis William (c. 1700-1735); Proffen Christian Jakob (1715-1769); Frederick Pedersen Svané (1710-1789).
of certainty may be held that the name “Amo” is from the common Ghanaian West African name, and is neither a name of endearment derived from the Latin ‘amo,’ nor other European sources, simply for the reason that these alternatives are not historically supported vis-à-vis the sources on Amo, and they make no sense of his life story, as will be shown later.

After the first use of the name “Amo” during his teenage years, during his academic career especially, Amo added to his patronymic the more conspicuously African cognomen: “Guinea-Afer” (African from Guinea). From the beginning of his tertiary training, all written instances of self-identification (his three known works, and otherwise) bear the Latinized “Antonio Guilielmo Amo Guinea-Afer,” or very close cognate. In another instance, Amo penned a German variant of the same construct: “Anton Wilhelm Amo Von Guinea in Africa.” From these early stages already, there is observed in Amo a tendency to append African patronymic constructs to his European names, and this, it appears, as a matter of an assertion of identity – hence, ‘Amo,’ ‘Mohre,’ and a bit later, ‘Afer.’ Questions immediately arise as to what these name designations might indicate about Amo’s thought vis-à-vis African identity and related issues. These will be taken up shortly.


98 Mabe, Anton Wilhelm Amo interkulturell gelesen, 16. Amo biographer, Mabe, though concluding against this suggestion, informs that the word ‘amo’ was a popular one in Dutch poetry of the Baroque period as symbolic of love, majesty and happiness.

99 Hence, there may be more to Amo’s taking up of the name, ‘Amo,’ than simply the conjecture by William Abraham, Paul Hountondji and others: that as a little child brought to Europe, Amo was able to remember his family. Abraham speculates even further: if Amo could remember his family name and be allowed to preserve it, then he was likely not brought to Europe as a slave, but perhaps as a predicant trainee. This may or may not be case. The more important point here may be the taking up of the name itself – viz., that the name ‘Amo’ is not recorded officially till, from available records, it makes its appearance during Amo’s adolescence. Of importance, therefore, is the intentionality and consistency with which he suffixes his official names with “Amo” and, as shall be seen later, other name constructs all indicative of Africa.

100 Jacob Emmanuel Mabe, Anton Wilhelm Amo: The Intercultural Background of His Philosophy, (Nordhausen: Verlag Traugott Bautz, 2014), 10-14. Mabe, calls into question the necessary association of the name “Amo” with an African ethnic group, and with the Nzema of the Gold Coast, in particular. Among reasons adduced is the historical anomaly this represents to the christening conventions of the time – i.e. Amo as an African “court servant” (according to Mabe) being able to preserve his original African name; the prevalence of the Latin term “amo” in Baroque Dutch poetry as a designation of endearment; and
Early education

Following Amo’s adoption by Duke Ulrich, and the latter’s benevolence, Amo received fatherly care and attention, as was later attested by his university lecturers about his childhood:

The most serene princes, dukes of Braunschweig-Wolfenbüttel, August Wilhelm and Ludwig Rudolph, exercised graciousness towards his educational needs, so that he [Amo] was not wanting from the love of a father.101

Duke Ulrich was responsible in large part for creating the intellectually stimulating environment of the Wolfenbüttel Court in which Amo was raised. Amo would likely have enjoyed a privileged education at the court’s Ritterakademie.102 103 There were other intellectual structures at Wolfenbüttel. For example, it is known that it held the illustrious Herzog August Bibliothek library, one of Europe’s foremost, and that this library

the affirmation that the name has not been associated with “any ethnic group in Africa.” For Mabe, “Amo is the verb form of amo, which means I love in Latin.” A few points must be articulated in response. First, the point of christening conventions and African identity is irrelevant – this, because those conventions have been observed in Amo’s christening. Amo was not christened with an African name, but only took it up later. Mabe’s conclusion that the “artificial name” was “obviously” acquired at the Dutch fortress near Axum is not as evident as he supposes. If this name is simply a nickname of fondness, then Amo makes a lot out of it indeed! (Using it consistently on all records since 1720, at least). Perhaps Mabe (and Suchier before him) does not appreciate Amo’s tireless push to identify with Africa throughout his life: by persistently appending his origin (“from Africa”) to his names; his activism for Africa in his first dissertation; his immediate association with African thinkers of antiquity by his teachers; and above all, his return to his native homeland. To trivialize the name “Amo” is to unduly flatten out the resonances suggested by these historical episodes. It seems more probable that the same legal activist streak that brought Amo to defend the rights of blacks in a setup where this move was likely unpopular, is the same that motivated his brashness in insisting on an African self-designation, and this as an identity marker. Also, the name “Amo” need not be his original family name; but that does not mean there is no African link, or even an Nzema link. Lastly, Mabe’s position that “Amo” finds no “genealogical and genetical” link with any ethnic group in Africa is unsupported. The name Ghana remains a very common local ethnic name to this day.


102 A Ritterakademie is a special school for the nobility. They were hugely popular after the Thirty Years War (1618-1648) in Germany. They prepared students for high offices of state, and focused their training in modern languages, law, history, financial sciences, chivalric arts, and politics. See, Maria Rosa di Simone, “Admission,” in *A History of the University in Europe: Volume 2, Universities in Early Modern Europe (1500-1800)*, ed. Walter Rüegg (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 285–325, 317-322.

103 Abraham’s, “The Life and Times of Anton Wilhelm Amo,” 66, hasty elimination of the possibilities of Amo’s education at the court or at an aristocratic school on the basis of “his status as an outsider” or his low birth, should be assessed with reservation. The testimony of Wittenberg’s rector (above) that Amo lacked nothing by way of fatherly care may leave the options of a ‘high’ education open.
particularly housed the most impressive collections of Ancient manuscripts, Greek and Roman Classics, and Medieval works.\textsuperscript{104} It was resourced between 1690-1716 by the famed erudite philosopher, Gottfried Leibniz, its \textit{bibliothekar}.\textsuperscript{105} Amo may further have received his first tertiary education at the University of Helmstedt, the alma mater of his adopted father, Duke Anton Ulrich, and the official training institution for the Principality of Braunschweig-Wolfenbüttel and immediate environs.

If the historical data reveals little of Amo’s education during these early years, even less can be said with precision concerning the content of his intellectual formation during this period – 1707 and 1727. It is therefore from the intellectual contextual situation that answers must be sought. A sharper focus, then, on Amo’s immediate context as represented by Duke Anton Ulrich’s (and later August Wilhelm) own intellectual orientation, might provide the needed pointers.\textsuperscript{106}

Duke Ulrich was responsible for Amo’s adoption and early upbringing, that much is known historically. Amo biographers have further commented that Ulrich may have been following the lead of his relative, Tsar Peter the Great (1672-1725) of Russia who had blazed the trail in adopting and educating another promising African child from the Gold Coast, Petrovitch Gannibal (1696-1781),\textsuperscript{107} – the latter described by Voltaire as “the dark

\textsuperscript{104} The Wolfenbüttel library is known as the Herzog Augusta Bibliothek (HAB), founded in 1572, it was one of the dominant centres of learning in Europe, and housed the most impressive of Ancient and Medieval manuscripts in particular. It thus drew notable scholars and bibliophiles to Wolfenbüttel since the sixteenth century – most notably, Leibniz, and his involvement with the library through his friend, Duke Ulrich. See impressive digitalization project of HAB for listing of its collections and history, Herzog Augusta Bibliothek [Web:] \url{http://www.hab.de/} [Date of access: 15 July, 2014]. The Wolfenbüttel court maintained other important institutions of learning and culture including: an Italian opera and a playhouse. See Haile, H. G. “‘Octavia: Römische Geschichte’: Anton Ulrich’s Use of the Episode.” \textit{The Journal of English and Germanic Philology} 57, no. 4 (October 1, 1958): 611–32, 614; Stuart Murray, \textit{The Library: An Illustrated History}, (New York: Skyhorse Publishing, 2012), 284–5.

\textsuperscript{105} For Leibniz’s central involvement in the building of the Ritterakademie, and the Wolfenbüttel Library, see correspondence with Anton Ulrich in Eduard Bodemann, “Leibnizens Briefwechsel mit dem Herzoge Anton Ulrich von Braunschweig-Wolfenbüttel,” \textit{Zeitschrift des historischen Vereins für Niedersachsen} (1888), 73-244.

\textsuperscript{106} Besides the treatment of Mougnol, \textit{Amo Afer. Un Noir, professeur d'université en Allemagne au XVIIIe siècle}, I am aware of no biographical account that has identified the importance of the possible role played by Duke Ulrich’s own intellectual perspective on Amo’s formation. It is not the case, as Abraham comments, that Anton Ulrich was “a rather strange old man” whose “most serious work, \textit{Fifty Reasons why one must be a Catholic}, convinced at least its author;” Abraham, \textit{The Life and Times of Anton Wilhelm Amo}, 64.

\textsuperscript{107} There is every indication that the similar interests in modernization, scientific and humanist learning, and multiculturalism between Duke Ulrich and Peter the Great, and their close friendship through
star of Russia’s Enlightenment.” But who really was Duke Ulrich, and what influence could he have had on Amo’s early intellectual formation at that most impressionable period of the boy’s life? Contrary to the perfunctory nod usually given him by Amo biographers, Duke Ulrich showed himself to have been more than a mere magnanimous old man who adopted an African child. There is evidence for his proto-Enlightenment inclinations in his political and personal dealings, and in the kind of influence he wielded at Wolfenbüttel.

Educated in theology at the University of Helmstedt under the ecumenist theologian Georg Calixt (1586-1656), Ulrich is known to have imbibed the spirit of his teacher’s program of confessional unity for Europe. In a rare demonstration of this inclination to unity and religious toleration during a period of confessional territorial sectarianism, Duke Ulrich converted to Roman Catholicism while allowing his court to remain Lutheran, and permitted the building of a Catholic Church in his Lutheran territory. He pushed for confessional ecumenism by the de-emphasis of doctrinal adiaphora (non-essentials), and in its place advocated a common-denominator Christianity of piety and relatedness by marriage, indicates more than an incidental relationship between Amo’s and Gannibal’s education and life trajectories. For details of friendship between both rulers see Nicholas Rescher, *On Leibniz: Expanded Edition* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2013), 256-9.

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109 See fn. 106.

110 Georg Calixt is part of a long tradition of thinkers who, following the Thirty Years War, pushed for religious unity, where rigid confessional, religious, and cultural sectarianism would be deemphasized. He strove for the unification of Roman Catholic, Lutheran, and Reformed faiths by downplaying dogmatic non-essentials, and seeking to establish an acceptable creedal inter-confessional “common ground” – which he found in the Apostle’s Creed. Calixt’s works to this effect, *Apparatus Theologicus* (1628), and *Epitome Theologiae* (1634)). For the influence of Calixt’s program on the theology faculty of Helmstedt, see W. A. Kelly, *The Theological Faculty at Helmstedt* (East Linton: Cat’s Whisters, 1996); Hermann Schüssler, *Georg Calixt: Theologie und Kirchenpolitik: Eine Studie zur Ökumenizität des Luthertums* (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1961); Bodo Nischan, “John Bergius: Irenicism and the Beginning of Official Religious Toleration in Brandenburg-Prussia,” in *Church History* 51, no. 4 (December 1, 1982): 389–404; Callisen, Christian Thorsten. “Georg Calixtus, Isaac Casaubon, and the Consensus of Antiquity” in *Journal of the History of Ideas* 73, no. 1 (January 1, 2012): 1–23.

111 The popular policy of cuius regio, eius religio, where a given territory was to subscribe to whatever confession its ruler adopted.

the eschewal of worldliness.\footnote{113} He pursued the same spirit of toleration and irenicism in politics by promoting cultural and ethnic diversity\footnote{114} – very consistent with the kind of extensive European international exposure he had himself acquired as a traveling student.\footnote{115} Trained as he was in “\textit{allen Wissenschaften},” he was a humanist in the arts, took interest in supporting science, and was superbly competent in Ancient Classical literature. He was a prolific author, playwright and historian of Ancient Rome. His largest published work was the monumental 7200-page quarto, \textit{Romanische Octavia} – a work of historical fiction giving an exhaustive treatment of Roman political history in the periods 68 to 71 AD from the last days of Emperor Nero, and a detailed presentation of the religious and social contexts of the era.\footnote{116} Part of his interest in Classical literature was with Christian Stoicism, and these are reflected in his plays.\footnote{117} Duke Ulrich promoted classical learning and built schools, closely courted thinkers of ecumenical and tolerant persuasions like Leibniz,\footnote{118} and has been described by historians as “an enlightened ruler.”\footnote{119} His leadership of Wolfenbüttel and the influence of his philosophical

\footnote{113} Zedler, \textit{Universal Lexicon}, 691.

\footnote{114} Ulrich was a ‘man of the world’ as evidenced by the international interest of his arts collection housed at the Herzog Anton Ulrich Museum: he avidly collected from China, Egypt, the Middle East, and South America, as well as Europe. \[Web:] http://www.3landesmuseen.de/Geschichte.366.0.html#sthash.s5wkW4or.dpuf \[Date of access: 05 June 2014].

\footnote{115} Zedler, \textit{Universal Lexicon}, 690.

\footnote{116} Duke Ulrich’s written corpus span over 25 volumes of written plays, poetry, novels, and a staggering 7-volume work of 7200 pages, the \textit{Romische Octavia}. See Stephen Kraft, “Anton Ulrich Herzog zu Braunschweig und Lüneburg,” 2004, \[Web:] http://www.pierre-marteau.com/library/g-1677-0001.html \[Date of access: 03 June 2014]. The writing of the \textit{Romanische Octavia} not simply a literary piece written privately by Duke Ulrich. It was a big-scale research project involving much of the court’s resources in the 1700s. It employed the full services of poet Sigmund von Birken (1626-1681) in the earlier days, full-time secretaries, resource people, etc. The project eventually went bankrupt after the publication of its seventh volume in 1714.


\footnote{119} Haile, ‘Octavia: Römische Geschichte’: Anton Ulrich’s Use of the Episode, 614.
inclinations set a strong precedence for his son August Wilhelm’s education and ideas, and for those trained at the court like Amo.\textsuperscript{120}

If Duke Ulrich was an “interesting old man,” to use Abraham’s phrasing employed in patronizing streak, that interest is rather to be found in his embodiment of the impetus to weave intellectual strands of ancient classical sources and of proto-Enlightenment ideals into new syntheses. His profound knowledge of the classics, notably Roman literature and themes of Christian Stoicism, coupled with the size of his literary projects make it fairly likely that Amo came under this strong classical influence. The Duke’s inclination towards freethinking, not least in matters of religion, his love for the humanities and sciences; a general distaste or apathy to religious sectarianism and rigid orthodoxy, in preference for toleration and ecumenism; an inclination towards the non-dogmatic investigation of natural phenomena through reason, as opposed to the uncritical acceptance of religious authority are tendencies later to be seen in Amo.

**Portrait of early years**

From these preliminary biographical observations, a two-dimensional portrait of Amo’s philosophical perspective is possible: first, how his impulse to identify with his African roots materialize into what might be termed an African consciousness; secondly, how the intellectual influences of Duke Ulrich in ancient literature coalesce into a full philosophical orientation in Amo’s own thought.

\textsuperscript{120} There is record of at least another boy adopted by Duke Ulrich, and given similar training as Amo. Danish boy, Konrad Detlev von Dehn (1688-1753). Detlev von Dehn was brought to Anton Ulrich’s court as a page in 1703, baptized in the Wolfenbüttel chapel, like Amo, adopted as a son, given quality formal education by Duke Wilhelm, sent on trips around Europe, and later tasked with the duties of arts collector for the Herzog Anton Museum, and with foreign diplomacy on behalf of the electorate, and as Privy Counselor to Wilhelm. (See, Manfred Garzmann, Wolf-Dieter Schuegraf (eds.): *Braunschweiger Stadlexikon*. Ergänzungsband. (Braunschweig: Joh. Heinr. Meyer Verlag, 1996), 37; Horst-Rüdiger Jarck, Dieter Lent et al. (eds.), *Braunschweigisches Biographisches Lexikon – 8. bis 18. Jahrhundert*, (Braunschweig: Appelhans Verlag, 2006), 169–170.
A. African consciousness

The intentionality and consistency of Amo’s use of African cognomens obviously indicate deep-rooted attachment to his origins, and perhaps a bit more. To understand the significance of this impulse of name adoption, it may be asked if Amo is influenced by a precedent elsewhere. What narrative could he be playing into with these names? It has already been suggested that Amo might have had a particularly extensive knowledge of ancient literature – this owing to Duke Ulrich’s love for Classical antiquity, the grand project of the latter’s Roman history novel and plays, the large selection of ancient literature at the Wolfenbüttel Library, and the portrayal by Kraus of Amo as competent in ancient wisdom. Could it be that from his knowledge of ancient history Amo has identified a historical precedent with whose narrative he shares particular affinity, and whom Amo might be emulating?

In answer to these questions, the person of Publius Terentius Afer (c. 195 – 159 BCE) presents himself for investigation. In Kraus’ congratulatory speech, he had likened Amo to this Terence of Carthage (as better known in English), ahead of other ancient African intellectuals whom he deemed Amo to personify – Tertullian, Cyprian, Arnobius, Optatus, and Augustine. Terence was a playwright in the Roman Republic. A Roman senator, Terentius Lucanus, had brought Terence from North Africa to Rome as a slave. Later impressed by Terence’s abilities, the senator gave him an education and later freed him. Terence added the cognomen, “Afer,” to his official “Terentius” as identification both with his native North Africa, and also with his Berber ethnic grouping. The narrative parallels between Amo and Terence are fairly striking. Added to this, as a playwright himself, there is a high likelihood of Terence’s story and plays being common knowledge to Duke Ulrich, and at the court. If Amo knew about Terence, for which the

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123 That Terence was not an obscure, but a known figure even in eighteenth-century Germany is borne out by several facts: Terence’s plays were widely used in the Middle Ages and Renaissance to learn Latin (Julia Bolton Holloway, *Sweet New Style: Brunetto Latino, Dante Alighieri, Geoffrey Chaucer*, Essays,
probability is high, then it is imaginable that seeing a reflection of his own story on many levels in Terence, he was impressed to emulate the African playwright. It is hard to conceive that Terence’s narrative of African identity – from slavery and social disadvantage to good fortune complemented with personal hard work, and eventual success – would have left Amo indifferent. Moreover, Kraus’ knowledge of Amo’s background, coupled with his invoking of prominent *Afri doctores* from antiquity, and his seal of approval that Amo had fulfilled those aspirations, might bespeak Amo’s conscious efforts, based on his knowledge of Terence *et al*, to have patterned his life in this light. The suggestion here, in other words, is that Amo, with the benefit of ancient history, worked out his life with a sense that he potentially was one of a number of African intellectuals whose narratives looked strikingly similar to his, and that his taking up of African names, especially Terence’s “Afer,” was a part of this consciousness. Thus, Amo may be employing “Afer,” on one hand, following the Latin meaning “African,” as a racial identifier, and on the other, as a conscious attempt to identify with the narrative of the African, Terence. Amo thus seals his destiny, as it were, with a dominant African consciousness of his origins and sense of life duty, a perspective that will remain important through out his life.

B. Ancient Philosophy

The strong influence of ancient philosophies as a prominent aspect of Amo’s philosophical portrait comes to light in consideration of the person of Epictetus (55-135). Dispersed throughout Amo’s works are endorsing mentions of Epictetus and allusions to the Stoic philosophy that the latter represented. Biographically, in the same vein as Terence above, Epictetus’s role in Amo’s philosophical life comes to the fore. Epictetus was born in Phrygia, Greece; brought to Rome at a very young age as a slave to Nero’s secretary, Epaphroditos. Epictetus took an early interest in philosophy and was trained in

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124 Mugnol, *Amo Afer: Un Noir, professeur d’université en Allemagne au XVIIIe siècle*, 76-79 has made a similar observation.
the Stoic tradition. Eventually gaining his freedom at about 68 CE after Nero’s death – the precise historical period of Duke Anton’s *Octavia Romanische* – Epictetus taught philosophy in Rome. In 93 CE, following Emperor Domitian’s banishing from Rome of all philosophers, Epictetus returned to his native Greece and there founded a philosophical school that focused on the Socratic task of self-knowledge and the cultivation of virtue.

The points of convergence in biography, coupled with Amo’s evident knowledge of Epictetus, might make Amo’s interest in the Greek philosopher much more than a purely abstract and intellectual one. Several important biographical moments of Amo’s show the strong influence of ancient philosophy in general, and Epictetus’ Stoicism in particular. On a cursory reading, some generally recognized points of a Stoic outlook on life are noted. First, philosophy to Stoicism is not simply an intellectual discipline, but praxis (*askēsis*), and a way of life. The thinker must be transformed in the process of philosophizing. By the same token, then, speculative knowledge is congruent with moral virtue. Important to Stoic ethic are the concepts of the purposeful ends of the world (*telos*), and the idea of the happy thriving (*eudaimonia*) of things. The notions capture the Stoic ideas that the ordering of the world, though complex, is nonetheless rational and purposive. All things move towards a providential, rational unraveling, and ultimate happiness and contentment consist in acquiescing to the rationality of providence even at personal inconvenience. Far from being quietistic, it is rather an indifference to necessity and a serene response to the vagaries of fortune, based on confidence in its underlying teleology.

The elements of this philosophy and more are seen in Amo. In conceptualizing philosophy, Amo provides a derived definition from the Stoic Cicero:

> This kind of philosophy is defined by the conditioning of the intellect and the will. Philosophy is nothing but wisdom – ‘wisdom’, in other words, ‘virtue’. This is an ability that has to do with the exercise of a known truth.127

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125 Doctrinal discontinuities among different schools and periods of ancient Stoicism, and divergences of among interpreters granted.


127 Amo, *De Arte Sobrie*, Ch. II, Tit. 2, § 2.
This same outlook, as shall be seen, will be brought to practical application later in Amo’s life. The philosophy of life encapsulated here reveals a Stoic approach to necessity. This perspective will be taken up in more detail later. It suffices for now to observe that the theme of ancient philosophies, especially of the Stoic variant, is a present one in Amo, and this, it is suggested, is mediated through his biographical affinities with Epictetus.

The portrait of the early years of Amo’s intellectual formation therefore shows these outstanding perspectives. The early exposure to ancient literature through Duke Ulrich’s influence, and the upbringing at the court, thus situate Amo within a large philosophical pool of sources from which the personalities of Terence and Epictetus have stood out as prominent voices for his African consciousness and ancient philosophical leanings.

**University of Halle Years**

After Duke Ulrich died in 1714, Amo came under the patronage of the former’s son and heir, Duke August Wilhelm. Duke Wilhelm shows signs of adhering to his father’s enlightened outlook, not least by his project to specifically send Amo to the reputedly freethinking University of Halle. As eighteenth-century historian, Johann Zedler (1706-1751), reported: “His Highness the Elector of Braunschweig-Wolfenbüttel, at his own expense, sent Amo to study philosophy and law for some years.” Amo matriculated into the university on June 9, 1727, where he studied law for at least two years. The choice of the University of Halle for Amo’s studies, out of the five strongly Lutheran universities within a seventy-mile radius, is likely not arbitrary. In several respects Amo would find at Halle an intellectually congenial environment for the flowering of the intellectual seeds already sown in his upbringing at the Wolfenbüttel court. In the

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129 The Lutheran universities of Leipzig, Wittenberg, Jena, Helmstedt and Erfurt were within short range. John Robert Holloran, “Professors of Enlightenment at the University of Halle 1690-1730” (PhD diss., University of Virginia, 2000), 3.
following sections, the intellectual and philosophical landscape of Halle will be sketched, and Amo situated within it.

**Intellectual Setting at Halle**

The very founding vision and ethos of the University of Halle set it apart as a place of intellectual freedom. Unlike other German institutions, the University of Halle had been established by Elector Friedrich III of Brandenburg (1657-1713) in 1694 to bring education reform to Germany, and to create a de-confessional, and less religiously volatile academic space where differing opinions could be transacted in a spirit of tolerance. In this intellectual setup, the founding professors at Halle became the main pioneers and drivers of the disciplinary innovations of thought that blossomed into the German Enlightenment.

Amo’s presence at Halle in the late 1720s situated him at the confluence of at least four identifiable philosophical visions for innovation in Germany. One was the legal cameralist vision of the founding law professor, Christian Thomasius (1655-1728), whose reform program attempted to secularize the public political space by an appropriate separation between a private religious realm of spiritual law, and a secular public realm.

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of natural law. Thomasius’ program, *inter alia*, tried to sever the metaphysical continuity – orchestrated, he asserted, by Scholastic Protestantism – between divine and human reason. For Thomasius, the radical impact of the Fall in Christian theology, necessarily makes impossible the direct translation of divine law into human laws; consequently, a non-transcendent source of human law that is based only on “sound reason,” and aimed at public harmony, must be sought in jurisprudence.132 Thomasius, taking cue from his Pietist religious background, tried to formulate in philosophy an epistemology of inner-light voluntarism – where, in place of the dogmatic traditions and religious *auctoritas* of scholastic religious “sectarian philosophy,” each individual evaluated truth by the application of personal critical judgment (without metaphysical pre-commitments), and the use of an eclectic method applied to a wide-ranging body of knowledge – not least the Ancient Classical sources.133

Another vision was the rationalist and mechanist philosophy engendered by Christian Wolff (1679-1754) and the so-called Leibniz-Wolffian synthesis. This synthesis, as expressed by Wolff, tried to found philosophy on new grounds of scientific methodological rigour, based on rationalist assumptions – confidence in the powers of human reason to discover truth independently of tradition and authority, by application of right method. The program saw philosophy as epistemically propaedeutic to all knowledge disciplines – including theology, putatively founded on divine revelation.134

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134 The two most influential Wolffian works in this regard are: *Vernünftige Gedanken von den Kräften des menschlichen Verstandes* 1712 (Rational Thoughts on the Powers of the Human Understanding); *Vernünftige Gedanken von Gott, der Welt, der Seele des Menschen auch allen Dingen überhaupt*, 1719
Added to this was the Wolffian exposition of a broadly Cartesian dualist metaphysics of matter and mind, and consequently, a very mechanical and mathematically predictable physical universe.\textsuperscript{135} In physiology and psychology it denied any direct or causal relationship between ontologically disparate mind and body, but accounted for their interaction on the basis of Leibniz’s theory of pre-established harmony.\textsuperscript{136} In the latter, mind and body operate independently – mind purely by ideation, and body by mechanism – but the operations of both are in sync, such that the action of either finds some sort of equivalence in the other, without immediate causal influences.\textsuperscript{137}

Another vision was the pedagogical and theological vision of Pietist educator and founder, August Hermann Francke (1663-1727) along with Halle professor of theology, Joachim Lange (1670-1744), whose programs represented an attempt to advance Pietist Lutheran orthodoxy and its synthesis with Scholastic philosophy, against the sweeping influences of philosophical rationalism and the Cartesian mechanistic metaphysics of the Leibniz-Wolffian system. To this end Lange, in particular, held a sustained campaign against Christian Wolff and the perceived atheistic tendencies of the mechanist philosophy the latter represented.\textsuperscript{138}

A last vision was the animistic physiology pushed by influential Pietist professor of medicine, Georg Ernst Stahl (1659-1734), and challenged by a counter perspective of mechanistic physiology championed by colleague Friedrich Hoffmann (1660-1742).


\textsuperscript{136} Since Wolff did not unreservedly endorse pre-established harmony, I here attribute it to the general inclination of the \textit{Leibnizian-Wolffian} hybrid, and to those in that tradition later on.


\textsuperscript{138} Some of Lange’s written works of attack on Wolffianism include: \textit{Bescheidene und ausführliche Entdeckung der falschen und schädlichen Philosophie in dem Wolffianischen Systemate metaphysico von Gott, der Welt und dem Menschen} (Halle, 1724); \textit{Kontroversschriften gegen die Wolffische Metaphysik} (Halle, 1723)
Stahl’s medical theory represented an animistic concept of the human body as *organismus*, where the human soul is seen fundamentally as an organism’s principle of vitality, and the sum total of the body’s perceptual processes. It is integrated completely with the body in one unity called the ‘organic,’ or simply ‘life,’ in such a way that, for Stahl, the usual separation between a somatic realm of perception and a psychological one is untenable.¹³⁹ The soul-body, *qua* ‘organismus,’ is therefore an integrated whole, and self-determining of all its operations.¹⁴⁰ On the contrary, Hoffmann’s medical theory, building on the inherent ‘active’ property of matter, insisted that the material body, without soul or vital principles, was sufficient to account for the various characteristics of life.¹⁴¹

These differing philosophical, theological, and jurisprudential perspectives at Halle represented competing visions of thought, visions that vied fiercely for dominance and the allegiances of Halle students. Partisanship was rife, and from the 1700 into the 30s, Halle, it seems, was a sum of its influential professors and their student epigones. Hence, for Thomasius at the Law Faculty, there was student protégé (and later professor) Nikolaus Hieronymous Gundling (1671-1729); for Francke in the Theology Faculty, there were Lange and one Johann Heinrich (1668-1738), among others;¹⁴² for mechanist professor Friedrich Hoffmann (1660-1742), Andrea Dornmeyer (1674-1717) at the medical faculty; and for law professor Samuel Stryck (1640-1710), Johann Friedemann

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¹³⁹ Georg Stahl, *Disquisitio de Mechanismi et Organismi Diversitate; De Vera Diversitate Corporis Mixtii et Vivi*, (Halle, 1708).


Schneider (1669-1733). The tension was particularly exacerbated as each school of thought considered itself entrusted with the mantle of bringing innovation.\textsuperscript{143}

In spite of these rivalries, however, the University of Halle remained a place (one of the first of its kind in Germany) where the academic endeavour was not pursued exclusively as an auctoritas traditit, but as a principle of libertas philosophandi et docendi.\textsuperscript{144} The intellectual climate at Halle was aptly described by Halle Professor of Jurisprudence, Gundling (1671-1729) in 1711, in a eulogy to university founder, Elector Friedrich III, when he concluded: Veritas adhuc in medio posita est; qui potest, adscendat, qui audet, rapiat: et applaudemus.\textsuperscript{145}

Amo’s studies at Halle (c. 1727-1729) therefore situated him in an intellectual atmosphere where, because of a policy of freedom of thought, the free investigation of truth was championed, and open to anyone who would dare apply himself or herself to it. Not only that, he was privileged by place and time to be in one of the most defining periods of German legal studies under Christian Thomasius, with whom Amo’s time at Halle overlapped by at least one year. Other minds at the faculty included Gundling, Thomasius’ ablest student, along with jurist and diplomat, Johann Peter von Ludewig (1668-1743), who later presided over Amo’s dissertation.

Legal studies

It was in this intellectually diverse and freethinking context that Amo undertook studies at the law faculty. That faculty, still under Thomasius’ pervasive three-decade long influence, was oriented strongly towards Samuel Pufendorf’s (1632-1694) program of natural law for civic society.\textsuperscript{146} Under this approach, the jurisprudential architecture of a post-confessional society had to demarcate between the Christian’s responsibility to the

\textsuperscript{143} Holloran’s dissertation remains the most extensive treatment of these clashes at Halle. Holloran, “Professors of Enlightenment at the University of Halle 1690-1730,” esp. 125-183.


\textsuperscript{145} Referenced from Paulsen, The German Universities and University Study, 46. “Truth is laid in [their] midst: he who can, ascends; he who dares, ravishes, and is cheered on.”

\textsuperscript{146} For discussion of Samuel Pufendorf’s natural law, particularly in reference to Thomasius’ appropriation, see see T. J. Hochstrasser, Natural Law Theories in the Early Enlightenment, Ideas in Context 58 (Cambridge, UK ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 40-74.
State, for the sake of public well being, and his duties to religion.\textsuperscript{147} Due to the distinction between the natural and the revealed realms of religion, it is the civil state, not revealed or confessional religion, which is tasked with upholding the rights of all its citizens, for the sake of social cohesion.\textsuperscript{148} In addition to the Pufendorian influence of natural law at the faculty, specific works recommended by Thomasius in his lectures give further perspective: he endorsed Pierre Bayle’s (1647-1706) \textit{Dictionnaire historique et critique} (1697), for its positions on religious liberty, toleration and freedom of conscience;\textsuperscript{149} he also recommended a French translation and a foreword by Jean Barbeyrac (1674-1744) to Pufendorf’s natural law.\textsuperscript{150} Another influence came from Gundling’s teaching of natural law during Amo’s time. Gundling, popular among students (but infamous with the theologians), reportedly gave a version of natural law tinged with “Hobbesianism” and “godless leanings.”\textsuperscript{151} Thomas Hobbes’s (1588-1679) \textit{Leviathan} 1651 was the most likely work of political philosophy in reference here. Gundling was also known to have been one of the first introducers of John Locke (1632-1704) to Germany.\textsuperscript{152}

\textsuperscript{147} Thomasius’ work in jurisprudence to a large extent advanced Pufendorf theories of church-state relations in the latter’s \textit{De habitu religionis christianae ad vitam civilem}, 1687. Thomasius’ lectures in 1695, later published in 1724 as \textit{Vom Recht eines Christlichen Fürsten in Religions-Sachen} (“On the Right of a Christian Prince in Religious Matters”) indicate the general orientation of Halle’s law faculty.

\textsuperscript{148} Thomasius, “On the Right of Protestant Princes in Adiaphora,” in \textit{Essays on Church, State, and Politics}, Natural Law and Enlightenment Classics, Ian Hunter ed., (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2007), 67-68. “There is no sentence in the New Testament specifically directed at supreme secular rulers by which they are entrusted with a particular office concerning the church — in the way that there was a precept for the kings of Israel Deuteronomy XVII... I conclude from this that all rights of Christian princes—regarded as princes—are to be learned from the principles of natural law and the genuine nature of civil sovereignty.”

\textsuperscript{149} From Thomasius’ preface to the German translation of Hugo Grotius’ \textit{De Jure belli ac pacis} which appeared as \textit{Drei Bücher vom Recht des Krieges und des Friedens}, 1707: Ian Hunter, “Introduction,” \textit{Essays on Church, State, and Politics}, 17.

\textsuperscript{150} The recommended reading was entitled: \textit{Le droit de la nature & des gens, ou système général des principes les plus importants de la morale, de la jurisprudence & de la politique}. Traduit de latin de feu monsieur le baron de Pufendorf, avec des notes du traducteur & une preface, qui sert d’introduction à tout l’ouvrage, (Amsterdam, 1706).

\textsuperscript{151} From Holloran’s study of archives and letters exchanged between professors and academic committees in conflict at Halle. Holloran, “Professors of Enlightenment at the University of Halle 1690-1730,” 177.

By 1729, after two years of legal studies in the rich intellectual atmosphere of Halle, the key thoughts of the twenty-six year-old Amo would have been formed and reasonably developed. Any early signs of an African consciousness in Amo took on fuller expression when he wrote a dissertation in defence of the rights of Africans, entitled *De Jure Maurorum in Europa* (On the Rights of Africans in Europe), presided by then university Chancellor, Johann Ludewig. Though not yet found, the thesis of the dissertation is preserved in two earliest sources: the university advertisement for the dissertation by the praeses, Ludewig (1729), and Zedler’s *Universal Lexicon* (1739). Ludewig reports:

So that the argument of the disputation should be appropriate to his situation, the topic *De iure Maurorum in Europa*, or the law of Moors, was chosen. Therein it was not only shown from books and from history, that the kings of the Moors were enfeoffed by the Roman Emperor, and that every one of them had to obtain a royal patent from him, which Justinian also issued, but it was also investigated how far the freedom or servitude of Moors bought by Christians in Europe extends, according to the usual laws.

Going by this short report, the central argument advanced by Amo immediately strikes as eccentric and unconventional. The basis for the rights that he advocated is not

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153 Ludewig was also an eminent Prussian diplomat, historian and scholar of international law. He was adviser to Frederick II of Prussia, and played important roles in numerous matters of foreign diplomacy, including negotiating the Brandenburg-Prussian settlement in Amo’s native land, Gold Coast, which saw the Dutch East India Company acquire all property of Brandenburg-Prussia in that region on 13 August 1720. He evidently was exposed to Amo’s people, and could relate to the latter on multiple levels: jurisprudence, the German cultural setting, and Amo’s African origins. (See, Lochner, 171-2; Owusu-Ansah, *Historical Dictionary of Ghana*. 2nd ed. African Historical Dictionaries, no. 63. Metuchen, N.J: Scarecrow Press, 1995, xxiv, 64).

154 Johann Heinrich Zedler, "Amo (Anton Wilhelm)," in *Großes Universallexicon aller Wissenschaften und Künste*, Leipzig, 1739-1750. Zedler’s report on Amo’s *De iure* dissertation is almost verbatim from Ludewig’s, and needs no quoting.

religious, but political-legal, therefore no moral imperatives are appealed to. The Pufendorian-Thomasian jurist influence on Amo is immediately observed. We may reason cautiously that for Amo, within the context of a state or commonwealth, the rights of citizens are guaranteed by a common natural law, and upheld by the state or its prince, and not by revealed law, or the Christian establishment. On several levels, this summary of Amo’s seems to directly invoke Thomasius’ *On the Right of Protestant Princes Regarding Indifferent Matters or Adiaphora* (esp. § 6-8), whose context is the need for the preservation, by Protestant princes, of the religious freedoms and cultural identities of pagan, Jewish, and other religious minorities in Europe, by upholding their civil rights. Like Thomasius, Amo argues on the basis of civil rights, anchored in political history, and thereby subtly undermines the place of the religious institution in anchoring the rights of Africans. Yet, unlike his professor who was an avid critique of the Justinian Law Code, Amo forges his own path. He uses the political history of the Byzantine Emperor Justinian (482-565 CE) to establish a common political and legal status between Africans and Europeans. Amo’s intellectual orientation in this regard comes into sharper focus against the contrasting backdrop of his contemporary and Gold Coast countryman in Europe, minister and missionary of the Dutch Reformed Church, Jacobus Capitein (1717-1747). Capitein’s 1742 thesis (*Dissertatio politico-theologica, de servitute, libertati christianae non contraria*) at the University of Leiden argued that slaves’ conversion to Christianity and their baptism did not necessitate emancipation by their

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156 Christian Thomasius, *Auserlesene und in Deutsch noch nie gedruckte Schriften* (Halle, 1705). For English translation, see Christian Thomasius, “Right of Protestant Princes in Indifferent Matters or Adiaphora,” Ian Hunter, ed., *Essays on Church, State, and Politics*, 49-127. Thomasius, “Right of Protestant Princes in Indifferent Matters or Adiaphora,” pp. 65-71). In the § 6-8, Thomasius argues that princes derive their power from “the principles of natural law and the genuine nature of civil sovereignty,” and as such, a Christian commonwealth must not be construed as Christian theocracies. Civil power must not interfere with the internal issues of a religious group, nor should civil issues be determined by religious power. To this end, when a pagan commonwealth (or individual pagans) convert to Christianity their rights vis-à-vis the state do not change, nor do the princes’ rights in ruling over them. Princes must learn to rule over pagan citizens while upholding the latter’s civil rights, without politically imposing Christian conversion. Conversion, for Thomasius must be upheld as a matter conscience, not coercion.

157 Thomasius, “Right of Protestant Princes in Indifferent Matters or Adiaphora,” pp. 66-67). Thomasius denounced the political theories represented in Emperors Constantine, Theodosius, and Justinian for their upholding of a compulsory national religion, and the promulgation of civil laws on that basis: to the destruction of various freedoms. With regards to matters of religious freedom, he characterizes these systems as “Anti-Christ.”
Christian slave-owners. Following this, the rights of Africans, for Capitein are adjudicated by the Christian religion, for which adherence may be a precondition to full Africans’ rights.

This approach to rights may not only bespeak the influence on Amo of Thomasius’ project in law, but also of Christian Wolff’s project in practical philosophy. Comparing Amo with the law dissertation of Wolff’s student, Regnerus Engelhard (1717-1777) at the universities of Marburg and Jena, broad parallels are observed. Engelhard’s dissertation Specimen juris feudorum naturalis (1742), and later his key work, Rechts, nach den Grundsätzen der Weltweisheit und besonders des Rechts des Natur (1756), was an application of Wolff’s practical philosophy within the realms of criminal law, and heartily endorsed by Wolff. Like Wolff’s establishment of virtue on non-theistic foundations, for Engelhard, basic rights are natural, not necessarily founded on revelation. While the Wolffian influence on Amo’s thesis here is not in itself conclusive, more generally, it seems plausible that Amo was well exposed to Wolff’s philosophy, and would not have been oblivious to Wolff’s most controversial thesis that a virtuous ethic that didn’t necessitate Christian revelation and spiritual transformation.

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158 Jacobus Johannes Elisa Capitein, Dissertatio politico-theologica, de servitute, libertati christianae non contraria; Staatkundig-godgeleerd onderzoekschrift, over de slaverny, als niet strjdig tegen de Christelyke Vryheid...; (Leiden, 1742). Capitein particularly argued his position against one Godefridus Cornelisz Udemans, a Dutch minister who advocated the right to freedom for slaves seven years after their Christian baptism, though many 17th-century Reformed commentaries on the Heidelberg Catechism in Holland, within the context of delivered sermons, stated that slavery was a transgression of the eighth commandment of the Decalogue. See, Jacobus Elisa Johannes Capitein, The Agony of Asar: A Thesis on Slavery by the Former Slave, Jacobus Elisa Johannes Capitein, 1717–1747. (Translated with comments by Grant Parker, (Princeton, N.J: Markus Wiener, 2001)); David Nii Anum Kpobi, Mission in chains. The life, theology and ministry of the ex-slave Jacobus E.J. Capitein (1717-1747) with a translation of his major publications, (Zoetermeer: Boekencentrum, 1993); Kpobi, Saga of a Slave: Jacobus Capitein of Holland and Elmina. Admittedly, Capitein’s argument has a missionary concern, and is primarily aimed at European slave owners who, on the basis of Udemans’ argument, were refraining from baptizing their ‘heathen’ slaves into Christianity. However, the point is sustained that Capitein while in Europe did not express the same kind of African social consciousness as Amo did in his dissertation.

159 Approximately, “Law, according to the principles of philosophy and especially the law of nature.”


161 Wolff’s works in practical philosophy include: Philosophia practica universalis methodo scientifica pertractata ['Universal Practical Philosophy'] 2 vols. (Frankfurt: 1738-9); Jus naturae methodo scientifica pertractatum 8 vols. (Frankfurt, 1740-1748); Jus gentium methodo scientifica pertractatum (Halle, 1750); Philosophia moralis sive ethica (‘Moral Philosophy or Ethics’) 5 vols. (Halle: 1750-3).
The reception of Amo’s unconventional treatment of this sensitive subject is not known. The impulses of his African consciousness reach full consummation and, with Amo’s increased intellectual exposure, new strands of philosophy begin to be woven into his thought. After this episode, the social activist streak becomes difficult to discern in Amo.162

A Professional Philosopher: Amo’s academic career

From 1729, then, following Amo’s departure from Halle, and possessed with the qualification of Candidate in Law, his academic life as a student and later as a Privatdozent becomes highlighted by fairly frequent moves across German universities. He moves from Halle to Wittenberg, back to Halle, then to Jena – all in the space of about eight years. In is here suggested that when juxtaposed against the backdrop of Amo’s historical academic context, these biographical pieces reveal a lot about Amo the philosopher. Thus, building on the characterizations of the various intellectual impulses in Amo, the foregoing treatment will seek to fill more details of this portrait of Amo as an academic philosopher. To proceed, a sketch of the general academic philosophical background that was most defining of philosophers’ career dynamics in the 1720s and 30s is in order.

The Wolffian Conflicts in German Institutions

One of the most defining intellectual moments in eighteenth-century Europe was the series of Wolffian controversies (1723-1740) that erupted in Halle and rapidly spread across German institutions and around Europe. These Wolffian controversies, it has been suggested, largely define the philosophical contours of the first half of eighteenth-century

162 As to the unavailability (if not disappearance) of this thesis, Mugnol strongly suspects foul play from those who felt threatened by the potency of its line of argument. Mugnol, Amo Afer: Un Noir, professeur d’université en Allemagne, 46-7.
German academic scene and, for the entire century, is arguably second in importance only to the French Revolution.\textsuperscript{163}

When Christian Wolff joined the Faculty of Mathematics at Halle in 1706, he came with much enthusiasm at the prospect of introducing young minds to his project of a new scientific method based on mathematical demonstration; a standard \textit{Wissenschaftlichkeit} not based on a teacher’s moral example or authority, but on rational proof applied universally in investigating truth.\textsuperscript{164} In his \textit{Vernünftige Gedanken von den Kräften des meschlichen Verstandes} (popularly, “German Logic”) 1712, Wolff laid the theoretical groundwork for how the mathematical sciences are to serve as the epistemic foundations for all other disciplines. He complained about the “blindness” of German youth owing to the ignorance of their masters in teaching the fundamental sciences. Wolff thus presented his method as the instrument required to bring enlightenment to darkness, and conceived his task as rescuing German students.\textsuperscript{165} The rationalism systematized in this work was followed in the same vein by many other textbooks in metaphysics, psychology, and logic.

As expected, Wolff’s rationalism and his attempt to raise the powers of the human understanding primarily through scientific method and reason, and not through the cultivation of moral virtues and spiritual regeneration, immediately drew much opposition from Pietist theologians at Halle and elsewhere, notably Joachim Lange.\textsuperscript{166} In 1721, after Wolff’s one-year Pro-rectorship of Halle, he delivered a grand speech (\textit{Prorectoratsrede}) exalting the practical philosophy of Confucius and the Chinese, and its value in developing a virtuous society, independently of Christianity – \textit{Oratio de

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\item[\textsuperscript{163}] Israel, \textit{Radical Enlightenment}, 544, sees it as so defining as to be (arguably) the most important “cultural encounters” of the age of Enlightenment in Central Europe and the Baltics prior to the French Revolution.
\item[\textsuperscript{164}] Holloran, “Professors of Enlightenment at the University of Halle 1690-1730,” 216.
\item[\textsuperscript{165}] Wolff, \textit{German Logic}, 105 “Der mensch hat nichts vortreflichs von Gott empfangen, als seinen Verstand: den so bald er nur in demselben wird, so halb wird er entweder ein Kind, oder ärger als ein wildes Their, und ist also ungeschicket, Gott zu ehren und den Menschen zu dienen” (Referenced from Holloran, “Professors of Enlightenment at the University of Halle 1690-1730”, 212).
\item[\textsuperscript{166}] I depend considerably on Israel, \textit{Radical Enlightenment} for the broad overview of the ongoing paragraphs on the Wolffian controversies. See Holloran, “Professors of Enlightenment at the University of Halle 1690-1730,” esp. 184-219, for detailed historical account of the controversies.
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Sinarum philosophical practica. 167 This speech precipitated an avalanche of incriminations on Wolffian philosophy and publications. Lange charged Wolff with atheism. Wolffian psychology and metaphysics, too, were found dangerous, with the accusation that Wolff’s construal of two independently functioning body and soul made of man a “double machine.” 168 By detaching the soul from the motions of the body and accounting for their interaction through Leibniz’s pre-established harmony, as Wolff had done, Lange accused Wolff of creating a deterministic state of affairs, where a person’s actions with the body are not voluntarily decided, but mechanically predetermined, and thus devoid of moral content. 169 In 1723, a Pietist consortium from Halle’s theology and philosophy faculty consisting of Lange, Francke, Paul Anton (1661-1730) and J.H. Michaelis took their vexations over Wolff’s philosophy to Frederick Wilhelm I of Prussia (1688-1740). 170 The accusation of atheism, and ‘Spinozism’ was levied against the Wolffian system, resulting in intense controversies that brought Frederick Wilhelm I of Prussia, convinced of the harm of Wolff’s philosophy, to expel Wolff from his chair at Halle and from Prussia in 1723. 171 In the period following this incident, as eighteenth-century historian Brucker reports it, “almost every German university was inflamed with disputes, about liberty and necessity, and the names of Wolffians and anti-Wolffians reverberated everywhere.” 172 Anti-wolffian judgments were passed in at least nine

167 Joachim Lange, Christian Wolff, von Freiherr, Recueil de different pièces philosophiques, concernant le different renouvellè entre messieurs Joachim Lange, Dr. et Professeur en Theologie à Halle, et Christien Wolf, Dr. et Professeur à Marbourg, avec des avis aux lecteurs, contenant l’histoire de ce different, Ernst Christoph von Manteuffel (ed.) (Leipzig, 1737), 36. [The above-mentioned work is an early French translation of parts of the exchanges and debates between Lange and Wolff in the 1720s and 30s.]

168 Lange, “Court Exposé des Maximes de la Philosophie de Mr. Wolf” in Recueil de different pièces philosophiques, Ernst Christoph von Manteuffel (ed.) (Leipzig, 1737), 20. The subtitle of Lange’s accusations are summative of his critique of Wolff: “Qui sont prejudiciables à la religion naturelle, et à la révélation ou qui les détruisent même entièrement l’une et l’autre, en menant à l’athéisme par plusieurs detours, et sous de trompeuses apparances.”

169 Ibid.

170 Holloran, “Professors of Enlightenment at the University of Halle 1690-1730,” 333.


172 Israel, Radical Enlightenment, 547.
German universities in the decade of Wolff’s expulsion. In 1729, the use of Wolff’s textbooks, or the sympathetic discussion of his philosophy, both publicly and privately, were prohibited. Württemberg soon followed Prussia in banning anything Wolffian from its territories. The University of Jena was an anti-Wolffian stronghold well into the late 1730s. For twenty-five years (1705-1729), Pietist theology professor and friend of Lange, Johann Franz Buddeus (1667-1729), led the anti-Wolffian coalition. His publication Bedencken über die Wolffianische Philosophie (Halle, 1724), describing Wolffian philosophy as obviating human freewill and moral responsibility became a standard critique, and was decisive in the condemnation at Jena of Wolff and his followers in December 1725. Other professors at Jena such as theology professors and former students of Buddeus, Johann Jakob Syrbius (1674-1738) and Johann Georg Walch (1693-1775) joined in the anti-Wolff campaign. At the University of Wittenberg, even though there was no official ban on Leibnizian-Wolffian philosophy, there was a strong push against it, particularly from orthodox Lutheran theologian, Johann Georg Abicht (1672-1740), who in a number of treatises and disputations tried to counter Leibnizian-Wolffian philosophy of pre-established harmony between soul and body. Further tension continued against Leibnizian-Wolffian philosophy, resulting in further book bans in Berlin, and the muzzling of all Wolffian exponents. In the heated environment of the

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173 Ibid. 545.
174 Lewis, Early German Philosophy, 259.
176 Ibid.
178 Notably, Die übelgestimmte Harmonia Praestabillita (Leipzig, 1737); Praelectiones de creatione mundi, in quibus quaedam Leibnittii & aliorum opiniones examinantur (Wittenberg, 1738); Einige Mängel der Leibnizischen Philosophie, welche der Theologie zuwider sind (Leipzig, 1739). In 1729, for example, he presided over a disputation that argued a parallel between God’s ability, qua immaterialis, to move material substance by the exercise of his will, and similarly, the ability of the human soul, being similarly immaterial, to move its material body through the faculty of volitions, and affection by physical contact. Ioanni Friederico Rhanæo, Disputatio de Commercio Animae Corporis, Predi by Johann Georg Abicht in the Common Auditorium on 6th July 1729. Another one presided over at Wittenberg a year after Amo’s 1734 Humane Mentis Apatheia, took a broadly anti-Leibnizian position. Fridericus Nicolaus Ulrich, Disputatio Theologica de Animabus Humanis Post Mortem Corporis Vivis, Presieded by Ioannis Georgii Abicht in the Theology Auditorium on 26th September (Wittenberg, 1735).
179 Israel, Radical Enlightenment, 550-1.
later 1720s particularly, it became career-jeopardizing at best, and life-threatening at worst, to be known as a Wolffian in the academic system. Christian Gabriel Fischer (1686-1751) at the University of Königsberg, for example, known to have sympathized with, and lectured on Wolffianism, was denounced by Pietist colleague, Georg Friedrich Rogall (1701-1732) and, by royal order in 1725, given forty-eight hours to leave Prussia, on penalty of death by hanging.\textsuperscript{180} Wolffians in the university system simply lay low. Lange is reported to have celebrated triumphantly at the success of his campaigns: “Cecidit! Cecidit Philosophia Wolffiana et ariete Regia Majestatis percussa corruit.”\textsuperscript{181}

While, however, places like Halle, Jena, Rostock, Tübingen, Koenigsberg, and Wittenberg succeeded in suppressing Wolff’s philosophy through most of the 1720s into the early 30s, the numbers of Wolffian exponents grew, and with this a sense of solidarity between them. The comprehensive inventory of known Wolffian thinkers up till 1737, compiled by historian Carl Ludovici (1707-1778), already lists a hundred and seven prominent philosophers and thinkers.\textsuperscript{182} By the early 1730s a lot of traction in the anti-Wolffian campaign had been lost, owing partly to deaths of its prominent men,\textsuperscript{183} the increased attraction of international and local students to Wolffianism, and the revocation in 1734 of the Prussia ban on Wolff’s works and the teaching of his doctrines at its universities.\textsuperscript{184} Ludovici reckons the years 1736-7 to have marked the turning point for Wolffianism. As such, philosophers of Wolffian persuasion began to confidently exposit their doctrine. Decisive for the Wolffian cause was the open partisanship of the new King of Prussia, Friedrich II (1712-1786), with Wolffianism. In 1736, a commission was established to review the accusations of “atheism” and “Spinozism” brought by Lange, and to reassess Wolff’s defence. Its findings declared Wolffian philosophy not to be

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{181} Quoted in Holloran, “Professors of Enlightenment at the University of Halle 1690-1730,” 380 “Fallen! Fallen is the Wolffian philosophy and from the battering-ram of the royal majesty beaten apart.”
\item \textsuperscript{183} Buddeus died in 1729. Another key Pietist and anti-Wolffian figure along with Lange was Joachim Just Breithaupt (1691-1732), who died only three years after Buddeus.
\item \textsuperscript{184} Israel, \textit{Radical Enlightenment}, 551.
\end{itemize}
inimical to faith, thereby easing the intellectual atmosphere for Wolffians.  

Against the background of these Pietist-led oppositions to Wolffianism, the danger posed to its adherents, and the eventual triumph of Wolffian philosophy in Germany, Amo’s biographical details and philosophy can be better appreciated. If at all Amo was reckoned in his time to be Leibnizian-Wolffian, either in the content of his thought, or by his professional association, it should be expected that his academic career would be largely defined by these controversies, particularly in Prussia. Ludovici’s 1737 list of Wolffians reveals this to be the case. He lists Anton Amo not just as a Wolffian, but as “vornehmsten Vertreter der Wolffschen Philosophie,” (“one of the most important representatives of Christian Wolff’s philosophy”), and cites one of the works that decides Amo’s Wolffianism: his 1734 *Disputatio philosophica continens Ideam Distinctam eorum quae competent vel menti vel corpori nostro vivo et organico*, 1734. Although it may not be known for sure at what point Amo imbibed the philosophy, signs are already evident from his days in Halle. In this light, the further progress of Amo’s academic life reveals his association with Wolffian philosophy: both in the content of his works, and in the biographical data.

**Academic life: Ups and Downs**

**A. University of Wittenberg**

After Halle, Amo in 1730 matriculated into the University of Wittenberg, where four

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185 Manteuffel, *Recueil de different pièces philosophiques*, 5-6, 9. The commission of five consisted of – two Reformed, two Lutherans, and the affiliation of the fifth undeclared. The report concluded: “Ils ont satisfait, disent-ils, à l’ordre de S. M. [King of Prussia]; Ils ont soigneusement examiné non suelment le Court Exposé du Professeur Lange, et les erreurs dangereuses, qu’il impute au Professeur Wolf; Mais aussi la Réponse de ce Philosophe, et ceux de ses écrits, que l’autre a jugé à propos d’attaquer. Ils ne trouvent pas cependant , que ces écrits contiennent les erreurs et les sentimens athées que Lange prétend y avoir trouvés, et ils asseurent, que ce qu’ils en disent, est absolument impartial, conforme à leurs consciences, et tel qu’ils sont prêts à en soutenirs la Verité à la face de tout l’univers Chrétien, et à en répondre au Tout-Puissant, et au Roi leur Maitre.”


187 Ibid. §448, p. 361-62.
years later, under the supervision of Wittenberg professor of medicine and physics, Martin Gotthelff Löscher (c. 1680–1735), in April 1734 he defended an inaugural dissertation in medical philosophy, titled *Dissertatio inauguralis philosophica de Humane Mentis Απαϑεια* (On the Impassibility of the Human Mind). This dissertation is particularly insightful for the characterization of Amo’s philosophical thought. In it Amo presents a medical theory of the constitution of the human mind and body, and their interrelationship. He defends the thesis that the human mind is incapable of bodily sensation (απαϑεια), since for him, sensation is a purely material transaction between sense organs and objects through “contact” of surfaces, the “communication” of physical properties, and the “penetration” of constitutive parts. The mind’s immateriality precludes such interaction with body. Rather, he furthers a mechanist physiology in which the body is a biological mechanism – an organic body – that inherently possesses the property of “life,” independently of the soul or other vitalistic principle. The mind for its part is a simple substance, whose incorporeal nature is naturally impassible to the motions of the purely physical organic body. Both the dissertation’s thesis, and the authoritative sources marshaled in its support, represents Amo’s *parti pris* with the Cartesian-based Leibnizian-Wolffian “Mechanici,” against the vitalistic “Stahlianer,” as Gundling identified the dominant camps. Amo’s treatment takes clear sides in this debate whose positions had been clearly drawn out in exchanges between Leibniz and


Stahl from 1709-10, and published by Stahl as *Negotium Otiosum* (1720). Stahl’s explication of physiological and pathological phenomena relies on his concept of *organismus*, where the human is an irreducibly integrated psychosomatic whole. The motions of the physical body therefore relate directly to the passions and *voluntas* of the human heart (soul), and vice versa. The effects of the physical body do not reduce to the mechanisms of their material causes or composition. On the other hand, the position represented by Amo is precisely the one denounced by Lange as ultimately making material bodies autonomous, detaching the physical body from the spiritual influences of the regenerated soul (in the case of Christians), and ultimately from direct divine jurisdiction.

Under the prevailing intellectual climate, it would have been ill advised for Amo to pursue this decidedly counter-Pietist work in Halle or in Prussia as a whole. That he was able to present this work at Wittenberg in 1734 is initially quite unexpected, and might indicate two facts about the university. First, that the anti-Wolffian campaign in general was waning by 1734, as already reported, and so Wolffians could gradually rise. Even more, Lutheran Orthodoxy, of which Wittenberg was the bastion, and its theological doctrine of traducianism, conceivably may have been less inimical to Amo’s doctrine in which ‘life’ is construed independently of the soul, compared to the Pietist accounts of vitalism. As early as the second decade of the seventeenth century, Wittenberg’s medical faculty, under Daniel Sennert (1572-1637), had already started to innovate upon the

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193 The Christian doctrine that the soul is propagated along with the natural generation of the material body.
dominant Aristotelian theories forged by Philip Melanchthon (1497-1560). Sennert significantly nuanced Melanchthon’s hylomorphist account of soul-body union with a corpuscular conception of the origin of life. Organic bodies are composed of homogenous minima naturalia that spontaneously generate life, logically prior to the traduction of souls into them. By the time of Amo’s arrival at Wittenberg, his praeses Löescher had been an active influence at the faculty for nearly twenty years. With the exception of Jena, Wittenberg was presumably less anti-Wolffian in the early 1730s, as might be suggested by the arrival from Jena of known Wolffian student Friedrich Christian Baumeister (1709-1785) in the year of 1729/30, as Amo.

At this career height, only a month later, Amo exercised his newly achieved qualification. On the 29th of May 1734 he presided over a disputation of his own writing titled and delivered by one Johannes Theodosius Meiner (of whom no more is at yet known). The disputation, Disputatio philosophica continens Ideam distinctam, evidently builds upon the physiology and conception of mind laid out in the Humanae Apatheia Mentis, and focuses on a theory of the mind’s operation in cognition and sensation. In accordance with Ludovici’s assessment, it presents a Wolffian theory of mind. In this disputation, as shall be discussed at length in the coming chapters, Amo presents a philosophical psychology where the internal workings of the mind are conceived as the self-contained, self-determinative, self-effecting operations of an immaterial entity. The

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194 Melanchthon followed Aristotle’s hylomorphist definition of the he soul as the first entelechy of a human body having life potentially; the soul as essentially united with the body. More specifically, his appropriation of the general Aristotelian philosophy of the soul was for the theological purposes of discerning the faculties and powers of the soul and body, especially vis-à-vis salvation, morality, Christian discipline etc. He considered the soul and body under the rubric of “the whole man,” and emphasized the place of human anatomy in understanding the soul itself. See Lewis, Early German Philosophy, 103-110; Sachiko Kusukawa, The Transformation of Natural Philosophy: The Case of Philip Melanchthon, Ideas in Context (Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995), esp. 75-123.


196 Baumeister went on to become adjunct of the philosophy faculty in 1734, and became the greatest of Wolff commentators and expositors. “Baumeister, Friedrich Christian (1709-85),” Dictionary of 18th Century German Thinkers.
mind’s operations function synchronically with the material body, but independently of it. Amo directs this operational sovereignty of the mind, then, to explain the psychological phenomena of intellection and cognition, of volition, and of action.

B. Tragedy

Unfortunately, tragedy struck Amo’s personal life at the height of his academic rise. He suffered two losses that were of much consequence to his prospects as an academic philosopher. The first was the death, a few years earlier, of his benefactor and patron, Duke August Wilhelm, on 23 March 1731. The task of patronage and protection for Amo had been immediately taken up by Wilhelm’s brother and successor, Duke Ludwig Rudolph (1671 – 1735);197 but only four years after, the latter similarly passed away, living Amo devoid of all “paternae caritatis.”198 There is no record of any continuity of patronage for Amo from the court, particularly since Ludwig Rudolph had no male heir and was rather succeeded by a cousin.199

After these episodes, Amo found himself in financial straits, and had to use his training in the Arts, for the first time perhaps, primarily as a means of livelihood. He courts old philosophy friends, solicits teaching positions, and initiates catchy advertising ploys. Amo’s biography from this point on reveals both an ideological dynamic in the philosophical content of his thought, which has been explored so far, and a socio-economic dimension in the realities of an academic philosopher in eighteenth-century Germany. This latter perspective recognizes Amo historically as a professional within the guild of philosophers, and shall be briefly explored below.

198 Ibid. 21.
199 The House of Welf (official site) [Web:] http://welfen.de/LudRud.htm [Date of access: 14 August 2014]. Intriguingly, the cousin successor, Duke Ferdinand Albert II, died prematurely only six months later, exacerbating the already dwindling prospects of any financial or social support from the court for Amo.
C. Life as an academic philosopher in Germany

As an academic philosopher, a Master of Arts, Amo’s employment options were significantly limited.200 Academic teaching as a whole in eighteenth-century Europe was generally ill paid, with only few exceptions.201 Sources of a lecturer’s income included a combination of endowments, state funds, student fees or other financial streams. German institutions were particularly (in some cases exclusively) dependent on student fees, exposing teachers’ livelihoods to the vagaries of student numbers, and teachers’ individual ability to vie for students.202 With no aristocratic patronage, Amo’s academic career was beset by these portentous factors, coupled with rapidly dwindling student numbers per year through the century – an average of 290 per institution in Germany.203 Teachers within the faculty of arts were most faced with indigence, such that German poet, Goethe, described their plight as ‘hoffnungsloze Existenz’ (a hopeless existence).204 A university philosopher’s annual salary (within the arts faculty), it is reported, could thus vary between two to five times less those of other faculties.205 Amo’s status only as a Magister legens at Wittenberg, a dozent at Halle, and later Privatdozent at Jena, first mean that private tutoring and keen competition for dwindling student numbers remained his only option to supplement very meager stipends (or in some cases no stipends at all).

Based on the background of these prevailing circumstances, Amo’s life in academia, in the absence of patronage, can be better assessed. He returned to Halle around 1734/5.


201 Key determinants of a scholar’s financial income within the academic system included the universities’ economic situation, the city or state of their location, the prestige of a particular chair, a teacher’s fame and experience, student numbers, and the faculty in question. Vandermeersch, Teachers, 233.

202 Ibid. 233-4.


204 Ibid. 234.

205 Ibid. 234. It is reported that at Frankfurt-on-Oder in Prussia, the faculty of philosophy annual salaries ranged from 100 to 175 thalers in 1721, compared with 338 – 557, 200 – 500, and 100 – 300 thalers for theology, law, and medicine, respectively.
The intellectual climate at Halle had not necessarily returned to its founding *libertas philosophandi* ideals. For one, Lange, though somewhat marginalized, was still pushing further petitions against Wolffians. Amo’s move to Halle thus might have been primarily financially motivated, since that university offered much more favourable economic prospects: with its greater student numbers, reputable professors, and heavy state patronage, it enjoyed higher salaries.

Following a request to Halle for permission to give public lectures, Amo was granted the privilege on 21 July 1736 on the basis of his competence in philosophy and in its teaching, and because he was “a learned but poor man who had indeed only recently lost his most serene benefactor.” At Halle, Amo likely supervised the medical dissertation of Jewish student Moses Abraham Wolf, titled *Dissertatio inauguralis medica de morborum inconsulta ratione suppressorum revocatione*, 1737, defended on the 5th of October of that year. Appended to Wolf’s dissertation is a poem written and signed off by Amo as “Anton Wilhelm Amo, Von Guinea in Africa.” The poem itself suggests

206 Ernst Christoph von Manteuffel, “Intro,” *Recueil de different pièces philosophiques*.

207 Comparative records of staffing and salaries at German institutions from mid seventeenth to mid eighteenth century can be seen – with little change during the period. In the 1740s, a small German university, Rinteln, had on its payroll 13 professors (with salaries between 100 and 547 Reichstaler), a *fiscus academicus* (20 Rtl.), a *syndicus* (50 Rtl.), a manager (81 Rtl.), an *emonitor* (27 Rtl.), a *depositor* and a beadle (60 Rtl. each), a fencing master (100 Rtl.), a dance teacher, a printer, a gardener (50 Rtl. each), a bookbinder (25 Rtl.) and the dean of the Community residence (740 Rtl.). The University of Jena shows similar figures over the same period, while salary figures for University of Halle are roughly double these figures. (See Hilde De Ridder-Symoens, “Management and Resources,” in *A History of the University in Europe: Volume 2, Universities in Early Modern Europe (1500-1800)*, Walter Rüegg (ed.), (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 154–209, 175.

208 Notice of the retention of Amo as *Dozent* at the Faculty of Philosophy at Halle. See Abraham, “The Life and Times of Anton Wilhelm Amo,” 77.


210 The poem reads:

“Dein aufgeweckter Geist im klugen meditieren,
und unermüdter Geist im gründlichen Studieren
Hoch Edler, macht daß Du in der Gelehrten Orden
Ein Stern, ein Heller Stern, der ersten Größe worden,
Der immer heller wird in neuer Ehren Schein.
So einen großen Lohn gibt Weisheit ihren Söhnen,
Genung. Vom Himmel muß die Lust ungemeyn

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deference and amicability between Amo and Wolf, which in itself may also indicate Amo’s empathy with Wolf’s social challenges as a Jewish student in eighteenth-century Germany.\textsuperscript{211} In this episode, then, may be observed some continuity of the African consciousness motif of Amo’s student days into his professional life.

Amo further taught and wrote productively at Halle till 1739, and during this period, in 1738, released his biggest publication in 1738, \textit{Tractatus de arte sobrie et accurate philosophandi, academicis suis praelectionibus accomodatus; addita tractione succincta et diligenti de critica interpretatione, methodo, arte disputandi, alisique, quae in logicis tratuntur, rebus}, (Halle Magdeburg, 1738).\textsuperscript{212} It is a compendium on logic culled from his lectures, and of a similar genre to the well-known \textit{La logique ou l’art de penser} (Port-Royal Logic) 1662, by Antoine Arnauld (1612-1694) and Pierre Nicole (1625-1695). It covered topics relating to good argumentation, principles of deduction, the nature of propositions, introduction to metaphysics, and topics of ontology, \textit{inter alia}. In this work, Amo definitively validates every mention by his teachers regarding his competence in

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\textit{Dich und die Deinigen in Lauter Segen kröhen!}

\textit{Dieses setzt seinem Hochgelehrtesten Freunde}

\textit{Glückwünschend hinzu}

\textit{Anton Wilhelm Amo}

\textit{Von Guinea in Africa, der Philosophie und Freyen künste}

\textit{Magister legens.”}


\textsuperscript{212} “Treatise on the art of philosophizing wisely and accurately, adapted from his university lectures: with the addition of a concise and careful discussion on critical interpretation, method, the art of argumentation, and other things that are taught in Logic.”
philosophy. But even more, the work gives a sense of the breath of philosophical sub-disciplines mastered by Amo, and the wide scope of sources drawn on from the history of philosophy. In line with Kraus’ appraisal, Amo’s philosophical thought here reveals an ability to consolidate both and the ‘ancients’ and the ‘moderns.’ With regards to the moderns, Amo is reported during this period to have lectured a course entitled ‘De harmonia, seu Concordia rerum,’ a defense of Leibniz’s doctrine of pre-established harmony, and perhaps also lectured on Wolffian political philosophy.

D. University of Jena

For reasons yet unknown historically, Amo left Halle and was welcomed into the philosophy faculty at the University of Jena after his request for employment in a surviving letter of 27 June 1739. From his correspondence with the faculty, one of the contributing factors to his ready employment was their apparent prior knowledge of Amo, especially the head of department, Friedrich Andreas Hallbauer (1692-1750). This biographical episode, the last available record of Amo’s university life, gives a final perspective on Amo academic life by highlighting, it will be suggested, the Wolffian professional circles that he was readily recognized to be a part of.

If the push factors for Amo’s departure from Halle are not known, the pull factor to Jena can reasonably be conjectured. The University of Jena was a Wolffian stronghold, from the 1720s onwards. Three of those largely responsible for this were past students of

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213 Amo draws extensively from the Aristotelian corpus and the Peripatetic traditions. The Aristotelian works often cited include: Prior Analytics, Posterior Analytics, De Anima, and Topics. He draws on Epictetus (especially the Enchiridion) and Stoic philosophy; on Augustine; Thomas Aquinas’ Summa Theologiae and Commentary on Aristotle’s De Anima; Cicero, Scholastic philosophy in general; Philip Melanchthon; philosophers in the modern period: included Descartes and Leibniz (only one explicit mention); Christian Thomasius, among others.


215 Abraham, “The Life and Times of Anton Wilhelm Amo,” 78; Abraham reports this without quoting a source. The information may be called into question since at the time there was a ban by royal decree on the teaching of all Wolffian philosophy in Halle; hence it is unlikely (though not impossible) that a presumably favour-currying (at this time in his life) Amo would have been in a position to so blatantly defy the ban.

Wolff at Halle in the 1710s: Johann Peter Reusch (1691-1758), Heinrich Kohler (1685-1737), and Jakob Carpov (1699-1768). From the early 1720s they formed “a triad of modern *Magistri legentes,*” and achieved success energetically propagating Wolff and Leibniz’s philosophy at Jena. All three were involved with the philosophy faculty, with Reusch taking up the chair in metaphysics and logic in 1738. Faculty dean and professor of rhetoric and poetry, Hallbauer, had also studied philosophy under Christian Wolff at Halle. Yet another, Johann Ernst Schubert (1717-1774), whose teaching of philosophy at Wittenberg as Magister almost overlapped with Amo’s time there, was adjunct professor of philosophy at Jena (1741-1745), and was a recognized proponent of Wolffian philosophy. To attest to this dominance of Wolffianism at Jena, the young Baumeister, influential commentator of Leibniz and Wolff, who had been a Magister at Wittenberg in the same period as Amo, had been irredeemably converted to the new philosophy while at Jena. The pro-Pietist contingency at Jena consisting of the prolific Buddeus, Johann Jakob Syrbius (1674-1738) and famous Wolff critique, Johann Georg Walch (1693-1775), were by far out-numbered. With the concentration of Wolff and

217 Prantl, Carl von, “Reusch, Johann Peter”, in *Allgemeine Deutsche Biographie* (1889), S. 296 [Online version], [Web:] http://www.deutsche-biographie.de/pnd115536884.html?anchor=adb [Date of access: 11 Sept. 2014]. Heinrich Kohler, in particular, was key in the dissemination of Leibniz’s philosophy in Jena and Germany as a whole. He met Leibniz in 1712 in Vienna, and in 1720 translated into German Leibniz’s *Theodicée*, the *Correspondence between Leibniz and Clarke*, and the *Monadologie*. (See “Kohler, Heinrich” Dictionary of 18th Century German Thinkers).


219 Reusch replaced the influential pietist philosopher Johann Jakob Syrbius (taught, 1707-1738). Syrbius was good friend of Jena theology professor, Johann Franz Buddeus (taught, 1705-1729), close ally of Lange.


Leibnizian exponents at Jena, Amo’s attraction to the intellectual climate of the university is evident.

Amo wrote to Hallbauer requesting employment at Jena, and addressed the letter to “My Most Eminent and Outstanding Professors and Esteemed Supporters.” He went on to state the urgency of his need for the job, and seemingly expected that Hallbauer and the faculty would decide favourably on the request without much ado. That Amo’s request was considered somewhat presumptuous was indicated by one Lehmann, a faculty member, who immediately pointed out what he felt was Amo’s overriding of the official employment solicitation protocols:

If a person wants the slightest thing to be granted to him, he must go around to all of the members of our faculty, so that people can get to know him and see whether he is worthy of this benefit. But this Amo pretends to very much in vain, so that I am unable to learn about his circumstances.223

Besides these reservations, the rest of the philosophy faculty seemed not to need the official introduction to Amo that Lehmann insisted upon, and favourably granted the request on grounds that bespeak prior knowledge and, perhaps prior friendship with Amo:

(1) Amo in his early childhood he was taken from another part of the world; (2) he has turned from paganism to the Christian religion; (3) he has been entirely cut off and abandoned by his family and their associates, and thus (4) possesses nothing other than what he earns through his own industriousness.224

The question, therefore, begs to be answered: in the highly polarized partisan academic atmosphere of the period, why does a decidedly Wolffian faculty of philosophy so readily take on Amo into its ranks, except if Amo is recognized as one of their kind, or in the very least, sympathetic to the Wolffian cause? How does the faculty know so much about Amo’s personal life story, and is willing to help? With the available historical data, answers to these questions can only be inconclusive. However, a simple explanation would be that the philosopher from Africa was truly a recognized philosopher, of the Leibnizian-Wolffian variant, and that he possessed the necessary credentials to attest to this. By the time of Amo’s application, Ludovici’s Historie der Wolffischen Philosophie had been published (1738), Amo’s Humane Mentis Apatheia (1734), Ideam Distinctam

223 Justin Smith, “Documents Pertaining to the Hiring of Anton Wilhelm Amo at the University of Jena, 1739.”

224 Ibid.
(1734), and *Arte Sobrie Philosophandi* (1738) were all published. Further, a bit more speculatively, the past association of a significant part of the faculty with Amo’s alma mater, Halle, and directly with Wolff, might even suggest the presence of a sort of intellectual club of Wolffian philosophers, helping each other settle in the few available Wolffian strongholds in academia. It is hard to imagine that under circumstances where both Wolffians and anti-Wolffians were striving to consolidate their influence in faculties and in academic institutions at large, that Amo would have been accepted to Jena’s faculty, and quite enthusiastically at this, if he were of the opposite camp. Whatever the case, this biographical episode suggests that professionally, Amo was readily recognized as a Wolffian philosopher, and that this recognition would not be without evidence in his work.

**The Last Academic Stint**

Whatever the case, the move to Jena was momentous for his career. As the *Privatdozent* that he had become, he was formally welcomed into the guild of professional academic philosophers, and was on track towards a full-time position. However, such prospects would only be realized on condition of the demonstration of excellent research abilities, but more importantly in Germany, by acclaim and popularity in teaching. That year, therefore, Amo announced the teaching of his first course at Jena for a triple session on 17 July 1739 – 8 A.M., Noon, and 2 P.M. – 3 P.M. The course was to consist in:

| Physiognomy, parts of the more elegant and curious philosophy; chiromancy; geomancy, commonly known as the art of divination; purely natural astrology, which is opposed to cryptography, the art of deciphering (also called Dechiffrirkunst); cutting and rejecting all the common and superstitious traditions of the ancients, and to those things that are the less commended by their ambiguity: I will be covering these topics clearly, |

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225 The academic role of *Privatdozent* is particularly a German one, and might be roughly equivalent to an assistant professor today. It was not salaried by the university; teachers lived off the pittances received as student fees. (It only became remunerated in Germany in 1939.) However, it gave upcoming scholars – after the third cycle degrees, and their habilitation – the much-needed opportunity to hone their academic skills, and formally be eligible for potential consideration for full-time positions. See Jeremy Bernstein, *Albert Einstein: And the Frontiers of Physics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 91; Jonathan Harwood, *Styles of Scientific Thought: The German Genetics Community, 1900-1933* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993), 168.
solidly, and exhaustively over the course of the whole term, with diligent application, in the aim of more prudently fostering life in the political state.\textsuperscript{226}

Consistent with his characteristic sobriquet, the philosopher from Africa signed off on the advertisement with: “Anton Guil. Amo Afer, Mag. Ph. Legens.”

The announcement is limited in conveying the exact content of the course Amo proposed to teach. It is not clear exactly what position he was taking on the exotic arts (\textit{elegantioris et curiosae}) – whether an outright or qualified endorsement, or (perhaps less likely) a refutation; and of course, room must be made for the tradeoffs in precision expected of an advertising jingle. However, given Amo’s exposure to ancient philosophy, and the influences of Stoic thought, the exotic elements of this announcement do not strike as overly surprising. In fact, this episode rather serves as a check against magnifying his mechanist and Leibniz-Wolffian portraits in disproportion to other aspects of his thought. This may be taken further by asking the question: Why is Amo given the job of teaching the exotic sciences? Is it possible that his African roots have qualified him above others for this position?

In response to these, the practical circumstantial context must not be overlooked. Amo’s advertisement is evidently aimed at attracting better student numbers in light of the keen competition and the direct dependence of teachers’ livelihoods on these numbers. Further, foreseably, there might have been potential conflict of disciplinary specialization between Amo and Reusch – since Amo, like Reusch, ordinarily taught metaphysics and logic (by eighteenth-century definitions) – ontology, philosophical psychology and physiology, etc.\textsuperscript{227 228} There is a possibility that Amo shifted (even if


\textsuperscript{227} “Logic” as understood by Amo covers a broad sub-disciplinary spectrum within philosophy. Amo provides a taxonomy of sub-disciplines within “speculative philosophy”: ontology, physic, pneumatology, logic, and ethics. Logic he defines as the intellect’s action in investigating things in themselves, their existence, origin and essence.
temporarily) from teaching the traditional courses simply to avoid competition for students with Reusch.\(^{229}\) Another possibility for Amo’s teaching of the exotic sciences might rightly be that he was the only one with such qualification, and this qualification might owe to an inclination to investigate the recondite aspects of philosophy, being African.\(^{230}\) The strong indication of this is that in the last days of his life in Africa, Amo would be found, as Gallandat would later report, practicing as a “soothsayer,” and “learned in astrology and astronomy.”\(^{231}\)

Granted the inconclusive nature of these issues, perhaps this announcement gives occasion to reemphasize a point already indicated about Amo’s philosophy. From all indications, the intellectual influences and philosophical streams from which Amo’s thought is resourced are very diverse, and are not necessarily independently consistent with each other. For example the philosophical project of Christian Thomasius and its aversion to metaphysics, is not very consistent with the metaphysics-intensive Wolffian project; yet there is ample evidence for Amo’s drawing on both. This is also the case with his often use of paradigms of modern philosophy alongside those from ancient philosophy. These all should suggest that Amo does not appropriate any one philosophy wholesale. Even the recognition of his “Leibniz-Wolffianism,” as overwhelming as that influence is, requires further qualification as to what aspects of that system have been adopted, and how (if applicable) they may have been modified. Amo’s approach to philosophy may perhaps be better captured by the method of “eclecticism,” a designation

\(^{228}\) Reusch, only assuming the chair of metaphysics and logic a year before Amo’s arrival (after over twenty years at Jena), indicates in the employment correspondences, that Amo might be coming within his philosophical sub-discipline: “I would very much like to allow him into my profession and discipline, if the Much-Honored Faculty has no misgivings” (emphasis added) (Justin Smith, “Documents Pertaining to the Hiring of Anton Wilhelm Amo at the University of Jena, 1739”).

\(^{229}\) As was the case at Halle, much was done to minimize conflicts of academic interests among professors and lecturers. This just might be one of such. See Holloran, “Professors of Enlightenment at the University of Halle 1690-1730,” esp. 125-183.

\(^{230}\) Of course, being “African” does not automatically translate into a predisposition to magic and the supernatural, and no facile equation must be made; this, especially given Amo’s entirely Western education. However, given Amo’s consistent identification with the land of his birth, it should not be much of a leap to infer that in important ways, he might have sought to identify with its customs as well.

to be used advisedly. An eclectic philosophical approach, as Amo defines it in contrast to a “sectarian” one, is:

Where, using sure principles that have been clearly established according to the rules of orthodox philosophy, we investigate things without using the positions advanced by others – positions that often have not been amply demonstrated or proven. 232

It requires an individual’s ability to discern what philosophies (or parts) are established on certain principles, from available options; but it also requires personal and independent contemplation of the matter under investigation. Such all-rounding academic dexterity may attest to the scope of Amo’s philosophical expertise, further underscoring Rector Kraus’ assessment: “he was at home in explaining philosophy […] commenting on the positions of the ancients, as well as of the moderns.” 233

Last days in Germany

After this episode, little else is known of Amo’s life in Germany. Presumably he continued at the University of Jena, for which there are so far no records of his progress there. From available data (or lack thereof), his academic pen becomes silent after the publication of his Tractatus. There is no concrete evidence for his embarking on another career, although this has been suggested. 234 As a result of the increasingly rationalist, anti-superstition context of the German university and society in the 1740s – and this precisely as a result of Thomasius’s and Wolff’s influences – if Amo continued teaching the topics earlier advertised, it is imaginable that eking out a living from the potentially

232 Adapted Amo, De humanae mentis apatheia; Tractatus de arte sobrie et accurate philosophandi: textes originaux, 56 (my translation)
233 Amo, Humane Mentis Apatheia, 21.
234 There is a report that in the 1740s, after teaching at Jena, Amo became a counselor to the King in Berlin. This data is first (as far as I know) recorded by Blumenbach’s 1787 article, (“Einige naturhistorische Bemerkungen bey Gelegenheit einer Schweizerreise. Von den Negern,” in Magazin für das Neueste aus der Physik und der Naturgeschichte. 4(3): 9-11), and given currency by Grégoire’s, De la Littérature des Nègres, 198-202. Blumenbach’s own source for this report is not given, neither has there been any corroboration for it. Interestingly, however, in Blumenbach’s later 1790 Contribution to Natural History, of which his chapter, “The Negro” is an obvious reworking of his earlier “Von den Negern,” the detail of Amo’s earlier supposed Berlin counsellorship is excised, while every other detail is retained almost verbatim. Blumenbach has corrected himself, and so this detail should be provisionally discounted till there is concrete evidence for the claim. See Johann F. Blumenbach, Anthropological Treatises, trans. Thomas Bendyshe (London: Longman, 1865), 311.
dismal prospects of student numbers would have been truly challenging. Besides this, in the absence of patronage, it is difficult to know if Amo had any real prospects of bettering his professional situation, to start with. It should not be overlooked that Reusch held the chair of Logic and Metaphysics (Amo’s domain) till 1755, and that from 1741, there was likely a candidate ahead of Amo for full professorship in the person of the adjunct professor, Schubert.  

If Amo were indeed faced with major professional and financial hardship, then his response may well be the serene acceptance of life’s vicissitudes in hope of their ultimate purpose, typical of the Stoic philosophy of Epictetus with which he identifies. His very last known written record while at Jena indicates just such a philosophy of life. Amo signed, on 5th May 1740, a book for his friend, Gottfried Achenwall (1719-68), with a quotation from Epictetus: “Necessitati qui se accommodat sapit, estque rerum Divinarum consius…” [He who can accommodate himself to necessity is wise and has an inkling of things divine. These words Anthony William Amo […] has put down in memory of himself.] That philosophy of accommodation may have been lived out practically as well, for a few years later, in a drastic turn of events, Amo is known to have abandoned the academic establishment and the European cultural milieu of Germany, and returned to his native Africa.

As is recorded in Gallandat’s journal, Amo was paid a visit in Chama, Gold Coast, by the ship’s doctor in 1753. As the latter reported, the “Heer Anthonius Guilielmus Amo” is said to have returned following the death of his master, located his family (his father and sister), and plied his trade as an astrologer, soothsayer and “groot Wysgeer,” living as a recluse in a fortress of the West Indian St. Sebastian Company, four days journey from his relatives. The precise circumstances around this return to Gold Coast


236 Brentjes, Anton Wilhelm Amo: der schwarze Philosoph in Halle, 67. Brentjes’ research shows that this note was Amo’s last in Germany. Also, Abraham, “The Life and Times of Anton Wilhelm Amo,” 79.

remain unclear. Gallandat’s report indicates that Amo’s return occurred “some time later, after his master died.” Conjecture has been rife about the identity of this master. Most biographers have, along with William Abraham, identified Amo’s first praeses at Halle, Johann Peter von Ludewig, who died in 1743. Perhaps other academic mentors to Amo might be considered: Friedrich Hoffmann (1660-1742) and Justo Hennings Boehmer (1674-1749).238 Even more, Amo’s crisis may owe to the deaths of not one, but two of his masters – Ludewig and Hoffmann – at about the same period, and might have been an insurmountable loss for him to bear, worsening his already dire professional outlook in Germany. Another incident has been put forward to his disillusionment and radical decision to leave Germany for Africa: the mention of his name in a satirical poem by one Johann Ernst Philippi in 1747, in which the author portrays Amo expressing amorous intentions to a brunette named Astrine, with the latter rejecting the lovelorn Amo on the account that she cannot love a “Moor.”239 The supposed implied racial slur in the poem’s verses, biographers have suggested, was the ultimate culmination of Amo’s frustration, and the most determinative cause for his return to Africa circa 1748.240 The details of the poem itself may reveal otherwise, falling short of the alleged racial innuendos, much less

238 Boehmer was, like Ludewig, a councilor to the King of Prussia. There is an indication of close friendship to Amo, for Amo’s Tractatus de Arte Sobrie Philosophandi is dedicated to three people among which is Boehmer, who is described as “my master and protector” (patrono meo pie colendo) The other, Hoffman, is called “my honourable and great protector” (maeentati meo honoratissimo protectore magnifice). The third is Ludewig, whom Amo refers to as “my teacher and inestimable patron” (praeceptori ac patrono meo incomparabili).

239 Johann Ernst Philippi, Belustigende Poetische Schaubühne, und auf derselben I. Ein Poßirlicher Student, Haß Dümchen aus Norden, nebst Zwölff seiner lustigen Cameraden. II. Die Academische Scheijnjungfer, als ein Muster aller Cocketten. III. Herrn M. Amo, eines gelehrten Mohren, galanter Liebes-Antrag an eine schöne Brünette, Madem. Astrine. IV. Der Mademoiselle Astrine, Parodische Antwort auf solchen Antrag eines verliebten Mohren. Cöthen, in der Cörnerischen Buchhandlung, 1747. See Justin Smith, “Philippi’s Poem about Amo, 1747” (2012) [Web:] http://www.theamoproject.org/amo-biography/ [Date of access: 30 July 2014]. Also available here is a transcription of the third and fourth sections (in German) of the third and fourth sections of the four-part poem (Amo’s and Astrine’s parts, respectively).

the capacity to provide sufficient reason for such a momentous counterpoint in Amo’s life, as some others have recently suggested.\(^\text{241}\)

But more importantly, new biographical evidence indicates that Amo had left Germany before the 1747 date of the poem’s publication. Mabe reports records at the “Dutch National Archives in The Hague” that specify Amo’s departure from Germany on 20\(^{\text{th}}\) December 1746 upon the Dutch-West Indian Company ship, Catharina Galey.\(^\text{242}\) If this piece of information is correct, the question still remains to be answered: even given Amo’s hardship and struggle in Germany, why do these culminate specifically in his return to Africa – a land he had left while only about four years old? Even more, how was he able to locate his family in a distant land, which he ordinarily would have known practically nothing about? Tentative answers to these questions might help conclude the portrait of Amo’s African consciousness painted so far. With the various snapshots of his attachment to his native land observed consistently throughout his life and career, it is only natural for these strong sentiments to have materialized into a longing to ultimately return to Africa; and likely accompanying this longing, was a sense of mission and duty in his ability to be an agent of enlightenment among his own people, as he had sought to do in his early university days. Further, could Amo’s return to Africa, and his work as a sort of sage-philosopher be indicative of a conscious reenactment of the life of his Stoic hero, Epictetus? Could it be that the biographical affinities between Epictetus and Amo, the former’s return to his own homeland to found a sage school, coupled with Amo’s known belief in, and acquiescence to the underlying purposiveness of fate, have played some determinative role in Amo’s own return?\(^\text{243}\) While not too much can be conjectured on Amo’s last days owing to the lack of surviving data, the episode of his return to the Gold Coast, and the vocation he took on conclude the portrait of his strong and enduring African consciousness, along with the strands of influence from ancient philosophy.

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\(^\text{241}\) Among those who have investigated the poem in detail, Justin Smith is not totally convinced of the alleged racism of the poem, nor of its ability to account for Amo’s sudden departure from Germany.

\(^\text{242}\) Mabe, *Anton Wilhelm Amo: The Intercultural Background of His Philosophy*, 21. Mabe reports this record in a footnote: “According to the report of the Dutch National Archives in the The Hague, Amo sailed in a ship named Catharina Galey. The Director of the port at the Gold Coast was even said to have confirmed his arrival on 7. 4. 1747.” However, Mabe provides not further specification on the document for this piece of information.

\(^\text{243}\) See section ‘Portrait of early years’ above.
Conclusion

It is now possible to conclude the objectives of this chapter within the larger project of the thesis: the former, viz., to provide a fuller biographical portrait of Amo the philosopher from Africa in Germany by an integration of biography and philosophy, sketching the historical-intellectual matrix that both framed his philosophical development and to which he made contribution; the latter, viz., the identification of important strands and influences on his philosophical thought in view of a better appreciation of the relatively unknown eighteenth-century African-German philosopher, and a more informed interpretation of his philosophical psychology.

Amo’s intellectual life as a whole is shown to be a multi-dimensional portrait. In his earlier intellectual formation, the dominant strands are seen to consist of a strong patriotic African consciousness, and the influence of Stoic and other ancient philosophical literature. These trajectories, it has been shown, are birthed in the early years but find consistent expression throughout Amo’s life and career. From his university years in particular, another dimension of the portrait, and more dominant than all others, is seen in the African philosopher’s deep rootedness in the rich philosophical context of the first half of eighteenth-century Germany, particularly its academic professional streams. Within this context, the weight of Amo’s intellectual sympathies lies with the Enlightenment projects of some of Halle’s prominent professors, and a general mechanistic orientation to the world and to physiology. More precisely, Amo’s philosophical thought is shown to be Leibnizian-Wolffian in orientation. Yet, Amo eludes any clean and definitive classification. Important caveats surface at every such turn. For example, his mechanism is far removed from the impulses of materialism and rabid anti-Aristotelianism/Scholasticism observed in the second half of the seventeenth century. Amo’s appropriation of the mechanistic philosophy is akin to Leibniz’s in that its explanatory power is restricted to the phenomena of physical quantities. As such the immaterial, and the concerns of metaphysics would occupy an important place in his philosophy. Amo’s thought therefore circumscribes a number of perspectives spanning ancient to early modern thought, and held together by the dynamic, and critical eclecticism embodied by his one of his earliest professors, Christian Thomasius. That
eclectic project may explain the breath of Amo’s philosophical sources, and his ease in navigating between otherwise incompatible sources and authors. In this regard, he is confirmed as a legitimate actor within the philosophical economy of his time. In response to David Hume’s obloquy earlier, Amo, standing consciously in proxy for generations of Africans, represents an eighteenth-century rebuttal of that narrative by showcasing formidable ability at speculation and subtlety of thought. All in all, the biographical episodes of his life are windows through which an inquirer may peer into more details of his philosophy. The African academic philosopher in eighteenth-century Germany is both revealed to be a product of his immediate context, and yet reaching beyond that context to tap into other philosophical and cultural sources that would find their expression in varying amplitudes within the specifics of his philosophy. It behooves the present investigation to explore the particulars of these influences on Amo’s philosophical psychology, and later on, their outworking within the text of his Disputatio.
CHAPTER 2
TRAJECTORIES IN AMO’S PHILOSOPHICAL PSYCHOLOGY

Introduction: A Clash of the Old and New

Ideas hardly ever evolve in isolation, but are often creative transactions between diverse intellectual voices, disparate and allied philosophical visions interacting complexly with other factors to create a thinker’s nexus of thought. When Amo wrote the Disputatio that was defended by Theodosius Meiner in 1734, both the thesis of that work and the philosophical registry on which its arguments would have been heard were conditioned by an intellectual context whose currents in large part originate in seventeenth-century Europe.

The Disputatio argued for a careful delineation between those things that belong either to the human mind or to the organic body. Working within a strongly dualist framework, the human being, Amo expounded, is a composite of two ontologically disparate substances — a mind (mens) and a body (corpori vivo et organico); yet both necessarily inhere together by a “very tight bond and commerce” (ab arctissimum cum corpore uniculum et commercium uid). Implied in the either-or syntax of the thesis title is the idea that the mind and the organic body have properties and operations that are exclusive to the ontology of each. A significant part of the philosophical foundations of Amo’s work here had been laid by his Humanae Apatheia Mentis dissertation, in which he had advanced a mechanical conception of the organic human body as an integral physiological system where the phenomenon of life, the organic functions of the body, and the reception and response to sensory stimuli could be fully explicated without appeal to any extrinsic principles of vitalism or animation. Also conceptualized was the human non-material aspect, mind, as being distinct from the body, and having exclusive operations that do not causally transact with bodily motions. Conceived thus, Amo immediately falls under the intellectual umbrella of the second half of the seventeenth
century following, and the debates around mind-body dualism (in)famously precipitated by Descartes. What account can be provided for how the mind and the body interrelate to yield the various complex psycho-physiological phenomena of human experience? To answer this and related questions, Amo presents a philosophical psychology in which the inner workings of psychic experience are probed and explicated as a series of mental operations (*mentis operatio*) that account for the human’s cognition, perception of the sensory world, moral judgment, and the interaction between mind and body.

On the intellectual historical front, Amo’s *Disputatio* is situated within the German academic context of the first four decades of the eighteenth century. As it has been sketched in chapter one, this context was dominated by the controversies between the philosophical impulses of the *Aufklärung*-leaning Wolffian rationalists, and the orthodox theological concerns of Halle Pietism. The period from the 1690s to the last decades of the eighteenth century are reckoned to constitute the *Aufklärung*, the era in Germany representing the most creative revolutions in thought – consisting in either the rejection of old systems, their modification, or the formulation of new syntheses. Following this, of contextual importance are the clashes between the theological anthropologies of Pietist doctrine and spirituality, on one hand, and the mechanistic anthropologies of the new philosophy, on the other. As was of central worry to the Halle Pietist theologian, Joachim Lange, any anthropology that fails to integrate the soul’s operations and passions with the physical body in a thoroughgoing way, or that does so only contingently and by ad hoc arrangements, becomes inadequate in accounting for the theological concerns of moral culpability, freewill, and holy-living.244

Amo’s *Disputatio* then is at the confluence of a number of important philosophical themes and traditions: the mechanistic physiologies that increasingly dominated natural philosophy from the seventeenth century into the eighteenth; the complex intellectual trajectories on the nature of the soul, its functions, and how it inheres the body; the diverse systems explicating the mind’s perception of extra-psychic reality; the role played by sensation and sense organs in the mind’s cognition; the competing theories accounting for the nature of causality operative between the immaterial mind and its material body,

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244 Joachim Lange, *Causa Dei et religionis naturalis adversus atheismum* (Halle, 1723); Ibid., *Modesta disquisitio novi philosophiae systematis de Deo, Mundo et homine* (Halle, 1723).
especially from post-Cartesian to Wolffian eras; and quite unexpectedly, the role of mental states and operations in theological-moral philosophy. The *Disputatio*, by far the most concise of Amo’s written works, very compactly weaves together these philosophical strands of Amo’s thought, strands that often are only elaborated elsewhere in Amo. Considered in this extended sense, the work brings into conversation the voices of several thinkers – from Aristotle to Aquinas, Epictetus to Melanchthon, modern rationalists from Descartes to Leibniz and Wolff, personages from Greek mythology, and the authority of Holy Scriptures. The bulk of the material to be surveyed may be organized around four distinct axes of philosophical concerns that converge in Amo’s *Disputatio*. These may can be more specifically identified.

The first relates to Amo’s conception of the human body as a self-contained organic structure consisting of integrated mechanical systems to which life and sentience are intrinsic. The trajectories of this mechanistic scheme are encapsulated by Descartes’ *Traité de l’Homme* (1633), among a plethora of other mechanist physiologies. A wider range of the available options to Amo in physiology is captured by influential voices such as the Dutch physiologist and chemist of Leiden, Herman Boerhaave (1669-1738),245 Halle mechanist and moderate Pietist, Friedrich Hoffmann (1660-1742), and most importantly, the controversies between Leibniz and Stahl over their positions on mechanistic and vitalistic organic principles. But of course, the mechanistic physiologies of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries were not philosophically isolated novelties, but evolve from older paradigms of thinking about bodies, among which the Aristotelian and Peripatetic hylomorphic accounts,246 Hippocratic animistic vitalism, and Galenic humoristic physiologies were dominant.

A second axis involves Amo’s philosophical psychology of the internal operations of the mind, and how it moves from perception to cognition to action. The intellectual background here is a variegated selection of psychologies dominated – up until prior to

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246 The soul as the form (Gr. μορφή, morphê) of the body (Gr. υλή, hylê). It follows from the Aristotelian matter-form metaphysics.
Descartes – by Aristotelian and Scholastic accounts of bodily perception by simple apprehension (*simplex apprehensio*) followed by a multi-staged process of the conversion of sensible objects (*species sensibilis*) to the mental objects of cognition (*species intelligibilis*). The other trajectory of influence on Amo in this regard springs, to a large extent, from the impetus of Descartes’ vision of the enterprise of psychology as a systematic introspection of the conscious *ego*, and the conceptual clarification of *ideas* held as mental objects of intuition. Specifically for the German context are the inventive cognitive theories of Leibniz and Wolff using the tools of *perception* and *apperception*, where, as a result, no efficient causal transaction is required between the mind and the body for its cognitive processes.

A third axis concerns the quest for an adequate philosophical anthropology robust enough to account for the ordinary experience of psychological and somatic functions as a unity, and as somewhat causally conjoined – in other words, an anthropology providing a philosophically viable account of mind and body interaction, especially with regard to the mind’s awareness of sensation and its movement of bodily parts by intention. To this end, three major options stand out in Amo’s time: the theories of *physical influx*, in which the soul and the body stand in a relationship of immediate and mutual causal efficacy, even though both are substantially heterogeneous; the *occasionalist solutions* to the mind-body problem proffered by later seventeenth-century Cartesians – Nicholas Malebranche (1638-1715), Arnold Geulincx (1624-69), and Louis de la Forge (1632-66) – where efficient causality between the soul and body is denied due to their ontological incompatibility, but affirmed is the role of God as the true efficient cause, bringing about harmonious modifications to either substance on occasion of the other; Leibniz’s *pre-established harmony*, exposited and modified by Halle’s Christian Wolff into a full blown philosophical psychology, synthesizing Leibniz and Thomas Aquinas – captured

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247 Leen Spruit, *Species Intelligibilis: From Perception to Knowledge*, 2 vols., Brill’s Studies in Intellectual History, (Leiden; New York: Brill, 1994). As far as I am aware, this is about the most exhaustive historical and philosophical surveys of the theories of perception and cognition available. It is particularly strong on the Scholastic and pre-Modern theories.

in his acclaimed 1719 textbook, *Vernünftige Gedanken von Gott, der Welt, der Seele des Menschen auch allen Dingen überhaupt.*

An adjunct fourth axis may be reckoned: physiological accounts of the vitalistic schools influenced preeminently by Pietist physiologist, Stahl. Here the problematic of soul-body causation is essentially moot because the soul is counted as the principle of animation of organic body, and thus is directly involved in all the biological processes of the body.

These four philosophical axes as sketched above, though somewhat scattered throughout Amo’s writings, are yet laced together by a simple logic, and the *Disputatio* roughly provides that structure. The conception of physiology (axis 1) adhered to by Amo delimits the range of options open to him regarding what philosophical psychological account (axis 2) he can proffer, and so psychology flows out of physiology, as it were. Naturally connected with the two foregoing are the philosophical strategies for accounting for their interaction (axis 3). Perhaps more peculiar to Amo’s German setting is the moral-theological dimension (axis 4) to these questions as essential to the account of mind provided. As will be shown below, even this moral category is informed in part by the Leibnizian-Wolffian partisanship, and of course, not least by the Halle Pietistic intellectual milieu.

From the portrait of Amo as philosopher painted in the previous chapter, the observed mosaic of intellectual sources of influence is not surprising, neither yet their historical expanse – straddling the ancient and the modern. However, by far the dominant paradigm among these themes is the family of mechanistic new philosophies that serve as the intellectual prism through which the others are filtered to Amo. The various philosophical themes of the foregoing paragraphs had long been discussed prior to the seventeenth century. However, particularly from Descartes onwards, the key *status quaestiones* were recast along lines of mechanism and a general antagonism to Scholastic

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249 “Rational thoughts on God, the world, the soul of man, and all thing in general”

250 ‘Adjunct’ because it was not usually listed among the available options of soul-body causal theories – particularly those identified by Leibniz and by Wolff. (More on this in the following sections.)

251 For example, should Amo subscribe to an Aristotelian hylomorphist physiology, his likely option in philosophical psychology would be the Scholastic paradigms of simple apprehension, and species doctrines.
metaphysical devices of substantial forms, powers \((vis)\) and entelechies in natural philosophy.\(^\text{252}\) It is evident that Amo came under this influence. Yet his own approach, as has been indicated, is never a wholesale reception of any one philosophical school or system – and, as will be discussed below, neither is this the case with his reception of mechanistic philosophy. The persistence in Amo’s thought of a strong influence from the broader history of philosophy means that any appraisal must reckon with a wide historical philosophical spectrum.

In the present chapter, the broad task set forth in chapter one – viz., the appreciation of Amo as a competent, creative philosopher whose thought is at the junction of multiple intellectual streams – will be furthered, but that task will here be given a different focus. Moving beyond the historical context in which the philosopher was shaped, to be explored here is the philosophy proper within the economy of Amo’s intellectual world. This broader category of “intellectual world” suggests that the consideration will not be limited only to the task of discerning direct philosophical “influences” on Amo by a textual comparative analysis of his used sources. Rather, the approach here will be to discuss, in reasonable detail, important voices relating to the philosophical axes of thought identified above. These philosophical themes are taken from the \textit{Disputatio}, even though their more detailed elucidation by Amo himself could be found in his \textit{Apatheia} and/or \textit{Arte Sobrie Philosophandi} (1738).

**Amo’s Status Quaestiones: a brief introduction**

The programmatic questions for investigating the soul in general (\textit{anima}) – what we refer to as philosophical psychology – were most systematically laid out by Aristotle, and

remain roughly the important threads of questioning by Amo’s time and beyond. 253 The questions follow: What is the nature of the soul – is it a homogeneous single substance, or an entity composed of parts? What are its essential properties: should the soul be investigated functionally (its operations), or through its faculties (its powers)? Can the soul per se experience the affections of the body? How can the soul and its functions be distinguished from the soul-body? Do the functions of the body in general involve the soul? Does the act of thinking in particular necessarily involve the body through the use of imagination and phantasm, or can the soul exist totally independently of the body? 254 Those questions kept philosophers occupied for many centuries after Aristotle, and received unprecedented impetus to foray into new directions after Descartes’ extensive works on the body, the mind (or sometimes, for Descartes, ‘soul’) and physics in the first half of the seventeenth century. By the 1730s, though the heyday of the Cartesian buzz had gone, philosophers were still reckoning with, in their various disciplines, the new state of affairs he had created. 255 One of these philosophers in eighteenth-century Germany was Amo, and his disagreement with Descartes sets the background to two of Amo’s written works – the Disputatio and the Apatheia.

The foil to the central arguments of the Disputatio is set up primarily by the famous correspondences between Descartes and Princess Elisabeth of Bohemia (1618–80) from May 1643 to 1649. Amo specifies that his project is a reaction to the theses of Descartes’ letters to the princess: “These things are said and defended against Descartes, and against his view in the Letters, Part I, Letter 29.” 256 In the Disputatio, Amo invokes the same critique to Descartes’ theses of the Letters: “these things are said and defended against those who are implicitly of a different opinion.” 257 Other philosophical positions

253 To be sure, the “philosophical psychology” and theory of soul to be found in Aristotle’s De anima defies the modern classifications of the psyche as conscious and intentional mental states. Aristotle’s work concerns the functions of living things in general, and the role of psuchê as the principle of all organic life, in general.

254 Aristotle, De anima, 402a11 – 403a2.


256 Apatheia, II: 13.

257 Disputatio, II, Mem. I; Also see, I, Intro.
contribute to Amo’s *status controversiae*, including: Jean Le Clerc’s (1657-1736) taxonomy of the mental faculties in which the faculty of sensing (*sentiendi facultas*) is conceived as a part of the mind.\(^{258}\)

Descartes’ correspondences with Princess Elisabeth revolve around her objections (or request for clarification) to the thesis of Descartes’ Sixth *Meditationes* (1641) with regard to how the mind comes to its cognition of material reality. After Descartes’ elaborate presentation of a dualist cosmology in his *Meditationes* consisting of the mind as a purely thinking thing, and the body a purely extended thing, he suggested that this mind does not arrive at its knowledge by pure intellection,\(^ {259}\) but might ‘feel pain’ and experience other bodily sensations:

> Nature teaches me, by these sensations of pain, hunger, thirst and so on, that I am not merely present in body as a sailor is present in a ship, but that I am very closely joined and, as it were, intermingled with it, so that I and the body form a unit. If this were not so, I, who am nothing but a thinking thing, would not feel pain when the body was hurt, but would perceive the damage purely by the intellect, just as a sailor perceives by sight if anything in his ship is broken.”\(^ {260}\)

Elisabeth, building upon mechanist the presuppositions that efficient causation requires impact and the communication of motion (*l’attouchement*) between involved bodies, finds the notion of an incorporeal mind’s ‘feeling’ (*patir*) of body sensation to be incoherent. Elisabeth brings to sharp focus the infamous dilemma of Descartes’ mind-body dualism: “How can the soul of a human, being but a thinking thing, be determinative of bodily spirits so as to result in voluntary actions?” She thus asks for more clarification: “*une definition de l’âme plus particulière qu’en votre Métaphysique.*”\(^ {261}\)

Descartes’ response was an ambivalent position between, on one hand, postulating a derivative third middle substance (metaphysical trialism) between the mind and the body – a mind-body *substance* imbued with its irreducibly psychophysiological properties,

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\(^{259}\) That is, by an abstract intellectual knowing of the facticity of a somatic event.

\(^{260}\) Descartes, *Sixth Meditation*, CSM 2: 56; AT VII: 81.

\(^{261}\) Correspondance CCCI, Elisabeth à Descartes, La Haye, 6/16 mai 1643, in AT, III: 660. For historical background and commentary on the correspondence, see helpful introduction in Lisa Shapiro, trans., *The Correspondence between Princess Elisabeth of Bohemia and René Descartes*, The Other Voice in Early Modern Europe (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007).
among which is the sensation of pain;\textsuperscript{262} and on the other hand, a maintenance of the original substance dualist scheme, but an identification of sensation as a \textit{mode} of the mind’s thought – i.e. a mode of the property of thinking and belonging to the substrate \textit{res cogitans}.\textsuperscript{263} In other words, the mind \textit{qua} united with body, has “special modes of thinking” (\textit{specialibus quibusdam modis cogitandi}) that include: doubting, understanding, affirming denying, willing, unwilling (\textit{dubitans, intelligens, affirmans, negans, volens, nolens}), and also imagining and having sensory perceptions (\textit{imaginans quoque et sentiens}).\textsuperscript{264} These modes are not properties of a third substance, but result from the “union” – new configurations of the \textit{essential properties} of the only two substances: thought and extension.\textsuperscript{265} As Descartes’ response to Elisabeth made clear, the \textit{union} of the mind and body generates new properties (\textit{notions primitives}) – such as the mind’s sensation of the body (\textit{patir}), and the mind’s ability to move the body (\textit{agir}) – that belong neither to mind nor to body individually. In these discussions, what was clear for Descartes was that some forms of experience are not resolvable to either psychological or physiological properties \textit{alone}, but belong to the union of mind and body.\textsuperscript{266} Thus he


\textsuperscript{264} Second \textit{Meditationes} AT, VII: 28; CSM II: 19.

\textsuperscript{265} To help elucidate this, we may appeal to Descartes’ explanation to Dutch Catholic theologian, Johannes Caterus, on a related issue from the \textit{Meditationes}. “If I consider a triangle inscribed in a square, with a view not to attributing to the square properties that belong only to the triangle, or attributing to the triangle properties that belong to the square, but with a view to examining only the properties which arise out of the conjunction of the two, then the nature of this composite will be just as true and immutable as the nature of the triangle alone or the square alone. And hence it will be quite in order to maintain that the square is not less than double the area of the triangle inscribed within it, and to affirm other similar properties that belong to the nature of this composite figure” (CSM II: 84; AT VI: 118).

\textsuperscript{266} Descartes reiterates this position in his \textit{Principia Philosophiae} (Part I, §48): “Perception, volition and all the modes both of perceiving and of willing are referred to thinking substance; while to extended substance belong size (that is, extension in length, breath and depth), shape, motion, position, divisibility of component parts and the like. But we also experience within ourselves certain other things which must not be referred either to the mind alone or to the body alone. These arise…from the close and intimate union of
insisted, that the mind, the pure *res cogitans*, being united to a body, does not perceive sensation by pure intellection – as a sailor in a boat. Rather, the mind, upon union with the body, suffers (*pati*) along with the body.

Amo interprets Descartes’ response to Elisabeth to support the second reading: viz., that united with the body, the mind itself suffers and acts with the body (i.e. sensation is a mode of thought). To this notion of a purely thinking mind being able to act and suffer with the body Amo reacts, quoting Descartes:

> There are two facts about the human soul on which depend all the knowledge we can have of its nature. The first is that it thinks, the second is that, being united to the body, it can act and acted upon along with it.

At the heart of the incompatibility of this state of affairs for Amo is the jeopardy of the understanding of the essential natures of body, on one hand, and mind on the other. Not only can the mind not ‘suffer’ (*pati*) and act (*agere*) with the body, but the concepts of suffering and acting are, for Amo, essential to the *organic living body* – and this entity for him is a sort of living machine. Moreover, from Amo and Elisabeth’s shared mechanistic presupposition of causation, to admit sensation and acting to mind is to imply the mind’s interaction with material reality by modifications of quantity and quality. Sensation, therefore, and life are synonymous concepts, and to ascribe sensation to the mind as Descartes does is, by extension, to construe a vitalist animistic physiology. Given the essentiality of sensation to the living organic body, then, Amo rejects any taxonomy of the mind’s faculties that includes sensation. Besides Descartes’,

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268 Details on Amo’s concept of the living organic body are treated in the next chapter.

269 *Apatheia*, Ch. II, Mem. I, “Patiet sentire in rebus vivis sunt synonyma. In rebus vero vira privatis sentire est; mutations aliunde venientes quoad quantitatem et qualitatem in se admirtere, i.e. aliunde modificari et determinari.”

270 *Apatheia*, Ch. II, Mem. I, §2 “As these things are so, it follows that it is not the mind, but the body, that admits of the principle of life together with the faculty of sensing.”
also rejected is Jean LeClerc’s seven-fold taxonomy of the mind’s faculties, which includes sensation:

(1) intellect (intellectus), (2) will (voluntas), (3) faculty of sensing (sentiendi facultas), (4) liberty (libertas), (5) imagination (phantasia), (6) memory (memoria), (7) disposition (habitus) from varied repeated actions. 271

However, it is not enough to reject sensation as a faculty of the mind. How can the experience of the material world be accounted for? Descartes was getting at something in his affirmation that some experience is irreducible to properties of either mind or body individually, and that the union generates new properties. Descartes does not go the direction of mental cognition of material reality by pure intellection, either. The union of mind and body, as it were, opens up another channel for mental cognition – i.e. through sensation. Amo concedes that the union of the mind and body necessitates that the mind act with the body it inheres “by the mediation of a mutual union.” 272 Yet, Amo insists, this concession of the body’s role in the mind’s acts must not mean the mind’s participation in the passions of the body – suffering with it. This being Amo’s position, the question at hand is: can an account of cognition be given, where the union of the mind and body is truly affirmed, the mediation of the body in the mind’s cognitive processes are truly established, and yet the mind is not reckoned to ‘suffer’ along with its body, or be affected by the causal mechanisms of the material body? Put differently, how can the mind come to true cognition of somatic states and, by the same token, influence bodily conditions, without thereby affirming the transference of material qualities from body to mind? These questions, set the stage for what Amo attempts to do in a sketchy way with his Disputatio. The three-fold operations of the mind that he presents – act of the intellect, act of the will, and the effective act – are meant to account for key phenomena of the mind qua properly united with an organic body. They account for the mind’s cognition or consciousness, for its intentionality vis-à-vis effective action with the body, and the moral or deliberative aspect of the mind’s intentionality.


272 Apatheia, Ch. II, Mem. I “Ad quae verba ita monemus et dissentimus; mentem cum corpore mediante mutua unione agere, concedeimus; sed cum corpore pati negamus.”
In order to proceed with this investigation, an important piece of the puzzle to be understood is the concept of the living organic body, for it is Amo’s conception here – his ascription of sensation to the essence of organic life, and its consequent preclusion from the mind – that sets him on a quest for a philosophical psychology of psycho-somatic ‘commerce’ without violating the ontological integrity of either mind or body. To the philosophical questions of the four axes attention will now be directed, commencing first with the intellectual context of the German Enlightenment which is the crucible for the ferment of these philosophical ingredients.

The German Enlightenment Setting

The historical period from about 1680 till the 1770s, from Leibniz to Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), were unparalleled years for the effulgence of philosophy in Germany. This period delimits a distinct intellectual movement in Germany known for its innovation in thought, and often referred to as Aufklärung or Frühaufklärung (for its earlier decades), among whose key players were Gottfried Leibniz, Christian Thomasius, Christian Wolff, Johann Gottsched (1700-66), Georg Lichtenberg (1742-99), Gotthold Lessing (1729-81), Moses Mendelsohn (1729-86), to name a few. The intellectual history of this period is fairly well documented. One of the important dynamics of the German Enlightenment was its being domiciled

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273 Martin Schönfeld has characterized the period as possibly the most vibrant time in the history of ideas since Plato’s Academy. Martin Schönfeld, “German Philosophy After Leibniz,” in A Companion to Early Modern Philosophy, Steven M. Nadler (ed.), Blackwell Companions to Philosophy 23 (Malden, Mass: Blackwell Pub, 2002), 545–61.


275 Schönfeld, German Philosophy After Leibniz, 546.
primarily within the university setup. With only a few exceptions, then, the significant developments in German Enlightenment philosophy lie with its university professors, many of whom were introduced in the previous chapter.

Concerning its philosophical significance, it is difficult, if not misguided to reduce the German Enlightenment into one intellectual program. In several respects, it is divergent from, though not discontinuous with well-known currents of the wider European enlightenments. Germany’s *Aufklärung* is not easily resolved into the currents of anticlericalism, atheism, social struggle, observable in France and England, for example. On the contrary, if Germany’s Enlightenment is seen broadly, as Beck proposes, in terms of the “greatest changes within Germany,” and reckoned from the 1680s onwards, defining hallmarks are revealed: first, the radical sweeping influences of seventeenth-century new mechanical science are not found in Germany to the same extent as other places; second, Germany’s Enlightenment occurred in tandem and in dialogue with Pietist religious revivals, unlike England where Methodist revivals were to occur after the Age of Reason; third, it lacked the kind of social and political base consisting of a mass dissatisfied intelligentsia to foment clamor towards republicanism, as was the case in France, for example. Germany’s revolution in thinking was in fact driven to a large extent by political absolutism. Rather than suggesting a sharp

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276 Beck, *Early German Philosophy*, 5-8. Beck comments on the dominance of German philosophy by university professors since the fourteenth century. To this end, seminal thinking, and the philosophical traditions out of Germany have been linked to their promulgating universities, and historically, entire universities were established to disseminate particular ideas: — e.g. nominalism at Heidelberg and Tübingen; realism at Cologne and Louvain; Lutheranism at Wittenberg, Jena, and Königsberg; Lutheran Pietism at Halle; secular Enlightenment at Götingen; anti-Wolffianism at Leipzig etc. Beck, *Early German Philosophy*, 5-8.

277 Notable exceptions are Gottfried Leibniz, Gotthold Ephraim Lessing, Arthur Schopenhauer (1788-1860), and a few others.


Beck argues that it is only after the 1740s that counterparts to Age-of-Reason exponents like Bacon, Hobbes, Descartes, Hume, and Montesquieu can be found in Germany – Beck, *Early German Philosophy*, 244.
discontinuity with the larger European Enlightenment, as Knudsen fears, the identification and appreciation for a distinct German *Aufklärung* and its influential players, *Aufklärer*, helps identify peculiar philosophical trajectories before the 1750s.

For all the varied ideological currents identified by intellectual historians as characterizing the *Aufklärung* – from Pietist doctrines of spiritual birth to Wolffian philosophy of conceptual self-clarification – there remains a recognized unifying programmatic theme, and it is found in the notion that developments in philosophy (as opposed to say, jurisprudence), and innovations in metaphysics specifically, were the driving force of enlightenment.\(^{280}\) In this vein, Norbert Hinske conceptualizes the *Aufklärung* as a body of fundamental philosophical ideas with an intellectual trajectory running through Leibniz, Wolff, and Kant, and a metaphysical project initiated and shaped by the triad.\(^{281}\) Three distinct ideas include: (1) a new doctrine, motivated by Cartesian rationalism, of the conceptual clarification of the phenomena of experience as the basis for the epistemic intelligibility of any discipline; (2) an emphasis on intellectual independence and judgment by enlightened minds (*Eklektik*, *Selbstdenken*, *Mündigkeit*); (3) a notion of intellectual and moral perfection.\(^{282}\)

This family of philosophical programs define in general some of the conscious agitation for change observed in Germany in the period – whether this came from the Wolffians philosophers and mathematicians, Thomasian jurists, Pietist theologians and educators, or medical theorists and physiologists. The broad landscape is characterized by multiple visions and projects of intellectual reform, in which philosophy was sooner or

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later to play a significant role. The four axes presented for investigation feed into this context – and in significant ways are themselves responsible for that intellectual state of affairs. Thus, within a general context of new philosophical and scientific discoveries, new ground of epistemic legitimization, and a need to reevaluate older doctrines in light of the new, Amo’s engagement with the various currents in philosophical psychology is situated.

**AXIS 1: Material Stuff and Organic Bodies**

**Aristotle to Descartes**

The detailed systematic investigation of the principles of living organisms and soul owes primarily to Aristotle. The perspective that informs his starting point in treating the soul is his interest in the phenomenon of life, and his desire to understand the principles of animation and vitalism in organic bodies. The first step in any philosophical psychology is physiology because, for Aristotle, the various faculties of the rational soul are only subsets of the same vital principle that differentiates living organisms from material inanimate bodies. As is broadly known of Aristotle’s metaphysics, he conceptualizes existing things within the categories of form and matter. The highest genus of all being (τὸν ὄντον), is substance (όσια), and living and non-living bodies are categorized in different species according to the specific difference of life. The substance of actual bodies is constituted of form and matter. Hence both living and non-living bodies are composites of these two.²⁸³ “Every natural body which has life is a

²⁸³ This would not be the place to present Aristotle’s complex substance metaphysics, something extensively treated in numerous sources and to which much controversy abounds regarding specifics of interpretation. A rather simplified presentation here will suffice for our purposes. *De anima* II.1, 412a15-16: “We are in the habit of recognizing, as one determinate kind of what is, substance, and that in several senses, (a) in the sense of matter or that which in itself is not ‘a this’, and (b) in the sense of form or essence, which is that precisely in virtue of which a thing is called ‘a this’, and thirdly (c) in the sense of that which is compounded of both (a) and (b). Now matter is potentiality, form actuality.” In making these qualifications, Aristotle is able to distinguish between the matter of which natural bodies are constituted, and the principle (form) that determines their specific nature (such-ness). Matter, to Aristotelian metaphysics, is pure potentiality and it is that which has not yet been individuated to any ‘this particular of such thing’. It is the form that provides the principle of this individuation. Also, a form, in a more general
substance, and so a substance in the sense of being composite." Thus, every actually existing individual thing (hoc aliquod) is a composite of indeterminate matter (hulê), and a determining form (morphê). The soul (psukhē or anima) is a form constituted of three powers that account for the vital functions of organisms – a vegetative, a sensitive, and a rational. The soul is “the primary actuality of a physical body capable of life;” or later simply, “the primary actuality of a physical bodily organism;” or yet, “the form of a natural body having life potentially.” There are two stages to this actuality: the first involves an organism’s possession of the capacity for something – e.g. animal’s capacity to sense; the second, the exercise of the capacity in question, following possession of the requisite organs and presence of external sufficient conditions. As actuality, the soul is therefore the “cause and principle” (aitia kai archê) of all the living capabilities of organisms. As such, the investigation of the soul proceeds methodologically, for Aristotle, by inquiring into the various functions of organisms – sensation, nutrition, growth, thinking etc. The principle or cause of vital functions in plant life is a vegetative soul; in non-human animal life, it is a vegetative and sensitive soul; human life possesses both the vegetative and sensitive, and in addition, a rational soul. He then puts forward a hylomorphic theory in which an actual living organism is a composite of indeterminate matter (the body) and a determining form (soul). Hence, the soul is the ‘first actuality’

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284 De Anima II.1, 412a15-16.
285 De Anima II.1, 412a15-16,20, 412b5.

286 De Anima 412b27 – 413a1.
287 De Anima II.2, 413a13-16.

288 Although it is the dominant position – the idea that Aristotle’s theory of the soul’s relation to the body is hylomorphist – it is not uncontested. Some texts in Aristotle seem to indicate an interactive dualist position. For an account of the various positions, see Stephen Menn, ‘Aristotle's Definition of Soul and the Programe of the De Anima’ Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, (2002) 22: 83–139, esp. 87-90. Menn himself proposes a “developmental solution” that sees Aristotle move from the position of an interactive dualist to his position in De Anima. This is not the place to engage at any length with the details of the theories of the soul in the Corpus Aristotelicum. For discussion, see Nussbaum, Martha Craven, and Amélie Rorty, Essays on Aristotle's De Anima, (Oxford [England]: Clarendon Press, 1992); M. Tweedale, ‘Aristotle’s Motionless Soul,’ Dialogue, 29 (1990), 123-32; Robert Heinaman, ‘Aristotle and the Mind-Body Problem,’ Phronesis, 37(1990), 83-102.
of a natural body. Metaphysically, this natural body can never actually exist without its form, the soul. Aristotle thus presents a theory in which all biological processes are to be accounted for in terms of the soul.289

Following the influence of Aristotelian philosophy in general, Aristotle’s hylomorphic theory of organic body also wielded much influence, even if in modified forms. Thomas Aquinas follows the same general Aristotelian scheme. The intellectual soul is the form of the matter of the body, and the soul as a whole is its principle of life – “the first thing by which a body lives.”290 All the vital actions (operum vitae) of the body thus owe to the soul. Aquinas has the nuance of consistently using the intellectual soul as the form of the body, not, like Aristotle, the soul as a whole.291 The intellect and the body are truly distinct from each other, and the former can subsist (after death) without the body. Yet Aquinas is careful to emphasize that like matter and form, the intellect and material body still constitute one essence (natura cuius essentia est una, composita ex materia et forma).292

Moving on from medieval times, particularly influential for the context of Lutheran Germany was the Reformer and ally of Martin Luther, Philipp Melanchthon (1497-1560), who had much to say on the topics of philosophical psychology. Melanchthon followed in the tradition of commentaries on Aristotle’s De anima, and though following the general Aristotelian hylomorphism, he nuances and puts that theory to distinctly new


290 ST, Ia, 76, 1, “Manifestum est autem quod primum quo corpus vivit, est anima. Et cum vita manifestetur secundum diversas operationes in diversis gradibus viventium, id quo primo operamur unumquodque horum operum vitae, est anima, anima enim est primum quo nutrimur, et sentimus, et movemur secundum locum; et similiter quo primo intelligimus.”

291 This can be explained by considering that Aquinas’ discussion of the intellectual soul is with reference to humans. In ST 75 he argues that the soul is subsistent – i.e. can exist independently without the operations of the body (after death, say). But the vegetative and sensitive souls necessarily include the body in their very concept. Only the intellective functions can do without body, and so are the form that actualizes bodily vital potencies.

292 ST Ia, 76, 1
purposes. From Melanchthon’s influential *Commentarius de anima* (1540), he defined the subject matter of philosophical psychology as embracing the faculties (*potentiae*) and powers (*vires*) of both the human soul and body, or ‘the whole nature of man’ (*tota natura hominis*). Like Aristotle, physiology is central and prior to the program of philosophical psychology. Aristotle’s was an investigation of the soul as a principle of life in all animated being in general. But in Melanchthon there is a more organic integration of physiology and psychology. He thus presents a philosophical anthropology inquiring into human nature as a whole. The body under this framework, then, is seen as a material piece of anatomy to be investigated scientifically by understanding its internal structural constitution and integration of organs. The body, for Melanchthon, expresses the powers of the soul, hence the former’s anatomy is important in knowing the soul itself. The body is also seen as the seat of human passions and appetites. Because of the

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293 One of the most important intellectual influences in Lutheranism and in Germany during and well after the Reformation was Melanchthon. As the humanist that he was, he was interested in reviving the wisdom of ancient classical learning as tools for developing theology (Lewis, *Early German Philosophy*, 101-105). It has often been pointed out that he is responsible for keeping Aristotelianism alive in German universities for at least two centuries, and mediated its synthesis with Lutheran theology (see, Georg Wieland, “The Reception and Interpretation of Aristotle’s Ethics,” in *The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy: From the Rediscovery of Aristotle to the Disintegration of Scholasticism, 1100-1600*, Norman Kretzmann, Anthony Kenny, and Jan Pinborg (eds.) (Cambridge [Cambridgeshire]; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 657–72.) Unlike Luther’s general suspicion of philosophy and rejection of Scholastic philosophy, generally, Melanchthon’s approach rather tended towards the eclectic appropriation of philosophy to the service of theology. Coupled with this approach to philosophy was Melanchthon’s extensive influence in the Lutheran universities of Germany, particularly in Wittenberg where he taught, so much so as to be called the *praecceptor Germaniae* (J. W. Richard, *Philipp Melanchthon, The Protestant Preceptor of Germany* (New York: Putnam, 1907)). To this end, filtered through Melanchthon are a number of philosophical influences to be found in Lutheran theology even in the eighteenth century. For example, it is reported that the influence of Melanchthon’s *Liber de anima* commentary as a textbook of psychology within German arts faculties reaches into the eighteenth century. (see Holzapfel, Wolfgang, and Georg Eckerdt. “Philipp Melanchthon’s Psychological Thinking Under the Influence of Humanism, Reformation and Empirical Orientation.” *Revista de Historia de La Psicologia* 20, no. 4 (1999): 5–34, p. 8.) In spite of this influence, the evident importance of philosophy to Melanchthon, and his attempts to appropriate Aristotelianism to different ends, yet significantly little work has been done on investigating the philosophy of Melanchthon. One exception is the recently published German work Günter Frank and Felix Mundt, (eds.), *Der Philosoph Melanchthon* (Berlin; Boston: De Gruyter, 2012). Sachiko Kusukawa, *The Transformation of Natural Philosophy: The Case of Philip Melanchthon*, Ideas in Context, (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995) still stands as one of the most detailed studies on Melanchthon’s philosophy (especially on philosophical psychology) in English.

294 “Nec vero locupletior, nec eruditor, nec dulcior ulla pars est *physices*, quam haec disputationes de Anima. Etsi enim substantia Animae non satis perspicui potest, tamen viam ad cius agnitionem monstrat. Itaque cum actionibus dicendum erit, potentiae ceu vires discernentur, descriptur organs, qua in re simul tota corporis, ac praecipue humani, natura explicantur. Itaque haec pars, non solum de anima, sed de tota natura hominis, inscribi debeat” (*Commentarius de Animae*, a1).

notion of *tota natura hominis* it is directly expressive of the soul’s desires. Any proper treatment of the soul (the rational soul) cannot be divorced from the body, which God skillfully crafted in ordered mechanisms. This philosophy is strongly influenced by Martin Luther’s teaching of the soul/spirit and the body as effectively a single entity known as human nature. This conceptualization of human nature as necessarily including the soul-body and body is one that would have a distinguished and lasting influence within the Lutheran-inspired treatments of philosophical psychology. Its influence on Amo’s philosophical world of thought will be pursued further later.

Under the Aristotelian-dominated hylomorphist conceptions of body, it is seen that the body is an organic something whose various properties and processes belong to the *materia* proper of that corporeal body. But these exist only as potentialities that are actuated by the soul. For none of the three thinkers briefly explored is the soul reducible to body, and vice versa. However, neither the soul nor the body can exist as an autonomous complete entity in any given living thing. Both entities are distinct, but independently, may be seen as ontologically unstable, until they inhere together as one essence. Amo’s own articulation of the organic body is certainly not drawn immediately from these hylomorphic theories. Even though to some extent (as will be shown in more detail in the next chapter) he endorses an Aristotelian-inspired metaphysic of substance and accidents, he does not explicate the soul (specifically mind) as the form of the matter of body. He decidedly follows another metaphysic on this note. However, Amo takes important cues from the hylomorphic theories by strongly affirming the union of the soul and body as one entity – not a contingent, but a somewhat essential union, and, to invoke the scholastic terminology, not an *ens per accidens*, but an *ens per se*. It must be admitted that these theories are much more nuanced and complex than this presentation provides, but for the present purposes this general framework should suffice. Now to be explored is

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296 Ibid. 13-14. See further treatment in Kusukawa, *Transformation of Natural Philosophy*, 75-123

297 “Et cum Deus tantum adhibuerit artis in fabricando humano corpore, voluit profecto, tam mirum opus conspicui, ut cogitaremus tam fabricatas et distributas machinas nequaquam casu ortas esse, sed esse mentem aeternam architectatricem” (*Commentarius de anima*, a3v). Compare Melanchthon’s idea of the body and God’s craftsmanship with Amo’s “Duae dantur partes essentiales hominis mens et corpus. De mente dictum est, ad corpus quod adtinet est: elegantissimum e diversis organisualibus et animalibus a creatore primum fabrefactum, et de hinc quoque per generationem propagatum” [It (the body) is most elegant, first crafted by the creator from diverse vital and animal organs, and thereafter propagated through generation] (*De Humane Mentis Apatheia*, ch. 1, § III, nota. 3).
the seventeenth-century revolution of mechanism that fundamentally transforms the foregoing paradigms of the organic body.

**Mechanism: Organic Bodies as Machines**

The rise of mechanist philosophies mark a watershed in how organic bodies are understood, and Descartes’ important role – though by no means singular – here in constructing a dualist metaphysics is significant. The intellectual world created by these new paradigms is the one to which Amo belongs, and the one he most immediately draws from. In the following paragraphs, these positions will be sketched as they relate to body.

The philosophical currents in the seventeenth century represented by the rise of the new mechanical philosophies, the study of nature as a system of universal laws applied homogeneously to particulars, and the dismantling of the hegemony of the older Aristotelian-Scholastic hylomorphic systems, all came irreversibly to define the contours of the intellectual history that Amo inherits in the eighteenth century. In his *The Origin of Forms and Qualities according to the Corpuscular Philosophy* (1666), avid proponent of the new mechanical philosophy, Robert Boyle (1627-91), outlined its key theses:

That then which I chiefly aime at, is to make Probable to you by Experiments…That allmost all sorts of Qualities, most of which have been by the Schooles either left Unexplicated, or Generally refer’d, to I know not what Incomprehensible Substantiall Formes, may be produced Mechanically, I mean by such Corporeall Agents, as do not appear, either to Work otherwise, then by vertue of the Motion, Size, Figure, and Contrivance of their own Parts (which attributes I call the Mechanicall Affections of Matter, because to Them men willingly Referre the various Operations of Mechanical Engines:) or to Produce the new Qualities exhibited by those Bodies, their Action changes, by any other way, then by changing the Texture, or Motion, or some other Mechanical Affection of the Body wrought upon.

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298 Yet the so-called ‘break with the old,’ as paradigm-shifting as they were, must never be construed so radically as so deny the continued currency of older philosophical systems in all kinds of complex configurations within the newer frameworks. More recent histories of philosophy, thus, have been nuancing the relationship between older and newer systems by increasingly tracing the continuity between modern philosophy and the Scholastic tradition. See Roger Ariew, “Descartes and Scholasticism: The intellectual background to Descartes’ thought,” in *The Cambridge Companion to Descartes*, John Cottingham (ed.) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 58-90; Roger Ariew and Alan Gabbey, “Body and the Physical World: The Scholastic Background,” in *The Cambridge History of Seventeenth-Century Philosophy*, ed. Daniel Garber and Michael Ayers (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 425–53; Daniel Garber, “Descartes, the Aristotelians and the revolution that did not happen in 1637,” *Monist* 71(1988), 471-486.

Boyle is emblematic of the general impulse towards mechanization of physical quantities.\textsuperscript{300} Others like Pierre Gassendi (1591-1655) revived an Epicurean corpuscular theory of atoms as the basic elements of reality.\textsuperscript{301} In the same vein, Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) in his \textit{Leviathan} (1651) and \textit{De Corpore} (1655) defended a completely materialist philosophy, where all phenomena can be reduced to the physical properties by which they are observed.\textsuperscript{302} Variation in precise conceptualizations granted, one central thesis of the mechanical philosophy was the world picture of reality as governed and universally regulated by laws of motion analyzable in terms of mathematical quantities and relations.\textsuperscript{303} Another was the development of a theory of matter and a cosmology conceived of in terms of a universal \textit{minima naturalia} – the homogeneous fundamental ‘building blocks’ of nature, consisting only in shape, size, and motion. Boyle again well describes it: “there is one Catholick or Universal Matter common to all Bodies, by which I mean a Substance Extended, divisible and impenetrable.”\textsuperscript{304} By far the most influential exponent was Descartes’ conscious attempt to replace the Aristotelian-Scholastic philosophies of powers and substantial forms with a mechanical account of the organic body as a complex machine.\textsuperscript{305}


\textsuperscript{304} Boyle, \textit{The Works of Robert Boyle}, V: 305.

\textsuperscript{305} Whether Descartes was successful at extricating himself from the Scholastic philosophical paradigms he sought to replace is a matter of considerable debate. For treatments of Descartes Scholastic background, see Roger Ariew, “Descartes and Scholasticism: The Intellectual Background to Descartes’ Thought,” in \textit{The Cambridge Companion to Descartes}, John Cottingham (ed.) (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 58–90; Etienne Gilson, \textit{Etudes sur le role de la pensée médiéval dans la formation du système cartésien}, (Paris: Vrin, 1975). The Aristotelian-Scholastic background was not the only one to which seventeenth-century mechanist philosophies reacted. There were also Platonist,
These new mechanical philosophies were not conceived to be isolated developments, but were designed to be new paradigms under which other intellectual questions would be tackled. Descartes thus, for example, extended his confidence in this mechanical program to the realms of physiology, contributing significantly to the revolutionary concept of *l’homme machine*. In his *Traité de L’homme* (1633) Descartes gives an indication of the explanatory scope of the new philosophy:

I should like you to consider, after this, all the functions I have ascribed to this machine – such as the digestion of food, the beating of the heart and arteries, the nourishment and growth of the limbs, respiration, waking and sleeping, the reception by the external sense organs of light, sounds, smells, tastes, heat and other such qualities… I should like you to consider that these functions follow from the mere arrangement of the machine’s organs every bit as naturally as the movements of a clock or other automaton follow from the arrangements of its counter-weights and wheels. In order to explain these functions, then, it is not necessary to conceive of this machine as having any vegetative or sensitive soul or other principle of movement and life, apart from its blood and its spirits, which are agitated by the heat of the fire burning continuously in its heart – a fire which has the same nature as all the fires that occur in inanimate bodies.  

Descartes’ explanation has the effect of expelling from accounts of the body’s biological processes, the Aristotelian vegetative, sensitive and rational levels of the soul, the Thomistic form of the material body (*intellectus*), and the Melanchthonian *tota natura hominis*, along with other accounts of vitality. As Descartes continues:

In order to explain these functions, then, it is not necessary to conceive of this machine as having any vegetative or sensitive soul or other principle of movement or life, apart from its blood and its spirits.

If the mechanistic philosophy generally rejects the soul as the principle of vitalism and animation in the organic body, how then does it account for biological processes? Are its principles of size, shape and motion and the *homme machine* sufficient to account for sentience? To answer this, Descartes’ physiology shall be taken as broadly representative of the mechanist program in this regard, and explored in some more detail.

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307 AT XI: 201-2; CSM 1:108.

308 There are significant caveats here: the spectrum of mechanist philosophy in general, and physiology in particular is broad. For one, Descartes is not a materialist like a mechanist such as Hobbes; Descartes is not an atomist like Boyle; also his mechanism is importantly distinct from that of, say, Leibniz. But there is an important sense in which these are all part of a similar project – viz., the idea that the
A Mechanist Physiology: A case study of Descartes

In his *Traité de l'Homme*, the second part of his *Le Monde* (1633),309 Descartes set out, as he described to his correspondent, Marin Mersenne (1588-1648), to give an account of “all the phenomena of nature” under the rubric of *la Physique*.310 Where previous physiologies appealed to forms and special incorporeal powers (*vis*) to account for life, Descartes’ attempt aimed to do this purely by physical mechanical laws, the same as those governing the heavenly bodies. His physiology was an extension of his mechanical philosophy of nature. To achieve this, he proposed to distinguish mind/soul from body, to give independent accounts of each (*à part*), then later, to account for their unity.311 Here Descartes gives a purely mechanistic physiology, equating body with any artificial machine:

I suppose the body to be nothing but a statue or machine made of earth, which God forms with the explicit intention of making it as much as possible like us. Thus God not only gives it externally the colours and shapes of all the parts of our bodies, but also places inside it all the parts required to make it walk, eat, breathe, and indeed to imitate all those of our functions which can be imagined to proceed from matter and to depend solely on the disposition of our organs.312

His program in physiology may be summarized by his aim “to give such a full account of the entire bodily machine that we will have no more reason to think that it is our soul which produces in it the movements which we know by experience are not controlled by our will than we have reason to think that there is a soul in a clock which makes it tell the time.”313 All the biological processes of the body are products of matter,314 and can be explained purely as the properties of their constituent matter.315

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309 Though written between 1629 and 1633, these works were only published posthumously in 1664, due to Descartes’ confessed fear after the Roman Inquisition’s condemnation of Galileo. AT XI: 1-215; CSM I: 79-99.

310 Letter to Mersenne, 13 November, 1629, AT I: 70.

311 Ibid. “Il faut que je vous décrive, premièrement, le corps à part, puis après l’âme aussi à part; & enfin, que je vous montre comment ces deux Natures doivent être jointes & unies, pour composer des homes qui nous ressemblent.”

312 *Traité de l’homme*, CSM I: 99; AT XI: 120.

Furthermore, as is well known, central to Descartes’ metaphysics, and his anthropology in particular, is the identification of two essential substances, or fundamental principles of nature: that which consists purely in thinking (*res cogitans*), the human mind; and that which consists purely in extension (*res extensa*), the body. These two establish, for Descartes’ anthropology and cosmology, two fundamental substances (*naturam sive essentia*). There is an intellectual substance (*substantia intelligente*) whose essence consists in the willful and conscious, intellectual act of thinking,316 and “another substance distinct from me” (*alia substantia me diversa*), a corporeal nature (*natura corporea*) that contains, “formally or eminently,” the objective reality of mental ideas.317

Biological bodies and their processes are seen to be complexly crafted and integrated mechanical systems. The argument is that even simple man-made parts could be ordered into mechanical automata with very complex functions. Similarly, organic bodies can be seen as divinely crafted automata from which the complexities of biological processes can obtain.318 Organic bodies can therefore be considered as automated players within the economy of Physics and inanimate bodies. They can respond appropriately and ‘intelligently’ (not in a reflective sense) to following direct contact with physical objects and laws. Even the process of talking, Descartes insists, may be attributed to a machine in

314 He claimed to have given a satisfactory mechanistic account of most biological functions. See above for the list. *Traité de l’homme*, AT XI:201-2 : CSM 1:108.

315 Descartes’ “matter” is here importantly distinguished from the various early modern atomic theories of Boyle or Gassendi. Matter, for Descartes, is not the smallest units, particles, or corpuscles, of which larger bodies are composed. Rather, matter is that which consists simply in extension; it can be infinitely divided. *Principia philosophiae*, AT : CSM 1:223-39.

316 AT VII:79 : CSM 2:55. Written as a negative thesis, the opposite of pure intellection (i.e. thought involving sensory perception and imagination of corporeal things: *Atque haec sane in me ipso esse non potest, quia nullam plane intellectionem præsupponit, & me non cooperante, sed sape etiam invite, ideæ istæ producantur*).


318 *Discours de la Méthode*, AT VI: 56 : CSM I: 140, “Ce qui ne semblera nullement étrange à ceux qui sachant combien de divers automates, ou machines mouvantes, l’industrie des hommes peut faire, sans y employer que fort peu de pieces, à comparaison de la grande multitude des os, des muscles […] considereont ce corps comme une machine, qui, ayant été faite des mains de Dieu, est incomparablement mieux ordonnée, et a en soi des mouvements plus admirables.”
response to physical stimuli. Under this scheme, bodily sensation, for example, is explicated using a contact-communication model as opposed to the Scholastic use of phantasms. Biological processes are engendered in the body when external objects strike the sense organs – the latter all linked by nerves to the brain. The distortion of shape in the sense organs, relayed mechanically by the nerves as disturbances to the brain, cause the opening of tiny pores on the brain’s surface, through which “animal spirits” (esprits animaux) resident in the brain are released into the muscles to generate a corresponding action. Animal spirits refer quite simply to the “corporeal principle” of propulsion generated by large quantities of rarefied blood suddenly brought to high pressure by the tiny vessels of the brain – hence, the finest blood particles (sang très subtiles) forced through miniscule brain ducts act like a jet squirt propelling muscles to motion. The animal spirits are the driving active forces of physiological phenomena, not the soul.

Respected correspondent, Antoine Arnauld, somewhat chided Descartes’ optimism to explain the full range of biological functions – with the exception of thinking – by his mechanistic principles, without the soul:

It seems incredible that it can come about, without the assistance of any soul, that the light reflected from the body of a wolf onto the eyes of a sheep should move the minute fibres of the optic nerves, and that on reaching the brain this motion should spread the animal spirits throughout the nerves in the manner necessary to precipitate the sheep’s flight.

What Arnauld thought to be an evidently absurd proposition, Descartes affirms to be precisely his claim. There is no principle of movement in animals (brutes), Descartes insists, other than the disposition of their bodily organs, the flow of animal spirits, and the

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319 AT VI:56 : CSM I:140.
320 AT XI: 141; CSM 1:101; AT VI: 55-57; CSM 1:139-140.
322 Descartes tries to counter the reasoning that because all bodies, after death (departure of the soul from body), are devoid of their physiological processes (la chaleur naturelle et le mouvement), therefore the soul is the principle of life in bodies. Rather, he argues, the soul leaves the body precisely because the body’s intrinsic chaleur naturelle et mouvement required for the functioning of its organs ceases. The difference, then, between a dead body and a living one is not the absence or presence of soul; but, like an unwound watch is devoid of the kinetic energy in its springs requisite for auto-motion, so a dead body has lost the mechanical force of its animal spirits, and by consequence, its soul also – AT XI: 330-331; CSM I: 329-30.
323 Objectiones Quartæ, Meditationes, AT VII: 205; CSM 2: 144.
mechanisms of blood flow through compression and rarefaction. Descartes strengthens this argument by pointing to the similarity of organic function between men and brutes – the latter of which are not possessed of minds, as is the case with humans. The common denominator for these physiological similarities, Descartes argues, is therefore, not the mind but dispositions of organs and animal spirits. The conclusion of Descartes’ mechanistic physiology, then, rejects the postulation of any principle other than those ordinarily obtainable in non-vital bodies ("corps inaniméz").

Amo’s account of physiology, as will be explored further in the next chapter, follows a similar mechanist trajectory as Descartes’. Organic bodies are understood to be divinely-crafted integrated mechanical systems that explain all biological phenomena. For example, what Amo calls the natural instinct (\textit{instinctu naturali}) – the propensity of an animal to instinctively act for its own good – is an instance of the organic body’s ability to generate very complex phenomena that do not need the mind for their explication. Only cognition and intellection, for Descartes and Amo alike, escape the range of phenomena attributable to the biological machine. This of course raises the infamous dualist impasse of how these two interact?

Descartes’ mechanism in physiology was by no means the physiology of the day. He represents an impulse that is paradigmatic. In the general atmosphere of the time, an important trajectory begins to rise – and one that is directly pertinent on Amo – viz., medical philosophy. Within the context of the Enlightenment an important but often overlooked trajectory is that of medicine – the special application of other philosophical currents to the conception of bodies, pathology, etiology, and the broader implications of these changes. Recalling that Amo’s \textit{Apatheia} was a work in eighteenth-century

\begin{enumerate}
\item Objectiones Quartæ, Meditationes, AT VII: 230; CSM 2: 162.
\item Ibid.
\item AT XI: 202; CSM 1:108, “Il ne faut point à leur occasion concevoir en elle aucune principe de mouvement & de vie, que son sang & ses esprits, agitez par la chaleur du feu qui brûle continuellement dans son cœur, & qui n’est point d’autre nature que tous les seux qui sont dans les corps inaniméz.”
medical philosophy that was praised for its quality, this intellectual context holds a great deal for understanding Amo.

**Medical Enlightenment**

Like natural philosophy, medicine was significantly impacted by the new mechanist philosophies. The old Hippocratic and Galenic medical theories were being challenged. Particularly rejected here were the notions of the soul’s vitalistic functions in the body, and the various pathologies of bodily humours. The general program among mechanist physicians was to ‘deliver’ on the promises and optimism of mechanists for full mechanic account of organic processes by close attention to anatomical observation and vivisection. Physicians like William Harvey (1578-1657) in his *De Motu Cordis* (1628), motivated by this mechanist impulse, provided an account of blood circulation in terms of the contraction of the heart muscles and the pumping of blood. Albrecht von Haller (1708-77), at the medical school at Leiden, importantly discovered and proposed in his *Elementa Physiologiae Corporis Humani* (1757-66), that irritability was an intrinsic property of muscles, and sensibility a property of nerves. Hermann Boerhaave (1669-1738) the famous physician at Leiden can be cited here, if not for a particular discovery in physiology, for his popularizing of the new iatromechanical and iatrochemical methods in medicine – a physiology based on an atomistic theory informed

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329 This is to by no means suggest that physicians and medical theorists were in any way unanimously following the mechanist program of Descartes in physiology. First, as will be shown shortly, not all were mechanist; as was indicated above, there were numerous mechanisms; as will be seen below, physicians such as Boerhaave were no friends of Descartes’ system.

330 “On the Motion of the Heart and Blood”

by Democritus and Gassendi, and fluids-based theory informed by Hippocrates. Amo in his *Apatheia* marshals a host of mechanist physicians who were at the fore in demonstrating that irritability, sensibility, and thus, motion arose from the material properties of nerves and body fluids (*sensionem fieri in succo et genere nervoso*). Among these were Amo’s own *praesis*, Martin Loescher (1680/85-1735), and Johann Gottfried von Berger (1659-1736).

But the mechanist impulse in medicine and physiology did not win the day without a pushback from the older medical systems. Another paradigm (or family of related ones) still had strong currency – a vitalistic system where all the physiological processes of the body are immediately and causally attributable to regulation by the soul. Johannes de Gorter (1680-1762) a professor of medicine at the University of Harderwijk expressed doubt that physiological processes could be explained only in terms of mechanics and chemistry, but that there are ‘automatic or vital’ motions in the soul, which are to be considered responsible, not least, for involuntary bodily movements.

Amo for his part held a consistent position on the human body, as is encapsulated by the concept of *corpori vivo et organico*. His position is readily identifiable with the broadly mechanist frameworks, where all somatic states and processes are to be

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335 Certainly no details of the medical debates of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries is aimed at here – debates that are much more complex and nuanced than an opposition between mechanist physiologies and older systems. For some more detail on such an appraisal, see French, *Science, 157-222; Roy Porter, The Greatest Benefit to Mankind: A Medical History of Humanity from Antiquity to the Present*, (London: Fontana Press, 1999).

accounted for purely in terms of the material constitution of the body and its attendant physical mechanisms, without appeal to psychic phenomena. This organic body for Amo is the material aspect of the human, and includes in itself all the dispositions for sentience. However, it is a special kind of material organization distinct from inanimate material objects. As Amo put it:

> With respect to matter we must distinguish between a living body and a body that is deprived of life: the former is, while the latter is not, affected by sensation by the mediation of its disposition. 337

Because the principle of life is intrinsic to this body, and this independently of the mind or soul, bodily functions such as sensation (among others) are natural functions of the material organic body.

> Whatever admits of the circulation of blood admits of the principle of life; whatever admits of this, admits of the faculty of sensing. But the body admits of the circulation of blood and of the principle of life. 338

### Leibniz-Stahl

For the German context of early eighteenth-century, the discussion on body and physiology is far from complete without mention of the Leibniz versus Stahl debates that crystallized important philosophical aspects of the medical enlightenment mediated to Amo. When the influential Pietist physician at Halle, Georg Stahl, published his *Theoria Medica Vera* (1708), it stood as an impressive counter-current to the various mechanistic physiologies in ascendency. 339 Stahl presents a medical theory that was decidedly

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339 Stahl’s *Theoria Medica Vera* (Halle, 1708) represent Stahl’s biggest work. Other important ones include: *Dissertatio Epistolica de Motu Tonica Vitali* (Jena, 1692); *Disquisitio de mechanismi et organismi diversitate* [`Disquisition on the Difference between Mechanism and Organism’] (Halle, 1706); *Demonstratio de mixti et vivi corporis vera diversitate* [`Demonstration of the True Difference between a Mixed and a Living Body’] (Halle, 1706). Stahl’s extensive volumes of works were compiled, translated into the French language, and enriched with detailed commentary and reflections by influential professors of the Montpellier medical school, which has had a long history of partisanship with Stahl’s vitalistic medicine since the days of Stahl contemporary, François Boissier de Sauvages (1706-67). From the Faculty of Medicine at Montpellier in the nineteenth century, a number of works and commentaries revived Stahl’s medical doctrines in France, among which: Albert Lemoine, *Stahl et L’animisme*, (Paris: J. B. Baillièere, 1858); Albert Lemoine, *Vitalisme et L’animisme de Stahl*, (Paris: Germer Baillièere, 1864); Théodore Blondin, *Stahl Philosophe et Physiologiste: Étude sur la doctrine médicale de G. E. Stahl*, (Paris: J. B. Baillièere, 1860). All references to Stahl’s works are primarily from the French translation by Théodore Blondin: Georg Ernst Stahl, *Œuvres Médico-philosophiques et Pratiques* (OMP) 7 vols., Théodore Blondin (ed.) (Paris, Montpellier, Strasbourg: J.-B. Baillièere et fils, Pitrat et Cie, Treuttel et Wurtz, 1859–1864).
orientated towards Pietist theology. His work aimed at a refutation of the dualist assumptions of Cartesian mechanism by medical observation and anatomy. He thus presents the concept of the ‘organism’ as one integrated whole consisting of life, body, intelligence and purposive determination of causes – *vita corporis quatenus est organicum*. From his observations that the physiological processes of organisms seem to be purposive or ‘intelligent’ in their acts, he concluded that the indifferent purely law-based paradigms of causation operative in mechanist philosophy is inadmissible to the concept of the organism.\(^{340}\) Rather, intentionality and purposive determination must be reckoned to organisms. The concepts of ‘life’, ‘soul’, and ‘body’ all integrate fully, such that somatic states are never independent of soul (or mental) states.

**Preliminary Conclusion**

The importance of the foregoing is that Amo’s conception of body is central to whatever philosophical psychology he will develop. The range of options available to him within the creative period of the medical enlightenment reveal a competing marketplace of in paradigms of physiology – from the Aristotle-inspired hylomorphic concepts of the human, to materialist and non-materialist mechanistic frameworks, iatrochemical notions of the seventeenth century, and Stahl’s organismic physiologies. From the content of his works, particularly his *De Humane Mentis Apatheia*, Amo’s position is shown to stand in the broadly mechanist, non-materialist tradition of physiology. As such, the human body is an organic entity whose biological functions operate mechanically, and absolutely independently of any mental or psychological faculties. This confidence in the ability to explicate the body as a soul-independent biological automaton results in the consistent orientation of Amo’s philosophy: that any account of the mind’s operations, then, whether in cognition or in perception, cannot include somatic states and operations as immediate and direct causal determinants.

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AXIS 2: A philosophical psychology of cognition and perception

It has been mentioned that the philosophical psychological strategies adduced for how the soul or mind comes to cognition of its somatic states and how it exerts an influence on its body, naturally flow from the account of physiology held. We have shown that Amo stands among a very diverse world of options in physiology in which he shows alignment with the broad iatromechanist and iatrochemical traditions. To be explored further is the range of accounts explaining cognition and perception that directly spring from these physiologies. One observation needs be made: that for all the physiologies explored – whether the broadly Aristotelian-Scholastic hylomorphic accounts, the largely mechanist paradigms, or the Stahlian organismic ones – there is always reckoned to be a special ‘realm’ or ‘seat’ of intellectual knowing, a place of consciousness, rationality and deliberation. This aspect, though variously accounted for, remains a distinct aspect of the human makeup, and a circumscribed avenue of investigation that may be called philosophical psychology. How does the psychological ‘something’ come to possess the knowledge that it has, and how can its intentionality be effective on materiality? At the heart of such questions are the internal operations of this psychological aspect.

After Amo wrote his Apatheia, his physiological thesis was not in doubt. What remained quite unclear was that given the dualist position he held between the mind and the body, what philosophical strategies was he putting forward to explain the mind’s relationship to its body? Interestingly, even given his conception of the organic body as a divinely crafted mechanical automate responsible for all biological processes besides thinking, Amo was yet emphatic about the importance of the body to the mind’s operations. In the following sections, the philosophical psychologies pertaining to the physiologies seen under axis-1 will be explored briefly, and more focus will be given to the seventeenth and eighteenth-century options.

Cognition and Perception in the Hylomorphic man

The level of the Aristotelian soul that is of interest to philosophical psychology is the rational soul, or ‘mind’ (nous), as Aristotle sometimes calls it. How does this rational
soul, known to be form of the body, come to cognition? The implication of this soul’s conceptualization in terms of form, is that it functions apart from matter. Mind, then, must be without quality and have no nature of its own, must be separable from the body (otherwise it acquires a quality and becomes in a sense actualized). Unlike the faculty of sensation, mind is not dependent on body for its activity.341 There are a number of interpretations of Aristotle’s theory of cognition and perception. Some interpreters suggest that Aristotle’s perception is: (1) a physicalist functionalist one – whereby perception is reduced to the material alteration of the sense organs by objects;342 (2) a dualist one, where the mind, as presented in De anima III.5, is immaterial, active and productive, and does not depend on the material alteration of the body for its perception and knowledge;343 (3) where material alteration is seen only as the material condition for the mind’s thought, and therefore only one of several stages in the cognitive-perceptual process.344 The interpretative details are not uncontested, but in the following our reading aligns more with the third position that sees a dual role between psychological and physiological accounts in cognition.345

Part of this independence from the alterations of materiality is the fact that the mind itself – that by which the soul thinks and judges – in order to be capable of knowing everything, is seen by Aristotle to be in potentiality to all things (i.e. to receive the forms of all things), while remaining impassible. The ‘change’ from ignorance to knowledge in the cognitive process is not an alteration of the mind per se (alloyoseos), but the intellect’s transition from potency for knowledge to actual knowing – hence, an increase

341 De Anima III.4, 429a10 – 429b10.
345 Here I follow Leen Spruit, Species Intelligibilis 1, 36-49.
Applying potentiality and actuality to cognition, Aristotle importantly distinguishes two stages of act and potency. The first is a sort of natural potency – the intellect is in potency to knowledge because it has such a natural capacity by virtue of its genus. However, this predisposition does not of necessity translate into actual knowledge by an individual intellect. A further stage in actualizing this potency obtains when an individual exercises his natural potency in an act. In addition to the rational soul’s essential ability (qua form) to stand in potentiality to things, the actualization of those potentialities require various schemes of sensation and representation. The whole process of the rational soul’s experience of its surrounding may be seen in Aristotle as two stages consisting of sense perception through apprehension, and a cognitive stage based on that perception. On the first stage, broadly, the episode of sense perception is enacted when a physical object impinges on a sense organ through an appropriate medium. The interaction between the sense organs and the external world produces a “qualitative alteration” in the senses by the reception of the form of the object without its matter. This alteration in turn generates an affection of the soul.

By a ‘sense’ is meant what has the power of receiving into itself the sensible forms of things without the matter. This must be conceived of as taking place in the way in which a piece of wax takes on the impress of a signet ring without the iron or gold... in a similar way the sense is affected by what is coloured or flavoured or sounding, but it is indifferent what in each case the substance is; what alone matters is what quality it has.

On this stage, Aristotle provides a physical causal transaction that involves the communication of an object’s qualities (sensible forms), where nothing is tangibly transferred from the perceived object’s essence; however, the matter of the perceiving sense organ, like the wax, is somehow altered. Such alteration triggers a process of representation by which sensible images, phantasmata, are generated, and capture “all the states and affections of sensible things.” The second stage involves the cognition of the mind through the instrumentality of the representational devices of the sense organs and

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346 De Anima II.5, 417b2 – 417b17.
347 De Anima II.5, 416b32-34; II.4, 415b24.
348 De Anima II.12, 424a15-20.
sense perception. Importantly for Aristotle, the mind is not a physical organ, nor does it inhere in any; therefore, it is not directly dependent on the physiological structures of the body. However, the mind’s cognition requires the objects generated by sense perception, and in order for the mind to interact with these sensible objects, a ‘conversion’ of the physiologically-dependent sensible object is required. To this, Aristotle introduces an active intellect whose role bridges the gap between bodily perceptual objects and noetic objects of the mind. How exactly this process occurs is not clear – whether it consists in generating and abstracting intelligible form from sensible objects, or in unpacking a sort of intelligible core to sensible objects. It is also not clear what the nature of the resulting mental objects is: whether it is a pictorial, descriptive, or iconic representation of the sensibles. Aristotle therefore leaves much to be desired for how materiality comes to be an object of a non-material mind. What is clear, however, is that there is an unbroken perceptual-cognitive path from the external objects perceived by the senses to the knowledge that the non-physiological mind has of them. Also, the cognitive representational process between sensible objects and mind may be seen as analogous to the representational processes that occur between sense faculties and external objects.

If thinking is like perceiving, it must be either a process in which the soul is acted upon by what is capable of being thought, or a process different from but analogous to that. The thinking part of the soul must therefore be, while impassible, capable of receiving the form of an object; that is, must be potentially identical in character with its object without being the object. Mind must be related to what is thinkable, as sense is to what is sensible.

**Thomas Aquinas**

Thomas Aquinas is the most dominant voice in the very vibrant milieu of medieval philosophical psychology, particularly for his systematization, development, and mediation of Aristotle’s *De anima* to later centuries. The influence of Aquinas on

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350 *De Anima* III.4, 429b4, “While the faculty of sensation is dependent on the body, mind is separable from it.”

351 Spruit, *Species Intelligibilis* 2, 46.

352 *De Anima*, III.4, 429b12-18.

353 This would not be the place to pursue the development of doctrines between Aristotle and Aquinas. See, Spruit, *Species Intelligibilis* I, esp. 156-74.
Amo’s philosophical psychology is seen at an important juncture: Amo marshals Aquinas in support of the position that the intellect could not be a magnitude otherwise its intellecction and understanding of things would be impossible — *Si intellectus sit magnitudo, quonam pacto intellectio*. This idea is a generally Aristotelian-Scholastic one, which consists in placing the mind nature of the mind in the heighest and most general possible category of being, so that its ability to perceive other things is not limited by its material (if granted) composition.354 Another Thomistic influence, if not a direct one, can be seen broadly in the intellectualist orientation of Amo’s psychology, as opposed to a voluntarist one. Under ideal circumstances, for Amo, the intellect is the seat of rational judgment, and the will is directed to the agenda determined for it by the “decreet of the mind” (*mentis decretum*).355 In less ideal cases, the will is said to incline to the natural instinct. Aquinas held a similar notion in which the intellect was considered to be ‘absolutely’ higher than the will, but ‘relatively’ lower than the will on occasion.356 Given this background of Aquinas’ importance for Amo, and the former’s prominence in representing the Aristotelian-dominated “ancient” axis of philosophical psychology, a closer investigation here follows.

i. *Aquinas on the Soul*

Aquinas treats the soul largely within the conceptual framework of ‘movement.’ Under this, he echoes Aristotle’s counter-response to the pre-Socratic materialists that a

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354 *Disputatio*, Ch. I, Mem. II, Sect. I. Amo’s use of Aquinas here invokes Aristotle’s critique in Book I of *De Anima* of Ancient Greek theories of cognition. Aristotle particularly criticized Empedocles’ notion that the soul was a magnitude – this, based on the assumption that only like could perceive like; and that consequently, the soul must be composed of magnitude, and possess the likeness of all things in order to apprehend the corporeal. Aquinas’ summary of that argument: “Quorum positio fuit quod anima cognosceret res omnes, quia cognition fit per assimilationem, quasi hoc a longe divinantem, dicebant animam, ad hoc quod omnia cognosceret, esse compositam ex omnibus; et quod similitudo rerum omnium esset in anima secundum proprium modum essendi, scilicet corporalem. Unde, cum res constent ex elementis, dicebant, quod anima erat composita ex omnibus elementis, ut sentiat et cognoscat omnia quae sunt” (*Commentary on Aristotle’s De Anima*, Bk. I, Ch. V Lect. 12). Aquinas’ commentary on ten Aristotelian refutations against this position are referenced by Amo: see Ibid. Lect. 12, §180-188.


356 *ST*, Ia. 82. . 3, “Cum ergo propria ratio potentiae sit secundum ordinem ad obiectum, sequitur quod secundum se et simpliciter intellectus sit altior et nobilior voluntate. Secundum quid autem, et per comparationem ad alterum, voluntas inventur interdum altior intellectu; ex eo scilicet quod obiectum voluntatis in altiori re invenitur quam obiectum intellectus.”
mover is not necessarily moved in the act of causing movement – hence the soul need not be a material principle (non omne movens movetur), nor be subject to physical change. Adopting Aristotle’s three-fold levels of the soul (nutritive, sensory, and rational), Aquinas defines it as “the first principle of life in those things which in our judgment live.” As principle of life, the soul is not a body, as was assumed by materialists. If the soul is not a body, he affirms, its operations do not occur through bodily contact. Rather, the Aristotelian doctrines of potentiality and actuality must be appealed to as philosophical tools to explain the possibility of the soul’s being an immaterial principle of bodily movement without, like bodies, being moved in the process.

Specifically for the rational soul, it is the principle of intellectual activity, or the faculty of cognition. Aquinas’ discussion of these topics is particularly influential for many thinkers after him, and particularly enlightening for later investigation is the methodology he applies to his treatment. The Aristotelian task in defining a thing consists in its classification according to genus and species, and the identification of its specific difference. Further, in Aristotle’s metaphysical scheme, everything can be categorized most generally by distinguishing substantia from accidens. According to this, Aquinas categorizes the intellect within the broadest genus of the Aristotelian Category of being – i.e. substance. This rational soul, as intellectual principle (mens vel intellectus), is said to be both incorporeal and subsistent (i.e. a substance). While it admits of a principle of individuation into a ‘this-particular-thing’ (hoc aliquid), it does not have a specific

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357 Focus here being on the soul in humans, the emphasis is the rational soul.
358 ST, Ia.75.1, res.
359 Ibid.
360 A few important Aristotelian philosophical distinctions are necessary to the understanding of substance. Substance is described as one of the kinds of things that simply have existence (substantia esse unum genus entium) - Sententia libri De Anima, lect. 1:214. (ii) Substance could further be distinguished into (a) form, (b) matter, or (c) a composite of form and matter. Form is that by which a ‘particular thing’ (hoc aliquid) exists in actuality. Matter is non est hoc aliquid (a not this particular thing), but stands in potentiality to be individuated as a ‘particular thing’. The essence of a hoc aliquid is to have per se existence (not in an Absolute sense) – i.e. to be independent and sufficient to their own being and operations. Immaterial substances, though they are not composed of matter and form, are actual hoc aliquid and therefore have actual existence in themselves (subsistens in actu). However, Aristotle and Aquinas make the exception of the rational soul: although, qua immaterial, it has existence in itself (like a hoc aliquid), yet not in every respect – it is not a complete nature by itself, but is part of the specific nature (Ibid.). The composite is an actual being – i.e. complete in its nature and kind (completum in esse et specie). Ibid. 215: Est ergo differentia inter materium et formam, quod material est ens in potentia, forma autem est endelechia, id est actus, quo scilicet material fit actu, unde ipsum compositum est ens actu.
nature.\textsuperscript{361} The philosophical implication of the intellect’s nature as substance is: (1) the indeterminacy of its specific nature \textit{qua} substance, within an Aristotelian-Scholastic scheme, means that the intellect can have knowledge of the natures of all corporeal things (since these latter are all subcategories of substance). (2) The intellect, as subsistent, has its metaphysical principle of operation within itself. In other words, it does not need to be caused or moved extrinsically in order for it to operate. From the incorporeality of the intellectual principle, therefore, it is impossible, in Aquinas’ rendition, that the intellect’s cognition of materiality occur through affection and the physical impression of bodies on it – (\textit{similiter impossibile est quod intelligat per organum corporeum, quia etiam natura determinata illius organi corporei prohiberet cognitionem omnium corporum}).\textsuperscript{362}

\textit{ii. The intellect as a simple substance}

Aquinas’ establishing of the incorporeality and subsistence of the intellect requires that he further specify its nature as substance. If the intellect is not matter, is it a form, or a composite of form and matter (i.e. a complete substance)\textsuperscript{363}. The general Aristotelian concept of the soul’s relation to body is that the soul is the \textit{form} of the body. Specifically, for the human soul, \textit{inquantum est intellectiva}, it is said to be pure form. This specification of its nature as pure \textit{form}, within the framework of Scholastic metaphysics, implies that by itself it is ontologically ‘unstable,’ as it were. To defend this position, Aquinas appeals to a well known Scholastic theory of cognition – the axioms that (i) whatever is received into something is received after the mode/order of the recipient (\textit{omne quod recipitur in aliquo, recipitur in eo per modum recipientis}), coupled with the generalization that (ii) knowledge consists in the presence of the form of a thing in a knower (\textit{cognoscitur unumquodque, sicut forma eius est in cognoscente anima}).\textsuperscript{364}

\textsuperscript{361} \textit{ST}, Ia.75.1, ad 1, “Hoc aliquid potest accipi dupliciter, uno modo, pro quocumque subsistente, alio modo, pro subsistente completo in natura alicuius speciei. Primo modo, excludit inhaerentiam accidentis et formae materialis, secundo modo, excludit etiam imperfectionem partis. Unde manus posset dici hoc aliquid primo modo, sed non secundo modo. Sic igitur, cum anima humana sit pars speciei humanae, potest dici hoc aliquid primo modo, quasi subsistens, sed non secundo modo, sic enim compositum ex anima et corpore dicitur hoc aliquid.”

\textsuperscript{362} \textit{ST}, Ia. 75. 2.

\textsuperscript{363} See footnote 360.

\textsuperscript{364} \textit{ST}, Ia.75.5, res.

### iii. Cognition and Perception

Aquinas’ account of perception reveals the possibility of direct influence between the soul and body. Even more clearly than Aristotle, Aquinas conceives the intellect and all its principles to be immaterial, and the body to be material. Because the intellect is unable to perceive the sensible forms of material objects, the notion of the agent intellect, conceived as that which is naturally in act, has a power to bridge the ontological gap between the intellect and materiality in the act of perception. The agent intellect performs this by abstracting a sort of intelligible kernel to material things, making possible the intellect’s apprehension.\footnote{ST, Ia.79.3, “Formae autem in materia existentes non sunt intelligibiles actu, sequentur quod naturae seu formae rerum sensibilium, quas intelligimus, non essent intelligibiles actu. Oportebat igitur ponere aliquam virtutem ex parte intellectus, quae faceret intelligibilis in actu, per abstractionem specierum a conditionibus materialibus. Et haec est necessitas ponendi intellectum agentem.”} Under the Aristotelian metaphysical paradigm of form-matter,
the forms of material objects are found in individual objects, and these forms the soul abstracts as intelligible species. However, the natures of the forms abstracted are not in the same modes as the sensible objects from which they are taken, rather they follow the mode of the intellect – i.e. immaterial, universal, and necessary. The importance of this last point for Aquinas preserves the ontological discontinuity between the intellect and the material, while establishing grounds for their transaction. Thus, sensible forms do not ‘fly off’ material things, neither yet their accidents or non-essential qualities. Forms are received into the intellect following the Scholastic principle: nam receptum est in recipiente per modum recipientis. A certain ‘something’ that is of the same immaterial nature as the intellect is “abstracted” by the intellect.

Further, Aquinas’s system here also adduces a theory of knowledge that necessitates the place of the senses in the cognitive content of the human intellect. The human intellect, for Aquinas, cannot know things purely internally through its own essence and operational resources. Such a postulate would necessitate that the essence in question have all things in itself immaterially (following the mode of the intellect). Only God’s Essence, Aquinas affirms, comprises the principles of all things immaterially, ”as effects pre-exist virtually in their cause” (prout effectus virtute praeexistunt in causa), and therefore, can have knowledge through His Essence. The human intellect cannot have knowledge through innate species (species sibi naturaliter inditas), either. To this Aquinas invokes Aristotle’s tabula rasa notion of the intellect: quod est sicut tabula in

368 As opposed to Plato’s Forms that are extrinsic to their material particulars.

369 ST, Ia, 84. 1. “Et per hunc etiam modum forma sensibilis alio modo est in re quae est extra animam, et alio modo in sensu, qui suscipit formas sensibilium absque materia, sicut colorem auri sine auro. Et similiiter intellectus species, corporum, quae sunt materiales et mobiles, recipit immaterialiter et immobiliiter, secundum modum suum, nam receptum est in recipiente per modum recipientis. Dicendum est ergo quod anima per intellectum cognoscit corpora cognitione immateriali, universali et necessaria.”

370 Leibniz’s charge.

371 Aquinas consistently uses the word “abstract” here without further specification of the actions taking place – hence, characterizations such as ‘transfer,’ ‘passing on’ etc., must be employed very cautiously. Furthermore, this abstraction by the intellect is different from the one performed by the senses on material things. In the latter, the material form of the object perceived is received into the senses; in the former, the abstraction precludes all materiality. “Unde et intellectus, qui abstrahit speciem non solum a materia, sed etiam a materialibus conditionibus individuantibus, perfectius cognoscit quam sensus, qui accipit formam rei cognitae sine materia quidem, sed cum materialibus conditionibus” (ST, Ia. 84. 2).

372 ST, Ia. 84. 2.

373 Ibid.
Instead of the intellect having innate intelligible species, for Aquinas the intellect must be conceived simply as being in potency to the objects of the senses, and thus, it necessarily attains actual knowledge following its transaction with the senses and the sense organs. Perceptible in the foregoing account, then, has been the Peripatetic principle of *nihil est in intellectu quod non prius (or antea) fuerit in sensibus* [nothing is in the intellect that was not first in the senses]. One last consideration of Aquinas’s on this topic is in order.

More constructively, Aquinas affirms that the intellect’s knowledge is derived (*acci piatur*) from the senses. To establish this, he plots two ancient theories as representing polar opposites: on one hand, the atomistic theory of Democritus that all knowledge in the soul is caused immediately by ‘images’ (*imagines*) discharging from material objects and entering the soul; on the other hand, there is Plato’s theory that the intellect is an immaterial power (*virtutem immaterialem*) that operates independently of corporeal organs, therefore its cognitive processes preclude affection from corporeal sense organs. Democritus’ theory does not make an ontological distinction between the intellect and senses (immaterial-material). Plato’s theory draws such a distinction, but precludes the possibility that the intellect’s cognition issues from the senses; rather, he (Plato) develops an ‘excitation’ theory – the senses ‘excite’ the intellect’s intrinsic principle of understanding to act. Aquinas represents Aristotle and himself as steering a middle course: against Democritus and along with Plato, the intellect is recognized as an immaterial principle distinguished from the materiality of the senses. Against Plato, and

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374 On this note, the detail of Aquinas’ denial of innate natural knowledge is instructive, especially for future references to Leibniz. First, Aquinas ascribed to Plato the idea that the human intellect has innate knowledge of all things. He further ascribes to Plato the notion that this comprehensive knowledge possessed by the intellect in hindered from attaining full actuality because of its unification with the body. Then he rejects this on the basis that if the soul has natural knowledge, it seems counter-intuitive that it would forget this knowledge, or be unconscious of this knowledge (*ST*, Ia. 84. 3). In the account given of Plato, the seeds of Leibniz monads are seen: the universal knowledge naturally possessed by the monad (*perception*), the limitation of this knowledge as a result of it union with body, and Leibniz’s postulation of an act (*apperception*) requisite to make natural knowledge into a conscious state (*apperception*). In Aquinas’ denial, too, may be seen the harbinger to John Locke’s objection to innate ideas.

375 In addition to this, for Plato, even the processes through which the transaction between the sense organs and the senses occurs (i.e. the reception of ‘sensibles’ by the internal senses) does not subscribe to a paradigm of direct physical contact or cause, (see *ST*, Ia. 84. 6).

376 “Sic igitur secundum Platonis opinionem, neque intellectualis cognitio a sensibili procedit, neque etiam sensibilis totaliter a sensibilibus rebus; sed sensibilia excitant animam sensibilem ad sentiendum, et similiter sensus excitant animam intellectivam ad intelligendum” (*ST*, Ia., 84. 6).
partly with Democritus, the knowledge of the intellect is ‘based’ on the senses, this however, not by flying images from objects, but by a two-stage operation of impression of the sensible on the senses organs, and the abstraction of intelligible species by the intellect. Therefore, while the intellect has its own incorporeal operations, the senses form the necessary material cause for all its knowledge. Aquinas’ conclusion from the foregoing, then is:

It cannot be said that sensible knowledge is the total and perfect cause of intellectual knowledge, but rather it is in a way the material cause.  

Aquinas’ theory, then, presents a paradigm in which the intellect has its incorporeal operations, but does not have any actual cognitive content naturally, and the actualization of its potency to apprehend knowledge is necessarily caused by the material presence of episodes of experience external to it, and mediated by the representational schemes of the sensory organs and senses. The notion, therefore, of nihil est in intellectu quod non prius fuerit in sensibus broadly subscribes to this model of perception, and by extension, the conceptualization of the interaction between the intellect or mind and the body. It is thus discerned that, although operating on different principles, a sort of causal relationship obtains between the body and the mind.

**Preliminary Conclusion**

In the foregoing, it is immediately observed that even in physiologies where the rational soul (mind) is seen as the form of a material body, and therefore one essence with body, there still remains some recognition of a discontinuity between the objects that pertain to the mind and those of the body (except, of course, in the case of materialists). As such, cognition and perception of the extra-mental world does not happen without some kind of mediatory processes. It might be observed that the more the independence of mind and body – a dualist framework – is asserted, the more the need for some acceptable account of their interaction. A continuum might be observed of the ‘dualization’ of the physiologies from Aristotle through Aquinas (his affirmation of the subsistence of the intellect, though the form of the body) to the mechanist traditions, and

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377 ST, Ia. 84. 6, “Non potest dici quod sensibilis cognitio sit totalis et perfecta causa intellectualis cognitionis, sed magis quodammodo est materia causae.”
with this a precipitation of the impasse that necessitates theories of cognition and perception. The Scholastic discussions were still able to use various schemes of abstraction to move apprehended objects from the materiality of the external world to the appropriate natures required for the intellect’s grasp. However, the further there is dualization between the psychic and somatic, the less amenable these theories become to each other. From Descartes’ dualism (and related positions), the ontological chasm between mind and body become unbridgeable by the devices of abstraction and simple apprehension. If Amo’s physiology, as has been discussed, is mechanist and dualistic, the theories so far discussed hold little promise for a viable account of cognition, perception and mind-body interaction. However, it must not be concluded that Amo has nothing to borrow from these earlier theories. As will be shown below, he does draw on important parts of these theories to supplement the more mechanistic framework within which he operates. Thus, it is this selection of the range of mechanistic cognitive options that will be explored in the next sections.

Theories of Cognition and Perception in Mechanistic Dualism

A. Descartes

The broad dualistic framework of Descartes’ metaphysics and anthropology is widely known and has been discussed briefly above.\(^378\) The purely thinking substance of the mind and the purely extended substance of the machine man constitute his anthropology. As discussed earlier, all biological processes, for Descartes, can be accounted for by the mechanics of the body, with the exception of thinking. The mind and body are joined together in such a way as to account for some phenomena of experience that may be considered irreducibly psycho-somatic in nature – i.e. the mind’s conscious experience of bodily states such as sensation, and its effecting of voluntary motion in the body. To account for this interaction, an important part of the human constitution is a third derivative ‘component’ made up of the “union” and “intermingling”

\(^{378}\) Descartes’ dualism will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter, within the context of Amo’s interaction with the Princess Elisabeth-Descartes correspondence.
of the mind and body (*ab unione & quasi permixtione*).\(^{379}\) But the question arises for how this purely thinking thing comes to have knowledge of the material. Of course, Descartes’ ontological dualistic framework heightens the problem of interaction and conditions what kinds of accounts he can proffer.

In response to objections arising from his mind-body metaphysic, Descartes provides an account of how the mind comes to ‘know’ things, with reference to sensation. That account distinguishes “three grades of sensory response” – (i) the first is “the immediate stimulation of the bodily organs by external objects” – a purely physical interaction of impact and alteration; (ii) the immediate effects produced in the mind owing to its union with affected bodily organs – such bodily affections include the panoply of perceptions (pain, pleasure, thirst, hunger, colours, sound, taste smell, heat, cold etc.); (iii) the mind’s *judgments* – with the help of previous experience – of the perceptions it obtains at the occasion of the movements in the bodily organs.\(^{380}\) In the scheme presented here, stage one meets no objection. Stage three shows that cognition for Descartes is a purely mental act of judgment. Whatever enters the mind as object, the mind can know it for what it is. That much is clear. The question remains how material objects become mental objects. To this, Descartes’ response refers to the complex formed by the union of the mind and body. By virtue of this mediating union, whose seat Descartes located in the pineal gland,\(^{381}\) the ontological gap between the mind and body is effectively bridged. The purely thinking mind is able to apply its cognitive operations directly to the objects of this union.

The major shortcoming of this mind-body complex is that it is obscure, at best. Nothing is known of its ontology except what is affirmed of its function by Descartes. What is its ontology – such that its objects are at the same time extended and accessible to the mind? As obscure as Descartes’ thought might appear here, what he is getting at is an interactionist account of causality where, even though tenuous with his mechanism,

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\(^{379}\) AT VII:81 : CSM 2:56.


\(^{381}\) Letter to Meyssonier, 29 January 1640 (AT III: 18-19; CSMK 143): “My view is that this gland [*conarion* (pineal gland)] is the principal seat of the soul, and the place in which all our thoughts are formed. The reason I believe this is that I cannot find any part of the brain, except this, which is not double. Since we see only one thing with two eyes...it must necessarily be the case that the impressions which enter by the two eyes or by the two ears, and so on, unite with each other in some part of the body before being considered by the soul.” “There is only this gland to which the soul can be joined” (CSMK 145).
there might be a possibility for finite heterogeneous substances to influence each other. It was this notion in Descartes that Amo saw as contradicting the framework metaphysic of a purely thinking and a purely extended thing. This postulation by Descartes of a third quantity residing in the pineal gland was evidently found unsatisfactory by generations of philosophers working within the Cartesian dualist framework. Amo’s disagreement with Descartes’ here strongly suggests that he would have sought answers in other dualist cognitive theories.

The special case of Leibniz and Wolff

In further exploring the theories that Amo was likely to directly draw on, to be presented here will be the philosophies of Gottfried Leibniz and Christian Wolff as a special case study. These two thinkers come to the fore in evaluating the philosophical world of Amo’s interaction for several reasons: firstly, as was argued in chapter one, the academic life of Amo was importantly framed by his partisanship with the Leibniz-Wolffian philosophical hybrid and movement, and this, both by his professional association with that camp and in the content of his thought. Secondly, from the philosophical portrait of Amo so far presented, he has been seen to be both a thinker of the new philosophies and of the old. If not systematically reconciling both, he is seen to easily straddle both intellectual worlds. The importance of Leibniz (in particular) and Wolff, beside Amo’s historical overlap with both, becomes apparent upon the appreciation of their programs of integrating Scholastic metaphysics and modern physics into a coherent philosophical system. Amo thus shares important philosophical perspectives with each. Thirdly, the close analysis of Amo’s work reveals important points of convergence with Leibniz and Wolff, as will be briefly sketched here and in more detail in the next chapter.

382 Apatheia, Ch. II, Mem. I. From Descartes’ Third Meditation, it is known that “thinking”, as the essence of the res cogitans, could be quite an ambiguous term. As Descartes defines it, it consists in doubting, affirming, understanding, ignoring, willing (volens), denying (nolens), and importantly, imagining and having sensory perception (AT VI: 34; CSM I: 24). Elsewhere, ‘thought’ is described under the rubric of consciousness, which embraces “everything that is in us in such a way that we are immediately conscious of it” – operations of the will, intellect, imagination, and the senses (AT VII, 160). These will be taken up in more detail in the following chapter.
B. Leibniz

Leibniz is only ever mentioned once by name in Amo’s known written works – he is mentioned in passing in a list of other thinkers including Hugo Grotius, Daniel Morhof, and in reference to their encyclopedic scientific knowledge. Brentjes, as seen in the previous chapter, reports that Amo taught a course on Leibniz’s pre-established harmony while at Halle. Historically, Leibniz and Amo may have crossed paths during the latter’s late childhood. It is striking that in spite of the dominance of Leibnizian philosophy on Amo’s thought (which will be shown soon), the former receives almost no direct mention. In all likelihood the Wolffian censure at the universities, and ipso facto Leibniz’s philosophical psychology, was a constraining factor on the interaction Amo could have with Leibniz in his writing. It is also likely for the same reason that Wolff is never mentioned by name in Amo’s works. If Leibniz’s work is virtually never referenced in Amo, echoes of Leibniz’s thought are seen in key places. There are strong lines of Leibnizian influence on Amo in the areas of (1) Leibniz’s conception of substance as essentially active; (2) Leibniz’s categories of simple and composed substances; (3) his framing of the cognitive and perceptual processes of the mind (a simple substance) in terms of following an intrinsic scheme of conscious self-determination, and; (4) a strict denial of efficient causation between the body and mind.383

During Amo’s formative and career years, Leibniz’s thought was considerably well known in Germany.384 The extent of Leibniz’s influence on a diversity of philosophical

383 Leibniz’s thoughts on the topics relevant to this study are scattered across various publications – private correspondences, journal articles, and published works. Among these: Discours de Métaphysique (1686), Système Nouveau pour expliquer la nature des substances et leur communication entre elles (1695), Nouveaux Essais sur l’Entendement Humain (1704), Théodicée (1710), La Monadologie (1714), Principes de la Nature et de la Grace (1714), among many others.

384 A number of Leibniz’s works were published posthumously and only available to the wide public sometimes several decades after the philosopher’s death in 1716. This is the case, for example, with the important Nouveaux Essais sur L’entendement Humain (1704) – Leibniz’s critical response to John Locke’s philosophical psychological treatise, New Essays (1690), which was only published in 1765. In spite of this limitation, however, other important works containing Leibniz’s philosophical psychology were already published and in circulation by the time of Amo’s university days, and numerous entries in scientific journals such as Acta Eruditorum and Journal des Scavans were available. Also, a number of Leibniz’s unpublished works were already circulated among his erudite friends. Thus, his thought still had considerable penetration in Amo’s time, not least through the efforts of Wolff. See, Roger Ariew, “G. W. Leibniz, Life and Works,” in The Cambridge Companion to Leibniz, Nicholas Jolley (ed.), (Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 18–42.
topics from the last three decades of the seventeenth century into the eighteenth was aptly summarized by French Enlightenment *philosophe*, Denis Diderot (1713-1784):

“Perhaps never has a man read as much, studied as much, meditated more, and written more than Leibniz... What he has composed on the world, God, nature, and the soul is of the most sublime eloquence. If his ideas had been expressed with the flair of Plato, the philosopher of Leipzig would cede nothing to the philosopher of Athens.”

Leibniz stands at an important juncture for understanding Amo’s philosophy because unlike most of the mechanist thinkers seen so far, Leibniz balances, on one hand, his strong belief in the promise of the modern new philosophy for scientific explanation of physical data with, on the other hand, a strong appreciation for the value of the ancient philosophies of substantial forms, and their place as metaphysical first principles. Leibniz’s “vision” and prodigious work in philosophy, particularly metaphysics and philosophical psychology, in many ways could be summarized as the critical evaluation of both ancient Aristotelian-Scholastic qualitative natural philosophy, and the ‘modern’ mechanist philosophies, resulting in the forging of new metaphysical syntheses.

Perhaps no philosopher would be more akin to Amo and his combined interest in ancient and modern philosophy than is Leibniz. One of Leibniz’s testimonies to his own approach in this regard follows:

“I know I am putting forward a considerable paradox in claiming to rehabilitate to some extent the ancient philosophy, and to recall substantial forms which have all but been banished. But perhaps I will not be quickly criticized when it is known that I have meditated at length on modern philosophy [...]”

With the appreciation for both ancient and modern philosophical paradigms in Leibniz, one can expect to observe considerable nuance in the framing of important doctrines. The same applies to Amo. Thus, for example, while Leibniz and Amo embrace the mechanist philosophies, they are by no means materialists like Hobbes, say. Both of them also are not content to explicate their metaphysics of corporeal bodies (bracketing for the moment the incorporeal) only in terms of the properties of size, shape, and motion. Working off his extensive knowledge of ancient substantial form metaphysics and the modern

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386 For comprehensive treatment of the intellectual program of Leibniz, see Maria Rosa Antognazza, *Leibniz: An Intellectual Biography* (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), esp. 46-59 on this note.

387 *Discours de Métaphysique*, §11 (L: 309).
mechanistic philosophy, Leibniz immediately observed the inadequacy of the Cartesian metaphysics in conceiving matter as a substance whose essence is pure extension. In a journal publication of 1694, for example, Leibniz affirmed that Descartes’ error in properly accounting for the union of mind and body arose from the latter’s misunderstanding of corporeal substances. Thus, against the background of Descartes metaphysics and mind philosophy, we consider Leibniz’s view of substance as a critique of Descartes – a critique that closely parallels Amo’s. The following sections will delve into a fair amount of detail. Leibniz’s philosophy of substance will be presented as the major tool from which the innovative accounts of cognition and perception, and soul-body interaction flow. On Leibniz, the focus will be on the philosophical basis, and with Wolff, the application and systematization into a full philosophical psychology. It shall be shown in the next chapter how these form the background for a large part of Amo’s philosophy of mind.

i. Substance

Against the general ebb of mechanist philosophy and the position that the essence of physical stuff was their material properties (in the Cartesian variant, extension: shape, size and motion), Leibniz, with his metaphysical sensibilities, saw the inadequacy of such a conception, and offered to modern philosophy a new theory of substance that was to serve as a powerful tool for tackling a number of philosophical questions – in particular, cognition and mind-body interaction. Leibniz’s new substance theory was in effect an ingenious synthesis of modified forms of the new mechanical philosophies with Scholastic substantial forms. The need for a different substance theory arose from what Leibniz perceived to be the inadequacy of holding mechanical properties to be fundamental units of reality – viz. substance. He summarizes his objections:

I believe that anyone who will meditate about the nature of substance as I have explained it above will find that the entire nature of the body does not consist merely in

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389 The complexities and volume of the subject matter prohibit treatment in any extensive detail. What follows is only a detailed sketch, and is sufficient for our purposes. Extensive discussions of Leibniz’s substance theory are available elsewhere. See R. S. Woolhouse, *Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz the Concept of Substance in Seventeenth-Century Metaphysics* (London; New York: Routledge, 1993), esp. 54-74.
extension, that is to say, in size, figure, and motion, but that there must necessarily be recognized in it something related to souls, which is commonly called a substantial form, although this form makes no change in the phenomena, any more than does the soul of beasts if they have one. It can even be demonstrated that the concepts of size, figure, and motion are not so distinct as has been imagined and that they include something imaginary and relative to our perceptions, as do also (though to a greater extent) color, heat, and other similar qualities which one may doubt truly are found in the nature of things outside ourselves. This is why qualities of this kind cannot constitute any substance. And if there is not other principle of identity in body than those we have just mentioned, no body can ever subsist longer than a moment.390

If the idea of an individual substance, Leibniz argued, is that it is the subject of all predicates and is itself predicated of nothing else, then an adequate account of substance had to establish it as the sufficient reason, and ultimate cause of every observed phenomenon.391 To a true individual substance, then, all “actions and passions” must be causally attributable (actiones sunt suppositorum). Hence, a metaphysical first principle necessarily underlies and grounds mechanical properties and laws. 392 For this metaphysical ‘grounding’, Leibniz appealed to substantial forms. To this, he introduces his doctrine of “complete being” (être complet): a being, S, whose nature provides the

390 Leibniz, Discours de Métaphysique, XII. Famously, Leibniz uses the example of one moving body (B1) bashing into another (B2). He puzzles at the observation that B1 comes to rest and does not continue on its path, while B2 is made to move (as applicable). If motion, qua Cartesian substance, is essential to extended stuff, and the motion of B1 specifically is essential to it, then its being impeded and brought to rest, for Leibniz, is inexplicable purely in terms of extension – except at the pain of affirming that B1 has lost something essential to itself. For further treatment, see Pauline Phemister, “Corporeal Substances and the ‘Discourse on Metaphysics,’” Studia Leibnitiana 33, no. 1 (2001): 68–85.

391 “On the Correction of Metaphysics and the Concept of Substance” in Acta Euriditorum, March 1694. G, IV, 468-70, L 433-4. “It is certainly that when several predicates are attributed to the same subject, and this subject is not attributed to any other, it is called an individual substance. But that is not enough, and such an explanation is only nominal. It is necessary, therefore, to consider what it is to be truly attributed to a certain subject.” It seems clear enough that analytic logical predication is not what Leibniz has in mind. Louis Couturat has famously argued that Leibniz is here proposing the idea that all the predicates that belong properly to a subject can be found by a logical analysis of the terms of the subject. As Couturat affirms: “Dans toute proposition vraie, universelle ou singulière, nécessaire ou contingente, le prédicat est contenu dans le sujet; en d’autres termes, toute vérité est réductible à une proposition identique, et doit pouvoir se démontrer a priori par l’analyse de ses termes” Louis Couturat, La logique de Leibniz (Paris: Germer Baillière, 1901), x. But this overlooks that Leibniz wants to account for the actions of created things. For further treatment see, Robert S. Sleigh, Leibniz and Arnauld: A Commentary on the Correspondence (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990).

392 L: 309-10. For Leibniz, Scholastic substantial forms have a key role in natural philosophy as long as they are restricted to their proper place of providing general first principles, and not employed to explain particular natural effects.
complete reason for all the properties and events attributable to $S$. Under this scheme, all states of affairs – past and future, necessary and contingent – can be resolved to the natures of the concerned individual substances, *qua* complete being.

For substance to function in this capacity, then, it has to be self-determinative – that is, possess its own internal principle of action. In this regard, Leibniz develops *action* as the essence of all substances.

The concept of *forces or powers*, which the Germans call *Kraft* and the French *la force*, … brings the strongest light to bear on our understanding of the true concept of *substance*. Substance, then, is *essentially* active within itself, without need for external compulsion. This action (*force, Kraft*) is distinguished from the Scholastic “powers or faculties,” which indicate the propensity or potentiality to be in act. For Leibniz, it is something stronger: it refers to the substance actually acting, generating its own force. Hence, “I say that this power of acting inheres in all substance and that some action always arises from it, so that the corporeal substance itself does not, anymore than spiritual substance, ever cease to act.” Elsewhere, Leibniz refers to this substantial force as “originating activity” or “sources of actions.” Of course, since substance is not spatially

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393 *Discours de métaphysique*, § 8: G IV, 433; L: 307. “La nature d’une substance individuelle, ou d’un Être complet, est d’avoir une notion si complet, qu’elle soit suffisante, à comprendre et à en faire deduire tous les prédicats du sujet à qui cette notion est attribuée.”

394 L: 433-4.

395 L: 433, “Active force, in contrast, contains a certain act or entelechy and is thus midway between the faculty of acting and the act itself and involves a conatus. It is thus carried into action by itself and needs no help but only the removal of an impediment.”

396 Ibid.


398 Seventeenth-century mechanists, while affirming motion to be a fundamental principle of matter, were yet unanimous in affirming that this motion needed an external immaterial cause – which in most instances was identified as God. Descartes and other mechanistic philosophers had tried to meet this requirement by an attempt to ground the motion of bodies in a causal principle. Descartes’ solution was the identification of God as the primary cause of motion both by his initial act of creation, and by his activity of concurrence thereafter. “Et generalem quod attinet, manifestum mihi videtur illum non aliun esse, quam Deum ipsum, qui materiam simul cum motu & quiete in principio creavit, jamque, per solum suum concursum ordinarium, tantundem motus & quietis in ea tota quantum tunc psuit conservat” *Principiorum Philosophiae* XXXVI, AT VIIA, 61. Gassendi gave a similar grounding of the motion of matter in God. But in Leibniz, since action is essential to substance, the latter can ‘initiate’ operations. With this concept of substance, it must be stated, Leibniz still holds to the ultimate depended of all created substances on God.
extended, but is a “metaphysical point,” the ‘movement’ generated by its force of action it is not one of displacement; neither it is Aristotelian-Scholastic ‘move’ from potentiality to actuality. It is action with reference to substance’s auto-generation of all its internal operations – an important one of which is its ability to “express the universe” and move from one perception to another. More details of this ‘movement’ will be further explored below under Leibniz’s metaphysic of the monad.

ii. Cosmology and the Monad

Leibniz’s putative mature metaphysics is found in his concept of the monad (in his La Monadologie, 1714). Building on the earlier discussions on the essence of the individual substance, Leibniz sketches the idea within a cosmological framework. The fundamental unit of reality is individual simple substance – the monad. These monads, being ‘simple,’ have no composition of parts or shape, thus are not extended; they cannot naturally be formed or unmade – their full numbers having already been established by God at creation. From the notion of substance, monads have their principle of internal action. As Leibniz conceives them, by virtue of their lacking composition of parts, they cannot be altered or affected extrinsically. They are windowless, and no ”internal motion can be excited, directed, increased, or diminished from without.” Under this conception, monads receive no outside influence – this, not simply owing to the ontological incompatibility between the immaterial and the material, but also because as a matter of their windowless essence their internal states cannot be altered, not even by other monads. All of reality, therefore, is a complex economy of homogeneous monadic simple substances and their aggregated compound substance.

Further, because everything is a monad or compounded as a substance from monads, nature for Leibniz is constituted by a plenum – i.e. without a void, and the activity of each substance either remotely or proximately ‘affects’ all others in some way.

Everywhere there are simple substances actually separated from each other by their own actions, which continually change their relations. And each outstanding simple substance or monad which forms the center of a compound substance, and is the principle of its unique, is surrounded by a mass composed of an infinity of other

399 L: 456.

400 Monadologie, § 7, G. VI: 607; L: 643.
monads which constitute the body belonging to this central monad, corresponding to the affections by which it represents, as in a kind of center, the things which are outside of it. 401

From this idea of the plenum, the connectedness of all monads guarantees that the ‘motion’ of any monad is, as it were, “mirrored” in all others, and this effect is more or less distinct owing to the distance of separation from the source of ‘movement’. 402 The result is that each monad “represents the universe according to its point of view.” 403 This mirroring can be seen in representations of all the states of affairs in the universe by the monad as confused indistinct internal states. 404 It is this ability of the monad to represent the entire universe to itself that becomes a powerful tool for philosophical psychology. 405

iii. Leibniz’s perception and cognition

Given the framework above, the human soul or mind, for Leibniz, is a specialized monad or individual substance. Monads, though ordinarily homogeneous, come to ‘specialize’ according to the predominance of some representational states over others, and this, based on their location in the universe. Each monad that specializes as a human soul or entelechy belongs to an organic body, and together they constitute a “living being.” 406 Leibniz’s strategy for how the mind achieves cognition follows from this:

Although each created monad represents the whole universe, it represents more distinctly the body which is particularly affected by it and of which it is the entelechy. And as this body expresses the whole universe by the connection between all matter in

401 Principes de la Nature et de la Grâce, § 3, L: 637.

402 ‘Distance’ here is of course not spatial. It is phenomenal ‘distance’ that is in view, and this refers to the number of intervening middle terms occurring in the analysis of perception (see Loemker’s commentary, L: 653).

403 Ibid. “Since everything is connected because of the plenitude of the world, and each body acts on every other one more or less, depending on the distance, and is affected by its reaction, it follows that each monad is a living mirror, or a mirror endowed with an internal action, and that it represents the universe according to its point of view and is regulated as completely as the universe itself.”

404 Monadologie §60, L: 649.

405 In effect, Leibniz’s metaphysic of the monad serves other important philosophical purposes that cannot be pursued here. A central one is the application of monadology to explicate the phenomenon of organic life. Here the monad is seen as a vital centre, consequently, all of nature teems with life. For in-depth treatment on these topics, see Justin E. H. Smith and Ohad. Nachtomy, Machines of Nature and Corporeal Substances in Leibniz (Dordrecht; New York: Springer, 2011); Justin E. H. Smith, Divine Machines: Leibniz and the Sciences of Life (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011).

406 Monadologie §63-4, L: 649, “Each organic body belonging to a living being is a kind of divine machine or natural automaton infinitely surpassing all artificial automata.”
the plenum, the soul also represents the whole universe in representing the body which belongs to it in a particular way.\textsuperscript{407}

By this, Leibniz in effect creates in the soul two categories of representational states upon which its cognition is based: its confused representation of the universe, and the distinct representation owing to the body to which the soul belongs. The first representation Leibniz calls \textit{perception}, and it is the set of all non-conscious internal universal states represented in the soul \textit{qua} monad. But this representation is not yet knowledge proper – it is an infinite confused jumble of precognition (which Leibniz likens to the rumbling of the sea) the details of which could be unraveled to give distinct knowledge. The second, \textit{apperception}, refers to conscious mental states, which Leibniz characterizes as being “distinct,” and pertains to the human soul \textit{qua} monad-belonging-to-body.\textsuperscript{408} At least two factors are instrumental in the soul’s move from precognitive states to conscious mental states: first, self-reflection on inner states; second, the instrumentality of the senses through ideation. An internal principle in monads, Leibniz adds, serves to ‘facilitate’ the move from perception to apperception.

\textbf{Preliminary Conclusion}

This rather rough sketch of Leibniz’s philosophy, it may be concluded, marks an important turning point in philosophical psychology vis-à-vis Amo. Whereas in the approaches previously surveyed the general method is to take for granted that the content of the soul/mind’s cognition and perception reach it from ‘outside’, and then try from there to develop accounts for the conversion of perceived material objects into mind-appropriate natures, Leibniz’s starting point is the mind’s possession of perception internally, albeit, in confused and indistinct modes. Leibniz presents a system of cognition that is fundamentally different from the Aristotelian-Scholastic framework of starting off with a \textit{tabula rasa} and then etching the items of cognition onto it. Rather, it is in line with the general Platonic concept of ‘reminiscence’, following which, to stretch

\textsuperscript{407} \textit{Monadologie} §62, L: 649.

\textsuperscript{408} \textit{Principes de la Nature et de la Grâce} §12, L: 637, “It is well to make a distinction between perception, which is the inner state of the monad representing external things, and \textit{apperception}, which consciousness or the reflective knowledge of this inner state itself and which is not given to all souls or to any soul all the time.”
the tablet motif, the information on a white board pre-written with ‘invisible ink’, is revealed and only unraveled upon the application of the appropriate chemical agent.\textsuperscript{409} But given this scheme, Leibniz still gives a place of importance to bodily sensation as a means for the clear and distinct perception of minds in bodies. “We can also say that we receive our knowledge from without through the ministry of the sense, because certain exterior things contain or express more particularly the reasons which determine our soul to certain thoughts.”\textsuperscript{410} This orientation of Leibniz will be explored more specifically with application to philosophical psychology.

\textbf{C. Wolff}

It has been argued from chapter one that Amo’s academic career as a philosopher was decidedly influenced – based on the historical data – by his partisanship with the Wolffian movements in the universities. Taking off from the Wolffian historian, Ludovici’s, record that Amo was a premier Wolffian exponent, that intellectual influence on Amo must here be explored vis-à-vis philosophical psychology. As already argued, Wolff’s influence on Amo is an immediate one, because of Halle, and owing to the extensive penetration of his writing thought during the first four decades of eighteenth-century Germany and beyond.\textsuperscript{411} In what follows, to be surveyed is Wolff’s

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  \item \textsuperscript{409} *Discours de Métaphysique*, § 26, L: 320.
  \item \textsuperscript{410} Ibid.
  \item \textsuperscript{411} The major works specifically relating to philosophy of mind include: *Vernünftige Gedanken von den Kräften des menschlichen Verstandes und ihrem richtigen Gebrauch in der Erkenntnis der Wahrheit* (‘Rational Thoughts on the Powers of the Human Understanding and their Correct Employment in the Cognition of the Truth’) [German Logic] (Halle: 1712); *Vernünftige Gedanken von Gott, der Welt und der Seele des Menschen, auch allen Dingen überhaupt* (‘Rational Thoughts on God, the World and the Soul of Man, and on All Things Whatsoever’) [German Metaphysics] (Halle: 1719; 5th edition: 1732); *Vernünftige Gedanken von der Menschen Thun und Lassen zur Beförderung ihrer Glückseligkeit* (‘Rational Thoughts on Man’s Acts of Commission and Omission, with a View to Advancing His Happiness’) (Halle: 1720); *Vernünftige Gedanken von dem Gebrauche der Theile des menschlichen Leibes, der Thiere und Pflanzen* (‘Rational Thoughts on the Employment of the Parts of the Human Body, of Animals and Plants’) (Frankfurt: 1725); *Philosophia rationalis sive logica Methodo scientifica pertractata et ad usum scientiarum atque vitae aptata* (‘Rational Philosophy, or Logic Treated According to the Scientific Method, and Suited to the Use of the Sciences and of Life’) [Latin Logic] (Frankfurt: 1728; 3rd edition: 1740); *Philosophia rationalis sive Logica, metodo scientifica pertractata, et ad usum scientiarum. atque vitae aptata. Praemittitur discursus praeliminaris de philosophia in genere.* (‘Preliminary Discourse on Philosophy in General’) [Preliminary Discourse] (Premlin Frankfurt: 1728); *Philosophia prima sive ontologia methodo scientifica pertractata qua omnis cognitionis humanae principia continentur* (‘First Philosophy or Ontology’) (Frankfurt: 1730); *Psychologia empirica methodo scientifica pertractata, qua ea quae de anima humana indubia experientiae fide constant, continetur…* (‘Empirical Psychology’)
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general philosophical psychology along with its Leibnizian synthesis as representing the
crowning influence upon the African philosopher, both in actual philosophical content,
methodology, and vocabulary.

i. Wolff and Method in Psychology

Wolff famously developed his approach to psychology – the conception of the soul,
its faculties and operations – as a two-staged method of a single science: the first stage is
empirical psychology (psychologia empirica) and the second, rational psychology
(psychologia rationalis). The knowledge of the existence of the soul, what it is, and what
operations belong to it, for Wolff, starts off from an intuitive matter-of-fact knowing or
consciousness of ‘soul,’ and further reflection, through the process of introspection, on
what this experience consists in. Empirical psychology, then, is the stage of investigation
that takes off from the givenness of psychological experience, and from there “establishes
principles through experience, and so explains what pertains to the human soul.”

The program already reminds of Amo’s task in the Disputatio – to have a distinct idea of what
pertains to the mind. But how exactly can it be known what pertains to the soul? The
answer, for Wolff, is found in consciousness (qua nobis conscius). Consciousness, or
what is known in experience (cognoscimus), results from attending to our perceptions.

This suggests (and is later defended at length by Wolff) that what he refers to as
‘perceptions’ is not conscious cognition until after the reflective act (introspective) has
occurred. To somewhat preempt the exposition of the doctrine below: perception for
Wolff, like Leibniz, is a pre-conscious act of the soul’s essence itself, through which it

[Empirical Psychology] (Frankfurt and Leipzig: 1732); Psychologia rationalis methodo scientifica
pertractata, qua ea, quae de anima humana indubia experientiae fide innotescunt…(‘Rational Psychology’)
[Rational Psychology] (Frankfurt, 1734).

412 Wolff, Philosophia Rationalis, §111, “Definio adeo Psychologiam empiricam, quod sit scientia
stabilendi principia per experientiam, unde ratio redditur eorum, quae in anima humana sient.” Also in
Wolff, “Prolegomena to Empirical Psychology.” For English translation to Wolff’s prolegomena to
Empirical Psychology’ and ‘Rational Psychology’, see Robert J. Richards, “Christian Wolff’s Prolegomena
to Empirical and Rational Psychology: Translation and Commentary.” Proceedings of the American

413 Wolff, Philosophia rationalis sive logica, §664, “Experiri dicimur, quicquid ad perceptiones
nostras attenti cognoscimus. Ipsa vero horum cognitio, qua sola attentione ad perceptiones nostras patent,
experientia vocatur.”
represents to itself the universe.\textsuperscript{414} Reflection, then, on the internal perceptions of the soul yields the consciousness of what truly belongs to it. The soul, as Wolff defines it, then, is conscious of itself and of things outside itself: \textit{Ens istud, quod in nobis sibi sui et aliarum rerum extra nos conscium est, anima dicitur}.\textsuperscript{415} From the beginning of Wolff’s task of knowing the nature of the soul and its operations, it is established that the enterprise is not a purely rationalistic one of deduction from \textit{a priori} first principles. What can be consciously known of the soul’s operations would require the occasioning of a broad range of experience.\textsuperscript{416} Empirical psychology therefore establishes the analytic propositions or axioms (\textit{notiones psychologicas}) that serve as the basis for the construction of psychology \textit{qua} true scientific discipline.\textsuperscript{417}

The second stage, rational psychology, consists of the analytic demonstration of the notions obtained from the soul’s conscious experience. “Rational psychology is the science of whatever is possible through the human soul.” From whatever is known of the essence of the soul, its properties or predicates can be deduced \textit{a priori}. In Wolff’s philosophy, what belongs to the essence of a particular being, in general, has to do with the formal and conceptual non-repugnancy among its predicates; from which it follows that internally contradictory notions cannot \textit{be}, or are simply no-things, or nonbeing.\textsuperscript{418}

\textsuperscript{414} Wolff, \textit{Psychologia Rationalis}, §66.
\textsuperscript{415} Wolff, \textit{Psychologia Empirica}, §20.
\textsuperscript{416} Wolff, \textit{Psychologia Empirica}, §2 (trans. Richards), “Doubtless, to discover psychological notions the soul must be able to elicit from itself many operations; hence occasion must exist for experiencing many things. For from those events which transpire in our soul, we gather what can occur and reduce them to determinate notions (\textit{notiones determinatas}).”
\textsuperscript{417} In true rationalist method, for Wolff, science proper consists in demonstration of analytic propositions, the deduction of necessary conclusions, “If one knows how to demonstrate a proposition, he is said to know (\textit{scire}) it. And thus science (\textit{scientia}) is the habit demonstrating what we affirm or deny” (\textit{Philosophia rationalis sive logica}, § 594) [Quoted from Richards, “Christian Wolff’s Prolegomena”, 234].
\textsuperscript{418} Wolff’s reason for this position follows from his philosophy of non-contradiction whereby experience shows that the mind cannot simultaneously represent something to itself and simultaneously judge it both to exist and not to exist – \textit{eam experimur mentis nostre naturam, ut, du mea judicata liquid esse, simul judicare nequeat, idem non esse} (Ontologia, §27, 15). Also, “\textit{Fieri non potest, ut idem simul sit & non sit, seu quod perinde est, si A sit B, falsum est, idem A non esse B, sive A denoter ens absolute consideratum, sive sub data conditione spectatum}” (ibid., §28, 16). To a large extent, then, the fact of Wolff’s non-contradiction is to be found empirically in the mind’s own operation. “Being” is that which “can exist and, consequently, that with which existence is not incompatible.” Wolff, \textit{Philosophia prima sive ontologia}, § 134, 115, “\textit{Ens dicitur quod existere potest, consequenter cui existentia non repugnat}.”
The methodology of this rationalist psychology is to first delineate what the human soul is (\textit{quid sit}), before its operations and faculties can be known. This is achieved by the Scholastic enterprise of classification according to genus, species and specific difference. The human soul is first placed within the category of \textit{being} in general. (For this soul to be a ‘real’ being, of course, its existence must first be ascertained.)\(^\text{419}\) Further categorization of its genus and species must then follow:

The human soul actually exists and is numbered among beings. Thus whatever is demonstrated of being in general can be applied to the soul, since it is a species of being. Therefore, since those things which come to be predicated of being in general are demonstrated in ontology, rational psychology takes principles of demonstration from ontology.\(^\text{420}\)

Following this, then:

Since we know of no genus more proximate than simple being, that is, simple substance, nor more remote than being, we assume no theory other than that of being in general and of simple being. […] We treat of what we observe \textit{a posteriori} to distinguish the soul specifically from all other simple beings.\(^\text{421}\)

The Wolffian project of philosophical psychology, therefore, falls specifically under the aspect of ontology, and the operative method of investigation are those of the science of being.

\textit{ii. The Nature of the Human Soul}

Following Wolff’s method in psychology, we are now in position to follow how that method is applied to the subject matter. He starts by intuiting some of the \textit{notiones psychologicas}. The first concerns the soul’s cognition \textit{(de modo cognoscendi animam)}. Cognition, as Wolff defines it, is the act of the soul by which it is made conscious of things within itself and represented things outside itself.\(^\text{422}\) He delineates two steps in the

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\(^{419}\) Wolff gives a syllogism for establishing the soul’s existence: “Insofar as we are conscious of ourselves and of other things beyond us (§14), we exist. But insofar as we are conscious of ourselves and of other things beyond us, we are soul (§20). Therefore our soul exists” (\textit{Psychologia Empirica}, §21). The basis of this syllogism (esp. the first proposition) seems to come down to, like Descartes’ \textit{ego}, the clear and undeniable intuition of existence provided by consciousness.

\(^{420}\) Wolff, \textit{Psychologia Empirica}, §3.

\(^{421}\) Ibid. §4.

\(^{422}\) Wolff, \textit{Psychologia empirica}, §23, “\textit{Cogitare} dicimur, quando nobis conscii sumus eorum, quæ in nobis contingit, & que nobis tanquam extra nos representantur. \textit{Cogitatio} igitur est actus animæ, quo sibi sui rerumque alias trium extra se conscia est.”
soul’s cognitive process: perception (*perceptio*) and apperception (*apparceptio*). Perception is the act of the mind by which it represents objects to itself.\(^{423}\) While apperception is when the mind makes itself conscious of its own perceptions.\(^{424}\) ‘Representation’ is thus conceived as a pre-conscious mental act that serves as a necessary prerequisite for the conscious states of apperception.\(^{425}\)

In addition to cognition, Wolff further investigates other aspects of the soul known by experience, among which: sensation. Central to Wolff’s presentation here is the thesis that the mind’s knowledge of the external material world is invariably dependent on the physical changes (*mutationes*) of the body’s sense organs.\(^{426}\) In fact, the sense organs contain the basis (*rationes*) for the mind’s perception of material things.\(^{427}\) But these bodily mutations are circumscribed within the physical body and do not communicate qualities to the mind. They simply form the basis for the mind’s perception.\(^{428}\) Wolff will adopt another paradigm for the interaction of soul and body. In the philosophical psychology of Wolff, therefore, as in Leibniz, is seen the dual emphasis of the mind’s cognition by its spontaneous pre-conscious representation, and by the involvement of the sense and sense organs. Thus, the senses play a very role in cognition and sensation, even given the mind’s ability for universal representation.

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\(^{423}\) Ibid. §24. (Wolff suddenly switches from using the word ‘soul’ (*anima*) to ‘mind’ (*mens*).) Also see *Psychologia Rationalis*, §66, where Wolff specifies the scope of this act of representation as “the universe.”


\(^{425}\) The evocation of Leibniz here is strong. Wolff here recognizes his indebtedness to Leibniz for these terminologies. This is not the place for a full survey of Wolff treatment of cognition. In the *Psychologia Empirica* alone, the topic receives far more detailed investigation. Wolff touches on topics relating to confused and distinct ideas, notions, the nature of the mind’s perceptions, ideation, representation, and a host of others. Some of these topics may be mentioned succinctly below, but this, only insofar as they very closely border on Amo’s work.

\(^{426}\) *Psychologia empirica*, §56, “Observamus aliquod corpus et in eo mutationes, quibus contingentibus, corpore istorum mutationum causas percipimus. Immo quae sunt in mundo adspectabili, non alter perципimus, nisi quatenus mutationes quasdam corpori huic inducunt.”

\(^{427}\) Ibid. §66, “*Organum sensorium* appellatur organum seu pars organica corporis, in cujus mutationibus continetur rationes perceptionum rerum materialium in mundo adspectabili.”

\(^{428}\) Ibid. §78, “Anima in sensationibus suis nihil immutare potest, nec unam alteri pro arbitrio substituere valet, dum objectum sensibile in organum sensorium agit. Etenim sensationum ratio continentur in mutationibus, quae organis sensoris ab objectis sensibilibus inducuntur, adeoque positis istis mutationibus ponuntur et ipsae.”
Preliminary Conclusion

The philosophical tools for the psychology Amo presents in the Disputatio and other works are drawn to a large extent from the Leibniz and Wolff. While Leibniz provides the key philosophical concepts of substantial force, representation as the primary cognitive scheme of the mind’s perception, and the place of sensation as occasioning the mind’s distinct perceptions (i.e. ‘apperception’), Wolff provides the Amo with the methodological tools for a systematization into a discipline. From Wolff Amo would draw the rigorous approach to psychology as a science concerned with ‘possibles’, and therefore, the orientation of his method to use the tools of ontology and the demonstrative approaches of logic to enquire into the mind. As such, through the inspiration of Wolff, Amo’s task of delineating between the functions that pertain to the mind and those that pertain to the body, becomes an enterprise first of explicating the ontologies and essential properties of both mind and body. Therefore, in the Leibniz-Wolff synthesis as a whole, Amo finds new philosophical resources for conceptualizing cognition and perception within a dualist framework without a large part of the Scholastic problems with the species doctrines. And this approach finds new methodological rigour in ontology and logic. The details of Amo’s philosophical psychology as arising out of the Leibniz-Wolff tradition will be shown in the next chapter. In the following sections, it remains to be investigated how inter-substantial causation, or mind-body interaction would obtain, given Amo’s inclination to understand cognition and perception within a broadly Leibniz-Wolffian framework.

AXIS 3: Paradigms of Soul-Body Causation

Given any particular understanding of the workings of cognition and perception, the central question arises for how to account for the observed ‘causation’ or influence between the mind and the body. Leibniz seems to have been one of the earliest to outline three predominant options of “systems” in the late seventeenth century into the eighteenth
that tried to account for the influence between the soul and the body.\textsuperscript{429} They include: (i) "the common hypothesis of influx" (\textit{hypothesis vulgaris influxus}) or "physical influence" (\textit{influence physique});\textsuperscript{430} (ii) the "hypothesis of occasional causes;"\textsuperscript{431} and, (iii) pre-established harmony.\textsuperscript{432} The system of physical influx is a family of different philosophical schemes that generally posits the possibility of direct causality between two finite substances, say, $sA$ and $sB$, by the inter-communication or transfusion of qualities.\textsuperscript{433} The system of occasional causes, or simply ‘occasionalism,’ denies the possibility of direct causal interaction between $sA$ and $sB$, and rather posits God as the immediate efficient influence on $sB$, where the movements of $sA$ simply represent the occasion or sufficient cause vis-à-vis $sB$. Pre-established harmony denies the possibility of interaction between $sA$ and $sB$, and advances a metaphysic where the all movements of $sA$ are harmonious and coordinated with the related $sB$, even though there is no causal efficacy between both.

The identification of these three systems as options for soul-body union and interaction was well known in Amo’s eighteenth-century Germany.\textsuperscript{434} This owed particularly to Leibniz’s influence and the renewed interest in questions of the soul and body in Germany. When Leibniz identified these three systems, he did so to show the error of the first two as plausible accounts for how the soul and body interrelate. Physical influx (hereafter, \textit{PI}), for example, Leibniz held as “unintelligible” since it could not be

\textsuperscript{429} Pierre Bayle’s \textit{Dictionnaire Historique et Critique} (1697) presents a similar categorization. Wolff identifies the same schools and gives an extensive survey of each. See Christian Wolff, \textit{Psychologia rationalis methodo scientifica pertractata, qua ea, quae de anima humana indubia experimentiae fide innotescunt, per essentiam et naturam animae explicatur, et ad intimiorem naturae ejusque autoris cognitionem profutura proponuntur} (Francofurti & Lipsiae: Libraria Rengeriana, 1734), §530-642.

\textsuperscript{430} L: 269; G, VI: 135.

\textsuperscript{431} L: 269, 457.

\textsuperscript{432} Also referred to as “the hypothesis of concomitance” (L: 269); “the hypothesis of the correspondence of substances” (L: 338).

\textsuperscript{433} The specification of “finite substance” here is important because it is precisely the causation between \textit{finite} substances that is denied by the other two systems. Both occasionalism and pre-established harmony would affirm immediate causation between the infinite substance, God, and all other substances.

\textsuperscript{434} For example, influential Wolffian commentator, Magister at Wittenberg at the same period as Amo, Friedrich Baumeister, \textit{Institutiones Metaphysicae}, (Wittenberg: Zimmermann, 1738) (see chapter one). Preeminent Wolffian, Georg Bernhard Bilfinger (1693-1750), \textit{De harmonia animi et corporis humani, maxime praestabilita, ex mente illusi Leibniti, commentatio hypothetica: Accedunt solutiones difficultatum, ab eruditissima viris, abn. Foucherio, Baylio, Lamio, Tourneminio, Newtono, Clarkio, atone Stahlho motanum} (Frankfurt: T. Mezlerum, 1723).
shown how “anything can pass over” from one substance to another.\textsuperscript{435} Further for him, if non-physical agents (mind, for example) are efficient causes of corporeal bodies, then the law of the conservation of forces would be violated.\textsuperscript{436} Occasional causes (hereafter, \textit{OC}), it was objected, introduce a \textit{Deus ex machina} and posit an arbitrary system of ‘constant miracles’ in the phenomena of nature, thereby making impossible any physical science. Pre-established harmony (henceforth, \textit{PH}), Leibniz felt, held the best promise for maintaining the independence of both physical laws of nature and the metaphysical laws that underlie the former.

But the matter was by no means decided by Leibniz’s arguments. In fact, the intensity of the debates only climaxed after Leibniz. The questions of how the intentions of the soul move the body to action, and how the soul comes to cognition and perception through its body seemed to hold a lot at stake for various disciplines. Pro Leibniz-Wolffian intellectuals tended to be quite outspoken in critiquing, like Leibniz, the “unintelligibility” of \textit{PI}. Wolffian philosopher, Bilfinger’s \textit{De harmonia animi et corporis humani} (1723) was particularly thorough in identifying the three camps, listing the exponents of each system, and attempting to debunk the thesis of the first two. Baumeister followed in the same vein, arguing for the higher plausibility of \textit{PH} over the rest.\textsuperscript{437} Others, for example, Sam Christian Hollmann (1696-1787) who taught philosophy at Wittenberg from 1723-34, during the period of Amo’s \textit{Disputatio} defence, offered friendly criticism of \textit{PH}, feeling better at home with the seemingly more intuitive \textit{PI}.\textsuperscript{438} Yet others such as the ethicist and Jena Professor of Physics, Johann Friedrich Wucherer (1682-1737) wrote and presided over a dissertation rebutting \textit{PH} with physico-theological arguments.\textsuperscript{439} Wolffian and Pietist syncretist, Martin Knutzen (1713-51) at

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\item \textsuperscript{435} L: 269.
\item \textsuperscript{436} Monadologie, §80, L: 651.
\item \textsuperscript{437} Baumeister, \textit{Institutiones Metaphysicae}. For in-depth discussion of the reception of \textit{PH} in eighteenth-century Germany, see Eric Watkins, “From Pre-established Harmony to Physical Influx: Leibniz’s Reception in Early 18\textsuperscript{th} Century Germany,” \textit{Perspectives on Science} 6 (1998): 136-203, special issue: “Leibniz and the Sciences,” D. Garber (ed.).
\item \textsuperscript{438} Hollmann, \textit{Commentatio philosophica de harmonia inter animam et corpus praestabilita} (Wittenberg, 1724); Ibid., \textit{Observationes elencticae in controversia Wolffiana} (Wittenberg, 1724).
\item \textsuperscript{439} Johann F. Wucherer, \textit{De Harmonia Mentis et Corporis Humani Praestabilitata Stabilimento Orbata}, (Jena, 1724), 16, “Accedit iam ratio IV. quae Deum ex hoc systemate si judica veris auctorem peccati futurum, urget. Uti enim omnes cogitationes pravae, ex ipsius animae virtute, eliciuntur; ita omnes
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Königsberg, defended $PI$ against $PH$. On the theological front, the Pietists, even more vocally than Wolffians (in the 1720s and 30s), were concerned for a correct conception of soul-body interaction. Amidst the soul-body conversation in Germany, which itself is only a more nuanced instance of the Pietist versus Wolffian standoff, the range of available theories on that interaction further offer a backdrop to understand Amo, and appreciate how his positions would have been heard, even in places where he is not explicit on certain positions.

In what follows, these three systems will be used as broad markers for the range of philosophical options regarding soul and body interactions that Amo had to transact with. The purpose here, building on previous sections, is to show how a commitment to one or other conception of either soul or body may bring about a predisposition to one of the foregoing systems, and thus to evaluate what possibilities exist for where Amo might be situated on the continuum.

**Physical Influx**

The system of $PI$ is a very broad family of approaches to causation, even though the numerous proponents of the approach could be strongly divergent on other philosophical questions. The doctrine of $PI$ is a special application of a general theory of causation.

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440 Martin Knutzen, *Commentatio philosophica de commercio mentis et corporis per influxum physicum explicando, ipsis illustris Leibnitii principiis superstructa* (1735).

441 See chapter one. Among opponents of $PH$ listed by Baumeister, specifically for the German context (“inter nostros eruditos”), principally cited are Lange and Buddeus (See Baumeister, *Institutiones Metaphysicae*, §905). More detail on the theological aspects below.

442 Given the breath of this system, focus here is on German eighteenth-century treatments of the topic. For a general historical-philosophical survey of physical influx, see Eileen O’Neill, “Influxus Physicus,” in *Causation in Early Modern Philosophy: Cartesianism, Occasionalism, and Preestablished Harmony*, ed. Steven Nadler (Pennsylvania: Penn State Press, 2010), 27–55.

443 Francisco Suarez (1548-1617) best summarizes the idea: Physical cause in this case in not taken for a corporeal or natural cause, action by means of a corporeal or material motion, but it is taken more universally for a cause truly and really inflowing into an effect; for just as we said above that ‘nature’ sometimes signifies any essence, so *influxus physicus* sometimes is called ‘that which happens by means of a true and real causality, essentially and per se’. And in this way, even God is the physical cause while he creates, and an angel, when it brings about motion either in the heavens or also in itself, and the intellect, when it brings about understanding, and the will, [when it brings about] volition, and so on for other cases.
In Amo’s Germany, a number of survey works treating the system of *influxus physicus* were available.\textsuperscript{444} *PI*, within the context of soul-body treatments, was generally conceived as the transference of some ‘reality’ between the soul and the body.\textsuperscript{445} More specifically, it is the idea that the willing of the soul, either immediately or mediately, produces motion in the body fluids and results in action; and the related notion that the body’s movements cause cognition or ideas in the soul through the sense organs, senses, and perceptions.\textsuperscript{446} For the present purposes – a special application of the interaction between soul and body – *PI* systems most generally grant inter-substantial and intra-substantial causation, involving some kind of communication of properties from the cause to the effect. In order, then, for the body to ‘influence’ the mind, there is the communication of something from body to mind in the act of perception. It is evident from Suarez’s account that the ‘influx’ represented ‘physical influx’ is not necessarily a communication of corporeal qualities, and so ‘physical’ may be somewhat misleading; albeit, it is a real communication. Varying models of this causal paradigm are applied to the soul-body question, both in strongly dualist anthropologies and otherwise.\textsuperscript{447} The various Scholastic species doctrines so far surveyed would fit broadly within this framework.

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\item\textsuperscript{444} For example, influential Wolffian commentator, Magister at Wittenberg at the same period as Amo, Friedrich Baumeister, *Institutiones Metaphysicae*, (Wittenberg: Zimmermann, 1738). Preeminent Wolffian, Georg Bernhard Bilfinger (1693-1750), *De harmonia animi et corporis humani, maxime praestabilita, ex mente illustris Leibniti, commentatio hypothetica: Accedunt solutiones difficultatum, ab eruditissima viris, dnn. Foucherio, Baylio, Lamio, Tourneminio, Newtono, Clarkio, atone Stahlio motanum* (Frankfurt: T. Mezlerum, 1723).
\item\textsuperscript{445} Baumeister, *Institutiones Metaphysicae*, § 898, “Corpus nostrum organicum physice influere dicitur in animam, quatenus ex corpore quaedam in animam transfertur realitas, quae, cum ante corpori inesset, nunc insit animae.”
\item\textsuperscript{446} Bilfinger, *De harmonia animi et corporis humani*, §24, “Influxum animae & corporis communiter mutuum credimus, eo sensu, quod anima, si motum fieri velit in corpore, eundem vi sua active producat, & vel immediate, vel mediantibus in corpore fluidis ejusdem organa moveat; quam animae vim vocamus facultatem loco motivam. Quod ubi corporibus nostrum ambientibus impetus fiat in nostra sensuum organa, id sensum, perceptionem, idea vel cogitationem in anima caussetur, atque adeo ex corpore transitus in mentem fiat.”
\item\textsuperscript{447} For a historical philosophical survey of these ‘models’ of physical influx, see O’Neill, “Influxus Physicus,” 27-55. We shall draw generally upon this survey for the distinguishing traits of this system, and refer to the corresponding primary sources where necessary.
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Occasionalism

The doctrine of occasional causes had considerable currency in the second half of the seventeenth century among Cartesians such as Géraud de Cordemoy, Louis de la Forge, Arnold Geulincx, Johannes Clauberg, and Claude Clerselier. Taking up the challenges bequeathed to them by Descartes’ dualism, in different ways they developed ideas of what constituted a true cause in the world, with special application to mind-body interaction. No one is better known for this doctrine in the seventeenth century than Father Nicholas Malebranche (1638-1715). Occasionalism results from a few fundamental notions of Malebranche’s philosophy. First, unlike the Leibniz-Wolff position, action (la force) is not seen as an essential attribute of finite substances or of corporeal bodies, thus their “mouvement” is necessarily caused extrinsically. Finite minds (esprits finis) too have no power to act causally. Rather, their principle of action (as well as all finite substance) is said to be the will of God. How so? Because for Malebranche, God’s will equates with God’s infinite power, and the former is the means by which the latter is effectively communicated. Second, as to the conception of the nature of a true cause, Malebranche understood it to be where a necessary connection exists with the effect produced. Every true cause, thus, must be necessarily efficacious. He argued that this requirement of necessary efficacy could only be fulfilled by an infinitely perfect and powerful agent – God, or more precisely, the will of God.

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448 For causation in Descartes, see Daniel Garber, “Descartes and Occasionalism,” in Causation in Early Modern Philosophy: Cartesianism, Occasionalism, and Preestablished Harmony, Steven Nadler (ed.), (Pennsylvania: Penn State Press, 2010), 9–26. Garber concludes that Descartes was a “quasi-occasionalist” – with regards to an inanimate world of physics only, God is the real cause; but in a world also populated by minds, these latter can be real causes.

449 Nicolas Malebranche, Oeuvres de Malebranche: Recherche de la vérité, ed. Jules Simon (Charpentier, 1853), Bk. VI, pt. II, ch. 3: 573. “It is evident,” he says, “that all bodies whether big or small do not have the power (la force) to move themselves.”

450 Ibid., “La nature ou la force de chaque chose n’est que la volonté de Dieu.”

451 Ibid., “Il y a une liaison nécessaire entre la volonté de Dieu et la chose qu’il veut. Sa puissance est donc sa volonté.”

452 Malebranche, Recherche de la vérité, Bk. VI, pt. II, ch. 3: 576. “Une cause véritable est une cause entre laquelle et son effet l’esprit aperçoit une liaison nécessaire, c’est ainsi que je l’entends.”

453 Malebranche, Recherche de la vérité, Bk. VI, pt. II, ch. 3: 576. “Or il n’y a que l’être infiniment parfait entre la volonté duquel et les effets l’esprits aperçoive une liaison nécessaire. Il n’y a donc que Dieu qui soit véritable cause et qui ait véritablement la puissance de mouvoir les corps.”
Malebranche therefore denies real causal efficacy to any agent but God, since the will of finite substance cannot be *per se* efficacious – i.e. neither inter-substantial nor intra-substantial real causation can obtain without the involvement of God *qua* perfect, omnipotent being.

When we ponder the idea of God, that is, a being which is infinitely perfect, and ipso facto all-powerful, we recognize that there is a [real] connection between his will and the movement of all bodies, that it is impossible to conceive that he might will a body to move, and the body does not.\(^\text{454}\)

Thus, for Malebranche, finite minds have a will, but there is no *causal necessity* between what they will and the production of effects since they do not have the unlimited power to guarantee the outcome of the thing willed. On this ground, the will of finite spirits do not have causal efficacy, except that by which they occasion God’s efficacy. In this account, it appears that the possibility of incorporeal-corporeal inter-causation *in principle* is not so much denied (since the incorporeal God is able to directly influence the corporeal), as is the ability of finite substances to be true immediate causal agents – though the former obtains by implication.

In occasionalism, therefore, as far as the movement of bodies is concerned, the substance of the human mind cannot bring about any modification of somatic states, nor can the affects of the body directly influence psychic states. Only God effectually brings about movement in either entity by his will. God is thus the *true* cause of the perceived interaction between the mind and body. However, the will of minds play some role in the process of God’s effective willing. Minds serve as occasional causes of the body’s movements – i.e. they serve as the initiating act of God’s effective acts: (*les désirs de ces esprits détermineraient la volonté de Dieu à agir, comme nos volontés de remuer les parties de notre corps déterminent la première cause à les remuer*)\(^\text{455}\) Without any direct

\(^{454}\) Ibid. (my translation)

interaction between them, the mind and body under this scheme can function independently, with the will of God bridging both the ontological gap and the requisite causal efficacy.

Given Amo’s desire to separate the workings of the mind from those of the body while yet preserving a means of explaining their interaction or ‘commerce,’ would Malebranche’s occasionalism have been an option for him? There is a significant divergence of Amo from the occasionalist framework. Importantly here is that Amo, like Leibniz and Wolff, and contrary to Malebranche, sees “activity” (la force, or kraft) as intrinsic to simple (immaterial, or mind) substance.\textsuperscript{456} He did not hold with Malebranche and the Cartesian tradition that the essence of the substance of the soul was thinking alone. Furthermore, if Amo followed occasionalism, neither the body nor the mind would be the self-sustaining, standalone systems that he conceptualizes them to be. Therefore, any potential attraction of this system for Amo immediately conflicts with core the positions of the Leibniz-Wolffian philosopher.

**Pre-established Harmony**

The rejection of physical influx between substances, and of the immediate action of God on substance results in an innovative third option propounded by Leibniz. Generally, pre-established harmony (hereafter, ‘PH’) is the doctrine that finite substances do not act causally on each other, but independently follow their own created ends within a harmoniously constructed order. \textit{PH} builds on Leibniz’s concept of the individual substance (as above), and on his doctrine of the complete concept. The philosophical implication of the affirmation of causal inter-action between finite substances (say \(sC\) and \(sE\)), for Leibniz, is that \(sE\) would be endued with accidents (e.g. motion) that it did not previously possess in its concept. Whereas, from his doctrine of the complete concept, all possible predicates, both present and future, must be ‘found’ in the subject – the individual substance.\textsuperscript{457} Following this, every individual substance is a complete concept (\(être complet\)), and properties or effects that otherwise are said to result from causation

\textsuperscript{456} Apatheia, I, § III, “Mens humana est: substantia mere actuosa et immaterialis.”

\textsuperscript{457} Leibniz, Discours de Métaphysique §8, L: 307.
between entities, in Leibniz’s system, must be considered *a priori* as predicates of the complete concept of some individual substance somewhere in the universe.

We must say that God has originally created the soul, and every other real unity, in such a way that everything in it must arise from its own nature by a perfect *spontaneity* with regard to itself, yet by a *conformity* to things without.458

Under this conception, then, psychological states do not result from the transmission of species and qualities from the organic body or other extrinsic sources. Rather they obtain from the mind’s internal spontaneous determinations and its nature as a complete concept of all its past, present and future predicates. The relation of these mental states with the external world is by way of “conformity” – psychical states (*sentimens interieurs*) perfectly correlate with the succession of somatic states and modifications, so much so that both are usually reckoned to be causally interrelated (although, for Leibniz, they are not). All the states of the soul are internally generated, as it were, and the cognition of reality external to it is by way of non-causal representational devices.459

Since our internal sensations, that is, those which are in the soul itself and not in the brain or in the subtle parts of the body, are merely phenomena which follow upon external events or better, are really appearances or like well-ordered dreams, it follows that these perceptions internal to the soul itself come through its own original constitution, that is to say, through its *representative nature*, which is capable of expressing entities outside of itself in agreement with its organs – this nature having been given it from its creation and constituting its individual character.460

These representational abilities in turn result from, on a cosmological scale, the harmony “regulated in advance in every substance of the universe.” The distinctness and clarity of what is represented by a given substance is conditioned by that substance’s metaphysical relationships. Thus, on the scale of particulars, the substance of the soul spontaneously has representations of the organic body (*la masse organisée*) with which it is most proximately related by virtue of the “mutual agreement” between them.461 This harmonious correlation between substances proceeds with each maintaining the integrity

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458 Leibniz, *Système Nouveau de la Nature et de la Communication des Substances* §14, L: 457 (italics are original).

459 That is, not involving a transference of any quality or species, as with the Scholastic schemes seen above.

460 Ibid. (emphasis mine)

461 G. IV: 484; L: 458.
and independence of its own internal operations. The union of the soul and body thus consists in precisely this conception of a pre-established harmony between the soul and body as a result of the immediate relationship between both.

The organized mass in which the point of view of the soul is found is itself expressed more immediately by the soul and is in turn ready to act by itself following the laws of the corporeal mechanism, at the moment at which the soul wills but without either disturbing the laws of the other, the animal spirits and the blood taking on, at exactly the right moment, the motions required to correspond to the passions and the perceptions of the soul.

Important concepts to be highlighted here are the notions of representation as the operative scheme of cognition within the philosophical framework of pre-established harmony; the spontaneity of this representational act as being natural or essential to an individual substance; and the notion of the mutual agreement between psychic states and the commensurate modifications of somatic functions, and vice versa.

Other voices in Amo’s eighteenth-century Germany contribute to making this “hypothesis” of Leibniz into an influential philosophical position. Most importantly here is Christian Wolff whose work brought pre-established harmony squarely within the discipline of psychology. But other Leibniz-Wolffian thinkers are important in this regard. Among many a noteworthy name is the prominent leibnitio-wolffiani, Friedrich Baumeister at the University of Wittenberg (see chapter one), whose widely circulated Institutiones Metaphysicae (1738) systematized and popularized pre-established harmony as a doctrine of psychology; and Georg Benhard Bilfinger (1693-1750) at Wittenberg, preeminent ally of Wolff strongly defending PH in a number of works.

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462 Leibniz, Système Nouveau §14, L: 458. As Leibniz puts it, “sans que l’un trouble les lois de l’autre” (G. IV: 484).

463 Ibid.

464 The instance of Baumeister’s is particularly noteworthy because, as suggested in chapter one, he must have crossed paths with Amo at Wittenberg. Baumeister’s expertise on the philosophies of Leibniz and Wolff, and his extensive writing on these personages, help enrich the philosophical portrait of Amo’s eighteenth century. Baumeister’s Institutiones Metaphysicae also identifies the three predominant positions on the soul-body union. He lists occasional causes, whose proponents he identifies as the Cartesians Malebranche and De la Forge; and in Germany, “in recent times”: one Gottlieb Sturm (1699-1764) at Wittenberg (Ibid. §902). Pre-established harmony, he identified with Leibniz as its inventor. It is defined as “quo commercium animae & corporis explicatur per seriem perceptionum atque appetitionum in anima, & seriem motuum in corpore, quae per naturam animae ac corporis harmonicae sunt, seu consentiunt.”

465 Dissertatio de harmonia animi et corporis humani maxime praestabilita (Tübingen, 1721); De harmonia animi et corporis humani maxime praestabilita, ex mente illustris Leibniti, commentatio hypothetica (Frankfurt/M., 1723). Bilfinger even corresponded with Hollmann, while the latter was
**Preliminary Conclusion**

From the foregoing, the need for any given philosophical psychology to proffer an account for the mind’s interaction with the body is seen. But that account is itself shaped by philosophical pre-commitments regarding the nature of substance and causation. The paradigms of either physical influx, occasionalism or pre-established harmony operative in a thinker’s philosophical psychology can thus be discerned – even when these are not explicitly stated – from their positions on substance and causation. Although Amo’s available writings do not explicitly mention ‘pre-established harmony’, this hypothesis seems to be the most consistent with his ontologies of the organic body and the mind. For reasons already indicated above, physical influx and occasionalism do not present themselves as viable options for Amo, given his other commitments. *PI* is in fact explicitly rejected on grounds of his general denial of mechanical interaction between the material and immaterial. Occasionalism is not particularly engaged with by Amo, albeit it represents one of the important causal options in currency at the time. Given his brand of mechanism and strong dualism, Amo’s admittance of immediate immaterial causal determinants (God’s will, angels, spirits) into the order of materiality and mechanical processes, would be inconsistent and highly unlikely. The case of Amo’s inclination to *PH* will be strengthened further in the next chapter, where it will be argued that important aspects of Amo’s philosophical psychology are unintelligible without a reckoning of a *PH* framework as central to his thought. It can be concluded here that Amo’s physiology reveals itself to be strongly mechanistic, his anthropology dualistic, and as a result he is aligned more closely with early modern approaches to philosophical psychology and its general rejection of species doctrines. Amo’s understanding of substance and causation, places him, as will be shown more fully, within the Wolff-Leibniz streams of early modern options. However, as has been maintained, Amo’s general eclecticism gives him a measure of philosophical dexterity and mobility, such that no one school of thought is imbibed or rejected wholesale, and the ancient-modern dynamic remains an important perspective. The outworking of these will be pursued in the next chapter. The last axis of Amo’s philosophical psychology will now be laid out – the moral theological resonances.
AXIS 4: Souls and Bodies: The Theological Resonances

Themes of the soul and mind, of body, and of anthropology in general have never been matters of indifference to Christian theology and morality. This is the case because central to core teachings of Christianity – the doctrines of sin and its imputation to individuals, salvation and the experience thereof, morality and holy living, religious experience, and a host of others – the human being, particularly his cognitive and perceptual faculties, is the subject of the application of these doctrines. Therefore, Christian thinkers have kept a watchful eye over the philosophy of the soul, how its internal operations are exposited, and its interaction with the body. Christian thinkers, anthropology and philosophical psychology, therefore, must not be incompatible with theological doctrine. As Melanchthon summed it:

The theologian who does not know those most erudite discussions on the soul, on the senses, on the causes of volition and affections, on knowledge and on the will, lacks a great instrument. He who teaches dialectics will be behaving insolently if he does not know those divisions of causes which are taught only in natural philosophy (in Physicis) and cannot be understood except from natural philosophy (a Physicis).466

In Amo’s three operations of the mind in the Disputatio – intellect, will, and action – at the heart of the middle operation was his terse discussion of the mind’s volitional acts either in the pursuit of evil or of good actions. For Amo these three operations belong to the domain of logic, morality, and practice, respectively.467 Described in his treatment of will and morality is the notion of the mind’s experienced tension between acting either in conformity with the appetites and impulses of the natural instinct or enforcing rationally-held behaviour that is in tune with known truths. The categories of morality and behaviour here invoked by Amo primarily concern the suppression of brutish passions by an exercise of “the decree of the mind” (mentis decretum), and as such represents a broadly intellectualist framework of moral philosophy, as opposed to a voluntarist one. The sources used in this section – lessons from Greek mythology, and Melanchthon’s treatment of the appetites – and the moralistic (though not necessarily theological)


467 Tractatus, Ch. I, Mem. VI, §1: 47.
approach he employs brings to the fore the earlier suggestion of the Stoic influence on the philosopher’s thought. That psychology and anthropology cannot be separated from morality is borne out by Amo’s understanding of philosophy in general, echoing Cicero, as the perfection of one’s moral essence.\textsuperscript{468} Specifically, the study of the physical body yields an understanding of its natural instincts and processes of action. Knowing the operations of the soul and its faculties of reason confer the knowledge of truth on the inquirer. Together these two foster “normal” (level-headed) and rational behavior.\textsuperscript{469} Thus there is a strong strand of practical morality in Amo’s philosophical psychology, particularly with reference to the faculties of the will. This orientation is not peculiar to him, but falls within a broader moral-theological context in Germany informed both by orthodox Lutheranism and by Pietism. In this context, the very philosophical positions advanced by Amo would be heard, to some extent, through moral-theological filters.

The German theological scene of the middle decades of the eighteenth century is highlighted by various reactions and engagements with the perceived implications of the Leibnizian-Wolffian pre-established harmony and its concomitant theories of the body and mind. Reactions primarily issued from Pietist theologians; but there were also other theological perspectives in this regard. Besides the often strongly polemical anti-Wolffian works of Lange, Buddeus, and Walch, there were equally spirited but more sophisticated attacks from the likes of the philosopher theologian Christian August Crusius (1715-75).\textsuperscript{470} Crusius’s work on moral philosophy, followed by another on ontology and rational psychology famously rejected Wolff’s intellectualist rationalism in which the intellect’s understanding of the good inevitably led to good moral behavior. He replaced this with a voluntarist moral philosophy that saw the will as the seat of human and animal desires, and the nexus for the determination of bodily actions and influence on the understanding.\textsuperscript{471}

\textsuperscript{468} Tractatus, Ch. I, Mem. V, §1: 46.

\textsuperscript{469} Tractatus, Ch. I, Mem. V-VI: 46-8.

\textsuperscript{470} Crusius was a very able philosopher and later professor of theology at the University of Leipzig. He was a student of Pietist physiologist at Halle, Friedrich Hoffmann.

\textsuperscript{471} Christian Crusius, Anweisung vernünftig zu leben, Leipzig, 1744, Werke, vol 1. A reprint of his complete works can be found in —— Die philosophischen Hauptwerke, Giorgio Tonelli (ed.), (Hildesheim: Georg Olms, 1964). For helpful summaries of his philosophy, see Beck, Early German Philosophy, 394-
Martin Luther

In order to understand the theological trajectories on anthropology among orthodox Lutherans and Pietists, one must go back to Martin Luther’s (1483-1546). Within Luther’s theological framework, to understand the true nature of man is to understand him vis-à-vis his sinful corruption and need for divine grace. Luther’s anthropology falls within a theological narrative with the following highpoints: God’s creation of humanity in his image and in a pristine sinless state, humanity’s fall into sin and subsequent loss of that image, and the work of grace in eventually restoring the lost image of God to humanity. This narrative captures the most central feature of theological anthropology – the inherent corruption of the imago Dei in humanity by sin and death; corruption that is seen as ontological, and therefore all-encompassing. This image of God, Luther identified with the “whole nature of man.”

The whole nature of man thus becomes the locus of the activity of sin and corruption, such that, although soul and body are distinct, the sinful manifestations of the one are seen to directly involve the other. Similarly, any reception of redemptive grace must affect both soul and body. In his famous Commentary on Galatians Luther summarizes the issue:

In my temerity I do not make a complete separation of flesh, soul, and spirit. For the flesh experiences no desire except through the soul and spirit, by virtue of which it is alive. By spirit and flesh, moreover, I understand the whole man, especially the soul itself. Briefly, to give a very crude comparison, just as I may call flesh that is injured or ill both healthy and ill (for no flesh is altogether illness), because, to the extent that it begins to be healed and is healthy, it is called health, but where injury or illness is left, it is called illness; and just as illness or injury hinders the rest of the flesh, healthy thought it is, from doing perfectly that which healthy flesh would do – so the same man, the same soul, the same spirit of man, because he is associated with and tainted by the disposition of the flesh, is spirit insofar as he savors the things that are of God (Matt. 16:23), but is flesh insofar as he is influenced by the enticements of the flesh, and if he consents to these, he is altogether flesh, as stated in Gen. 6:3. Thus we in the church are in the process of being healed, but we are not fully healthy. For the latter reason we are called “flesh”; for the former, “spirit.” It is the whole man who loves chastity, and the

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same whole man is titillated by the enticements of lust. There are two whole men, and there is only one whole man.\textsuperscript{473}

This Lutheran framework sets a broad perspective on the concerns of theologically-minded thinkers around soul and body. Any rigid dichotomy between both, such as to eliminate their direct inter-dependent influence, it seems, could not bare the weight of the doctrines of sin, of the Fall, or of redemption, among others. The soul and body must be held within a philosophical framework of direct influence such that moral choices milled by the soul have immediate consequences for the body, and sinful indulgences of the body necessarily affect the spiritual condition of the soul. This particular Lutheran theological understanding is immediately seen to be violated by the system of pre-established harmony, which is not only strongly dualist, but also maintains the operational autonomy of both body and soul. But before an appraisal, building on the same foundations, German Pietism at Halle, especially as seen in its major theologian, Joachim Lange, gives further insight into the theological aspects of these questions.

**Joachim Lange**

Halle Pietism as a whole played a very important role in framing some on the anthropological and philosophical psychological questions of Amo’s time.\textsuperscript{474} But the dominant representative voice of Pietism was from Halle’s theological faculty in the person of Lange, and the latter’s theological polemics against the philosophical systems of Wolffianism. Lange accuses those drawn by Wolffian philosophy to have been enticed by its promises of bridging the divide between reason and faith by its rational account of theology.\textsuperscript{475} In the inquiry initiated by Lange (\textit{Kurzer Abriß derjenigen Lehrsätze, welche

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{473} Walter A. Hansen and Walter. Hansen, \textit{Luther’s Works: Lectures on Galatians 1535 ; Chapters 5-6 ; Lectures on Galatians 1519 ; Chapters 1-6 Volume 27. Volume 27. (Saint Louis: Concordia Pub., 1964), 363-4

\textsuperscript{474} But the Pietism even at the University of Halle was not monolithic. Significant differences are observed between the pietism of Christian Thomasius, Friedrich Hoffmann, Georg Stahl and Hermann Francke. Hoffmann, for example, disagreed with the organismic picture of Stahl, rejected the ‘Enthusiasm’ variant of Pietism, and was more inclined to the rational theology of Wolff, over against spiritual experience. See Roger French, “Sickness and the Soul: Stahl, Hoffmann and Pathology,” in \textit{The Medical Enlightenment of the Eighteenth Century}, Andrew Cunningham and Roger French (eds.), (Cambridge England ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 88–110. The Pietism of Thomasius too, with his project of natural law, veered off the orthodoxy of Halle’s theological faculty.

\textsuperscript{475} Lange, “Court Exposé,” \textit{Recueil de nouvelles pieces philosophiques}, 44.}
in der Wolffischen Philosophie der natürlichen und geoffenbarten Religion nachteilig sin, 1736) in an attempt to censure Wolff’s philosophy for the second time, the foremost of his five objections concerned the soul and pre-established harmony. In Lange’s understanding of Wolff, the soul and body were construed by the latter to each have their independent operations. On this notion, the phenomenal world of experience is internally generated by the soul and, this, without influence from the external corporeal world. The soul produces its ideas and images from its own essence, following the pre-created ability to ‘mirror’ all ideas. Sensations of the external world generated by the sense organs do not directly transact with the soul, neither do mental intentions with the body; rather there is pre-established synchrony between soul and body. As Lange further construes it, the motions of the physical body (act of speaking, for example) are not determined, in the real sense of the word, by the soul’s willing, but are purely mechanically determined – from initiation of the act, to execution. This Wolffian metaphysical scheme, for Lange, suggests man is a “double machine,” a “double automate.” Lange’s reading of Wolff isolates the former’s chief theological concern: the suspicion that the Leibnizian-Wolff pre-established harmony denies real causation in the world, therefore making room for events to unfold deterministically according to their natures (Leibniz’s complete concept), without the possibility of effecting a different outcome or consequence. The main Pietist objection to this system therefore concerns the question of morality and freedom. For Lange the natural necessity captured by this system obviates human moral responsibility, and eliminates the possibility for reckoning virtue or vice to human actions.

Even more, this Leibniz-Wolff metaphysics of the soul potentially undermines a central Pietist doctrine – viz., the conception of the human soul as helplessly corrupt and utterly bankrupt in attaining any true knowledge of God or creation, unless aided by the intervention of God’s grace in repentance and spiritual regeneration or “new birth” (Wiedergeburt). According to the Lutheran spiritual renewal movements represented by Johann Arndt’s Das wahre Christentum, 1605-09 (True Christianity) – the tradition on

477 Lange, “Court Exposé,” Recueil de nouvelles pieces philosophiques, 42.
which Francke’s version of pietism drew significantly – the emphasis of the Christian religion is not the contemplative knowledge of God’s being, but a sort of mystical union outworked in spiritual experience and growth in holiness and love.\textsuperscript{478} Such experience is only possible when a regenerated heart (the center of a person’s entire being) is exposed to grace, and in consequence, practically disciplines the body (flesh), which itself is naturally inimical to holiness.\textsuperscript{479} Philip Jakob Spener’s \textit{Pia Desideria}, 1675 was particularly key in framing the focus of Pietist Christianity as the improvement of morality. Spener summed it up:

Our whole Christian faith consists in the inner man and the new man. Faith and good works are the fruits of this new life. Preaching should set forth the mercies of God so that faith and the inner man may be strengthened more and more. [The preacher] should work in such a way that he is not satisfied with the outward man and outward virtues. Rather, we must lay the foundations properly in people’s hearts.\textsuperscript{480}

The biggest ill of society was identified as immorality and the debauched behavior of the flesh constantly warring against the regenerated self, and the solution was the societal institutionalization of discipline and controls.\textsuperscript{481} To this, the variant of Pietism represented by the Halle theological faculty – Francke, Paul Anton (1661-1730), Joachim Justus Breithaupt (1658-1732), Lange – following the lead of Francke, advocated various practical steps to discipline and condition the body against immorality. This motivation was premised on the Pietist notion that the spiritual condition of a person’s heart is necessarily linked to physical states of the body, or physical life. In fact, while spiritual rebirth is a divine work of grace, moral progress in sanctification is a largely external


\textsuperscript{479} Ibid.


effort at discipline carried out with the body. One of the areas of this discipline was to be in the cultivation of a robust knowledge of the Bible, which alone could result in the real experience of God – the desideratum of Pietist spirituality.\footnote{482 Paul Anton’s \textit{Commentatio theologica de analogia fidei} (Halle, 1724) was key in this regard, especially in the training of theology students at Halle.} The goal of Christian spirituality, therefore, being the experience of God, all knowledge that does not ultimately result in spiritual life impartation to the heart was considered defective. Under this scheme, activities carried out with the physical body (reading the Bible) have immediate spiritual effects (the energizing of the inner heart). Essential, then, for Pietist theology is an anthropology in which the divide between the soul and body, if ever such a divide is granted, is to be firmly bridged by direct causal interaction between both. For example, even the medical care received at eighteenth-century Pietist hospitals included attention to the spiritual states of patients’ souls. Although not reducible to each other, somatic states are directly affected by psychological states, and vice versa.

The conversation between the \textit{Disputatio} and the broad orientation of Pietist theological psychology may not be an amicable one. The framework of pre-established harmony that informs Amo’s psychology sounds to Pietist theological ears as eliminating a basis for moral responsibility. It would seem that Lange’s conclusion from Wolff here somewhat of a caricature. But it serves to highlight the importance of questions of morality for Pietist theology, and the need for a free will in guaranteeing moral responsibility.

**Preliminary conclusion**

The moral and theological resonances of philosophical psychology in Amo’s eighteenth-century German context therefore reveal two keys concerns: the need for an account that maintains immediate causal influence between the soul and body so as to establish the effects of sin and moral culpability to the whole man; and similarly, an account that makes possible the Pietist concerns for practical holy living by guaranteeing that exercises of discipline and fleshly abstinence have a spiritual therapeutic effect on the soul, or properly, the whole man. It is not clear Amo’s \textit{Disputatio}, or his
philosophical psycheology elsewhere had the particulars of the Pietist theological concerns in view. However, the moral dimension of his subject matter is clearly at the fore of his thinking, especially in his treatment of the human will. Coupled with his general Stoic-influenced concern for the importance of philosophy as a character molder, Amo is very aware, even in a strongly dualistic context, of the interplay between the will of the mind and the animal passions of the body, and the need to curb the expressions of the latter if good moral behaviour must ensue. But what is not granted is the Pietist insistence upon soul-body inter-influence as essential to this moral-theological framework. Amo will maintain his positions dualism and pre-established harmony, construing moral behaviour in terms of the mind’s suppression of bodily brutish passions through its exercise of rationally known truths. This seems to set the mind as a neutral receptacle for rationally discerned moral truths, and the bodily desires as the sole seat of immoral inclinations. Of course, such a position proves inadequate to the Lutheran and Pietistic ideas of a radical theology of the Fall and a comprehensive notion of human depravity in which the entirety of a person is equally corrupted by sin. Pre-established harmony thus remained an unacceptable philosophical doctrine to many Lutheran and Pietist theologians of Amo’s time. To this end it is seen that Amo’s philosophical psychology both has moral and theological concerns proper to itself, and would have been heard on various theological frequencies in Amo’s context.

Conclusion

This chapter set out to survey and explore the philosophical contexts and trajectories requisite for understanding Amo’s philosophical psychology by attempting to provide some insight into the conversations that both directly influence him and provide the context to which he spoke. Within the broader aims of the present study, this chapter is concerned with showing Amo to be a bona fide philosopher of his time by dint of the breath of his philosophical engagement, and his rootedness in and contribution to the big conversations of his time. The survey was organized around four axes of philosophical enquiry, and four characterized as arising largely out of the matrix of revolutions in thought captured by the Enlightenment in Germany.
The surveys of these axes of thought bring about the conclusion that Amo’s work on the human body and mind – for whatever the merits or demerits of its particular contribution may be later shown to be – establishes him as a relevant philosophical voice engaged with an impressive lineup of ancient and modern philosophers. Concerning the specifics of his philosophical psychology: the first axis presents Amo as an exponent of a strong mechanistic physiology in line with the revolutions of seventeenth-century medical enlightenment. Against much of the philosophy prior to his period, Amo steers away from all notions of the soul as a vitalistic principle of the body, insisting on a mechanistic account of biological life and operation. Yet Amo is no materialist, but espouses a version of mechanism in tune with Leibniz in key respects. He is rather shown to be a dualist – affirming both a material and an immaterial realm of cosmology. In the second axis, given his mechanist physiology, tends towards the early modern accounts of cognition and perception, eschewing the long traditions of the Scholastic species doctrines. Yet, granted this abandonment of Scholastic cognitive theory, he does not yet find adequate some of the mechanistic alternatives of mental cognition by various models of contact or physical influence, nor yet the vague Cartesian option postulating a third universal ontological entity. Instead, his attention is drawn to the creative Leibnizian notions of substance and their promise for an alternative starting point in cognition – i.e. intrinsic precognition. On the third axis, the commitment to a particular physiology and concept of the mind requires an account for the nature of the interaction between the soul and the body in yielding the complexities of psycho-somatic human experiences. To this, Amo has been shown to pursue his proclivity to Leibniz by imbibing the latter’s notion of pre-established harmony, given methodological rigour and application to philosophical psychology by the mediation of Wolff. The fourth axis, shows Amo’s awareness of the moral theological concerns of his context vis-à-vis philosophical discussions of the soul, and his attempts to factor these in his treatment; but this, perhaps not far enough to allay the Pietist worries at the orientation of Leibniz-Wolffian philosophy in general.

With the context of Amo’s philosophical world surveyed, the study is in better position to closely explore the content of the thinker’s philosophical psychology by taking his Disputatio as the springboard text of inquiry.
CHAPTER 3

AMO’S PHILOSOPHICAL PSYCHOLOGY: AN EXEGETICAL-
SYSTEMATIC EXAMINATION

Introduction

One of the notoriously challenging issues in philosophical psychology has been the intuition, on one hand, that the human mind and body are essentially different kinds of things, which naturally should not interact following the usual paradigms of mechanistic efficient causation; but the experience, on the other hand, of a seamless flow of apparently causal and intentional determination between them. Though anthropological dualism seems a most evident conclusion, once that move is made, accounting for the experienced ‘unity’ between the soul and body is fraught with philosophical difficulties. The seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in particular represent some of the most creative attempts at proffering philosophically coherent solutions to these questions. In the previous chapter, attempt was made at showing how the philosopher from Africa, Amo, is part of the rich conversation of philosophers critiquing, adopting, refining, refuting, and systematizing each other’s positions on these questions. It was suggested much earlier that as a result of an intellectually broad upbringing, the adopted Ghanaian-German has a penchant for engaging a wide selection of thinkers or traditions, and as such brings unlikely faces to the same conversation table. Amo’s involvement and contribution to this enterprise of philosophical psychology suggests among other things that the participants of the conversation do not constitute a monolithic demographical base, whether racially, intellectually, geographically, or in religious conviction. It was shown that Amo’s own voice in this big conversation shows masterful acquaintance with the issues of the day, and from that platform he critiques options that be considers to be philosophically untenable. In the present chapter, an attempt will be made to unpack the
content of Amo’s philosophical psychology, taking off from his Disputatio and engaging his other works, as required.

The controlling question in Amo’s psychology is this: given the mechanistic conception of the organic body as a material and biological automaton, and the human mind as an absolutely impassible and purely immaterial center of intellection, volition and action, on what basis can phenomena such as cognition, perception of sensation, moral (or immoral) action, etc. – which require the interfacing of mind and body – take place without compromising the ontological and operational integrity of either? For Amo, not only are the ontologies of the mind and body disparate, but consequently, so are their internal operations. Thus, perhaps even more radically than Descartes, the wedge of dualism is sharply drawn, bringing Amo to side more readily with the Leibnizian framework of pre-established harmony – in which the operational sovereignty of the mind and the body is preserved.

Yet, even within this dualistic framework, Amo sets up a very strong relationship of dependence between mind and body. For him, the mind by definition is a spirit that is bound to an organic body. As such the human mind and its operations are irreducibly and exclusively psychological, yet are functionally inconceivable without the body it inheres. Amo’s construct to describe this phenomenon is the mind’s “very tight bond and commerce” with the body (arctissimum cum corpore uniculum et commercium uid). The concept is not defined per se, but it is illustrated. The mind’s autonomy from the body yet commerce with it is seen in its cognitive processes – where Amo can affirm simultaneously that the mind knows things from an internal precognition, and yet endorse the strongly empiricist maxim, “nothing is in the intellect that was not first in the senses.” Like all dualists, Amo is here saddled with the readers’ curiosity for precision on the nature of the ‘mind-and-body’ ‘union’ or ‘bond’ or ‘commerce.’ Is it a contingent arrangement? It is ontological – even here, is it accidental (ens per accidens) or substantial (ens per se)?483 To be reckoned of Amo’s philosophical psychology, therefore,

483 This is immediately reminiscent of Descartes’s correspondence with the Professor of Medicine at Utrecht, Henricus Regius (1598-1679), and the latter’s projection unto Descartes the notion that the human is an ens per accidens. (See AT III, 454-62; CSMK, 199-201).
is this double emphasis on a strict dualism, and a very strong emphasis on the commerce between the soul and the body.

The following sections delve into considerable detail in explicating Amo’s philosophy. But the details must not be lost to the greater purpose. In all of these, the aim is to present the philosophical schemes Amo employs in giving a coherent account of the mind’s interaction with the body.

**The Disputatio: a summary**

The thesis of Amo’s *Disputatio* is straightforward and is captured by its title:

Whatever is placed in the faculty of thinking (*cogitandi faculitate*) alone concerns the mind; whatever is of the faculty of sensing (*facultatis sentiendi*) alone, and is immediately in the senses, concerns the body.\footnote{Disputatio, Ch. I, preface, “Quidquid in sola cogitandi facultate situm est, illud menti; quidquid solius facultatis sentiendi, immediate que in sensibus est, illus corpori competit.”}

His motivation, therefore, is to form a ‘distinct idea’ of what belongs to either. It involves the accurate delimitation of the functions of the human mind (*humanae mentis*) from those of the organic body (*corporis nostro vivo et organico*) through the precise definition and conceptualization of each. Amo, as he claims, carries further the thesis already extensively demonstrated (*prolixe deduximus*) in his early *Apatheia*. The program of his disputation involves formulating a “distinct idea” (*ideam distinctam*) of this categorization, where distinct idea refers to “the cognition of those things that occur in human actions, in themselves, and always either in the mind alone or in our living and organic body alone.” The operative word in Amo’s task here seems to be his exclusivist classification of phenomena, as captured by “alone.” From the onset, the project is conceived upon the premise that, for two really distinct entities, \( A \) and \( B \), their essential properties \( A' \) and \( B' \), cannot be shared or identical, otherwise \( A \) will be identical to \( B \). The distinct idea of each entity thus involves an identification of those essential properties of either mind or body that are *necessarily* distinct from each other (“*per se, & semper*”).

The *Disputatio* is organized into two chapters: the first treats the theoretical basis and exposition of Amo’s mind philosophy around the questions of its operations; the second contains a brief pointer to the “*status controversiae*” of the work – principally presenting
the same counter-argument to Descartes’ attribution of sensation to the thinking mind, as in *Apatheia*; and a short critique of Jean Le Clerc’s taxonomy of the faculties of the mind.

The first chapter is further sectioned into two parts: the first of these treats the mind in general terms, while the second deals specifically with the acts of the mind. In arguing for a correct classification of the things of the mind and body, Amo shows how the mind determines its internal operations distinct from those of the body. He builds on the thesis of his *Apatheia* that presented the human body as a living organism in which all biological processes are purely somatic and independent of the mind’s operations, but, however, inseparably in ‘commerce’ with the latter. While the *Apatheia* had focused on conceptualizing natures of the organic body and the mind as two distinct entities, the *Disputatio* explores the operations of the mind that make the ‘commerce’ with its body possible.

Amo conceives and investigates the operations of the mind as three acts: an act of intellection (*intellectus*), of willing (*voluntas*), and of efficiency or effecting (*efficiendi seu effectivus*). These treatments of the operations of the mind unify the classic themes in the philosophy of mind or philosophical psychology: viz., the operative schemes for the mind’s apprehension of knowledge, perception and sensation; its processes of judgment and truth-affirmation or denial, which for Amo includes moral categories; and the mind’s dimension of action and purposive intent. In Amo’s terse exploration of these operations of the mind, it must always be held in perspective that his overall project is to identify and predicate to mind only those things that essentially belong to mind *qua* mind, while accounting for the reality of the its commerce with the body.

**General observations on the Disputatio**

As mentioned in the second chapter, Amo’s *Disputatio* is of the genre of the philosophical disputation, and in this case a publically delivered disputation. Generally, a disputation, as opposed to a treatise, argues a very focused thesis or question of debate. The implication is that what the disputation gains in terseness and focus, it loses in detail and comprehensiveness (sometimes comprehensibility). Amo’s *Disputatio* itself is particularly succinct. The *Disputatio* thus leaves many philosophical questions
unanswered, and assumes many premises without a background discussion. Important philosophical concepts are often left undefined or the reader is referred to the *Apatheia* for more detail. Compiled as it is by Amo for presentation by his student, Theodosius Meiner, the work compactly weaves in themes often to be found in fuller detail elsewhere within Amo’s writings. Bearing this in mind, in such instances, free usage would be made of these fuller treatments.

**Structure**

The logical order in which Amo’s program is executed is conceived in four steps:\(^{485}\)

1. What is our body (*quid corpus nostrum*)?
2. What is the human mind (*quid mens humana*)?
3. What is the operation of the mind in general (*quid humanæ mentis in genere*)?
4. How many operations in general are there (*haec quotuplex in genere*)? – Namely, what is an act of the intellect (*quid actus intellectus*)? What is the will (*quid voluntas*)? What is the act of effecting, or the effective act (*quid actus efficiendi seu effectivus*)?

The entire disputation programmatically follows this outline above: i.e. after the definitions proper of both body and mind, and following a specification of what operations or functions are particular to mind in general, the inquirer is then in a position to unmistakably judge where such functions as sense perception should be placed – *vel menti vel corpori nostro organico*. Steps (1) and (2) are not developed in the *Disputatio* but in the *Apatheia*, and Amo makes reference and assumes prior knowledge of those treatments.\(^{486}\) The specific contribution of the *Disputatio*, then, is on (3) and (4), the operations of the mind with view to the same thesis as outlined above. The emphasis here constitutes Amo’s philosophy of mind: his understanding of how the mind internally functions vis-à-vis knowledge, cognition, will, ideas, etc. On this note, to the question, ‘what is the operation of the mind in general?’ It is “an act of the mind carried out with

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\(^{485}\) *Disputatio*, Ch. I, preface, “methodi causa explicari debent.”

\(^{486}\) Ibid., “What the human mind is, and what is our living and organic body is, we have stated in our dissertation *De humanæ mentis apatheia*. (‘What is mind?’ dl. C. I. memb. I. §. 3. ‘What is body?’ *ibid.* in *Note 3*). Therefore, the next follows presently.”
consciousness and with intention, by ideas and sensations of thinking, and verifying the things that are thought.”487 With this working definition, Amo explores the number of the mind’s operations.

The numbers of these operations may be considered both in general and in particular. Considered in general, Amo’s concern finds the basis for the distinction between the three acts of the mind. The distinction (differentias relativas) between these acts owes not to their real differences (for they are “numerically” and “specifically” one), but to the objects and ends at which they are aimed in each instance of their activity. Of further concern is the kind of objects that the acts of the mind may be aimed at, and the role played by objects and ends (objecto & fine) in the mind’s acts. In the former, the mind is said to direct its intellective acts towards either sensation/sensible objects (sensio), or things (res). In the latter, objects and ends constitute, respectively, the means or medium of the mind’s cogitation, and the goal towards which its act must reach a resolution.

For the acts of the mind in particular, following the sketchy scheme above, the act of mind for intellection concerns its ability to represent to itself either objects of sensation or things in the process of understanding – quidquid mens sibi conscium facit, est vel res, vel sensio.488 It builds on the Scholastic notion that – and in this case specifically quotes from Melanchthon – “nothing is in the intellect that was not previously in the senses.”489 Intellection concerns both this representation of things and sensation as mental ideas, and the mind’s reflection upon them, in order to make judgment calls based on its purposive intentions (intentionis mentis cognoscentis).490 Following this is the will (voluntas), the act of the mind in the pursuit of (or restraint therefrom) the content of ideas as represented and judged by the intellect.491 This act of the mind functions through the “premeditated decree of the mind” (præmeditato mentis Decreto), and essentially

488 Ibid., Ch. I, Mem. II, Sec. I, §. 1.
490 Ibid., §. 5.
491 Ibid., Ch. I, Mem. II, Sec. II, §. 1, “Voluntas est: actus mentis per ideas, propter finem consequendum, sed ratione habita convenientiæ & discrepantiæ instinctus naturalis, immediate concurrentis, cum præmeditato mentis Decreto.”
represents the mind’s decision process through ends known to and in itself. This category of the mind’s operation is developed by Amo within a distinctly practical framework of moral action, and is a combination of a kind Wolffian intellectualism (as a general principle), and ideas from Stoic ascetic philosophies. The judgment of the will, however, is not conceived of as an indifferent rational decision between available options, but is set up by Amo as somewhat influenced by brutish natural instincts (*instinctu naturali*). The effective act of the mind involves the mind’s undertaking to pursue particular ends. It concerns the negotiation of means and ends, and their application. The application per se for action is made possible through the mind’s commerce with the body, and the mediation of the latter (“*mediantibus corporis commercio & mediis*”).

**The Significance of Amo’s Program**

Before a more in-depth analysis of the *Disputatio* can proceed, an indication of the significance of Amo’s philosophy of mind as here summarized is in order. First, it may be asked: what is the significance of Amo’s preoccupation with delimiting the distinct ideas that belong to the body from those that belong to the mind? The importance of this program is not immediately evident. In response, the observation can be made that the notion of ‘distinct idea’ (*ideam distinctam*) has a strong Cartesian ring to it. Descartes’ correspondence with Princess Elisabeth makes some pronouncements on the importance of holding distinct ideas of things vis-à-vis knowledge in general. For Descartes, all of human knowledge consists in the correct and precise attribution of notions to the things (*chooses*) of which they are properties. The false attribution of notions or properties to things results in a general state of wrong thinking – indistinct and confused ideas. This attribution of notions to their correct ‘things’ by Descartes falls precisely within the ambit of ontology rather than epistemology, as has already been discussed in the preceding chapter. Within this realm of ontology, the influence of Leibniz and Wolff on Amo is

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492 *Disputatio*, Ch. I, Mem. I, Sec. III, “In actu efficiendi seu effective ad media, instrumenta eorumque applicationem.”

493 AT III, 665-66, “Je considère aussi que toute la science des hommes ne consiste qu’à bien distinguer ces notions, et à n’attribuer chacune d’elles qu’aux choses auxquelles elles appartiennent. Car, lors que nous voulons expliquer quelque difficulté par le moyen d’une notion qui ne lui appartient pas, nous pouvons manquer de nous méprendre.”
evidenced in this regard: viz., that according to the law of non-contradiction, contradictory or incompatible notions cannot be predicated of the same ‘thing’. To put it in distinctly Wolffian terms: in philosophy, qua science of possibles or of non-contradictory existence, opposite predicates cannot exist as a being (or the same being).

Amo follows a similar line of reasoning first by his description of what true scientific knowledge is: it involves the knowledge of a thing as it is in itself. It is an apprehension of the origin, essence and existence of a thing per se. Added to this is Amo’s understanding that a being or an entity is necessarily known by its attributes or qualities. Similar to Descartes, then, the attribution of some notions to a thing (for Descartes, forming a ‘distinct idea’) is equivalent to the Scholastic concept of essential predication. The essential predicates of a thing constitute its nature, ontologically speaking – or its quiddity. Furthermore, if these attributes are conceptually opposed to each other – which, for Amo, is the case between the immaterial operations of the mind (say, $M$) and the material sense faculties and sensation (say, $S$) – then no being with both properties can exist. Put differently, the conception of an entity, $E$, having the contradictory attributes of $M$ and $S$ is a non-being, tout court. Therefore, for Amo, having ideam distinctam and separating what belongs to the mind from what belongs to the body is not a pedantic mongering for an accurate taxonomy of biological functions. Rather, at issue here is the theoretical conceptualization of the quiddities of mind and organic body so as to make scientific knowledge of them possible.

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494 See Leibniz, “First Truths” (L: 267). $A$ is $A$, or $A$ is not non-$A$; if it is true that $A$ is $B$, it is false that $A$ is not $B$ or that $A$ is non-$B$.

495 Wolff, Philosophia Prima sive Ontologia, §133. “Quod possibile est, illud existere potest. Cum enim possibile contradicitionem nullam involvat; eo posito idem non ponitur simul esse & non esse, consequenter quod esse ponitur, tantum esse, haud quaquam vero simul non esse ponitur” (cf. §28, §30, §56, and §85).

496 Tractatus, Ch. I, Mem. VI, § 6. Note: The Latin text of all Tractatus references will be cited when a copy of the original Latin edition is obtained. Provisionally all citations are my translations of the Mugnol French translation.

497 Ibid., § 8.

498 Tractatus, Ch. I, Mem. I.

499 Apatheia, Ch. I, Mem. I, §1, Expo. 5, “Of two contrary opposites, one cannot contain and possess the other, since contrary opposites mutually exclude each other from the same genus, the same species, and the same denomination.” [Contrarie oppositorum unum alterum continere et habere nequit; quia contrarie opposita ab inunicem excludant, genus, speciem et candem denominationem.]
A second significance of Amo’s *Disputatio* treatment is that with the identification and presentation of the mind and the organic body in terms of two ontologically distinct entities or substances, which though in ‘commerce’, yet metaphysically, cannot causally interact, Amo is stuck with the classical dilemma of dualism, similar to the Cartesian mind-body problem – especially the variant of how the mind’s *substantia immaterialis*\(^{500}\) can interact with the body’s *substantia materialis*. The significance of Amo’s philosophy of mind here is to give a fuller and more specific account of the program already started in the *Apatheia*: viz., the idea that spirits achieve cognition, not through contact, communication and penetration of the objects to be known, but rather make themselves conscious of objects (*sibi conscias facit*).\(^{501}\) Spirits (the genus of minds) understand by operating “spontaneously,” i.e. “intrinsically, determines its operations toward an end that is to be pursued, and is not absolutely compelled from outside to operate” (*omnis spiritus operator sua sponte i.e. intrinsece, suas operationes determinat ad finem consequendum, nec aliunde absolute cogitur ut operetur*).\(^{502}\) The implication of this intrinsic spontaneity is that, not only is the mind apathetic to the putative objects of sensation, but these objects are not causally efficient in the determination of the mind’s cognitive processes.\(^{503}\) The force of the dilemma vis-à-vis the possibility for the mind’s cognition of material things (and its influence over the same) is mitigated if a plausible account may be proffered for how the role of the body’s sensation is merely *mediate*, not *immediate*, in the process.

To this end, the significance of the *Disputatio* is an attempt to provide such a philosophy of mind applied specifically to the human mind and its operations. Amo’s treatment here has thus aimed at giving an account of the human mind’s cognition and operations that depends on its own intrinsic and spontaneous acts, unaffected *directly* by

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\(^{500}\) Ibid., Ch. I, Mem. I, §. 3.

\(^{501}\) *Disputatio*, Ch. I, Mem. II, §1.

\(^{502}\) *Apatheia*, Ch. I, Mem. I, §. 1, Expo. 3.

\(^{503}\) It must be reiterated, as will be shown further below, it is not that the material body and sensation plays no role whatsoever in the mind’s operations, but rather that this role is not one of efficient causation – something which, as has been described, Amo understands in specifically mechanist terms. This nuance is borne out by Amo’s (as above): “…and is not absolutely compelled from outside to operate;” even further, by his use of “efficient cause” (*causa efficiens*) in precisely this section of his discussion (*Apatheia*, Ch. I, Mem. I, §. 1, Expo. 4).
the motions of the senses and the living organic body’s faculties of sensation. The Disputatio thus preserves Amo’s physiology of the autonomous natural machine by attempting to provide a psychology of mind and body commerce without mechanistically-conceived schemes of causation.

**Detailed Commentary**

It is to be expected that Amo’s diverse philosophical influences and contexts, as was discussed in the previous chapter, would come to play in interesting ways in his philosophy of mind. But these influences must be teased out. A general guiding aim in the following sections, therefore, will be to survey how Amo, given his reactions to various mind-body interactionist schemes, achieves a philosophy of mind that is consistent with his conceptions of the living organic body and mind. Another aim is to discern some of the ways he navigates the rich landscape of philosophical psychology and its related themes.

To proceed in this exposition of Amo’s Disputatio, we will adopt a broadly textual and systematic-thematic approach. The presentation will primarily exegete the original Latin text following Amo’s development of themes as they arise. However, although focusing on the Disputatio, the presentation shall not be bound to its text. Concerning the thematic-systematic angle, for reasons indicated in chapter two above, some liberties would be taken with inter-textuality in the Amo corpus, with regards to themes that receive further elucidation elsewhere in his works. Also, contextual philosophical issues already raised in the last chapter will be indicated by way of comparison and contrast with Amo.

**Status Controversiae**

The correspondence between Descartes and Princess Elisabeth of Bohemia evidently held much importance for Amo, for both his Apatheia and Disputatio take their theoretical point de départ from a critique of Descartes’ position in those exchanges. Central to the content of the correspondence is Descartes’ apparent inconsistency with the
tenets of his own dualist metaphysics when confronted with how the mind and body should interact. Amo would take what he perceives to be Descartes’ shortcoming as starting point for his own aims of exploring alternatives of mind-body interaction. ⁵⁰⁴

The first exchange took place in May of 1643 when Princess Elisabeth asked Descartes to further explain “how the mind (l’âme de l’homme) ⁵⁰⁵ can determine the animal spirits (esprits du corps) in producing voluntary actions, being that the former is a purely thinking substance.” ⁵⁰⁶ If the movement of material objects necessitates contact (l’attouchement) and extension, how can causality obtain between the thinking mind and the material body? ⁵⁰⁷ It seems Elisabeth was simply looking for an acceptable account of causation between extended (material) substance and non-extended (immaterial) substance, assuming as she did, a basic mechanistic causal theory of physical contact, alteration of shape, and motion.

In Descartes’ response two weeks later (21 May 1643), he appeals to certain “primitive notions” (notions primitives) that form fundamental categories through which the world is conceived and understood. ⁵⁰⁸ ‘Extension’ is the only primitive notion that can be conceived of the body, and this property ‘entails’ (suivent) others – size, shape and motion. For the mind, only the primitive notion of ‘thinking’ (la pensée) is conceived of it, where this thinking includes cognition (les perceptions de l’entendement) and will (les inclinations de la volonté). In addition to these, there is a third primitive notion of the union of the mind and body to which must belong (depend) the properties of the mind’s power (force) to move the body, and the body’s power to act on the mind by causing

⁵⁰⁴ It was generally recognized from the seventeenth century that Descartes’ explanation of mind-body interaction was a most unsatisfactory one. Consequently, Cartesians thereafter took it upon themselves to provide an adequate account. Leibniz captures this sentiment well in his comment that Descartes “gave up the struggle over this problem” (Leibniz, New System of the Nature and the Communication of Substances §12, L: 457).

⁵⁰⁵ I follow the conventions used in these correspondences to refer to “human soul” (l’âme de l’homme) what Descartes ordinarily calls ‘mind.’ In the ongoing sections these are used interchangeably, but with preference for the former where Elisabeth uses it.

⁵⁰⁶ AT, III: 661.

⁵⁰⁷ AT, III: 661, “Car il me semble que toute la détermination de mouvement se fait par la pulsion de la chose mue, à manière dont elle est poussée par celle qui la meut, ou bien, de la qualification & figure de la superficie de cette dernière. L’attouchement est requis aux deux premières conditions, & l’extension à la troisième.”

⁵⁰⁸ Descartes lists among these primitive notions, ‘being’ (l’être), ‘quantity’ (nombre), ‘duration’ (la durée), AT III: 665.
sensations and passions. Any comprehensive knowledge of the nature of the human soul, therefore, must proceed programatically in two steps: the determination of the primitive notion of the soul existing by itself (which primitive notion is thinking), and of the soul as united to the body. Under this second consideration, part of the nature of the human soul is that “being united with the body, it [the human soul] can act and be affected by it [the body]” (étant unie au corps, elle peut agir et patir avec lui). For Descartes, then, the notions of the human soul’s effecting of bodily movements, and its being affected by bodily passions are themselves primitive or fundamental notions that, like general notions such as weight, cannot be explicated in terms of any simpler notions. In the absence of the knowledge of simpler notions of causality and explanation, it must be reckoned, as a matter of primitive notion, that there is a ‘something’ (mind-body) possessing the power of ‘immateriality-can-affect-materiality’.

Elisabeth’s response to Descartes on June 10 1643 suggests, in the most deferential of tones, that she is dissatisfied with the philosopher’s answer. Descartes, for her, seems to have missed the heart of her question. For one, she is dubious of Descartes’ move here of advancing the phenomenon to be explained as a quality or primitive notion of a supposed other substance. Descartes’ incorrect identification of weight as a primitive notion of materiality, and his use of that as analogy for mind-body interaction, for Elisabeth, far from explains how the immaterial can ‘move’ the material. She understands Descartes as meaning that since no material cause can be adduced for the human soul’s causal relationship to the body, then, material causality has to be attributed to immaterial agency as a ‘notion primitive.’ Elisabeth’s mechanist assumptions on this question come to light: “I have never been able to conceive of the immaterial but as the negation and the contrary of the material, something that can have no communication whatsoever with the material.” On this note, then, Elisabeth finds more viability to the materialist

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509 AT, III: 665.
510 AT, III: 664.
511 AT, III: 684.
512 Ibid.
option of an extended corporeal human soul that possessed abilities for intelligence — but such a possibility was already rejected by Descartes’ *Meditationes*.

It is immediately clear how assuming, as Elisabeth does, a mechanist framework of causality by contact and communication of forces, Descartes’ answer is not only unsatisfactory, but seems to revert to the very paradigms of Scholastic ‘scientific’ explanation that he was methodically trying to break with — viz., explanation of phenomena in terms of powers (*vis*) or qualities of a postulated underlying substrate. Even more problematic for any mechanist (indeed Cartesian) assumption is the attribution to an otherwise immaterial purely thinking mind (*res cogitans*) — mind qua united with body — the attributes of bodily effection and affection (*agir et patir*). It is precisely this answer here proffered by Descartes that Amo, standing firmly on a mechanist causal framework, reacts to. From Elisabeth, he quotes the very Cartesian notion that is found objectionable:

> There are two things in the human soul upon which all the knowledge/cognition we are able to have of its nature depends, one of which is that it thinks, the other that, united to a body, it is able to act and to suffer together with it.

But perhaps more sympathetic to Descartes’ position than Elisabeth is, Amo concedes the potential importance that the mind’s union with the body would have for any philosophical psychology. However, what remains unacceptable for Amo’s own position is that these new properties (*agir et patir*, or *agere et pati*) should be considered as belonging to the *nature* of the mind (*naturam animae*), whose essence is conceived as the ability to think alone.

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513 AT, III: 685, “J’avoue qu’il me serait plus facile de conceded la matière et l’extension à l’âme, que la capacité de mouvoir un corps et d’en être emeu, à un être immatériel.”

514 As presented by Descartes, ‘*agir*’ concerns the qualities of the mind’s ability to intentionally move the body; ‘*patir*’ refers to the mind’s ability to be affected by the passions of bodily sensation. I will use the construct “*agir et patir*” as shorthand in reference to these.

515 *Apatheia*, Ch. II, ‘Status controversiae’, “Nam cum duo sint in anima humana, ex quibus pendet tota cognition, quam de eius natura habere possimus, quorum unum est quod cogitetur, alterum quod unita corpori possit cum illo agere et pati.” Amo is quoting from Renati Descartes, *Epistolae, Partim ab Auctore Latino sermone conscriptae, partim ex Gallico translatae*, Part I (Amsterdam: Apud Danielem Elzevirium, 1668), 59.

516 Ibid., “We concede that the mind acts together with the body by the mediation of a mutual union.”

517 *Apatheia*, Ch. II, ‘Status controversiae’
The ambiguity of Descartes’ response is thus revealed: what is the metaphysical status of the mind-body? Do the properties of *agir et patir* belong to the *nature* of mind (a *res cogitans*) or to the nature of body (a *res extensa*), or to an ontological *tertium quid*?

In other words, since apparently Descartes has conceded, on his own mechanist foundations and along with Elisabeth, that the ‘moving’ of the body by the mind (and vice versa) [i.e. the *agir et patir*] cannot be accounted for within a framework of physical contact and communication, he has instead taken these to be primitive notions of the mind-body union. But is the mind-body itself a substance having *agir et patir* as its attributes? Are the properties of the mind-body simply an aggregation of the individual properties of mind and body, perhaps following the principle of *totum maior summa partum*? Amo and Elisabeth take Descartes’ meaning to be that *agir et patir* actually belong to the nature of the mind. Elisabeth mentions the higher possibility (and preference) for their belonging to the body instead – if a choice had to be made between either. On both accounts, the incompatibility of *agir et patir* with a purely thinking mind or a purely extended body is immediately seen. The question can thus be restated: to what *nature* do the properties of *agir et patir* actually belong?

As has been pointed out, Amo’s reading of these correspondences sees Descartes, as expected, through the prism of dualism; consequently, the properties ascribed by Descartes to the mind-body union are simply aggregated from properties that ordinarily can only belong to either the nature of the body or the mind. There is therefore no third real substance called mind-body. In this case, the notions of ‘to effect and to be affected’ are properties of the mind – something incompatible with the mind’s essential nature of thinking only.

It can be concluded that Amo’s dissatisfaction with Descartes centres around the latter’s costly concession that in order to explain the mind’s determination of the body and its perception of sensation, it must be conceded that the mind receives passions into itself. Amo’s position is also against Jean LeClerc’s similar conclusion that conceives the mind as capable of sensation. Amo’s takeoff point is that such concession is unnecessary. Instead, the processes of sensation could remain circumscribed to the organic body where they belong, while other options of the mind-body union could be explored. We now explore Amo’s chosen option.
Amo’s ontology of material bodies

Commencing with Amo’s programmatic, steps (1) and (2) must first be explored: ‘What is our body?’ ‘What is the human mind in general?’ Consistent throughout Amo’s corpus is the notion that the human mind is always in commerce with a body. As a genere spirituum (of the genus of spirits), its specific difference from other spiritual beings (God included) is that the mind always inheres in a body, and the human being is necessarily a composite of both. The human mind as such is never considered as a metaphysical Cartesian ego with the possibility of existing and functioning without the body. However, the body in which this mind is present is always conceived by Amo as corpori nostro vivo et organico. To explore the significance of this particular coinage, Amo’s general ontology of material bodies needs to be understood.

Ontological Foundations

Like Wolff, a rational account of the mind and its operations, for Amo, is an ontological enterprise. Wolff’s ontology-intensive approach is seen in Amo. The soul (Wolff’s preferred usage) is considered insofar as it is a species of being, and then follows a demonstration of what can be predicated of it, according to principles of ontology. Amo’s investigation of the quid sit of the body and mind, therefore, need to start with ontology.

His ontology outlines as follows: Being (ens) – considered in the broadest sense of all entities, properties and modes whatsoever – may be denominated as actual being (ens actuale), possible being (ens possibile), impossible being (ens impossibile), and rational being (ens rationis). Impossible beings are positively possessed of no attributes (non entis nulle attributa), or are ‘possessed’ of conceptually contradictory attributes, and therefore are not actual, nor can they be objects of knowledge – for things are known only by virtue

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518 Apatheia, Ch. I, Mem. I, § 3, Not. 3, “Duae dantur partes essentiales hominis mens et corpus de mente dictum est ad corpus quod adhine est.”

519 Wolff, Psychologia Rationalis, §3, “In psychologia rationali principia demonstrandi petenda sunt ex ontologia. Porro anima humana cum actu existat in numero entium est consequenter ad demonstrata sunt. Quamobrem cum in Ontologia demonstratur, quae de ente in genere praedicanda veniunt; in Psychologia rationali principia demonstrandi petuntur ex Ontologia.”
of their attributes and qualities.\textsuperscript{520} Possible beings involve no conceptual contradiction or repugnancy (recalling Wolff) and therefore could exist;\textsuperscript{521} they are, however, only found to have an “origin, existence and essence” (\textit{originem, existentiam, essentiam}) if some operation is employed to actualize them.\textsuperscript{522} Rational beings have their origin, existence, and essence \textit{only} within the human understanding, and have no reality outside the mind – for example, the representation of a golden mountain.\textsuperscript{523} The last category of being, that possessing real existence, is \textit{actual being}.\textsuperscript{524}

An actual being is constituted of \textit{substance}, the immutable substrate of being,\textsuperscript{525} and \textit{quality}, the attributes and properties of that being. ‘Substance’ can further be characterized, as does Amo, as the principle of \textit{reality} (\textit{LATIN}) from which actual being draws its origin, existence and essence. It is also the principle and subject of all predication, to which ‘quality’ constitutes the formal principles of modification.\textsuperscript{526} In other words, anything that exists in reality is necessarily some kind of substance. Importantly, this tripartite construct of origin-existence-essence as applied to substance in general, is Amo’s consistently-used shorthand for the \textit{exhaustive} explanation for the being of any things that \textit{actually} exists – both its \textit{ratione} and the various causal requirements for its existence.

Moving further, substance, the self-existing reality,\textsuperscript{527} is said to denominate into two kinds: \textit{spirit substance} and \textit{matter substance}. ‘Quality’, naturally is an attribute of

\textsuperscript{520} \textit{Tractatus}, Ch. I, Mem. I.

\textsuperscript{521} A golden mountain, for example, is a possible being.

\textsuperscript{522} \textit{Tractatus}, Ch. I, Mem. III, §7. The strong suggestion of Amo’s ontology along Thomistic lines can be seen – viz. that like Aquinas, the actuality of a being involves a two-stage metaphysical act, its \textit{essence} (for which the condition is non-repugnance), and its \textit{existence} – an actualizing of essence, for which Amo uses the shorthand ‘origin, existence, essence’. See Etienne Gilson, \textit{Being and Some Philosophers} (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 1952), famous for elucidating these concepts.

\textsuperscript{523} Ibid., § 3: 45. Evidently, for Amo here, for something to “exist” is reference to a category of existence that is broader than merely extra-mental tangible existence. Mental objects, for Amo, can also be said to ‘exist’ – provided, of course, that they are possible.

\textsuperscript{524} Ibid., “L’être actuel, celui qui existe et que l’on perçoit hors de l’entendement humain, hors de toute fiction, en tant qu’effet de l’intention ou divine, ou humaine.”

\textsuperscript{525} \textit{Tractatus}, Ch. II, Mem. II, §5.

\textsuperscript{526} \textit{Tractatus}, Ch. III, Mem. I, §3.

\textsuperscript{527} Not ‘self-existing’ in an absolute sense, but as highest genus of being and therefore not a property of anything else.
substance (or its property); but beyond that, it seems for Amo, some category of quality has the same kind of independent existence as substance does: for “beings exist as either substance or quality.”\(^{528}\) By all indication, some qualities exist as universals; however, they cannot exist concretely as an actual being without substance.\(^{529}\) Existing as universal qualities, are spiritual qualities and material qualities.\(^{530}\)

Beings are either qualities or substances. Some qualities belong jointly to spirits and to bodies; they are universal and shared, and belong to the discipline of ontology. When qualities are particular to spirits only, they are categorized as pneumatology; if they belong to bodies alone, they are said to pertain to Physics.\(^{531}\)

Spiritual and material qualities, for Amo, are irreducible. Only a composed or material substance, for example, can possess material qualities; and the possession of material qualities de facto implies a material substance. For Amo, then, the ontological category of real existents, actual beings, are constituted by qualities/properties and the substances in which they inhere,\(^{532}\) and these could be presented as ‘spirit: spiritual’, and ‘matter: material’.\(^{533}\) One may speak of ‘spiritual beings’ and ‘material beings.’ Amo thus recognizes only two ultimate categories of substance within the realm of actual beings.\(^{534}\)

Their differences follow: these two kinds of actual beings are different (real difference) both substantially and qualitatively. More strictly ontologically, a spiritual or immaterial being can be designated as a simple substance, while a material being is a composed substance. Amo characterizes these two substances:

A material or composed substance is [...] a substance consisting of a variety and multiplicity of parts and properties. An incorporeal or simple substance is [...] a

\(^{528}\) Tractatus, Ch. III, Mem. III, §1.

\(^{529}\) Ibid., §3.

\(^{530}\) Tractatus, Ch. I, Mem. I; I, III, §2.

\(^{531}\) Tractatus, Ch. II, Mem. III, §1.

\(^{532}\) Amo follows the general substance-quality scheme of Aristotelian-Scholastic metaphysics. But exactly how substances and properties are united in actual being is not developed. It must be observed, however, that this unity between substances and property is a potential problem only for composed substances; in simple substances, quality is equivalent to substance, as will be described further below.

\(^{533}\) The construct ‘spirit: spiritual’ and ‘matter: material’ is made here simply to indicate that for Amo, actual being (and also ‘being’ in general) is always conceived as some substance with its attending property [i.e. substance: property]. Usually, the designation “spiritual” or “spirit”, “material” or “matter” is simply a reference to kind of being, considered as one unit of substance and property. Often, also, “spiritual” and “inmaterial” are used interchangeably; the same applies for “material” and “physical”.

\(^{534}\) Tractatus, Ch. II, Mem. III, §3.
substance in which there is neither spatial presence, multiplicity of part, nor diversity of properties. Their specific ontological concepts will follow as the need arises. What it is proper to conclude here is that for Amo’s ontology, material things fall into the category of composed substance, meaning that they are actually existing, their essence is material substance, and they have qualities that are irreducibly material.

Within this framework of Amo’s ontology, his concepts of body and mind, as will be shown, are situated. This also goes some way to showing that although Amo is a mechanist within the realm of material things, he is by no means a materialist. His ontology makes for the simultaneous presence of both material and spiritual reality within the continuum of the experienced reality. This ontology further gives some insight into the version of dualism held by Amo, by highlighting its divergence from Descartes’ mind-body dualism – a point not often appreciated in understanding Amo’s reaction to the latter. It is not simply the case that Amo shares with Descartes a “common dualism,” or of Amo’s “agreement with Descartes” on the philosophy of mind as Wiredu sees it. Amo’s dualism is arrived at from the a priori analysis of being, and as such, uses the categories of simple versus composed, or immaterial vs. material. Descartes’ dualism follows an a posteriori analysis of phenomena to identify two irreducible basic notions in the world – thinking and extension. Following from this, as will be seen, Amo’s dualism is much more fundamental than Descartes’.

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535 *Tractatus*, Special Section, Ch. I, Mem. V, §3-4.

536 Kwasi Wiredu, “Amo’s Critique of Descartes’ Philosophy of Mind,” in *A Companion to African Philosophy*, Kwasi Wiredu (ed.) (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2004), 200-206, 204. Wiredu sees an essential agreement between Amo and Descartes’ dualisms. He fails to appreciate that Amo arrives at his dualism from a very different philosophical route, and therefore operates with a different tradition of ontology. On these grounds, while Wiredu observes that Amo, unlike Descartes, conceives the mind as purely active, and sensation as purely passive, Wiredu does not see the ontological background from whence Amo makes these distinctions. His dualism is not essentially Cartesian, but rather from the Aristotelian-Scholastic-Wolffian tradition.

537 See *Principles* Part I, art. 52: AT VIIIA, 25; CSM I, 210. “We cannot initially become aware of a substance merely through its being an existing thing, since this alone does not have any effect on us. We can, however, easily come to know a substance by one of its attributes, in virtue of the common notion that nothingness possesses no attributes, that is to say, no properties or qualities. Thus, if we perceive the presence of some attribute, we can infer that there must also be present an existing thing or substance to which it may be attributed.”
**(I) Quid Corpus Nostrum**

The first element of Amo’s consideration is ‘what is the body?’ To this question he refers the reader to his treatment in the *Apatheia*. The aim of this element of his *Disputatio* is to investigate the quiddity of the human organic body *per se*. For Amo, such a question is not answered simply by describing the functions and faculties of body, but first by knowing its nature or substance.\(^{538}\) In investigating the quiddity of a thing, its formal principle must be accounted for using the following guidelines: the kind of nature it has; in what way it is; its duration; whether it is substantially simple or complex; what can about it formally; its genus and species; and particular thing it is.\(^{539}\) Following this, the properties of body thus pertain to its substance. Therefore, a general appraisal of Amo’s ontology of body is required.\(^{540}\)

**Composed substances**

The ontological *quid sit* of a body is an affirmation that it is a composed substance. It is not clear exactly in what sense the *substance* is composed: whether as aggregates of the simple substances, like Leibniz’s later metaphysics of the monadology suggests, for example, or whether composed substances are irreducible units of substance. What is clear is that the multiple qualities and parts that Amo attributes to composed substances are *essential* (as opposed to accidental or contingent).\(^{541}\) The *qualities*, then, of composed substances are said to be ‘material.’ Beside what we know about the universal and irreducible status of these qualities, Amo simply characterizes materiality primarily as the negation immateriality – “the predicate of immateriality precludes that of materiality.”\(^{542}\)

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\(^{538}\) *Tractatus*, Ch. I, Mem. III, §1-4.

\(^{539}\) Ibid.

\(^{540}\) For a general presentation of Amo’s ontology, see Andrej Krause, “Anton Wilhelm Amo’s Ontology,” *Philosophia Africana* 12, no. 2 (2009): 141–57. As far as I am aware, Krause’s article is about the only available publication with focus on Amo’s ontology. I disagree on finer details of the interpretation of Amo’s ontology; but overall, it is a satisfactory first introduction.

\(^{541}\) *Tractatus*, Ch. I, Mem. III, §2-6.

\(^{542}\) *Apatheia*, Ch. I, Mem. I, §1, Rat. 2, “Si aliquid est immateriale sequitur quod materiale esse nequeat: sunt enim contrarie opposita, nam praedicatum immaterialis excludit praedicatum materialitatis, quia praesentia immaterialitatis est absentia materialitatis, item ubi spiritualitas ibi ab est materialitas et vice versa.”
Hence, an *immaterial* or *spiritual* quality cannot belong to a material or composed substance. Amo says a bit more. A composed substance and its material qualities are characterized by having *parts* (*qua* composed), *properties*, and particular attendant *effects*. These all obtain from the *natures* of the substance and quality, and thus belong to the essence of the composed substance. Amo describes elsewhere that these “parts and properties are intrinsic to substance, and not from without.” Effects do not exist *in* the substance *per se*, but exist extrinsically as the necessary outcome of the substance’s causal potentialities or acts. The parts, properties, and effects of composed substances therefore indicate the *nature* or essence of the substance. Amo offers a brief characterization of each of these three. Any composed or material substance, thus, shows characteristics of inter-action by *communication*, *penetration*, and *contact*. These traits would be essential to the substance displaying them, because requisite for such action are the *material* qualities that inhere composed substance.

The attributes, communication, penetration and contact here adduced by Amo immediately evoke the mechanistic program in natural philosophy. By virtue of its nature, any action of the matter can only occur following the above-mentioned paradigms of causation – hence, Descartes’ *res extensa* substance. Under Amo’s scheme, the properties or effects that are essential to composed or corporeal substances are essential to them not as a matter of substance proper, but as *quality* – i.e. universal material qualities.

Amo’s philosophy in general, while mechanistic in orientation, yet maintains the Aristotelian-Scholastic substance metaphysics. Actual beings are thus conceived in terms of substance and attributes. The substance proper is the *real principle* while properties are the second ontological stage (*the formal principle*) of an entity. Like Scholastic metaphysics in general, properties are either essential or accidental. An essential property

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545 Ibid.
547 *Tractatus*, Ch. III, Mem. I, §5 (Definition of).
shares in the origin, existence and duration of the substance to which it is joined. 548 For Amo, although essential properties are co-existent with substance, it is a two-staged metaphysical principle that brings about the being of an entity. Such a move means that when Amo attributes evidently (essentially) mechanistic properties and modes of operations to composed corporeal substances, he is able to do that while yet maintaining an Aristotelian-Scholastic metaphysic of substance and attributes. Mechanistic properties thus still inhere in a metaphysical substrate – substance proper. Amo, like Leibniz, can have a purely mechanistic account of body at the level of Physics and natural scientific explanations, without recourse to substantial forms.

**Special material substances: Amo and organic living bodies**

If all material substances belong to the same category of being – composed incorporeal substance – as Amo’s ontology lays it out, then, how are organic sentient bodies accounted for? Amo makes clear that the various hylomorphic and vitalistic schemes of bodily animation by the soul are not admissible. Living organic bodies, as Amo affirms, are to be distinguished from non-living corporeal bodies by the principle of life. 549 That much is obvious: a living dog is distinguished from a stone, even though both are corporeal substances. But what constitutes the special category of the living organic body?

The organic body, as Amo describes it, is “most elegant, first crafted by the Creator from diverse vital and animal organs, and thereafter propagated through generation.” 550 This theme of the structuring of the organic body by the “Creator” or ‘God’ evokes Descartes and Leibniz: “a machine, which, having been made by God, is incomparably better ordered.” 551 The construction of this body gives it the organic properties it possesses. This organic nature is identified with two principles: a principle of life

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548 Tractatus, Ch. III, Mem. III, §6.
549 Apatheia, Ch. I, Mem. III, §2 “Ratione materiae distinguendum inter corpus vivum et vita privatum; illud utique, hoc minime mediante sua dispositione sensione afficitur.”
550 Apatheia, Ch. II, Mem. I, §3.
551 Descartes, Discours de la Méthode, AT, VI: 56.
(principium vitae), and sensation or perception. These two form, for Amo, a twin essential precondition for the organic – quidquid sentit, illud vivit.

To live and to sense are two inseparable predicates. The reason is this inversion: everything that lives necessarily senses, and everything that senses necessarily lives, so that the presence of the one implies the necessary presence of the other. From these two principles follow the other vital processes of the body:

Whatever senses, lives; whatever lives, is nourished; whatever lives and is nourished, grows; whatever is of this sort is in the end resolved into its first principles; whatever is resolved into its first principles, is derived from principles; everything derived from principles has its constitutive parts; whatever is of this sort, is a divisible body; therefore, if the human mind senses, it follows that it is a divisible body.

Without any appeal to the soul or mind whatsoever, the organic body is said to be responsible for the functions of nourishment, growth, the enjoyment of pleasurable situations and aversion to harm, and action by way of complex responses to stimuli. To show how the organic body carries out these functions, Amo invokes some of the mechanistic traditions of the second and first halves of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, respectively. He relies on the Galen-inspired iatrochemical traditions represented by moderns such as Johann Gottfried von Berger (1659-1736) and his own paresis Martin Loescher, and considers the organic processes of the body in terms of chemical reactions between body fluids – in this case, sensation as arising purely from the transmission of nerve fluids. Amo also draws on the iatromechanical traditions informed prominently by Albrecht von Haller’s ascription of the properties of irritability to nerves, and William Harvey’s theories of blood circulation by cardiac contraction. In this regard, the circulation of blood, explicated by the iatromechanical process of contraction, is itself the evidence of the principle of organic life – “whatever admits of

552 Apatheia, Ch. II, Mem. I, Not. 1.

553 Apatheia, Ch. II, Mem. I. “Quidquid sentit, illud vivit, quidquid vivit nutritur, quidquid vivit et nutritur augmentatur, quidquid huius modi est, tandem in sua Prima principia resolvitur, quidquid in sua prima principia resolvitur, est principiatum, omne principiarum habet sua partes constitutivas, quidquid eius modi est, est corpus divisibile si igitur mens humana sentit, sequitur quod sit corpus divisibile.”

554 See Johann Gottfried von Berger, Physiologia medica sive de natura humana, (Wittenberg, 1702); Martin Gottfried Loescher, Physica theorhetica et experimentalis compendiosa, (Wittenberg, 1728).

the circulation of blood admits of the principle of life.” For none of these vital processes does Amo admit a principle of the soul in their explication. Rather, his conception of organic body affirms the independence of physiology from pneumatology, and rather explicates the organic body in terms of its structural arrangements and integration. The evocation of the notions of Descartes’ *homme machine* and Leibniz’s *machina animalis* are immediately discerned.

Amo further characterizes the organic body and its independence from mind by developing in his *Disputatio* the theme of ‘natural instinct’ (*instinctu naturali*). As expected, it concerns the ability of animals – both humans and beasts – to respond appropriately to environmental circumstances: “propensio ad præsentiam usumque ejus, quod gratum & bonum, & absentiam ejus quod ingratum & malum.”

For it is inherent in the nature of all animals [in their various classes] to flee and avoid those things which appear will harm, along with their causes, and, by contrast, to follow and admire those things that are useful along with their causes, etc.

Humans naturally (*naturaliter*) have in common with brutes, sensation, the faculty of sensing, and the natural instinct. For Amo this assertion further captures the essence of how an organic body possessed of life and sensation can display a broad range of vital functions without recourse to a mind – what could be called for convenience, the “brute

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559 *Disputatio*, Ch. I, Mem. II, Sec. II, §1.

As Amo defines it and uses it consistently through his corpus, “facultas/facultatis,” usually translated as ‘faculty’ is not a ‘thing’ per se, or a ‘part’ or seat responsible for some observed function. Rather, it refers to a disposition or ability of the whole considered homogeneously. Hence, intention as a ‘faculty of the mind’ is not reference to a *part* of the mind that has intent – since ontologically, as Amo establishes, the mind is not constituted of parts – but, to the disposition of the human mind, following from its singular act, to have an ability to have purposive intent. To this end the definition: “Facultas sentiendi quid: nempe quod sit: organici et vivi nostri corporis talis dispositio, …” (*Apatheia*, Ch. I, Mem. II, §. 2; also see *Tractatus*, Ch. V, Mem. I, §. 1).

Wolff offers a similar notion: a “facultas” is an ‘active power’ (*potentia activa*); where an active power concerns traits in the subject through which its actions can be distinctly explained, so that one may understand how its actions are performed (*Philosophia Prima*, §716).

560 Ibid., “Naturali cum Brutis communes habemus sensiones, facultatem sentiendi & instinctam naturalem, de instinctu naturali.”
argument”. Like Descartes’ argument in response to Arnauld,\(^{561}\) the similarity of biological functions between humans and brutes, coupled with the fact of brutes’ lacking minds, concludes that the panoply of biological functions are to be accounted for not by mind, but by the dispositions of bodily organs, the flow of animal spirits, and the mechanisms of these operations. Amo’s organic body, therefore, like Descartes’ and others, stretches as far as accounting for what appears to be appetitive dispositions (the natural instinct of fleeing and avoiding fleeing), yet without the deliberative operations of the mind.\(^{562}\)

Amo therefore envisions a sort of machine of nature – to allude to Leibniz – that is ontologically heterogeneous with the mind, and operatively autonomous from it. The organic body, for Amo, consists of a structurally integrated body of systems and processes (\textit{suas partes constitutivas}), whose diverse functionalities can be fully explicated by the various mechanistic-oriented physiological schemes he briefly appealed to.

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textbf{(II) What is mind?}
\end{itemize}

Like the Leibniz-Wolffian program, the mind’s operations, its commerce with the body, and the operative schemes of its cognition and perception are faculties that directly flow out of its essence. Thus, it is to ontology that appeal must be made to unpack the mind’s operations. Amo’s conception of composed substances has been presented. In order to understand his notion of ‘mind’ his conception of simple substances must be treated. Amo identifies mind and incorporeal substances as being ontologically \textit{simple}. We turn to Amo’s \textit{Disputatio} and \textit{Apatheia} in which these concepts are developed.

In his \textit{Apatheia} Amo gives a definition of “mind,” and the elements of that definition remain his consistent understanding in the \textit{Disputatio} and elsewhere. “The human mind (\textit{mens humana}),” Amo states, “belongs to the genus of spirits,” where a ‘spirit’ is:

\footnotesize
\begin{itemize}
  \item See preceding chapter.
  \item Amo is clear that the natural instinct he attributes to the organic body is different from the willing of the mind: “\textit{Voluntas, quatenus est mentis volendi & nolendi facultas, cum instinctu naturali, confundenda non est}” (Disputatio, Ch. I, Mem. I, Sec. II).
\end{itemize}
Any purely active, immaterial substance which is always in itself understanding and operating spontaneously and intentionally on account of an intended end of which it is conscious.\textsuperscript{563}

As belonging to the genus of spirits, the human mind has the qualities of spirit and in addition, the specific difference of its commerce with the body. Hence the mind is:

A purely active and immaterial substance which, by commerce with the living organic body in which it is present, understands and operates from intention on account of a determinate end of which it is conscious.\textsuperscript{564}

Central to Amo’s conception is the role that the living organic body must invariably play in the very essential conception of the mind. The operations of the human mind – \textit{qua} spirit necessarily inhering in a body – are significantly conditioned, as it were, by the matter of the body, even though there is no communication of passion between them. As will be seen further, for Amo, like Wolff, physiology and philosophical psychology are closely related. The elements of the definition present the ontology of the mind first, then the mode of its operations. The mind is a substance of a specific order – it is immaterial. This, for Amo, primarily means that it is non-composed or simple. We briefly look at Amo’s understanding of this broad genus of simple substance.

**Simple substances**

For his immediate concerns – the refutation of the thesis that the mind can ‘feel’ – Amo states explicitly that a simple substance “has nothing material in its essence.” Elsewhere he affirms that the mind is that which does not admit any “material and sensible parts, properties, and effects” into itself;\textsuperscript{565} and is distinguished from a composed substance in that both are “contrary opposites.” A simple substance is further differentiated from a composed substance in that the former is ontologically homogeneous and indivisible – it cannot be resolved into parts. There is no difference between the substantial substrate (essence) and its properties. Hence, “an incorporeal or

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\textsuperscript{563} Apatheia, Ch. I, Mem. I, §1. “Quaevis substantia mere actuosa, immaterialis, per se semper intelligens, suaque sponte ex intentione operans, propter destinatum et sibi conscium finem.”

\textsuperscript{564} Apatheia, Ch. I, Mem. I, §3.

\textsuperscript{565} Apatheia, I, §. 1, Expl. 5, “Nihil materiale habet in sua essentia et proprietatibus;” Ibid. rat. 2
simple substance...is the substance itself; by the same token, everything that is in God is God himself.\textsuperscript{566}

The act of the soul in itself is indivisible (1) because the soul is itself indivisible, the property of substance is effectively the same as substance itself, (2) since there is no variation of properties and parts in the soul, there also no differentiation its act \textit{per se}. We conceive of no heterogeneity in the soul and in other spirits, but rather an immutable uniformity; this is what the nature of a simple substance consists in, and the latter is consequently possessed of simple quality.\textsuperscript{567}

In Amo’s ontology, composed substance and simple substance seem to be diametrical opposites on the same continuum of actual being. The “immaterial substance” under consideration here, therefore, belongs to this order of being. Amo proceeds to get a “clear and distinct idea” of the subject, mind.\textsuperscript{568}

The definition of mind here, for Amo, is a \textit{real definition}, and captures its essence or quiddity.\textsuperscript{569} From Amo’s notion of a real definition, it follows that the predicates to be discussed below are metaphysical qualities that \textit{de re} constitute the essence of mind. From the concept of the simple substance, it follows that these predicates are also not constitutive parts of the mind, but are the principles of the mind’s being. Thus, it is owing to this essence that the mind has whatever operations it is observed to have. At the heart of Amo’s definition are five essential aspects: first, the ascription of the human mind to the genus of spirits means that the mind is “purely active” (\textit{mere actuosa}), and thus has its own metaphysical principle of force. Recalling Leibniz’s metaphysic of action (\textit{la

\textsuperscript{566} Tractatus, Ch. I, Mem. V, §. 4: 91.

\textsuperscript{567} Tractatus, Ch. I, Mem. II, §. 2: 84.

“L’acte de l’âme en soi est indivisible (1) car l’âme elle même est indivisible, la propriété de la substance est en effet telle que la substance, (2) puisque dans l’âme, il n’y a pas une variété de proprieties et de parties, il n’en existe donc pas dans ses actes en soi. On ne note aucune hétérogénéité dans l’âme et dans d’autres esprits, mais plutôt une uniformité immuable; c’est en cela que consiste la nature de la substance la plus simple qui est dotée par consequent de la qualité la plus simple.”

\textsuperscript{568} Quia mens humana subjectum quaestionis seu theseos est, operis ratio postulat, ut declaremus quid nam pereandem intelligamus, eum in finem ut positis ideis claris et distinctis felicius res procedat. (Apatheia, Ch. I, Mem. I).

\textsuperscript{569} Amo’s \textit{Tractatus} lays out in detail his understanding of the task of defining a thing. A real definition, for Amo, considers a thing objectively. It is a verbal reference to something real in a given object – either the object’s essential or non-essential properties. References to the essential properties are either physical or metaphysical. The physical concerns the constitutive parts of the object in question, and the metaphysical, its qualities. As such, Amo’s definition of the mind can be said to be a real, essential and metaphysical predication to the subject ‘mind’. (See, \textit{Tractatus}, Partie Spéciale III, Ch. I, Mem. V, §. 1-2:148).
force) as the essence of substance, the human mind in this definition, therefore, does not need any extrinsic determination to carry out its operations. Secondly, the mind is immaterial, as discussed above. From the mind’s ontology – substantial activity and immateriality – flow its operations. Thirdly, the mind’s cognitive and perceptual processes are, internally determined (per se semper intelligens), and, fourthly, depend on its ability to operate spontaneously (qua mere actuosa) without an extrinsic efficient causal influence. A last trait is the mind’s ability to operate based on intention, or towards the pursuit of determined ends. In what follows, each of these will be considered in turn.

A. Amo’s conception of pure active substances

What is it for the human mind to be an active substance? Amo’s ontology of substance has been related above. The mind is a simple substance. The purely active (mere actuosa) nature of this substance implies its inability to receive any passion within itself; where by ‘passion’ (passionem) is meant the alteration that results from causal interaction with material things – viz., by communication of parts, properties or effects, by penetration of the parts, or by mutual contact. Hence, by virtue of the mind’s purely active nature, it cannot interact with other entities by the way of passions. The argument evidently is that something that is essentially active cannot equally receive passion into itself (substantially) – “otherwise,” Amo puts it in deceptively simple terms, “the spirit would contain in its essence and substance something other than what it was supposed to contain.” Amo may be saying slightly more than is at first discerned. The idea of receiving passion – causation by communication, penetration, and contact – is an evident reference to, and rejection of the theories of physical influx of his time. The conception of the mind as a simple substance implies that any interaction it may have with another

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570 The italicization of ‘is’, as pedantic as it may appear, is meant to emphasize that, for Amo, the five ‘properties’ of spirit are absolutely essential properties, and are therefore the substance of the simple substance spirit. Consequently, they are per se undifferentiated, but together constitute one simple act of being. Any mention of ‘spirit’ proper, implies all five properties taken as one.

571 Apatheia, Ch. I, Mem. I, §1, “Dico spiritum esse substantiam mere actuosam; quod idem acsi dicas: spiritus nullam in se admittit passionem.”

572 Ibid.
body by influx would be an inflow of qualities into its essence, with the implication of an alteration of its substance itself. Hence, the problem is not simply that the interaction is physical, but that there is an influx at all. Even further, the mind, as belonging to the genus of spirits, possesses what Amo calls “spontaneity or the faculty of free acting and reacting” (spontaneitas seu Libera agenda et reagendi facultas). The implication of this substantial activeness and spontaneity of operation is that the mind is not the passive recipient of external causes. Unlike matter that is conceived by Amo to be passive (semper patiens quid) and in need of an external force to compel it to action, the mind “intrinsically determines its own operations.” Descartes’ conception of the essence of the mind as res cogitans (which remains strongly in the background to Amo’s discussion) does not make evident the incompatibility of physical influx as a means of the mind’s interaction with bodies. Rather, the notions of simple and active substance, which for Amo are axiomatic and taken, as far as can be discerned, from Leibniz, makes clear that the mind cannot interact causally with metaphysically non-active bodies. He can affirm confidently: “therefore the spirit does not sense through communication.” Amo’s argument is thus that if the mind is an active substance, another framework of causality must be found for how its operations are effected.

The value of Amo’s denial of physical influx can be better appreciated by considering the Ancient Greek and Aristotelian similar attempts to construe the soul as naturally imbued with activity, and as the uncaused origin of motion in bodies. In their case, they took ‘activeness’ to mean physical movement, and so were stuck with a materialist account of soul, and a passible soul, always itself altered in the process of its own acts. Aristotle’s innovation was to construe the soul’s activeness using the metaphysical devices of potentiality and actuality, following which the soul is per se impassible even though it can ‘move’ material bodies, and this, simply by passing from

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573 Apatheia, Ch. I, Mem. I, §1, Expo.3.
574 Apatheia, Ch. I, Mem. I, §1, Expo.1.
575 See Aristotle’s survey of the positions, De anima, Bk. I, 3, 406a – 406b.
576 Aristotle’s objection here: “If the soul naturally partakes in movement, it follows that it must have a place” (Ibid.).
potentiality to actuality.\textsuperscript{577} As compelling as the Aristotelian potentiality-actuality metaphysic may be in this regard, Amo does not take that option, but instead draws on what is indicative of the Leibnizian solution: that metaphysical activeness is essential to the substance of mind, \textit{but}, unlike Aristotle, this principle of activity does not cross the ontological divide, as it were, to become an efficient cause to material bodies. Rather, it serves to “intrinsically determine its [own] operations.”\textsuperscript{578} Following this alignment with Leibniz on this question, Amo has to find another kind of account for how this intrinsic activity of the mind ‘influences’ the material body.

\textbf{B. The mind’s cognitive and perceptual processes}

With the mind understood as an active immaterial substance, it is further conceived as able to “understand through itself” (\textit{omnis per se semper intelligit}). It does this by being “conscious to itself of itself, of its own operations, and of other things.”\textsuperscript{579} Amo is at this stage indicating as part of its definition, the bases for the mind’s cognitive and perceptual operations vis-à-vis extra-mental reality. By virtue of the mind’s “tight bond and commerce” with the body, two aspects will be discerned in Amo’s discussion of cognition and perception: the first concerns the various purely mental devices employed in its cognitive acts; second, the role of the organic body in these activities.

The language used by Amo to conceive of the mind’s cognition and perception is strongly suggestive of his Leibnizian and Wolffian influences. The mind’s knowledge is

\textsuperscript{577} In this vein, then, not denying that the soul in some way ‘moves’ the body, Aristotle seeks another account for how this is made possible. The soul does not ‘move’ the body directly through the physical causal means of “locomotion, alteration, diminution, [and] growth.” That which originates movement must not necessarily be moved. The proposed metaphysical solution to this problem is Aristotle’s philosophy of actuality and potentiality, or act and power. But in a simple substance there cannot be motion proper since motion only occurs between the constituent parts of composed substances. The only ‘motion’ within simple substances is that of moving from potentiality to actuality. The first metaphysical principle of any simple substance is the inherence of all its operations and properties as potentialities, and the ‘essentializing’ (they become essence) of all these potentialities in one act of existence. In other words, simple substances have within them all their operations potentially; but since actuality is essential to them, they, without outside influence, effect or actualize all their operation in themselves. That act is essential to the soul is to say that it is ‘moved’ (directed to its operations) not by any extrinsic influence, but is totally set to its ends internally.

\textsuperscript{578} \textit{Apathetia}, Ch. I, Mem. I, §1, Expo. 3.

\textsuperscript{579} \textit{Apathetia}, Ch. I, Mem. I, §1, Expo. 2, “Spiritus omnis per se semper intelligit. i.e. conscius est sibi sui, suarumque operationem, nec non aliarum rerum.”
said to obtain “through itself” without compulsion from outside – *nec aliunde absolute cogitur ut operetur*. It is also conceived as an intrinsic and spontaneously effected ‘move’ from precognitive mental states to conscious awareness of itself (*sibi sui*), its own internal operations (*suarumque operationem*), and extra-mental reality (*aliarum rerum*). The *process* through which perception occurs is broadly referred to as “representation” – the mind “represents or sets up as present.” These concepts, it has been seen, are developed at length in Leibniz and Wolff. The renowned *leibnitio-wolffiani*, Baumeister strengthens this thesis of Amo’s continuity with Leibniz-Wolff. Explicitly echoing the masters, Baumeister similarly reckons the mind’s cognition to consist in its ability to make itself conscious of itself (*quae in nobis contingunt*) and of things outside itself (*extra nos*) by representation.

Amo’s language of consciousness, therefore, distinguishes cognition proper from a prior stage of mental states identified simply as “precognition” (*praecognitione*). This is akin to Leibniz’s “confused” *perceptio* and clear and distinct *apperceptio*. Amo does not specify if this precognition consists in the mind’s natural representation of the universe, like Leibniz. But in order for the mind’s precognition to become conscious cognition, the senses of the organic body become the necessary instruments. It is here that Amo’s conception of the strong bond between the human mind and its body is most manifest. For although there are two *essential* parts to a human being (*duas dantur partes essentiales hominis*), the mind’s tight bond and commerce with the body invariably conditions its operations in essential respects. All mental states depend on the mind’s ability at representation. But the mental representational acts that result in *conscious* cognition and perception are limited materially by the organic body’s situation in the universe, and formally by the succession of sensory states in the organs. The conscious representational act of the mind only does commerce, as it were, with its associated

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580 Ibid. Expo. 3.
581 *Apathetia*, Ch. I, Mem. I, §1, Expo. 2.
organic body. Bodily sensation, therefore, is instrumentally necessary for conscious cognition.\textsuperscript{584} Hence, Amo’s affirmation that the mind “uses the body as the subject in which it is present, and as an instrument and medium of its operation.”

For Amo, therefore, the essence of the human mind vis-à-vis cognition and perception is its ability of internally representing states of affairs – its own conscious states, and the succession of somatic states in its organic body. Of course, questions arise for more precision on the nature of this representation. Amo seems to use the concept more restrictively than Leibniz – limiting his usage to the mind’s representation of the senses and sense organs, even though not precluding Leibniz’s universal preconscious representation. This will be taken up in some more detail below. For now Amo’s ‘representation’ can be characterized negatively, as has been mentioned already, it involves no communication of passions into the mind, no transference of Scholastic species (even with regard to the ‘commerce’ with the senses), and overall no extrinsic determination for its operations. This last point leads into the last two of Amo’s essential qualities of the mind – spontaneity and intentionality.

\textbf{C. Spontaneity and Intentionality}

If the mind is not extrinsically determined to its operations, the concept of spontaneity is used to capture its ability to initiate its own actions without any efficient causal prompting. Its very substantial nature of activity would naturally suggest such ability. To say that the mind operates spontaneously is to affirm that it, Amo explains, “intrinsically determines its operations towards an end that is to be pursued, and is not absolutely compelled from outside to operate.”\textsuperscript{585} The mind is here presented as a dynamic centre of independently generated psychic operations in a way that is

\textsuperscript{584} The consistent qualification of cognition by ‘conscious’ is important. If Amo is Leibnizian-Wolffian on the concept of perceptual representation as the essential process for the determination of the mind’s cognitive states, then, like Leibniz, the scope of Amo’s consideration of this representation might be universal, including within it the mind’s pre-conscious states – as strongly suggested by his language of “precognition.” However, Amo is unequivocal that conscious mental states owe to the instrumentality of the succession of somatic states represented by the mind. \textit{Tractatus} Ch. I, Mem. VI: 47 puts it stronger: “Ce qui en nous appréhende et connaît, c’est l’âme et ce qui l’y aide en tant qu’instrument, c’est sa faculté intellective. Ce par le biais de quoi la compréhension se fait, c’est la sensation.”

\textsuperscript{585} \textit{Apatheia}, Ch. I, Mem. I, Expo. 3. “Omnis spiritus operator sua sponte i.e. intrinsece, suas operations determinat ad finem consequendum, nec aliunde absolute cogitut ut operetur.”
reminiscent of Leibniz’s windowless, self-contained monads. Amo’s further description, as expected, eliminates any external material (matter *qua semper patiens quid*) compulsion of the mind, but does not *necessarily* preclude, it seems, some kind of influence by other “spirits.”

This observation may bring Amo closer to Wolff than Leibniz. The fundamental monadic concept seems to have been modified from its Leibnizian radical windowless enclosure, to one with some openings. However, the basic idea remains firmly intact – the determination of the mind’s operations are intrinsic to itself.

This being the case, what guides or determines the mind’s spontaneous activity in acting one particular way instead of another? The absence of such a basis would result in arbitrariness and the mind’s failure to act “rationally and from understanding.” The option of external efficient causal influences has been eliminated. Amo’s solution to this is that the mind operates by “intention” (*intentione*) – “that operation of the spirit by which it makes something known to itself, and by which it is exercised towards an end followed.” Elsewhere, intention is characterized as an essential property of all intelligent substances, and the means by which they determine their operations. The intentional act of the mind falls within the realm of final causes. But this knowledge of what is to be pursued (intention) does not obtain from the influence of changes in the body; rather they result from the mind’s “precognition of what should come about.” Here, like Leibniz, the determination of the mind’s intentional activity owes to the unfolding of its intrinsic states of consciousness – precisely its consciousness of itself.

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586 Amo, it appears, here grants the possibility that some other finite substances that are themselves active and spontaneous (i.e. spirits) could compel (*cogatur*) the mind. In such case, both spirits would maintain their essential faculties of free acting and reacting. (“*Si spiritus aliunde cogatur hoc fieret aut cogente spiritu alio, aut materia. Si spiritu alio, salua manet in untroue spontaneitas seu Libera agendi et reagendi facultas. Si a materia spiritus cogatur, hoc fieri nequit, quia spiritus semper est actuosus, sed materia semper patiens quid, et omnem recipiens actionem in se agentis.*”) Ibid.


588 *Apatheia*, Ch. I, Mem. I, § 1, Not. 2, “Per intentionem intelligimus; illam spiritus operationem, qua sibi aliquid notum facit, quo exercito finis consequuntur.”

589 *Tractatus*, Ch. I, Mem. II, § 1: 42.

590 Recalling above the three aspects of the mind’s consciousness: itself, its operations, and things outside itself.
and perhaps even its pre-conscious states. Amo does not unpack further details about how the conscious and preconscious states of the mind *substance* obtain, whether he holds to, say, Leibniz’s theory of the complete concept of an individual substance. He stops just short of using the trademark Leibnizian-Wolffian terminology of *perception*, *apperception*, and *appetition*. However, his affinity with this school is strongly evidenced. With this school Amo affirms that the mind, like other spirits, determines its actions exclusively based on its internal resources – viz., the pre-knowledge of what should be, or its states of self-consciousness, which is logically prior to its representative acts of external reality.

From the foregoing discussion, Amo’s presentation of the quiddity of the mind has been laid out. The operations of the mind to be discussed below thus flow directly from its ontology.

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591 Provided Amo’s concept of ‘representation’ is fully Leibnizian (as discussed above).


593 I want to offer a hypothesis on this note regarding Amo’s appropriation of Leibniz. In the discussion so far, it has been indicated that while Amo’s dependence on the Leibnizian notion of ‘representation’ is evident, he yet seems to use the concept somewhat restrictively for the mind’s representation of somatic states, and not quite in the sense of a monad. If that be the case, then for Amo, every mental state would be a conscious one (both self, and extra mental). For Leibniz, on the other hand, not every state of the human soul is a conscious one. Perception, as seen in the previous chapter, is a pre-conscious mental state, and two acts at least mediate the mind’s ‘move’ to conscious cognition – appetition, and the states of the mind’s organic body; the same applies to Wolff. I want to propose that although Amo does not explicitly use these terminologies, nor does he outrightly explicate them, in a seemingly isolate paragraph, he draws a distinction between two stages of knowledge that are very close to Leibniz’s categories of pre-conscious and conscious perceptions. In the *Tractatus*, Amo discusses two stages in the mental states that result from the mind’s act of representation: first, pre-reflective mental states in which states of affairs of things are said to be present in the mind; second a post-reflective deliberative act by which are consciously known (*Tractatus*, ‘Partie Special Section I’, Ch. I, Mem. III, § 6: 87). This may suggest that Amo’s concept of representation functions in similar ways to Leibniz’s, though the point is not explicit. (The topic of representation will be taken up further below.) This cryptic presentation of the Leibnizian concepts by Amo, may owe to the censorship and general discredit of Leibniz-Wolff philosophical positions on these question, not least at Wittenberg (see ch. 1).
(III) What is the operation of the human mind in general?

**Act (actu) and Operation (operatio)**

Amo proceeds to another aspect of his philosophical psychology, that is, his account of the principles of the mind’s various acts and operations. The mind, as a simple substance, is said to have a number of ‘operations.’ To this end, Amo makes a subtle distinction between “operation” and “act.” The constructs ‘Mentis operatio’ and ‘mentis actum’ are employed in ways that may initially appear interchangeable. From the discussion above, the “act” is the internal metaphysical principle of simple substances whereby all their potencies are realized without external compulsion or ‘movement.’ An ‘operation,’ on the other hand, refers to the product or result of ‘act;’ they are the observable phenomena attributable to mind (in this case), but caused precisely because the mind is in act. The act of the mind is metaphysically prior to its operations – while the former is homogeneous and undifferentiated, the latter is heterogeneous and diverse.\(^{594}\) This distinction is essentially Scholastic, again indicating Amo’s eclectic appropriation of various intellectual traditions.\(^{595}\) The operation of the human mind therefore suggests that which it has the power to do by virtue of its ontological status of being in act.

**General considerations**

By the ‘operation of the mind in general’ I understand: an act of the mind carried out with consciousness (Bewust-Werdung) and with intention, by ideas and sensations of thinking, and the verifying of the things thought.\(^{596}\)

Two main aspects of Amo’s understanding are immediately discerned: first, the cogitative process of the mind consists dually in ideas and sensations of thought; second, the means for the possibility of this process is the act of the mind with (cum) consciousness and intention. A corollary element, verification, provides a means of

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\(^{594}\) The basis for this diversification is not in the mind *per se*, but is based on the objects to which the mind is directed, as will be seen below.

\(^{595}\) The distinction is seen by Aquinas’ articulation of the principle – “quia nihil agit nisi secundum quod est actu, unde quo aliquid est actu, eo agit” ST, 1a, Qu. 76, Art. 1, resp.

\(^{596}\) *Disputatio*, Ch. I, Mem. I, §. 2, “Per mentis operationem in genere intelligo; mentis actum cum conscientia (Bewust-Werdung) & intendione, per ideas & sensiones cogitandi, & cogitata verifitandi.”
checks and balances to the process. The first and more specific item will be treated in due course. The second, and more general one, follows.

Amo treats the operations of the mind within a well-defined sphere that is delimited by the concept of consciousness. Pre-conscious perceptions (if Amo grants them) are not in view here. But what does such delimitation imply? Amo’s understanding of ‘consciousness’ concerns self-awareness, awareness of the mind’s internal operations, and of things outside the mind. This conception is significant in that it is a nuance on the Leibnizian understanding. Leibniz equates consciousness with his apperception, with the meaning that it is the mind’s reflective knowledge of its internal states of perception – in other words, ‘consciousness’ is precisely self-consciousness. Wolff on the other hand, for example, delimits consciousness in the same way as Amo does: “we are conscious of ourselves and of other things.” Consciousness here is a category that necessarily includes (in addition to internal-directedness) the mind’s representational activities of bodily sensation. Amo in this regard more closely aligns with Wolff in the emphasis of sense experience as being central to consciousness (in addition, of course, to self-consciousness). This nuance becomes important, as will be seen, in understanding Amo’s almost tiresome refrain: nihil est in intellectu, quod non anteà fuerit in sensibus.

Mental Operation by Intention

Within this framework of consciousness, the operations of the mind function by intention. As seen above, this is an essential quality of the intelligent simple substance. Amo has a lot to say about intention, and here uses it as a shorthand for fuller exposition

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597 Apatheia, Ch. I, Mem. I, §1, Expo. 2.
598 Leibniz, Principes de la Nature et de la Grace, §4; L: 637. “It is well to make a distinction between perception, which is the inner state of the monad representing external things, and apperception, which is consciousness or the reflective knowledge of this inner state itself […]” (cf. Monadologie, §14).
599 Wolff, Vernüfftige Gedancken von Gott [German Metaphysics], §1; Psychologia Empirica, §23.
600 Amo’s identification of consciousness as the locus of the mind’s operations must not be taken to be his equation of mind with consciousness. Such a move would suggest Amo’s parti pris with Cartesian philosophy of mind where this is the case, for that would represent an important dissociation from the Leibniz-Wolff camp. Amo may recognize pre-conscious mental states, even while not giving these a place of consideration in his psychology; this, particularly in his psychology that operates by intentions. (See Monadologie §14 for Leibniz’s characterization and disagreement with the Cartesian reduction of the mind to consciousness).
elsewhere. As was seen, in the place of extrinsic efficient causal determinations, the mind rather operates by intentions in directing its cognitive, perceptual, voluntary, effective processes. The intention through which the mind functions is, however, within the realm of final causes. As Amo defines a bit more comprehensively,

> Intention in general is a faculty that pertains to intelligent substance, which categorizes the things known in itself according to end goals of which it is conscious, and according to what things should be done and should not be done. This faculty can be known subjectively, objectively, or by final ends.  

To understand this, it should be considered that Amo treats the totality of existing beings as drawing their existence, either immediately or ultimately, from God’s causal efficacy. Logically prior to the efficient cause that brings about the actual existence of something, there is the intention or purpose of that thing in the mind of an intelligent causal agent. The intention of a thing prior to its actualized existence, for Amo, is at least formally equivalent to the actual being to result from the efficient cause. Intention as such may be likened to Aristotle’s final cause. As Amo comments:

> God is the first of everything outside himself, and every being is the realization of an intention […] action is the necessary consequence of an intention.

The intention thus represents a sort of final cause of existing things (even though Amo very rarely uses the Aristotelian construct). Like the priority of Aristotle’s final cause over the efficient, and its formal equivalence with the latter, knowing the intention yields pre-knowledge of a thing before its actual existence. As such, an intention is the “origin” of any thing that exists; and “anything that is ordered to the realization of an end is intentional.” Intention thus concerns the ‘existence’ of things in the realm of their purposive design or teleology. As such they are necessarily in the domain of

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601 Tractatus, Mem. II: 42.
602 Tractatus, Ch. I, Mem. I: 41.
603 He only once equates intention to final causes. Tractatus, ‘Partie Spéciale Sect. I,’ Ch. I, Mem. II, §6: 86.
604 In his De Partibus Animalium, with reference to the generation of living organisms, Aristotle provides background for the priority of final over efficient cause. Before the efficient causal act of a thing, it has a particular kind of substance that is attributable to its final cause. Hence, “generation is for the sake of substance, not substance for the sake of generation” (640a.18-19).
605 Tractatus, Ch. III, Mem. II, §1: 66.
intelligent substances – i.e. they result only from the activity of intelligent beings, or can be apprehended only by such (God, spirits, human minds).\footnote{There is an intentional dimension to every being, since for Amo, these are all the result of God’s creative act. “Being […] as we have said, is the consummation of an intention, and of a divine or human operation” (\textit{Tractatus}, Ch. II, Mem. III, §1: 60).}

In cognition, for example, what the mind thus apprehends is the intentional dimension of existing things. Complementarily, the mind itself, being intelligent, produces intentional objects according to the purposive ends that it strives to attain. Hence,

> the intellect is the faculty of the soul for thinking and knowing objects in themselves, following the scheme of intention. Everything present in the intellect is present either as an object, or as an end. As object, it is considered in itself; as end, it is the fruit of an intention.\footnote{\textit{Tractatus}, Ch. V, Mem. I, §4: 73.}

Intention, therefore, is the formal existence of a thing prior to its concrete existence, under the aspect of its teleology established by the purposiveness of an intelligent being.

### The three operations of the mind

Amo identifies three operations of the mind that are distinguished according the objects to which they are directed. The act of the simple substance, mind, is one (\textit{unus}). However, it is said to revolve differently around intellectual things (\textit{intelligibilia}), around the appetites (\textit{appetibilia}), and things concerning efficient action (\textit{efficienda}). To this end the mind’s operations denominate as: (i) the act of intellecting or intellect; (ii) the act of willing and nilling; (iii) the act of effecting or the effective.

To keep things in perspective, what is to be expected in this treatment of the mind’s operations? The central question to be borne in mind in the following discussion is that it represents Amo’s attempted answer at the question of how the mind achieves cognition and perception of bodily sensations, given a non-interactionist framework. With what is so far known of Amo’s conception of the body as an organic machine sufficient in itself to account for the phenomenon of life and all biological processes, his understanding of the human mind, ontologically, as a simple immaterial substance, his notion of the tight commerce between the mind and the organic, yet the preclusion of any direct causal influence between both, we are in need of a philosophical psychology that is able to
account for the possibility of the mind’s perception of the sensations of the body, as well as able to deploy the organic body in the execution of its intentions. In all these, it must be recalled, for Amo, no solution that obviates the ontological distinction between the mind and body, or that allows for the communication of passion to the impassible mind is acceptable. Thus, as the status controversiae lays it, both Descartes’ notion of a passible mind, and LeClerc’s reckoning of the faculty of sensation to the mind, fall short of the expected philosophy of mind.

A. The Intellect

Typical of his Scholastic orientation, Amo commences by exploring the quid sit of the intellect, or the act of the mind for intellection. Three options are identified in this regard. The intellect could be referred to as either “the mind itself” (mens ipsa), as idea, or as an operation of the mind. The positions Amo here drives at concern (i) whether the intellect be identified with the entirety of the mind (i.e. Is the mind reducible to intellect?); (ii) whether the intellect reduces to the sum of the conscious perceptions held in the mind by ideation (the notion of “distinct idea,” as opposed to confused ones), or (iii) whether intellect (intellection) is a mental event or an act, a modification of the mind at the instance of an episode of perception, after which the mind returns to its original state.609

In the first option, the position is advanced that the action of intellection belongs to some thing called intellect – hence, “the intellect intellects.” The first option, Amo easily discards on grounds of its superfluity. To affirm that the intellect intellects says nothing substantial about what it is. The second option has more philosophical substance to it. Is intellection equivalent to the totality of ideas present in the mind? This of course begs the question of how ‘idea’ is construed. Are ideas substantive representations of things, presented to the mind during perception, and together constituting what it is conscious of? Though Amo does not mention it, the categories invoked here (particularly in comparison to the third option) have overtones of the Arnauld-Malebranche debates of the late seventeenth century – debates that held considerable interest for Leibniz. For

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609 Disputatio, Ch. I, Mem. II, Sect. 1. See Appendix for reference. Interestingly, this whole paragraph is repeated verbatim in Amo’s Tractatus, Ch. V, Mem. I, §5: 73.
Malebranche, every intellection or understanding of extra-mental reality issues necessarily by the mind’s immediate apprehension of the ideas (idées) of those things, where ideas are representational entities having “objective reality” in God (les idées ont une existence très réelle).\textsuperscript{610} The third option might be seen as closely parallel to Arnauld’s position. Perception of things outside the mind is a mental act or event because ideas are not distinct from perception per se. The “ideas” that represent things to the mind are not ontologically autonomous or causally independent of the mind. Ideas are more properly modes of the mind’s thought during an episode of perception – “perception-ideas.”\textsuperscript{611} Here, ‘idea’ is not an objective reality standing between the perceiver and the

\textsuperscript{610}The debate between Antoine Arnauld (1612-94) and Malebranche on ideas took off importantly (inter alia) from an exegetical detail in Descartes. Descartes in the Third Meditation had distinguished between intellection through ideation by an internal modification of mental states (“modes of thought”) and ideas as representational objects having “objective reality.” Roughly, a key point of the discussion became precisely the kind of “reality” these ideas should be understood to have, and whether perception in general is the modification of the mind in an act or event (i.e. ideas are nothing but mental modifications – Arnauld), or whether there is a difference between the mind’s states and the objective reality of the ideas that they perceive, the process of intellection was to be seen as the apprehension of the reality of these ideas (Malebranche). The text in Descartes reads thus: “In so far as ideas are considered simply modes of thought, there is no recognizable inequality between them: they all appear to come from within me in the same fashion. But in so far as different ideas are considered as images which represent different things, it is clear that they differ widely. Undoubtedly, the ideas that represent substances to me amount to something more and, so to speak, contain within themselves more objective reality that the ideas that merely represent modes or accidents (AT VII: 40, CSM 2:27-8). On Malebranche’s position, he sees the mind’s perception of things as the reality of ideas entering the mind: “Our soul can only perceive bodies outside itself by the ideas that represent them (bodies) […] It is absolutely necessary that the ideas we hold of bodies and of all other objects (since we cannot directly perceive the objects themselves) issue either from these very same bodies and objects; or our souls have the power to generate them; or God created these ideas along with the objects (they represent) – or produces them each time a person thinks of some object, or that the soul possesses all these ideas as perfections within itself, or the soul is united with a perfect being in whom is found all the intelligible perfections or all the ideas of created beings” (my translation) (Recherche de la Vérité, Bk. III, Pt. II, §2). The first source of ideas is of course similar the Scholastic notion of species issuing from things. The first two options are rejected and the third affirmed – the objective reality of things perceived are found in the perfect being (God), and the soul’s unification with him. For treatment of the positions of the debate, see Monte Cook, “Malebranche Versus Arnauld,” Journal of the History of Philosophy 29, no. 2 (1991): 183–99; Monte Cook, “The Ontological Status of Malebranchean Ideas,” Journal of the History of Philosophy 36, no. 4 (1998): 525–44; G. N. Dolson, “The Idealism of Malebranche,” Philosophical Review 15, no. 4 (1906): 387–405; Denis Moreau, “The Malebranche-Arnauld Debate,” in The Cambridge Companion to Malebranche, ed. Steven M. Nadler (Cambridge [England]; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 87–111.

\textsuperscript{611}As Arnauld captures it succinctly, “I take the perception and the idea to be the same thing. Nevertheless, it must be noted that this thing, although only one, has two relations: one to the soul which modifies, the other to the thing perceived insofar as it is objectively in the soul; and that the word ‘perception’ indicates more directly the first relation and the word idea the second. So the perception of a square indicates more directly the soul as perceiving the square and the idea of a square indicates more directly the square insofar as it is objectively in the mind” (VFI, 38:198). For further discussion, see John W. Yolton, Perceptual Acquaintance from Descartes to Reid (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1984), 52-75.
thing perceived. The mind more or less perceives things immediately by a sort of perception-by-ideation.

To these positions, Amo’s description of intellection as the “act of the mind in intellecting” seems much closer to Arnauld. The intellect therefore is defined as “the act of the mind by which it makes itself conscious of things.” The intellect is the seat of the mind’s cognitive and perceptual processes – viz., anything that the mind is conscious of. But how does this process take place? Amo offers that this intellecting act of the mind specifically concerns the apprehension of things (res), or of sensation (sensio), such that the Scholastic maxim needs be invoked: “nothing is in the intellect that was not first in the senses.” For Amo who so far has been shown to be Leibnizian on essential concepts of his philosophy of mind, the Scholastic notion here seems incompatible with a Leibnizian idea of perception. Does Amo’s use of this notion bring him instead to a Lockean empiricist position of experience as the only ‘window’ into the mind? Such a move would undermine the interpretation so far. We may answer in the negative by pointing out that when Amo uses “intellect” he has in mind “act of the mind in intellecting;” and as seen above, this act of the mind, or intellect, is not equivalent to the entirety of the mind. Therefore, Amo would qualify his use of the Scholastic theory thus: “nothing is in the mind’s act of intellecting [not the mind in toto], that was not first in the senses of perception.” This is reminiscent of Leibniz’s qualified acceptance of the same notion by stating: “nothing is in the intellect that was not first in the senses, except the intellect itself.” For Amo, it may be said, then, that the determination of the particulars of the mind’s (in toto) knowledge is necessitated by sensation, and sensation concerns the affects of the material organic body. Hence in Amo, there must be a dual appreciation

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612 Disputatio, Ch. I, Mem. II, Sect. 1, “Illa mentis operatio, qua aliquid confuse vel distincte intelligit, (germanice der Verstand) & hunc intellectum actum mentis intelligendi nominamus.”

613 There is of course Leibniz’s detailed response and rejection of Locke’s key tenets on these topics. See, Leibniz, Nouveaux Essais sur l’Entendement Humain.

614 Disputatio, Ch. I, Mem. II, §1.

615 Leibniz, Nouveaux Essais, bk. 2, ch. 1. Leibniz would grant the important place of sensation for knowing things in their particulars: “Experience is necessary, I admit, for the soul to be determined to one thought rather than another and to become aware of the ideas within us. But I do not see how experience and the senses can furnish us with ideas.”
both for his Leibniz-influenced philosophy of mind, and for the dependence of the intellect’s knowledge on sensation and experience.

But if the intellect thus depends on the sensations of the body for its conscious perceptions, what devices make this dependence possible without breaching the independence of either body or mind?

i. Schemes of perception

A scheme of perception that is found compatible to his framework is presented. For this, two stages in the mind’s intellection act are first distinguished – a momentary (momentaneus) and a reflective (reflexivus) one. The first, Amo here defines as involving the stage of perception in which the mind does not inquire into the “origin, existence, and essence” (hereafter, ‘o-e-e’) of the thing known; or (in most cases) it is an act prior to reflection. The construct o-e-e, it has been seen, is shorthand for the formal and causal ratione of a being. Hence, for the mind not to inquire into the o-e-e of something is for it to fail to apprehend the thing is its full objective reality. The second, the reflective, concerns a conscious stage of the mind’s perception – cognition proper. It involves the act of the intellect “posterior to reflection,” where “the mind simply applies ideas acquired by judicious reasoning (judiciosa ratione), towards an end of which it is conscious.”616 Upon the delineation of these two stages of the mind’s act of intellection – which we may take to be pre-conscious and conscious mental states – Amo announces that his schemes of perception, in the first stage, include: repræsentatio, attentio, enumeratio, recensio rerum (recension of things). At thus crucial stage of the thesis, the Disputatio tantalizes by its brevity. Nothing more is said about this representation, et al than their identification as being prior to reflection (ante reflexionem). Even more unsatisfactory, is Amo’s claim that he has already dealt with the topics (mox diximus) – whereas this is the first instance of their appearance in the work.617 We would have to turn elsewhere in Amo to unpack these concepts.

616 Disputatio, Ch. I, Mem. II, §3.

617 This raises all kinds of questions regarding the Disputatio. What this work initially a part of what later was published as the Tractatus? See chapter two above for discussion.
ii. Representation and sensation

The notion of “representation” and of “ideality” are very close concepts for Amo, and they specify how the mind comes to cognition of the ‘movements’ present in the senses and sense organs. Representation by means of ideas, Amo insists, is a necessary device for the mind’s knowledge. This ‘idea’ is:

The momentary operation of the mind, by which it represents or sets up as present things that were previously perceived by the senses or sensory organs. 618

In an episode of representation two aspects of the act may be reckoned: the sensation or memory to be represented, and the perceptual psychological experience of the thing represented.619 The complementary phenomena of physiological sensory schemes and the equivalent psychological content necessarily function together in an episode of perceptual awareness. (Neither of them can individually give rise to perceptual awareness.) As Amo puts it: “simple apprehension [Scholastic mechanism of sensation] is a twin sister to our notion of representation.”620 The content of the former (which are logically prior) become the cognitive event of the latter by a scheme that ‘sets up’ the one for the other through representation. The language of “setting up as present” is quite ambiguous – What does it mean? Is some kind of transaction to occur before the mind can set up as present? What is the ontic status of what ever is “set up”? Some preliminary comments might be made in response to these questions: the first is that whatever is represented in the mind must, as expected, be continuous with the substantial modalities of the mind itself – i.e. its ontology and operations.621 Also, Amo’s consideration here, as already indicated, is with the intellective act of the mind as a psychological event that occurs by its internal modification – perception. As such, it should not be expected that

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618 Apatheia, Ch. I, Mem. I, §1, Expo. 2.
619 Tractatus, “Partie Speciale, Section I”, I, II, §. 5, “That through which it [the soul] truly represents something is its representative act; that which it represents to itself as object is the sensation left as traces in the sense organs and memory. Nothing exists in the intellect that was not first in the senses. Such a sensation, as represented by the soul, constitutes an idea. The representative act of the soul is akin to the soul, while the sensation that is and may be represented is akin to body.” (my translation).
621 “Every substance has its property; similarly, the soul is immaterial […], therefore its property also is [immaterial]. The idea is a composite being that issues when the soul represents to itself a sensation that previously existed in the body” (Apatheia, Ch. II, Mem. I, Nota).
an entity (‘idea’) would enter into the mind from without. Rather, the mind’s act in
cognition is simply said to be “representative.”

The question still remains: how can the physiological content of the senses become
psychological events or cognitive experiences? It is known that for this process to occur,
Amo earlier mentioned the “very tight bond and commerce” between the mind and the
organic body. He further suggests that the acts of representation and ideation are
contingent on this ‘bond’. We can be sure that whatever this bond consists in, it
precludes any mechanical causal scheme. The sensory phenomena excited by the sense
organs’ contact with physical reality are causally circumscribed to its physiological
apparatus. Similarly, the operations of the mind remain itself. One way in which Amo
characterizes this representation in order to maintain the independence of the mind and
body is to propose the idea of *reminiscence* elsewhere – “representation, recalling and
reminiscence are synonymous.”

Concerning the act of the soul, it is an act of representation, which we understand
sometimes to mean remembrance or reminiscence. The sensations of the body appear to trigger corresponding mental episodes of
reminiscence. But what does the mind recall? This would only be intelligible if the mind
were granted to possess precognitive states – such as Leibniz’s confused perceptions.

It will be suggested in the following paragraphs that in order to understand Amo’s
conception the mind’s perceptual awareness of bodily states through representation, one
must reckon in humans two distinct ways of experiencing the world: a physical one
consisting of sensory interaction with bodies, and an irreducibly cognitive one consisting
of the mind’s ‘knowing’ or being conscious of something. We propose that these two are
both irreducible to each other, and that for Amo, the cognitive is a basic category of the
mind’s knowing, and cannot be resolved into any more fundamental categories – such as
schemes of contact, or species. Further, that Amo’s notion of a tight commerce and bond

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622 *Apatheia*, Ch. I, Mem. I, §1, Expo. 2. Here Amo contrasts God, spirits, and angels – who are said
to be bodiless and beyond matter (*extra materiam*), and thus cannot understand by representation and
ideation – with humans that necessarily are spirits with bodies. He concludes: “Therefore, it follows from
this that God and other spirits understand themselves, their operations, and other things without any ideality
or ideas and repeated sensations, whereas our mind both understands and operates through ideas on account
of its very tight bond and commerce with the body.”


between the mind and the body makes possible the independence of, yet correlation between the phenomena of the physiological and psychological, and this that is only made intelligible within a framework of pre-established harmony.

Amo’s mechanistic conception of the physical processes of sensation and passions in the organic body have been amply discussed above. In need of further treatment is the second phenomenon – the processes of the mind’s perception. Consistent throughout Amo’s writing is the notion that the mind experiences physical reality simply as known, or by becoming aware of. His preferred terminology is to become conscious of. Some instances are in order:

The intellect is the act of the mind by which it makes itself conscious of things. Whatever the mind makes itself conscious of is either a thing (res) or a sensation (sensio). The momentary intellective act of the mind is: when the human mind does not inquire into the origin, existence, essence of the thing known (consciae), or of what pertains to it [i.e. thing known]; but simply applies ideas to the end goal of which it is itself conscious (sibi conscium). To understand and to become conscious of something are synonymous.

Amo’s work seems to establish that through the intellective act of representation, the mind experiences physical reality by an immediate coming-to-consciousness-of, or awareness. When the sense organs are physically ‘moved’ in sensory perception, an equivalent and concurrent cognitive event is naturally triggered in the mind, following which event the mind returns to its original state.

An end goal is that which, when attained and present, the mind ceasing from its pristine operation, acquiesces, and is either a sensation, or an idea, or a thing.

For this Amo uses the language of sensations being “set up as present.” Thus, the means of the mind’s act of representative intellection is non-causal, but irreducibly cognitive. But what kind of soul-body interaction is requisite for this sort of non-causal relationship? The schemes of physical influx and occasionalism discussed above may be ruled out. Rather, Amo’s proposal of tight, non-causal soul-body commerce, suggests that pre-established harmony (PH) may be the only intelligible paradigm for Amo’s philosophy of mind. Amo does not mention PH (and from the unfavourable historical

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626 *Disputatio*, Ch. I, Mem. II, §3.

627 (*Apatheia*, Ch. I, Mem. I, §1, Not. 1). Other examples include: “Every spirit always understands through itself, i.e. it is conscious to itself” (Ibid. Expo. 2). “The human mind […] understands and operates from intention on account of a determinate end of which it is conscious” (*Apatheia*, Ch. I, Mem. I, §3).
circumstances around Leibnizian-Wolffian philosophy during his time, the possible reasons are understandable). However, the notion of reminiscence, along with Amo’s framing of representation all continue the trajectory of his thought concerning the independence of the operations of mind and body from each other. The mind-body bond therefore indicates that whatever occurs in the physical processes of the senses invariably finds some sort of psychological equivalence in the mind. This may give new perspective on “there is nothing in the intellect which was not first in the senses” – in that sensations invariably find their cognitive representations. This is what Amo may have in mind in the following text: “We observe that the sensations that impress upon sense organs and the memory correspond to their representations.”

iii. Reflexive acts

Finally, Amo presents the intellective act as having a reflective stage. Here the mind simply inquires into the contents of its own knowledge. This it does by a investigating the origin, existence, and essence of what is known to it. This process yields understanding since it apprehends the causes of existence, for the processes made possible by representation.

B. The Will

The second operation of the mind considered concerns deliberative abilities, the act of willing and denying. Like much philosophy of mind before Amo, the act of the mind by which it cogitates and perceives is distinguished from the act by which it decides and desires to pursue or refrain from pursuing ends. To keep in consistency with his physiology, Amo is quick to point out that the mind’s acts of volition in pursuing ends must not be confused with the natural instinct. The latter is something essential to Amo’s concept of the organic body, in which mind-less animals naturally respond appropriately

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628 *Tractatus*, ‘Partie Speciale Sect. I’, Ch. II, Mem. I, §3: 96. (Emphasis added) Further, Amo gives criteria for the mind’s representation of sensation: “In order for there to be an adequate perception of a sensation, and in order for the resulting idea [from the perceptual process] to be complete, (1) the thing [perceived] must be immediately and really present; […] (4) it must be a sensible body; (5) there must be an appropriate disposition in the senses to it; […] (8) all the senses [objects] must concur with the perception [of the object] “(Ibid. Mem. III, §9: 101).
to stimuli in their environment, all towards self-preservation. Drawing on Melanchthon, Amo defines the natural instinct as “the propensity toward the presence and use of that which is pleasing and good, and the absence of that which is displeasing and bad.” Like Descartes’ animal machine, a mind needs not be postulated to account for animals’ natural behavior of fleeing danger. The idea of the natural instinct thus indicates that organic bodies naturally have inclinations towards what is perceived favorable or unfavorable, which inclinations they invariably follow, in the absence of an intervening deliberative faculty.

On the other hand, the mind’s act of the will, as a higher faculty, Amo defines as:

The act of the mind through ideas, on account of an end that is pursued, but by reason of the convenience and discrepancy of the natural instinct [being] immediately concurrent with the premeditated Decree of the mind.

By some kind of premeditated willing the mind sets up an agenda to be pursued, which Amo identifies as a “premeditated decree of the mind” – its operation by which it sets up for itself an agenda to be pursued or ignored, in accordance with an end known to it. But such an agenda, as Amo presents it, requires the concurrence of the natural instinct for its successful execution. The setup already presents potential tension between what the natural instinct perceives to be naturally convenient to itself, and what is discrepant with its inclinations. Further suggested is the possibility that a smooth concurrence would not always obtain between the mind’s decrees and the natural instinct. Here again, Amo’s dualist framework surfaces: psychological intentions and decrees operating by ideas, on one hand, and physiological inclinations operating blindly by natural propensities on the other.

Another ingredient of the definition is seen. While the intellecutive act is concerned with the truthfulness and falsity of ideas, the act of the mind in willing or denying concerns good and bad, perfect and imperfect ideas, in which case the mind must be able to discriminate between what ideas represent good ends, and which ones represent bad ends. Elsewhere Amo gives some indication of the kind of ideas that are under discussion

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631 Ibid.
A special category of ideas, moral ideas, forms the basis for volitional acts by the decree of the mind. Moral ideas denominate into good and bad ideas. But what is the principle for their classification? Ideas of good are roughly identified, metaphysically speaking, with whatever tends towards the perfection of existence and essence; physically, it is whatever enhances the existence of natural beings; and morally, it is whatever conforms to the betterment, the perfection and full realization of intrinsic natures. Ideas of the bad are taken to be the antitheses of these. Moral ideas are thus presented as objective moral categories, which when known by the mind, its act of willing sets up as agenda what is to be (or not) pursued. The will inevitably pursues what is good, if known.

Where is all this headed? What is the role of practical moral philosophy in psychology? First, it may be appreciated that there is an intuitive link between praxis and desires or appetites – this link, Amo makes implicitly in the text. But the ‘objects’ of the mind’s volitional faculties are ideas, which for Amo are objectively either good or bad. It thus follows that whatever the intellect apprehends clearly, becomes the subject of the mind’s appetites, and this in turn guides praxis. Even further, judging from the strong influence of Wolff on Amo – particularly discernible on this point – there is a strong Wolffian tradition on the primacy of psychology for moral philosophy. Wolff advocated that practical philosophy and ethics must methodologically proceed from the principles of psychology, where the appetites and abilities of the soul are known. In fact, Wolff announces his ambition to “deduce a priori a system of moral philosophy from the principles of psychology.” Any one familiar with Wolff’s practical philosophy immediately discerns the resonances between the African and the German master, particularly on the conceptualization of “the good.” In Wolff’s famous Vernünftige

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632 Tractatus, Ch. III, Mem. II: 104-5.

633 For Wolff, while practical philosophy delineates the good that is to be pursued, and the evil to be avoided, psychology shows the things that are possible to the human soul and the dependence of other mental faculties on the appetites. (Wolff, Philosophia Rationalis Sive Logica, §92, “Philosophia practica demonstrat, qua ratione dirigenda sit facultas appetitiva in eligendo bono et fugiendo malo. Sed psychologia explicans ea, quae per animas humanas possibilia sunt eorumque rationem reddens, facultatem appetitivam ejusque a ceteris facultatibus mentis dependantiam declarat.) To this end, he argues, the full demonstration of practical philosophy is to be found in the more fundamental disciplines of ontology, psychology, and natural theology.

634 Wolff, Psychologia Empirica, §8.
Gedanken von der Menschen Thun und Lassen, 1720, moral good and bad are delineated thus: “what makes our inner and outer conditions perfect is good; by contrast, what makes them less perfect is bad.”635 As such, the will rationally and freely chooses as its ends the good it knows.636 This for Wolff formed the basis for the will’s action, and could be stated as a natural law: “Do what makes you and your condition more perfect, and omit what makes you and your condition less perfect’ is a law of nature.”

In the foregoing, then, a Wolffian-influenced psychology holds the foundational principles for human moral action. Even though Amo ascribes deliberation and decision to a volitional act (and not to an intellectual act), his advanced position is still strongly intellectualist. The presented volitional act operates not by impulses of desire or voluntarism, but by ideation. Further suggested is the near inevitability of the mind’s inclination towards the good insofar as good ideas are known by it. For Amo then, the will is a seat of rational judgment, whose only impediment might be the contrary disposition of the natural instinct. But Amo does not stop at the rationalist impulse of Wolff’s moral philosophy. The will, for Amo, does not automatically guide the human in the way of perceived good, but rather, is hindered by the natural instinct of the body. This natural instinct, Amo describes as having the propensity to impede the will’s spontaneous freedom of action in view of good.637 Amo transposes the discussion to practical philosophy of moral action. It may be asked: if the mind’s volitional acts concern moral ideas, then how does it determine the natural instinct of the body towards concurrence with the decree of the mind in matters of moral behaviour? The questions of the practical implications of the various philosophies of mind were of central concern to Amo’s context. A good philosophy of mind had to provide a clear means for how commendable behaviour could be cultivated, and culpability for bad behaviour reckoned to the offender.

635 English translation from J. B. Schneewind, Moral Philosophy from Montaigne to Kant (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 335.

636 Ibid. “The knowledge of good is a motive (Bewegungsgrund) of the will. Whoever distinctly conceives those free acts of man that are good in and of themselves will recognize that they are good. And therefore the good we perceive in them is a motive for us to will them. Now, because it is not possible for something to be a motive both to will and not to will, it cannot happen that one does not will an inherently good act if one distinctly conceives it.”

637 Disputatio, Ch. II, Mem. II, §4, “Ratione mentis libertas est spontaneitas vel illa facultas, qua mens statuit aliquid agendum vel ommittendum, non aliunde impedita.”
The focus of Amo’s very terse practical application concerns how moral behaviour can be fostered, given a natural instinct that is often negatively inclined to the will’s apprehension of good.

The will’s decree of the mind, Amo expounds drawing on Melanchthon, operates either despotically or politically. The former obtains when the will compels the body’s desires to its own ends; the latter, when there is harmonious concurrence between both. The dilemma of personal moral behaviour issues from the evil desires of the natural instincts, and the struggle of the will to rule the former’s passions. A tone of frustration is picked up in Amo at the rather often failure of the will to despotically govern the natural instinct to good behaviour.

These things are all good and well if the mind operated purely by commanding, but often it operates by indulging the natural instinct, and thence results unjust and evil actions; but just and good actions result when the mind rules the natural instinct in the exercise of a pre-cognized truth. 

With his knowledge of ancient classical literature, ready examples from Greek mythology are forthcoming. The story of Hippolytus, son of Theseus, and his abstaining from the sexual advances of his stepmother Phaedra, captures the ideal of the will’s ability to be resolute through reason and conviction, and by an honest will, in suppressing the desires of the natural instinct. As a counter example, Amo uses the story of Cain (Genesis. 4) as a portrayal of how the appetites of the natural instinct can dominate the will, if not ruled over. Both Hippolytus and Cain come to the same end – death, following their choices. Thus, the virtues of moral self-control and discipline, through the exercise of the will, for Amo, is a good thing in itself, regardless of any given outcome.

This presentation of moral action in terms of warring desires between a rational will and an irrational passion-based natural instinct strongly echoes his Stoic influences.

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638 Disputatio, Ch. I, Mem. II, Sect. II.

639 Amo here invokes Euripides’ Greek myth of Hippolytus and Phaedra. As the myth goes: Hippolytus was the son of Theseus, founder-king of Athens. Phaedra was the wife of Theseus, and stepmother to Hippolytus. One version of the myth narrates that the young Hippolytus committed himself to celibate devotion to the deity Artemis. During this time his stepmother, Phaedra fell in love with him, and wanted to consummate her love sexually. Against passions, Hippolytus remained steadfast in his vows of chastity, and eventually paid the ultimate price of death. Phaedra, frustrated at her failures, lied to Theseus that she had been raped by Hippolytus. In his anger, Theseus killed his son. (William Smith, “Phaedra,” Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography and Mythology (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1867).
resolute acceptance of the hardships of life, while striving to uphold a life of virtue and honesty by an exercise of reason and a suppression of animal desires, was a Stoic hallmark.\textsuperscript{640}

C. The Effective Act

Lastly, the effective act of the mind sums up the acts discussed so far. The function of this act emphasizes that all mental operations are executed by the mind in commerce with the body.

The effective act of the mind is when a mind, by the mediation of the body [with which it is in] commerce and by the application of means, pursues an intended goal.\textsuperscript{641}

The mind by this act follows means of execution of the logically preceding acts.

Conclusion

Amo’s task here has been to suggest, that in the place of the communication of sensory bodily passions to the mind by physical influx, other accounts offer better explanation of the mind’s commerce with the body, in such a way as to maintain the ontological and operational autonomy of both. This account he finds in the Leibnizian-Wolffian schemes of representation. The mind can ‘know’ extra-mental reality by its intellective act on intentions. These intentions, from our interpretation of Amo, we have described as a sort of conceptual reality of the thing to be done, logically prior to the efficient cause that brings it about. Further, for Amo’s appropriation of representation, we have seen that mental acts are irreducibly cognitive in nature, and cannot be explicated in terms of anything more fundamental. As such, by virtue of the tight commerce between the mind and body, physical disturbances of the sense organs find their automatic cognitive correspondence in the mind. This process, though treated by Amo with unsatisfactory brevity, it has been suggested can only be understood against the background of Leibniz’s pre-established harmony.

\textsuperscript{640} Schneewind, Moral Philosophy from Montaigne to Kant, 12.

\textsuperscript{641} Disputatio, Ch. I, Mem. II, Sect. III.
More than anything, Amo reveals himself in his philosophy of mind to be strongly Leibnizian on the broad themes – such as representation, pre-established harmony, and the notion of activity as the essence of the mind’s substance (and substance, in general). As to methodology in philosophical psychology and the centrality of ontology to the discipline, Amo is strongly Wolffian. But in addition to these, Amo very tersely indicates the influence of his own early training by transposing the discussion of the mind’s volitional act to a framework of Stoic moral philosophy. Other cases can be made for other strands of thought on the themes discussed in the Disputatio. Particularly important in this regard is how Amo’s doctrine of mental acts as psychological events is redolent of Antoine Arnauld’s position.

On the whole the Disputatio can be commended for its attempt to tackle a notoriously stubborn philosophical issue. However, its treatment – even given supplementation from Amo’s thought elsewhere – is rather cursory, and at times quite unsatisfactory. Frustration ensues from Amo’s reticence to more freely draw on, and spell out his philosophical sources. The stifling aura of the anti-Wolffian intellectual atmosphere, though gradually easing out by 1734, is still palpable. Consequently, Amo’s quoted bibliography for the Disputatio – Aristotle, Epictetus, Aquinas, Melanchthon, Descartes and LeClerc (in opposition) – may be seen to betray the full scope of the actual content of the work. The sources he explicitly engaged with would easily conform to the non-mechanist physiology, and orthodox psychology still dominant at Wittenberg. However, the philosophical categories actually discussed owe more centrally to the censured philosophies of Leibniz and Wolff. If anything, the author of the Disputatio and the supporting works cannot be reproached for lack of philosophical genius. Amo shows himself to be an able philosopher of his time.
CONCLUSION

Summaries and final remarks

This study has conducted an intellectual historical investigation into the eighteenth-century African philosopher in Germany, Anton Wilhelm Amo, by enquiry into his philosophical psychology in particular, taken primarily from his *Disputatio*, and secondarily from his other works. The overarching motivation has been to bring to attention and to amplify the philosophical voice of a generally unknown participant within the conversations of early eighteenth-century Germany; to rescue Amo studies in particular from cursory, adulatory and instrumentalist biographical studies that stop at fascination with his narrative; and to offer a long overdue detailed systematic treatment of an aspect of the African philosopher’s thought. At the close of the study it is appropriate to draw concluding comments on the task embarked on. The order of this conclusion follows the three main chapter breakdown of the study.

Taking off from dissatisfaction with the general state of scholarship on the life Amo and the failure of biographers to adequately position him as a philosopher of his time and context, Chapter One attempted to present a more detailed biography of the African philosopher. This biographical task was explored by tracing the intellectual influences on the thinker’s formative years, painting the academic philosophical contexts of his university career in Germany, and against this contextual backdrop, enhancing his portrait as a philosopher of the eighteenth century. Resulting from this task was the identification of important strands of philosophical thought in Amo: (i) a streak of patriotism for Africa and an impulse at self-identification with his homeland – what we dubbed his ‘African consciousness.’ With the exception of Amo biographer, Mugnol, this African patriotism as an intellectual influence in Amo has received little attention, and has been particularly downplayed by some biographers such as Mabe. (ii) An early intellectual influence seen in Amo’s extensive knowledge of ancient classical philosophical sources, and his imbibing of a Stoic outlook on practical moral philosophy. (iii) The world of modern philosophical thought mediated to Amo through the various intellectual reform programs of Halle’s innovative professors – Thomasius, Wolff,
Francke, and Stahl. This modern strand of Amo’s thought was seen to position him, both by conviction and professional affiliation, squarely within the Leibniz-Wolffian camps of the German academia, and was a determining factor of his career mobility within the system. These philosophical strands are woven together in Amo by his general eclectic approach, such that it is difficult to characterize the philosopher as an epigone of any particular system. Rather, his thought is a patchwork of critically selected philosophies spanning ancient and modern sources. This new biographical portrait attempts to accomplish two major aims in Amo scholarship: it provides a richer intellectual historical context for appreciating Amo as a philosopher, especially by painting the philosophical world of his academic milieu; it nuances the general one-dimensional portrait of Amo as a mechanist *Leibnitio-Wolffiani* by enriching that dimension itself, and exploring other sources of philosophical influence that reveal of rich mosaic of thought. That richer intellectual biography set the stage for a more focused contextual study of the man’s philosophical psychology.

Chapter Two delved into the complex philosophical world of Amo’s works, by plotting important points of philosophical psychology along four identified axes – physiology, theories of cognition and perception, soul-body causation, and the moral, theological resonances of the foregoing. These axes were portrayed as anchored in the more general intellectual-cultural movement of the early European Enlightenment, conceived as a multi-perspectival historical influence beginning in the second half of the seventeenth century. The thrust of these trajectories for Amo is that his philosophical psychology in the *Disputatio* and other works arises out of positions taken on the developments represented by these axes of thought. On these grounds, in the first axis, his extensive engagement with medical theorists of the later seventeenth century, in particular, reveal his alignment with the mechanistic revolution of the period and its application to accounts of biological processes. On the second axis, the Leibniz-Wolffian orientation of his philosophy indicated in the first chapter is justified by the discernment of Amo’s adoption of a generally Leibnizian philosophy in his treatment of mental cognition and perception. This orientation sees Amo’s preference for a Leibnizian theory of precognition, as opposed to Scholastic doctrine of species transfer. Amo’s further philosophical commitments to a Leibniz-inspired metaphysics of substance influence the
direction of his theory of cognition and perception. On the third axis, prior philosophical commitments in physiology and mind colour Amo’s account of the nature of interaction between the mind and the body. This interaction Amo conceives within a framework of pre-established harmony, and this in explicit rejection of the mechanistic alternatives represented by Descartes and later Cartesians – viz., physical influx and occasionalism, respectively. On the fourth axis, the ongoing discussion of philosophical psychology is heard on a frequency of morality and theology. Important aspects of that theological frequency are informed by the German eighteenth-century context, and represented chiefly by Pietist theologians Lange et al, for whom doctrines of the soul and its interaction with the body are not matters of indifference for Christian theological views on sin, the Fall, and practical holy living. The trajectories and episodes represented by these axes serve the purposes of the study by showing Amo, more than ever before, to be a participant within a vibrant economy of philosophical discourse. This philosophical discourse, for Amo, is not only the immediate eighteenth-century German context, but reaches beyond it to an international European-wide conversation. Even further, as mentioned, it pulls in conversation partners from ancient philosophy, Medieval Scholastic traditions, as well as moderns.

Having sketched the broad conversations, Chapter Three sought to hear Amo’s distinct voice in the discussion by a systematic-exegetical exploration of his *Disputatio*, and his philosophical psychology in general. The details of that exploration reveal in Amo a strong Wolffian influence in psychological method. That method adopts the tools of ontology and logic, and investigates the essential attributes of the mind and body by an establishment of their *quid sit*, following the Scholastic philosophy of essential predication. On these grounds, Amo reacts to Descartes’ thesis that sensation is a phenomenon of the mind. Against the reputed father of modern philosophy, Amo defended the position that sensation and sense faculties belong to the aspect of physiology, the latter understood as a self-sufficient mechanical, organic automaton. In this vein, Amo might be seen as arguing against Descartes for a purist dualism, with the clear demarcation between things and processes that are material, and from those that are immaterial. From these bases he presents a philosophy of the mind’s operations in intellective cognition, willing, and action. In these accounts, although not explicit, it was
argued that the Leibnizian notions of the individual substance as a complete concept and its essential nature as force, along with the doctrine of pre-established harmony, are the philosophical driving engines of Amo’s treatment of the mind’s operations. Thus, instead of affirming a direct transaction between the material organic body and the immaterial mind, Amo’s position presents a theory of cognition by a Leibnizian-inspired account of internal precognitive mental self-representation, without the direct causal transaction with the body.

In addition to the exploration of Amo as an eighteenth-century philosopher from Africa functioning within the German academic setup, one of the questions running in the background of the study has been whether his African cultural heritage contributes anything distinctive to his philosophical psychology in particular. At this final stage of the study, an attempted answer can be given to that question. The available historical evidence suggests that even given Amo’s undisputed African consciousness, it is not clear how culturally savvy he was of African traditions and thought. The young boy was fully educated and shaped by European cultural institutions into his forties, such that the legacy of an African way of thinking – as far as available historical data allow – may be called into doubt. From an exegetical standpoint, coupled with the benefit of the historical biographical background, it is hard to discern any aspect of Amo’s philosophical psychology that is distinctly attributable to the thought of his native black Africa. Any case to be argued for the practical moral aspect of his work is immediately countered by the rebuttal that the position may owe instead to his Stoic Ciceronian influence than anything else, nor are practical moral considerations peculiar African thought. Added to this is the nebulousness that attends to the very idea of “African.” In the case of Amo, it is black (sub-Saharan) Africa that is in view, and here there seems no distinctive contribution. However, if an “African philosophy” per se cannot be reckoned in Amo, yet the study can conclude the legitimacy of the notion “philosophy by/from an African.” Amo’s engagement in the bigger enterprise of philosophy, and this with the self-consciousness of pursuing this task _qua_ black African, satisfies the criteria for identifying ‘African thought,’ or precisely, an African voice within a global philosophical discourse. In this sense one may speak of an ‘African’ contribution to the discussion on philosophical psychology as early as the first half of the eighteenth-century. As such this
study may make some contribution to the growing realization among intellectual historians and historiographers of philosophy that the movements during the Enlightenment, philosophical space of the period had a base of contributing intellectuals that was much more diversified along lines of culture, geography and gender, than previously thought. And Amo represents an instance of this new orientation, and of an early convergence between sub-Saharan African and European thinkers.

**Limitations and Prospects**

This study, following its interest in philosophical psychology, has restricted itself to Amo’s *Disputatio* and selected parts of his *Apatheia* and *Tractatus*. However, this topic does not exhaust Amo’s philosophical reflection. Other aspects of his thought still present much opportunity for enquiry. His largest work, the *Tractatus* is yet to receive extensive and contextual intellectual-historical examination. Particularly, for future studies of Amo within his academic context, the content of the *Tractatus*, as a collection of his lecture notes at Halle and Wittenberg, present much potential for investigating the African philosopher’s thought, and for providing further insights into the academic setup, philosophical curricula, and the reception of a larger pool of philosophers in Amo’s thought.

If this study has been successful in its aims, it is hoped that a richer, contextually informed intellectual history of Amo as a philosopher from Africa has been presented, and that through this a better appreciation of his philosophical engagement within the mainline of European eighteenth-century philosophies of mind has been fostered.
Q. D. B. V.
DISPUTATIO PHILOSOPHICA
CONTINENS

IDEAM DISTINCTAM
EORUM QUAE COMPETUNT
VEL MENTI VEL CORPORI
NOSTRO VIVO ET ORGANICO

QUAM
CONSENTIENTE AMPLISSIMORUM PHILOSOPHOR ORDINE

PRAESIDE
M. ANTONIO GUILLIELMO AMO
GUINEA-AFRO

IN AUDITORIO PHILOSOPHICO
DIE XXIX. MAII cIC IC CCXXXIV

DEFENDIT
IOANNES THEODOSIUS
ROCHLIZ-MISNIC.
PHILOS. ET I. V. CVLTOR

WITEMBERGÆ, LITERIS VIDÆ KOBERSTEINIANAE
A PHILOSOPHICAL DISPUTATION
CONTAINING

A DISTINCT IDEA
OF THOSE THINGS THAT BELONG
EITHER TO THE MIND OR TO OUR LIVING AND ORGANIC
BODY
WHICH IS
THE CONSENT OF THE MOST DISTINGUISHED ORDER OF PHILOSOPHERS

PRESIDED BY

M. ANTONIO GUILIELMO AMO
AFRICAN of GUINEA

IN THE AUDITORIUM OF PHILOSOPHY
ON THE 29TH MAY 1734

DEFENDED BY

JOHANNES THEODOSIUS MEINER
ROCHLITZ-MEISSEN
BOTH PHILOSOPHER AND LAW ADMIRER

Wittenberg, Kobersteinianae

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642 Q.D.B.V. = Quod Deus Bene Vertat
CAP. I.

Continens Praemittenda.

Præmonitum ad rubrum hujus disputationis. Per ideam distinctam eorum, quæ competunt vel menti, vel corpori nostro vivo et organico intelligo; cognitionem eorum, quæ in actionibus humanis, per se, & semper, vel soli menti, vel soli corpori nostro vivo & organico, competunt.


Membrum I

Continens generalia.

Præmonitum ad rubrum hujus membri. Per generalia hic intelligo; ea quæ in prælimine quasi, methodi causa explicari debent; eum in finem ut rectius agenda ex ordine procedant.

§. I.

Ante omnia quæstiones hæ occurrunt (1) quid corpus nostrum. (2) quid mens humana (3) quid humanæ mentis operatio in genere (4) hæc quotuplex in genere, nempe (a) quid actus intellectus (b) quid voluntas (c) quid actus efficiendi seu effectivus?

CHAPTER 1.
CONTAINING PRELIMINARIES.

Reminder regarding the title of this disputation. By ‘distinct idea of those things that pertain either to the mind, or to our living and organic body,’ I understand the cognition of those things which, vis-à-vis human actions proper and always (per se & semper), pertain either to the mind only, or to our living and organic body alone.

Note. Whatever is placed in the faculty of thinking alone concerns the mind; whatever is of the faculty of sensing alone, and is immediately in the senses belong to the body. See Descartes or (Cartesius) in Epist. Part I. Ep. 99. in examin. Program. in artic. 12 in the same place in the explanation of the program is this: “The human mind is that where cogitative actions have been performed since the First man; it consists only in the faculty of thinking, and in an internal principle.”643 Furthermore, the faculty of sensing only applies to the body, as extensively deduced in our inaugural dissertation De Humane Mentis Apatheia, chapter II.

PART I.
Containing general points.

A reminder concerning the title of this part. By ‘general points’ I understand those things that, like preliminaries, issues of method should be explained, so that matters are treated in the right order in which they should proceed.

§. I.

Above all, these questions arise: (1) What is our body? (2) What is the human mind? (3) What is the operation of the human mind in general? (4) How many operations in general are there? Namely, (a) what is the act of the intellect (actus intellectus)? (b) What is the will (voluntas)? (c) What is the act of effecting (actus efficiendi) or the effective act (effectivus)?

Note. What the human mind is, and what is our living and organic body is, we have stated in our dissertation De humanae mentis apatheia. (‘What is mind?’ dl. C. I. membr. I. §. 3. ‘What is body?’ ibid. in Note 3). Therefore, the next follows presently:

§ 2.

I. Quid mentis operatio in genere.

Per mentis operationem in genere intelligo; mentis actum cum conscientia (BEWUST-WERDUNG) & intentione, per ideas & sensiones cogitandi, & cogitata verifitandi.

NOTA. Quid intentio vid. Dicta diff. de human. Mentis 'απαθεια C.l.m.I ff.1. Nota II.

EXPOSITIO I: Per verificationem intelligo; adhibitis mediis consequi finem quem intendimus.

EXPOSITIO II: Cogitatio est; quivis mentis qctus per ideas & sensiones.

§ 3.

II. Quotuplex mentis operatio in genere.

Actus mentis respectu objecti circa quod, & finis quem intendit, triplex est. Nempe (I) actus mentis intelligendi seu intellectus (2) actus mentis volendi & nolendi (3) actus mentis efficiendi seu effectivus. Postremus effectus est priorum.

NOTA I. Triplex hic mentis actus, tam numerice quam specifice est unus; & suas differentias relativas, saltem accipit ab objecto & fine.

PROBATIO I. Quidquid cogitamus est vel sensio vel res: Sed utraque diversa est, ergo & mentis operatio, eo modo quo res & sensiones sua natura diversæ, in eadem continentur. i. e. ratione objecti & finis cogitantis.

NOTA II. Objectum circa quod, est vel medium vel instrumentum, aliudque semper per illud intenditur. Finis est, quo adepto & præsente, mens a pristina sua operatione cessans, adquiescit, est que vel sensio vel idea, vel res.

PROBATIO II. Non eodem modo mens versatur circa omnia. Mens enim aliter versatur circa intelligibilia, aliter circa appetibilia, aliter denique circa efficienda, & quidem hæc omnia ratione habita objecti & finis.
§. 2.

I. What is the operation of the mind in general?

By the ‘operation of the mind in general’ I understand: an act of the mind (mentis actum) carried out with consciousness (Bewust-Werdung) and with intention, by ideas and sensations of thinking (sensiones cogitandi), and the verifying of the things thought (cogitata verificandi).\(^{644}\)

**NOTE.** For what intention is, see as stated in dissertation De humane mentis apatheia C. I. M. I. §. 1. Note II.\(^{645}\)

**EXPOSITION I:** By ‘verification’ I understand, when the end that we intend follows from the means employed.

**EXPOSITION II:** Thinking (cogitatio) is any act of the mind by means of ideas and sensations.

§. 3.

II. How many operations of the mind in general [are there]?

The act of the mind with respect to the object concerning which, and for the purpose of which, it aims is three-fold. Namely, (1) the act of the mind in intellecting (actus intelligendi), or intellect (intellectus); (2) the act of the mind in willing (volendi) and nilling (nolendi); (3) the act of the mind in effecting (efficiendi) or the effective (effectivus). The latter is an effect of the prior ones.

**NOTE I.** This three-fold act of the mind is both numerically as well as specifically one, and its relative difference, at least, derives from the object and end goal (objecto & fine).

**PROOF I.** Whatever we cogitate (cogitamus)\(^ {646}\) is either a sensation (sensio) or a thing (res). But each of these is distinct; therefore the operation of the mind is also

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\(^{644}\) Underlined words are those that receive special definition by Amo.

\(^{645}\) Amo Wilhelm Amo, *Dissertatio inauguralis de humane mentis apatheia*, 4, “Per intentionem intelligimus; illam spiritus operationem, qua sibi aliquid notum facit, quo exercito finis consequantur” (By ‘intention’ we understand that operation of the spirit, by which it makes something known to itself, by which it reaches to its end).

\(^{646}\) The word “cogitate” here is preferable to “think,” although roughly similar in meaning. The Latin word family of ‘cogitatio’ carries the nuances of reflection, deliberation, apprehension, perception etc. Amo’s usage includes these shades of meaning as different stages of his philosophy of mind. “Think,” with an emphasis on deliberation and reflection, fails to capture these nuances.
distinguished in same way that the things and sensations contained in it\textsuperscript{647} are
distinguished by their nature, that is, by virtue of the object and end goal of the thinker.

\textit{NOTE II.} The object here concerned is either the medium or instrument
\textit{(instrumentum)}, and something other is always aimed at by it. An end goal is that which,
when attained and present, the mind ceasing from its pristine operation, acquiesces, and is
either a \textit{sensation}, or an \textit{idea}, or a \textit{thing}.

\textit{PROOF II.} The mind does not revolve around all things in the same way. For the
mind revolves differently around intelligible things \textit{(intelligibilia)}, differently around
objects of the appetite \textit{(appetibilia)}, and finally, differently regarding things to be
effected \textit{(efficienda)}; and indeed all these things in view of the object and the end goal.

\textsuperscript{647} Both the ‘sensation’ \textit{and} the ‘res’ are contained in the mind.
Membrum II.
Continens specialia de quovis actu mentis in specie.

SECTIO 1.

I. De intellectu seu actu mentis intelligendi.

PART II.

Containing special treatments of each act of the mind specifically

SECTION I.

I. Concerning the intellect, or the act of the mind in intellection

A notice concerning the title of this section: This act of the mind for intellection is commonly called ‘intellect,’ however, not without ambiguity. For the intellect is either mind itself (mens ipsa), or idea (idea), or an operation of the mind (mentis operatio). [(1)]

When it is said concerning the mind itself: The intellect intellects, ratiocinates etc. see Curs. Philos. Aristo-Thomistic. Tom. V. libr. I. 648 Aristotle, De Anima, C. III; the soul is not a body that moves and is moved (“anima non est movens & motum”) 649 D. Thomæ Lect. 6. 7. 8. Pag. m 234. N. 2. says: “If the intellect is a magnitude, how does it understand, etc?” 650 ibid. n. 4., hence: since the motion of the intellect is intellection/understanding etc, ‘intellect’ is to be replaced by ‘mind.’ “If the mind is a magnitude,” etc., “the motion of the mind is intellection/understanding” 651 etc., for other expressions of this kind sound as if we were to say, “the action of speaking, is spoken,” or “the locution is locuted,” etc. (2) By replacing ‘intellect’ with ‘idea,’ ‘intellect’ and ‘intellection’ become synonymous – namely, any distinct idea. (3) Replacing ‘intellect’ with the ‘operation of the mind:’ this operation of the mind which intellects something either confusedly or distinctly (“in German, Verstand”), we call this intellect the act of the mind in intellecting (or intellecitive act of the mind).

648 “Augustinus à Virgine Maria”, also known as Guillaume de Goazmoal, Philosophiae Aristo-Thomisticae Cursus, (Lyon: H. Boissat & G. Remeus, 1664).


650 Thomas Aquinas, Commentaria in tres libros Aristotelis de anima I, 6-8, in Cosmas Morelles (ed.), Opera Omnia vol. 3, (Antwerp, 1654), 6b ss, “Si intellectus sit magnitudo, quonam pacto intelliget?”

651 Ibid.
§. I.

Est nobis igitur intellectus in genere: actus ille mentis quo res sibi conscias facit.

NOTA. Quidquid mens sibi conscium facit, est vel res, vel sensio.


§. 2

Actus his mentis intellectivus est vel momentaneus vel reflexivus.

§. 3

Actus mentis intellectivus momentaneus est; in quo mens humana non inquirit in rei consciæ originem, existentiam, essentiam, & ea quæ eo pertinent; sed ideas simpliciter adplicat, ad finem sibi conscium. Qui iterum est vel ante post Reflexionem, qualis ante reflexionem, mox diximus, ut v. c. repræsentatio, attentio, enumeratio seu recensio rerum &c. & in hoc non continentur ideæ judiciae ratione adquisitas. Post reflexionem vero, quando mens ideas judiciae ratione adquisitas simpliciter adplicat, propter finem sibi conscientium. Ut in definiendi actu, ubi mens ideas judiciosas componit &c. Item, in divisione, ratiocinatione, in syllogismos, demonstrationibus &c.
§. I.

Hence, the intellect in general is for us is this act of the mind by which it makes itself conscious of things.

NOTE. Whatever the mind makes known to itself is either a thing (res) or a sensation (sensio).

Reason. Nothing is in the intellect that was not first in the senses. Philip. Melanchthon, Tr. de Anima. de Potentia sentiente Q. I. quid potentia sentiens [What is the ability of sensing?] etc.⁶⁵² i.e.: nothing is in the mind’s act of intellection that had not been previously perceived by the senses. But nothing is perceived that does not affect the senses; everything affecting the senses is a sensible thing, namely matter.

§. 2.

This intellectual act of the mind is either momentary (momentaneus) or reflexive (reflexivus).

§. 3.

The momentary intellective act of the mind is: when the human mind does not inquire into the origin, existence, essence of the thing known (consciae), or of what pertains to it [i.e. thing known]; but simply applies ideas to the end goal of which it is itself conscious (sibi conscium). Which again [the momentary intellection of the mind] could be either prior to or posterior to reflection; such an act prior to reflection, as we have just said, is for example, representation, attention, enumeration, or the recension of things etc., here ideas that are acquired by judicious reasoning are not included. But the [act of the intellect] posterior to reflection is when the mind simply applies ideas acquired by judicious reasoning (judiciosa ratione), towards an end of which it is conscious – for example, in the act of defining, where the mind composes judicious ideas etc The same obtains in division, ratiocination, syllogisms, demonstrations, etc.

⁶⁵² Philipp Melanchthon, Liber de anima, (Wittenberg, 1562), 91.
§. 4.

The act of the mind in intellection is reflexive; in which the mind – as far as it is able to, with rectitude and adequacy – really inquires into the origin, existence, essence of the thing known to it, and what pertains to it the latter, in order to understand the thing perfectly to the extent possible, and as it is in itself.

§. 5.

What, then, is it to be either adequate or less adequate? ‘Adequate’ is when the mind distinctly understands all things that are in the cognized thing; ‘inadequate’ is when not all thing [are understood], and less distinctly so. In both cases, these apply in respect of sensation, the thing cognized, to the intentions of the mind of the cognizer.

SECTION II.

II. On the Will

REMINDER. The will (voluntas), to the extent that it is the mind’s faculty of willing (volendi) and nilling (nolendi), should not be confused with the natural instinct (instinctu naturali), as will be made clear.

§. 1.

Will is: the act of the mind through ideas, on account of an end that is pursued, but by reason of the convenience and discrepancy of the natural instinct [being] immediately concurrent with the premeditated Decree of the mind.

EXPOSITION I. The natural instinct is: the propensity toward the presence and use of that which is pleasing and good, and the absence of that which is displeasing and bad, or, with Philipp Melanchthon. d. l. De Sensib. interiorib. Question: Quid potentia appetiva (What is the appetitive power)? It is the faculty for following after or fleeing from objects.653

NOTE. Naturally, in common with the Brutes we have senses, the faculty of sensing, and natural instinct; concerning natural instinct, see Epictetus in Enchiridion c. 38: for it is inherent in the nature of all animals [in their various classes] to flee and avoid those

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653 Melanchthon, Liber de anima, 103.
things which appear will harm, along with their causes, and, by contrast, to follow and admire those things that are useful along with their causes, etc.\textsuperscript{654}

facultatem sentiendi & sensiones nobis & Brutis esse communes, probatur, ex eo quod complura dentur animalia, quæ vita & sensionibus carere non possunt, eo modo quo sunt animalia. vid. R. P. AUGUSTINUS AVIRGINE MARIA IN ARISTOTELE RESERATO Tom. V. libr. I. Arist. DE ANIMA. pag. m. 245. VERBIS: vivere namque videntur & c.

EXPOSITIO II. Mentis Decretum est: operatio ejus, qua sibi aliquid statuit agendum vel ommittendum, propter sibi conscium finem.

NOTA. Ratione hujus mentis decreti, mens operatur vel δεσποτικως, vel πολιτικως. Sunt verba Philipp. Melanchth. qui ita habet d. l. de anima. de sensib. interiorib. Ita in homine duplex est gubernatio altera δεσποτικη qua mens & voluntas cogunt locomotivam & c. & paucis interiectis pergit: Secunda gubernatio in homine est ea, quæ nominatur πολιτικη, cum non tantum externa membra per locomotivam cohercentur, sed ipsum cor congruit cum recta ratione, honesta voluntate, motum persuasione, ut cum Filius Thesei Hippolytus abstinet a Noverca Phædra. hæc omnia bene se habent, ubi mens operatus imperando; Sed non raro etiam operatur indulgendo instinctui naturali, & inde actiones injustæ & malæ, ex illo vero actiones justæ & bonæ. i.e. Quando instinctui naturali imperat, in veritatis præcognitæ exercitio. Secundum illud Gen. IV. sub te sit appetitus, & tu domineris ejus. indulgentis instinctui naturali est dicere: video meliora proboque, sed deteriora sequor.

\textsuperscript{654} Epictetus, \textit{Enchiridion}, (Wolfenbüttel, 1692), 85.
That the faculty of sensing and sensation are common to us and Brutes is proven by the fact that there are many animals that, when deprived of life and sensation, are not able to exist in the animals normally do. See *R. P. AUGUSTINUS A VIRGINE MARIA IN ARISTOTELE RESERATO* Vol. V. Book. I. Arist. *DE ANIMA* pag. m. 245, with the words: “They appear to live,” etc.\(^{655}\)

**EXPLANATION II. A Decree of the Mind is:** its operation by which it sets up for itself an agenda to be pursued or ignored, in accordance with an end known to it.

**NOTE.** By reason of this decree of the mind, the mind operates either despotically (δεσποτικως) or politically (πολιτικως). These are the words of Philipp Melanchthon as found in *d. l. De Anima. de sensib. interiorib.* That in man the government [seat of control] is twofold: first, despotic, in which the mind and the will compel locomotion etc. and this proceeds with minimal interjection; the second government in man is that which is called political, where the external members are not so much coerced into locomotion, but rather the heart itself agrees with right reason, with honest will, by movement of the conviction, as with the son of Theseus, Hippolytus, abstaining from his stepmother Phaedra.\(^{656}\) These things are all good and well if the mind operated purely by commanding, but often it operates by indulging the natural instinct, and thence results unjust and evil actions; but just and good actions result when the mind rules the natural instinct in the exercise of a pre-cognized truth. Also, in *Gen. IV:* “your desire shall be under (subordinated), and he will dominate you.”\(^{657}\) Concerning those indulgent of the natural instinct, it is said: “I see and approve [judge] of the better, but pursue the worse.”\(^{658}\)

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\(^{655}\) De Goazmoal, *Philosophiae Aristo-Thomisticae Cursus*, 245.

\(^{656}\) Melanchthon, *Liber de Anima*, 110.

\(^{657}\) Genesis 4:7-8.

SECTIO III.

III. De Actu mentis effectivo.

Actus mentis effectivus est; quo mens aliquid, mediantibus corporis commercio & mediis adhibitis, finem consequi intendit. Varius est, (quem ad modum actus intelligendi & volendi) ratione objecti & finis.

NOTA. In actu intelligendi intelligimus vel substantiam vel proprietatem. Substantia altera est vel spiritus, altera materia. Proprietas altera est vel spiritualis vel materialis. In actu mentis volendi & nolendi respicitur vel ad simplicem sensationem, quae est vel grata vel ingrata vel ad conservationem & destructionem rerum & humani corporis, vel denique ad perfectionem & imperfectionem rerum & hominis. In actuefficiendi seu effectivo ad media, instrumenta eorumque applicationem. Ex actu intellectivo, res intellectuales; ex actu volendi & nolendi res morales, ex actu effectivo rerum politicæ & artificiales. Hucusque præmittenda.

CAP. II.

Continens eorum quæ dicta sunt applicationes.

Membrum I.

Status Controversiae

Thesis. Omnes res quæ effectus sunt exercitii intentionis humanæ mentis, eatenus menti tribuendæ sunt, quatenus suam naturam habent ex conscientia (Bewust-Werdung) & præmeditato mentis Decreto; sed quatenus effectus sunt sensationis, facultatis sentiendi, instinctusque naturalis, simpliciter in se considerati, corpori nostro vivo & organico competunt.

SECTION III.

III. About the effective act of the mind.

The effective act of the mind is when a mind, by the mediation of the body [with which it is in] commerce and by the application of means, pursues an intended goal. The act varies according to the object and end [it is aimed at] – just like the acts of intellection and of willing.

NOTE. In the act of intellection we understand either a substance or a property. A substance is either spirit or matter. A property is either spiritual, or material. In the act of the mind for willing and nilling reference is either to a simple sensation: which is either agreeable (grata) or disagreeable (ingrata), for the conservation and destruction of things and of the human body, or finally, for the perfection and imperfection of things and of man. In the act of effecting or effective act, of concern is the means, the instrument, and their application. From the intellective act, intellectual things (res intellectuales) obtain; from the act of willing and nilling, things of morality; and from the effective act, political and artificial things (res politicae et artificiales). Thus far are our premises.

CHAPTER II.

CONTAINING APPLICATIONS OF WHAT HAS BEEN SAID

MEMBER I.

State of the Controversy.

Thesis. All things that are the effect of the exercise of an intention of the human mind, as far as they are attributed to the mind, to the same extent they have their nature from consciousness (Bewust-Werdung) and from the premeditated decree of the mind; but in so far as they are the effect of sensation, the faculty of sensing and of the natural instinct simply considered in itself, they belong to our living and organic body.

NOTE. This is stated and defended against those who implicitly dissent [from this position]. See in our dissertation De humane mentis apatheia chap. II. p. 13, 14. But specifically against Jean LeClerc] in his Pneumatolog. S. I. C. III. §. 2. Pag. m. 14, where it has: “There are principally seven faculties of the mind which are worth considering separately, (1) intellect (intellectus), (2) will (voluntas), (3) faculty of sensing (sentiendi facultas), (4) freedom? (libertus), (5) fantasy (phantasia), (6) memory (memoria), (7) various habits (habitus) acquired from repeated actions.659

Membrum II.
Continens applicationes speciales.

§. I.


*NOTA.* *Denominationem animalitatis* voco, quando homo consideratur Ut animal, & quoad corpus vivum & organicum. Secundum illud: *homo est animal rationale.* ubi τὸ animal quoad corpus vivum & Organicum, τὸ rationale, quoad mentem intelligentem.

§. 2.

II. VOLUNTAS. Voluntas de mente prædicari potest, *quoad Conscientiam & præmeditatum mentis Decretum*, non quoad instinctum naturalem simpliciter talem, qualem diximus esse *cap. I. membr. II. Sect. II. §. I. Exposit. I.* Nam alias etiam daretur voluntas in Brütis, quem admodum instinctu hoc naturali gaudent.

*NOTA.* Auctor laudatus, in definitione sua, voluntatis, idem per idem declarat. Declarat enim voluntatem per *velle aut nolle* (2) per imperium voluntas vid. D. 1. §. 6. ubi ita: *voluntas est qua volumus aut nolumus aliquid contemplari mente, aut fieri a corpore, quatenus ab imperiis voluntatis pendet.*
MEMBER II.

Containing special applications.

§. I.

I. INTELLECT. What the intellect is, as was stated (in Ch. I, Mem. II, Sec. 1), truly pertains to the mind in so far as it is in consciousness and in the operation of the mind by means of ideas from a premeditated Decree. But following the same way that the mind operates by means of ideas, so the body [functions] by represented sensations, since body consists in sensation and the faculty of sensing – as in our dissertation On the Impassivity of the Human Mind, c. II m. unic. Thes. I. negativ. in exposit. cum. not. Likewise, whatever we have in common with Beasts is under the category of animality, and this pertains not to the mind but to the body; yet with Beasts, under the category of animality, we share sensation and the faculty of sensing. Therefore, the minor [proposition] is proven by the fact that many animals lacking a mind and reason are not thereby deprived of enjoying the faculty of sensing, see dl. cap. I. membr. II. Sect. II. exposit. I., in the Note, with the words , "the faculty of sensing," etc.660

NOTE. I say 'the category of animality' when man is being considered as an animal, and with respect to his living and organic body. Consequently, man is a rational animal, where the 'animal' component is the living and organic body, and the 'rational' aspect is with respect to the intelligent mind.

§ 2.

II. WILL. Will can be predicated of the mind with respect to consciousness and the premeditated Decree of the mind, and this absolutely not with respect to the natural instinct, as we said (in Ch. I, Mem. II, Sec. 2, § 1, Expo. 1). For otherwise Beasts would be given a will, just as they enjoy this natural instinct.

NOTE. The esteemed author, in his definition of 'will', explains one thing by means of the same thing. For he describes 'will' as [(1)] wanting and rejecting, and as (2) the ruling of the will, see d. l. § 6. where it is stated: The will is that by which we desire or reject something to be contemplated by the mind, or done by the body, in so far as it depends on the command of the will.661

660 Amo, Humane Mentis Apatheia, 8.
661 LeClerc, Pneumatologia I, 15.
III. FACULTAS SENTIENDI. Hanc totam de mente negamus, corporique damus *vid. diss. Nostr. de human. mentis απαθεία tot.*

IV. LIBERTAS. Hanc intelligimus vel de sola mente, vel de universo homine. Racione mentis libertas est spontaneitas vel illa facultas, qua mens statuit aliquid agendum vel ommittendum, non aliunde impedita. Hæc nunquam absolute talis est, quia mens non potest non mediante corporis commercio operari; eo modo quo operatur per sensiones. *vid. DN. des Cartes seu Cartesius dl. Epist. V. n. 2. verbis: cur infantis &c.*
Racione vero totius hominis libertas est: Absentia *impedimenti*, in operatione mentis per corpus.

*EXPOSITIO. Impedimentum est*: quæ vis res qua præsente, finis qui intenditur, consequi nequit.

V. PHANTASIA. Est phantasia: Actus mentis intelligendi momentaneus, ante sufficientem reflexionem, in quo mens, pro indole instinctus naturalis, & affectuum qui præsentes sunt, sibi alicquid ut existens representat, quod tamen revera absens est. Hæc non simpliciter menti, sed saltem quoad operationem mentis repreäsentativam, cometit, quoad vero sensationem, facultatem sentiendi & instinctum naturalem, corpori nostro vivo & organico.

*EXPOSITIO. Immanentia est*: Perduratio alicujus rei in alio.

VI. MERMORIA. Memoria est: continuata idearum Præsensia, in cerebri dispostione, ex mentis operatione repetitiva, plusquam semel facta, oriundarum, & servatarum ad futurum finem. Hæc quoad actum mentis repetitivum, cum conscientia & præmeditato decreto, menti, competit quoad vero cerebi dispositionem & *immanentiam* corpori.

*EXPOSITIO. Immanentia est*: Perduratio alicujus rei in alio.
III. THE FACULTY OF SENSING. This we deny entirely to the mind, and attribute it to the body. See our dissertation On the Impassivity of the Human Mind.

IV. LIBERTY. This we understand either concerning the mind alone, or concerning the whole man. Concerning the mind, liberty refers to spontaneity, or that faculty by which the mind aims at something that is to be done or to be avoided, if it is not otherwise impeded. This is never absolutely the case, because the mind cannot operate without the the mediate commerce of the body, in the same way that it operates by means of sensations. See Descartes or Cartesius, dl. Epist. part. II. Epist. V. u. 2., with the words, "why the child," etc. But with respect to the whole man, liberty is the absence of an impediment in the mind’s operation by means of the body.

EXPOSITION. An Impediment is: anything, which, being present, prevents the pursuit of an intended end.

V. FANTASY. A fantasy is: a momentary act of the mind of in intellecting, prior to sufficient reflection, in which the mind, by the disposition of the natural instinct, and of the affects that are present in them, represents to itself as existing that which in reality is absent. This pertains not to the mind in its entirety, but at least to the mind’s operation in representation; but with respect to sensation and the faculty of sensing, [it pertains] to our living and organic body.

VI. MEMORY. Memory is: the continued Presence of ideas in the disposition of the brain, arising from the repeated operation of the mind performed more than once, and serving towards a future end. This repetitive act of the mind with regards to consciousness and the premeditated decree pertains to the mind; but with respect to the disposition of the brain and immanence, [it pertains] to the body.

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662 Descartes, Epistolae, Part II, 16 [Letter No. 5].
EXPOSITION. Immanence is: the persistence of any given thing in something else.

§. 7.

VII. HABITUS. Habitus est: Promtitudo agendi, acquisita per actiones plusquam simplici vice repetitas. quo ad conscientiam & decretam mentis operationem menti, quoad vero dispositionem subjecti, habitum recipientis, corpori, competit.

COROLLARIUM.

Quidquid in homine immutabile est, illud menti,
quidquid vero cum tempore mesabile est, illud
corpori competit.

TANTUM.
§. 7.

VII. *Habit.* Habit is: the Promptitude of acting, acquired by simple actions [being] repeated more than once. With respect to consciousness and the decreed operation of the mind, it pertains to the mind; however, with respect to the disposition of the subject receiving the habit, it pertains to the body.

**COROLLARY**

Whatever is *immutable* in man pertains to the mind; but whatever is *mutable with time* pertains to the body.

THAT IS ALL.
Nobiliissimo
Suo
Joanni Theodosio
Meiner
S. P. D.

Præses

Continuatæ, quæ spectat humanam sapientiam, diligentiae, indefessis jugiter exercitationibus partam, & festinatis magni momenti incrementis, auctam, eruditionem, publica cum laude declarasti.


Ego Vero TIBI, VIR NOBILISSIME,
potius ex optima animi propensione,
quam verborum ambagibus
gratulor.
TO HIS MOST NOBLE

JOHANNES THEODOSIUS

MEINER

Many Greetings (S. P. D.)\textsuperscript{663}

From the President

Your continued wisdom in the humanities, your diligence, tireless exercise and ceaseless application to development and increasing learning is manifest and declared in public with great honours.

Proceed, therefore, successfully as you have formerly done, recommended by honest behaviour and prudent living, pursuing your learning with industry. In this way, you may be loved by the best of men. In this way your Father – much venerated for his age, and mastery of things, the merits of his office, his titles, and piety, who embellished your hometown of Meissen with an ornament of beauty – will have in You a Son not unworthy of such a father. In this way, your most noble people, its illustrious ancestry and achieved splendor, its radiance and virtues may be seen in You with force and more flourishing.

I truly congratulate you, MOST NOBLE SIR, rather with the most heartfelt disposition, than with long-winded, rambling words.

\textsuperscript{663} S.P.D. = salutem plurimam dicit
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